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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Arbitrage and Duality in Nondominated Discrete-Time Models I: Under NA(𝒫) the Superhedging Price Equals the Supremum of Expectations over Martingale Measures and Is AttainedResearch Paper

Motivation

Classical arbitrage pricing fixes one probability measure PPP describing the market and asks for the cheapest way to dominate a payoff PPP-almost surely. When the model itself is uncertain, this choice is not available: a trader who only trusts a family P\mathcal PP of possible models wants a hedge that works under every one of them. Two literatures meet here. Robust (model-independent) finance studies hedging that must hold for all paths, as in the martingale-optimal-transport approach to option bounds (Beiglböck, Henry-Labordère, Penkner, 2013). Nondominated model uncertainty studies families P\mathcal PP with no single reference measure, as in the quasi-sure analysis of Denis–Martini (2006) and the volatility-uncertainty literature. Bouchard and Nutz (2015) give a discrete-time framework that contains both extremes (all measures on a path space; a single measure) and prove the fundamental theorems and superhedging duality for it.

Timeline of the dominated and robust predecessors:

  • 1990. Dalang, Morton and Willinger prove the discrete-time fundamental theorem of asset pricing (FTAP) for one measure.
  • 2001. Kabanov and Stricker give a short proof of the closedness of the superhedgeable cone behind the DMW theorem. The proof of Theorem 2.2 follows their argument.
  • 2013. Acciaio, Beiglböck, Penkner, Schachermayer prove a model-independent FTAP for a pathwise no-arbitrage notion, with options.
  • 2015. Bouchard and Nutz prove the FTAP, the superhedging theorem and the second FTAP under a nondominated family P\mathcal PP, with dynamic trading in stocks and static trading in finitely many options.

Setting

Fix a horizon T∈NT\in\mathbb NT∈N and a Polish space Ω1\Omega_1Ω1​. Paths are ω=(ω1,…,ωT)∈Ω=Ω1T\omega=(\omega_1,\dots,\omega_T)\in\Omega=\Omega_1^Tω=(ω1​,…,ωT​)∈Ω=Ω1T​, and Ωt=Ω1t\Omega_t=\Omega_1^tΩt​=Ω1t​ holds the first ttt coordinates. Information at time ttt is the universal completion Ft\mathcal F_tFt​ of the Borel σ\sigmaσ-field of Ωt\Omega_tΩt​.

For each t<Tt<Tt<T and history ω∈Ωt\omega\in\Omega_tω∈Ωt​, a nonempty convex set Pt(ω)\mathcal P_t(\omega)Pt​(ω) of probability measures on Ω1\Omega_1Ω1​ describes the possible laws of the next coordinate. Its graph must be an analytic set. The set of models P\mathcal PP consists of all products P=P0⊗P1⊗⋯⊗PT−1P=P_0\otimes P_1\otimes\cdots\otimes P_{T-1}P=P0​⊗P1​⊗⋯⊗PT−1​ whose kernels choose Pt(ω)∈Pt(ω)P_t(\omega)\in\mathcal P_t(\omega)Pt​(ω)∈Pt​(ω). A property holds P\mathcal PP-quasi surely (q.s.) if it holds PPP-a.s. for every P∈PP\in\mathcal PP∈P.

There are ddd stocks with Borel prices St:Ωt→RdS_t:\Omega_t\to\mathbb R^dSt​:Ωt​→Rd and eee options g=(g1,…,ge)g=(g^1,\dots,g^e)g=(g1,…,ge), Borel on Ω\OmegaΩ, bought or sold at time 000 at price 000. A semistatic strategy (H,h)(H,h)(H,h) consists of a predictable HHH and a vector h∈Reh\in\mathbb R^eh∈Re; its terminal gain is

H∙ST+hg=∑u=1THu (Su−Su−1)+∑i=1ehigi.H\bullet S_T+hg=\sum_{u=1}^T H_u\,(S_u-S_{u-1})+\sum_{i=1}^e h^ig^i .H∙ST​+hg=u=1∑T​Hu​(Su​−Su−1​)+i=1∑e​higi.

No-arbitrage NA(P\mathcal PP) says that a gain which is q.s. nonnegative is q.s. zero. The superhedging price of a claim fff is

π(f)=inf⁡{x∈R: ∃(H,h), x+H∙ST+hg≥f  P-q.s.}.\pi(f)=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\ \exists (H,h),\ x+H\bullet S_T+hg\ge f\ \ \mathcal P\text{-q.s.}\}.π(f)=inf{x∈R: ∃(H,h), x+H∙ST​+hg≥f  P-q.s.}.

The dual objects are the martingale measures Q⋘PQ\lll\mathcal PQ⋘P, meaning Q≪PQ\ll PQ≪P for some P∈PP\in\mathcal PP∈P. Under QQQ the stock SSS is a martingale and EQ[gi]=0E_Q[g^i]=0EQ​[gi]=0 for all iii; they form the set Q\mathcal QQ. Given a weight φ≥1\varphi\ge1φ≥1, set Qφ={Q∈Q:EQ[φ]<∞}\mathcal Q_\varphi=\{Q\in\mathcal Q: E_Q[\varphi]<\infty\}Qφ​={Q∈Q:EQ​[φ]<∞}. Expectations of arbitrary measurable functions use the convention E[f]=E[f+]−E[f−]E[f]=E[f^+]-E[f^-]E[f]=E[f+]−E[f−] with ∞−∞=−∞\infty-\infty=-\infty∞−∞=−∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1(b)

Let φ≥1\varphi\ge1φ≥1 be a random variable with ∣gi∣≤φ|g^i|\le\varphi∣gi∣≤φ, let NA(P\mathcal PP) hold, and let fff be upper semianalytic with ∣f∣≤φ|f|\le\varphi∣f∣≤φ. Then

π(f)=sup⁡Q∈QφEQ[f]∈(−∞,∞],\pi(f)=\sup_{Q\in\mathcal Q_\varphi}E_Q[f]\in(-\infty,\infty],π(f)=Q∈Qφ​sup​EQ​[f]∈(−∞,∞],

and some (H,h)(H,h)(H,h) satisfies π(f)+H∙ST+hg≥f\pi(f)+H\bullet S_T+hg\ge fπ(f)+H∙ST​+hg≥f P\mathcal PP-q.s.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof:

  1. General setting (§2). Closedness of the superhedgeable cone under q.s. convergence (Theorem 2.2), and existence of optimal strategies (Theorem 2.3).
  2. One-period market (§3). The fundamental lemma (Lemma 3.3), the one-period FTAP (Theorem 3.1), approximation lemmas (Lemmas 3.5, 3.6) and one-period duality (Theorem 3.4).
  3. Expectation bound (Lemma A.2). The elementary bound EQ[f]≤xE_Q[f]\le xEQ​[f]≤x for a superhedge under a consistent local martingale measure.
  4. Multi-period market without options (§4). Local characterization of NA (Lemma 4.6, Theorem 4.5), measurable one-step duality (Lemma 4.10), dynamic superhedging (Lemma 4.13) and duality (Theorem 4.9).
  5. With options (§5). The first and second fundamental theorems (Theorem 5.1(a), (c)).

Significance

The superhedging theorem identifies the robust price of a claim as a supremum of linear prices. This turns a hedging problem into an optimization over measures, which is how robust option bounds are computed in practice. Remark 1.4 of the paper gives another consequence: every martingale inequality E[f(M1,…,MT)]≤aE[f(M_1,\dots,M_T)]\le aE[f(M1​,…,MT​)]≤a follows from a pathwise inequality f≤a+H∙STf\le a+H\bullet S_Tf≤a+H∙ST​. The first and second fundamental theorems make the nondominated framework a complete analogue of the classical theory. NA(P\mathcal PP) is equivalent to P\mathcal PP and Q\mathcal QQ sharing their polar sets, and replicable claims are those whose price is the same under every martingale measure.

All results are proved in the paper. None of them, nor the classical dominated discrete-time FTAP, is formalized in Lean or Mathlib as far as is known. A formalization produces machine-checked statements of the model (analytic random sets, products of universally measurable kernels, quasi-sure analysis) and proofs of the fundamental theorems on top of it. Alternative arguments and extensions (portfolio constraints, infinitely many options) are also welcome.

Difficulty

There is no reference measure. Two dominated tools therefore fail. Closedness in L0(P)L^0(P)L0(P) cannot be applied, because convergence must hold quasi surely. A Hahn–Banach separation in a single Lp(P)L^p(P)Lp(P) space cannot produce martingale measures either. The paper argues one period at a time instead and glues the periods together measurably. That gluing is where the work lies. The one-period dual value Et(f)(ω)\mathcal E_t(f)(\omega)Et​(f)(ω) and the one-period hedge y(ω)y(\omega)y(ω) must depend measurably on the history ω\omegaω, but the value function of a Borel claim need not be Borel. The argument therefore runs in the class of upper semianalytic functions and needs measurable selection theorems for analytic sets. A recursion that tries to keep everything Borel breaks down at the first step.

Formalization scope

  • Spaces. Ωt\Omega_tΩt​ is Fin t → Ω₁ with [PolishSpace Ω₁] [BorelSpace Ω₁]. Measures are Borel measures, and Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurability is universal measurability. The published definition BertsekasShreve.AnalyticSelection.Measurability is reused for this.
  • Models. P(Ω1)\mathfrak P(\Omega_1)P(Ω1​) is Mathlib's ProbabilityMeasure with the weak topology. P\mathcal PP is generated by Borel Markov kernels lying in Pt(⋅)\mathcal P_t(\cdot)Pt​(⋅) almost surely; this is the paper's equivalent formulation on p. 4.
  • Strategies. Lean's H u is the paper's Hu+1H_{u+1}Hu+1​, a universally measurable function of the first uuu coordinates.
  • Values in EReal. Expectations of non-integrable functions are the extended expectation E[f+]−E[f−]E[f^+]-E[f^-]E[f+]−E[f−]. Prices are EReal infima with inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset=+\inftyinf∅=+∞, and suprema over Qφ\mathcal Q_\varphiQφ​ are EReal suprema.
  • Settings. The §2 and §3 milestones are stated in the paper's more general settings: a general filtered space, and a one-period market on an arbitrary measurable space.
  • Citations. Page numbers are those of the arXiv v3 reprint (arXiv:1305.6008v3), not the journal's pp. 823–859.

Two encodings would trivialize the mission and are excluded. Replacing P\mathcal PP by an arbitrary set of measures drops the product structure that the theorems need. Bochner integrals for EQ[f]E_Q[f]EQ​[f] would return 000 on non-integrable claims and make the duality meaningless. Neither encoding is used.

A complete development needs:

  • analytic and universally measurable sets and the Jankov–von Neumann selection theorem;
  • products of universally measurable kernels;
  • quasi-sure analysis;
  • relative interiors and separation in Rd\mathbb R^dRd;
  • discrete-time local and generalized martingales.

The selection and kernel infrastructure is reusable well beyond this paper, for instance in dynamic programming on Borel spaces. Contributions of these foundations are welcome.

Selected references

  • B. Bouchard, M. Nutz, Arbitrage and duality in nondominated discrete-time models, Ann. Appl. Probab. 25(2) (2015) 823–859. https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.6008 , https://doi.org/10.1214/14-AAP1011
  • R. C. Dalang, A. Morton, W. Willinger, Equivalent martingale measures and no-arbitrage in stochastic securities market models, Stochastics Stochastics Rep. 29 (1990) 185–201. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=1041035
  • B. Acciaio, M. Beiglböck, F. Penkner, W. Schachermayer, A model-free version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing and the super-replication theorem, Math. Finance 26(2) (2016) 233–251. https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.5568
  • M. Beiglböck, P. Henry-Labordère, F. Penkner, Model-independent bounds for option prices — a mass transport approach, Finance Stoch. 17(3) (2013) 477–501. https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.5929
  • L. Denis, C. Martini, A theoretical framework for the pricing of contingent claims in the presence of model uncertainty, Ann. Appl. Probab. 16 (2006) 827–852. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=2244434
  • Y. Kabanov, C. Stricker, A teachers' note on no-arbitrage criteria, Séminaire de Probabilités XXXV, Lecture Notes in Math. 1755 (2001) 149–152. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=1837282
  • D. P. Bertsekas, S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978 (Chapter 7, analytic sets and measurable selection).
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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics XXIII: Countable-Lifetime Hattendorff LimitTextbook

Actuarial Mathematics XXIII: Countable-Lifetime Hattendorff Limit

Mathematical source and original extension

Elias S. W. Shiu and Xiaoyi Xiong (2021), An elementary derivation of Hattendorff's theorem, European Actuarial Journal 11, 319–323, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13385-020-00256-9. In that paper equation (1) defines the fully discrete insurer's complete-life loss; equation (2) gives the Hattendorff variance formula, and equations (3)–(5) connect annual reserve recursion to the net amount at risk by summation by parts.

The present mission proposes an original countable-outcome and L²-convergence formalisation of that discrete formula. It is not asserted that the authors stated this exact Lean theorem, and it does not inherit proofs from the earlier finite-scenario missions.

Unbounded lifetime and conditional mortality

Let K∈NK\in\mathbb NK∈N be the realised curtate lifetime, the number of full years remaining until the year of death. Its possible values are not uniformly bounded. Set wk=Pr⁡(K=k)w_k=\Pr(K=k)wk​=Pr(K=k), where wk≥0w_k\ge0wk​≥0 and ∑k=0∞wk=1\sum_{k=0}^{\infty}w_k=1∑k=0∞​wk​=1. Assume the survival tail is positive in every year:

St=∑k≥twk>0,qt=wtSt,pt=St+1St=1−qt.S_t=\sum_{k\ge t}w_k>0,\qquad q_t=\frac{w_t}{S_t},\qquad p_t=\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}=1-q_t.St​=k≥t∑​wk​>0,qt​=St​wt​​,pt​=St​St+1​​=1−qt​.

These are unconditional death masses wtw_twt​ and conditional mortality and survival rates qt,ptq_t,p_tqt​,pt​. Some individual wtw_twt​ may be zero. The outcome space is genuinely countable; a finite Fintype of realised death years would force a bounded support and undermine the claimed infinite-horizon extension.

Mortality surprises and reserve losses

The annual mortality martingale difference is defined pathwise by

It(k)=1{k=t}−qt1{k≥t}.I_t(k)=\mathbf1_{\{k=t\}}-q_t\mathbf1_{\{k\ge t\}}.It​(k)=1{k=t}​−qt​1{k≥t}​.

For t<kt<kt<k, It(k)=−qtI_t(k)=-q_tIt​(k)=−qt​; at death t=kt=kt=k, It(k)=1−qtI_t(k)=1-q_tIt​(k)=1−qt​; and after death t>kt>kt>k, it is zero. Let the discounted net amount at risk for the payment at year-end t+1t+1t+1 be ρt=vt+1(bt+1−Vt+1)\rho_t=v^{t+1}(b_{t+1}-V_{t+1})ρt​=vt+1(bt+1​−Vt+1​). This matches Shiu–Xiong's year-end death-benefit timing. The truncated centred reserve loss and the pathwise complete-life centred loss are

Zn(k)=∑t=0n−1ρtIt(k),Z∞(k)=Zk+1(k).Z_n(k)=\sum_{t=0}^{n-1}\rho_tI_t(k),\qquad Z_\infty(k)=Z_{k+1}(k).Zn​(k)=t=0∑n−1​ρt​It​(k),Z∞​(k)=Zk+1​(k).

The complete-life variable is well-defined on each realised finite kkk and Zn(k)=Z∞(k)Z_n(k)=Z_\infty(k)Zn​(k)=Z∞​(k) whenever n>kn>kn>k. These definitions only model the centred innovation component. A separate cashflow reserve-recursion bridge, as in earlier missions, is needed to identify a given insurer contract loss LLL with V0+Z∞V_0+Z_\inftyV0​+Z∞​; this mission does not silently assert that for arbitrary premium sequences.

Supporting results and convergence condition

The discrete expectations are weighted countable sums. Show, under summability and positive in-force mass,

E[It]=0,E[IiIj]=0  (i≠j),E[It2]=wtpt.\mathbb E[I_t]=0,\quad \mathbb E[I_i I_j]=0\;(i\ne j),\quad \mathbb E[I_t^2]=w_tp_t.E[It​]=0,E[Ii​Ij​]=0(i=j),E[It2​]=wt​pt​.

Using finite sums and cross-year orthogonality first gives

E[Zn2]=∑t=0n−1ρt2wtpt.\mathbb E[Z_n^2]=\sum_{t=0}^{n-1}\rho_t^2w_tp_t.E[Zn2​]=t=0∑n−1​ρt2​wt​pt​.

The capstone introduces the mathematically substantive L² risk condition

∑t=0∞ρt2wtpt<∞.\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\rho_t^2w_tp_t<\infty.t=0∑∞​ρt2​wt​pt​<∞.

This implies that the sequence of truncated centred losses is Cauchy in the probability-weighted L² space; its limit equals the pathwise stabilised Z∞Z_\inftyZ∞​. Hence

E[Z∞]=0,Var⁡(Z∞)=E[Z∞2]=∑t=0∞ρt2wtpt.\boxed{\mathbb E[Z_\infty]=0,\qquad \operatorname{Var}(Z_\infty)=\mathbb E[Z_\infty^2] =\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\rho_t^2w_tp_t.}E[Z∞​]=0,Var(Z∞​)=E[Z∞2​]=t=0∑∞​ρt2​wt​pt​.​

The capstone explicitly assumes nonnegative weights, unit total mass, positive survival tails, countable weight summability and risk-variance summability. The formal statement must not be weakened to merely a pointwise convergence or an unjustified interchange of infinite sums.

Exact-rational validation and boundaries

A geometric law with q=14q=\frac14q=41​, p=34p=\frac34p=43​, wk=qpkw_k=qp^kwk​=qpk and ρt=2\rho_t=2ρt​=2 gives

Z∞(k)=2(p−qk),E[Z∞]=0,Var⁡(Z∞)=3.Z_\infty(k)=2(p-qk),\qquad \mathbb E[Z_\infty]=0,\quad\operatorname{Var}(Z_\infty)=3.Z∞​(k)=2(p−qk),E[Z∞​]=0,Var(Z∞​)=3.

Its finite-year variance is 3(1−pn)3(1-p^n)3(1−pn). The repository includes exact-rational tests for 13 horizons. The model allows an individually zero death mass but requires positive tails. Every scenario terminates in some finite year; adding a K=∞K=\inftyK=∞ outcome with positive weight would require a separate transversality condition and is not part of this mission.

Prove2Me proof structure

The mission supplies four mathematical definitions, eleven supporting milestone theorems and one combined capstone theorem. Prove the indicator identities, the countable weighted first and second moments, finite orthogonality and finite allocation, and finally the L² passage to the unbounded lifetime. The target Lean namespace is `ActuarialValuation` in the pinned Mathlib environment. Finite-year results from earlier actuarial missions are background, not automatic countable-measure proof imports. None of the present open theorem statements is an accepted proof.

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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics XVI: Discrete Mortality Innovations and Hattendorff OrthogonalityTextbook

Motivation: from actuarial reserves to Hattendorff's theorem

A prospective insurance reserve is the conditional expected amount needed to fund the remaining liabilities of an in-force policy. Annual realised claims differ from their conditional expectations, and the variation in total discounted insurer loss can be allocated to these unexpected annual outcomes. Hattendorff's theorem expresses that allocation as a sum of year-specific variance contributions. The fully discrete case contains an important factor: the conditional probability of surviving the policy year.

Shiu and Xiong's article An elementary derivation of Hattendorff's theorem [1] gives a direct discrete derivation. With curtate lifetime KKK, annual death benefits bj+1b_{j+1}bj+1​ paid at time j+1j+1j+1, premiums πj\pi_jπj​ paid at time jjj, discount factor vvv and prospective reserve Vj+1V_{j+1}Vj+1​, their formulas include

L=vK+1bK+1−∑j=0Kvjπjandρj=vj+1(bj+1−Vj+1).L=v^{K+1}b_{K+1}-\sum_{j=0}^{K}v^j\pi_j \qquad\text{and}\qquad \rho_j=v^{j+1}(b_{j+1}-V_{j+1}).L=vK+1bK+1​−j=0∑K​vjπj​andρj​=vj+1(bj+1​−Vj+1​).

In particular, the variance identity they derive has a mortality-year survival factor,

Var⁡(L)=E ⁣[ρK2px+K].\operatorname{Var}(L)=\mathbb E\!\left[\rho_K^2p_{x+K}\right].Var(L)=E[ρK2​px+K​].

This mission establishes the finite-scenario mortality-innovation component of that result. It derives the orthogonality of annual death surprises rather than assuming it. It does not yet identify their weighted sum with the full insurance loss L−V0L-V_0L−V0​; that requires the separate time-dependent reserve recursion and summation-by-parts identities in [1, equation (3)]. Those insurance cashflow bridge obligations are explicitly reserved for the next mathematical stage.

