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Optimization

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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions III: Convergence of the Normalized Subgradient Method with Divergent-Series StepsizesTextbook

Motivation

Many optimization problems of operations research have objectives that are convex but not differentiable: Lagrangian duals of integer and combinatorial programs, maxima of finitely many affine or smooth functions, penalty functions for systems of inequalities, and the value functions produced by decomposition. For such functions the gradient method and steepest descent fail. Constant steps cannot work because the subgradients need not tend to zero at a nondifferentiable minimum, and exact line search along the negative gradient can converge to a point that is not a minimizer (the example on pp. 22–23 of the source).

The subgradient method replaces the gradient by an arbitrary subgradient and gives up monotone decrease of the objective. Its convergence theory is the foundation of nondifferentiable optimization and of Lagrangian relaxation in integer programming.

Timeline. N. Z. Shor proposed the method with normalized steps in 1962 (Kiev). Yu. M. Ermoliev proved convergence in finite dimensions with divergent-series stepsizes (Kibernetika, 1966), and B. T. Polyak proved it for constrained problems in Hilbert space (Doklady Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1967). Held, Wolfe and Crowder (Mathematical Programming, 1974) brought the method to large combinatorial problems through Lagrangian relaxation. This mission formalizes the exposition of Section 2.1–2.2 of Shor's monograph (Springer, 1985), which gives self-contained proofs of these results.

Setting

Let EnE_nEn​ be the nnn-dimensional Euclidean space with inner product (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) and norm ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥. Let f:En→Rf : E_n \to \mathbb{R}f:En​→R be a convex function finite everywhere. A vector ggg is a subgradient of fff at x0x_0x0​ if

f(x)−f(x0)≥(g,x−x0)for all x∈En.f(x) - f(x_0) \ge (g, x - x_0) \quad \text{for all } x \in E_n.f(x)−f(x0​)≥(g,x−x0​)for all x∈En​.

Every convex fff has at least one subgradient at every point. Let M∗={x:f(x)≤f(y) ∀y}M^* = \{x : f(x) \le f(y) \ \forall y\}M∗={x:f(x)≤f(y) ∀y} be the set of minimum points and, when it is nonempty, f∗=min⁡ff^* = \min ff∗=minf.

A subgradient selection gfg_fgf​ assigns to each xxx some subgradient gf(x)g_f(x)gf​(x) of fff at xxx. No particular choice is made: every result holds for every selection. Given stepsizes h1,h2,⋯>0h_1, h_2, \dots > 0h1​,h2​,⋯>0 and a starting point x0x_0x0​, the normalized subgradient method is

xk+1=xk−hk+1 gf(xk)∥gf(xk)∥,k=0,1,…(2.4)x_{k+1} = x_k - h_{k+1}\, \frac{g_f(x_k)}{\|g_f(x_k)\|}, \qquad k = 0, 1, \dots \tag{2.4}xk+1​=xk​−hk+1​∥gf​(xk​)∥gf​(xk​)​,k=0,1,…(2.4)

If gf(xk)=0g_f(x_k) = 0gf​(xk​)=0, then xkx_kxk​ is a minimizer and the computation stops. The unnormalized method is xk+1=xk−hk+1gf(xk)x_{k+1} = x_k - h_{k+1} g_f(x_k)xk+1​=xk​−hk+1​gf​(xk​) (2.5), and the method with restarts takes that step when hk+1∥gf(xk)∥≤ch_{k+1}\|g_f(x_k)\| \le chk+1​∥gf​(xk​)∥≤c and returns to x0x_0x0​ otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.2 (p. 25)

If M∗M^*M∗ is nonempty and bounded, hk>0h_k > 0hk​>0, hk→0h_k \to 0hk​→0 and ∑k≥1hk=+∞\sum_{k \ge 1} h_k = +\infty∑k≥1​hk​=+∞, then for every x0x_0x0​ and every subgradient selection, the method (2.4) either reaches M∗M^*M∗ at some index kˉ\bar kkˉ or

lim⁡k→∞min⁡y∈M∗∥xk−y∥=0,lim⁡k→∞f(xk)=f∗.\lim_{k \to \infty} \min_{y \in M^*} \|x_k - y\| = 0, \qquad \lim_{k \to \infty} f(x_k) = f^*.k→∞lim​y∈M∗min​∥xk​−y∥=0,k→∞lim​f(xk​)=f∗.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (2.3), the one-step inequality ∥xk+1−x∗∥2≤∥xk−x∗∥2+h2−2h ρ(x∗,Uk)\|x_{k+1} - x^*\|^2 \le \|x_k - x^*\|^2 + h^2 - 2h\,\rho(x^*, U_k)∥xk+1​−x∗∥2≤∥xk​−x∗∥2+h2−2hρ(x∗,Uk​), where Uk={x:f(x)=f(xk)}U_k = \{x : f(x) = f(x_k)\}Uk​={x:f(x)=f(xk​)}.
  2. Theorem 2.1: with constant step length hhh, some level surface {f=f(xk∗)}\{f = f(x_{k^*})\}{f=f(xk∗​)} passes within h(1+ε)/2h(1+\varepsilon)/2h(1+ε)/2 of any x∗∈M∗x^* \in M^*x∗∈M∗.
  3. Corollaries 1 and 2: a suitable constant step length yields a subsequence with f(xki)−f∗<δf(x_{k_i}) - f^* < \deltaf(xki​​)−f∗<δ. If M∗M^*M∗ contains a ball of radius r>h/2r > h/2r>h/2, the method terminates in M∗M^*M∗.
  4. Theorem 2.5: if M∗M^*M∗ contains a ball of radius rrr, ∑hk=∞\sum h_k = \infty∑hk​=∞ and lim sup⁡hk<2r\limsup h_k < 2rlimsuphk​<2r, then (2.4) terminates in M∗M^*M∗.
  5. Theorem 2.3: for the unnormalized method (2.5), bounded subgradients along the trajectory imply convergence, and unbounded subgradients rule it out.
  6. Theorem 2.4: the method with restarts converges for every c>0c > 0c>0.

Significance

Theorem 2.2 is the basic convergence guarantee for first-order methods on general nonsmooth convex functions. It needs no Lipschitz constant, no bound on the subgradients and no smoothness: normalizing the step makes the step length independent of the size of the subgradient. The divergent-series rule hk→0h_k \to 0hk​→0, ∑hk=∞\sum h_k = \infty∑hk​=∞ is the standard stepsize condition of stochastic approximation and of Lagrangian relaxation codes. Theorems 2.3–2.5 mark its boundaries. The unnormalized method needs bounded subgradients (Theorem 2.3), restarts remove that need (Theorem 2.4), and a solution set with nonempty interior gives finite termination (Theorem 2.5). The last result is the basis of the finite methods for systems of convex inequalities and for the dual of an assignment problem with a unique solution (pp. 28–29).

All of these results are classical and proved in the source. None of them is formalized in Lean's Mathlib. The platform has neighbouring results that are not the same statements: Poljak's divergent-series theorem for concave piecewise-linear maximization (in Validation of Subgradient Optimization I), and rate bounds for Lipschitz objectives (First-Order and Stochastic Optimization Methods for ML II, Understanding Machine Learning X). This mission adds the general convex case with normalized steps, the dichotomy for unnormalized steps, and finite termination.

Difficulty

The standard rate analysis of the subgradient method bounds ∥xk+1−x∗∥2−∥xk−x∗∥2\|x_{k+1} - x^*\|^2 - \|x_k - x^*\|^2∥xk+1​−x∗∥2−∥xk​−x∗∥2 by −2hk+1(f(xk)−f∗)/∥gf(xk)∥+hk+12-2h_{k+1}(f(x_k) - f^*)/\|g_f(x_k)\| + h_{k+1}^2−2hk+1​(f(xk​)−f∗)/∥gf​(xk​)∥+hk+12​. It then needs a uniform bound on ∥gf(xk)∥\|g_f(x_k)\|∥gf​(xk​)∥, which is exactly what is not assumed here. Nothing a priori keeps the iterates in a bounded set, and the subgradients of a general convex function (for instance f(x)=x4f(x) = x^4f(x)=x4, the source's example on p. 26) grow without bound away from M∗M^*M∗; with unnormalized steps this makes the method diverge. Even with normalized steps, the distance to a minimizer decreases only outside a neighbourhood of M∗M^*M∗ whose size is of the order of the current step, so a monotone decrease argument gives at best a subsequence with small function values. Convergence of the whole sequence min⁡y∈M∗∥xk−y∥\min_{y \in M^*}\|x_k - y\|miny∈M∗​∥xk​−y∥ to zero is a stronger statement, and boundedness of M∗M^*M∗ is essential to it.

Formalization scope

  • EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); fff is real-valued (finite everywhere) with ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ f.
  • The subgradient selection g is arbitrary, with the hypothesis ∀ x, IsSubgradient f x (g x). The starting point is arbitrary.
  • The iterations are defined recursively (normalizedIter, plainIter, resetIter); the stepsize sequence is h : ℕ → ℝ with h (k+1) used at step kkk. In (2.4), a zero subgradient is handled by an explicit branch that repeats the current iterate (which is then in M∗M^*M∗). No statement relies on Lean's convention x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0.
  • M∗M^*M∗ is required to be nonempty wherever the book writes min⁡y∈M∗\min_{y \in M^*}miny∈M∗​ or f∗=min⁡ff^* = \min ff∗=minf. min⁡y∈M∗∥xk−y∥\min_{y \in M^*}\|x_k - y\|miny∈M∗​∥xk​−y∥ is Metric.infDist, and f∗f^*f∗ is ⨅ y, f y.
  • ∑k≥1hk=+∞\sum_{k \ge 1} h_k = +\infty∑k≥1​hk​=+∞ is Tendsto (fun N => ∑ k ∈ Finset.range N, h (k+1)) atTop atTop. lim sup⁡hk<2r\limsup h_k < 2rlimsuphk​<2r is "for some q<2rq < 2rq<2r, eventually hk≤qh_k \le qhk​≤q", so it cannot hold vacuously for an unbounded sequence.
  • Corollary 1's step length hδh_\deltahδ​ is quantified before the selection and the starting point: it depends only on fff and δ\deltaδ.
  • Theorem 2.3 is stated as two implications, (bounded subgradients ⇒ convergence) and (unbounded ⇒ no convergence), not as a disjunction that one case could satisfy trivially.
  • A formalization of Theorem 2.2 that assumes bounded subgradients, a Lipschitz fff, or a specific subgradient choice (such as the minimal-norm one) proves a different and weaker theorem, and does not close the goal.

Needed infrastructure: continuity of convex functions on EnE_nEn​ (in Mathlib), compactness of sublevel sets when M∗M^*M∗ is bounded, and the geometry of level surfaces relative to supporting hyperplanes. The one-step inequality (2.3) and the level-set compactness lemma are reusable by the later missions of this series (linear rate, Polyak's stepsize, stochastic subgradient). Contributions that prove Eq. (2.3) or Theorem 2.1 first are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 3, Springer, 1985, Chapter 2, pp. 22–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9
  • B. T. Polyak, A general method for solving extremal problems, Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR 174 (1967), 33–36 (the source's reference [64]).
  • Yu. M. Ermoliev, Methods for solving nonlinear extremal problems, Kibernetika (Kiev), no. 4 (1966), 1–17 (the source's reference [24]).
  • M. Held, P. Wolfe, H. P. Crowder, Validation of subgradient optimization, Mathematical Programming 6 (1974), 62–88. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580223
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AnalysisConvex Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions II: Convex Functions Are Almost Differentiable and Their Almost-Gradients Are SubgradientsTextbook

Motivation

Gradient methods assume a continuous gradient; subgradient methods assume convexity. Many objective functions met in practice satisfy neither. Shor's example is economic planning, where components of the objective are piecewise-smooth, not necessarily convex functions of a parameter describing the productivity of a unit, and where minimax formulations produce kinks as a rule (Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer 1985, §1.4, p. 17, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9). Such problems need a class of functions wide enough to contain piecewise-smooth and minimax functions and narrow enough to carry a usable replacement for the gradient.

Shor's answer is the class of almost differentiable functions, introduced in his 1972 work and presented in §1.4 of the book, together with the almost-gradient, a limit of gradients taken at nearby points of differentiability. The capstone of the section, Theorem 1.15, connects this class with convex analysis: every convex function on EnE_nEn​ is almost differentiable, and its almost-gradients are subgradients. This is what lets the later chapters treat convex minimization and almost-differentiable minimization with one set of tools. Clarke's generalized gradient of locally Lipschitz functions (Clarke 1975) is the closest relative; Shor's definition differs in requiring the gradient to be continuous on its domain (p. 19).

Setting

Let EnE_nEn​ denote nnn-dimensional Euclidean space with inner product (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) and norm ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥. For f:En→Rf : E_n \to \mathbb{R}f:En​→R, write M={x∈En:f is differentiable at x}M = \{x \in E_n : f \text{ is differentiable at } x\}M={x∈En​:f is differentiable at x} and ∇f(x)\nabla f(x)∇f(x) for the gradient at x∈Mx \in Mx∈M.

A function fff is almost differentiable if

  1. on every bounded set SSS it is Lipschitz: ∣f(x)−f(y)∣≤LS∥x−y∥|f(x) - f(y)| \le L_S \|x - y\|∣f(x)−f(y)∣≤LS​∥x−y∥ for x,y∈Sx, y \in Sx,y∈S, with a constant LSL_SLS​ depending on SSS;
  2. it is differentiable at Lebesgue-almost every point of EnE_nEn​;
  3. the map x↦∇f(x)x \mapsto \nabla f(x)x↦∇f(x), restricted to MMM, is continuous.

An almost-gradient of fff at x0x_0x0​ is a vector ggg that is an accumulation point of a sequence ∇f(x1),∇f(x2),…\nabla f(x_1), \nabla f(x_2), \dots∇f(x1​),∇f(x2​),… with xk∈Mx_k \in Mxk​∈M and xk→x0x_k \to x_0xk​→x0​. The set of almost-gradients is G(x0)G(x_0)G(x0​). A generalized almost-gradient is a point of the closure of the convex hull of G(x0)G(x_0)G(x0​).

A vector ggg is a subgradient of fff at x0x_0x0​ if f(x)−f(x0)≥(g,x−x0)f(x) - f(x_0) \ge (g, x - x_0)f(x)−f(x0​)≥(g,x−x0​) for all x∈Enx \in E_nx∈En​; for convex fff the set of subgradients is the subdifferential Gf(x0)G_f(x_0)Gf​(x0​).

In Lean these objects are AlmostDifferentiable f, almostGradients f x₀ and IsSubgradient f x₀ g in the namespace ShorNonsmooth.AlmostDiff, with EnE_nEn​ = EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.15 (p. 18)

For convex f:En→Rf : E_n \to \mathbb{R}f:En​→R,

f is almost differentiableandG(x0)⊆Gf(x0)  for every x0∈En.f \text{ is almost differentiable} \quad\text{and}\quad G(x_0) \subseteq G_f(x_0) \ \text{ for every } x_0 \in E_n .f is almost differentiableandG(x0​)⊆Gf​(x0​)  for every x0​∈En​.

The printed statement says the almost-gradients "coincide with" the subgradients. As a set equality this is false (for f(x)=∣x∣f(x) = |x|f(x)=∣x∣ on E1E_1E1​, G(0)={−1,1}G(0) = \{-1, 1\}G(0)={−1,1} while Gf(0)=[−1,1]G_f(0) = [-1, 1]Gf​(0)=[−1,1]), and the book's proof establishes the inclusion. The goal is the inclusion.

Milestones

  1. Proof of Theorem 1.15, display (p. 18). For convex fff differentiable at xkx_kxk​: f(x)−f(xk)≥(∇f(xk),x−xk)f(x) - f(x_k) \ge (\nabla f(x_k), x - x_k)f(x)−f(xk​)≥(∇f(xk​),x−xk​) for all xxx.
  2. Proof of Theorem 1.15 (p. 18). For convex fff and bounded SSS there is CCC with ∣fv′(x)∣≤C∥v∥|f'_v(x)| \le C\|v\|∣fv′​(x)∣≤C∥v∥ for all x∈Sx \in Sx∈S and all vvv, the one-sided directional derivatives existing.
  3. Proof of Theorem 1.15 (p. 18). A convex fff is differentiable almost everywhere and ∇f\nabla f∇f is continuous on MMM.
  4. Theorem 1.14 (p. 18). For almost differentiable fff, G(x)G(x)G(x) is nonempty, bounded and closed at every xxx.
  5. p. 19. For almost differentiable fff, conv⁡‾ G(x)\overline{\operatorname{conv}}\, G(x)convG(x) is convex, bounded and closed.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1.15 embeds convex functions into the almost differentiable class and identifies each almost-gradient of a convex function as a subgradient. Consequently any method that only needs almost-gradients (limits of gradients at nearby differentiable points, which is what a numerical procedure can actually compute) produces valid subgradients when applied to a convex function. Theorem 1.14 supplies the compactness that makes G(x)G(x)G(x) usable as a set-valued substitute for the gradient.

Formalizing it. All results here are classical and proved on paper. Mathlib contains Rademacher's theorem for Lipschitz functions (LipschitzWith.ae_differentiableAt) and local Lipschitz continuity of convex functions on open sets; it does not contain the continuity of the gradient of a convex function on its domain of differentiability, nor any notion of almost-gradient. The mission produces those, together with a formal record that the printed "coincide" is an inclusion. A formal proof of the true equality Gf(x0)=conv⁡‾ G(x0)G_f(x_0) = \overline{\operatorname{conv}}\, G(x_0)Gf​(x0​)=convG(x0​) would be a welcome further contribution.

Difficulty

Two parts of the goal carry real content. The first is condition (c): the gradient of a convex function, restricted to the set where it exists, is continuous. The book cites this from the literature; it is not a consequence of Rademacher's theorem, which gives differentiability almost everywhere and says nothing about how gradients at nearby points relate. The second is condition (b) in a form Lean accepts: Rademacher's theorem in Mathlib is stated for globally Lipschitz functions, while a convex function on EnE_nEn​ is only Lipschitz on bounded sets, so the almost-everywhere statement has to be assembled from local pieces. The passage from gradients to subgradients in the second conjunct is comparatively routine.

The analogous closure properties claimed on the same pages for sums, products and maxima of almost differentiable functions (Theorems 1.16 and 1.17) are false as printed and are not targets; see the formalization scope.

Formalization scope

  • EnE_nEn​ is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); n=0n = 0n=0 is allowed and harmless. Functions are total and real-valued; convexity is ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ f.
  • The gradient is Mathlib's gradient f x; condition (c) is ContinuousOn (gradient f) {x | DifferentiableAt ℝ f x}, continuity of the restriction in the subspace topology.
  • Condition (a) is quantified over every bounded set with a set-dependent constant: ∀ S, Bornology.IsBounded S → ∃ L, LipschitzOnWith L f S. Condition (b) is ∀ᵐ x ∂volume, DifferentiableAt ℝ f x.
  • An almost-gradient is a cluster point (MapClusterPt) of the gradient sequence, not its limit; the points xkx_kxk​ may equal x0x_0x0​.
  • Subgradients are taken relative to the whole space, the domain of every function in this mission.
  • The goal states the inclusion G(x0)⊆Gf(x0)G(x_0) \subseteq G_f(x_0)G(x0​)⊆Gf​(x0​) proved in the book. Stating the printed set equality would make the goal false; weakening the first conjunct to "locally Lipschitz and differentiable almost everywhere" would drop condition (c) and with it the substance of the theorem. Neither is acceptable.
  • Theorem 1.16 (sums, differences, products) and Theorem 1.17 (maxima) are omitted: both are false for the class as defined. With h(x)=x2sin⁡(1/x)h(x) = x^2 \sin(1/x)h(x)=x2sin(1/x), the functions h+∣x∣h + |x|h+∣x∣ and −∣x∣-|x|−∣x∣ are almost differentiable but their sum hhh is differentiable everywhere with a derivative discontinuous at 000; and max⁡(h−∣x∣, h−∣x∣+2x)=h+x\max(h - |x|,\, h - |x| + 2x) = h + xmax(h−∣x∣,h−∣x∣+2x)=h+x. Theorem 1.18 (Mifflin's superposition theorem for semismooth functions) is cited from the literature without proof and rests on Clarke's generalized gradient; it is outside this mission.

Infrastructure that is reusable beyond this mission: continuity of the gradient of a convex function on its domain; Rademacher's theorem for locally Lipschitz functions on EnE_nEn​; the almost-gradient set and its compactness. Contributions that prove these as standalone lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Z. Shor, Minimization Methods for Non-Differentiable Functions, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 3, Springer, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82118-9
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970, Theorem 25.5 (continuity of the gradient of a convex function). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
  • F. H. Clarke, Generalized gradients and applications, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 205 (1975), 247–262. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1975-0367131-6
  • H. Rademacher, Über partielle und totale Differenzierbarkeit von Funktionen mehrerer Variabeln und über die Transformation der Doppelintegrale, Mathematische Annalen 79 (1919), 340–359. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01498415
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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VIII: Bounds on Optimal Stock AllocationsTextbook

Motivation

Military and commercial service parts systems keep repairable parts at a central depot warehouse and at a set of operating bases. Chapter 10 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) turns from the planning models of the earlier chapters to execution. Each period, the stock that is at the depot or arriving there must be divided among the bases. The planner knows what is already in the pipeline and faces random demand at each base. The chapter's models are solved in a rolling-horizon manner. Each period's decisions are the first step of an optimal plan over a short horizon. That plan has to be computable at scale, for thousands of items and dozens of bases.

What makes this possible is a structural fact. In an optimal allocation, the cumulative stock sent to a base never exceeds what a single-period newsvendor problem at that base would ask for. This bound shrinks the allocation integer programs to linear programs of manageable size. This mission formalizes that bound and the facts it rests on.

Setting

Fix one item. Time is counted in whole periods t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \dotst=0,1,2,…, and JJJ is the finite set of bases. For each base jjj:

  • Ti0T_{i0}Ti0​ is the repair lead time, so shipments are decided in periods t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​;
  • TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ and TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ are the regular and expedited transportation times from the depot to base jjj, integers with 1≤Tije<Tijr1 \le T^e_{ij} < T^r_{ij}1≤Tije​<Tijr​;
  • S~i0t\tilde S_{i0t}S~i0t​ is the known cumulative supply at the depot through period ttt (stock on hand plus arrivals already in the pipeline), and S~ijt\tilde S_{ijt}S~ijt​ the known cumulative supply at base jjj. The latter is constant for t≥Tijrt \ge T^r_{ij}t≥Tijr​, since nothing not yet shipped can arrive earlier than TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ by regular transport;
  • XijtX_{ijt}Xijt​ is the cumulative demand at base jjj through period ttt, a nonnegative integer random variable, nondecreasing in ttt, with finite mean;
  • hij>0h_{ij} > 0hij​>0, bij>0b_{ij} > 0bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0 are the incremental holding, shortage and expediting costs.

If SijtS_{ijt}Sijt​ units have arrived at base jjj by period ttt, the expected cost of that period is

Gijt(S)=hij E[S−Xijt]++bij E[Xijt−S]+,G_{ijt}(S) = h_{ij}\,E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ + b_{ij}\,E[X_{ijt} - S]^+,Gijt​(S)=hij​E[S−Xijt​]++bij​E[Xijt​−S]+,

and stock left at the end of the horizon costs

Qij(S)=hij∑t>Tijr+Ti0E[S−Xijt]+.Q_{ij}(S) = h_{ij}\sum_{t > T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}} E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ .Qij​(S)=hij​t>Tijr​+Ti0​∑​E[S−Xijt​]+.

The stock allocation model SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ chooses nonnegative integer regular shipments yijtry^r_{ijt}yijtr​, t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​, with cumulative shipments never exceeding cumulative depot supply. The cumulative stock at base jjj is Sijt=S~ij(Tijr−1)+∑t′≤t−Tijryijt′rS_{ijt} = \tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} + \sum_{t' \le t - T^r_{ij}} y^r_{ijt'}Sijt​=S~ij(Tijr​−1)​+∑t′≤t−Tijr​​yijt′r​, and the model minimizes ∑j{∑t=TijrTijr+Ti0Gijt(Sijt)+Qij(Sij(Tijr+Ti0))}\sum_j \{\sum_{t=T^r_{ij}}^{T^r_{ij}+T_{i0}} G_{ijt}(S_{ijt}) + Q_{ij}(S_{ij(T^r_{ij}+T_{i0})})\}∑j​{∑t=Tijr​Tijr​+Ti0​​Gijt​(Sijt​)+Qij​(Sij(Tijr​+Ti0​)​)}. The extended model ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ adds expedited shipments yijtey^e_{ijt}yijte​, which arrive after TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ periods at an extra cost eije_{ij}eij​ per unit.

The constrained newsvendor problem CNijt\mathrm{CN}_{ijt}CNijt​ minimizes Gijt(S)G_{ijt}(S)Gijt​(S) over integers S≥S~ijtS \ge \tilde S_{ijt}S≥S~ijt​. Its largest optimal solution is written S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15 (p. 237)

In every optimal solution of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​, for every base jjj and every t∈[Tijr,Tijr+Ti0]t \in [T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}]t∈[Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​],

S~ij(Tijr−1)  ≤  Sijt∗  ≤  S^ijt.\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} \;\le\; S^*_{ijt} \;\le\; \hat S_{ijt}.S~ij(Tijr​−1)​≤Sijt∗​≤S^ijt​.

The bound is uniform over optimal solutions and uses nothing but the single-period problems.

Milestones

  1. Separability (Section 10.4.1, p. 236). The multi-item problem SAM\mathrm{SAM}SAM splits into the SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​: its optimal solutions are exactly the tuples of optimal item solutions, and Z∗=∑iZi∗Z^* = \sum_i Z^*_iZ∗=∑i​Zi∗​.
  2. Convexity of QijQ_{ij}Qij​ (p. 234) and of GijtG_{ijt}Gijt​ (p. 237), in the discrete sense of nondecreasing first differences on Z\mathbb ZZ.
  3. The newsvendor solution (10.19). S^ijt=max⁡(S~ijt,s0)\hat S_{ijt} = \max(\tilde S_{ijt}, s^0)S^ijt​=max(S~ijt​,s0) with s0s^0s0 the least integer such that P(Xijt≤s0)>bij/(bij+hij)P(X_{ijt} \le s^0) > b_{ij}/(b_{ij}+h_{ij})P(Xijt​≤s0)>bij​/(bij​+hij​).
  4. Monotonicity (10.20). S^ij(t−1)≤S^ijt\hat S_{ij(t-1)} \le \hat S_{ijt}S^ij(t−1)​≤S^ijt​ on [Tijr,Tijr+Ti0][T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}][Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​].
  5. Theorem 16, corrected (p. 244). In every optimal solution of ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​, S~ijt≤Sijt∗\tilde S_{ijt} \le S^*_{ijt}S~ijt​≤Sijt∗​. Writing Mjt=max⁡k∈[Tije,t](S^ijk−S~ijk)M_{jt} = \max_{k \in [T^e_{ij}, t]}(\hat S_{ijk} - \tilde S_{ijk})Mjt​=maxk∈[Tije​,t]​(S^ijk​−S~ijk​), also Sijt∗≤S~ijt+MjtS^*_{ijt} \le \tilde S_{ijt} + M_{jt}Sijt∗​≤S~ijt​+Mjt​, provided Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​.

Two supporting items state that SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ have optimal solutions. A third, theorem16_counterexample, exhibits an instance in which Theorem 16's upper bound, as printed, fails.

Significance

Theorem 15 is what allows the book (pp. 238–239) to rewrite SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ with 0–1 variables δijtk\delta_{ijtk}δijtk​ indicating Sijt=kS_{ijt} = kSijt​=k. Only kkk between S~ij(Tijr−1)\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)}S~ij(Tijr​−1)​ and S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​ is needed, so the number of variables is governed by the newsvendor quantities rather than by the total depot supply. Theorem 16 plays the same role for the model with expediting. Both bounds also justify the greedy heuristics of Sections 10.4.3 and 10.5.3. Those heuristics never raise a base's stock above its newsvendor level.

The book proves both theorems in half a page each by an exchange argument. This mission produces machine-checked versions and, in doing so, settles the exact scope of Theorem 16. As printed it is false. With Tijr≥Tije+2T^r_{ij} \ge T^e_{ij} + 2Tijr​≥Tije​+2, an expedited shipment in the last decision period can be the only way to cover a later period's demand, and the optimal plan then overstocks an earlier period. The mission states the corrected theorem and the counterexample; the counterexample was checked in Lean during drafting. None of the chapter's results has been formalized before, as far as the platform's catalogue shows.

Difficulty

The central step is the exchange. Take the first period kkk in which an optimal plan overshoots its bound, and delay by one period one unit that arrives at kkk. This must be shown feasible, to change only SijkS_{ijk}Sijk​, and to lower the objective strictly. That in turn needs strict decrease of a convex function to the right of its largest minimizer, and an argument for the last period, where there is no later period to delay into. The indexing is heavy: two lead times, truncated sums min⁡(t−Tije,Ti0)\min(t - T^e_{ij}, T_{i0})min(t−Tije​,Ti0​), and cumulative constraints across bases.

The first idea, that a plan above the newsvendor level can always be improved by shipping less, fails. Shipping less changes the stock in every later period too, and later periods may need the unit. The bound follows only from a delay that affects exactly one period. For ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ even such a delay is sometimes unavailable, which is where the book's Theorem 16 breaks.

