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Optimization

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Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Schemes for the Restricted Shortest Path Problem: The Rounding Algorithm Outputs a T-Path of Length at Most (1 + ε)·OPTResearch Paper

Motivation

The restricted shortest path problem asks for a shortest route between two points of a network subject to a budget on a second additive quantity, such as travel time, cost or risk. It appears as the pricing subproblem of column generation for crew scheduling and vehicle routing, in quality-of-service routing in communication networks, and in scheduling, where Hassin's own §7 uses it for a single-machine problem. The problem is NP-hard (Garey and Johnson, 1979), so exact polynomial algorithms are not expected, and the natural question is how well it can be approximated in polynomial time.

Timeline.

  • 1966–1985. Practical exact methods and pseudopolynomial dynamic programs (Joksch 1966; Lawler 1976; Handler and Zang 1980; Aneja, Aggarwal and Nair 1983; Henig 1985).
  • 1987. Warburton gives the first fully polynomial approximation scheme (FPAS) for this problem on acyclic graphs, based on rounding and scaling (Warburton, Oper. Res. 35, 1987).
  • 1992. Hassin gives two faster FPASs: a rounding-and-scaling scheme driven by an approximate decision test (§3–§4), and a strongly polynomial scheme (§5–§6) (Hassin, Math. Oper. Res. 17, 1992).
  • 2001. Lorenz and Raz give a simpler and faster scheme built on the same test-and-search pattern (Lorenz–Raz, Oper. Res. Lett. 28, 2001).

Hassin's combination of an approximate decision test with a geometric search on the bounds is the pattern later schemes for resource-constrained path problems refine, which is why his first scheme is the subject of this mission.

Setting

A directed graph has vertex set {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n}, n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, and edge set EEE. Following the paper, the vertices are numbered so that every edge (i,j)∈E(i,j)\in E(i,j)∈E has i<ji<ji<j; in particular the graph is acyclic. Each edge carries a positive integer length cijc_{ij}cij​ and a positive integer transition time tijt_{ij}tij​. A path p=(v0,…,vm)p=(v_0,\dots,v_m)p=(v0​,…,vm​) has length c(p)=∑rcvr−1vrc(p)=\sum_r c_{v_{r-1}v_r}c(p)=∑r​cvr−1​vr​​ and transition time t(p)=∑rtvr−1vrt(p)=\sum_r t_{v_{r-1}v_r}t(p)=∑r​tvr−1​vr​​. For a nonnegative integer TTT, a TTT-path is a path from 111 to nnn with t(p)≤Tt(p)\le Tt(p)≤T, and OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the length of a shortest TTT-path.

Fix 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1. For a real VVV, the rounded lengths are

c~ijV=⌊cij(n−1)Vε⌋.\tilde c^V_{ij}=\Big\lfloor \frac{c_{ij}(n-1)}{V\varepsilon}\Big\rfloor .c~ijV​=⌊Vεcij​(n−1)​⌋.

Procedure TEST(V) deletes the edges with cij>Vc_{ij}>Vcij​>V and answers NO if, for some integer c<(n−1)/εc<(n-1)/\varepsilonc<(n−1)/ε, some 111–nnn path in the remaining graph has transition time at most TTT and rounded length at most ccc; otherwise it answers YES.

The Rounding Algorithm keeps bounds (LB,UB)(LB,UB)(LB,UB) on OPT. Starting from initial bounds (LB0,UB0)(LB_0,UB_0)(LB0​,UB0​), Step 1 repeats while UB>2LBUB>2LBUB>2LB: with V=(LB⋅UB)1/2V=(LB\cdot UB)^{1/2}V=(LB⋅UB)1/2 it sets LB←VLB\leftarrow VLB←V if TEST(V) = YES and UB←V(1+ε)UB\leftarrow V(1+\varepsilon)UB←V(1+ε) if TEST(V) = NO. Step 2 outputs a TTT-path that is shortest for the rounded lengths c~ijLB=⌊cij(n−1)/(εLB)⌋\tilde c^{LB}_{ij}=\lfloor c_{ij}(n-1)/(\varepsilon LB)\rfloorc~ijLB​=⌊cij​(n−1)/(εLB)⌋. The bounds after kkk passes are written (LBk,UBk)(LB_k,UB_k)(LBk​,UBk​).

Formalization targets

Goal: the approximation guarantee of the Rounding Algorithm

If LB0>0LB_0>0LB0​>0 is a lower bound on the length of every TTT-path, NNN is a stage at which UBN≤2LBNUB_N\le 2LB_NUBN​≤2LBN​, and ppp is a Step 2 output at LBNLB_NLBN​, then

c(p)≤(1+ε) c(q)for every T-path q,c(p)\le (1+\varepsilon)\,c(q)\qquad\text{for every }T\text{-path }q,c(p)≤(1+ε)c(q)for every T-path q,

that is, c(p)≤(1+ε) OPTc(p)\le(1+\varepsilon)\,\mathrm{OPT}c(p)≤(1+ε)OPT. The initial upper bound UB0UB_0UB0​ is arbitrary.

Milestones (§3–§4)

  1. Rounding error (§3, p. 38): with δ=Vε/(n−1)\delta=V\varepsilon/(n-1)δ=Vε/(n−1), 0≤cij−δc~ijV≤δ0\le c_{ij}-\delta\tilde c^V_{ij}\le\delta0≤cij​−δc~ijV​≤δ for every edge, and 0≤c(p)−δc~V(p)≤Vε0\le c(p)-\delta\tilde c^V(p)\le V\varepsilon0≤c(p)−δc~V(p)≤Vε for every path.
  2. TEST(V) = NO (§3, p. 38): some TTT-path has length <V(1+ε)<V(1+\varepsilon)<V(1+ε), so OPT<V(1+ε)\mathrm{OPT}<V(1+\varepsilon)OPT<V(1+ε).
  3. TEST(V) = YES (§3, p. 38): every TTT-path has length ≥V\ge V≥V, so OPT≥V\mathrm{OPT}\ge VOPT≥V.
  4. Bound update (§4, p. 39): along the run, LBk>0LB_k>0LBk​>0 and LBkLB_kLBk​ is a lower bound on every TTT-path; if some TTT-path has length at most UB0UB_0UB0​, some TTT-path has length at most UBkUB_kUBk​.
  5. Scaled-optimum error (§4, p. 39): a Step 2 output ppp at any LB>0LB>0LB>0 satisfies c(p)≤c(q)+εLBc(p)\le c(q)+\varepsilon LBc(p)≤c(q)+εLB for every TTT-path qqq.

Companion statements

  • Termination when (1+ε)2<2(1+\varepsilon)^2<2(1+ε)2<2: some stage NNN has UBN≤2LBNUB_N\le 2LB_NUBN​≤2LBN​; and an explicit instance with ε=9/10\varepsilon=9/10ε=9/10 on which Step 1 never stops.
  • Initial bounds (Step 0, p. 39): every 111–nnn path has length between 111 and the sum of the n−1n-1n−1 longest edge-lengths.
  • Algorithms A and B (§2, pp. 37–38): their recursions compute fj(t)f_j(t)fj​(t) and gj(c)g_j(c)gj​(c), with OPT=fn(T)=min⁡{c∣gn(c)≤T}\mathrm{OPT}=f_n(T)=\min\{c\mid g_n(c)\le T\}OPT=fn​(T)=min{c∣gn​(c)≤T}.

Significance

The guarantee makes the Rounding Algorithm a fully polynomial approximation scheme: combined with the paper's running-time analysis, a (1+ε)(1+\varepsilon)(1+ε)-approximate TTT-path is computed in time polynomial in the input size and 1/ε1/\varepsilon1/ε. The two ingredients, an approximate decision test that answers "OPT ≥V\ge V≥V" or "OPT <V(1+ε)<V(1+\varepsilon)<V(1+ε)", and a geometric search on the ratio UB/LBUB/LBUB/LB, are reused in later FPASs for constrained path, knapsack-type and scheduling problems; the milestones isolate them as separate statements.

The result has been proved since 1992 but, as far as a search of the platform and of Mathlib shows, none of it is machine-checked. This mission produces a checked version of the first scheme, stated for every stage at which the printed stopping test holds and every optimal Step 2 output. It also records, as a companion, that the printed Step 1 need not terminate when ε>2−1\varepsilon>\sqrt2-1ε>2​−1, and proves termination under (1+ε)2<2(1+\varepsilon)^2<2(1+ε)2<2.

Difficulty

The arithmetic of each step is short; the difficulty is in the combinatorial facts the page uses without proof and in the bookkeeping of a run. The rounding error of a path is at most VεV\varepsilonVε only because a 111–nnn path has at most n−1n-1n−1 edges, which follows from the numbering i<ji<ji<j and must be derived for list-encoded paths. The YES case must cover TTT-paths through edges that TEST deleted, which the rounding argument does not see. The bound update needs both bounds to stay positive so that (LB⋅UB)1/2(LB\cdot UB)^{1/2}(LB⋅UB)1/2 is a meaningful test point, an invariant of the whole run rather than of one step. A tempting shortcut, assuming that LB is a lower bound on OPT at the stopping stage, would assume milestone 4; the goal assumes it only for LB0LB_0LB0​.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Vertices are natural numbers; an instance is a structure with nnn, a finite edge set of pairs, and length and time functions, with a well-formedness predicate: n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, every edge (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) has 1≤i<j≤n1\le i<j\le n1≤i<j≤n, and lengths and times are positive. The requirement n≥2n\ge2n≥2 is not printed: a 111–nnn path and the divisions by n−1n-1n−1 presuppose it. Paths are nonempty vertex lists.
  • Arithmetic. n−1n-1n−1 is taken in the reals; ⌊⋅⌋\lfloor\cdot\rfloor⌊⋅⌋ is the natural-number floor of a nonnegative real; (LB⋅UB)1/2(LB\cdot UB)^{1/2}(LB⋅UB)1/2 is the real square root. Bounds and ε\varepsilonε are reals, TTT is a natural number.
  • OPT. OPT is never a number in the formal statements, because it is ∞\infty∞ when no TTT-path exists. "OPT ≥V\ge V≥V" is a bound on every TTT-path, "OPT <V(1+ε)<V(1+\varepsilon)<V(1+ε)" is the existence of a TTT-path, and the goal compares the output with every TTT-path. Algorithms A and B use values in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}.
  • TEST(V) is defined by the answer the procedure reaches, not through Algorithm B's printed recursion, whose initial condition gj(0)=∞g_j(0)=\inftygj​(0)=∞ is wrong for rounded lengths 000; for n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and ε<1\varepsilon<1ε<1 the answers agree.
  • The run is the iterate of one pass of Step 1; a stopped state is a fixed point. Step 2 outputs any TTT-path optimal for the rounded lengths, without pruning edges, as printed.
  • Added hypothesis. The termination statement assumes (1+ε)2<2(1+\varepsilon)^2<2(1+ε)2<2, which the page does not state; without it the printed loop can run forever, and an explicit instance is included.
  • Not a trivialization. The goal assumes nothing about TEST's correctness, the rounding error or the lower-bound invariant along the run, and the termination companion shows that its stopping hypothesis is reachable.
  • Out of scope. The second, strongly polynomial scheme of §5–§6 is not included, because as printed its Partitioning Algorithm can report infeasibility on a feasible instance and formalizing it would require a corrected algorithm that is not the author's. All running-time claims, stated as O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) bounds under an informal operation count, are also excluded, as are the V′V'V′ variant of the test points and the scheduling application of §7.
  • Reusable parts. The list-based path layer with two additive weights, and the correctness of the pseudopolynomial recursions of Algorithms A and B, are independent of the approximation scheme. Contributions of proofs for any milestone or companion are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Hassin, Approximation schemes for the restricted shortest path problem, Mathematics of Operations Research 17(1):36–42, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.17.1.36
  • A. Warburton, Approximation of Pareto optima in multiple-objective, shortest-path problems, Operations Research 35(1):70–79, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.35.1.70
  • D. H. Lorenz and D. Raz, A simple efficient approximation scheme for the restricted shortest path problem, Operations Research Letters 28(5):213–219, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6377(01)00069-4
  • M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Ellipsoid Method and Its Consequences in Combinatorial Optimization: With a Weak Separation Oracle, the Rounded Ellipsoid Method Is ε-Optimal After N = 4n²⌈log(2R²‖c‖/(rε))⌉ StepsResearch Paper

Motivation

The ellipsoid method decides questions about a convex set K⊆RnK \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nK⊆Rn by maintaining an ellipsoid that contains the relevant part of KKK and shrinking it step by step. Introduced for convex minimization by Yudin and Nemirovskii and by Shor in the 1970s, it became famous in 1979 when Khachiyan used it to show that linear programming is solvable in polynomial time. Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver (Combinatorica 1 (1981)) observed that the method never needs an explicit description of KKK: it only needs, for a query point yyy, either a confirmation that yyy is (nearly) in KKK or a hyperplane (nearly) separating yyy from KKK. From this they derived that optimization and separation are polynomially equivalent for convex bodies, which in turn gives polynomial algorithms for problems with exponentially many constraints: matroid intersection, submodular function minimization, and the stable set problem in perfect graphs.

The engine of all of these applications is a single quantitative statement, Theorem (2.4) of the paper: with a weak separation oracle and with all numbers rounded to a fixed number of binary digits, a prescribed number NNN of ellipsoid steps produces an ε\varepsilonε-optimal point.

Timeline. 1976–1977: Yudin–Nemirovskii and Shor, the method for convex programming. 1979: Khachiyan, polynomial-time linear programming. 1981: Gács–Lovász publish a complete proof of Khachiyan's result with the explicit rounded update; Grötschel–Lovász–Schrijver state and prove the weak-oracle version, Theorem (2.4), and its combinatorial consequences; Bland–Goldfarb–Todd survey the method (Oper. Res. 29 (1981)). 1988: the monograph of Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver (Springer) gives the full theory of weak oracles.

Setting

All norms are Euclidean: ∥v∥=vTv\|v\| = \sqrt{v^{\mathsf T}v}∥v∥=vTv​, and for a symmetric matrix ∥A∥\|A\|∥A∥ is the largest absolute eigenvalue. S(a0,ρ)S(a_0,\rho)S(a0​,ρ) is the closed Euclidean ball of radius ρ\rhoρ about a0a_0a0​, and S(K,δ)S(K,\delta)S(K,δ) the set of points within distance δ\deltaδ of KKK.

A convex body (K,a0,r,R)(K, a_0, r, R)(K,a0​,r,R) consists of a compact convex K⊆RnK\subseteq\mathbb{R}^nK⊆Rn, n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, and 0<r≤R0<r\le R0<r≤R with

S(a0,r)⊆K⊆S(a0,R).S(a_0,r)\subseteq K\subseteq S(a_0,R).S(a0​,r)⊆K⊆S(a0​,R).

A weak separation oracle with precision δ>0\delta>0δ>0 answers a query yyy either with "y∈S(K,δ)y\in S(K,\delta)y∈S(K,δ)", or with a vector ddd, ∥d∥≥1\|d\|\ge 1∥d∥≥1, such that dTx≤dTy+δd^{\mathsf T}x\le d^{\mathsf T}y+\deltadTx≤dTy+δ for all x∈Kx\in Kx∈K.

Given an objective ccc and an accuracy ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 (with ε<r\varepsilon<rε<r and ∥c∥≥1\|c\|\ge 1∥c∥≥1), set

N=4n2⌈log⁡2R2∥c∥rε⌉,δ=R2 4−N300n,p=5N.N = 4n^2\left\lceil \log\frac{2R^2\|c\|}{r\varepsilon}\right\rceil,\qquad \delta = \frac{R^2\,4^{-N}}{300n},\qquad p = 5N .N=4n2⌈logrε2R2∥c∥​⌉,δ=300nR24−N​,p=5N.

Start from x0=a0x_0=a_0x0​=a0​, A0=R2IA_0=R^2IA0​=R2I. At step kkk query the oracle at xkx_kxk​. If it answers "feasible", kkk is a feasible index and a=ca=ca=c; otherwise a=−da=-da=−d. Put bk=Aka/aTAkab_k = A_ka/\sqrt{a^{\mathsf T}A_ka}bk​=Ak​a/aTAk​a​ and

xk∗=xk+1n+1bk,Ak∗=2n2+32n2(Ak−2n+1bkbkT),x_k^* = x_k+\frac{1}{n+1}b_k,\qquad A_k^* = \frac{2n^2+3}{2n^2}\Bigl(A_k-\frac{2}{n+1}b_kb_k^{\mathsf T}\Bigr),xk∗​=xk​+n+11​bk​,Ak∗​=2n22n2+3​(Ak​−n+12​bk​bkT​),

and obtain xk+1x_{k+1}xk+1​, Ak+1A_{k+1}Ak+1​ by rounding xk∗x_k^*xk∗​, Ak∗A_k^*Ak∗​ to ppp binary digits, keeping Ak+1A_{k+1}Ak+1​ symmetric. The ellipsoids are Ek={x:(x−xk)TAk−1(x−xk)≤1}E_k=\{x : (x-x_k)^{\mathsf T}A_k^{-1}(x-x_k)\le 1\}Ek​={x:(x−xk​)TAk−1​(x−xk​)≤1}, and KkK_kKk​ is the set of points of KKK whose objective value is at least that of every feasible centre found before step kkk.

In Lean, IsRoundedRun K c a₀ R δ p N x A feas a d records exactly these conditions, Kk is KkK_kKk​, and EkE_kEk​ is the published LinearOptimization.ellipsoid (x k) (A k).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem (2.4)

If j<Nj<Nj<N is a feasible index whose centre is best among the feasible centres, cTxj=max⁡{cTxk:k<N feasible}c^{\mathsf T}x_j=\max\{c^{\mathsf T}x_k : k<N \text{ feasible}\}cTxj​=max{cTxk​:k<N feasible}, then

cTxj ≥ max⁡x∈KcTx−ε.c^{\mathsf T}x_j \ \ge\ \max_{x\in K} c^{\mathsf T}x - \varepsilon .cTxj​ ≥ x∈Kmax​cTx−ε.

The statement is for every run, i.e. for every sequence of valid oracle answers and every admissible rounding.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. (13): the explicit inverse (Ak∗)−1=2n22n2+3(Ak−1+2n−1aaTaTAka)(A_k^*)^{-1}=\frac{2n^2}{2n^2+3}\bigl(A_k^{-1}+\frac{2}{n-1}\frac{aa^{\mathsf T}}{a^{\mathsf T}A_ka}\bigr)(Ak∗​)−1=2n2+32n2​(Ak−1​+n−12​aTAk​aaaT​), and Ak∗≻0A_k^*\succ 0Ak∗​≻0.
  2. Lemma (2.1): A0,…,ANA_0,\dots,A_NA0​,…,AN​ are positive definite, ∥xk∥≤∥a0∥+R2k\|x_k\|\le\|a_0\|+R2^k∥xk​∥≤∥a0​∥+R2k, ∥Ak∥≤R22k\|A_k\|\le R^22^k∥Ak​∥≤R22k, ∥Ak−1∥≤R−24k\|A_k^{-1}\|\le R^{-2}4^k∥Ak−1​∥≤R−24k.
  3. Lemma (2.2): μ(Ek+1)<e−1/(5n)μ(Ek)\mu(E_{k+1}) < e^{-1/(5n)}\mu(E_k)μ(Ek+1​)<e−1/(5n)μ(Ek​).
  4. Lemma (2.3): Kk⊆EkK_k\subseteq E_kKk​⊆Ek​ for k=0,…,Nk=0,\dots,Nk=0,…,N.
  5. (32): μ(KN)≤μ(EN)≤e−N/(4n)μ(E0)=e−N/(4n)RnVn\mu(K_N)\le\mu(E_N)\le e^{-N/(4n)}\mu(E_0)=e^{-N/(4n)}R^nV_nμ(KN​)≤μ(EN​)≤e−N/(4n)μ(E0​)=e−N/(4n)RnVn​.
  6. (34): the piece above the level ttt of the cone with base the rrr-disc through x0x_0x0​ orthogonal to ccc and apex y∈Ky\in Ky∈K has volume Vn−1rn−1(ζ−cTx0)n∥c∥(ζ−tζ−cTx0)n\frac{V_{n-1}r^{n-1}(\zeta-c^{\mathsf T}x_0)}{n\|c\|}\bigl(\frac{\zeta-t}{\zeta-c^{\mathsf T}x_0}\bigr)^nn∥c∥Vn−1​rn−1(ζ−cTx0​)​(ζ−cTx0​ζ−t​)n, which bounds μ({z∈K:cTz≥t})\mu(\{z\in K: c^{\mathsf T}z\ge t\})μ({z∈K:cTz≥t}) from below.

Significance

Theorem (2.4) turns any weak separation procedure for a convex body into a weak optimization procedure, with a number of oracle calls and a numerical precision polynomial in nnn, log⁡R\log RlogR, log⁡(1/r)\log(1/r)log(1/r), log⁡∥c∥\log\|c\|log∥c∥ and log⁡(1/ε)\log(1/\varepsilon)log(1/ε). This is the "only if" half of the paper's Theorem (3.1), and through it the source of the polynomial algorithms of Chapters 4–6 of the paper and of the 1988 monograph. Its rounding analysis is what makes the method an algorithm on finite-precision numbers rather than an argument about exact real arithmetic.

The result is proved, and has been for over forty years. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof of the rounded, weak-oracle version, including the error analysis that the paper compresses into "rounding errors can be estimated similarly". Related items already on the platform formalize exact-arithmetic ellipsoid methods: Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis's central-cut method for polyhedra (LinearOptimization.ellipsoid_method_correct, proved) and Bubeck's version for convex minimization with a first-order oracle (arXiv:1405.4980). Neither has a weak oracle, the inflated factor (2n2+3)/(2n2)(2n^2+3)/(2n^2)(2n2+3)/(2n2), or rounding.

Difficulty

For the exact update with factor n2/(n2−1)n^2/(n^2-1)n2/(n2−1) and an exact separating hyperplane through the centre, containment and volume decrease are a classical computation. Here three perturbations interact. The cut is shifted by δ\deltaδ, so the retained half-ellipsoid is slightly larger than a half. The rounded matrix differs from Ak∗A_k^*Ak∗​ by up to n2−pn2^{-p}n2−p in norm, which could destroy positive definiteness if the smallest eigenvalue were not controlled from below, and Lemma (2.1)'s bound R24−kR^24^{-k}R24−k is what controls it. The containment Kk+1⊆Ek+1K_{k+1}\subseteq E_{k+1}Kk+1​⊆Ek+1​ must absorb both errors, and it is the inflation factor (2n2+3)/(2n2)(2n^2+3)/(2n^2)(2n2+3)/(2n2), chosen larger than the optimal one, that leaves room. The paper bounds the remainder term in (29) only by "similar methods"; making that bound explicit is the bulk of the work. The final step also needs the volume rate e−N/(4n)e^{-N/(4n)}e−N/(4n) in (32), which is sharper than iterating Lemma (2.2) and requires the exact per-step volume ratio of the inflated update.

Formalization scope

Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is Fin n → ℝ with Lebesgue measure. Since Lean's norm on Fin n → ℝ is the sup norm, the Euclidean norm is written out (euclNorm), and the bounds ∥Ak∥≤R22k\|A_k\|\le R^22^k∥Ak​∥≤R22k, ∥Ak−1∥≤R−24k\|A_k^{-1}\|\le R^{-2}4^k∥Ak−1​∥≤R−24k are stated as quadratic-form (eigenvalue) bounds. NNN uses the natural logarithm and the integer ceiling.

The runs generalize the page in three ways, each of which makes the theorems stronger: the oracle's answers are any answers valid for its specification; rounding is any symmetric value within 2−p2^{-p}2−p entrywise; and data are real rather than rational.

The page's standing assumptions ε<r\varepsilon<rε<r, ∥c∥≥1\|c\|\ge1∥c∥≥1, n≥2n\ge2n≥2 (p. 173) are hypotheses. Two hypotheses are added, because the page's NNN, δ\deltaδ and ppp are absolute numbers and the claims fail at extreme scales:

  • R≥1R\ge 1R≥1 (Lemmas (2.1)–(2.3), (32), Theorem (2.4)): for R=r=2−1000R=r=2^{-1000}R=r=2−1000, ε=r/2\varepsilon=r/2ε=r/2, n=2n=2n=2, rounding can make A1=0A_1=0A1​=0.
  • ε≤1\varepsilon\le1ε≤1 (Lemma (2.3), (32), Theorem (2.4)): for R=r=1013R=r=10^{13}R=r=1013, ε=0.99r\varepsilon=0.99rε=0.99r, n=2n=2n=2, δ>2r\delta>2rδ>2r, and a valid oracle can cut away all of KKK.

Neither is needed in (13) or (34).

A run predicate without the oracle clause would make Lemma (2.3) false, and one with exact equality instead of rounding would state a weaker theorem; the goal quantifies over every run, never over some run. Positive definiteness of the AkA_kAk​ is a consequence (Lemma (2.1)), not a hypothesis: since Lean's inverse of a singular matrix is 000, assuming it would hide the lemma's content.

Out of scope: the paper's polynomial-time claims (Theorem (3.1) and its consequences), the bit length of the numbers, and the rationality of inputs, since no oracle-machine model with bit complexity exists in Mathlib or on the platform.

Reusable infrastructure: volumes of ellipsoids and of cone pieces, Sherman–Morrison-type inverses, and perturbation bounds for positive definite matrices. Contributions of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, The ellipsoid method and its consequences in combinatorial optimization, Combinatorica 1(2) (1981) 169–197. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02579273
  • P. Gács, L. Lovász, Khachiyan's algorithm for linear programming, Mathematical Programming Study 14 (1981) 61–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0120921
  • L. G. Khachiyan, A polynomial algorithm in linear programming, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 20 (1979) 191–194 (English translation of the original article).
  • R. G. Bland, D. Goldfarb, M. J. Todd, The ellipsoid method: a survey, Operations Research 29(6) (1981) 1039–1091. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.6.1039
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-97881-4
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, Ch. 8. Book record.
  • S. Bubeck, Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 8 (2015). https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.4980
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Convex OptimizationFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonlinear Proximal Point Algorithms Using Bregman Functions, with Applications to Convex Programming 1: The Bregman Proximal Point Algorithm Converges to a Zero of a Maximal Monotone OperatorResearch Paper

Motivation

The proximal point algorithm is a way to find a zero of a set-valued monotone operator by repeatedly solving a regularized version of that operator equation. Its classical regularizer is quadratic, so the distance from one iterate to the next is Euclidean. In convex optimization, that geometry can be poorly matched to the domain: the natural iterates may be constrained to a positive orthant, a simplex, or an open set with a meaningful boundary. Eckstein's 1993 paper studies what happens when a Bregman function supplies the regularization instead. The convergence question matters because the later multiplier methods in the same paper are instances of this general iteration. Eckstein (1993) develops the general result before applying it to convex programs.

The result considered here is Theorem 1 of that paper. It concerns an existing infinite run: it states what such a run does, while Theorems 4 and 5 address conditions under which a run can be generated. This separation keeps the convergence assertion precise. The result is known mathematically; the mission asks for a Lean proof of its stated generality, including its alternative when the operator has no zero.

Setting

Work in a finite-dimensional real inner-product space HHH, representing the paper's Rn\mathbb R^nRn. A monotone operator T:H→2HT:H\to 2^HT:H→2H associates a set T(x)T(x)T(x) of vectors with each point. It is monotone when ⟨x−y,u−v⟩≥0\langle x-y,u-v\rangle\ge0⟨x−y,u−v⟩≥0 for every u∈T(x)u\in T(x)u∈T(x) and v∈T(y)v\in T(y)v∈T(y), and maximal monotone when its graph has no proper monotone extension. Its domain is dom⁡T={x:T(x)≠∅}\operatorname{dom}T=\{x:T(x)\ne\varnothing\}domT={x:T(x)=∅}; a zero is a point zzz with 0∈T(z)0\in T(z)0∈T(z).

Let S⊆HS\subseteq HS⊆H be open and hhh a real function on S‾\overline SS. At y∈Sy\in Sy∈S, define the Bregman distance

Dh(x,y)=h(x)−h(y)−⟨∇h(y),x−y⟩,x∈S‾.D_h(x,y)=h(x)-h(y)-\langle\nabla h(y),x-y\rangle,\qquad x\in\overline S.Dh​(x,y)=h(x)−h(y)−⟨∇h(y),x−y⟩,x∈S.

It need not be symmetric and is generally not a metric. Definition 1 requires hhh to be continuously differentiable on SSS, strictly convex and continuous on S‾\overline SS, and to satisfy boundedness of both kinds of partial DhD_hDh​ sublevel sets. Two sequential conditions connect convergence in HHH to convergence of Bregman distances, including sequences approaching the boundary of SSS. These six requirements together define a Bregman function with zone SSS.

A Bregman proximal-point run uses positive parameters ckc_kck​ and a sequence xk∈Sx^k\in Sxk∈S satisfying

∇h(xk)−∇h(xk+1)ck∈T(xk+1),k=0,1,….\frac{\nabla h(x^k)-\nabla h(x^{k+1})}{c_k}\in T(x^{k+1}),\qquad k=0,1,\ldots.ck​∇h(xk)−∇h(xk+1)​∈T(xk+1),k=0,1,….

This is the inclusion form (4) of the paper's recursion (3). It permits set-valued TTT and does not assert that a next iterate exists for arbitrary starting data. The model also uses the paper's standing domain condition dom⁡T⊆S‾\operatorname{dom}T\subseteq\overline SdomT⊆S.

Formalization targets

The main target is Theorem 1. Assume that the positive parameters have a common positive lower bound and that one of the following conditions holds: (C1) dom⁡T‾⊆S\overline{\operatorname{dom}T}\subseteq SdomT⊆S, or (C2) T=∂fT=\partial fT=∂f for a proper lower semicontinuous convex extended-valued function fff. Then

T−1(0)≠∅⟹xk⟶z for some z∈T−1(0),T−1(0)=∅ and (C1)⟹{xk:k≥0} is unbounded.\begin{aligned} T^{-1}(0)\ne\varnothing &\quad\Longrightarrow\quad x^k\longrightarrow z\text{ for some }z\in T^{-1}(0),\\ T^{-1}(0)=\varnothing\text{ and (C1)} &\quad\Longrightarrow\quad \{x^k:k\ge0\}\text{ is unbounded}. \end{aligned}T−1(0)=∅T−1(0)=∅ and (C1)​⟹xk⟶z for some z∈T−1(0),⟹{xk:k≥0} is unbounded.​

The second line retains the paper's extra (C1) requirement. The standing inclusion dom⁡T⊆S‾\operatorname{dom}T\subseteq\overline SdomT⊆S has a different direction and role. The milestone list follows Lemma 1 and the three labelled steps of Theorem 1's convergence proof: the resolvent inequality, boundedness of the run when a zero exists, identification of every limit point as a zero, and convergence of the full run. The no-zero alternative remains in the goal because restating that conjunct as a separate milestone would add no independent target.

Significance

Theorem 1 says that the nonlinear iteration cannot remain bounded without approaching a zero under (C1), and that when a zero exists the whole sequence converges under either (C1) or (C2). This is stronger than saying only that accumulation points solve the operator equation. It supplies a common convergence result for the paper's later proximal minimization and multiplier algorithms, where the operator is often a subdifferential and the geometry comes from a nonquadratic hhh. Eckstein (1993) gives those applications after the general theorem.

A formalization would add a reusable interface for Bregman functions with open zones, including their boundary behavior, and for proximal-point runs of set-valued maximal monotone operators. The published platform definitions of monotone operators and extended-valued convex analysis are reused. The new proof work is the Bregman resolvent estimate and the convergence alternative at Theorem 1's level of generality. No machine-checked proof of this specific theorem is claimed here.

Difficulty

The usual Euclidean proximal-point theorem does not apply directly after changing coordinates by y=∇h(x)y=\nabla h(x)y=∇h(x): the transformed operator need not remain monotone, as the paper observes after Theorem 1. A proof must account for the nonsymmetric DhD_hDh​, the possible boundary of SSS, and two distinct ways to identify a limit point as a zero. Under (C1), the point lies where the gradient is continuous; under (C2), the argument uses the subdifferential structure instead. The no-zero case has its own difficulty because boundedness would have to contradict maximal monotonicity without first assuming that a zero exists. The proof cites a closed-graph result for maximal monotone operators and a zero-existence fact for operators with bounded domain; those external facts are groundwork for solvers, not invented milestones.