Finite lifetime model

Let Ω\OmegaΩ be a finite scenario space, wω≥0w_\omega\ge0wω​≥0 its weights and K:Ω→NK:\Omega\to\mathbb NK:Ω→N a curtate future lifetime, where K=jK=jK=j means death during year jjj, at the end of which the death benefit is payable.

For policy duration ttt, define the in-force probability mass and the death-year mass:

St=∑ω∈Ωwω1{K(ω)≥t},Dt=∑ω∈Ωwω1{K(ω)=t}.S_t=\sum_{\omega\in\Omega}w_\omega\mathbf1_{\{K(\omega)\ge t\}}, \qquad D_t=\sum_{\omega\in\Omega}w_\omega\mathbf1_{\{K(\omega)=t\}}.St​=ω∈Ω∑​wω​1{K(ω)≥t}​,Dt​=ω∈Ω∑​wω​1{K(ω)=t}​.

For probabilistic interpretation assume in addition ∑ωwω=1\sum_\omega w_\omega=1∑ω​wω​=1. The exact algebraic statements do not generally require weight normalisation, though they explicitly require nonnegative weights for probability inequalities.

The disjoint identity

{K≥t}={K=t}∪˙{K≥t+1}\{K\ge t\}=\{K=t\}\mathbin{\dot\cup}\{K\ge t+1\}{K≥t}={K=t}∪˙{K≥t+1}

gives St=Dt+St+1S_t=D_t+S_{t+1}St​=Dt​+St+1​. If St>0S_t>0St​>0, the conditional one-year death and survival probabilities are

qt=DtSt,pt=St+1St,qt+pt=1.q_t=\frac{D_t}{S_t},\qquad p_t=\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t},\qquad q_t+p_t=1.qt​=St​Dt​​,pt​=St​St+1​​,qt​+pt​=1.

Division by St=0S_t=0St​=0 is totalised as a Lean real expression but is not interpreted as conditioning on an impossible event. All substantive annual-innovation results impose positive in-force mass for the years used.

A centred innovation for every policy year

For each outcome and policy year define the mortality innovation

It(ω)=1{K(ω)=t}−qt1{K(ω)≥t}.I_t(\omega)= \mathbf1_{\{K(\omega)=t\}} -q_t\mathbf1_{\{K(\omega)\ge t\}}.It​(ω)=1{K(ω)=t}​−qt​1{K(ω)≥t}​.

It equals 1−qt1-q_t1−qt​ for death in year ttt, equals −qt-q_t−qt​ for an individual surviving that year, and equals zero after death. Under St>0S_t>0St​>0,

Ew[It]=Dt−qtSt=0.\mathbb E_w[I_t]=D_t-q_tS_t=0.Ew​[It​]=Dt​−qt​St​=0.

The orthogonality is more than a generic assumption. For i<ji<ji<j, if Ij≠0I_j\ne0Ij​=0 then the policy is still in force at jjj, so the preceding year iii must have been survived and Ii=−qiI_i=-q_iIi​=−qi​. If Ij=0I_j=0Ij​=0, the product is also zero. Thus, pointwise,

IiIj=−qiIj,i<j.I_iI_j=-q_iI_j,\qquad i<j.Ii​Ij​=−qi​Ij​,i<j.

Taking the weighted expectation and using the centring of IjI_jIj​ gives

Ew[IiIj]=0,i<j,Sj>0.\mathbb E_w[I_iI_j]=0,\qquad i<j,\quad S_j>0.Ew​[Ii​Ij​]=0,i<j,Sj​>0.

These innovations can be uncorrelated despite being highly dependent events generated by the same curtate lifetime. They must not be claimed independent.

The one-year discrete second moment

By conditioning on the death-year and survival outcomes, the squared mortality surprise has expected value

Ew[It2]=Dt(1−qt)2+St+1qt2=Dt pt,St>0.\begin{aligned} \mathbb E_w[I_t^2] &=D_t(1-q_t)^2+S_{t+1}q_t^2\\ &=D_t\,p_t,\qquad S_t>0. \end{aligned}Ew​[It2​]​=Dt​(1−qt​)2+St+1​qt2​=Dt​pt​,St​>0.​

The final conditional survival factor ptp_tpt​ is characteristic of the fully discrete actuarial Hattendorff identity. It is not an arbitrary variance weight, and it cannot be dropped by borrowing a continuous-time formula.

For a finite horizon nnn, let ρt∈R\rho_t\in\mathbb Rρt​∈R be any deterministic year-specific net-amount-at-risk coefficient. Define the discounted innovation portfolio

Zn(ω)=∑0≤t<nρtIt(ω).Z_n(\omega)=\sum_{0\le t<n}\rho_t I_t(\omega).Zn​(ω)=0≤t<n∑​ρt​It​(ω).

When St>0S_t>0St​>0 for each t<nt<nt<n, the annual zero-mean and cross-year orthogonality identities yield

Ew[Zn]=0,Var⁡w(Zn)=∑0≤t<nρt2Dtpt.\boxed{ \mathbb E_w[Z_n]=0,\qquad \operatorname{Var}_w(Z_n)= \sum_{0\le t<n}\rho_t^2D_tp_t. }Ew​[Zn​]=0,Varw​(Zn​)=0≤t<n∑​ρt2​Dt​pt​.​

For nonnegative unit-sum weights this is the usual finite-scenario variance. The capstone couples the derived pairwise cross-year zero moments with the resulting finite-horizon variance formula. No reserve balance, actuarial premium equation or conditional L² filtration theorem is silently assumed.

Formal proof structure and scope

The formal graph contains seven definitions: survival and death masses, conditional death and survival rates, the mortality innovation, its finite discounted portfolio and a finite weighted variance. Supporting theorems establish event partitions, nonnegativity, qt+pt=1q_t+p_t=1qt​+pt​=1, behaviour after death, innovation centring, a pointwise earlier/later product identity, orthogonality, the discrete second-moment formula, zero horizon and portfolio moments. The capstone packages zero covariance and the mortality-weighted variance allocation.

The variance theorem is valid for arbitrary deterministic coefficient sequence ρ\rhoρ and any finite number of years with positive survival mass; it does not presume every life dies before that horizon. n=0n=0n=0 is covered by the empty sum. For standard actuarial application choose ρt=vt+1(bt+1−Vt+1)\rho_t=v^{t+1}(b_{t+1}-V_{t+1})ρt​=vt+1(bt+1​−Vt+1​), as in [1]. A future bridge must show that this particular innovation portfolio equals the centred insurer loss under the correct reserve recursion and endpoint conventions.

The root theorem is therefore a genuine probabilistic predecessor, not an assertion that the entire traditional Hattendorff theorem has already been proved. The mission is proposed for formal proof: private remote statement elaboration and finite rational tests, if accepted, do not constitute public Prove2Me proof acceptance.

References

[1] Shiu, Elias S. W. and Xiong, Xiaoyi (2021), “An elementary derivation of Hattendorff's theorem”, European Actuarial Journal, 11, pp. 319–323, equations (1)–(3). This is the direct source for the fully discrete variance factor, net amount at risk and finite summation-by-parts strategy.

[2] Gerber, Hans U. (1997), Life Insurance Mathematics, third edition, Springer, Chapter 6, §6.7, Allocation of the Overall Loss to Policy Years. The reserve-change and annual-loss decomposition provides broader actuarial context.

[3] Gerber, Hans U., Leung, Bartholomew P. K. and Shiu, Elias S. W. (2003), “Indicator Function and Hattendorff Theorem”, North American Actuarial Journal, 7(1), pp. 38–47. Explains the central role of indicator functions and the relationship to uncorrelated martingale increments.

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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics XVII: Finite-Horizon Markov Decision and Optimal Policy ValuationTextbook

Motivation: from one-step reinsurance decisions to an optimal policy

An insurer may adjust its reinsurance retention or other risk-management decision repeatedly, rather than optimising a single future year's payments. Current action choices affect both the immediate net reward and the state of the business next year, which changes the value of all later decisions. A finite-horizon Markov decision process makes this multi-year optimisation precise.

Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Chapter 4 [1], develops the finite-horizon Bellman equations and existence of optimal deterministic Markov policies for finite decision problems. Mission XV introduces a finite-action Bellman operator and excess-of-loss claim splitting, but is still under moderator review. This mission formalises the full finite-horizon backward recursion and optimal deterministic policy existence, without importing an unreviewed declaration.

The reinsurance motivation comes from Brachetta and Ceci's optimal excess-of-loss study [2]. Their original problem is a continuous-time stochastic-factor and HJB verification problem. The present mission is strictly a finite-state, finite-action, discrete-time precursor. Neither the stochastic-factor diffusion nor the jump-process verification theorem is asserted here.

Finite states, actions and one-year valuation

Let SSS be a finite state type, and let AAA be a finite nonempty set of admissible control actions. A state can encode a simplified surplus, rating, claims regime or any finite risk-class abstraction. At the beginning of a policy year the insurer is in state sss and selects an action aaa.

Let P(s,a,t)P(s,a,t)P(s,a,t) be the transition weight for next state ttt, and r(s,a)r(s,a)r(s,a) the immediate reward. The usual Markov model requires P(s,a,t)≥0P(s,a,t)\ge0P(s,a,t)≥0 and ∑tP(s,a,t)=1\sum_tP(s,a,t)=1∑t​P(s,a,t)=1 for every s,as,as,a. The general algebraic definitions accept real matrices, while the economic probabilistic interpretation requires valid row-stochasticity.

If U(t)U(t)U(t) is the continuation value in state ttt, the return from action aaa is

Q(s,a;U)=r(s,a)+v∑t∈SP(s,a,t)U(t),Q(s,a;U)=r(s,a)+v\sum_{t\in S}P(s,a,t)U(t),Q(s,a;U)=r(s,a)+vt∈S∑​P(s,a,t)U(t),

where vvv is a deterministic annual discount factor. The discount is applied to following-year continuation, not to the current reward. For policy interpretation 0≤v≤10\le v\le10≤v≤1 is conventional, but finite-horizon algebra makes sense at other fixed real vvv as well.

The one-year Bellman optimisation is

(TU)(s)=max⁡a∈AQ(s,a;U).(TU)(s)=\max_{a\in A}Q(s,a;U).(TU)(s)=a∈Amax​Q(s,a;U).

The maximum is attained because AAA is finite and nonempty. Both this attainment and the inequality Q(s,a;U)≤(TU)(s)Q(s,a;U)\le(TU)(s)Q(s,a;U)≤(TU)(s) are explicit supporting theorem obligations.

Finite-horizon policy evaluation

Let h(s)h(s)h(s) denote a terminal benefit or terminal value. A deterministic nonstationary Markov policy is a mapping

π:N×S⟶A.\pi:\mathbb N\times S\longrightarrow A.π:N×S⟶A.

Here πn(s)\pi_n(s)πn​(s) is the action chosen when n+1n+1n+1 decisions remain, so the index counts backwards towards the terminal time. This makes the recursion valid for a homogeneous one-step transition model without reversing calendar-time transitions.

For a fixed policy, recursively define

V0π(s)=h(s),Vn+1π(s)=r(s,πn(s))+v∑t∈SP(s,πn(s),t)Vnπ(t).\begin{aligned} V^\pi_0(s)&=h(s),\\ V^\pi_{n+1}(s) &=r(s,\pi_n(s)) +v\sum_{t\in S}P(s,\pi_n(s),t)V^\pi_n(t). \end{aligned}V0π​(s)Vn+1π​(s)​=h(s),=r(s,πn​(s))+vt∈S∑​P(s,πn​(s),t)Vnπ​(t).​

The policy is nonstationary because its choice at the same state may differ according to remaining time nnn. It is Markov because the action depends only on current state and remaining horizon, not on the entire historical path. The mission does not introduce a path-space filtration or general history-dependent randomised policy, so the precise capstone compares deterministic nonstationary Markov policies.

Optimal backward induction

Define Vn(s)V_n(s)Vn​(s) by the finite Bellman recursion

V0(s)=h(s),Vn+1(s)=max⁡a∈A[r(s,a)+v∑t∈SP(s,a,t)Vn(t)].\begin{aligned} V_0(s)&=h(s),\\ V_{n+1}(s)&= \max_{a\in A}\left[ r(s,a)+v\sum_{t\in S}P(s,a,t)V_n(t) \right]. \end{aligned}V0​(s)Vn+1​(s)​=h(s),=a∈Amax​[r(s,a)+vt∈S∑​P(s,a,t)Vn​(t)].​

Under P(s,a,t)≥0P(s,a,t)\ge0P(s,a,t)≥0 and v≥0v\ge0v≥0, a larger continuation function cannot reduce the value of any action; taking a finite maximum preserves this monotonicity. That simple inequality allows induction on the remaining horizon to show

Vnπ(s)≤Vn(s)for every deterministic Markov policy π.V^\pi_n(s)\le V_n(s) \qquad\text{for every deterministic Markov policy }\pi.Vnπ​(s)≤Vn​(s)for every deterministic Markov policy π.

The second substantive step is existence of an attaining policy. Since AAA is finite and nonempty, at each remaining horizon and each state there is at least one maximising action. Choosing such actions and combining them recursively gives a single nonstationary deterministic Markov policy π⋆\pi^\starπ⋆ satisfying

Vnπ⋆(s)=Vn(s)for all states s.V^{\pi^\star}_n(s)=V_n(s) \qquad\text{for all states }s.Vnπ⋆​(s)=Vn​(s)for all states s.

The capstone combines the universal upper bound and existence of an attaining policy. This is genuinely more than a one-step maximum: it is an optimality result over an arbitrary finite number of sequential decisions.

A complete optimality result against all history-dependent randomised policies would need an additional equivalence argument showing no improvement from extra history or randomisation. Such an extension is well-known for suitable finite Markov models but is not silently claimed by this narrower Lean target.

Formal graph and limiting cases

Four proposed definitions encode the one-step action return, the finite Bellman maximum, policy evaluation and recursively optimal horizon value. Eleven supporting theorem targets establish zero-discount behaviour, action domination and attainment, monotonicity of action and Bellman values, zero-horizon and successor recursions, policy domination and existence of an attaining policy. The capstone packages the latter two results.

At n=0n=0n=0 there are no decisions and both values are precisely hhh. At v=0v=0v=0, any continuation is irrelevant to the one-step value. Nonnegative weights and discount are explicit hypotheses for monotonicity and policy domination, rather than false claims for signed matrix weights. The existence of an attaining maximiser in each finite action set does not itself require stochastic row-sum assumptions.

To obtain a reinsurance model from this graph, one must specify how each action corresponds to an admissible retention, how the retention changes reinsurance premiums and retained claim distributions, and how those assumptions determine the transition matrix PPP and rewards rrr. That specialised bridge is separate from the finite-horizon mathematical result.

All theorems are proposed Lean proof targets. Preliminary remote elaboration establishes statement well-formedness only if verified by the authoritative compiler. It does not constitute a completed proof or approval of the mission's mathematical design.

References

[1] Puterman, Martin L. (1994), Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Chapter 4, Finite-Horizon Markov Decision Processes, Wiley. This is the direct mathematical reference for finite-horizon Bellman recursions, backward induction and existence of optimal deterministic policies under finite-state/action assumptions.

[2] Brachetta, Matteo and Ceci, Claudia (2019), “Optimal Excess-of-Loss Reinsurance for Stochastic Factor Risk Models”, Risks 7(2), article 48. This motivates insurance retention as a controlled decision but uses a continuous-time stochastic-factor/HJB model not established by this mission.

[3] Schäffeler, Maximilian and Abdulaziz, Mohammad (2022), “Formally Verified Solution Methods for Markov Decision Processes”, computer-assisted formalisation of Bellman equations, value iteration and optimal policy existence in Isabelle/HOL. This is methodology context only; no proof code is imported into Lean from that project.

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Numerical AnalysisRandom Matrix Theory·Captain: tc

Gaussian Random Matrices III: Extreme Singular Values and ConcentrationTextbook

Motivation

A tall N×nN\times nN×n matrix with independent standard normal entries is, with high probability, a near-isometry: all its singular values lie in [N−n, N+n][\sqrt N-\sqrt n,\ \sqrt N+\sqrt n][N​−n​, N​+n​] up to Gaussian fluctuations. This is Gordon's theorem together with Gaussian concentration (Vershynin 2012, Theorem 5.32 and Corollary 5.35), the non-asymptotic counterpart of the Bai–Yin law and the model result for the whole theory of non-asymptotic random matrices. In randomized numerical linear algebra the same two ingredients give the expected spectral norm of SΓTS\Gamma TSΓT (Halko–Martinsson–Tropp 2011, Proposition 10.1 (10.2)), its second moment (Tropp–Webber 2023, Lemma B.1), and the lower tail of σmin⁡\sigma_{\min}σmin​ of a Gaussian sketch, which controls the inverse moments E σmin⁡−2p\mathbb E\,\sigma_{\min}^{-2p}Eσmin−2p​ that appear in the analysis of sketching algorithms with rank truncation. None of these results is available in Mathlib; this mission proves them.

Setting

A standard Gaussian matrix A∈RN×nA\in\mathbb R^{N\times n}A∈RN×n has independent N(0,1)\mathcal N(0,1)N(0,1) entries; its law is γN,n\gamma_{N,n}γN,n​. Its extreme singular values are

smin⁡(A)=inf⁡∥x∥2=1∥Ax∥2,smax⁡(A)=sup⁡∥x∥2=1∥Ax∥2=∥A∥,s_{\min}(A)=\inf_{\|x\|_2=1}\|Ax\|_2,\qquad s_{\max}(A)=\sup_{\|x\|_2=1}\|Ax\|_2=\|A\|,smin​(A)=∥x∥2​=1inf​∥Ax∥2​,smax​(A)=∥x∥2​=1sup​∥Ax∥2​=∥A∥,

the infimum and supremum over the unit sphere of Rn\mathbb R^nRn (n≥1n\ge1n≥1); ∥A∥\|A\|∥A∥ is the spectral norm. For a wide matrix G∈Rk×tG\in\mathbb R^{k\times t}G∈Rk×t, k≤tk\le tk≤t, the usual σmin⁡(G)\sigma_{\min}(G)σmin​(G) is smin⁡(GT)s_{\min}(G^{\mathsf T})smin​(GT). The Frobenius norm is ∥A∥F=(∑i,jAij2)1/2\|A\|_F=(\sum_{i,j}A_{ij}^2)^{1/2}∥A∥F​=(∑i,j​Aij2​)1/2; a function hhh on matrices is LLL-Lipschitz if ∣h(X)−h(Y)∣≤L∥X−Y∥F|h(X)-h(Y)|\le L\|X-Y\|_F∣h(X)−h(Y)∣≤L∥X−Y∥F​. A chi-square variable with ddd degrees of freedom is χd2=∑i=1dgi2\chi_d^2=\sum_{i=1}^d g_i^2χd2​=∑i=1d​gi2​ for independent standard normals gig_igi​. The letter eee denotes Euler's number.

Formalization targets

Goal — deviation of the extreme singular values (Vershynin, Corollary 5.35)

For every t≥0t\ge0t≥0, with probability at least 1−2e−t2/21-2e^{-t^2/2}1−2e−t2/2,

N−n−t ≤ smin⁡(A)andsmax⁡(A) ≤ N+n+t.\sqrt N-\sqrt n-t\ \le\ s_{\min}(A)\qquad\text{and}\qquad s_{\max}(A)\ \le\ \sqrt N+\sqrt n+t .N​−n​−t ≤ smin​(A)andsmax​(A) ≤ N​+n​+t.

This is the goal because it is the statement users of Gaussian matrices quote: a quantitative near-isometry with explicit sub-Gaussian deviations. It follows from the expectation bounds (Gordon) and concentration, both of which are milestones.