Formalization scope

  • One item at a time: ItemModel J Ω P bundles the data of one item with the cumulative demands on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), [IsProbabilityMeasure P]. Bases form a Fintype. Periods are ℕ. Stock levels and supplies are ℤ, since net inventory may be negative. Shipments are functions J → ℕ → ℕ, so nonnegativity and integrality are built in. Costs are in ℝ.
  • GGG and QQQ are defined from the demand as in the book: Bochner integrals of (S−X)+(S - X)^+(S−X)+ and (X−S)+(X - S)^+(X−S)+, and a tsum for QQQ. The item model requires finite means and convergence of the series for QQQ at every stock level, so that no integral or sum takes Lean's junk value 000.
  • "The largest optimal solution" is the predicate IsLargestCNSolution (feasible, minimizing, and above every feasible minimizer). Theorems take S^\hat SS^ as a function satisfying it. Milestone (10.19) shows it exists.
  • "An optimal solution" means a feasible plan with objective at most that of every feasible plan. The theorems hold for every optimal plan.
  • Pinned conventions and additions. The following are not written in the book: hij,bij>0h_{ij}, b_{ij} > 0hij​,bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0; nonnegative, nondecreasing depot supply; nondecreasing base supply (used in the book's proof of Theorem 16); finite mean demand; convergence of QQQ's series. (10.19) is read with the critical fractile "least sss with F(s)>b/(b+h)F(s) > b/(b+h)F(s)>b/(b+h)", the book's ⌈F−1⌉\lceil F^{-1}\rceil⌈F−1⌉/⌊F−1⌋\lfloor F^{-1}\rfloor⌊F−1⌋ with ties broken upward. Theorem 16 carries the proviso "Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​". Separability is stated both for optimal plans and for optimal values.
  • Ruled out. The feasible sets of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ impose no upper bound on the cumulative stock, and S^\hat SS^ is defined from GGG alone, never from the allocation problem. The bounds are therefore not true by definition.
  • Omitted. The LP reformulations (10.22)–(10.28) and (10.45)–(10.52) and the integrality of their relaxations, which the book asserts with a reference to [68]; the greedy algorithms and their optimality conditions (asserted); the book's claim that QijQ_{ij}Qij​ is strictly increasing (p. 238), which fails when P(Xijt≤S)=0P(X_{ijt} \le S) = 0P(Xijt​≤S)=0 beyond the horizon and is not needed; the dynamic program of Section 10.3 and the repair model of Section 10.6.
  • The discrete-convexity and newsvendor facts are reusable for any single-location inventory model on Z\mathbb ZZ. Contributions are welcome on the convexity lemmas, the critical-fractile characterization, and a reusable exchange lemma for cumulative-shipment models.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005, Chapter 10, pp. 225–246. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, "Optimal inventory policy", Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272 (the newsvendor critical fractile). DOI 10.2307/1906813
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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains V: Marginal Allocation and Risk PoolingTextbook

Motivation

Service parts networks (spare parts for aircraft, military systems, industrial equipment) hold stock at several echelons: a depot, intermediate stocking facilities, and bases or warehouses that face demand. Two questions recur in their planning. First, how should a given amount of stock be split among locations whose expected costs are convex in the stock they hold? Second, does adding an echelon, a depot that pools the demand of several warehouses, raise or lower the stock the system needs?

Chapter 7 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879), treats both. For the second it follows Eppen and Schrage (1981, reference [78] of the book): with normal demands, a depot that places orders every period and allocates stock so that all warehouses face the same stockout probability reduces the choice of system stock to a single critical-fractile equation. For the first, the chapter's multi-echelon pooling model (Section 7.3) evaluates nested cost functions of the form "holding and shortage cost plus the minimum over allocations of a sum of convex costs", and its appendix (Section 7.4) gives the marginal allocation algorithm AllocOpt that computes these minima exactly for every stock level at once.

Marginal analysis for separable convex resource allocation is classical (Fox, Management Science, 1966); the monograph of Ibaraki and Katoh (MIT Press, 1988) surveys it.

Setting

Allocation data (Section 7.4). There is a set M={1,…,Mˉ}M = \{1, \dots, \bar M\}M={1,…,Mˉ} of locations and an augmented set M0={0}∪MM_0 = \{0\} \cup MM0​={0}∪M. Each location m∈M0m \in M_0m∈M0​ has integer gridpoints 0=r0m<r1m<⋯<rn(m)m0 = r^m_0 < r^m_1 < \dots < r^m_{n(m)}0=r0m​<r1m​<⋯<rn(m)m​. For m∈Mm \in Mm∈M, the value cnmc^m_ncnm​ of a convex function is given at each gridpoint. The slopes (7.19) are c^nm=(cn+1m−cnm)/(rn+1m−rnm)\hat c^m_n = (c^m_{n+1} - c^m_n)/(r^m_{n+1} - r^m_n)c^nm​=(cn+1m​−cnm​)/(rn+1m​−rnm​) for n<n(m)n < n(m)n<n(m), and c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ repeats the last one. The piecewise linear approximation C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ of (7.20)–(7.21) interpolates the values cnmc^m_ncnm​ at the gridpoints and continues with slope c^n(m)m\hat c^m_{n(m)}c^n(m)m​ beyond the last one. A convex function fff on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ is also given.

The allocation optimization (7.22) asks, for each n∈N0={0,…,n(0)}n \in N_0 = \{0, \dots, n(0)\}n∈N0​={0,…,n(0)}, for

cn0=f(rn0)+min⁡{∑m∈MC~m(rm):rm≥0 integer, ∑m∈Mrm=rn0}.c^0_n = f(r^0_n) + \min\Bigl\{ \sum_{m \in M} \tilde C_m(r_m) : r_m \ge 0 \text{ integer},\ \sum_{m \in M} r_m = r^0_n \Bigr\}.cn0​=f(rn0​)+min{m∈M∑​C~m​(rm​):rm​≥0 integer, m∈M∑​rm​=rn0​}.

Algorithm AllocOpt (Definition 4) keeps a current gridpoint index n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) and allocation r∗(m)r^*(m)r∗(m) per location. For each increment rn0−rn−10r^0_n - r^0_{n-1}rn0​−rn−10​ of the target, it repeatedly gives units to a location m∗m^*m∗ whose current slope c^n∗(m∗)m∗\hat c^{m^*}_{n^*(m^*)}c^n∗(m∗)m∗​ is minimal, up to that location's next gridpoint, and records the accumulated cost.

Pooling system (Section 7.2.1). One depot supplies mmm warehouses. The demand djtd_{jt}djt​ at warehouse jjj in period ttt is normal with mean μj\mu_jμj​ and variance σj2\sigma_j^2σj2​, independent across periods and warehouses. The supplier-to-depot lead time is DDD periods, the depot-to-warehouse lead time AAA periods, and holding and backorder costs h,bh, bh,b are equal at all warehouses. Positions IjI_jIj​ are in balance when Φ((Ij−Aμj)/(A σj))\Phi((I_j - A\mu_j)/(\sqrt A\,\sigma_j))Φ((Ij​−Aμj​)/(A​σj​)) is the same for all jjj. For system inventory position sss, with Y0Y_0Y0​ the system demand over DDD periods and YjY_jYj​ the demand at jjj over the next A+1A + 1A+1 periods, the balanced allocation gives each warehouse a share proportional to σj\sigma_jσj​, and zjz_jzj​ is its end-of-period net inventory.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (correctness)

For every tie-breaking rule in its arg min steps, AllocOpt returns values cn0c^0_ncn0​ that satisfy (7.22) for every n∈N0n \in N_0n∈N0​: some feasible integer allocation attains cn0−f(rn0)c^0_n - f(r^0_n)cn0​−f(rn0​), and no feasible integer allocation does better.

Milestones

  1. Slope monotonicity (p. 178): c^nm≥c^n−1m\hat c^m_n \ge \hat c^m_{n-1}c^nm​≥c^n−1m​ for 0<n≤n(m)0 < n \le n(m)0<n≤n(m).
  2. Convexity of C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) (proof of Proposition 2, p. 179).
  3. Remark 2 (p. 179): with the inner loop run only while the current slope is ≤0\le 0≤0, AllocOpt solves (7.22) with ∑mrm≤rn0\sum_m r_m \le r^0_n∑m​rm​≤rn0​.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 152): if the positions are in balance and
∑jdj,t−1≥max⁡i{∑j≠idj,t+D−1+di,t+D−1(1−∑jσjσi)},\sum_{j} d_{j,t-1} \ge \max_{i} \Bigl\{ \sum_{j \ne i} d_{j,t+D-1} + d_{i,t+D-1}\Bigl(1 - \frac{\sum_j \sigma_j}{\sigma_i}\Bigr)\Bigr\},j∑​dj,t−1​≥imax​{j=i∑​dj,t+D−1​+di,t+D−1​(1−σi​∑j​σj​​)},

then a nonnegative allocation of the arriving ∑jdj,t−1\sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​dj,t−1​ units restores balance. 5. Net inventory law (pp. 156–157): zjz_jzj​ is normal with mean (s−(D+A+1)∑iμi) σj/∑iσi(s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i)\,\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i(s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​)σj​/∑i​σi​ and variance (A+1)σj2+(σj/∑iσi)2D∑iσi2(A + 1)\sigma_j^2 + (\sigma_j / \sum_i \sigma_i)^2 D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)σj2​+(σj​/∑i​σi​)2D∑i​σi2​. 6. Critical fractile (pp. 157–158): sss minimizes ∑jE[h(zj)++b(zj)−]\sum_j E[h (z_j)^+ + b (z_j)^-]∑j​E[h(zj​)++b(zj​)−] if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h), where

z=s−(D+A+1)∑iμi[(A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2]1/2.z = \frac{s - (D + A + 1)\sum_i \mu_i}{\bigl[(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2\bigr]^{1/2}}.z=[(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​]1/2s−(D+A+1)∑i​μi​​.

Significance

The goal certifies an algorithm that the chapter uses as a subroutine three times: in the pool cost (7.14), the subsystem cost (7.15) and the system cost (7.17), and hence in the claim of Section 7.3 that the system-wide cost function can be computed in time nlog⁡nn \log nnlogn in the number of locations. Because AllocOpt produces the whole vector (cn0)n∈N0(c^0_n)_{n \in N_0}(cn0​)n∈N0​​ in one pass, its correctness gives the nested value functions at every gridpoint of the next echelon, which is what allows the recursion up the echelons. The Eppen–Schrage milestones give the classical quantitative form of risk pooling: the system stock is set by one critical fractile, and the standard deviation term (A+1)(∑iσi)2+D∑iσi2(A + 1)(\sum_i \sigma_i)^2 + D \sum_i \sigma_i^2(A+1)(∑i​σi​)2+D∑i​σi2​ is what the book compares with the single-warehouse and the decentralized systems.

On formalization: the book states Proposition 2 with a two-sentence argument and Remark 2 without proof. The Eppen–Schrage computations are displayed derivations. None of these results has a machine-checked proof on the platform. A verified AllocOpt, stated for an explicit algorithm rather than for an abstract greedy procedure, is reusable for any separable convex integer allocation with a sum constraint.

Difficulty

The usual greedy exchange argument assumes that units are allocated one at a time. AllocOpt allocates in blocks, up to the next gridpoint of the chosen location, and it carries its state across successive targets rn−10→rn0r^0_{n-1} \to r^0_nrn−10​→rn0​ without restarting. The proof must therefore show that the state after each outer step is itself an optimal allocation for the current target, and that block moves never step past a breakpoint where the arg min would change. The slopes can be negative, and the equality constraint forces allocation even when every marginal cost is positive. Remark 2 needs an additional argument: under the inequality constraint the loop may stop before uuu reaches zero, and that point is optimal only because the slopes are nondecreasing.

For the pooling results, the balanced allocation mixes the depot-lead-time demand Y0Y_0Y0​ of all warehouses with the local demand YjY_jYj​, and the Gaussian law of zjz_jzj​ rests on the independence of disjoint blocks of periods. The fractile statement requires strict monotonicity of each warehouse's expected cost derivative in sss, not only a first-order condition.

Formalization scope

  • Indices and types. Locations of MMM are Fin Mbar; gridpoints are integers, values and slopes real numbers; allocations are functions Fin Mbar → ℕ. The standing assumptions of Section 7.4 form the predicate WellFormed: Mˉ≥1\bar M \ge 1Mˉ≥1, n(m)≥1n(m) \ge 1n(m)≥1 for m∈Mm \in Mm∈M (a slope (7.19) needs two gridpoints), gridpoints starting at 000 and strictly increasing at every location of M0M_0M0​, each cnmc^m_ncnm​ the value of a function convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and fff convex on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞).
  • The minimum in (7.22) is stated as attainment plus a lower bound over the finite, nonempty set of feasible integer allocations, never as an unconstrained infimum.
  • Ties. The book's arg min fixes no tie-breaking rule. Results are stated for every selection rule that returns a minimizing location.
  • Termination. AllocOpt is a total Lean function. The inner loop is given more passes than it can use, so it always exits through its own condition.
  • Not stated. The operation count of Proposition 2, O((1+log⁡2Mˉ)∑m∈M0n(m))O((1 + \log_2 \bar M)\sum_{m \in M_0} n(m))O((1+log2​Mˉ)∑m∈M0​​n(m)), and Proposition 1 and Remark 1 (p. 177) are operation counts with no machine model and are left out.
  • Corrections. The first expected-cost display on p. 157 has + b∫−∞0z dFzj(z)+\,b\int_{-\infty}^0 z\,dF_{z_j}(z)+b∫−∞0​zdFzj​​(z), which is negative. The formalization uses b E[(zj)−]b\,E[(z_j)^-]bE[(zj​)−], as in the book's next display.
  • Pinnings. Lemma 3 is deterministic: the demands are arbitrary reals, and "in balance following the allocation" means that some xj≥0x_j \ge 0xj​≥0 with ∑jxj=∑jdj,t−1\sum_j x_j = \sum_j d_{j,t-1}∑j​xj​=∑j​dj,t−1​ exists. The critical-fractile milestone is the characterization "minimizer if and only if Φ(z)=b/(b+h)\Phi(z) = b/(b+h)Φ(z)=b/(b+h)" of the book's "can be found by setting".
  • Trivialization ruled out. The allocation problem (7.22) is defined independently of the algorithm, as a minimum over explicit integer allocations, and the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are built from the data by (7.19)–(7.21). Neither (7.22) nor the C~m\tilde C_mC~m​ are defined as, or required to agree with, what AllocOpt returns.
  • Welcome contributions. Lemmas on the invariants of AllocOpt, in particular that after each outer step the allocation r∗r^*r∗ is feasible for rn0r^0_nrn0​ with cost zzz and all slopes to the left of n∗(m)n^*(m)n∗(m) are at most those to the right. Also Gaussian sum lemmas over finite index sets and a general newsvendor first-order characterization.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • G. D. Eppen and L. Schrage, "Centralized ordering policies in a multi-warehouse system with lead times and random demand", in L. B. Schwarz (ed.), Multi-Level Production/Inventory Control Systems: Theory and Practice, Studies in the Management Sciences, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 51–67.
  • G. D. Eppen, "Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem", Management Science 25(5), 1979, 498–501. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.25.5.498
  • B. Fox, "Discrete optimization via marginal analysis", Management Science 13(3), 1966, 210–216. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.13.3.210
  • T. Ibaraki and N. Katoh, Resource Allocation Problems: Algorithmic Approaches, MIT Press, 1988.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains I: Optimality of Order-Up-To Policies by Dynamic ProgrammingTextbook

Motivation

A stocking point that reviews its inventory once per period and must decide how much to order is the basic unit of every service parts supply chain: each warehouse, each repair depot and each forward location in the networks studied later in Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) faces this decision for thousands of items. The practical rule used everywhere is the order-up-to (base-stock) rule: bring the inventory position up to a fixed target level whenever it falls below it, and order nothing otherwise. Chapter 2 of the book justifies this rule for a single item with linear costs, following the dynamic-programming argument of Karlin and Scarf, and the rest of the book takes the rule as given.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak posed the periodic-review inventory problem as a dynamic program in 1951 (Econometrica). Bellman, Glicksberg and Gross showed in 1955 that with linear ordering cost and convex expected holding and shortage costs the optimal policy has a critical-number form (Management Science). Karlin and Scarf (1958) extended the analysis to a positive lead time, the setting of the book's Theorems 1–3. Veinott (1965) gave conditions under which a base-stock policy is optimal in multi-product, nonstationary models (Management Science).

Setting

One item is stocked at one location. At the start of each period the inventory position yyy is observed and a quantity u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 is ordered; with lead time one period it arrives at the start of the next period. Demand in each period is independent of other periods and has a density ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) that is positive and continuous. Unmet demand is backordered. Costs are linear: ccc per unit ordered, hhh per unit on hand at the end of a period, bbb per unit backordered at the end of a period, and future costs are discounted by α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1). The one-period cost is

L(y)={h∫0y(y−x)g(x) dx+b∫y∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y>0,b∫0∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y≤0.L(y) = \begin{cases} h\displaystyle\int_0^y (y-x)g(x)\,dx + b\int_y^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y > 0,\\[1mm] b\displaystyle\int_0^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y \le 0. \end{cases}L(y)=⎩⎨⎧​h∫0y​(y−x)g(x)dx+b∫y∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,b∫0∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,​y>0,y≤0.​

The book assumes throughout that b>1−αα cb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\,cb>α1−α​c: the backorder cost outweighs the saving from deferring a purchase.

The nnn-period value functions are f1=Lf_1 = Lf1​=L and, for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2,

fn(y)=min⁡u≥0{c u+L(y)+α∫0∞fn−1(y+u−x) g(x) dx}.f_n(y) = \min_{u \ge 0}\Big\{ c\,u + L(y) + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}(y+u-x)\,g(x)\,dx \Big\}.fn​(y)=u≥0min​{cu+L(y)+α∫0∞​fn−1​(y+u−x)g(x)dx}.

An order uuu is optimal at yyy if it attains this minimum over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0. The order-up-to rule with level sss orders u(y)=max⁡{0,s−y}u(y) = \max\{0, s-y\}u(y)=max{0,s−y}. The marginal function of eq. (2.8) is Fn(w)=c+α∫0∞fn′(w−x) g(x) dxF_n(w) = c + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_n'(w-x)\,g(x)\,dxFn​(w)=c+α∫0∞​fn′​(w−x)g(x)dx. In Lean these are Model, Model.L, Model.f, Model.IsOptimalOrder, Model.IsOrderUpToOptimal and Model.F in the namespace ServiceParts.BaseStock.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18) in its nnn-period form

For every horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, either there is a real level sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ with

un∗(y)=max⁡{0, sn∗−y} optimal for every y,u_n^*(y) = \max\{0,\ s_n^* - y\} \ \text{optimal for every } y,un∗​(y)=max{0, sn∗​−y} optimal for every y,

or ordering nothing is optimal for every yyy (level −∞-\infty−∞); and there is N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 such that the level is real for all n≥Nn \ge Nn≥N. No value of sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is fixed: the goal asserts the shape of the optimal policy only.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. LLL is convex (p. 21).
  2. Every fnf_nfn​, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, is convex (p. 19, property (c)).
  3. Every fnf_nfn​ is differentiable with −(c+b)≤fn′≤h/(1−α)-(c+b) \le f_n' \le h/(1-\alpha)−(c+b)≤fn′​≤h/(1−α) (p. 20).
  4. Property (b): given an optimal real level sss for horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, fn′=−c+L′f_n' = -c + L'fn′​=−c+L′ below sss and fn′=L′+α∫0∞fn−1′(⋅−x)g(x) dxf_n' = L' + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}'(\cdot - x)g(x)\,dxfn′​=L′+α∫0∞​fn−1′​(⋅−x)g(x)dx from sss on (p. 19).
  5. Given such a level, Fn(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0F_n(w) \to (1-\alpha)c - b\alpha < 0Fn​(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0 as w→−∞w \to -\inftyw→−∞ (p. 19).
  6. Property (a): optimal real levels are nondecreasing in the horizon, sn∗≤sn+1∗s_n^* \le s_{n+1}^*sn∗​≤sn+1∗​ (p. 18).

Significance

The theorem reduces an infinite-dimensional control problem, a choice of order quantity for every possible inventory position, to one number per period. Every later chapter of the book (Palm's theorem for (s−1,s)(s-1,s)(s−1,s) policies, METRIC-type stock level optimization, allocation in multi-echelon systems) parameterizes policies by such stock levels; this is where the book justifies that parameterization.

The result is classical and proved in many texts. On Prove2Me the mission produces a machine-checked finite-horizon version with a continuous demand density, including the calculus the proof needs: convexity of an expected cost defined by integrals against a density, differentiation under the integral sign in the recursion, and the one-sided behaviour of the value function at the order-up-to level. Existing platform results on base-stock optimality (Veinott's multi-product model, advance demand information) use different models and different arguments; none covers this recursion.

Difficulty

The argument is an induction on nnn whose hypothesis carries convexity, the derivative formula (b), and bounds on fn′f_n'fn′​. The delicate step is the existence of a finite root of FnF_nFn​: its limit at −∞-\infty−∞ depends on whether the previous level was finite. For n=1n = 1n=1 nothing is ordered and the limit is c−bαc - b\alphac−bα, which the assumption b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c does not make negative. The book's base case ("left to the reader") therefore fails when c>αbc > \alpha bc>αb: with α=12\alpha = \tfrac12α=21​, c=1c = 1c=1, b=32b = \tfrac32b=23​ the two-period problem never orders. The goal is corrected accordingly.

Two properties the book's induction also carries are not usable as printed. Property (d), fn′≤fn−1′f_n' \le f_{n-1}'fn′​≤fn−1′​, is false: for large yyy, fn′(y)f_n'(y)fn′​(y) approaches h(1+α+⋯+αn−1)h(1 + \alpha + \dots + \alpha^{n-1})h(1+α+⋯+αn−1), which increases with nnn. The second-derivative clause of property (c) fails at y=0y = 0y=0 whenever g(0+)>0g(0^+) > 0g(0+)>0. A solver cannot follow the printed induction step for step; property (a), which the book derives from (d), is true and is a milestone in its own right.

Formalization scope

  • Horizon. The book states Theorem 2 for "the optimal policy" without a horizon. Its proof is an induction on a finite horizon, and the passage n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞ is left as a conjecture (p. 21). The goal is the finite-horizon theorem; no infinite-horizon value function is constructed.
  • Lead time. The proof sets τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 "to simplify notation"; so does the formalization. Theorem 1 (dependence on the inventory position only) and Theorem 3 (general τ\tauτ, whose level equation is the conjectured infinite-horizon one) are not stated.
  • Level −∞-\infty−∞. The goal allows "never order" as the order-up-to rule with level −∞-\infty−∞ and adds eventual finiteness; see Difficulty.
  • Added hypotheses. c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, h>0h > 0h>0 (the book uses lim⁡w→∞fn′(w−x)>0\lim_{w\to\infty} f_n'(w - x) > 0limw→∞​fn′​(w−x)>0), 0<α0 < \alpha0<α (the book divides by α\alphaα), and a finite mean ∫0∞x g(x) dx<∞\int_0^\infty x\,g(x)\,dx < \infty∫0∞​xg(x)dx<∞ (without it LLL is infinite). All are fields of Model, together with positivity and continuity of ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), ∫0∞g=1\int_0^\infty g = 1∫0∞​g=1, and b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c.
  • Minimum and derivatives. fnf_nfn​ is defined with the infimum over u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 of a nonnegative quantity; optimality is always against every u′≥0u' \ge 0u′≥0. Statements about fn′f_n'fn′​ assert differentiability (Differentiable, HasDerivAt) and do not read deriv as evidence of it.
  • Levels. The book's sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is "the unique solution of (2.6)"; milestones take any real level at which the order-up-to rule is optimal.

A recursion in which ordering is restricted to order-up-to rules, or in which fnf_nfn​ is defined through sn∗s_n^*sn∗​, would make the goal a tautology; here fnf_nfn​ is defined by minimization over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 and optimality is checked against all orders.

Needed infrastructure: convexity and differentiation of parametric integrals against a density on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and minimization of a differentiable convex function over a half-line. Both are reusable for the other stochastic inventory missions on the platform. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 2, Section 2.1. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory models of the Arrow–Harris–Marschak type with time lag, in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958 (no DOI).
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris and J. Marschak, Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906814
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg and O. Gross, On the optimal inventory equation, Management Science 2(1), 1955, 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • A. F. Veinott Jr., Optimal policy for a multi-product, dynamic, nonstationary inventory problem, Management Science 12(3), 1965, 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
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Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization V: Asymptotic Optimality of List Scheduling for the Machine Investment ProblemTextbook

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic integer programs combine the two hardest features of mathematical programming: uncertainty in the data and integrality of the decisions. Even evaluating the objective of such a program at a single first-stage decision requires the expected optimal value of an NP-hard combinatorial problem. Chapter 8 of Ermoliev and Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988), by A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan and L. Stougie, argues that for many such problems the way forward is probabilistic analysis: the random optimal value of the second-stage problem often converges, after normalization, to a simple function of the problem parameters, and that function can replace the intractable expectation.

The chapter illustrates this on the machine investment problem: first buy mmm identical machines at cost ccc each, knowing only the distribution of the processing times of nnn jobs, then schedule the jobs once their processing times are revealed so as to minimize the makespan. This mission formalizes the chapter's analysis of that example: the almost sure asymptotics of the optimal makespan (8.13), its expectation version, and the asymptotic clairvoyance of the resulting two-stage heuristic.

Setting

Let p1,p2,…p_1, p_2, \dotsp1​,p2​,… be processing times: independent, identically distributed, nonnegative random variables on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, P)(Ω,F,P) with mean μ=Ep1>0\mu = \mathbb E p_1 > 0μ=Ep1​>0 and finite second moment Ep12<∞\mathbb E p_1^2 < \inftyEp12​<∞. The instance with nnn jobs uses the first nnn of them.

An assignment of the nnn jobs to m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 identical machines is a map σ:{1,…,n}→{1,…,m}\sigma : \{1, \dots, n\} \to \{1, \dots, m\}σ:{1,…,n}→{1,…,m}. The load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=ipj\sum_{j : \sigma(j) = i} p_j∑j:σ(j)=i​pj​ and the makespan of σ\sigmaσ is its largest load. The minimum makespan is

Cn∗(m)=min⁡σmax⁡i=1,…,m∑j: σ(j)=ipj,C^*_n(m) = \min_{\sigma} \max_{i=1,\dots,m} \sum_{j:\ \sigma(j) = i} p_j ,Cn∗​(m)=σmin​i=1,…,mmax​j: σ(j)=i∑​pj​,

and the machine investment problem is to minimize Zn(m)=cm+E Cn∗(m)Z_n(m) = cm + \mathbb E\, C^*_n(m)Zn​(m)=cm+ECn∗​(m) over integers mmm (8.9).

List scheduling takes the jobs in the order 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n and assigns each to the first available machine, a machine of least current load (lowest index on ties). Its makespan is CnH(m)C^H_n(m)CnH​(m). Write Sn=∑j=1npjS_n = \sum_{j=1}^n p_jSn​=∑j=1n​pj​ and pmax⁡=max⁡j≤npjp_{\max} = \max_{j \le n} p_jpmax​=maxj≤n​pj​.

For §8.3, the estimate Zn′(m)=cm+nμ/mZ'_n(m) = cm + n\mu/mZn′​(m)=cm+nμ/m is minimized over integers by the heuristic first-stage decision mnH1m^{H1}_nmnH1​, the better of ⌊nμ/c⌋\lfloor\sqrt{n\mu/c}\rfloor⌊nμ/c​⌋ and ⌈nμ/c⌉\lceil\sqrt{n\mu/c}\rceil⌈nμ/c​⌉. A clairvoyant decision maker who sees the processing times first chooses mn∘(ω)≥1m^\circ_n(\omega) \ge 1mn∘​(ω)≥1 minimizing cm+Cn∗(m)cm + C^*_n(m)cm+Cn∗​(m).

Formalization targets

Goal: Eq. (8.13)

For machine counts m=m(n)≥1m = m(n) \ge 1m=m(n)≥1 with m(n)=O(n)m(n) = O(\sqrt n)m(n)=O(n​),

P{lim⁡n→∞Cn∗(m)nμ/m=1}=1.P\Bigl\{ \lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{C^*_n(m)}{n\mu/m} = 1 \Bigr\} = 1 .P{n→∞lim​nμ/mCn∗​(m)​=1}=1.

The machine count is allowed to grow with nnn; this is the regime the first-stage heuristic lives in, since mnH1m^{H1}_nmnH1​ is of exact order n\sqrt nn​.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (8.10): the deterministic sandwich Sn/m≤Cn∗(m)≤CnH(m)≤Sn/m+pmax⁡S_n/m \le C^*_n(m) \le C^H_n(m) \le S_n/m + p_{\max}Sn​/m≤Cn∗​(m)≤CnH​(m)≤Sn​/m+pmax​, divided by nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m.
  2. Eq. (8.11): the strong law of large numbers, (Sn−nμ)/(nμ)→0(S_n - n\mu)/(n\mu) \to 0(Sn​−nμ)/(nμ)→0 almost surely (a published platform theorem).
  3. Lemma 8.1 (i): pmax⁡/n→0p_{\max}/\sqrt n \to 0pmax​/n​→0 almost surely.
  4. Eq. (8.12): m pmax⁡/(nμ)→0m\, p_{\max}/(n\mu) \to 0mpmax​/(nμ)→0 almost surely when m=O(n)m = O(\sqrt n)m=O(n​).
  5. Lemma 8.1 (ii): E pmax⁡/n→0\mathbb E\, p_{\max}/\sqrt n \to 0Epmax​/n​→0.
  6. p. 207: E Cn∗(m)/(nμ/m)→1\mathbb E\, C^*_n(m)/(n\mu/m) \to 1ECn∗​(m)/(nμ/m)→1 when m=O(n)m = O(\sqrt n)m=O(n​).
  7. p. 211, asymptotic clairvoyance: almost surely
lim⁡n→∞c mnH1+CnH2(mnH1)c mn∘+Cn∗(mn∘)=1,\lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{c\, m^{H1}_n + C^{H2}_n(m^{H1}_n)}{c\, m^\circ_n + C^*_n(m^\circ_n)} = 1 ,n→∞lim​cmn∘​+Cn∗​(mn∘​)cmnH1​+CnH2​(mnH1​)​=1,

where CnH2C^{H2}_nCnH2​ is the list-scheduling makespan.

Significance

Result (8.13) says that the optimal value of an NP-hard problem, rescaled, is almost surely asymptotic to the elementary function nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m of the data and the first-stage decision. Its expectation version replaces the intractable term E Cn∗(m)\mathbb E\,C^*_n(m)ECn∗​(m) in (8.9) by nμ/mn\mu/mnμ/m, and the clairvoyance statement shows that the heuristic built on that replacement loses asymptotically nothing, not even against a decision maker with full information. The chapter presents the example as the template for vehicle routing and location problems preceded by an investment decision.

All results here are classical and proved in the literature cited by the chapter (Lemma 8.1 is quoted from Feller without proof; the chapter refers to Dempster et al. for the asymptotic optimality of the two-stage heuristic and to Lenstra et al. for the notion of asymptotic clairvoyance). None of them has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal model of identical-machine makespan scheduling and of list scheduling, the extreme-value estimates of Lemma 8.1 for square-integrable i.i.d. sequences, and the full chain from the strong law to (8.13).

