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AnalysisNumerical AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Generalized Newton Method for Subgradient Systems 1: Under Metric Regularity and Semismoothness*, the Prox-Based Newton Algorithm Converges Superlinearly for Prox-Regular FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in optimization reduce to a subgradient inclusion 0∈∂φ(x)0\in\partial\varphi(x)0∈∂φ(x): for a smooth φ\varphiφ this is the gradient equation ∇φ(x)=0\nabla\varphi(x)=0∇φ(x)=0, and for an extended-real-valued φ=f+g\varphi=f+gφ=f+g (a smooth loss plus an indicator or a nonsmooth regularizer) it is the first-order optimality condition of a composite problem. Newton's method is the classical way to solve such equations with a superlinear rate, but its textbook form needs φ∈C2\varphi\in C^2φ∈C2 and a nonsingular Hessian. Khanh, Mordukhovich and Phat (arXiv:2009.10551v2, 2022; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) design a Newton-type method in which the Hessian is replaced by Mordukhovich's second-order subdifferential ∂2φ\partial^2\varphi∂2φ, and prove local superlinear convergence under two assumptions that are weaker than the usual ones: metric regularity (instead of strong metric regularity or tilt stability) and the semismooth* property of Gfrerer and Outrata.

Timeline of the ingredients:

  • 1996: Poliquin and Rockafellar introduce prox-regular functions and show that, for small parameters, their Moreau envelopes are C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 near the reference point and their proximal mappings are single-valued and Lipschitz there (Trans. AMS 348).
  • 2002: Klatte and Kummer develop Newton methods for Lipschitzian equations through generalized derivatives (Nonsmooth Equations in Optimization, Kluwer).
  • 2021: Gfrerer and Outrata define semismooth* set-valued maps and a semismooth* Newton method (SIAM J. Optim. 31).
  • 2021: Mordukhovich and Sarabi give a generalized Newton method for tilt-stable minimizers of prox-regular functions (SIAM J. Optim. 31).
  • 2020/2022: Khanh, Mordukhovich and Phat replace tilt stability and strong metric regularity by metric regularity of ∂φ\partial\varphi∂φ.

Setting

Let φ:Rn→(−∞,∞]\varphi:\mathbb R^n\to(-\infty,\infty]φ:Rn→(−∞,∞] be proper. Its limiting subdifferential ∂φ(x)\partial\varphi(x)∂φ(x) collects the limits of Fréchet subgradients at points xk→xx_k\to xxk​→x with φ(xk)→φ(x)\varphi(x_k)\to\varphi(x)φ(xk​)→φ(x). For a set Ω\OmegaΩ, the regular normal cone N^Ω(z)\widehat N_\Omega(z)NΩ​(z) contains the vectors aaa with ⟨a,w−z⟩≤o(∥w−z∥)\langle a,w-z\rangle\le o(\|w-z\|)⟨a,w−z⟩≤o(∥w−z∥) for w∈Ωw\in\Omegaw∈Ω; the limiting normal cone NΩ(z)N_\Omega(z)NΩ​(z) contains the limits of regular normals at nearby points. For a set-valued GGG, the coderivative is D∗G(x,y)(w)={u:(u,−w)∈Ngph⁡G(x,y)}D^*G(x,y)(w)=\{u:(u,-w)\in N_{\operatorname{gph}G}(x,y)\}D∗G(x,y)(w)={u:(u,−w)∈NgphG​(x,y)}, and the second-order subdifferential is ∂2φ(x,v)=D∗∂φ(x,v)\partial^2\varphi(x,v)=D^*\partial\varphi(x,v)∂2φ(x,v)=D∗∂φ(x,v).

The function φ\varphiφ is prox-regular at xˉ\bar xxˉ for vˉ∈∂φ(xˉ)\bar v\in\partial\varphi(\bar x)vˉ∈∂φ(xˉ) with modulus r>0r>0r>0 if it is l.s.c. around xˉ\bar xxˉ and, for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, φ(x)≥φ(u)+⟨v,x−u⟩−r2∥x−u∥2\varphi(x)\ge\varphi(u)+\langle v,x-u\rangle-\tfrac r2\|x-u\|^2φ(x)≥φ(u)+⟨v,x−u⟩−2r​∥x−u∥2 whenever x,ux,ux,u lie within ε\varepsilonε of xˉ\bar xxˉ, ∣φ(u)−φ(xˉ)∣<ε|\varphi(u)-\varphi(\bar x)|<\varepsilon∣φ(u)−φ(xˉ)∣<ε and v∈∂φ(u)v\in\partial\varphi(u)v∈∂φ(u) lies within ε\varepsilonε of vˉ\bar vvˉ. It is continuously prox-regular if, in addition, φ(xk)→φ(xˉ)\varphi(x_k)\to\varphi(\bar x)φ(xk​)→φ(xˉ) along every (xk,vk)→(xˉ,vˉ)(x_k,v_k)\to(\bar x,\bar v)(xk​,vk​)→(xˉ,vˉ) with vk∈∂φ(xk)v_k\in\partial\varphi(x_k)vk​∈∂φ(xk​). It is prox-bounded if it is bounded below by a quadratic function.

For λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, the Moreau envelope and proximal mapping are

eλφ(x)=inf⁡y{φ(y)+12λ∥y−x∥2},Prox⁡λφ(x)=argmin⁡y{φ(y)+12λ∥y−x∥2}.e_\lambda\varphi(x)=\inf_y\Big\{\varphi(y)+\tfrac1{2\lambda}\|y-x\|^2\Big\},\qquad \operatorname{Prox}_\lambda\varphi(x)=\operatorname*{argmin}_y\Big\{\varphi(y)+\tfrac1{2\lambda}\|y-x\|^2\Big\}.eλ​φ(x)=yinf​{φ(y)+2λ1​∥y−x∥2},Proxλ​φ(x)=yargmin​{φ(y)+2λ1​∥y−x∥2}.

Algorithm 6.2 starts at x0∈Uλ=rge⁡(I+λ∂φ)x^0\in U_\lambda=\operatorname{rge}(I+\lambda\partial\varphi)x0∈Uλ​=rge(I+λ∂φ). While 0∉∂φ(xk)0\notin\partial\varphi(x^k)0∈/∂φ(xk) it sets vk=λ−1(xk−Prox⁡λφ(xk))v^k=\lambda^{-1}(x^k-\operatorname{Prox}_\lambda\varphi(x^k))vk=λ−1(xk−Proxλ​φ(xk)), picks any dkd^kdk with −vk∈∂2φ(xk−λvk,vk)(λvk+dk)-v^k\in\partial^2\varphi(x^k-\lambda v^k,v^k)(\lambda v^k+d^k)−vk∈∂2φ(xk−λvk,vk)(λvk+dk), and moves to xk+1=xk+dkx^{k+1}=x^k+d^kxk+1=xk+dk.

The standing assumptions at a solution xˉ\bar xxˉ are:

  • (H1) the inclusion −v∈∂2φ(x,v)(d)-v\in\partial^2\varphi(x,v)(d)−v∈∂2φ(x,v)(d) is solvable for every (x,v)∈gph⁡∂φ(x,v)\in\operatorname{gph}\partial\varphi(x,v)∈gph∂φ near (xˉ,0)(\bar x,0)(xˉ,0);
  • (H2) ∂φ\partial\varphi∂φ is metrically regular around (xˉ,0)(\bar x,0)(xˉ,0);
  • (H3) ∂φ\partial\varphi∂φ is semismooth* at (xˉ,0)(\bar x,0)(xˉ,0).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.6 (corrected parameter range)

If φ\varphiφ is proper, prox-bounded, continuously prox-regular at xˉ\bar xxˉ for 0∈∂φ(xˉ)0\in\partial\varphi(\bar x)0∈∂φ(xˉ) with constants r,εr,\varepsilonr,ε, and (H1)–(H3) hold, then

∃ λ0∈(0,r−1]  ∀λ∈(0,λ0)  ∃ U∈N(xˉ), U⊆Uλ: Algorithm 6.2 is well-defined from U and every run from U converges Q-superlinearly to xˉ.\exists\,\lambda_0\in(0,r^{-1}]\ \ \forall\lambda\in(0,\lambda_0)\ \ \exists\,U\in\mathcal N(\bar x),\ U\subseteq U_\lambda:\ \text{Algorithm 6.2 is well-defined from }U\text{ and every run from }U\text{ converges Q-superlinearly to }\bar x.∃λ0​∈(0,r−1]  ∀λ∈(0,λ0​)  ∃U∈N(xˉ), U⊆Uλ​: Algorithm 6.2 is well-defined from U and every run from U converges Q-superlinearly to xˉ.

Milestones

  • Lemma 5.4: for continuous FFF, metric regularity around xˉ\bar xxˉ holds iff ∥v∥≥c∥u∥\|v\|\ge c\|u\|∥v∥≥c∥u∥ for all v∈D∗F(x)(u)v\in D^*F(x)(u)v∈D∗F(x)(u), xxx near xˉ\bar xxˉ.
  • Lemma 5.6: D∗F(xˉ)(u1+u2)⊆D∗F(xˉ)(u1)+D∗F(xˉ)(u2)D^*F(\bar x)(u_1+u_2)\subseteq D^*F(\bar x)(u_1)+D^*F(\bar x)(u_2)D∗F(xˉ)(u1​+u2​)⊆D∗F(xˉ)(u1​)+D∗F(xˉ)(u2​) for locally Lipschitz FFF.
  • Lemma 5.5: for C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 φ\varphiφ, ∇φ\nabla\varphi∇φ is semismooth* at xˉ\bar xxˉ iff ∇φ(x)−∇φ(xˉ)−∂2φ(x)(x−xˉ)⊆o(∥x−xˉ∥)\nabla\varphi(x)-\nabla\varphi(\bar x)-\partial^2\varphi(x)(x-\bar x)\subseteq o(\|x-\bar x\|)∇φ(x)−∇φ(xˉ)−∂2φ(x)(x−xˉ)⊆o(∥x−xˉ∥).
  • Theorem 5.7: the C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 Newton method (Algorithm 5.3) converges locally Q-superlinearly under (H1)–(H3) for ∇φ\nabla\varphi∇φ.
  • Lemma 6.3 (i)–(iii), corrected: near xˉ+λvˉ\bar x+\lambda\bar vxˉ+λvˉ, and for λ\lambdaλ small, eλφe_\lambda\varphieλ​φ is C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1, Prox⁡λφ\operatorname{Prox}_\lambda\varphiProxλ​φ is single-valued, monotone and Lipschitz, and ∇eλφ(x)=λ−1(x−Prox⁡λφ(x))\nabla e_\lambda\varphi(x)=\lambda^{-1}(x-\operatorname{Prox}_\lambda\varphi(x))∇eλ​φ(x)=λ−1(x−Proxλ​φ(x)).
  • Lemma 6.4, corrected: x∗∈D∗∇eλφ(x,v)(v∗)  ⟺  x∗∈∂2φ(x−λv,v)(v∗−λx∗)x^*\in D^*\nabla e_\lambda\varphi(x,v)(v^*)\iff x^*\in\partial^2\varphi(x-\lambda v,v)(v^*-\lambda x^*)x∗∈D∗∇eλ​φ(x,v)(v∗)⟺x∗∈∂2φ(x−λv,v)(v∗−λx∗).
  • Remark 6.5, corrected: the steps of Algorithm 6.2 are the steps of Algorithm 5.3 for eλφe_\lambda\varphieλ​φ.

Significance

The result gives a Newton method for nonsmooth, nonconvex subgradient inclusions whose convergence does not require strong metric regularity. Example 5.2 of the paper exhibits a C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 function whose gradient is metrically regular and semismooth* but not strongly metrically regular, so the theorem covers solutions that earlier generalized Newton theories exclude. Through the Moreau envelope, the method reduces to a C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 gradient equation; the same reduction, with the forward–backward envelope, drives the paper's composite algorithm (the companion mission) and its applications to Lasso-type problems.

The paper's results are proved on paper; none of them, nor the underlying theory of coderivatives, second-order subdifferentials or semismooth* maps, is formalized in Mathlib. This mission produces a machine-checked development of that layer and of the convergence theorem. It also fixes a defect: as printed, Lemma 6.3 and Theorem 6.6 claim their conclusions for every λ∈(0,r−1)\lambda\in(0,r^{-1})λ∈(0,r−1), which is false (see Formalization scope); the formal statements are the corrected ones.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says "Algorithm 6.2 is Algorithm 5.3 for eλφe_\lambda\varphieλ​φ, so apply Theorem 5.7". Each step of that sentence carries the difficulty. Transferring (H1)–(H3) from ∂φ\partial\varphi∂φ to ∇eλφ\nabla e_\lambda\varphi∇eλ​φ requires the coderivative of the inverse (λI+∂φ−1)−1(\lambda I+\partial\varphi^{-1})^{-1}(λI+∂φ−1)−1, which needs a local graphical calculus for limiting normals that Mathlib does not have. The C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 property of the envelope and single-valuedness of the proximal map hold only for small λ\lambdaλ and near xˉ+λvˉ\bar x+\lambda\bar vxˉ+λvˉ: prox-regularity is local while Prox⁡λφ\operatorname{Prox}_\lambda\varphiProxλ​φ minimizes globally, so a far-away deep well can capture the proximal point. Theorem 5.7 itself rests on a uniform coderivative bound from metric regularity (Lemma 5.4, a pointwise-to-uniform form of the Mordukhovich coderivative criterion) and on the semismooth* estimate (Lemma 5.5), which combines directional normal cones with the symmetry of generalized Hessians.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); definitions are stated on real inner product spaces, and E×FE\times FE×F carries the sup norm (the cones are norm-independent).
  • ∂\partial∂ is the published analytic limiting subdifferential NonconvexSplitting.Shared.LimitingSubdiff. It agrees with the paper's geometric (2.9) for functions l.s.c. around the point, which covers every function ∂\partial∂ is applied to here.
  • φ\varphiφ takes values in EReal and is assumed proper; the envelope is EReal-valued, and finiteness is asserted wherever it is differentiated.
  • Prox⁡λφ(x)\operatorname{Prox}_\lambda\varphi(x)Proxλ​φ(x) is the argmin set. A run of an algorithm selects any proximal point and any direction solving the Newton inclusion. The stop of Step 1 is a constant tail. Well-definedness means every partial run from UUU can be continued.
  • Metric regularity uses dist⁡(⋅;∅)=+∞\operatorname{dist}(\cdot;\emptyset)=+\inftydist(⋅;∅)=+∞. Q-superlinear convergence is stated in ε\varepsilonε-form, avoiding 0/00/00/0. C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 is local to a neighbourhood.
  • Correction. Lemma 6.3, Lemma 6.4, Remark 6.5 and Theorem 6.6 are posed as "there is λ0∈(0,r−1]\lambda_0\in(0,r^{-1}]λ0​∈(0,r−1] such that for every λ∈(0,λ0)\lambda\in(0,\lambda_0)λ∈(0,λ0​)", on neighbourhoods instead of UλU_\lambdaUλ​. As printed they fail for φ(y)=12y2\varphi(y)=\tfrac12y^2φ(y)=21​y2 on [−5,5][-5,5][−5,5], −1000−∣y−10∣-1000-|y-10|−1000−∣y−10∣ on [9,11][9,11][9,11], +∞+\infty+∞ elsewhere, with xˉ=0\bar x=0xˉ=0, r=1r=1r=1, λ=12\lambda=\tfrac12λ=21​: there Prox⁡λφ(x)={9}\operatorname{Prox}_\lambda\varphi(x)=\{9\}Proxλ​φ(x)={9} near 000, and Algorithm 6.2 jumps to the stationary point 999. Lemmas 5.4–5.6 and Theorem 5.7 are posed as printed.
  • Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: λ0>0\lambda_0>0λ0​>0 is part of the conclusion, so the ∀λ\forall\lambda∀λ is never vacuous; conclusions hold for every run rather than for a run chosen by Classical.choose; and φ\varphiφ is not specialized (no convexity, which would make Uλ=RnU_\lambda=\mathbb R^nUλ​=Rn; no C2C^2C2; no strong metric regularity; no assumption that xˉ\bar xxˉ is a minimizer).
  • Reusable infrastructure: normal cones to graphs, limiting and directional coderivatives, metric regularity, semismooth*, prox-regularity, Moreau envelopes. Formalizations of Mordukhovich's coderivative criterion, of the scalarization formula D∗F(xˉ)(u)=∂⟨u,F⟩(xˉ)D^*F(\bar x)(u)=\partial\langle u,F\rangle(\bar x)D∗F(xˉ)(u)=∂⟨u,F⟩(xˉ) for Lipschitz FFF, and of Poliquin–Rockafellar's Theorem 4.4 are especially welcome.

Selected references

  • P. D. Khanh, B. S. Mordukhovich, V. T. Phat, A Generalized Newton Method for Subgradient Systems, arXiv:2009.10551v2, 2022; Math. Oper. Res., 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.10551
  • R. A. Poliquin, R. T. Rockafellar, Prox-regular functions in variational analysis, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 348, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-96-01544-9
  • H. Gfrerer, J. V. Outrata, On a semismooth Newton method for solving generalized equations*, SIAM J. Optim. 31, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1137/19M1257408
  • B. S. Mordukhovich, M. E. Sarabi, Generalized Newton algorithms for tilt-stable minimizers in nonsmooth optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 31, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1137/20M1329937
  • B. S. Mordukhovich, Variational Analysis and Generalized Differentiation I, Springer, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-31247-1
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
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AnalysisOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality I: Feasible Solutions of the Continuous Stopping LP Can Be Improved to Threshold FormResearch Paper

Motivation

Two classical online selection problems sit at opposite ends of an information spectrum. In the secretary problem items arrive in uniformly random order, only their relative ranks are observed, and the best possible probability of stopping on the best item tends to 1/e1/e1/e. In the i.i.d. prophet inequality the values are independent draws from a known distribution, and the best guarantee against the expected maximum is the constant ≈0.745\approx 0.745≈0.745 of Hill and Kertz (1982), shown tight by Correa, Foncea, Hoeksma, Oosterwijk and Vredeveld (2017).

Correa, Cristi, Epstein and Soto (arXiv:2011.06516) interpolate between the two with the ppp-sample-driven optimal stopping problem. Each of NNN items is sampled independently with probability ppp; the decision maker observes the relative rankings of the sampled items, then faces the remaining items online, observing relative rankings, and makes irrevocable stop/continue decisions. Stopping on the item of overall rank iii earns a reward YiY_iYi​, with Y1≥Y2≥⋯Y_1\ge Y_2\ge\cdotsY1​≥Y2​≥⋯. At p=0p=0p=0 and Y=(1,0,0,… )Y=(1,0,0,\dots)Y=(1,0,0,…) this is the secretary problem; for adversarial YYY the optimal guarantee tends to 0.7450.7450.745 as p→1p\to1p→1, the i.i.d. prophet constant.

For known YYY, the paper writes a linear program over the stopping probabilities of rank-based algorithms (after Buchbinder, Jain and Singh, 2014) and takes its limit as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞. The analysis rests on one structural result, Theorem 2: this limiting program can be restricted, without loss, to solutions of an explicit threshold form, so that the optimal algorithm stops on an item of current rank iii after a time tit_iti​. This mission is that theorem.

Setting

Fix p∈[0,1)p\in[0,1)p∈[0,1). Time runs over [p,1][p,1][p,1] (time ttt is the fraction of the NNN items seen so far; the sample accounts for the first fraction ppp in the limit), and ranks ℓ=1,2,…\ell=1,2,\dotsℓ=1,2,… refer to the relative rank of the current item among all items seen so far. A candidate solution is a function q(t,ℓ)q(t,\ell)q(t,ℓ), the density of stopping at time ttt on an item of relative rank ℓ\ellℓ.

The cumulative mass of qqq is Mq(t)=∫pt∑s≥1q(τ,s) dτM_q(t)=\int_p^t\sum_{s\ge1}q(\tau,s)\,d\tauMq​(t)=∫pt​∑s≥1​q(τ,s)dτ. A solution is feasible for the continuous linear program CLPp_pp​ when q(t,ℓ)≥0q(t,\ell)\ge0q(t,ℓ)≥0, each q(⋅,ℓ)q(\cdot,\ell)q(⋅,ℓ) is integrable on [p,1][p,1][p,1], and

t q(t,ℓ)+Mq(t)≤1∀t∈[p,1], ∀ℓ≥1.t\,q(t,\ell)+M_q(t)\le1\qquad\forall t\in[p,1],\ \forall\ell\ge1 .tq(t,ℓ)+Mq​(t)≤1∀t∈[p,1], ∀ℓ≥1.

For k≥1k\ge1k≥1 the negative-binomial term is nbk,ℓ(t)=∑j=ℓk(j−1ℓ−1)(1−t)j−ℓtℓ\mathrm{nb}_{k,\ell}(t)=\sum_{j=\ell}^{k}\binom{j-1}{\ell-1}(1-t)^{j-\ell}t^{\ell}nbk,ℓ​(t)=∑j=ℓk​(ℓ−1j−1​)(1−t)j−ℓtℓ, the probability that a NegativeBinomial(ℓ,t)(\ell,t)(ℓ,t) variable is at most kkk, and

Fk(q)=∑ℓ=1k∫p1q(t,ℓ) nbk,ℓ(t) dt.F_k(q)=\sum_{\ell=1}^{k}\int_p^1 q(t,\ell)\,\mathrm{nb}_{k,\ell}(t)\,dt .Fk​(q)=ℓ=1∑k​∫p1​q(t,ℓ)nbk,ℓ​(t)dt.

Fk(q)F_k(q)Fk​(q) is the limit of the probability that the algorithm stops on an item of overall rank at most kkk. The objective of CLPp_pp​ is Y1−∑k≥1(Yk−Yk+1)(1−Fk(q))Y_1-\sum_{k\ge1}(Y_k-Y_{k+1})(1-F_k(q))Y1​−∑k≥1​(Yk​−Yk+1​)(1−Fk​(q)) for a non-increasing sequence YYY, so any solution that increases every FkF_kFk​ is at least as good.

A threshold sequence is a non-decreasing (ti)i≥0⊆[p,1](t_i)_{i\ge0}\subseteq[p,1](ti​)i≥0​⊆[p,1] with t0=pt_0=pt0​=p; put Ti=∏j=1itjT_i=\prod_{j=1}^{i}t_jTi​=∏j=1i​tj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 8)

For every feasible qqq there are a feasible q∗q^*q∗ and a threshold sequence (ti)(t_i)(ti​) with Fk(q∗)≥Fk(q)F_k(q^*)\ge F_k(q)Fk​(q∗)≥Fk​(q) for all k≥1k\ge1k≥1, such that for every ℓ≥1\ell\ge1ℓ≥1 and t∈[p,1)t\in[p,1)t∈[p,1)

t q∗(t,ℓ)+∫pt∑s≥1q∗(τ,s) dτ=1  (t≥tℓ),q∗(t,ℓ)=0  (t<tℓ),(5–6)t\,q^*(t,\ell)+\int_p^t\sum_{s\ge1}q^*(\tau,s)\,d\tau=1\ \ (t\ge t_\ell),\qquad q^*(t,\ell)=0\ \ (t<t_\ell),\tag{5–6}tq∗(t,ℓ)+∫pt​s≥1∑​q∗(τ,s)dτ=1  (t≥tℓ​),q∗(t,ℓ)=0  (t<tℓ​),(5–6) q∗(t,ℓ)={Ti/ti+1t∈[ti,ti+1), ℓ≤i,0else.(7)q^*(t,\ell)=\begin{cases}T_i/t^{i+1}&t\in[t_i,t_{i+1}),\ \ell\le i,\\0&\text{else.}\end{cases}\tag{7}q∗(t,ℓ)={Ti​/ti+10​t∈[ti​,ti+1​), ℓ≤i,else.​(7)

Milestones

  1. Lemma 17 (p. 28): nbk,ℓ\mathrm{nb}_{k,\ell}nbk,ℓ​ is non-decreasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1] for 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k.
  2. Lemma 18 (p. 29): nbk,ℓ(t)\mathrm{nb}_{k,\ell}(t)nbk,ℓ​(t) is non-increasing in ℓ≥1\ell\ge1ℓ≥1 for t∈[0,1]t\in[0,1]t∈[0,1].
  3. (8) (p. 9): one mass-moving step qn−1↦qnq_{n-1}\mapsto q_nqn−1​↦qn​, which pushes each component to the right up to the envelope 1t(1−Mqn−1(t))\frac1t(1-M_{q_{n-1}}(t))t1​(1−Mqn−1​​(t)), keeps each component's mass, satisfies Mqn≤Mqn−1M_{q_n}\le M_{q_{n-1}}Mqn​​≤Mqn−1​​ in the form (8), and preserves feasibility.
  4. Fk(qn−1)≤Fk(qn)F_k(q_{n-1})\le F_k(q_n)Fk​(qn−1​)≤Fk​(qn​) (p. 9) for the same step.
  5. Uniqueness (p. 10): for fixed thresholds, (5)–(6) have at most one feasible solution on [p,1)[p,1)[p,1).
  6. Existence (p. 10): the function (7) satisfies (5)–(6).

Significance

Theorem 2 turns an infinite-dimensional linear program over functions of two variables into the reduced problem RPp_pp​, an optimization over a single non-decreasing sequence of thresholds. Every quantitative result of the paper is read off RPp_pp​: the optimal ratio for each ppp, its limit as p→1p\to1p→1 (Theorem 8, mission II of this series) and the explicit lower bound α∗p\alpha^*pα∗p (Theorem 9, mission III). It also identifies the optimal rank-based algorithms as threshold rules: accept the current item if it is among the iii best seen so far, where iii grows at the times tit_iti​.

The result is proved in the paper. It has not been formalized, and neither has any part of the continuous-LP approach to secretary and prophet problems. The formal development produces a reusable layer: continuous stopping LPs with extended-real cumulative constraints, monotonicity of negative-binomial distribution functions in both parameters, and a rearrangement argument for integrals against monotone weights.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to improve qqq greedily: push each component's mass as far right as the constraint allows. One step is easy, but the step changes the constraint itself, since the envelope 1t(1−Mq(t))\frac1t(1-M_q(t))t1​(1−Mq​(t)) depends on all components. The proof iterates, needs the thresholds tℓ(n)t_\ell(n)tℓ​(n) to be monotone in nnn, and must pass to a limit q∞q_\inftyq∞​ in L1L^1L1 with a dominating function that exists only because the smallest threshold is bounded away from 000. The limit thresholds need not be monotone in ℓ\ellℓ, and the components must then be reordered using Lemma 18. Finally, (5)–(6) are an integral equation in which each component depends on the sum of all others; identifying their unique solution with (7) needs both a uniqueness argument for a linear ODE and a telescoping computation.

Formalization scope

  • A solution is a function q : ℝ → ℕ → ℝ, a representative of an element of L1([p,1]×N)L^1([p,1]\times\mathbb N)L1([p,1]×N). Ranks, kkk, iii, jjj are 1-based; q(⋅,0)q(\cdot,0)q(⋅,0) is never used. Constraints are imposed pointwise for all ttt, as printed.
  • The cumulative mass Mq(t)M_q(t)Mq​(t) is the lower Lebesgue integral of ∑s≥1q(τ,s)\sum_{s\ge1}q(\tau,s)∑s≥1​q(τ,s) in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], never a Bochner integral of a real series, which Lean would set to 000 on divergent data.
  • Integrability of each q(⋅,ℓ)q(\cdot,\ell)q(⋅,ℓ) is part of feasibility, so FkF_kFk​ is never a junk value.
  • Equations (5)–(7) are imposed on [p,1)[p,1)[p,1), not on [p,1][p,1][p,1]. At the single point t=1t=1t=1 the printed (5) and (7) contradict each other whenever finitely many thresholds are below 111 (already for q=0q=0q=0). Feasibility of q∗q^*q∗ is required on all of [p,1][p,1][p,1].
  • The threshold intervals [ti,ti+1)[t_i,t_{i+1})[ti​,ti+1​) are half-open, as in (7); they are pairwise disjoint because (ti)(t_i)(ti​) is non-decreasing.
  • "Increasing" in Lemma 17 and "decreasing" in Lemma 18 are read as non-decreasing and non-increasing.
  • The mass-moving step (milestones 3–4) takes the thresholds tℓ(n)t_\ell(n)tℓ​(n) as hypotheses satisfying their defining equation, and requires them to be positive (this only matters at p=0p=0p=0, where the paper's equation already forces it).
  • Milestone 6 assumes t1>0t_1>0t1​>0, and claims (5) at ttt when t<tit<t_it<ti​ for some iii or when Tm/tmm→0T_m/t_m^m\to0Tm​/tmm​→0; on the page these conditions are implicit, and without them the claim fails.
  • A statement of Theorem 2 that keeps only "there is a feasible q∗q^*q∗ with Fk(q∗)≥Fk(q)F_k(q^*)\ge F_k(q)Fk​(q∗)≥Fk​(q)" is trivial (q∗=qq^*=qq∗=q); equations (5)–(7) are part of the goal and must not be dropped.
  • Mathlib supplies interval and lower Lebesgue integrals, series in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and binomial coefficients. Contributions welcome: the negative-binomial lemmas, the rearrangement inequality for monotone weights, and a Grönwall-type uniqueness argument for the integral equation.

Selected references

  • J. Correa, A. Cristi, B. Epstein, J. A. Soto, Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality, arXiv:2011.06516v2, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06516
  • T. P. Hill, R. P. Kertz, Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables, Annals of Probability 10(2), 1982. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993861
  • J. Correa, P. Foncea, R. Hoeksma, T. Oosterwijk, T. Vredeveld, Posted price mechanisms for a random stream of customers, ACM EC 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085137
  • N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, M. Singh, Secretary problems via linear programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0604
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing in On-Demand and One-Way Vehicle-Sharing Networks 1: Static Prices Earn at Least K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) of the Fluid Optimum, via Increasingly Tight Availability BoundsResearch Paper

Why static prices in vehicle sharing

In one-way car sharing, bike sharing and ride hailing, a vehicle that serves a trip from location iii to location jjj ends up at jjj. Prices therefore do two jobs: they collect revenue and they steer the fleet. The best dynamic (state-dependent) pricing policy reacts to where every vehicle is, but computing it is a Markov decision problem over a state space that grows combinatorially with the fleet. A static policy, one fixed price per origin–destination pair, is easy to compute and to post, and the question is how much it gives up.

Waserhole and Jost (2016) bounded the loss when travel times are negligible. Banerjee, Freund and Lykouris (arXiv:1803.07841, Operations Research 2022) gave guarantees for large fleets. Benjaafar and Shen (SSRN 3998297; Operations Research Technical Note, 2023, doi:10.1287/opre.2023.2446) prove a bound valid for every fleet size KKK that accounts for travel times, and then a sequence of progressively tighter bounds. This mission formalizes that chain.

Setting

There is a finite set N\mathcal NN of NNN locations and K≥1K\ge 1K≥1 vehicles. Trip requests from iii to jjj arrive at rate Λij≥0\Lambda_{ij}\ge 0Λij​≥0; the pairs with positive demand form A={(i,j):Λij>0}\mathcal A=\{(i,j):\Lambda_{ij}>0\}A={(i,j):Λij​>0}, and the network (N,A)(\mathcal N,\mathcal A)(N,A) is strongly connected. A trip from iii to jjj lasts on average 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. A quantile policy q=(qij)q=(q_{ij})q=(qij​), qij∈[0,1]q_{ij}\in[0,1]qij​∈[0,1], is the fraction of requests that accept the posted price; the effective rates are λij=qijΛij\lambda_{ij}=q_{ij}\Lambda_{ij}λij​=qij​Λij​ and λi=∑jλij\lambda_i=\sum_j\lambda_{ij}λi​=∑j​λij​. Each served trip earns Iij(qij)I_{ij}(q_{ij})Iij​(qij​), and q↦qIij(q)q\mapsto qI_{ij}(q)q↦qIij​(q) is concave.

The fluid problem (2) is

max⁡q Rs(q)=∑(i,j)∈AΛijqijIij(qij)s.t.∑jΛijqij=∑jΛjiqji ∀i,∑(i,j)∈AΛijqijμij≤Δ,qij∈[0,1],\max_q\ R_s(q)=\sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}I_{ij}(q_{ij})\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}=\sum_j\Lambda_{ji}q_{ji}\ \forall i,\quad \sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\frac{\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}}{\mu_{ij}}\le\Delta,\quad q_{ij}\in[0,1],qmax​ Rs​(q)=(i,j)∈A∑​Λij​qij​Iij​(qij​)s.t.j∑​Λij​qij​=j∑​Λji​qji​ ∀i,(i,j)∈A∑​μij​Λij​qij​​≤Δ,qij​∈[0,1],

with Δ≥K\Delta\ge KΔ≥K. Its optimal solution qsq^sqs is the static policy; it is assumed to induce a strongly connected network. The value Rs(qs)R_s(q^s)Rs​(qs) is the fluid optimum.

Under a static policy the fleet moves through a closed queueing network: a single-server pick-up queue at each location, served at rate λi\lambda_iλi​, and an infinite-server transit queue for each pair, with mean time 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. The paper invokes the BCMP theorem for this network; the mission writes its stationary law as the product form. With rrr a positive solution of the traffic equations (9), ri=∑jrjλji/λjr_i=\sum_j r_j\lambda_{ji}/\lambda_jri​=∑j​rj​λji​/λj​, a state xxx (vehicle counts at locations and in transit, total KKK) has weight

w(x)=∏i(riλi)xi∏(i,j)1xij!(riλijλiμij)xij.w(x)=\prod_i\Bigl(\frac{r_i}{\lambda_i}\Bigr)^{x_i}\prod_{(i,j)}\frac{1}{x_{ij}!}\Bigl(\frac{r_i\lambda_{ij}}{\lambda_i\mu_{ij}}\Bigr)^{x_{ij}}.w(x)=i∏​(λi​ri​​)xi​(i,j)∏​xij​!1​(λi​μij​ri​λij​​)xij​.

The availability αi(K)\alpha_i(K)αi​(K) is the weight share of the states with xi≥1x_i\ge 1xi​≥1: the probability that a customer at iii finds a vehicle. The reward rate of the static policy is (3):

R(qs)=∑(i,j)∈Aαi ΛijqijsIij(qijs).R(q^s)=\sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\alpha_i\,\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}I_{ij}(q^s_{ij}).R(qs)=(i,j)∈A∑​αi​Λij​qijs​Iij​(qijs​).

Finally Λ=∑AΛij\Lambda=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}Λ=∑A​Λij​, 1/μ=∑AΛij/(Λμij)1/\mu=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}/(\Lambda\mu_{ij})1/μ=∑A​Λij​/(Λμij​), and λ/μ=∑AΛijqijs/μij\lambda/\mu=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}/\mu_{ij}λ/μ=∑A​Λij​qijs​/μij​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, static half (p. 9)

With B0j(qs)=B0j=0B^j_0(q^s)=B^j_0=0B0j​(qs)=B0j​=0 and, for 1≤i≤K1\le i\le K1≤i≤K,

BiK(qs)=KN+K−1+λμ(1−Bi−1K−1(qs)),BiK=KN+K−1+Λμ(1−Bi−1K−1),B^K_i(q^s)=\frac{K}{N+K-1+\frac{\lambda}{\mu}\bigl(1-B^{K-1}_{i-1}(q^s)\bigr)},\qquad B^K_i=\frac{K}{N+K-1+\frac{\Lambda}{\mu}\bigl(1-B^{K-1}_{i-1}\bigr)},BiK​(qs)=N+K−1+μλ​(1−Bi−1K−1​(qs))K​,BiK​=N+K−1+μΛ​(1−Bi−1K−1​)K​,

the goal is: for every i=1,…,Ki=1,\dots,Ki=1,…,K,

R(qs)Rs(qs) ≥ BiK(qs) ≥ BiK ≥ KN+K−1+Λ/μ,\frac{R(q^s)}{R_s(q^s)}\ \ge\ B^K_i(q^s)\ \ge\ B^K_i\ \ge\ \frac{K}{N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu},Rs​(qs)R(qs)​ ≥ BiK​(qs) ≥ BiK​ ≥ N+K−1+Λ/μK​,

and Bi+1K>BiKB^K_{i+1}>B^K_iBi+1K​>BiK​ for i=1,…,K−1i=1,\dots,K-1i=1,…,K−1.

The paper's Theorem 2 begins with one more inequality, R(qs)/R(q∗)≥R(qs)/Rs(qs)R(q^s)/R(q^*)\ge R(q^s)/R_s(q^s)R(qs)/R(q∗)≥R(qs)/Rs​(qs), where q∗q^*q∗ is the best state-dependent policy. That inequality is Proposition 1 (p. 6). Its proof needs the stationary behaviour of the network under an arbitrary state-dependent policy with matrix-exponential trip times, together with Jensen's inequality and Little's law; that model is not formalized here. Proposition 1 is not part of this mission. The goal is the remaining chain, and it implies the paper's theorem once Proposition 1 is available.

Milestones

  1. Equal availability under balanced flows (p. 7, Appendix p. 23): αi(K)=αj(K)\alpha_i(K)=\alpha_j(K)αi​(K)=αj​(K).
  2. The ratio equals the availability (pp. 7–8): R(qs)/Rs(qs)=αR(q^s)/R_s(q^s)=\alphaR(qs)/Rs​(qs)=α.
  3. Equation (5) (p. 8): α(K)=K/(K+N−1+λμ(1−α(K−1)))\alpha(K)=K/\bigl(K+N-1+\frac{\lambda}{\mu}(1-\alpha(K-1))\bigr)α(K)=K/(K+N−1+μλ​(1−α(K−1))).
  4. Theorem 1, static half (p. 7): R(qs)/Rs(qs)≥K/(K+N−1+Λ/μ)R(q^s)/R_s(q^s)\ge K/(K+N-1+\Lambda/\mu)R(qs)/Rs​(qs)≥K/(K+N−1+Λ/μ).
  5. Equation (6) and 0≤α(K−i)≤(K−i)/(N+K−i−1)0\le\alpha(K-i)\le(K-i)/(N+K-i-1)0≤α(K−i)≤(K−i)/(N+K−i−1) (p. 9).
  6. BKK(qs)=α(K)B^K_K(q^s)=\alpha(K)BKK​(qs)=α(K) (p. 10).
  7. Bi+1K(qs)>BiK(qs)B^K_{i+1}(q^s)>B^K_i(q^s)Bi+1K​(qs)>BiK​(qs) (p. 10).