Milestones

  • Gaussian concentration for Lipschitz functions of a Gaussian matrix: P{h(G)≥Eh(G)+Lt}≤e−t2/2\mathbb P\{h(G)\ge\mathbb E h(G)+Lt\}\le e^{-t^2/2}P{h(G)≥Eh(G)+Lt}≤e−t2/2 (HMT Proposition 10.3; Vershynin Proposition 5.34).
  • Gordon–Chevet bound. E∥SΓT∥≤∥S∥∥T∥F+∥S∥F∥T∥\mathbb E\|S\Gamma T\|\le\|S\|\|T\|_F+\|S\|_F\|T\|E∥SΓT∥≤∥S∥∥T∥F​+∥S∥F​∥T∥ (HMT Proposition 10.1 (10.2), A.2) and its second-moment form (E∥SΓT∥2)1/2≤∥S∥∥T∥F+∥S∥F∥T∥(\mathbb E\|S\Gamma T\|^2)^{1/2}\le\|S\|\|T\|_F+\|S\|_F\|T\|(E∥SΓT∥2)1/2≤∥S∥∥T∥F​+∥S∥F​∥T∥ (Tropp–Webber Lemma B.1).
  • Gordon's theorem. N−n≤Esmin⁡(A)≤Esmax⁡(A)≤N+n\sqrt N-\sqrt n\le\mathbb E s_{\min}(A)\le\mathbb E s_{\max}(A)\le\sqrt N+\sqrt nN​−n​≤Esmin​(A)≤Esmax​(A)≤N​+n​ (Vershynin Theorem 5.32).
  • One-sided tail of smin⁡s_{\min}smin​. P{smin⁡(A)≤N−n−u}≤e−u2/2\mathbb P\{s_{\min}(A)\le\sqrt N-\sqrt n-u\}\le e^{-u^2/2}P{smin​(A)≤N​−n​−u}≤e−u2/2 for u≥0u\ge0u≥0 (Davidson–Szarek Theorem II.13; one-sided form of Vershynin Corollary 5.35).
  • Chi-square lower tail. P{χd2≤u}≤(eu/d)d/2\mathbb P\{\chi_d^2\le u\}\le(eu/d)^{d/2}P{χd2​≤u}≤(eu/d)d/2 for 0≤u≤d0\le u\le d0≤u≤d (Dasgupta–Gupta Lemma 2.2).
  • Small-ball bound for smin⁡s_{\min}smin​. P{smin⁡(A)≤s}≤n(e ns2N−n+1)(N−n+1)/2\mathbb P\{s_{\min}(A)\le s\}\le n\bigl(\frac{e\,ns^2}{N-n+1}\bigr)^{(N-n+1)/2}P{smin​(A)≤s}≤n(N−n+1ens2​)(N−n+1)/2 for s≥0s\ge0s≥0, ns2≤N−n+1ns^2\le N-n+1ns2≤N−n+1, from the invertibility-via-distance lemma of Rudelson–Vershynin (Lemma 3.5), rotational invariance and the chi-square lower tail.

Significance

The results. Gordon's theorem is sharp: Esmin⁡\mathbb E s_{\min}Esmin​ and Esmax⁡\mathbb E s_{\max}Esmax​ are pinned to within O(1)O(1)O(1) of the Bai–Yin limits for every N,nN,nN,n. Gaussian concentration upgrades it to tail bounds with the optimal sub-Gaussian rate, and the Chevet-type bound is the same mechanism for SΓTS\Gamma TSΓT, where it yields the expected spectral error of the randomized SVD. The small-ball bound covers the other regime, s→0s\to0s→0, with polynomial decay of the exact order N−n+1N-n+1N−n+1; together the two tails make every negative moment Esmin⁡(A)−2p\mathbb E s_{\min}(A)^{-2p}Esmin​(A)−2p, 2p<N−n+12p<N-n+12p<N−n+1, finite and explicitly bounded, which is what the early-truncated analysis needs.

Formalizing them. Mathlib has the standard Gaussian measure on finite-dimensional inner product spaces but neither Gaussian concentration for Lipschitz functions, nor Slepian's or Gordon's comparison inequalities, nor any result on singular values of random matrices. These are foundational pieces of high-dimensional probability whose formalization would be reused far beyond this series.

Difficulty

The upper bound in Gordon's theorem is proved by Slepian's comparison lemma for the Gaussian process (u,v)↦⟨Au,v⟩(u,v)\mapsto\langle Au,v\rangle(u,v)↦⟨Au,v⟩ on Sn−1×SN−1S^{n-1}\times S^{N-1}Sn−1×SN−1, and the lower bound by Gordon's minimax comparison inequality for max⁡vmin⁡u⟨Au,v⟩\max_v\min_u\langle Au,v\ranglemaxv​minu​⟨Au,v⟩; both require a theory of Gaussian processes indexed by continuous parameter sets, or at least a discretization argument with careful limits. Gaussian concentration (Tsirelson–Ibragimov–Sudakov) is usually proved through the Gaussian logarithmic Sobolev inequality or the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck semigroup, with a smoothing step to pass from smooth to Lipschitz functions. Both are long developments with no Mathlib support. The elementary alternatives do not reach the stated constants: an ε\varepsilonε-net argument bounds E∥A∥\mathbb E\|A\|E∥A∥ by C(N+n)C(\sqrt N+\sqrt n)C(N​+n​) with C>1C>1C>1, and a union bound over rows for the small-ball estimate is exactly how the stated bound is obtained, but it needs the fact that the distance from a Gaussian vector to a fixed (n−1)(n-1)(n−1)-dimensional subspace is a χN−n+1\chi_{N-n+1}χN−n+1​ variable, which again rests on rotational invariance.

Formalization scope

Matrices are sampled from the product measure γN,n\gamma_{N,n}γN,n​ on arrays. smin⁡s_{\min}smin​ is sMin, the real infimum over the unit sphere of Rn\mathbb R^nRn; n≥1n\ge1n≥1 is assumed so the sphere is nonempty, and N≥nN\ge nN≥n is not assumed for Gordon's theorem (for N<nN<nN<n one has smin⁡=0s_{\min}=0smin​=0 and the lower bound is trivial, as in the source). smax⁡s_{\max}smax​ is Mathlib's ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ operator norm. Expectation bounds are stated together with integrability of their integrands, so the Lean convention that non-integrable functions integrate to 000 cannot trivialize them. Probabilities are measures in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] compared with ofReal⁡\operatorname{ofReal}ofReal of the real bound; the goal's lower bound 1−2e−t2/21-2e^{-t^2/2}1−2e−t2/2 uses truncated subtraction and is vacuous for t≤2log⁡2t\le\sqrt{2\log2}t≤2log2​, exactly as in the source. Gaussian concentration is stated with L>0L>0L>0 and t≥0t\ge0t≥0, which the sources leave implicit (for L=0L=0L=0 or t<0t<0t<0 the event has probability one). Results that the sketching literature states for wide k×tk\times tk×t matrices are stated here for tall N×nN\times nN×n matrices via σmin⁡(G)=smin⁡(GT)\sigma_{\min}(G)=s_{\min}(G^{\mathsf T})σmin​(G)=smin​(GT), with (N,n)=(t,k)(N,n)=(t,k)(N,n)=(t,k).

Welcome contributions: Gaussian concentration for Lipschitz functions on Rd\mathbb R^dRd (any proof), Slepian's and Gordon's inequalities, the 111-Lipschitz property of smin⁡s_{\min}smin​ and smax⁡s_{\max}smax​, the chi-square Chernoff bounds, and the law of the distance from a Gaussian vector to a subspace.

Selected references

  • N. Halko, P.-G. Martinsson, J. A. Tropp, Finding structure with randomness: probabilistic algorithms for constructing approximate matrix decompositions, SIAM Review 53(2), 217–288, 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/0909.4061
  • J. A. Tropp, R. J. Webber, Randomized algorithms for low-rank matrix approximation: design, analysis, and applications, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.12418
  • R. Vershynin, Introduction to the non-asymptotic analysis of random matrices, in Compressed Sensing: Theory and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3027
  • L. Isserlis, On a formula for the product-moment coefficient of any order of a normal frequency distribution in any number of variables, Biometrika 12, 134–139, 1918. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/12.1-2.134
  • S. Dasgupta, A. Gupta, An elementary proof of a theorem of Johnson and Lindenstrauss, Random Structures & Algorithms 22, 60–65, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1002/rsa.10073
  • M. Rudelson, R. Vershynin, The Littlewood–Offord problem and invertibility of random matrices, Advances in Mathematics 218, 600–633, 2008. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0703503
  • Y. Chen, J. Dongarra, Condition numbers of Gaussian random matrices, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 27(3), 603–620, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1137/040616413
  • A. Edelman, Eigenvalues and condition numbers of random matrices, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 9(4), 543–560, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1137/0609045
  • Y. Gordon, Some inequalities for Gaussian processes and applications, Israel J. Math. 50, 265–289, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02759761
  • K. R. Davidson, S. J. Szarek, Local operator theory, random matrices and Banach spaces, Handbook of the Geometry of Banach Spaces, Vol. 1, 317–366, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1874-5849(01)80010-3
  • M. Ledoux, The Concentration of Measure Phenomenon, AMS Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 89, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1090/surv/089

Shared definitions: the items of this mission import Definitions.Def_GaussianMatrix_basic, a draft of Mission I; submit that proposal first so the import resolves at compile time.

Series: I. Rotation Invariance and Moment Identities · II. Inverse Moments of the Pseudoinverse · III. Extreme Singular Values and Concentration. All three missions share the definition bundle GaussianMatrix_basic, published with Mission I, and the namespace GaussianMatrix.

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Numerical AnalysisRandom Matrix Theory·Captain: tc

Gaussian Random Matrices II: Inverse Moments of the PseudoinverseTextbook

Motivation

The expected error of the randomized SVD with a k×(k+p)k\times(k+p)k×(k+p) Gaussian test matrix is (1+kp−1)1/2\bigl(1+\tfrac{k}{p-1}\bigr)^{1/2}(1+p−1k​)1/2 times the optimal error (Halko–Martinsson–Tropp 2011, Theorem 10.5). The factor kp−1\tfrac{k}{p-1}p−1k​ is E∥G†∥F2\mathbb E\|G^{\dagger}\|_F^2E∥G†∥F2​ for a k×(k+p)k\times(k+p)k×(k+p) standard Gaussian matrix GGG: the quality of every Gaussian sketching method is governed by inverse moments of a Gaussian matrix — moments of its pseudoinverse, equivalently of the inverse of the Wishart matrix GGTGG^{\mathsf T}GGT. The expected spectral error uses E∥G†∥\mathbb E\|G^{\dagger}\|E∥G†∥ instead (Tropp–Webber 2023, Lemmas B.2–B.3), and deviation bounds use tail estimates for both norms (HMT Proposition 10.4). None of these inverse moments is available in Mathlib. This mission proves them.

Setting

A standard Gaussian matrix G∈Rr×kG\in\mathbb R^{r\times k}G∈Rr×k has independent N(0,1)\mathcal N(0,1)N(0,1) entries; its law is γr,k\gamma_{r,k}γr,k​. Throughout, GGG is wide or square, r≤kr\le kr≤k, so that GGT∈Rr×rGG^{\mathsf T}\in\mathbb R^{r\times r}GGT∈Rr×r is almost surely invertible; GGTGG^{\mathsf T}GGT is a Wishart matrix with kkk degrees of freedom and (GGT)−1(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}(GGT)−1 is inverse-Wishart.

The pseudoinverse of a full-row-rank matrix is G†=GT(GGT)−1G^{\dagger}=G^{\mathsf T}(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}G†=GT(GGT)−1. Its norms are determined by the inverse Wishart matrix:

∥G†∥F2=tr⁡(GGT)−1,∥G†∥2=∥(GGT)−1∥=σmin⁡(G)−2,\|G^{\dagger}\|_F^2=\operatorname{tr}(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1},\qquad \|G^{\dagger}\|^2=\|(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}\|=\sigma_{\min}(G)^{-2},∥G†∥F2​=tr(GGT)−1,∥G†∥2=∥(GGT)−1∥=σmin​(G)−2,

where ∥⋅∥F\|\cdot\|_F∥⋅∥F​ is the Frobenius norm, ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ the spectral norm (largest singular value) and σmin⁡(G)\sigma_{\min}(G)σmin​(G) the smallest of the rrr singular values of GGG. The letter eee denotes Euler's number.

Formalization targets

Goal — Tropp–Webber inverse spectral moment (Lemma B.3)

For integer 1≤p≤181\le p\le181≤p≤18 and k≥r+2pk\ge r+2pk≥r+2p,

(E ∥(GGT)−1∥p)1/p≤e2(k+r)2(k−r)2.\Bigl(\mathbb E\,\bigl\|(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}\bigr\|^p\Bigr)^{1/p}\le\frac{e^2(k+r)}{2(k-r)^2}.(E​(GGT)−1​p)1/p≤2(k−r)2e2(k+r)​.

The case p=1p=1p=1 is E∥G†∥2≤e2(k+r)/(2(k−r)2)\mathbb E\|G^{\dagger}\|^2\le e^2(k+r)/(2(k-r)^2)E∥G†∥2≤e2(k+r)/(2(k−r)2), the spectral inverse moment at the heart of expected spectral-norm error bounds. It is the goal because it is the one inverse moment that is not an exact formula: its proof passes through Edelman's bound on the density of λmin⁡(GGT)\lambda_{\min}(GG^{\mathsf T})λmin​(GGT) and an explicit integration, and it implies the expectation bound of HMT Proposition 10.2 by Jensen's inequality.

Milestones

  • Inverse-Wishart mean. E(GGT)−1=1k−r−1Ir\mathbb E(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}=\frac{1}{k-r-1}I_rE(GGT)−1=k−r−11​Ir​ for r≤k−2r\le k-2r≤k−2 (Tropp–Webber Lemma B.2).
  • Frobenius inverse moment. E∥G†∥F2=rk−r−1\mathbb E\|G^{\dagger}\|_F^2=\frac{r}{k-r-1}E∥G†∥F2​=k−r−1r​ for k−r≥2k-r\ge2k−r≥2 (HMT Proposition 10.2 (10.3) and A.5).
  • Second-order inverse-Wishart moments. E∥G†∥F4=r2(k−r)−2r(r−1)(k−r)(k−r−1)(k−r−3)\mathbb E\|G^{\dagger}\|_F^4=\frac{r^2(k-r)-2r(r-1)}{(k-r)(k-r-1)(k-r-3)}E∥G†∥F4​=(k−r)(k−r−1)(k−r−3)r2(k−r)−2r(r−1)​ and E∥(GGT)−1∥F2=r(k−1)(k−r)(k−r−1)(k−r−3)\mathbb E\|(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}\|_F^2=\frac{r(k-1)}{(k-r)(k-r-1)(k-r-3)}E∥(GGT)−1∥F2​=(k−r)(k−r−1)(k−r−3)r(k−1)​ for r≤k−4r\le k-4r≤k−4 (Tropp–Webber Lemma B.2).
  • Chen–Dongarra tail. P{∥G†∥>t}≤12π(k−r+1)(ekk−r+1)k−r+1t−(k−r+1)\mathbb P\{\|G^{\dagger}\|>t\}\le\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi(k-r+1)}}\bigl(\frac{e\sqrt k}{k-r+1}\bigr)^{k-r+1}t^{-(k-r+1)}P{∥G†∥>t}≤2π(k−r+1)​1​(k−r+1ek​​)k−r+1t−(k−r+1) for k≥r≥2k\ge r\ge2k≥r≥2, t>0t>0t>0 (HMT Proposition A.3).
  • Expected spectral norm of the pseudoinverse. E∥G†∥≤ekk−r\mathbb E\|G^{\dagger}\|\le\frac{e\sqrt k}{k-r}E∥G†∥≤k−rek​​ for r≥2r\ge2r≥2, k≥r+1k\ge r+1k≥r+1 (HMT Proposition 10.2 (10.4) and A.4).
  • Frobenius tail. P{∥G†∥F2>12rk−rt}≤4t−(k−r)/2\mathbb P\{\|G^{\dagger}\|_F^2>\frac{12r}{k-r}t\}\le4t^{-(k-r)/2}P{∥G†∥F2​>k−r12r​t}≤4t−(k−r)/2 for k−r≥4k-r\ge4k−r≥4, t≥1t\ge1t≥1 (HMT Theorem A.6).

Significance

The results. Combined with the second-moment identity and block independence of Mission I, the Frobenius inverse moment gives the expected Frobenius error of the randomized SVD and of generalized Nyström; the spectral inverse moment gives the expected spectral error and the core-noise bounds of truncated sketching methods; the two tail bounds give the large-deviation statements of HMT §10.3. The second-order inverse-Wishart moments quantify the variance of ∥G†∥F2\|G^{\dagger}\|_F^2∥G†∥F2​, which Tropp–Webber use for concentration of the randomized SVD error.

Formalizing them. The inverse-Wishart mean and the second-order moments are classical multivariate-statistics formulas (Muirhead; von Rosen) with no Mathlib counterpart. The Chen–Dongarra tail requires the exact distribution of σmin⁡\sigma_{\min}σmin​, or at least Edelman's density bound; the Frobenius tail is HMT's own argument through the bidiagonal (Householder) model of a Gaussian matrix and chi-square moment estimates. Every statement here is a proved theorem in the literature; none has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

There is no Wishart distribution in Mathlib. The direct approach — compute the density of GGTGG^{\mathsf T}GGT and integrate — needs the Wishart density, a change of variables on the cone of positive-definite matrices, and the matrix-variate gamma function. The classical route to the mean avoids this: by rotational invariance (GGT)−1(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}(GGT)−1 has the same law as Q(GGT)−1QTQ(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}Q^{\mathsf T}Q(GGT)−1QT for every orthogonal QQQ, so its mean is a multiple of the identity, and the trace is ∑i1/χk−r+12\sum_i 1/\chi^2_{k-r+1}∑i​1/χk−r+12​-type quantities whose means are elementary; making "the diagonal entries of (GGT)−1(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}(GGT)−1 are reciprocals of χk−r+12\chi^2_{k-r+1}χk−r+12​ variables" rigorous requires the Gram–Schmidt (QR) decomposition of a Gaussian matrix and the independence of its factors. The spectral inverse moment needs a lower-tail bound for λmin⁡(GGT)\lambda_{\min}(GG^{\mathsf T})λmin​(GGT) of the exact order t(k−r+1)/2t^{(k-r+1)/2}t(k−r+1)/2; a union bound over rows loses a factor rrr and does not give the stated constant. The naive attempt to bound E∥G†∥2\mathbb E\|G^{\dagger}\|^2E∥G†∥2 by E∥G†∥F2\mathbb E\|G^{\dagger}\|_F^2E∥G†∥F2​ loses a factor rrr as well.

Formalization scope

GGG is sampled from the product measure γr,k\gamma_{r,k}γr,k​ on arrays; (⋅)−1(\cdot)^{-1}(⋅)−1 is Mathlib's total matrix inverse, equal to 000 on the null set where GGTGG^{\mathsf T}GGT is singular, and G†G^{\dagger}G† is defined as GT(GGT)−1G^{\mathsf T}(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}GT(GGT)−1 (pinvR). Every inequality is stated together with integrability of its integrand, so the Lean convention that a non-integrable function integrates to 000 cannot make a bound vacuous; identities with nonzero right-hand sides force integrability on their own but are also stated with it. The inverse-Wishart mean is stated entrywise. Tail bounds are inequalities between a measure in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and ofReal⁡\operatorname{ofReal}ofReal of the real bound. Real powers with non-integer exponents are Mathlib's rpow; all bases are positive under the hypotheses. The spectral norm is Mathlib's ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ operator norm. The sizes follow Tropp–Webber (G∈Rr×kG\in\mathbb R^{r\times k}G∈Rr×k); HMT's k×(k+p)k\times(k+p)k×(k+p) and m×nm\times nm×n conventions are translated in each item's source field.

Welcome contributions: a Wishart/inverse-Wishart library (QR decomposition of a Gaussian matrix, Bartlett decomposition, chi-square moments E Ξ−q=Γ(k/2−q)/(2qΓ(k/2))\mathbb E\,\Xi^{-q}=\Gamma(k/2-q)/(2^q\Gamma(k/2))EΞ−q=Γ(k/2−q)/(2qΓ(k/2))), and the distribution of σmin⁡\sigma_{\min}σmin​ of a Gaussian matrix (Edelman).

Selected references

  • N. Halko, P.-G. Martinsson, J. A. Tropp, Finding structure with randomness: probabilistic algorithms for constructing approximate matrix decompositions, SIAM Review 53(2), 217–288, 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/0909.4061
  • J. A. Tropp, R. J. Webber, Randomized algorithms for low-rank matrix approximation: design, analysis, and applications, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.12418
  • R. Vershynin, Introduction to the non-asymptotic analysis of random matrices, in Compressed Sensing: Theory and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3027
  • L. Isserlis, On a formula for the product-moment coefficient of any order of a normal frequency distribution in any number of variables, Biometrika 12, 134–139, 1918. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/12.1-2.134
  • S. Dasgupta, A. Gupta, An elementary proof of a theorem of Johnson and Lindenstrauss, Random Structures & Algorithms 22, 60–65, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1002/rsa.10073
  • M. Rudelson, R. Vershynin, The Littlewood–Offord problem and invertibility of random matrices, Advances in Mathematics 218, 600–633, 2008. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0703503
  • Y. Chen, J. Dongarra, Condition numbers of Gaussian random matrices, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 27(3), 603–620, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1137/040616413
  • A. Edelman, Eigenvalues and condition numbers of random matrices, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 9(4), 543–560, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1137/0609045
  • Y. Gordon, Some inequalities for Gaussian processes and applications, Israel J. Math. 50, 265–289, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02759761
  • K. R. Davidson, S. J. Szarek, Local operator theory, random matrices and Banach spaces, Handbook of the Geometry of Banach Spaces, Vol. 1, 317–366, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1874-5849(01)80010-3
  • M. Ledoux, The Concentration of Measure Phenomenon, AMS Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 89, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1090/surv/089

Shared definitions: the items of this mission import Definitions.Def_GaussianMatrix_basic, a draft of Mission I; submit that proposal first so the import resolves at compile time.