Difficulty

The deterministic part is elementary on paper, but list scheduling is a recursively defined procedure, and its makespan bound has to be established for that recursion rather than for a picture like the chapter's Figure 8.3. The probabilistic core is Lemma 8.1: the strong law controls Sn/nS_n/nSn​/n, but the error term m pmax⁡/(nμ)m\, p_{\max}/(n\mu)mpmax​/(nμ) is of order pmax⁡/np_{\max}/\sqrt npmax​/n​ once mmm grows like n\sqrt nn​, and the strong law says nothing about maxima. With a fixed number of machines the whole statement would reduce to the strong law; the growth m(n)=O(n)m(n) = O(\sqrt n)m(n)=O(n​) is exactly where the second moment is needed. For the clairvoyance statement, the clairvoyant choice mn∘m^\circ_nmn∘​ is a random, unstructured minimizer, so its value must be bounded below without knowing where the minimum is attained.

Formalization scope

Processing times are one sequence p : ℕ → Ω → ℝ, 0-based (the book's pjp_jpj​ is p (j-1)), with each p j measurable, the family mutually independent (iIndepFun), identically distributed with p 0, pointwise nonnegative, p 0 ^ 2 integrable and ∫ p 0 = μ with μ > 0. Nonnegativity and μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 are not printed in the book; they are implicit in "processing times" and in the division by nμn\munμ. Machines are Fin m; a schedule is an assignment Fin n → Fin m, which is faithful because jobs are non-preemptive, machines identical and there are no precedence constraints.

The book writes "m=0(n)m = 0(\sqrt n)m=0(n​)"; this is read as mmm a function of nnn with m(n)≥1m(n) \ge 1m(n)≥1 and (fun n => (m n : ℝ)) =O[atTop] (fun n => √n). Stating (8.13) for a fixed mmm would trivialize it into the strong law and is ruled out. "Pr⁡{lim⁡⋯=1}=1\Pr\{\lim \dots = 1\} = 1Pr{lim⋯=1}=1" means that almost surely the limit exists and equals 111. Expectations are Bochner integrals of functions that are measurable and bounded by SnS_nSn​, hence integrable. List scheduling uses the index order and breaks ties towards the lowest machine index; both are admissible instances of the book's "arbitrary fixed order" and "first available machine". In the clairvoyance statement the minimum is over m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 (the book writes m∈Nm \in \mathbb Nm∈N; no machine cannot process any job, and the Lean value Cn∗(0)C^*_n(0)Cn∗​(0) is an empty-infimum convention). No explicit constants replace an O(·): the statements are limits and the O-hypothesis is carried as stated.

Out of scope: (8.14) and the p. 210 expectation statement, which need a positive density at 000 and whose proof the book calls "far from easy", and the dynamic programming recursion of §8.3.

Needed infrastructure: finite maxima and minima of measurable functions, extreme-value estimates for square-integrable i.i.d. sequences (Lemma 8.1), and Mathlib's strong law. The makespan and list-scheduling definitions are reusable for other identical-machine scheduling results; alternative proofs of Lemma 8.1 and sharper forms of the clairvoyance statement are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, L. Stougie, "Stochastic Integer Programming", in Yu. Ermoliev, R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 8, pp. 201–213. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. 1, 3rd edition, Wiley, 1968 (cited by the chapter for Lemma 8.1).
  • M. A. H. Dempster, M. L. Fisher, L. Jansen, B. J. Lageweg, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, "Analysis of heuristics for stochastic programming: results for hierarchical scheduling problems", Mathematics of Operations Research 8 (1983) 525–537. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.525
  • J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, L. Stougie, "A framework for the design and analysis of hierarchical planning systems", Annals of Operations Research 1 (1984) 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01874451
  • R. L. Graham, "Bounds on multiprocessing timing anomalies", SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 17 (1969) 416–429. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117039
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Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization III: Stochastic Quasi-Féjer Sequences and the Stochastic Quasigradient Projection MethodTextbook

Motivation

Many optimization problems in operations research have an objective that is an expectation, F0(x)=Ef0(x,ω)F^0(x)=E f^0(x,\omega)F0(x)=Ef0(x,ω), over a random parameter ω\omegaω whose distribution is known only through samples or is too complex to integrate. Two-stage stochastic programs, inventory and reliability models, and simulation-based design all have this form. Neither F0F^0F0 nor its subgradients can be evaluated exactly, but a random vector whose conditional mean is close to a subgradient is often cheap to compute: a sample subgradient of f0(⋅,ω)f^0(\cdot,\omega)f0(⋅,ω), or a finite-difference quotient of two sampled values.

Stochastic quasigradient (SQG) methods, developed by Ermoliev and co-workers in Kiev from the late 1960s, use such vectors in place of subgradients. They extend the stochastic approximation procedures of Robbins–Monro (1951) and Kiefer–Wolfowitz (1952) to nonsmooth convex objectives, general convex constraints, and directions whose conditional mean is biased by a vanishing amount. This mission formalizes the basic convergence theory of the simplest SQG method, the projection method, as presented by Yu. Ermoliev in Chapter 6 of the IIASA volume Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988).

Timeline (as cited in the chapter's bibliography).

  • 1951–1954: Robbins and Monro, Kiefer and Wolfowitz, Dvoretzky and Blum prove convergence of stochastic approximation for unconstrained smooth problems.
  • 1962–1967: Shor introduces the generalized gradient (subgradient) method; Ermoliev (Kibernetika 4, 1966) and Polyak (Soviet Math. Doklady 8, 1967) prove its convergence.
  • 1967–1969: Ermoliev and Nekrylova introduce stochastic subgradients; Ermoliev ("On the stochastic quasi-gradient method and stochastic quasi-Feyer sequences", Kibernetika 2, 1969) introduces stochastic quasi-Féjer sequences.
  • 1976: Ermoliev's monograph Stochastic Programming Methods (Nauka) contains the proof of Theorem 6.1 (p. 98).
  • 1988: the survey chapter formalized here presents the projection method, Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, and an efficiency estimate for the averaged iterate.

Setting

Let X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn be a nonempty convex compact set and F0:Rn→RF^0:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb RF0:Rn→R convex and continuous on XXX. The optimal set is X∗={x∈X:F0(x)≤F0(y) ∀y∈X}X^*=\{x\in X: F^0(x)\le F^0(y)\ \forall y\in X\}X∗={x∈X:F0(x)≤F0(y) ∀y∈X}. The projection onto XXX is πX(y)=argmin⁡{∥y−x∥2:x∈X}\pi_X(y)=\operatorname{argmin}\{\|y-x\|^2:x\in X\}πX​(y)=argmin{∥y−x∥2:x∈X}.

On a probability space, the stochastic quasigradient projection method produces random vectors x0,x1,…x^0,x^1,\dotsx0,x1,… by

xs+1=πX[xs−ρs ξ0(s)],s=0,1,…(6.11)x^{s+1}=\pi_X\big[x^s-\rho_s\,\xi^0(s)\big],\qquad s=0,1,\dots \tag{6.11}xs+1=πX​[xs−ρs​ξ0(s)],s=0,1,…(6.11)

where ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 is a step size and ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) a random direction. Write E{⋅∣x0,…,xs}E\{\cdot\mid x^0,\dots,x^s\}E{⋅∣x0,…,xs} for conditional expectation given the history σ(x0,…,xs)\sigma(x^0,\dots,x^s)σ(x0,…,xs). The direction is a stochastic quasigradient if, for every x∗∈X∗x^*\in X^*x∗∈X∗,

F0(x∗)−F0(xs)≥⟨E{ξ0(s)∣x0,…,xs}, x∗−xs⟩+γ0(s)a.s.,(6.12)F^0(x^*)-F^0(x^s)\ge\big\langle E\{\xi^0(s)\mid x^0,\dots,x^s\},\,x^*-x^s\big\rangle+\gamma_0(s)\quad\text{a.s.}, \tag{6.12}F0(x∗)−F0(xs)≥⟨E{ξ0(s)∣x0,…,xs},x∗−xs⟩+γ0​(s)a.s.,(6.12)

where the error γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) is a function of the history. If the conditional mean of ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) is a subgradient plus a bias b0(s)b^0(s)b0(s), then (6.12) holds with γ0(s)=−⟨b0(s),x∗−xs⟩\gamma^0(s)=-\langle b^0(s),x^*-x^s\rangleγ0(s)=−⟨b0(s),x∗−xs⟩ (6.13).

A sequence of random vectors z0,z1,…z^0,z^1,\dotsz0,z1,… is a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for Z⊆RnZ\subseteq\mathbb R^nZ⊆Rn if E∥z0∥2<∞E\|z^0\|^2<\inftyE∥z0∥2<∞ and there are random rs≥0r_s\ge0rs​≥0 with ∑sErs<∞\sum_s E r_s<\infty∑s​Ers​<∞ such that for all z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z

E{∥z−zs+1∥2∣z0,…,zs}≤∥z−zs∥2+rs.(6.14)E\{\|z-z^{s+1}\|^2\mid z^0,\dots,z^s\}\le\|z-z^s\|^2+r_s. \tag{6.14}E{∥z−zs+1∥2∣z0,…,zs}≤∥z−zs∥2+rs​.(6.14)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2

If, with probability 1, ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 and ∑sρs=∞\sum_s\rho_s=\infty∑s​ρs​=∞, and

∑s=0∞E{ρs∣γ0(s)∣+ρs2∥ξ0(s)∥2}<∞,(6.15)\sum_{s=0}^\infty E\{\rho_s|\gamma_0(s)|+\rho_s^2\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\}<\infty, \tag{6.15}s=0∑∞​E{ρs​∣γ0​(s)∣+ρs2​∥ξ0(s)∥2}<∞,(6.15)

then with probability 1 the iterates converge and lim⁡sxs∈X∗\lim_s x^s\in X^*lims​xs∈X∗.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 6.1 (a)–(c). For a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for ZZZ: ∥z−zs+1∥2\|z-z^{s+1}\|^2∥z−zs+1∥2 converges a.s. and E∥z−zs∥2E\|z-z^s\|^2E∥z−zs∥2 is bounded, for each z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z; accumulation points exist a.s. (for Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅); and a.s. ZZZ lies in the hyperplane equidistant from any two distinct accumulation points outside ZZZ.
  2. Eq. (6.13). Biased stochastic subgradients satisfy (6.12).
  3. One-step inequality (p. 145): E{∥x∗−xs+1∥2∣⋅}≤∥x∗−xs∥2+2ρs⟨E{ξ0(s)∣⋅},x∗−xs⟩+E{ρs2∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}E\{\|x^*-x^{s+1}\|^2\mid\cdot\}\le\|x^*-x^s\|^2+2\rho_s\langle E\{\xi^0(s)\mid\cdot\},x^*-x^s\rangle+E\{\rho_s^2\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\mid\cdot\}E{∥x∗−xs+1∥2∣⋅}≤∥x∗−xs∥2+2ρs​⟨E{ξ0(s)∣⋅},x∗−xs⟩+E{ρs2​∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅} for x∗∈Xx^*\in Xx∗∈X.
  4. Quasi-Féjer property (p. 145): the iterates of (6.11) form a stochastic quasi-Féjer sequence for X∗X^*X∗.
  5. Efficiency estimate (p. 147), for deterministic ρk\rho_kρk​ and xˉs=∑k≤sρkxk/∑k≤sρk\bar x^s=\sum_{k\le s}\rho_kx^k/\sum_{k\le s}\rho_kxˉs=∑k≤s​ρk​xk/∑k≤s​ρk​:
EF0(xˉs)−F0(x∗)≤(2∑k=0sρk)−1[E∥x∗−x0∥2+∑k=0sE(2ρk∣γ0(k)∣+ρk2∥ξ0(k)∥2)].E F^0(\bar x^s)-F^0(x^*)\le\Big(2\sum_{k=0}^s\rho_k\Big)^{-1}\Big[E\|x^*-x^0\|^2+\sum_{k=0}^s E\big(2\rho_k|\gamma_0(k)|+\rho_k^2\|\xi^0(k)\|^2\big)\Big].EF0(xˉs)−F0(x∗)≤(2k=0∑s​ρk​)−1[E∥x∗−x0∥2+k=0∑s​E(2ρk​∣γ0​(k)∣+ρk2​∥ξ0(k)∥2)].

Significance

Theorem 6.2 is the prototype convergence theorem for SQG methods. Its hypotheses allow random step sizes chosen from the history, nonsmooth objectives, and directions with a bias that vanishes fast enough; its conclusion is convergence of the iterates themselves to a single optimal point, not only convergence of function values or of dist⁡(xs,X∗)\operatorname{dist}(x^s,X^*)dist(xs,X∗). The later chapters of the same volume (adaptive step sizes, Chapters 17–18; nonstationary problems, §6.4) reuse the same framework. Theorem 6.1 isolates the probabilistic content in a form that applies to any algorithm with a quasi-Féjer inequality. The efficiency estimate gives a non-asymptotic accuracy bound for the averaged iterate.

The results are classical and proved in the literature: Theorem 6.1 in Ermoliev (1976, p. 98), Theorem 6.2 in this chapter (pp. 145–146). To our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. Mathlib has conditional expectations and the a.s. martingale convergence theorem, but no Robbins–Siegmund-type almost-supermartingale lemma and no stochastic subgradient method. A formal proof of this mission would supply both.

Difficulty

The deterministic argument for projected subgradient methods compares ∥x∗−xs+1∥\|x^*-x^{s+1}\|∥x∗−xs+1∥ with ∥x∗−xs∥\|x^*-x^s\|∥x∗−xs∥ for a fixed x∗x^*x∗. In the stochastic setting this comparison holds only in conditional mean, with a perturbation rsr_srs​ that is random, and the distances converge only almost surely, with an exceptional null set that depends on x∗x^*x∗. Since X∗X^*X∗ is typically uncountable, "for every x∗x^*x∗, almost surely" does not immediately give "almost surely, for every x∗x^*x∗", and it is the second form that identifies a single limit. A second difficulty is that ∑ρs(F0(xs)−F0(x∗))<∞\sum\rho_s(F^0(x^s)-F^0(x^*))<\infty∑ρs​(F0(xs)−F0(x∗))<∞ only yields a subsequence along which F0F^0F0 approaches its minimum; passing from there to convergence of the whole sequence is exactly what part (c) of Theorem 6.1 is for.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The probability space is an arbitrary measurable space with a probability measure. πX\pi_XπX​ is a chosen minimizer of ∥y−x∥2\|y-x\|^2∥y−x∥2 over XXX (unique for nonempty closed convex XXX). The history is the σ\sigmaσ-algebra generated by x0,…,xsx^0,\dots,x^sx0,…,xs; ρs\rho_sρs​ and γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) are measurable with respect to it.
  • Directions ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) are integrable and random vectors are measurable; conditional expectations are Mathlib's condExp. The quasi-Féjer definition requires square integrability of every zsz^szs (implied by the book's definition when Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅), so no conditional expectation is taken of a non-integrable function.
  • X≠∅X\ne\emptysetX=∅ and x0∈Xx^0\in Xx0∈X are stated; Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅ is added in Theorem 6.1 (b), which is false without it.
  • γ0(s)\gamma_0(s)γ0​(s) does not depend on x∗x^*x∗; the x∗x^*x∗-dependent error of (6.13) is dominated on a bounded XXX by ∥b0(s)∥diam⁡X\|b^0(s)\|\operatorname{diam}X∥b0(s)∥diamX.
  • (6.15) keeps its mixed form: ρs≥0\rho_s\ge0ρs​≥0 and ∑ρs=∞\sum\rho_s=\infty∑ρs​=∞ almost surely, and a deterministic sum of expectations (lower Lebesgue integrals) finite.
  • Explicit constants. The book's "CCC" in the efficiency estimate is instantiated from its proof: 222 on ρk∣γ0(k)∣\rho_k|\gamma_0(k)|ρk​∣γ0​(k)∣ and 111 on ρk2∥ξ0(k)∥2\rho_k^2\|\xi^0(k)\|^2ρk2​∥ξ0(k)∥2. The unspecified CCC before the quasi-Féjer sentence is replaced by the existence of summable rsr_srs​.
  • Typo corrections. The one-step inequality on p. 145 prints ρsE{∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}\rho_sE\{\|\xi^0(s)\|^2\mid\cdot\}ρs​E{∥ξ0(s)∥2∣⋅}; it is ρs2\rho_s^2ρs2​. The efficiency estimate on p. 147 omits EEE before the last sum; it is restored. "ρk\rho_kρk​ independent of (x0,…,xk)(x^0,\dots,x^k)(x0,…,xk)" is read as deterministic step sizes.
  • A trivializing formalization is excluded: the goal does not replace ξ0(s)\xi^0(s)ξ0(s) by an exact subgradient, does not set γ0≡0\gamma_0\equiv0γ0​≡0, and concludes convergence of xsx^sxs to a point of X∗X^*X∗ rather than dist⁡(xs,X∗)→0\operatorname{dist}(x^s,X^*)\to0dist(xs,X∗)→0.
  • Reusable infrastructure: a Robbins–Siegmund lemma for nonnegative almost-supermartingales, the nonexpansiveness of πX\pi_XπX​, and Theorem 6.1 itself, which applies to any quasi-Féjer algorithm (Chapter 6 §6.4 and Chapters 17–18 of the same book). Contributions of these general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • Yu. Ermoliev, "Stochastic Quasigradient Methods", in Yu. Ermoliev and R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 6, §6.1–6.2 (pp. 141–147). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • Yu. Ermoliev, "On the stochastic quasi-gradient method and stochastic quasi-Feyer sequences", Kibernetika 2 (1969) (in Russian; English translation in Cybernetics). Reference [3] of the chapter.
  • Yu. Ermoliev, Stochastic Programming Methods, Nauka, Moscow, 1976 (in Russian); Theorem 6.1 is on p. 98. Reference [5] of the chapter.
  • H. Robbins and D. Siegmund, "A convergence theorem for non negative almost supermartingales and some applications", in J. S. Rustagi (ed.), Optimizing Methods in Statistics, Academic Press, 1971, 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-604550-5.50015-8
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, "A stochastic approximation method", Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22 (1951) 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to the Scenario Approach V: Support Sets Certify the Violation of Nonconvex Scenario SolutionsTextbook

Why certify nonconvex scenario solutions

The scenario approach replaces an optimization problem with uncertain constraints θ∈Θδ\theta\in\Theta_\deltaθ∈Θδ​, δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, by the program that enforces only NNN constraints Θδ1,…,ΘδN\Theta_{\delta_1},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_N}Θδ1​​,…,ΘδN​​ drawn at random from the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertainty. Its solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is then judged by its violation, the probability that a new instance δ\deltaδ is not satisfied. For convex programs in Rd\mathbb R^dRd the violation is controlled by the dimension ddd alone (Calafiore and Campi 2006; Campi and Garatti 2008), because a convex program has at most ddd support constraints. Many problems where the scenario approach is used in practice are not convex: control with quantized inputs, mixed-integer design, classification with nonconvex losses, and decisions over infinite-dimensional or unstructured sets. For those programs no a priori bound on the number of constraints that determine the solution exists.

Timeline, as recorded in Chapter 8 of Campi and Garatti's textbook:

  • 2006–2008: the violation of convex scenario solutions is bounded, and then characterized exactly, in terms of ddd.
  • 2018: the wait-and-judge theory (Campi and Garatti, Math. Programming 2018) evaluates the violation from the number of support constraints counted after solving the program; it extends to nonconvex programs but requires a nondegeneracy assumption.
  • 2018: Campi, Garatti and Ramponi (IEEE TAC 2018) prove a bound in terms of the size of any support set, with no convexity and no nondegeneracy assumption. This is the result formalized here, stated in the book as Eq. (8.15).

Setting

Let Θ\ThetaΘ be a generic set; it may be an infinite-dimensional space or a set with no algebraic structure. Let f:Θ→Rf:\Theta\to\mathbb Rf:Θ→R be a cost and Θδ⊆Θ\Theta_\delta\subseteq\ThetaΘδ​⊆Θ constraint sets indexed by δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, where Δ\DeltaΔ carries a probability P\mathbb PP. Neither fff nor the Θδ\Theta_\deltaΘδ​ is required to be convex. With a sample δ1,…,δN\delta_1,\dots,\delta_Nδ1​,…,δN​ drawn independently from P\mathbb PP, the scenario program is

min⁡θ∈Θf(θ)subject toθ∈⋂i=1,…,NΘδi,(8.12)\min_{\theta\in\Theta} f(\theta)\quad\text{subject to}\quad \theta\in\bigcap_{i=1,\dots,N}\Theta_{\delta_i},\tag{8.12}θ∈Θmin​f(θ)subject toθ∈i=1,…,N⋂​Θδi​​,(8.12)

and θ∗\theta^*θ∗ denotes its solution, assumed to exist and be unique for every sample.

The violation of a decision is V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∉Θδ}V(\theta)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta:\theta\notin\Theta_\delta\}V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∈/Θδ​} (Definition 3.1).

A support set (Definition 8.8) is a subset {Θδi1,…,Θδik}\{\Theta_{\delta_{i_1}},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_{i_k}}\}{Θδi1​​​,…,Θδik​​​} of the constraints such that the program with only these constraints in place has the same solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ as the program with all constraints. The full set of constraints is always a support set; a support set need not be minimal (of smallest cardinality) or irreducible (with no removable element). Let σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ be the cardinality of the support set returned, for every sample, by some fixed algorithm.

Formalization targets

Goal: the support-set bound, Eq. (8.15)

For every function ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1]\epsilon:\{0,1,\dots,N\}\to[0,1]ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1] with ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1,

PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤∑k=0N−1(Nk) (1−ϵ(k))N−k.\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\sum_{k=0}^{N-1}\binom Nk\,(1-\epsilon(k))^{N-k}.PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤k=0∑N−1​(kN​)(1−ϵ(k))N−k.

The level function ϵ\epsilonϵ is free: the statement is one inequality per admissible ϵ\epsilonϵ, and it holds for any algorithm producing support sets. This is the weakest form that carries the whole result.

Milestone: the level function for a confidence β\betaβ, Eq. (8.16)

For β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] let

ϵ(k)={1k=N,1−βN(Nk)N−kotherwise.\epsilon(k)=\begin{cases}1 & k=N,\\ 1-\sqrt[N-k]{\dfrac{\beta}{N\binom Nk}} & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}ϵ(k)=⎩⎨⎧​11−N−kN(kN​)β​​​k=N,otherwise.​

The arithmetic half states that ϵ\epsilonϵ maps {0,…,N}\{0,\dots,N\}{0,…,N} into [0,1][0,1][0,1], ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1, and the right-hand side of (8.15) equals β\betaβ (for N≥1N\ge1N≥1). The probabilistic half states PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\betaPN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β.

Significance

The result turns the size of a support set, a quantity observed after the program is solved, into a certificate on the violation of the solution, for any optimization or decision problem whose solution is determined by a subset of the data. With the choice (8.16), a user who finds a support set of size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ can assert V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗)V(\theta^*)\le\epsilon(\sigma^*)V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗) with confidence 1−β1-\beta1−β. The book's Figure 8.12 shows that ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k) for β=10−6\beta=10^{-6}β=10−6 remains well below 111 for kkk up to a sizeable fraction of NNN. Because the algorithm that finds the support set is arbitrary, cheap heuristics that return non-minimal support sets still give valid, if weaker, guarantees. The result does not recover the tight convex bound (3.4); for convex programs the Chapter 3 theory remains sharper.

The statement is proved in [31] and is the probabilistic core of the sample-compression arguments of learning theory (Floyd and Warmuth 1995) in the form used by the scenario approach. To the best of available knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The platform's UnderstandingML.compression_bound proves a sample-compression bound for a fixed compression size with a different constant; it does not cover a data-dependent size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ or an arbitrary level function. A formal proof here provides a reusable bound for data-dependent support sets over arbitrary decision sets.

Difficulty

The natural first step is: condition on the support set being a particular index set III with ∣I∣=k|I|=k∣I∣=k, and argue that the solution is then a function of the kkk sampled constraints in III alone, while the other N−kN-kN−k samples are independent of it and must all be satisfied. The difficulty is that the event "the algorithm returns III" depends on all NNN samples, and the solution of the reduced program on III is defined only where that program has a unique solution; the decomposition of the probability therefore has to be carried out on sections of the product space, with a measurability argument for each piece. A second point is that σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is random and data-dependent: a bound for each fixed kkk does not directly give a bound at the random level ϵ(σ∗)\epsilon(\sigma^*)ϵ(σ∗), and the role of the condition ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1 must be accounted for at k=Nk=Nk=N.

Formalization scope

Lean representation and committed conventions:

  • Θ\ThetaΘ and Δ\DeltaΔ are arbitrary types with measurable structures; P\mathbb PP is a probability measure on Δ\DeltaΔ; a sample is ω : Fin N → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin N => P); indices run over 0,…,N−10,\dots,N-10,…,N−1.
  • A subset of constraints is a Finset (Fin N); the reduced program with index set III has feasible set ⋂i∈IΘδi\bigcap_{i\in I}\Theta_{\delta_i}⋂i∈I​Θδi​​ (all of Θ\ThetaΘ for I=∅I=\emptysetI=∅).
  • The solution map θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is a parameter with the hypothesis that θ∗(ω)\theta^*(\omega)θ∗(ω) is the unique solution of the full program for every sample.
  • "Has the same solution" in Definition 8.8 means: the reduced program has a unique solution and it equals the unique solution of the full program. Existence of solutions is not assumed for reduced programs in general, only for those that are support sets.
  • The algorithm is an arbitrary map alg : (Fin N → Δ) → Finset (Fin N) returning a support set for every sample; σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is the cardinality of its output. The goal is universal over such maps.
  • ϵ\epsilonϵ is a real function on N\mathbb NN with ϵ(k)∈[0,1]\epsilon(k)\in[0,1]ϵ(k)∈[0,1] for k≤Nk\le Nk≤N and ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1.
  • The violation is real-valued in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the probability of the event is compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with ENNReal.ofReal of the real right-hand side.

Implicit hypotheses of the page, made explicit (the book states on p. 33 that measurability issues are glossed over): the constraint relation {(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ}\{(\theta,\delta):\theta\in\Theta_\delta\}{(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ​} is measurable in Θ×Δ\Theta\times\DeltaΘ×Δ; the solution map is measurable; each event {ω:the algorithm returns J}\{\omega:\text{the algorithm returns }J\}{ω:the algorithm returns J} is measurable; θ∗\theta^*θ∗ exists and is unique for every sample; N≥1N\ge1N≥1 in the arithmetic half of (8.16).

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the algorithm is not existentially quantified and is not the minimal support set, the reduced programs are not all assumed solvable (which would be unsatisfiable when fff has no unconstrained minimizer), and the support-set property requires uniqueness of the reduced solution, without which the bound is false.

Needed infrastructure: product measures on Fin N → Δ, splitting of such products along a subset of coordinates, and Fubini/Tonelli for sections. These pieces are reusable for other compression-type bounds. Contributions welcome: proofs of the two milestones and of the goal, and lemmas on splitting Measure.pi over a Finset of coordinates.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM/MOS, 2018, §8.6, pp. 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, F. A. Ramponi, A general scenario theory for nonconvex optimization and decision making, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2018.2808446
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
  • S. Floyd, M. Warmuth, Sample compression, learnability, and the Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimension, Machine Learning, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993593
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer 2: Under Production Economy the Retailer Earns Weakly More from Sequential Information Contracting and the Manufacturers from ConcurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

Large retailers hold point-of-sale and loyalty-card data that their suppliers cannot observe, and many of them sell access to it through data-sharing programs; others share the same data for free, or with only some suppliers (Shang, Ha & Tong 2016, §1). When two competing manufacturers sell through one common retailer, sharing a demand signal with a manufacturer changes how he sets his wholesale price, which in turn changes the retailer's margins and the rival's demand. Whether the retailer wants to share, with how many manufacturers, and at what price, is therefore a question about a multistage game with incomplete information.

Shang, Ha and Tong answer it for linear demand, a linear-expectation signal and quadratic production costs, under two contracting protocols. This mission covers the production economy case (marginal cost decreasing in volume, §6 of the paper), in which the retailer may have an incentive to share information even without payment. A companion mission covers production diseconomy (§5).

Setting

Two manufacturers i∈{0,1}i \in \{0,1\}i∈{0,1} sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Demand for product iii is

qi=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi+ϕpj,q_i = a + \theta - (1+\phi)p_i + \phi p_j ,qi​=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi​+ϕpj​,

where pip_ipi​ is the retail price, ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 measures competition intensity and θ\thetaθ is a demand shock with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0. The retailer observes a demand signal YYY with E[Y∣θ]=θE[Y \mid \theta] = \thetaE[Y∣θ]=θ and a linear-expectation structure E[θ∣Y]=βYE[\theta \mid Y] = \beta YE[θ∣Y]=βY, where β=β(t,σ)\beta = \beta(t,\sigma)β=β(t,σ) is the signal weight. Producing qqq units costs bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2 with ce>0c_e > 0ce​>0; the paper writes c=−cec = -c_ec=−ce​ and assumes ce<2/(1+ϕ)c_e < 2/(1+\phi)ce​<2/(1+ϕ) (the Assumption, p. 251). Retailing is costless.

The game has three stages.

  1. Information contracting. Under concurrent contracting the retailer offers both manufacturers the same payment T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 for the signal; they decide simultaneously and play a Pareto-optimal pure equilibrium. Under sequential contracting she offers a payment TfT_fTf​ to a first manufacturer kkk and, after his decision, a payment TsT_sTs​ to the other; the outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). The retailer commits not to share for free after a rejection (§6.2).
  2. Pricing. Given the information statuses Xi∈{I,U}X_i \in \{I, U\}Xi​∈{I,U}, each manufacturer sets a wholesale price wiw_iwi​ (a function of YYY if informed, a constant otherwise), then the retailer sets retail prices; the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
  3. Demand realizes and profits are collected.