Significance

The bound K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) holds for every fleet size, tends to 111 at rate O(1/K)O(1/K)O(1/K), and reduces to the Waserhole–Jost bound when travel times vanish. The sequence BiK(qs)B^K_i(q^s)BiK​(qs) gives a computable certificate between that bound and the exact ratio BKK(qs)=α(K)B^K_K(q^s)=\alpha(K)BKK​(qs)=α(K), which an operator can evaluate from NNN, KKK and the fluid solution alone. Equation (5), a one-step recursion in the fleet size for a network mixing single-server and infinite-server stations, is the reusable core: the two sibling missions (the demand-free bound of Theorem 3 and the split-network bound of Theorem 4) rest on the same recursion.

The results are proved in the paper; none is formalized elsewhere as far as a search of the platform shows. The platform has the multiclass BCMP framework and single-server closed Jackson networks, but not availability in networks with infinite-server stations, nor equation (5). This mission adds a product-form availability layer, the equal-availability lemma, the recursion (5), and the bound chain.

Difficulty

The paper derives (5) from the random observer (arrival) theorem and Little's law, and neither is available as a formal tool, so the recursion has to be obtained from the product form itself, as an identity between sums over the state spaces with KKK and K−1K-1K−1 vehicles. Equal availability needs uniqueness, up to scale, of the positive solution of the traffic equations on a strongly connected network (a Perron–Frobenius-type fact for an irreducible stochastic matrix). In the bound chain, BiK(qs)≥BiKB^K_i(q^s)\ge B^K_iBiK​(qs)≥BiK​ needs the recursion map to be monotone in both the workload and the previous value, which holds only once 0≤B≤10\le B\le 10≤B≤1 is established; strict monotonicity in iii is a double induction.

The obvious shortcut, defining α\alphaα by the recursion (5), makes Theorem 1 a one-line consequence of α(K−1)≥0\alpha(K-1)\ge 0α(K−1)≥0 and deletes the content of the first three milestones; the mission rules it out by defining α\alphaα as the product form.

Formalization scope

Locations form a Fintype with Nonempty; NNN is its cardinality. Demand, travel rates, rewards and policies are functions on all ordered pairs, self-pairs included; sums over A\mathcal AA are sums over all pairs, which agree because each summand carries Λij\Lambda_{ij}Λij​. Strong connectivity, of (N,A)(\mathcal N,\mathcal A)(N,A) and of the network induced by qsq^sqs, uses nonempty paths (Relation.TransGen), so every location has positive accepted demand and A≠∅\mathcal A\ne\emptysetA=∅. Every ordered pair has a transit queue; a pair with λij=0\lambda_{ij}=0λij​=0 has load 000 and stays empty (00=10^0=100=1). All arithmetic on KKK, NNN and iii is in R\mathbb RR; B(K,0)=0B(K,0)=0B(K,0)=0 for every K≥0K\ge 0K≥0, including the B00B^0_0B00​ that the paper's definition omits. Rs(qs)>0R_s(q^s)>0Rs​(qs)>0 is a hypothesis of the ratio statements, since otherwise the ratio is 0/00/00/0. The statements keep the paper's hypothesis that qsq^sqs is optimal for (2) with Δ≥K\Delta\ge KΔ≥K; the proofs use only feasibility and balanced flows, and the queueing milestones are stated for every balanced quantile policy inducing a strongly connected network.

The product form is a definition: the mission does not prove that it is the stationary law of the network's Markov chain (the BCMP theorem). The general closed product-form network (single-server and infinite-server stations on an arbitrary finite station set) is a separate definition and is reusable beyond this mission. Contributions welcome: proofs of (5) via normalizing constants, the traffic-equation uniqueness lemma, and the elementary bound-sequence inequalities.

Selected references

  • S. Benjaafar, X. Shen, Pricing in On-Demand (and One-Way) Vehicle Sharing Networks, SSRN abstract 3998297, version of 2023-01-10. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3998297 ; Technical Note, Operations Research, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2446
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, Closed, and Mixed Networks of Queues with Different Classes of Customers, J. ACM 22(2), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • S. Banerjee, D. Freund, T. Lykouris, Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework, Operations Research 70(3), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.07841
  • A. Waserhole, V. Jost, Pricing in Vehicle Sharing Systems: Optimization in Queuing Networks with Product Forms, EURO J. Transportation and Logistics 5, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13676-014-0054-4
  • D. K. George, C. H. Xia, Fleet-Sizing and Service Availability for a Vehicle Rental System via Closed Queueing Networks, European J. Operational Research 211(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.12.015
  • M. Reiser, S. S. Lavenberg, Mean-Value Analysis of Closed Multichain Queuing Networks, J. ACM 27(2), 1980. https://doi.org/10.1145/322186.322195
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing in On-Demand and One-Way Vehicle-Sharing Networks 2: With Workload Budget K, Static Prices Earn a Demand-Independent 1 − O(1/√K) Fraction of the Fluid OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

One-way vehicle-sharing systems (car sharing, bike sharing, ride-hailing fleets) set a price for every origin–destination trip. Prices decide which trips are taken, and so they decide where vehicles end up. Pricing that depends on the current position of every vehicle is in principle optimal, but its state space grows combinatorially with the fleet. Practitioners therefore use static prices, which depend only on the origin and destination. The question is how much revenue, throughput or welfare such prices give up.

Benjaafar and Shen (SSRN 3998297; Technical Note, Operations Research, 2023, doi:10.1287/opre.2023.2446) answer this with explicit lower bounds on the performance ratio of the static policy obtained from a fluid relaxation. Banerjee, Freund and Lykouris (arXiv:1611.07624) proved the earlier guarantee, which requires the fleet size KKK to be at least 100100100 and the workload to be at most K−2Kln⁡KK-2\sqrt{K\ln K}K−2KlnK​. Benjaafar and Shen give two bounds that hold for every KKK. The first is K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) (their Theorems 1–2), and it degrades when total demand Λ\LambdaΛ grows with KKK. The second, Theorem 3, does not depend on demand or travel times at all. This mission is about Theorem 3.

Setting

There is a finite set N\mathcal NN of NNN locations and KKK vehicles. Trip requests from iii to jjj arrive as a Poisson process of rate Λij≥0\Lambda_{ij}\ge0Λij​≥0, and A={(i,j):Λij>0}\mathcal A=\{(i,j):\Lambda_{ij}>0\}A={(i,j):Λij​>0} is the set of pairs with demand. The graph (N,A)(\mathcal N,\mathcal A)(N,A) is strongly connected. A trip from iii to jjj lasts a random time with mean 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. A static policy is a matrix q=(qij)q=(q_{ij})q=(qij​) of quantiles: qij∈[0,1]q_{ij}\in[0,1]qij​∈[0,1] is the fraction of (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) customers who accept the posted price. Each accepted trip earns a reward Iij(qij)I_{ij}(q_{ij})Iij​(qij​), and q↦q Iij(q)q\mapsto q\,I_{ij}(q)q↦qIij​(q) is concave. A customer who finds no vehicle at the origin is lost.

Problem (2) is the fluid relaxation, in which vehicles are always available:

max⁡q Rs(q)=∑(i,j)∈AΛijqijIij(qij)s.t.∑jΛijqij=∑jΛjiqji,∑(i,j)∈AΛijqijμij≤Δ,qij∈[0,1].\max_q\ R_s(q)=\sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}I_{ij}(q_{ij}) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}=\sum_j\Lambda_{ji}q_{ji},\quad \sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\frac{\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}}{\mu_{ij}}\le\Delta,\quad q_{ij}\in[0,1].qmax​ Rs​(q)=(i,j)∈A∑​Λij​qij​Iij​(qij​)s.t.j∑​Λij​qij​=j∑​Λji​qji​,(i,j)∈A∑​μij​Λij​qij​​≤Δ,qij​∈[0,1].

The first constraint balances the flows, and the second caps the workload λ/μ=∑Λijqij/μij\lambda/\mu=\sum\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}/\mu_{ij}λ/μ=∑Λij​qij​/μij​ (the mean number of vehicles in transit) by a budget Δ\DeltaΔ. Let qsq^sqs be an optimal solution that induces a strongly connected network.

Under a static policy the vehicles move in a closed queueing network. Each location has a single-server pick-up queue with service rate λi=∑jΛijqij\lambda_i=\sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}λi​=∑j​Λij​qij​. Each pair has an infinite-server transit queue with mean service time 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. This network is of BCMP type, so its stationary law has product form. With rrr a positive solution of the traffic equations (9), a state with xix_ixi​ vehicles at location iii and xijx_{ij}xij​ in transit from iii to jjj has weight ∏i(ri/λi)xi∏(i,j)(riλij/(λiμij))xij/xij!\prod_i(r_i/\lambda_i)^{x_i}\prod_{(i,j)}(r_i\lambda_{ij}/(\lambda_i\mu_{ij}))^{x_{ij}}/x_{ij}!∏i​(ri​/λi​)xi​∏(i,j)​(ri​λij​/(λi​μij​))xij​/xij​!. The availability αi(K)\alpha_i(K)αi​(K) is the stationary probability that location iii holds at least one vehicle. The reward rate of the policy is Equation (3):

R(q)=∑(i,j)∈Aαi ΛijqijIij(qij).R(q)=\sum_{(i,j)\in\mathcal A}\alpha_i\,\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}I_{ij}(q_{ij}).R(q)=(i,j)∈A∑​αi​Λij​qij​Iij​(qij​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, static half

For K≥1K\ge1K≥1, Δ=K\Delta=KΔ=K, qsq^sqs optimal for (2), inducing a strongly connected network, with Rs(qs)>0R_s(q^s)>0Rs​(qs)>0:

R(qs)Rs(qs) ≥ 1−((N−12K+12(N+K)+1)2−1−(N−12K+12(N+K))).\frac{R(q^s)}{R_s(q^s)}\ \ge\ 1-\left(\sqrt{\Bigl(\tfrac{N-1}{2K}+\tfrac{1}{2(N+K)}+1\Bigr)^2-1}-\Bigl(\tfrac{N-1}{2K}+\tfrac{1}{2(N+K)}\Bigr)\right).Rs​(qs)R(qs)​ ≥ 1−((2KN−1​+2(N+K)1​+1)2−1​−(2KN−1​+2(N+K)1​)).

The paper states the bound for R(qs)/R(q∗)R(q^s)/R(q^*)R(qs)/R(q∗), where q∗q^*q∗ is the optimal dynamic policy. It passes from one ratio to the other with Proposition 1, R(q∗)≤Rs(qs)R(q^*)\le R_s(q^s)R(q∗)≤Rs​(qs) (p. 6), whose proof needs the stationary analysis of arbitrary state-dependent policies. Proposition 1 is not part of this mission. The goal implies the paper's Theorem 3 once Proposition 1 is available.

Milestones

  1. Equal availability (pp. 7, 23): under balanced flows, αi(K)=αj(K)\alpha_i(K)=\alpha_j(K)αi​(K)=αj​(K) for all i,ji,ji,j.
  2. R(qs)/Rs(qs)=αR(q^s)/R_s(q^s)=\alphaR(qs)/Rs​(qs)=α (pp. 7–8).
  3. Equation (5) (p. 8): α(K)=K/(K+N−1+(λ/μ)(1−α(K−1)))\alpha(K)=K/\bigl(K+N-1+(\lambda/\mu)(1-\alpha(K-1))\bigr)α(K)=K/(K+N−1+(λ/μ)(1−α(K−1))).
  4. β(K)=K/(N+K−1+Δ(1−β(K−1)))\beta(K)=K/(N+K-1+\Delta(1-\beta(K-1)))β(K)=K/(N+K−1+Δ(1−β(K−1))), β(0)=0\beta(0)=0β(0)=0, is non-decreasing and concave (p. 10).
  5. α(K)≥β(K)\alpha(K)\ge\beta(K)α(K)≥β(K) for K≥1K\ge1K≥1 when λ/μ≤Δ\lambda/\mu\le\Deltaλ/μ≤Δ (p. 11).
  6. β(K)−β(K−1)≤β(1)=1/(N+Δ)\beta(K)-\beta(K-1)\le\beta(1)=1/(N+\Delta)β(K)−β(K−1)≤β(1)=1/(N+Δ) (p. 11).
  7. β(K)≥(bK−bK2−4KΔ)/(2Δ)\beta(K)\ge\bigl(b_K-\sqrt{b_K^2-4K\Delta}\bigr)/(2\Delta)β(K)≥(bK​−bK2​−4KΔ​)/(2Δ) with bK=N+K−1+Δ+Δ/(N+Δ)b_K=N+K-1+\Delta+\Delta/(N+\Delta)bK​=N+K−1+Δ+Δ/(N+Δ) (p. 11).

Significance

The bound tends to 111 at rate 1−O(1/K)1-O(1/\sqrt K)1−O(1/K​), uniformly in demand rates, travel times and the reward functions. It is the regime-free counterpart of the K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) bound: that bound is better for light demand, this one for heavy demand (Remark 7). Remark 6 reports that it is also numerically tighter than the guarantee of Banerjee et al., and unlike that guarantee it applies to every fleet size.

Formalizing it adds several things to the platform. The first is availability in closed networks of single-server and infinite-server stations, defined from the product form. Two classical facts about this model follow: availability is equal across locations under balanced flows, and it satisfies the mean-value recursion (5). Milestone 4 is a concavity statement about the throughput of a closed network in its population, and for N=1N=1N=1 it contains the concavity of the Erlang-B carried load in the number of servers. The paper does not prove it; it cites George and Xia (2011) and Shanthikumar and Yao (1988). None of these results is formalized anywhere that this mission is aware of, so the mission formalizes a proved result, not an open problem.

Difficulty

The algebra at the end (milestones 6–7 and the substitution Δ=K\Delta=KΔ=K) is elementary. Two steps are not.

Equation (5) is stated as a relation between availabilities, but its content is an identity between normalizing constants G(K−1)/G(K)G(K-1)/G(K)G(K−1)/G(K) of the product form. The paper derives it from the arrival theorem and Little's law, and neither is available. A direct proof has to compute G(K)G(K)G(K) under balanced flows, which takes a counting argument over the state space. Equal availability likewise needs the positive solution of (9) to be unique up to scale on a strongly connected network.

Concavity of β\betaβ is the hard milestone. A natural first attempt is induction on the recursion: if β(K)−β(K−1)\beta(K)-\beta(K-1)β(K)−β(K−1) is non-increasing up to KKK, show that the next increment is no larger. The map β(K−1)↦β(K)\beta(K-1)\mapsto\beta(K)β(K−1)↦β(K) is increasing and convex in its argument, and convexity points the wrong way, so increments do not propagate directly. The published proofs go through the closed-network interpretation, not through the recursion.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in VehicleSharePricing.DemandFree. Locations are a Fintype with Nonempty, and NNN is its cardinality. Λ, μ, q are real matrices on all pairs, and entries outside A\mathcal AA enter only multiplied by Λij=0\Lambda_{ij}=0Λij​=0. Strong connectivity is the transitive closure of the positive-flow relation (Relation.TransGen). This guarantees λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0 at every location, even for N=1N=1N=1. Availability is the product-form busy probability of the general definition ProductFormNetwork, applied to the induced network. That law is a definition that records the paper's appeal to BCMP (p. 6), not a theorem of this mission. Theorems quantify over every positive solution rrr of (9). R(q)R(q)R(q) is Equation (3) with per-location availabilities. The sequence β\betaβ is defined by its recursion, which is correct because it is a proof device, not the availability of qsq^sqs. All arithmetic is in R\mathbb RR, and K−1K-1K−1 appears only under K≥1K\ge1K≥1.

Two trivializations are ruled out. Defining α\alphaα by the recursion (5) would make milestones 1–3 empty, and defining R(q)R(q)R(q) as αRs(q)\alpha R_s(q)αRs​(q) would make milestone 1 empty. The hypothesis Rs(qs)>0R_s(q^s)>0Rs​(qs)>0 is added because the ratio is otherwise 0/00/00/0.

The proof of the goal uses only feasibility of qsq^sqs and the strong connectivity of the induced network; optimality is kept because it is the paper's hypothesis. Contributions are welcome on any milestone. A library for normalizing constants of closed product-form networks, and the concavity of throughput in the population, would be reusable well beyond this paper.

Selected references

  • S. Benjaafar, X. Shen, Pricing in On-Demand (and One-Way) Vehicle Sharing Networks, SSRN abstract 3998297, version of 2023-01-10; Technical Note, Operations Research, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3998297, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2446
  • S. Banerjee, D. Freund, T. Lykouris, Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework, Operations Research, 2022 (cited by the paper as forthcoming); arXiv:1611.07624. https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.07624
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, Closed, and Mixed Networks of Queues with Different Classes of Customers, Journal of the ACM 22(2), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • D. K. George, C. H. Xia, Fleet-Sizing and Service Availability for a Vehicle Rental System via Closed Queueing Networks, European Journal of Operational Research 211(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.12.015
  • J. G. Shanthikumar, D. D. Yao, Second-Order Properties of the Throughput of a Closed Queueing Network, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(3), 1988. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.3.524
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing in On-Demand and One-Way Vehicle-Sharing Networks 3: The K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) Guarantee Holds When Static Prices Split the Network into ComponentsResearch Paper

Motivation

One-way vehicle-sharing systems (car sharing, bike sharing, on-demand fleets) move a fixed fleet of KKK vehicles among NNN locations. Customers take a vehicle at one location and leave it at another, so prices shape both revenue and where the fleet ends up. The optimal dynamic pricing policy, which reacts to the current position of every vehicle, solves a dynamic program whose state space grows combinatorially in NNN and KKK. Static policies, with one fixed price per origin–destination pair, are simple to compute and to operate, and the question is how much they lose.

Benjaafar and Shen (SSRN 3998297; Operations Research, 2023, doi:10.1287/opre.2023.2446) take the static policy qsq^sqs that solves a fluid relaxation, Problem (2), and bound its performance ratio. When qsq^sqs induces a strongly connected network, Theorem 1 gives the ratio K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ). Waserhole and Jost (2016) observed that the best static policy may deliberately disconnect the network: prices that make some trips unattractive can leave two or more separate networks. The fleet then has to be split among the pieces, and Theorem 1 no longer applies. This mission formalizes Theorem 4 of the paper (§6, p. 18), which shows that the same guarantee holds in that case, provided the vehicles are allocated optimally among the networks.

Setting

There are NNN locations and KKK vehicles. Trip requests from location iii to jjj arrive at rate Λij≥0\Lambda_{ij}\ge0Λij​≥0, and A={(i,j):Λij>0}\mathcal A=\{(i,j):\Lambda_{ij}>0\}A={(i,j):Λij​>0} is strongly connected. A trip on (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) lasts on average 1/μij1/\mu_{ij}1/μij​. A static policy is a vector of quantiles qij∈[0,1]q_{ij}\in[0,1]qij​∈[0,1] (the fraction of customers who accept the price), and earns Iij(qij)I_{ij}(q_{ij})Iij​(qij​) per trip, with q↦qIij(q)q\mapsto qI_{ij}(q)q↦qIij​(q) concave.

Problem (2) maximises the fluid reward Rs(q)=∑AΛijqijIij(qij)R_s(q)=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}I_{ij}(q_{ij})Rs​(q)=∑A​Λij​qij​Iij​(qij​) over balanced flows (∑jΛijqij=∑jΛjiqji\sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}=\sum_j\Lambda_{ji}q_{ji}∑j​Λij​qij​=∑j​Λji​qji​ at every location) with workload ∑AΛijqij/μij≤Δ\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}/\mu_{ij}\le\Delta∑A​Λij​qij​/μij​≤Δ, where Δ≥K\Delta\ge KΔ≥K. Let qsq^sqs be an optimal solution.

The policy qsq^sqs splits the locations into networks ccc with location sets Nc\mathcal N_cNc​ (Nc=∣Nc∣N_c=|\mathcal N_c|Nc​=∣Nc​∣) and pair sets Ac\mathcal A_cAc​: accepted demand Λijqijs>0\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}>0Λij​qijs​>0 only joins locations of the same network, and within each network it is strongly connected. With KcK_cKc​ vehicles, network ccc is a closed queueing network: a single-server pick-up queue at each location (rate λi=∑jΛijqijs\lambda_i=\sum_j\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}λi​=∑j​Λij​qijs​) and an infinite-server transit queue on each pair. Its stationary law is the BCMP product form, with loads computed from a positive solution rrr of the traffic equations (9). The availability α(qs,Kc,Nc)\alpha(q^s,K_c,N_c)α(qs,Kc​,Nc​) is the stationary probability that a location of network ccc has a vehicle.

An allocation K=(Kc)\mathbf K=(K_c)K=(Kc​) with ∑cKc=K\sum_cK_c=K∑c​Kc​=K earns R(qs,K)=∑AαiΛijqijsIij(qijs)R(q^s,\mathbf K)=\sum_{\mathcal A}\alpha_i\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}I_{ij}(q^s_{ij})R(qs,K)=∑A​αi​Λij​qijs​Iij​(qijs​) (Equation (3)), and Problem (8) chooses K∗\mathbf K^*K∗ to maximise it. Write Mc=∑AcΛijqijs/μijM_c=\sum_{\mathcal A_c}\Lambda_{ij}q^s_{ij}/\mu_{ij}Mc​=∑Ac​​Λij​qijs​/μij​, pcp_cpc​ for network ccc's share of Rs(qs)R_s(q^s)Rs​(qs), Λ=∑AΛij\Lambda=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}Λ=∑A​Λij​ and 1/μ=∑AΛij/(Λμij)1/\mu=\sum_{\mathcal A}\Lambda_{ij}/(\Lambda\mu_{ij})1/μ=∑A​Λij​/(Λμij​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4, static half (p. 18)

R(qs,K∗)Rs(qs) ≥ KN+K−1+Λ/μ.\frac{R(q^s,\mathbf K^*)}{R_s(q^s)}\ \ge\ \frac{K}{N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu}.Rs​(qs)R(qs,K∗)​ ≥ N+K−1+Λ/μK​.

The paper's Theorem 4 opens with R(qs,K∗)/R(q∗)≥R(qs,K∗)/Rs(qs)R(q^s,\mathbf K^*)/R(q^*)\ge R(q^s,\mathbf K^*)/R_s(q^s)R(qs,K∗)/R(q∗)≥R(qs,K∗)/Rs​(qs), where R(q∗)R(q^*)R(q∗) is the reward of the optimal dynamic policy. That inequality is Proposition 1 (R(q∗)≤Rs(qs)R(q^*)\le R_s(q^s)R(q∗)≤Rs​(qs), p. 6). It needs the stationary distribution of the network under an arbitrary state-dependent policy, a controlled-Markov-chain development that is not part of this mission. The goal is the rest of the chain, and it implies the paper's theorem once Proposition 1 is available.

Milestones (p. 18–19)

  1. The recursion (5) on each network: α(qs,Kc,Nc)=Kc/(Nc+Kc−1+(1−α(qs,Kc−1,Nc))Mc)\alpha(q^s,K_c,N_c)=K_c/(N_c+K_c-1+(1-\alpha(q^s,K_c-1,N_c))M_c)α(qs,Kc​,Nc​)=Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+(1−α(qs,Kc​−1,Nc​))Mc​).
  2. The mixture identity R(qs,K)/Rs(qs)=∑cα(qs,Kc,Nc)pcR(q^s,\mathbf K)/R_s(q^s)=\sum_c\alpha(q^s,K_c,N_c)p_cR(qs,K)/Rs​(qs)=∑c​α(qs,Kc​,Nc​)pc​, with ∑cpc=1\sum_cp_c=1∑c​pc​=1.
  3. The per-network bound pcKc/(Nc+Kc−1+Mc(1−α(qs,Kc−1,Nc)))≥pcKc/(Nc+Kc−1+Mc)p_cK_c/(N_c+K_c-1+M_c(1-\alpha(q^s,K_c-1,N_c)))\ge p_cK_c/(N_c+K_c-1+M_c)pc​Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+Mc​(1−α(qs,Kc​−1,Nc​)))≥pc​Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+Mc​).
  4. The reduction R(qs,K∗)/Rs(qs)≥max⁡∑Kc=K∑cpcKc/(Nc+Kc−1+Mc)R(q^s,\mathbf K^*)/R_s(q^s)\ge\max_{\sum K_c=K}\sum_cp_cK_c/(N_c+K_c-1+M_c)R(qs,K∗)/Rs​(qs)≥max∑Kc​=K​∑c​pc​Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+Mc​).
  5. The Chu–Vandermonde identity ∑K1=0K(K+T−K1−T1−1K−K1)(T1+K1−1K1)=(K+T−1K)\sum_{K_1=0}^K\binom{K+T-K_1-T_1-1}{K-K_1}\binom{T_1+K_1-1}{K_1}=\binom{K+T-1}{K}∑K1​=0K​(K−K1​K+T−K1​−T1​−1​)(K1​T1​+K1​−1​)=(KK+T−1​) for real T1,T2>0T_1,T_2>0T1​,T2​>0.
  6. The reduced inequality for C=2C=2C=2: max⁡K1+K2=K∑i=12piKi/(Ni+Ki−1+Mi)≥K/(N+K−1+M)\max_{K_1+K_2=K}\sum_{i=1}^2p_iK_i/(N_i+K_i-1+M_i)\ge K/(N+K-1+M)maxK1​+K2​=K​∑i=12​pi​Ki​/(Ni​+Ki​−1+Mi​)≥K/(N+K−1+M).
  7. The same for any number of networks, the case C>2C>2C>2.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 removes the connectivity assumption from Theorem 1. A static policy chosen by the fluid relaxation may disconnect the network, and it then still earns at least K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ)K/(N+K-1+\Lambda/\mu)K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) of the fluid optimum, uniformly in the demand and reward data. The bound tends to 111 as K→∞K\to\inftyK→∞ for fixed NNN and Λ/μ\Lambda/\muΛ/μ. Milestones 6–7 hold for arbitrary weights, location counts and workloads, so they apply to any separable allocation problem whose pieces satisfy recursion (5).

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. No part of it is machine-checked so far. The mission adds closed-network availability on a disconnected network, the mixture decomposition of the performance ratio, a real-argument Vandermonde identity in the paper's own notation, and a discrete allocation inequality proved by an averaging argument. The companion missions of this series formalize Theorems 1–3 of the same paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument applies Theorem 1 to each network: α(qs,Kc,Nc)≥Kc/(Nc+Kc−1+Mc)\alpha(q^s,K_c,N_c)\ge K_c/(N_c+K_c-1+M_c)α(qs,Kc​,Nc​)≥Kc​/(Nc​+Kc​−1+Mc​). This leaves a maximisation over allocations, and no single allocation obviously beats K/(N+K−1+M)K/(N+K-1+M)K/(N+K−1+M). Proportional splitting fails because Nc+Kc−1N_c+K_c-1Nc​+Kc​−1 does not scale with KcK_cKc​, and the best allocation depends on all of pcp_cpc​, NcN_cNc​ and McM_cMc​. The paper does not exhibit a good allocation. It averages the objective against probability weights from the Chu–Vandermonde identity, which needs binomial coefficients with real upper arguments. It then passes from two networks to many by an induction that merges networks. The recursion (5) itself rests on a computation with the normalising constants of a product form that has both single-server and infinite-server stations.

Formalization scope

Locations form a finite type. A\mathcal AA is the set of pairs with Λij>0\Lambda_{ij}>0Λij​>0, and its strong connectivity is a transitive closure. The split is a surjective map from locations onto a finite index type of networks. Every pair with positive accepted demand stays inside one class, and each class is strongly connected under accepted demand, again as a transitive closure. So every location has positive accepted demand. The paper's C>1C>1C>1 is relaxed to C≥1C\ge1C≥1.

Availability is the BCMP product form of each network on its own, with loads ri/λir_i/\lambda_iri​/λi​ (pick-up) and riΛijqij/(λiμij)r_i\Lambda_{ij}q_{ij}/(\lambda_i\mu_{ij})ri​Λij​qij​/(λi​μij​) (transit), and rrr a positive solution of (9). This is a disclosed definition, since the paper invokes the BCMP class without writing it. Availability is defined per location; its equality across a network follows from milestone 1. R(qs,K)R(q^s,\mathbf K)R(qs,K) is Equation (3) with per-location availabilities. Problem (8) is an explicit maximisation over the finite set of allocations. All ratios are real numbers, Rs(qs)>0R_s(q^s)>0Rs​(qs)>0 is assumed so that the ratio is defined, and N+K−1N+K-1N+K−1 is computed in R\mathbb RR.

Defining availability by the recursion (5), or RRR as α⋅Rs\alpha\cdot R_sα⋅Rs​, would make milestones 1–2 trivial and is ruled out.

A complete development needs:

  • the product-form computation behind (5);
  • equal availability within a network;
  • the Vandermonde identity for generalized binomials (Mathlib's Ring.add_choose_eq);
  • the averaging argument and the induction.

The closed-network definitions and milestones 5–7 are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so is a proof of Proposition 1.

Selected references

  • S. Benjaafar, X. Shen, Pricing in On-Demand (and One-Way) Vehicle Sharing Networks, SSRN abstract 3998297, version of 2023-01-10. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3998297 ; published as a Technical Note in Operations Research, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2446
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, Closed, and Mixed Networks of Queues with Different Classes of Customers, J. ACM 22(2), 1975, 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • A. Waserhole, V. Jost, Pricing in Vehicle Sharing Systems: Optimization in Queuing Networks with Product Forms, EURO J. Transportation and Logistics 5(3), 2016, 293–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13676-014-0054-4
  • D. K. George, C. H. Xia, Fleet-Sizing and Service Availability for a Vehicle Rental System via Closed Queueing Networks, European J. Operational Research 211(1), 2011, 198–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.12.015
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Dynamical SystemsEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces I: The Marketplace Is Stable Exactly When M ≤ w* Under Tight Labor Supply (p* ≤ w*) and M ≤ H(R(p*)) Under Loose SupplyResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum hourly earnings rules for ride-hailing drivers are meant to protect income during periods when drivers spend part of their time idle. A platform pays a wage per hour carrying riders, yet drivers care about earnings per hour logged onto the platform. When many drivers enter after a wage increase, utilization can fall and offset the increase. A regulation that uses the preceding period's utilization to set the next wage can therefore create feedback in the marketplace. Asadpour, Lobel, and van Ryzin model this feedback and identify the exact minimum earnings targets compatible with bounded wages and continuing service (Asadpour, Lobel, and van Ryzin, 2022, §§3–4).

The question matters to marketplace design because a target that cannot be sustained within the model cannot be reached through a bounded wage policy, even if the platform changes prices over time. The theorem separates two economic regimes. When labor supply is tight, the decisive number is the price where demand equals supply. When supply is loose, the decisive number is the greatest revenue the platform can obtain from riders, converted into affordable driver earnings. This mission concerns the paper's threshold theorem and the four lemmas that state its main analytic ingredients.

Setting

In each discrete period ttt, a platform chooses a rider price pt≥0p_t\ge0pt​≥0 and a wage per ride hour wt≥0w_t\ge0wt​≥0. At price ppp, riders demand D(p)D(p)D(p) hours of trips. At expected hourly earnings zzz, drivers supply S(z)S(z)S(z) hours. The quantity of completed rides and driver utilization are

Q(p,z)=min⁡{D(p),S(z)},u(p,z)=Q(p,z)S(z).Q(p,z)=\min\{D(p),S(z)\},\qquad u(p,z)=\frac{Q(p,z)}{S(z)}.Q(p,z)=min{D(p),S(z)},u(p,z)=S(z)Q(p,z)​.

Drivers earn wages only while carrying riders. Thus an earnings equilibrium is a positive sequence ztz_tzt​ satisfying zt=wtu(pt,zt)z_t=w_tu(p_t,z_t)zt​=wt​u(pt​,zt​) in every period. The platform's period profit is π(p,w,z)=(p−w)Q(p,z)\pi(p,w,z)=(p-w)Q(p,z)π(p,w,z)=(p−w)Q(p,z). A minimum earnings target M>0M>0M>0 requires

wt+1≥Mu(pt,zt).w_{t+1}\ge\frac{M}{u(p_t,z_t)}.wt+1​≥u(pt​,zt​)M​.

The rule uses utilization in one period to set a wage floor in the next. A policy is stable if its prices and wages are feasible, it satisfies equilibrium and the wage rule, wages have a finite upper bound across all periods, and profit is nonnegative in all but finitely many periods. This definition permits a finite transition with losses but excludes a wage sequence that grows without bound (Asadpour, Lobel, and van Ryzin, 2022, p. 8, Definitions 1–2 and (5)).

The revenue function is R(p)=pD(p)R(p)=pD(p)R(p)=pD(p), and the labor cost function is C(z)=zS(z)C(z)=zS(z)C(z)=zS(z). Write HHH for the inverse of CCC on positive expenditure. The paper assumes that DDD is positive, continuous, and strictly decreasing; SSS is strictly increasing, differentiable, and positive except possibly at zero; RRR has a unique peak at p∗p^*p∗; and demand and supply cross at w∗w^*w∗, so D(w∗)=S(w∗)D(w^*)=S(w^*)D(w∗)=S(w∗) (Asadpour, Lobel, and van Ryzin, 2022, p. 8, Regularity assumptions).

Each theorem in this mission retains these standing assumptions, including when a particular result uses only some of them.

Formalization targets

Exact stability threshold

The goal is Theorem 1 of the paper. For every M>0M>0M>0, stability is characterized by

Stable⁡(D,S,M)⟺M≤z∗,z∗={w∗,p∗≤w∗,H(R(p∗)),p∗>w∗.\operatorname{Stable}(D,S,M)\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad M\le z^*,\qquad z^*=\begin{cases}w^*,&p^*\le w^*,\\H(R(p^*)),&p^*>w^*.\end{cases}Stable(D,S,M)⟺M≤z∗,z∗={w∗,H(R(p∗)),​p∗≤w∗,p∗>w∗.​

The equality case p∗=w∗p^*=w^*p∗=w∗ belongs to the first branch. The theorem gives an if and only if statement about all feasible sequences of prices and wages, rather than a condition for one chosen stationary policy (Asadpour, Lobel, and van Ryzin, 2022, p. 11, Theorem 1 and (7)).

Supporting results

The milestones reproduce Lemmas 1–4 and two claims in the Online Appendix. Lemma 1 establishes the inverse labor cost's existence, regularity, and monotonicity. Lemma 2 identifies continuous, unique equilibrium earnings for a given price and positive wage. Lemma 3 states that stability admits a policy with price equal to wage. Lemma 4 rewrites the wage rule in that regime. The appendix claims compare the loose-supply threshold with w∗w^*w∗ and show that the tight-supply wage-growth factor exceeds one above w∗w^*w∗ (Asadpour, Lobel, and van Ryzin, 2022, pp. 9–10 and Online Appendix p. 4).

Significance

The theorem identifies the full stable range of targets in this model. In the tight-supply case, raising the target above the demand–supply crossing cannot be stabilized by choosing a different sequence of prices. In the loose-supply case, the highest stable target is tied to the cost of supplying drivers at the platform's peak potential revenue. The distinction explains why the same regulation can have different limits across markets with different demand and supply curves (Asadpour, Lobel, and van Ryzin, 2022, p. 11 and Figure 2).

The paper proves this result mathematically. The remaining formalization task is to represent its sequence model and analytic assumptions in Lean and prove the threshold statement and its supporting lemmas there. Its inverse-cost, equilibrium, and policy-stability interfaces can also be reused for the companion results on utilization shocks and static stability in the same paper. Those companion theorems are separate missions in this series.

Difficulty

The short threshold formula hides two distinct obligations: a policy must satisfy the earnings equilibrium and lagged wage rule at every period, while the impossibility direction must exclude every stable feasible policy, including policies that vary prices over time. The equilibrium earnings formula changes regime when supply at the posted wage crosses demand. At the boundary the two formulas must agree, and the argument must still handle wages that approach or cross the demand–supply point. Boundedness and profit conditions also interact with a finite initial period in which profit may be negative.

The paper's printed explanation for one strict inequality in the tight-supply converse is insufficient: two decreasing factors do not determine the direction of their product. The formal target keeps the inequality the paper uses, while the appendix quotation remains as printed (Asadpour, Lobel, and van Ryzin, 2022, Online Appendix p. 4).

Formalization scope

Prices, wages, earnings, demand, supply, cost, and revenue are real valued. The curves' regularity is imposed on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); differentiability of supply is imposed on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) together with continuity at zero. Revenue is strictly increasing up to p∗p^*p∗ and strictly decreasing afterward, encoding the unique peak. The crossing w∗w^*w∗ and inverse HHH are parameters with their characterizing properties, so the statements hold for their uniquely determined values. The inverse is only used at positive costs.

Lean indexes the first period by 000, so its rule applies to wt+1w_{t+1}wt+1​ for every t≥0t\ge0t≥0 and places no floor on w0w_0w0​. The paper starts at period 111 and likewise leaves the first wage free. “Bounded wages” means a single real upper bound for every period; “all but finitely many periods” is represented by an eventually true condition on N\mathbb NN.

An equilibrium requires zt>0z_t>0zt​>0. This explicit domain condition prevents a zero-supply input from making u=0/0u=0/0u=0/0 and then M/u=0M/u=0M/u=0 under Lean's total real division, which would make the regulation vacuous. Lemma 2 correspondingly uses w>0w>0w>0. Its branch condition S(w)<D(p)S(w)<D(p)S(w)<D(p) agrees with the paper's w<S−1(D(p))w<S^{-1}(D(p))w<S−1(D(p)) wherever that inverse exists and remains meaningful when demand is outside the range of supply. These domain choices are stated with the items they affect. A complete development needs real-analysis facts about continuous strictly monotone functions and inverses, eventual properties of sequences, and elementary bounds on the utilization ratio. Contributions establishing these interfaces or the stated milestones are within scope.