Series: I. Rotation Invariance and Moment Identities · II. Inverse Moments of the Pseudoinverse · III. Extreme Singular Values and Concentration. All three missions share the definition bundle GaussianMatrix_basic, published with Mission I, and the namespace GaussianMatrix.

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🏆Completed
Numerical AnalysisRandom Matrix Theory·Captain: tc

Gaussian Random Matrices I: Rotation Invariance and Moment IdentitiesTextbook

Motivation

Randomized algorithms for low-rank approximation — the randomized SVD of Halko, Martinsson and Tropp (HMT 2011), generalized Nyström, randomized subspace iteration, one-pass sketching (Tropp–Webber 2023) — multiply the input matrix by a random test matrix Ω\OmegaΩ with independent standard normal entries. Every error bound for these methods rests on a small number of facts about such standard Gaussian matrices: they are invariant under rotations, disjoint blocks of a rotated copy are independent, and the second and fourth moments of a linearly transformed Gaussian matrix are given by explicit formulas. These facts are classical, but none of them is available in Mathlib, so a Lean development of randomized numerical linear algebra currently has to carry every one of them as an explicit hypothesis of its main theorems. This mission removes those hypotheses.

Setting

For p,m∈Np,m\in\mathbb Np,m∈N, a standard Gaussian matrix of size p×mp\times mp×m is a random matrix Γ∈Rp×m\Gamma\in\mathbb R^{p\times m}Γ∈Rp×m whose pmpmpm entries are independent N(0,1)\mathcal N(0,1)N(0,1) random variables. Its law, written γp,m\gamma_{p,m}γp,m​, is the product measure ⨂i<p⨂j<mN(0,1)\bigotimes_{i<p}\bigotimes_{j<m}\mathcal N(0,1)⨂i<p​⨂j<m​N(0,1) on real p×mp\times mp×m arrays.

For a real matrix AAA, ∥A∥F2=∑i,jAij2\|A\|_F^2=\sum_{i,j}A_{ij}^2∥A∥F2​=∑i,j​Aij2​ is the squared Frobenius norm; rank⁡A\operatorname{rank}ArankA is the dimension of its column space. A matrix V1∈Rn×kV_1\in\mathbb R^{n\times k}V1​∈Rn×k has orthonormal columns when V1TV1=IkV_1^{\mathsf T}V_1=I_kV1T​V1​=Ik​; a square such matrix is orthogonal. For t≥1t\ge1t≥1, a matrix S∈Rn×tS\in\mathbb R^{n\times t}S∈Rn×t with independent N(0,1/t)\mathcal N(0,1/t)N(0,1/t) entries is written S=t−1/2ΩS=t^{-1/2}\OmegaS=t−1/2Ω with Ω∼γn,t\Omega\sim\gamma_{n,t}Ω∼γn,t​, so that SST=1tΩΩTSS^{\mathsf T}=\tfrac1t\Omega\Omega^{\mathsf T}SST=t1​ΩΩT is an unbiased sketch of the identity.

Formalization targets

Goal — Gaussian approximate matrix multiplication

For fixed M∈Ra×nM\in\mathbb R^{a\times n}M∈Ra×n, N∈Rb×nN\in\mathbb R^{b\times n}N∈Rb×n and S∈Rn×tS\in\mathbb R^{n\times t}S∈Rn×t with independent N(0,1/t)\mathcal N(0,1/t)N(0,1/t) entries,

E ∥MSSTNT−MNT∥F2=∥M∥F2∥N∥F2+∥MNT∥F2t≤2t∥M∥F2∥N∥F2.\mathbb E\,\bigl\|MSS^{\mathsf T}N^{\mathsf T}-MN^{\mathsf T}\bigr\|_F^2=\frac{\|M\|_F^2\|N\|_F^2+\|MN^{\mathsf T}\|_F^2}{t}\le\frac2t\|M\|_F^2\|N\|_F^2 .E​MSSTNT−MNT​F2​=t∥M∥F2​∥N∥F2​+∥MNT∥F2​​≤t2​∥M∥F2​∥N∥F2​.

This is the exact mean-squared error of the sketched product MSSTNTMSS^{\mathsf T}N^{\mathsf T}MSSTNT as an estimator of MNTMN^{\mathsf T}MNT, a direct consequence of Isserlis' pairing formula for Gaussian fourth moments. It is the goal because it is the one fourth-moment computation the series needs and because every other identity in the mission is a step towards it.

Milestones

  • Rotational invariance. UΓV∼γp,mU\Gamma V\sim\gamma_{p,m}UΓV∼γp,m​ for orthogonal U∈Rp×pU\in\mathbb R^{p\times p}U∈Rp×p, V∈Rm×mV\in\mathbb R^{m\times m}V∈Rm×m (HMT §10.1).
  • Blocks of a rotated Gaussian matrix. For V1∈Rn×kV_1\in\mathbb R^{n\times k}V1​∈Rn×k with orthonormal columns, V1TΩ∼γk,tV_1^{\mathsf T}\Omega\sim\gamma_{k,t}V1T​Ω∼γk,t​; for orthonormal V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ with V1TV2=0V_1^{\mathsf T}V_2=0V1T​V2​=0, the blocks V1TΩV_1^{\mathsf T}\OmegaV1T​Ω and V2TΩV_2^{\mathsf T}\OmegaV2T​Ω are independent (HMT, proof of Theorem 10.5).
  • Second moment. E∥SΓT∥F2=∥S∥F2∥T∥F2\mathbb E\|S\Gamma T\|_F^2=\|S\|_F^2\|T\|_F^2E∥SΓT∥F2​=∥S∥F2​∥T∥F2​ (HMT Proposition 10.1 (10.1); Tropp–Webber Lemma B.1).
  • Fourth moment. E∥SΓT∥F4=(∥S∥F2∥T∥F2)2+2∥STS∥F2∥TTT∥F2\mathbb E\|S\Gamma T\|_F^4=(\|S\|_F^2\|T\|_F^2)^2+2\|S^{\mathsf T}S\|_F^2\|TT^{\mathsf T}\|_F^2E∥SΓT∥F4​=(∥S∥F2​∥T∥F2​)2+2∥STS∥F2​∥TTT∥F2​, the Isserlis formula for the Gaussian quadratic form tr⁡(ΓTSTS Γ TTT)\operatorname{tr}(\Gamma^{\mathsf T}S^{\mathsf T}S\,\Gamma\,TT^{\mathsf T})tr(ΓTSTSΓTTT); its special case E∥Ω∥F4=(kt)2+2kt\mathbb E\|\Omega\|_F^4=(kt)^2+2ktE∥Ω∥F4​=(kt)2+2kt is the chi-square second moment (HMT Proposition A.8).
  • Full rank. rank⁡Γ=min⁡{p,m}\operatorname{rank}\Gamma=\min\{p,m\}rankΓ=min{p,m} almost surely (HMT, proof of Theorem 10.5 and Proposition A.5).

Significance

The results. Rotational invariance and block independence are the mechanism behind every conditioning argument in randomized linear algebra: writing the right singular vectors of the input as [V1 V2][V_1\ V_2][V1​ V2​], the sketch splits into independent standard Gaussian blocks Ω1=V1TΩ\Omega_1=V_1^{\mathsf T}\OmegaΩ1​=V1T​Ω and Ω2=V2TΩ\Omega_2=V_2^{\mathsf T}\OmegaΩ2​=V2T​Ω, and one may condition on Ω1\Omega_1Ω1​ while treating Ω2\Omega_2Ω2​ as fresh. The second-moment identity then turns the deterministic range-finder bound ∥Σ2Ω2Ω1†∥F\|\Sigma_2\Omega_2\Omega_1^{\dagger}\|_F∥Σ2​Ω2​Ω1†​∥F​ into ∥Σ2∥F2 E∥Ω1†∥F2\|\Sigma_2\|_F^2\,\mathbb E\|\Omega_1^{\dagger}\|_F^2∥Σ2​∥F2​E∥Ω1†​∥F2​, and the approximate-multiplication identity gives the one-pass error terms. Almost-sure full rank is what makes Ω1†\Omega_1^{\dagger}Ω1†​ a genuine pseudoinverse.

Formalizing them. Mathlib has the one-dimensional Gaussian measure, product measures, independence of coordinate projections, and (recently) the standard Gaussian measure on a finite-dimensional inner product space together with its invariance under linear isometries. None of the matrix-level statements above is in Mathlib. Once proved here they are reusable by every later mission in the series and by any formalization of randomized low-rank approximation, whose expectation-level inputs (e.g. E∥Σ2Ω2Ω1†∥F2=kt−k−1∥Σ2∥F2\mathbb E\|\Sigma_2\Omega_2\Omega_1^{\dagger}\|_F^2=\frac{k}{t-k-1}\|\Sigma_2\|_F^2E∥Σ2​Ω2​Ω1†​∥F2​=t−k−1k​∥Σ2​∥F2​) follow from these milestones together with the inverse moments of Mission II.

Difficulty

Rotational invariance is not a computation with densities on Rpm\mathbb R^{pm}Rpm that Mathlib supports out of the box: the clean route is through characteristic functions or through the basis-independence of the standard Gaussian on an inner product space, transported along the linear isometry Γ↦UΓV\Gamma\mapsto U\Gamma VΓ↦UΓV of Rp×m\mathbb R^{p\times m}Rp×m with the Frobenius inner product. Independence of the blocks requires identifying [V1 V2]TΩ[V_1\ V_2]^{\mathsf T}\Omega[V1​ V2​]TΩ with a product measure and then projecting onto disjoint coordinate sets, with a completion of [V1 V2][V_1\ V_2][V1​ V2​] to an orthogonal matrix when k+r<nk+r<nk+r<n. The moment identities are finite computations, but the fourth-moment identity needs the Gaussian moments Eg4=3\mathbb E g^4=3Eg4=3, Eg2=1\mathbb E g^2=1Eg2=1 organized through Isserlis' pairing formula over a four-fold sum of indices; the obvious entrywise expansion produces O((pm)4)O((pm)^4)O((pm)4) terms that must be collapsed symbolically. Almost-sure full rank is the statement that the zero set of a nonzero polynomial (det⁡\detdet of a maximal square submatrix) is Lebesgue-null, which must be established for the product Gaussian measure.

Formalization scope

The sample space is the function type Rp→Rm→R\mathbb R^{p}\to\mathbb R^{m}\to\mathbb RRp→Rm→R with the product σ\sigmaσ-algebra; a sample is viewed as a matrix through the identity map of\mathrm{of}of. Expectations are real Bochner integrals: for an identity with a nonzero right-hand side this forces integrability, and the integrands here are polynomials in Gaussian entries. Laws are stated as equalities of pushforward measures; independence is Mathlib's IndepFun. Dimensions may be 000; all statements remain true in that case. The hypothesis V1TV1=IkV_1^{\mathsf T}V_1=I_kV1T​V1​=Ik​ silently forces k≤nk\le nk≤n (vacuous otherwise), which matches the source.

The definition bundle GaussianMatrix_basic supplies the law γp,m\gamma_{p,m}γp,m​, ∥⋅∥F2\|\cdot\|_F^2∥⋅∥F2​, ∥⋅∥F\|\cdot\|_F∥⋅∥F​, the spectral norm (Mathlib's ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ operator norm), the smallest singular value and the pseudoinverse G†=GT(GGT)−1G^{\dagger}=G^{\mathsf T}(GG^{\mathsf T})^{-1}G†=GT(GGT)−1; it is shared by the whole series. Welcome contributions: the Gaussian integration-by-parts and Isserlis lemmas for finite index sets, the identification of γp,m\gamma_{p,m}γp,m​ with Mathlib's stdGaussian on the Frobenius inner product space, and the "polynomial zero sets are null" lemma for product measures.

Selected references

  • N. Halko, P.-G. Martinsson, J. A. Tropp, Finding structure with randomness: probabilistic algorithms for constructing approximate matrix decompositions, SIAM Review 53(2), 217–288, 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/0909.4061
  • J. A. Tropp, R. J. Webber, Randomized algorithms for low-rank matrix approximation: design, analysis, and applications, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.12418
  • R. Vershynin, Introduction to the non-asymptotic analysis of random matrices, in Compressed Sensing: Theory and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3027
  • L. Isserlis, On a formula for the product-moment coefficient of any order of a normal frequency distribution in any number of variables, Biometrika 12, 134–139, 1918. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/12.1-2.134
  • S. Dasgupta, A. Gupta, An elementary proof of a theorem of Johnson and Lindenstrauss, Random Structures & Algorithms 22, 60–65, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1002/rsa.10073
  • M. Rudelson, R. Vershynin, The Littlewood–Offord problem and invertibility of random matrices, Advances in Mathematics 218, 600–633, 2008. https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0703503
  • Y. Chen, J. Dongarra, Condition numbers of Gaussian random matrices, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 27(3), 603–620, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1137/040616413
  • A. Edelman, Eigenvalues and condition numbers of random matrices, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 9(4), 543–560, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1137/0609045
  • Y. Gordon, Some inequalities for Gaussian processes and applications, Israel J. Math. 50, 265–289, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02759761
  • K. R. Davidson, S. J. Szarek, Local operator theory, random matrices and Banach spaces, Handbook of the Geometry of Banach Spaces, Vol. 1, 317–366, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1874-5849(01)80010-3
  • M. Ledoux, The Concentration of Measure Phenomenon, AMS Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 89, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1090/surv/089

Series: I. Rotation Invariance and Moment Identities · II. Inverse Moments of the Pseudoinverse · III. Extreme Singular Values and Concentration. All three missions share the definition bundle GaussianMatrix_basic, published with Mission I, and the namespace GaussianMatrix.

8 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningOptimizationReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Global Convergence of Policy Gradient Methods to (Almost) Locally Optimal Policies: Random-Horizon Policy Gradient with Robbins–Monro Stepsizes Drives the Policy Gradient to Zero Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

Policy gradient methods are the main family of reinforcement learning algorithms that search directly over a parameterized class of stochastic policies πθ\pi_\thetaπθ​, θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd, by stochastic gradient ascent on the expected discounted return. They underlie REINFORCE, actor-critic methods and their deep-learning descendants. The return is a nonconvex function of θ\thetaθ, and the gradient is available only through Monte Carlo samples of trajectories, so the basic question is what the iterates of such a method converge to.

Classical analyses of actor-critic algorithms (Konda and Tsitsiklis, 2003) use the ODE method of stochastic approximation and assume that the gradient estimate is unbiased. In the infinite-horizon discounted setting, a trajectory of finite length cannot by itself produce an unbiased sample of the gradient. Zhang, Koppel, Zhu and Başar (arXiv:1906.08383, SIAM J. Control Optim. 58(6), 2020) resolve this with random horizons: drawing the trajectory lengths from geometric distributions makes the resulting estimate exactly unbiased and almost surely bounded. They then prove convergence of the resulting random-horizon policy gradient (RPG) algorithm with the supermartingale convergence theorem, an optimization argument that also yields rates. This mission formalizes that first part of the paper (§2–§4 and App. A.1–A.4). The paper's later results on escaping saddle points are not part of it.

Setting

A finite Markov decision process is a tuple (S,A,P,R,γ)(\mathcal S,\mathcal A,P,R,\gamma)(S,A,P,R,γ): finite state and action sets, transition probabilities P(s′∣s,a)P(s'\mid s,a)P(s′∣s,a), rewards R(s,a)R(s,a)R(s,a) and a discount factor γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1). A stochastic policy π\piπ gives a probability vector π(⋅∣s)\pi(\cdot\mid s)π(⋅∣s) on A\mathcal AA at each state. Its value Vπ(s)=E(∑t≥0γtR(st,at)∣s0=s)V_\pi(s)=\mathbb E\big(\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^tR(s_t,a_t)\mid s_0=s\big)Vπ​(s)=E(∑t≥0​γtR(st​,at​)∣s0​=s) and Q-function Qπ(s,a)Q_\pi(s,a)Qπ​(s,a) are the expected discounted returns from a state, respectively a state-action pair.

A parameterized policy assigns to each θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd a policy πθ\pi_\thetaπθ​. Fix an initial state s0s_0s0​. The objective is

J(θ)=Vπθ(s0),max⁡θ∈RdJ(θ).J(\theta)=V_{\pi_\theta}(s_0),\qquad \max_{\theta\in\mathbb R^d}J(\theta).J(θ)=Vπθ​​(s0​),θ∈Rdmax​J(θ).

The score function is ∇θlog⁡πθ(a∣s)\nabla_\theta\log\pi_\theta(a\mid s)∇θ​logπθ​(a∣s). The discounted state-occupancy measure is ρπθ(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0γtp(st=s∣s0,πθ)\rho_{\pi_\theta}(s)=(1-\gamma)\sum_{t\ge0}\gamma^tp(s_t=s\mid s_0,\pi_\theta)ρπθ​​(s)=(1−γ)∑t≥0​γtp(st​=s∣s0​,πθ​), and ρθ(s,a)=ρπθ(s)πθ(a∣s)\rho_\theta(s,a)=\rho_{\pi_\theta}(s)\pi_\theta(a\mid s)ρθ​(s,a)=ρπθ​​(s)πθ​(a∣s).

Assumption 3.1 asks for ∣R(s,a)∣≤UR|R(s,a)|\le U_R∣R(s,a)∣≤UR​ and for a differentiable policy whose score exists, is LΘL_\ThetaLΘ​-Lipschitz in θ\thetaθ and is bounded in norm by BΘ>0B_\Theta>0BΘ​>0. Two constants recur below:

L=URLΘ(1−γ)2+(1+γ)URBΘ2(1−γ)3,ℓ^=BΘUR(1−γ)(1−γ1/2).L=\frac{U_RL_\Theta}{(1-\gamma)^2}+\frac{(1+\gamma)U_RB_\Theta^2}{(1-\gamma)^3},\qquad \hat\ell=\frac{B_\Theta U_R}{(1-\gamma)(1-\gamma^{1/2})}.L=(1−γ)2UR​LΘ​​+(1−γ)3(1+γ)UR​BΘ2​​,ℓ^=(1−γ)(1−γ1/2)BΘ​UR​​.

The RPG algorithm (Algorithm 3) works as follows at the current iterate θk\theta_kθk​:

  1. Draw a horizon T∼Geom(1−γ)T\sim\mathrm{Geom}(1-\gamma)T∼Geom(1−γ) and simulate s0,a0,…,sT,aTs_0,a_0,\dots,s_T,a_Ts0​,a0​,…,sT​,aT​ under πθk\pi_{\theta_k}πθk​​.
  2. From the last pair (sT,aT)(s_T,a_T)(sT​,aT​), the subroutine EstQ draws an independent T′∼Geom(1−γ1/2)T'\sim\mathrm{Geom}(1-\gamma^{1/2})T′∼Geom(1−γ1/2), rolls out T′T'T′ further steps and returns Q^=∑t=0T′γt/2R(st,at)\hat Q=\sum_{t=0}^{T'}\gamma^{t/2}R(s_t,a_t)Q^​=∑t=0T′​γt/2R(st​,at​).
  3. Update
θk+1=θk+αk∇^J(θk),∇^J(θ)=11−γQ^ ∇log⁡πθ(aT∣sT).\theta_{k+1}=\theta_k+\alpha_k\hat\nabla J(\theta_k),\qquad \hat\nabla J(\theta)=\frac{1}{1-\gamma}\hat Q\,\nabla\log\pi_\theta(a_T\mid s_T).θk+1​=θk​+αk​∇^J(θk​),∇^J(θ)=1−γ1​Q^​∇logπθ​(aT​∣sT​).

Assumption 4.1 is the Robbins–Monro condition ∑kαk=∞\sum_k\alpha_k=\infty∑k​αk​=∞, ∑kαk2<∞\sum_k\alpha_k^2<\infty∑k​αk2​<∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2, in the form its proof establishes

Under Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1, almost surely

lim⁡k→∞∥∇J(θk)∥=0,\lim_{k\to\infty}\|\nabla J(\theta_k)\|=0,k→∞lim​∥∇J(θk​)∥=0,

and almost surely every cluster point θˉ\bar\thetaθˉ of (θk)(\theta_k)(θk​) satisfies ∇J(θˉ)=0\nabla J(\bar\theta)=0∇J(θˉ)=0. The page states the conclusion as "lim⁡kθk∈Θ∗\lim_k\theta_k\in\Theta^*limk​θk​∈Θ∗", where Θ∗\Theta^*Θ∗ is the set of stationary points. Read literally, that asserts convergence of θk\theta_kθk​, which fails when JJJ has no stationary point at all (one state, two actions, a softmax policy). The goal states what the proof on p. 30 concludes.

