Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality I: Bayes Rationality at Every State Yields Exactly the Correlated Equilibrium DistributionsResearch Paper
Motivation
Nash equilibrium is the standard solution concept for strategic games, but it is usually justified by appeal to what players "would" do once they somehow coordinate on a profile. Correlated equilibrium, introduced by Aumann (J. Math. Econ. 1, 1974), enlarges the set of outcomes by letting players condition their actions on correlated private signals. In Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (Econometrica 55, 1987), Aumann gave the concept a decision-theoretic foundation: if the players share a common prior over the states of the world and each player maximizes expected utility given his information at every state, then what they play is a correlated equilibrium — and every correlated equilibrium arises this way. The result is a standard entry point to the epistemic foundations of game theory, and correlated equilibria are central in algorithmic game theory because no-swap-regret learning dynamics converge to them (Foster–Vohra 1997; Hart–Mas-Colell 2000).
Timeline:
- 1974, Aumann: correlated equilibrium defined, in a measure-theoretic model with subjective probabilities and information σ-fields.
- 1987, Aumann: the Main Theorem (Bayes rationality at every state under a common prior implies correlated equilibrium play) and its converse, in a finite model with information partitions.
Setting
A game in strategic form has players , action sets , action -tuples , and payoffs .
A correlated strategy -tuple is a function on a finite probability space , with and . Its expected payoff is . For , the profile replaces player 's coordinate of by . The function is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 2.1) if
for every player and every that is a function of (i.e. ). The distribution of assigns to each the number , and a correlated equilibrium distribution (c.e.d.) is the distribution of some correlated equilibrium.
An information system consists of a finite set of states of the world, a common prior on , an information partition of for each player, and action functions with , each constant on the elements of (each player knows his own action). For a random variable , is the -average of over the element of containing . Player is Bayes rational at if
Formalization targets
Goal: Main Theorem with its converse
This is the two-sided statement the paper announces in its introduction (p. 2) and closes in Sect. 4d (p. 11): "under Bayesian rationality, the set of all information systems corresponds precisely to the set of all correlated equilibria."
Milestones
- Main Theorem, proof: summing the cell-wise inequalities over the partition, for constant on the cells of .
- Main Theorem, proof: itself is a correlated equilibrium on .
- Main Theorem (p. 7): the distribution of is a c.e.d.
- Sect. 4d: in the system generated by (partitions generated by ), Bayes rationality everywhere is equivalent to (2.2).
- Sect. 4d: every correlated equilibrium is realized by a Bayes-rational information system with the same distribution.
The mission also states, as a supporting lemma without a milestone, the cell-wise step of the proof of the Main Theorem: Bayes rationality at every state gives on every cell for constant on cells.
Significance
The theorem identifies correlated equilibrium as the outcome of individual Bayesian decision making under a common prior, without any assumption that players randomize or that their choices are independent. It shows that the Nash equilibrium's independence requirement is not implied by rationality alone, and it is the template for later epistemic characterizations of solution concepts. On the computational side, correlated equilibrium distributions form a polytope described by linear inequalities (the companion mission of this series), which is why they are the tractable equilibrium notion in algorithmic game theory.
The result is proved in the paper; it has no machine-checked formalization known to this mission. Formalizing it pins down the exact role of the standing assumptions — finiteness, a common prior, measurability of each player's action with respect to his own partition, rationality at every state — and of the conditional expectation on cells of probability zero. The definitions (information systems, Bayes rationality, correlated equilibria as functions on a finite probability space) are reusable for later formalizations of the paper's Sect. 5 (subjective correlated equilibrium) and of other epistemic results.
Difficulty
The mathematics is short; the difficulty lies in the bookkeeping that the paper's notation hides. The hypothesis is interim (a conditional inequality at each state), while Definition 2.1 is ex ante (an unconditional inequality). Passing between them requires the law of total expectation over a partition whose cells may have probability zero, where conditional expectations are undefined. Deviations in Definition 2.1 are functions of , not arbitrary maps, and must be shown constant on cells, which uses measurability of . A tempting first idea — that rationality against every fixed action already gives rationality against every deviation — fails without measurability: a player who does not know his own action could be rational at each state against constant deviations while a deviation varies inside his cells. The converse direction needs an information system that satisfies every axiom of the goal's right-hand side, not just one that is Bayes rational.
Formalization scope
- Players form a finite type
ιwith decidable equality; action setsS iare arbitrary types (the paper's finiteness of is not used); payoffs areh : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ. - Probability spaces are finite types with a real weight vector satisfying
AGT.IsLottery(from the published definitionagt_games). State spaces and the witnessing probability spaces of a c.e.d. range overType; for finite sets this loses nothing. - Partitions are
Setoids. The Common Prior Assumption is built into the information system, which has a single prior. Measurability of each action function is a field of the structure. - Conditional expectation on a cell is a ratio of finite sums; on a cell of probability zero Lean returns , so Bayes rationality at such states holds vacuously. The prior is not required to have full support. This matches the paper, whose argument multiplies each cell inequality by the cell's probability.
- Deviations in Definition 2.1 are exactly the compositions ; neither all maps nor only constant maps. A c.e.d. requires a genuine probability vector, ruling out the trivializing reading in which the zero weight function witnesses every .
- Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a general law-of-total-expectation lemma for finite partitions, and lemmas relating
distrto sums over action profiles.
Selected references
- R. J. Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), no. 1, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911154
- R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
- D. P. Foster and R. V. Vohra, Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium, Games and Economic Behavior 21 (1997), 40–55. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0595
- S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium, Econometrica 68 (2000), 1127–1150. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00153