Formalization scope

Lean uses a finite-dimensional real inner-product space rather than a coordinate-fixed Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The total function h:H→Rh:H\to\mathbb Rh:H→R is constrained only on S‾\overline SS; its gradient is evaluated only on the open zone SSS. The Bregman distance is used on S‾×S\overline S\times SS×S. Definition 1's condition (vi) explicitly places its first sequence in S‾\overline SS, the natural domain stated immediately after the definition. The run explicitly keeps every xkx^kxk in SSS and encodes recursion (3) using the equivalent inclusion (4). A positive lower bound on ckc_kck​ is expressed by one ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 with ck≥εc_k\ge\varepsilonck​≥ε for every kkk.

The operator TTT is a published set-valued operator object, with its published notions of monotonicity, maximality, domain, and zeros. The proper and convex extended-valued function in (C2) uses the published epigraph and subgradient definitions, with EReal able to express +∞+\infty+∞. Subdifferentials are built from those definitions. A limit point means a limit along a strictly increasing subsequence, and unboundedness means that the full set of iterates is not bounded. The proof step on p. 207 prints T−1(0)⊆ST^{-1}(0)\subseteq ST−1(0)⊆S; the formal Step 1 uses the standing condition T−1(0)⊆S‾T^{-1}(0)\subseteq\overline ST−1(0)⊆S, which is sufficient for the Bregman distance and also covers (C2).

The run relation cannot be satisfied by an arbitrary constant sequence: its inclusion must hold at every step, and a zero-free operator under (C1) triggers the unbounded conclusion. Nor does the theorem replace convergence by existence of one convergent subsequence. Reusable contributions include properties of the Bregman resolvent and maximal-monotone graph limits. Theorem 5's separate existence and minimization claims are outside this mission's core.

Selected references

  • Jonathan Eckstein, Nonlinear proximal point algorithms using Bregman functions, with applications to convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 18(1), 202–226, 1993. DOI: 10.1287/moor.18.1.202.
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

How Many Parts to Make at Once: The Cost per Unit (CX + S)/240M + S/X + C Is Minimized Exactly at the Lot Size X = √(240MS/C)Research Paper

Motivation

Every manufacturer who makes a part in batches faces the trade-off Ford W. Harris described in 1913: large lots spread the fixed set-up cost of an order over many pieces, but they also tie up money in stock that must be carried. Harris's article "How many parts to make at once" (Factory, The Magazine of Management 10(2), 1913, reprinted in Operations Research 38(6), 1990) resolved the trade-off with a closed formula, the square-root or economic order quantity (EOQ) formula. It is the starting point of deterministic inventory theory and is still taught as the first model of every operations-management course.

Timeline. Harris published the formula in 1913, without proof ("the solution of this problem involves higher mathematics"). The same formula was popularised by R. H. Wilson in 1934 and was for decades attributed to him. D. Erlenkotter traced it back to Harris (Operations Research 38(6), 1990, 937–946), and the article was reprinted in the same issue. Later work built stochastic (Q, r) models on top of it; Zheng (1992) compared the EOQ heuristic with the optimal (Q, r) policy.

Setting

A part is used at a regular rate of MMM units per month (the movement). Each unit costs CCC dollars (the unit cost), and each order costs SSS dollars to set up. Parts are made in lots of XXX units, the lot size. Under regular movement a lot of XXX is delivered when the stock reaches nothing and is then used up at rate MMM, so the stock at time t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 (months, from a delivery) is the sawtooth

stock⁡(t)=X(1−{Mt/X}),\operatorname{stock}(t) = X\bigl(1 - \{Mt/X\}\bigr),stock(t)=X(1−{Mt/X}),

with {u}\{u\}{u} the fractional part. Interest and depreciation on stock are charged at ten per cent a year, a rate the paper fixes.

Harris prices a unit in three parts:

  1. the interest charge per piece: the average stock is X/2X/2X/2, its value including set-up is 12(CX+S)\tfrac12(CX+S)21​(CX+S), ten per cent of this is the annual charge, and dividing by the 12M12M12M units used a year gives 1240M(CX+S)\frac{1}{240M}(CX+S)240M1​(CX+S);
  2. the set-up cost per piece S/XS/XS/X;
  3. the unit cost CCC.

The cost per unit is therefore

Y(X)=1240M(CX+S)+SX+C,Y(X) = \frac{1}{240M}(CX + S) + \frac{S}{X} + C,Y(X)=240M1​(CX+S)+XS​+C,

and the economic lot size is X∗=240MS/CX^* = \sqrt{240MS/C}X∗=240MS/C​. In Lean these are stockLevel, interestPerPiece, costPerUnit and econLotSize in the namespace HarrisEOQ.Lot.

Formalization targets

Goal: the square-root formula

For M,C,S>0M, C, S > 0M,C,S>0,

X∗>0,Y(X∗)≤Y(X) for all X>0,Y(X)=Y(X∗), X>0  ⟹  X=X∗.X^* > 0, \qquad Y(X^*) \le Y(X) \text{ for all } X > 0, \qquad Y(X) = Y(X^*),\ X > 0 \implies X = X^* .X∗>0,Y(X∗)≤Y(X) for all X>0,Y(X)=Y(X∗), X>0⟹X=X∗.

This is Harris's claim that the value of XXX giving the minimum value to YYY "reduces to the square root of (240MS divided by C)": X∗X^*X∗ is admissible, attains the minimum, and is the only lot size that does.

Milestones: the derivation of YYY

  1. The long-run average of the sawtooth stock is X/2X/2X/2: lim⁡T→∞1T∫0Tstock⁡(t) dt=X/2\lim_{T\to\infty}\frac1T\int_0^T \operatorname{stock}(t)\,dt = X/2limT→∞​T1​∫0T​stock(t)dt=X/2.
  2. The interest charge per piece, built in the paper's steps, equals 1240M(CX+S)\frac{1}{240M}(CX+S)240M1​(CX+S), and YYY is the sum of the three per-piece costs.

These justify the objective YYY, not its minimization; the paper gives no argument for the minimization.

Companion statements

  • X∗=KMX^* = K\sqrt MX∗=KM​ with K=240S/CK = \sqrt{240S/C}K=240S/C​ (p. 948).
  • The fourfold law: X∗(M′)=2X∗(M)  ⟺  M′=4MX^*(M') = 2X^*(M) \iff M' = 4MX∗(M′)=2X∗(M)⟺M′=4M (p. 950).
  • A lot too small by ddd costs more than one too large by ddd: Y(X∗+d)<Y(X∗−d)Y(X^*+d) < Y(X^*-d)Y(X∗+d)<Y(X∗−d) for 0<d<X∗0 < d < X^*0<d<X∗ (p. 949, general form of an observation made on an example).
  • At the optimum, S/X∗=CX∗/(240M)S/X^* = CX^*/(240M)S/X∗=CX∗/(240M) (p. 948).
  • The paper's three worked lot sizes 2,190, 6,850 and 48.5, each to its last printed digit (pp. 948–949).

Significance

The result. The square-root formula gives the cost-minimising batch size in closed form from three observable numbers. Its consequences are the ones Harris draws: lot sizes grow only with the square root of demand (so consumption must quadruple to double a lot), the cost curve is flat near the optimum and asymmetric (erring small is worse than erring large), and at the optimum the set-up cost balances the variable carrying cost. Every later deterministic and stochastic lot-sizing model reduces to this one in its simplest case.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and proved in textbooks, but Harris's paper itself contains no proof. A formalization supplies the missing argument for the paper's exact objective, which differs from the textbook EOQ by charging interest on the set-up cost (S/2S/2S/2 in the stock value) and by the fixed ten per cent rate. It also makes the paper's modelling step precise: the claim that the average stock is X/2X/2X/2 becomes a statement about a time average of a sawtooth function. To our knowledge none of these statements has a machine-checked proof on the platform; the EOQ items of Zheng (1992) concern a different model, with backorders.

Difficulty

The minimization is elementary calculus; the substance of the mission is fidelity. The objective must be the display as printed, with 1240M\frac{1}{240M}240M1​ meaning 1/(240⋅M)1/(240\cdot M)1/(240⋅M), and the claim includes uniqueness, not only that X∗X^*X∗ is a minimizer. The average-stock milestone needs a genuine long-run average of a discontinuous periodic function over [0,T][0, T][0,T] with TTT not a whole number of cycles, which is where the integration and limit bookkeeping lies.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers; lot sizes are not restricted to integers (the paper's own optimum is 48.5). The hypotheses M,C,S>0M, C, S > 0M,C,S>0 are not written on the page; they are implicit in the meaning of a usage rate, a price and a cost, and are added. Every quantifier over lot sizes is over X>0X > 0X>0. Time is measured in months, and the interest rate is fixed at ten per cent, so the constant 240=12⋅2⋅10240 = 12 \cdot 2 \cdot 10240=12⋅2⋅10 appears as printed; the formula is not generalized to an arbitrary rate.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: YYY is defined as the printed display, not rewritten around X∗X^*X∗; the average stock is an integral of the stock level, never defined as X/2X/2X/2; and the goal does not quantify over all real XXX, where Lean's convention S/0=0S/0 = 0S/0=0 would make X=0X = 0X=0 a spurious minimizer.

The manufacturing interval TTT and the safe stock minimum play no role in the formula and are not modelled. The examples' cost figures (0.188 cents, $0.00028, and so on) are not formalized. The development needs only Mathlib's real numbers, square roots, fractional parts, interval integrals and limits; contributions of proofs of any item are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. W. Harris, How many parts to make at once, Factory, The Magazine of Management 10(2):135–136, 152, 1913; reprinted in Operations Research 38(6):947–950, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.38.6.947
  • D. Erlenkotter, Ford Whitman Harris and the economic order quantity model, Operations Research 38(6):937–946, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.38.6.937
  • R. H. Wilson, A scientific routine for stock control, Harvard Business Review 13:116–128, 1934.
  • Y.-S. Zheng, On properties of stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimization and Approximation in Deterministic Sequencing and Scheduling: A Survey 1: The Optimal Two-Machine Open Shop Makespan Is max{T₁, T₂, maxⱼ(aⱼ + bⱼ)}Research Paper

Motivation

Shop scheduling asks how to sequence jobs that each need processing on several machines. In an open shop, a job's operations may be executed in any order, as in testing stations, repair bays, or classroom and examination timetables, where the order in which a candidate visits the stations is irrelevant. The objective studied here is the makespan Cmax⁡C_{\max}Cmax​, the time at which the last operation finishes.

The survey of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (Ann. Discrete Math. 5, 1979) introduced the three-field notation α∣β∣γ\alpha|\beta|\gammaα∣β∣γ that the scheduling literature still uses, and classified the complexity of the problems it names. For the open shop, its §5.2.1 presents a simplified exposition of the result of Gonzalez and Sahni (J. ACM 23, 1976): with two machines and no preemption, the obvious lower bound on the makespan is always achieved. The same page records that the three-machine case O3∥Cmax⁡O3\|C_{\max}O3∥Cmax​ is binary NP-hard, so two machines is exactly where the problem is easy.

Timeline. Gonzalez and Sahni (1976) gave the linear-time algorithm for O2∥Cmax⁡O2\|C_{\max}O2∥Cmax​, proved NP-hardness for O3∥Cmax⁡O3\|C_{\max}O3∥Cmax​, and gave a polynomial algorithm for the preemptive problem O∣pmtn∣Cmax⁡O|pmtn|C_{\max}O∣pmtn∣Cmax​. Graham et al. (1979, §5.2.1) gave the shorter construction formalized here, and observed (§5.2.2) that it implies preemption brings no advantage for m=2m = 2m=2. Lenstra (cited as forthcoming in the survey) showed O2∣rj∣Cmax⁡O2|r_j|C_{\max}O2∣rj​∣Cmax​, O2∣tree∣Cmax⁡O2|tree|C_{\max}O2∣tree∣Cmax​ and O∥Cmax⁡O\|C_{\max}O∥Cmax​ unary NP-hard.

Setting

There are nnn jobs J1,…,JnJ_1, \dots, J_nJ1​,…,Jn​ and two machines M1M_1M1​, M2M_2M2​. Job JjJ_jJj​ has an operation on M1M_1M1​ of length aj≥0a_j \ge 0aj​≥0 and an operation on M2M_2M2​ of length bj≥0b_j \ge 0bj​≥0. There is no preemption, and every job is available at time 000. A schedule assigns start times s1(j)s_1(j)s1​(j) and s2(j)s_2(j)s2​(j) to the two operations of JjJ_jJj​, which then occupy [s1(j),s1(j)+aj)[s_1(j), s_1(j)+a_j)[s1​(j),s1​(j)+aj​) on M1M_1M1​ and [s2(j),s2(j)+bj)[s_2(j), s_2(j)+b_j)[s2​(j),s2​(j)+bj​) on M2M_2M2​.

A schedule is feasible if

  1. all start times are nonnegative;
  2. each machine processes at most one job at a time: the intervals of distinct jobs on the same machine do not overlap;
  3. each job is processed on at most one machine at a time: the two intervals of the same job do not overlap, in either order.

Write T1=∑jajT_1 = \sum_j a_jT1​=∑j​aj​ and T2=∑jbjT_2 = \sum_j b_jT2​=∑j​bj​ for the two machine loads. The survey's construction uses the sets

A={Jj∣aj≥bj},B={Jj∣aj<bj},A = \{J_j \mid a_j \ge b_j\}, \qquad B = \{J_j \mid a_j < b_j\},A={Jj​∣aj​≥bj​},B={Jj​∣aj​<bj​},

two distinct jobs JrJ_rJr​, JlJ_lJl​ with ar≥max⁡Jj∈Abja_r \ge \max_{J_j \in A} b_jar​≥maxJj​∈A​bj​ and bl≥max⁡Jj∈Bajb_l \ge \max_{J_j \in B} a_jbl​≥maxJj​∈B​aj​, and A′=A−{Jr,Jl}A' = A - \{J_r, J_l\}A′=A−{Jr​,Jl​}, B′=B−{Jr,Jl}B' = B - \{J_r, J_l\}B′=B−{Jr​,Jl​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: the optimal makespan

Cmax⁡∗=max⁡{T1, T2, max⁡j (aj+bj)},C^*_{\max} = \max\Big\{T_1,\ T_2,\ \max_j\,(a_j + b_j)\Big\},Cmax∗​=max{T1​, T2​, jmax​(aj​+bj​)},

and the optimum is attained. Formally, for every T≥0T \ge 0T≥0: a feasible schedule completing every operation by TTT exists if and only if T1≤TT_1 \le TT1​≤T, T2≤TT_2 \le TT2​≤T and aj+bj≤Ta_j + b_j \le Taj​+bj​≤T for all jjj. The goal mentions neither AAA, BBB, JrJ_rJr​, JlJ_lJl​ nor the case analysis; those are the milestones.

Milestones (in the order of the argument)

  1. Two distinct jobs JrJ_rJr​, JlJ_lJl​ with the required bounds exist when n≥2n \ge 2n≥2.
  2. Fig. 5.1: the blocks B′∪{Jl}B' \cup \{J_l\}B′∪{Jl​} and A′∪{Jr}A' \cup \{J_r\}A′∪{Jr​}, with A′A'A′ and B′B'B′ in arbitrary order, have feasible staircase schedules without idle time.
  3. Fig. 5.2: if T1−al≥T2−brT_1 - a_l \ge T_2 - b_rT1​−al​≥T2​−br​, the blocks combine into a feasible schedule of all jobs ending by T1+brT_1 + b_rT1​+br​.
  4. Case (1): if moreover ar≤T2−bra_r \le T_2 - b_rar​≤T2​−br​, some feasible schedule has length at most max⁡{T1,T2}\max\{T_1, T_2\}max{T1​,T2​}.
  5. Case (2): if moreover ar>T2−bra_r > T_2 - b_rar​>T2​−br​, some feasible schedule has length at most max⁡{T1,ar+br}\max\{T_1, a_r + b_r\}max{T1​,ar​+br​}.
  6. The symmetric case T1−al<T2−brT_1 - a_l < T_2 - b_rT1​−al​<T2​−br​: some feasible schedule has length at most max⁡{T1,T2,al+bl}\max\{T_1, T_2, a_l + b_l\}max{T1​,T2​,al​+bl​}.
  7. The lower bound: every feasible schedule has Cmax⁡≥max⁡{T1,T2,max⁡j(aj+bj)}C_{\max} \ge \max\{T_1, T_2, \max_j(a_j + b_j)\}Cmax​≥max{T1​,T2​,maxj​(aj​+bj​)}.

Significance

The result. The theorem gives a closed form for the optimal makespan of a two-machine open shop, together with a linear-time construction of an optimal schedule. The survey uses it immediately: since the bound is also a lower bound for preemptive schedules, O2∣pmtn∣Cmax⁡O2|pmtn|C_{\max}O2∣pmtn∣Cmax​ is solved by the same schedules, so preemption gives no advantage on two machines (§5.2.2). It is the standard example of a shop problem whose trivial lower bound is tight, and the contrast with the binary NP-hard O3∥Cmax⁡O3\|C_{\max}O3∥Cmax​ marks the complexity boundary for nonpreemptive open shops.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and proved on paper; no machine-checked proof is known to exist on this platform. The mission produces a reusable model of nonpreemptive two-machine open-shop schedules with real processing times, a verified lower bound, and a verified constructive argument. Unlike many existence-of-schedule results, the survey's construction is explicit (orders and start times), so it can be formalized directly rather than through an abstract existence argument.

Difficulty

The lower bound is the easy half. The difficulty is the construction: a schedule must meet the bound simultaneously on both machines and for every job. The natural first idea, running every job on M1M_1M1​ then M2M_2M2​ in some order (a flow-shop schedule), fails: Johnson's rule then gives a makespan that can exceed max⁡{T1,T2,max⁡j(aj+bj)}\max\{T_1, T_2, \max_j(a_j+b_j)\}max{T1​,T2​,maxj​(aj​+bj​)}, because the open shop needs some job to visit M2M_2M2​ first. The survey's construction moves exactly one job, JrJ_rJr​, to the front of M2M_2M2​, and its correctness depends on the choice of JrJ_rJr​ and JlJ_lJl​ and on the case split on T1−alT_1 - a_lT1​−al​ versus T2−brT_2 - b_rT2​−br​. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 are drawn for T1≥T2T_1 \ge T_2T1​≥T2​; in the other subcases the start times shown in the figures need adjustment, and the formal statements of the cases assert lengths rather than the figures' exact start times.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace SchedSurvey.O2. Jobs are Fin n, 0-based (JjJ_jJj​ is index j−1j-1j−1). Processing times and start times are real numbers with aj,bj≥0a_j, b_j \ge 0aj​,bj​≥0; the survey's integer data are a special case, and every claim of §5.2.1 holds over the reals. A schedule is a pair of start-time functions s₁ s₂ : Fin n → ℝ. Interval non-overlap is s + p ≤ s' ∨ s' + p' ≤ s, so touching intervals are allowed and a zero-length operation occupies nothing. Feasibility (IsFeasible) contains both disjointness constraints of §2.1, the machine constraint and the job constraint, with the two operations of a job in either order. The job constraint is essential: without it the optimum would be max⁡{T1,T2}\max\{T_1, T_2\}max{T1​,T2​} and the goal false.

"Length at most LLL" is CompletesBy a b S L: every operation ends by LLL. Optimality is stated in threshold form, which avoids taking a supremum or infimum over a possibly empty set and is equivalent to "Cmax⁡∗C^*_{\max}Cmax∗​ equals the maximum and is attained". A maximum over AAA or BBB appears as a bound on every member, which is also correct for empty AAA or BBB. The orders of A′A'A′ and B′B'B′ are duplicate-free lists whose members are exactly those sets; back-to-back start times are given by contigStart.

The milestone on the choice of JrJ_rJr​, JlJ_lJl​ assumes n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, which the page presupposes; the goal does not, and covers n≤1n \le 1n≤1 as well. The lower bound assumes T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, which matters only for n=0n = 0n=0.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: feasibility includes both disjointness constraints and nonnegative start times, the threshold is quantified over all T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, and no constant is fixed.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the lower bound (a sum of disjoint intervals inside [0,T][0, T][0,T]), of the list-based block lemmas, of the case lemmas, and of the goal from them. The interval and back-to-back-schedule lemmas are reusable for other shop problems.

Selected references

  • R.L. Graham, E.L. Lawler, J.K. Lenstra, A.H.G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • T. Gonzalez, S. Sahni, Open shop scheduling to minimize finish time, Journal of the ACM 23(4) (1976) 665–679. https://doi.org/10.1145/321978.321985
  • S.M. Johnson, Optimal two- and three-stage production schedules with setup times included, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 1 (1954) 61–68. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800010110
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor II: If E(X_j)/α_j and α_j/[c_j(1+α_j)] Both Increase in j, the Order 1, …, N Minimizes the Weighted Expected Completion Time (Proposition 2)Research Paper

Why deteriorating jobs need a scheduling rule

On one processor, the completion time of a job normally depends on how much work precedes it. In the model of Browne and Yechiali (1990), waiting also changes the job's own processing requirement: a job that starts later takes longer. The sequence therefore changes both when each job starts and how long subsequent jobs must wait. This matters when the goal is a weighted completion cost, because a delay to one job can raise the completion costs of many others.

The paper gives an expected-makespan ordering for this linear deterioration model and, in Proposition 2, a sufficient condition under which the original job order minimizes weighted expected completion cost. The latter is the target of this mission. Related platform work on Delayed SWPT and the AvgCompletionSched family treats weighted completion scheduling without this job-specific linear deterioration. Their additive processing-time models do not supply the completion-time object used here.

Jobs, schedules, and cost

There are NNN jobs, all available at time zero, processed one at a time on a single machine without idle time or preemption. A schedule π\piπ is a permutation of the jobs: π(k)\pi(k)π(k) is the job processed in position kkk. The paper labels positions and jobs from 111 to NNN; the Lean development labels them from 000 to N−1N-1N−1. The identity schedule π0\pi_0π0​ processes jobs in label order.

For job iii, XiX_iXi​ is its random initial processing requirement, αi\alpha_iαi​ its deterministic growth rate, and cic_ici​ its waiting cost rate. If the job starts at time ttt, its actual processing time is Yi(t)=Xi+αitY_i(t)=X_i+\alpha_i tYi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t. Deterioration stops once processing starts. Write Sk(π)S_k(\pi)Sk​(π) for the time at which the first kkk scheduled jobs have all finished. The model sets S0(π)=0S_0(\pi)=0S0​(π)=0 and

Sk+1(π)=Sk(π)+Xπ(k+1)+απ(k+1)Sk(π)S_{k+1}(\pi)=S_k(\pi)+X_{\pi(k+1)}+\alpha_{\pi(k+1)}S_k(\pi)Sk+1​(π)=Sk​(π)+Xπ(k+1)​+απ(k+1)​Sk​(π)

in the paper's one-based position notation. Thus the completion time of the job in position kkk is Sk(π)S_k(\pi)Sk​(π). Its cost is its own rate cπ(k)c_{\pi(k)}cπ(k)​ times that completion time, giving

C(π)=∑k=1Ncπ(k)Sk(π).C(\pi)=\sum_{k=1}^{N}c_{\pi(k)}S_k(\pi).C(π)=k=1∑N​cπ(k)​Sk​(π).

All of these are random quantities until an expectation is taken. Equation (2) of the paper writes SkS_kSk​ as a sum of the initial requirements multiplied by the later growth factors. Equation (8) substitutes that expression into C(π0)C(\pi_0)C(π0​). Both equations are included as milestones, stated along an arbitrary schedule by relabelling the jobs. The third milestone is the exact change in CCC from swapping two adjacent jobs. These three statements are pathwise identities, so their mathematical content does not depend on a probability distribution.

Formalization targets

The principal target is Proposition 2: if both sequences of job-indexed ratios are strictly increasing,

E(X1)α1<⋯<E(XN)αN,α1c1(1+α1)<⋯<αNcN(1+αN),\frac{E(X_1)}{\alpha_1}<\cdots<\frac{E(X_N)}{\alpha_N}, \qquad \frac{\alpha_1}{c_1(1+\alpha_1)} <\cdots< \frac{\alpha_N}{c_N(1+\alpha_N)},α1​E(X1​)​<⋯<αN​E(XN​)​,c1​(1+α1​)α1​​<⋯<cN​(1+αN​)αN​​,

then, for every permutation σ\sigmaσ,

E[C(π0)]≤E[C(σ)].E[C(\pi_0)]\le E[C(\sigma)].E[C(π0​)]≤E[C(σ)].

The first ratio compares an initial expected requirement with its growth rate. The second couples growth and the cost rate. The conclusion is global optimality over the paper's whole class of nonpreemptive, non-idling permutations. It does not assert that the identity order is the unique minimizer; strict input ratios do not by themselves justify a uniqueness claim.

The attack path records exactly the supporting statements printed in the paper: the closed completion-time formula (2), the weighted cost formula (8), and the unnumbered adjacent-interchange identity after (8). The milestone quotations preserve the paper's printed display, while the Lean statements use an arbitrary permutation where relabelling permits it. The interchange display has a multiplication dot before its second bracket; expansion for two jobs shows that the term is added. The formal statement records that correction, and the source quotation retains the printed symbol.

What the result establishes

The proposition identifies a directly checkable pair of ordering conditions under which the natural job-label order solves a weighted stochastic scheduling problem. A condition involving only E(Xi)/αiE(X_i)/\alpha_iE(Xi​)/αi​, enough for the paper's expected-makespan target, does not determine this weighted objective. The cost rates introduce another ordering requirement. The result gives a sufficient rule, not a characterization of every optimal schedule or of every parameter choice.

The mathematical result was published in 1990; this mission asks for its machine-checked formalization. A complete development will connect the processing-time recursion, the pathwise cost identities, and the expected optimality statement in Lean. The recursion and cost definitions can be reused for other finite single-machine problems in which a job's processing time depends on its start time. The milestone identities are also useful independently of the final sufficient condition, including for studying other choices of weights and ordering indices.

Where the argument is difficult

Sorting by expected initial requirement alone cannot settle the problem, because processing a job changes later start times and hence later processing times. Even sorting by the expected-makespan index leaves the cost rates unaccounted for. The value of an adjacent swap depends on the elapsed time before the pair and on the completion costs of jobs after the pair. It is not enough to compare the two jobs' own completion costs in isolation.

The source states the sufficient condition after its interchange display but does not present a full proof of the global claim. Closing the Lean goal requires connecting local comparisons to every schedule and handling the expected value of the recursively defined cost. The identities are finite, but their indices change between zero-based Lean positions and the paper's one-based display, especially at the first position and at an empty suffix.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin N\mathrm{Fin}\,NFinN, and a policy is an equivalence permutation with π(k)\pi(k)π(k) equal to the job in position kkk. Completion time is defined by the processing rule Yi(t)=Xi+αitY_i(t)=X_i+\alpha_i tYi​(t)=Xi​+αi​t, not by the closed form (2). At positions beyond the NNN jobs it stays constant, and theorems about the closed form restrict kkk to 0≤k≤N0\le k\le N0≤k≤N. The total cost is defined from job-weighted completion times, not from equation (8). This keeps both identities substantive.

The proposition uses a probability space and the Bochner integral of the real-valued cost. Every XiX_iXi​ is integrable, so its expectation and the finite linear combinations appearing in the cost are meaningful. Initial requirements are nonnegative at every outcome, reflecting the paper's standing positive-processing convention; strict positivity is unnecessary for the claim. Growth rates and cost rates are strictly positive. Those two assumptions make the printed ratios well-defined and support the ordering rule. The paper's common independence convention is not required for these expectations and is not assumed.

The two strict orderings are over the labels of jobs in π0\pi_0π0​, not positions of an arbitrary schedule. The conclusion compares π0\pi_0π0​ with every permutation, not only with schedules obtained by one adjacent swap. The N=0N=0N=0 and N=1N=1N=1 cases are allowed: the order conditions have no pair to compare, and there is only one permutation. Solvers may contribute the finite-sum, interchange, and integrability facts needed to link the milestones to Proposition 2. The pathwise identities require no probability assumptions and can support later variants.

Selected references

  • Browne, Sid, and Uri Yechiali, Scheduling Deteriorating Jobs on a Single Processor, Operations Research 38(3), 495–498 (1990). DOI: 10.1287/opre.38.3.495.
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CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Additive Algorithm for Solving Linear Programs with Zero-One Variables: In Finitely Many Iterations the Additive Algorithm Yields an Optimal Solution or Proves InfeasibilityResearch Paper

Motivation

Binary decisions arise when a variable records whether a project is selected, a facility is opened, or an action is taken. Linear constraints then describe the resources or conditions those choices must satisfy. Egon Balas's 1965 paper gives a direct algorithm for a finite linear program with zero-one variables: it begins with all variables at zero, adds variables with value one, and uses explicit tests to discard assignments that cannot improve the best feasible assignment found so far. The paper states that the procedure eventually produces an optimal feasible solution or a conclusion that none exists. Its numbered convergence theorem is the target of this mission. Balas (1965)

The result is historically distinct from algorithms that solve a continuous relaxation and then enforce integrality. Balas describes his method as a direct combinatorial search over binary assignments, with additions and subtractions used to update costs and slacks. The theorem concerns the correctness and finite termination of the particular steps printed in the paper, including their backward scan and cancellation rules. The local catalog contains work on branch and bound for a biconvex program, but no existing platform item about a zero-one programming algorithm with these steps; the biconvex result concerns a different model and algorithm. Balas (1965)

Setting

Let NNN be a finite set of binary coordinates and MMM a finite set of constraints. The data are a real matrix A=(aij)i∈M,j∈NA=(a_{ij})_{i\in M,j\in N}A=(aij​)i∈M,j∈N​, a real vector b=(bi)i∈Mb=(b_i)_{i\in M}b=(bi​)i∈M​, and nonnegative objective coefficients cj≥0c_j\ge0cj​≥0. A binary assignment is represented by the set J⊆NJ\subseteq NJ⊆N of coordinates assigned one; all other coordinates are zero. Its slack and cost are

yi(J)=bi−∑j∈Jaij,z(J)=∑j∈Jcj.y_i(J)=b_i-\sum_{j\in J}a_{ij},\qquad z(J)=\sum_{j\in J}c_j.yi​(J)=bi​−j∈J∑​aij​,z(J)=j∈J∑​cj​.

The assignment is feasible when yi(J)≥0y_i(J)\ge0yi​(J)≥0 for every i∈Mi\in Mi∈M. It is optimal when it is feasible and has no greater cost than any other feasible assignment. These are Balas's problem PPP and solutions (1)–(8). The coefficients of AAA and bbb may have either sign; NNN and MMM may be empty. Balas (1965), pp. 519, 523

The algorithm generates assignments J0,J1,…,JsJ_0,J_1,\ldots,J_sJ0​,J1​,…,Js​, starting at J0=∅J_0=\varnothingJ0​=∅. Among the generated feasible assignments, their least cost is the ceiling z∗(s)z^{*(s)}z∗(s); if there are none, z∗(s)=+∞z^{*(s)}=+\inftyz∗(s)=+∞. Each generated assignment has an improving set NpN_pNp​ formed when it first appears. Later steps cancel candidate indices and keep records CksC_k^sCks​ of which values attached to an earlier assignment have been cancelled by the time JsJ_sJs​ is generated. The algorithm either processes the latest assignment, scans earlier strict subsets in descending order, or stops. Its value-based choice rule permits several choices when both value and cost tie. Balas (1965), pp. 523–528

Formalization targets

The paper's two lemmas and Theorem 1 establish the cancellation claims used by its convergence theorem. Lemma 1 says a feasible completion Jt⊃JsJ_t\supset J_sJt​⊃Js​ below the current ceiling adds no index in CsC^sCs; Lemma 2 makes the corresponding assertion for an earlier assignment under its stated complete-cancellation hypothesis. Theorem 1 says that an abandoned assignment has no better feasible completion. The two numbered parts of the convergence proof assert that a single iteration cannot continue indefinitely and that no assignment is generated twice. A remark after (16) records that a feasible generated assignment has an empty improving set. Balas (1965), pp. 529–533

The mission's goal is Convergence Theorem 2:

every run from J0=∅ stops after finitely many steps, with either an optimal feasible assignment or a valid infeasibility verdict.\text{every run from }J_0=\varnothing\text{ stops after finitely many steps, with either an optimal feasible assignment or a valid infeasibility verdict.}every run from J0​=∅ stops after finitely many steps, with either an optimal feasible assignment or a valid infeasibility verdict.