Milestones

  1. ∣Qπ(s,a)∣,∣Vπ(s)∣≤UR/(1−γ)|Q_\pi(s,a)|,|V_\pi(s)|\le U_R/(1-\gamma)∣Qπ​(s,a)∣,∣Vπ​(s)∣≤UR​/(1−γ) (p. 6).
  2. The policy gradient theorem (3.4): ∇J(θ)=11−γE(s,a)∼ρθ[∇log⁡πθ(a∣s)Qπθ(s,a)]\nabla J(\theta)=\frac1{1-\gamma}\mathbb E_{(s,a)\sim\rho_\theta}[\nabla\log\pi_\theta(a\mid s)Q_{\pi_\theta}(s,a)]∇J(θ)=1−γ1​E(s,a)∼ρθ​​[∇logπθ​(a∣s)Qπθ​​(s,a)].
  3. Lemma 3.2: ∇J\nabla J∇J is LLL-Lipschitz.
  4. Theorem 3.4, ∇^J\hat\nabla J∇^J clauses: E∇^J(θ)=∇J(θ)\mathbb E\hat\nabla J(\theta)=\nabla J(\theta)E∇^J(θ)=∇J(θ), ∥∇J(θ)∥≤BΘUR/(1−γ)2\|\nabla J(\theta)\|\le B_\Theta U_R/(1-\gamma)^2∥∇J(θ)∥≤BΘ​UR​/(1−γ)2, ∥∇^J(θ)∥≤ℓ^\|\hat\nabla J(\theta)\|\le\hat\ell∥∇^J(θ)∥≤ℓ^ a.s.
  5. Lemma A.1: the ascent inequality (A.23), and Wk=J(θk)−Lℓ^2∑j≥kαj2W_k=J(\theta_k)-L\hat\ell^2\sum_{j\ge k}\alpha_j^2Wk​=J(θk​)−Lℓ^2∑j≥k​αj2​ is a bounded submartingale with E[Wk+1∣Fk]≥Wk+αk∥∇J(θk)∥2\mathbb E[W_{k+1}\mid\mathcal F_k]\ge W_k+\alpha_k\|\nabla J(\theta_k)\|^2E[Wk+1​∣Fk​]≥Wk​+αk​∥∇J(θk​)∥2.
  6. (A.26): ∑kαk∥∇J(θk)∥2<∞\sum_k\alpha_k\|\nabla J(\theta_k)\|^2<\infty∑k​αk​∥∇J(θk​)∥2<∞ a.s.
  7. (A.27): lim inf⁡k∥∇J(θk)∥=0\liminf_k\|\nabla J(\theta_k)\|=0liminfk​∥∇J(θk​)∥=0 a.s.

Companion: Corollary 4.4 in its explicit form (A.37)

With constant stepsize α>0\alpha>0α>0 and Assumption 3.1 only, for every k≥1k\ge1k≥1,

1k∑m=1kE∥∇J(θm)∥2≤1kα⋅2UR1−γ+Lαℓ^2.\frac1k\sum_{m=1}^k\mathbb E\|\nabla J(\theta_m)\|^2\le\frac{1}{k\alpha}\cdot\frac{2U_R}{1-\gamma}+L\alpha\hat\ell^2.k1​m=1∑k​E∥∇J(θm​)∥2≤kα1​⋅1−γ2UR​​+Lαℓ^2.

Significance

The theorem shows that Monte Carlo policy gradient, with a sampling scheme that can be implemented from simulated trajectories alone, behaves like an exact stochastic gradient method on a smooth nonconvex objective. It needs no ODE approximation, no two-timescale critic and no assumption that the estimate is unbiased: unbiasedness is proved (Theorem 3.4). The same estimates give the finite-time bound of Corollary 4.4 and are the starting point of the paper's second part, which adds perturbations to escape saddle points.

To our knowledge none of these results has been machine-checked. The mission's work is to formalize the known proof: the infinite-horizon policy gradient theorem with a vector parameter, the smoothness bound with its explicit constant, the exact law of the random-horizon estimator and its moments, and the supermartingale argument. The formal statements also repair three misprints of the source: the conclusion of Theorem 4.2, the tail ∑j=k∞αk2\sum_{j=k}^\infty\alpha_k^2∑j=k∞​αk2​ of (A.22), which is read as ∑j≥kαj2\sum_{j\ge k}\alpha_j^2∑j≥k​αj2​, and the O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) of Corollary 4.4, which is replaced by its explicit form (A.37).

Difficulty

Each step of the argument is standard on paper. The work is in the parts that the paper treats in one line:

  • Unbiasedness. It rests on two separate identities. The law of the last state of a Geom(1−γ)\mathrm{Geom}(1-\gamma)Geom(1−γ)-length trajectory is ρπθ\rho_{\pi_\theta}ρπθ​​. A γ1/2\gamma^{1/2}γ1/2-discounted sum over a Geom(1−γ1/2)\mathrm{Geom}(1-\gamma^{1/2})Geom(1−γ1/2) horizon has the mean of a γ\gammaγ-discounted infinite sum. Both are exchanges of infinite sums over trajectories of unbounded length.
  • Smoothness. Lemma 3.2 requires differentiating JJJ twice through an infinite series of policy-dependent transition matrices, with bounds uniform in θ\thetaθ.
  • The final step. (A.26) and the non-summability of the stepsizes give only lim inf⁡∥∇J(θk)∥=0\liminf\|\nabla J(\theta_k)\|=0liminf∥∇J(θk​)∥=0. Upgrading this to a limit needs a separate pathwise argument, which uses the Lipschitz continuity of ∇J\nabla J∇J and the almost sure convergence of the martingale part of the iterates. The tempting first idea, that a summable series with non-summable weights forces its terms to zero, is false.

Formalization scope

  • Finite case. The state and action spaces are finite types. The paper also allows compact real vector spaces; this mission does not cover them. Values, Q-functions and occupation probabilities are the published FoundationsML layer (PolicyValue, QFunction, OccupationDist, IsPolicy, IsTransitionKernel). Rd\mathbb R^dRd is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), and ∇\nabla∇ is Mathlib's gradient.
  • Assumption 3.1 includes πθ(a∣s)>0\pi_\theta(a\mid s)>0πθ​(a∣s)>0: this is the reading of "the score function exists", since log⁡0\log 0log0 is a junk value in Lean. It also states LΘ≥0L_\Theta\ge0LΘ​≥0, which is implicit in "LΘL_\ThetaLΘ​-Lipschitz".
  • The algorithm is encoded by its exact sampling law. rpgLaw θ is the law of ∇^J(θ)\hat\nabla J(\theta)∇^J(θ), built from the geometric horizons, the trajectory probabilities and EstQ. A run is a filtered probability space carrying θk\theta_kθk​ and gkg_kgk​ with θk+1=θk+αkgk\theta_{k+1}=\theta_k+\alpha_kg_kθk+1​=θk​+αk​gk​ on every path, θk\theta_kθk​ adapted, and the conditional law of gkg_kgk​ given Fk\mathcal F_kFk​ equal to rpgLaw θ_k.
  • Ruled out. Postulating an abstract "unbiased bounded oracle" in place of rpgLaw would assume Theorem 3.4 and turn the goal into generic SGD; that encoding is ruled out. A sorry-free example shows that the run hypothesis is satisfiable and that rpgLaw is a probability measure.
  • Stepsizes and limits. The stepsizes are positive; the page says only "stepsize", and its proofs divide by αk\alpha_kαk​. Divergence of ∑αk\sum\alpha_k∑αk​ is Tendsto of the partial sums to +∞+\infty+∞. "Cluster point" is MapClusterPt.
  • Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, in particular the infinite-horizon policy gradient theorem with vector parameters and the unbiasedness of rpgLaw. These are reusable for every Monte Carlo policy gradient analysis.

Selected references

  • K. Zhang, A. Koppel, H. Zhu, T. Başar, Global Convergence of Policy Gradient Methods to (Almost) Locally Optimal Policies, SIAM J. Control Optim. 58(6), 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.08383 (v3 is the source of this mission)
  • R. S. Sutton, D. McAllester, S. Singh, Y. Mansour, Policy Gradient Methods for Reinforcement Learning with Function Approximation, NeurIPS 1999. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/1713-policy-gradient-methods-for-reinforcement-learning-with-function-approximation
  • V. R. Konda, J. N. Tsitsiklis, On Actor-Critic Algorithms, SIAM J. Control Optim. 42(4), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0363012901385691
  • D. P. Bertsekas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Gradient Convergence in Gradient Methods with Errors, SIAM J. Optim. 10(3), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623497331063
  • H. Robbins, D. Siegmund, A Convergence Theorem for Non Negative Almost Supermartingales and Some Applications, in Optimizing Methods in Statistics, 1971. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-604550-5.50015-8
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Dynamical SystemsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Propagation of Chaos for Stochastic Spatially Structured Neuronal Networks with Delay driven by Jump Diffusions 1: The Spatially Structured McKean–Vlasov Delay Equation with Jumps Is Well-PosedResearch Paper

Motivation

Networks of conductance-based neurons, such as FitzHugh–Nagumo networks, are modelled by systems of stochastic differential equations in which each neuron interacts with the others through synapses, and the signal from one neuron reaches another only after a transmission delay. Biological neurons sit at positions in space, belong to a few distinct subpopulations, are driven by Brownian and Poisson (jump) noise, and vary from one to another; the last feature is modelled by a random disorder parameter. When the number of neurons tends to infinity, the state of a typical neuron is expected to follow a McKean–Vlasov equation: an SDE whose coefficients depend on the law of its own solution. S. Mehri, M. Scheutzow, W. Stannat and B. Z. Zangeneh (arXiv:1805.01654; Ann. Appl. Probab. 30 (2020), DOI 10.1214/19-AAP1499) prove that this limit equation is well-posed, with coefficients that are only monotone (one-sided Lipschitz), a general delay, jump noise, spatial structure and disorder all at once, and then prove propagation of chaos towards it.

Earlier work, as surveyed on p. 3 of the paper, covered parts of this setting: global Lipschitz coefficients (Quiñinao and Touboul 2015, and the paper's references [10, 11]), locally Lipschitz coefficients (Baladron, Fasoli, Faugeras and Touboul 2012, with the clarification of Bossy, Faugeras and Talay 2015 on the localization by hitting times; the same issue affects Touboul 2012), one-sided Lipschitz coefficients with diffusive noise (Luçon and Stannat 2014), and Lévy noise under global Lipschitz assumptions or gradient-type local dynamics (Andreis, Dai Pra and Fischer 2018). The paper constructs the solution by an Euler approximation, which, by the authors' account, had not been applied to McKean–Vlasov equations before.

Setting

Fix dimensions ddd (state), mmm, nnn (noise), kkk (space), a delay τ>0\tau > 0τ>0 and P≥1P \ge 1P≥1 subpopulations, located at pairwise disjoint measurable regions Γ1,…,ΓP⊂Rk\Gamma_1,\dots,\Gamma_P \subset \mathbb R^kΓ1​,…,ΓP​⊂Rk whose union Γ\GammaΓ is bounded. A finite Borel measure R\mathcal RR on Γ\GammaΓ with R(Γα)=1\mathcal R(\Gamma_\alpha) = 1R(Γα​)=1 describes the spatial distribution of neurons. A disorder probability space (Ω′,F′,P′)(\Omega',\mathcal F',\mathbb P')(Ω′,F′,P′) is fixed. On a filtered probability space (Ω,F,(Ft),P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,(\mathcal F_t),\mathbb P)(Ω,F,(Ft​),P) there are an mmm-dimensional Brownian motion WWW, nnn-dimensional Brownian motions B1,…,BPB^1,\dots,B^PB1,…,BP, Poisson random measures N,N1,…,NPN, N^1, \dots, N^PN,N1,…,NP on [0,∞)×U[0,\infty)\times U[0,∞)×U with intensity dt⊗νdt\otimes\nudt⊗ν (ν\nuν σ-finite; N~=N−dt⊗ν\tilde N = N - dt\otimes\nuN~=N−dt⊗ν), all independent, and initial paths z^ζ∈L2(Ω;Caˋdlaˋg([−τ,0];Rd))\hat z^\zeta \in L^2(\Omega;\text{Càdlàg}([-\tau,0];\mathbb R^d))z^ζ∈L2(Ω;Caˋdlaˋg([−τ,0];Rd)).

For a path yyy, write y(t−τ)−:t−y_{(t-\tau)^-:t^-}y(t−τ)−:t−​ for the segment u↦y(t+u)−u\mapsto y_{(t+u)^-}u↦y(t+u)−​, u∈[−τ,0]u\in[-\tau,0]u∈[−τ,0]. The equation is

dXtr=f(t,r,Xt−r,ω′)dt+g(⋅)dWt+∫Uh(⋅,ξ)N~(dt,dξ)+∑α=1P∫ΓαE~[θ(t,r,r′,Xt−r,X~(t−τ)−:t−r′,ω′)]R(dr′)dtdX^r_t = f(t,r,X^r_{t-},\omega')dt + g(\cdot)dW_t + \int_U h(\cdot,\xi)\tilde N(dt,d\xi) + \sum_{\alpha=1}^P\int_{\Gamma_\alpha}\tilde{\mathbb E}\big[\theta(t,r,r',X^r_{t-},\tilde X^{r'}_{(t-\tau)^-:t^-},\omega')\big]\mathcal R(dr')dtdXtr​=f(t,r,Xt−r​,ω′)dt+g(⋅)dWt​+∫U​h(⋅,ξ)N~(dt,dξ)+α=1∑P​∫Γα​​E~[θ(t,r,r′,Xt−r​,X~(t−τ)−:t−r′​,ω′)]R(dr′)dt +∑α=1P∫ΓαE~[β(⋯ )]R(dr′)dBtα+∑α=1P∫Γα∫UE~[η(⋯ ,ξ)]R(dr′)N~α(dt,dξ),Xtr=z^tζ (r∈Γζ, t∈[−τ,0]),(6)+ \sum_{\alpha=1}^P\int_{\Gamma_\alpha}\tilde{\mathbb E}[\beta(\cdots)]\mathcal R(dr')dB^\alpha_t + \sum_{\alpha=1}^P\int_{\Gamma_\alpha}\int_U\tilde{\mathbb E}[\eta(\cdots,\xi)]\mathcal R(dr')\tilde N^\alpha(dt,d\xi),\qquad X^r_t = \hat z^\zeta_t\ (r\in\Gamma_\zeta,\ t\in[-\tau,0]), \tag{6}+α=1∑P​∫Γα​​E~[β(⋯)]R(dr′)dBtα​+α=1∑P​∫Γα​​∫U​E~[η(⋯,ξ)]R(dr′)N~α(dt,dξ),Xtr​=z^tζ​ (r∈Γζ​, t∈[−τ,0]),(6)

where X~\tilde XX~ is an independent copy of the solution XXX and E~\tilde{\mathbb E}E~ its expectation. The local dynamics f,g,hf, g, hf,g,h satisfy the monotonicity and growth conditions (H1)–(H3) of Hypothesis 1.1 with locally integrable random rates Lt(ω′)L_t(\omega')Lt​(ω′), Kt(ω′)K_t(\omega')Kt​(ω′), K~t(R,ω′)\tilde K_t(R,\omega')K~t​(R,ω′); the synaptic coefficients θ,β,η\theta, \beta, \etaθ,β,η are Lipschitz (H4) and of linear growth (H5) in (x,y)(x, y)(x,y), with rates Lˉt(ω′)\bar L_t(\omega')Lˉt​(ω′), Kˉt(ω′)\bar K_t(\omega')Kˉt​(ω′), the path variable measured through a probability measure λ\lambdaλ on [−τ,0][-\tau,0][−τ,0]. In Lean, the model is the definition module NeuroMV.WellPosed.Setting: Space, Coeffs, Hyp1_1, Noise/IsNoise, IsStrongSol6, InClass and the constant C1 of (7).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.5 (p. 7)

For every T>0T>0T>0 there is a process Xtr(ω;ω′)X^r_t(\omega;\omega')Xtr​(ω;ω′), measurable in (r,ω′,ω)(r,\omega',\omega)(r,ω′,ω), such that for P′\mathbb P'P′-almost every ω′\omega'ω′, X(ω′)X(\omega')X(ω′) is a strong solution of (6) on [−τ,T][-\tau,T][−τ,T],

X(ω′)∈L∞([−τ,T],dt;L2(Ω×Γ,P⊗R;Rd)),X(\omega') \in L^\infty\big([-\tau,T],dt;L^2(\Omega\times\Gamma,\mathbb P\otimes\mathcal R;\mathbb R^d)\big),X(ω′)∈L∞([−τ,T],dt;L2(Ω×Γ,P⊗R;Rd)),

and every other strong solution YYY in that class satisfies ∫ΓE∣Xtr−Ytr∣2R(dr)=0\int_\Gamma\mathbb E|X^r_t - Y^r_t|^2\mathcal R(dr) = 0∫Γ​E∣Xtr​−Ytr​∣2R(dr)=0 for all t∈[−τ,T]t\in[-\tau,T]t∈[−τ,T].

Milestones

  1. Theorem A.2 (p. 23): well-posedness of the general path-dependent delay SDE (20) with jumps under the monotonicity Hypothesis A.1, joint measurability in (t,ω,ω′)(t,\omega,\omega')(t,ω,ω′), the moment bound (22), and convergence of the Euler approximation (21).
  2. The scheme (11) exists and is measurable (p. 9), and satisfies the uniform bound (12): sup⁡t∈[−τ,T]E∣Xtn,r∣2≤C1(T,ω′)\sup_{t\in[-\tau,T]}\mathbb E|X^{n,r}_t|^2 \le C_1(T,\omega')supt∈[−τ,T]​E∣Xtn,r​∣2≤C1​(T,ω′).
  3. Claims (iv) and (v) (p. 10): the schemes are Cauchy in probability uniformly on [0,T][0,T][0,T], and their limit solves (6).
  4. Lemma 1.4 (p. 6): every solution in the class satisfies sup⁡s∈[−τ,t]E∣Xsr∣2≤C1(t,ω′)\sup_{s\in[-\tau,t]}\mathbb E|X^r_s|^2 \le C_1(t,\omega')sups∈[−τ,t]​E∣Xsr​∣2≤C1​(t,ω′).
  5. Uniqueness (pp. 16–17): two solutions in the class agree in L2(Ω×Γ)L^2(\Omega\times\Gamma)L2(Ω×Γ) at every time.

Significance

Theorem 1.5 makes the infinite-population limit of the network well defined; the second main result of the paper, Theorem 1.8, proves that the network converges to it in L2L^2L2. The theorem applies to coefficients that are only monotone in the state, which covers the cubic nonlinearity of FitzHugh–Nagumo neurons (Example 1.3), and to synaptic weights of conductance type driven by jump noise. Theorem A.2, proved in the appendix, is a well-posedness and Euler-convergence result for monotone stochastic delay equations with jumps and random coefficients, stated by the authors as new in this generality; it is reusable beyond this paper.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a Lean statement of the limit equation with the published Brownian and compensated Poisson integral relations, and invites formal proofs of the scheme estimates, the Cauchy property, the identification of the limit, the moment bound and uniqueness.

Difficulty

Under monotone coefficients there is no global contraction, so the Picard iteration that proves McKean–Vlasov well-posedness under Lipschitz assumptions does not apply. Localization by stopping times, the standard replacement for SDEs with monotone coefficients, does not localize the mean-field terms, which depend on the law of the solution at all positions; mishandling this step is the gap that Bossy, Faugeras and Talay pointed out in earlier work, and the acknowledgements (p. 30) record that the first version of this paper contained an unjustified application of the moment estimate of Lemma 1.4. A priori bounds must therefore be uniform in the approximation, and the limit of the mean-field stochastic integrals must be identified, with jumps and delay present. A second difficulty is measurability: the mean-field integrals require the solution to be measurable in the position r′r'r′, and the theorem asserts measurability in (r,ω′)(r,\omega')(r,ω′).