The ex ante profits of the pricing equilibrium are denoted πM(0)\pi_M(0)πM​(0), πMU(1)\pi_M^U(1)πMU​(1), πMI(1)\pi_M^I(1)πMI​(1), πM(2)\pi_M(2)πM​(2) for a manufacturer and πR(n)\pi_R(n)πR​(n) for the retailer, nnn the number of informed manufacturers. neNn_e^NneN​, neCn_e^CneC​, neSn_e^SneS​ denote the equilibrium number of informed manufacturers without contracting, under concurrent and under sequential contracting.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8(d)

For every ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 and 0<ce<2/(1+ϕ)0 < c_e < 2/(1+\phi)0<ce​<2/(1+ϕ), pricing equilibria exist, concurrent outcomes and sequential SPEs exist, and for every concurrent outcome and every SPE (either first mover)

ΠRC≤ΠRS,ΠMS≤ΠMC,\Pi_R^C \le \Pi_R^S, \qquad \Pi_M^S \le \Pi_M^C ,ΠRC​≤ΠRS​,ΠMS​≤ΠMC​,

where ΠR\Pi_RΠR​ is the retailer's profit after side payments and ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ the manufacturers' total profit net of them. The second inequality is asserted for all cec_ece​ except at most two values depending only on ϕ\phiϕ. The comparisons about every pricing equilibrium family exclude the single value ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)] (see Formalization scope). The paper says "higher"; the inequalities are weak because both sides coincide on intervals of positive length.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: the pricing equilibrium exists and, for ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​, is unique and linear in YYY with explicit coefficients.
  2. §4.2: the ex ante profits πM(⋅)\pi_M(\cdot)πM​(⋅) and πR(⋅)\pi_R(\cdot)πR​(⋅) in closed form.
  3. Lemma 5(a)–(c) and Lemma 5(d): sign comparisons of these profits in cec_ece​, with thresholds 1/(1+ϕ)1/(1+\phi)1/(1+ϕ), (4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)](4+5\phi)/[(2+3\phi)(1+\phi)](4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)], ceac_e^acea​ and ceNc_e^NceN​.
  4. Proposition 7: thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ such that
neZ=0 for ce<11+ϕ,neZ=2 for 11+ϕ≤ce<ceZ,neZ=1 for ceZ≤ce<21+ϕ.n_e^Z = 0 \text{ for } c_e < \tfrac{1}{1+\phi}, \quad n_e^Z = 2 \text{ for } \tfrac{1}{1+\phi} \le c_e < c_e^Z, \quad n_e^Z = 1 \text{ for } c_e^Z \le c_e < \tfrac{2}{1+\phi}.neZ​=0 for ce​<1+ϕ1​,neZ​=2 for 1+ϕ1​≤ce​<ceZ​,neZ​=1 for ceZ​≤ce​<1+ϕ2​.
  1. Proposition 6(b): the same structure for neNn_e^NneN​ with a threshold ceNc_e^NceN​.
  2. Proposition 8(a): ceN<ceS≤ceCc_e^N < c_e^S \le c_e^CceN​<ceS​≤ceC​.

Significance

Proposition 8(d) says that a common retailer who sells information prefers to sell it sequentially, and that the manufacturers bear the cost: sequential offers let her extract a larger payment from the first manufacturer, because his outside option depends on what she will do with the second. Together with Propositions 6 and 7 it explains why retailers under production economy share with only a subset of suppliers once economies of scale or competition are strong, and why a retailer may share data for free, a practice the diseconomy model cannot produce.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by "it is straightforward" arguments (the proofs of Lemmas 2–5 are omitted). No part of the paper is formalized. A formalization adds a machine-checked account of the equilibrium selection at the boundary payments, where the paper's case analysis is informal, and of the points at which the retailer is indifferent between outcomes.

Difficulty

The pricing stage is a Bayesian game with a continuum of strategies: an informed manufacturer's strategy is an arbitrary square-integrable function of the signal. Lemma 1's uniqueness needs the Assumption (without it the manufacturer's problem is not concave) and a conditional-expectation argument, not a finite-dimensional computation. The comparisons of Lemma 5 are sign conditions on rational functions of (ce,ϕ)(c_e, \phi)(ce​,ϕ) whose thresholds ceac_e^acea​, ceNc_e^NceN​ are implicit roots. The contracting stage is where the naive argument fails: at the boundary payments several equilibria give the retailer the same payoff but the manufacturers different payoffs, so "the" outcome is not well defined there, and a direct comparison of closed-form profits at the paper's selected equilibria does not cover every equilibrium.

Formalization scope

Lean represents manufacturers by Fin 2, statuses by an inductive type with informed and uninformed, and a pricing strategy by a function of the signal value. The committed conventions are these.

  1. Admissible strategies are measurable with square-integrable wi(Y)w_i(Y)wi​(Y), and constant for an uninformed manufacturer; ex ante optimality over them is the Bayesian equilibrium condition.
  2. The retailer's rule is a best response for every wholesale price pair and signal value, off path included.
  3. The production cost is the uncapped quadratic bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2. The paper caps the quantity at qˉ=b/(2ce)\bar q = b/(2c_e)qˉ​=b/(2ce​) but assumes the cap is reached with negligible probability (footnote 11, p. 251) and computes every result of §4.2 and §6 without it. The condition b<ab < ab<a of that footnote is not imposed.
  4. Contracting uses pure strategies, nonnegative payments, and no free-sharing move after a rejection.
  5. A concurrent outcome is a payment and a pure equilibrium whose retailer payoff equals the supremum of her payoffs over Pareto-optimal equilibria. The supremum is not always attained: for large cec_ece​ the paper's optimal payment πMI(1)−πM(0)\pi_M^I(1) - \pi_M(0)πMI​(1)−πM​(0) makes (U,U)(U,U)(U,U) an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the one-informed outcome it selects.
  6. Threshold statements take the two-clause form: the stated value of nnn is attained on each region with its printed endpoints, and is the only value on the region's interior. Thresholds depend only on ϕ\phiϕ and are quantified before all other parameters.
  7. The manufacturers' comparison in the goal excludes at most two values of cec_ece​. At the thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ outcomes with different manufacturer totals coexist, and the universal comparison fails.
  8. A correction of the paper. At ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)], which lies in (1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ))(1/(1+\phi), 2/(1+\phi))(1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ)), the slope of the best-response wholesale price (2) is exactly −1-1−1. The equations wi=w^i(wj)w_i = \hat w_i(w_j)wi​=w^i​(wj​) are then singular, and every status profile has a continuum of pricing equilibria (for n=0n = 0n=0, w1,2=wˉ±tw_{1,2} = \bar w \pm tw1,2​=wˉ±t for every ttt) whose ex ante profits differ. Lemma 1's uniqueness claim fails there, so do the §4.2 identities for every equilibrium family, and so does every statement built on them. Each statement that quantifies over all pricing equilibria therefore assumes ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​; existence is still asserted at ce∗c_e^*ce∗​.

The ex ante profits in every statement are those of an equilibrium of the pricing game on the signal model, not the §4.2 closed forms; a formalization that defined them by the closed forms would reduce the goal to algebra and a 2×22 \times 22×2 game, and is ruled out. The model layer (signal model, pricing equilibrium, payoff table, both contracting games) is shared, name for name, with the production diseconomy mission. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, and on reusable pieces: linear-expectation signals, and pointwise optimization under conditional expectation.

Selected references

  • Shang W., Ha A. Y., Tong S., Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer, Management Science 62(1):245–263, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
  • Ericson W. A., A note on the posterior mean of a population mean, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 31(2):332–334, 1969 (cited for the formula of β(t,σ)\beta(t,\sigma)β(t,σ), which this mission does not use).
  • Vives X., Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, MIT Press, 1999, §2.7.2.
  • Li L., Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition, Management Science 48(9):1196–1212, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.9.1196.177
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I: Sign and Monotonicity of the Relative Value of Information Across Size RegimesResearch Paper

Motivation

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers noisy signals about the state of a road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, each with its own subscriber base and its own information, a natural question for operators and regulators is whether subscribing to one system rather than another actually lowers a driver's expected travel cost in equilibrium, and how this advantage depends on how many drivers use each system. More information for one population also changes the congestion everybody else faces, so the answer is not simply "more information is better".

Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar (Operations Research 69(1), 2021) answer this question for nonatomic routing games with heterogeneous, possibly correlated information. Their model builds on the weighted potential game framework of Sandholm (2001) and on sensitivity analysis of convex programs. This mission formalizes their Section 5 result: for any two populations the sign of the relative value of information is determined by which of three explicitly computable size regimes the population sizes lie in, and the relative value decreases as one population grows at the expense of the other.

Setting

A Bayesian routing game has a finite set of populations I\mathcal II, one per TIS, a finite set of network states S\mathcal SS, and for each population iii a finite nonempty type space Ti\mathcal T^iTi of signals. A common prior π\piπ is a probability distribution on S×T\mathcal S\times\mathcal TS×T, T=∏iTi\mathcal T=\prod_i\mathcal T^iT=∏i​Ti. A network with a single origin–destination pair has edges E\mathcal EE and a finite nonempty set of routes R\mathcal RR; each edge has a state-dependent cost cesc^s_eces​ that is positive, strictly increasing and differentiable. The total demand is D>0D>0D>0, and population iii carries the fraction λi\lambda^iλi of it, with λi≥0\lambda^i\ge0λi≥0 and ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda^i=1∑i​λi=1.

A strategy profile qqq assigns to each population iii and type tit^iti a split qri(ti)≥0q^i_r(t^i)\ge0qri​(ti)≥0 of its demand λiD\lambda^iDλiD over routes. It induces the route flow fr(t)=∑iqri(ti)f_r(t)=\sum_iq^i_r(t^i)fr​(t)=∑i​qri​(ti) and the edge load we(t)=∑r∋efr(t)w_e(t)=\sum_{r\ni e}f_r(t)we​(t)=∑r∋e​fr​(t). With the belief βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr⁡(ti)\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)=\pi(s,t^i,t^{-i})/\Pr(t^i)βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr(ti), type tit^iti evaluates route rrr by its expected cost E[cr(q)∣ti]\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]E[cr​(q)∣ti]. A Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE) is a feasible qqq in which every type uses only routes of minimal expected cost. The equilibrium population cost is Ci∗(λ)=∑tiPr⁡(ti)min⁡rE[cr(q)∣ti]C^{i*}(\lambda)=\sum_{t^i}\Pr(t^i)\min_r\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]Ci∗(λ)=∑ti​Pr(ti)minr​E[cr​(q)∣ti] at a BWE qqq.

The game has a weighted potential Φ(q)=∑s,e,tπ(s,t)∫0we(t)ces(z) dz\Phi(q)=\sum_{s,e,t}\pi(s,t)\int_0^{w_e(t)}c^s_e(z)\,dzΦ(q)=∑s,e,t​π(s,t)∫0we​(t)​ces​(z)dz; its minimum over feasible profiles is the equilibrium potential value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ). For two populations i≠ji\ne ji=j, the direction zijz^{ij}zij moves demand share from jjj to iii, and ∣λ−ij∣|\lambda^{-ij}|∣λ−ij∣ is the total share of the other populations. The impact of information J^i(f)\widehat J^i(f)Ji(f) measures how much of population iii's demand is moved by its signal. Two thresholds λ‾i≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi are computed from the optimal set Fij,†\mathcal F^{ij,\dagger}Fij,† of an auxiliary convex program over route flows in which the separate information constraints of iii and jjj are merged. They define three regimes: Λ1ij\Lambda^{ij}_1Λ1ij​ (λi<λ‾i\lambda^i<\underline\lambda^iλi<λ​i), Λ2ij\Lambda^{ij}_2Λ2ij​ (λ‾i≤λi≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi≤λi) and Λ3ij\Lambda^{ij}_3Λ3ij​ (λi>λ‾i\lambda^i>\overline\lambda^iλi>λi). The relative value of information is Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=C^{j*}(\lambda)-C^{i*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For i≠ji\ne ji=j and admissible λ\lambdaλ (in the simplex with λi,λj>0\lambda^i,\lambda^j>0λi,λj>0), and every BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ),

Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij,V^{ij*}(\lambda)>0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_1,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)=0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_2,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)<0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_3,Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij​,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij​,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij​,

and Vij∗V^{ij*}Vij∗ is nonincreasing along zijz^{ij}zij: Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda+\varepsilon z^{ij})\le V^{ij*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ) for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 with both endpoints admissible.

Milestones

The route to the goal follows the paper: Lemma 1 (weighted potential), Lemma 2 (strict convexity of the edge-load potential), Theorem 1 (equilibria are the minimizers of Φ\PhiΦ; unique edge load), Lemma 3 (unique Lagrange multipliers), Proposition 1 (the feasible route flows form a polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Proposition 2 (equilibrium route flows minimize Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ over F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Lemma 4 (0≤λ‾i≤λ‾i≤1−∣λ−ij∣0\le\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^i\le1-|\lambda^{-ij}|0≤λ​i≤λi≤1−∣λ−ij∣), Theorem 2 (equilibrium flows in each regime), Proposition 3 (Ψ\PsiΨ decreases, stays constant, increases along zijz^{ij}zij in the three regimes) and Lemma 5 (Ψ\PsiΨ is convex and directionally differentiable, and Vij∗(λ)=−1D∇zijΨ(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=-\frac1D\nabla_{z^{ij}}\Psi(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=−D1​∇zij​Ψ(λ)).

Significance

Theorem 3 says that a population has an advantage over another exactly when it is the minor population of the pair, relative to thresholds that depend only on the other populations' sizes. Both populations face the same equilibrium cost in the middle regime. It gives a procedure for comparing two information systems without computing equilibria for each size vector: solve one convex program, read off two thresholds, and locate λi\lambda^iλi. The paper's Section 6 uses the same machinery, through Lemma 5, to characterize the equilibrium adoption rates of information systems.

The paper proves these results with the main proofs in the article and the sensitivity-analysis lemmas (Lemmas EC.1–EC.4) in its e-companion. None of them has a machine-checked proof. The formalization requires a Lean account of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria, of the equivalence between equilibria and a convex program, and of directional derivatives of the optimal value of a parametric convex program. Parts of this are reusable for any nonatomic routing or congestion game.

Difficulty

The equilibrium strategy profile is not unique and changes discontinuously with λ\lambdaλ. Differentiating equilibrium costs in λ\lambdaλ directly therefore fails. The paper instead works with the optimal value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ), whose one-sided directional derivative is expressed through Lagrange multipliers. That requires a sensitivity theorem for convex programs whose constraints depend affinely on the parameter, together with uniqueness of multipliers, which fails for populations of size zero. The regime analysis also needs a characterization of the route flows that are induced by feasible strategy profiles. That set is described by the nonlinear-looking constraint J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD, a minimum over types inside a sum over routes. Strict monotonicity of Ψ\PsiΨ in the side regimes needs the tightness of an information constraint at every equilibrium, not only at one.

Formalization scope

The model is a Lean structure BayesRouting.VOI.Game over finite types of populations, type spaces, states, edges and routes. Routes are given by their edge sets, and the directed-graph structure is not used. Type spaces and the route set are nonempty. The prior is a probability distribution, D>0D>0D>0, and costs are positive on nonnegative loads, strictly increasing and differentiable on R\mathbb RR. One assumption is added: every type profile has positive probability. It makes beliefs well defined and the equilibrium edge load unique, and it excludes perfectly correlated signals.

Conventions: Ci∗C^{i*}Ci∗ is the last form of eq. (7), which does not divide by λiD\lambda^iDλiD. J^i\widehat J^iJi is the maximum of eq. (16) over the reference profile, so that J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD is exactly (14d). Ψ\PsiΨ and the thresholds are sInf/sSup over sets that are nonempty and compact for size vectors in the simplex, and every statement keeps size vectors there. Statements about "the" equilibrium are stated for every BWE, and existence of a BWE is a separate item, so they are not vacuous. The thresholds are defined from the optimal set of the auxiliary program, not assumed as parameters. Taking them as parameters constrained only by Lemma 4 would give a different theorem.

Disclosed deviations: Lemma 2's C2C^2C2 clause assumes C1C^1C1 costs; Lemma 3 is stated for populations of positive size; Lemma 5 assumes λj>0\lambda^j>0λj>0; Proposition 3 is stated with strict monotonicity in the side regimes, as used in the proof of Theorem 3. Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome: interval-integral potentials of monotone costs, KKT theory for polyhedral constraints, and directional derivatives of parametric optimal values.

Selected references

  • M. Wu, S. Amin, A. Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1999
  • W. H. Sandholm, Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets, Journal of Economic Theory 97(1):81–108, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Directional Differentiability of the Optimal Value Function in a Nonlinear Programming Problem, in Sensitivity, Stability and Parametric Analysis (Mathematical Programming Studies 21), Springer, 1984, pp. 213–226.
  • A. V. Fiacco, J. Kyparisis, Convexity and Concavity Properties of the Optimal Value Function in Parametric Nonlinear Programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 48(1):95–126, 1986.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VI: With Verification, the Compensation-and-Bonus Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful Optimal ImplementationResearch Paper

Motivation

Scheduling tasks on machines owned by self-interested parties is the running example of Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001), the paper that introduced the study of mechanisms whose allocation rule is an algorithm with a computational objective. Each machine (agent) privately knows how long it needs for each task; the designer wants to minimize the make-span, the completion time of the last machine, and can only influence the agents through payments.

Without further information the designer is in a weak position: the paper shows that no mechanism approximates the optimal make-span within a factor below 2 (Theorem 4.6), and that the natural truthful mechanism, MinWork, only achieves a factor nnn. Section 5 of the paper observes that in many applications the designer learns more than the agents' reports: it can pay after the work is done and observe how long each task actually took. It introduces mechanisms with verification and shows that, with this extra information, the make-span can be minimized exactly by a strongly truthful mechanism. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 5.1, together with the steps of its proof and the participation variant, Theorem 5.4.

Setting

There are kkk tasks and nnn agents. The type of agent iii is the vector ti=(t1i,…,tki)t^i = (t^i_1,\dots,t^i_k)ti=(t1i​,…,tki​) of positive numbers, tjit^i_jtji​ being the least time in which agent iii can perform task jjj. An allocation xxx gives each task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks of agent iii. For a type vector ttt and for a vector t~\tilde tt~ of actual execution times the make-spans are

g(x,t)=max⁡i∑j∈xitji,g(x,t~)=max⁡i∑j∈xit~j.g(x,t) = \max_i \sum_{j\in x^i} t^i_j, \qquad g(x,\tilde t) = \max_i \sum_{j\in x^i} \tilde t_j .g(x,t)=imax​j∈xi∑​tji​,g(x,t~)=imax​j∈xi∑​t~j​.

A mechanism with verification is a pair (x,p)(x, p)(x,p). The allocation x(d)x(d)x(d) is computed from the agents' declarations d=(d1,…,dn)d = (d^1,\dots,d^n)d=(d1,…,dn) only. Each agent then performs its tasks, in any times t~j≥tji\tilde t_j \ge t^i_jt~j​≥tji​ it chooses, and the mechanism pays agent iii the amount pi(d,t~)p^i(d, \tilde t)pi(d,t~), which may depend on the declarations and on the observed actual times. Agent iii's utility is pi(d,t~)−∑j∈xit~jp^i(d,\tilde t) - \sum_{j \in x^i} \tilde t_jpi(d,t~)−∑j∈xi​t~j​. A strategy of agent iii therefore has two parts: a declaration did^idi and an execution plan eie^iei that says, for every allocation, how long the agent takes on each of its tasks.

A strategy is dominant if it maximizes the agent's utility against all declarations and all execution plans of the other agents. The mechanism is truthful if, for every agent and type, declaring the true type (with a suitable execution plan) is dominant, and strongly truthful if the only dominant strategy is to declare the true type and to execute every task in minimal time.

The Compensation-and-Bonus mechanism uses an optimal allocation algorithm x(⋅)x(\cdot)x(⋅) and pays

pi(d,t~)=∑j∈xi(d)t~j⏟compensation ci  − g(x(d),corri(x(d),d,t~))⏟bonus bi,p^i(d,\tilde t) = \underbrace{\sum_{j \in x^i(d)} \tilde t_j}_{\text{compensation } c^i} \;\underbrace{-\, g\big(x(d), \mathrm{corr}^i(x(d), d, \tilde t)\big)}_{\text{bonus } b^i},pi(d,t~)=compensation cij∈xi(d)∑​t~j​​​bonus bi−g(x(d),corri(x(d),d,t~))​​,

where the corrected time vector corri\mathrm{corr}^icorri lists agent iii's own tasks at their actual times and every other task at the time declared by the agent it was given to.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

For n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 agents and every optimal allocation algorithm (ties broken arbitrarily), the Compensation-and-Bonus mechanism is a strongly truthful implementation of task scheduling:

strongly truthfulandg(x(D),t~)≤min⁡yg(y,t) whenever every agent plays a dominant strategy for its true type.\text{strongly truthful} \quad\text{and}\quad g\big(x(D), \tilde t\big) \le \min_y g(y, t) \text{ whenever every agent plays a dominant strategy for its true type.}strongly truthfulandg(x(D),t~)≤ymin​g(y,t) whenever every agent plays a dominant strategy for its true type.

Milestones (proof of Claim 5.2)

  1. The utility of every agent equals its bonus.
  2. For every allocation, the bonus of agent iii is maximized by executing its tasks in minimal time.
  3. With t=(d−i,ti)t = (d^{-i}, t^i)t=(d−i,ti), for every declaration t′it'^it′i,
−g(x(t),corr∗(x(t),t))≥−g(x(t′i,d−i),corr∗(x(t′i,d−i),t)).-g\big(x(t), \mathrm{corr}^*(x(t), t)\big) \ge -g\big(x(t'^i, d^{-i}), \mathrm{corr}^*(x(t'^i, d^{-i}), t)\big).−g(x(t),corr∗(x(t),t))≥−g(x(t′i,d−i),corr∗(x(t′i,d−i),t)).
  1. Declaring the true type and executing in minimal time is dominant.
  2. Claim 5.2: the mechanism is strongly truthful.

Further target: Theorem 5.4

For n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 there is a strongly truthful mechanism with an optimal allocation algorithm that satisfies participation constraints: an agent that performs its tasks in its declared times never ends with negative utility.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5.1 shows that the lower bound of 2 for task scheduling (Theorem 4.6) is an artefact of the information structure, not of incentives as such: once execution times are observable, the exact optimum is achievable in dominant strategies, and the agents have a unique rational behaviour. The construction also isolates a general principle, used again in §5.6 of the paper: an agent paid by the global objective value, computed with the others' declarations, has the designer's incentives. Theorem 5.4 shows that the bonus can be shifted to make participation individually rational, which the plain mechanism violates (its bonus is negative).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, in a few lines, and has no machine-checked version. A formalization has to settle what the paper leaves informal: what a strategy with an execution part is, over which strategies of the others dominance is quantified, what "the only dominant strategy" demands of the execution plan on allocations that seem never to arise, and which hypotheses on the number of agents the uniqueness needs. The model built here is also the base of two companion missions of the same series (Compensation-and-Bonus with a non-optimal allocation algorithm, and the rounding mechanism with verification).

Difficulty

Truthfulness (milestones 1–4) is short once the model is right. The difficulty is uniqueness. For a misreport or a slow execution to be excluded, one must exhibit, for every alternative strategy, declarations of the other agents under which that strategy is strictly worse. The declarations must be positive, the optimal allocation algorithm breaks ties arbitrarily, and agent iii's slower execution only hurts it when agent iii is the bottleneck. The paper's proof dismisses this step with "clearly, … there are circumstances"; the naive reading ("the others declare +∞+\infty+∞ elsewhere") is not available in a model with finite positive times, and the uniqueness clause must also cover the execution plan on every allocation, not only on the allocation produced by truthful play.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin n, tasks Fin k, allocations functions Fin k → Fin n; both make-spans are Finset.sup' over the nonempty set of agents ([NeZero n]).
  • Types and declarations are positive real vectors; declarations range over this type space (Definition 18's "unrestricted" declaration is any element of it).
  • An execution plan is a function from allocations to actual times; feasibility for type tit^iti requires t~j≥tji\tilde t_j \ge t^i_jt~j​≥tji​ on the agent's own tasks only. In the dominance quantifier the other agents' plans are arbitrary.
  • Payments are amounts handed to the agent; utility is quasi-linear.
  • The optimal allocation algorithm is a parameter with the hypothesis that it minimizes g(⋅,d)g(\cdot, d)g(⋅,d) on every positive ddd; every theorem holds for every such algorithm.
  • Strong truthfulness constrains both parts of the strategy: the declaration equals the type, and the plan executes every task in minimal time under every allocation.
  • Thresholds made explicit: n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 in Claim 5.2, Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.4 (not printed; with one agent every declaration is dominant, and the construction of Theorem 5.4 needs a second agent).
  • Printed slips: the displayed inequality prints >=; Theorem 5.4 prints "strongly truthfulmechanism"; Definition 28 writes t~j=tj\tilde t_j = t_jt~j​=tj​ for t~j=tji\tilde t_j = t^i_jt~j​=tji​.
  • Running time is out of scope.
  • A formalization in which dominance is checked only against truthful other agents, in which the mechanism ignores executions, in which strong truthfulness constrains only the declaration, or in which the implementation clause is stated only at the truthful profile, is not the theorem and is ruled out by the statements.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, the uniqueness witnesses as reusable lemmas, and the contribution-based mechanism behind Theorem 5.4. Theorem 5.3 (generalized Compensation-and-Bonus) is not stated in this mission.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • T. Groves, Incentives in Teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–631. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
  • A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995.
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design V: The Randomly Biased Min Work Mechanism Is a Strongly Truthful 7/4-Approximation for Two AgentsResearch Paper

Motivation

Algorithmic mechanism design, introduced by Nisan and Ronen (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001), studies optimization problems whose input is held by self-interested agents. Each agent reports its private data to a protocol, and the protocol must choose an output and payments so that reporting the truth is in every agent's interest while the chosen output is close to optimal.

The paper's test case is task scheduling on unrelated machines: kkk tasks must be assigned to nnn agents, agent iii needs time tjit^i_jtji​ for task jjj, and the goal is to minimize the make-span. For deterministic mechanisms the paper shows that truthfulness is costly: the MinWork mechanism achieves ratio nnn, and no mechanism achieves a ratio below 222 (Theorem 4.6). Section 4.4 asks whether randomization helps and answers yes for two agents: a randomized mechanism, truthful for every outcome of its coins, achieves expected ratio 7/4<27/4 < 27/4<2.

Timeline.

  • 1979: Roberts characterizes weighted (affine) maximizers; the weighted Vickrey–Groves–Clarke (VGC) mechanisms are truthful.
  • 1999: Lehmann supplies the case analysis that improves the authors' original bound of 1.8231.8231.823 to 7/47/47/4 (acknowledged on p. 182).
  • 2001: Nisan and Ronen publish the randomly biased min work mechanism and Theorem 4.16.

Setting

There are two agents, 111 and 222, and kkk tasks. A type vector t=(t1,t2)t = (t^1, t^2)t=(t1,t2) gives, for each agent iii and task jjj, the positive time tjit^i_jtji​ agent iii needs for task jjj. An allocation xxx assigns each task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks of agent iii. The make-span of xxx is

g(x,t)=max⁡i∈{1,2}∑j∈xitji.g(x, t) = \max_{i \in \{1,2\}} \sum_{j \in x^i} t^i_j .g(x,t)=i∈{1,2}max​j∈xi∑​tji​.

A direct mechanism receives declared types ddd and returns an allocation x(d)x(d)x(d) and payments pi(d)p^i(d)pi(d) handed to the agents. Agent iii with true type tit^iti gets utility pi(d)−∑j∈xi(d)tjip^i(d) - \sum_{j \in x^i(d)} t^i_jpi(d)−∑j∈xi(d)​tji​. The mechanism is truthful if declaring the true type maximizes an agent's utility whatever the other agent declares, and strongly truthful if in addition every false declaration is strictly worse for some declaration of the other agent.

A randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms; its objective is the expected make-span. It is universally truthful if every mechanism in its support is truthful, and universally strongly truthful if moreover truth-telling is the only strategy dominant in every mechanism of the support.

The biased min work mechanism with parameters β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1 and s∈{1,2}ks \in \{1,2\}^ks∈{1,2}k treats each task jjj separately. With i=sji = s_ji=sj​ the favoured agent and i′=3−ii' = 3 - ii′=3−i the other: if tji≤β⋅tji′t^i_j \le \beta \cdot t^{i'}_jtji​≤β⋅tji′​, task jjj goes to iii, who is paid β⋅tji′\beta \cdot t^{i'}_jβ⋅tji′​; otherwise it goes to i′i'i′, who is paid β−1⋅tji\beta^{-1} \cdot t^i_jβ−1⋅tji​. The randomly biased min work mechanism draws sss uniformly from {1,2}k\{1,2\}^k{1,2}k and uses β=4/3\beta = 4/3β=4/3. Its expected make-span is

Es g(xs(t),t)=12k∑s∈{1,2}kg(xs(t),t).\mathbb{E}_s\, g(x_s(t), t) = \frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{s \in \{1,2\}^k} g(x_s(t), t).Es​g(xs​(t),t)=2k1​s∈{1,2}k∑​g(xs​(t),t).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.16

For every kkk: the randomly biased min work mechanism is universally strongly truthful, and for every positive type vector ttt and every allocation yyy,

12k∑s∈{1,2}kg(xs(t),t)≤74 g(y,t).\frac{1}{2^k} \sum_{s \in \{1,2\}^k} g(x_s(t), t) \le \frac74\, g(y, t).2k1​s∈{1,2}k∑​g(xs​(t),t)≤47​g(y,t).