Selected references

  • Arash Asadpour, Ilan Lobel, and Garrett van Ryzin, Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces, SSRN preprint 3502607, version of August 24, 2022; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022. SSRN preprint. The local formalization uses the dated preprint's page and theorem numbering.
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Digital Privacy I: The Profit-Maximizing Data Collection and Protection Have a Closed Form, and Both Weakly Increase with the Data-Driven Revenue Share PResearch Paper

Why digital businesses choose how much data to keep and how well to guard it

Platforms that earn money from their users' activity make two linked decisions about the data that activity generates: how much of it to record and store, and how much to spend protecting what they store. Stored data lets a business tailor its services and sell data-driven products, but it also attracts adversaries (hackers, data brokers, unauthorized third parties) whose access harms users, who then use the service less. Fainmesser, Galeotti and Momot, Digital Privacy (Management Science 69(6), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4513; author manuscript SSRN 3459274), build a tractable model of this trade-off and solve it in closed form. Their first main result, Theorem 1, gives the profit-maximizing data strategy explicitly and shows that a business whose revenue depends more on data both collects more and protects more. The result is the basis for the paper's policy analysis (data protection standards, Pigouvian taxes on stored data) and for its comparison with the social optimum, which is the subject of a companion mission.

Setting

A unit mass of identical users each choose an activity level a≥0a \ge 0a≥0. The business stores a fraction ξ∈[0,1]\xi \in [0,1]ξ∈[0,1] of every user's activity and protects it at level C≥0C \ge 0C≥0, at cost ψC\psi CψC. With average activity aˉ\bar aaˉ and a mass ω\omegaω of active adversaries, a user's utility is (display (1))

U(a,aˉ)=a−12a2+βaaˉ+(ρ−ω)aξ,U(a, \bar a) = a - \tfrac12 a^2 + \beta a\bar a + (\rho - \omega) a\xi ,U(a,aˉ)=a−21​a2+βaaˉ+(ρ−ω)aξ,

where β∈[0,1)\beta \in [0,1)β∈[0,1) measures network effects and ρ∈[0,1)\rho \in [0,1)ρ∈[0,1) the users' benefit from tailored services built on stored data. Adversaries have access costs γC\gamma CγC with γ\gammaγ uniform on [0,M][0, M][0,M] and gain aˉξ\bar a\xiaˉξ; letting M→∞M \to \inftyM→∞, the mass of active adversaries is ω=ξaˉ/C\omega = \xi\bar a/Cω=ξaˉ/C. Proposition 1 shows that for every data strategy (ξ,C)(\xi, C)(ξ,C) with C>0C > 0C>0 this users–adversaries subgame has a unique equilibrium,

aˉ∗(ξ,C)=C(1+ρξ)C(1−β)+ξ2,ω∗(ξ,C)=ξaˉ∗(ξ,C)C,\bar a^*(\xi, C) = \frac{C(1+\rho\xi)}{C(1-\beta)+\xi^2}, \qquad \omega^*(\xi, C) = \frac{\xi\bar a^*(\xi, C)}{C},aˉ∗(ξ,C)=C(1−β)+ξ2C(1+ρξ)​,ω∗(ξ,C)=Cξaˉ∗(ξ,C)​,

with consumer surplus CS(ξ,C)=12aˉ∗(ξ,C)2\mathrm{CS}(\xi, C) = \tfrac12\bar a^*(\xi, C)^2CS(ξ,C)=21​aˉ∗(ξ,C)2; when nothing is stored, aˉ∗(0,C)=1/(1−β)\bar a^*(0, C) = 1/(1-\beta)aˉ∗(0,C)=1/(1−β). The business's profit is (display (2))

Π(ξ,C)=(1−P) aˉ∗(ξ,C)+P ξaˉ∗(ξ,C)−ψC,\Pi(\xi, C) = (1-P)\,\bar a^*(\xi, C) + P\,\xi\bar a^*(\xi, C) - \psi C ,Π(ξ,C)=(1−P)aˉ∗(ξ,C)+Pξaˉ∗(ξ,C)−ψC,

where the revenue model P∈[0,1]P \in [0,1]P∈[0,1] is the share of revenue that is data-driven: P=0P = 0P=0 is a purely usage-driven business, P=1P = 1P=1 a purely data-driven one. A business optimum is a strategy (ξ,C)∈[0,1]×[0,∞)(\xi, C) \in [0,1] \times [0,\infty)(ξ,C)∈[0,1]×[0,∞) that maximizes Π\PiΠ over [0,1]×[0,∞)[0,1] \times [0,\infty)[0,1]×[0,∞).

The Lean development uses the same names: abar, omegaStar, CS, profit, Feasible, IsBusinessOpt, the best-response quantities Ch (ChC_hCh​), kappa (κ\kappaκ), Cl (ClC_lCl​), xiBR, the threshold psiL (ψL\psi_LψL​), the interior root xiI (ξi\xi_iξi​), and the closed forms xiStar (ξ⋆\xi^\starξ⋆) and CStar (C⋆C^\starC⋆).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For fixed 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1, 0<ρ<10 < \rho < 10<ρ<1, ψ>0\psi > 0ψ>0 and every P∈(0,1]P \in (0,1]P∈(0,1], let

ξ⋆=max⁡{0,min⁡{1,12Pρ(−(1−P)ρ−P+∣P−(1−P)ρ∣ψmax⁡{0,ψ−Pρ})}},\xi^\star = \max\Big\{0, \min\Big\{1, \frac{1}{2P\rho}\Big(-(1-P)\rho - P + |P-(1-P)\rho|\sqrt{\frac{\psi}{\max\{0,\psi-P\rho\}}}\Big)\Big\}\Big\},ξ⋆=max{0,min{1,2Pρ1​(−(1−P)ρ−P+∣P−(1−P)ρ∣max{0,ψ−Pρ}ψ​​)}}, C⋆=ξ⋆1−β(−ξ⋆+1ψ(1+ρξ⋆)(1−P(1−ξ⋆))).C^\star = \frac{\xi^\star}{1-\beta}\Big(-\xi^\star + \sqrt{\tfrac1\psi(1+\rho\xi^\star)(1-P(1-\xi^\star))}\Big).C⋆=1−βξ⋆​(−ξ⋆+ψ1​(1+ρξ⋆)(1−P(1−ξ⋆))​).

Then (ξ⋆,C⋆)(\xi^\star, C^\star)(ξ⋆,C⋆) is a business optimum, and both P↦ξ⋆P \mapsto \xi^\starP↦ξ⋆ and P↦C⋆P \mapsto C^\starP↦C⋆ are weakly increasing on (0,1](0,1](0,1].

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 10): the subgame equilibrium (3) is unique, and consumer surplus is (4).
  2. Proposition 1 (a)–(b) with footnote 15: aˉ∗\bar a^*aˉ∗ and ξaˉ∗\xi\bar a^*ξaˉ∗ increase in CCC, and are single-peaked in ξ\xiξ.
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 29): for fixed ξ\xiξ, the unique optimal protection is max⁡{Ch(ξ),0}\max\{C_h(\xi), 0\}max{Ch​(ξ),0}.
  4. Lemma 2 (p. 29): for fixed C>0C > 0C>0, the unique optimal collection is −κ(C)+κ(C)2+C(1−β)-\kappa(C) + \sqrt{\kappa(C)^2 + C(1-\beta)}−κ(C)+κ(C)2+C(1−β)​ if C<ClC < C_lC<Cl​ and 111 if C>ClC > C_lC>Cl​.
  5. App. A.2 summary (p. 31): with Pρ≤ψL≤ψHP\rho \le \psi_L \le \psi_HPρ≤ψL​≤ψH​, the business optimum is (1,Ch(1))(1, C_h(1))(1,Ch​(1)) for ψ≤ψL\psi \le \psi_Lψ≤ψL​, (ξi,Ch(ξi))(\xi_i, C_h(\xi_i))(ξi​,Ch​(ξi​)) with ξi∈(0,1)\xi_i \in (0,1)ξi​∈(0,1) for ψL<ψ<ψH\psi_L < \psi < \psi_HψL​<ψ<ψH​, and (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) for ψ≥ψH\psi \ge \psi_Hψ≥ψH​.

Significance

Theorem 1 is the statement that a business's revenue model alone orders its data practices: holding users and costs fixed, moving toward data-driven revenue never lowers collection and never lowers protection. The paper uses it to explain why consumer surplus is maximized at an intermediate revenue model P=ρ/(1+ρ)P = \rho/(1+\rho)P=ρ/(1+ρ) (Proposition 2), and as the benchmark against which it evaluates regulation in §6. The closed form also makes the regime structure explicit: no collection when protection is expensive, full collection when it is cheap, and an interior solution in between.

The result is proved in the paper (App. A.2–A.3, with the proofs of Lemmas 1–2 in Online App. B), but parts of that proof are informal: several steps are "easy to check" or "can be derived similarly", one case is treated and the other left to the reader, and the second-order conditions are referred to a general lemma in Online App. C.5. No machine-checked version exists. A formal proof certifies the closed form, including its boundary cases, which the printed formula handles through an infinite square root.

Difficulty

The profit is not jointly concave, so first-order conditions do not settle the problem. The argument intersects the two best responses (Lemmas 1–2), and two candidate strategies survive in the intermediate regime: (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) and the interior point. Choosing between them requires comparing profits across all ψ\psiψ and showing the comparison flips exactly at ψH\psi_HψH​. Monotonicity in PPP is harder still: as PPP moves, so do both thresholds ψL(P)\psi_L(P)ψL​(P) and ψH(P)\psi_H(P)ψH​(P), so a fixed ψ\psiψ can cross from one regime to another, and ξ⋆\xi^\starξ⋆ and C⋆C^\starC⋆ must be shown monotone within each regime and across the switches. Within the interior regime C⋆=Ch(ξ⋆)C^\star = C_h(\xi^\star)C⋆=Ch​(ξ⋆) depends on PPP both directly and through ξ⋆\xi^\starξ⋆, so differentiating the closed form does not by itself give the sign.

Formalization scope

All parameters are explicit real numbers; every optimum is taken over ξ∈[0,1]\xi \in [0,1]ξ∈[0,1], C≥0C \ge 0C≥0, never over R2\mathbb R^2R2. The page's ranges are 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1, 0≤ρ<10 \le \rho < 10≤ρ<1, ψ≥0\psi \ge 0ψ≥0, 0≤P≤10 \le P \le 10≤P≤1. The following are added and disclosed in each item: ψ>0\psi > 0ψ>0 everywhere (otherwise ChC_hCh​ and (6) divide by zero and no maximizer exists); P>0P > 0P>0 and ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0 in Theorem 1 and the App. A.2 summary (formula (5) divides by 2Pρ2P\rho2Pρ); C>0C > 0C>0 in Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 (the adversary mass ξaˉ/C\xi\bar a/Cξaˉ/C); ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0 in Lemma 2.

Three conventions are fixed. First, aˉ∗(0,C)=1/(1−β)\bar a^*(0, C) = 1/(1-\beta)aˉ∗(0,C)=1/(1−β) for every CCC, the paper's value at (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) where (3) is 0/00/00/0. Second, ξ⋆=1\xi^\star = 1ξ⋆=1 whenever ψ≤Pρ\psi \le P\rhoψ≤Pρ, the page's own reading of the infinite square root in (5). Third, ψ≥ψH\psi \ge \psi_Hψ≥ψH​ is written as (P+(1−P)ρ)2≤4(1−P)ψ(P+(1-P)\rho)^2 \le 4(1-P)\psi(P+(1−P)ρ)2≤4(1−P)ψ, so that ψH=+∞\psi_H = +\inftyψH​=+∞ at P=1P = 1P=1. Using Lean's 0/0=00/0 = 00/0=0 at either of the first two places makes Theorem 1 false, not trivial, and is ruled out by these definitions. Theorem 1 asserts that (ξ⋆,C⋆)(\xi^\star, C^\star)(ξ⋆,C⋆) is a maximizer: uniqueness fails at P=ρ/(1+ρ)P = \rho/(1+\rho)P=ρ/(1+ρ), ψ=ρ2/(1+ρ)\psi = \rho^2/(1+\rho)ψ=ρ2/(1+ρ). Monotonicity is MonotoneOn on (0,1](0,1](0,1] with β,ρ,ψ\beta, \rho, \psiβ,ρ,ψ fixed; a Monotone statement with junk values outside (0,1](0,1](0,1] would not be the paper's claim.

A complete development needs only real analysis from Mathlib: one-variable calculus for the best responses, square-root and absolute-value manipulations for the closed form, and a profit comparison across regimes. The best-response lemmas are reusable for the companion mission on the social optimum. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of auxiliary lemmas such as C⋆=Ch(ξ⋆)C^\star = C_h(\xi^\star)C⋆=Ch​(ξ⋆), are welcome.

Selected references

  • I. P. Fainmesser, A. Galeotti, R. Momot, Digital Privacy, Management Science 69(6):3157–3173, 2023. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4513; author manuscript (This Draft: April 2022), SSRN 3459274.
  • E. L. Glaeser, J. A. Scheinkman, Non-Market Interactions, NBER Working Paper 8053, 2000 (existence and uniqueness of the users' response, used in App. A.1). doi:10.3386/w8053
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Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Ride-Hailing Networks with Strategic Drivers: The Impact of Platform Control Capabilities on Performance: Centralized Control Has a Unique Driver Equilibrium and the Two-Step Solution Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Ride-hailing platforms such as Uber and Lyft match riders with self-scheduling drivers who decide for themselves whether to work. Two features make capacity planning on such a platform different from classical fleet management. Demand is spatially imbalanced: more trips start in some locations than end there, so cars accumulate where they are not needed unless they drive back empty. And capacity is endogenous: the number of participating drivers depends on what drivers expect to earn, which in turn depends on how the platform uses them.

Afèche, Liu and Maglaras (MSOM 2023) study how much a platform gains from two operational controls under these conditions: admission control (rejecting some ride requests, depending on destination) and centralized repositioning (directing idle drivers to move empty between locations). The benchmark of their comparison is the regime in which the platform has both controls, called centralized control (regime CCC). This mission formalizes the paper's characterization of that benchmark: how a fixed number of drivers should be allocated, what each driver then earns, and why the resulting driver equilibrium is the platform's optimum.

Setting

There are two locations and four routes lklklk, l,k∈{1,2}l,k\in\{1,2\}l,k∈{1,2}. Route lklklk has potential demand rate Λlk\Lambda_{lk}Λlk​ and travel time tlk>0t_{lk}>0tlk​>0. The price is ppp per unit of travel time; the platform keeps a share γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and drivers keep γˉp\bar\gamma pγˉ​p, with γˉ=1−γ\bar\gamma=1-\gammaγˉ​=1−γ, while paying a driving cost rate ccc, with γˉp−c>0\bar\gamma p-c>0γˉ​p−c>0. Demand is imbalanced: 0<Λ12<Λ210<\Lambda_{12}<\Lambda_{21}0<Λ12​<Λ21​ (Assumption 1). Repositioning is profitable: c t12<t21(γˉp−c)c\,t_{12}<t_{21}(\bar\gamma p-c)ct12​<t21​(γˉ​p−c) and c t21<t12(γˉp−c)c\,t_{21}<t_{12}(\bar\gamma p-c)ct21​<t12​(γˉ​p−c) (Assumption 2).

A pool of NNN potential drivers has opportunity cost rates drawn from a continuous distribution with CDF FFF, strictly increasing on [0,cˉo][0,\bar c_o][0,cˉo​] with cˉo≥p−c\bar c_o\ge p-ccˉo​≥p−c, F(0)=0F(0)=0F(0)=0 and F(cˉo)=1F(\bar c_o)=1F(cˉo​)=1 (Assumption 3). If drivers expect a profit rate π\piπ, then n=NF(π)n=NF(\pi)n=NF(π) of them participate.

In steady state the platform splits a driver capacity nnn into service capacity slk≤Slk:=Λlktlks_{lk}\le S_{lk}:=\Lambda_{lk}t_{lk}slk​≤Slk​:=Λlk​tlk​ on each route, repositioning capacity r12,r21r_{12},r_{21}r12​,r21​ (empty driving) and queueing capacity q1,q2q_1,q_2q1​,q2​ (idle drivers). With totals sˉ\bar ssˉ, rˉ\bar rrˉ, qˉ\bar qqˉ​ and Sˉ=∑lkSlk\bar S=\sum_{lk}S_{lk}Sˉ=∑lk​Slk​, the set CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n) of feasible allocations is

s12+r12t12=s21+r21t21,sˉ+rˉ+qˉ=n,0≤s≤S, r≥0, q≥0.\frac{s_{12}+r_{12}}{t_{12}}=\frac{s_{21}+r_{21}}{t_{21}},\qquad \bar s+\bar r+\bar q=n,\qquad 0\le s\le S,\ r\ge0,\ q\ge0 .t12​s12​+r12​​=t21​s21​+r21​​,sˉ+rˉ+qˉ​=n,0≤s≤S, r≥0, q≥0.

The first equation balances the flows of cars between the locations. The platform earns Π(s)=γpsˉ\Pi(s)=\gamma p\bar sΠ(s)=γpsˉ; each driver earns

π(s,r,n)=(γˉp−c)sˉ−crˉn.\pi(s,r,n)=\frac{(\bar\gamma p-c)\bar s-c\bar r}{n}.π(s,r,n)=n(γˉ​p−c)sˉ−crˉ​.

The platform's problem (13) maximizes Π(s)\Pi(s)Π(s) over (s,r,q,n)(s,r,q,n)(s,r,q,n) with (s,r,q)∈CC(n)(s,r,q)\in\mathcal C_C(n)(s,r,q)∈CC​(n) and the participation equation n=NF(π(s,r,n))n=NF(\pi(s,r,n))n=NF(π(s,r,n)); its value is ΠC∗\Pi^*_CΠC∗​.

The paper solves (13) in two steps. Step 1 fixes nnn, computes the maximal revenue ΠC(n)\Pi_C(n)ΠC​(n) over CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n), and among the revenue-maximizing allocations selects one that maximizes π\piπ, giving the per-driver profit πC(n)\pi_C(n)πC​(n). Step 2 solves nC=NF(πC(nC))n_C=NF(\pi_C(n_C))nC​=NF(πC​(nC​)). The constants

n1C:=Sˉ−(Λ21−Λ12)t21,n2C:=Sˉ+(Λ21−Λ12)t12n^C_1:=\bar S-(\Lambda_{21}-\Lambda_{12})t_{21},\qquad n^C_2:=\bar S+(\Lambda_{21}-\Lambda_{12})t_{12}n1C​:=Sˉ−(Λ21​−Λ12​)t21​,n2C​:=Sˉ+(Λ21​−Λ12​)t12​

split capacities into scarce, moderate and ample zones.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1

πC continuous and nonincreasing on (0,∞), strictly decreasing on (n1C,∞);∃! nC>0: nC=NF(πC(nC));\pi_C \text{ continuous and nonincreasing on }(0,\infty),\ \text{strictly decreasing on }(n^C_1,\infty);\qquad \exists!\,n_C>0:\ n_C=NF(\pi_C(n_C));πC​ continuous and nonincreasing on (0,∞), strictly decreasing on (n1C​,∞);∃!nC​>0: nC​=NF(πC​(nC​)); πC(n)=max⁡(s,r,q)∈CC(n)π(s,r,n)(0<n≤N);ΠC∗=ΠC(nC), attained by the two-step tuple at nC.\pi_C(n)=\max_{(s,r,q)\in\mathcal C_C(n)}\pi(s,r,n)\quad(0<n\le N);\qquad \Pi^*_C=\Pi_C(n_C),\ \text{attained by the two-step tuple at } n_C .πC​(n)=(s,r,q)∈CC​(n)max​π(s,r,n)(0<n≤N);ΠC∗​=ΠC​(nC​), attained by the two-step tuple at nC​.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1(1)–(3): the selected optimal allocation in each zone — sˉ=n\bar s=nsˉ=n, r=q=0r=q=0r=q=0 for n≤n1Cn\le n^C_1n≤n1C​; sˉ+r12=n\bar s+r_{12}=nsˉ+r12​=n with r12=t12t12+t21(n−n1C)r_{12}=\frac{t_{12}}{t_{12}+t_{21}}(n-n^C_1)r12​=t12​+t21​t12​​(n−n1C​), r21=0r_{21}=0r21​=0, q=0q=0q=0 for n1C<n≤n2Cn^C_1<n\le n^C_2n1C​<n≤n2C​; sˉ=Sˉ\bar s=\bar Ssˉ=Sˉ, r12=n2C−Sˉr_{12}=n^C_2-\bar Sr12​=n2C​−Sˉ, r21=0r_{21}=0r21​=0, qˉ=n−n2C\bar q=n-n^C_2qˉ​=n−n2C​ for n>n2Cn>n^C_2n>n2C​.
  2. Display (18): the closed form of πC(n)\pi_C(n)πC​(n) in the three zones.
  3. Lemma 1 at X=CX=CX=C: if πC\pi_CπC​ is driver-optimal (16) and nonincreasing, the two-step solution solves (13).

Significance

The corollary is what makes centralized control a usable benchmark. It says the platform's joint problem, which couples a linear program with a fixed-point equation in nnn, decomposes: the platform can optimize a fixed capacity and then let drivers settle, with no loss. Under the other regimes of the paper this alignment of platform and driver incentives can fail, and the paper's comparisons of regimes (value of admission control, value of repositioning) are measured against the regime-CCC optimum characterized here. Proposition 1 also makes explicit that a centralized platform keeps drivers idle only when all demand is served.

The paper's proofs are in its e-companion, which is not part of the source this mission cites; no machine-checked version of these results exists. The mission produces a checked parametric solution of a small linear program, a checked closed form of the per-driver profit, and a checked equilibrium-and-optimality argument, with every standing assumption made explicit.

Difficulty

Proposition 1 is a parametric linear program in eight variables, but stating its solution is not enough: each zone needs an upper bound on sˉ\bar ssˉ valid on all of CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n), and a second optimization (per-driver profit) over the set of revenue maximizers, which is not a singleton. Driver-optimality (16) is a separate claim about a different objective over the full set CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n); it holds only because Assumption 2 makes the capacity used for excess cross-location demand still profitable for drivers. Finally, Lemma 1 compares tuples of (13) at different capacities, which requires monotonicity of ΠC\Pi_CΠC​ and πC\pi_CπC​ in nnn and the participation equation at both capacities. The natural reading of "nC∗=nCn^*_C=n_CnC∗​=nC​" as uniqueness of the optimal capacity is false when nC>n2Cn_C>n^C_2nC​>n2C​, since wasteful repositioning can keep revenue γpSˉ\gamma p\bar SγpSˉ at a smaller capacity; the targets assert attainment instead.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace RideHailing.Central, in one definition file. Routes are named fields (Λ11 … Λ22, t11 … t22), not indexed. FFF is ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ of a measure μ on R\mathbb RR. The standing hypothesis Model.Standing bundles 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1, γˉp−c>0\bar\gamma p-c>0γˉ​p−c>0, Assumptions 1–3 as printed, and the paper's implicit conventions, made explicit: tlk>0t_{lk}>0tlk​>0, Λ11,Λ22≥0\Lambda_{11},\Lambda_{22}\ge0Λ11​,Λ22​≥0, p>0p>0p>0, N>0N>0N>0, c>0c>0c>0, μ\muμ a probability measure with continuous CDF.

ΠC(n)\Pi_C(n)ΠC​(n) and πC(n)\pi_C(n)πC​(n) are defined as suprema over the allocation problem; every target states attainment with IsGreatest or with membership in the selected set, so no conclusion rests on a supremum convention. Capacities in (13) and (16) are strictly positive, because (12d) divides by nnn.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: πC\pi_CπC​ is defined through the two-step selection, never by its closed form (18); "max" is never an unattained supremum; feasibility for (13) includes the participation equation and n>0n>0n>0; and nCn_CnC​ is characterized by ∃!\exists!∃! and then quantified over, never chosen.

Regimes MMM and AAA of the paper, which need objects defined only in the e-companion, are out of scope, as are the reformulation of §2.4 and Remark 2. Proofs of any milestone, and lemmas on monotonicity of ΠC\Pi_CΠC​ or attainment of linear programs over CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n), are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Afèche, Z. Liu, C. Maglaras, Ride-Hailing Networks with Strategic Drivers: The Impact of Platform Control Capabilities on Performance, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Articles in Advance, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1221
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Analytical Solution to a Partially Observable Machine Maintenance Problem with Obvious Failures: The Optimal Maintenance Frontier Has Six Possible StructuresResearch Paper

Motivation

Machines in production lines deteriorate in ways that are only partly visible. A machine may run in a degraded state that raises costs without announcing itself, and eventually fail in a way that cannot be missed. The decision maker must choose between continuing production, paying for an inspection that reveals the hidden state, and replacing the machine preventively. Models of this kind are partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), and for POMDPs closed-form optimal policies are rare: the value function lives on the space of beliefs and is usually only computed numerically.

H. Zhang and W. Zhang, Analytical Solution to a Partially Observable Machine Maintenance Problem with Obvious Failures (Management Science, 2022; read here as SSRN 2945049, version of 2022-08-21), solve the classical two-state version of this problem completely. Working in the dual "efficient frontier" framework of Zhang (2010), they show that the optimal solution has exactly six possible structures and give each in closed form, with explicit or implicitly characterized thresholds on the replacement and inspection costs.

Setting

A machine is in a hidden state x∈{0,1}x\in\{0,1\}x∈{0,1} (good or bad) or in the observable failure state FFF. Each period, if the machine has failed it is replaced correctively at cost cFc^FcF; otherwise one of three actions is chosen:

  • production PPP costs 000 in state 0 and cPc^PcP in state 1;
  • inspection III costs cIc^IcI and reveals the current state;
  • preventive replacement RRR costs cRc^RcR and resets the machine to state 0.

Production always takes place. From state 0 the machine moves to state 1 with probability γ0\gamma_0γ0​; from state 1 it fails with probability γ1\gamma_1γ1​. Write γˉx=1−γx\bar\gamma_x=1-\gamma_xγˉ​x​=1−γx​, p0=(γˉ0,γ0)′\mathbf p_0=(\bar\gamma_0,\gamma_0)'p0​=(γˉ​0​,γ0​)′, p1=(0,γˉ1)′\mathbf p_1=(0,\bar\gamma_1)'p1​=(0,γˉ​1​)′, gP(uF)=(0,cP+βγ1uF)′\mathbf g^P(u_F)=(0,c^P+\beta\gamma_1u_F)'gP(uF​)=(0,cP+βγ1​uF​)′, gI(uF)=(cI,cI+βγ1uF)′\mathbf g^I(u_F)=(c^I,c^I+\beta\gamma_1u_F)'gI(uF​)=(cI,cI+βγ1​uF​)′ and PPu=(p0′u,p1′u)′\mathbf P^P\mathbf u=(\mathbf p_0'\mathbf u,\mathbf p_1'\mathbf u)'PPu=(p0′​u,p1′​u)′. Costs are discounted by β\betaβ over an infinite horizon.

A continuation-cost vector u=(u0,u1)′\mathbf u=(u_0,u_1)'u=(u0​,u1​)′ records the cost of a continuation policy from each hidden state, and uFu_FuF​ the cost after a failure. The expected optimal cost at an (unnormalized) belief π=(π0,π1)′≥0\boldsymbol\pi=(\pi_0,\pi_1)'\ge0π=(π0​,π1​)′≥0 is V(π)=min⁡u∈U∗π′uV(\boldsymbol\pi)=\min_{\mathbf u\in U^*}\boldsymbol\pi'\mathbf uV(π)=minu∈U∗​π′u, where U∗U^*U∗ is the set of extreme points of the efficient frontier. The pair (U∗,uF∗)(U^*,u^*_F)(U∗,uF∗​) is the fixed point of the dual value iteration (12)–(16). In support-function form, a pair (W,wF)(W,w_F)(W,wF​) is mapped to

W′(π)=min⁡{π′gP(wF)+βW((PP)′π), (π0+π1)(cR+βW(p0)), π′gI(wF)+β(π0W(p0)+π1W(p1))},W'(\boldsymbol\pi)=\min\Big\{\boldsymbol\pi'\mathbf g^P(w_F)+\beta W\big((\mathbf P^P)'\boldsymbol\pi\big),\ (\pi_0+\pi_1)\big(c^R+\beta W(\mathbf p_0)\big),\ \boldsymbol\pi'\mathbf g^I(w_F)+\beta\big(\pi_0W(\mathbf p_0)+\pi_1W(\mathbf p_1)\big)\Big\},W′(π)=min{π′gP(wF​)+βW((PP)′π), (π0​+π1​)(cR+βW(p0​)), π′gI(wF​)+β(π0​W(p0​)+π1​W(p1​))}, wF′=cF+βW(p0),w_F'=c^F+\beta W(\mathbf p_0),wF′​=cF+βW(p0​),

the three terms being PPP, RRR and III. A finite set UUU with a number uFu_FuF​ is the optimal solution for an action set if value iteration from zero terminal costs converges to min⁡u∈Uπ′u\min_{\mathbf u\in U}\boldsymbol\pi'\mathbf uminu∈U​π′u for every π≥0\boldsymbol\pi\ge0π≥0 and to uFu_FuF​ after a failure.

The structures are built from two point sequences. The production sequence is ui+1=gP(uF)+βPPui\mathbf u_{i+1}=\mathbf g^P(u_F)+\beta\mathbf P^P\mathbf u_iui+1​=gP(uF​)+βPPui​. Started on the diagonal at (uR,uR)′(u^R,u^R)'(uR,uR)′ with uF=uR+cF−cRu_F=u^R+c^F-c^RuF​=uR+cF−cR, the self-consistency equation uR=cR+βp0′umu^R=c^R+\beta\mathbf p_0'\mathbf u_muR=cR+βp0′​um​ has a unique solution uR=f(m)u^R=f(m)uR=f(m) (31). Started instead at the inspection point (35), it gives g(m)g(m)g(m) (40).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (pp. 27–28, Table 1)

Let θ=cP+βγ1cF1−β+β(γ0+γ1)\theta=\dfrac{c^P+\beta\gamma_1c^F}{1-\beta+\beta(\gamma_0+\gamma_1)}θ=1−β+β(γ0​+γ1​)cP+βγ1​cF​ and c^=(1+βγ0)cP−βγˉ1(1−β+βγ0+βγ1)cR+β2γ1γˉ1cF\hat c=(1+\beta\gamma_0)c^P-\beta\bar\gamma_1(1-\beta+\beta\gamma_0+\beta\gamma_1)c^R+\beta^2\gamma_1\bar\gamma_1c^Fc^=(1+βγ0​)cP−βγˉ​1​(1−β+βγ0​+βγ1​)cR+β2γ1​γˉ​1​cF. Under {P,I,R}\{P,I,R\}{P,I,R}:

cR≥θ ⇒ [P];γ0γ1θ≤cR<θ ⇒ R[P], IR[P] or [PIR] by explicit thresholds on cI;c^R\ge\theta\ \Rightarrow\ [P];\qquad \tfrac{\gamma_0}{\gamma_1}\theta\le c^R<\theta\ \Rightarrow\ R[P],\ IR[P]\ \text{or}\ [PIR]\ \text{by explicit thresholds on }c^I;cR≥θ ⇒ [P];γ1​γ0​​θ≤cR<θ ⇒ R[P], IR[P] or [PIR] by explicit thresholds on cI; cR<min⁡{γ0γ1θ,θ} ⇒ ∃ 0<c^1≤c^2<cR: [PR], I[PR] or [PIR] as cI≥c^2, c^1≤cI<c^2, cI<c^1,c^R<\min\{\tfrac{\gamma_0}{\gamma_1}\theta,\theta\}\ \Rightarrow\ \exists\,0<\hat c_1\le\hat c_2<c^R:\ [PR],\ I[PR]\ \text{or}\ [PIR]\ \text{as}\ c^I\ge\hat c_2,\ \hat c_1\le c^I<\hat c_2,\ c^I<\hat c_1,cR<min{γ1​γ0​​θ,θ} ⇒ ∃0<c^1​≤c^2​<cR: [PR], I[PR] or [PIR] as cI≥c^2​, c^1​≤cI<c^2​, cI<c^1​,

with every structure an explicit pair (U∗,uF∗)(U^*,u^*_F)(U∗,uF∗​) from Table 1, and the thresholds characterized implicitly (uI†\mathbf u^{I\dagger}uI† on the frontier of U†U^\daggerU† at cI=c^2c^I=\hat c_2cI=c^2​; min⁡f=min⁡g\min f=\min gminf=ming at cI=c^1c^I=\hat c_1cI=c^1​).

Milestones

Proposition 2 (the fixed-point equations), Proposition 3 (the cost of producing forever), Lemma 1 and Lemma 6 (the two sequences in closed form), Lemma 3 and Lemma 7 (the anchors fff and ggg), Proposition 4 (unimodality of fff), Theorem 1 (the two-action solution: [P][P][P], R[P]R[P]R[P], [PR][PR][PR], with extreme-point exactness) and Lemma 5 (when inspection enters).

Significance

The result. The theorem turns a POMDP into a finite list of explicit policies. Each structure is a periodic plan that needs no belief updating: produce for m†m^\daggerm† periods and replace; or inspect every m∗m^*m∗ periods and replace only if the machine is found bad. The thresholds tell when inspection is worth its cost, and the comparative statics of m†m^\daggerm† and m∗m^*m∗ follow from the closed forms. The authors use the solution to justify common maintenance practices.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper (main text §4, proofs in its e-companion, App. A); no part is machine-checked. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 argue geometrically from figures of convex curves in the plane ("the curve bends back", "all the points are still extreme points"). A formal development has to turn these into inequalities between piecewise-linear concave functions, and has to prove convergence of value iteration to the stated sets. The implicit thresholds of part (3) were not checked numerically when this mission was planned. Parts (1) and (2) and Theorem 1 were.

Difficulty

Verifying that a candidate set UUU is a fixed point is not enough: the goal asserts that value iteration from zero converges to it, so uniqueness of the bounded fixed point must be proved (a contraction argument in the supremum norm over the simplex). More importantly, finding the frontier requires knowing which points of the infinite production sequence are extreme, which depends on the location of the anchor relative to the curve {ui:i≥0}\{\mathbf u_i:i\ge0\}{ui​:i≥0} (Fig. 5 of the paper, five subcases). The natural induction on mmm fails because fff is not monotone: its least minimizer m†m^\daggerm† must be located through the unimodality of the real extension (Proposition 4). In part (3) the thresholds c^1,c^2\hat c_1,\hat c_2c^1​,c^2​ are defined implicitly, and showing that the three regimes are ordered in cIc^IcI requires monotonicity of the whole frontier in cIc^IcI.

Formalization scope

Everything is defined in the namespace MaintPOMDP.Frontier. Vectors and beliefs are Fin 2 → ℝ (index 0 = good state); beliefs are unnormalized, π≥0\boldsymbol\pi\ge0π≥0. The optimal solution is the limit of the support-function value iteration started from W≡0W\equiv0W≡0, wF=0w_F=0wF​=0; "the structure is X" means that this limit equals min⁡\minmin over the points of row X of Table 1, with the failure cost of that row.

Standing assumptions: 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1, 0<cP<cI<cR<cF0<c^P<c^I<c^R<c^F0<cP<cI<cR<cF (p. 14), and 0<γ0<10<\gamma_0<10<γ0​<1, 0<γ1<10<\gamma_1<10<γ1​<1, which the paper never states and which are added (the thresholds divide by γ1\gamma_1γ1​). The hypothesis γ0≠γ1\gamma_0\ne\gamma_1γ0​=γ1​ is added only to Lemmas 1, 3, 6, 7 and Proposition 4, whose printed formulas divide by γ1−γ0\gamma_1-\gamma_0γ1​−γ0​; fff and ggg themselves are defined as solutions of the affine anchor equations, so Theorems 1 and 2 cover γ0=γ1\gamma_0=\gamma_1γ0​=γ1​. Proposition 4 also carries the range of cRc^RcR that its proof uses. "m†=arg⁡min⁡fm^\dagger=\arg\min fm†=argminf" is the least minimizer, and its existence is part of the conclusion. In Theorem 2, the indices nR,nIn_R,n_InR​,nI​ of Table 1 are existential and extreme-point exactness is not asserted for the I[PR]I[PR]I[PR] and [PIR][PIR][PIR] rows (Table 1's I[PR]I[PR]I[PR] row conflicts with the paper's Proposition 8). It is asserted in Theorem 1. In part (3) the thresholds are chosen before cIc^IcI and the claims hold for every cI∈(cP,cR)c^I\in(c^P,c^R)cI∈(cP,cR).

Trivializing readings are ruled out: the value function is the limit of the iterates, not an arbitrary fixed point or a junk limit; identities hold for every belief π≥0\boldsymbol\pi\ge0π≥0, not only at vertices; every frontier set is given by formulas, so no extra points can be slipped in; minimizers are asserted, not assumed; and thresholds involving γ0/γ1\gamma_0/\gamma_1γ0​/γ1​ are evaluated with γ1>0\gamma_1>0γ1​>0.