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Positions are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin k), states EthierKurtz.SDEState d, matrices Matrix (Fin d) (Fin m) ℝ with the Hilbert–Schmidt norm; subpopulations are Fin P, 0-based. Processes are indexed by ℝ on [−τ,T][-\tau,T][−τ,T]; drivers by ℝ≥0. Path segments are functions ℝ → ℝ^d read on [−τ,0][-\tau,0][−τ,0] with the product (cylinder) σ-algebra; the paper's sup-norm Borel σ-algebra is larger, so joint measurability of the coefficients for the cylinder σ-algebra is a mild added requirement.
  • Noise and integrals. Brownian integrals are the published EthierKurtz.HasBrownianItoIntegral, compensated jump integrals the published JacodTodorov10.LLN.HasCompInt, coordinatewise, with integrands cut off after TTT. All Poisson measures are one JacodTodorov10.LLN.IsFPoisson measure on a product mark space, equivalent to independent measures N,NαN, N^\alphaN,Nα. Independence of the initial data from the drivers is encoded by F0\mathcal F_0F0​-measurability.
  • Mean field. The copy X~\tilde XX~ enters only through its law, so E~\tilde{\mathbb E}E~ is an expectation over XXX itself; the mean-field integrands are required to be integrable on Γα×Ω\Gamma_\alpha\times\OmegaΓα​×Ω. Expectations and suprema are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; Bochner integrals carry integrability clauses.
  • Hypotheses. Hypothesis 1.1 (H1)–(H5) and the regularity of p. 2; (H6) is omitted from every item, because it involves the network data of (1) only and the proof never uses it. The class L∞L^\inftyL∞–L2L^2L2 is a bound for every ttt rather than a.e. ttt.
  • Every position. The goal requires the integral identity at every r∈Γr\in\Gammar∈Γ, as (6) is posed; §2 proves it for R×P′\mathcal R\times\mathbb P'R×P′-a.e. (r,ω′)(r,\omega')(r,ω′) (p. 16), and on the remaining null set of positions (6) is an ordinary delay SDE solved by Theorem A.2 — a step the paper leaves implicit. Claim (v) keeps the R\mathcal RR-a.e. reading.
  • No trivialization. The stochastic integrals are the published relations tied to WWW, BαB^\alphaBα, NNN, NαN^\alphaNα, not free processes; the mean-field terms are computed from the solution's own segments; the solution class is non-empty for zero coefficients (a sorry-free check accompanies the mission); and the scheme and limit are the paper's, not new processes with their own noise.
  • Not stated. Claims (i)–(iii) of §2 (the remainder estimate and the a priori bounds before the stopping time) are not separate items.
  • Welcome contributions. Itô's formula for jump diffusions in this encoding, Gronwall-type lemmas in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], stability of the published integral relations under convergence in probability, and the monotone delay SDE theory of Appendix A are all reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Mehri, M. Scheutzow, W. Stannat, B. Z. Zangeneh, Propagation of Chaos for Stochastic Spatially Structured Neuronal Networks with Delay driven by Jump Diffusions, arXiv:1805.01654v3, 2019; Ann. Appl. Probab. 30, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.01654, https://doi.org/10.1214/19-AAP1499
  • J. Baladron, D. Fasoli, O. Faugeras, J. Touboul, Mean-field description and propagation of chaos in networks of Hodgkin–Huxley and FitzHugh–Nagumo neurons, J. Math. Neurosci. 2:10, 2012.
  • M. Bossy, O. Faugeras, D. Talay, Clarification and complement to "Mean-field description and propagation of chaos in networks of Hodgkin–Huxley and FitzHugh–Nagumo neurons", J. Math. Neurosci. 5:19, 2015.
  • E. Luçon, W. Stannat, Mean field limit for disordered diffusions with singular interactions, Ann. Appl. Probab. 24(5):1946–1993, 2014.
  • C. Quiñinao, J. Touboul, Limits and dynamics of randomly connected neuronal networks, Acta Appl. Math. 136(1):167–192, 2015.
  • J. Touboul, Limits and dynamics of stochastic neuronal networks with random heterogeneous delays, J. Stat. Phys. 149(4):569–597, 2012.
  • L. Andreis, P. Dai Pra, M. Fischer, McKean–Vlasov limit for interacting systems with simultaneous jumps, Stoch. Anal. Appl., 2018.
  • W. Liu, M. Röckner, Stochastic Partial Differential Equations: An Introduction, Universitext, Springer, 2015.

The bibliographic data of the last seven entries are taken from the reference list of the paper (pp. 30–31).

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Algorithmic Game TheoryDynamic ProgrammingStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Markov-Nash Equilibria for Discrete-Time Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field Games 1: A Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field Game with Compact Actions and Weakly Continuous Kernel Has a Mean-Field EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

Mean-field games describe large populations of identical agents who interact only through the distribution of their states. Each agent solves a stochastic control problem in which the population appears through a deterministic flow of distributions, and an equilibrium requires that this flow coincide with the distribution the agents generate themselves. The theory goes back to Huang, Malhamé and Caines (2006) and Lasry and Lions (2007) in continuous time. In discrete time, Saldi, Başar and Raginsky (SIAM J. Control Optim. 2018) proved existence of equilibria for risk-neutral agents with discounted costs on Polish state spaces.

Risk-neutral agents care only about expected cost. Many applications in engineering and finance call for agents that also penalize the variability of their cost. A standard way to model this is the exponential (risk-sensitive) criterion E[exp⁡(λ⋅cost)]E[\exp(\lambda\cdot\text{cost})]E[exp(λ⋅cost)] with risk factor λ>0\lambda>0λ>0. Its theory for single-agent Markov decision processes goes back to Howard and Matheson (1972) and Jacobson (1973), and Bäuerle and Rieder (Math. Oper. Res. 2014) treat general utilities. Saldi, Başar and Raginsky (arXiv:1808.03929, Math. Oper. Res. 2020) carry the discrete-time mean-field program over to this criterion. This mission covers its first main result: existence of a mean-field equilibrium (Theorem 1).

Setting

The state space X\mathsf XX and the action space A\mathsf AA are Polish, and A\mathsf AA is compact. P(E)\mathcal P(E)P(E) denotes the probability measures on EEE, with the topology of weak convergence and its Borel σ-field. The model consists of:

  • a stochastic kernel p(⋅ ∣ x,a,μ)p(\cdot\,|\,x,a,\mu)p(⋅∣x,a,μ) on X\mathsf XX given X×A×P(X)\mathsf X\times\mathsf A\times\mathcal P(\mathsf X)X×A×P(X);
  • a one-stage cost c(x,a,μ)∈[0,K]c(x,a,\mu)\in[0,K]c(x,a,μ)∈[0,K];
  • an initial law μ0\mu_0μ0​, a discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1) and a risk factor λ>0\lambda>0λ>0.

A Markov policy is a sequence π=(πt)t≥0\pi=(\pi_t)_{t\ge0}π=(πt​)t≥0​ of kernels πt(da ∣ x)\pi_t(da\,|\,x)πt​(da∣x). A policy in general is allowed to depend on the whole history (x(0),a(0),…,x(t))(x(0),a(0),\dots,x(t))(x(0),a(0),…,x(t)). Given a measure flow μ=(μt)t≥0⊂P(X)\mu=(\mu_t)_{t\ge0}\subset\mathcal P(\mathsf X)μ=(μt​)t≥0​⊂P(X), a generic agent evolves as

x(0)∼μ0,a(t)∼πt(⋅ ∣ history),x(t+1)∼p(⋅ ∣ x(t),a(t),μt),x(0)\sim\mu_0,\qquad a(t)\sim\pi_t(\cdot\,|\,\text{history}),\qquad x(t+1)\sim p(\cdot\,|\,x(t),a(t),\mu_t),x(0)∼μ0​,a(t)∼πt​(⋅∣history),x(t+1)∼p(⋅∣x(t),a(t),μt​),

and pays the risk-sensitive cost

Jμ(π)=Eπ[exp⁡(λ∑t=0∞βtc(x(t),a(t),μt))].J_\mu(\pi)=E^\pi\Big[\exp\Big(\lambda\sum_{t=0}^\infty\beta^tc(x(t),a(t),\mu_t)\Big)\Big].Jμ​(π)=Eπ[exp(λt=0∑∞​βtc(x(t),a(t),μt​))].

For a Markov policy, Λ(π)\Lambda(\pi)Λ(π) is the flow of state laws it generates: it starts at μ0\mu_0μ0​ and satisfies μt+1(⋅)=∫p(⋅ ∣ x,a,μt) πt(da∣x) μt(dx)\mu_{t+1}(\cdot)=\int p(\cdot\,|\,x,a,\mu_t)\,\pi_t(da|x)\,\mu_t(dx)μt+1​(⋅)=∫p(⋅∣x,a,μt​)πt​(da∣x)μt​(dx). A pair (π,μ)(\pi,\mu)(π,μ) is a mean-field equilibrium if μ=Λ(π)\mu=\Lambda(\pi)μ=Λ(π) and π\piπ minimizes JμJ_\muJμ​ over all policies.

Assumption 1 asks for the following:

  • (a) ccc is continuous with ∥c∥≤K\|c\|\le K∥c∥≤K;
  • (b) ppp is weakly continuous in (x,a,μ)(x,a,\mu)(x,a,μ);
  • (c) A\mathsf AA is compact;
  • (d) there are α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0 and a continuous moment function w≥1w\ge1w≥1 (compact sets Kn↑XK_n\uparrow\mathsf XKn​↑X with inf⁡x∉Knw(x)→∞\inf_{x\notin K_n}w(x)\to\inftyinfx∈/Kn​​w(x)→∞) with ∫w(y) p(dy∣x,a,μ)≤αw(x)\int w(y)\,p(dy|x,a,\mu)\le\alpha w(x)∫w(y)p(dy∣x,a,μ)≤αw(x);
  • (e) ∫w dμ0<∞\int w\,d\mu_0<\infty∫wdμ0​<∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 10)

Under Assumption 1 there are a Markov policy π\piπ and a flow μ\muμ with

μ=Λ(π)andJμ(π)=inf⁡σ∈ΠJμ(σ).\mu=\Lambda(\pi)\qquad\text{and}\qquad J_\mu(\pi)=\inf_{\sigma\in\Pi}J_\mu(\sigma).μ=Λ(π)andJμ​(π)=σ∈Πinf​Jμ​(σ).

Milestones

In the paper's order of proof:

  1. Proposition 1: Markov policies achieve the optimal value.
  2. Lemmas 1–3: the finite- and infinite-horizon optimal value functions Jkn(⋅,λβk)J^n_k(\cdot,\lambda\beta^k)Jkn​(⋅,λβk) and Jk(⋅,λβk)J_k(\cdot,\lambda\beta^k)Jk​(⋅,λβk) of the nonhomogeneous MDP of a fixed flow are bounded and continuous. They satisfy the dynamic programming equation TkJk+1(⋅,λβk+1)=Jk(⋅,λβk)T_kJ_{k+1}(\cdot,\lambda\beta^{k+1})=J_k(\cdot,\lambda\beta^k)Tk​Jk+1​(⋅,λβk+1)=Jk​(⋅,λβk), and
∥Jkn(⋅,λβk)−Jk(⋅,λβk)∥≤λK1−βeλβkK1−ββn+1.\big\|J^n_k(\cdot,\lambda\beta^k)-J_k(\cdot,\lambda\beta^k)\big\|\le\frac{\lambda K}{1-\beta}e^{\frac{\lambda\beta^kK}{1-\beta}}\beta^{n+1}.​Jkn​(⋅,λβk)−Jk​(⋅,λβk)​≤1−βλK​e1−βλβkK​βn+1.
  1. Theorem 2: a Markov policy is optimal if and only if it almost surely selects minimizers in the dynamic programming equation.
  2. Propositions 2–5 and Lemma 4: equilibria are fixed points of a set-valued map Γ\GammaΓ on state–action flows in Ξ=∏t{ν:ν1(w)≤αtM}\Xi=\prod_t\{\nu:\nu_1(w)\le\alpha^tM\}Ξ=∏t​{ν:ν1​(w)≤αtM}; the optimal value functions depend continuously on the flow; and the graph of Γ\GammaΓ is closed in Ξ×Ξ\Xi\times\XiΞ×Ξ.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 is what makes the second main result of the paper meaningful. That result, Theorem 3 and the second mission of this series, states that the equilibrium policy is an ε\varepsilonε-Markov–Nash equilibrium of every NNN-agent game with NNN large enough. Equilibria of finite risk-sensitive games with many agents are rarely computable, so a mean-field equilibrium gives an approximately optimal decentralized policy that ignores the other agents' states. Along the way, the paper proves results on nonhomogeneous risk-sensitive MDPs that it describes as "mostly absent and dispersed in the literature": uniform finite-to-infinite horizon bounds and a characterization of optimal Markov policies. These results are useful outside game theory.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper. No part of it, nor of the risk-neutral precursor, has a machine-checked proof. Formalization produces a verified theory of nonhomogeneous risk-sensitive MDPs on Polish spaces, a verified closed-graph argument for the mean-field map, and an exact record of the hypotheses. The paper omits or cites several steps: Proposition 1, Proposition 2, Lemma 2, the conditional optimality (8) and the nonemptiness and convexity of Γ(ν)\Gamma(\nu)Γ(ν). A formalization has to supply them.

Difficulty

The obvious route is Banach's fixed point theorem for the dynamic programming operator, as in risk-neutral discounted MDPs. It fails here: the cost is multiplicative, and the operator TkT_kTk​ is not a contraction. Uniform convergence of value iteration has to come from the explicit tail bound of Lemma 3 instead.

The second obstacle is the fixed point itself. The natural map, from a flow to the flows of its optimal policies, is set-valued and lives on an infinite product of spaces of measures. Kakutani–Fan–Glicksberg applies only after three steps:

  • re-encoding the problem on state–action flows (the map Γ=C∩B\Gamma=C\cap BΓ=C∩B);
  • proving compactness of Ξ\XiΞ through the moment function (tightness);
  • proving that the graph of Γ\GammaΓ is closed (Proposition 4).

The last step requires the optimal value functions to vary continuously with the flow (Proposition 5) and a portmanteau argument for sets defined by optimality conditions. None of this machinery (the Kakutani–Fan–Glicksberg theorem in locally convex spaces, Prokhorov compactness via moment functions, continuous convergence) is in Mathlib in the required form.

Formalization scope

P(E)\mathcal P(E)P(E) is a type synonym of Mathlib's ProbabilityMeasure E with the weak topology and its Borel σ-field. The kernel ppp is a Mathlib Kernel on X×A×P(X)\mathsf X\times\mathsf A\times\mathcal P(\mathsf X)X×A×P(X). Policies are sequences of Markov kernels, and history-dependent policies take (X×A)t×X(\mathsf X\times\mathsf A)^t\times\mathsf X(X×A)t×X as input. The law PπP^\piPπ is built with the Ionescu–Tulcea kernel Kernel.trajMeasure, one coordinate (x(t),a(t))(x(t),a(t))(x(t),a(t)) per time step. Time is 000-based.

Standing hypotheses on every statement:

  • X\mathsf XX and A\mathsf AA are Polish and Borel;
  • A\mathsf AA is compact and nonempty (used tacitly by the paper);
  • β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1), λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, and c≥0c\ge0c≥0 is measurable;
  • Assumption 1.

For §4.2 the pair (α,w)(\alpha,w)(α,w) defining Ξ\XiΞ is an explicit argument. In §4.1, "policy" means Markov policy, as the paper states on p. 11. The conditional expectations "given x(k)=xx(k)=xx(k)=x" are expectations for the chain started at time kkk in xxx. Lemma 1 is stated with ζk,n=∑t=knβt\zeta_{k,n}=\sum_{t=k}^n\beta^tζk,n​=∑t=kn​βt, the quantity its proof uses; the page prints ∑t=knβk\sum_{t=k}^n\beta^k∑t=kn​βk.

The goal asks for a Markov equilibrium policy that is optimal against all history-dependent policies, at least as strong as Definition 3. Optimality is "≤\le≤ the cost of every policy", not an infimum, so it has no junk case. The cost is a genuine integral: with c≥0c\ge0c≥0 bounded, the integrand lies in [1,eλK/(1−β)][1,e^{\lambda K/(1-\beta)}][1,eλK/(1−β)], so no policy is trivially optimal. The moment-function predicate has no infimum, so compact X\mathsf XX is admitted.

Contributions are welcome at every level:

  • risk-sensitive dynamic programming on Borel spaces (reusable for any MDP);
  • the Kakutani–Fan–Glicksberg theorem in locally convex spaces;
  • Prokhorov compactness from moment functions;
  • measurable selection and disintegration of state–action measures.

Selected references

  • N. Saldi, T. Başar, M. Raginsky, Discrete-time Risk-sensitive Mean-field Games, arXiv:1808.03929v2, 2018; published as Approximate Markov-Nash Equilibria for Discrete-Time Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field Games, Math. Oper. Res. 45(4), 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.03929
  • N. Saldi, T. Başar, M. Raginsky, Markov–Nash Equilibria in Mean-Field Games with Discounted Cost, SIAM J. Control Optim. 56(6), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1137/17M1112583
  • N. Bäuerle, U. Rieder, More Risk-Sensitive Markov Decision Processes, Math. Oper. Res. 39(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0601
  • O. Hernández-Lerma, J. B. Lasserre, Discrete-Time Markov Control Processes: Basic Optimality Criteria, Springer, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0729-0
  • C. D. Aliprantis, K. C. Border, Infinite Dimensional Analysis, 3rd ed., Springer, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-29587-9
15 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Chance-Constrained Problems via a Smooth Sample-Based Nonlinear Approximation 2: Optimal Values and Solutions of the Smoothed SAA Converge w.p.1 as N → ∞ and ε → 0Research Paper

Motivation

A chance-constrained program asks for a decision that satisfies uncertain constraints with high probability rather than surely:

min⁡x∈Xf(x)s.t.P(cj(x,ξ)≤0, j=1,…,m)≥1−α.(1.1)\min_{x\in X} f(x) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \mathbb P\bigl(c_j(x,\xi)\le 0,\ j=1,\dots,m\bigr)\ge 1-\alpha. \tag{1.1}x∈Xmin​f(x)s.t.P(cj​(x,ξ)≤0, j=1,…,m)≥1−α.(1.1)

Such models appear in power-system operation, portfolio selection, chemical-process and reservoir management, and other settings where requiring the constraints for every realization is too conservative (Nemirovski–Shapiro 2006; the paper's introduction lists applications). The probability is rarely available in closed form, and when the distribution of ξ\xiξ is only accessible through samples, the feasible set of the empirical counterpart is a union of polyhedral-like pieces: it is non-smooth and non-convex, and the empirical quantile introduces many spurious local minima (Peña-Ordieres, Luedtke, Wächter 2020, §2).

Peña-Ordieres, Luedtke and Wächter replace the indicator inside the empirical probability by a smooth kernel with bandwidth ε\varepsilonε, which turns the sample constraint into a differentiable one suitable for nonlinear programming solvers. This mission formalizes the paper's consistency result: as the sample size grows and the bandwidth shrinks, jointly, the optimal values and optimal solutions of the smoothed sample problem converge to those of the true problem with probability one.

Timeline. Consistency of sample approximations of chance constraints with the plain empirical cdf goes back to Pagnoncelli, Ahmed, Shapiro 2009 (reference [36] of the paper; its Propositions 2.1 and 2.2). Luedtke–Ahmed 2008 gave finite-sample feasibility guarantees for the same empirical approximation. Convergence with respect to a smoothing parameter alone was studied by Geletu, Hoffmann, Klöppel and Li (SIAM J. Optim. 27, 2017), Hong, Yang, Zhang 2011 and Hu, Hong and Zhang (IIE Trans. 45, 2013) (references [15], [25], [26] of the paper). Peña-Ordieres–Luedtke–Wächter 2020 (SIAM J. Optim. 30(3)) treat both parameters simultaneously; Theorem 3.5 of the preprint arXiv:1905.07377v2 is the result posed here.

Setting

Decisions are vectors x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn restricted to a closed set XXX. The random data ξ\xiξ takes values in a measurable space Ξ\XiΞ with law Pξ\mathbb P_\xiPξ​. The constraints are aggregated into one scalar function C(x,ξ)=max⁡jcj(x,ξ)C(x,\xi)=\max_j c_j(x,\xi)C(x,ξ)=maxj​cj​(x,ξ), and the risk level is α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1).

  • True distribution function. F(t;x)=Pξ(C(x,ξ)≤t)F(t;x)=\mathbb P_\xi(C(x,\xi)\le t)F(t;x)=Pξ​(C(x,ξ)≤t). The true feasible region is Xα={x∈X∣F(0;x)≥1−α}X_\alpha=\{x\in X\mid F(0;x)\ge 1-\alpha\}Xα​={x∈X∣F(0;x)≥1−α}; the optimal solution set and value of (1.1) are SSS and v∗v^*v∗.
  • Smoothed indicator. For ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, Γε(y)\Gamma_\varepsilon(y)Γε​(y) equals 111 for y≤−εy\le-\varepsilony≤−ε, 000 for y≥εy\ge\varepsilony≥ε, and γε(y)\gamma_\varepsilon(y)γε​(y) in between, where γε:[−ε,ε]→[0,1]\gamma_\varepsilon:[-\varepsilon,\varepsilon]\to[0,1]γε​:[−ε,ε]→[0,1] is strictly decreasing, symmetric (γε(−y)=1−γε(y)\gamma_\varepsilon(-y)=1-\gamma_\varepsilon(y)γε​(−y)=1−γε​(y)), and makes Γε\Gamma_\varepsilonΓε​ differentiable. The paper's concrete choice is the quartic kernel (2.6).
  • Smoothed distribution functions. Fε(t;x)=∫Γε(C(x,ξ)−t) dPξF_\varepsilon(t;x)=\int\Gamma_\varepsilon(C(x,\xi)-t)\,d\mathbb P_\xiFε​(t;x)=∫Γε​(C(x,ξ)−t)dPξ​, and, for an i.i.d. sample ξ1,…,ξN\xi_1,\dots,\xi_Nξ1​,…,ξN​,
FεN(t;x)=1N∑i=1NΓε(C(x,ξi)−t).F^N_\varepsilon(t;x)=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\Gamma_\varepsilon\bigl(C(x,\xi_i)-t\bigr).FεN​(t;x)=N1​i=1∑N​Γε​(C(x,ξi​)−t).
  • Smoothed sample problem (2.4). min⁡x∈Xf(x)\min_{x\in X} f(x)minx∈X​f(x) subject to FεN(0;x)≥1−αF^N_\varepsilon(0;x)\ge1-\alphaFεN​(0;x)≥1−α, with optimal solution set SεNS^N_\varepsilonSεN​ and value vεNv^N_\varepsilonvεN​.