The finite-step assertion includes progress: every reachable state before a stopping situation has a successor. At a stop, z∗(s)=+∞z^{*(s)}=+\inftyz∗(s)=+∞ means no feasible binary assignment exists; if the ceiling is finite, a generated assignment attaining it exists and every generated assignment at that cost is optimal for PPP. These clauses make the paper's two possible outcomes explicit. Balas (1965), Convergence Theorem 2 and step 5a

Significance

The theorem certifies the algorithm as a complete decision and optimization procedure for the stated finite binary program. The infeasibility outcome concerns every possible binary assignment, not only the assignments the algorithm happened to visit. The optimality outcome similarly compares the reported assignment against all feasible assignments. Without these global claims, reaching a stopping situation would only show that the current search path has no remaining candidates. Balas (1965), pp. 526, 533

The result was proved in the 1965 paper. The work here is to state its algorithm and correctness claims in Lean and provide a target for a machine-checked proof; the submitted theorem files are open statements. The finite binary-program model, cost and slack functions, ceiling with infinity, and state-transition vocabulary can also support formal analyses of other exact enumeration procedures. The particular cancellation and backward-scan rules belong to Balas's algorithm. Balas (1965)

Difficulty

It is immediate that there are finitely many binary assignments. That alone does not show finite termination: the paper's step 5 may revisit earlier generated assignments, and the rules must prevent repeated work within one iteration as well as repeated generated assignments across iterations. It also does not justify pruning. When an improving set becomes empty, the remaining challenge is to show that no feasible assignment omitted by the search improves the ceiling. These are the separate claims recorded in parts (a) and (b), Lemmas 1–2, and Theorem 1. Balas (1965), pp. 529–533

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin n and Fin m for the paper's one-based index sets. A binary assignment is a Finset (Fin n). A general finite zero-one linear program is its own definition; problem PPP adds the paper's standing assumption cj≥0c_j\ge0cj​≥0. There is no positive-size assumption on either index set. The algorithm stores generated assignments, each improving set as formed, cancellation snapshots, current cancellations, and its program point. Slack and cost are recomputed from the assignment by (6) and (21). Reachability is the reflexive transitive closure of the printed steps, and all milestone claims about states are restricted to reachable ones. The strict symbol ⊂\subset⊂ means proper inclusion as the paper's footnote specifies. Balas (1965), pp. 523–525

The ceiling is represented in WithTop ℝ, with ⊤\top⊤ for +∞+\infty+∞. The cost tests (14), (17), (24), and (29) are written additively so they retain the paper's meaning when no feasible assignment has yet been generated. The improving set NpN_pNp​ remains fixed after generation; the step-5 scan uses Nks=Nk−(Cks∪Dks)N_k^s=N_k-(C_k^s\cup D_k^s)Nks​=Nk​−(Cks​∪Dks​) with the stored snapshot CksC_k^sCks​, as in (18). Step 1a cancels the cost-bound indices for every earlier assignment, and steps 6a and 7b resume the scan below the index just checked. The final tie break permits any index still tied after minimizing its cost. “In a finite number of iterations” is encoded as no infinite run plus a next step at each reachable non-stopped state. “No feasible solution” quantifies over all binary assignments. “Abandoned” is the predicate specified before Theorem 1: uku^kuk is abandoned when the algorithm is instructed to stop, or to check some NpsN_p^sNps​ with p<k≤sp<k\le sp<k≤s, including the indices step 5 passes over because their remaining improving set is empty. Lemma 2 reads Cps+1C_p^{s+1}Cps+1​ either as the cancellations accumulated so far during iteration s+1s+1s+1 or as the cancellation records at the transition that obtains us+1u^{s+1}us+1. Balas (1965), pp. 525–533

The paper prints z∗(k)z^{*(k)}z∗(k) in Theorem 1, but its algorithm and proof use the ceiling at the abandonment iteration, z∗(s)z^{*(s)}z∗(s); the Lean theorem states that corrected version and retains the original wording in the milestone record. A transition system that is stuck before a declared stopping situation, a ceiling encoded as a finite real sentinel, or a verdict quantified only over generated assignments would make the goal weaker than the paper's claim. Contributions toward the milestone proofs, state invariants, and reusable finite-search lemmas are in scope. The preliminary reduction of a general binary program to PPP, the efficiency remarks, numerical examples, and the modified algorithm of Remark II are outside this mission. Balas (1965), pp. 519, 528–533

Selected references

  • Egon Balas, An Additive Algorithm for Solving Linear Programs with Zero-One Variables, Operations Research 13(4), 517–546, 1965. DOI: 10.1287/opre.13.4.517
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Convex OptimizationFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Convex Programming in Hilbert Space: Gradient Projection x_{k+1} = P(x_k − ρ_k∇f(x_k)) with σ ≤ ρ_k ≤ 2ρ₀ − σ Stays in the Level Set, and for Convex f Drives f(x_k) to inf_C fResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing a smooth function over a closed convex set is the basic problem of constrained continuous optimization. When the constraint set is simple enough that the nearest point of the set to any given point can be computed (a ball, a box, an orthant, an affine subspace), the most direct method is the gradient projection method: take a gradient step and project back onto the set. The method is the ancestor of the projected gradient and proximal gradient algorithms used today in signal processing, machine learning, and optimal control, where the variable is often a function, so that the natural setting is an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space rather than Rn\mathbb R^nRn.

A. A. Goldstein's 1964 note in the Bulletin of the AMS (Goldstein 1964) is one of the two founding papers of the method, alongside the independent work of Levitin and Polyak (1966). It states, in a Hilbert space and with an explicit step-size window, that the iterates stay in the initial level set, that the objective values converge, and that under convexity they converge to the optimal value, with weak and strong convergence of the iterates under further hypotheses. Goldstein motivates the method by applications to control theory (Balakrishnan 1963; Goldstein, Minimizing functionals on Hilbert space, 1964).

Timeline.

  • 1959: Cheney and Goldstein study proximity maps (metric projections) onto convex sets and a fixed-point construction for the distance between two convex sets (Cheney–Goldstein 1959, cited by the note as [1]).
  • 1964: Goldstein, this note: the gradient projection method in Hilbert space with steps in [σ,2ρ0−σ][\sigma, 2\rho_0 - \sigma][σ,2ρ0​−σ].
  • 1966: Levitin and Polyak give the same method and convergence rates for constrained minimization.
  • 1987: Calamai and Moré extend the analysis to Armijo-type step rules and identification of the active constraints in Rn\mathbb R^nRn (Calamai–Moré 1987).

Setting

Let HHH be a real Hilbert space with inner product [x,y][x, y][x,y] and norm ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥. Let C⊆HC \subseteq HC⊆H be closed and convex, and let P:H→HP : H \to HP:H→H be the projection onto CCC: P(x)P(x)P(x) is the point of CCC closest to xxx. In Lean, IsProjection C P says that P(x)∈CP(x) \in CP(x)∈C and ∥x−P(x)∥≤∥x−y∥\|x - P(x)\| \le \|x - y\|∥x−P(x)∥≤∥x−y∥ for all y∈Cy \in Cy∈C.

Let f:H→Rf : H \to \mathbb Rf:H→R, x0∈Cx_0 \in Cx0​∈C, and let

S={x∈C:f(x)≤f(x0)}S = \{x \in C : f(x) \le f(x_0)\}S={x∈C:f(x)≤f(x0​)}

be the level set (levelSet f C x0). Let S^\hat SS^ be an open set containing the convex hull of SSS. Write f′(x,h)f'(x, h)f′(x,h) for the Fréchet derivative of fff at xxx applied to hhh, ∇f(x)\nabla f(x)∇f(x) for the gradient (so f′(x,h)=[∇f(x),h]f'(x, h) = [\nabla f(x), h]f′(x,h)=[∇f(x),h]), and

f′′(x,h,h)=ddt∣t=0f′(x+th,h)f''(x, h, h) = \frac{d}{dt}\Big|_{t=0} f'(x + th, h)f′′(x,h,h)=dtd​​t=0​f′(x+th,h)

for the directional second derivative in the sense of Gâteaux (d2 f x h). The curvature hypothesis is that for some ρ0>0\rho_0 > 0ρ0​>0, at every x∈S^x \in \hat Sx∈S^ and for every h∈Hh \in Hh∈H, these derivatives exist and

∣f′′(x,h,h)∣≤∥h∥2ρ0.|f''(x, h, h)| \le \frac{\|h\|^2}{\rho_0}.∣f′′(x,h,h)∣≤ρ0​∥h∥2​.

Choose 0<σ≤ρ00 < \sigma \le \rho_00<σ≤ρ0​ and step sizes σ≤ρk≤2ρ0−σ\sigma \le \rho_k \le 2\rho_0 - \sigmaσ≤ρk​≤2ρ0​−σ. The method is

xk+1=P(xk−ρk∇f(xk)),k≥0.x_{k+1} = P\big(x_k - \rho_k \nabla f(x_k)\big), \qquad k \ge 0.xk+1​=P(xk​−ρk​∇f(xk​)),k≥0.

A point z∈Cz \in Cz∈C is stationary if P(z−ρ∇f(z))=zP(z - \rho \nabla f(z)) = zP(z−ρ∇f(z))=z for every ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0.

Formalization targets

Goal: the THEOREM, parts (i)–(v)

Assume fff is bounded below and continuous on CCC. There is L∈RL \in \mathbb RL∈R such that

  1. (i) xk∈Sx_k \in Sxk​∈S for all kkk, xk+1−xk→0x_{k+1} - x_k \to 0xk+1​−xk​→0, and f(xk)f(x_k)f(xk​) decreases to LLL;
  2. (ii) if SSS is compact, every cluster point zzz of (xk)(x_k)(xk​) near which ∇f\nabla f∇f is continuous is stationary, and a unique cluster point is the limit of (xk)(x_k)(xk​);
  3. (iii) if SSS is convex and f′′(x,h,h)≥μ∥h∥2f''(x, h, h) \ge \mu \|h\|^2f′′(x,h,h)≥μ∥h∥2 on SSS for some μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0, then
L=inf⁡{f(x):x∈C};L = \inf\{f(x) : x \in C\};L=inf{f(x):x∈C};
  1. (iv) under (iii) with SSS bounded, every weak cluster point of (xk)(x_k)(xk​) minimizes fff on CCC;
  2. (v) under (iii) with μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and ∇f\nabla f∇f bounded on SSS, there is z∈Sz \in Sz∈S with f(z)=Lf(z) = Lf(z)=L, xk→zx_k \to zxk​→z in norm, and zzz is the unique minimizer of fff on CCC.

The goal is the whole theorem, because its five parts share one limit LLL and one standing setting.

Milestones

The projection inequality [x−y,P(x)−y]≥∥P(x)−y∥2[x - y, P(x) - y] \ge \|P(x) - y\|^2[x−y,P(x)−y]≥∥P(x)−y∥2 for y∈Cy \in Cy∈C; the Lipschitz property of PPP; the characterization of stationarity for convex fff at a differentiability point; the one-step Taylor estimate; the step lemma (for σ≤ρ≤2ρ0−σ\sigma \le \rho \le 2\rho_0 - \sigmaσ≤ρ≤2ρ0​−σ the new point stays in SSS and the decrease is at least ∥xk+1−xk∥2σ/4ρ02\|x_{k+1} - x_k\|^2 \sigma / 4\rho_0^2∥xk+1​−xk​∥2σ/4ρ02​); parts (i) and (ii); the strong-convexity bound f(x)≥f(y)+[∇f(y),x−y]+12μ∥x−y∥2f(x) \ge f(y) + [\nabla f(y), x - y] + \frac12\mu\|x - y\|^2f(x)≥f(y)+[∇f(y),x−y]+21​μ∥x−y∥2 on SSS; the supporting-hyperplane inequality of the proof of (iii); parts (iii), (iv) and (v). A companion item states the last clause of (ii) under convexity of fff on CCC.

Significance

The result. The theorem gives a step-size rule that needs only a curvature bound near the level set, not a global Lipschitz constant of the gradient, and it covers the infinite-dimensional case directly: (iii) gives convergence of the objective values to the optimal value without assuming that a minimizer exists, (iv) yields minimizers as weak cluster points when the level set is bounded, and (v) gives strong convergence of the iterates under strong convexity on the level set. These are the prototypes of the convergence statements now proved for projected and proximal gradient methods.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and proved on paper; it has no machine-checked proof. The note is two pages long and its proof is terse ("The proof of (ii) being straightforward"), and checking it in Lean exposes two places where the printed statement needs repair (see Formalization scope). A complete development also produces reusable infrastructure: the variational inequality and Lipschitz property of the metric projection in a Hilbert space, a one-dimensional Taylor estimate from a Gâteaux second derivative along a segment, and weak lower semicontinuity of convex continuous functions on closed convex sets used through cluster points in WeakSpace.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for (i) applies a quadratic upper bound for fff along the segment from xkx_kxk​ to xk+1x_{k+1}xk+1​. That bound is only available where the curvature hypothesis holds, on S^\hat SS^, and nothing guarantees in advance that xk+1x_{k+1}xk+1​, or the segment, lies in S^\hat SS^. Ruling this out requires control of fff up to the boundary of the level set, which the printed hypotheses do not give; this is where the added continuity hypothesis enters. In (iii) the iterates may be unbounded and no minimizer need exist, so compactness arguments are unavailable. In (iv) the cluster points are weak, so norm-closedness arguments do not apply directly.

Formalization scope

  • HHH is a real Hilbert space: [NormedAddCommGroup H] [InnerProductSpace ℝ H] [CompleteSpace H]. The inner product [x,y][x, y][x,y] is ⟪x, y⟫_ℝ, and ∇f\nabla f∇f is Mathlib's gradient f.
  • PPP is any map with IsProjection C P; there is no chosen projection and no junk value.
  • f′′(x,h,h)f''(x, h, h)f′′(x,h,h) is the derivative at t=0t = 0t=0 of t↦f′(x+th,h)t \mapsto f'(x + th, h)t↦f′(x+th,h). The hypothesis on S^\hat SS^ (SecondDerivBound) states both differentiabilities before the bound, so the bound is never on a junk zero.
  • The run starts at x0x_0x0​, and 0<σ≤ρ00 < \sigma \le \rho_00<σ≤ρ0​ makes the step window nonempty.
  • "L=inf⁡L = \infL=inf" is IsGLB (f '' C) L. Weak cluster points are cluster points in WeakSpace ℝ H.
  • Added hypothesis: fff is continuous on CCC. Part (i) as printed is false without it: on H=C=RH = C = \mathbb RH=C=R with P=idP = \mathrm{id}P=id, f(x)=(x−2)2f(x) = (x - 2)^2f(x)=(x−2)2 for x<1x < 1x<1 and f(x)=100f(x) = 100f(x)=100 for x≥1x \ge 1x≥1, x0=0x_0 = 0x0​=0, S^=(−1,1)\hat S = (-1, 1)S^=(−1,1), ρ0=1/2\rho_0 = 1/2ρ0​=1/2, σ=1/4\sigma = 1/4σ=1/4, ρk=1/2\rho_k = 1/2ρk​=1/2, the first step lands at x1=2x_1 = 2x1​=2 with f(x1)=100>f(x0)f(x_1) = 100 > f(x_0)f(x1​)=100>f(x0​).
  • Moved clause. The last clause of (ii), "zzz minimizes fff on CCC", is false for nonconvex fff (a unique cluster point can be a stationary point that is not a minimizer). The goal omits it, and a companion item states it under convexity of fff on CCC.
  • The goal assumes nothing about the step decrease, the step size ρ^\hat\rhoρ^​ of the proof, or the iterates beyond the run's definition. A formalization that adds such facts as hypotheses, or that proves only one of the five parts, does not count as closing the goal.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, in particular the projection inequality and Lipschitz property (independent of the rest), the Taylor estimate from the Gâteaux second derivative, and the weak-closedness argument of (iv).

Selected references

  • A. A. Goldstein, Convex programming in Hilbert space, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 70 (1964), 709–710. https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1964-11178-2
  • E. W. Cheney and A. A. Goldstein, Proximity maps for convex sets, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 10 (1959), 448–450.
  • A. V. Balakrishnan, An operator theoretic formulation of a class of control problems and a steepest descent method of solution, J. SIAM Control Ser. A 1 (1963), 109–127.
  • E. S. Levitin and B. T. Polyak, Constrained minimization methods, USSR Comput. Math. Math. Phys. 6(5) (1966), 1–50.
  • P. H. Calamai and J. J. Moré, Projected gradient methods for linearly constrained problems, Math. Programming 39 (1987), 93–116. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02592073
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Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Linear Programming Approach to the Cutting Stock Problem—Part II 2: For a Linear-Fractional Objective, a Basic Feasible Solution with No Improving Edge Is a Global MinimumResearch Paper

Motivation

In the cutting stock problem, stock rolls of length LLL are cut into pieces of lengths l1,…,lml_1,\dots,l_ml1​,…,lm​ to fill orders. Part I of Gilmore and Gomory's work (Opns. Res. 9 (1961)) solved its linear programming relaxation by the simplex method with column generation: the columns (cutting patterns) are too many to list, so each simplex iteration finds an improving column by solving a knapsack problem. Part II (Opns. Res. 11 (1963)) extends the method in several directions. One of them, customer tolerances, lets the amount produced of each length lie in a range [Ni′,Ni′′][N_i',N_i''][Ni′​,Ni′′​] instead of matching a fixed demand. Total roll usage then stops being a good measure of quality, because overproducing within the tolerance is free. The natural objective becomes the fraction of waste: total waste divided by total material cut. This objective is a ratio of two linear functions, not a linear one.

The paper's answer, on p. 882, is that the ordinary simplex method still works for such an objective. It moves from vertex to vertex, at each vertex asks whether some edge improves the objective, and stops when none does. Ratio objectives of this kind, called linear-fractional programs, were studied in the same years by Isbell and Marlow (1956), Martos (1960–61, in Hungarian; in English in 1964), Charnes and Cooper (1962) and Dinkelbach (1962; see also 1967). Gilmore and Gomory say that their method is closest to Martos's. They derive the edge test for the ratio and show that, for cutting stock, choosing the entering column is again a knapsack problem.

Setting

Let AAA be a real m×nm\times nm×n matrix, b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm and c,d∈Rnc,d\in\mathbb R^nc,d∈Rn. The linear-fractional program is

minimizeζ(x)=z1(x)z2(x)=∑icixi∑idixisubject toAx=b, x≥0.\text{minimize}\quad \zeta(x)=\frac{z_1(x)}{z_2(x)}=\frac{\sum_i c_ix_i}{\sum_i d_ix_i}\qquad\text{subject to}\quad Ax=b,\ x\ge 0 .minimizeζ(x)=z2​(x)z1​(x)​=∑i​di​xi​∑i​ci​xi​​subject toAx=b, x≥0.

In the cutting stock instance (p. 881), column jjj is either a cutting pattern aj∈Z≥0ma_j\in\mathbb Z^m_{\ge0}aj​∈Z≥0m​ with ∑iaijli≤L\sum_ia_{ij}l_i\le L∑i​aij​li​≤L or a slack column −ei-e_i−ei​. The right-hand side is bi=Ni′b_i=N_i'bi​=Ni′​. The numerator coefficient of a pattern is its waste wj=L−∑iaijliw_j=L-\sum_ia_{ij}l_iwj​=L−∑i​aij​li​ (eq. (4)), and dj=1d_j=1dj​=1 on patterns and 000 on slacks, so ζ\zetaζ is waste per roll cut. The paper drops the upper bounds si≤Ni′′−Ni′s_i\le N_i''-N_i'si​≤Ni′′​−Ni′​ on the slacks from the discussion (p. 882), and so does this mission.

A basis is a set BBB of mmm column indices whose columns of AAA are linearly independent. A basic feasible solution xˉ\bar xxˉ with basis BBB is a feasible point with xˉk=0\bar x_k=0xˉk​=0 for every k∉Bk\notin Bk∈/B. For a nonbasic j∉Bj\notin Bj∈/B, the edge direction of xjx_jxj​ is the vector vvv with Av=0Av=0Av=0, vj=1v_j=1vj​=1 and vk=0v_k=0vk​=0 for the other nonbasic kkk. This is "the edge that would be traced out if xjx_jxj​ were increased, but all other nonbasic variables kept zero" (p. 883). The quantity the simplex test inspects is the rate of change along the edge,

dζdxj=ddτ ζ(xˉ+τv)∣τ=0.\frac{d\zeta}{dx_j}=\frac{d}{d\tau}\,\zeta(\bar x+\tau v)\Big|_{\tau=0}.dxj​dζ​=dτd​ζ(xˉ+τv)​τ=0​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the edge criterion (p. 882)

Assume ∑idixi>0\sum_id_ix_i>0∑i​di​xi​>0 for every feasible xxx. Let xˉ\bar xxˉ be a basic feasible solution with basis BBB, and suppose dζ/dxj≥0d\zeta/dx_j\ge0dζ/dxj​≥0 for every j∉Bj\notin Bj∈/B and every edge direction of xjx_jxj​. Then

ζ(xˉ)≤ζ(x)for every x≥0 with Ax=b.\zeta(\bar x)\le\zeta(x)\qquad\text{for every } x\ge0 \text{ with } Ax=b .ζ(xˉ)≤ζ(x)for every x≥0 with Ax=b.

Milestones (p. 882–883)

  1. Monotonicity along lines. On an interval where the denominator does not vanish, τ↦ζ(x+τv)\tau\mapsto\zeta(x+\tau v)τ↦ζ(x+τv) is strictly increasing, strictly decreasing or constant. Moreover f′(τ) D(τ)2f'(\tau)\,D(\tau)^2f′(τ)D(τ)2 is constant, where DDD is the denominator.
  2. Equation (5), first line.
dζdxj=z2 (dz1/dxj)−z1 (dz2/dxj)z22.\frac{d\zeta}{dx_j}=\frac{z_2\,(dz_1/dx_j)-z_1\,(dz_2/dx_j)}{z_2^2}.dxj​dζ​=z22​z2​(dz1​/dxj​)−z1​(dz2​/dxj​)​.
  1. The edge test. If dζ/dxj<0d\zeta/dx_j<0dζ/dxj​<0, increasing xjx_jxj​ strictly decreases ζ\zetaζ along any segment where the denominator does not vanish. Otherwise ζ\zetaζ does not decrease anywhere on that segment.
  2. Column choice is a knapsack problem. With k=Lz2−z1k=Lz_2-z_1k=Lz2​−z1​ and Πˉi=−(z1Πi2−z2Πi1−z2li)\bar\Pi_i=-(z_1\Pi^2_i-z_2\Pi^1_i-z_2l_i)Πˉi​=−(z1​Πi2​−z2​Πi1​−z2​li​), the numerator of dζ/dxjd\zeta/dx_jdζ/dxj​ for pattern aaa equals k−∑iΠˉiaik-\sum_i\bar\Pi_ia_ik−∑i​Πˉi​ai​. Hence, for z2≠0z_2\ne0z2​=0, the most negative dζ/dxjd\zeta/dx_jdζ/dxj​ is attained exactly by the patterns maximizing ∑iΠˉiai\sum_i\bar\Pi_ia_i∑i​Πˉi​ai​ subject to ∑iaili≤L\sum_ia_il_i\le L∑i​ai​li​≤L.

Significance

The result. The edge criterion turns a nonconvex problem into one the simplex method solves. A ratio of linear functions is neither convex nor concave, so a point where no feasible direction improves the objective locally is not obviously a global minimum. The criterion says that, on a polyhedron where the denominator keeps its sign, this local test at a vertex certifies global optimality, exactly as for a linear objective. It underlies the convergence of Martos's method and of every simplex-type algorithm for linear-fractional programming. Together with milestone 4, it is what makes column generation with a knapsack pricing step applicable to the waste-fraction objective of cutting stock.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and proved; no machine-checked version is known to exist. The published platform items closest to it are Derman's Charnes–Cooper transformation of a linear-fractional program into a linear program and Matoušek's reduced-cost optimality criterion for a linear objective. Neither states an edge criterion for a ratio. A formal proof here also settles the paper's own imprecisions (see below), and yields reusable lemmas about ratios of affine functions along lines.

Difficulty

The obvious argument does not reach the goal. Along any single segment the objective is monotone (milestone 1), so a nonnegative derivative at xˉ\bar xxˉ in the direction of the segment would settle it. But the test at xˉ\bar xxˉ inspects only the n−mn-mn−m edge directions, while a feasible point xxx lies in the direction x−xˉx-\bar xx−xˉ, which is in general not an edge. Monotonicity along each edge says nothing directly about other directions, and ζ\zetaζ is neither convex nor concave, so local optimality along a few lines does not by itself transfer to the whole polyhedron. The step that has to be supplied is the passage from the edges to all feasible directions at a basic solution. It fails without the basis: at a feasible point that is not basic, or with linearly dependent columns, the edge directions need not reach every feasible point. At a degenerate vertex some edge directions leave the feasible set at once, and a test restricted to the feasible edges does not certify optimality.

Formalization scope

The feasible set and the objective are the published definitions DermanSeqDecisions.LinProg.IsFeasible11 (x≥0x\ge0x≥0, Ax=bAx=bAx=b) and DermanSeqDecisions.LinProg.fracObj ((∑cixi)/(∑dixi)(\sum c_ix_i)/(\sum d_ix_i)(∑ci​xi​)/(∑di​xi​)). The basis is the published MatousekLP.BFS.IsBasis. Indices are 0-based. A mission definition adds the basic feasible solution and the relational edge direction. The edge direction is given by its defining equations, not through a basis inverse, and is not required to be feasible.

Committed conventions and disclosed choices:

  • The goal is stated for minimization, the paper's problem; the paper's sentence says "maximize", which is the same statement for −c-c−c.
  • "In a domain where the denominator does not vanish" is the hypothesis ∑idixi>0\sum_id_ix_i>0∑i​di​xi​>0 for every feasible xxx (the paper's footnote: ∑jxj>0\sum_jx_j>0∑j​xj​>0). It is not required on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn, where it would be unsatisfiable for the cutting stock ddd.
  • The derivative in the test is Mathlib's deriv of τ↦ζ(xˉ+τv)\tau\mapsto\zeta(\bar x+\tau v)τ↦ζ(xˉ+τv) at 000: the actual rate of change, not a formula assumed to equal it.
  • The page says that along a line the derivative "will have the same value". This is false when the denominator varies along the line. Milestone 1 states the correct version: the derivative times the squared denominator is constant, so the sign is constant.
  • In the formula after substituting (4), the page prints the coefficient −li-l_i−li​ where −z2li-z_2l_i−z2​li​ is meant. Milestone 4 uses the corrected coefficient.
  • The slack upper bounds are dropped, as on p. 882.

The following would trivialize the goal and are excluded: an edge hypothesis over all directions vvv instead of the edge directions, which turns the goal into quasi-convexity along segments; an edge hypothesis stated as the global inequality; a positivity hypothesis on the denominator over all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn; and dropping the basis, under which the goal is false.

The development needs elementary real calculus (derivatives of quotients, monotonicity from the sign of the derivative) and the linear algebra of a basis (existence, uniqueness and spanning of the edge directions). The lemmas about ratios of affine functions along lines and about edge directions of a basis are reusable for any simplex-type method. Contributions of proofs of the milestones, and of auxiliary lemmas on edge directions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. C. Gilmore and R. E. Gomory, A linear programming approach to the cutting stock problem—Part II, Operations Research 11(6), 863–888, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.11.6.863
  • P. C. Gilmore and R. E. Gomory, A linear programming approach to the cutting stock problem, Operations Research 9(6), 849–859, 1961. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.9.6.849
  • B. Martos, Hyperbolic programming, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 11(2), 135–155, 1964. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800110204
  • A. Charnes and W. W. Cooper, Programming with linear fractional functionals, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 9(3–4), 181–186, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800090303
  • W. Dinkelbach, Die Maximierung eines Quotienten zweier linearer Funktionen unter linearen Nebenbedingungen, Zeitschrift für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie 1, 141–145, 1962 (cited by the paper as [11]).
  • W. Dinkelbach, On nonlinear fractional programming, Management Science 13(7), 492–498, 1967. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.13.7.492
  • J. R. Isbell and W. H. Marlow, Attrition games, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3, 71–94, 1956 (cited by the paper as [9]).
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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers V: Sharing ADMM — the z-Update Reduces to One n-Variable Problem and the Dual Variables AgreeTextbook

Why consensus and sharing

Many large optimization problems arising in statistics, machine learning, signal processing and resource allocation have an objective that is a sum of terms, each depending on data held by a different processor, or a coupling term that depends on the sum of the agents' decisions. Chapter 7 of Boyd, Parikh, Chu, Peleato and Eckstein's monograph on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) (Found. Trends Mach. Learn. 3(1), 2011) introduces two templates that turn such problems into distributed algorithms: consensus and sharing. Nearly every distributed application in the rest of the monograph (distributed lasso, distributed logistic regression, splitting across examples and across features in Chapter 8) is an instance of one of the two. Consensus problems in the context of ADMM go back to Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (Parallel and Distributed Computation, 1989).

The value of the templates lies in a handful of exact algebraic facts about the ADMM subproblems: the global update is an average, the dual variables average to zero, and the sharing update, which looks like a problem in NnNnNn variables, is really a problem in nnn variables. These facts are what this mission formalizes.

Setting

There are N≥1N\ge1N≥1 agents. Vectors live in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean inner product, and an overline denotes an average over agents, vˉ=1N∑i=1Nvi\bar v=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N v_ivˉ=N1​∑i=1N​vi​. Each local cost fif_ifi​ and the shared cost ggg are functions into R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}. The penalty parameter is ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0.

Global variable consensus (§7.1) is the problem

minimize ∑i=1Nfi(xi)subject to xi−z=0, i=1,…,N,\text{minimize }\sum_{i=1}^N f_i(x_i)\quad\text{subject to } x_i-z=0,\ i=1,\dots,N,minimize i=1∑N​fi​(xi​)subject to xi​−z=0, i=1,…,N,

with local variables xi∈Rnx_i\in\mathbb R^nxi​∈Rn and a global variable zzz. ADMM alternates a parallel xix_ixi​-update, an averaging zzz-update and a dual update of the multipliers yiy_iyi​. With a regularizer g(z)g(z)g(z) added (7.2), the zzz-update (7.4) becomes a minimization involving ggg.

General form consensus (§7.2) lets local variable xi∈Rnix_i\in\mathbb R^{n_i}xi​∈Rni​ copy only some entries of zzz: entry jjj of xix_ixi​ corresponds to entry zG(i,j)z_{\mathcal G(i,j)}zG(i,j)​, and z~i∈Rni\tilde z_i\in\mathbb R^{n_i}z~i​∈Rni​ is defined by (z~i)j=zG(i,j)(\tilde z_i)_j=z_{\mathcal G(i,j)}(z~i​)j​=zG(i,j)​. The number of local entries copying zgz_gzg​ is kgk_gkg​.