A complete development needs convergence of value iteration for a monotone contraction on bounded functions over the cone π≥0\boldsymbol\pi\ge0π≥0, explicit solutions of two-dimensional linear recurrences, and lemmas on lower envelopes of finitely many linear functions in two variables. These are reusable beyond this mission, for other two-state POMDPs. Contributions of any milestone, of the γ0 = γ1 closed forms (App. B), or of a proof of Theorem 1 alone are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Zhang, W. Zhang, Analytical Solution to a Partially Observable Machine Maintenance Problem with Obvious Failures, Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4547 (read as SSRN 2945049, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945049)
  • H. Zhang, Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes: A Geometric Technique and Analysis, Operations Research 58(1), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0697
  • R. D. Smallwood, E. J. Sondik, The Optimal Control of Partially Observable Markov Processes over a Finite Horizon, Operations Research 21(5), 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.5.1071
  • S. M. Ross, Quality Control under Markovian Deterioration, Management Science 17(9), 1971. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.17.9.587
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Faster Cutting Plane Method and its Implications for Combinatorial and Convex Optimization I: The Largest-Coordinate Strategy Keeps the Stochastic Chasing 0 Game within 2(c+R)log(4mk²/p)Research Paper

Motivation

Cutting plane methods minimize a convex function, or find a point in a convex set, using only a separation oracle: a routine that, given a query point, either certifies it is good or returns a halfspace containing the target. Lee, Sidford and Wong (arXiv:1508.04874, FOCS 2015) gave a cutting plane method for a convex set in Rn\mathbb R^nRn inside a box of radius RRR that uses an expected O(nlog⁡(nR/ϵ))O(n\log(nR/\epsilon))O(nlog(nR/ϵ)) oracle calls and O(n3log⁡O(1)(nR/ϵ))O(n^3\log^{O(1)}(nR/\epsilon))O(n3logO(1)(nR/ϵ)) additional time, improving on the O(nω+1log⁡(nR/ϵ))O(n^{\omega+1}\log(nR/\epsilon))O(nω+1log(nR/ϵ)) additional time of Vaidya's method from over 25 years earlier, and derived from it faster algorithms for submodular function minimization, matroid intersection and submodular flow.

The speed-up depends on not recomputing the leverage scores of the current constraint matrix from scratch at every step. The algorithm maintains approximations and refreshes a few of them per step. Section 7.2 of the paper isolates the bookkeeping question this raises as a two-player game, the stochastic chasing 0⃗\vec 00 game, and shows that a simple greedy strategy keeps the accumulated error small. The game is self-contained and has nothing to do with convexity: it is a statement about a random walk in Rm\mathbb R^mRm that is partially reset at every step.

Setting

Fix a dimension m≥1m\ge1m≥1 and constants c>0c>0c>0, R>0R>0R>0. For v⃗∈Rm\vec v\in\mathbb R^mv∈Rm, ∥v⃗∥∞=max⁡i∣vi∣\|\vec v\|_\infty=\max_i|v_i|∥v∥∞​=maxi​∣vi​∣ and ∥v⃗∥2=(∑ivi2)1/2\|\vec v\|_2=(\sum_iv_i^2)^{1/2}∥v∥2​=(∑i​vi2​)1/2.

A point starts at x⃗(1)=0⃗\vec x^{(1)}=\vec 0x(1)=0. Each round k=1,2,…k=1,2,\dotsk=1,2,… runs as follows (Algorithm 4).

  1. A stochastic adversary chooses a probability distribution D(k)\mathcal D^{(k)}D(k) on Rm\mathbb R^mRm with mean 0⃗\vec 00 and ∥Δ⃗∥2≤c\|\vec\Delta\|_2\le c∥Δ∥2​≤c for every Δ⃗\vec\DeltaΔ in its support.
  2. The adversary chooses an observation y⃗(k)\vec y^{(k)}y​(k) with ∥y⃗(k)−x⃗(k)∥∞≤R\|\vec y^{(k)}-\vec x^{(k)}\|_\infty\le R∥y​(k)−x(k)∥∞​≤R.
  3. The player chooses a coordinate i(k)i^{(k)}i(k), knowing only y⃗(k)\vec y^{(k)}y​(k): neither x⃗(k)\vec x^{(k)}x(k), nor D(k)\mathcal D^{(k)}D(k), nor the step.
  4. A step Δ⃗(k)\vec\Delta^{(k)}Δ(k) is drawn from D(k)\mathcal D^{(k)}D(k) and the point moves to
xi(k)(k+1)=0,xj(k+1)=xj(k)+Δj(k)(j≠i(k)).x^{(k+1)}_{i^{(k)}}=0,\qquad x^{(k+1)}_j=x^{(k)}_j+\Delta^{(k)}_j\quad(j\ne i^{(k)}).xi(k)(k+1)​=0,xj(k+1)​=xj(k)​+Δj(k)​(j=i(k)).

The adversary may use everything that has happened so far to make its choices. The player wants to keep x⃗(k)\vec x^{(k)}x(k) near 0⃗\vec 00 in ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​; the adversary wants to push it away. The largest-coordinate strategy is i(k)=argmax⁡i∣yi(k)∣i^{(k)}=\operatorname{argmax}_i|y^{(k)}_i|i(k)=argmaxi​∣yi(k)​∣: reset the coordinate that looks largest.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 34

If the player uses the largest-coordinate strategy, then for every p∈(0,1]p\in(0,1]p∈(0,1], with probability at least 1−p1-p1−p,

∥x⃗(k)∥∞≤2(c+R)log⁡(4mk2/p)for all k≥1.\|\vec x^{(k)}\|_\infty\le2(c+R)\log\big(4mk^2/p\big)\qquad\text{for all }k\ge1.∥x(k)∥∞​≤2(c+R)log(4mk2/p)for all k≥1.

The bound holds simultaneously for all rounds, against every adaptive adversary, and grows only logarithmically in kkk, in mmm and in 1/p1/p1/p.

Milestones

The milestones are the steps that the paper's proof of Theorem 34 (pp. 43–44) displays:

  1. the exponential inequality ex≤1+x+x22e∣x∣e^x\le1+x+\tfrac{x^2}{2}e^{|x|}ex≤1+x+2x2​e∣x∣ and its consequence eαx+αδ≤eαx+αδeαx+12α2δ2eαx+∣α∣ce^{\alpha x+\alpha\delta}\le e^{\alpha x}+\alpha\delta e^{\alpha x}+\tfrac12\alpha^2\delta^2e^{\alpha x+|\alpha|c}eαx+αδ≤eαx+αδeαx+21​α2δ2eαx+∣α∣c for ∣δ∣≤c|\delta|\le c∣δ∣≤c;
  2. the one-step drift bound for the potential Φ(x⃗)=∑ieαxi+∑ie−αxi\Phi(\vec x)=\sum_ie^{\alpha x_i}+\sum_ie^{-\alpha x_i}Φ(x)=∑i​eαxi​+∑i​e−αxi​:
EΔ⃗∼D Φ(x⃗+Δ⃗)≤Φ(x⃗)+α2eαcc2η,η=max⁡(max⁡ieαxi,max⁡ie−αxi);\mathbb E_{\vec\Delta\sim\mathcal D}\,\Phi(\vec x+\vec\Delta)\le\Phi(\vec x)+\alpha^2e^{\alpha c}c^2\eta,\qquad\eta=\max\big(\max_ie^{\alpha x_i},\max_ie^{-\alpha x_i}\big);EΔ∼D​Φ(x+Δ)≤Φ(x)+α2eαcc2η,η=max(imax​eαxi​,imax​e−αxi​);
  1. the choice α=1/(2(c+R))\alpha=1/(2(c+R))α=1/(2(c+R)), for which e2α(c+R)(α(c+R))2≤1e^{2\alpha(c+R)}(\alpha(c+R))^2\le1e2α(c+R)(α(c+R))2≤1 and α2eαcc2≤e−α(R+c)\alpha^2e^{\alpha c}c^2\le e^{-\alpha(R+c)}α2eαcc2≤e−α(R+c);
  2. the union-bound arithmetic 1−∑k≥12m/λk=1−∑k≥1p/(2k2)≥1−p1-\sum_{k\ge1}2m/\lambda_k=1-\sum_{k\ge1}p/(2k^2)\ge1-p1−∑k≥1​2m/λk​=1−∑k≥1​p/(2k2)≥1−p for λk=4mk2/p\lambda_k=4mk^2/pλk​=4mk2/p.

Significance

Within the paper, Theorem 34 is what lets the cutting plane method keep its leverage-score estimates within a bounded multiplicative error while refreshing only one estimate per step; this is one of the ingredients behind the O(n3log⁡O(1)(nR/ϵ))O(n^3\log^{O(1)}(nR/\epsilon))O(n3logO(1)(nR/ϵ)) additional time. The game reappears whenever an algorithm tracks many slowly drifting quantities with noisy observations and can afford to recompute only a few of them exactly per step, which makes the statement useful beyond this paper.

None of the statements in this mission has a machine-checked proof. The theorem is published with a proof. The mission asks for a formal proof of the statement exactly as published, with the constant 444 inside the logarithm. A formal proof of the milestones alone would already give a reusable exponential-potential toolkit for adaptive random processes in Rm\mathbb R^mRm.

Difficulty

The point process is not a martingale: the player's resets depend on a noisy observation, the adversary is adaptive, and the reset can hit a coordinate that is up to 2R2R2R smaller in absolute value than the largest one. Per-coordinate tail bounds do not suffice, because the adversary may concentrate its moves on whichever coordinates the player is not resetting. A bound that holds for all kkk at once, with only logarithmic dependence on kkk, has to control all coordinates jointly. Establishing such joint control, with the specific constant 444 inside the logarithm, against the most adversarial interaction between the observation error RRR and the step size ccc, is where the work lies.

Formalization scope

  • Probability model. The randomness is a probability space (Ω,μ)(\Omega,\mu)(Ω,μ) with a filtration (Fk)k≥0(\mathcal F_k)_{k\ge0}(Fk​)k≥0​. The adversary's adaptive choice of D(k)\mathcal D^{(k)}D(k) is modelled by the conditional law of the step: each coordinate of the step has conditional mean 000 given the past, the step is measurable with respect to the next σ\sigmaσ-algebra, and ∑iΔi2≤c2\sum_i\Delta_i^2\le c^2∑i​Δi2​≤c2 holds everywhere. The observation y⃗(k)\vec y^{(k)}y​(k) is measurable with respect to the current σ\sigmaσ-algebra, so it is fixed before the step is drawn, and ∥y⃗(k)−x⃗(k)∥∞≤R\|\vec y^{(k)}-\vec x^{(k)}\|_\infty\le R∥y​(k)−x(k)∥∞​≤R holds on the actual trajectory.
  • Indexing. Coordinates are Fin m (0-based), with m≥1m\ge1m≥1. Lean round k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N is the paper's round k+1k+1k+1, so the goal's bound reads log⁡(4m(k+1)2/p)\log(4m(k+1)^2/p)log(4m(k+1)2/p); at Lean round 000 the point is 0⃗\vec 00.
  • Norms. ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​ is Lean's sup norm on Fin m → ℝ. The step bound ∥Δ⃗∥2≤c\|\vec\Delta\|_2\le c∥Δ∥2​≤c is written as ∑iΔi2≤c2\sum_i\Delta_i^2\le c^2∑i​Δi2​≤c2, never as a sup-norm bound. The paper's prose once writes ∥Δ⃗∥22≤c\|\vec\Delta\|_2^2\le c∥Δ∥22​≤c; Algorithm 4 and the proof use ∥Δ⃗∥2≤c\|\vec\Delta\|_2\le c∥Δ∥2​≤c, which is what is formalized.
  • Tie rule. argmax⁡i∣yi∣\operatorname{argmax}_i|y_i|argmaxi​∣yi​∣ breaks ties by the least index; the paper's theorem is claimed for any tie rule.
  • Constants. c>0c>0c>0, R>0R>0R>0 (Algorithm 4), 0<p≤10<p\le10<p≤1, natural logarithm. The drift milestone adds α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0.
  • Not trivial by construction. The hypotheses are satisfiable by genuinely random adversaries (a fair-coin step of size ccc is one), and the conclusion is a probability lower bound on an event, not a statement that holds vacuously; a formalization in which the observation could depend on the step, or in which the step bound were a sup-norm bound, would not be the paper's theorem.
  • Out of scope. Running time, the leverage-score application (Section 7.1, Theorem 31) and the rest of the cutting plane method.
  • Infrastructure. Conditional expectation with respect to a filtration, Markov's inequality and countable union bounds are in Mathlib. Supermartingale lemmas for nonnegative adapted processes, and the passage from a per-step drift inequality to a bound on the expected potential, are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • Y. T. Lee, A. Sidford, S. C. Wong, A Faster Cutting Plane Method and its Implications for Combinatorial and Convex Optimization, FOCS 2015; arXiv:1508.04874v2, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04874
  • P. M. Vaidya, A new algorithm for minimizing convex functions over convex sets, FOCS 1989; Mathematical Programming 73 (1996) 291–341. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02592216
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Faster Cutting Plane Method and its Implications for Combinatorial and Convex Optimization II: A Large upper(p) Yields a New Valid Arc for Submodular Minimization over a Ring FamilyResearch Paper

Motivation

Submodular function minimization (SFM) asks for a set S⊆VS \subseteq VS⊆V minimizing a function f:2V→Zf : 2^V \to \mathbb Zf:2V→Z with diminishing marginal returns. It contains minimum cut, matroid intersection and many problems of combinatorial optimization, and the question of how fast it can be solved with a value oracle has a long history: Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver (1981) gave the first polynomial algorithm via the ellipsoid method; Iwata, Fleischer and Fujishige (2001) and Schrijver (2000) gave the first combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithms; Orlin (2009) brought the bound to O(n5⋅EO+n6)O(n^5 \cdot \mathrm{EO} + n^6)O(n5⋅EO+n6).

Lee, Sidford and Wong (arXiv:1508.04874, FOCS 2015) applied their faster cutting plane method to SFM and obtained an O~(n3⋅EO+n4)\tilde O(n^3 \cdot \mathrm{EO} + n^4)O~(n3⋅EO+n4) strongly polynomial algorithm. Like several earlier strongly polynomial algorithms, theirs works over a ring family and repeatedly adds new valid arcs that shrink the family without losing a minimizer. The combinatorial core of that step is Lemma 79 (p. 84) and its mirror image Lemma 80 (p. 86), which the authors describe as new to their work. This mission formalizes Lemma 79 and the lemmas its proof uses.

Setting

Let V=[n]V = [n]V=[n] and let f:2V→Zf : 2^V \to \mathbb Zf:2V→Z be submodular (Definition 58): f(T+i)−f(T)≤f(S+i)−f(S)f(T + i) - f(T) \le f(S + i) - f(S)f(T+i)−f(T)≤f(S+i)−f(S) whenever S⊆TS \subseteq TS⊆T and i∉Ti \notin Ti∈/T, where S+i=S∪{i}S + i = S \cup \{i\}S+i=S∪{i}. As in §13.1, f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0.

For y∈Rny \in \mathbb R^ny∈Rn write y(S)=∑i∈Syiy(S) = \sum_{i \in S} y_iy(S)=∑i∈S​yi​. The base polyhedron is

B(f)={y∈Rn:y(S)≤f(S) ∀S⊆V, y(V)=f(V)}.\mathcal B(f) = \{ y \in \mathbb R^n : y(S) \le f(S) \ \forall S \subseteq V,\ y(V) = f(V) \}.B(f)={y∈Rn:y(S)≤f(S) ∀S⊆V, y(V)=f(V)}.

Every permutation v1,…,vnv_1, \dots, v_nv1​,…,vn​ of VVV defines a basic feasible solution (BFS) hhh of B(f)\mathcal B(f)B(f) by hvi=f({v1,…,vi})−f({v1,…,vi−1})h_{v_i} = f(\{v_1, \dots, v_i\}) - f(\{v_1, \dots, v_{i-1}\})hvi​​=f({v1​,…,vi​})−f({v1​,…,vi−1​}) (Theorem 62); viv_ivi​ precedes vjv_jvj​ when i<ji < ji<j.

A set AAA of arcs on VVV (an acyclic digraph) represents the ring family FA\mathcal F_AFA​ of sets SSS such that i∈Si \in Si∈S implies j∈Sj \in Sj∈S for every arc (i,j)∈A(i, j) \in A(i,j)∈A. R(i)R(i)R(i) and Q(i)Q(i)Q(i) are the descendants and the ancestors of iii, both including iii. A permutation, or its BFS, is consistent with AAA if for every arc (i,j)(i, j)(i,j) the element jjj precedes iii (Definition 74). A vector is non-degenerate if it has both a positive and a negative entry. Finally,

upper(i)=f(R(i))−f(R(i)−i),lower(i)=f(V∖Q(i)+i)−f(V∖Q(i)).\mathrm{upper}(i) = f(R(i)) - f(R(i) - i), \qquad \mathrm{lower}(i) = f(V \setminus Q(i) + i) - f(V \setminus Q(i)).upper(i)=f(R(i))−f(R(i)−i),lower(i)=f(V∖Q(i)+i)−f(V∖Q(i)).

An arc (p,q)(p, q)(p,q) is valid if adding it keeps a minimizer of fff over FA\mathcal F_AFA​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 79 (new arc)

Let y=∑kλ(k)y(k)y = \sum_k \lambda^{(k)} y^{(k)}y=∑k​λ(k)y(k) be a non-degenerate convex combination of BFS's consistent with AAA. If

upper(p)>n4max⁡jyj,\mathrm{upper}(p) > n^4 \max_j y_j,upper(p)>n4jmax​yj​,

then there is q∉R(p)q \notin R(p)q∈/R(p) such that every minimizer of fff over FA\mathcal F_AFA​ that contains ppp also contains qqq.

Milestones, in the order of the proof

  1. Lemma 65 (p. 77): a non-negative h∈B(f)h \in \mathcal B(f)h∈B(f) makes ∅\emptyset∅ a minimizer; a non-positive one makes VVV a minimizer.
  2. (15.2) (p. 85): moving R(p)R(p)R(p) to the front of a consistent permutation gives a BFS y′y'y′ with yp′=upper(p)y'_p = \mathrm{upper}(p)yp′​=upper(p), yj′≥yjy'_j \ge y_jyj′​≥yj​ on R(p)R(p)R(p) and yj′≤yjy'_j \le y_jyj′​≤yj​ off R(p)R(p)R(p).
  3. The restriction claim (p. 85): f′(S)=f(S∪R(p))f'(S) = f(S \cup R(p))f′(S)=f(S∪R(p)) on V∖R(p)V \setminus R(p)V∖R(p) is submodular, Smin⁡∖R(p)S_{\min} \setminus R(p)Smin​∖R(p) minimizes it over the induced ring family, and y′y'y′ restricted to V∖R(p)V \setminus R(p)V∖R(p) lies in its base polyhedron.
  4. (15.3) (p. 85): y′(V∖R(p))<(n−n4)max⁡jyjy'(V \setminus R(p)) < (n - n^4) \max_j y_jy′(V∖R(p))<(n−n4)maxj​yj​.
  5. Lemma 77 (p. 84): if y∈B(f)y \in \mathcal B(f)y∈B(f) is non-degenerate and yi<−(n−1)max⁡jyjy_i < -(n-1)\max_j y_jyi​<−(n−1)maxj​yj​, then iii is in every minimizer over FA\mathcal F_AFA​.

The mission also contains Lemma 76 (the mirror of Lemma 77), Lemma 78 (lower(i)≤hi≤upper(i)\mathrm{lower}(i) \le h_i \le \mathrm{upper}(i)lower(i)≤hi​≤upper(i) for consistent BFS's) and Lemma 80 (the mirror of Lemma 79, giving an arc (q,p)(q, p)(q,p) with q∉Q(p)q \notin Q(p)q∈/Q(p) when lower(p)<n4min⁡jyj\mathrm{lower}(p) < n^4 \min_j y_jlower(p)<n4minj​yj​).

Significance

Lemmas 79 and 80 are what make the paper's SFM algorithms strongly polynomial: each application adds one of at most 2(n2)2\binom n22(2n​) arcs, and the cutting plane method supplies, through its separating hyperplanes, exactly the convex combinations of consistent BFS's the lemmas take as input. Lemma 80 has no counterpart in earlier work, and the two lemmas are stated for general ring families, which the earlier versions were not. They are also a robust version of Lemma 65: a point of the base polyhedron that is only approximately degenerate still yields structural information about every minimizer.

The lemmas are proved in the paper; none of them is formalized. The mission produces machine-checked statements and proofs of the arc-adding step, in a form independent of the cutting plane machinery and reusable by any formalization of a ring-family SFM algorithm (Iwata–Fleischer–Fujishige, Orlin, or Lee–Sidford–Wong).

Difficulty

The inequality chain of each lemma is short; the work is in the combinatorics of permutations. Moving R(p)R(p)R(p) to the front of a permutation must be shown to produce a permutation again, and the comparison (15.2) depends on knowing exactly which elements precede each jjj before and after the move; the identity yp′=upper(p)y'_p = \mathrm{upper}(p)yp′​=upper(p) holds only because consistency puts all of R(p)−pR(p) - pR(p)−p before ppp, which needs an induction along paths of AAA. The restriction to V∖R(p)V \setminus R(p)V∖R(p) changes the ground set, so Lemma 77, stated on the full ground set, does not apply verbatim to the restricted problem. The paper's application of Lemma 77 also does not check that the restricted vector is non-degenerate, so that case has to be handled as well.

Formalization scope

The ground set is Fin n (0-based); sets are Finset (Fin n), fff is integer valued and vectors are real. A permutation σ : Equiv.Perm (Fin n) is a position map (uuu precedes vvv iff σ u < σ v), and the BFS of a permutation is defined by the formula of Theorem 62; Theorem 62 itself (that these are the vertices of B(f)\mathcal B(f)B(f)) is not formalized and not needed. Arcs are a relation on Fin n; RRR and QQQ use its reflexive-transitive closure, and the digraph is assumed acyclic, as the paper does. Minimizers in Lemmas 76–80 are over the ring family FA\mathcal F_AFA​; in Lemma 65 over all subsets. Constants n4n^4n4, n−1n - 1n−1 and n−n4n - n^4n−n4 are real numbers.

Running-time and oracle-count clauses ("using O(n⋅EO)O(n \cdot \mathrm{EO})O(n⋅EO) oracle calls and O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) time") are out of scope, as is the paper's main Theorem 31 and the bound O(n)O(n)O(n) on the number of BFS's in the combination (the existence claim holds for any finite combination). Validity of the new arc is stated in the strong form proved on p. 85: every minimizer containing ppp contains qqq. The page's base polyhedron constraint "∀S⊈V\forall S \not\subseteq V∀S⊆V" is read as S⊆VS \subseteq VS⊆V. The restricted base polyhedron in the restriction claim uses the normalized f′−f′(∅)f' - f'(\emptyset)f′−f′(∅).

The hypotheses are satisfiable: with n=2n = 2n=2, A=∅A = \emptysetA=∅, f({0})=f({1})=1000f(\{0\}) = f(\{1\}) = 1000f({0})=f({1})=1000, f(∅)=f(V)=0f(\emptyset) = f(V) = 0f(∅)=f(V)=0, the combination (12+164)(1000,−1000)+(12−164)(−1000,1000)(\tfrac12 + \tfrac1{64})(1000, -1000) + (\tfrac12 - \tfrac1{64})(-1000, 1000)(21​+641​)(1000,−1000)+(21​−641​)(−1000,1000) satisfies them for p=0p = 0p=0. A modular fff never does, so the goal is not vacuous only because fff is genuinely submodular; a formalization in which the BFS's are not tied to fff, or in which non-degeneracy is non-strict, would change the statement and is ruled out.

Useful infrastructure: greedy vectors of a submodular function lie in its base polyhedron; reordering lemmas for permutations of Fin n; restriction of a set function to the complement of a set. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of Lemmas 76, 78 and 80, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. T. Lee, A. Sidford, S. C. Wong, A Faster Cutting Plane Method and its Implications for Combinatorial and Convex Optimization, arXiv:1508.04874v2, 2015; FOCS 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04874
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, The ellipsoid method and its consequences in combinatorial optimization, Combinatorica 1 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579273
  • A. Schrijver, A combinatorial algorithm minimizing submodular functions in strongly polynomial time, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 80 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1006/jctb.2000.1989
  • S. Iwata, L. Fleischer, S. Fujishige, A combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm for minimizing submodular functions, J. ACM 48 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1145/502090.502096
  • J. B. Orlin, A faster strongly polynomial time algorithm for submodular function minimization, Math. Program. 118 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-007-0189-2
  • S. T. McCormick, Submodular function minimization, Handbooks in OR & MS 12 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(05)12007-6
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EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Gathering Information before Negotiation II: Under a Uniform Prior and Linear Information Cost, the Seller's Expected Payoff Jumps Down at θs = 1 − θ̃, Up at c = c_l and Down at c = c_hResearch Paper

Motivation

In many trades the buyer does not know how much the good is worth to it, and can find out before negotiating: a firm commissions due diligence before an acquisition, a hospital pilots a device before negotiating its price, a household inspects a house before making an offer. Such information has two effects. It makes the trade decision better informed, which enlarges the total surplus, and it is paid for by the buyer alone, while the surplus it creates is shared through bargaining.

L. Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation (SSRN 3930651; Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4360), studies how this interaction shapes the seller's payoff. Its headline is a reversal: a seller with more bargaining power, or with a more valuable outside option, can be worse off, and a seller with a higher production cost can be better off. The reason is that the buyer's information choice reacts to these parameters, and the reaction can outweigh their direct effect. This mission formalizes that reversal for the paper's worked example, the uniform prior with a linear information cost.

Setting

A seller and a buyer negotiate over one unit of a good. The seller's cost is c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1). The buyer's value uuu is unknown to both parties; the common prior is the uniform distribution F(u)=uF(u)=uF(u)=u on [0,1][0,1][0,1], with mean u^=1/2\hat u=1/2u^=1/2. The bargaining powers are θb∈(0,1)\theta_b\in(0,1)θb​∈(0,1) for the buyer and θs=1−θb\theta_s=1-\theta_bθs​=1−θb​ for the seller.

Before negotiating, the buyer chooses an informativeness α∈[α‾,αˉ]\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]α∈[α​,αˉ], with 0<α‾<αˉ<10<\underline\alpha<\bar\alpha<10<α​<αˉ<1. It then observes a truth-or-noise signal www: with probability α\alphaα it equals uuu, and otherwise it is an independent draw from the prior. The buyer's posterior mean is v=αw+(1−α)u^v=\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat uv=αw+(1−α)u^. The information cost is linear,

k(α)=kˉ α−α‾αˉ−α‾,kˉ>0.k(\alpha)=\bar k\,\frac{\alpha-\underline\alpha}{\bar\alpha-\underline\alpha},\qquad \bar k>0 .k(α)=kˉαˉ−α​α−α​​,kˉ>0.

If v>cv>cv>c the parties trade and split the net surplus v−cv-cv−c in the proportions θs:θb\theta_s:\theta_bθs​:θb​; otherwise they do not trade. The total ex ante surplus is

A(α,c)=E[(v−c)+]=∫01max⁡{αw+1−α2−c,  0} dw,A(\alpha,c)=\mathbb E\big[(v-c)^+\big]=\int_0^1\max\Big\{\alpha w+\frac{1-\alpha}{2}-c,\;0\Big\}\,dw ,A(α,c)=E[(v−c)+]=∫01​max{αw+21−α​−c,0}dw,

and the buyer chooses α\alphaα to maximise

Ub(α)=θb A(α,c)−k(α).U_b(\alpha)=\theta_b\,A(\alpha,c)-k(\alpha).Ub​(α)=θb​A(α,c)−k(α).

The optimal set α∗\alpha^*α∗ is the set of maximisers of UbU_bUb​ on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ]. The seller's equilibrium expected payoff is

Us∗=θs A(α∗,c)(material cost),Vs∗=c+θs A(α∗,c)(opportunity cost).U_s^*=\theta_s\,A(\alpha^*,c)\quad\text{(material cost)},\qquad V_s^*=c+\theta_s\,A(\alpha^*,c)\quad\text{(opportunity cost)}.Us∗​=θs​A(α∗,c)(material cost),Vs∗​=c+θs​A(α∗,c)(opportunity cost).

Write Δ(c)=A(αˉ,c)−A(α‾,c)\Delta(c)=A(\bar\alpha,c)-A(\underline\alpha,c)Δ(c)=A(αˉ,c)−A(α​,c) for the surplus gain of maximal information, and θ~=kˉ/Δ(c)\tilde\theta=\bar k/\Delta(c)θ~=kˉ/Δ(c) when Δ(c)>kˉ\Delta(c)>\bar kΔ(c)>kˉ, θ~=1\tilde\theta=1θ~=1 otherwise. For fixed θb\theta_bθb​, the cost thresholds cl≤1/2≤chc_l\le 1/2\le c_hcl​≤1/2≤ch​ are the endpoints of the set of costs at which θbΔ(c)>kˉ\theta_b\Delta(c)>\bar kθb​Δ(c)>kˉ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 14), uniform prior

For every selection of optimal information levels:

  1. θs↦Us∗\theta_s\mapsto U_s^*θs​↦Us∗​ and θs↦Vs∗\theta_s\mapsto V_s^*θs​↦Vs∗​ are nondecreasing on (0,1−θ~)(0,1-\tilde\theta)(0,1−θ~) and on (1−θ~,1)(1-\tilde\theta,1)(1−θ~,1), and, if θ~<1\tilde\theta<1θ~<1, drop strictly at θs=1−θ~\theta_s=1-\tilde\thetaθs​=1−θ~;
  2. c↦Us∗c\mapsto U_s^*c↦Us∗​ is nonincreasing on (0,cl)(0,c_l)(0,cl​) and on (cl,1)(c_l,1)(cl​,1), and, if cl<chc_l<c_hcl​<ch​, jumps up strictly at c=clc=c_lc=cl​;
  3. c↦Vs∗c\mapsto V_s^*c↦Vs∗​ is nondecreasing on (0,ch)(0,c_h)(0,ch​) and on (ch,1)(c_h,1)(ch​,1), and, if cl<chc_l<c_hcl​<ch​, drops strictly at c=chc=c_hc=ch​.

A drop at t0t_0t0​ means: for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, every value just to the right of t0t_0t0​ is strictly below every value just to the left.

Milestones

A(α,c)={max⁡{1/2−c,0},α≤∣1−2c∣,[(1+α)/2−c]2/(2α),α≥∣1−2c∣,A(\alpha,c)=\begin{cases}\max\{1/2-c,0\},&\alpha\le|1-2c|,\\ [(1+\alpha)/2-c]^2/(2\alpha),&\alpha\ge|1-2c|,\end{cases}A(α,c)={max{1/2−c,0},[(1+α)/2−c]2/(2α),​α≤∣1−2c∣,α≥∣1−2c∣,​

the uniform display of p. 13. The proof of Corollary 1 (p. 30) then contributes three steps: A(⋅,c)A(\cdot,c)A(⋅,c) is constant and then increasing, and convex; the optimum is a corner, α∗∈{α‾,αˉ}\alpha^*\in\{\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha\}α∗∈{α​,αˉ}; and Δ\DeltaΔ vanishes for extreme costs, rises and then falls in ccc, and peaks at Δ(1/2)=(αˉ−α‾)/8\Delta(1/2)=(\bar\alpha-\underline\alpha)/8Δ(1/2)=(αˉ−α​)/8. Corollary 1 (p. 13) gives the two threshold rules: (i) α∗=α‾\alpha^*=\underline\alphaα∗=α​ for θb≤θ~\theta_b\le\tilde\thetaθb​≤θ~ and α∗=αˉ\alpha^*=\bar\alphaα∗=αˉ for θb>θ~\theta_b>\tilde\thetaθb​>θ~; (ii) α∗=αˉ\alpha^*=\bar\alphaα∗=αˉ exactly for cl<c<chc_l<c<c_hcl​<c<ch​.

Significance

The result. Without information acquisition, the seller's payoff is increasing in its bargaining power and in its outside option and decreasing in its material cost: these are the direct effects. Proposition 2 shows that each of them can be reversed by a discontinuous jump. The mechanism is that the buyer stops gathering information when its own share of the surplus becomes too small (high θs\theta_sθs​) or the trade decision becomes clear-cut (extreme ccc). The result bears on when a seller should prefer to commit to a weaker bargaining position, and on why cost increases need not hurt a seller facing an uninformed buyer.

Formalizing it. The paper calls Proposition 2 an immediate consequence of Corollary 1. That corollary rests on a short appendix argument whose printed version contains slips: the peak of Δ\DeltaΔ is printed as θb(αˉ−α‾)/8\theta_b(\bar\alpha-\underline\alpha)/8θb​(αˉ−α​)/8, strictness is claimed on a closed interval at whose endpoints Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0, and "α∗∈{α‾,αˉ}\alpha^*\in\{\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha\}α∗∈{α​,αˉ}" fails at c=1/2c=1/2c=1/2 when the two corners tie. A machine-checked development settles exactly which form of each claim is true. The result has been proved informally in the paper; it has not been formalized before.

Difficulty

The obvious argument treats α∗\alpha^*α∗ as a function and differentiates Us∗U_s^*Us∗​. That does not work here. At the thresholds α∗\alpha^*α∗ is not single-valued, and between them it is constant, so the whole content lies in the jumps. A jump statement must hold whichever optimal level is selected at each parameter, and it must compare values on both sides of a threshold whose location depends on Δ\DeltaΔ. Showing that the thresholds are well placed requires the inverted-U shape of Δ\DeltaΔ, which comes from an explicit but piecewise integral. The corner property needs convexity of AAA across the kink at α=∣1−2c∣\alpha=|1-2c|α=∣1−2c∣, where the two branches of the closed form meet.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. AAA is the interval integral over the uniform prior after the change of variables v=αw+(1−α)u^v=\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat uv=αw+(1−α)u^; no density is assumed. The bargaining stage is not modelled; the payoffs are the paper's reduced forms (6) and θsA(α∗,c)\theta_sA(\alpha^*,c)θs​A(α∗,c). Conventions: c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1) (the paper's c∈(u‾,uˉ)c\in(\underline u,\bar u)c∈(u​,uˉ)); θb,θs∈(0,1)\theta_b,\theta_s\in(0,1)θb​,θs​∈(0,1) with θs=1−θb\theta_s=1-\theta_bθs​=1−θb​; [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ] non-degenerate; θ~=1\tilde\theta=1θ~=1 when Δ(c)≤kˉ\Delta(c)\le\bar kΔ(c)≤kˉ, which avoids kˉ/0\bar k/0kˉ/0 and keeps θ~∈(0,1]\tilde\theta\in(0,1]θ~∈(0,1]. Monotonicity is claimed on each side of the jump point, open at that point (and across the other cost threshold), and the jump whenever the threshold is interior. In (ii) and (iii), cl≤1/2≤chc_l\le1/2\le c_hcl​≤1/2≤ch​ are assumed to satisfy "cl<c<chc_l<c<c_hcl​<c<ch​ iff θbΔ(c)>kˉ\theta_b\Delta(c)>\bar kθb​Δ(c)>kˉ" for all c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1), which determines them; when the buyer never gathers information this forces cl=ch=1/2c_l=c_h=1/2cl​=ch​=1/2.

The paper states Corollary 1 and Proposition 2 for four focal priors (uniform, exponential, logistic, modified Pareto) but works out only the uniform one. This mission is pinned to the uniform prior and the linear cost.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: AAA is not defined by its closed form (that closed form is a milestone), α∗\alpha^*α∗ is the set of maximisers of UbU_bUb​ and not a threshold rule, and the goal quantifies over every selection from that set, so neither Corollary 1 nor Proposition 2 holds by definition.

A complete development needs piecewise interval integrals of max⁡{⋅,0}\max\{\cdot,0\}max{⋅,0}, convexity of a function with a C1C^1C1 junction, and the fact that a convex function on a segment attains its maximum at an endpoint. All of these are general facts, reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome; Proposition 3 and the other priors are not posed here.

Selected references

  • L. Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651, manuscript of 15 Feb 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3930651
  • L. Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, Management Science (journal version of the manuscript above; its theorem numbering is not used here). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4360
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand 6: For Identical Loss-Neutral Substitutes the Optimal Policy Is Cyclic If the Single-Price Policy Is, and Under (26) Even If NotResearch Paper

Motivation

Retail prices are rarely constant over long horizons: promotions, high–low cycles and staggered discounts across similar items are the norm. One explanation in the pricing literature is the reference effect: consumers compare a posted price with a reference price formed from past prices, and react to gains and losses relative to it. Single-product models with reference effects (Popescu and Wu 2007; Hu, Chen and Hu 2016) predict that, for consumers who react symmetrically to gains and losses, the optimal price usually settles to a constant. Guo, Jiang and Shen (SSRN 4189049, published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025) study the same question for several substitutable products sold under multinomial-logit (MNL) demand. Their §4.3 shows that pricing substitutes jointly, rather than at one common price, makes cyclic optimal pricing more likely. This mission formalizes that comparison, Theorem 7, together with the results the paper ties it to.

Setting

A seller offers n≥2n\ge2n≥2 products N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} over periods t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\dotst=0,1,2,…. In period ttt product iii has price pitp_i^tpit​ and reference price ritr_i^trit​, both in P=[0,pH]\mathcal P=[0,p_H]P=[0,pH​] with pH>0p_H>0pH​>0. Reference prices follow exponential smoothing rt+1=αrt+(1−α)ptr^{t+1}=\alpha r^t+(1-\alpha)p^trt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt with memory α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1].

The deterministic utility of product iii is

ui(p,r)=ai−bipi+ci+(ri−pi)+−ci−(pi−ri)+,u_i(p,r)=a_i-b_ip_i+c_i^+(r_i-p_i)_+-c_i^-(p_i-r_i)_+ ,ui​(p,r)=ai​−bi​pi​+ci+​(ri​−pi​)+​−ci−​(pi​−ri​)+​,

with bi>0b_i>0bi​>0 and ci±≥0c_i^\pm\ge0ci±​≥0. The market share is qi(p,r)=eui/(1+∑keuk)q_i(p,r)=e^{u_i}/(1+\sum_k e^{u_k})qi​(p,r)=eui​/(1+∑k​euk​) and the period revenue is Π(p,r)=∑ipi qi(p,r)\Pi(p,r)=\sum_i p_i\,q_i(p,r)Π(p,r)=∑i​pi​qi​(p,r). Product iii is loss-neutral when ci+=ci−=:cic_i^+=c_i^-=:c_ici+​=ci−​=:ci​. The seller maximises ∑tβtΠ(pt,rt)\sum_t\beta^t\Pi(p^t,r^t)∑t​βtΠ(pt,rt) with discount β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1); V⋆(r0)V^\star(r^0)V⋆(r0) is the optimal value. The myopic policy pm(r)p^m(r)pm(r) maximises Π(⋅,r)\Pi(\cdot,r)Π(⋅,r) over Pn\mathcal P^nPn. Throughout, the paper assumes pH≥p^Hp_H\ge\hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​, where p^H\hat p_Hp^​H​ solves its equation (9); this makes the ceiling inactive for the myopic problem.