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.2 (Roberts): for positive weights βi\beta^iβi, a mechanism whose output maximizes ∑iβivi(ti,o)\sum_i \beta^i v^i(t^i, o)∑i​βivi(ti,o) and whose payments are pi=1βi∑j≠iβjvj(tj,o)+hi(t−i)p^i = \frac{1}{\beta^i}\sum_{j \ne i}\beta^j v^j(t^j, o) + h^i(t^{-i})pi=βi1​∑j=i​βjvj(tj,o)+hi(t−i) is truthful.
  • Lemma 4.15: for every β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1 and every sss, the biased min work mechanism is strongly truthful.
  • Lemma 4.17: the randomly biased min work mechanism is universally strongly truthful.
  • Claim 4.19, part 5: allocating two tasks independently at random gives an expected make-span no larger than allocating their merge at random.
  • Reduced case (Fig. 2, Cases 1–3): for a,b,c,d≥0a, b, c, d \ge 0a,b,c,d≥0 with a+c=43b+da + c = \frac43 b + da+c=34​b+d,
14(max⁡(a+b+c+43d,0)+max⁡(a+b+c,d)+max⁡(a+b+43d,43c)+max⁡(a+b,43c+d))≤74(a+c).\tfrac14\Big(\max(a+b+c+\tfrac43 d, 0) + \max(a+b+c, d) + \max(a+b+\tfrac43 d, \tfrac43 c) + \max(a+b, \tfrac43 c + d)\Big) \le \tfrac74 (a+c).41​(max(a+b+c+34​d,0)+max(a+b+c,d)+max(a+b+34​d,34​c)+max(a+b,34​c+d))≤47​(a+c).
  • Lemma 4.18: the 7/47/47/4 bound on the expected make-span.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.16 separates randomized from deterministic truthful mechanisms for scheduling two unrelated machines: 7/47/47/4 against the deterministic lower bound of 222. The notion of truthfulness it uses is the strong one, dominance for every coin outcome, so the separation does not rest on agents being risk-neutral or knowing the distribution. Later work on truthful randomized scheduling, and on the gap between deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms, starts from this construction.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. A formalization produces a checked definition of universal truthfulness for randomized mechanisms, a checked weighted VGC theorem usable for any affine-maximizer mechanism, and a checked version of the reduction argument (Claim 4.19), which the paper states in five informal instance transformations, one of them a limiting argument.

Difficulty

Truthfulness reduces to one task at a time, where the mechanism is a weighted VGC mechanism; the difficulty lies in the approximation bound. A naive task-by-task comparison with the optimum fails: the bound is on a maximum of two loads averaged over 2k2^k2k coin vectors, and the maximum does not decompose over tasks. The paper reduces an arbitrary instance to four tasks through transformations that each move the ratio in one direction, and the reduced instance still needs a three-way case analysis. Making the reduction rigorous is the main work: part 1 of Claim 4.19 replaces a ratio "arbitrarily close to β\betaβ" by β\betaβ, and under the mechanism's tie rule a task with ratio exactly β\betaβ is allocated by the coin rather than to the efficient agent.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin 2 (agent 111 is 0, agent 222 is 1); the other agent is other i = 1 - i. Tasks are Fin k; allocations are functions Fin k → Fin 2. The statements hold for every kkk, including k=0k = 0k=0.
  • Types are positive: every truthfulness quantifier ranges over positive declarations, true types and misreports, and the approximation bound is stated on positive type vectors. The reduced-case and merging milestones are pure real inequalities with nonnegative times, since the paper represents missing tasks by zero times.
  • Payments are handed to the agent; utility is quasi-linear.
  • The make-span is a finite maximum (Finset.sup') over the two agents. The expected make-span is the average over all 2k2^k2k vectors sss, which is exactly the expectation of Definition 15 for the uniform distribution; no measure theory is used.
  • Universal (strong) truthfulness quantifies over all s∈{1,2}ks \in \{1,2\}^ks∈{1,2}k, the support of the uniform distribution. Truthfulness in expectation over sss is weaker and is not the notion stated.
  • The tie rule of Fig. 1 (≤\le≤: ties go to the favoured agent) is kept.
  • The goal fixes β=4/3\beta = 4/3β=4/3; only Lemma 4.15 is stated for every β≥1\beta \ge 1β≥1. The ratio is compared with every allocation yyy, not with one fixed allocation, and the average is over all sss, not the best sss.
  • Roberts' theorem is stated for arbitrary output sets, type sets and valuations, with positive weights.
  • "Polynomial time computable" in Theorem 4.16 is not formalized; running time is out of scope.
  • Claim 4.19 (the reduction to the four-task case) is not a separate item beyond its part 5, because its parts are instance transformations with a limiting step, not a single statement; a solver may formalize the reduction in any form that proves Lemma 4.18.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and reusable lemmas on averages of maxima over product coin spaces.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • K. Roberts, The characterization of implementable choice rules, in J.-J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North-Holland, 1979, pp. 321–349.
  • T. Groves, Incentives in teams, Econometrica 41 (1973) 617–631. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design IV: No Local Truthful Mechanism Achieves a c-Approximation for Task Scheduling for Any c < nResearch Paper

Motivation

Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) asks how well a computational task can be carried out when its inputs are held by self-interested agents who may lie about them. Their test case is scheduling on unrelated machines: tasks must be assigned to agents (machines), each agent privately knows how long it needs for each task, and the planner wants to minimize the time at which the last agent finishes. The paper shows that the mechanism MinWork, which gives each task to the fastest agent and pays it the second-fastest time, is truthful and loses a factor of at most nnn against the optimum, and that no truthful mechanism can do better than a factor 222. It then conjectures (Conjecture 4.9) that the factor nnn cannot be improved by any truthful mechanism.

That conjecture became the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, one of the central questions of algorithmic mechanism design. A sequence of papers raised the general lower bound from 222 to 1+21 + \sqrt 21+2​ (Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali), to 1+φ≈2.6181 + \varphi \approx 2.6181+φ≈2.618 (Koutsoupias and Vidali) and to larger constants, and Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács (STOC 2023) finally proved the conjecture for all deterministic truthful mechanisms. In the original paper, Nisan and Ronen confirm the conjecture for two restricted classes of mechanisms, with short direct arguments. This mission concerns the second class, local mechanisms (Theorem 4.12).

Setting

There are kkk tasks j∈{1,…,k}j \in \{1, \dots, k\}j∈{1,…,k} and nnn agents i∈{1,…,n}i \in \{1, \dots, n\}i∈{1,…,n}. A type vector ttt records, for every agent iii and task jjj, the positive time tjit^i_jtji​ agent iii needs for task jjj. An allocation xxx assigns every task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks of agent iii. For a set XXX of tasks write ti(X)=∑j∈Xtjit^i(X) = \sum_{j \in X} t^i_jti(X)=∑j∈X​tji​. The make-span of xxx is g(x,t)=max⁡iti(xi)g(x, t) = \max_i t^i(x^i)g(x,t)=maxi​ti(xi).

A direct mechanism (x,p)(x, p)(x,p) asks every agent for its type, computes an allocation x(t)x(t)x(t) from the declarations, and hands agent iii the payment pi(t)p^i(t)pi(t). Agent iii's utility is pi(t)−ti(xi(t))p^i(t) - t^i(x^i(t))pi(t)−ti(xi(t)) measured with its true times. The mechanism is truthful if declaring the true type maximizes each agent's utility whatever the other agents declare. The allocation rule is a ccc-approximation if g(x(t),t)≤c⋅g(y,t)g(x(t), t) \le c \cdot g(y, t)g(x(t),t)≤c⋅g(y,t) for every type vector ttt and every allocation yyy.

For a truthful mechanism the payment to agent iii depends only on the set it receives and on the declarations t−it^{-i}t−i of the others (Proposition 4.4). This gives the price offered to agent iii for a set XXX (Definition 12):

pi(X,t−i)={pi(t′i,t−i)if some t′i gives xi(t′i,t−i)=X,0otherwise.p^i(X, t^{-i}) = \begin{cases} p^i(t'^i, t^{-i}) & \text{if some } t'^i \text{ gives } x^i(t'^i, t^{-i}) = X, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}pi(X,t−i)={pi(t′i,t−i)0​if some t′i gives xi(t′i,t−i)=X,otherwise.​

A mechanism is local (Definition 14) if pi(X,t−i)p^i(X, t^{-i})pi(X,t−i) depends only on the other agents' times {tjl:l≠i,j∈X}\{t^l_j : l \ne i, j \in X\}{tjl​:l=i,j∈X} on the tasks of XXX. MinWork is local: its price for XXX is ∑j∈Xmin⁡l≠itjl\sum_{j \in X} \min_{l \ne i} t^l_j∑j∈X​minl=i​tjl​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.12

For every n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, every k≥n2k \ge n^2k≥n2 and every real c<nc < nc<n, no truthful local mechanism is a ccc-approximation:

∀(x,p) truthful and local, ∀c<n:∃ t, yg(x(t),t)>c⋅g(y,t).\forall (x, p) \text{ truthful and local},\ \forall c < n:\quad \exists\, t,\ y \quad g(x(t), t) > c \cdot g(y, t).∀(x,p) truthful and local, ∀c<n:∃t, yg(x(t),t)>c⋅g(y,t).

The bound holds for every c<nc < nc<n, so together with MinWork it shows that nnn is the exact best ratio for local truthful mechanisms.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4.4 (Independence). Payments depend only on the allocated set and on t−it^{-i}t−i.
  2. Proposition 4.5 (Maximization). xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t) maximizes pi(X,t−i)−ti(X)p^i(X, t^{-i}) - t^i(X)pi(X,t−i)−ti(X) over the sets XXX that agent iii can obtain.
  3. Lemma 4.13. Every type vector has type vectors arbitrarily close to it at which each agent's maximizing set is unique.
  4. Claim 4.14, first step. If xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t) is the unique maximizer, lowering agent iii's times on xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t) keeps xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t).
  5. Ratio step. An allocation that gives one agent nnn tasks of time about 111, while every other agent's own tasks are nearly free, has make-span about nnn, while splitting those nnn tasks gives make-span about 111.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.12 settles the Nisan–Ronen conjecture for a natural class of mechanisms. Locality captures the mechanisms in which the price for a bundle of tasks is set only by the competition for those tasks. It includes MinWork and, more generally, every mechanism that prices tasks separately using the other agents' bids on them. The theorem says that for this class the trivial per-task auction is already optimal, so any improvement over the ratio nnn must use prices that depend on the other agents' times on tasks outside the bundle.

Formalizing it. The statement is not open: it follows from the 2023 proof of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, and Nisan and Ronen's own argument is much shorter. That argument is a sketch, though. Lemma 4.13 rests on an informal measure-theoretic appeal, and the core claim relies on a maximization property stated over all sets of tasks. A machine-checked proof pins down exactly which properties of truthful mechanisms the short argument needs. None of these results is known to have been formalized. The definitions (type vectors, truthful mechanisms, prices, locality) are shared with the other missions of this series.

Difficulty

An argument that looks at one agent at a time does not go through. Changing one agent's declaration changes the prices offered to every other agent, so an allocation that is stable for one agent can shift for another. The argument needs a type vector at which every agent's choice is strict, and only then can it lower times agent by agent and follow the allocation. Producing such a type vector is Lemma 4.13. The printed argument for it applies a "for almost every type vector" statement to sets defined by the price functions of an arbitrary mechanism, which need not be measurable. A proof must therefore work without any regularity of the mechanism. A second difficulty is Definition 12's convention that a set the agent cannot obtain has price 000. Locality constrains these zero prices too, and the argument has to account for sets that are obtainable at one type vector and not at a nearby one.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n, tasks Fin k. An allocation is a function Fin k → Fin n, a type vector is Fin n → Fin k → ℝ, and a mechanism is a pair of functions alloc (declarations to allocation) and pay (declarations to the payment handed to each agent). Utilities are quasi-linear. All types, declarations and misreports are positive, and every truthfulness, locality and approximation quantifier ranges over positive type vectors. The make-span is a Finset.sup' over the nonempty set of agents ([NeZero n]).

Conventions and explicit thresholds:

  • k≥n2k \ge n^2k≥n2. The theorem is printed without a bound on the number of tasks, and its proof begins "Let k≥n2k \ge n^2k≥n2". The goal carries k≥n2k \ge n^2k≥n2 as a hypothesis.
  • Truthfulness is assumed. §4.3 assumes throughout that the mechanism is truthful (by the revelation principle this is no loss). The goal quantifies over all truthful local mechanisms.
  • Prices use Definition 12 literally, including the value 000 for sets the agent cannot obtain, and locality is Definition 14 applied to that price function over all sets XXX, not only single tasks. When several declarations give the same set, the price uses one chosen witness; by Proposition 4.4 the choice does not matter for truthful mechanisms.
  • Proposition 4.5 is stated over the sets the agent can obtain. As printed, over all subsets, it is false for a truthful mechanism that never leaves an agent idle and pays it negative amounts. Uniqueness of maximizers (Lemma 4.13, Claim 4.14) refers to the same family.
  • Lemma 4.13 uses Mathlib's norm on Fin n → Fin k → ℝ, the sup norm. No measurability of the mechanism is assumed.
  • Claim 4.14 is printed at tji=1t^i_j = 1tji​=1 with 0<ε<10 < \varepsilon < 10<ε<1. The first step is stated at any type vector, with 0<ε≤tji0 < \varepsilon \le t^i_j0<ε≤tji​ on the lowered tasks.
  • Running time and computability are out of scope.

Ruled-out trivializations: locality is not restricted to single tasks; the goal does not assume that maximizers are unique at every type vector (that is Lemma 4.13's conclusion at one point, not a hypothesis); and the bound holds for every c<nc < nc<n, not for some.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over allocation fibres, sup norms on function spaces, and a genericity argument for finitely many affine functions (Lemma 4.13). The model file and the price and locality definitions are reusable in the other missions of the series. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995 (pp. 876–880, basic properties of truthful mechanisms).
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Vidali, A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms, Algorithmica 55 (2009).
  • E. Koutsoupias, A. Vidali, A lower bound of 1+φ for truthful scheduling mechanisms, Algorithmica 66 (2013).
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovács, A proof of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, STOC 2023.
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design II: A Lower Bound for Truthful Task SchedulingResearch Paper

Motivation

Algorithms deployed on the Internet often take their inputs from parties who own them and who may lie when lying pays. Nisan and Ronen's Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001) proposed studying optimization problems in this setting: the algorithm designer may hand out payments, and must guarantee that the intended output is produced when every participant acts in its own interest. The paper's central test case is scheduling on unrelated machines, a standard problem of combinatorial optimization, in which the machines are the selfish participants and only they know how long each job takes them.

For this problem the paper shows that incentives cost a factor of two at least: with two or more machines, no mechanism can guarantee a make-span below twice the optimum. This was the first lower bound separating what incentive-compatible mechanisms can achieve from what ordinary approximation algorithms can achieve, and it started a line of work on the "Nisan–Ronen conjecture" (that the right factor for nnn machines is nnn), with improved lower bounds by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Vidali (Algorithmica, 2009) and by Koutsoupias and Vidali (Algorithmica, 2013), and a resolution announced by Christodoulou, Koutsoupias and Kovács (STOC 2023).

Setting

There are nnn agents (machines) i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n and kkk tasks j=1,…,kj = 1,\dots,kj=1,…,k. Agent iii's private type is the vector ti=(t1i,…,tki)t^i = (t^i_1,\dots,t^i_k)ti=(t1i​,…,tki​) of positive real numbers, tjit^i_jtji​ being the time agent iii needs for task jjj; a type vector is t=(t1,…,tn)t = (t^1,\dots,t^n)t=(t1,…,tn). An allocation xxx assigns every task to one agent; xix^ixi is the set of tasks given to agent iii. For a set XXX of tasks write ti(X)=∑j∈Xtjit^i(X) = \sum_{j\in X} t^i_jti(X)=∑j∈X​tji​. The objective is the make-span

g(x,t)=max⁡iti(xi),g(x,t) = \max_{i} t^i(x^i),g(x,t)=imax​ti(xi),

and an allocation rule is a ccc-approximation if its make-span is at most ccc times that of every allocation, on every type vector.

A mechanism m=(o,p)m = (o,p)m=(o,p) gives each agent iii a set AiA^iAi of strategies. On a strategy profile a=(a1,…,an)a = (a^1,\dots,a^n)a=(a1,…,an) it outputs an allocation o(a)o(a)o(a) and hands agent iii a payment pi(a)p^i(a)pi(a). An agent of type tit^iti has utility pi(a)−ti(oi(a))p^i(a) - t^i(o^i(a))pi(a)−ti(oi(a)). A strategy is dominant if it maximizes the agent's utility whatever the others play. The mechanism implements a ccc-approximation if every agent of every type has a dominant strategy and every profile of dominant strategies yields a ccc-approximate allocation.

A direct mechanism (x,p)(x,p)(x,p) has AiA^iAi equal to the set of types, and is truthful if reporting the true type is dominant. For a truthful mechanism, the price pi(X,t−i)p^i(X,t^{-i})pi(X,t−i) is the payment agent iii receives when, against the others' reports t−it^{-i}t−i, some report of its own makes it receive exactly XXX (and 000 if none does); the price difference is Δi(A,B)=pi(A∪B,t−i)−pi(A,t−i)\Delta^i(A,B) = p^i(A\cup B,t^{-i}) - p^i(A,t^{-i})Δi(A,B)=pi(A∪B,t−i)−pi(A,t−i).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.6

For every n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, k≥3k\ge3k≥3 and c<2c<2c<2, no mechanism with any strategy sets implements a ccc-approximation:

∀ (A,o,p):¬ Implements(o,p,c).\forall\, (A, o, p):\quad \neg\ \mathrm{Implements}(o,p,c).∀(A,o,p):¬ Implements(o,p,c).

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1 (revelation principle): a mechanism implementing a ccc-approximation yields a truthful direct mechanism whose allocation rule is a ccc-approximation.
  2. Theorem 4.6 for truthful mechanisms (§4.3): no truthful direct mechanism has a ccc-approximate allocation rule for c<2c<2c<2. With milestone 1 it gives the goal.
  3. Proposition 4.4 (independence): for a truthful mechanism, t1−i=t2−it_1^{-i}=t_2^{-i}t1−i​=t2−i​ and xi(t1)=xi(t2)x^i(t_1)=x^i(t_2)xi(t1​)=xi(t2​) imply pi(t1)=pi(t2)p^i(t_1)=p^i(t_2)pi(t1​)=pi(t2​).
  4. Proposition 4.5 (maximization): xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t) maximizes pi(X,t−i)−ti(X)p^i(X,t^{-i}) - t^i(X)pi(X,t−i)−ti(X) over attainable XXX.
  5. Lemma 4.7: the price-difference inequalities satisfied by xi(t)x^i(t)xi(t), and the uniqueness statement for sets satisfying them strictly.
  6. Claim 4.8: for two agents, all-ones types and 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1, moving agent 1's times to ε\varepsilonε on its own bundle and 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε elsewhere leaves the allocation unchanged.
  7. The even case of the ratio: at that perturbed instance the mechanism's make-span is ∣x2(t)∣|x^2(t)|∣x2(t)∣ while some allocation achieves 12∣x2(t)∣+kε\tfrac12|x^2(t)| + k\varepsilon21​∣x2(t)∣+kε.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.6 shows that the requirement of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, by itself, rules out approximation ratios below 222 for scheduling on unrelated machines, a problem for which polynomial-time 222-approximation algorithms that ignore incentives exist (Lenstra, Shmoys, Tardos 1990) and for which the exact optimum is computable in exponential time. Combined with the MinWork mechanism of the same paper (an nnn-approximation), it determines the optimal ratio for two machines. It is the base case of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture and the prototype of the "characterize truthful mechanisms by prices" technique used throughout later work on the conjecture.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1999, but no machine-checked version is known to exist. The mission produces a formal account of general mechanisms with arbitrary strategy sets, dominant-strategy implementation, the revelation principle in that generality, and the price characterization of truthful mechanisms (independence and maximization). These are reusable for every other lower bound in this paper and for the later literature on the conjecture.

Difficulty

The statement quantifies over all mechanisms, with arbitrary strategy sets and arbitrary payment functions, so no finite search settles it. The revelation principle reduces to truthful direct mechanisms, but even these are an infinite-dimensional family: the allocation rule may break ties in any way, and prices may be any functions of the other agents' reports.

The printed argument also has two places that need care. Proposition 4.5 and Lemma 4.7, as printed, range over all sets of tasks, while Definition 12 gives unattainable sets price 000; the statements hold only over attainable sets, and are formalized that way. And the case where agent 2's bundle has odd size is dispatched in one sentence ("which still yields the same allocation"), which the preceding lemma does not justify when agent 2's best bundle at the perturbed prices is not unique. A complete formal proof of the goal must supply an argument for that case.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin n, tasks Fin k; an allocation is a function Fin k → Fin n; bundles may be empty. The make-span is a finite maximum and assumes n≥1n\ge1n≥1 (NeZero n).
  • Types, declarations and misreports are strictly positive reals throughout (Definition 10). Utility is quasi-linear; payments are handed to the agent and may have either sign.
  • A general mechanism has strategy sets A : Fin n → Type u (any universe), output ooo and payments ppp on dependent strategy profiles. Implements requires both that every agent of every positive type has a dominant strategy and that every profile of dominant strategies yields a ccc-approximate allocation. Dominance is against every profile of the others, not only dominant ones. Without the existence clause, a mechanism with no dominant strategies would implement vacuously; the definition excludes that.
  • Thresholds made explicit: n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and k≥3k\ge3k≥3, both taken from the proof ("We prove the theorem for the case of two agents"; "Let k≥3k\ge3k≥3"). The goal holds for each fixed nnn and kkk and every c<2c<2c<2, for every mechanism, with no restriction on tie-breaking and no requirement of strong truthfulness. At n=1n=1n=1 the claim is false.
  • Proposition 2.1 is stated for task scheduling with the ccc-approximation specification; "truthful implementation" is read as truth-telling dominant and the truthful output ccc-approximate.
  • Printed slips: Proposition 4.5 and Lemma 4.7 are stated over attainable sets; the "Moreover" of Lemma 4.7 requires YYY attainable. The odd case of the ratio step is not a milestone.
  • The reduction from n>2n>2n>2 to two agents ("having the other agents be much slower") is not a separate milestone; the goal covers every n≥2n\ge2n≥2.
  • Running time ("polynomial-time computable") is out of scope and not modelled.

Contributions of any of the milestones are welcome, as are alternative proofs of the goal that avoid the terse odd case.

Selected references

  • N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games and Economic Behavior 35 (2001) 166–196. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0790
  • A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995 (revelation principle, p. 871).
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46 (1990) 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Vidali, A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms, Algorithmica 55 (2009).
  • E. Koutsoupias, A. Vidali, A lower bound of 1+φ for truthful scheduling mechanisms, Algorithmica 66 (2013).
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, A. Kovács, A proof of the Nisan–Ronen conjecture, STOC 2023.
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Discrete Convex Analysis XIV: The König-Egerváry Theorem for Mixed MatricesTextbook

Motivation

Every physical or engineering model built from linear relations mixes two kinds of numbers. Some coefficients are exact — the ±1\pm 1±1 entries recording Kirchhoff's current and voltage laws in an electrical network, or the incidence structure of a mechanical linkage — because they come from a topological or combinatorial fact, not a measurement. Others are physical parameters: resistances, masses, spring constants, reaction rates. These are known only approximately, and different parameters are, for modeling purposes, independent of one another. Classical linear algebra treats every entry of a coefficient matrix alike, so it cannot express this distinction, and a numerical computation on a matrix with noisy parameter entries can accidentally hit a non-generic coincidence — a determinant that would vanish only for a measure-zero set of parameter values, but that plain Gaussian elimination has no way to certify is not actually structurally forced to vanish. Murota and collaborators (see the bibliographical notes to chapter 12; the underlying theory is developed at length in Murota's Matrices and Matroids for Systems Analysis, 2000) formalized this distinction through mixed matrices, and showed that their key structural questions — is the matrix nonsingular, and what is its rank — reduce to a combinatorial optimization problem solvable by the discrete convex analysis this book develops. This mission formalizes that reduction and its capstone consequence, a generalization of the classical König–Egerváry theorem.

Setting

Fix two fields K⊆FK \subseteq FK⊆F: typically K=QK = \mathbb{Q}K=Q and FFF a field large enough to hold every number in the problem. A family t1,…,tm∈Ft_1, \dots, t_m \in Ft1​,…,tm​∈F is algebraically independent over KKK if no nonzero polynomial with coefficients in KKK vanishes at (t1,…,tm)(t_1, \dots, t_m)(t1​,…,tm​) — informally, the tit_iti​ behave as free, unconstrained parameters relative to KKK. Fix finite row and column index sets RRR and CCC. A matrix A=(Aij)i∈R,j∈CA = (A_{ij})_{i \in R, j \in C}A=(Aij​)i∈R,j∈C​ over FFF is a mixed matrix with respect to (K,F)(K, F)(K,F) if it decomposes as

A=Q+TA = Q + TA=Q+T

where Q=(Qij)Q = (Q_{ij})Q=(Qij​) has every entry in KKK, and T=(Tij)T = (T_{ij})T=(Tij​) has entries in FFF whose nonzero values, taken together as one family, are algebraically independent over KKK. QQQ models the exact, structural part of the system; TTT models the independent physical parameters. For I⊆RI \subseteq RI⊆R and J⊆CJ \subseteq CJ⊆C, write A[I,J]A[I,J]A[I,J] for the submatrix with rows III and columns JJJ. The rank of AAA is its rank over FFF — equivalently, the size of the largest nonvanishing-determinant square submatrix. Write ρ(I,J)=rank⁡Q[I,J]\rho(I,J) = \operatorname{rank} Q[I,J]ρ(I,J)=rankQ[I,J], τ(I,J)=rank⁡T[I,J]\tau(I,J) = \operatorname{rank} T[I,J]τ(I,J)=rankT[I,J], and γ(I,J)\gamma(I,J)γ(I,J) for the number of rows of III that contain a nonzero entry of TTT in some column of JJJ. A mixed polynomial matrix A(s)=Q(s)+T(s)A(s) = Q(s) + T(s)A(s)=Q(s)+T(s) is the same decomposition applied entrywise to matrices whose entries are polynomials in an indeterminate sss (used to model the Laplace- or zzz-transform variable of a linear time-invariant system): Q(s)Q(s)Q(s) has every coefficient of every entry in KKK, and the coefficients of T(s)T(s)T(s)'s entries, taken together, are algebraically independent over KKK.

Formalization targets

Theorem 12.9 (goal).For a mixed matrix A=Q+T, ∃ I⊆R, J⊆C:∣I∣+∣J∣−rank⁡Q[I,J]=∣R∣+∣C∣−rank⁡A  and  rank⁡T[I,J]=0.\textbf{Theorem 12.9 (goal).}\quad \text{For a mixed matrix } A=Q+T,\ \exists\, I \subseteq R,\ J \subseteq C:\quad |I|+|J|-\operatorname{rank} Q[I,J] = |R|+|C|-\operatorname{rank} A \ \ \text{and}\ \ \operatorname{rank} T[I,J] = 0.Theorem 12.9 (goal).For a mixed matrix A=Q+T, ∃I⊆R, J⊆C:∣I∣+∣J∣−rankQ[I,J]=∣R∣+∣C∣−rankA  and  rankT[I,J]=0.

This is the König–Egerváry theorem for mixed matrices: a combinatorial certificate of AAA's rank deficiency, generalizing the classical theorem relating the maximum matching size of a bipartite graph (equivalently, the rank of a 0-1 matrix) to a minimum vertex cover. It is reached via three supporting results, each a genuine theorem in its own right: Proposition 12.6 (nonsingularity of AAA reduces to nonsingularity of a QQQ-part and a TTT-part on complementary index splits), Theorem 12.7 (the resulting rank max-formula), and Theorem 12.8 (the three dual min-formulas Theorem 12.9 is extracted from). Theorem 12.13 extends the max-formula to the degree of the determinant of a mixed polynomial matrix.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 12.9 gives a certificate, not just a number: a pair (I,J)(I,J)(I,J) that simultaneously proves the exact numeric rank contribution of QQQ and exhibits a submatrix of TTT that vanishes identically. Because ρ\rhoρ (via Gaussian elimination on QQQ) and γ\gammaγ, τ\tauτ (via maximum bipartite matching on TTT's nonzero pattern) are each individually cheap to evaluate, and the min-max structure of Theorem 12.8 is exactly the kind of problem Edmonds's matroid intersection theorem (a special case of this book's Theorem 4.18) and this book's discrete convexity machinery solve efficiently, the whole rank computation for a mixed matrix — and hence the generic solvability test for a physical system modeled by one — is polynomial-time, despite Theorem 12.7's formula naively ranging over exponentially many index-set pairs.

Formalizing it. All five results in this mission are proved in the source text (this is textbook, not open, mathematics). What formalization adds is a machine-checked confirmation that the genericity hypothesis — "the nonzero entries of TTT are algebraically independent" — is precisely what the printed proofs use, expressed through Mathlib's own AlgebraicIndependent rather than an informal paraphrase such as "generic" or "random" values, which would be either meaningless or a different (probabilistic) condition.

Difficulty

The naive approach to testing whether A=Q+TA = Q+TA=Q+T is nonsingular is to expand det⁡A\det AdetA directly and check whether the resulting expression, as a polynomial in TTT's free parameters, is the zero polynomial. This is exactly what genericity is supposed to let you avoid: Proposition 12.6's proof observes that the Laplace-type expansion det⁡A=∑∣I∣=∣J∣±det⁡Q[I,J]⋅det⁡T[R∖I,C∖J]\det A = \sum_{|I|=|J|} \pm \det Q[I,J] \cdot \det T[R\setminus I, C\setminus J]detA=∑∣I∣=∣J∣​±detQ[I,J]⋅detT[R∖I,C∖J] has no cancellation between distinct terms, precisely because the nonzero entries of TTT are algebraically independent — a coincidental cancellation would be a nontrivial polynomial relation among free parameters, which cannot happen. This turns a determinant computation with symbolic entries into a purely combinatorial search over row/column splits, each of whose two pieces is checked in the "easy" arithmetic appropriate to it (numeric determinant for QQQ, a nonzero-pattern-only matching argument for TTT). Missing this point — e.g. by treating TTT's entries as merely "distinct" or "typically nonzero" rather than algebraically independent — reintroduces exactly the cancellation risk the theorem is built to rule out.

Formalization scope

Row and column index sets RRR, CCC are general finite types (Fintype, with DecidableEq where needed for Finset operations), not fixed to Fin n\mathrm{Fin}\ nFin n. No constant appears in any statement in this mission — every quantity (ranks, cardinalities, γ\gammaγ) is instance-dependent, so rule 7's explicit-constant obligation does not apply here. "Nonsingular" for a (possibly rectangular, cross-type-indexed) submatrix M[I,J]M[I,J]M[I,J] is formalized as I.card = J.card together with rank M[I,J] = I.card (full rank) rather than via Matrix.det, because Mathlib's determinant requires both index sets to be the same Lean type, which I : Finset R and J : Finset C are not in general even when equinumerous; this coincides with ordinary nonsingularity whenever the ambient matrix is genuinely square. The degree of the determinant of a submatrix in Theorem 12.13 is computed the same way, via an arbitrary reindexing bijection between the row- and column-index subtypes — a choice that changes the determinant by at most a sign and hence never changes its degree. A formalization that replaced the genericity hypothesis on TTT with mere distinctness of its nonzero entries would admit spurious cancellations in the determinant expansion and would not prove Proposition 12.6 or any of its consequences; AlgebraicIndependent K is the precise, non-trivializing condition the book's proofs use. This chapter is self-contained: no definitions from any other mission in this series are imported. Reusable beyond this mission: MatrixSubRank, IsNonsingularSub, and SubDegDet apply to any pair of matrices over any field, not only to mixed-matrix decompositions.