Sharing (§7.3) is the problem

minimize ∑i=1Nfi(xi)+g(∑i=1Nxi),(7.11)\text{minimize }\sum_{i=1}^N f_i(x_i)+g\Big(\sum_{i=1}^N x_i\Big),\tag{7.11}minimize i=1∑N​fi​(xi​)+g(i=1∑N​xi​),(7.11)

written for ADMM with copies ziz_izi​ of the xix_ixi​ (7.12). In scaled form, with ai=uik+xik+1a_i=u_i^k+x_i^{k+1}ai​=uik​+xik+1​, its zzz-update is

(z1k+1,…,zNk+1)∈argmin⁡z1,…,zN g(∑i=1Nzi)+(ρ/2)∑i=1N∥zi−ai∥22,(z_1^{k+1},\dots,z_N^{k+1})\in\operatorname*{argmin}_{z_1,\dots,z_N}\ g\Big(\sum_{i=1}^N z_i\Big)+(\rho/2)\sum_{i=1}^N\|z_i-a_i\|_2^2,(z1k+1​,…,zNk+1​)∈z1​,…,zN​argmin​ g(i=1∑N​zi​)+(ρ/2)i=1∑N​∥zi​−ai​∥22​,

followed by uik+1=uik+xik+1−zik+1u_i^{k+1}=u_i^k+x_i^{k+1}-z_i^{k+1}uik+1​=uik​+xik+1​−zik+1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the sharing zzz-update reduction (§7.3, p. 57)

For every a1,…,aNa_1,\dots,a_Na1​,…,aN​: (z1,…,zN)(z_1,\dots,z_N)(z1​,…,zN​) solves the NnNnNn-variable zzz-update iff zˉ\bar zzˉ solves

minimize⁡zˉ∈Rn g(Nzˉ)+(ρ/2)∑i=1N∥zˉ−aˉ∥22\operatorname*{minimize}_{\bar z\in\mathbb R^n}\ g(N\bar z)+(\rho/2)\sum_{i=1}^N\|\bar z-\bar a\|_2^2zˉ∈Rnminimize​ g(Nzˉ)+(ρ/2)i=1∑N​∥zˉ−aˉ∥22​

and

zi=ai+zˉ−aˉ(7.13);z_i=a_i+\bar z-\bar a\quad (7.13);zi​=ai​+zˉ−aˉ(7.13);

and along every run of sharing ADMM,

uik+1=uˉk+xˉk+1−zˉk+1(7.14),u_i^{k+1}=\bar u^k+\bar x^{k+1}-\bar z^{k+1}\quad(7.14),uik+1​=uˉk+xˉk+1−zˉk+1(7.14),

so all scaled dual variables agree after one step.

Milestones

  • §7.1: the consensus zzz-update is zk+1=xˉk+1+(1/ρ)yˉkz^{k+1}=\bar x^{k+1}+(1/\rho)\bar y^kzk+1=xˉk+1+(1/ρ)yˉ​k; then yˉk+1=0\bar y^{k+1}=0yˉ​k+1=0, zk=xˉkz^k=\bar x^kzk=xˉk and the simplified iteration.
  • (7.4), §7.1.1: with a regularizer, the zzz-update is averaging followed by a proximal step with weight NρN\rhoNρ; the soft-threshold (g=λ∥⋅∥1g=\lambda\|\cdot\|_1g=λ∥⋅∥1​) and positive-part (ggg the indicator of R+n\mathbb R^n_+R+n​) examples.
  • §7.2: the general form zzz-update is local averaging, and the dual entries attached to each global index sum to zero after the first iteration.
  • (7.13): with zˉ\bar zzˉ fixed, zi=ai+zˉ−aˉz_i=a_i+\bar z-\bar azi​=ai​+zˉ−aˉ is the unique minimizer.

Significance

The reduction is what makes sharing ADMM scale: the central step needs only the averages xˉk+1\bar x^{k+1}xˉk+1, uˉk\bar u^kuˉk and one nnn-dimensional proximal problem, regardless of the number of agents, and the dual state collapses to a single vector. The same reduction underlies exchange ADMM (§7.3.2) and the splitting-across-features algorithms of §8.3. The consensus facts explain why the fusion center only averages and why the dual variables can be dropped from its update.

All results of the chapter are proved, informally, in the monograph; they are elementary. To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces checked statements of the update formulas that later chapters of the series and distributed-optimization developments can cite instead of re-deriving.

Difficulty

The statements are exact identities between minimizer sets of nonsmooth problems in which ggg may be any extended-real-valued function: there is no first-order condition to use, so each step must be argued by comparing objective values, and the iff requires producing, for an arbitrary competitor, a competitor of the reduced problem with no larger value. The index bookkeeping is the other half: averages of sums of sequences indexed by agents and by iterations, the off-by-one in "after the first iteration", and in §7.2 sums over the fibres {(i,j):G(i,j)=g}\{(i,j):\mathcal G(i,j)=g\}{(i,j):G(i,j)=g} of an index map between local vectors of different dimensions.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); agents are indexed by Fin N, so the book's i=1,…,Ni=1,\dots,Ni=1,…,N is Lean's i−1i-1i−1; components are 0-based as well.
  • An extended-real-valued function is encoded by its effective domain (a set) and its finite values; every minimization is over the domain. Convexity is not assumed: none of the stated identities needs it, so the statements are slightly more general than the chapter's standing assumption that each fif_ifi​ is convex.
  • Iterates are hypotheses: a run is any sequence satisfying the update rules (argmin properties, not chosen minimizers). The consensus run uses the averaging formula exactly as printed on p. 49; the general form and sharing runs use the argmin form printed on pp. 55–56.
  • Explicit hypotheses that the book leaves implicit: N≥1N\ge1N≥1, ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 (named lam), kg≥1k_g\ge1kg​≥1 for every global index ggg in §7.2, and the index ranges k≥1k\ge1k≥1 for yˉk=0\bar y^{k}=0yˉ​k=0 and k≥2k\ge2k≥2 for zk=xˉkz^k=\bar x^kzk=xˉk (the starting y0y^0y0 is arbitrary).
  • Corrected misprints: p. 52 prints xˉk+1−(1/ρ)yˉk\bar x^{k+1}-(1/\rho)\bar y^kxˉk+1−(1/ρ)yˉ​k in the soft-threshold and positive-part examples, while the proximal form gives xˉk+1+(1/ρ)yˉk\bar x^{k+1}+(1/\rho)\bar y^kxˉk+1+(1/ρ)yˉ​k; p. 55 prints ∑i=1m\sum_{i=1}^m∑i=1m​ for ∑i=1N\sum_{i=1}^N∑i=1N​; p. 57 writes u∈Rmu\in\mathbf R^mu∈Rm for a vector of Rn\mathbb R^nRn.
  • The goal is about minimizers of the NnNnNn-variable zzz-subproblem, not the algebraic identity (7.13) alone, and (7.14) is derived for every run rather than built into a single-dual-variable definition; either shortcut would make the goal trivial.
  • Not included: the consensus residual norms (p. 51), the duality discussion of §7.3.1 and exchange ADMM (§7.3.2). Contributions formalizing them on top of these definitions are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Boyd, N. Parikh, E. Chu, B. Peleato, J. Eckstein, Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 3(1), 1–122, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000016
  • D. P. Bertsekas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods, Prentice Hall, 1989. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/pdc.html
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Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Robust Solutions in Two-Stage Stochastic and Adaptive Optimization Problems 5: For Hypercube Uncertainty, Even in the Constraints, the Robust and Adaptive Optima CoincideResearch Paper

Motivation

In two-stage optimization under uncertainty, a first-stage decision xxx is taken before the data are known, and a second-stage decision yyy is taken after a scenario ω\omegaω is revealed. The fully adaptive formulation lets yyy depend on ω\omegaω and minimizes the worst-case cost. It is the natural model of recourse, but it optimizes over policies, one decision per scenario, and is computationally hard in general. The static robust formulation fixes one yyy in advance that must be feasible in every scenario. It is a single deterministic mixed integer program and is the standard tractable surrogate (Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer, Nemirovski 2004; Bertsimas & Sim 2004).

The question is how much is lost by the surrogate. Bertsimas and Goyal (2010) bound the gap by 222 against the stochastic problem and by 444 against the adaptive problem when the uncertainty set is symmetric. Their §5.3 identifies a case with no gap at all: when the uncertainty set is a hypercube (a box), the static robust optimum equals the adaptive optimum, and this holds even when the constraint matrices themselves are uncertain. Box uncertainty is the simplest and most common uncertainty model in practice (interval data on every coefficient), so the result says that for it, adaptivity buys nothing.

This mission formalizes that theorem, Theorem 5.4, together with Theorem 2.4, which shows that under right-hand-side uncertainty the robust problem is a single deterministic problem with the coordinatewise worst right-hand side.

Setting

Fix dimensions m,n1,n2m,n_1,n_2m,n1​,n2​ and sets I1,I2I_1,I_2I1​,I2​ of integer coordinates. The decision domains are

DI={x∈Rn:x≥0, xi∈Z for i∈I},D_{I}=\{x\in\mathbb R^n : x\ge0,\ x_i\in\mathbb Z\ \text{for } i\in I\},DI​={x∈Rn:x≥0, xi​∈Z for i∈I},

which is R+n−p×Z+p\mathbb R_+^{n-p}\times\mathbb Z_+^{p}R+n−p​×Z+p​ up to relabelling coordinates, p=∣I∣p=|I|p=∣I∣.

A scenario set Ω\OmegaΩ is given. In scenario ω\omegaω the data are a constraint matrix A(ω)∈Rm×n1A(\omega)\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A(ω)∈Rm×n1​, a recourse matrix B(ω)∈Rm×n2B(\omega)\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B(ω)∈Rm×n2​, a right-hand side b(ω)∈Rmb(\omega)\in\mathbb R^mb(ω)∈Rm and a second-stage cost d(ω)∈R+n2d(\omega)\in\mathbb R^{n_2}_+d(ω)∈R+n2​​. The first-stage cost c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​ is fixed.

  • The adaptive problem ΠAdapt(A,B,b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(A,B,b,d)ΠAdapt​(A,B,b,d) (5.6) chooses x∈DI1x\in D_{I_1}x∈DI1​​ and y(ω)∈DI2y(\omega)\in D_{I_2}y(ω)∈DI2​​ for every ω\omegaω with A(ω)x+B(ω)y(ω)≥b(ω)A(\omega)x+B(\omega)y(\omega)\ge b(\omega)A(ω)x+B(ω)y(ω)≥b(ω) for all ω\omegaω, and has value
zAdapt=inf⁡ cTx+sup⁡ω∈Ωd(ω)Ty(ω).z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}=\inf\ c^Tx+\sup_{\omega\in\Omega}d(\omega)^Ty(\omega).zAdapt​=inf cTx+ω∈Ωsup​d(ω)Ty(ω).
  • The robust problem ΠRob(A,B,b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(A,B,b,d)ΠRob​(A,B,b,d) (5.7) chooses one x∈DI1x\in D_{I_1}x∈DI1​​, y∈DI2y\in D_{I_2}y∈DI2​​ with A(ω)x+B(ω)y≥b(ω)A(\omega)x+B(\omega)y\ge b(\omega)A(ω)x+B(ω)y≥b(ω) for all ω\omegaω, and has value
zRob=inf⁡ cTx+sup⁡ω∈Ωd(ω)Ty.z_{\mathrm{Rob}}=\inf\ c^Tx+\sup_{\omega\in\Omega}d(\omega)^Ty.zRob​=inf cTx+ω∈Ωsup​d(ω)Ty.

The uncertainty set is U={(A(ω),B(ω),b(ω),d(ω)):ω∈Ω}\mathcal U=\{(A(\omega),B(\omega),b(\omega),d(\omega)) : \omega\in\Omega\}U={(A(ω),B(ω),b(ω),d(ω)):ω∈Ω}, a subset of RN\mathbb R^NRN with N=mn1+mn2+m+n2N=mn_1+mn_2+m+n_2N=mn1​+mn2​+m+n2​. Following Definition 1.1, U\mathcal UU is a hypercube if U=[l1,u1]×⋯×[lN,uN]\mathcal U=[l_1,u_1]\times\cdots\times[l_N,u_N]U=[l1​,u1​]×⋯×[lN​,uN​] for some li≤uil_i\le u_ili​≤ui​.

For Theorem 2.4, AAA, BBB and ddd are fixed and only b(ω)∈R+mb(\omega)\in\mathbb R^m_+b(ω)∈R+m​ varies; ΠRob(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)ΠRob​(b) (1.2) is the robust problem above, and Π\PiΠ is the deterministic problem with right-hand side bjh=max⁡ωbj(ω)b^h_j=\max_\omega b_j(\omega)bjh​=maxω​bj​(ω).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.4 (p. 31)

If U\mathcal UU is a hypercube, then

zRob(A,B,b,d)=zAdapt(A,B,b,d).z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(A,B,b,d)=z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(A,B,b,d).zRob​(A,B,b,d)=zAdapt​(A,B,b,d).

The integer coordinates I1,I2I_1,I_2I1​,I2​ are arbitrary, and nothing is assumed about the signs of AAA, BBB, bbb.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.4 (p. 17). Under right-hand-side uncertainty, (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) is feasible for ΠRob(b)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)ΠRob​(b) if and only if Ax+By≥bhAx+By\ge b^hAx+By≥bh; hence zRob(b)=z(Π)z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b)=z(\Pi)zRob​(b)=z(Π).
  2. p. 31 display. zAdapt(A,B,b,d)≤zRob(A,B,b,d)z_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(A,B,b,d)\le z_{\mathrm{Rob}}(A,B,b,d)zAdapt​(A,B,b,d)≤zRob​(A,B,b,d) for every uncertainty set.
  3. Eqs. (5.8)–(5.10). If U\mathcal UU is a hypercube, some scenario ωˉ\bar\omegaωˉ has A(ωˉ)A(\bar\omega)A(ωˉ), B(ωˉ)B(\bar\omega)B(ωˉ) entrywise minimal and b(ωˉ)b(\bar\omega)b(ωˉ), d(ωˉ)d(\bar\omega)d(ωˉ) entrywise maximal over Ω\OmegaΩ.
  4. Eqs. (5.11)–(5.13). For such ωˉ\bar\omegaωˉ, if (x,y(⋅))(x,y(\cdot))(x,y(⋅)) is adaptive feasible, then (x,y(ωˉ))(x,y(\bar\omega))(x,y(ωˉ)) is robust feasible.
  5. Eq. (5.14). For such ωˉ\bar\omegaωˉ, the robust worst-case cost of (x,y(ωˉ))(x,y(\bar\omega))(x,y(ωˉ)) is at most the adaptive worst-case cost of (x,y(⋅))(x,y(\cdot))(x,y(⋅)).

Significance

The result. Theorem 5.4 says that for interval uncertainty on every coefficient, the static robust program, whose size does not grow with the number of scenarios, solves the adaptive problem exactly. Combined with Theorem 2.4 for right-hand-side uncertainty, the adaptive problem collapses to one deterministic mixed integer program with worst-case data. It marks the boundary case of the paper's adaptability-gap bounds: the gap is at most 444 for symmetric sets, and exactly 111 for boxes.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces a Lean model of two-stage robust and adaptive mixed integer programs with uncertain constraint matrices, with values as extended-real infima, which other formalizations of adjustable robust optimization can build on.

Difficulty

The mathematics is elementary; the care is in the statement. The step that fails for a general uncertainty set is the existence of a single worst scenario ωˉ\bar\omegaωˉ that is simultaneously entrywise smallest in AAA, BBB and entrywise largest in bbb, ddd. For a set that is only contained in a box, the box's worst corner need not be realized. With two scenarios b=(1,0)b=(1,0)b=(1,0) and b=(0,1)b=(0,1)b=(0,1), B=IB=IB=I, d=(1,1)d=(1,1)d=(1,1), the adaptive value is 111 and the robust value is 222. A formalization therefore has to state the hypercube hypothesis as an equality of sets. A second point is the arithmetic of extended reals: the paper argues from optimal solutions, which need not exist, so the inequalities must be transported through infima over feasible sets that may be empty and through suprema that may be infinite.

Formalization scope

  • Decisions are vectors Fin n → ℝ; matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ; constraints use Mathlib's componentwise order and mulVec.
  • Mixed-integer domains are "nonnegative, integer on a designated coordinate set III", the paper's R+n−p×Z+p\mathbb R_+^{n-p}\times\mathbb Z_+^pR+n−p​×Z+p​ up to relabelling.
  • Optimal values are EReal infima over the feasible set, +∞+\infty+∞ when infeasible; worst-case costs are EReal suprema over Ω\OmegaΩ. No optimal solution is assumed.
  • A scenario datum is a structure with the four blocks (A,B,b,d)(A,B,b,d)(A,B,b,d); the box and the hypercube predicate are written entrywise on these blocks, which is Definition 1.1 in RN\mathbb R^NRN.
  • The hypercube hypothesis is IsHypercube (uncertaintySet A B b d), i.e. the realized data are exactly a box. Assuming only that the data lie inside a box would make the statement false (example above); assuming fixed AAA, BBB would state Corollary 5.1 instead of Theorem 5.4.
  • Typos corrected in the Lean: (5.6)–(5.7) print Z+n2\mathbb Z^{n_2}_+Z+n2​​ for the second-stage integer block, read as Z+p2\mathbb Z^{p_2}_+Z+p2​​; §5.3's opening sentence names ΠAdapt(b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Adapt}}(b,d)ΠAdapt​(b,d) twice where the first is ΠRob(b,d)\Pi_{\mathrm{Rob}}(b,d)ΠRob​(b,d).
  • In Theorem 2.4 the paper's max⁡ωbj(ω)\max_\omega b_j(\omega)maxω​bj​(ω) is a real supremum under the hypothesis that the right-hand sides are bounded above, and the second stage is continuous (p2=0p_2=0p2​=0), as in the problem Π\PiΠ on the page.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones and of the goal, and lemmas on monotonicity of mulVec for nonnegative vectors and on EReal infima over feasible sets, which are reusable across the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power of robust solutions in two-stage stochastic and adaptive optimization problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 35(2), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0440 (cited from the authors' manuscript, MIT DSpace).
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Mathematical Programming 99, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • D. Bertsimas, M. Sim, The price of robustness, Operations Research 52(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0065
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties 3: For Maximum Discrepancy, Some Optimum Schedule Is in Standard Form and Has the Release Time PropertyResearch Paper

Motivation

In just-in-time scheduling each job has a preferred time, and finishing it early is as undesirable as finishing it late. Garey, Tarjan and Wilfong (Math. Oper. Res. 13 (1988), 330–348) study the one-processor version in which task TiT_iTi​ has a length li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0 and a preferred starting time ai≥0a_i \ge 0ai​≥0, and the discrepancy of a task started at time sis_isi​ is ∣si−ai∣|s_i - a_i|∣si​−ai​∣. The penalty is symmetric: earliness and tardiness cost the same. The paper shows that minimizing the total discrepancy is NP-complete, gives an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) algorithm for a fixed task order, and, in §3, gives an efficient algorithm for minimizing the maximum discrepancy max⁡i∣si−ai∣\max_i |s_i - a_i|maxi​∣si​−ai​∣: a linear-time test for a given bound γ\gammaγ after an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) sort, combined with a search over γ\gammaγ.

This mission formalizes the structural core of §3: the normal-form theorems (Theorem 4, Corollaries 1 and 2) on which the paper's algorithm for maximum discrepancy is built. The two companion missions of the series cover the NP-completeness result (THEOREM 1) and the fixed-order algorithm (THEOREMS 2 and 3).

Setting

Fix a bound γ≥0\gamma \ge 0γ≥0. A schedule has maximum discrepancy at most γ\gammaγ exactly when every task starts no earlier than its release time ri=max⁡{0,ai−γ}r_i = \max\{0, a_i - \gamma\}ri​=max{0,ai​−γ} and finishes no later than its deadline di=ai+li+γd_i = a_i + l_i + \gammadi​=ai​+li​+γ (p. 342). These release times and deadlines are in special form: with α=2γ\alpha = 2\gammaα=2γ, for every task

di−ri=li+αor(ri=0 and di<li+α).d_i - r_i = l_i + \alpha \quad\text{or}\quad \big(r_i = 0 \text{ and } d_i < l_i + \alpha\big).di​−ri​=li​+αor(ri​=0 and di​<li​+α).

From here on the data are arbitrary reals li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0, ri≥0r_i \ge 0ri​≥0, did_idi​ in special form for some α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

A schedule is an execution order σ\sigmaσ (σ(p)\sigma(p)σ(p) is the task in position ppp) with starting times sis_isi​, such that a task finishes no later than any later-positioned task starts: sσ(p)+lσ(p)≤sσ(q)s_{\sigma(p)} + l_{\sigma(p)} \le s_{\sigma(q)}sσ(p)​+lσ(p)​≤sσ(q)​ for p<qp < qp<q. It is feasible if ri≤sir_i \le s_iri​≤si​ and si+li≤dis_i + l_i \le d_isi​+li​≤di​ for every iii. Its makespan is max⁡i(si+li)\max_i (s_i + l_i)maxi​(si​+li​), and it is optimum if it is feasible and no feasible schedule has a smaller makespan.

Let TNT_NTN​ be a task of largest deadline. A schedule has the release time property if every task executed after TNT_NTN​ has release time strictly later than the starting time of TNT_NTN​. When the tasks are indexed with d1≤⋯≤dNd_1 \le \dots \le d_Nd1​≤⋯≤dN​, a schedule is in standard form with split index jjj, 0≤j≤N−10 \le j \le N-10≤j≤N−1, if it begins with an optimum schedule of T1,…,TjT_1, \dots, T_jT1​,…,Tj​, followed by TNT_NTN​ started at the maximum of rNr_NrN​ and the completion time of that first part, followed by Tj+1,…,TN−1T_{j+1}, \dots, T_{N-1}Tj+1​,…,TN−1​ in this order without idle time.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2 (p. 344)

∃ a feasible schedule  ⟹  ∃ an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.\exists\ \text{a feasible schedule} \;\Longrightarrow\; \exists\ \text{an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.}∃ a feasible schedule⟹∃ an optimum schedule that is in standard form and has the release time property.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 4 (pp. 342–343): if a feasible schedule exists, some optimum schedule has the release time property with respect to any task of largest deadline.
  2. The deadline split (proof of Corollary 1, p. 344): in every feasible schedule with the release time property, a task Ti≠TNT_i \neq T_NTi​=TN​ precedes TNT_NTN​ if and only if di≤sN+αd_i \le s_N + \alphadi​≤sN​+α.
  3. Corollary 1 (p. 344): some optimum schedule executes before TNT_NTN​ exactly the tasks of deadline at most β\betaβ, for some β≥0\beta \ge 0β≥0.
  4. Release before finish (p. 344): every task executed after TNT_NTN​ has ri≤sN+lNr_i \le s_N + l_Nri​≤sN​+lN​.
  5. Normalization after TNT_NTN​ (p. 344): an optimum schedule with the release time property can be changed, without moving TNT_NTN​ later and without touching the tasks before it, so that there is no idle time from the start of TNT_NTN​ on and the later tasks run in deadline order.

Two companion items state the reformulation of the maximum-discrepancy bound as release times and deadlines, and the special form with α=2γ\alpha = 2\gammaα=2γ.

Significance

Corollary 2 reduces the search for an optimum schedule of T1,…,TnT_1, \dots, T_nT1​,…,Tn​ to nnn candidates, one per split index, each assembled from an optimum schedule of a shorter prefix. This is the dynamic program of §3.2, which the paper implements in O(N)O(N)O(N) time after an O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN) sort; combined with a search over γ\gammaγ it minimizes the maximum discrepancy. Without the special form, deciding whether one processor can meet arbitrary release times and deadlines is NP-complete (reference [4] of the paper, Garey and Johnson 1979), so the normal form is what separates the tractable case from the general one.

The results are proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of them is known on Prove2Me. A formal proof of Corollary 2 would certify the correctness of the split-index recursion and, together with the companions, of the reduction from maximum discrepancy to this release-time/deadline problem.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails in Theorem 4. Exchanging a straggler (a task after TNT_NTN​ released no later than TNT_NTN​ starts) with TNT_NTN​ shifts the tasks between them, and for general release times and deadlines those tasks can become infeasible. The paper's argument uses the special form at every step: a task released after TNT_NTN​ starts has ri>0r_i > 0ri​>0, hence di−ri=li+αd_i - r_i = l_i + \alphadi​−ri​=li​+α exactly, and this equality is what bounds how far tasks may move. It also needs an extremal choice of the optimum schedule (fewest tasks after TNT_NTN​, then fewest tasks between TNT_NTN​ and the first straggler), which requires showing that optimum schedules exist over the reals. The passage to standard form then combines this with an earliest-deadline exchange for the tasks after TNT_NTN​ and the replacement of the first part by an optimum sub-schedule without losing feasibility of the later tasks.

Formalization scope

Tasks are indexed by Fin N (0-based: the paper's T1,…,TNT_1, \dots, T_NT1​,…,TN​ are 0,…,N−10, \dots, N-10,…,N−1; the paper's TNT_NTN​ in Corollary 2 is the index N−1N-1N−1). All data are real. A schedule is a permutation σ : Fin N ≃ Fin N with starting times s : Fin N → ℝ; "executed before/after" refers to σ, not to a comparison of starting times, because zero-length tasks may share a starting time. Execution intervals meet at most at endpoints. The makespan is a supremum over Fin N; "optimum" quantifies over all feasible schedules, not only standard-form ones.

The standing hypotheses on every structural item are α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0, ri≥0r_i \ge 0ri​≥0, li≥0l_i \ge 0li​≥0 (from γ≥0\gamma \ge 0γ≥0, the max⁡{0,⋅}\max\{0, \cdot\}max{0,⋅} in rir_iri​, and nonnegative lengths); since si≥ris_i \ge r_isi​≥ri​, start times are nonnegative, as the paper assumes throughout. The special form is a hypothesis of every structural item and cannot be dropped. The paper's dummy task T0T_0T0​ (r0=d0=l0=0r_0 = d_0 = l_0 = 0r0​=d0​=l0​=0) is not a task; an empty first part completes at time 000. Corollary 1's "the set of all tasks with deadline β\betaβ or less" is read as excluding TNT_NTN​, the only reading under which it is true. The page's "(which can be assumed optimum)" is part of the standard form. The deadline-split and release-before-finish milestones are stated for every feasible schedule, as their arguments allow.

A trivializing formalization is excluded: the standard form pins TNT_NTN​'s start to max⁡(rN,C)\max(r_N, C)max(rN​,C) and the later tasks to consecutive positions in index order, so the goal is not Corollary 1 restated with an unconstrained split.

Running times (O(Nlog⁡N)O(N \log N)O(NlogN), O(N)O(N)O(N)) and the algorithm of §3.2 are out of scope. The development needs only finite permutations, finite suprema and the exchange arguments of §3.1; the existence of an optimum schedule (minimum makespan over finitely many orders, earliest-start schedules) is reusable for other single-machine problems with release times and deadlines. Proofs of any milestone, and a sorry-free proof of the existence of optimum schedules, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. R. Garey, R. E. Tarjan, G. T. Wilfong, One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(2):330–348, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.2.330
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979 (reference [4] of the paper, cited on p. 342 for the NP-completeness of one-processor scheduling with release times and deadlines). ISBN 0-7167-1045-5
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties 2: For a Fixed Task Order, the Block-Shifting Algorithm Minimizes the Total DiscrepancyResearch Paper

Motivation

A task may have a preferred execution time because a material delivery, external event, or downstream operation is timed to it. Starting early can be as costly as starting late. Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong study this situation on one processor, where tasks cannot overlap but idle time between tasks is permitted. Their total-discrepancy problem is hard when the execution order is free; fixing the order leaves a substantial timing problem because each start can still move and can force changes to earlier starts. The paper gives an explicit scheduling procedure for that case and proves that it minimizes the sum of deviations from preferred starts (Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong, 1988, §§1–2).

This mission targets that procedure and its correctness theorem. It also records the paper's equal-length result: when task lengths are identical, a minimum-cost schedule exists in preferred-start order, so the fixed-order procedure applies after sorting. These are two precise claims about total discrepancy, distinct from the paper's separate maximum-discrepancy problem.

Setting

There are nnn tasks, indexed i=0,…,n−1i=0,\ldots,n-1i=0,…,n−1. Task iii has a nonnegative length lil_ili​, a nonnegative preferred starting time aia_iai​, and an actual starting time sis_isi​. Once started, it occupies the one processor until si+lis_i+l_isi​+li​. Each start must be nonnegative. For the fixed-order problem, task iii must finish before task i+1i+1i+1 starts, so si+li≤si+1s_i+l_i\le s_{i+1}si​+li​≤si+1​. This permits idle time when the inequality is strict. The task's discrepancy is ∣si−ai∣|s_i-a_i|∣si​−ai​∣; because its preferred completion is ai+lia_i+l_iai​+li​, this is also its absolute completion-time discrepancy. The total discrepancy is

cost⁡n(s)=∑i=0n−1∣si−ai∣.\operatorname{cost}_n(s)=\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}|s_i-a_i|.costn​(s)=i=0∑n−1​∣si​−ai​∣.

A block is a maximal consecutive set of tasks with no idle time between neighboring tasks. Within a block, Decrease counts tasks whose actual starts are later than preferred, and Increase counts tasks whose actual starts are no later than preferred. These names describe the effect of moving the entire block earlier: the discrepancy of a Decrease task falls initially, whereas that of an Increase task rises. The algorithm's state is a schedule SnS_nSn​ for the first nnn tasks. It inserts the next task at its preferred start when the previous task has finished, and at that finish time otherwise. In the latter case it may move the final block earlier until one of the paper's stopping events occurs: the block reaches time zero, a late task reaches its preferred start, or the block meets its predecessor (§2.2, p. 337).

For the equal-length result, schedules may execute tasks in any order. Two distinct tasks are feasible together when one completes before the other starts; meeting at endpoints is allowed. The objective remains the same sum of absolute discrepancies.

Formalization targets

Fixed-order optimality

The main target is the paper's Theorem 2. For all nonnegative task data and every nnn, the actual schedule SnS_nSn​ produced by the block-shifting algorithm is feasible and satisfies

cost⁡n(Sn)≤cost⁡n(s)for every feasible fixed-order schedule s.\operatorname{cost}_n(S_n)\le\operatorname{cost}_n(s) \qquad\text{for every feasible fixed-order schedule }s.costn​(Sn​)≤costn​(s)for every feasible fixed-order schedule s.

This includes the empty schedule and schedules with idle time. The milestone list follows the paper's own assertions: a balanced final block can move earlier without changing cost; every block of SnS_nSn​ has more Increase tasks than Decrease tasks or begins at zero (Lemma 7); and the two claims in Case 2 of the proof record the cost of adding a late task and the comparison with schedules that place it earlier (Theorem 2 and Lemma 7, p. 338).

Equal-length schedules

The companion target is Theorem 3. If every task has a common length L≥0L\ge0L≥0 and the preferred starts are indexed so that ai≤ai+1a_i\le a_{i+1}ai​≤ai+1​, then among all feasible schedules, including those with another task order, at least one minimum-cost schedule starts the tasks in index order:

∃s  [cost⁡n(s)≤cost⁡n(t) for every feasible t]with si≤si+1 whenever i+1<n.\exists s\;\bigl[ \operatorname{cost}_n(s)\le\operatorname{cost}_n(t) \text{ for every feasible }t \bigr] \quad\text{with }s_i\le s_{i+1}\text{ whenever }i+1<n.∃s[costn​(s)≤costn​(t) for every feasible t]with si​≤si+1​ whenever i+1<n.

The paper uses this statement to connect free-order equal-length scheduling to its fixed-order procedure (Theorem 3, p. 340).

Significance

Theorem 2 certifies an explicit schedule, not just the existence of an optimum. It fixes the objective value for a prescribed execution order and gives a baseline against which any other legal timing of the same tasks can be compared. Theorem 3 supplies the ordering fact needed to use that result when all lengths agree. Together they explain why a problem that is difficult for unrestricted task lengths still has these structured solvable cases (Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong, 1988, abstract and §2.5).

The paper proves both theorems on paper. The work here is to formalize its schedule construction, cost, block boundaries, and comparison classes in Lean, then obtain machine-checked proofs of the stated targets. The draft theorem declarations compile with proof placeholders; this proposal does not claim that they are already machine-checked results. A completed development would make the model and the algorithm available for later formal work on scheduling with idle time and symmetric earliness and tardiness penalties.