A policy has a steady state xxx if it maps reference xxx to price xxx. An optimal steady state (Definition 4) is a steady state of an optimal policy, and a policy is cyclic when it has no steady state.

§4.3 takes nnn perfect substitutes: ai=aa_i=aai​=a, bi=bb_i=bbi​=b, ci=cc_i=cci​=c for all iii, loss-neutral. The single-product-based policy psp^sps solves the problem (25) restricted to one common price yt1y^t\mathbf 1yt1 for all products, from a uniform reference rt1r^t\mathbf 1rt1. The common myopic steady state pm⋆=Πm⋆+1/(b+c)p^{m\star}=\Pi^{m\star}+1/(b+c)pm⋆=Πm⋆+1/(b+c) comes from Corollary 2, where Πm⋆\Pi^{m\star}Πm⋆ solves Π=nb+cea−bΠ−b/(b+c)\Pi=\frac{n}{b+c}e^{a-b\Pi-b/(b+c)}Π=b+cn​ea−bΠ−b/(b+c). The constants are

ζ1=ea+log⁡n+c pm⋆,ζ2=2αb+c(α+1)(αb+c)(b+c),κ=1−β1−αβ.\zeta_1=e^{a+\log n+c\,p^{m\star}},\quad \zeta_2=\frac{2\alpha b+c(\alpha+1)}{(\alpha b+c)(b+c)},\quad \kappa=\frac{1-\beta}{1-\alpha\beta}.ζ1​=ea+logn+cpm⋆,ζ2​=(αb+c)(b+c)2αb+c(α+1)​,κ=1−αβ1−β​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 25)

For identical loss-neutral products with n≥2n\ge2n≥2:

  1. if psp^sps has no steady state, the optimal policy has no steady state;
  2. if
pH[1−ζ1e−(b+c)pH]−ζ1ζ2e−(b+c)pH≤ζ2(26a)p_H\big[1-\zeta_1e^{-(b+c)p_H}\big]-\zeta_1\zeta_2e^{-(b+c)p_H}\le\zeta_2 \quad(26a)pH​[1−ζ1​e−(b+c)pH​]−ζ1​ζ2​e−(b+c)pH​≤ζ2​(26a)

and

[(1−κ)2+β(1−ακ)2]c2−(1+βα2)(b+cκ)2≥(b+c)2+β(αb+c)2n−1(26b)\big[(1-\kappa)^2+\beta(1-\alpha\kappa)^2\big]c^2-(1+\beta\alpha^2)(b+c\kappa)^2\ge\frac{(b+c)^2+\beta(\alpha b+c)^2}{n-1}\quad(26b)[(1−κ)2+β(1−ακ)2]c2−(1+βα2)(b+cκ)2≥n−1(b+c)2+β(αb+c)2​(26b)

hold, then psp^sps has a steady state and the optimal policy has none.

Milestones

  • Corollary 2 (p. 16): for loss-neutral products, the myopic policy has the unique steady state pim⋆=Πm⋆+1/(bi+ci)p_i^{m\star}=\Pi^{m\star}+1/(b_i+c_i)pim⋆​=Πm⋆+1/(bi​+ci​), with Πm⋆\Pi^{m\star}Πm⋆ the unique root of (18). This is where pm⋆p^{m\star}pm⋆ and ζ1\zeta_1ζ1​ come from.
  • Corollary 4 (p. 23): a loss-neutral optimal steady state, if it exists, is unique and equals Π⋆⋆+1/(bi+ciκ)\Pi^{\star\star}+1/(b_i+c_i\kappa)Π⋆⋆+1/(bi​+ci​κ), with Π⋆⋆\Pi^{\star\star}Π⋆⋆ the unique root of (24).
  • Remark 3 (p. 26): if both psp^sps and the optimal policy have steady states, they coincide.
  • Remark 4 (p. 27): for loss-neutral products with possibly different parameters, the condition ∃i: κi,1−κi,2>(2κi,1−κi,2) qi(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)\exists i:\ \kappa_{i,1}-\kappa_{i,2}>(2\kappa_{i,1}-\kappa_{i,2})\,q_i(p^{\star\star},p^{\star\star})∃i: κi,1​−κi,2​>(2κi,1​−κi,2​)qi​(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆) (28) rules out an optimal steady state. For identical products, qi(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)<1/nq_i(p^{\star\star},p^{\star\star})<1/nqi​(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)<1/n, and (26b) yields (28).

Significance

Theorem 7 separates two models that coincide in their steady states (Remark 3) but differ in whether a steady state exists. Joint pricing can sustain asynchronous cycles, in which some substitutes are discounted while others are not, and these keep total purchase probability high. A single common price can only cycle synchronously. Part 1 says the multi-product optimum never settles when the single-price one does not. Part 2 gives explicit parameter regions, strong reference effects (large ccc), short memory (small α\alphaα) and patient sellers (large β\betaβ), where the single-price model predicts a constant price but the true optimum is cyclic. Practically, a retailer who prices similar items at one price can misjudge whether long-run promotions are optimal at all.

The paper's proofs are in its online supplement (Appendix C.6), which is not part of the source file used for this mission. To our knowledge none of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would check the inequality algebra behind (26)–(28) and pin down exactly what "the optimal policy is cyclic" means when optimal policies need not be unique.

Difficulty

The statements compare two infinite-horizon problems, each with a continuous state, through the existence of fixed points of their optimal policies. Neither problem has a closed-form value function. A steady state is optimal only if no deviation, however long, improves on the constant path, so ruling it out requires a profitable deviation, and establishing it for psp^sps requires a global optimality argument for (25). Stationarity conditions at a steady state only produce candidates (Corollaries 2 and 4); they do not decide whether a candidate is optimal, so the obvious argument stops exactly where the theorem starts. The revenue Π\PiΠ is not concave in prices, the reference dynamics couple all periods, and the comparison must hold uniformly over every optimal policy, not one computed policy.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (index i−1i-1i−1 for the paper's product iii), and parameters are functions Fin n → ℝ; the identical-products results use constant functions of scalars a,b,ca,b,ca,b,c. The market share (3) is defined directly, without the Gumbel derivation. V⋆V^\starV⋆ is the supremum of the discounted revenue over all price sequences in [0,pH]n[0,p_H]^n[0,pH​]n, and the single-price value is the supremum over uniform sequences yt1y^t\mathbf 1yt1 from a uniform reference. Steady states are in sequence form: xxx is an optimal steady state when the constant path xxx from reference xxx attains V⋆(x)V^\star(x)V⋆(x), and similarly for psp^sps. "Cyclic" is the universal statement that no point is a steady state. A myopic policy is any maximising selection, and every statement about it quantifies over all selections.

Standing hypotheses in every theorem: b>0b>0b>0, c±≥0c^\pm\ge0c±≥0, α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1), pH>0p_H>0pH​>0, and pH≥p^Hp_H\ge\hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​ stated as "some root of (9) is at most pHp_HpH​". Added hypotheses: n≥2n\ge2n≥2 (the setting of §4.3); αb+c>0\alpha b+c>0αb+c>0 in Theorem 7.2, so that ζ2\zeta_2ζ2​ is defined (it excludes only α=c=0\alpha=c=0α=c=0, where (26b) fails anyway); α<1\alpha<1α<1 for the limit claims of Corollary 2 (at α=1\alpha=1α=1 the reference never moves). Quantities the paper calls "the unique solution" are bound as variables solving their equation, never chosen. Remark 4 evaluates (28) at the candidate p⋆⋆p^{\star\star}p⋆⋆ of Corollary 4, because the conclusion is that no optimal steady state exists.

A trivial formalization is ruled out: "cyclic" may not be read as a statement about one chosen policy or one initial reference price, and the single-price problem may not be replaced by the n=1n=1n=1 problem, since it keeps all nnn products and the shared MNL denominator.

A complete development needs: summability and boundedness of discounted revenue, the Bellman characterisation of steady states, analysis of the myopic MNL problem (Theorems 1–2 of the paper), and the second-order analysis behind (28). The MNL revenue lemmas and the sequence-form steady-state calculus are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the parts of Theorem 7 separately, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. A. Guo, H. Jiang, Z.-J. M. Shen, Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand, SSRN 4189049 (version of 2024-05-25); Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189049, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0801
  • I. Popescu, Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0352
  • Z. Hu, X. Chen, P. Hu, Dynamic Pricing with Gain-Seeking Reference Price Effects, Operations Research 64(1), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1446
  • D. McFadden, Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior, in Frontiers in Econometrics, 1974.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Topology III: With Power-Law Channel-Cost Tails, a Random Lightning Network Is Hermetizable with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

The Lightning Network is a payment layer built on top of Bitcoin: pairs of participants lock funds in a bilateral payment channel and then exchange payments off-chain, settling on the blockchain only occasionally. Keeping a channel open costs money, because it ties up capital and needs periodic rebalancing, and Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (Lightning Network Economics: Channels, 2022, cited in the paper as [GHS22]) showed that this recurring cost depends on the channel's net flow and grows less than proportionally with it. Which network topology a population of payers and payees should use is therefore an economic question about subadditive costs on graphs.

Lightning Network Economics: Topology (SSRN 4439190; published version in Management Science, 2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03872) answers this question in an axiomatic model. Its §3.2 introduces hermetization, which replaces the channels inside a group of nodes by channels to a new hub, and asks when this reduces cost. Theorem 3.8 gives a deterministic sufficient condition, a large average degree compared with the spread of channel sizes. Theorem 3.9, the subject of this mission, shows that the condition is typical: if channel sizes are random with thin, power-law-bounded cost tails, the network is hermetizable with high probability. The paper reads this as "cost reduction is the norm, not the exception", which is the economic argument for hubs in payment-channel networks.

Setting

Nodes form a finite set VVV. A Lightning Network (LN) is an anti-symmetric real matrix Λ=(λi,j)i,j∈V\Lambda=(\lambda_{i,j})_{i,j\in V}Λ=(λi,j​)i,j∈V​, λi,j=−λj,i\lambda_{i,j}=-\lambda_{j,i}λi,j​=−λj,i​, of net channel flows; λi,j=0\lambda_{i,j}=0λi,j​=0 means there is no channel between iii and jjj. A channel cost is a function c:R→R+c:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R_+c:R→R+​ with

  • (MO) c(x)>c(y)c(x)>c(y)c(x)>c(y) for x>y≥0x>y\ge 0x>y≥0; (SY) c(−x)=c(x)c(-x)=c(x)c(−x)=c(x); (CI) c(0)=0c(0)=0c(0)=0;
  • (SA) c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y) for x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0;
  • (SA+) for a strictly increasing g+:R+→R+g_+:\mathbb R_+\to\mathbb R_+g+​:R+​→R+​, c(kx)<kg+(k)c(x)c(kx)<\dfrac{k}{g_+(k)}c(x)c(kx)<g+​(k)k​c(x) for k>1k>1k>1, x>0x>0x>0.

The cost of the network is c(G)=12∑i,jc(λi,j)c(G)=\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}c(\lambda_{i,j})c(G)=21​∑i,j​c(λi,j​). For a node iii, d(i)d(i)d(i) is its number of channels, s(i)s(i)s(i) the smallest and S(i)S(i)S(i) the largest ∣λi,j∣|\lambda_{i,j}|∣λi,j​∣ over its channels.

The hermetization of a set of nodes UUU deletes all channels inside UUU, adds a new node v0v_0v0​, and joins each i∈Ui\in Ui∈U to v0v_0v0​ by a channel carrying ∑j∈Uλi,j\sum_{j\in U}\lambda_{i,j}∑j∈U​λi,j​, its net flow towards the rest of UUU. The set UUU is hermetizable if this strictly lowers the cost, and the LN is hermetizable if some UUU is.

In the random model a simple graph EEE on VVV fixes the channels, so d(i)d(i)d(i) is the degree of iii in EEE and is not random. On a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,\mathbb P)(Ω,P), the flows λi,j(ω)\lambda_{i,j}(\omega)λi,j​(ω) are random variables, nonzero exactly on the channels of EEE, and Λ(ω)\Lambda(\omega)Λ(ω) is an LN for every ω\omegaω.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.9

Let a>1a>1a>1, b>0b>0b>0, ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0. There is k>0k>0k>0, depending only on (a,b,ε)(a,b,\varepsilon)(a,b,ε), such that for every finite EEE with at least one channel, every c,g+c,g_+c,g+​ satisfying (MO)–(SA+), and every random LN with, for all channels ij∈Eij\in Eij∈E,

(i)  P(c(λi,j)>x)<b x−a  (x>0),(ii)  P(c(λi,j)>ε)=1,\text{(i)}\ \ \mathbb P\big(c(\lambda_{i,j})>x\big)<b\,x^{-a}\ \ (x>0),\qquad \text{(ii)}\ \ \mathbb P\big(c(\lambda_{i,j})>\varepsilon\big)=1,(i)  P(c(λi,j​)>x)<bx−a  (x>0),(ii)  P(c(λi,j​)>ε)=1,

the LN is hermetizable with probability at least

1−k∑i∈Vd(i) (g+(d(i)))−a.1-k\sum_{i\in V}d(i)\,\big(g_+(d(i))\big)^{-a}.1−ki∈V∑​d(i)(g+​(d(i)))−a.

The constant is not fixed: any kkk uniform in the network and in c,g+c,g_+c,g+​ is a proof of the goal.

Milestones

  1. Lemma B.1. If every iii in a nonempty set UUU has a channel in UUU and g+(dU(i))>2c(SU(i))/c(sU(i))g_+(d_U(i))>2c(S_U(i))/c(s_U(i))g+​(dU​(i))>2c(SU​(i))/c(sU​(i)), with degrees and sizes in the subnetwork induced on UUU, then UUU is hermetizable.
  2. (8)–(10). P(hermetizable)≥1−∑i: d(i)≥1P(g+(d(i))≤2c(S(i))/c(s(i)))\mathbb P(\text{hermetizable})\ge 1-\sum_{i:\,d(i)\ge1}\mathbb P\big(g_+(d(i))\le 2c(S(i))/c(s(i))\big)P(hermetizable)≥1−∑i:d(i)≥1​P(g+​(d(i))≤2c(S(i))/c(s(i))).
  3. (11). Under (ii), P(g+(d(i))≤2c(S(i))/c(s(i)))≤P(ε2g+(d(i))≤c(S(i)))\mathbb P\big(g_+(d(i))\le 2c(S(i))/c(s(i))\big)\le\mathbb P\big(\tfrac{\varepsilon}{2}g_+(d(i))\le c(S(i))\big)P(g+​(d(i))≤2c(S(i))/c(s(i)))≤P(2ε​g+​(d(i))≤c(S(i))) for d(i)≥1d(i)\ge1d(i)≥1.
  4. (12)–(13). Under (i), P(c(S(i))≥x)≤d(i) b x−a\mathbb P\big(c(S(i))\ge x\big)\le d(i)\,b\,x^{-a}P(c(S(i))≥x)≤d(i)bx−a for every x>0x>0x>0.

The paper closes with "for some constant kkk, P(c(S(i))≥ε2g+(d(i)))≤k d(i) (g+(d(i)))−a\mathbb P\big(c(S(i))\ge\tfrac{\varepsilon}{2}g_+(d(i))\big)\le k\,d(i)\,(g_+(d(i)))^{-a}P(c(S(i))≥2ε​g+​(d(i)))≤kd(i)(g+​(d(i)))−a, whence the claim."

Significance

The theorem turns the deterministic criterion of Lemma B.1 into a statement about typical networks. When degrees grow, g+(d)−ag_+(d)^{-a}g+​(d)−a decays, and the probability that no hub can reduce cost vanishes for any law with a power-bounded cost tail and a positive cost floor. This is the paper's evidence that hub-and-spoke structures are the economically stable outcome; the companion results of the paper (Theorem 3.1 on local restructuring, Theorem 3.10 on the star topology) are treated in sibling missions of this series.

The result is proved in the paper, in about half a page. It has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it makes the quantifier structure explicit, in particular that kkk does not depend on the network, settles the boundary cases the paper leaves implicit, and records corrected forms of two axioms that are unsatisfiable as printed. Lemma B.1 is shared with the mission on Theorem 3.8.

Difficulty

The probabilistic estimates are elementary; the obstacles are in the bookkeeping. Lemma B.1 compares two costs on different node sets (the hermetized network has one more node), and its degrees and channel sizes must be read in the subnetwork induced on UUU; with the degrees of the whole network the lemma is false. To apply it to a random network one must choose UUU: the set of all nodes fails when some node is isolated, because s(i)s(i)s(i) is then undefined. The step from the strict tail P(c>x)\mathbb P(c>x)P(c>x) of (i) to the weak tail P(c≥x)\mathbb P(c\ge x)P(c≥x) used in (12)–(13) is a limit the paper does not write out. The inverse g+−1g_+^{-1}g+−1​ that the paper uses need not exist, since g+g_+g+​ is not assumed onto.

Formalization scope

Nodes are an arbitrary finite type V; the LN is Λ : V → V → ℝ, anti-symmetric; the channel graph is E : SimpleGraph V, with λi,j(ω)≠0  ⟺  ij∈E\lambda_{i,j}(\omega)\ne0\iff ij\in Eλi,j​(ω)=0⟺ij∈E for every ω\omegaω, and d(i)d(i)d(i) is E.degree i. The cost is the 12∑i,j\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}21​∑i,j​ form. The hub v0v_0v0​ of a hermetization is none : Option V. Probabilities are toReal of a probability measure, and events are not assumed measurable. Each λi,j\lambda_{i,j}λi,j​ is assumed measurable in the goal. The conventions committed to:

  • (SA) is used for all x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0: as printed ("for x>y≥0x>y\ge0x>y≥0") it demands c(x)<c(x)c(x)<c(x)c(x)<c(x) at y=0y=0y=0. The corrected range is the one Appendix D verifies.
  • (SA+) is used for k>1k>1k>1, x>0x>0x>0: as printed (k∈R+k\in\mathbb R_+k∈R+​) it fails at x=0x=0x=0, and for k≤1k\le1k≤1 even for the paper's own example.
  • Every condition d>g+−1(y)d>g_+^{-1}(y)d>g+−1​(y) is written g+(d)>yg_+(d)>yg+​(d)>y.
  • In Lemma B.1, ddd, sss, SSS are those of the subnetwork induced on UUU; UUU is nonempty and each i∈Ui\in Ui∈U has a channel in UUU. For a node without a channel, sss and SSS take the junk value 000, which no statement uses.
  • The constants a,b,εa,b,\varepsilona,b,ε are common to all channels. Neither independence nor identical distribution of the flows is assumed: the theorem's hypotheses are only (i) and (ii).
  • The goal assumes at least one channel. With none, the printed bound is 111 but the cost 000 cannot be reduced.

The following formalizations are trivializing and are ruled out: a kkk allowed to depend on VVV, EEE, P\mathbb PP, Λ\LambdaΛ, ccc or g+g_+g+​ (take kkk large enough that the bound is ≤0\le0≤0); a specific law, such as a Pareto law, or a specific cost such as c(x)=∣x∣c(x)=\sqrt{|x|}c(x)=∣x∣​; replacing "the LN is hermetizable" by the event that every node satisfies Lemma B.1's inequality; an empty channel set; and the printed, unsatisfiable (SA) or (SA+), under which every statement is vacuous.

The development needs finite sums over Option V, a min/max over a node's channels, and union bounds for outer measures (Mathlib's measure_biUnion_finset_le). Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a proof that the corrected axioms are satisfiable by c(x)=∣x∣c(x)=\sqrt{|x|}c(x)=∣x∣​, g+(k)=k1/4g_+(k)=k^{1/4}g+​(k)=k1/4, and a reusable statement of Lemma B.1 for the series.

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Topology, SSRN working paper 4439190, version of February 3, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4439190 ; published in Management Science, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03872
  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, 2022 (cited in the paper as [GHS22]; reference list, p. 16 of SSRN 4439190).
  • J. Poon, T. Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments, 2016. https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand 5: When Consumers Ignore Gains (c_i⁻ ≥ c_i⁺ = 0) the Optimal Pricing Policy Admits a Steady StateResearch Paper

Reference prices and promotion-insensitive consumers

Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal standard formed from the prices they have seen before. A price above the reference is perceived as a loss and a price below it as a gain. When gains and losses weigh differently, the seller's current price shapes tomorrow's demand, and dynamic pricing becomes a sequential decision problem. A central question in this literature is whether the seller should hold a constant price in the long run or keep cycling through high and low prices.

For a single product, classic results show that loss aversion favours constant prices (Fibich, Gavious and Lowengart 2003; Popescu and Wu 2007; Nasiry and Popescu 2011). Hu and Nasiry (2018) showed that individual loss aversion need not carry over to aggregate demand, and under logit demand Jiang, Cao and Shen (2022, Proposition 5) found loss-averse single-product settings in which cyclic pricing is optimal. Guo, Jiang and Shen (2025) study the multi-product version under multinomial logit demand. For general parameters they show that an optimal steady state may fail to exist. This mission formalizes their positive result for one market: consumers who ignore gains, i.e. who do not respond to discounts. The paper motivates this case with luxury goods, where promotions can signal declining prestige.

Setting

A seller offers products N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Product iii has intrinsic utility ai∈Ra_i\in\mathbb Rai​∈R, price sensitivity bi>0b_i>0bi​>0 and reference sensitivities ci+≥0c_i^+\ge0ci+​≥0 (to gains) and ci−≥0c_i^-\ge0ci−​≥0 (to losses). At price vector p\mathbf pp and reference price vector r\mathbf rr, the utility of product iii is

ui(p,r)=ai−bipi+ci+(ri−pi)+−ci−(pi−ri)+,u_i(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)=a_i-b_ip_i+c_i^+(r_i-p_i)_+-c_i^-(p_i-r_i)_+ ,ui​(p,r)=ai​−bi​pi​+ci+​(ri​−pi​)+​−ci−​(pi​−ri​)+​,

with (x)+=max⁡{x,0}(x)_+=\max\{x,0\}(x)+​=max{x,0}. The multinomial logit market share and the single-period revenue are

qi(p,r)=eui(p,r)1+∑k∈Neuk(p,r),Π(p,r)=∑i∈Npi qi(p,r).q_i(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)=\frac{e^{u_i(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)}}{1+\sum_{k\in N}e^{u_k(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)}},\qquad \Pi(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)=\sum_{i\in N}p_i\,q_i(\mathbf p,\mathbf r).qi​(p,r)=1+∑k∈N​euk​(p,r)eui​(p,r)​,Π(p,r)=i∈N∑​pi​qi​(p,r).

Prices and reference prices lie in the admissible box Pn=[0,pH]n\mathcal P^n=[0,p_H]^nPn=[0,pH​]n with pH>0p_H>0pH​>0. Reference prices follow exponential smoothing with memory α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1]: rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt\mathbf r^{t+1}=\alpha\mathbf r^t+(1-\alpha)\mathbf p^trt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt. Revenue is discounted at rate β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1), and the optimal value from reference price r0\mathbf r^0r0 is

V⋆(r0)=sup⁡(pt)t≥0⊂Pn∑t≥0βt Π(pt,rt).V^\star(\mathbf r^0)=\sup_{(\mathbf p^t)_{t\ge0}\subset\mathcal P^n}\sum_{t\ge0}\beta^t\,\Pi(\mathbf p^t,\mathbf r^t).V⋆(r0)=(pt)t≥0​⊂Pnsup​t≥0∑​βtΠ(pt,rt).

The myopic policy pm(r)\mathbf p^m(\mathbf r)pm(r) maximises Π(⋅,r)\Pi(\cdot,\mathbf r)Π(⋅,r) over Pn\mathcal P^nPn. An optimal steady state (Definition 4) is a price p⋆⋆∈Pn\mathbf p^{\star\star}\in\mathcal P^np⋆⋆∈Pn fixed by the optimal policy: holding the price at p⋆⋆\mathbf p^{\star\star}p⋆⋆ forever is optimal when the reference price is p⋆⋆\mathbf p^{\star\star}p⋆⋆.

Throughout §3–§4 the paper assumes the price ceiling is large enough: pH≥p^Hp_H\ge\hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​, where p^H\hat p_Hp^​H​ is the root of

p=χ+∑i∈N1bi+ci+exp⁡(ai−bip+(bi+ci+)χ−1),χ=max⁡i∈N1bi+min⁡{ci+,ci−}.p=\chi+\sum_{i\in N}\frac{1}{b_i+c_i^+}\exp\big(a_i-b_ip+(b_i+c_i^+)\chi-1\big),\qquad \chi=\max_{i\in N}\frac{1}{b_i+\min\{c_i^+,c_i^-\}} .p=χ+i∈N∑​bi​+ci+​1​exp(ai​−bi​p+(bi​+ci+​)χ−1),χ=i∈Nmax​bi​+min{ci+​,ci−​}1​.

Under this assumption the ceiling does not bind for the myopic problem.

Consumers are promotion-insensitive when ci+=0c_i^+=0ci+​=0 for every iii: a price below the reference brings no extra utility, while a price above it is penalised at rate ci−≥0c_i^-\ge0ci−​≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 24)

If ci−≥ci+=0c_i^-\ge c_i^+=0ci−​≥ci+​=0 for all i∈Ni\in Ni∈N, then there exists p⋆⋆∈Pn\mathbf p^{\star\star}\in\mathcal P^np⋆⋆∈Pn with

V⋆(p⋆⋆)≤Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)1−β.V^\star(\mathbf p^{\star\star})\le\frac{\Pi(\mathbf p^{\star\star},\mathbf p^{\star\star})}{1-\beta}.V⋆(p⋆⋆)≤1−βΠ(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)​.

This holds for all parameters, memory and discount factors satisfying the hypotheses.

Milestone: the §4.2.1 observation (p. 24)

Under ci+=0c_i^+=0ci+​=0 there is p⋆⋆∈Pn\mathbf p^{\star\star}\in\mathcal P^np⋆⋆∈Pn that is a fixed point of the myopic policy and whose diagonal pair attains the largest single-period revenue:

Π(p,r)≤Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)for all p,r∈Pn.\Pi(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)\le\Pi(\mathbf p^{\star\star},\mathbf p^{\star\star})\qquad\text{for all }\mathbf p,\mathbf r\in\mathcal P^n .Π(p,r)≤Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)for all p,r∈Pn.

Significance

Theorem 6 is the only general existence result for optimal steady states in the paper. Theorem 4 shows that a single gain-seeking product rules out any optimal steady state. Theorem 5 constrains where a steady state can lie when there is no gain-seeking product, but it does not say that one exists. Theorem 6 settles existence for promotion-insensitive markets, for every number of products and every parameter value: constant pricing is optimal in the long run regardless of parameters and initial reference prices. This holds even though the aggregate logit demand can be more sensitive to gains than to losses in some regions, which is exactly the situation in which earlier general guarantees for constant pricing do not apply.

The result is proved in the paper's online supplement (App. C.5), which is not part of the source file used here. It has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it requires the first Lean treatment of reference-dependent MNL revenue, with a kinked utility, an outside option and an exponentially smoothed state. It also requires a sequence-form optimal value function for a deterministic infinite-horizon problem with a continuous state. The other missions of this series (myopic dynamics, optimality gap, gain-seeking cycles, steady-state structure, multi- versus single-price policies) use the same objects.

Difficulty

Π(p,r)\Pi(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)Π(p,r) is neither concave nor monotone in a convenient way. Setting c+=0c^+=0c+=0 does not simply make the reference price irrelevant. Lowering a product's utility raises the logit revenue when that product's price is below the current revenue level, so a larger loss term can help. The joint maximisation over (p,r)(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)(p,r) therefore does not reduce to "take r≥p\mathbf r\ge\mathbf pr≥p". The diagonal maximiser must also lie inside the box, and that is where the ceiling assumption pH≥p^Hp_H\ge\hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​, which involves the transcendental equation (9), enters. Finally, an optimal steady state is a statement about the infinite-horizon optimum V⋆V^\starV⋆, a supremum over all price sequences. It is not about the myopic policy, and a myopic fixed point is not in general an optimal steady state.

Formalization scope

Products are indexed by Fin n (the paper's product iii is index i−1i-1i−1), and vectors are Fin n → ℝ. The market shares (3) are defined directly. The Gumbel random-utility derivation is motivation only. Every statement carries the standing hypotheses of §2:

  • bi>0b_i>0bi​>0 and ci±≥0c_i^\pm\ge0ci±​≥0 for all iii;
  • α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] and β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1) (Theorem 6 only);
  • pH>0p_H>0pH​>0;
  • the ceiling assumption, stated as "some root p^H\hat p_Hp^​H​ of (9) satisfies p^H≤pH\hat p_H\le p_Hp^​H​≤pH​", where χ\chiχ is a supremum over Fin n (zero when n=0n=0n=0).

V⋆V^\starV⋆ is the supremum of the discounted revenue over all admissible price sequences rather than over stationary policies. For this deterministic problem with continuous revenue on a compact box the two values coincide. Optimal policies need not be unique, so an optimal steady state is stated as optimality of the constant price path: x∈Pn\mathbf x\in\mathcal P^nx∈Pn and V⋆(x)≤Π(x,x)/(1−β)V^\star(\mathbf x)\le\Pi(\mathbf x,\mathbf x)/(1-\beta)V⋆(x)≤Π(x,x)/(1−β). The milestone's "myopic fixed point" is stated as "p⋆⋆\mathbf p^{\star\star}p⋆⋆ maximises Π(⋅,p⋆⋆)\Pi(\cdot,\mathbf p^{\star\star})Π(⋅,p⋆⋆) over the box", without fixing a myopic selection.

No trivializing reading is available. On the box 0≤Π≤pH0\le\Pi\le p_H0≤Π≤pH​, so the sequence family is bounded by pH/(1−β)p_H/(1-\beta)pH​/(1−β) and V⋆V^\starV⋆ is the genuine supremum, not Lean's default value 000. The hypothesis is c+=0c^+=0c+=0 (no response to gains), not the opposite case c−=0c^-=0c−=0, and the conclusion is existence only, not uniqueness. A complete development needs bounds and continuity for the logit revenue, the joint single-period maximisation behind the milestone, and the comparison of the constant path with arbitrary sequences. The revenue model and the value function are reusable throughout the series. Proofs of either item, and of general facts about the shared model, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. A. Guo, H. Jiang, Z.-J. M. Shen, Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025; SSRN 4189049 (version of 2024-05-25). https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189049, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0801
  • G. Fibich, A. Gavious, O. Lowengart, Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects, Operations Research 51(5):721–734, 2003.
  • I. Popescu, Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3):413–429, 2007.
  • J. Nasiry, I. Popescu, Dynamic Pricing with Loss-Averse Consumers and Peak-End Anchoring, Operations Research 59(6):1361–1368, 2011.
  • Z. Hu, X. Chen, P. Hu, Dynamic Pricing with Gain-Seeking Reference Price Effects, Operations Research 64(1):150–157, 2016.
  • Z. Hu, J. Nasiry, Are Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers More Sensitive to Losses?, Management Science 64(3):1384–1395, 2018.
  • H. Jiang, J. Cao, Z.-J. M. Shen, Intertemporal Pricing via Nonparametric Estimation: Integrating Reference Effects and Consumer Heterogeneity, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand 4: Without Gain-Seeking Products an Optimal Steady State Has p_i − Π ∈ [1/(b_i + c_i⁻κ), 1/(b_i + c_i⁺κ)]Research Paper

Motivation

Consumers judge a price against a reference price formed from the prices they have seen before. A price above the reference is perceived as a loss and depresses demand beyond the plain price effect; a price below it is perceived as a gain and lifts demand. Because today's price moves tomorrow's reference price, a seller who prices many products over time faces a dynamic problem: a discount today raises demand now but lowers the reference price and so weakens demand later.

Whether such a seller should eventually settle on constant prices or keep the prices cycling matters in practice. Stable prices mean stable demand, which simplifies production and inventory planning; cycling prices mean recurring promotions. For a single product with additive demand, Popescu and Wu (2007) showed that loss aversion favours constant prices and gain-seeking favours cycles. Guo, Jiang and Shen (2025) study the multi-product version with multinomial logit (MNL) demand, where products compete for the same customers and each product can have its own type of reference effect. This mission formalizes their characterization of the optimal constant prices.

Setting

There are nnn products, i∈N={1,…,n}i \in N = \{1, \dots, n\}i∈N={1,…,n}. Product iii has an intrinsic utility aia_iai​, a price sensitivity bi>0b_i > 0bi​>0, a gain sensitivity ci+≥0c_i^+ \ge 0ci+​≥0 and a loss sensitivity ci−≥0c_i^- \ge 0ci−​≥0. Given a price vector ppp and a reference price vector rrr, the utility of product iii is

ui(p,r)=ai−bipi+ci+(ri−pi)+−ci−(pi−ri)+,(y)+=max⁡{y,0}.u_i(p, r) = a_i - b_i p_i + c_i^+ (r_i - p_i)_+ - c_i^- (p_i - r_i)_+, \qquad (y)_+ = \max\{y, 0\}.ui​(p,r)=ai​−bi​pi​+ci+​(ri​−pi​)+​−ci−​(pi​−ri​)+​,(y)+​=max{y,0}.

A customer buys product iii with the MNL probability qi(p,r)=eui/(1+∑keuk)q_i(p, r) = e^{u_i}/(1 + \sum_k e^{u_k})qi​(p,r)=eui​/(1+∑k​euk​) and buys nothing otherwise. The single-period revenue is Π(p,r)=∑ipi qi(p,r)\Pi(p, r) = \sum_i p_i\, q_i(p, r)Π(p,r)=∑i​pi​qi​(p,r).

Product iii is loss-averse if ci+<ci−c_i^+ < c_i^-ci+​<ci−​, loss-neutral if ci+=ci−c_i^+ = c_i^-ci+​=ci−​ and gain-seeking if ci+>ci−c_i^+ > c_i^-ci+​>ci−​; NlN_lNl​, NnN_nNn​, NgN_gNg​ denote the three classes.

Prices and reference prices lie in the box Pn=[0,pH]nP^n = [0, p_H]^nPn=[0,pH​]n. The reference price evolves by exponential smoothing with memory parameter α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0, 1]α∈[0,1]:

rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt.r^{t+1} = \alpha r^t + (1 - \alpha) p^t .rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt.

With discount factor β∈[0,1)\beta \in [0, 1)β∈[0,1), the optimal value from an initial reference price r0r^0r0 is

V⋆(r0)=sup⁡(pt)t≥0⊂Pn∑t≥0βt Π(pt,rt).V^\star(r^0) = \sup_{(p^t)_{t \ge 0} \subset P^n} \sum_{t \ge 0} \beta^t\, \Pi(p^t, r^t).V⋆(r0)=(pt)t≥0​⊂Pnsup​t≥0∑​βtΠ(pt,rt).

An optimal steady state is a price vector p⋆⋆∈Pnp^{\star\star} \in P^np⋆⋆∈Pn that the optimal policy keeps fixed: starting from reference price p⋆⋆p^{\star\star}p⋆⋆, charging p⋆⋆p^{\star\star}p⋆⋆ forever is optimal. The constant path keeps rt=p⋆⋆r^t = p^{\star\star}rt=p⋆⋆ and earns Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)/(1−β)\Pi(p^{\star\star}, p^{\star\star})/(1 - \beta)Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)/(1−β), so the condition reads V⋆(p⋆⋆)=Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)/(1−β)V^\star(p^{\star\star}) = \Pi(p^{\star\star}, p^{\star\star})/(1 - \beta)V⋆(p⋆⋆)=Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)/(1−β).

Finally, set

κ:=1−β1−αβ∈(0,1].\kappa := \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \alpha\beta} \in (0, 1].κ:=1−αβ1−β​∈(0,1].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 22)

If no product is gain-seeking (N=Nl∪NnN = N_l \cup N_nN=Nl​∪Nn​), every optimal steady state satisfies

pi⋆⋆−Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)∈[1bi+ci−κ, 1bi+ci+κ],∀i∈N.(20)p_i^{\star\star} - \Pi(p^{\star\star}, p^{\star\star}) \in \Bigl[\frac{1}{b_i + c_i^-\kappa},\ \frac{1}{b_i + c_i^+\kappa}\Bigr], \qquad \forall i \in N. \qquad (20)pi⋆⋆​−Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)∈[bi​+ci−​κ1​, bi​+ci+​κ1​],∀i∈N.(20)

The theorem does not assert that an optimal steady state exists; it describes every one that does.

Corollary 3 (p. 22)

In the same scenario, the equations

Π=∑ieai−biΠ−bi/(bi+ci+κ)bi+ci−κ(22a),Π=∑ieai−biΠ−bi/(bi+ci−κ)bi+ci+κ(22b)\Pi = \sum_{i} \frac{e^{a_i - b_i\Pi - b_i/(b_i + c_i^+\kappa)}}{b_i + c_i^-\kappa} \quad (22a), \qquad \Pi = \sum_{i} \frac{e^{a_i - b_i\Pi - b_i/(b_i + c_i^-\kappa)}}{b_i + c_i^+\kappa} \quad (22b)Π=i∑​bi​+ci−​κeai​−bi​Π−bi​/(bi​+ci+​κ)​(22a),Π=i∑​bi​+ci+​κeai​−bi​Π−bi​/(bi​+ci−​κ)​(22b)

have unique solutions ΠL\Pi^LΠL and ΠU\Pi^UΠU, and every optimal steady state satisfies Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)∈[ΠL,ΠU]\Pi(p^{\star\star}, p^{\star\star}) \in [\Pi^L, \Pi^U]Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)∈[ΠL,ΠU] and pi⋆⋆∈[ΠL+1/(bi+ci−κ), ΠU+1/(bi+ci+κ)]p_i^{\star\star} \in [\Pi^L + 1/(b_i + c_i^-\kappa),\ \Pi^U + 1/(b_i + c_i^+\kappa)]pi⋆⋆​∈[ΠL+1/(bi​+ci−​κ), ΠU+1/(bi​+ci+​κ)].