Selected references

  • Murota, K. Discrete Convex Analysis. SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508. (Chapter 12.)
  • Murota, K. Matrices and Matroids for Systems Analysis. Springer, 2000.
  • Murota, K. "Systems Analysis by Graphs and Matroids: Structural Solvability and Controllability." Springer, 1987.
  • König, D. "Gráfok és mátrixok" (Graphs and matrices). Matematikai és Fizikai Lapok 38, 1931, 116–119.
  • Egerváry, J. "Matrixok kombinatorius tulajdonságairól" (On combinatorial properties of matrices). Matematikai és Fizikai Lapok 38, 1931, 16–28.
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Discrete Convex Analysis XXXIV: Conjugate ScalingTextbook

Motivation

This mission continues chapter 10's algorithmic account across its remaining two sections: finishing the Iwata-Fleischer-Fujishige fixing algorithm for submodular minimization (§10.2.3's tail), the steepest descent algorithm for L-convex function minimization (§10.3), and — the capstone of chapter 10's account of the M-convex submodular flow problem (§10.4) — conjugate scaling, the operation that finally makes the primal-dual algorithm run in polynomial time. As in mission 34-ch10b-algorithms, most of this block's numbered results are asymptotic complexity bounds; this mission places the results that are ordinary mathematical propositions.

Setting

The IFF fixing algorithm (mission 34-ch10b-algorithms) builds an acyclic graph D=(U,F) and partition Z,H,Γ certifying the maximal minimizer of a submodular ρ once η≤0 (Eq. (10.26)); this mission places the case-independent inequality its own legitimacy rests on, and restates its correctness conclusion. The steepest descent algorithm for an L-convex function g repeatedly minimizes the submodular set function ρ_p(X)=g(p+χ_X)-g(p) and moves to p+χ_X for its minimal minimizer X (the tie-breaking rule (10.33)); this mission places the resulting monotonicity fact and a domain-size bound for the L♮^\natural♮-convex adaptation. Conjugate scaling replaces a dual-integral M-convex function's conjugate g with g_α(p)=g(αp)/α, defining f⟨α⟩ via the resulting sup-formula (Eq. (10.77)) — a scaling operation compatible with M-convexity where the naive ⌈f(·)/α⌉ is not.

Formalization targets

Goal: Conjugate scaling preserves M-convexity (Proposition 10.41)

For a dual-integral polyhedral M-convex function f (represented as the mixed real-primal/ integer-dual conjugate of an L♮^\natural♮-convex g), the conjugate scaling f⟨α⟩ is again dual-integral M-convex, witnessed by g_α itself being L♮^\natural♮-convex, provided f⟨α⟩>-∞. Chosen as goal: this is the fact the whole conjugate scaling algorithm — chapter 10's final and most refined algorithm for the M-convex submodular flow problem — depends on, and the book's own text singles it out as the "compatible scaling operation" that makes M-convex cost scaling work where a naive approach provably does not.

Supporting structural targets

Proposition 10.26 (the case-independent inequality underlying the IFF fixing algorithm's own legitimacy) and Proposition 10.28 (that algorithm's correctness conclusion) close out mission 34-ch10b-algorithms's coverage of §10.2.3. Proposition 10.30 gives the steepest descent algorithm's monotonicity property under its tie-breaking rule; Proposition 10.32 (found by direct reading) bounds the L♮^\natural♮-convex adaptation's domain-size parameter in terms of the original function's.

Significance

Conjugate scaling is chapter 10's demonstration that M-convexity, while a combinatorial rather than a numeric-magnitude notion, still admits a genuine scaling technique compatible with its own structure — completing the book's account of the M-convex submodular flow problem with an algorithm whose polynomial running time depends on exactly this compatibility. Propositions 10.26/10.28 complete the correctness/legitimacy argument for the strongly polynomial submodular- minimization algorithm mission 34-ch10b-algorithms began placing, and Propositions 10.30/10.32 are the analogous structural facts for L-convex function minimization, chapter 10's third major algorithmic thread.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of submodular-function- minimization (§10.2 continued), L-convex minimization (§10.3), and conjugate scaling (§10.4.5). What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, including one result (Proposition 10.32) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

As in mission 34-ch10b-algorithms, several numbered results in this block are excluded as hard for being pure algorithmic-complexity bounds (Propositions 10.25, 10.27, 10.31); see HARD.md. A further three (Propositions 10.37-10.39, on the primal-dual algorithm's maximum submodular flow subproblem) are excluded for a distinct reason: the source text's own OCR extraction demonstrably cannot distinguish the two visually different capacity-bound symbols (c* overlined vs. underlined) central to their shared defining formula, confirmed directly against the raw extracted bytes, making faithful reconstruction of that formula impossible from the available text; see HARD.md.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq. All apparatus needed for Propositions 10.26/10.28 (Submodular, GammaSet, RhoTilde, ReachSet, Eta, IsMaximalMinimizer) is redeclared fresh from mission 34-ch10b-algorithms, genericized over an arbitrary ground type where the original was V-specific, since this draft cannot import that sibling. Proposition 10.26 is placed as the case-independent core inequality its own proof establishes, rather than by replicating the three-case verification against Proposition 10.24's own internal proof objects (Cases (i)-(iii)); see HARD.md. Proposition 10.30 omits its own trailing iteration-count corollary (a pure complexity bound); see HARD.md. Six numbered results (Propositions 10.25, 10.27, 10.31, 10.37, 10.38, 10.39) are hard. Contributions completing any of the five sorrys are welcome; the goal carries the most independent proof content (via the conjugacy theorem and Theorem 7.10(2), both established elsewhere in this series).

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • S. Iwata, "A faster scaling algorithm for minimizing submodular functions," SIAM Journal on Computing, 32 (2003), pp. 833-840 [99] (conjugate scaling's origin).
  • A. Frank, "A weighted matroid intersection algorithm," Journal of Algorithms, 2 (1981), pp. 328-336 [55] (the primal-dual framework this mission's Proposition 10.28 continues, via mission 34-ch10b-algorithms's own Proposition 10.24).
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The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem V: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk over Covariance Ambiguity Sets as a Quadratically Constrained ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

In the capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) a fleet of mmm vehicles of capacity QQQ leaves a depot and serves nnn customers; every customer is visited once, and the load of each route must not exceed QQQ. In practice customer demands are uncertain at planning time. The chance-constrained CVRP asks that each route respect the capacity with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, but this presupposes a known demand distribution, which is rarely available. Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) require the chance constraints to hold for every distribution in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP built from the information that can actually be estimated: support, means and dispersion bounds.

Their branch-and-cut method separates rounded capacity inequalities whose right-hand side is the worst-case value-at-risk of the total demand of a customer set SSS. This quantity is evaluated thousands of times during the search, so it matters whether it has a closed form or a small convex reformulation. This mission concerns the paper's covariance ambiguity sets (§5.2), which bound the whole covariance matrix of the demands and can therefore express that demands of nearby customers are correlated, as happens with geographically clustered demand. The covariance bound can be derived from data, for example analytically through McDiarmid's inequality (Delage and Ye, 2010) or by bootstrapping.

Setting

Customers are indexed by i∈{1,…,n}i\in\{1,\dots,n\}i∈{1,…,n} and their random demand vector is q~∈Rn\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathbb R^nq~​∈Rn. Fix a box Q=[q‾,q‾]\mathcal Q=[\underline{\boldsymbol q},\overline{\boldsymbol q}]Q=[q​,q​] with q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, a mean vector μ\boldsymbol\muμ in the interior of Q\mathcal QQ, and a symmetric positive definite matrix Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0. The covariance ambiguity set is

P={P∈P0(Rn): P[q~∈Q]=1, EP[q~]=μ, EP[(q~−μ)(q~−μ)⊤]⪯Σ},(16)\mathcal P=\Big\{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n):\ \mathbb P[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathcal Q]=1,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}]=\boldsymbol\mu,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}\big[(\tilde{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu)(\tilde{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu)^\top\big]\preceq\Sigma\Big\},\tag{16}P={P∈P0​(Rn): P[q~​∈Q]=1, EP​[q~​]=μ, EP​[(q~​−μ)(q~​−μ)⊤]⪯Σ},(16)

where P0(Rn)\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n)P0​(Rn) is the set of all probability distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and A⪯ΣA\preceq\SigmaA⪯Σ means that Σ−A\Sigma-AΣ−A is positive semidefinite.

For a distribution P\mathbb PP and a real random variable X~\tilde XX~, the value-at-risk at level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1), is P-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\mathbb P[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}P-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}. For a customer set SSS, the worst-case value-at-risk is sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i]supP∈P​P-VaR1−ϵ​[∑i∈S​q~​i​]. A route serving SSS satisfies the chance constraint for every P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P exactly when this number is at most QQQ.

Two componentwise bounds appear in the answer:

qℓ=max⁡{−1−ϵϵ(q‾−μ), q‾−μ},qu=min⁡{1−ϵϵ(μ−q‾), q‾−μ}.\boldsymbol q^\ell=\max\Big\{-\tfrac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}(\overline{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu),\ \underline{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu\Big\},\qquad\boldsymbol q^u=\min\Big\{\tfrac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol\mu-\underline{\boldsymbol q}),\ \overline{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu\Big\}.qℓ=max{−ϵ1−ϵ​(q​−μ), q​−μ},qu=min{ϵ1−ϵ​(μ−q​), q​−μ}.

A route set is an ordered partition of the customers into mmm nonempty ordered routes. It is feasible in the distributionally robust problem RVRP(P\mathcal PP) if every route satisfies the chance constraint for every P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P, and feasible in a deterministic instance with capacity Q′Q'Q′ and demands q\boldsymbol qq if every route's total demand is at most Q′Q'Q′.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

For every customer set SSS,

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=max⁡{1S⊤μ+1S⊤q: q⊤Σ−1q≤1−ϵϵ, q∈[qℓ,qu]}.(17)\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]=\max\Big\{\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol q:\ \boldsymbol q^\top\Sigma^{-1}\boldsymbol q\le\tfrac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon},\ \boldsymbol q\in[\boldsymbol q^\ell,\boldsymbol q^u]\Big\}.\tag{17}P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=max{1S⊤​μ+1S⊤​q: q⊤Σ−1q≤ϵ1−ϵ​, q∈[qℓ,qu]}.(17)

The right-hand side maximizes an affine function over the intersection of an ellipsoid and a box.

Milestone: Corollary 4 (corrected)

For a diagonal bound Σ=diag⁡(σ12,…,σn2)\Sigma=\operatorname{diag}(\sigma_1^2,\dots,\sigma_n^2)Σ=diag(σ12​,…,σn2​), program (17) collapses to a search over one parameter θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0 with S(θ)={i∈S:σi2>θqiu}S(\theta)=\{i\in S:\sigma_i^2>\theta q^u_i\}S(θ)={i∈S:σi2​>θqiu​}:

sup⁡θ 1S⊤μ+∑i∈S(θ)qiu+[1−ϵϵ−∑i∈S(θ)(qiuσi)2][∑i∈S∖S(θ)σi2],(18)\sup_{\theta}\ \mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\sum_{i\in S(\theta)}q^u_i+\sqrt{\Big[\tfrac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}-\sum_{i\in S(\theta)}\big(\tfrac{q^u_i}{\sigma_i}\big)^2\Big]\Big[\sum_{i\in S\setminus S(\theta)}\sigma_i^2\Big]},\tag{18}θsup​ 1S⊤​μ+i∈S(θ)∑​qiu​+[ϵ1−ϵ​−i∈S(θ)∑​(σi​qiu​​)2][i∈S∖S(θ)∑​σi2​]​,(18)

over the θ\thetaθ for which the first bracket is nonnegative and the point of (17) that θ\thetaθ induces respects qu\boldsymbol q^uqu (see Formalization scope).

Milestone: Theorem 6

For some instance with the ambiguity set (16), no deterministic CVRP instance on the same customers and fleet has the same set of feasible route sets.

Significance

Theorem 7 makes the worst-case value-at-risk over (16) computable in polynomial time as a convex quadratically constrained program. With it, the rounded capacity inequalities of the two-index vehicle flow formulation can be separated for covariance information. Theorem 2 of the same paper shows that the resulting demand estimator is subadditive, so this formulation is exact. Corollary 4 gives a closed form for the diagonal case, which the paper uses to evaluate the estimator in time linear in ∣S∣|S|∣S∣ after sorting. Theorem 6 explains why the paper needs this machinery: the robust feasible region cannot be reproduced by any deterministic demand vector and capacity.

The results are proved in the paper's online supplement. No part of them is formalized anywhere to our knowledge; the platform has no worst-case value-at-risk and no moment-based ambiguity set. A complete development would give machine-checked worst-case VaR bounds over moment sets with second-order information. These are used well beyond routing, in distributionally robust portfolio and inventory models.

Difficulty

The supremum ranges over an infinite-dimensional set of distributions, while (17) ranges over vectors. The inequality "≥\ge≥" requires, for every feasible q\boldsymbol qq of (17), a sequence of distributions in (16) whose value-at-risk approaches 1S⊤(μ+q)\mathbf 1_S^\top(\boldsymbol\mu+\boldsymbol q)1S⊤​(μ+q). The value-at-risk is a lower quantile, so a distribution placing mass exactly ϵ\epsilonϵ on a high point does not attain the value: the construction has to be a limit. The inequality "≤\le≤" is harder. It must rule out every distribution, not only two-point ones, and a bound through the one-dimensional Chebyshev–Cantelli inequality for ∑i∈Sq~i\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i∑i∈S​q~​i​ alone ignores the box: it yields 1−ϵϵ1S⊤Σ1S\sqrt{\frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}\mathbf 1_S^\top\Sigma\mathbf 1_S}ϵ1−ϵ​1S⊤​Σ1S​​, which is too large whenever the support bounds bind. The interaction between the Loewner constraint and the componentwise support bounds, which produces the unusual bound qℓ\boldsymbol q^\ellqℓ, is where the work lies. For Theorem 6 the difficulty is to exhibit the instance and to evaluate enough chance constraints exactly.

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based) and demand vectors are Fin n → ℝ. Distributions are measures on Fin n → ℝ. The set (16) is covarianceSet qlo qhi μ Sig: a probability measure with P (Set.Icc qlo qhi) = 1, coordinate means μ, and Sig - M positive semidefinite, where M is the matrix of integrals ∫(qi−μi)(qj−μj) dP\int(q_i-\mu_i)(q_j-\mu_j)\,d\mathbb P∫(qi​−μi​)(qj​−μj​)dP. The covariance bound is called Sig because Σ is Lean syntax. The side conditions q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, μ∈int⁡Q\boldsymbol\mu\in\operatorname{int}\mathcal Qμ∈intQ, Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0 (Sig.PosDef) and 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1 are hypotheses of every theorem. The value-at-risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk P Y (1 - ε). The worst-case value-at-risk is a real sSup over the image of the set. That image is nonempty (the Dirac measure at μ\boldsymbol\muμ lies in (16)) and bounded (the box), so the supremum is genuine. "The optimal objective value" of a maximization is stated as a supremum; attainment is not part of any claim. Σ−1\Sigma^{-1}Σ−1 is Mathlib's matrix inverse.

The paper states Theorem 7 and Corollary 4 with "P\mathbb PP-VaR" without a level; the level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, used in the sentence introducing Theorem 7 and everywhere else, is read in. Corollary 4 as printed is false. It maximizes over every θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0 with a nonnegative bracket. For n=1n=1n=1, every large θ\thetaθ then gives the value μ1+σ1(1−ϵ)/ϵ\mu_1+\sigma_1\sqrt{(1-\epsilon)/\epsilon}μ1​+σ1​(1−ϵ)/ϵ​, which can exceed q‾1\overline q_1q​1​ and hence every value-at-risk. The formal statement adds the condition that makes each θ\thetaθ a feasible point of (17): σi2s(θ)≤qiu∑k∈S∖S(θ)σk2\sigma_i^2\sqrt{s(\theta)}\le q^u_i\sqrt{\sum_{k\in S\setminus S(\theta)}\sigma_k^2}σi2​s(θ)​≤qiu​∑k∈S∖S(θ)​σk2​​ for i∈S∖S(θ)i\in S\setminus S(\theta)i∈S∖S(θ), where s(θ)s(\theta)s(θ) is the first bracket. With this condition the statement is the diagonal case of Theorem 7.

A theorem about the Lean set is trivial if the set is empty or the supremum is a junk value. Neither happens here, and replacing the Loewner constraint by a scalar variance bound on ∑i∈Sq~i\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i∑i∈S​q~​i​ would state a different theorem. The dual second-order cone program printed after Theorem 7 is not a target: as printed it has the all-ones vector where Lagrangian duality gives 1S\mathbf 1_S1S​, and it has no multiplier for q≥qℓ\boldsymbol q\ge\boldsymbol q^\ellq≥qℓ.

Needed infrastructure: quantiles of pushforward measures, the Loewner order on moment matrices, and finite-support (two-point) distributions. The value-at-risk lemmas and the moment-matrix lemmas are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of either kind are welcome. Theorem 6 needs only the route-set layer defined here and one explicit instance.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal and W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • E. Delage and Y. Ye, Distributionally Robust Optimization Under Moment Uncertainty with Application to Data-Driven Problems, Operations Research 58(3):595–612, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804441
  • G. Laporte, Y. Nobert and M. Desrochers, Optimal Routing under Capacity and Distance Restrictions, Operations Research 33(5):1050–1073, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.5.1050
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The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem IV: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk over First-Order Generic Moment Ambiguity Sets as a Convex ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

In the capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) a depot serves customers VC={1,…,n}V_C=\{1,\dots,n\}VC​={1,…,n} with mmm vehicles of capacity QQQ, and every route must respect the capacity. When customer demands are uncertain, the distributionally robust chance-constrained CVRP of Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) requires every route to meet its capacity with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under every distribution in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP, a family of distributions consistent with what is known about the demands. Such constraints are handled in a branch-and-cut scheme through rounded capacity inequalities, whose right-hand sides require one quantity for each customer subset SSS: the worst-case value-at-risk of the cumulative demand of SSS.

For ambiguity sets that describe each customer separately (marginal moment sets), this quantity is additive over customers and the problem reduces to a deterministic CVRP. Such sets cannot express that the demands of customers in the same municipality, county or state vary jointly within limits. The first-order generic moment ambiguity set does express this: it bounds the mean absolute deviation of the cumulative demand of prescribed customer groups. The mean absolute deviation is a standard robust dispersion measure, less sensitive to outliers than the standard deviation (see Casella and Berger, Statistical Inference, 2002). This mission formalizes the paper's description of the worst-case value-at-risk over such sets.

Setting

Demands form a random vector q~\tilde{\boldsymbol q}q~​ on Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The data are a support box Q=[q‾,q‾]\mathcal Q=[\underline{\boldsymbol q},\overline{\boldsymbol q}]Q=[q​,q​] with q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, a mean vector μ\boldsymbol\muμ in the interior of Q\mathcal QQ, customer subsets S1,…,Sp⊆VCS_1,\dots,S_p\subseteq V_CS1​,…,Sp​⊆VC​ and bounds ν>0\boldsymbol\nu>\mathbf 0ν>0. For A⊆VCA\subseteq V_CA⊆VC​, 1A∈{0,1}n\mathbf 1_A\in\{0,1\}^n1A​∈{0,1}n is its indicator vector. The first-order generic moment ambiguity set, Eq. (12) of the paper, is

P={P∈P0(Rn): P[q~∈Q]=1, EP[q~]=μ, EP[1Si⊤∣q~−μ∣]≤νi  ∀i=1,…,p},\mathcal P=\Bigl\{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n):\ \mathbb P[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathcal Q]=1,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}]=\boldsymbol\mu,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}\bigl[\mathbf 1_{S_i}^\top|\tilde{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu|\bigr]\le\nu_i\ \ \forall i=1,\dots,p\Bigr\},P={P∈P0​(Rn): P[q~​∈Q]=1, EP​[q~​]=μ, EP​[1Si​⊤​∣q~​−μ∣]≤νi​  ∀i=1,…,p},

where P0(Rn)\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n)P0​(Rn) is the set of probability distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣ acts componentwise. The subsets are arbitrary: they may overlap and need not cover VCV_CVC​.

For a risk level ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1) and a random variable X~\tilde XX~, the value-at-risk is P-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\mathbb P[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}P-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}. For a customer subset SSS the quantity of interest is

sup⁡P∈P P-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i].\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\ \mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Bigl[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Bigr].P∈Psup​ P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​].

Write q^=min⁡{q‾−μ, 1−ϵϵ(μ−q‾)}\hat{\boldsymbol q}=\min\{\overline{\boldsymbol q}-\boldsymbol\mu,\ \frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}(\boldsymbol\mu-\underline{\boldsymbol q})\}q^​=min{q​−μ, ϵ1−ϵ​(μ−q​)} (componentwise) and [⋅]+[\cdot]_+[⋅]+​ for the componentwise positive part. A route set R=(R1,…,Rm)\mathbf R=(\mathbf R_1,\dots,\mathbf R_m)R=(R1​,…,Rm​) partitions VCV_CVC​ into mmm nonempty ordered routes. It is feasible in the deterministic CVRP with demands q\boldsymbol qq if ∑i∈Rkqi≤Q\sum_{i\in\mathbf R_k}q_i\le Q∑i∈Rk​​qi​≤Q for all kkk, and feasible in the distributionally robust CVRP if P[∑i∈Rkq~i≤Q]≥1−ϵ\mathbb P[\sum_{i\in\mathbf R_k}\tilde q_i\le Q]\ge1-\epsilonP[∑i∈Rk​​q~​i​≤Q]≥1−ϵ for all P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P and all kkk.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 726)

For every customer subset SSS,

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=inf⁡γ∈R+p 1S⊤μ+q^⊤[1S−2∑i=1pγi1Si]++1ϵν⊤γ.\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Bigl[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Bigr]=\inf_{\boldsymbol\gamma\in\mathbb R^p_+}\ \mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\hat{\boldsymbol q}^\top\Bigl[\mathbf 1_S-2\sum_{i=1}^p\gamma_i\mathbf 1_{S_i}\Bigr]_+ +\frac1\epsilon\boldsymbol\nu^\top\boldsymbol\gamma .P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=γ∈R+p​inf​ 1S⊤​μ+q^​⊤[1S​−2i=1∑p​γi​1Si​​]+​+ϵ1​ν⊤γ.

The right-hand side is the optimal value of the paper's problem (13). The statement holds for every family of subsets and all data satisfying the standing assumptions, so it is the general form of which the milestones are special cases.

Corollary 2 (p. 726, Eq. (14))

If S1,…,Sp−1S_1,\dots,S_{p-1}S1​,…,Sp−1​ are pairwise disjoint and cover VCV_CVC​ and Sp=VCS_p=V_CSp​=VC​, then

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=1S⊤μ+min⁡{νp2ϵ, ∑i=1p−1min⁡{1S∩Si⊤q^, νi2ϵ}}.\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Bigl[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Bigr]=\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\min\Bigl\{\frac{\nu_p}{2\epsilon},\ \sum_{i=1}^{p-1}\min\Bigl\{\mathbf 1_{S\cap S_i}^\top\hat{\boldsymbol q},\ \frac{\nu_i}{2\epsilon}\Bigr\}\Bigr\}.P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=1S⊤​μ+min{2ϵνp​​, i=1∑p−1​min{1S∩Si​⊤​q^​, 2ϵνi​​}}.

Corollary 3 (pp. 726–727, Eq. (15))

If p=n+1p=n+1p=n+1, Si={i}S_i=\{i\}Si​={i} for i≤ni\le ni≤n and Sn+1=VCS_{n+1}=V_CSn+1​=VC​, then

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=1S⊤μ+min⁡{νn+12ϵ, ∑i∈Smin⁡{q^i, νi2ϵ}}.\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Bigl[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Bigr]=\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu+\min\Bigl\{\frac{\nu_{n+1}}{2\epsilon},\ \sum_{i\in S}\min\Bigl\{\hat q_i,\ \frac{\nu_i}{2\epsilon}\Bigr\}\Bigr\}.P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=1S⊤​μ+min{2ϵνn+1​​, i∈S∑​min{q^​i​, 2ϵνi​​}}.

Theorem 4 (p. 726)

For some instance with an ambiguity set of the form (12), no deterministic CVRP instance on the same customers and vehicles (capacity Q′≥0Q'\ge0Q′≥0, demands q′≥0\boldsymbol q'\ge\mathbf 0q′≥0) has the same set of feasible route sets.

Significance

Theorem 5 makes the worst-case value-at-risk over (12) computable in polynomial time as the value of a nonsmooth convex problem over the nonnegative orthant, which the paper notes can be written as a linear program. This gives the right-hand sides of the rounded capacity inequalities in a branch-and-cut scheme for the distributionally robust CVRP. Corollaries 2 and 3 give closed forms for two structured families of groups, evaluable in time linear in ∣S∣|S|∣S∣. Theorem 4 shows the gain in modelling power has a cost: unlike the marginal case, the problem cannot in general be replaced by a deterministic CVRP with altered demands. With a single customer and S1={1}S_1=\{1\}S1​={1}, Theorem 5 reduces to the closed form μ+min⁡{q^,ν/(2ϵ)}\mu+\min\{\hat q,\nu/(2\epsilon)\}μ+min{q^​,ν/(2ϵ)} for marginalized first-order sets, so it extends that single-customer formula to joint dispersion constraints.

All four results are proved in the paper's online supplement. As far as a platform search shows, none has been machine-checked. The mission produces checked proofs of the equality in Theorem 5, the two closed forms, and an explicit instance for Theorem 4.

Difficulty

The supremum ranges over an infinite-dimensional set of joint distributions, and the value-at-risk is neither convex nor concave in the distribution. Bounding the value-at-risk of each group separately and adding the bounds does not work when groups overlap, and it ignores the total-dispersion constraint. It gives only an upper bound, and in the setting of Corollary 2 that bound is strict whenever the total bound νp/(2ϵ)\nu_p/(2\epsilon)νp​/(2ϵ) is the binding term. Showing that the infimum in (13) is attained in the limit needs distributions that saturate several overlapping dispersion constraints at once while keeping the mean fixed and the support inside the box. For Theorem 4, the witness must separate the feasible-route-set family of the robust instance from every family defined by a single linear capacity inequality with nonnegative weights.

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based), subsets are Sfam : Fin p → Finset (Fin n), and a distribution is a Measure (Fin n → ℝ) that is required to be a probability measure. Support is P (Set.Icc qlo qhi) = 1, the mean condition is ∫ q, q j ∂P = μ j, and the dispersion condition is ∫ q, ∑ j ∈ Sfam l, |q j - μ j| ∂P ≤ ν l. The integrability clauses stated alongside are automatic for measures carried by the box. The value-at-risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk P Y (1 - ε). The worst-case value-at-risk is the real sSup of its image over the set; under the standing assumptions this image is nonempty (the Dirac at μ\boldsymbol\muμ lies in the set) and bounded (bounded support), so the real supremum is the paper's. The optimal value of (13) is the real sInf of the objective over {γ≥0}\{\boldsymbol\gamma\ge\mathbf 0\}{γ≥0}, a nonempty set on which the objective is bounded below by 1S⊤μ\mathbf 1_S^\top\boldsymbol\mu1S⊤​μ. Attainment is not claimed. All statements carry the standing assumptions q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, q‾<μ<q‾\underline{\boldsymbol q}<\boldsymbol\mu<\overline{\boldsymbol q}q​<μ<q​, ν>0\boldsymbol\nu>\mathbf 0ν>0 and 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1. Corollary 2 writes p=r+1p=r+1p=r+1 with the last subset Sfam (Fin.last r). Corollary 3 indexes the singleton of customer iii by Fin.castSucc i. In Theorem 4 route sets are Fin m → List (Fin n) and only feasibility is modelled; costs play no role.

The theorems are not trivialized by an empty ambiguity set or a junk supremum: membership of the Dirac distribution at μ\boldsymbol\muμ is checked locally with a sorry-free proof. Theorem 4 needs a genuinely separating instance: an instance in which no route set is robustly feasible, for example, is matched by a deterministic instance in which none is feasible either.

Needed infrastructure: two-point and finitely supported distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and their value-at-risk; weak duality for moment problems over the box; the positive-part calculus of (13). The value-at-risk lemmas for finitely supported measures are reusable in the sibling missions on this paper. Contributions of any of the milestones, of lemmas for these building blocks, or of either inequality of Theorem 5 on its own are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal and W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • G. Casella and R. L. Berger, Statistical Inference, 2nd ed., Duxbury, 2002.
  • S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804441
  • G. Laporte, Y. Nobert and M. Desrochers, Optimal routing under capacity and distance restrictions, Operations Research 33(5):1050–1073, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.5.1050
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The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem III: Worst-Case Value-at-Risk Is Additive over Marginalized Moment Ambiguity SetsResearch Paper

Motivation

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) assigns customers to a fleet of mmm identical vehicles of capacity QQQ and orders each vehicle's visits so as to minimize transportation cost, subject to each vehicle's total load not exceeding QQQ. In practice the customers' demands are not known when the routes are planned. Two classical responses are the robust CVRP, which requires feasibility for every demand vector in an uncertainty set, and the chance-constrained CVRP, which requires each capacity constraint to hold with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under a known demand distribution. The first ignores all distributional information; the second assumes a distribution that is rarely known and usually requires independent demands.

Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) study the distributionally robust chance-constrained CVRP, RVRP(P\mathcal PP), in which each capacity constraint must hold with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under every distribution of an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP. Whether this problem can be solved with existing CVRP technology depends on how the worst-case value-at-risk of a customer set's total demand behaves as a set function. This mission formalizes §4 of the paper, which treats ambiguity sets that only constrain each customer's demand separately.

