Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices 3: The Scaled Expected Matching Value Converges to the Fluid LP Value Φ(λ, π)Research Paper
Why a fluid limit for matching markets
Two-sided platforms (ride hailing, delivery, freelancing, logistics) collect demand and supply requests over a matching cycle and then clear them with an optimization problem. When such a platform runs an experiment, treated and control units compete for the same supply, so the outcome of one unit depends on the treatment of others. Interference bias of this kind is the subject of Bright, Delarue and Lobel, Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices (arXiv:2205.02274v4; Management Science, 2025). Their analysis of estimators, including the shadow-price estimator built from linear-programming duals, is carried out in a deterministic fluid limit. Theorem 1 of the paper justifies that step: as the market becomes dense, the expected matching value per unit of density converges to the optimal value of a deterministic linear program with the arrival rates as inputs.
The same kind of statement, the expected value of a random linear program converging to the value of the program at the mean data, is also used in network revenue management and in stochastic matching, where fluid linear programs serve as benchmarks.
Setting
Network. There are demand types and supply types. A directed network has one demand node per demand type (a sink), one supply node per supply type (a source) and a finite set of intermediate nodes. Every arc carries a value and a capacity .
Matching program. For a density , demand vector and supply vector , is the maximum of over flows with inflow at most at , outflow at most at , flow balance at every intermediate node and (display (2), p. 7). Write . Without intermediate nodes this is a capacitated bipartite transportation problem.
Random counts. Demand units of type arrive at rate and supply units of type at rate . At density the numbers of units collected in one cycle are independent Poisson counts
Treatment effect. If a treatment changes the demand rates from to (with ), the global treatment effect at density is (Definition 1, p. 8).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 1, display (7), p. 12
for every network, every and every , along integer densities . No rate of convergence and no constant is fixed.
Milestones
- Lemma 1 (p. 37), scaling. For integer and , , and is optimal on the right if and only if is optimal on the left.
- Poisson tail bound (proof of Lemma 2, p. 38). For , for every (Janson, Łuczak and Ruciński 2000, Corollary 2.4).
- Lemma 2 (p. 38). If for , then has finite mean, whatever the joint law of the .
Companion: Corollary 1, display (8), p. 13
Significance
Theorem 1 is the bridge between the paper's stochastic model and its deterministic analysis. Corollary 1 follows from it and identifies the estimand . Every fluid-limit result of the paper is stated about this deterministic quantity: that the RCT estimator overestimates the treatment effect (Theorem 2), and that in a symmetric experiment the shadow-price estimator is no more biased than the RCT estimator (Theorem 4). Without Theorem 1 those results describe a linear program, not the experiment.
The result is proved in the paper (Appendix C.1, pp. 37–39). As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalogue shows, it has not been formalized: the catalogue has fluid limits of queueing networks and several Poisson concentration bounds, but no law of large numbers for the value of a random network-flow program. A formal development would provide a reusable definition of the capacitated network-flow program with supply and demand bounds, its scaling identity, and an integrability tool for suprema of scaled Poisson counts. The two other missions of this series, on the shadow-price estimator in the fluid limit and in finite samples, use the same network program.
Difficulty
The obvious argument is: and , is continuous, so the expectations converge. Each step needs care.
- The counts at different densities are defined only through their laws. A pathwise limit needs a coupling of the counts across , which is not part of the statement.
- Continuity of in its right-hand side, including at data where some or is zero, is a statement about the value function of a parametric linear program. Mathlib has no theory of LP value functions.
- Passing the limit inside the expectation needs a dominating function. The paper builds one from the supremum of scaled Poisson counts (Lemma 2), whose integrability rests on the Poisson tail bound. That bound is not in Mathlib either.
Formalization scope
Representation.
- Demand types are
Fin ndand supply typesFin ns; Lean index is the paper's type . - A network is a structure with arc type
Eand intermediate-node typeI. Each arc's tail is a supply or intermediate node and its head is a demand or intermediate node, which builds in the source/sink structure. Values are real and capacities nonnegative. - is the supremum of the objective over the feasible set of (2). For nonnegative data this set contains and lies in the box , so the supremum is a maximum.
Probability.
- The count law at density is the product of independent Poisson laws on . Independence across types and between demand and supply is the paper's reading of a Poisson process per type; it is used by the proofs but not written out.
- Expectations are Bochner integrals. The integrand of the goal is bounded by , and every function on the countable count space is measurable, so the expectation is genuine and not the junk value .
- The limit is taken along integer , as on p. 12.
- In Lemma 2, is read as a supremum in , and "finite mean" as a finite lower Lebesgue integral.
Ruled out. A trivializing formalization is excluded: the expectation is taken against the Poisson laws with means and , with the factor inside the expectation, not against point masses at the rates or in the rescaled form . No hypothesis beyond is imposed.
Not stated.
- The second sentence of Theorem 1, the almost-sure convergence of optimal primal and dual solutions. It assumes unique optima only inside its proof and needs a coupling across that the paper does not construct.
- Lemma 1's "" presupposes unique optima. It is stated as the equivalence " is optimal for if and only if is optimal for ".
The statements follow arXiv:2205.02274v4. Its printed slips are corrected as disclosed in each item's Formalization Note.
Infrastructure needed.
- Monotonicity and continuity of the value of a capacitated linear program in its right-hand side.
- The Poisson Chernoff bound.
- Convergence in probability of scaled Poisson counts.
The network-program definition and the Poisson tail bound are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions toward any of these are welcome.
Selected references
- I. Bright, A. Delarue, I. Lobel, Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices, arXiv preprint, v4, 2024; Management Science, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.02274v4
- S. Janson, T. Łuczak, A. Ruciński, Random Graphs, Wiley, 2000, Corollary 2.4. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118032718