Difficulty

Moving a task closer to its preferred start can move neighboring tasks farther from theirs. A simple task-by-task choice therefore does not establish global optimality. Nor does a count of late and early tasks in one block, by itself, justify arbitrary earlier movements of individual tasks. The difficult comparison in the paper is between the algorithm's schedule and a competing feasible schedule whose new task starts earlier: the whole final block and its constrained relative movements matter. The proof also has to account for the boundary at time zero and for blocks that merge when shifted. These are the reasons the explicit procedure and its block invariant need careful statements (§§2.2–2.3, pp. 337–338).

Formalization scope

The Lean development represents task data and starts as functions from natural-number indices to real numbers; only indices below nnn count. Task iii in Lean is the paper's Ti+1T_{i+1}Ti+1​. Preferred times, lengths, and legal starting times are nonnegative. The start-time condition is a standing convention used by the paper's algorithm, especially its zero-boundary stopping rule. Fixed-order feasibility requires successive tasks to be separated by at least the earlier task's length; unrestricted feasibility uses pairwise nonoverlap. An empty schedule is legal and has cost zero. The representation allows zero-length tasks, as does the paper's li≥0l_i\ge0li​≥0 model.

The algorithm is defined by its stated insertion and single-block-shift operations. Defining SnS_nSn​ as a chosen minimizer would erase the content of Theorem 2; the goal also explicitly asserts feasibility so that an illegal low-cost function cannot qualify. Theorem 3 compares with every feasible unrestricted-order schedule, not just schedules already in preferred-start order. The core definitions, the block invariant, and the cost comparisons are useful beyond this particular proof. Formalizing the paper's running-time bounds and heap implementation is outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Michael R. Garey, Robert E. Tarjan, and Gordon T. Wilfong, One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(2), 330–348, 1988. DOI: 10.1287/moor.13.2.330.
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A Variational Inequality Formulation of the Dynamic Network User Equilibrium Problem I: Route-Departure Equilibria Are Exactly the Solutions of the Path-Integral Variational InequalityResearch Paper

Motivation

Commuters choose not only a route but also a departure time, trading travel delay against the penalty of arriving early or late. Static traffic assignment, in the tradition of Wardrop's user-equilibrium principle, ignores the time dimension; dynamic traffic assignment adds it, and its central modelling question is what "equilibrium" means when flows, delays and costs all vary over a time horizon. Friesz, Bernstein, Smith, Tobin and Wie (Oper. Res. 41(1), 1993) proposed the simultaneous route-departure (SRD) equilibrium of a path-based dynamic model and showed that it is equivalent to an infinite-dimensional variational inequality. That equivalence is the starting point of a large literature on dynamic user equilibrium: existence theory, solution algorithms and differential-variational formulations all take the variational inequality as their definition of the problem.

Timeline, as far as this mission is concerned:

  • 1952: Wardrop states the static user-equilibrium criterion (equal and minimal travel times on used routes).
  • 1979–1980: Smith and Dafermos formulate static user equilibrium as a finite-dimensional variational inequality.
  • 1989: Friesz, Luque, Tobin and Wie treat dynamic route choice with a fixed departure schedule as an optimal-control problem.
  • 1993: Friesz et al. (this paper) formulate simultaneous route and departure-time equilibrium and prove its equivalence with a variational inequality on (L2[0,T])∣P∣(L^2[0,T])^{|P|}(L2[0,T])∣P∣ (Theorem 2, p. 187).

Setting

A traffic network has a finite set PPP of paths. Each path ppp connects exactly one origin–destination (OD) pair klklkl; PklP_{kl}Pkl​ denotes the paths of pair klklkl. Travellers depart during the horizon [0,T][0,T][0,T], T>0T>0T>0, which carries Lebesgue measure ν\nuν; "∀ν(t)\forall_\nu(t)∀ν​(t)" means "for ν\nuν-almost every t∈[0,T]t\in[0,T]t∈[0,T]".

A vector of departure-time densities h=(hp)p∈Ph=(h_p)_{p\in P}h=(hp​)p∈P​ assigns to each path a square-integrable, almost everywhere nonnegative function hph_php​ on [0,T][0,T][0,T]: hp(t)h_p(t)hp​(t) is the rate at which travellers depart at time ttt on path ppp. The set of such vectors is H+H_+H+​. Each OD pair has a fixed travel demand QklQ_{kl}Qkl​, and the feasible set is

Λ={h∈H+:∑p∈Pkl∫0Thp(t) dν(t)=Qkl for every OD pair kl}.(38)\Lambda=\Big\{h\in H_+ : \sum_{p\in P_{kl}}\int_0^T h_p(t)\,d\nu(t)=Q_{kl}\ \text{for every OD pair } kl\Big\}.\qquad(38)Λ={h∈H+​:p∈Pkl​∑​∫0T​hp​(t)dν(t)=Qkl​ for every OD pair kl}.(38)

A cost operator gives the effective delay Cp(t,h)≥0C_p(t,h)\ge 0Cp​(t,h)≥0 of departing at time ttt on path ppp when the densities are hhh: travel time plus a penalty for early or late arrival (13). Because densities are defined only up to null sets, the relevant lowest achievable cost on a path is an essential infimum,

μp(h)=ess inf⁡{Cp(t,h):t∈[0,T]}=sup⁡{x∈R: ν{t:Cp(t,h)<x}=0},\mu_p(h)=\operatorname{ess\,inf}\{C_p(t,h):t\in[0,T]\}=\sup\{x\in\mathbb R:\ \nu\{t: C_p(t,h)<x\}=0\},μp​(h)=essinf{Cp​(t,h):t∈[0,T]}=sup{x∈R: ν{t:Cp​(t,h)<x}=0},

and the lowest achievable cost for pair klklkl is μkl(h)=min⁡p∈Pklμp(h)\mu_{kl}(h)=\min_{p\in P_{kl}}\mu_p(h)μkl​(h)=minp∈Pkl​​μp​(h).

Definition 3. For h∈Λh\in\Lambdah∈Λ and a nonnegative vector μ=(μkl)\mu=(\mu_{kl})μ=(μkl​), the pair (h,μ)(h,\mu)(h,μ) is an SRD equilibrium if for every OD pair klklkl and every p∈Pklp\in P_{kl}p∈Pkl​:

hp(t)>0 ⇒ Cp(t,h)=μkl∀ν(t),Cp(t,h)≥μkl∀ν(t).h_p(t)>0\ \Rightarrow\ C_p(t,h)=\mu_{kl}\quad\forall_\nu(t),\qquad C_p(t,h)\ge\mu_{kl}\quad\forall_\nu(t).hp​(t)>0 ⇒ Cp​(t,h)=μkl​∀ν​(t),Cp​(t,h)≥μkl​∀ν​(t).

No positive-measure set of travellers can lower its cost by switching route or departure time.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (PIE VIP)

For h∗h^*h∗ with nonnegative, square-integrable costs Cp(⋅,h∗)C_p(\cdot,h^*)Cp​(⋅,h∗):

(∃ μ∗: (h∗,μ∗) SRD equilibrium) ⟹ h∗∈Λ and ∑p∈P∫0TCp(t,h∗) [hp(t)−hp∗(t)] dν(t)≥0  ∀h∈Λ,(39)\big(\exists\,\mu^*:\ (h^*,\mu^*)\ \text{SRD equilibrium}\big)\ \Longrightarrow\ h^*\in\Lambda\ \text{and}\ \sum_{p\in P}\int_0^T C_p(t,h^*)\,[h_p(t)-h^*_p(t)]\,d\nu(t)\ge 0\ \ \forall h\in\Lambda,\qquad(39)(∃μ∗: (h∗,μ∗) SRD equilibrium) ⟹ h∗∈Λ and p∈P∑​∫0T​Cp​(t,h∗)[hp​(t)−hp∗​(t)]dν(t)≥0  ∀h∈Λ,(39)

and conversely, if h∗∈Λh^*\in\Lambdah∗∈Λ solves (39), then (h∗,μ(h∗))(h^*,\mu(h^*))(h∗,μ(h∗)) with μkl∗=μkl(h∗)\mu^*_{kl}=\mu_{kl}(h^*)μkl∗​=μkl​(h∗) is an SRD equilibrium. The formal goal states the two directions as two conjuncts; the second names the equilibrium cost vector explicitly, which is stronger than an equivalence with an existential μ∗\mu^*μ∗.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2: a measurable function positive on a set of positive measure exceeds some ε0>0\varepsilon_0>0ε0​>0 on a set of positive measure.
  2. The pointwise inequality (42) at an equilibrium, and the necessity half of Theorem 2.
  3. Condition (17) holds by construction for μ∗=μ(h∗)\mu^*=\mu(h^*)μ∗=μ(h∗).
  4. The positive-measure sets (44)–(46) and (47) produced by a failure of (16).
  5. Feasibility (50) of the mass-shifted vector (48)–(49), the value bound (54), and the sufficiency half of Theorem 2.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 converts an equilibrium defined by almost-everywhere complementarity conditions into a single variational inequality over a convex subset of a Hilbert space. This is what makes dynamic user equilibrium accessible to the general theory of variational inequalities: existence via monotonicity or compactness arguments, and projection-type algorithms in function space or after time discretization. The sufficiency half also identifies the equilibrium cost levels: they are the essential infima μkl(h∗)\mu_{kl}(h^*)μkl​(h∗), so the multiplier μ∗\mu^*μ∗ need not be found separately.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. A formal proof requires essential infima, the shifting of mass between paths on sets of prescribed measure (the paper cites Halmos, Proposition 41.2, for the nonatomicity of Lebesgue measure), and careful integrability bookkeeping. The development is a self-contained template for "complementarity conditions a.e. ⇔ variational inequality in L2L^2L2" arguments, which recur in continuous-time equilibrium models.

Difficulty

Necessity is routine once integrability is in place, though the paper's text asserts the per-path identity ∫0T[hp−hp∗] dν=0\int_0^T[h_p-h^*_p]\,d\nu=0∫0T​[hp​−hp∗​]dν=0, which is false; only the sum over PklP_{kl}Pkl​ vanishes, and that suffices. Sufficiency is the substantive half. The obvious approach, testing (39) against a perturbation that moves flow from an expensive to a cheap route, has to be carried out with sets rather than points: the costs are only defined almost everywhere, the minimal cost is an essential infimum that need not be attained at any time, and the perturbation must keep the demand constraints exact. This forces the choice of sets of exactly equal positive measure inside the positive-measure sets Sp(ε,δ)S_p(\varepsilon,\delta)Sp​(ε,δ) and Tq(ε)T_q(\varepsilon)Tq​(ε), a nonatomicity argument that a pointwise proof would miss.

Formalization scope

Densities are plain functions R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R with a square-integrability condition with respect to ν=\nu=ν= Lebesgue measure restricted to [0,T][0,T][0,T], not L2L^2L2 equivalence classes; every pointwise condition is ν\nuν-almost everywhere, and values outside [0,T][0,T][0,T] are unconstrained. Paths and OD pairs are finite types, with a map sending each path to its OD pair. The essential infimum is the literal formula (12), a real supremum; it is not the pointwise infimum, which changes when CCC is altered on a null set and makes sufficiency false. μkl\mu_{kl}μkl​ is a real infimum over PklP_{kl}Pkl​; for a pair with no paths it is an unused default value.

The cost operator C is abstract, with the paper's measurability assumption strengthened to square-integrability so that every integral in (39) is a genuine Lebesgue integral. The network dynamics (3)–(11) that produce C in the paper are not formalized. Nonnegativity (the codomain R+\mathbb R_+R+​ of (13)) and square-integrability are assumed only at h∗h^*h∗, which makes the formal statements stronger than the paper's. Without integrability, Lean's integral of a non-integrable function is 000, so (39) could hold vacuously; the added hypothesis excludes that trivialization. The goal quantifies over every cost operator satisfying these hypotheses and never fixes one. In the milestones, the reduction from p=qp=qp=q to p≠qp\ne qp=q (p. 188) is taken as the hypothesis p≠qp\ne qp=q.

A complete development needs: properties of the real essential infimum (12) on a finite measure space; Lemma 2 (continuity of measure from below); the existence of measurable subsets of prescribed measure in Lebesgue measure (nonatomicity, available in Mathlib in some form); and integral bookkeeping for products of L2L^2L2 functions on a finite measure. The essential-infimum and mass-shift lemmas are reusable for other continuous-time equilibrium models. Proofs of any milestone, and cleaner restatements of the essential-infimum API, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. L. Friesz, D. Bernstein, T. E. Smith, R. L. Tobin and B. W. Wie, A variational inequality formulation of the dynamic network user equilibrium problem, Operations Research 41(1):179–191, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.179
  • J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers 1(3):325–362, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259
  • M. J. Smith, The existence, uniqueness and stability of traffic equilibria, Transportation Research B 13(4):295–304, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-2615(79)90022-5
  • S. Dafermos, Traffic equilibrium and variational inequalities, Transportation Science 14(1):42–54, 1980. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.14.1.42
  • T. L. Friesz, J. Luque, R. L. Tobin and B. W. Wie, Dynamic network traffic assignment considered as a continuous time optimal control problem, Operations Research 37(6):893–901, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.6.893
  • P. R. Halmos, Measure Theory, Van Nostrand, 1950 (Proposition 41.2, nonatomicity of Lebesgue measure).
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimal Transport·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations II: Worst-Case Distributions from a Finite Convex ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

In data-driven stochastic optimization a decision maker knows the distribution of an uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ only through NNN samples ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​. Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization hedges against this ignorance by evaluating a loss ℓ\ellℓ under the worst distribution in a ball, measured in the Wasserstein metric, around the empirical distribution of the samples. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116v3, published in Mathematical Programming 171, 2018) showed that for piecewise concave losses the worst-case expectation is the optimal value of a finite convex program (their Theorem 4.2), which made the approach computationally practical.

Knowing the worst-case value is often not enough. Stress tests of a candidate decision require the extremal distributions themselves: the distributions inside the ball that (nearly) achieve the worst case. Section 4.2 of the paper answers this question. Its Theorem 4.4 shows that the worst case is approached by discrete distributions with at most NKNKNK atoms, read off from near-optimal solutions of a second finite convex program, and its Example 2 shows that a worst-case distribution need not exist at all. This mission formalizes that section. The source is the arXiv preprint version 3 (13 June 2017); all numbering below refers to it.

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real vector space with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ (the paper's Rm\mathbb R^mRm), equipped with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra. Linear functionals zzz on EEE act by ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩, and the dual norm is ∥z∥∗=sup⁡∥ξ∥≤1⟨z,ξ⟩\|z\|_* = \sup_{\|\xi\|\le 1}\langle z,\xi\rangle∥z∥∗​=sup∥ξ∥≤1​⟨z,ξ⟩. Extended reals R‾=[−∞,+∞]\overline{\mathbb R} = [-\infty,+\infty]R=[−∞,+∞] follow the paper's conventions 0⋅∞=0/0=00\cdot\infty = 0/0 = 00⋅∞=0/0=0 and ∞−∞=∞\infty - \infty = \infty∞−∞=∞.

  • Samples and empirical distribution. ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​ lie in a set Ξ⊆E\Xi\subseteq EΞ⊆E, and P^N=1N∑iδξ^i\widehat{\mathbb P}_N = \frac1N\sum_i\delta_{\hat\xi_i}PN​=N1​∑i​δξ^​i​​.
  • Wasserstein ball. dW(Q1,Q2)d_W(\mathbb Q_1,\mathbb Q_2)dW​(Q1​,Q2​) is the infimum of ∫∥ξ1−ξ2∥ Π(dξ1,dξ2)\int\|\xi_1-\xi_2\|\,\Pi(d\xi_1,d\xi_2)∫∥ξ1​−ξ2​∥Π(dξ1​,dξ2​) over couplings Π\PiΠ of Q1\mathbb Q_1Q1​ and Q2\mathbb Q_2Q2​, and Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) is the set of probability distributions supported on Ξ\XiΞ within distance ε\varepsilonε of P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.
  • Loss. ℓ(ξ)=max⁡k≤Kℓk(ξ)\ell(\xi) = \max_{k\le K}\ell_k(\xi)ℓ(ξ)=maxk≤K​ℓk​(ξ) for measurable pieces ℓk:E→R‾\ell_k : E\to\overline{\mathbb R}ℓk​:E→R, and EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=EQ[max⁡{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min⁡{ℓ,0}]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\max\{\ell,0\}] + \mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\min\{\ell,0\}]EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=EQ[max{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min{ℓ,0}].
  • Worst-case expectation (10). sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)]supQ∈Bε​(PN​)​EQ[ℓ(ξ)].
  • Assumption 4.1. Ξ\XiΞ is convex and closed; every −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ is proper, convex and lower semicontinuous; and no ℓk\ell_kℓk​ is identically −∞-\infty−∞ on Ξ\XiΞ.
  • Program (13). Over weights αik≥0\alpha_{ik}\ge 0αik​≥0 and displacements qik∈Eq_{ik}\in Eqik​∈E,
sup⁡αik,qik 1N∑i=1N∑k=1Kαik ℓk(ξ^i−qikαik)s.t.1N∑i,k∥qik∥≤ε,  ∑kαik=1,  ξ^i−qikαik∈Ξ.\sup_{\alpha_{ik},q_{ik}}\ \frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\sum_{k=1}^K\alpha_{ik}\,\ell_k\Big(\hat\xi_i-\frac{q_{ik}}{\alpha_{ik}}\Big)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\|q_{ik}\|\le\varepsilon,\ \ \sum_k\alpha_{ik}=1,\ \ \hat\xi_i-\frac{q_{ik}}{\alpha_{ik}}\in\Xi .αik​,qik​sup​ N1​i=1∑N​k=1∑K​αik​ℓk​(ξ^​i​−αik​qik​​)s.t.N1​i,k∑​∥qik​∥≤ε,  k∑​αik​=1,  ξ^​i​−αik​qik​​∈Ξ.

When αik=0\alpha_{ik}=0αik​=0 the last constraint forces qik=0q_{ik}=0qik​=0 and the ikikik-th objective term is 000.

  • Candidate distributions. Q=1N∑i,kαik δξik\mathbb Q = \frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\,\delta_{\xi_{ik}}Q=N1​∑i,k​αik​δξik​​ with ξik=ξ^i−qik/αik\xi_{ik} = \hat\xi_i - q_{ik}/\alpha_{ik}ξik​=ξ^​i​−qik​/αik​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4 (worst-case distributions)

Under Assumption 4.1 and for every ε≥0\varepsilon\ge 0ε≥0,

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=optimal value of (13),\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \text{optimal value of (13)},Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=optimal value of (13),

and for every feasible sequence (αik(r),qik(r))r(\alpha_{ik}(r),q_{ik}(r))_r(αik​(r),qik​(r))r​ of (13) whose objective values converge to that optimal value, the distributions Qr\mathbb Q_rQr​ lie in Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) and

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=lim⁡r→∞EQr[ℓ(ξ)]=lim⁡r→∞1N∑i,kαik(r) ℓ(ξik(r)).\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \lim_{r\to\infty}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q_r}[\ell(\xi)] = \lim_{r\to\infty}\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}(r)\,\ell(\xi_{ik}(r)).Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=r→∞lim​EQr​[ℓ(ξ)]=r→∞lim​N1​i,k∑​αik​(r)ℓ(ξik​(r)).

The limits may be +∞+\infty+∞; no finiteness is assumed.

Milestones, in the order of the proof

The proof starts from (10) = (12f) (proof of Theorem 4.2, p. 13), which is posed in mission I of this series, Wasserstein Worst-Case Expectations as Finite Convex Programs, and is not restated here; it will be linked as a milestone once that mission is live.

  1. Lemma 4.5: inf⁡z⟨z,q−αξ^⟩+αf∗(z)\inf_z\langle z,q-\alpha\hat\xi\rangle+\alpha f^*(z)infz​⟨z,q−αξ^​⟩+αf∗(z) is the extended perspective of q↦−f(ξ^−q)q\mapsto -f(\hat\xi-q)q↦−f(ξ^​−q) for proper, convex, lower semicontinuous fff.
  2. (14d)–(14f): the ikikik-th dual term equals αℓk(ξ^−q/α)−χΞ(ξ^−q/α)\alpha\ell_k(\hat\xi-q/\alpha)-\chi_\Xi(\hat\xi-q/\alpha)αℓk​(ξ^​−q/α)−χΞ​(ξ^​−q/α) under the extended-arithmetic conventions.
  3. (12f) = (13), the first part of the proof of Theorem 4.4.
  4. Qr∈Bε(P^N)\mathbb Q_r\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Qr​∈Bε​(PN​) for every feasible point of (13).
  5. EQr[ℓ(ξ)]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q_r}[\ell(\xi)]EQr​[ℓ(ξ)] equals 1N∑i,kαikℓ(ξik)\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\ell(\xi_{ik})N1​∑i,k​αik​ℓ(ξik​) and is at least the objective of (13) for every feasible point.

Companion results

Corollary 4.6: if Ξ\XiΞ is compact or K=1K=1K=1, the sequence has an accumulation point that defines a worst-case distribution. Example 2: for Ξ=R\Xi=\mathbb RΞ=R, N=1N=1N=1, ξ^1=0\hat\xi_1=0ξ^​1​=0, ℓ=max⁡{0,ξ−1}\ell=\max\{0,\xi-1\}ℓ=max{0,ξ−1}, the worst-case expectation is ε\varepsilonε and, for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, is attained by no distribution in the ball.

Significance

Theorem 4.4 turns the abstract supremum over an infinite-dimensional ball of distributions into a finite-dimensional convex program whose near-optimal solutions are near-worst-case distributions. The atoms ξik\xi_{ik}ξik​ sit within total weighted distance ∑i,kαik∥ξik−ξ^i∥≤Nε\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\|\xi_{ik}-\hat\xi_i\|\le N\varepsilon∑i,k​αik​∥ξik​−ξ^​i​∥≤Nε of the data, and they may lie off the data, which distinguishes Wasserstein balls from ambiguity sets based on the total variation distance or the Kullback–Leibler divergence. Example 2 marks the boundary: the theorem cannot be upgraded to the existence of a maximizer in general, while Corollary 4.6 names two cases where it can.

The results are proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. The formalization adds a precise account of the extended-arithmetic conventions the paper relies on (0⋅∞=00\cdot\infty=00⋅∞=0, q/0∉Eq/0\notin Eq/0∈/E, ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞), each of which is made explicit in the definitions, and a reusable Lean treatment of extended-valued conjugates and perspective functions on a normed space with an arbitrary norm.

Difficulty

The first claim goes through Lagrangian duality for program (12f), whose constraints involve conjugates that may take the value +∞+\infty+∞; the strong duality and the minimax interchange (14c) must be justified for extended-valued convex functions, not just finite ones. Lemma 4.5 needs the Fenchel–Moreau theorem f∗∗=ff^{**}=ff∗∗=f for proper, convex, lower semicontinuous R‾\overline{\mathbb R}R-valued functions on a finite-dimensional normed space, together with its degenerate case α=0\alpha=0α=0. The second claim is a squeeze argument, but it rests on computing an extended expectation of an R‾\overline{\mathbb R}R-valued function under a discrete measure and on an explicit coupling for the Wasserstein distance. A tempting shortcut, attaining the supremum by a limit distribution, fails: Example 2 shows the maximizing atoms can escape to infinity.

Formalization scope

  • The space is a finite-dimensional real normed space E with [BorelSpace E]; the dual space is StrongDual ℝ E, and the dual norm is the operator norm. All values are in EReal.
  • The Wasserstein distance, the ball (6) and P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​ are the published WassersteinDRO.Duality.wassersteinDistance, ambiguitySet (with p=1p=1p=1) and empiricalDistribution.
  • The extended expectation is the published DupacovaWets.Consistency.expect; it integrates the positive and negative parts separately and returns +∞+\infty+∞ when the positive part is infinite; there is no integrability guard, so a distribution with infinite expected loss pushes (10) to +∞+\infty+∞ as in the paper.
  • Program values are infima or suprema over feasibility predicates, so an empty feasible set gives ±∞\pm\infty±∞, never a junk 000. Program (13) encodes αik=0\alpha_{ik}=0αik​=0 by the clauses "qik=0q_{ik}=0qik​=0" and "objective term =0=0=0" (p. 14).
  • Standing assumptions carried as hypotheses: N≥1N\ge1N≥1, K≥1K\ge1K≥1, ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ (§2), measurability of each ℓk\ell_kℓk​ (p. 11).
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: dropping the clause αik=0⇒qik=0\alpha_{ik}=0\Rightarrow q_{ik}=0αik​=0⇒qik​=0 or the hypothesis ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ would change program (13) or make the ball empty, and both are kept explicitly.
  • The objects shared with mission I (extended expectation, worst-case expectation, conjugate, Assumption 4.1, program (12f)) are restated verbatim in this mission's namespace; they will be merged with mission I's copies. Contributions to the convex-analysis groundwork (extended-valued Fenchel–Moreau, perspective functions) are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani and D. Kuhn, Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations, Mathematical Programming 171, 2018. Version formalized: arXiv:1505.05116v3.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Convex Optimization Theory, Athena Scientific, 2009 (Propositions 1.6.1 and 5.5.4, used in the proofs).
  • R. T. Rockafellar and R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimal Transport·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations I: Wasserstein Worst-Case Expectations as Finite Convex ProgramsResearch Paper

Motivation

A decision maker who must minimize an expected cost EP[h(x,ξ)]\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}[h(x,\xi)]EP[h(x,ξ)] rarely knows the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ; usually only NNN samples ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​ are available. Replacing P\mathbb PP by the empirical distribution (sample average approximation) tends to produce decisions that perform poorly out of sample when NNN is small. Distributionally robust optimization instead minimizes the worst expected cost over a set of distributions that are plausible given the data. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116v3, published in Mathematical Programming 171, 2018) take that set to be a ball in the Wasserstein metric around the empirical distribution. Such balls give finite-sample and asymptotic guarantees, but each evaluation of the robust objective is an optimization over infinitely many probability distributions. Section 4.1 of the paper shows that, for a large class of losses, this inner problem is a finite convex program. That result, Theorem 4.2, is the subject of this mission.

Timeline. Wasserstein ambiguity sets for portfolio selection were proposed by Pflug and Wozabal (2007); before this paper, robust problems over such sets were solved with global optimization algorithms (Pflug and Pichler 2014). Strong duality for conic linear and moment problems (Shapiro 2001) underlies the reduction. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (preprint 2015, journal 2018) proved the convex reduction for piecewise concave losses; Gao and Kleywegt (arXiv:1604.02199) and Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446) proved strong duality for general transport costs in 2016.

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real vector space with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ (the paper's Rm\mathbb R^mRm) and its Borel σ-algebra. Its dual norm is ∥z∥∗=sup⁡∥ξ∥≤1⟨z,ξ⟩\|z\|_* = \sup_{\|\xi\|\le 1}\langle z,\xi\rangle∥z∥∗​=sup∥ξ∥≤1​⟨z,ξ⟩, where ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩ is the value of the linear functional zzz at ξ\xiξ. Let Ξ⊆E\Xi\subseteq EΞ⊆E be the support set and ξ^1,…,ξ^N∈Ξ\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_N\in\Xiξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​∈Ξ the samples, with empirical distribution P^N=1N∑i=1Nδξ^i\widehat{\mathbb P}_N=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\delta_{\hat\xi_i}PN​=N1​∑i=1N​δξ^​i​​.

The 1-Wasserstein distance between two distributions is the least transport cost ∫∥ξ−ξ′∥ Π(dξ,dξ′)\int\|\xi-\xi'\|\,\Pi(d\xi,d\xi')∫∥ξ−ξ′∥Π(dξ,dξ′) over all couplings Π\PiΠ with the given marginals. The Wasserstein ball Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) is the set of probability distributions on Ξ\XiΞ within distance ε≥0\varepsilon\ge 0ε≥0 of P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.

The loss is a pointwise maximum ℓ(ξ)=max⁡k≤Kℓk(ξ)\ell(\xi)=\max_{k\le K}\ell_k(\xi)ℓ(ξ)=maxk≤K​ℓk​(ξ) of measurable functions ℓk:E→R‾=R∪{±∞}\ell_k:E\to\overline{\mathbb R}=\mathbb R\cup\{\pm\infty\}ℓk​:E→R=R∪{±∞}. Its expectation is EQ[ℓ]=EQ[max⁡{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min⁡{ℓ,0}]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell]=\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\max\{\ell,0\}]+\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\min\{\ell,0\}]EQ[ℓ]=EQ[max{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min{ℓ,0}] with ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞. The worst-case expectation is

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)].(10)\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)].\tag{10}Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)].(10)

The conjugate of f:E→R‾f:E\to\overline{\mathbb R}f:E→R is f∗(z)=sup⁡ξ⟨z,ξ⟩−f(ξ)f^*(z)=\sup_\xi\langle z,\xi\rangle-f(\xi)f∗(z)=supξ​⟨z,ξ⟩−f(ξ), the characteristic function χΞ\chi_\XiχΞ​ is 000 on Ξ\XiΞ and +∞+\infty+∞ off it, and the support function is σΞ(z)=sup⁡ξ∈Ξ⟨z,ξ⟩\sigma_\Xi(z)=\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}\langle z,\xi\rangleσΞ​(z)=supξ∈Ξ​⟨z,ξ⟩. Assumption 4.1 requires Ξ\XiΞ to be convex and closed, each −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ to be proper, convex and lower semicontinuous, and no ℓk\ell_kℓk​ to be identically −∞-\infty−∞ on Ξ\XiΞ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2 (convex reduction)

Under Assumption 4.1, for every ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0, (10) equals

inf⁡λ,si,zik,νik λε+1N∑i=1Nsis.t.[−ℓk]∗(zik−νik)+σΞ(νik)−⟨zik,ξ^i⟩≤si,  ∥zik∥∗≤λ∀i,k.(11)\inf_{\lambda,s_i,z_{ik},\nu_{ik}}\ \lambda\varepsilon+\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N s_i\quad\text{s.t.}\quad [-\ell_k]^*(z_{ik}-\nu_{ik})+\sigma_\Xi(\nu_{ik})-\langle z_{ik},\hat\xi_i\rangle\le s_i,\ \ \|z_{ik}\|_*\le\lambda\quad\forall i,k.\tag{11}λ,si​,zik​,νik​inf​ λε+N1​i=1∑N​si​s.t.[−ℓk​]∗(zik​−νik​)+σΞ​(νik​)−⟨zik​,ξ^​i​⟩≤si​,  ∥zik​∥∗​≤λ∀i,k.(11)

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. (12a)–(12c). Without any convexity, (10) is at most the value of (12c): inf⁡{λε+1N∑isi: sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓ(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^i∥)≤si, λ≥0}\inf\{\lambda\varepsilon+\frac1N\sum_i s_i:\ \sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell(\xi)-\lambda\|\xi-\hat\xi_i\|)\le s_i,\ \lambda\ge0\}inf{λε+N1​∑i​si​: supξ∈Ξ​(ℓ(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^​i​∥)≤si​, λ≥0}.
  2. Corollary 4.3. Without Assumption 4.1, (10) is at most the value of (12f), the program with constraints [−ℓk+χΞ]∗(zik)−⟨zik,ξ^i⟩≤si[-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi]^*(z_{ik})-\langle z_{ik},\hat\xi_i\rangle\le s_i[−ℓk​+χΞ​]∗(zik​)−⟨zik​,ξ^​i​⟩≤si​ and ∥zik∥∗≤λ\|z_{ik}\|_*\le\lambda∥zik​∥∗​≤λ.
  3. (12a) is an equality for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 under Assumption 4.1.
  4. The case ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0. (10) is the sample average 1N∑iℓ(ξ^i)\frac1N\sum_i\ell(\hat\xi_i)N1​∑i​ℓ(ξ^​i​), the objective of (12b) converges to it as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞, and (12a) is again an equality.
  5. (12e) is an equality. For each constraint, sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓk(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^i∥)=min⁡∥z∥∗≤λsup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓk(ξ)−⟨z,ξ−ξ^i⟩)\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell_k(\xi)-\lambda\|\xi-\hat\xi_i\|)=\min_{\|z\|_*\le\lambda}\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell_k(\xi)-\langle z,\xi-\hat\xi_i\rangle)supξ∈Ξ​(ℓk​(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^​i​∥)=min∥z∥∗​≤λ​supξ∈Ξ​(ℓk​(ξ)−⟨z,ξ−ξ^​i​⟩).
  6. (10) equals (12f) under Assumption 4.1.
  7. (12f) equals (11) under Assumption 4.1, as optimal values.