Setting

There are nnn customers VC={1,…,n}V_C=\{1,\dots,n\}VC​={1,…,n} with random demand vector q~∈Rn\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathbb R^nq~​∈Rn and a risk level ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1). For a probability distribution P\mathbb PP and a real random variable X~\tilde XX~, the value-at-risk is

P-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x∈R: P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}.\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\ \mathbb P[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}.P-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x∈R: P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}.

For an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP and a customer subset SSS, the worst-case value-at-risk of SSS is sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i]supP∈P​P-VaR1−ϵ​[∑i∈S​q~​i​].

Fix a support box Q=[q‾,q‾]\mathcal Q=[\underline{\boldsymbol q},\overline{\boldsymbol q}]Q=[q​,q​] with q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, a mean vector μ\boldsymbol\muμ in the interior of Q\mathcal QQ, and for each customer iii a componentwise convex dispersion measure φi:R→Rpi\boldsymbol\varphi_i:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R^{p_i}φi​:R→Rpi​ with bound σi>φi(μi)\boldsymbol\sigma_i>\boldsymbol\varphi_i(\mu_i)σi​>φi​(μi​). The marginalized moment ambiguity set (5) is

P={P∈P0(Rn): P(q~∈Q)=1, EP[q~]=μ, EP[φi(q~i)]≤σi ∀i∈VC}.\mathcal P=\Big\{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n):\ \mathbb P(\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathcal Q)=1,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}]=\boldsymbol\mu,\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\boldsymbol\varphi_i(\tilde q_i)]\le\boldsymbol\sigma_i\ \forall i\in V_C\Big\}.P={P∈P0​(Rn): P(q~​∈Q)=1, EP​[q~​]=μ, EP​[φi​(q~​i​)]≤σi​ ∀i∈VC​}.

It constrains marginal moments only, and so contains joint distributions of every dependence structure, from independent to perfectly correlated demands. Three special cases have their own closed forms: the first-order set (6), where σi>0\sigma_i>0σi​>0 bounds the mean absolute deviation E∣q~i−μi∣\mathbb E|\tilde q_i-\mu_i|E∣q~​i​−μi​∣; the variance set (8), where σi>0\sigma_i>0σi​>0 bounds E(q~i−μi)2\mathbb E(\tilde q_i-\mu_i)^2E(q~​i​−μi​)2; and the semivariance set (10), where σi+,σi−>0\sigma_i^+,\sigma_i^->0σi+​,σi−​>0 bound E[q~i−μi]+2\mathbb E[\tilde q_i-\mu_i]_+^2E[q~​i​−μi​]+2​ and E[μi−q~i]+2\mathbb E[\mu_i-\tilde q_i]_+^2E[μi​−q~​i​]+2​.

A route set R=(R1,…,Rm)∈P(VC,m)\mathbf R=(R_1,\dots,R_m)\in\mathfrak P(V_C,m)R=(R1​,…,Rm​)∈P(VC​,m) partitions the customers into mmm nonempty ordered routes. It is feasible in RVRP(P\mathcal PP) if P[∑i∈Rkq~i≤Q]≥1−ϵ\mathbb P[\sum_{i\in R_k}\tilde q_i\le Q]\ge1-\epsilonP[∑i∈Rk​​q~​i​≤Q]≥1−ϵ for all P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P and all kkk, and feasible in the deterministic CVRP with demands q\boldsymbol qq if ∑i∈Rkqi≤Q\sum_{i\in R_k}q_i\le Q∑i∈Rk​​qi​≤Q for all kkk.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 723)

For every marginalized moment ambiguity set (5) and every nonempty S⊆VCS\subseteq V_CS⊆VC​,

sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]=∑i∈Ssup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[q~i].\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]=\sum_{i\in S}\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde q_i].P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]=i∈S∑​P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[q~​i​].

The dispersion measures are left arbitrary (convex, componentwise, any number of components), so the goal covers every set of the form (5).

Milestones

  • Proposition 2 (p. 724, Eq. (7)), first-order sets: sup⁡PP-VaR1−ϵ[q~i]=μi+min⁡{q‾i−μi,1−ϵϵ(μi−q‾i),12ϵσi}\sup_{\mathbb P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde q_i]=\mu_i+\min\{\overline q_i-\mu_i,\frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}(\mu_i-\underline q_i),\frac1{2\epsilon}\sigma_i\}supP​P-VaR1−ϵ​[q~​i​]=μi​+min{q​i​−μi​,ϵ1−ϵ​(μi​−q​i​),2ϵ1​σi​}.
  • Proposition 3 (p. 725, Eq. (9)), variance sets: the same with last term 1−ϵϵσi\sqrt{\frac{1-\epsilon}{\epsilon}\sigma_i}ϵ1−ϵ​σi​​.
  • Proposition 4 (p. 725, Eq. (11)), semivariance sets: the four-term minimum with σi+/ϵ\sqrt{\sigma_i^+/\epsilon}σi+​/ϵ​ and (1−ϵ)σi−/ϵ\sqrt{(1-\epsilon)\sigma_i^-}/\epsilon(1−ϵ)σi−​​/ϵ.
  • Corollary 1 (p. 723): a route set is feasible in RVRP(P\mathcal PP) over (5) if and only if it is feasible in the deterministic CVRP with demands qi=sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[q~i]q_i=\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde q_i]qi​=supP∈P​P-VaR1−ϵ​[q~​i​].

Significance

Theorem 3 says that over (5) the worst case of a sum is the sum of the worst cases. Because the value-at-risk is not additive for a fixed distribution, and the online supplement exhibits distributions in such a set for which the individual values-at-risk are not additive, the statement is about the ambiguity set, not about any of its members. Its consequence, Corollary 1, is that RVRP(P\mathcal PP) over (5) is a deterministic CVRP with inflated demands, so existing branch-and-cut and branch-and-cut-and-price codes solve it unchanged. Propositions 2–4 make those inflated demands explicit for three standard dispersion measures, so that the whole reduction is in closed form. The corollary also exposes a limitation: under (5) the worst-case distribution does not depend on the route set, and the model cannot represent known dependencies between customers.

The results are proved in the paper's online supplement; none has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces a checked worst-case value-at-risk calculus over moment sets with support constraints, including sharp one-sided Chebyshev-type bounds under mean-absolute-deviation, variance and semivariance constraints, which are reusable in distributionally robust optimization beyond vehicle routing.

Difficulty

The value-at-risk is neither subadditive nor superadditive in general, so neither inequality of Theorem 3 follows from properties of a single distribution. The inequality "≥\ge≥" requires combining near-worst-case distributions of the individual customers into one joint distribution in P\mathcal PP that is simultaneously near-worst for the sum; the inequality "≤\le≤" requires bounding the value-at-risk of the sum for an arbitrary joint law using only marginal information. In Propositions 2–4 the supremum is typically not attained: the distribution concentrating mass at the claimed worst-case value violates the mean constraint, and the value is reached only as a limit of distributions in P\mathcal PP. An argument that exhibits a single maximizer therefore fails, and the statements must be proved as equalities of suprema.

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based) and demand vectors are Fin n → ℝ. An ambiguity set is a set of measures on Fin n → ℝ, each required to be a probability measure; the support condition is P (Set.Icc qlo qhi) = 1 and expectations are Bochner integrals. The sets are sets of joint laws on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, never products of marginals. In (5) each expectation EP[φi,l(q~i)]\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\varphi_{i,l}(\tilde q_i)]EP​[φi,l​(q~​i​)] is required to exist; this is automatic for convex φi,l\varphi_{i,l}φi,l​ on the bounded support. The value-at-risk is the published definition MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk P Y (1 - ε), and the worst-case value-at-risk is the real supremum of its values over the ambiguity set; under the standing assumptions that set of values is nonempty (the Dirac law at μ\boldsymbol\muμ belongs to P\mathcal PP) and bounded (by the support), so the supremum is not a default value. The single-customer quantity is the case S={i}S=\{i\}S={i}. The standing assumptions (q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0, q‾<μ<q‾\underline{\boldsymbol q}<\boldsymbol\mu<\overline{\boldsymbol q}q​<μ<q​, convexity of φi,l\varphi_{i,l}φi,l​, φi,l(μi)<σi,l\varphi_{i,l}(\mu_i)<\sigma_{i,l}φi,l​(μi​)<σi,l​, σ,σ±>0\boldsymbol\sigma,\boldsymbol\sigma^\pm>\mathbf 0σ,σ±>0, 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1) are explicit hypotheses. Routes are lists of customers; a route set has nonempty routes whose concatenation is a permutation of all customers. Costs are not formalized, since both routing problems minimize the same cost over their feasible route sets.

All targets are equalities or equivalences; a one-sided inequality, a statement asserting that some distribution attains the value, or a formulation over product measures is a different theorem and does not count.

Contributions welcome: the reduction of the chance constraint to a value-at-risk bound, the right-continuity lemmas for the value-at-risk of a measure on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, two-point constructions in the ambiguity sets, and one-sided Chebyshev-type bounds with support constraints.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal and W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • G. Laporte, Y. Nobert and M. Desrochers, Optimal routing under capacity and distance restrictions, Operations Research 33(5):1050–1073, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.33.5.1050
  • G. Casella and R. L. Berger, Statistical Inference, 2nd ed., Duxbury, 2002.
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The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem II: Moment Ambiguity Sets Give Subadditive Demand EstimatorsResearch Paper

Motivation

The capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) asks for a set of minimum-cost routes by which a fleet of identical vehicles of capacity QQQ, based at a depot, serves every customer exactly once without any vehicle carrying more than its capacity. In practice customer demands are not known when routes are planned. Ghosal and Wiesemann (Oper. Res. 68(3), 2020) study the distributionally robust CVRP: the demand vector q~\tilde{\boldsymbol q}q~​ is random, its distribution is known only to lie in an ambiguity set P\mathcal PP, and every route must respect its capacity with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under every distribution in P\mathcal PP.

Exact CVRP solvers rely on compact two-index vehicle flow formulations strengthened by rounded capacity inequalities, which bound from below the number of vehicles entering any customer subset SSS by a demand estimator d(S)d(S)d(S). The paper shows (its Theorem 1) that the robust two-index formulation is exact whenever the demand estimator is subadditive and demands are nonnegative, and that this fails for some natural ambiguity sets: sets that fix the marginal distribution of each customer's demand violate it (Example 1). This mission formalizes the paper's positive result for the most widely used class of ambiguity sets, the moment ambiguity sets of distributionally robust optimization (see El Ghaoui et al. 2003, Delage and Ye 2010, Wiesemann et al. 2014).

Setting

There are nnn customers, indexed i=1,…,ni=1,\dots,ni=1,…,n; the demand vector is q~∈Rn\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathbb R^nq~​∈Rn. Fix

  • a rectangular support Q=[q‾,q‾]\mathcal Q=[\underline{\boldsymbol q},\overline{\boldsymbol q}]Q=[q​,q​] with q‾≥0\underline{\boldsymbol q}\ge\mathbf 0q​≥0;
  • a mean vector μ∈Rn\boldsymbol\mu\in\mathbb R^nμ∈Rn;
  • a dispersion measure φ=(φ1,…,φp):Rn→Rp\boldsymbol\varphi=(\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_p):\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^pφ=(φ1​,…,φp​):Rn→Rp (for example mean absolute deviations ∣qi−μi∣|q_i-\mu_i|∣qi​−μi​∣, variances (qi−μi)2(q_i-\mu_i)^2(qi​−μi​)2 or Huber losses) and bounds σ∈Rp\boldsymbol\sigma\in\mathbb R^pσ∈Rp.

The moment ambiguity set is

P={P∈P0(Rn): P(q~∈Q)=1,  EP[q~]=μ,  EP[φ(q~)]≤σ},\mathcal P=\Big\{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n):\ \mathbb P(\tilde{\boldsymbol q}\in\mathcal Q)=1,\ \ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde{\boldsymbol q}]=\boldsymbol\mu,\ \ \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\boldsymbol\varphi(\tilde{\boldsymbol q})]\le\boldsymbol\sigma\Big\},P={P∈P0​(Rn): P(q~​∈Q)=1,  EP​[q~​]=μ,  EP​[φ(q~​)]≤σ},

where P0(Rn)\mathcal P_0(\mathbb R^n)P0​(Rn) denotes all probability distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The paper's standing assumptions are μ∈int⁡Q\boldsymbol\mu\in\operatorname{int}\mathcal Qμ∈intQ, each φl\varphi_lφl​ closed and convex, and φ(μ)<σ\boldsymbol\varphi(\boldsymbol\mu)<\boldsymbol\sigmaφ(μ)<σ.

For a distribution P\mathbb PP the value-at-risk of a random variable is P-VaR1−ϵ[X~]=inf⁡{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\tilde X]=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\mathbb P[\tilde X\le x]\ge1-\epsilon\}P-VaR1−ϵ​[X~]=inf{x∈R:P[X~≤x]≥1−ϵ}, with risk level ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1). The worst-case value-at-risk of a customer subset SSS is sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i]supP∈P​P-VaR1−ϵ​[∑i∈S​q~​i​], and the demand estimator (2) is

dP(S)=max⁡{⌈1Qsup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]⌉,1}(S≠∅),dP(∅)=0.d_{\mathcal P}(S)=\max\left\{\left\lceil\frac1Q\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]\right\rceil,1\right\}\quad(S\neq\emptyset),\qquad d_{\mathcal P}(\emptyset)=0 .dP​(S)=max{⌈Q1​P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]⌉,1}(S=∅),dP​(∅)=0.

The Lean development names these momentAmbiguitySet qlo qhi μ φ σ, worstCaseVaR, demandEstimator and twoPointMeasure in the namespace DRCVRP.Moment.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 723)

For every moment ambiguity set satisfying the standing assumptions, every ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1) and every Q>0Q>0Q>0,

dP(S∪T)≤dP(S)+dP(T)for all customer subsets S,T.d_{\mathcal P}(S\cup T)\le d_{\mathcal P}(S)+d_{\mathcal P}(T)\qquad\text{for all customer subsets } S,T .dP​(S∪T)≤dP​(S)+dP​(T)for all customer subsets S,T.

This is condition (S) of the paper, stated for the rounded estimator (2) and for all pairs of subsets, overlapping or empty ones included.

Milestone: Proposition 1 (p. 723)

For every customer subset SSS there are two-point distributions Pt=p1tδq1t+p2tδq2t∈P\mathbb P^t=p_1^t\delta_{\boldsymbol q_1^t}+p_2^t\delta_{\boldsymbol q_2^t}\in\mathcal PPt=p1t​δq1t​​+p2t​δq2t​​∈P with p1t,p2t≥0p_1^t,p_2^t\ge0p1t​,p2t​≥0 and q1t,q2t∈Q\boldsymbol q_1^t,\boldsymbol q_2^t\in\mathcal Qq1t​,q2t​∈Q such that

Pt-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i]⟶sup⁡P∈PP-VaR1−ϵ[∑i∈Sq~i](t→∞).\mathbb P^t\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]\longrightarrow\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-VaR}_{1-\epsilon}\Big[\sum_{i\in S}\tilde q_i\Big]\qquad(t\to\infty).Pt-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​]⟶P∈Psup​P-VaR1−ϵ​[i∈S∑​q~​i​](t→∞).

Significance

Combined with the paper's Theorem 1, Theorem 2 says that for every moment ambiguity set with nonnegative demands the robust CVRP can be solved through the compact two-index formulation with robust rounded capacity inequalities, i.e. by the branch-and-cut machinery of the deterministic CVRP. It also separates moment ambiguity sets from ambiguity sets built from marginal histograms, hypothesis tests, ϕ\phiϕ-divergences or Wasserstein balls, whose estimators can violate subadditivity. Proposition 1 describes the worst case: however many moment constraints the set contains, two demand scenarios suffice to approach the worst-case value-at-risk, strengthening the Richter–Rogosinski theorem for this functional.

Both results are proved in the paper's online supplement. They have not, to the best of current knowledge, been machine checked. This mission produces a checked statement and proof of both, together with a reusable encoding of moment ambiguity sets and of the worst-case value-at-risk over them. The companion missions of the series formalize the equivalence theorem (I) and the explicit worst-case VaR formulas for marginalized (III), first-order (IV) and covariance (V) ambiguity sets.

Difficulty

Value-at-risk is not subadditive for a single distribution, so the obvious route, subadditivity of the worst-case VaR followed by ⌈a+b⌉≤⌈a⌉+⌈b⌉\lceil a+b\rceil\le\lceil a\rceil+\lceil b\rceil⌈a+b⌉≤⌈a⌉+⌈b⌉, needs an argument specific to the moment set; for the marginal-histogram set of Example 1 the worst-case VaR itself fails to be subadditive. The supremum over P\mathcal PP ranges over an infinite-dimensional set of distributions and is in general not attained, so an argument that picks a maximizer does not apply, and the classical finite-support reduction (Richter–Rogosinski) yields a number of support points that grows with the number of moment constraints, not two. The integer rounding and the max⁡{⋅,1}\max\{\cdot,1\}max{⋅,1} must also be handled for all pairs of subsets, including overlapping ones.

Formalization scope

Customers are Fin n (0-based) and customer subsets are Finset (Fin n). Distributions are measures on Fin n → ℝ; membership in the moment set requires a probability measure giving mass one to the closed box Set.Icc qlo qhi, integrable coordinates with ∫ q, q i ∂P = μ i (an equality), and integrable φ l with ∫ q, φ l q ∂P ≤ σ l. The integrability clauses hold automatically under the standing assumptions and do not shrink the set. The dispersion measure is an arbitrary real-valued function whose components are convex (convex real functions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn are continuous, which covers "closed"); p=0p=0p=0 is allowed. The value-at-risk is the published platform definition MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk at level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ. The worst-case VaR is a real sSup; over a moment set satisfying the standing assumptions the set of VaRs is nonempty (the Dirac measure at μ\boldsymbol\muμ belongs to P\mathcal PP) and bounded by the box, so this is the true supremum. The estimator is integer valued. Every standing assumption is a hypothesis of both theorems.

Neither statement can be satisfied trivially: the goal is about the rounded estimator of the true supremum over a nonempty set, not about subadditivity of an arbitrary set function, and the milestone requires the two-point laws to lie in P\mathcal PP and their VaRs to converge to the supremum, not to be attained. Extended-valued dispersion measures, such as the one expressing the covariance set of §5.2 as an instance of (4), are outside the scope of the real-valued encoding.

A complete development needs basic facts about quantiles of finitely supported measures, the structure of the moment set, and a duality or construction argument for the worst-case VaR. Lemmas about value-at-risk of two-point laws and about moment sets are reusable across the series. Proofs of the milestone, of the goal, and of intermediate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Ghosal, W. Wiesemann, The Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Vehicle Routing Problem, Operations Research 68(3):716–732, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1924
  • L. El Ghaoui, M. Oks, F. Oustry, Worst-case value-at-risk and robust portfolio optimization: A conic programming approach, Operations Research 51(4):543–556, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.4.543.16101
  • E. Delage, Y. Ye, Distributionally robust optimization under moment uncertainty with application to data-driven problems, Operations Research 58(3):595–612, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn, M. Sim, Distributionally robust convex optimization, Operations Research 62(6):1358–1376, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1314
  • A. Shapiro, D. Dentcheva, A. Ruszczyński, Lectures on Stochastic Programming: Modeling and Theory, 2nd ed., SIAM, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973433
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Discrete Convex Analysis XI: Max-Flow Min-Cut for Submodular FlowsTextbook

Motivation

Chapters 6 through 8 built M-convex and L-convex functions and their conjugacy theory as abstract combinatorial objects on the integer lattice. Chapter 9 grounds that theory in a setting every reader already knows: network flows. The chapter's throughline is that the classical minimum cost flow problem — flows bounded by simple arc capacities, with a single linear cost — is a shadow of a much richer submodular flow problem, in which the constraint on a flow's boundary is not "equal a fixed supply vector" but "lie in the base polyhedron of an arbitrary submodular set function." This mission formalizes the feasibility theory for both problems and its capstone: a max-flow min-cut theorem for submodular flows that specializes to the classical max-flow min-cut theorem exactly when the submodular function degenerates to a plain capacity function.

Setting

Let G=(V,A)G = (V, A)G=(V,A) be a finite directed graph, with tail,head:A→V\mathrm{tail}, \mathrm{head} : A \to Vtail,head:A→V giving each arc's start and end vertex. The boundary of a flow ξ:A→R\xi : A \to \mathbb Rξ:A→R is ∂ξ(v)=∑a:tail(a)=vξ(a)−∑a:head(a)=vξ(a)\partial\xi(v) = \sum_{a : \mathrm{tail}(a) = v} \xi(a) - \sum_{a : \mathrm{head}(a) = v} \xi(a)∂ξ(v)=∑a:tail(a)=v​ξ(a)−∑a:head(a)=v​ξ(a). For X⊆VX \subseteq VX⊆V, Δ+X\Delta^+XΔ+X and Δ−X\Delta^-XΔ−X are the arcs leaving and entering XXX. Given an upper capacity cˉ:A→R∪{+∞}\bar c : A \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}cˉ:A→R∪{+∞} and lower capacity c‾:A→R∪{−∞}\underline c : A \to \mathbb R \cup \{-\infty\}c​:A→R∪{−∞}, the cut capacity function is κ(X)=cˉ(Δ+X)−c‾(Δ−X)\kappa(X) = \bar c(\Delta^+X) - \underline c(\Delta^-X)κ(X)=cˉ(Δ+X)−c​(Δ−X). A submodular set function ρ:2V→R∪{+∞}\rho : 2^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}ρ:2V→R∪{+∞} with ρ(∅)=ρ(V)=0\rho(\emptyset) = \rho(V) = 0ρ(∅)=ρ(V)=0 plays the same structural role as κ\kappaκ but is arbitrary problem data rather than a derived quantity.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9.13 (max-flow min-cut for submodular flows)

For a feasible maximum submodular flow problem on a specified arc a0a_0a0​: sup⁡{ξ(a0):ξ feasible}=min⁡(cˉ(a0),min⁡X{cˉ(Δ−X)−c‾(Δ+X∖{a0})+ρ(X):a0∈Δ+X})\sup\{\xi(a_0) : \xi \text{ feasible}\} = \min\big(\bar c(a_0), \min_X\{\bar c(\Delta^-X) - \underline c(\Delta^+X \setminus \{a_0\}) + \rho(X) : a_0 \in \Delta^+X\}\big)sup{ξ(a0​):ξ feasible}=min(cˉ(a0​),minX​{cˉ(Δ−X)−c​(Δ+X∖{a0​})+ρ(X):a0​∈Δ+X}), a common value in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}; if the data is integer valued and the value is finite, an integer-valued maximum flow exists.

Milestones: Proposition 9.2, Theorem 9.3, Theorem 9.10

Proposition 9.2: the cut capacity function κ\kappaκ is always submodular — the fact that lets the classical minimum cost flow problem's feasibility be phrased in exactly the same base- polyhedron language as the general submodular flow problem. Theorem 9.3: a flow meeting the capacity constraint with boundary xxx exists if and only if x(X)≤κ(X)x(X) \le \kappa(X)x(X)≤κ(X) for all XXX and x(V)=0x(V) = 0x(V)=0 — the classical case, and the direct predecessor of the goal's feasibility side. Theorem 9.10: the submodular flow problem is feasible if and only if cˉ(Δ−X)−c‾(Δ+X)+ρ(X)≥0\bar c(\Delta^-X) - \underline c(\Delta^+X) + \rho(X) \ge 0cˉ(Δ−X)−c​(Δ+X)+ρ(X)≥0 for all XXX — obtained from Theorem 9.3 via Edmonds's intersection theorem in the book's own proof, and the feasibility half of the goal's own maximum-flow variant.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 9.13 is a genuine generalization of the max-flow min-cut theorem — one of the most-cited results in combinatorial optimization — to a submodularly constrained setting where the classical single-source-single-sink cut structure is replaced by an arbitrary vertex subset XXX scored by a submodular function ρ\rhoρ rather than merely counted. It specializes to the classical theorem when ρ\rhoρ is the indicator of a fixed boundary value and the graph carries a single source/sink; the book's own derivation (dividing the target arc a0a_0a0​ and reducing to Theorem 9.10's feasibility criterion) is exactly the kind of "one shared mechanism explains two theorems" result this whole book is organized around.

Formalizing it. A prior-art search (GET /theorems?q=max-flow min-cut) found two existing platform items for the classical theorem — LinearOptimization.max_flow_min_cut (Bertsimas & Tsitsiklis, single source/sink, plain capacities) and menger_directed_max_flow (Ford-Fulkerson, integer capacities) — both at a genuinely different, simpler generality (no lower capacity bounds, no submodular vertex-cut function, a fixed source/sink rather than an arbitrary marked arc). A further search (q=network flow) found a distinct mission formalizing Bertsimas & Tsitsiklis's uncapacitated network flow LP theory (basic feasible solutions, tree solutions, basis-matrix integrality) — a different technique (linear-algebraic, not cut-based) for a different problem (no capacities at all). Neither family is reused; this mission gives the first formal statement of submodular-flow feasibility and its max-flow min-cut theorem at the book's own generality.

Difficulty

The obvious shortcut — state only the value equality of Theorem 9.13 and drop the integrality clause — would misrepresent the theorem's own content: the equality of the extremal values follows from ordinary LP duality on the polyhedron B(κ)∩B(ρ)B(\kappa) \cap B(\rho)B(κ)∩B(ρ) (arguably already within reach of chunk 04's Edmonds's intersection theorem machinery, as the book's own proof of the feasibility predecessor Theorem 9.10 uses exactly that), whereas the integer-flow existence half is the theorem's genuine combinatorial content, unique to the integer lattice. This chunk keeps both halves in every drafted theorem (Theorem 9.3, 9.10, and the goal) rather than only the polyhedral half.

A second, more structural difficulty governed this chunk's scope: BRIEF.md recommended Theorem 9.4 (the potential-optimality criterion) and its M-convex-cost specialization Theorem 9.14 as milestones, but both need a polyhedral convexity hypothesis on real-valued (or M-convex) functions over RV\mathbb R^VRV that this series has never built — the identical scope boundary chunk 10 hit with Theorem 8.4. Rather than silently drop the polyhedral-convexity hypothesis (which would make the drafted statement unsound, since the theorem's hard direction genuinely needs it), this chunk selects only results — Proposition 9.2, Theorem 9.3, Theorem 9.10, Theorem 9.13 — that need no convexity apparatus of any kind, only the submodularity of κ\kappaκ/ρ\rhoρ and elementary capacity-constraint feasibility.

Formalization scope

VVV and AAA are Fintypes with DecidableEq V (and DecidableEq A where a Finset.erase is needed); tail, head : A → V are plain functions, not a bundled graph structure. Every capacity- and cut-related quantity is WithTop ℝ-valued (ℝ ∪ {+∞}) throughout, with no EReal: a per-term check (documented in MODERATION_NOTES.md) confirms every subtraction this chunk needs is really an addition of two terms each individually in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}, via a small new cast NegLowerToUpper : WithBot ℝ → WithTop ℝ. The base polyhedron B(ρ)B(\rho)B(ρ) is stated by its defining inequalities rather than via a named polyhedral object (chunk 04's BasePolyhedron is ℤ^V-domain and does not fit chapter 9's real-vector- space setting). Not drafted: Theorem 9.4/9.14 (needs the real-domain polyhedral-convexity layer above), Theorem 9.6 (needs a real-domain polyhedral L-convexity notion for its dual-integrality half), Theorem 9.5/9.18/9.20/9.22 (negative-cycle criteria, an alternative non-potential certificate family, checked against platform prior art and found adjacent only), Propositions 9.23–9.25 (supporting technical facts), and Theorems 9.26–9.28 (the separate network- transformation technique of §9.6). A trivializing formalization would state Theorem 9.13's value equality with the integrality clause dropped, or would silently allow cˉ\bar ccˉ/c‾\underline cc​ to range over all of EReal (permitting a nonsensical c‾(a)=+∞\underline c(a) = +\inftyc​(a)=+∞ upper- capacity-like lower bound); neither is done — both the integrality clause and the WithTop ℝ/WithBot ℝ type-level domain restriction are kept exactly as the book states them.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
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Discrete Convex Analysis XXX: Lagrangian Duality for M-Convex ProgramsTextbook

Motivation

Missions 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality and 30-ch08c-conjugacyduality built the M2-/L2-convex function classes and proved their conjugacy correspondence is nearly complete. This mission finishes that correspondence (Theorems 8.48-8.49) and then turns to chapter 8's capstone application: a Lagrangian duality theory for integer programs, built entirely from the M-/L-convexity machinery developed across the whole book. It develops the general perturbation-based duality framework (mirroring Rockafellar's conjugate duality for nonlinear programming), specializes it to M-convex programs via the perturbation FrF_rFr​, and proves the strong duality theorem this specialization exists to deliver — together with its mirror construction recovering the primal problem from the dual.

Setting

An M-convex program consists of a set B⊆ZVB\subseteq\mathbb Z^VB⊆ZV satisfying (REG) — BBB is an M-convex set — and an objective c:ZV→Z∪{+∞}c:\mathbb Z^V\to\mathbb Z\cup\{+\infty\}c:ZV→Z∪{+∞} satisfying (OBJ) — ccc is an M-convex function. The general duality framework embeds any f(x)=c(x)+δB(x)f(x)=c(x)+\delta_B(x)f(x)=c(x)+δB​(x) in a family of perturbed problems via F:ZV×ZV→Z∪{+∞}F:\mathbb Z^V\times\mathbb Z^V\to\mathbb Z\cup\{+\infty\}F:ZV×ZV→Z∪{+∞} with F(x,0)=f(x)F(x,0)=f(x)F(x,0)=f(x), yielding an optimal-value function φ\varphiφ, a Lagrangian KKK, and a dual objective ggg. For M-convex programs the perturbation Fr(x,u)=c(x)+δB(x+u)+r(u)F_r(x,u)=c(x)+\delta_B(x+u)+r(u)Fr​(x,u)=c(x)+δB​(x+u)+r(u), for an M-convex regularizer rrr with r(0)=0r(0)=0r(0)=0, makes this framework concrete; the case r≡0r\equiv 0r≡0 is written with subscript 000.

