Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games 1: Closed-Form Values of Interior Oceanic GamesResearch Paper
Motivation
Weighted voting bodies often combine a few large blocs with a mass of small, unorganized voters: shareholders' meetings with a handful of large holders and a dispersed float, legislatures with party blocs and independents. The Shapley value measures each participant's voting power as the probability of being pivotal — the one whose arrival first turns a losing coalition into a winning one — when participants arrive in a uniformly random order. For many small voters this computation becomes a combinatorial problem whose size grows with the number of voters.
Milnor and Shapley (RAND RM-2649, 1961; revised as Mathematics of Operations Research 3(4), 1978) replaced the small voters by a continuum, the ocean, and obtained explicit formulas for the power of the large voters. The memorandum is the second of a RAND series on values of large games; the first (L. S. Shapley and N. Z. Shapiro, Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem, RM-2648, 1960) proves the limit theorem for finite games with many small players on which the oceanic model rests. This mission formalizes the part of the memorandum that leads to explicit closed forms for the values of interior oceanic games (§2, §4, §5).
Setting
There are major players with weights , and . The ocean is the interval with Lebesgue measure, carrying total weight . In the oceanic game with quota , a coalition wins when the weight of its major players plus times its share of the ocean is at least .
The random order is modelled by a uniform random point of the cube : major player is inserted into the ocean at position , and is the set of major players placed before position . Player is pivotal when
and the value of player is the probability of (2.4), i.e. the volume of the set where it holds. The combined value of the ocean is (2.5).
With the quota as a variable, has values , , and the pivot location is a random, nondecreasing, piecewise linear function of with expectation . Adding a major player of weight gives the game .
The game is interior when
that is, the ocean alone wins and the major players together lose. With , define for , the analogous product over for , and the integers , , i.e.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 20)
In an interior game, with ,
Both identities are part of the goal. The values do not depend on within the interior range.
Milestones
- §2, p. 5: the pivot sets overlap only in measure zero.
- (4.3): for .
- (4.4)–(4.5): for , is differentiable at almost surely, and .
- Theorem 2, (4.7): .
- Lemma, (4.12)–(4.13): with , .
- Theorem 5, (5.4): if and are both interior, .
- Proof of Theorem 6, p. 21: the right-hand sides above add up to 1, an identity valid for all real and .
Further items, not milestones: the Corollary (5.5), Theorem 3 (averaged over all quotas, each value equals the player's share of the total weight), Theorem 4 (small players behave like ocean), and (5.8) with its footnote ( is the nearest integer to and counts derangements).
Significance
Theorem 6 turns the voting power of the large blocs, a priori a probability over a continuum of orderings, into a finite multilinear polynomial in the ratios . Table 1 of the memorandum lists the cases , and the theorem gives every . Its coefficients are signed derangement numbers. The Corollary (5.5) states that a major player's value per vote equals the ocean's value per vote in the game without that player.
The memorandum's arguments are short and partly heuristic: "E commutes with the derivative", the disjointness of the pivot sets is "obvious", and the induction for Theorem 6 relies on the symmetry of the value in the major players, which is never stated. A formalization makes each of these steps precise, including the measure-zero exceptions and the quota ranges. To our knowledge none of these results has a machine-checked proof; Mathlib has the Lebesgue measure on cubes, interval integrals and derangement numbers, but no game-theoretic value with a continuum of players.
Difficulty
The values are volumes of regions of cut out by inequalities whose shape depends on the order of the coordinates, so a direct computation splits into order cells, with the quota entering each. The paper's route avoids this by passing through the random function , Theorem 2 and the Lemma; that route needs differentiation under the integral sign for a function that is only piecewise linear in , with kinks at random locations, and an exact bookkeeping of the interval of integration when the quota approaches the ends of . Theorem 6 is then an induction on that uses Theorem 5 for every player in turn, so it also needs the invariance of under a relabelling of the major players.
Formalization scope
- Major players are
Fin m( is allowed; then ). The probability of an event is the Lebesgue volume of its intersection with ; no probability space is built. - uses the strict inequality , as printed.
- is defined as the volume of the pivot set (2.4), for every real quota. is defined by (2.5), as the paper allows ("We might equally well take (2.5) as the definition of "). Neither is defined through the formulas of Theorem 6 or through ; defining them that way would make the goal an unfolding, and is ruled out.
- The paper writes (4.2) as a minimum , which need not be attained; is the infimum over , the value shown in its Fig. 3.
- The standing assumptions and (§2) are explicit hypotheses. The p. 5 footnote's applies to the pivot-set milestone. Other quota ranges are explicit: for (4.3) and Theorem 2 (one-sided derivatives at the ends), the open interval for (4.4)–(4.5) (two-sided derivatives, stated with
HasDerivAt), and for the Lemma, as on p. 14. - The added player is appended with
Fin.snocas indexFin.last m. - Corollary (5.5) assumes , since it divides by . Theorem 4, stated in the paper "in the general oceanic game", is false at quota and when the limit game has no winning coalition; it is stated for .
- The identity of milestone 7 is pure algebra and is stated for all real weights and .
A complete development needs: measurability of the pivot sets and of in , the structure of as a piecewise linear function of , differentiation of , and invariance of the values under permutations of the major players. The pivot-set and infrastructure is reusable for the companion mission on limits of finite weighted majority games. Contributions of any of the milestones, of the symmetry lemma, and of the non-milestone items are welcome.
Selected references
- J. W. Milnor and L. S. Shapley, Values of Large Games, II: Oceanic Games, The RAND Corporation, Research Memorandum RM-2649, February 1961. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM2649.html
- J. W. Milnor and L. S. Shapley, Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games, Mathematics of Operations Research 3(4):290–307, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.3.4.290
- L. S. Shapley, A Value for n-Person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, Princeton University Press, 1953, 307–317. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-018
- L. S. Shapley and N. Z. Shapiro, Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem, The RAND Corporation, Research Memorandum RM-2648, November 1960.
- R. J. Aumann and L. S. Shapley, Values of Non-Atomic Games, Princeton University Press, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400867080