The standing assumptions are: Assumption 3.1, for each x∈Xx\in Xx∈X the random variable C(x,ξ)C(x,\xi)C(x,ξ) has a continuous distribution; Assumption 3.2, CCC is Carathéodory, i.e. C(x,⋅)C(x,\cdot)C(x,⋅) is measurable for each x∈Xx\in Xx∈X and C(⋅,ξ)C(\cdot,\xi)C(⋅,ξ) is continuous for almost every ξ\xiξ; Assumption 3.3, some optimal solution xˉ\bar xxˉ of (1.1) is a limit of points x∈Xx\in Xx∈X with F(0;x)>1−αF(0;x)>1-\alphaF(0;x)>1−α.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.5

If XXX is compact, fff is continuous and Assumptions 3.1–3.3 hold, then with probability one, as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ and ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0 jointly,

SεN≠∅ eventually,vεN→v∗,D(SεN,S)=sup⁡x∈SεNdist⁡(x,S)→0.S^N_\varepsilon\neq\emptyset\ \text{eventually},\qquad v^N_\varepsilon\to v^*,\qquad \mathbb D(S^N_\varepsilon,S)=\sup_{x\in S^N_\varepsilon}\operatorname{dist}(x,S)\to0 .SεN​=∅ eventually,vεN​→v∗,D(SεN​,S)=x∈SεN​sup​dist(x,S)→0.

Milestones

  1. Uniform law of large numbers (proof of Theorem 3.4): w.p.1, sup⁡ε∈(0,1]sup⁡x∈U∣FεN(0;x)−Fε(0;x)∣→0\sup_{\varepsilon\in(0,1]}\sup_{x\in U}|F^N_\varepsilon(0;x)-F_\varepsilon(0;x)|\to0supε∈(0,1]​supx∈U​∣FεN​(0;x)−Fε​(0;x)∣→0 as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞, for compact U⊆XU\subseteq XU⊆X.
  2. Removal of the smoothing (proof of Theorem 3.4): sup⁡x∈U∣Fε(0;x)−F(0;x)∣→0\sup_{x\in U}|F_\varepsilon(0;x)-F(0;x)|\to0supx∈U​∣Fε​(0;x)−F(0;x)∣→0 as ε→0+\varepsilon\to0^+ε→0+.
  3. Theorem 3.4: w.p.1, sup⁡x∈U∣FεN(0;x)−F(0;x)∣→0\sup_{x\in U}|F^N_\varepsilon(0;x)-F(0;x)|\to0supx∈U​∣FεN​(0;x)−F(0;x)∣→0 as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ and ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0.
  4. Eventual nonemptiness of SεNS^N_\varepsilonSεN​ (proof of Theorem 3.5).
  5. (3.3): lim inf⁡vεN≥v∗\liminf v^N_\varepsilon\ge v^*liminfvεN​≥v∗ w.p.1.
  6. (3.4): lim sup⁡vεN≤v∗\limsup v^N_\varepsilon\le v^*limsupvεN​≤v∗ w.p.1.

Significance

Theorem 3.5 justifies solving the smooth problem (2.4) in place of (1.1): with enough samples and a small enough bandwidth, global solutions of the surrogate approximate global solutions of the chance-constrained program, and the optimal values agree in the limit. Unlike earlier results it controls the two approximation errors, sampling and smoothing, at once, so no order of limits has to be chosen in practice. It is the asymptotic counterpart of the paper's finite-sample feasibility bound (Theorem 3.13) and the theoretical basis for the trust-region method of §5.

The result is proved in the paper, with two steps imported from Shapiro–Dentcheva–Ruszczyński, second edition (a uniform law of large numbers, Theorem 7.53, and a convergence-of-expectations result, Theorem 4.91) and the deviation statement deferred to Theorem 5.3 there. None of these results, and no consistency theorem for sample approximations of chance constraints, is machine-checked on Prove2Me or, as far as is known, elsewhere. A formal proof requires writing the imported steps out for the specific integrands of this problem and completing the solution-set argument the paper leaves to the reference.

Difficulty

The pointwise statements are routine; the uniformity is not. The integrand Γε(C(x,ξ))\Gamma_\varepsilon(C(x,\xi))Γε​(C(x,ξ)) converges, as ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0, to the indicator 1{C(x,ξ)≤0}\mathbf 1\{C(x,\xi)\le0\}1{C(x,ξ)≤0}, which is discontinuous in xxx wherever C(x,ξ)=0C(x,\xi)=0C(x,ξ)=0. A uniform law of large numbers for a family that degenerates into indicators needs the no-atom Assumption 3.1 at every point of UUU, not only at the limit. Moreover, the smoothing functions γε\gamma_\varepsilonγε​ for different ε\varepsilonε are unrelated, so the family is not continuous in ε\varepsilonε, and a Glivenko–Cantelli argument over a joint parameter (x,ε)(x,\varepsilon)(x,ε) cannot be applied directly. The convergence of solution sets needs, in addition, that the limit of feasible points of (2.4) is feasible for (1.1), which uses the continuity of F(0;⋅)F(0;\cdot)F(0;⋅) on XXX; that continuity again rests on Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2.

Formalization scope

  • Decisions are Fin n → ℝ with the sup norm. Assumption 3.3 is stated for every radius, so the norm choice does not change it.
  • The sample is an infinite sequence ξ : ℕ → Ω → Ξ of measurable, independent maps on a probability space, each with law Pξ\mathbb P_\xiPξ​; FεNF^N_\varepsilonFεN​ uses the first NNN draws.
  • "As N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ and ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0" is the product filter atTop ×ˢ 𝓝[>] 0 on N×R\mathbb N\times\mathbb RN×R, with ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 because Γε\Gamma_\varepsilonΓε​ needs it; one null set serves every conclusion of a statement.
  • Assumption 3.1 is "no atoms": Pξ(C(x,ξ)=y)=0\mathbb P_\xi(C(x,\xi)=y)=0Pξ​(C(x,ξ)=y)=0 for all x∈Xx\in Xx∈X, y∈Ry\in\mathbb Ry∈R. Assumption 3.2 is measurability of C(x,⋅)C(x,\cdot)C(x,⋅) on XXX plus almost-sure continuity of C(⋅,ξ)C(\cdot,\xi)C(⋅,ξ) on Rn\mathbb R^nRn.
  • The family γε\gamma_\varepsilonγε​ is any family with each member admissible; no relation across ε\varepsilonε is assumed. The quartic kernel (2.6) is admissible for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, so the hypothesis is satisfiable.
  • The feasible set of (2.4) is {x∈X∣FεN(0;x)≥1−α}\{x\in X\mid F^N_\varepsilon(0;x)\ge1-\alpha\}{x∈X∣FεN​(0;x)≥1−α}, the form the paper's proof uses. The quantile Qε1−αQ^{1-\alpha}_\varepsilonQε1−α​ of (2.4) is defined only when (1−α)N∉Z(1-\alpha)N\notin\mathbb Z(1−α)N∈/Z, which fails for infinitely many NNN when α\alphaα is rational; where it is defined, the two feasible sets coincide.
  • The optimal value is the real infimum, which Lean sets to 000 on an empty set. The goal therefore asserts eventual nonemptiness of SεNS^N_\varepsilonSεN​ itself, and (3.3)–(3.4) are stated as bounds on fff over the feasible set of (2.4), which imply the liminf and limsup without reading an infimum over a possibly empty set. The deviation D\mathbb DD is stated pointwise ("every point of SεNS^N_\varepsilonSεN​ is eventually within η\etaη of SSS"), with SSS nonempty by Assumption 3.3, so the distance to the empty set never arises.
  • Iterated limits (first NNN, then ε\varepsilonε), a null set chosen after η\etaη, or a feasible set defined through QεQ_\varepsilonQε​ with its junk value would each be a different and weaker statement; none is used.

The definitions layer (Γ_ε, admissibility, FFF, FεF_\varepsilonFε​, FεNF^N_\varepsilonFεN​, XαX_\alphaXα​, the shifted sample sets (3.2)) is shared with the companion mission on finite-sample feasibility. A uniform law of large numbers for almost-surely continuous, bounded integrands on a compact parameter set, and convergence of optimal values under uniform convergence of constraint functions, are reusable beyond this mission; contributions of either as standalone lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Peña-Ordieres, J. R. Luedtke, A. Wächter, Solving chance-constrained problems via a smooth sample-based nonlinear approximation, SIAM J. Optim. 30(3), 2020; preprint arXiv:1905.07377v2, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07377, https://doi.org/10.1137/19M1261985
  • A. Shapiro, D. Dentcheva, A. Ruszczyński, Lectures on Stochastic Programming: Modeling and Theory, SIAM, second edition, 2014 (Theorems 4.91, 5.3, 7.53; reference [40] of the paper). https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973433
  • B. K. Pagnoncelli, S. Ahmed, A. Shapiro, Sample average approximation method for chance constrained programming: theory and applications, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 142, 2009, pp. 399–416. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-009-9523-6
  • J. Luedtke, S. Ahmed, A sample approximation approach for optimization with probabilistic constraints, SIAM J. Optim. 19, 2008, pp. 674–699. https://doi.org/10.1137/070702928
  • L. J. Hong, Y. Yang, L. Zhang, Sequential convex approximations to joint chance constrained programs: a Monte Carlo approach, Oper. Res. 59, 2011, pp. 617–630. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0910
  • A. Nemirovski, A. Shapiro, Convex approximations of chance constrained programs, SIAM J. Optim. 17, 2006, pp. 969–996. https://doi.org/10.1137/050622328
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Online Matching, Assortment, and Pricing with Tight Weight-Dependent Competitive Ratios II: In the Deterministic Case Multi-price Ranking Is minᵢ F(𝒫ᵢ)-CompetitiveResearch Paper

Motivation

Online matching models a platform that must commit resources to requests as they arrive, without knowing the future. In revenue management the resources are items in limited supply and the requests are customers, and the firm also chooses the price. Ma and Simchi-Levi (arXiv:1905.04770, Oper. Res. 2020, DOI 10.1287/opre.2019.1957) give algorithms whose worst-case guarantee depends on the set of prices each item can be sold at, and show that the guarantee is tight.

Timeline of the deterministic (matching) case:

  • 1990. Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani introduce RANKING for unweighted online bipartite matching: each item gets a random rank, and each arriving customer takes the best-ranked available neighbour. Its competitive ratio is 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e, which is optimal.
  • 2011. Aggarwal, Goel, Karande and Mehta extend RANKING to vertex-weighted matching, where each item has a single fixed price, with the same ratio 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e.
  • 2013. Devanur, Jain and Kleinberg give a randomized primal–dual proof of these results with continuous seeds Wi∼U[0,1]W_i\sim U[0,1]Wi​∼U[0,1].
  • 2019. Ma and Simchi-Levi allow each item a set of prices. Their Multi-price Ranking ranks items by a price-dependent value function, and it is min⁡iF(Pi)\min_iF(\mathcal P_i)mini​F(Pi​)-competitive. F(P)F(\mathcal P)F(P) depends only on the ratios of the prices; it equals 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e for one price and lies in [1−e−1/m,1−1/e][1-e^{-1/m},1-1/e][1−e−1/m,1−1/e] for mmm prices (p. 14).

Setting

A firm sells nnn items, one unit of each. Item iii has a price set Pi={ri(1)<⋯<ri(mi)}\mathcal P_i=\{r_i^{(1)}<\dots<r_i^{(m_i)}\}Pi​={ri(1)​<⋯<ri(mi​)​} with ri(1)>0r_i^{(1)}>0ri(1)​>0, and ri(0):=0r_i^{(0)}:=0ri(0)​:=0. Customers t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T arrive one at a time. In the deterministic case, customer ttt either would or would not buy item iii at price jjj: pt,i(j)∈{0,1}p^{(j)}_{t,i}\in\{0,1\}pt,i(j)​∈{0,1}. Let jt,ij_{t,i}jt,i​ be the largest jjj with pt,i(j)=1p^{(j)}_{t,i}=1pt,i(j)​=1, or 000 if there is none. Assigning item iii to customer ttt earns ri(jt,i)r_i^{(j_{t,i})}ri(jt,i​)​. An online algorithm sees ptp_{t}pt​ only when customer ttt arrives.

The benchmark is the LP (5): maximize ∑t,i,jpt,i(j)ri(j)xt,i(j)\sum_{t,i,j}p^{(j)}_{t,i}r_i^{(j)}x^{(j)}_{t,i}∑t,i,j​pt,i(j)​ri(j)​xt,i(j)​ subject to ∑t,jpt,i(j)xt,i(j)≤ki\sum_{t,j}p^{(j)}_{t,i}x^{(j)}_{t,i}\le k_i∑t,j​pt,i(j)​xt,i(j)​≤ki​, ∑i,jxt,i(j)≤1\sum_{i,j}x^{(j)}_{t,i}\le1∑i,j​xt,i(j)​≤1 and x≥0x\ge0x≥0, with optimal value OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT. Its dual (19) minimizes ∑ikiyi+∑tzt\sum_ik_iy_i+\sum_tz_t∑i​ki​yi​+∑t​zt​ subject to pt,i(j)yi+zt≥pt,i(j)ri(j)p^{(j)}_{t,i}y_i+z_t\ge p^{(j)}_{t,i}r_i^{(j)}pt,i(j)​yi​+zt​≥pt,i(j)​ri(j)​ and y,z≥0y,z\ge0y,z≥0. An algorithm is ccc-competitive if E[ALG]≥c⋅OPT\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]\ge c\cdot\mathrm{OPT}E[ALG]≥c⋅OPT for every arrival sequence.

Booking limits. By Proposition 1 there are unique positive α(1),…,α(m)\alpha^{(1)},\dots,\alpha^{(m)}α(1),…,α(m) that sum to 111 and satisfy

1−e−α(1)=1−e−α(j)1−r(j−1)/r(j)(j=2,…,m).1-e^{-\alpha^{(1)}}=\frac{1-e^{-\alpha^{(j)}}}{1-r^{(j-1)}/r^{(j)}}\quad (j=2,\dots,m).1−e−α(1)=1−r(j−1)/r(j)1−e−α(j)​(j=2,…,m).

Set F(P)=1−e−α(1)F(\mathcal P)=1-e^{-\alpha^{(1)}}F(P)=1−e−α(1) and L(j)=α(1)+⋯+α(j)L^{(j)}=\alpha^{(1)}+\dots+\alpha^{(j)}L(j)=α(1)+⋯+α(j). For w∈[0,1]w\in[0,1]w∈[0,1] let ℓ(w)\ell(w)ℓ(w) be the segment containing www. The value function is

ΦP(w)=r(ℓ−1)+(r(ℓ)−r(ℓ−1))e w−L(ℓ−1)−1eα(ℓ)−1,ℓ=ℓ(w).\Phi_{\mathcal P}(w)=r^{(\ell-1)}+\bigl(r^{(\ell)}-r^{(\ell-1)}\bigr)\frac{e^{\,w-L^{(\ell-1)}}-1}{e^{\alpha^{(\ell)}}-1},\qquad \ell=\ell(w).ΦP​(w)=r(ℓ−1)+(r(ℓ)−r(ℓ−1))eα(ℓ)−1ew−L(ℓ−1)−1​,ℓ=ℓ(w).

It increases continuously from 000 to r(m)r^{(m)}r(m) and equals r(j)r^{(j)}r(j) at L(j)L^{(j)}L(j).

Multi-price Ranking (Algorithm 2). Each item draws an independent seed Wi∼U[0,1]W_i\sim U[0,1]Wi​∼U[0,1]. Customer ttt is assigned an available item maximizing ri(jt,i)−ΦPi(Wi)r_i^{(j_{t,i})}-\Phi_{\mathcal P_i}(W_i)ri(jt,i​)​−ΦPi​​(Wi​), provided the maximum is strictly positive. Ties are broken arbitrarily. The analysis uses dual variables: when iii is assigned to ttt, Zt=ri(jt,i)−ΦPi(Wi)Z_t=r_i^{(j_{t,i})}-\Phi_{\mathcal P_i}(W_i)Zt​=ri(jt,i​)​−ΦPi​​(Wi​) and Yi=ΦPi′(Wi)Y_i=\Phi'_{\mathcal P_i}(W_i)Yi​=ΦPi​′​(Wi​); all other dual variables are 000.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 16)

For every setup in the deterministic case with ki=1k_i=1ki​=1, every arrival sequence, every tie-breaking rule and every feasible xxx of (5),

min⁡iF(Pi)⋅∑t,i,jpt,i(j)ri(j)xt,i(j) ≤ EW[ALG].\min_iF(\mathcal P_i)\cdot\sum_{t,i,j}p^{(j)}_{t,i}r_i^{(j)}x^{(j)}_{t,i}\ \le\ \mathbb E_{W}\bigl[\mathrm{ALG}\bigr].imin​F(Pi​)⋅t,i,j∑​pt,i(j)​ri(j)​xt,i(j)​ ≤ EW​[ALG].

Milestones

  1. Weak duality for (5)/(19) (p. 19).
  2. Lemma 2 (p. 22): if item iii is assigned to customer ttt, then (1−e−αi(1))(Yi+Zt)≤ri(jt,i)(1-e^{-\alpha_i^{(1)}})(Y_i+Z_t)\le r_i^{(j_{t,i})}(1−e−αi(1)​)(Yi​+Zt​)≤ri(jt,i​)​.
  3. Dominance claim (App. C, pp. 45–46): let ZcritZ^{\mathrm{crit}}Zcrit be the pseudorevenue at ttt of the run without item iii. If Wi∈[0,Wcrit)W_i\in[0,W^{\mathrm{crit}})Wi​∈[0,Wcrit), then item iii is matched by time ttt in the run with item iii.
  4. Monotonicity claim (App. C, p. 46): Zt≥ZcritZ_t\ge Z^{\mathrm{crit}}Zt​≥Zcrit for every value of WiW_iWi​.
  5. Lemma 3 (p. 22): yi=E[Yi]y_i=\mathbb E[Y_i]yi​=E[Yi​], zt=E[Zt]z_t=\mathbb E[Z_t]zt​=E[Zt​] is feasible for (19).

Significance

The theorem shows that one randomized rule achieves the optimal guarantee for every price set, and that the guarantee depends only on the price ratios. For one price, F=1−1/eF=1-1/eF=1−1/e and the classical vertex-weighted result is recovered. With several prices the benchmark (5) is stronger, because the offline optimum may also choose prices, and the guarantee degrades gracefully: F(P)F(\mathcal P)F(P) lies in [1−e−1/m,1−1/e][1-e^{-1/m},1-1/e][1−e−1/m,1−1/e] and depends only on how far apart the prices are. Theorem 3 of the same paper shows that no online algorithm does better than F(P)F(\mathcal P)F(P) when every item has price set P\mathcal PP, so the ratio is tight.

The results are proved in the paper, in §4 and App. C. As far as the platform's records show, they have not been formalized. A formalization adds three things on top of the paper. It machine-checks a randomized primal–dual argument whose expectations are integrals over [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n. It makes precise the measure-zero conventions the paper uses: ties in (23), and Φ′\Phi'Φ′ at segment borders. It also gives a Lean model of a ranking algorithm with continuous seeds that sees only the present customer, which could be reused for related online algorithms.

Difficulty

The pointwise part (Lemma 2) is a direct computation from the booking-limit identity (7). The difficulty is Lemma 3. The constraint for a pair (t,i)(t,i)(t,i) needs E[Yi+Zt]≥ri(jt,i)\mathbb E[Y_i+Z_t]\ge r_i^{(j_{t,i})}E[Yi​+Zt​]≥ri(jt,i​)​, but on a single sample path Yi+ZtY_i+Z_tYi​+Zt​ can be far below this: item iii may be taken by an earlier customer, or customer ttt may take another item. The bound only holds after conditioning on the other seeds and comparing two coupled runs, one with item iii and one without. That comparison needs an invariant that holds at every step: the set of items still available in the run with iii contains the set in the run without iii. The invariant fails when ties are broken differently in the two runs, so the measure-zero set of ties must be handled explicitly. The conditional expectation of YiY_iYi​ is then an integral of Φ′\Phi'Φ′, which is discontinuous at the segment borders.