Corollary 4 (p. 23)

If every product is loss-neutral, ci:=ci+=ci−c_i := c_i^+ = c_i^-ci​:=ci+​=ci−​, an optimal steady state, if it exists, is unique, satisfies pi⋆⋆=Π⋆⋆+1/(bi+ciκ)p_i^{\star\star} = \Pi^{\star\star} + 1/(b_i + c_i\kappa)pi⋆⋆​=Π⋆⋆+1/(bi​+ci​κ), and Π⋆⋆=Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)\Pi^{\star\star} = \Pi(p^{\star\star}, p^{\star\star})Π⋆⋆=Π(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆) is the unique solution of Π=∑i(bi+ciκ)−1eai−biΠ−bi/(bi+ciκ)\Pi = \sum_i (b_i + c_i\kappa)^{-1} e^{a_i - b_i\Pi - b_i/(b_i + c_i\kappa)}Π=∑i​(bi​+ci​κ)−1eai​−bi​Π−bi​/(bi​+ci​κ) (24).

Significance

Theorem 5 is the paper's only structural description of the optimal policy's long-run behaviour when it is stable. Computing the optimal policy requires solving a Bellman equation on an nnn-dimensional continuous state space, which is intractable for many products; the theorem replaces that with an explicit per-product markup interval around a single scalar, the steady-state revenue. Corollary 3 turns it into explicit price bounds computable from two one-dimensional equations, so candidate constant prices outside those bounds can be discarded without solving the dynamic program. Corollary 4 shows that pure loss-neutrality pins down the steady state completely, and the comparison with the myopic steady state (markup 1/(bi+ci)1/(b_i + c_i)1/(bi​+ci​)) shows how forward-looking pricing shrinks the reference-effect term by the factor κ\kappaκ. The same paper shows (Theorem 4) that a single gain-seeking product rules out optimal steady states altogether, which is why the hypothesis N=Nl∪NnN = N_l \cup N_nN=Nl​∪Nn​ is essential.

The results are proved in the paper's online supplement (Appendix C.4); that supplement is not part of the source file used for this mission, and none of these results has a machine-checked proof. This mission produces formal statements of Theorem 5 and Corollaries 3–4 over a formal definition of the optimal value; a complete development would also produce a Lean theory of the deterministic infinite-horizon pricing problem with reference effects.

Difficulty

An optimal steady state is defined through the value function V⋆V^\starV⋆, which has no closed form, and the revenue is not differentiable exactly where every steady state sits: the utility has a kink at pi=rip_i = r_ipi​=ri​, with loss sensitivity ci−c_i^-ci−​ on one side and gain sensitivity ci+c_i^+ci+​ on the other. The obvious approach, writing first-order conditions of the Bellman equation at the fixed point, therefore does not apply directly. A change in today's price also moves every future reference price, so the comparison between a steady state and its alternatives involves the whole discounted future revenue stream rather than a single period, and the factor κ\kappaκ in (20) reflects this intertemporal coupling. The myopic analysis of the same paper does not transfer, because the myopic problem is a single-period optimisation over PnP^nPn while here optimality is a property of an infinite-horizon value.

Formalization scope

Products are indexed by Fin n (0-based). All vectors are Fin n → ℝ. The shares are defined directly by the MNL formula; the Gumbel random-utility derivation is motivation only. The theorems carry the paper's standing hypotheses explicitly: bi>0b_i > 0bi​>0, ci±≥0c_i^\pm \ge 0ci±​≥0, α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0, 1]α∈[0,1], β∈[0,1)\beta \in [0, 1)β∈[0,1), pH>0p_H > 0pH​>0, and the standing ceiling assumption of §2.4, pH≥p^Hp_H \ge \hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​, where p^H\hat p_Hp^​H​ solves equation (9) (CeilingOK: some root of (9) is at most pHp_HpH​).

Conventions committed to:

  • V⋆V^\starV⋆ is the supremum of discounted revenue over all price sequences in [0,pH]n[0, p_H]^n[0,pH​]n, not over stationary policies; for this deterministic problem the two coincide.
  • Optimal policies need not be unique, so an optimal steady state is stated through values: IsOptSteadyState x means x∈Pnx \in P^nx∈Pn and V⋆(x)≤Π(x,x)/(1−β)V^\star(x) \le \Pi(x, x)/(1 - \beta)V⋆(x)≤Π(x,x)/(1−β). The reverse inequality always holds (the constant path is admissible), so this is the equality above.
  • "If there exists an optimal steady state, p⋆⋆p^{\star\star}p⋆⋆ satisfies …" is stated for every optimal steady state.
  • "The unique solution of (E)" is split into existence-and-uniqueness (∃!) or "solves (E), and every solution equals it"; no solution is chosen with Classical.choose.
  • Corollary 3 is stated in Theorem 5's scenario (ci+≤ci−c_i^+ \le c_i^-ci+​≤ci−​), from which the paper derives it.

The hypothesis N=Nl∪NnN = N_l \cup N_nN=Nl​∪Nn​ must not be dropped: with a gain-seeking product no optimal steady state exists (Theorem 4), so a statement without it would be vacuously true there. A formalization in which IsOptSteadyState is unsatisfiable by construction (for example a junk value of V⋆V^\starV⋆ above every constant path) would make every statement here empty; the supremum is over a nonempty family bounded by pH/(1−β)p_H/(1 - \beta)pH​/(1−β).

Needed infrastructure: summability and bounds for discounted revenue streams, one-sided perturbation estimates for the kinked MNL revenue, and comparison arguments for the value function. Contributions of reusable lemmas about the MNL revenue Π\PiΠ and about reference-price dynamics are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. A. Guo, H. Jiang, Z.-J. M. Shen, Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. SSRN version of 2024-05-25: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189049; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0801
  • I. Popescu, Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
  • D. McFadden, Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior, in P. Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, Academic Press, 1974, pp. 105–142.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes III: Bipartite, Unit-Patience Side: Rounding Then Probing by Weight Earns ≥ (1 − 1/e)·Σ w_e p_e y_eResearch Paper

Motivation

Stochastic matching with patience models kidney exchange, online dating and labour platforms: every edge of a graph is present only with some probability, the only way to learn whether it is present is to probe it, and a probed edge that turns out to be present must be added to the matching. Each vertex vvv also has a patience tvt_vtv​, a limit on how many of its edges may be probed. The goal is a probing strategy whose expected matched weight is a large fraction of what the best adaptive strategy obtains. Since the best strategy is hard to compute, algorithms are compared with the value of a linear program (LP (3) below), which upper-bounds every probing strategy (Bansal, Gupta, Li, Mestre, Nagarajan, Rudra, Algorithmica 2012).

Bansal et al. gave a 1/31/31/3-approximation for stochastic bipartite matching. Brubach, Grammel, Ma, MacRury and Srinivasan (Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2106.06892v3) single out the case in which one side of the bipartition has unit patience, tu=1t_u=1tu​=1 for every u∈V1u\in V_1u∈V1​. This case contains "Problem A" of Hikima et al. (AAAI 2021), whose approximation ratio transfers to their integrated two-stage problem ISPCB; Hikima et al. obtained 1/31/31/3 from the bound of Bansal et al. For the special case in which one side has arbitrary patience and the other unlimited patience, Borodin and MacRury had already obtained the same (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e) guarantee through an online problem.

Setting

Let G=(V1∪V2,E)G=(V_1\cup V_2,E)G=(V1​∪V2​,E) be a finite bipartite graph; δ(x)\delta(x)δ(x) denotes the set of edges at a vertex xxx. Each edge eee has a weight we≥0w_e\ge 0we​≥0 and an activation probability pe∈[0,1]p_e\in[0,1]pe​∈[0,1], independently across edges. Every u∈V1u\in V_1u∈V1​ has patience 111; every v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​ has a patience tv∈N∪{∞}t_v\in\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}tv​∈N∪{∞}.

LP (3). A vector (ye)e∈E(y_e)_{e\in E}(ye​)e∈E​ is feasible when 0≤ye≤10\le y_e\le 10≤ye​≤1 and, for every vertex xxx,

∑e∈δ(x)yepe≤1,∑e∈δ(x)ye≤tx.\sum_{e\in\delta(x)}y_ep_e\le 1,\qquad \sum_{e\in\delta(x)}y_e\le t_x .e∈δ(x)∑​ye​pe​≤1,e∈δ(x)∑​ye​≤tx​.

Write ze=yepez_e=y_ep_eze​=ye​pe​ and OPT(v)=∑e∈δ(v)weze\mathsf{OPT}(v)=\sum_{e\in\delta(v)}w_ez_eOPT(v)=∑e∈δ(v)​we​ze​.

The algorithm. A dependent rounding (Gandhi, Khuller, Parthasarathy, Srinivasan, J. ACM 2006) turns yyy into a random set E^={e:Ye=1}\hat E=\{e:Y_e=1\}E^={e:Ye​=1} of rounded edges with Pr⁡[Ye=1]=ye\Pr[Y_e=1]=y_ePr[Ye​=1]=ye​, at most one rounded edge at each u∈V1u\in V_1u∈V1​, at most tvt_vtv​ at each v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​, and the negative correlation property (2): for v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​, S⊆δ(v)S\subseteq\delta(v)S⊆δ(v) and b∈{0,1}b\in\{0,1\}b∈{0,1},

Pr⁡[⋂e∈S(Ye=b)]≤∏e∈SPr⁡[Ye=b].\Pr\Big[\bigcap_{e\in S}(Y_e=b)\Big]\le\prod_{e\in S}\Pr[Y_e=b].Pr[e∈S⋂​(Ye​=b)]≤e∈S∏​Pr[Ye​=b].

In the rounded graph every v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​ is the centre of a star. Each vvv probes its rounded edges in decreasing order of weight and is matched to the first active one; W(v)W(v)W(v) is the weight of that edge (000 if none), and E[ALG]=E[∑v∈V2W(v)]\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}]=\mathbb E[\sum_{v\in V_2}W(v)]E[ALG]=E[∑v∈V2​​W(v)].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18)

For every feasible yyy, every rounding with the properties above and every decreasing-weight probing order,

E[ALG] ≥ (1−1e)∑v∈V2∑e∈δ(v)wepeye.\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}]\ \ge\ \Big(1-\frac1e\Big)\sum_{v\in V_2}\sum_{e\in\delta(v)}w_ep_ey_e .E[ALG] ≥ (1−e1​)v∈V2​∑​e∈δ(v)∑​we​pe​ye​.

Milestones

  1. The proof of Lemma 7 (p. 17) expresses W(v)W(v)W(v) as E[∑iwiYiPi∏j<i(1−YjPj)]\mathbb E[\sum_i w_iY_iP_i\prod_{j<i}(1-Y_jP_j)]E[∑i​wi​Yi​Pi​∏j<i​(1−Yj​Pj​)] and bounds E[∏j≤i(1−YjPj)]≤∏j≤i(1−yjpj)\mathbb E[\prod_{j\le i}(1-Y_jP_j)]\le\prod_{j\le i}(1-y_jp_j)E[∏j≤i​(1−Yj​Pj​)]≤∏j≤i​(1−yj​pj​) using (2).
  2. Lemma 7 (p. 16): E[W(v)]≥∑i=1kwizi∏j=1i−1(1−zj)\mathbb E[W(v)]\ge\sum_{i=1}^k w_iz_i\prod_{j=1}^{i-1}(1-z_j)E[W(v)]≥∑i=1k​wi​zi​∏j=1i−1​(1−zj​) for the edges of δ(v)\delta(v)δ(v) labelled by decreasing weight.
  3. Eq. (29) (p. 18): the bound F(i)≥1−e−F∗(i)≥(1−1/e)F∗(i)F(i)\ge1-e^{-F^*(i)}\ge(1-1/e)F^*(i)F(i)≥1−e−F∗(i)≥(1−1/e)F∗(i). The summation-by-parts identity (27) on the same page is included as a supporting lemma.
  4. Lemma 8 (p. 17): ∑iwizi∏j<i(1−zj)≥(1−1/e)∑iwizi\sum_i w_iz_i\prod_{j<i}(1-z_j)\ge(1-1/e)\sum_iw_iz_i∑i​wi​zi​∏j<i​(1−zj​)≥(1−1/e)∑i​wi​zi​ when zi∈[0,1]z_i\in[0,1]zi​∈[0,1], ∑izi≤1\sum_iz_i\le1∑i​zi​≤1 and w1≥⋯≥wk≥0w_1\ge\cdots\ge w_k\ge0w1​≥⋯≥wk​≥0.
  5. Lemma 9 (p. 18): E[W(v)]≥(1−1/e) OPT(v)\mathbb E[W(v)]\ge(1-1/e)\,\mathsf{OPT}(v)E[W(v)]≥(1−1/e)OPT(v) for every v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​.

The paper's proofs are in §4, pp. 16–19.

Significance

Combined with the LP upper bound (Lemma 1 of the paper, from Bansal et al.), Theorem 2 is a (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e)-approximation for stochastic matching on bipartite graphs with a unit-patience side, improving and generalizing the 1/31/31/3 guarantee of Hikima et al. for Problem A and, through their reduction, for ISPCB. By the paper's account (§1.1, p. 4), the guarantee rests on a new ingredient, a (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e)-balanced ordered contention resolution scheme for rank-1 matroids under negative correlation, in which the algorithm chooses the order: the per-star bound of Lemmas 7 and 9 holds for every rounding satisfying (2), not only for independent activations.

The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been machine-checked. This mission formalizes the per-star analysis and the theorem for an abstract rounding described by its properties, which is reusable for any algorithm that probes stars after a negatively correlated rounding.

Difficulty

If the rounded indicators YeY_eYe​ at a vertex were independent, Lemma 7 would be an equality and the remaining work would be the deterministic inequality of Lemma 8. They are not: the rounding is dependent, and Example 1 (p. 19) shows that this dependence can raise the probability that a particular edge is blocked to 1/21/21/2, so that no correlation-agnostic contention resolution scheme is better than 1/21/21/2-balanced. A per-edge guarantee, of the kind a contention resolution scheme that ignores correlation provides, is therefore unavailable: the bound of Theorem 2 holds only for the total weight collected at each vvv, and the negative correlation property (2) is one-sided, so it can be used only in the direction in which it holds.

Formalization scope

  • All randomness is finite. The rounding is a probability vector μ\muμ on subsets of EEE; the activeness pattern P:E→{0,1}P:E\to\{0,1\}P:E→{0,1} is independent with product weights. Every expectation is an explicit finite sum.
  • The rounding of Gandhi et al. is represented by its properties: μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0, ∑μ=1\sum\mu=1∑μ=1, the marginals Pr⁡[Ye=1]=ye\Pr[Y_e=1]=y_ePr[Ye​=1]=ye​, at most one rounded edge at each u∈V1u\in V_1u∈V1​, at most tvt_vtv​ at each v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​, and (2) on the rounded indicators for every v∈V2v\in V_2v∈V2​, S⊆δ(v)S\subseteq\delta(v)S⊆δ(v), b∈{0,1}b\in\{0,1\}b∈{0,1}. The goal holds for every such μ\muμ, so it covers the paper's rounding; formalizing the rounding procedure itself is a separate project.
  • W(v)W(v)W(v) is defined from the run (the first active edge in vvv's probe list), not by the formula of Lemma 7; the identity between the two is a milestone.
  • Standing assumptions, disclosed: we≥0w_e\ge0we​≥0 (with a negative weight the bound fails), pe∈[0,1]p_e\in[0,1]pe​∈[0,1], patience ∞\infty∞ is allowed on V2V_2V2​, and parallel edges are allowed. The goal is stated for every feasible yyy, a stronger statement than the paper's "optimal" yyy, since the proof never uses optimality. The phrase "yielding a (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e)-approximation" is not formalized: it needs Lemma 1 of Bansal et al.
  • Ruled out: defining W(v)W(v)W(v) as ∑iwiYiPi∏j<i(1−YjPj)\sum_iw_iY_iP_i\prod_{j<i}(1-Y_jP_j)∑i​wi​Yi​Pi​∏j<i​(1−Yj​Pj​), as the best active edge regardless of the rounding, or stating the goal for one specific (independent) rounding or "for some rounding" would each be a different, weaker theorem.
  • Useful infrastructure: finite expectations over product measures, a negative-correlation inequality for products, Abel summation (Finset.sum_range_by_parts), and 1−x≤e−x1-x\le e^{-x}1−x≤e−x. Proofs of any milestone, and of the theorem from the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • B. Brubach, N. Grammel, W. Ma, C. MacRury, A. Srinivasan, Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. arXiv:2106.06892v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.06892
  • R. Gandhi, S. Khuller, S. Parthasarathy, A. Srinivasan, Dependent rounding and its applications to approximation algorithms, Journal of the ACM 53(3):324–360, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1145/1147954.1147956
  • N. Bansal, A. Gupta, J. Li, J. Mestre, V. Nagarajan, A. Rudra, When LP is the cure for your matching woes: improved bounds for stochastic matchings, Algorithmica 63(4):733–762, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-011-9511-8
  • Y. Hikima, Y. Akagi, H. Kim, M. Kohjima, T. Kurashima, H. Toda, Integrated optimization of bipartite matching and its stochastic behavior: new formulation and approximation algorithm via min-cost flow optimization, The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2021) (reference [28] of the paper; no link).
  • A. Borodin, C. MacRury, Online bipartite matching in the probe-commit model, Mathematical Programming, 2025, pp. 1–54 (reference [9] of the paper; no link).
10 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimal Transport·Captain: mikedeng1

Robustifying Conditional Portfolio Decisions via Optimal Transport 5: For a Fiber of Radius γ > 0 and Fiber Mass at Least ε > 0, the Worst-Case Conditional Loss Equals a Finite-Dimensional DualResearch Paper

Motivation

A portfolio manager who observes side information, the covariate XXX (a market state, a set of signals), wants to choose a portfolio for the asset returns YYY given the current value x0x_0x0​ of that covariate. Estimating the conditional law of YYY given X=x0X=x_0X=x0​ from NNN joint samples is fragile: typically no sample has x^i=x0\hat x_i=x_0x^i​=x0​ exactly, and a nearest-neighbour or kernel estimate inherits all the noise of the few samples near x0x_0x0​. Nguyen, Zhang, Wang, Blanchet, Delage and Ye robustify this decision with optimal transport: they let an adversary perturb the empirical joint distribution within a transport budget and evaluate the portfolio by its worst conditional expected loss over the perturbed distributions. This mission formalizes their main reformulation result for the general case, a fiber of positive radius with a positive mass requirement.

Setting

Let X\mathcal XX and Y\mathcal YY be Polish spaces. The data are N≥1N\ge1N≥1 samples (x^i,y^i)∈X×Y(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)\in\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y(x^i​,y^​i​)∈X×Y, i∈[N]i\in[N]i∈[N], with empirical distribution P^=N−1∑iδ(x^i,y^i)\hat{\mathbb P}=N^{-1}\sum_i\delta_{(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)}P^=N−1∑i​δ(x^i​,y^​i​)​. Ground costs DX\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}DX​ and DY\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}DY​ give the joint cost D((x,y),(x′,y′))=DX(x,x′)+DY(y,y′)\mathbb D((x,y),(x',y'))=\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,x')+\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(y,y')D((x,y),(x′,y′))=DX​(x,x′)+DY​(y,y′), and the optimal transport cost W(Q,P^)\mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\hat{\mathbb P})W(Q,P^) is the least expected cost Eπ[D]\mathbb E_\pi[\mathbb D]Eπ​[D] over couplings π\piπ of Q\mathbb QQ and P^\hat{\mathbb P}P^. The ambiguity set is the ball

Bρ={Q∈M(X×Y):W(Q,P^)≤ρ}.\mathbb B_\rho=\{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal M(\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y):\mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\hat{\mathbb P})\le\rho\}.Bρ​={Q∈M(X×Y):W(Q,P^)≤ρ}.

The neighbourhood of the observed covariate is Nγ(x0)={x:DX(x,x0)≤γ}\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)=\{x:\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,x_0)\le\gamma\}Nγ​(x0​)={x:DX​(x,x0​)≤γ}, and Nγ(x0)×Y\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\times\mathcal YNγ​(x0​)×Y is the fiber set. For a fixed portfolio the loss is a function ℓ:Y→R\ell:\mathcal Y\to\mathbb Rℓ:Y→R, and the quantity of interest is the worst-case conditional expected loss

sup⁡{EQ[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ(x0)]: Q∈Bρ, Q(X∈Nγ(x0))≥ε},\sup\Big\{\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[\ell(Y)\mid X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)]:\ \mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho,\ \mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))\ge\varepsilon\Big\},sup{EQ​[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ​(x0​)]: Q∈Bρ​, Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))≥ε},

where ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 is a minimum mass the adversary must leave on the fiber, so that the conditional expectation is well defined.

Three more data enter the result. The minimum radius ρmin⁡(x0,γ,ε)\rho_{\min}(x_0,\gamma,\varepsilon)ρmin​(x0​,γ,ε) is the least W(Q,P^)\mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\hat{\mathbb P})W(Q,P^) over Q\mathbb QQ with fiber mass at least ε\varepsilonε. The index sets are I1={i:x^i∈Nγ(x0)}\mathcal I_1=\{i:\hat x_i\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\}I1​={i:x^i​∈Nγ​(x0​)} and I2=[N]∖I1\mathcal I_2=[N]\setminus\mathcal I_1I2​=[N]∖I1​. The boundary distances are di=inf⁡x∈∂Nγ(x0)DX(x,x^i)d_i=\inf_{x\in\partial\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)}\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,\hat x_i)di​=infx∈∂Nγ​(x0​)​DX​(x,x^i​). The dual set V\mathcal VV (display (16)) consists of the tuples (λ,s,ν+,ν−,ϕ,φ,ψ)(\lambda,s,\nu^+,\nu^-,\phi,\varphi,\psi)(λ,s,ν+,ν−,ϕ,φ,ψ) with λ,ψ∈R+N\lambda,\psi\in\mathbb R^N_+λ,ψ∈R+N​, s∈RNs\in\mathbb R^Ns∈RN, ν±,φ≥0\nu^\pm,\varphi\ge0ν±,φ≥0, ϕ∈R\phi\in\mathbb Rϕ∈R, subject to

ϕ−diφ+ψi−si≥0 (i∈I1),ϕ+diφ+ψi−si≥0 (i∈I2),ν+−ν−+(∑i∈I1di−Nρ)φ−∑iψi≥0,φ≥λi.\phi-d_i\varphi+\psi_i-s_i\ge0\ (i\in\mathcal I_1),\quad \phi+d_i\varphi+\psi_i-s_i\ge0\ (i\in\mathcal I_2),\quad \nu^+-\nu^-+\Big(\sum_{i\in\mathcal I_1}d_i-N\rho\Big)\varphi-\sum_i\psi_i\ge0,\quad \varphi\ge\lambda_i.ϕ−di​φ+ψi​−si​≥0 (i∈I1​),ϕ+di​φ+ψi​−si​≥0 (i∈I2​),ν+−ν−+(i∈I1​∑​di​−Nρ)φ−i∑​ψi​≥0,φ≥λi​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4

For γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and ρ>ρmin⁡(x0,γ,ε)\rho>\rho_{\min}(x_0,\gamma,\varepsilon)ρ>ρmin​(x0​,γ,ε),

sup⁡Q∈BρQ(X∈Nγ(x0))≥εEQ[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ(x0)]=inf⁡{ϕ+ν+Nε−ν−N: (λ,s,ν+,ν−,ϕ,φ,ψ)∈V, si≥sup⁡y∈Y{ℓ(y)−λiDY(y,y^i)} ∀i}.\sup_{\substack{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho\\ \mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))\ge\varepsilon}}\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[\ell(Y)\mid X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)]=\inf\Big\{\phi+\frac{\nu^+}{N\varepsilon}-\frac{\nu^-}{N}:\ (\lambda,s,\nu^+,\nu^-,\phi,\varphi,\psi)\in\mathcal V,\ s_i\ge\sup_{y\in\mathcal Y}\{\ell(y)-\lambda_i\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(y,\hat y_i)\}\ \forall i\Big\}.Q∈Bρ​Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))≥ε​sup​EQ​[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ​(x0​)]=inf{ϕ+Nεν+​−Nν−​: (λ,s,ν+,ν−,ϕ,φ,ψ)∈V, si​≥y∈Ysup​{ℓ(y)−λi​DY​(y,y^​i​)} ∀i}.

Milestones

  1. Representation (24) of Bρ\mathbb B_\rhoBρ​ as the set of averages N−1∑iπiN^{-1}\sum_i\pi_iN−1∑i​πi​ of probability measures with N−1∑iEπi[D(⋅,(x^i,y^i))]≤ρN^{-1}\sum_i\mathbb E_{\pi_i}[\mathbb D(\cdot,(\hat x_i,\hat y_i))]\le\rhoN−1∑i​Eπi​​[D(⋅,(x^i​,y^​i​))]≤ρ.
  2. Proposition 2.5: ρmin⁡\rho_{\min}ρmin​ is the value of a fractional knapsack linear program, and a feasible Q\mathbb QQ exists iff ρ≥ρmin⁡\rho\ge\rho_{\min}ρ≥ρmin​.
  3. Reduction (proof of Theorem 4.4, pp. 48–49): the worst case equals a supremum over weights pi∈[0,1]p_i\in[0,1]pi​∈[0,1] and laws μ0i\mu_0^iμ0i​ on Y\mathcal YY of ∑ipiEμ0i[ℓ]/∑ipi\sum_ip_i\mathbb E_{\mu_0^i}[\ell]/\sum_ip_i∑i​pi​Eμ0i​​[ℓ]/∑i​pi​, under a transport budget and ∑ipi≥Nε\sum_ip_i\ge N\varepsilon∑i​pi​≥Nε.
  4. Conic duality (p. 50) for one sample: sup⁡{Eμ[υℓ]:Eμ[υDY(⋅,y^)]≤θ}=inf⁡λ≥0θλ+υsup⁡y{ℓ(y)−λDY(y,y^)}\sup\{\mathbb E_{\mu}[\upsilon\ell]:\mathbb E_\mu[\upsilon\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(\cdot,\hat y)]\le\theta\}=\inf_{\lambda\ge0}\theta\lambda+\upsilon\sup_y\{\ell(y)-\lambda\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(y,\hat y)\}sup{Eμ​[υℓ]:Eμ​[υDY​(⋅,y^​)]≤θ}=infλ≥0​θλ+υsupy​{ℓ(y)−λDY​(y,y^​)} for θ>0\theta>0θ>0.
  5. LP duality (29) (pp. 50–51): the supremum of ∑iθiλi+υisi\sum_i\theta_i\lambda_i+\upsilon_is_i∑i​θi​λi​+υi​si​ over the Charnes–Cooper variables (υ,t)(\upsilon,t)(υ,t) and the budgets θ\thetaθ equals the infimum of ϕ+(Nε)−1ν+−N−1ν−\phi+(N\varepsilon)^{-1}\nu^+-N^{-1}\nu^-ϕ+(Nε)−1ν+−N−1ν− over V\mathcal VV.

Significance

The theorem turns an infinite-dimensional problem, a supremum over probability measures on X×Y\mathcal X\times\mathcal YX×Y of a ratio of integrals, into a program in O(N)O(N)O(N) real variables whose only infinite part is the per-sample supremum sup⁡y{ℓ(y)−λiDY(y,y^i)}\sup_y\{\ell(y)-\lambda_i\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(y,\hat y_i)\}supy​{ℓ(y)−λi​DY​(y,y^​i​)}. For the losses used in portfolio selection (mean–variance, CVaR) this supremum has a closed form or a conic representation, and the outer minimization over portfolios becomes a single convex program; this is how the paper computes its conditional robust portfolios. It is the most general of the paper's four cases (Figure 1, p. 12); the companion missions of this series treat a singleton fiber (γ=0\gamma=0γ=0) and a zero mass requirement (ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0).

The result is proved in the paper, not formalized anywhere. A machine-checked version requires, and would leave behind, an optimal-transport representation of Wasserstein balls around empirical measures, a Dirac-nominal conic duality for moment problems, and finite-dimensional linear programming duality, none of which is in Mathlib.

Difficulty

The conditional expectation is a ratio, so the problem is not a linear program in Q\mathbb QQ and the standard Wasserstein DRO duality does not apply directly. Passing to finitely many sample weights requires that leaving the fiber from a sample inside it costs exactly did_idi​, which depends on the geometry of the neighbourhood and not only on Assumption 2.4. The two duality steps are of different kinds: an infinite-dimensional one over laws on Y\mathcal YY, where the loss is only measurable, and a finite-dimensional linear program whose strong duality must be certified from ρ>ρmin⁡\rho>\rho_{\min}ρ>ρmin​. The representation of the ball needs an optimal coupling, which is an existence theorem on Polish spaces.

Formalization scope

  • X\mathcal XX, Y\mathcal YY are Polish Borel spaces; [N][N][N] is Fin N with N≥1N\ge1N≥1; samples may repeat.
  • W\mathbb WW is the published RWPI.SqrtLasso.transportCost, an infimum over couplings of a lower integral of the [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued cost; the ball compares it with ENNReal.ofReal ρ.
  • Expectations of the loss are the published ModelRiskOT.Duality.extIntegral, ∫ℓ+−∫ℓ−\int\ell^+-\int\ell^-∫ℓ+−∫ℓ− in the extended reals. Both sides of the goal are extended reals; the infimum over an empty set is +∞+\infty+∞.
  • The loss is an arbitrary measurable L:Y→RL:\mathcal Y\to\mathbb RL:Y→R, standing for ℓ(⋅,α,β)\ell(\cdot,\alpha,\beta)ℓ(⋅,α,β) at any fixed feasible (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β); no boundedness or continuity is assumed.
  • Assumption 2.4 (separable, symmetric, nonnegative, continuous costs; unique projections onto Nγ(x0)\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)Nγ​(x0​); vicinity of boundary points) is a hypothesis of every statement. ∂\partial∂ is the topological frontier in X\mathcal XX; κi\kappa_iκi​ and did_idi​ are real infima.
  • Added hypotheses. A boundary-regularity predicate: ∂Nγ(x0)≠∅\partial\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\ne\emptyset∂Nγ​(x0​)=∅, did_idi​ is the greatest lower bound of DX(x,x^i)\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,\hat x_i)DX​(x,x^i​) over x∉Nγ(x0)x\notin\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)x∈/Nγ​(x0​) for i∈I1i\in\mathcal I_1i∈I1​, and di=κid_i=\kappa_idi​=κi​ for i∈I2i\in\mathcal I_2i∈I2​. The proof uses both facts, and neither follows from Assumption 2.4 for a general continuous cost; both hold when DX\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}DX​ is a norm distance. Measurability of LLL. In the conic duality milestone, θ>0\theta>0θ>0.
  • Ruled out. The conditional expectation is never evaluated at a Q\mathbb QQ with zero fiber mass (the supremum ranges only over Q\mathbb QQ with mass at least ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0); no Bochner integral of a possibly non-integrable loss appears; ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0 follows from ρ>ρmin⁡\rho>\rho_{\min}ρ>ρmin​, so ofReal never collapses a negative radius; and the supremum ranges exactly over Bρ\mathbb B_\rhoBρ​ intersected with the mass constraint, not over all measures.
  • Welcome contributions: existence of optimal couplings on Polish spaces, the decomposition of couplings with a finitely supported marginal, a Dirac-nominal moment duality, and LP strong duality in the form needed for (29). These are reusable well beyond this paper.

Selected references

  • V. A. Nguyen, F. Zhang, S. Wang, J. Blanchet, E. Delage, Y. Ye, Robustifying conditional portfolio decisions via optimal transport, arXiv:2103.16451v3, 2024; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.16451
  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying distributional model risk via optimal transport, Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2), 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01446
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009 (Theorem 4.1, existence of optimal couplings). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
  • A. Charnes, W. W. Cooper, Programming with linear fractional functionals, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 9, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800090303
  • M. Sion, On general minimax theorems, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 8(1), 1958. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimal Transport·Captain: mikedeng1

Robustifying Conditional Portfolio Decisions via Optimal Transport 4: For a Fiber of Radius γ > 0 and a Budget ρ < ρ_max, Every Measure in the Ball Puts at Least an Explicit Mass ε > 0 on the FiberResearch Paper

Motivation

A portfolio manager who observes side information, such as a vector of market covariates x0x_0x0​ today, wants a decision that performs well conditionally on that information: the relevant risk is the expected loss of the portfolio given that the covariate equals, or is close to, x0x_0x0​. Estimating this conditional loss from NNN historical pairs (x^i,y^i)(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)(x^i​,y^​i​) of covariates and returns is fragile, since few or no samples may lie near x0x_0x0​. Nguyen, Zhang, Wang, Blanchet, Delage and Ye (arXiv:2103.16451, Operations Research 2025) robustify the conditional decision with an optimal-transport ambiguity set: the worst case of the conditional expected loss is taken over all distributions within transport budget ρ\rhoρ of the empirical distribution.

Conditioning makes this worst case delicate. The adversary may move mass away from the conditioning set, and a conditional expectation on a set of probability zero is undefined. Section 4.1 of the paper treats a neighbourhood of positive radius γ\gammaγ around x0x_0x0​ and requires only that the conditioning set have positive probability. This mission formalizes the result showing that, when the budget is below an explicit threshold ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​, the requirement "positive probability" is automatically "probability at least ε‾\underline\varepsilonε​", with ε‾>0\underline\varepsilon>0ε​>0 the value of a small linear program.

Setting

Let X\mathcal XX and Y\mathcal YY be Polish spaces carrying their Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebras, with ground costs DX\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}DX​ and DY\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}DY​ and the separable joint cost D((x,y),(x′,y′))=DX(x,x′)+DY(y,y′)\mathbb D((x,y),(x',y'))=\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,x')+\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(y,y')D((x,y),(x′,y′))=DX​(x,x′)+DY​(y,y′). The data are N≥1N\ge1N≥1 samples (x^i,y^i)(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)(x^i​,y^​i​), i∈[N]i\in[N]i∈[N], and the empirical distribution is P^=N−1∑iδ(x^i,y^i)\widehat{\mathbb P}=N^{-1}\sum_i\delta_{(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)}P=N−1∑i​δ(x^i​,y^​i​)​.

The optimal transport cost W(Q,P^)\mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\widehat{\mathbb P})W(Q,P) is the infimum of Eπ[D]\mathbb E_\pi[\mathbb D]Eπ​[D] over couplings π\piπ of Q\mathbb QQ and P^\widehat{\mathbb P}P, and the ambiguity set is the ball Bρ={Q:W(Q,P^)≤ρ}\mathbb B_\rho=\{\mathbb Q:\mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\widehat{\mathbb P})\le\rho\}Bρ​={Q:W(Q,P)≤ρ} of probability measures on X×Y\mathcal X\times\mathcal YX×Y.

The covariate neighbourhood is Nγ(x0)={x:DX(x,x0)≤γ}\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)=\{x:\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,x_0)\le\gamma\}Nγ​(x0​)={x:DX​(x,x0​)≤γ}, and Nγ(x0)×Y\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\times\mathcal YNγ​(x0​)×Y is the fiber set. For a loss ℓ:Y→R\ell:\mathcal Y\to\mathbb Rℓ:Y→R (the loss y↦ℓ(y,α,β)y\mapsto\ell(y,\alpha,\beta)y↦ℓ(y,α,β) of a fixed portfolio decision), the worst-case conditional loss under a mass requirement is

sup⁡Q∈Bρ, Q(X∈Nγ(x0)) ≥ ε EQ[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ(x0)],\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho,\ \mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))\ \ge\ \varepsilon}\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}\big[\ell(Y)\mid X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\big],Q∈Bρ​, Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​)) ≥ εsup​ EQ​[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ​(x0​)],

and problem (12) replaces "≥ε\ge\varepsilon≥ε" by ">0>0>0".

Two derived quantities organize §4.1. The maximal budget ρmax⁡(x0,γ)\rho_{\max}(x_0,\gamma)ρmax​(x0​,γ) is the least transport cost of a distribution that puts no mass on the fiber. Write I1={i:x^i∈Nγ(x0)}\mathcal I_1=\{i:\hat x_i\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\}I1​={i:x^i​∈Nγ​(x0​)} and I2\mathcal I_2I2​ for its complement, and let did_idi​ be the cost from x^i\hat x_ix^i​ to the boundary ∂Nγ(x0)\partial\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)∂Nγ​(x0​). Assumption 2.4 asks that the costs be symmetric, non-negative and continuous, with D=0\mathbb D=0D=0 exactly on the diagonal, that each x^i\hat x_ix^i​ have a unique projection onto Nγ(x0)\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)Nγ​(x0​), and that every boundary point be approached from outside the neighbourhood.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.3 (p. 19)

For γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 and 0≤ρ<ρmax⁡(x0,γ)0\le\rho<\rho_{\max}(x_0,\gamma)0≤ρ<ρmax​(x0​,γ), let

ε‾=min⁡{1N∑i∈I1pi: p∈[0,1]N, 1N∑i∈I1di(1−pi)≤ρ}.\underline\varepsilon=\min\Big\{\tfrac1N\textstyle\sum_{i\in\mathcal I_1}p_i:\ p\in[0,1]^N,\ \tfrac1N\sum_{i\in\mathcal I_1}d_i(1-p_i)\le\rho\Big\}.ε​=min{N1​∑i∈I1​​pi​: p∈[0,1]N, N1​∑i∈I1​​di​(1−pi​)≤ρ}.

Then ε‾>0\underline\varepsilon>0ε​>0, and for every loss ℓ\ellℓ

sup⁡Q∈Bρ, Q(X∈Nγ(x0))>0EQ[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ(x0)]=sup⁡Q∈Bρ, Q(X∈Nγ(x0))≥ε‾EQ[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ(x0)].\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho,\ \mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))>0}\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[\ell(Y)\mid X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)]=\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho,\ \mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))\ge\underline\varepsilon}\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[\ell(Y)\mid X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)].Q∈Bρ​, Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))>0sup​EQ​[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ​(x0​)]=Q∈Bρ​, Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))≥ε​sup​EQ​[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ​(x0​)].