Formalization targets

Goal: Strong duality for M-convex programs (Theorem 8.59)

For a feasible, bounded-below M-convex program, min⁡(P)=φr(0)=φr∙∙(0)=max⁡(Dr)\min(P)=\varphi_r(0)=\varphi_r^{\bullet\bullet}(0) =\max(D_r)min(P)=φr​(0)=φr∙∙​(0)=max(Dr​), and opt⁡(Dr)=−∂Zφr(0)\operatorname{opt}(D_r)=-\partial_{\mathbb Z}\varphi_r(0)opt(Dr​)=−∂Z​φr​(0). This is the theorem mission 11-conjugacy-ii-lagrange's own STATUS.md explicitly deferred, noting it needs the specific M-convex perturbation FrF_rFr​ (Eq. (8.61)) and Propositions 8.55-8.56/Theorems 8.57-8.58 as prerequisites — all built as milestones of this mission.

Supporting structural targets

Theorem 8.48 completes the M2-/L2-convex conjugacy correspondence; Theorem 8.49 characterizes separable convex functions as exactly the M2♮^\natural_22♮​-and-L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex functions. Theorem 8.53 (reduced to parts (1),(2),(4)) gives the general perturbation-independent duality identities: the dual objective is g=−φ∙(−⋅)g=-\varphi^{\bullet}(-\cdot)g=−φ∙(−⋅), weak duality's biconjugate form sup⁡(D)=φ∙∙(0)\sup(D)=\varphi^{\bullet\bullet}(0)sup(D)=φ∙∙(0), and the equivalence of strong duality with biconjugate exactness. Proposition 8.55 shows the M-convex perturbation FrF_rFr​ legitimately instantiates the general framework; Proposition 8.56 (reduced to part (1)) gives the closed form for the unregularized Lagrangian kernel K0K_0K0​ via the conjugate of BBB's indicator function; Theorems 8.57 and 8.58 establish the resulting convexity/concavity of the kernel, the dual objective, and the optimal-value function in each of their arguments. Propositions 8.62-8.63 and Theorems 8.64-8.65 build and analyze the mirror construction — the dual perturbation GrG_rGr​, its optimal-value function γr\gamma_rγr​, and the dual-of-dual reconstruction — showing that for bounded BBB the process exactly recovers the primal problem and its own strong duality theorem.

Significance

This is chapter 8's payoff: a full nonlinear-integer-programming duality theory, built without any convexity assumption beyond M-/L-convexity, mirroring Rockafellar's classical conjugate duality approach line for line while replacing every continuous convexity argument with a discrete M-/L-convexity one. Theorem 8.59's proof is a two-line consequence of the machinery this mission assembles (Theorems 8.35, 8.53, 8.58), which is itself the point: the discrete theory's hard combinatorial work (Theorems 8.35, 8.36, 8.42 from prior missions) is what makes the strong duality theorem here nearly free, exactly as convex analysis makes classical Lagrangian duality nearly free once Fenchel duality is established. The bidirectional construction of Theorems 8.62-8.65 is the discrete analogue of the classical fact that Lagrangian duality is symmetric between primal and dual convex programs.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's own account of M2-/L2-conjugacy and Lagrangian duality (section 8.3.3 and section 8.4), continuing chapter 8's duality program to its conclusion. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing the platform's coverage of chapter 8's duality theorems begun in missions 10-conjugacy-i and 11-conjugacy-ii-lagrange; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The EReal-valued (Z∪{±∞}\mathbb Z\cup\{\pm\infty\}Z∪{±∞}) typing is essential and new to this mission: unlike every prior mission in this series, the general framework's derived quantities (φ\varphiφ, KKK, ggg, and their mirror-construction analogues GrG_rGr​, γr\gamma_rγr​, K~r\tilde K_rK~r​, f~\tilde ff~​) are defined as infima/suprema over families that are not a priori bounded, so they can genuinely equal −∞-\infty−∞ or +∞+\infty+∞ — a value WithTop ℝ cannot represent and whose sInf instance would silently substitute a junk value (0) rather than correctly returning −∞-\infty−∞. The book's own repeated "XXX is convex (resp. concave), or X≡+∞X\equiv+\inftyX≡+∞, or X≡−∞X\equiv-\inftyX≡−∞" disjunctive escape clauses (Theorems 8.57, 8.58, Propositions 8.63) are captured with two small generic combinators, IsEmbedOf/IsNegOf, rather than restating the embedding by hand at each of the roughly dozen occurrences.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; the base M-/L-/M2-/L2-convexity vocabulary is redeclared verbatim from missions 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality and 30-ch08c-conjugacyduality, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Two results carry a documented partial-coverage scope reduction (see HARD.md): Theorem 8.53 is placed with only parts (1),(2),(4), the purely algebraic identities holding unconditionally for any perturbation FFF, omitting parts (3),(5),(6), which characterize opt⁡(D)\operatorname{opt}(D)opt(D) under the book's own biconjugacy hypothesis (8.55) — a hypothesis this mission's M-convex-specific Theorem 8.59 later establishes directly rather than invoking Theorem 8.53's general form; and Proposition 8.56 is placed with only part (1), the K0K_0K0​ closed form, omitting part (2), the KrK_rKr​ closed form via the infimal convolution δ−B□r[y]\delta_{-B}\square r[y]δ−B​□r[y], not independently needed elsewhere in this chunk. One numbered result nominally in this chunk's page range, Theorem 8.46, is not re-placed here: it was already found and placed as a milestone in mission 30-ch08c-conjugacyduality, whose own page range overlaps this chunk's by one page (PDF251/printed 233) — see HARD.md. Contributions completing any of the twelve sorrys are welcome; the goal and Theorem 8.57 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, "Conjugate duality and optimization," CBMS-NSF Regional Conference Series in Applied Mathematics, SIAM, 1974 [177] (the classical conjugate-duality framework this mission's section 8.4 adapts to the discrete M-/L-convex setting).
  • K. Murota, "Discrete convex analysis," Mathematical Programming, 83 (1998), pp. 313-371 [140] (the original source of M2-/L2-convexity, Theorems 8.35, 8.36, 8.45, 8.46, 8.48, and the Lagrange duality theory of section 8.4).
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXIX: M2-Convex and L2-Convex FunctionsTextbook

Motivation

Mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality opened chapter 8's account of M2-convex functions — sums of M-convex functions — proving their domains and minimizers are M2-convex and that they are integrally convex. This mission completes that program and builds its exact mirror for L2-convex functions (integer infimal convolutions of L-convex functions), the class that appears on the opposite side of Edmonds's intersection theorem's min-max relation from M2-convexity. It proves optimality and proximity theorems for both classes, shows their subdifferentials add (a discrete analogue of the classical subdifferential sum rule), derives how the Legendre-Fenchel transform interacts with the sum/infimal-convolution operation, and — the technically hardest result in the whole cluster — establishes that L♮₂-convex functions are integrally convex, by a genuinely different and more intricate argument than the M2-side analogue required.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. A function g:ZV→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}g:ZV→R∪{+∞} is L2-convex if g=g1□g2g = g_1 \square g_2g=g1​□g2​, the integer infimal convolution g1□g2(p)=inf⁡{g1(p1)+g2(p2):p1+p2=p}g_1\square g_2(p) = \inf\{g_1(p_1)+g_2(p_2) : p_1+p_2=p\}g1​□g2​(p)=inf{g1​(p1​)+g2​(p2​):p1​+p2​=p}, of two L-convex functions g1,g2g_1, g_2g1​,g2​; L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex if the summands are L♮^\natural♮-convex. An M2-convex function is a sum f1+f2f_1+f_2f1​+f2​ of two M-convex functions (mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality). The integer subdifferential ∂Zf(x)\partial_{\mathbb Z} f(x)∂Z​f(x) and real subdifferential ∂Rf(x)\partial_{\mathbb R} f(x)∂R​f(x) generalize the subgradient set to integer- and real-valued perturbation directions respectively.

Formalization targets

Goal: L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex functions are integrally convex (Theorem 8.42)

Every L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex function is integrally convex, and in particular every L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex set is integrally convex. The book's own proof is the most intricate argument in this cluster: given ppp in the Minkowski sum D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​ of two L-convex sets, it constructs an explicit representation of ppp as a convex combination of finitely many integer points of D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​, all lying in ppp's own integral neighborhood, via the sorted fractional-part values of a chosen decomposition p=p1+p2p=p_1+p_2p=p1​+p2​ — a genuinely different technique from the M2-side analogue (Theorem 8.31), whose proof is a two-line consequence of convex extensibility.

Supporting structural targets

Eleven further results build the M2-/L2-convex theory in parallel. Theorems 8.33-8.34 give the M2-optimality criterion (a nonnegative-sum condition over cyclic exchange families) and its scaling-based proximity theorem; Theorem 8.35 shows subdifferentials of a sum of M♮^\natural♮- convex functions add, and that subdifferentials of M2-/M2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex functions are L2-/L2♮^\natural_22♮​-convex; Theorem 8.36 computes the conjugate of a sum as the infimal convolution of conjugates, with biconjugacy recovering the original sum. Propositions 8.39-8.41 transfer L-(natural-)convexity from summands to the domain and minimizer set of an L2-convex function, and give the precise attainment condition under which a linearly-perturbed infimal convolution's minimizer set splits additively. Theorems 8.43-8.44 give the L2-optimality and L2-proximity theorems, the exact L-side mirrors of Theorems 8.33-8.34; Theorem 8.45 mirrors Theorem 8.35 for subdifferentials of an infimal convolution; and Theorem 8.46 (found by direct reading, immediately following 8.45 and explicitly named by the book as 8.36's counterpart) shows biconjugacy for L♮^\natural♮-convex infimal convolutions.

Significance

The M2-/L2-convex function classes are where discrete convex analysis's abstract machinery meets concrete combinatorial optimization: Edmonds's matroid intersection theorem and its generalizations are literally statements about M2-convex minimization, with the L2-convex side supplying the dual bound. Theorem 8.35's subdifferential additivity is the discrete analogue of the classical Moreau-Rockafellar sum rule, and its proof (via the M-convex intersection theorem, already a milestone of mission 10-conjugacy-i) shows the sum rule holding without the constraint-qualification technicalities the continuous theory needs — a case where the discrete theory is cleaner than its continuous ancestor. Theorem 8.42's harder, dedicated proof technique is itself informative: it demonstrates that L2-convexity's combinatorial structure is not a routine transcription of the M2-convex case, foreshadowing the book's broader theme that M- and L-convexity, while conjugate, are not interchangeable in how their proofs actually work.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of the sum/infimal-convolution closure properties of M-convex and L-convex functions, continuing chapter 8's duality program into its most combinatorially concrete corner. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, including one result (Theorem 8.46) the platform's own automated extractor missed, extending the shared Lean vocabulary (InfConv, L2Convex, M2ConvexSet) mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality began; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal would try to adapt the M2-side integral-convexity proof (a direct appeal to convex extensibility) verbatim; the book's own proof shows this does not work, requiring instead a from-scratch construction: decompose p=p1+p2p=p_1+p_2p=p1​+p2​, take fractional parts a1=p1−⌊p1⌋a_1 = p_1-\lfloor p_1\rfloora1​=p1​−⌊p1​⌋ and a2=⌈p2⌉−p2a_2=\lceil p_2\rceil-p_2a2​=⌈p2​⌉−p2​, sort their combined distinct values, build threshold sets exactly as in the Lovász-extension construction, and verify each resulting integer point qi=⌊p1⌋+χU1i+⌈p2⌉−χU2iq_i = \lfloor p_1\rfloor+\chi_{U_{1i}}+\lceil p_2\rceil-\chi_{U_{2i}}qi​=⌊p1​⌋+χU1i​​+⌈p2​⌉−χU2i​​ both lies in D1+D2D_1+D_2D1​+D2​ (via L-convex-set closure properties, Theorem 5.10) and in ppp's integral neighborhood (a case split on whether p(v)p(v)p(v) is itself an integer) — a genuinely multi-stage combinatorial argument with no single-inequality shortcut, unlike almost every other result in this mission.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; M2-/L2-convex functions are (V→ℤ)→WithTop ℝ. All twelve numbered results found in this chunk's page range are placed, with no partial-coverage scope reduction needed — every clause of every result, including all three parts of Theorems 8.35 and 8.45 and the full cyclic-exchange condition of Theorems 8.33-8.34, is stated in full. One numbered result nominally in this chunk's page range, Theorem 8.32, is not re-placed here: it was already found and placed as a milestone in mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality, whose own page range overlaps this chunk's by one page (PDF245) — see HARD.md. "g1□g2 > −∞" hypotheses are omitted rather than translated, since WithTop ℝ has no −∞ element to violate. This mission's base vocabulary is redeclared verbatim from mission 29-ch08b-conjugacyduality rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another; ConvexConjugate is redeclared from mission 10-conjugacy-i. Contributions completing any of the twelve sorrys are welcome; the goal and Theorem 8.35 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "Extreme points of a generalized polymatroid," Discrete Applied Mathematics, 152 (2005), pp. 268-278 [153] (the L2-convex integral-convexity proof this mission's goal is drawn from).
  • K. Murota and A. Tamura, "Application of M-convex submodular flow problem to mathematical economics," Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 20 (2003), pp. 257-277 [162] (the M2-proximity theorem, Theorem 8.34).
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Applied Combinatorics VIII: The Max Flow–Min Cut TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Moving as much as possible of something — freight, water, data — from an origin to a destination through connections of limited capacity is one of the basic problems of operations research. Its mathematical form, the maximum flow problem, was posed in the 1950s in work on rail networks and solved independently by Ford and Fulkerson (Maximal flow through a network, Canadian J. Math. 8 (1956)) and by Elias, Feinstein and Shannon (A note on the maximum flow through a network, IRE Trans. Inform. Theory 2 (1956)). The answer, the Max Flow–Min Cut Theorem, is a min–max duality: the largest amount that can be shipped equals the smallest total capacity whose removal disconnects the destination from the origin. It is a standard example of linear-programming duality with a combinatorial proof, and it is the source of Hall's matching theorem, Menger's theorem and Dilworth's theorem via network constructions.

This mission formalizes Chapter 13 of Keller and Trotter's Applied Combinatorics (2017 Edition), together with the two theorems of Chapter 14 that apply it, in the book's own model of a network.

Setting

A network consists of a finite vertex set VVV, a set of directed edges (x,y)(x, y)(x,y), a source SSS and a sink TTT with S≠TS \ne TS=T, and a capacity c(x,y)≥0c(x, y) \ge 0c(x,y)≥0 (a real number) on each edge. The underlying directed graph is an oriented graph: for any two vertices x,yx, yx,y at most one of (x,y)(x, y)(x,y), (y,x)(y, x)(y,x) is an edge. Every edge at SSS points away from SSS and every edge at TTT points into TTT.

A flow is a function ϕ\phiϕ on the edges with 0≤ϕ(x,y)≤c(x,y)0 \le \phi(x, y) \le c(x, y)0≤ϕ(x,y)≤c(x,y), extended by ϕ(x,y)=0\phi(x, y) = 0ϕ(x,y)=0 on pairs that are not edges, satisfying the conservation laws

∑xϕ(S,x)=∑xϕ(x,T),∑xϕ(x,y)=∑xϕ(y,x)(y≠S,T).\sum_x \phi(S, x) = \sum_x \phi(x, T), \qquad \sum_x \phi(x, y) = \sum_x \phi(y, x)\quad (y \ne S, T).x∑​ϕ(S,x)=x∑​ϕ(x,T),x∑​ϕ(x,y)=x∑​ϕ(y,x)(y=S,T).

The value of ϕ\phiϕ is value⁡(ϕ)=∑xϕ(S,x)\operatorname{value}(\phi) = \sum_x \phi(S, x)value(ϕ)=∑x​ϕ(S,x).

A cut is a partition V=L∪UV = L \cup UV=L∪U with S∈LS \in LS∈L, T∈UT \in UT∈U. Its capacity is

c(L,U)=∑x∈L, y∈Uc(x,y),c(L, U) = \sum_{x \in L,\ y \in U} c(x, y),c(L,U)=x∈L, y∈U∑​c(x,y),

summed over the edges directed from LLL to UUU only.

Given a flow ϕ\phiϕ, an edge (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) is used if ϕ(x,y)>0\phi(x, y) > 0ϕ(x,y)>0 and has spare capacity if ϕ(x,y)<c(x,y)\phi(x, y) < c(x, y)ϕ(x,y)<c(x,y). An augmenting path is a sequence P=(x0,…,xm)P = (x_0, \dots, x_m)P=(x0​,…,xm​) of distinct vertices from x0=Sx_0 = Sx0​=S to xm=Tx_m = Txm​=T such that each step either follows an edge (xi−1,xi)(x_{i-1}, x_i)(xi−1​,xi​) with spare capacity (a forward edge) or traverses a used edge (xi,xi−1)(x_i, x_{i-1})(xi​,xi−1​) backwards (a backward edge). Its augmentation amount is δ=min⁡{δ1,δ2}\delta = \min\{\delta_1, \delta_2\}δ=min{δ1​,δ2​}, where δ1\delta_1δ1​ is the least spare capacity of a forward edge and δ2\delta_2δ2​ the least flow on a backward edge (δ=δ1\delta = \delta_1δ=δ1​ when there is no backward edge).

For Chapter 14: in a finite simple graph with bipartition V=V1∪V2V = V_1 \cup V_2V=V1​∪V2​, a matching is a set of edges no two of which share an endpoint; it saturates a vertex that is an endpoint of one of its edges; and N(A)N(A)N(A) is the set of neighbors of the vertices in AAA.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Max Flow–Min Cut Theorem (Theorem 13.10)

For every network there is a real number v0v_0v0​ with

v0=max⁡{value⁡(ϕ):ϕ a flow}=min⁡{c(L,U):V=L∪U a cut},v_0 = \max\{\operatorname{value}(\phi) : \phi \text{ a flow}\} = \min\{c(L, U) : V = L \cup U \text{ a cut}\},v0​=max{value(ϕ):ϕ a flow}=min{c(L,U):V=L∪U a cut},

that is, v0v_0v0​ is attained by some flow and bounds every flow value from above, and v0v_0v0​ is attained by some cut and bounds every cut capacity from below.

Milestones

  • Theorem 13.4. For every flow ϕ\phiϕ and every cut, value⁡(ϕ)≤c(L,U)\operatorname{value}(\phi) \le c(L, U)value(ϕ)≤c(L,U).
  • Proposition 13.7. If PPP is an augmenting path for a flow ϕ\phiϕ of value vvv and δ\deltaδ is its augmentation amount, the function obtained by adding δ\deltaδ on the forward edges of PPP and subtracting δ\deltaδ on its backward edges is a flow of value v+δv + \deltav+δ.
  • Theorem 14.1. If every capacity is an integer, some maximum flow has ϕ(x,y)∈Z\phi(x, y) \in \mathbb Zϕ(x,y)∈Z on every edge.
  • Theorem 14.7 (Hall). In a finite bipartite graph with bipartition V1∪V2V_1 \cup V_2V1​∪V2​ there is a matching saturating every vertex of V1V_1V1​ if and only if ∣N(A)∣≥∣A∣|N(A)| \ge |A|∣N(A)∣≥∣A∣ for every A⊆V1A \subseteq V_1A⊆V1​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 13.10 turns every maximum-flow computation into a certified one: a flow and a cut of equal value prove each other optimal, and Theorem 13.4 shows no certificate can do better. Together with the integrality theorem 14.1 it is the engine behind the combinatorial applications of Chapter 14: maximum matchings in bipartite graphs, Hall's theorem, and the computation of the width of a poset with a minimum chain partition. Beyond the book, the same duality underlies Menger's theorem, König's theorem, the analysis of image segmentation by graph cuts, and the combinatorial theory of totally unimodular linear programs.

Formalizing it. The results are classical and proved. Mathlib has no theory of network flows. The platform has a Max-Flow Min-Cut theorem in the model of Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (a general digraph on Fin n with capacities in (0,∞](0, \infty](0,∞], value compared in EReal), which does not cover the book's networks with zero capacities and is stated for a different encoding. This mission produces the theory in the book's model: finite oriented networks with real non-negative capacities, flows as functions on vertex pairs, cuts as vertex subsets, and the augmenting-path step that the Ford–Fulkerson labeling algorithm iterates. Hall's theorem is in Mathlib in its indexed-family form; the graph form stated here is new to the platform.

Difficulty

Theorem 13.4 is a finite-sum rearrangement. The difficulty of the goal is the existence of a maximum flow. The textbook argument runs the labeling algorithm until it halts, then reads off a cut from the labeled vertices. With real capacities this algorithm need not halt: with badly chosen augmenting paths and irrational capacities the flow values can converge to a limit strictly below the maximum, so "repeat until no augmenting path exists" does not by itself produce a maximum flow. The existence of an optimal flow is therefore not a by-product of the algorithm's description; it has to be established in its own right before the absence of augmenting paths can be turned into a cut of equal capacity. A formalization that assumes a maximum flow exists proves a strictly weaker statement. Proposition 13.7 is elementary but bookkeeping-heavy: backward edges subtract flow, and conservation must be checked at every interior vertex of the path.

Formalization scope

The vertex set is a type V with [Fintype V] [DecidableEq V]. A network (AppliedComb.Flows.Network) bundles an edge relation adj, the source S and sink T with S ≠ T, and a real capacity function cap, together with the axioms of an oriented graph, the orientation of edges at S and T, and 0 ≤ cap x y on edges. Flows are functions ϕ : V → V → ℝ satisfying IsFlow, which includes ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 off the edges and keeps the first conservation law as part of the definition, as on the page. The value is ∑xϕ(S,x)\sum_x \phi(S, x)∑x​ϕ(S,x). A cut is its part L : Finset V with S ∈ L, T ∉ L. Augmenting paths are injective maps Fin (m + 1) → V, and δ1,δ2,δ\delta_1, \delta_2, \deltaδ1​,δ2​,δ are computed in WithTop ℝ so that an empty minimum is ⊤\top⊤ and δ=δ1\delta = \delta_1δ=δ1​ when there is no backward edge. Hall's theorem uses Mathlib's SimpleGraph with a given bipartition into two Finsets and matchings as sets of Sym2 V edges.

No explicit constants arise: the chapter has no asymptotic or approximate statements.

The book's sentence of Theorem 13.10 reads "if v0v_0v0​ is the maximum value of a flow and c0c_0c0​ the minimum capacity of a cut, then v0=c0v_0 = c_0v0​=c0​". A formalization that takes v0v_0v0​ and c0c_0c0​ as hypothetical extrema of possibly empty or unattained sets would be trivial or vacuous; the goal here asserts the existence of a maximum flow and a minimum cut at the same number, and the existence of a maximum flow for real capacities is part of what must be proved.

Needed infrastructure: finite-sum manipulation over Finset (reindexing, splitting over L and Lᶜ), existence of maximizers of a linear function over the set of flows, and, for Theorem 14.1, control of integrality. The definitions of networks, flows, cuts and augmenting paths are reusable for Menger's theorem, König's theorem and the chain-partition network of Section 14.3. Contributions of alternative proofs (via linear-programming duality) are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. T. Keller and W. T. Trotter, Applied Combinatorics, 2017 Edition, Chapters 13–14. https://www.appliedcombinatorics.org/book/
  • L. R. Ford and D. R. Fulkerson, Maximal flow through a network, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 8 (1956), 399–404. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5
  • P. Elias, A. Feinstein and C. E. Shannon, A note on the maximum flow through a network, IRE Transactions on Information Theory 2 (1956), 117–119. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.1956.1056816
  • P. Hall, On representatives of subsets, Journal of the London Mathematical Society 10 (1935), 26–30. https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-10.37.26
  • U. Zwick, The smallest networks on which the Ford–Fulkerson maximum flow procedure may fail to terminate, Theoretical Computer Science 148 (1995), 165–170. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3975(95)00022-O
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Discrete Convex Analysis XXVIII: The Conjugacy TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 8 is where discrete convex analysis explains why it needed two separate notions — M-convexity (exchangeability) and L-convexity (submodularity) — rather than one. The answer is conjugacy: under the classical Legendre-Fenchel transform, the two classes turn out to be exactly dual to each other, the discrete analogue of the fact that convex analysis's transform is self-dual within a single class of convex functions. Mission 10-conjugacy-i proved the integer-lattice version of this fact (Theorem 8.12) but explicitly deferred the polyhedral version — Theorem 8.4, the chapter's own headline "Conjugacy theorem" — noting it needed a real-variable M-/L-convex-function layer the series had not yet built. That layer now exists, built across missions 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions. This mission proves Theorem 8.4 and its companions: the polar-cone correspondence it induces, its nonpolyhedral generalization, the separation and Fenchel-duality theorems for M♮-/L♮-convex functions, and the basic theory of M2-convex functions (sums of M-convex functions), which the Edmonds intersection theorem's own combinatorics is built from.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. For f:RV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:RV→R∪{+∞}, the Legendre-Fenchel transform is f∙(p)=sup⁡x[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x [\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)]f∙(p)=supx​[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]. A polyhedral convex function fff is M-convex (f∈M[R→R]f \in M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]f∈M[R→R]) if it satisfies (M-EXC[R]); ggg is L-convex (g∈L[R→R]g \in L[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]g∈L[R→R]) if it satisfies (SBF[R]) and (TRF[R]). A concave function hhh is always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h, an ordinary convex function, so every "f≥hf \ge hf≥h" hypothesis is restated as "f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0" — an equivalent formulation avoiding any need to represent −∞-\infty−∞ in the codomain. A polyhedral cone's polar is C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}C^\circ = \{y : \langle y,x\rangle \le 0\ \forall x \in C\}C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}. A function is M2-convex if it is the sum of two M-convex functions.

Formalization targets

Goal: the conjugacy theorem (Theorem 8.4)

The classes of polyhedral M-convex functions and polyhedral L-convex functions are in one-to-one correspondence under the Legendre-Fenchel transform: f∈M⇒f∙∈Lf \in M \Rightarrow f^\bullet \in Lf∈M⇒f∙∈L, g∈L⇒g∙∈Mg \in L \Rightarrow g^\bullet \in Mg∈L⇒g∙∈M, and the transform is an involution (f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet}=ff∙∙=f, g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g) on each class, with the identical statement for the M♮^\natural♮/L♮^\natural♮ variants. This is the theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i deferred, citing exactly the missing infrastructure this series has since built.

Supporting structural targets

Twelve further results build the surrounding theory. Proposition 8.2 gives the easy two-variable case of the general submodularity-preservation fact (Theorem 8.1, already a milestone of mission 10-conjugacy-i); Proposition 8.3 is the technical minimizer-difference lemma the goal's harder direction is built from. Theorem 8.5 derives the M-convex/L-convex cone polarity from the goal, and Theorem 8.6 extends the correspondence beyond the polyhedral case to general closed proper convex functions. Proposition 8.14 and Theorems 8.15-8.16 build the separation theory for M♮-/L♮-convex and concave function pairs, with integral witnesses when the functions are integer valued; Theorem 8.21 (parts 1-2) derives the Fenchel-type strong-duality equality these separation theorems make possible. Propositions 8.29-8.30 and Theorem 8.31 (plus Theorem 8.32, found by direct reading immediately after 8.31) build the basic theory of M2-convex functions: their domains and minimizer sets are M2-convex, they are integrally convex, and their global optimality reduces to a finite local check.

Significance

The goal is the theorem that retroactively explains this entire series' two-track structure: missions 20-25 (M-convex sets and functions) and 08/21/26-28 (L-convex sets and functions) are not two independent theories that happen to share techniques — they are conjugate images of each other, so every theorem proved on one side has a dual counterpart automatically available on the other via Theorem 8.4. This is made concrete immediately: Theorem 8.5's cone polarity and the diagram the book draws connecting M0[R]M_0[\mathbb R]M0​[R], 0L[R→R]0L[\mathbb R\to\mathbb R]0L[R→R], and submodular set functions S[R]S[\mathbb R]S[R] (already correspondences this series proved independently, in missions 24-ch06d-mconvexfunctions and 28-ch07d-lconvexfunctions) are shown to be facets of one single conjugacy fact rather than three separate coincidences. The separation and Fenchel duality theorems (8.15, 8.16, 8.21) are the discrete analogues of the two theorems every convex optimization course opens with, and the book is explicit that they are not corollaries of the classical versions plus convex extensibility — they carry genuinely combinatorial content, specializing to Frank's discrete separation theorem and Edmonds's intersection theorem as examples the book itself gives.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of the duality at the heart of discrete convex analysis, the reason the theory needed two dual notions rather than one. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing a theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i explicitly left for a future session once the necessary polyhedral apparatus existed, and including one result (Theorem 8.32) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal's harder direction (L⇒M) would try to verify the exchange inequality for g∙g^\bulletg∙ directly from the definition of the transform; the book's actual proof instead identifies the exchange inequality with a statement about weighted minimizers of ggg itself via Proposition 8.3 (the minimizer-difference bound), converting a claim about the conjugate function into a claim about ggg's own combinatorial structure — a genuine change of perspective, not a direct calculation. Proposition 8.3's own proof is the hardest single argument in this block: it derives the minimizer-difference bound by a contradiction argument that constructs an explicit pair of "worse" minimizers via a join/meet perturbation and derives a strict inequality from Theorem 7.29's translation inequality — a multi-step combinatorial argument with no direct shortcut.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; convex functions are WithTop ℝ valued throughout (never EReal, except for the Legendre-Fenchel transform itself, whose defining supremum/infimum can genuinely be infinite). All thirteen numbered results found in this chunk's page range — the twelve in BRIEF.md's own table plus Theorem 8.32 — are placed, with one documented scope reduction: Theorem 8.21 states only its real-attainment parts (1)-(2), not the integer-attainment refinement of parts (3)-(4), which needs a separate argument no other result in this chunk requires — see HARD.md. Concave functions hhh are always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h and every inequality f≥hf \ge hf≥h restated as f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0, avoiding WithTop ℝ negation entirely. This chunk's own BRIEF.md inherited the chapters-4-7 page-offset boilerplate (printed = PDF −-− 19); chapter 8 uses offset 18, confirmed against the PDF's own footers — every citation here uses the corrected offset. This mission's base vocabulary is redeclared from missions 10-conjugacy-i, 20-ch04b-mconvexsets, 21-ch05b-lconvexsets, 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions, and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Contributions completing any of the thirteen sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 8.3 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "M-convex function on generalized polymatroid," Mathematics of Operations Research, 24 (1999), pp. 95-105 [152] (the polyhedral M-/L-convex conjugacy theory this mission's real-variable results are drawn from).
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