Significance

Theorem 4.2 is what makes Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization computable. Once the worst-case expectation is a convex program in (λ,s,z,ν)(\lambda,s,z,\nu)(λ,s,z,ν), minimizing over the decision xxx becomes one larger convex program. Section 5 of the paper derives linear and conic programs from it for piecewise affine losses, uncertainty quantification and two-stage problems. Theorem 4.4 of the same paper (mission II of this series) builds worst-case distributions from the same program. Corollary 4.3 gives a conservative convex bound for losses that are not piecewise concave.

The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. A formal development needs a working theory of extended-valued conjugates, support functions and inf-convolution in a normed space, Kantorovich-type couplings of an empirical measure, and a minimax theorem over a compact dual ball. Each of these is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The weak inequality, (10) ≤\le≤ (12f), is the elementary direction: integrate a pointwise bound against a near-optimal coupling. The difficulty lies in the two equalities. Equality in (12a) is strong duality for an infinite-dimensional moment problem whose loss may take the values ±∞\pm\infty±∞ and may be unbounded on an unbounded Ξ\XiΞ. A Slater point exists only for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, so ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0 needs a separate limit argument. The equality (12f) === (11) is subtle as well. The conjugate of −ℓk+χΞ-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi−ℓk​+χΞ​ is only the closure of the inf-convolution of [−ℓk]∗[-\ell_k]^*[−ℓk​]∗ and σΞ\sigma_\XiσΞ​, so the two constraint sets differ and only the optimal values agree. The paper's sentence "cl[f]≤0[f]\le 0[f]≤0 iff f≤0f\le0f≤0" is false pointwise and cannot be formalized as written.

Formalization scope

  • Space. EEE is a finite-dimensional real normed space with its Borel σ-algebra. The pairing ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩ is application of a continuous linear functional zzz, and ∥z∥∗\|z\|_*∥z∥∗​ is the operator norm. These choices keep the paper's arbitrary norm; §5 of the paper uses the 1- and ∞-norms.
  • Extended reals. Values are in EReal. Mathlib's EReal has ⊤+⊥=⊥\top+\bot=\bot⊤+⊥=⊥, whereas the paper has ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞, so the expectation treats an infinite positive part separately, and [−ℓk+χΞ]∗(z)[-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi]^*(z)[−ℓk​+χΞ​]∗(z) is written as sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(⟨z,ξ⟩+ℓk(ξ))\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\langle z,\xi\rangle+\ell_k(\xi))supξ∈Ξ​(⟨z,ξ⟩+ℓk​(ξ)), with no addition at all. The one EReal sum, [−ℓk]∗+σΞ[-\ell_k]^*+\sigma_\Xi[−ℓk​]∗+σΞ​ in (11), never meets ⊤+⊥\top+\bot⊤+⊥ under Assumption 4.1.
  • Programs. Each optimal value is an infimum over a feasibility predicate with real epigraph variables, so an infeasible program has value +∞+\infty+∞.
  • Ball. The ball is the published WassersteinDRO.Duality.ambiguitySet with p=1p=1p=1 around empiricalDistribution. Its condition Q(Ξc)=0\mathbb Q(\Xi^{\mathrm c})=0Q(Ξc)=0 encodes Q∈M(Ξ)\mathbb Q\in\mathcal M(\Xi)Q∈M(Ξ). The finite first moment is automatic at finite distance from P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.
  • Standing assumptions. Every statement carries N≥1N\ge1N≥1, K≥1K\ge1K≥1, ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ (§2, p. 5) and measurability of each ℓk\ell_kℓk​ (p. 11). The radius condition is ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0, or ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 in milestone 3.
  • Assumption 4.1. Convexity of −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ is stated through its real epigraph, because ConvexOn cannot take an EReal codomain.
  • Not trivializable. The statements cannot be made vacuous by an empty ball, because the samples lie in Ξ\XiΞ. They cannot be trivialized by a junk expectation either: the expectation is not guarded by integrability, so a distribution with infinite expected loss makes (10) infinite, exactly as in the paper.

Welcome contributions are reusable lemmas on EReal-valued conjugates and support functions, the decomposition of a coupling with an empirical marginal into conditional distributions, the dual-norm identity max⁡∥z∥∗≤λ⟨z,v⟩=λ∥v∥\max_{\|z\|_*\le\lambda}\langle z,v\rangle=\lambda\|v\|max∥z∥∗​≤λ​⟨z,v⟩=λ∥v∥, and a Sion-type minimax theorem.

Selected references

  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric: performance guarantees and tractable reformulations, arXiv:1505.05116v3, 2017; Math. Program. 171 (2018) 115–166. https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05116v3
  • A. Shapiro, On duality theory of conic linear problems, in M. A. Goberna, M. A. López (eds.), Semi-Infinite Programming, Kluwer, 2001.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 2010 (Theorem 11.23(a), p. 493).
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Convex Optimization Theory, Athena Scientific, 2009 (Proposition 5.5.4).
  • G. Ch. Pflug, A. Pichler, Multistage Stochastic Optimization, Springer, 2014.
  • G. Ch. Pflug, D. Wozabal, Ambiguity in portfolio selection, Quantitative Finance 7 (2007) 435–442.
  • R. Gao, A. J. Kleywegt, Distributionally robust stochastic optimization with Wasserstein distance, arXiv:1604.02199, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying distributional model risk via optimal transport, arXiv:1604.01446, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01446
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Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Partition of a Matroid Into Independent Subsets: A Matroid Splits Into k Independent Sets Iff Every Subset A Has |A| ≤ k·r(A)Research Paper

Motivation

A matroid abstracts the dependence structure of the columns of a matrix: which sets of columns are linearly independent, forgetting the numbers themselves. Graphs are the special case of incidence matrices over the integers mod 2, where a set of edges is independent exactly when it contains no cycle. A natural combinatorial question in this setting is the minimum partition (or covering) problem: how few independent sets are needed to cover all the elements? For a graph this is the least number of forests that cover its edges, its arboricity.

J. Edmonds answered this question for every finite matroid in Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets (J. Res. NBS 69B, 1965, doi:10.6028/jres.069b.004). The answer is a good characterization in Edmonds's sense: there is a short certificate both that a partition into kkk independent sets exists (the partition itself) and that it does not (a single subset that is too large for its rank). The paper is also the source of the matroid partition algorithm, which together with matroid intersection became a basic tool of combinatorial optimization.

Timeline:

  • 1935 — H. Whitney introduces matroids through rank and independence postulates (doi:10.2307/2371182).
  • 1961–1964 — C. St. J. A. Nash-Williams and W. T. Tutte characterize graphs whose edges split into kkk forests, and graphs containing kkk edge-disjoint spanning trees (doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-39.1.12).
  • 1965 — Edmonds proves the partition theorem for all matroids, with Nash-Williams's forest theorem as a corollary; the companion paper "Lehman's switching game and a theorem of Tutte and Nash-Williams" treats the packing side.

Setting

Let MMM be a finite set of elements and call some subsets of MMM independent. Edmonds's two axioms are:

  • Axiom 1. Every subset of an independent set is independent. (A system satisfying this is an independence system.)
  • Axiom 2. For any subset AAA of the elements, all maximal independent sets contained in AAA contain the same number of elements.

A matroid is a system satisfying both. The rank r(A)r(A)r(A) of A⊆MA\subseteq MA⊆M is the largest cardinality of an independent subset of AAA; in a matroid every maximal independent subset of AAA has exactly r(A)r(A)r(A) elements.

A circuit is a minimal dependent set. A span (closed set) is a set SSS such that no circuit has exactly one element outside SSS, and the span S(A)S(A)S(A) of AAA is the minimal span containing AAA. A partition into kkk independent sets is a family I1,…,IkI_1,\dots,I_kI1​,…,Ik​ of mutually disjoint independent sets whose union is MMM; any number of the IiI_iIi​ may be empty.

Formalization targets

Goal: THEOREM 1 (p. 69)

For every finite matroid MMM and every integer k≥0k\ge 0k≥0, the elements of MMM can be partitioned into kkk independent sets if and only if there is no A⊆MA\subseteq MA⊆M with

∣A∣>k⋅r(A).|A|>k\cdot r(A).∣A∣>k⋅r(A).

The condition ranges over all subsets AAA of MMM, as printed.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's own lemmas and the claims of its main proof, in order.

  1. PROPOSITION 1. Axioms 1 and 2 are equivalent to Axioms 1 and 2', where Axiom 2' says that the union of an independent set and one element contains at most one circuit.
  2. PROPOSITION 2. Axioms 1 and 2' are equivalent to the circuit axioms 1c (no circuit contains another) and 2c (if distinct circuits C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​ share eee, then C1∪C2−eC_1\cup C_2-eC1​∪C2​−e contains a circuit).
  3. PROPOSITION 3 (Lehman). If e∈C1∩C2e\in C_1\cap C_2e∈C1​∩C2​ and a∈C1−C2a\in C_1-C_2a∈C1​−C2​ for circuits C1,C2C_1,C_2C1​,C2​, some circuit CCC satisfies a∈C⊆C1∪C2−ea\in C\subseteq C_1\cup C_2-ea∈C⊆C1​∪C2​−e.
  4. PROPOSITION 4. e∈S(A)e\in S(A)e∈S(A) if and only if e∈Ae\in Ae∈A or some circuit CCC has C−A={e}C-A=\{e\}C−A={e}.
  5. PROPOSITION 5. S(A)S(A)S(A) is the unique maximal set containing AAA with rank r(A)r(A)r(A); in particular r(S(I))=∣I∣r(S(I))=|I|r(S(I))=∣I∣ for independent III.
  6. "Only if" (§1.3). For any independence system, a partition into kkk independent sets gives ∣A∣≤k⋅r(A)|A|\le k\cdot r(A)∣A∣≤k⋅r(A) for all AAA.
  7. Counting step (§1.6). If xxx lies in none of kkk disjoint sets IiI_iIi​, and x∈Sx\in Sx∈S with ∣S∣≤k r(S)|S|\le k\,r(S)∣S∣≤kr(S), then some IiI_iIi​ has ∣Ii∩S∣<r(S)|I_i\cap S|<r(S)∣Ii​∩S∣<r(S).
  8. Rank drop (§1.6). For a span SSS and an independent III with ∣I∩S∣<r(S)|I\cap S|<r(S)∣I∩S∣<r(S): S(I∩S)⊆SS(I\cap S)\subseteq SS(I∩S)⊆S and r(S(I∩S))<r(S)r(S(I\cap S))<r(S)r(S(I∩S))<r(S).
  9. One-element augmentation (§1.6). If ∣S∣≤k r(S)|S|\le k\,r(S)∣S∣≤kr(S) for every span SSS, any kkk disjoint independent sets missing xxx can be rearranged into kkk disjoint independent sets covering exactly the old elements and xxx.
  10. "If" from spans (§1.6). If ∣S∣≤k⋅r(S)|S|\le k\cdot r(S)∣S∣≤k⋅r(S) holds for every span SSS, then MMM partitions into kkk independent sets.

A further item states the paper's COROLLARY (Nash-Williams): the edges of a loopless finite graph GGG can be colored with kkk colors so that no circuit is one color if and only if no nonempty node set UUU has ∣EU∣>k(∣U∣−1)|E_U|>k(|U|-1)∣EU​∣>k(∣U∣−1), where EUE_UEU​ is the set of edges with both ends in UUU.

Significance

THEOREM 1 is the base case of matroid union: the sets coverable by kkk independent sets form a matroid whose rank is min⁡A(∣M∖A∣+k r(A))\min_{A}\bigl(|M\setminus A|+k\,r(A)\bigr)minA​(∣M∖A∣+kr(A)), and the paper's proof is the origin of the polynomial-time matroid partition algorithm and of Edmonds's later matroid intersection theory. Its graphic case gives the arboricity formula of Nash-Williams, used for sparse-graph decompositions and orientation problems. The criterion is a certificate: a single set AAA with ∣A∣>k r(A)|A|>k\,r(A)∣A∣>kr(A) proves that no partition exists.

The theorem has been proved since 1965 and appears in every matroid textbook. As far as the platform and Mathlib record, it has no machine-checked proof: Mathlib has matroids, circuits, closure and strong circuit elimination for its own Matroid structure, but no matroid union or partition theorem. This mission produces a formal proof from Edmonds's own axioms (Axiom 2 as an equal-cardinality condition, not an exchange axiom), together with the equivalences between his axiom systems, which are themselves standard results.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction is a three-line count. The difficulty lies in the converse: a greedy procedure that fills the kkk sets one after another fails even for matroids, so an element xxx that fits in no current set must be accommodated by moving other elements between sets. Such a chain of exchanges must keep all kkk sets independent and disjoint at every step and must terminate; stating it with sets whose contents change while their labels persist is the part that needs careful bookkeeping in a formal proof. A second, smaller difficulty is the translation between the paper's equal-cardinality Axiom 2 and the circuit and span language its proof uses (PROPOSITIONS 1–5).

Formalization scope

  • Elements. A finite type α\alphaα with decidable equality; MMM is Finset.univ, subsets are Finset α, and the independent sets are a predicate Indep : Finset α → Prop.
  • Axiom 1 and the rank are the published Whitney definitions IndepI1 and rankOfIndep (WhitneyMatroid.RankIndep.Postulates). The rank is integer-valued, and every inequality ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ versus k r(A)k\,r(A)kr(A) is compared in Z\mathbb ZZ with k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N.
  • Axiom 2 is stated exactly as printed: maximal independent subsets of each AAA have equal cardinality. It is not replaced by an augmentation axiom or by Mathlib's Matroid.
  • Added hypothesis. Every matroid statement assumes that ∅\emptyset∅ is independent. The paper's rank presupposes it; for the empty family Axioms 1 and 2 hold vacuously and THEOREM 1 fails (an empty ground set and k=1k=1k=1).
  • Spans are formalized from the paper's words, ∣C∖S∣≠1|C\setminus S|\ne1∣C∖S∣=1 for every circuit CCC; the formula printed beside them, ∣S∩C∣≠1|S\cap C|\ne1∣S∩C∣=1, is a misprint. S(A)S(A)S(A) is the intersection of all spans containing AAA.
  • Partitions are indexed families Fin k → Finset α of pairwise disjoint independent sets covering MMM, with empty parts allowed and k=0k=0k=0 included.
  • The COROLLARY uses a graph given by ends : E → Sym2 V (parallel edges allowed, loops excluded), with independence as linear independence of incidence columns over Z/2Z\mathbb Z/2\mathbb ZZ/2Z. It quantifies over nonempty UUU: as printed, U=∅U=\emptysetU=∅ makes the statement false.
  • Not a trivialization. The goal mentions neither spans nor circuits and quantifies over all subsets AAA; the spans-only condition is a separate milestone, and the augmentation step requires the new family to cover exactly the old elements plus xxx.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the axiom equivalences (reusable for any work with Edmonds-style or circuit-axiom matroids), the span lemmas, the augmentation step, and bridges to Mathlib's Matroid that would let its circuit and closure library be reused.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds, Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 67–72. doi:10.6028/jres.069b.004
  • J. Edmonds, Lehman's switching game and a theorem of Tutte and Nash-Williams, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards 69B (1965), 73–77. doi:10.6028/jres.069b.005
  • C. St. J. A. Nash-Williams, Decomposition of finite graphs into forests, J. London Math. Soc. 39 (1964), 12. doi:10.1112/jlms/s1-39.1.12
  • H. Whitney, On the abstract properties of linear dependence, Amer. J. Math. 57 (1935), 509–533. doi:10.2307/2371182
17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Auction Design: Giving the Object to a Bidder with the Highest Priority Level c̄ᵢ(tᵢ) ≥ t₀ and Charging (6.8) Is an Optimal Auction MechanismResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller with one indivisible object must decide whether to keep it or transfer it to one of several bidders whose values she does not observe. The allocation and the payment rule affect what bidders choose to report. Myerson's 1981 paper identifies a revenue-maximizing rule when bidders' private value estimates are independent, their densities are positive, and their valuations may be revised after learning other bidders' information. It covers value distributions for which the usual virtual-value rule is not monotone, by replacing each bidder's virtual value with an ironed priority level.

The question matters to auction design because a pointwise revenue-maximizing assignment can reward a bidder for understating a value. The seller must maximize expected utility subject to both incentive compatibility and each bidder's ability to decline participation. The paper's main theorem gives a specific allocation and payment pair that meets those constraints and attains the maximum. The result is proved in the source; this mission asks for a machine-checked formalization of it.

Setting

There is a finite nonempty set NNN of bidders and one seller. Bidder iii has a value estimate tit_iti​ in a finite interval [ai,bi][a_i,b_i][ai​,bi​], where ai<bia_i<b_iai​<bi​; endpoints may be negative and may differ between bidders. The continuous density fif_ifi​ is strictly positive on that interval and has total integral one. The bidders' estimates are independent, so a profile t=(ti)i∈Nt=(t_i)_{i\in N}t=(ti​)i∈N​ has density f(t)=∏ifi(ti)f(t)=\prod_i f_i(t_i)f(t)=∏i​fi​(ti​) on T=∏i[ai,bi]T=\prod_i[a_i,b_i]T=∏i​[ai​,bi​]. Write Fi(s)=∫aisfi(u) duF_i(s)=\int_{a_i}^{s}f_i(u)\,duFi​(s)=∫ai​s​fi​(u)du for the distribution function. The seller's known value for keeping the object is t0t_0t0​.

A revision effect ej(tj)e_j(t_j)ej​(tj​) describes the change in everyone else's valuation after bidder jjj's estimate becomes known. Bidder iii's revised value is vi(t)=ti+∑j≠iej(tj)v_i(t)=t_i+\sum_{j\ne i}e_j(t_j)vi​(t)=ti​+∑j=i​ej​(tj​), while the seller's is v0(t)=t0+∑jej(tj)v_0(t)=t_0+\sum_j e_j(t_j)v0​(t)=t0​+∑j​ej​(tj​). A direct mechanism assigns each profile an allocation probability pi(t)p_i(t)pi​(t) and expected payment xi(t)x_i(t)xi​(t) for each bidder. Payments may be negative and need not vanish when a bidder loses. Its feasibility conditions say that allocation probabilities are nonnegative and sum to at most one, each bidder's interim expected utility is nonnegative at every possible value, and truthful reporting yields at least as much interim utility as any other report. The seller maximizes her expected utility over all feasible mechanisms.

The virtual value is ci(s)=s−ei(s)−(1−Fi(s))/fi(s)c_i(s)=s-e_i(s)-(1-F_i(s))/f_i(s)ci​(s)=s−ei​(s)−(1−Fi​(s))/fi​(s). In the general case it need not increase with sss. Myerson transforms cic_ici​ through the quantile q=Fi(s)q=F_i(s)q=Fi​(s): hi(q)=ci(Fi−1(q))h_i(q)=c_i(F_i^{-1}(q))hi​(q)=ci​(Fi−1​(q)), Hi(q)=∫0qhi(r) drH_i(q)=\int_0^q h_i(r)\,drHi​(q)=∫0q​hi​(r)dr, and GiG_iGi​ is the convex envelope of HiH_iHi​ on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The slope gig_igi​ of GiG_iGi​, extended across kinks, gives the ironed priority cˉi(s)=gi(Fi(s))\bar c_i(s)=g_i(F_i(s))cˉi​(s)=gi​(Fi​(s)). At profile ttt, the winning set M(t)M(t)M(t) contains exactly those bidders whose priority is maximal and at least t0t_0t0​.

Formalization targets

The goal is Myerson's §6 theorem. The proposed rule shares the object equally among bidders in M(t)M(t)M(t), or keeps it when M(t)M(t)M(t) is empty, and charges each bidder the envelope payment:

pˉi(t)={∣M(t)∣−1,i∈M(t),0,i∉M(t),xˉi(t)=pˉi(t)vi(t)−∫aitipˉi(t−i,s) ds.\bar p_i(t)=\begin{cases}|M(t)|^{-1},&i\in M(t),\\0,&i\notin M(t),\end{cases} \qquad \bar x_i(t)=\bar p_i(t)v_i(t)-\int_{a_i}^{t_i}\bar p_i(t_{-i},s)\,ds.pˉ​i​(t)={∣M(t)∣−1,0,​i∈M(t),i∈/M(t),​xˉi​(t)=pˉ​i​(t)vi​(t)−∫ai​ti​​pˉ​i​(t−i​,s)ds.

The target asserts that (pˉ,xˉ)(\bar p,\bar x)(pˉ​,xˉ) is feasible and that every feasible (p,x)(p,x)(p,x) has seller utility no greater than that of (pˉ,xˉ)(\bar p,\bar x)(pˉ​,xˉ). The milestone list follows the paper's reduction: Lemma 2 characterizes feasible direct mechanisms by a monotone interim allocation rule and an envelope identity; equation (4.12) rewrites seller utility using virtual values; Lemma 3 turns maximization of virtual surplus into optimality. Equations (6.9)–(6.13) compare virtual and ironed priorities and establish the optimality and monotonicity of the proposed allocation.

Significance

The theorem specifies both who receives the object and how payments are computed, including irregular distributions and bidder-specific supports. The ironed priorities preserve incentives while retaining the seller's maximal expected utility. Equation (4.12) also gives the revenue-equivalence consequence: once the allocation rule and each lowest-type interim utility are fixed, expected seller utility is fixed.

A formal proof would connect several reusable results: product distributions with bidder-specific densities, interim incentive constraints, an envelope characterization, virtual-surplus accounting, and one-dimensional convex ironing. The source theorem and milestones are currently statements to be proved in this development, not existing machine-checked results. Related Börgers auction statements on Prove2Me use a common nonnegative support, at least two bidders, zero revision effects, and zero seller value; they do not provide this general theorem.

Difficulty

Maximizing virtual surplus at each profile is straightforward only if each bidder's virtual value rises with her report. When it falls, the resulting win probability can also fall, violating the incentive constraint. Replacing virtual values by slopes of a convex envelope restores monotonicity, but then the proof must account exactly for the difference between the original and ironed objectives, including flat portions of the envelope. Payments must satisfy the interim envelope identity for every type, while the seller's objective includes both transfers and her value for retaining the object.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses a finite nonempty bidder type, real-valued reports and payments, one object, independent continuous positive densities normalized on each finite support, and continuous revision effects. The latter regularity is implicit in the paper's assertion that cic_ici​ is continuous. No mean-zero condition on revision effects is imposed: the paper explicitly says its equation (2.9) is unnecessary. One bidder, negative support endpoints, unequal supports, and arbitrary seller value remain allowed.

The profile law is Lebesgue measure restricted to TTT and weighted by the product density. Integrating a function after replacing coordinate iii represents the T−iT_{-i}T−i​ integral, because bidder iii's marginal density has mass one. Mechanisms are total functions, but allocation and incentive conditions quantify over supported profiles and reports. Feasibility explicitly requires integrability of allocations, payments, and their report sections so no undefined Bochner expectation can acquire Lean's default value zero. The convex envelope is the two-point infimum of equation (6.3); its defining set is nonempty and bounded below on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The slope uses the right derivative below quantile one and the left derivative at one. The theorem requires feasibility of the proposed pair as well as its utility bound, ruling out an empty or unconstrained maximization claim.

The Stieltjes expressions in (6.9), (6.12), and (6.13) are combined into equivalent ordinary-integral comparisons over the profile law. A complete proof needs the one-dimensional envelope theorem, product-measure integration and Fubini results, differentiation of the convex envelope, and a careful endpoint treatment. The definitions of interim utilities and ironing can be reused for related auction models; contributions that establish these analytic components or the listed source lemmas are in scope.

Selected references

  • Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58–73, 1981. DOI: 10.1287/moor.6.1.58.
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Complexity TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes I: A Boolean Circuit Is True Iff Its Finite-Horizon Markov Decision Process Has Optimal Expected Cost ZeroResearch Paper

Motivation

Markov decision processes are the standard model of sequential decision making under uncertainty in operations research, control and artificial intelligence. Their finite-horizon, discounted and average-cost versions are all solvable in polynomial time, by dynamic programming or linear programming. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Math. Oper. Res. 12(3), 1987) asked the next question: can these problems be solved fast in parallel, in polylogarithmic time on polynomially many processors (the class NC)? Their Theorem 1 answers no, unless every polynomial-time problem parallelizes: all three versions are P-complete. The proof is a short reduction from the circuit value problem (CVP), the canonical P-complete problem (Ladner, 1975). This mission formalizes the mathematical heart of that reduction: the constructed process has optimal expected cost zero exactly when the circuit evaluates to true.

The result is the first of a series of five missions on the same paper; the others treat the deterministic special cases (which are in NC) and the partially observed case (which is PSPACE-hard).

Setting

A circuit is a finite sequence of triples C=((ai,bi,ci), i=1,…,k)C=((a_i,b_i,c_i),\ i=1,\dots,k)C=((ai​,bi​,ci​), i=1,…,k) with k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Each aia_iai​ is one of the operations false, true, and, or. A triple with ai∈{false,true}a_i\in\{\text{false},\text{true}\}ai​∈{false,true} is an input; a triple with ai∈{and,or}a_i\in\{\text{and},\text{or}\}ai​∈{and,or} is a gate, and a gate reads two earlier triples, 1≤bi,ci<i1\le b_i,c_i<i1≤bi​,ci​<i. The value of an input is its constant; the value of a gate is the Boolean operation aia_iai​ applied to the values of triples bib_ibi​ and cic_ici​. The value of CCC is the value of triple kkk.

A finite Markov decision process has a finite state set SSS, an initial state s0s_0s0​, and at each state sss a nonempty finite set DsD_sDs​ of decisions. Taking decision iii at state sss at time ttt costs c(s,i,t)c(s,i,t)c(s,i,t) and moves to s′s's′ with probability p(s,s′,i,t)p(s,s',i,t)p(s,s′,i,t). A policy δ\deltaδ chooses a decision δ(s,t)∈Ds\delta(s,t)\in D_sδ(s,t)∈Ds​ for every state and time. For a horizon TTT the expected cost of δ\deltaδ is

JT(δ)=Eδ[∑t=0Tc(st,δ(st,t),t)],J_T(\delta)=\mathbb E_\delta\Bigl[\sum_{t=0}^{T}c\bigl(s_t,\delta(s_t,t),t\bigr)\Bigr],JT​(δ)=Eδ​[t=0∑T​c(st​,δ(st​,t),t)],

and the optimal expected cost is JT∗=inf⁡δJT(δ)J_T^\ast=\inf_\delta J_T(\delta)JT∗​=infδ​JT​(δ) over all policies.

From a circuit CCC the proof of Theorem 1 builds a stationary process MCM_CMC​: one state per triple plus an absorbing state qqq. An input state has one decision, moving to qqq, at cost 111 if the input is false and 000 if it is true. An or gate has two free decisions, 000 moving to bib_ibi​ and 111 moving to cic_ici​. An and gate has one decision, moving to bib_ibi​ or cic_ici​ with probability 1/21/21/2 each. All other costs are zero. The initial state is triple kkk and the horizon is T=kT=kT=k.

In the Lean development these are MDPComplexity.CircuitValue.MDP (with Policy, trajProb, expCost, optCost), Circuit (with val, value, lastIdx) and Circuit.toMDP.

Formalization targets

Goal: correctness of the reduction

Jk∗(MC)≤0⟺the value of C is true,J_k^\ast(M_C)\le 0\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \text{the value of } C \text{ is true},Jk∗​(MC​)≤0⟺the value of C is true,

for every circuit CCC with k≥1k\ge1k≥1 triples (theorem1_reduction). This is the claim "the optimum expected cost is 0 or less iff the value of CCC was true" on p. 445.

Milestones

  1. Every policy has Jk(δ)≥0J_k(\delta)\ge0Jk​(δ)≥0 ("it cannot be less").
  2. For any finite process with nonnegative costs, JT(δ)=0J_T(\delta)=0JT​(δ)=0 iff no positive cost is incurred on any trajectory of positive probability ("the states with positive costs are impossible to reach").
  3. If some policy has Jk(δ)=0J_k(\delta)=0Jk​(δ)=0, then CCC is true.
  4. If CCC is true, some policy has Jk(δ)=0J_k(\delta)=0Jk​(δ)=0.

Further statement

The discounted analogue, which the paper asserts in one sentence: for β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1), the optimal expected discounted cost inf⁡δ∑t≥0βt Eδ[c(st,δ(st,t))]\inf_\delta\sum_{t\ge0}\beta^t\,\mathbb E_\delta[c(s_t,\delta(s_t,t))]infδ​∑t≥0​βtEδ​[c(st​,δ(st​,t))] of MCM_CMC​ is at most 000 iff CCC is true (discounted_reduction).

Significance

Combined with the log-space computability of MCM_CMC​ from CCC, the goal shows that the finite-horizon Markov decision problem is P-hard, hence not in NC unless P = NC. This is the reason dynamic programming for general Markov decision processes is believed to be inherently sequential, and it frames the contrast drawn in the rest of the paper: deterministic processes are in NC, and partially observed ones are PSPACE-hard. The construction is also stationary, so it shows that even the stationary finite-horizon problem is P-hard, as the paper remarks.

The theorem is proved in the paper, in one paragraph; it is not open. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of it exists. Formalizing it produces a precise statement of what the reduction proves, a reusable finite-trajectory model of finite-horizon Markov decision processes with time-dependent policies, and a reusable encoding of Boolean circuits and their value.

Difficulty

The informal argument is short, but two points need care. First, the optimum ranges over all time-dependent policies, which form an infinite type; the infimum is attained only because the expected cost depends on finitely many decisions, and this must be established rather than assumed. Second, the passage from "the expected cost is zero" to "the circuit is true" turns a statement about trajectory probabilities into a statement about the recursive value of the circuit, and the and gates (where both successors are reached with positive probability) behave differently from the or gates (where only the chosen successor is reached). Reasoning only along a single path, as for a deterministic process, does not suffice at and gates.

Formalization scope

Theorem 1 is a complexity statement: "The Markov Decision Process problem is P-complete in all three cases." Membership in P, the log-space computability of the construction, the notion of P-completeness, and the average-cost case are not part of this mission; Mathlib has no log-space reductions or class P. The mission states the correctness of the reduction, for the exact process of the proof.

Conventions committed to:

  • Triples are indexed by Fin k (paper index iii is Lean index i−1i-1i−1); k≥1k\ge1k≥1 via [NeZero k]. The fields bi,cib_i,c_ibi​,ci​ of an input are unused (the paper sets them to 000, not a triple index). Triple kkk need not be a gate.
  • States of MCM_CMC​ are Option (Fin k), with none the state qqq; decisions are Fin 2 at or gates and Fin 1 elsewhere.
  • The and-gate row is 121[s′=bi]+121[s′=ci]\tfrac12\mathbf 1[s'=b_i]+\tfrac12\mathbf 1[s'=c_i]21​1[s′=bi​]+21​1[s′=ci​], so that bi=cib_i=c_ibi​=ci​ (allowed by the paper) gives a probability vector.
  • Rows of the transition kernel are probability vectors and every DsD_sDs​ is nonempty (implicit in the paper, explicit here).
  • The expected cost is a finite sum over trajectories, with the §2 horizon convention ∑t=0T\sum_{t=0}^{T}∑t=0T​ and T=kT=kT=k. The optimum is a real infimum over all policies δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t), not over stationary ones.
  • The discounted cost is ∑tβt\sum_t\beta^t∑t​βt times the expected time-ttt cost, which equals the expectation of the discounted series for bounded nonnegative costs.

A formalization that defines the optimal cost directly as "the cost of the best choice at the or gates", or optimizes only over stationary policies, would make the goal a restatement of the circuit's value; the mission's optimum is over all time-dependent policies of the general model.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones and the goal; lemmas on the trajectory model (marginalization of trajProb, attainment of the infimum for policies that matter only up to time TTT) that are reusable for any finite-horizon process.