Milestones

  1. Display (24), p. 47: Q∈Bρ\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rhoQ∈Bρ​ if and only if Q=N−1∑iπi\mathbb Q=N^{-1}\sum_i\pi_iQ=N−1∑i​πi​ for probability measures πi\pi_iπi​ with N−1∑iEπi[DX(X,x^i)+DY(Y,y^i)]≤ρN^{-1}\sum_i\mathbb E_{\pi_i}[\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(X,\hat x_i)+\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(Y,\hat y_i)]\le\rhoN−1∑i​Eπi​​[DX​(X,x^i​)+DY​(Y,y^​i​)]≤ρ.
  2. Proposition 4.1, p. 18: ρmax⁡(x0,γ)=N−1∑i∈I1di\rho_{\max}(x_0,\gamma)=N^{-1}\sum_{i\in\mathcal I_1}d_iρmax​(x0​,γ)=N−1∑i∈I1​​di​.
  3. Proof of Proposition 4.3, p. 47: for ρ<ρmax⁡\rho<\rho_{\max}ρ<ρmax​, inf⁡Q∈BρQ(X∈Nγ(x0))>0\inf_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho}\mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))>0infQ∈Bρ​​Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))>0.
  4. Proof of Proposition 4.3, pp. 47–48: for ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, inf⁡Q∈BρQ(X∈Nγ(x0))=ε‾\inf_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho}\mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))=\underline\varepsiloninfQ∈Bρ​​Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))=ε​.

Significance

Proposition 4.3 removes the degenerate constraint "positive probability" from the conditional robust problem whenever the budget is below ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​. The degenerate constraint defines a feasible set that is not closed, and conditional expectations along it can involve divisions by arbitrarily small masses; after the reduction, the problem has a positive, explicitly computable mass requirement ε‾\underline\varepsilonε​, and the finite-dimensional dual reformulation of Theorem 4.4 (which needs a positive mass requirement) applies. Together with Proposition 4.2, which shows that above ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​ the worst case degenerates to sup⁡yℓ(y,α,β)\sup_y\ell(y,\alpha,\beta)supy​ℓ(y,α,β), it gives a complete picture of the regime γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0. The LP defining ε‾\underline\varepsilonε​ is a fractional knapsack problem, solvable greedily.

The paper proves these results; none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal account of the transport-ball representation (24) on Polish spaces, the closed form of ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​, and the reduction itself. It also records, with explicit counterexamples, where the printed arguments need additional hypotheses (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The obvious argument fixes Q∈Bρ\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rhoQ∈Bρ​, splits it as N−1∑iπiN^{-1}\sum_i\pi_iN−1∑i​πi​, and bounds the cost of the mass that each πi\pi_iπi​ moves out of the fiber. Two steps resist. The splitting with the exact budget ≤ρ\le\rho≤ρ requires an optimal coupling, so attainment of the transport infimum on Polish spaces is needed. And the bound "moving a fraction 1−pi1-p_i1−pi​ of sample iii out of the fiber costs at least di(1−pi)d_i(1-p_i)di​(1−pi​)" needs the cost of leaving Nγ(x0)\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)Nγ​(x0​) from x^i\hat x_ix^i​ to equal the boundary cost did_idi​, which is not implied by continuity of DX\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}DX​. Identifying the infimal fiber mass with the LP value also requires approximating boundary points from outside the neighbourhood, so the LP minimum is approached but not attained by measures in the ball.

Formalization scope

Spaces are Polish with Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebras; [N][N][N] is Fin N with N≥1N\ge1N≥1; repeated samples are allowed. The transport cost is the published RWPI.SqrtLasso.transportCost (an infimum over couplings with first marginal Q\mathbb QQ and second marginal P^\widehat{\mathbb P}P, lower Lebesgue integrals of a [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued cost); the paper's "min" is not built into it. Expectations of the loss are ∫ℓ+−∫ℓ−\int\ell^+-\int\ell^-∫ℓ+−∫ℓ− in the extended reals (published ModelRiskOT.Duality.extIntegral). Worst-case values are suprema in EReal over probability measures. The loss is an arbitrary function ℓ:Y→R\ell:\mathcal Y\to\mathbb Rℓ:Y→R, which covers every decision (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β). κi\kappa_iκi​ and did_idi​ are infima (sInf), and ∂\partial∂ is the topological frontier in X\mathcal XX.

Hypotheses beyond the page, all disclosed in the statements:

  • Every statement about γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 carries Assumption 2.4 and a predicate BoundaryRegular: the boundary of Nγ(x0)\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)Nγ​(x0​) is nonempty, for i∈I1i\in\mathcal I_1i∈I1​ the infimum of DX(x,x^i)\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,\hat x_i)DX​(x,x^i​) over x∉Nγ(x0)x\notin\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)x∈/Nγ​(x0​) is did_idi​, and for i∈I2i\in\mathcal I_2i∈I2​, di=κid_i=\kappa_idi​=κi​. It holds for norm distances; without it Proposition 4.1 fails for some continuous costs.
  • ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0, the paper's standing ρ∈R+\rho\in\mathbb R_+ρ∈R+​.
  • Milestone 4 is stated for ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0: at ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0 a sample on the boundary has di=0d_i=0di​=0 but cannot be moved, and the identity fails.

The formalization excludes the trivializing readings: no conditional expectation is evaluated at a distribution with zero fiber mass, no Bochner integral of a possibly non-integrable loss is used, a negative ρ\rhoρ cannot enter through ENNReal.ofReal, and the suprema range exactly over the probability measures of Bρ\mathbb B_\rhoBρ​ satisfying the stated mass constraint. "Equivalent" is formalized as equality of the inner suprema for every loss, which is stronger than equality of the min–max values.

A complete development needs couplings and gluing for finitely supported marginals, existence of optimal couplings for continuous costs on Polish spaces, and finite LP facts (attainment, positivity). The transport-ball representation and the optimal-coupling existence are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the representation (24) in particular, are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. A. Nguyen, F. Zhang, S. Wang, J. Blanchet, E. Delage, Y. Ye, Robustifying conditional portfolio decisions via optimal transport, arXiv:2103.16451v3, 2024; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.16451
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften 338, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying distributional model risk via optimal transport, Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0936
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Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Topology II: A Lightning Network with Average Degree Above 2g₊⁻¹(2·disc) Contains a Hermetizable SetResearch Paper

Why hubs appear in payment-channel networks

The Lightning Network (LN) is a layer-two payment system for Bitcoin. Two parties open a payment channel by locking funds on the blockchain and can then pay each other off-chain; payments between parties without a common channel are routed along paths of channels. Locking funds is costly, and the amount a channel needs grows with the net flow it has to carry. Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (SSRN 4439190, version of February 3, 2023; published in Management Science, 2024) ask which network topologies support a given pattern of payments at least cost, using only qualitative properties of the channel cost derived in their earlier work on channel sizing (Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, 2022, cited in the paper as [GHS22]).

One of the paper's central findings is that adding a new hub node, and routing the traffic of a group of nodes through it, reduces cost in a broad class of networks. This explains, from cost considerations alone, why hub-and-spoke structures emerge in deployed payment-channel networks. This mission formalizes the deterministic sufficient condition for that phenomenon (Theorem 3.8) and the chain of lemmas in Appendix B.1 that proves it.

Setting

Fix a finite set VVV of nodes. A Lightning Network is an anti-symmetric real matrix Λ=(λi,j)i,j∈V\Lambda=(\lambda_{i,j})_{i,j\in V}Λ=(λi,j​)i,j∈V​: λu,v\lambda_{u,v}λu,v​ is the net flow from uuu to vvv in the channel between them, λu,v=−λv,u\lambda_{u,v}=-\lambda_{v,u}λu,v​=−λv,u​, and λu,v=0\lambda_{u,v}=0λu,v​=0 means there is no channel.

A channel cost is a function c:R→R+c:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R_+c:R→R+​ that is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (MO), even (SY), zero at zero (CI), and strictly subadditive, c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y) for x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0 (SA). It satisfies (SA+) with a nonnegative, strictly increasing g+g_+g+​ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) if c(kx)<kg+(k) c(x)c(kx)<\tfrac{k}{g_+(k)}\,c(x)c(kx)<g+​(k)k​c(x) for all k>1k>1k>1, x>0x>0x>0: when the flow of a channel grows kkk-fold, its cost grows by at most k/g+(k)k/g_+(k)k/g+​(k). The cost of the network is c(G)=12∑i,jc(λi,j)c(G)=\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}c(\lambda_{i,j})c(G)=21​∑i,j​c(λi,j​).

For a node vvv and a set UUU of nodes, dU(v)d_U(v)dU​(v) is the number of channels of vvv into UUU, sU(v)s_U(v)sU​(v) the smallest and SU(v)S_U(v)SU​(v) the largest absolute flow of these channels, δ(U)=min⁡v∈UdU(v)\delta(U)=\min_{v\in U}d_U(v)δ(U)=minv∈U​dU​(v) the minimum degree, and disc(U)=max⁡vc(SU(v))/c(sU(v))\mathrm{disc}(U)=\max_v c(S_U(v))/c(s_U(v))disc(U)=maxv​c(SU​(v))/c(sU​(v)) the discrepancy, the maximum over nodes of UUU with a channel in UUU. For U=VU=VU=V these are d(v)d(v)d(v), s(v)s(v)s(v), S(v)S(v)S(v), δ(G)\delta(G)δ(G), disc(G)\mathrm{disc}(G)disc(G), and dˉ(G)=∑vd(v)/∣V∣\bar d(G)=\sum_v d(v)/|V|dˉ(G)=∑v​d(v)/∣V∣ is the average degree.

The hermetization of UUU deletes all channels among nodes of UUU, adds a new node v0v_0v0​, and joins each i∈Ui\in Ui∈U to v0v_0v0​ by a channel carrying ∑j∈Uλi,j\sum_{j\in U}\lambda_{i,j}∑j∈U​λi,j​, its net flow towards UUU; every node keeps its net flow. UUU is hermetizable if hermetization strictly reduces the cost, and the network is hermetizable if some UUU is.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.8 (existence part)

Under (MO)–(SA+), every network with at least one channel and

dˉ(G)  >  2 g+−1(2 disc(G))\bar d(G)\;>\;2\,g_+^{-1}\big(2\,\mathrm{disc}(G)\big)dˉ(G)>2g+−1​(2disc(G))

is hermetizable. The cost function and g+g_+g+​ are arbitrary subject to the axioms.

Milestones

  1. Lemma B.1. A nonempty UUU is hermetizable if dU(i)>g+−1(2c(SU(i))/c(sU(i)))d_U(i)>g_+^{-1}\big(2c(S_U(i))/c(s_U(i))\big)dU​(i)>g+−1​(2c(SU​(i))/c(sU​(i))) for every i∈Ui\in Ui∈U.
  2. Lemma B.2. A nonempty UUU is hermetizable if δ(U)≥g+−1(2 disc(U))\delta(U)\ge g_+^{-1}\big(2\,\mathrm{disc}(U)\big)δ(U)≥g+−1​(2disc(U)).
  3. Lemma B.4. A finite graph of average degree at least 2d2d2d, d>0d>0d>0, has a nonempty induced subgraph G′G'G′ with δ(G′)>d\delta(G')>dδ(G′)>d.
  4. Lemma B.3 (the peeling procedure). Repeatedly deleting every vertex with at most ttt neighbours among the remaining vertices returns the largest vertex set inducing minimum degree >t>t>t; it is empty exactly when no such set exists.

Significance

Theorem 3.8 turns a qualitative property of channel costs into a checkable topological criterion: if a network is dense relative to how unequal its channel flows are, a cost-reducing hub exists. The paper uses it to argue that such restructuring is profitable for an intermediary who charges part of the savings, and its probabilistic companion (Theorem 3.9) shows that random networks whose channel costs have light tails are hermetizable with high probability. The degree-to-subgraph Lemma B.4 is a standard tool of extremal graph theory (Diestel, Graph Theory, Prop. 1.2.2), and Lemma B.3 is the classical kkk-core peeling.

Mathematically the result is proved in the paper. None of it is formalized: Lean's Mathlib has minimum degree and induced subgraphs but neither Lemma B.4 nor the correctness of kkk-core peeling, and there is no formal model of payment-channel networks or of hermetization. The mission produces that model, machine-checked versions of the Appendix B.1 lemmas, and a statement of Theorem 3.8 under axioms that are actually satisfiable (see below).

Difficulty

The cost comparison in Lemma B.1 is node by node: the channels of a node inside UUU are replaced by one channel to the hub carrying their sum. The obvious bound on the hub channel's cost uses only monotonicity and subadditivity, and that is too weak: a single channel carrying the sum of ddd flows can cost almost as much as the ddd channels it replaces, while the deleted channels are each shared by two nodes. The quantitative axiom (SA+) is what makes the comparison strict, and the discrepancy controls how unequal the replaced flows may be.

Passing from the average degree of the whole network to a subnetwork in which every node has high degree is the second step, and it must keep track of the fact that the discrepancy of an induced subnetwork can be smaller but never larger than that of the network. Lemma B.4 needs an argument that the deletion process cannot exhaust the graph; a counting argument that treats every deleted vertex alike loses exactly the margin needed.

Formalization scope

Nodes form an arbitrary finite type V; the network is Λ : V → V → ℝ with anti-symmetry IsLN. The hub is the extra element none of Option V. The cost is the 12∑i,j\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}21​∑i,j​ form. In Lemmas B.1 and B.2 all degree data are those of the subnetwork induced on UUU; in Theorem 3.8 those of the whole network. s(v)s(v)s(v) has the junk value 000 for a node without channels, so every statement assumes the relevant nodes have a channel, and the discrepancy is a maximum over nodes having a channel.

Two axioms are corrected from the printed page and the correction is part of the statement. (SA) is printed for x>y≥0x>y\ge0x>y≥0, which at y=0y=0y=0 reads c(x)<c(x)c(x)<c(x)c(x)<c(x); it is stated for all x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0, the form the paper's Appendix D verifies. (SA+) is printed for all k∈R+k\in\mathbb R_+k∈R+​, which fails at x=0x=0x=0 and, for the paper's own example cost, at every k≤1k\le1k≤1; it is stated for k>1k>1k>1, x>0x>0x>0. Under the printed axioms every theorem would hold vacuously.

g+g_+g+​ is strictly increasing but not assumed onto, so g+−1g_+^{-1}g+−1​ is replaced throughout by the equivalent g+g_+g+​-form: d>g+−1(y)d>g_+^{-1}(y)d>g+−1​(y) becomes g+(d)>yg_+(d)>yg+​(d)>y, as in the paper's own proof of Lemma B.1. Theorem 3.8 therefore assumes g+(dˉ(G)/2)>2 disc(G)g_+(\bar d(G)/2)>2\,\mathrm{disc}(G)g+​(dˉ(G)/2)>2disc(G) and, explicitly, that the network has a channel (implied by the printed hypothesis). Lemma B.4 adds d>0d>0d>0 and reads "average degree 2d2d2d" as "at least 2d2d2d", as its proof does. The polynomial-time clause of Theorem 3.8 and the O(V+E)O(V+E)O(V+E) bound of Lemma B.3 are complexity claims and are not formalized; Lemma B.3 is posed as correctness of the procedure in its proof, which finds minimum degree >t>t>t (the printed statement says ≥t\ge t≥t).

Formalizations that would trivialize the mission are excluded: a specific cost such as c(x)=2(B∣x∣/r)1/2c(x)=2(B|x|/r)^{1/2}c(x)=2(B∣x∣/r)1/2 or a specific g+g_+g+​; hermetizability defined by the per-node inequality instead of the cost comparison; Theorem 3.8 with the empty set allowed to witness hermetizability (the strict cost decrease rules it out); Lemma B.4 without nonemptiness; and Lemma B.3 as "there exists an algorithm".

The definitions (network, cost axioms, degree data, hermetization, peeling) are reusable by the companion missions on this paper. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, Lemma B.4 and Lemma B.3 being independent of the network model.

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Topology, SSRN working paper 4439190, version of February 3, 2023, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4439190; published in Management Science, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03872 (theorem numbers here follow the SSRN version).
  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, 2022 (cited in the paper as [GHS22]; no stable link is given there).
  • R. Diestel, Graph Theory, 5th ed., Springer, 2017, Proposition 1.2.2. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53622-3
  • J. Poon, T. Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments, 2015. https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Topology IV: A Star Topology Costs at Most Twice the Minimal Cost of Supporting a Payment FlowResearch Paper

Motivation

The Lightning Network is a payment layer built on top of Bitcoin. Two parties lock funds in a payment channel and then exchange payments off the blockchain, settling on-chain only when the channel closes. Payments between parties without a direct channel are routed along paths of channels. Locked funds are idle capital, and the amount a channel needs grows with the flow it carries, so the topology of the network (which channels exist and what each carries) determines what it costs to support a given pattern of payments.

Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (SSRN 4439190) study this cost under a general channel cost function, building on their earlier analysis of the cost of a single bilateral channel ([GHS22]). Their §3.3 asks how much the globally cheapest network can cost, and how far a simple design is from it. A natural design is the star: every participant opens one channel to a common hub. Corollary 3.11 of the paper shows that a star is in general not cost-minimizing; Corollary 3.12, the goal of this mission, shows that it is never worse than the optimum by more than a factor of two. For symmetric channels (zero net flows) the factor-two bound was known from Sali and Zohar ([SZ20]); the present result covers arbitrary net flows and any cost function satisfying four axioms.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite set of nodes. A payment flow is a vector F=(fi)i∈V\mathcal F=(f_i)_{i\in V}F=(fi​)i∈V​ of reals with

∑i∈Vfi=0,\sum_{i\in V} f_i = 0,i∈V∑​fi​=0,

since every payment is sent by one node and received by another.

A Lightning Network (LN) on VVV is an anti-symmetric real matrix Λ=(λi,j)i,j∈V\Lambda=(\lambda_{i,j})_{i,j\in V}Λ=(λi,j​)i,j∈V​: λu,v\lambda_{u,v}λu,v​ is the net flow from uuu to vvv in the channel between them, λu,v=−λv,u\lambda_{u,v}=-\lambda_{v,u}λu,v​=−λv,u​, and λu,v=0\lambda_{u,v}=0λu,v​=0 means that there is no channel. The LN supports F\mathcal FF if ∑j∈Vλi,j=fi\sum_{j\in V}\lambda_{i,j}=f_i∑j∈V​λi,j​=fi​ for every node iii.

A channel cost function is a map c:R→R+c:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R_+c:R→R+​ with

  • (MO) c(x)>c(y)c(x)>c(y)c(x)>c(y) whenever x>y≥0x>y\ge0x>y≥0;
  • (SY) c(−x)=c(x)c(-x)=c(x)c(−x)=c(x);
  • (CI) c(0)=0c(0)=0c(0)=0;
  • (SA) c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y) for all x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0.

The cost of an LN G=(λi,j)G=(\lambda_{i,j})G=(λi,j​) is c(G)=12∑i,j∈Vc(λi,j)c(G)=\tfrac12\sum_{i,j\in V}c(\lambda_{i,j})c(G)=21​∑i,j∈V​c(λi,j​), the sum of its channel costs. The minimal cost of supporting F\mathcal FF is

cmin⁡(F)=inf⁡{c(G):G an LN on V supporting F}.c_{\min}(\mathcal F)=\inf\{c(G) : G \text{ an LN on } V \text{ supporting } \mathcal F\}.cmin​(F)=inf{c(G):G an LN on V supporting F}.

For a hub h∈Vh\in Vh∈V, the star Λh\Lambda^hΛh is the LN in which each node i≠hi\neq hi=h has a single channel, to hhh, carrying its flow: λi,hh=fi\lambda^h_{i,h}=f_iλi,hh​=fi​, λh,ih=−fi\lambda^h_{h,i}=-f_iλh,ih​=−fi​, and all other entries are 000.

In Lean these are IsLN, Supports, IsChannelCost, cost, cmin and star in the namespace LNTopology.StarBound.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 3.12

For every channel cost function ccc, every flow F\mathcal FF with ∑ifi=0\sum_i f_i=0∑i​fi​=0, and every hub h∈Vh\in Vh∈V,

c(Λh)  ≤  2 cmin⁡(F).c(\Lambda^h)\;\le\;2\,c_{\min}(\mathcal F).c(Λh)≤2cmin​(F).

Theorem 3.10

For nonempty VVV,

∑i∈Vc(fi)−max⁡i∈Vc(fi)  ≥  cmin⁡(F)  ≥  max⁡(∑fi>0c(fi), ∑fi<0c(fi)).\sum_{i\in V}c(f_i)-\max_{i\in V}c(f_i)\;\ge\;c_{\min}(\mathcal F)\;\ge\;\max\Big(\sum_{f_i>0}c(f_i),\ \sum_{f_i<0}c(f_i)\Big).i∈V∑​c(fi​)−i∈Vmax​c(fi​)≥cmin​(F)≥max(fi​>0∑​c(fi​), fi​<0∑​c(fi​)).

Milestones

  1. For every matrix supporting F\mathcal FF and every node iii: ∑jc(λi,j)≥c(fi)\sum_j c(\lambda_{i,j})\ge c(f_i)∑j​c(λi,j​)≥c(fi​) (proof of Theorem 3.10, p. 14).
  2. The star at any hub hhh is an LN supporting F\mathcal FF and costs ∑ic(fi)−c(fh)\sum_i c(f_i)-c(f_h)∑i​c(fi​)−c(fh​) (proof of Theorem 3.10, pp. 13–14).
  3. Every LN supporting F\mathcal FF costs at least ∑fi>0c(fi)\sum_{f_i>0}c(f_i)∑fi​>0​c(fi​) and at least ∑fi<0c(fi)\sum_{f_i<0}c(f_i)∑fi​<0​c(fi​) ((14)–(15), p. 14).
  4. Theorem 3.10 (p. 8). A supporting item, not a milestone: the chain (16): ∑ic(fi)−max⁡ic(fi)≤∑ic(fi)=∑fi>0c(fi)+∑fi<0c(fi)≤2M\sum_i c(f_i)-\max_i c(f_i)\le\sum_i c(f_i)=\sum_{f_i>0}c(f_i)+\sum_{f_i<0}c(f_i)\le 2M∑i​c(fi​)−maxi​c(fi​)≤∑i​c(fi​)=∑fi​>0​c(fi​)+∑fi​<0​c(fi​)≤2M, with MMM the maximum of the two sums (p. 14).

Significance

The result. Computing a cost-minimizing network for a general concave-type channel cost is a combinatorial optimization problem with no known closed form; Theorem 3.10 brackets its value by two explicit sums, and Corollary 3.12 turns that bracket into a guarantee for a design that needs no optimization at all. A hub-and-spoke network, the structure that large Lightning Network routing nodes tend to create in practice, thus pays at most twice the optimal locked-capital cost, whatever the flow pattern and whatever the cost function within the axioms. The lower bound of Theorem 3.10 is also a certificate: any supporting network whose cost is within a given factor of max⁡(∑fi>0c(fi),∑fi<0c(fi))\max(\sum_{f_i>0}c(f_i),\sum_{f_i<0}c(f_i))max(∑fi​>0​c(fi​),∑fi​<0​c(fi​)) is within that factor of optimal.

Formalizing it. The paper's argument is short, but it assumes that a cost-minimizing network exists and uses its bipartite structure (Theorem 3.1). For a cost function that is not continuous, the minimum need not be attained. The formal development replaces the minimizer by an infimum and proves the lower bound for every supporting network, which removes that gap. It also fixes the hub choice in the proof of the upper bound (see the Formalization scope). To our knowledge, no part of this paper has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The upper bound and the inequality (16) are bookkeeping. The substantive step is the lower bound: every supporting network costs at least the total cost of the payers' flows. The obvious argument applies subadditivity at each payer to the channels incident to it, but those channels carry flows of both signs, and channels between two payers are incident to both of them, so summing over payers can count the same channel twice. Working only with a cost-minimizing network avoids the double count by structure, but a minimizer may not exist. The lower bound must therefore be proved for an arbitrary anti-symmetric supporting matrix, using only (MO), (SY), (CI) and (SA).

Formalization scope

  • Nodes. An arbitrary finite type V with decidable equality, instead of {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n}. V nonempty where a maximum over nodes appears (Theorem 3.10, (16)).
  • Sign convention. "Supports" is the row-sum identity of §2.1, ∑jλi,j=fi\sum_j\lambda_{i,j}=f_i∑j​λi,j​=fi​, under which a net payer has fi>0f_i>0fi​>0. The numerical example of §2 and the proofs in Appendix C use the opposite sign. Every statement of this mission is invariant under F↦−F\mathcal F\mapsto-\mathcal FF↦−F.
  • Cost. The paper's 12∑i,jc(λi,j)\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}c(\lambda_{i,j})21​∑i,j​c(λi,j​) form, equal to ∑i>j\sum_{i>j}∑i>j​, so no order on V is needed.
  • Axiom (SA), corrected. The printed form "c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y) for x>y≥0x>y\ge0x>y≥0" is unsatisfiable at y=0y=0y=0, which would make every theorem vacuously true. It is stated for all x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0, the form Appendix D verifies. A local check confirms that c(x)=∣x∣c(x)=\sqrt{|x|}c(x)=∣x∣​ satisfies the corrected axioms. The stronger axiom (SA+) is not used in this mission.
  • Minimal cost. cmin⁡c_{\min}cmin​ is an infimum (sInf) over LNs on the same node set V, not a minimum, because ccc is not assumed continuous. Every statement involving it assumes ∑ifi=0\sum_i f_i=0∑i​fi​=0; without that hypothesis no network supports F\mathcal FF and cmin⁡c_{\min}cmin​ is Lean's junk value 000.
  • Star. The star uses λi,h=fi\lambda_{i,h}=f_iλi,h​=fi​. The paper writes λ0,i=fi\lambda_{0,i}=f_iλ0,i​=fi​, which has the opposite sign under the row-sum convention; by (SY) the cost is identical.
  • Hub. Corollary 3.12 is stated for every hub hhh, matching the paper's sentence that "the star topology is at most twice as costly as the minimum". The paper's proof takes a hub with f0=max⁡ifif_0=\max_i f_if0​=maxi​fi​ and then uses c(f0)=max⁡ic(fi)c(f_0)=\max_i c(f_i)c(f0​)=maxi​c(fi​), which fails when the most negative flow has larger magnitude. The milestone on the star is therefore stated with the cost ∑ic(fi)−c(fh)\sum_i c(f_i)-c(f_h)∑i​c(fi​)−c(fh​) for every hub.
  • Lower bound for every network. The inequalities (14)–(15) are derived in the paper for a cost-minimizing network. They are stated here for every supporting LN, which is a generalization and is what the infimum requires.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the cost function is arbitrary subject to the axioms (not ∣x∣\sqrt{|x|}∣x∣​ or a power), flows are arbitrary (not the symmetric case of [SZ20]), cmin⁡c_{\min}cmin​ ranges over all LNs on V (not over stars, trees or bipartite networks), the bound holds for every hub (not one chosen hub), and ∑ifi=0\sum_i f_i=0∑i​fi​=0 is kept so that cmin⁡c_{\min}cmin​ is never a junk value.

The development needs only finite sums and sInf on R\mathbb RR from Mathlib. A reusable by-product is the many-term subadditivity c(∑jxj)≤∑jc(xj)c(\sum_j x_j)\le\sum_j c(x_j)c(∑j​xj​)≤∑j​c(xj​) for a symmetric, monotone, subadditive ccc with c(0)=0c(0)=0c(0)=0, which applies to any concave-type cost on signed quantities. Contributions are welcome on each milestone independently, in particular on the lower bound (14)–(15).

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Topology, SSRN working paper 4439190, version of February 3, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4439190 (published in Management Science, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03872; theorem numbers here follow the SSRN version).
  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels [GHS22], working paper, 2022 (cited as [GHS22] in the SSRN version; no link given there).
  • O. Sali, A. Zohar, Optimizing Off-Chain Payment Networks in Cryptocurrencies [SZ20], arXiv:2007.09410, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.09410
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand 3: With Any Gain-Seeking Product the Optimal Pricing Policy Admits No Steady StateResearch Paper

Motivation

Retail prices are not judged in isolation. Consumers compare a posted price with a reference price formed from the prices they have seen before, and they react to a price below the reference (a perceived gain) differently from a price above it (a perceived loss). Empirical marketing studies of such reference effects include Briesch et al. (1997), and the dynamic-pricing literature asks what a seller facing them should do over time: keep prices constant, or alternate between high and low prices.

For a single product with demand linear in price this question has a classical answer. Popescu and Wu (2007, Operations Research) showed that loss aversion leads optimal prices to settle at a constant, and that sensitivity to gains favours cyclic, "high–low" pricing; Hu, Chen and Hu (2016) characterised optimal cyclic policies in a special gain-seeking case. Guo, Jiang and Shen (2025, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management) revisit the question for several substitutable products under multinomial-logit (MNL) demand, the standard discrete-choice model of retail, where earlier techniques no longer apply. This mission formalizes one of their structural results: a single gain-seeking product rules out a constant optimal price.

Setting

A seller offers nnn products i∈N={1,…,n}i \in N = \{1,\dots,n\}i∈N={1,…,n} over periods t=0,1,2,…t = 0,1,2,\dotst=0,1,2,…. Product iii has an intrinsic utility aia_iai​, a price sensitivity bi>0b_i > 0bi​>0, and reference-price sensitivities ci+≥0c_i^+ \ge 0ci+​≥0 (to gains) and ci−≥0c_i^- \ge 0ci−​≥0 (to losses). Given prices p=(pi)p = (p_i)p=(pi​) and reference prices r=(ri)r = (r_i)r=(ri​), the utility of product iii is

ui(p,r)=ai−bipi+ci+(ri−pi)+−ci−(pi−ri)+,u_i(p,r) = a_i - b_i p_i + c_i^+ (r_i - p_i)_+ - c_i^- (p_i - r_i)_+ ,ui​(p,r)=ai​−bi​pi​+ci+​(ri​−pi​)+​−ci−​(pi​−ri​)+​,

and the MNL purchase probability and the single-period revenue are

qi(p,r)=eui(p,r)1+∑keuk(p,r),Π(p,r)=∑ipi qi(p,r).q_i(p,r) = \frac{e^{u_i(p,r)}}{1 + \sum_{k} e^{u_k(p,r)}}, \qquad \Pi(p,r) = \sum_{i} p_i\, q_i(p,r).qi​(p,r)=1+∑k​euk​(p,r)eui​(p,r)​,Π(p,r)=i∑​pi​qi​(p,r).

Product iii is loss-averse if ci+<ci−c_i^+ < c_i^-ci+​<ci−​, loss-neutral if ci+=ci−c_i^+ = c_i^-ci+​=ci−​, and gain-seeking if ci+>ci−c_i^+ > c_i^-ci+​>ci−​; NgN_gNg​ denotes the set of gain-seeking products.

Prices and reference prices lie in the box Pn=[0,pH]n\mathcal P^n = [0, p_H]^nPn=[0,pH​]n, with a price ceiling pH>0p_H > 0pH​>0. Reference prices follow exponential smoothing with memory α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1]:

rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt.r^{t+1} = \alpha r^t + (1-\alpha) p^t .rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt.

With discount factor β∈[0,1)\beta \in [0,1)β∈[0,1), the optimal value from an initial reference price r0r^0r0 is

V⋆(r0)=sup⁡(pt)⊂Pn∑t=0∞βt Π(pt,rt).V^\star(r^0) = \sup_{(p^t) \subset \mathcal P^n} \sum_{t=0}^\infty \beta^t\, \Pi(p^t, r^t).V⋆(r0)=(pt)⊂Pnsup​t=0∑∞​βtΠ(pt,rt).

Throughout, the paper assumes pH≥p^Hp_H \ge \hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​, where p^H\hat p_Hp^​H​ is the unique root of its equation (9); this keeps the single-period problem unconstrained by the ceiling. A price vector x∈Pnx \in \mathcal P^nx∈Pn is an optimal steady state when the optimal policy maps the reference price xxx to the price xxx; equivalently, the constant path pt=xp^t = xpt=x started from r0=xr^0 = xr0=x is optimal, which reads

V⋆(x)=Π(x,x)1−β.V^\star(x) = \frac{\Pi(x,x)}{1-\beta}.V⋆(x)=1−βΠ(x,x)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 20)

If Ng≠∅N_g \neq \emptysetNg​=∅, the optimal pricing policy admits no steady state:

∀x∈Pn:V⋆(x)>Π(x,x)1−β.\forall x \in \mathcal P^n:\quad V^\star(x) > \frac{\Pi(x,x)}{1-\beta}.∀x∈Pn:V⋆(x)>1−βΠ(x,x)​.

Only one product needs to be gain-seeking; the others are unrestricted. No condition on α\alphaα or β\betaβ beyond α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1) is imposed.

Companion: Proposition 3 (p. 20)

If α<1\alpha < 1α<1, β>0\beta > 0β>0 and max⁡ici+>0\max_i c_i^+ > 0maxi​ci+​>0, then, whatever the types of the products, there is pˉ\bar ppˉ​ such that for every ceiling pH≥pˉp_H \ge \bar ppH​≥pˉ​ the optimal policy admits no steady state in [0,pH]n[0,p_H]^n[0,pH​]n.

Significance

Theorem 4 separates two regimes of reference-dependent pricing. Without gain-seeking products the paper shows elsewhere (Theorems 5–6) that optimal steady states can exist and describes where they lie; Theorem 4 shows that one gain-seeking product anywhere in the assortment destroys every steady state, so the optimal prices of the whole assortment keep moving. Together with the corresponding statement for the myopic policy (Theorem 3), it says that with gain-seeking consumers both the myopic and the optimal policies are cyclic in the long run, the multi-product logit analogue of Popescu and Wu's single-product finding. Proposition 3 explains the role of the price ceiling: without one, cyclic pricing becomes optimal for any product with positive gain sensitivity.

Both results are proved in the paper's online supplement (Appendices C.2, C.3), which is not part of the source file used for this mission; neither has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires the value function of an infinite-horizon problem with a continuous vector state, and a formal handle on how V⋆V^\starV⋆ responds to perturbations of a price path, infrastructure that other reference-price missions can reuse.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt is local: at a candidate steady state xxx, perturb the constant path and show the revenue increases. The difficulty is that Π\PiΠ is not differentiable at p=rp = rp=r: the kink in uiu_iui​ is exactly at the steady state, and the one-sided derivatives of Π\PiΠ involve ci+c_i^+ci+​ on one side and ci−c_i^-ci−​ on the other. A first-order argument in one direction is therefore not available, and the comparison has to be made against V⋆V^\starV⋆, a supremum over infinite price sequences, not against the myopic revenue. The MNL coupling adds a further layer: changing the price of the gain-seeking product moves the market shares of every other product, whose own reference effects may be of any type. Single-product arguments for linear demand (Popescu and Wu 2007) rely on assumptions that the logit model violates, as the paper notes on p. 20–21.

Formalization scope

Products are indexed by Fin n (the paper's product iii is index i−1i-1i−1). The parameters are functions a b cp cm : Fin n → ℝ; the standing assumptions b>0b > 0b>0, c±≥0c^\pm \ge 0c±≥0, α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1), pH>0p_H > 0pH​>0 are hypotheses of each theorem. The market shares are defined directly by the MNL formula; the Gumbel random-utility derivation is not formalized. V⋆V^\starV⋆ is optValue, the real supremum over all sequences in [0,pH]n[0,p_H]^n[0,pH​]n of the discounted revenue (a tsum); the family is nonempty and bounded by pH/(1−β)p_H/(1-\beta)pH​/(1−β), so this is a genuine supremum. The paper writes the problem over stationary policies and uses the Bellman equation (6); for this deterministic problem with continuous revenue on a compact box the two values coincide.

The ceiling assumption pH≥p^Hp_H \ge \hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​ is CeilingOK: some root of (9) lies below pHp_HpH​. The goal carries it; Proposition 3 does not, because it holds automatically for large pHp_HpH​ and is absorbed into the threshold.

An optimal steady state is IsOptSteadyState x: x∈[0,pH]nx \in [0,p_H]^nx∈[0,pH​]n and V⋆(x)≤Π(x,x)/(1−β)V^\star(x) \le \Pi(x,x)/(1-\beta)V⋆(x)≤Π(x,x)/(1−β). Optimal stationary policies need not be unique and the paper fixes none, so this sequence form, under which the theorem holds for every optimal policy, is used instead of a fixed point of a chosen policy. Stating the goal about the myopic policy, about one particular policy, or for xxx outside the box would trivialize it; the formal statement quantifies over every xxx and compares with V⋆V^\starV⋆, the supremum over all admissible sequences.

A complete development needs the value function, its finiteness and the Bellman equation (6), and a perturbation argument along the kink. Contributions welcome: the Bellman equation for optValue, monotonicity and continuity of V⋆V^\starV⋆, and either goal.

Selected references

  • M. A. Guo, H. Jiang, Z.-J. M. Shen, Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025; read as SSRN 4189049 (version of 2024-05-25). https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189049, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0801
  • I. Popescu, Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
  • Z. Hu, X. Chen, P. Hu, Technical Note—Dynamic Pricing with Gain-Seeking Reference Price Effects, Operations Research 64(1), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1445
  • R. A. Briesch, L. Krishnamurthi, T. Mazumdar, S. P. Raj, A Comparative Analysis of Reference Price Models, Journal of Consumer Research 24(2), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1086/209505
4 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning 2: The Greedy Circumcenter Policy Can Incur Regret Linear in the Horizon from a Pointed Knowledge SetResearch Paper

Learning a cost vector from optimal decisions

In inverse optimization, an observer sees decisions made by an expert who solves an optimization problem, and wants to recover the expert's unknown objective. Besbes, Fonseca and Lobel study a contextual version: in each period a feasible set and a context function are revealed, a learner must act before seeing the expert's choice, and then observes the expert's optimal action. The learner pays the expert's cost of its own action. This models, for example, a platform imitating a dispatcher's routing decisions or a recommender learning a user's trade-offs, where only optimal choices, not costs, are ever observed (Besbes, Fonseca, Lobel, arXiv:2106.14015).