Selected references

  • C. H. Papadimitriou and J. N. Tsitsiklis, The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3) (1987) 441–450. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.441
  • R. E. Ladner, The Circuit Value Problem is Log Space Complete for P, SIGACT News 7(1) (1975) 18–20. https://doi.org/10.1145/990518.990519
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimization under Variants of the Nested Logit Model 6: For δ > 1, the Powers-of-δ LP Optimum Scaled by (δ^(2γ̄+1), δ^(γ̄+1)) Is Feasible for the Full LPResearch Paper

Motivation

Assortment optimization asks which products a retailer should offer when customers choose among the offered products according to a probabilistic choice model, so as to maximize expected revenue. Under the nested logit model the products are grouped into nests: a customer first picks a nest, then a product inside it. The model is the standard relaxation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives property of the multinomial logit, and it is used throughout revenue management and transportation demand modelling.

Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 62(2), 2014) classify the complexity of the assortment problem under four variants of the nested logit model, according to whether the dissimilarity parameters are at most one and whether a customer who picks a nest always buys there. The problem is NP-hard as soon as some dissimilarity parameter exceeds one (their Theorem 5), and also when the nests have positive no-purchase weights (Theorem 8), so for the general variant approximation is the realistic aim. §6.2 of the paper gives an approximation scheme for the most general variant: for any δ>1\delta > 1δ>1 it restricts each nest to a short list of candidate assortments indexed by the powers of δ\deltaδ, solves a small linear program, and loses at most a factor δ2γˉ+1\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δ2γˉ​+1 of the optimal revenue. This mission formalizes the guarantee behind that scheme, Theorem 12.

Setting

There are nests MMM and products N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} in each nest. Product jjj of nest iii has revenue rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and preference weight vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0; the products are ordered so that ri1≥⋯≥rinr_{i1} \ge \dots \ge r_{in}ri1​≥⋯≥rin​. Nest iii has a no-purchase weight vi0≥0v_{i0} \ge 0vi0​≥0 and a dissimilarity parameter γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0, and v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0 is the weight of leaving without choosing a nest. Offering Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N in nest iii gives

Vi(Si)=vi0+∑j∈Sivij,Ri(Si)=∑j∈SirijvijVi(Si),Π(S1,…,Sm)=∑iVi(Si)γiRi(Si)v0+∑iVi(Si)γi.V_i(S_i) = v_{i0} + \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}, \qquad R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S_i} r_{ij} v_{ij}}{V_i(S_i)}, \qquad \Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m) = \frac{\sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} R_i(S_i)}{v_0 + \sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}}.Vi​(Si​)=vi0​+j∈Si​∑​vij​,Ri​(Si​)=Vi​(Si​)∑j∈Si​​rij​vij​​,Π(S1​,…,Sm​)=v0​+∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​Ri​(Si​)​.

The optimal expected revenue Z∗=max⁡ΠZ^* = \max \PiZ∗=maxΠ is the optimal value of the linear program (3): minimize xxx subject to v0x≥∑iyiv_0 x \ge \sum_i y_iv0​x≥∑i​yi​ and yi≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−x)y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - x)yi​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−x) for every nest iii and every Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N. Problem (4) keeps the second family of constraints only for a candidate collection of assortments in each nest.

Let γˉ=max⁡iγi\bar\gamma = \max_i \gamma_iγˉ​=maxi​γi​, assumed >1> 1>1 throughout §6, and fix δ>1\delta > 1δ>1. Put viL=vi0+min⁡jvijv^L_i = v_{i0} + \min_j v_{ij}viL​=vi0​+minj​vij​, viU=vi0+∑jvijv^U_i = v_{i0} + \sum_j v_{ij}viU​=vi0​+∑j​vij​, and let liLl^L_iliL​, liUl^U_iliU​ be the least integers with δl≥viL\delta^{l} \ge v^L_iδl≥viL​, δl≥viU\delta^l \ge v^U_iδl≥viU​. For each level l=liL,…,liUl = l^L_i, \dots, l^U_il=liL​,…,liU​, problem (15) maximizes ∑j∈Srijvij\sum_{j \in S} r_{ij} v_{ij}∑j∈S​rij​vij​ over the assortments with δl−1≤Vi(S)≤δl\delta^{l-1} \le V_i(S) \le \delta^lδl−1≤Vi​(S)≤δl; its value is G^il\hat G_{il}G^il​. An assortment S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ is feasible for (15) and satisfies δ∑j∈S^ilrijvij≥G^il\delta \sum_{j \in \hat S_{il}} r_{ij} v_{ij} \ge \hat G_{il}δ∑j∈S^il​​rij​vij​≥G^il​. The candidate collection of nest iii is {S^il:l=liL,…,liU}∪{∅}\{\hat S_{il} : l = l^L_i, \dots, l^U_i\} \cup \{\emptyset\}{S^il​:l=liL​,…,liU​}∪{∅}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 12 (p. 28)

If (x^,y^)(\hat x, \hat y)(x^,y^​) is an optimal solution of problem (4) over the candidate collections {S^il}∪{∅}\{\hat S_{il}\} \cup \{\emptyset\}{S^il​}∪{∅}, then

(δ2γˉ+1x^, δγˉ+1y^) is feasible for problem (3).\big(\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}\hat x,\ \delta^{\bar\gamma+1}\hat y\big) \text{ is feasible for problem (3).}(δ2γˉ​+1x^, δγˉ​+1y^​) is feasible for problem (3).

Milestones (Appendix A.6, pp. 53–54)

  1. x^≥0\hat x \ge 0x^≥0.
  2. Every nonempty assortment of nest iii lies in some level liL≤l≤liUl^L_i \le l \le l^U_iliL​≤l≤liU​.
  3. If δl−1≤a≤δl\delta^{l-1} \le a \le \delta^lδl−1≤a≤δl, then aγ−1≥(δl)γ−1δ−[γ−1]+a^{\gamma-1} \ge (\delta^l)^{\gamma-1}\delta^{-[\gamma-1]^+}aγ−1≥(δl)γ−1δ−[γ−1]+.
  4. Under the same hypothesis, (δl)γ−1≥δ−[1−γ]+aγ−1(\delta^l)^{\gamma-1} \ge \delta^{-[1-\gamma]^+} a^{\gamma-1}(δl)γ−1≥δ−[1−γ]+aγ−1.
  5. δγˉδ−[γi−1]+δ−[1−γi]+≥1\delta^{\bar\gamma}\delta^{-[\gamma_i-1]^+}\delta^{-[1-\gamma_i]^+} \ge 1δγˉ​δ−[γi​−1]+δ−[1−γi​]+≥1 and δγˉ+γi+1≤δ2γˉ+1\delta^{\bar\gamma+\gamma_i+1} \le \delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δγˉ​+γi​+1≤δ2γˉ​+1.
  6. The scaled pair satisfies δγˉ+1y^i≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−δ2γˉ+1x^)\delta^{\bar\gamma+1}\hat y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - \delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}\hat x)δγˉ​+1y^​i​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−δ2γˉ​+1x^) for every nonempty SiS_iSi​.
  7. The same inequality for Si=∅S_i = \emptysetSi​=∅.

Companions

  • The guarantee stated after Theorem 12: with v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, the assortment assembled from the candidates solving problem (5) earns at least Z∗/δ2γˉ+1Z^*/\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}Z∗/δ2γˉ​+1.
  • Proposition 15 (p. 51): when (15) is feasible, one of the explicit assortments S^(JL,JS)\hat S(J_L, J_S)S^(JL​,JS​), built from at most q=⌈δ/(δ−1)⌉q = \lceil \delta/(\delta-1)\rceilq=⌈δ/(δ−1)⌉ large and at most qqq small products by a greedy continuous knapsack, is feasible for (15) and within a factor δ\deltaδ of G^il\hat G_{il}G^il​.
  • The count liU−liL≤1+log⁡δ(viU/viL)l^U_i - l^L_i \le 1 + \log_\delta(v^U_i/v^L_i)liU​−liL​≤1+logδ​(viU​/viL​) (p. 28).

Significance

Theorem 12 is the analytical half of the approximation scheme. Together with the paper's Theorem 1 it shows that a linear program with 1+m1 + m1+m variables and at most 1+m(2+log⁡δ(viU/viL))1 + m(2 + \log_\delta(v^U_i/v^L_i))1+m(2+logδ​(viU​/viL​)) constraints yields an assortment within a factor δ2γˉ+1\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δ2γˉ​+1 of the optimum, for the most general variant, which is NP-hard, and Proposition 15 makes the candidate assortments computable. Letting δ↓1\delta \downarrow 1δ↓1 trades accuracy for running time, so the result is the paper's answer to how well the general problem can be approximated by this LP approach.

The result is proved in the paper; the work here is to formalize the known proof. To the best of a search of the Prove2Me library (local index and platform mirror, October 2026), no nested logit approximation result, and no knapsack lemma matching Proposition 15, has a machine-checked statement or proof. The definitions of the shared model (the instance, ViV_iVi​, RiR_iRi​, Π\PiΠ, the linear programs (3) and (4)) are common to the six missions of this series.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares an arbitrary assortment SiS_iSi​ with the candidate of its level and uses the candidate's constraint in (4). This fails as a direct comparison because the nest weight Vi(⋅)γiV_i(\cdot)^{\gamma_i}Vi​(⋅)γi​ enters twice with different exponents, γi−1\gamma_i - 1γi​−1 in front of the revenue and γi\gamma_iγi​ in front of x^\hat xx^, and within one level ViV_iVi​ may vary by a factor δ\deltaδ. When γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 and when γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 the monotonicity of t↦tγi−1t \mapsto t^{\gamma_i - 1}t↦tγi​−1 goes in opposite directions, so the losses must be tracked separately by [γi−1]+[\gamma_i - 1]^+[γi​−1]+ and [1−γi]+[1 - \gamma_i]^+[1−γi​]+, and they are absorbed by the common factor δγˉ\delta^{\bar\gamma}δγˉ​ only because γˉ>1\bar\gamma > 1γˉ​>1. The other half, Proposition 15, concerns a knapsack with both a lower and an upper bound on the total weight, where a feasible solution must be produced as well as a good objective value.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1 for 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n), nests a finite type, powers VγV^{\gamma}Vγ real powers, and x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0, which gives Ri(∅)=0R_i(\emptyset) = 0Ri​(∅)=0. The shared model carries the standing assumptions of §1 with the disclosed pins vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0, rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0 (the page allows γi=0\gamma_i = 0γi​=0 and zero-weight padding products, under which its convention 0γi=00^{\gamma_i} = 00γi​=0 and its proofs fail). Every statement of the mission also assumes n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 (for viLv^L_iviL​), γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ is the greatest of the γi\gamma_iγi​ (so at least one nest exists) with γˉ>1\bar\gamma > 1γˉ​>1, and δ>1\delta > 1δ>1. Integer powers δl\delta^lδl are zpow, and liLl^L_iliL​, liUl^U_iliU​ are written ⌈log⁡δviL⌉\lceil \log_\delta v^L_i\rceil⌈logδ​viL​⌉, ⌈log⁡δviU⌉\lceil \log_\delta v^U_i\rceil⌈logδ​viU​⌉, which equal the minima of the paper. An optimal solution of (4) is a feasible pair whose xxx is minimal among feasible pairs. The companion guarantee adds v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, the pin of Theorem 1. In Proposition 15 the capacity row of (33) includes v0v_0v0​, correcting a printed slip, and the running-time claim is not stated.

The assortments S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ enter Theorem 12 as an arbitrary family with the two properties of p. 28; the theorem is stated for every such family. A level at which (15) has no feasible assortment imposes nothing on S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​, as on the page. Requiring S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ to lie in its level unconditionally would make the hypothesis unsatisfiable for most instances and the goal vacuous; that encoding, and any goal that assumes displays (34)–(36) or the exponent bounds, is ruled out.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the real-power milestones (3)–(5), which are self-contained, of the two cases (6)–(7), and of Proposition 15, whose fractional knapsack lemma (the greedy solution of a continuous knapsack sorted by ratio is optimal) is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment optimization under variants of the nested logit model, Operations Research 62(2), 2014; cited from the revised manuscript of June 18, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256
  • A. M. Frieze, M. R. B. Clarke, Approximation algorithms for the m-dimensional 0–1 knapsack problem: worst-case and probabilistic analyses, European Journal of Operational Research 15(1), 1984. (cited on p. 50 of the paper for the continuous knapsack (33); link not verified here)
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts IX: An Internal Market at the Shadow Price w(α, Q) Allocates Output Optimally, and Paying Its Expectation per Unit Induces the Optimal Effort e°Textbook

Motivation

In most contracts of the supply chain coordination literature the transfer payments are fixed when the contract is signed: a wholesale price www, a buy-back rate bbb, a revenue share ϕ\phiϕ. Some settings need payments that respond to information arriving after signing, such as realized demand at several retailers and realized production output. Fixing the per-unit price in advance then fails twice: for some output realizations the retailers do not buy everything that was produced, and for others they want more than exists, so the supplier must ration, which invites strategic ordering and misallocation (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999).

Section 6.9 of Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003) studies an alternative after Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000): the supplier commits to hold an internal market for output after demand is observed, and pays her own production manager a fixed amount per unit of realized output. The model is a variant of Porteus and Whang (1991), who studied incentives between manufacturing and marketing managers in a firm. The section shows that this pair of mechanisms coordinates both the production decision and the allocation decision without the supplier observing either the demand shocks or the manager's effort.

This mission is part IX of a series formalizing the capstone results of that chapter.

Setting

One supplier employs a production manager and sells to two independent retailers. The constant demand elasticity is η>1\eta>1η>1.

  1. The manager chooses a production input level e≥0e\ge0e≥0. The output is Q=YeQ=YeQ=Ye, where Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1] is a random variable. The manager incurs the cost c(e)c(e)c(e), strictly convex and increasing, with derivative c′c'c′.
  2. Retailer i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} observes the realization αi\alpha_iαi​ of a random variable Ai>0A_i>0Ai​>0.
  3. The supplier allocates qiq_iqi​ units to retailer iii with q1+q2≤Qq_1+q_2\le Qq1​+q2​≤Q. Retailer iii earns revenue qipi(qi)q_ip_i(q_i)qi​pi​(qi​) with the inverse demand pi(qi)=αiqi−1/ηp_i(q_i)=\alpha_iq_i^{-1/\eta}pi​(qi​)=αi​qi−1/η​, that is, αiqi(η−1)/η\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}αi​qi(η−1)/η​.

If retailer one receives the share γ\gammaγ of QQQ, total retailer revenue is

π(γ,α,Q)=(α1γ(η−1)/η+α2(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)=\big(\alpha_1\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}+\alpha_2(1-\gamma)^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big)Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}.π(γ,α,Q)=(α1​γ(η−1)/η+α2​(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.

The optimal share is γo(α)=α1η/(α1η+α2η)\gamma^o(\alpha)=\alpha_1^\eta/(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)γo(α)=α1η​/(α1η​+α2η​) (Eq. (44)), and π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)=\pi(\gamma^o(\alpha),\alpha,Q)π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q) is revenue under it. The expected supply chain profit is Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e)\Pi(e)=E[\pi(A,Ye)]-c(e)Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e), and the optimal effort eoe^oeo solves the first-order condition (45).

In the decentralized system, if the per-unit price is www, retailer iii's profit is πi(qi,w)=αiqi(η−1)/η−wqi\pi_i(q_i,w)=\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-wq_iπi​(qi​,w)=αi​qi(η−1)/η​−wqi​. The contingent price is

w(α,Q)=(η−1η)(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ−1/η.w(\alpha,Q)=\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{-1/\eta}.w(α,Q)=(ηη−1​)(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ−1/η.

The manager is paid a fixed amount per unit of realized output. With K=E[(A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η]K=E\big[(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big]K=E[(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η], the payment is

(η−1η)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K/E[Y]\qquad(46),(ηη−1​)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),

and his expected utility is u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e)u(e)=(\text{payment})\cdot E[Ye]-c(e)u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal has two parts.

  1. For every realization α1,α2>0\alpha_1,\alpha_2>0α1​,α2​>0 and output Q>0Q>0Q>0, at the price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) retailer one's unique optimal order is γo(α)Q\gamma^o(\alpha)Qγo(α)Q and retailer two's is (1−γo(α))Q(1-\gamma^o(\alpha))Q(1−γo(α))Q. So the retailers order exactly QQQ, the allocation maximizes revenue over all feasible allocations, and
∂π(α,Q)∂Q=w(α,Q).\frac{\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)}{\partial Q}=w(\alpha,Q).∂Q∂π(α,Q)​=w(α,Q).
  1. If eo>0e^o>0eo>0 satisfies (45), then under the payment (46) the manager's unique optimal effort is eoe^oeo. The payment equals E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo]E[Qw(A,Q)\mid e^o]/E[Q\mid e^o]E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo], and the supplier's expected profit from the market is zero.

Milestones

  • (44): revenue is strictly concave in γ\gammaγ, and γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) is the unique optimal share.
  • The closed form π(α,Q)=(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ(η−1)/η\pi(\alpha,Q)=(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}π(α,Q)=(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ(η−1)/η.
  • (45): Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e)\Pi(e)=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-c(e)Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e) is strictly concave, and an interior eoe^oeo is optimal if and only if ((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0((\eta-1)/\eta)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K-c'(e^o)=0((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0.
  • The retailers' first-order condition, and the market allocation at w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q).
  • ∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q)\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)/\partial Q=w(\alpha,Q)∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q).
  • The identity (46).
  • The manager's optimal effort and the supplier's zero expected profit.

Significance

The result shows that one mechanism handles two separate information problems. The market price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the shadow price of output. Charging it makes the retailers' independent orders add up to exactly the output and split it as the integrated firm would, and the supplier never needs to observe AAA. Paying the manager the output-weighted expectation of that shadow price, a single number fixed in advance, aligns his marginal incentive with the supply chain's, and the supplier does not need to observe eee. The supplier breaks even on the market. Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) show that in more general settings she breaks even or loses money, so any profit must come from fixed fees. The section therefore illustrates a general design principle: market-based transfer prices inside a firm, combined with linear output-based pay.

The derivations are short calculus on the page. Formalizing them pins down what the page leaves implicit: the range of efforts and allocations; the role of E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0 and of the integrability of the shock; the fact that each retailer's problem has a unique interior optimum only at a positive price; and how the realized output Q=0Q=0Q=0 enters the expectation E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]. To our knowledge none of these statements has been machine-checked before.

Difficulty

The deterministic part requires real-power calculus with a non-integer exponent (η−1)/η∈(0,1)(\eta-1)/\eta\in(0,1)(η−1)/η∈(0,1). Strict concavity of γ↦γ(η−1)/η\gamma\mapsto\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}γ↦γ(η−1)/η has to be used on the closed interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], where the derivative blows up at the endpoints. The retailer's optimum has to be shown to be interior even though the profit at q=0q=0q=0 is defined.

The stochastic part requires pulling the effort out of the expectation, E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/ηE[\pi(A,Ye)]=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/η, pointwise in the shock, including at realizations with Y=0Y=0Y=0. The natural first idea, to differentiate under the expectation sign, is unnecessary but tempting. The obstacle it hides is that w(α,Ye)w(\alpha,Ye)w(α,Ye) is undefined where Y=0Y=0Y=0, so the identity (46) only holds once Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q) is read as its limit 000 at Q=0Q=0Q=0. Uniqueness of the manager's optimum depends on strict convexity of ccc alone, since his payment is linear in eee.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CachonCoord.InternalMarket. The deterministic file Revenue defines π(γ,α,Q)\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)π(γ,α,Q), γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) (as the printed formula, not as an argmax), π(α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)π(α,Q), πi(qi,w)\pi_i(q_i,w)πi​(qi​,w) and w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) with real powers (Real.rpow). The file Model bundles a probability space with measurable A1,A2>0A_1,A_2>0A1​,A2​>0 and Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1], the elasticity η>1\eta>1η>1, and the cost ccc. The cost is strictly convex and increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and has derivative c′c'c′ at every e>0e>0e>0. On top of these, Model defines Π\PiΠ, KKK, the payment (46) (by its printed left side, not as the ratio it is claimed to equal), expected output and market revenue, and the manager's utility (from the payment scheme, not by the printed formula). Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements and optima are IsMaxOn over [0,1][0,1][0,1] or [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The standing assumptions are those of the model paragraph on p. 92: risk neutrality and the distributional assumptions above. Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0, because (46) divides by it.
  • Integrability of (A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η.
  • A positive price in the retailer's first-order condition.
  • Differentiability of ccc only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

The existence of an effort satisfying (45) is a hypothesis, as on the page. Clauses 1 of the goal are stated for fixed realizations, not as random variables.

A trivializing formalization would define γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) as an argmax, or define the payment (46) as E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]; neither is done here. Outside γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] and Q>0Q>0Q>0, Lean's real power returns junk values, and every statement restricts to that range. The companion claim that w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the unique market-clearing price is not posed.

The formalization needs no infrastructure beyond Mathlib's real powers, convexity and Bochner integral. The concavity and first-order-condition lemmas for x↦axr−bxx\mapsto ax^{r}-bxx↦axr−bx with 0<r<10<r<10<r<1 may be reused for other constant-elasticity models. Contributions are welcome at any milestone; each is independent of the others except through the closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6, §6.9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • P. Kouvelis and M. A. Lariviere, Decentralizing cross-functional decisions: Coordination through internal markets, Management Science 46(8), 2000, 1049–1058. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1049.12025
  • E. L. Porteus and S. Whang, On manufacturing/marketing incentives, Management Science 37(9), 1991, 1166–1181. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.9.1166
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Capacity choice and allocation: strategic behavior and supply chain performance, Management Science 45(8), 1999, 1091–1108. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1091
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Wait-and-Judge Scenario Optimization 1: For Convex Programs, Seeing s_N Support Constraints Gives P^N{V(x_N) > ε(s_N)} ≤ γ, the Value of the Variational Problem (10)Research Paper

Motivation

Many decision problems in control, finance and engineering must hold against an uncertain parameter δ\deltaδ whose distribution is unknown, while samples of δ\deltaδ (measurements, historical records, simulations) are available. The scenario approach replaces the uncertain constraint by the constraints of the NNN observed samples and solves the resulting convex program. The open question is then how robust its solution is: with what probability does a new, unseen δ\deltaδ violate it?

The classical answer, due to Calafiore and Campi (doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0499-y, 2005; doi:10.1109/TAC.2006.875041, 2006) and sharpened by Campi and Garatti (doi:10.1137/07069821X, 2008), is an a-priori bound: it depends only on NNN and the dimension ddd, and it is tight for the worst problems. It is conservative for the many problems whose solution is determined by far fewer than ddd samples. Campi and Garatti's wait-and-judge theorem (doi:10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9, Math. Program. 2018) replaces it by an a-posteriori certificate: after solving, count the samples that actually determine the solution and certify the solution at a level that depends on that count.

Timeline:

  • 2005–2006, Calafiore and Campi: a convex scenario program in Rd\mathbb R^dRd has at most ddd support constraints; first sample-size bounds.
  • 2008, Campi and Garatti: the exact bound PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ}≤∑i=0d−1(Ni)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon\}\le\sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom Ni\epsilon^i(1-\epsilon)^{N-i}PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ}≤∑i=0d−1​(iN​)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i, with equality for fully-supported problems.
  • 2018, Campi and Garatti: the wait-and-judge bound, Theorem 1 below, with the 2008 bound as a corollary.

Setting

The decision variable is x∈Rdx\in\mathbb R^dx∈Rd. A problem consists of a cost vector c∈Rdc\in\mathbb R^dc∈Rd, a convex domain X⊆Rd\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb R^dX⊆Rd, convex constraint sets Xδ⊆Rd\mathcal X_\delta\subseteq\mathbb R^dXδ​⊆Rd indexed by δ\deltaδ in a probability space (Δ,F,P)(\Delta,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Δ,F,P), and convex tie-break functions t1,…,tpt_1,\dots,t_pt1​,…,tp​. Given an i.i.d. sample δ(1),…,δ(N)\delta^{(1)},\dots,\delta^{(N)}δ(1),…,δ(N) with N>dN>dN>d, the scenario program is

min⁡x∈X cTxsubject tox∈⋂i=1NXδ(i).\min_{x\in\mathcal X}\ c^{\mathsf T}x\quad\text{subject to}\quad x\in\bigcap_{i=1}^N\mathcal X_{\delta^{(i)}}.x∈Xmin​ cTxsubject tox∈i=1⋂N​Xδ(i)​.

Ties are broken by minimising t1t_1t1​ among the minimisers, then t2t_2t2​, and so on; the resulting solution is xN∗x^*_NxN∗​.

  • The violation of a point is V(x)=P{δ∈Δ:x∉Xδ}V(x)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta: x\notin\mathcal X_\delta\}V(x)=P{δ∈Δ:x∈/Xδ​}.
  • A constraint is a support constraint if removing it changes the solution; sN∗s^*_NsN∗​ is their number.
  • Assumption 1: for every mmm and every sample of size mmm, the program with those mmm constraints has a unique tie-broken solution.
  • Assumption 2 (non-degeneracy): for every mmm, with probability one, keeping only the support constraints does not change the solution.

The variational problem (10) is: for a function ϵ:{0,…,d}→[0,1]\epsilon:\{0,\dots,d\}\to[0,1]ϵ:{0,…,d}→[0,1],

γ∗=inf⁡ξ∈Cd[0,1]ξ(1)s.t.1k!dkdtkξ(t)≥(Nk)tN−k 1[0,1−ϵ(k))(t),  t∈[0,1], k=0,…,d.\gamma^*=\inf_{\xi\in C^d[0,1]}\xi(1)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\frac1{k!}\frac{\mathrm d^k}{\mathrm dt^k}\xi(t)\ge\binom Nk t^{N-k}\,\mathbf 1_{[0,1-\epsilon(k))}(t),\ \ t\in[0,1],\ k=0,\dots,d.γ∗=ξ∈Cd[0,1]inf​ξ(1)s.t.k!1​dtkdk​ξ(t)≥(kN​)tN−k1[0,1−ϵ(k))​(t),  t∈[0,1], k=0,…,d.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 10)

For every [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k), under Assumptions 1 and 2,

PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(sN∗)} ≤ γ∗.\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(s^*_N)\}\ \le\ \gamma^*.PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(sN∗​)} ≤ γ∗.

The level ϵ\epsilonϵ is evaluated at the observed number of support constraints. The goal fixes no particular ϵ\epsilonϵ, which keeps it stable under any later choice of levels.

Milestones (the proof of Theorem 1, Sect. 5.1)

  1. sm∗≤ds^*_m\le dsm∗​≤d for every sample (quoted from [7]).
  2. (14): PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(k)∧sN∗=k}=(Nk) PN{A}\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(k)\wedge s^*_N=k\}=\binom Nk\,\mathbb P^N\{A\}PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(k)∧sN∗​=k}=(kN​)PN{A}, where AAA adds "the first kkk constraints are of support".
  3. A=BA=BA=B up to a null set, where BBB concerns the program on the first kkk samples.
  4. (16): PN{A}=∫(ϵ(k),1](1−v)N−k dFk(v)\mathbb P^N\{A\}=\int_{(\epsilon(k),1]}(1-v)^{N-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)PN{A}=∫(ϵ(k),1]​(1−v)N−kdFk​(v), with Fk(v)=Pk{V(xk∗)≤v∧sk∗=k}F_k(v)=\mathbb P^k\{V(x^*_k)\le v\wedge s^*_k=k\}Fk​(v)=Pk{V(xk∗​)≤v∧sk∗​=k}.
  5. (17): PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(sN∗)}=∑k=0d(Nk)∫(ϵ(k),1](1−v)N−k dFk(v)\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(s^*_N)\}=\sum_{k=0}^d\binom Nk\int_{(\epsilon(k),1]}(1-v)^{N-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(sN∗​)}=∑k=0d​(kN​)∫(ϵ(k),1]​(1−v)N−kdFk​(v).
  6. (18): ∑k=0min⁡{m,d}(mk)∫[0,1](1−v)m−k dFk(v)=1\sum_{k=0}^{\min\{m,d\}}\binom mk\int_{[0,1]}(1-v)^{m-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)=1∑k=0min{m,d}​(km​)∫[0,1]​(1−v)m−kdFk​(v)=1 for every mmm.
  7. Weak duality between the truncated moment problem (20) and its dual (21), giving (22).
  8. (23): 1k!dkdtktm=(mk)tm−k\frac1{k!}\frac{\mathrm d^k}{\mathrm dt^k}t^m=\binom mk t^{m-k}k!1​dtkdk​tm=(km​)tm−k for m≥km\ge km≥k, and 000 otherwise.
  9. (24): the infimum of p(1)p(1)p(1) over polynomials feasible for (10) equals γ∗\gamma^*γ∗.

Companions

  • Theorem 2 (p. 11): for β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1) and ϵ(k)=1−t(k)\epsilon(k)=1-t(k)ϵ(k)=1−t(k), with t(k)t(k)t(k) the unique root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) of βN+1∑m=kN(mk)tm−k−(Nk)tN−k=0\frac{\beta}{N+1}\sum_{m=k}^N\binom mk t^{m-k}-\binom Nk t^{N-k}=0N+1β​∑m=kN​(km​)tm−k−(kN​)tN−k=0, the probability is at most β\betaβ.
  • The root lemma of Sect. 5.3, including its sign and divergence claims.
  • γ∗≤∑i<d(Ni)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i\gamma^*\le\sum_{i<d}\binom Ni\epsilon^i(1-\epsilon)^{N-i}γ∗≤∑i<d​(iN​)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i for constant ϵ\epsilonϵ (Sect. 5.2).
  • Corollary 1, the 2008 bound.

Significance

Theorem 1 turns the number of support constraints, which is observed after solving, into a confidence statement that holds uniformly over all convex problems and all distributions. With Theorem 2's choice of ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k), a user who finds k≪dk\ll dk≪d support constraints obtains a level ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k) comparable to that of a kkk-dimensional problem, which is far below the a-priori level for dimension ddd. The classical bound (2) is recovered as Corollary 1, so Theorem 1 contains the earlier theory.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known, it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization produces:

  • a formal account of scenario programs with lexicographic tie-break and of support constraints in the "changes the solution" sense;
  • the exchangeability argument (14) on product measures;
  • the representation (17) of a tail probability through generalized distribution functions;
  • a weak-duality argument for a generalized moment problem. The 2008 bound itself is posed on the platform as an open problem under other hypotheses; Corollary 1 states it under this paper's assumptions.

Difficulty

The obvious approach bounds the probability for each value of sN∗s^*_NsN∗​ separately by a binomial tail, then sums. This fails: the event sN∗=ks^*_N=ksN∗​=k is not known in advance, and summing the individual bounds over kkk loses the uniformity that makes the result useful. The paper instead characterises every convex problem by the (d+1)(d+1)(d+1)-tuple (F0,…,Fd)(F_0,\dots,F_d)(F0​,…,Fd​). It then maximises (17) over all tuples satisfying the infinitely many moment conditions (18), which is a generalized moment problem in d+1d+1d+1 measures, and solves it by duality.

Two steps carry most of the work. One is the almost-sure identity A=BA=BA=B, which depends on the precise interplay of Assumptions 1 and 2 with the tie-break. The other is passing from the polynomial dual problems to the variational problem (10), which needs a density argument in Cd[0,1]C^d[0,1]Cd[0,1]. The bound sN∗≤ds^*_N\le dsN∗​≤d itself is quoted from the earlier literature; it needs a Helly-type argument adapted to the lexicographic tie-break.

Formalization scope

  • Spaces. The decision space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with its Borel σ-algebra, and samples are Fin N → Δ, indexed from 000. P\mathbb PP is a probability measure and PN\mathbb P^NPN is the product measure.
  • Tie-break. The tie-broken solution is the lexicographic minimiser of (cTx,t1(x),…,tp(x))(c^{\mathsf T}x,t_1(x),\dots,t_p(x))(cTx,t1​(x),…,tp​(x)) and depends only on the feasible set, which is what makes the exchangeability step valid. A support constraint is one whose removal changes this solution; this is not the platform's earlier "removal lowers the cost" notion.
  • Assumptions. Assumption 1 is required for every sample, Assumption 2 almost surely.
  • Measurability. The paper takes measurability for granted (footnote 1). Here it is two explicit hypotheses: the relation {(x,δ):x∈Xδ}\{(x,\delta):x\in\mathcal X_\delta\}{(x,δ):x∈Xδ​} is measurable, and every solution map ω↦xm∗(ω)\omega\mapsto x^*_m(\omega)ω↦xm∗​(ω) is measurable. No event is assumed measurable directly.
  • FkF_kFk​. FkF_kFk​ is the finite measure on R\mathbb RR given by the law of V(xk∗)V(x^*_k)V(xk∗​) on the event {sk∗=k}\{s^*_k=k\}{sk∗​=k}; it is not normalised.
  • Problem (10). Cd[0,1]C^d[0,1]Cd[0,1] is ContDiffOn ℝ d on [0,1][0,1][0,1], with derivatives taken within [0,1][0,1][0,1]. γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ is a real infimum over a set that is nonempty (ξ(t)=tN\xi(t)=t^Nξ(t)=tN) and bounded below by 000.
  • Probabilities are compared with real quantities through ENNReal.ofReal.
  • Theorem 2 is stated for every ϵ\epsilonϵ whose values 1−ϵ(k)1-\epsilon(k)1−ϵ(k) are roots of (11) in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), which by its first part is the paper's ϵ\epsilonϵ.
  • Added hypothesis. The constant-ϵ\epsilonϵ companion assumes d≥1d\ge1d≥1: at d=0d=0d=0, ϵ=0\epsilon=0ϵ=0 its inequality is false.

Ruled-out trivializations:

  • The solution is never a free function of the sample.
  • The goal does not mention FkF_kFk​, moments or polynomials.
  • Assumption 1 is not weakened to almost surely.
  • N>dN>dN>d is kept on Theorems 1, 2 and Corollary 1.
  • The indicators keep the paper's open and closed ends: [0,1−ϵ(k))[0,1-\epsilon(k))[0,1−ϵ(k)) in (10), (ϵ(k),1](\epsilon(k),1](ϵ(k),1] in (16)–(21).

Contributions welcome:

  • the support-constraint bound under lexicographic tie-break, which is reusable for any convex scenario result;
  • the exchangeability lemma on Measure.pi;
  • the duality and density lemmas, which are pure analysis.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming 167 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, Uncertain convex programs: randomized solutions and confidence levels, Mathematical Programming 102 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0499-y
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 51 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization 19 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts V: With Market-Clearing Prices the Best Wholesale Price Earns θ/(2(1 + θ)) or θ/8, Below the (1 + θ)/8 a Full-Refund Buy-Back AttainsTextbook

Motivation

A supplier that sells through many competing retailers usually worries that competition among them pushes orders too high, because each retailer ignores the demand it takes from the others. Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997) identified the opposite failure. When the retail price is set by the market after demand is realized, retailers who hold too much stock in a weak market bid the price down, and anticipating this, perfectly competitive retailers order too little. The supplier then needs a contract that raises orders, and the classical justification for resale price maintenance (a price floor imposed on retailers) comes out of this model. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents the model in §6.5.2 as a closed-form example. In it the supplier's best wholesale price contract is computed explicitly and compared with two contracts that recover the monopoly profit: resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back.

This mission is volume V of a series that formalizes the section capstones of that chapter, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003), pp. 53–58.

Setting

Fix θ>1\theta>1θ>1. Industry demand is low or high, each with probability 1/21/21/2. If the retailers hold a total stock qqq, the market clearing price is

pl(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph(q)=(1−qθ)+ (high state).p_l(q)=(1-q)^+\ \text{(low state)},\qquad p_h(q)=\Big(1-\frac q\theta\Big)^+\ \text{(high state)}.pl​(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph​(q)=(1−θq​)+ (high state).

Leftover inventory has no salvage value, and the supplier's production cost is zero.

  • Monopolist benchmark. A single firm orders a stock QQQ, observes the state, and sells xl≤Qx_l\le Qxl​≤Q (low) or xh≤Qx_h\le Qxh​≤Q (high) at the market clearing price. Its expected profit is 12pl(xl)xl+12ph(xh)xh\tfrac12p_l(x_l)x_l+\tfrac12p_h(x_h)x_h21​pl​(xl​)xl​+21​ph​(xh​)xh​, and Πo\Pi^oΠo is the maximum of this.
  • Wholesale price contract. The supplier charges www per unit. A continuum of retailers orders before demand is known and sells everything at the market clearing price. Their aggregate expected profit is
π(q)=12pl(q)q+12ph(q)q−wq.\pi(q)=\tfrac12p_l(q)q+\tfrac12p_h(q)q-wq .π(q)=21​pl​(q)q+21​ph​(q)q−wq.

Perfect competition means the retailers keep ordering until expected profit is zero. The competitive order is the q>0q>0q>0 with π(q)=0\pi(q)=0π(q)=0 and π>0\pi>0π>0 on (0,q)(0,q)(0,q). The supplier earns wqwqwq.

  • Resale price maintenance (pˉ,w)(\bar p,w)(pˉ​,w): retailers may not sell below pˉ\bar ppˉ​. When the clearing price would fall below pˉ\bar ppˉ​, only the demand at pˉ\bar ppˉ​ is sold, allocated in proportion to stock.
  • Buy-back (w,b)(w,b)(w,b): the supplier pays bbb per unsold unit. The market price then cannot fall below bbb, and retailers sell at most 1−b1-b1−b units (low) and θ(1−b)\theta(1-b)θ(1−b) units (high).

The page's notation q1(w)=2θ1+θ(1−w)q_1(w)=\frac{2\theta}{1+\theta}(1-w)q1​(w)=1+θ2θ​(1−w), q2(w)=θ(1−2w)q_2(w)=\theta(1-2w)q2​(w)=θ(1−2w), πs(w)\pi_s(w)πs​(w) and w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is kept in Lean under the names q1, q2, supplierProfit, wStar.

Formalization targets

Goal (pp. 55, 57)

With

πs∗={θ2(1+θ)θ≤3,θ8θ>3,\pi_s^*=\begin{cases}\dfrac{\theta}{2(1+\theta)}&\theta\le3,\\[4pt]\dfrac\theta8&\theta>3,\end{cases}πs∗​=⎩⎨⎧​2(1+θ)θ​8θ​​θ≤3,θ>3,​

the goal states four things:

  1. πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ is the greatest supplier profit wqwqwq over all wholesale prices and their competitive orders.
  2. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) attains it.
  3. The monopolist's maximum is Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8, and πs∗<Πo\pi_s^*<\Pi^oπs∗​<Πo.
  4. Under the buy-back b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2 the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns exactly Πo\Pi^oΠo.

Milestones

  1. Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8 (p. 54).
  2. The competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w) if w≥12−12θw\ge\tfrac12-\tfrac1{2\theta}w≥21​−2θ1​ and q2(w)q_2(w)q2​(w) otherwise, for 0≤w<10\le w<10≤w<1 (p. 55).
  3. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), with the value πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ (p. 55).
  4. The orders and market clearing prices at w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) (p. 55).
  5. Under resale price maintenance with pˉ=1/2\bar p=1/2pˉ​=1/2 and total stock θ/2\theta/2θ/2, πr(t)=q(t)(1+θ4θ−w)\pi_r(t)=q(t)\big(\frac{1+\theta}{4\theta}-w\big)πr​(t)=q(t)(4θ1+θ​−w) (p. 56).
  6. Under (pˉ,wˉ)(\bar p,\bar w)(pˉ​,wˉ) the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns Πo\Pi^oΠo (p. 57).
  7. Under the buy-back b=1/2b=1/2b=1/2 the retailers' profit is q(34−w−q2θ)q\big(\frac34-w-\frac q{2\theta}\big)q(43​−w−2θq​) for 1/2<q<θ/21/2<q<\theta/21/2<q<θ/2 (p. 57).
  8. 1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ)1/2>(1+\theta)/(4\theta)1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ) (p. 57).

Significance

The goal shows that in this model a wholesale price contract always falls short of the integrated profit, whatever θ\thetaθ. It also shows where the shortfall comes from: at the optimal wholesale price the low-state market price falls below the monopoly price 1/21/21/2 (milestone 4). Restoring the monopoly profit therefore requires a mechanism that holds the low-state price at 1/21/21/2. Resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back both do this, so the section gives a closed-form efficiency argument for vertical restraints that are often treated as anticompetitive. The section also contrasts the buy-back with revenue sharing, which coordinates the single newsvendor (§6.2) but not this model.

The results are proved on the printed pages by elementary algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and nothing on Prove2Me covers this model. The mission produces checked versions of the case analysis, including the θ=3\theta=3θ=3 tie and the two regimes of the competitive order. It also adds a reusable encoding of "perfect competition" as the first zero of aggregate expected profit.

Difficulty

Every statement reduces to one-variable inequalities, but the case structure is easy to get wrong.

  • The retailers' profit is piecewise (prices hit zero at q=1q=1q=1 in the low state and at q=θq=\thetaq=θ in the high state). The competitive order lies on either side of q=1q=1q=1 depending on www.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is piecewise in www, and its second branch peaks at w=1/4w=1/4w=1/4 only when θ>2\theta>2θ>2.
  • The global optimum switches at θ=3\theta=3θ=3, where both prices are optimal.
  • A statement "the competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w)" needs the order to exist, to be unique, and to have positive profit everywhere below it. Exhibiting a root is not enough.
  • The buy-back profit is identically zero for q≥θ/2q\ge\theta/2q≥θ/2 when b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2. Only the "first zero" reading of perfect competition pins the order at θ/2\theta/2θ/2.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers and θ>1\theta>1θ>1 throughout. The continuum of retailers enters only through the total order. No measure space of retailers is formalized, and footnote 26's multiplicity of individual equilibria is not stated. The sales rules under resale price maintenance (proportional allocation) and under the buy-back (price floor bbb) are written into the contract definitions, as the page describes them in words. The theorems use only pˉ=b=1/2\bar p=b=1/2pˉ​=b=1/2.

The formulas q1q_1q1​, q2q_2q2​, πs\pi_sπs​ and w∗w^*w∗ are definitions transcribed from the page. That they are the competitive order and the optimum is the content of the theorems. Defining Πo\Pi^oΠo or the competitive order by its closed form would trivialize the mission, so the competitive order is defined only by the zero-profit property and Πo\Pi^oΠo as a greatest element of the monopolist's feasible profits. The goal is stated over all real wholesale prices, so it also rules out profitable prices outside [0,1)[0,1)[0,1). Uniqueness of w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is not asserted at θ=3\theta=3θ=3.

The chapter's standing assumptions used here are risk neutrality and full information, together with the model paragraph of pp. 53–54 (two equally likely states, zero salvage value, zero production cost). No platform definition is referenced: no published item formalizes this model.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, §6.5.2 (3rd draft, January 2003, pp. 53–58). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, American Economic Review 87(4), 619–641, 1997. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951366
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 885–913, 1996. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
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Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts III: With Effort-Dependent Demand, Buy-Backs, Quantity Flexibility and Revenue Sharing Under-Reward Effort, While a Quantity Discount Gives λΠ(q, e°)Textbook

Why effort breaks the standard coordinating contracts

A supplier selling through a retailer earns more when the retailer works harder at selling. Examples are a better shelf position, more knowledgeable sales staff, local advertising and keeping the display in order. These activities cost the retailer, raise demand, and usually cannot be observed or verified by the supplier, so no contract can be written on them directly. Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management (G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, 2003) surveys contracts that align a retailer's decisions with the interest of the whole supply chain. Its §6.4 asks which of these contracts survive when the retailer also chooses such an unverifiable effort level.

The question goes back to the marketing literature on retail effort (Chu and Desai 1995, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Lal 1990, Lariviere and Padmanabhan 1997). It was taken up for newsvendor contracts by Taylor (2000), who showed that a sales rebate combined with a buy back restores coordination, and by Krishnan, Kapuscinski and Butz (2001), who let effort be chosen after demand is observed. This mission is the third in a series that formalizes the chapter's section capstones. It covers §6.4.1.

The newsvendor with effort-dependent demand

One supplier sells to one retailer for a single selling season. Before the season the retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0. Effort costs him g(e)g(e)g(e), where g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0, g′>0g' > 0g′>0 and g′′>0g'' > 0g′′>0. Demand DDD given effort eee has distribution function F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), with F(0∣e)=0F(0 \mid e) = 0F(0∣e)=0 and F(⋅∣e)F(\cdot \mid e)F(⋅∣e) strictly increasing. Demand is stochastically increasing in effort: ∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e < 0∂F(y∣e)/∂e<0 for y>0y > 0y>0. Units sell at the retail price ppp and cost c<pc < pc<p to produce. Goodwill costs, the salvage value and the retailer's own unit cost are zero. Expected sales and the integrated channel's profit are

S(q,e)=E[min⁡(q,D)]=q−∫0qF(y∣e) dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).S(q, e) = \mathbb E[\min(q, D)] = q - \int_0^q F(y \mid e)\,dy, \qquad \Pi(q, e) = pS(q, e) - cq - g(e).S(q,e)=E[min(q,D)]=q−∫0q​F(y∣e)dy,Π(q,e)=pS(q,e)−cq−g(e).

Let (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximize Π\PiΠ. A contract fixes the transfer the retailer pays the supplier, as a function of what the supplier can verify: the order and, for some contracts, sales or leftover units, but never effort. The contracts compared are the buy back {wb,b}\{w_b, b\}{wb​,b}, quantity flexibility {wq,δ}\{w_q, \delta\}{wq​,δ}, revenue sharing {wr,ϕ}\{w_r, \phi\}{wr​,ϕ}, the sales rebate {ws,r,t}\{w_s, r, t\}{ws​,r,t} and the quantity discount wd(q)w_d(q)wd​(q). Under each, the retailer's profit πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) is his revenue pS(q,e)pS(q, e)pS(q,e) less the transfer and g(e)g(e)g(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal combines the section's negative and positive results.

  1. Buy backs distort effort (Eq. (19)). For every b>0b > 0b>0, q>0q > 0q>0 and e>0e > 0e>0,
∂πr(q,e,wb,b)∂e<∂Π(q,e)∂e.\frac{\partial \pi_r(q, e, w_b, b)}{\partial e} < \frac{\partial \Pi(q, e)}{\partial e}.∂e∂πr​(q,e,wb​,b)​<∂e∂Π(q,e)​.
  1. The quantity discount aligns effort and splits profit. With
wd(q)=(1−λ)p S(q,eo)q+λc−(1−λ)g(eo)q,λ∈[0,1],w_d(q) = (1 - \lambda)p\,\frac{S(q, e^o)}{q} + \lambda c - (1 - \lambda)\frac{g(e^o)}{q}, \qquad \lambda \in [0, 1],wd​(q)=(1−λ)pqS(q,eo)​+λc−(1−λ)qg(eo)​,λ∈[0,1],

the following hold for every q>0q > 0q>0. The retailer earns πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and the supplier earns (1−λ)Π(q,eo)(1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)(1−λ)Π(q,eo). The retailer's marginal profit of effort equals the channel's. His optimal efforts are the channel's. 3. The optimal order. If (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) maximizes Π\PiΠ, both firms' profits at effort eoe^oeo are maximized by qoq^oqo.

Milestones

The milestones follow the section's own claims: the integral form of SSS (p. 41); the first-order condition (18) for the chain-optimal effort; (19); the analogous strict inequalities for quantity flexibility (δ>0\delta > 0δ>0) and revenue sharing (ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1), and the reverse inequality for the sales rebate (r>0r > 0r>0, q>tq > tq>t); the two displays of πr\pi_rπr​ under the quantity discount; and the fact that S(q,e)/qS(q, e)/qS(q,e)/q decreases in qqq.

Significance

The result separates two jobs a contract does. To coordinate the order quantity, buy backs, quantity flexibility and revenue sharing all shield the retailer from part of the demand risk or take part of his revenue. The same shield dulls his incentive to raise demand, so each one leads him to under-invest in effort. The sales rebate pushes the other way, toward too much effort. The quantity discount works because the retailer keeps every unit of realized revenue and bears all of his own effort cost. The schedule then prices the order against expected revenue at the optimal effort, so the order is coordinated without touching the effort incentive. Because πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) with λ\lambdaλ free in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], any split of the channel's optimal profit is attainable. The chapter extends this observation to retailers that also set price (p. 43).

The section's claims are proved on the page only in outline; several are introduced with "it can be shown". To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires differentiating expected sales in a parameter of the demand law. That step recurs throughout stochastic inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is short. The substance is in the derivatives. ∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q∂F(y∣e)/∂e dy\partial S(q, e)/\partial e = -\int_0^q \partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e\,dy∂S(q,e)/∂e=−∫0q​∂F(y∣e)/∂edy is a differentiation under the integral sign. The strict inequalities need this integral to be strictly negative. That in turn needs ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e to be integrable and negative on a set of positive length, which is why q>0q > 0q>0 (and q>t≥0q > t \ge 0q>t≥0 for the sales rebate) matters.

The natural reading "the quantity discount makes (qo,eo)(q^o, e^o)(qo,eo) the retailer's joint optimum" is not what the page shows, and it fails in general. The page gives two partial statements: for each fixed qqq the retailer's effort incentive is the chain's, and at e=eoe = e^oe=eo his best order is qoq^oqo. Since πr(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e) = \Pi(q, e) - (1 - \lambda)\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,e)=Π(q,e)−(1−λ)Π(q,eo), the retailer can gain by moving qqq and eee together when λ\lambdaλ is small. The goal states exactly the two partial claims.

Formalization scope

The Lean namespace is CachonCoord.EffortNewsvendor. A structure Model collects the data: ppp and ccc with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p; a family of demand laws indexed by effort (probability measures on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with finite mean, no atom at 000, strictly increasing distribution function); the effort derivative ∂F(y∣e)/∂e\partial F(y \mid e)/\partial e∂F(y∣e)/∂e, negative for y>0y > 0y>0, e>0e > 0e>0; and ggg with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0 and positive first and second derivatives for e>0e > 0e>0. SSS is defined as an expectation, and its integral form is a milestone. Derivative claims are HasDerivAt statements at interior efforts e>0e > 0e>0. The inequalities assert that both derivatives exist.

The following hypotheses are standing assumptions or disclosed additions:

  • the chapter's model paragraph (p. 7) and the zeros gr=gs=v=cr=0g_r = g_s = v = c_r = 0gr​=gs​=v=cr​=0 of p. 41;
  • as regularity, differentiation of e↦∫abF(y∣e) dye \mapsto \int_a^b F(y \mid e)\,dye↦∫ab​F(y∣e)dy under the integral sign, with interval-integrable ∂F/∂e\partial F/\partial e∂F/∂e;
  • 0≤c0 \le c0≤c (a production cost);
  • wq>0w_q > 0wq​>0 and δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 for quantity flexibility (the contract's range, p. 24);
  • t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 for the sales rebate threshold;
  • q>0q > 0q>0 wherever wdw_dwd​, which divides by qqq, is used.

Revenue sharing and the sales rebate use §6.2's profit functions (pp. 21, 27) with this section's zeros, less g(e)g(e)g(e).

The page prints the last term of wdw_dwd​ as +(1−λ)g(eo)/q+(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q+(1−λ)g(eo)/q. With that sign the page's own displays πr(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo)\pi_r(q, e^o) = \lambda\Pi(q, e^o)πr​(q,eo)=λΠ(q,eo) and πr(q,e)\pi_r(q, e)πr​(q,e) fail by 2(1−λ)g(eo)2(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)2(1−λ)g(eo). The formalization uses −(1−λ)g(eo)/q-(1 - \lambda)g(e^o)/q−(1−λ)g(eo)/q, under which both hold. wdw_dwd​ is the explicit printed schedule with this correction. It is not defined as "a schedule with πr=λΠ\pi_r = \lambda\Piπr​=λΠ", which would make the goal empty.

Not covered: the price-and-effort schedule at the bottom of p. 43, for which the page gives no argument. The cachon-2005 revenue-sharing effort results (RevShareCoord.Effort.*, deterministic revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e)) are a different model and are not referenced. Proofs of any milestone, and a reusable library for differentiating newsvendor expectations in a parameter, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (read in the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • T. A. Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8), 2002, 992–1007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.8.992.168
  • H. Krishnan, R. Kapuscinski, D. A. Butz, Coordinating Contracts for Decentralized Supply Chains with Retailer Promotional Effort, Management Science 50(1), 2004, 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0154
  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, Management Science 51(1), 2005, 30–44. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments VI: Revenue-Ordered Offer Sets Grow with Capacity Left and Shrink with Time LeftResearch Paper

Motivation

In airline and hotel revenue management a firm sells a fixed stock of a perishable resource (seats on a flight leg, rooms on a night) over a finite selling horizon, and in each period decides which fare classes to open. Customers do not buy a fixed fare: they choose among the fares on offer, or leave. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science, 2004) formulated this single-leg, choice-based problem as a dynamic program over the time remaining and the units remaining.

Practical revenue management systems rarely offer arbitrary sets of fares. They use nested controls: fares are opened from the most expensive downwards, so the open set is always "every fare above some threshold". Whether restricting to such revenue-ordered offer sets is natural depends on how the optimal threshold moves as the state changes. For mixtures of multinomial logit models, Rusmevichientong, Shmoys, Tong and Topaloglu (Production and Operations Management, 2014, Theorem 6) showed that the best revenue-ordered threshold moves monotonically in both the remaining capacity and the remaining time.

Berbeglia and Joret (arXiv:1606.01371v3, §5, Theorem 5.1) extend these two monotonicity properties to every regular discrete choice model, the class that contains essentially every model used in revenue management, including all random utility models. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

A finite nonempty set C\mathcal CC of products is sold. For a choice set S⊆CS\subseteq\mathcal CS⊆C and a product xxx, P(x,S)\mathcal P(x,S)P(x,S) is the probability that a customer offered SSS buys xxx; the no-purchase probability is P(0,S)=1−∑x∈SP(x,S)\mathcal P(0,S)=1-\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)P(0,S)=1−∑x∈S​P(x,S). The system P\mathcal PP is regular when (i) all these probabilities are nonnegative, (ii) P(x,S)=0\mathcal P(x,S)=0P(x,S)=0 for x∉Sx\notin Sx∈/S, (iii) ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤1\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le 1∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤1, and (iv) P(x,S)≥P(x,S′)\mathcal P(x,S)\ge\mathcal P(x,S')P(x,S)≥P(x,S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′, for every x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and for the no-purchase option x=0x=0x=0.

Each product xxx has a revenue r(x)>0r(x)>0r(x)>0. Let r1<r2<⋯<rkr_1<r_2<\cdots<r_kr1​<r2​<⋯<rk​ be the distinct revenues. For ℓ∈[k]={1,…,k}\ell\in[k]=\{1,\dots,k\}ℓ∈[k]={1,…,k} the revenue-ordered assortment is Sℓ={x∈C:r(x)≥rℓ}S_\ell=\{x\in\mathcal C:r(x)\ge r_\ell\}Sℓ​={x∈C:r(x)≥rℓ​}; a larger index ℓ\ellℓ gives a smaller set, S1=CS_1=\mathcal CS1​=C.

In the multi-period model one customer arrives per period. With ttt periods remaining and qqq units left, the firm offers some SℓS_\ellSℓ​. The values of the revenue-ordered dynamic program are

Jt(q,ℓ)=∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)+Jt−1(q−1))+P(0,Sℓ) Jt−1(q)(t,q>0),\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)\bigl(r(x)+\mathcal J_{t-1}(q-1)\bigr)+\mathcal P(0,S_\ell)\,\mathcal J_{t-1}(q)\qquad(t,q>0),Jt​(q,ℓ)=x∈Sℓ​∑​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)+Jt−1​(q−1))+P(0,Sℓ​)Jt−1​(q)(t,q>0),

Jt(q,ℓ)=0\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=0Jt​(q,ℓ)=0 when t=0t=0t=0 or q=0q=0q=0, and Jt(q)=max⁡ℓ∈[k]Jt(q,ℓ)\mathcal J_t(q)=\max_{\ell\in[k]}\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)Jt​(q)=maxℓ∈[k]​Jt​(q,ℓ). The optimal revenue-ordered index is the smallest maximiser,

ℓt∗(q)=min⁡{ℓ∈[k]:Jt(q,ℓ)=Jt(q)},\ell^*_t(q)=\min\{\ell\in[k]:\mathcal J_t(q,\ell)=\mathcal J_t(q)\},ℓt∗​(q)=min{ℓ∈[k]:Jt​(q,ℓ)=Jt​(q)},

and ΔJt(q)=Jt(q)−Jt(q−1)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)=\mathcal J_t(q)-\mathcal J_t(q-1)ΔJt​(q)=Jt​(q)−Jt​(q−1) is the marginal value of capacity.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

For every t≥1t\ge 1t≥1 and q≥1q\ge 1q≥1,

ℓt∗(q)≤ℓt∗(q−1)  if q≥2,ℓt∗(q)≥ℓt−1∗(q)  if t≥2.\ell^*_t(q)\le\ell^*_t(q-1)\ \text{ if } q\ge 2,\qquad \ell^*_t(q)\ge\ell^*_{t-1}(q)\ \text{ if } t\ge 2 .ℓt∗​(q)≤ℓt∗​(q−1)  if q≥2,ℓt∗​(q)≥ℓt−1∗​(q)  if t≥2.

More units left give a weakly larger optimal offer set; more periods left give a weakly smaller one. The paper states the theorem for t∈[T]t\in[T]t∈[T], q∈[Q]q\in[Q]q∈[Q]; the horizon and the capacity only bound ttt and qqq, so the goal is stated for all t,q≥1t,q\ge 1t,q≥1.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1 (p. 6): ∑x∈SP(x,S)≤∑x∈S′P(x,S′)\sum_{x\in S}\mathcal P(x,S)\le\sum_{x\in S'}\mathcal P(x,S')∑x∈S​P(x,S)≤∑x∈S′​P(x,S′) for S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′.
  2. Lemma .1 (p. 35): with L∗(δ)\mathcal L^*(\delta)L∗(δ) the set of indices ℓ\ellℓ maximising ∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)+δ)\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)(r(x)+\delta)∑x∈Sℓ​​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)+δ), if δ1+rk≥0\delta_1+r_k\ge 0δ1​+rk​≥0 and δ1≤δ2\delta_1\le\delta_2δ1​≤δ2​ then min⁡L∗(δ2)≤min⁡L∗(δ1)\min\mathcal L^*(\delta_2)\le\min\mathcal L^*(\delta_1)minL∗(δ2​)≤minL∗(δ1​).
  3. Equation (16) (p. 36): Jt(q)=max⁡ℓ∑x∈SℓP(x,Sℓ)(r(x)−ΔJt−1(q))+Jt−1(q)\mathcal J_t(q)=\max_{\ell}\sum_{x\in S_\ell}\mathcal P(x,S_\ell)(r(x)-\Delta\mathcal J_{t-1}(q))+\mathcal J_{t-1}(q)Jt​(q)=maxℓ​∑x∈Sℓ​​P(x,Sℓ​)(r(x)−ΔJt−1​(q))+Jt−1​(q).
  4. Equations (17)–(18) (p. 36): ℓt∗(q)=min⁡L∗(−ΔJt−1(q))\ell^*_t(q)=\min\mathcal L^*(-\Delta\mathcal J_{t-1}(q))ℓt∗​(q)=minL∗(−ΔJt−1​(q)).
  5. Marginal value at most rkr_krk​ (p. 36): ΔJt(q)≤rk\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)\le r_kΔJt​(q)≤rk​.
  6. Marginal value non-increasing in capacity (p. 36, citing Talluri–van Ryzin, Lemma 4): ΔJt(q+1)≤ΔJt(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q+1)\le\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)ΔJt​(q+1)≤ΔJt​(q).
  7. Marginal value non-decreasing in time (p. 37, citing Talluri–van Ryzin, Lemma 5): ΔJt(q)≤ΔJt+1(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)\le\Delta\mathcal J_{t+1}(q)ΔJt​(q)≤ΔJt+1​(q).

Milestones 5–7 are asserted or cited in the paper, not proved there; milestones 6–7 are stated for this restricted dynamic program, which is the one the paper applies them to.

Significance

The theorem says that a firm restricted to revenue-ordered offer sets can implement its policy as a nested booking control: as seats sell out, the threshold fare can only rise, and as departure approaches with seats in hand, it can only fall. This is the structure that standard revenue management systems already assume, and Rusmevichientong et al. point out that such monotonicity can be used to implement them. The paper's contribution is that the property depends only on regularity of the choice model, not on its multinomial-logit form.

Formalizing it adds a machine-checked statement of the single-leg choice-based dynamic program over a general choice model, a precise account of the tie-breaking rule (the smallest maximiser), and machine-checked versions of the two marginal-value monotonicity facts that the paper cites from Talluri and van Ryzin rather than proves. To our knowledge none of these statements has been formalized in any proof assistant; the paper's proofs are informal.

Difficulty

The paper's proof is short, but two of its steps are not proved there. The marginal-value inequalities are imported from Talluri and van Ryzin, whose dynamic program optimises over all offer sets; here only the kkk revenue-ordered sets are available and the empty set is not, so those proofs have to be redone for this program, and the bound ΔJ≤rk\Delta\mathcal J\le r_kΔJ≤rk​ is needed to keep each stage's shifted problem well behaved. The claim ΔJ≤rk\Delta\mathcal J\le r_kΔJ≤rk​ itself is justified on the page only by an informal sentence.

The second subtlety is tie-breaking. The monotonicity is about the smallest optimal index. Several indices can be optimal at once, and the comparison of Lemma .1 transfers optimality of one index from one shift to another only through Lemma 2.1, that is, through the no-purchase case of the regularity axiom. Without that case the statement fails.

Formalization scope

  • Products form a finite nonempty type C; choice probabilities are P : C → Finset C → ℝ, defined on all pairs. The no-purchase option is not a product: its probability is the derived quantity noPurchase P S = 1 − ∑_{x∈S} P x S.
  • IsChoiceSystem P is axioms (i)–(iii); IsRegular P adds axiom (iv) for products and for the no-purchase option. Milestones 5–7 assume only axioms (i)–(iii), as the paper says suffices; Lemma .1, (16), (18) and the goal assume regularity and r>0r>0r>0.
  • Revenue levels use the paper's 1-based index: level r ℓ is rℓr_\ellrℓ​ for 1≤ℓ≤k1\le\ell\le k1≤ℓ≤k, topRevenue r is rkr_krk​, and roSet r ℓ is SℓS_\ellSℓ​ as a Finset. The paper's sorting of products (Sℓ={1,…,j(ℓ)}S_\ell=\{1,\dots,j(\ell)\}Sℓ​={1,…,j(ℓ)}) is notation only and is not used.
  • The dynamic program is defined by structural recursion on ttt; there is no stochastic process. Maxima over [k][k][k] are Finset.sup', and the minima defining ℓt∗(q)\ell^*_t(q)ℓt∗​(q) and min⁡L∗(δ)\min\mathcal L^*(\delta)minL∗(δ) are Finset.min' over sets proved nonempty.
  • ΔJt(q)\Delta\mathcal J_t(q)ΔJt​(q) is used only for q≥1q\ge 1q≥1; milestones are stated with t+1t+1t+1, q+1q+1q+1 in place of the paper's t−1t-1t−1, q−1q-1q−1 to avoid natural-number subtraction, which the goal keeps under its hypotheses q≥2q\ge 2q≥2, t≥2t\ge 2t≥2.

Formalizations that would trivialize the statement are ruled out: the dynamic program maximises over the kkk revenue-ordered sets only, never over all subsets (that is Talluri and van Ryzin's program); ℓ∗\ell^*ℓ∗ is the smallest maximiser, never the largest; and TTT, QQQ, kkk and the choice model are arbitrary, never fixed.

The definitions (regular choice model, revenue-ordered assortments, the restricted dynamic program) are reusable for other results on nested policies. Proofs of the cited Talluri–van Ryzin lemmas for this program are especially welcome, as they are the part the paper leaves to the literature.

Selected references

  • G. Berbeglia and G. Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, 2019; Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Rusmevichientong, D. Shmoys, C. Tong and H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization under the Multinomial Logit Model with Random Choice Parameters, Production and Operations Management 23(11), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12191
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