For the one-period (offline) problem the paper shows that the circumcenter policy, which acts as if the unknown cost were the center of the smallest revolution cone containing the set of costs still consistent with the data, is minimax optimal (Theorem 1). The natural online policy is to apply it greedily in every period. This mission formalizes the paper's Theorem 2, which shows that this greedy policy can fail badly: its worst-case regret can grow linearly in the horizon, even when the initial uncertainty is small in a precise geometric sense.

Setting

Costs live in Rd\mathbb R^dRd and actions in Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The true cost c⋆c^\starc⋆ lies on the unit sphere SdS^dSd. An action set X∈B\mathcal X\in\mathfrak BX∈B is a nonempty compact subset of Rn\mathbb R^nRn of diameter at most 111; a context function f∈Ff\in\mathfrak Ff∈F is a 111-Lipschitz map Rn→Rd\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^dRn→Rd. The forward problem with cost ccc has solution set

ψ(c,X,f)=arg⁡min⁡x∈Xf(x)′c.\psi(c,\mathcal X,f)=\arg\min_{x\in\mathcal X} f(x)'c .ψ(c,X,f)=argx∈Xmin​f(x)′c.

The angle between nonzero vectors is θ(c,c^)=arccos⁡(c′c^/(∥c∥∥c^∥))\theta(c,\hat c)=\arccos\big(c'\hat c/(\|c\|\|\hat c\|)\big)θ(c,c^)=arccos(c′c^/(∥c∥∥c^∥)), set to 000 if either vector is 000. The uncertainty angle of a set CCC is

α(C)=inf⁡c^∈Sd sup⁡c∈Cθ(c,c^),\alpha(C)=\inf_{\hat c\in S^d}\ \sup_{c\in C}\theta(c,\hat c),α(C)=c^∈Sdinf​ c∈Csup​θ(c,c^),

and a circumcenter c^(C)\hat c(C)c^(C) is a unit vector attaining this infimum. A set is pointed when α(C)<π/2\alpha(C)<\pi/2α(C)<π/2, i.e. it fits inside an open half-space cone.

Online protocol. In periods t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T nature reveals Xt\mathcal X_tXt​ and ftf_tft​, the learner picks xtπ∈Xtx^\pi_t\in\mathcal X_txtπ​∈Xt​, and then an optimal expert action xt⋆∈ψ(c⋆,Xt,ft)x^\star_t\in\psi(c^\star,\mathcal X_t,f_t)xt⋆​∈ψ(c⋆,Xt​,ft​) is revealed. Starting from a closed set C0⊆SdC_0\subseteq S^dC0​⊆Sd, the knowledge set is

C(It)={c∈C0: c′fs(xs⋆)≤c′fs(x)  ∀x∈Xs, s<t},C(\mathcal I_t)=\{c\in C_0:\ c'f_s(x^\star_s)\le c'f_s(x)\ \ \forall x\in\mathcal X_s,\ s<t\},C(It​)={c∈C0​: c′fs​(xs⋆​)≤c′fs​(x)  ∀x∈Xs​, s<t},

the regret is RTπ=∑t=1T(ft(xtπ)−ft(xt⋆))′c⋆R^\pi_T=\sum_{t=1}^T\big(f_t(x^\pi_t)-f_t(x^\star_t)\big)'c^\starRTπ​=∑t=1T​(ft​(xtπ​)−ft​(xt⋆​))′c⋆, and the worst-case regret WCRTπ(C0)\mathcal{WCR}^\pi_T(C_0)WCRTπ​(C0​) is its supremum over c⋆∈C0c^\star\in C_0c⋆∈C0​ and admissible instances. The greedy circumcenter policy chooses xtπ∈ψ(c^(C(It)),Xt,ft)x^\pi_t\in\psi\big(\hat c(C(\mathcal I_t)),\mathcal X_t,f_t\big)xtπ​∈ψ(c^(C(It​)),Xt​,ft​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (pp. 13–14)

There is a closed, nonempty, pointed C0⊆S3C_0\subseteq S^3C0​⊆S3 such that

WCRTπgreedy(C0)=Ω(T).\mathcal{WCR}^{\pi_{greedy}}_T(C_0)=\Omega(T).WCRTπgreedy​​(C0​)=Ω(T).

Concretely: there are C0C_0C0​ and κ>0\kappa>0κ>0 such that for every horizon T≥1T\ge1T≥1 some c⋆∈C0c^\star\in C_0c⋆∈C0​ and admissible (Xt,ft)(\mathcal X_t,f_t)(Xt​,ft​) admit a greedy run, and every greedy run (any circumcenter, any tie-break) has regret at least κT\kappa TκT. The constant κ\kappaκ is left existential, as the page claims only Ω(T)\Omega(T)Ω(T).

Milestones (the proof's displayed steps, App-9–App-11)

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 12): a circumcenter exists for every nonempty set, and is unique when the set is pointed and not {0}\{0\}{0}.
  2. Step 1: for 0<αˉ<π/20<\bar\alpha<\pi/20<αˉ<π/2 and 0≤ε≤tan⁡αˉ/20\le\varepsilon\le\tan\bar\alpha/20≤ε≤tanαˉ/2, the set Cε,αˉC_{\varepsilon,\bar\alpha}Cε,αˉ​, a polyhedral cone cut by three half-spaces and intersected with S3S^3S3, has the unique circumcenter
c^(Cε,αˉ)=11+ε2(1,ε,0).\hat c(C_{\varepsilon,\bar\alpha})=\tfrac{1}{\sqrt{1+\varepsilon^2}}(1,\varepsilon,0).c^(Cε,αˉ​)=1+ε2​1​(1,ε,0).
  1. Step 2: with C0=C0,αˉC_0=C_{0,\bar\alpha}C0​=C0,αˉ​, ft=idf_t=\mathrm{id}ft​=id, Xt={xˉt,0}\mathcal X_t=\{\bar x_t,0\}Xt​={xˉt​,0}, εt=ttan⁡αˉ/(2T)\varepsilon_t=t\tan\bar\alpha/(2T)εt​=ttanαˉ/(2T), the greedy knowledge sets are C(It)=Cεt−1,αˉC(\mathcal I_t)=C_{\varepsilon_{t-1},\bar\alpha}C(It​)=Cεt−1​,αˉ​.
  2. Step 3: in that instance, with tan⁡αˉ≤2\tan\bar\alpha\le 2tanαˉ≤2, each period's regret is at least sin⁡αˉ/4\sin\bar\alpha/4sinαˉ/4.

Significance

The result separates offline from online learning in this model. Theorem 1 makes the circumcenter the best one-shot guess, yet Theorem 2 shows that one-shot optimality says nothing about information collection: a greedy learner can keep choosing actions that are wrong by a fixed margin while the revealed expert actions cut away only slivers of the knowledge set. This is the reason the paper introduces its EllipsoidalCones algorithm, which acts greedily on an enlarged ellipsoidal-cone superset and attains logarithmic regret for pointed initial sets. Theorem 2 is the lower bound that makes that design necessary.

On the formal side, the paper's proof is complete but compressed; it asserts the circumcenter of a three-generator spherical polygon "using Definition 2" and leaves the induction's geometric inclusions to the reader. A machine-checked version fixes the normalization of the circumcenter and the quantitative condition behind "ε2≤1\varepsilon^2\le1ε2≤1", and gives a reusable formal treatment of uncertainty angles and circumcenters, which the paper's other results (Theorem 1, Theorem 3, Lemma 10) all use. No result of the paper has a formal statement or proof on Prove2Me yet.

Difficulty

The arithmetic of Step 3 is elementary once the knowledge sets are known. The difficulty is in Steps 1 and 2. Identifying the circumcenter of Cε,αˉC_{\varepsilon,\bar\alpha}Cε,αˉ​ requires a minimax argument over the whole sphere: one must show that no other unit vector has a smaller maximal angle to the three extreme rays, and that the minimizer is unique, which rests on Lemma 2. The greedy policy is defined through this minimizer, so without uniqueness nothing can be said about its actions. Step 2 then needs an exact description of each knowledge set: showing that the new half-space makes the previous one redundant inside C0C_0C0​ requires the sign information carried by the other constraints. A naive bound on the regret that ignores the knowledge-set dynamics fails, because a priori the policy might learn c⋆c^\starc⋆ after a few periods.

Formalization scope

Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), so norms, diameters and Lipschitz constants are Euclidean. The angle uses the paper's convention θ(c,0)=θ(0,c^)=0\theta(c,0)=\theta(0,\hat c)=0θ(c,0)=θ(0,c^)=0; Mathlib's InnerProductGeometry.angle is not used. Action sets are required to be nonempty (otherwise no action exists). Periods are 000-based in Lean: Lean period ttt is the paper's period t+1t+1t+1, and Lean's knowledge set at ttt is the paper's C(It+1)C(\mathcal I_{t+1})C(It+1​). The construction and the goal are in dimension d=3d=3d=3, as in the proof; the goal holds for every action dimension n≥1n\ge1n≥1.

The worst-case regret is never written as a real supremum, whose junk values would decide the statement. The lower bound is stated by exhibiting the instance. A run of the greedy policy is a predicate quantifying over every circumcenter choice and every minimizer, and nature's sequences are arbitrary. Two pins relative to the page: the printed circumcenter (1,ε,0)(1,\varepsilon,0)(1,ε,0) is normalized as in Step 3, and Step 3 assumes tan⁡αˉ≤2\tan\bar\alpha\le2tanαˉ≤2, which the page's "ε2≤1\varepsilon^2\le1ε2≤1" needs (the goal uses αˉ=π/4\bar\alpha=\pi/4αˉ=π/4).

Two trivializations are ruled out. Without pointedness the claim holds for C0=S3C_0=S^3C0​=S3 with antipodal costs, so α(C0)<π/2\alpha(C_0)<\pi/2α(C0​)<π/2 is part of the goal. A bound over all runs would hold vacuously if no run existed, so the goal also asserts that a greedy run exists.

A complete development needs spherical geometry of polyhedral cones (extreme rays, angles to a cone), continuity of the uncertainty-angle objective for Lemma 2, and elementary trigonometry. The Geometry and Online definitions are shared with the other missions of this series and are reusable for any work on inverse optimization or learning from revealed preferences. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative arguments for Lemma 2.

Selected references

  • O. Besbes, Y. Fonseca, I. Lobel, Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning, arXiv:2106.14015v3, 2023 (preprint used here; published in Operations Research, 2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14015
  • M. Cohen, I. Lobel, R. Paes Leme, Feature-Based Dynamic Pricing, Management Science 66(11), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3485
  • R. K. Ahuja, J. B. Orlin, Inverse Optimization, Operations Research 49(5), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.5.771.10607
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Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes I: With Patience at Least 2, Attenuated Random-Order Probing Gives Every Edge a(e)·Pr[e Is Free] ≥ β*Research Paper

Motivation

In offline stochastic matching a graph is given in which every edge is present only with some known probability, and the only way to find out is to probe it: a probed edge that turns out to be present must be added to the matching at once. Each vertex may also limit how many of its edges are probed (its patience). The model captures applications in which a proposed match may be refused and an accepted one is binding: organ (kidney) exchange, online dating, advertising, crowdsourcing and ride sharing are the examples the paper lists (pp. 1–2), following Chen, Immorlica, Karlin, Mahdian and Rudra (ICALP 2009) and Bansal, Gupta, Li, Mestre, Nagarajan and Rudra (Algorithmica 2012).

Finding the best probing strategy is computationally hard, so algorithms are compared with a linear-programming relaxation that upper-bounds every strategy (Lemma 1, from Bansal et al.).

Timeline (general graphs with patience, as recorded on p. 2 of the paper).

  • 2012: Bansal et al., a 0.250.250.25-approximation.
  • 2015: Adamczyk, Grandoni and Mukherjee, 0.2690.2690.269.
  • 2018: Baveja, Chavan, Nikiforov, Srinivasan and Xu, 0.310.310.31.
  • 2021–2026: Brubach, Grammel, Ma, MacRury and Srinivasan (arXiv:2106.06892v3; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025), 0.3820.3820.382 when every patience is at least 222. Their algorithm processes the edges in random order and attenuates each probe with an extra coin flip. Version 3 restricts the result to patience at least 222; earlier versions claimed it for all patience values, and Remark 1 shows why patience 111 fails.
  • Since then Pollner et al. have obtained 0.3950.3950.395 for general graphs (reference [35] of the paper).

This mission formalizes the per-edge bound behind the 0.3820.3820.382 result, Theorem 1 of the paper.

Setting

A finite graph G=(V,E)G = (V, E)G=(V,E) is given. Each edge eee is active independently with probability pe∈[0,1]p_e \in [0,1]pe​∈[0,1], and each vertex vvv has a patience tv∈{1,2,… }∪{∞}t_v \in \{1, 2, \dots\} \cup \{\infty\}tv​∈{1,2,…}∪{∞}, the largest number of probes that may be made to edges incident to vvv. Write δ(v)\delta(v)δ(v) for the edges incident to vvv.

LP (3). A vector (ye)e∈E(y_e)_{e \in E}(ye​)e∈E​ is feasible if

0≤ye≤1,∑e∈δ(v)yepe≤1,∑e∈δ(v)ye≤tv(e∈E, v∈V).0 \le y_e \le 1, \qquad \sum_{e \in \delta(v)} y_e p_e \le 1, \qquad \sum_{e \in \delta(v)} y_e \le t_v \quad (e \in E,\ v \in V).0≤ye​≤1,e∈δ(v)∑​ye​pe​≤1,e∈δ(v)∑​ye​≤tv​(e∈E, v∈V).

Here yey_eye​ is the probability of probing eee.

Attenuation. An attenuation function a~:[0,1]→[0,1]\tilde a : [0,1] \to [0,1]a~:[0,1]→[0,1] assigns to edge eee the probability a(e)=a~(peye)a(e) = \tilde a(p_e y_e)a(e)=a~(pe​ye​). It is effective (Definition 3) if a~(0)=1\tilde a(0) = 1a~(0)=1 and z↦ln⁡(1−xza~(z))z \mapsto \ln(1 - x z \tilde a(z))z↦ln(1−xza~(z)) is convex on [0,1][0,1][0,1] for every x∈(0,1)x \in (0,1)x∈(0,1). The two functions used here are a~exp⁡(z)=e−z/2\tilde a_{\exp}(z) = e^{-z/2}a~exp​(z)=e−z/2 and a~lin(z)=1−z/2\tilde a_{\mathrm{lin}}(z) = 1 - z/2a~lin​(z)=1−z/2 (Definition 4 with α=1/2\alpha = 1/2α=1/2).

Algorithm 1. Draw independent coins Ye∼Bernoulli(ye)Y_e \sim \mathrm{Bernoulli}(y_e)Ye​∼Bernoulli(ye​) and Ae∼Bernoulli(a(e))A_e \sim \mathrm{Bernoulli}(a(e))Ae​∼Bernoulli(a(e)) for every edge, and process the edges in a uniformly random order. When eee is processed it is free if both endpoints are unmatched and have made fewer than their patience in probes. If eee is free and Ye=Ae=1Y_e = A_e = 1Ye​=Ae​=1, probe eee; if it is active (coin Pe∼Bernoulli(pe)P_e \sim \mathrm{Bernoulli}(p_e)Pe​∼Bernoulli(pe​)), match it and both endpoints. Finally

β∗=∫01(e−2x+xe−2x)2 dx≈0.38278.\beta^* = \int_0^1 \bigl(e^{-2x} + x e^{-2x}\bigr)^2\,dx \approx 0.38278.β∗=∫01​(e−2x+xe−2x)2dx≈0.38278.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 9)

If every vertex has patience at least 222, yyy is feasible for LP (3), and a~\tilde aa~ is a~exp⁡\tilde a_{\exp}a~exp​ or a~lin\tilde a_{\mathrm{lin}}a~lin​, then for every edge eee

a(e)⋅Pr⁡[e is free]  ≥  β∗.a(e) \cdot \Pr[e \text{ is free}] \;\ge\; \beta^*.a(e)⋅Pr[e is free]≥β∗.

The probability is over the random order and the coins of Algorithm 1.

Milestones

The milestones are numbered results and displays of the paper, in the order its argument uses them:

  1. a~exp⁡\tilde a_{\exp}a~exp​ and a~lin\tilde a_{\mathrm{lin}}a~lin​ with α=1/2\alpha = 1/2α=1/2 are effective (Definition 4, p. 9).
  2. (7), p. 10: a safe edge (one whose neighbourhood has neither a successful probe nor an exhausted patience before it arrives) is free, so a(e)Pr⁡[e is free]≥a~(peye)Pr⁡[e is safe]a(e)\Pr[e \text{ is free}] \ge \tilde a(p_e y_e)\Pr[e \text{ is safe}]a(e)Pr[e is free]≥a~(pe​ye​)Pr[e is safe].
  3. Lemma 3, p. 11: ∏f∈E1(r)(1−x a(f)yf)≥e−x∑f∈E1(r)yf\prod_{f \in E_1(r)} (1 - x\,a(f) y_f) \ge e^{-x \sum_{f \in E_1(r)} y_f}∏f∈E1​(r)​(1−xa(f)yf​)≥e−x∑f∈E1​(r)​yf​ for an effective attenuation, where E1(r)E_1(r)E1​(r) is the set of edges at rrr other than eee with pf=1p_f = 1pf​=1.
  4. Lemma 4, p. 12 (Baveja et al.): Pr⁡[∑iBi<t]≥Pr⁡[Pois(μ)<t]\Pr[\sum_i B_i < t] \ge \Pr[\mathrm{Pois}(\mu) < t]Pr[∑i​Bi​<t]≥Pr[Pois(μ)<t] for independent Bernoullis with mean sum μ<t−1\mu < t - 1μ<t−1.
  5. Lemma 5, p. 12: the Chernoff bound Pr⁡[∑iBi<(1+ε)μ]≥1−e−ε2μ/(2+ε)\Pr[\sum_i B_i < (1+\varepsilon)\mu] \ge 1 - e^{-\varepsilon^2 \mu/(2+\varepsilon)}Pr[∑i​Bi​<(1+ε)μ]≥1−e−ε2μ/(2+ε).
  6. Proposition 1, p. 14: ∫01λφ≥λ(z∗)∫01φ\int_0^1 \lambda\varphi \ge \lambda(z^*)\int_0^1 \varphi∫01​λφ≥λ(z∗)∫01​φ for λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0 non-increasing and φ\varphiφ changing sign once, from +++ to −-−, at z∗z^*z∗.
  7. (22), p. 15: a~(ye)∫01(e−x(2−ye)+xe−x(2−ye))2 dx≥β∗\tilde a(y_e)\int_0^1 (e^{-x(2-y_e)} + x e^{-x(2-y_e)})^2\,dx \ge \beta^*a~(ye​)∫01​(e−x(2−ye​)+xe−x(2−ye​))2dx≥β∗ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], with equality at ye=0y_e = 0ye​=0.

Significance

The result. Equation (4) of the paper writes the expected weight of the algorithm's matching as ∑ewepeye a(e)Pr⁡[e is free]\sum_e w_e p_e y_e\, a(e)\Pr[e \text{ is free}]∑e​we​pe​ye​a(e)Pr[e is free]. Theorem 1 therefore gives at least β∗∑ewepeye\beta^* \sum_e w_e p_e y_eβ∗∑e​we​pe​ye​, and with an optimal LP solution and the LP upper bound of Bansal et al. this is a 0.3820.3820.382-approximation for stochastic matching on general graphs with patience at least 222. The bound is per edge, which is the form a random-order contention resolution scheme needs: the same algorithm rounds fractional matchings edge by edge.

Formalizing it. The paper's proof combines a reduction (Lemma 2), the analytic bound of Lemma 3, the tail bounds of Lemmas 4–5, an exchange argument (Lemma 6) resting on a graph construction from another paper, and a case analysis in the patience values that is closed by numerical minimization of explicit integrals over two or three parameters ("we numerically minimize (12)", p. 13; "we numerically verify", p. 15). The margins are thin: the bound 0.38280.38280.3828 in the last case exceeds β∗\beta^*β∗ by about 5⋅10−55 \cdot 10^{-5}5⋅10−5. No part of this argument has a machine-checked proof. A formal proof would certify both the probabilistic reasoning and every numerical step, and would supply a reusable finite model of random-order probing algorithms with patience, of which the platform has none.

Difficulty

The obvious argument bounds Pr⁡[e is free]\Pr[e \text{ is free}]Pr[e is free] by a product over the two endpoints of eee and applies a Poisson approximation to the number of probes at each endpoint. For an endpoint of patience 222 that approximation is only valid for arrival times x<xcx < x_cx<xc​, a threshold that can be 1/21/21/2, and the bound it gives, about 0.3470.3470.347 (display (16)), falls below β∗\beta^*β∗. Closing that case is what requires the exchange argument of Lemma 6. Beyond it, the remaining cases are optimization problems over the LP mass at each endpoint, which the paper settles by computer and a formal proof must settle by rigorous bounds.

Formalization scope

  • The graph is the platform's EdmondsMatching65.Polyhedron.Graph (loopless); the goal adds that the endpoint map is injective, since the paper's edges are pairs {u,v}\{u,v\}{u,v}. Patience is ℕ∞, with ∞\infty∞ allowed; "minimum patience 222" is tv≥2t_v \ge 2tv​≥2 at every vertex.
  • Standing assumptions: pe∈[0,1]p_e \in [0,1]pe​∈[0,1] for every edge; yyy feasible for LP (3) (which includes ye∈[0,1]y_e \in [0,1]ye​∈[0,1]).
  • Every probability is a finite average: over the ∣E∣!|E|!∣E∣! orders of the edges and over the 23∣E∣2^{3|E|}23∣E∣ outcomes of the coins Y,A,PY, A, PY,A,P, each weighted by a product of Bernoulli weights. The paper's continuous arrival times induce exactly this uniform order. Pr⁡[e is free]\Pr[e \text{ is free}]Pr[e is free] is computed from the run of Algorithm 1 (matched vertices and probe counters, step by step), never from the product formulas of p. 11, which would assume the lemmas being proved.
  • The goal is stated for a~exp⁡\tilde a_{\exp}a~exp​ and a~lin\tilde a_{\mathrm{lin}}a~lin​ with α=1/2\alpha = 1/2α=1/2. Theorem 1 cites "Definition 3 where α=1/2\alpha = 1/2α=1/2"; α\alphaα belongs to Definition 4, and an arbitrary effective function would make the statement false. The third function of Definition 4 is not effective (its ln⁡(1−xza~(z))\ln(1 - xz\tilde a(z))ln(1−xza~(z)) is concave near z=0z = 0z=0 for xxx close to 111), so neither the effectiveness milestone nor the goal covers it.
  • Lemma 4 prints e−xμe^{-x\mu}e−xμ in the Poisson sum; the statement uses e−μe^{-\mu}e−μ.
  • A formalization that defines "free" without the patience counters or the matched set, one that bounds Pr⁡[e is safe]\Pr[e \text{ is safe}]Pr[e is safe] or the integral (8) instead of a(e)Pr⁡[e is free]a(e)\Pr[e \text{ is free}]a(e)Pr[e is free], or one stated for "some" attenuation function, is a different theorem and does not count.
  • Not stated: Lemma 2 (a without-loss-of-generality reduction), Lemma 6 (its hypothesis is a graph built in another paper, with property (18) asserted there), the conditional bounds (8)–(17) and (23)–(25), whose objects live inside the proof, and the numerical values of pp. 13–15. Solvers who need them are welcome to state them as their own lemmas. The paper's proofs are in §3.2, pp. 9–15.
  • Reusable beyond this mission: the finite model of Algorithm 1 and its events, Lemma 4 (Bernoulli versus Poisson lower tails), Lemma 5 (a Chernoff bound for independent Bernoullis), and Proposition 1.

Selected references

  • B. Brubach, N. Grammel, W. Ma, C. MacRury, A. Srinivasan, Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2106.06892v3 (20 Apr 2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.06892v3
  • N. Bansal, A. Gupta, J. Li, J. Mestre, V. Nagarajan, A. Rudra, When LP is the cure for your matching woes: improved bounds for stochastic matchings, Algorithmica 63(4):733–762, 2012 (reference [7] of the paper).
  • A. Baveja, A. Chavan, A. Nikiforov, A. Srinivasan, P. Xu, Improved bounds in stochastic matching and optimization, Algorithmica 80(11):3225–3252, 2018 (reference [8]; source of Lemma 4).
  • M. Adamczyk, F. Grandoni, J. Mukherjee, Improved approximation algorithms for stochastic matching, ESA 2015, 1–12 (reference [1]).
  • N. Chen, N. Immorlica, A. R. Karlin, M. Mahdian, A. Rudra, Approximating matches made in heaven, ICALP 2009, 266–278 (reference [15]).
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Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes II: With Infinite Patience, Attenuated Random-Order Probing Probes Each Edge w.p. ≥ (1 − e^(−2))y_e/2Research Paper

Motivation

In stochastic matching a platform knows, for every potential pair, the probability that the pair would succeed, but learns whether it does only by trying it, and a successful trial is binding. Kidney exchange, online dating and labour markets are the standard examples: a crossmatch test, a date or an interview is a probe whose outcome is random, and a positive outcome commits both sides. Each participant also tolerates only a limited number of attempts, its patience. The algorithmic question, studied since Chen, Immorlica, Karlin, Mahdian and Rudra (ICALP 2009), is how much of the optimal adaptive strategy's expected weight a simple, non-adaptive rule can secure.

The modern approach solves a linear programming relaxation and rounds its fractional solution online, through a contention resolution scheme: edges are examined one at a time, and an edge is used only when it does not conflict with earlier decisions. Bansal, Gupta, Li, Mestre, Nagarajan and Rudra (Algorithmica 2012) introduced the relaxation (LP (3) below) and showed that it bounds every adaptive probing algorithm. Baveja, Chavan, Nikiforov, Srinivasan and Xu (Algorithmica 2018) analysed processing edges in a uniformly random order. Brubach, Grammel, Ma, MacRury and Srinivasan (Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2106.06892) add attenuation: an independent coin that sometimes skips an edge on purpose, so that edges likely to block others are probed less often. This mission formalizes their guarantee when patience is unlimited.

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a finite graph. Each edge eee is active independently with known probability pe∈[0,1]p_e\in[0,1]pe​∈[0,1], and each vertex vvv has a patience tv∈N∪{∞}t_v\in\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}tv​∈N∪{∞}, the maximal number of edges at vvv that may be probed. Write δ(v)\delta(v)δ(v) for the edges incident to vvv. A vector (ye)e∈E(y_e)_{e\in E}(ye​)e∈E​ is feasible for LP (3) when

0≤ye≤1,∑e∈δ(v)yepe≤1,∑e∈δ(v)ye≤tv(e∈E, v∈V);0\le y_e\le 1,\qquad \sum_{e\in\delta(v)}y_ep_e\le 1,\qquad \sum_{e\in\delta(v)}y_e\le t_v\qquad(e\in E,\ v\in V);0≤ye​≤1,e∈δ(v)∑​ye​pe​≤1,e∈δ(v)∑​ye​≤tv​(e∈E, v∈V);

yey_eye​ is read as the probability of probing eee, and ze=yepez_e=y_ep_eze​=ye​pe​ as the probability that eee is matched.

An attenuation function is a map a~:[0,1]→[0,1]\tilde a:[0,1]\to[0,1]a~:[0,1]→[0,1], and the attenuation of an edge is a(e)=a~(peye)a(e)=\tilde a(p_ey_e)a(e)=a~(pe​ye​). The paper's examples (Definition 4) are a~exp⁡(z)=e−αz\tilde a_{\exp}(z)=e^{-\alpha z}a~exp​(z)=e−αz, a~lin(z)=1−αz\tilde a_{\rm lin}(z)=1-\alpha za~lin​(z)=1−αz, and a~(z)=1−z1−e−(1−z)(1−1/e)\tilde a(z)=\frac{1-z}{1-e^{-(1-z)}}(1-1/e)a~(z)=1−e−(1−z)1−z​(1−1/e). A function is effective (Definition 3) when a~(0)=1\tilde a(0)=1a~(0)=1 and z↦ln⁡(1−xza~(z))z\mapsto\ln(1-xz\tilde a(z))z↦ln(1−xza~(z)) is convex on [0,1][0,1][0,1] for every x∈(0,1)x\in(0,1)x∈(0,1).

Algorithm 1 draws independent coins Ye∼Bernoulli(ye)Y_e\sim\mathrm{Bernoulli}(y_e)Ye​∼Bernoulli(ye​) and Ae∼Bernoulli(a(e))A_e\sim\mathrm{Bernoulli}(a(e))Ae​∼Bernoulli(a(e)) and processes the edges in a uniformly random order. When it reaches eee, it probes eee if eee is free (both endpoints unmatched and with remaining patience), Ye=1Y_e=1Ye​=1 and Ae=1A_e=1Ae​=1. A probe uses one unit of patience at both endpoints and reveals the activeness Pe∼Bernoulli(pe)P_e\sim\mathrm{Bernoulli}(p_e)Pe​∼Bernoulli(pe​); if Pe=1P_e=1Pe​=1, both endpoints are matched. The edge e={u,v}e=\{u,v\}e={u,v} is safe when, before eee is processed, each endpoint rrr has received at most tr−1t_r-1tr​−1 probes and no earlier edge f≠ef\neq ef=e at uuu or vvv has AfPfYf=1A_fP_fY_f=1Af​Pf​Yf​=1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 5 (p. 16)

If every patience is ∞\infty∞, (ye)(y_e)(ye​) is feasible for LP (3), and a~\tilde aa~ is a~exp⁡\tilde a_{\exp}a~exp​ or a~lin\tilde a_{\rm lin}a~lin​ with α=1/2\alpha=1/2α=1/2, then for every edge eee

Pr⁡[Algorithm 1 probes e] ≥ (∫01e−2x dx)ye=12(1−e−2)ye≈0.432 ye.\Pr[\text{Algorithm 1 probes }e]\ \ge\ \Bigl(\int_0^1e^{-2x}\,dx\Bigr)y_e=\tfrac12\bigl(1-e^{-2}\bigr)y_e\approx0.432\,y_e .Pr[Algorithm 1 probes e] ≥ (∫01​e−2xdx)ye​=21​(1−e−2)ye​≈0.432ye​.

Milestones

  1. The exponential and linear functions with α=1/2\alpha=1/2α=1/2 are effective (p. 9).
  2. Equation (4) (p. 9): the expected matched weight is ∑ewepePr⁡[e free]Pr⁡[Ye=1∩Ae=1]=∑ewepeyea(e)Pr⁡[e free]\sum_ew_ep_e\Pr[e\text{ free}]\Pr[Y_e=1\cap A_e=1]=\sum_ew_ep_ey_ea(e)\Pr[e\text{ free}]∑e​we​pe​Pr[e free]Pr[Ye​=1∩Ae​=1]=∑e​we​pe​ye​a(e)Pr[e free].
  3. Equation (7) (p. 10): a(e)Pr⁡[e is free]≥a~(peye)Pr⁡[e is safe]a(e)\Pr[e\text{ is free}]\ge\tilde a(p_ey_e)\Pr[e\text{ is safe}]a(e)Pr[e is free]≥a~(pe​ye​)Pr[e is safe].
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 11): ∏f∈E1(r)(1−xa(f)yf)≥e−x∑f∈E1(r)yf\prod_{f\in E_1(r)}(1-xa(f)y_f)\ge e^{-x\sum_{f\in E_1(r)}y_f}∏f∈E1​(r)​(1−xa(f)yf​)≥e−x∑f∈E1​(r)​yf​ for effective a~\tilde aa~, where E1(r)E_1(r)E1​(r) is the set of edges f≠ef\neq ef=e at rrr with pf=1p_f=1pf​=1.
  5. §3.3 (p. 16): z↦a~(z)∫01e−2x(1−z)dxz\mapsto\tilde a(z)\int_0^1e^{-2x(1-z)}dxz↦a~(z)∫01​e−2x(1−z)dx is minimized on [0,1][0,1][0,1] at z=0z=0z=0.

Companion: Corollary 6 (p. 16)

On a star graph with infinite patience and the third attenuation function, Pr⁡[e is probed]≥(1−1/e) ye\Pr[e\text{ is probed}]\ge(1-1/e)\,y_ePr[e is probed]≥(1−1/e)ye​. It comes with the identity of p. 16 behind it: for the third function, a~(z)∫01e−x(1−z)dx=1−1/e\tilde a(z)\int_0^1e^{-x(1-z)}dx=1-1/ea~(z)∫01​e−x(1−z)dx=1−1/e for all z∈[0,1]z\in[0,1]z∈[0,1]. Both are plain items of the mission, not milestones.

Significance

By (4), Corollary 5 bounds the expected weight of Algorithm 1 by 12(1−e−2)∑ewepeye\frac12(1-e^{-2})\sum_ew_ep_ey_e21​(1−e−2)∑e​we​pe​ye​, and with an optimal yyy and the bound of Bansal et al. this is a 0.4320.4320.432-approximation for stochastic matching without patience constraints. Because the bound holds edge by edge and for every feasible yyy, it also gives a random-order contention resolution scheme for the matching polytope, which is the form reused for other objectives and in online settings. Corollary 6 is the rank-one analogue with the constant 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e.

None of this is formalized. Stochastic probing, patience, random-order processing and attenuation have no counterpart in Mathlib or on the platform. The mission produces a finite, executable model of a probing algorithm run on random coins and a random order, in which these probabilities are exact finite sums; that model is reusable for the other results of the paper and for related rounding schemes. The paper's results are proved in §3.2 (pp. 9–15) and §3.3 (p. 16); the milestones are the steps used there.

Difficulty

The obvious argument treats the edges at the two endpoints of eee as independent obstacles, each blocking eee with probability proportional to its LP value. That fails because being free is not a product event: whether an earlier edge fff blocks eee depends on whether fff was itself free, which depends on the whole run before fff. A second difficulty is uniformity. The bound must hold for every feasible yyy, and the LP mass at an endpoint can be split among arbitrarily many edges of arbitrary sizes; the quantities involved are not monotone in how that mass is split, and the bound must survive the worst split, including the limit of many tiny edges. The choice of attenuation matters here: the third function of Definition 4 violates the convexity condition of Definition 3, which is why Corollary 6 is not covered by the paper's argument. Finally, the paper reasons with continuous arrival times, while the model has only permutations and finitely many coins.

Formalization scope

  • Model. The graph is the platform's EdmondsMatching65.Polyhedron.Graph (finite, loopless, parallel edges allowed). Probabilities ppp, LP values yyy, weights www and attenuations are real; patience is in ℕ∞, with ⊤=∞\top=\infty⊤=∞. Every probability is a finite average over the ∣E∣!|E|!∣E∣! orders of EEE and over all outcomes of the coins YYY, AAA, PPP, with product weights. The paper's independent uniform arrival times induce exactly this uniform order. The run of Algorithm 1 is computed step by step, with matched vertices and probe counters; free, probed and safe are events of that run.
  • Standing assumptions. 0≤pe≤10\le p_e\le10≤pe​≤1 for every edge (the meaning of "probability of being active"); LP (3) feasibility, which contains 0≤ye≤10\le y_e\le10≤ye​≤1; attenuations with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1] on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  • Disclosed choices. Corollary 5 is stated for a~exp⁡\tilde a_{\exp}a~exp​ and a~lin\tilde a_{\rm lin}a~lin​ with α=1/2\alpha=1/2α=1/2: the corollary says "the effective attenuation functions from Definition 4", its proof names these two, and the third function fails Definition 3 (g′′(0)<0g''(0)<0g′′(0)<0 for xxx near 1). The effectiveness milestone is stated for these two only. The third function is given its limit 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e at z=1z=1z=1, where the printed formula is 0/00/00/0. Corollary 6 is a companion item, not a milestone: the paper's argument for it passes through Lemma 3, which does not apply to the third function, so it is supported by numerical checks but its printed proof has a gap.
  • Not stated. The approximation-ratio and "balanced contention resolution scheme" sentences of Corollaries 5 and 6 need a model of all adaptive probing algorithms (Lemma 1 of the paper, from Bansal et al.) and are out of scope; the goals are the displayed probability bounds.
  • Ruled out. Defining Pr⁡[e is free]\Pr[e\text{ is free}]Pr[e is free] or Pr⁡[e is probed]\Pr[e\text{ is probed}]Pr[e is probed] by the product formula of p. 11 instead of from the run, or stating the goal for "some" attenuation function, would make the goal a different and easier theorem; neither is done.
  • Welcome contributions. Proofs of the milestones; a general lemma that an event depending only on the edges before eee is independent of eee's coins; a conditioning-on-arrival-time lemma for uniform permutations; a proof (or a counterexample) for Corollary 6.

Selected references

  • B. Brubach, N. Grammel, W. Ma, C. MacRury, A. Srinivasan, Improved Guarantees for Offline Stochastic Matching via New Ordered Contention Resolution Schemes, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2106.06892v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.06892
  • N. Bansal, A. Gupta, J. Li, J. Mestre, V. Nagarajan, A. Rudra, When LP Is the Cure for Your Matching Woes: Improved Bounds for Stochastic Matchings, Algorithmica 63(4):733–762, 2012. https://link.springer.com/journal/453/volumes-and-issues/63-4
  • A. Baveja, A. Chavan, A. Nikiforov, A. Srinivasan, P. Xu, Improved Bounds in Stochastic Matching and Optimization, Algorithmica 80(11):3225–3252, 2018. https://link.springer.com/journal/453/volumes-and-issues/80-11
  • N. Chen, N. Immorlica, A. R. Karlin, M. Mahdian, A. Rudra, Approximating Matches Made in Heaven, ICALP 2009, LNCS 5555. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02927-1
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