Formalization scope

  • Indexing. Items are Fin n and customers Fin T, both 0-based. Prices are 1-based within an item, with pr r 0 = 0 for r(0)=0r^{(0)}=0r(0)=0. Data at indices outside [1,mi][1,m_i][1,mi​] are never read.
  • Standing assumptions (p. 11), passed as hypotheses: every price set has mi≥1m_i\ge1mi​≥1 and 0<ri(1)<⋯<ri(mi)0<r_i^{(1)}<\dots<r_i^{(m_i)}0<ri(1)​<⋯<ri(mi​)​; the booking limits are positive, sum to 111 and satisfy (7) (IsBookingLimits, unique by Proposition 1); p∈{0,1}p\in\{0,1\}p∈{0,1} on [1,mi][1,m_i][1,mi​]; ki=1k_i=1ki​=1. Weak duality is stated for any p∈[0,1]p\in[0,1]p∈[0,1] and any inventories.
  • Algorithm. The step at customer ttt reads only ptp_tpt​, the seeds and the set of available items. Tie-breaking is any rule returning a maximizer of (23), universally quantified. A run can start from a subset of the items, which gives the run "with item iii removed".
  • Expectations are Lebesgue integrals over the product of nnn uniform laws on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. No integrability hypothesis is added: the integrands are bounded, and measurable outside the null set of ties.
  • Competitive ratio. It is stated multiplied out, for every feasible xxx of (5), and needs n≥1n\ge1n≥1 for the minimum (with no items both sides are 000). This rules out the trivializing readings E[ALG]/OPT\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]/\mathrm{OPT}E[ALG]/OPT with x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0, and an infimum over arrival sequences. The algorithm is fixed as Algorithm 2; it is not "any algorithm with a property".
  • Added or changed hypotheses.
    • Lemma 2 is claimed for every seed vector in [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n, with Φ′\Phi'Φ′ the right derivative at a border. This implies the paper's "w.p.1".
    • The two claims assume no ties, the paper's "we ignore measure-zero events".
    • Dominance is written as ΦPi(Wi)<ri(j)−Zcrit\Phi_{\mathcal P_i}(W_i)<r_i^{(j)}-Z^{\mathrm{crit}}ΦPi​​(Wi​)<ri(j)​−Zcrit. This is equivalent to Wi<WcritW_i<W^{\mathrm{crit}}Wi​<Wcrit because Φ\PhiΦ is a strictly increasing bijection [0,Li(j)]→[0,ri(j)][0,L_i^{(j)}]\to[0,r_i^{(j)}][0,Li(j)​]→[0,ri(j)​].
  • Infrastructure. A solver needs: monotonicity and continuity of ΦP\Phi_{\mathcal P}ΦP​ and the integral ∫0wΦ′=Φ(w)\int_0^{w}\Phi'=\Phi(w)∫0w​Φ′=Φ(w); measurability of the run in WWW; the fact that ties are null under the product of uniform laws; and conditioning via Fubini on [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n. These pieces are reusable for other randomized primal–dual analyses. The paper's proofs are in §4 (p. 23) and App. C (pp. 45–46). Proofs of any milestone, and lemmas on ΦP\Phi_{\mathcal P}ΦP​, are welcome.

Selected references

  • W. Ma, D. Simchi-Levi, Algorithms for Online Matching, Assortment, and Pricing with Tight Weight-dependent Competitive Ratios, arXiv:1905.04770v1, 2019; Operations Research 68(6), 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04770 · https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1957
  • R. M. Karp, U. V. Vazirani, V. V. Vazirani, An optimal algorithm for on-line bipartite matching, STOC 1990. https://doi.org/10.1145/100216.100262
  • G. Aggarwal, G. Goel, C. Karande, A. Mehta, Online vertex-weighted bipartite matching and single-bid budgeted allocations, SODA 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1007.1271
  • N. R. Devanur, K. Jain, R. D. Kleinberg, Randomized primal-dual analysis of RANKING for online bipartite matching, SODA 2013. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973105.7
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Algorithms for Online Matching, Assortment, and Pricing with Tight Weight-Dependent Competitive Ratios III: No Online Algorithm Earns More Than F(𝒫) Times the Expected Offline OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm sells several products, each in limited supply. Customers arrive one at a time, and each product can be offered at one of a few prices. This is the setting of airline fare classes, hotel rate plans and e-commerce discounting. Because future demand is unknown, the firm must decide online whether to sell a unit now at a low price or keep it for a customer who may pay more later. The competitive ratio measures how much an online policy loses against an omniscient benchmark in the worst case.

Ma and Simchi-Levi (arXiv:1905.04770; Oper. Res. 2020, doi:10.1287/opre.2019.1957) give online algorithms whose competitive ratio depends on the price set 𝒫 of each item through a number F(𝒫), and prove that this dependence is the best possible. This mission formalizes the second half, the impossibility result: no online algorithm can beat F(𝒫).

Timeline of the single-price precursors:

  • Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani (1990) introduced the upper-triangular random-permutation instance and showed that 1 − 1/e is optimal for online bipartite matching.
  • Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani and Vazirani (2007) used a similar construction for AdWords with small bids.
  • Golrezaei, Nazerzadeh and Rusmevichientong (2014) used one for personalized assortment with large inventories.
  • Ma and Simchi-Levi (2019, preprint v1) add phases of customers who pay different prices. With the phase lengths chosen adversarially, the bound becomes F(𝒫).

Setting

A setup has n items. Each item has starting inventory k ∈ ℕ, k ≥ 1, and the same price set 𝒫 = {r⁽¹⁾ < … < r⁽ᵐ⁾}, with r⁽¹⁾ > 0 and r⁽⁰⁾ := 0.

An arrival sequence 𝒜 has T customers. For each customer t, item i and price j it gives a purchase probability p⁽ʲ⁾{t,i}. It is deterministic if every p⁽ʲ⁾{t,i} is 0 or 1.

When customer t arrives, an online algorithm offers at most one in-stock item at one price. It decides using only the setup, the past, and the present customer's probabilities. A deterministic customer buys exactly when p⁽ʲ⁾_{t,i} = 1. A sale earns r⁽ʲ⁾ and uses one unit. ALG(𝒮, 𝒜) is the total revenue. A randomized online algorithm picks a deterministic one at random, ω ↦ alg(ω) with ω ~ μ.

The benchmark OPT(𝒮, 𝒜) is the value of the linear program (5):

max⁡∑t,i,jpt,i(j)r(j)xt,i(j)  s.t. ∑t,jpt,i(j)xt,i(j)≤k,  ∑i,jxt,i(j)≤1,  x≥0.\max \sum_{t,i,j} p^{(j)}_{t,i} r^{(j)} x^{(j)}_{t,i}\ \text{ s.t. } \sum_{t,j} p^{(j)}_{t,i} x^{(j)}_{t,i} \le k,\ \ \sum_{i,j} x^{(j)}_{t,i} \le 1,\ \ x \ge 0.maxt,i,j∑​pt,i(j)​r(j)xt,i(j)​  s.t. t,j∑​pt,i(j)​xt,i(j)​≤k,  i,j∑​xt,i(j)​≤1,  x≥0.

The booking limits α⁽¹⁾, …, α⁽ᵐ⁾ of Proposition 1 are the unique positive numbers summing to 1 with

1−e−α(1)=1−e−α(j)1−r(j−1)/r(j),j=2,…,m.(7)1 - e^{-\alpha^{(1)}} = \frac{1 - e^{-\alpha^{(j)}}}{1 - r^{(j-1)}/r^{(j)}}, \qquad j = 2, \dots, m. \qquad (7)1−e−α(1)=1−r(j−1)/r(j)1−e−α(j)​,j=2,…,m.(7)

The tight ratio is F(𝒫) = 1 − e^{−α⁽¹⁾}. For a single price F(𝒫) = 1 − 1/e. As r⁽ᵐ⁾/r⁽¹⁾ → ∞, F(𝒫) decreases.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 17), in ε-form

For every k ≥ 1, every price set 𝒫 and every ε > 0, there are a setup with all items of inventory k and price set 𝒫 and a finite distribution over deterministic arrival sequences, with 𝔼[OPT] > 0, such that every (measurable) randomized online algorithm satisfies

EA E[ALG(S,A)]≤(1−e−α(1)+ε) EA[OPT(S,A)].\mathbb E_{\mathcal A}\,\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}(\mathcal S,\mathcal A)] \le \big(1 - e^{-\alpha^{(1)}} + \varepsilon\big)\,\mathbb E_{\mathcal A}[\mathrm{OPT}(\mathcal S,\mathcal A)].EA​E[ALG(S,A)]≤(1−e−α(1)+ε)EA​[OPT(S,A)].

The statement only asserts that such an instance exists; it does not fix the paper's construction.

Milestones

The instance of §5 has n items and nk customers in n groups of k. The groups are ordered by a uniformly random permutation π: group g wants items π_g, …, π_n. The groups are split into m phases; phase j pays up to r⁽ʲ⁾ and contains a fraction β_j = B_j − B_{j+1} of the groups. The milestones are:

  1. (35): r⁽ʲ⁻¹⁾/r⁽ʲ⁾ ≤ e^{−α⁽ʲ⁾};
  2. Proposition 4: the system B_j r⁽ʲ⁾ e^{−α⁽ʲ⁾} = r⁽¹⁾e^{−α⁽¹⁾} has a unique solution with 0 < B_m < … < B₁ = 1;
  3. (25): on the instance, OPT = Σⱼ (r⁽ʲ⁾ − r⁽ʲ⁻¹⁾)Bⱼnk up to rounding;
  4. Lemma 5: the maximum of the concave program (27) is (28);
  5. (29): (28) at j = 1, τ = 1 equals F(𝒫) times (25);
  6. Lemma 4: the expected revenue of any online algorithm is at most the maximum of (26), up to εnk for large n.

Significance

The theorem shows that the guarantees of the paper's online algorithms cannot be improved. Theorem 2 of the paper (Multi-price Ranking is F(𝒫)-competitive in the deterministic case) and Corollary 1 (Multi-price Balance tends to F(𝒫) as inventories grow) meet this bound, by Yao's minimax principle. So F(𝒫) is the exact competitive ratio for each price set. Without the theorem, the algorithms' ratios would only be lower bounds. The paper also shows (Proposition 2) that F(𝒫) exceeds the ratios of earlier approaches, so the tight value has practical bite.

The result is proved in the paper, with proofs in §5 and Appendix D, but not machine-checked. The formalization adds three things. First, an explicit treatment of rounding, which the paper sets aside as negligible for large n. Second, a corrected Lemma 5, which as printed is false for small τ. Third, a reusable model of online algorithms with deterministic arrivals and their randomized mixtures, and of the random-permutation instance.

Difficulty

The bound must hold for every online algorithm, including adaptive and randomized ones. An algorithm's decision can depend on everything it has seen, and the instance is averaged over n! permutations. So computing the best online algorithm's revenue directly is hopeless. The single-price instances of earlier work do not suffice either. On them all reasonable algorithms perform alike, whereas here the adversary's phase lengths must leave exactly one optimal way to ration inventory across phases. The upper bound on online revenue holds only asymptotically: the paper approximates harmonic sums by logarithms as n → ∞ and ignores the rounding of phase lengths. That is why the goal is in ε-form. Finally, the concave program that evaluates the bound has a closed-form optimum only when the candidate maximizer is nonnegative; Lemma 5 as printed omits this condition.

Formalization scope

Lean conventions:

  • Items and customers are 0-based (Fin n, Fin T); prices are 1-based functions ℕ → ℝ with r⁽⁰⁾ = 0 via price.
  • The booking limits α and the phase sizes B are hypotheses (IsBookingLimits, IsPhaseB), not chosen functions; Propositions 1 and 4 make them unique.
  • OPT is the real supremum of the LP's objective, a true maximum because the feasible set is nonempty and bounded.
  • A deterministic online algorithm is a rule taking the rows of customers 0, …, t to an optional (item, price) offer. It never sees later customers, or T. In the deterministic case this is the paper's information set.
  • A randomized algorithm is alg : Ω → OnlineAlg n on any probability space. Its expected revenue is a Bochner integral, with measurability in ω assumed; without that the integral could be 0 and the bound trivial.
  • The instance's phase borders are ⌊(1 − B_j)n⌋ and customer t is in group ⌊t/k⌋.

Disclosed departures from the page:

  • The goal and Lemma 4 carry an ε, as their proofs require.
  • The goal assumes 𝔼[OPT] > 0, because an empty arrival sequence would otherwise satisfy it trivially.
  • Lemma 5 assumes every candidate λ_ℓ = α⁽ℓ⁾ − (A_j − τ)/(m − j + 1) is nonnegative; the paper's one use (j = 1, τ = 1) satisfies this.
  • (25) is stated with an explicit rounding error of at most k(r⁽ᵐ⁾ − r⁽¹⁾).

The quantifier order is part of the theorem: the instance and distribution are fixed before the algorithm. A statement in which each algorithm gets its own hard instance is weaker and is not this theorem.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over permutations, measure-theoretic expectation over the algorithm's randomness, harmonic-sum asymptotics, and one-dimensional concave maximization. The definitions of online algorithms and of the random-permutation instance are reusable for other Karp–Vazirani–Vazirani-type lower bounds. Contributions are welcome on any milestone. (35), Proposition 4 and (29) are elementary; (25) needs LP weak duality on the instance; Lemma 4 is the main work.

Selected references

  • W. Ma, D. Simchi-Levi, Algorithms for Online Matching, Assortment, and Pricing with Tight Weight-dependent Competitive Ratios, arXiv:1905.04770v1, 2019; Operations Research 68(6), 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04770, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1957
  • R. M. Karp, U. V. Vazirani, V. V. Vazirani, An optimal algorithm for on-line bipartite matching, STOC 1990. https://doi.org/10.1145/100216.100262
  • A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, V. Vazirani, AdWords and generalized online matching, J. ACM 54(5), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1145/1284320.1284321
  • N. Golrezaei, H. Nazerzadeh, P. Rusmevichientong, Real-time optimization of personalized assortments, Management Science 60(6), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1939
  • A. C. Yao, Probabilistic computations: Toward a unified measure of complexity, FOCS 1977. https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1977.24
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Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Case Study on Stochastic Games on Large Graphs in Mean Field and Sparse Regimes II: Large-Graph Limits of the Equilibrium Through the Laplacian Eigenvalue DistributionResearch Paper

Motivation

Mean field games describe large populations of agents who interact symmetrically: every agent sees the same average of all the others. Many populations interact instead along a network, where each agent responds only to its neighbours. Lacker and Soret (arXiv:2005.14102v2, 2021; Math. Oper. Res. 2022) study a linear-quadratic stochastic differential game on a finite graph that is simple enough to solve explicitly on every vertex-transitive graph, and then ask what happens to the equilibrium as the graph grows. The question is the network analogue of the classical convergence problem for mean field games: does the nnn-player equilibrium have a limit, and does that limit depend on the graph only through a small amount of information?

The answer of the paper is that the limit is governed by the empirical eigenvalue distribution of the graph Laplacian. Dense graph sequences (degrees tending to infinity) all have the same limit, the mean field game; sparse ones (bounded degrees) have limits that depend on the graph, through its spectrum. This mission formalizes that large-graph limit theorem, Theorem 2.6 of the paper. Mission I of the series formalizes the explicit equilibrium on a fixed transitive graph (Theorem 2.5), on which this mission builds.

Setting

Let GGG be a finite simple graph on vertex set {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n} with adjacency matrix AGA_GAG​ and degree matrix DGD_GDG​. Its Laplacian is LG=DG−1AG−IL_G = D_G^{-1}A_G - ILG​=DG−1​AG​−I. GGG is transitive if every vertex can be mapped to every other one by a graph automorphism; such a graph is regular, of degree δ(G)\delta(G)δ(G), and LGL_GLG​ is then symmetric with eigenvalues λ1G,…,λnG∈[−2,0]\lambda^G_1,\dots,\lambda^G_n\in[-2,0]λ1G​,…,λnG​∈[−2,0]. The empirical eigenvalue distribution is μG=1n∑iδλiG\mu_G = \frac1n\sum_i\delta_{\lambda^G_i}μG​=n1​∑i​δλiG​​.

Fix a horizon T>0T>0T>0, a volatility σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and a weight c>0c>0c>0. Player vvv controls the state

dXv(t)=αv(t,X(t)) dt+σ dWv(t),t∈[0,T],dX_v(t) = \alpha_v(t,\boldsymbol X(t))\,dt + \sigma\,dW_v(t),\qquad t\in[0,T],dXv​(t)=αv​(t,X(t))dt+σdWv​(t),t∈[0,T],

driven by independent Brownian motions, with Markovian feedback controls αv\alpha_vαv​, and pays

Jv=12 E[∫0T∣αv(t,X(t))∣2dt+c ∣Xv(T)−1deg⁡(v)∑u∼vXu(T)∣2].J_v = \tfrac12\,\mathbb E\Big[\int_0^T|\alpha_v(t,\boldsymbol X(t))|^2dt + c\,\Big|X_v(T) - \tfrac1{\deg(v)}\sum_{u\sim v}X_u(T)\Big|^2\Big].Jv​=21​E[∫0T​∣αv​(t,X(t))∣2dt+c​Xv​(T)−deg(v)1​u∼v∑​Xu​(T)​2].

On a transitive graph without isolated vertices, Theorem 2.5 gives an explicit Nash equilibrium: with QG(x)=det⁡(I−xLG)1/nQ_G(x) = \det(I - xL_G)^{1/n}QG​(x)=det(I−xLG​)1/n and fGf_GfG​ the solution of fG′=c QG′(fG)f_G' = c\,Q_G'(f_G)fG′​=cQG′​(fG​), fG(0)=0f_G(0) = 0fG​(0)=0 on [0,T][0,T][0,T], the feedback is αiG(t,x)=−ei⊤PG(t)x\alpha^G_i(t,\boldsymbol x) = -e_i^\top P_G(t)\boldsymbol xαiG​(t,x)=−ei⊤​PG​(t)x with PG(t)=−fG′(T−t)LG(I−fG(T−t)LG)−1P_G(t) = -f_G'(T-t)L_G(I - f_G(T-t)L_G)^{-1}PG​(t)=−fG′​(T−t)LG​(I−fG​(T−t)LG​)−1. The resulting equilibrium state process XG\boldsymbol X^GXG is Gaussian, and the value is Val(G)=1n∑vJv\mathrm{Val}(G) = \frac1n\sum_v J_vVal(G)=n1​∑v​Jv​.

For a probability measure μ\muμ define Qμ(x)=exp⁡∫[−2,0]log⁡(1−xλ) μ(dλ)Q_\mu(x) = \exp\int_{[-2,0]}\log(1-x\lambda)\,\mu(d\lambda)Qμ​(x)=exp∫[−2,0]​log(1−xλ)μ(dλ), so that QμG=QGQ_{\mu_G} = Q_GQμG​​=QG​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.6

Let (Gn)(G_n)(Gn​) be finite transitive graphs without isolated vertices, ∣Gn∣→∞|G_n|\to\infty∣Gn​∣→∞, with XGn(0)=0\boldsymbol X^{G_n}(0) = 0XGn​(0)=0, and suppose μGn→μ\mu_{G_n}\to\muμGn​​→μ weakly for a probability measure μ\muμ. Then (1) the ODE fμ′=c Qμ′(fμ)f_\mu' = c\,Q_\mu'(f_\mu)fμ′​=cQμ′​(fμ​), fμ(0)=0f_\mu(0) = 0fμ​(0)=0 has a unique solution on [0,T][0,T][0,T]; (2) for every vertex sequence knk_nkn​ and t∈[0,T]t\in[0,T]t∈[0,T],

Law(XknGn(t))→N(0,Vμ(t)),Vμ(t)=σ2∫0t∫[−2,0](1−λfμ(T−t)1−λfμ(T−s))2μ(dλ) ds;\mathrm{Law}\big(X^{G_n}_{k_n}(t)\big)\to\mathcal N\big(0,V_\mu(t)\big),\qquad V_\mu(t) = \sigma^2\int_0^t\int_{[-2,0]}\Big(\frac{1-\lambda f_\mu(T-t)}{1-\lambda f_\mu(T-s)}\Big)^2\mu(d\lambda)\,ds;Law(Xkn​Gn​​(t))→N(0,Vμ​(t)),Vμ​(t)=σ2∫0t​∫[−2,0]​(1−λfμ​(T−s)1−λfμ​(T−t)​)2μ(dλ)ds;

(3) the empirical measure 1∣Gn∣∑iδXiGn(t)\frac1{|G_n|}\sum_i\delta_{X^{G_n}_i(t)}∣Gn​∣1​∑i​δXiGn​​(t)​ converges weakly in probability to N(0,Vμ(t))\mathcal N(0,V_\mu(t))N(0,Vμ​(t)); (4)

lim⁡n→∞Val(Gn)=−σ22log⁡∫[−2,0]−λ1−λfμ(T) μ(dλ).\lim_{n\to\infty}\mathrm{Val}(G_n) = -\frac{\sigma^2}2\log\int_{[-2,0]}\frac{-\lambda}{1-\lambda f_\mu(T)}\,\mu(d\lambda).n→∞lim​Val(Gn​)=−2σ2​log∫[−2,0]​1−λfμ​(T)−λ​μ(dλ).

Milestones

The milestones are the statements the paper's proof (§3, §6, §7.1) relies on: the stability of fμf_\mufμ​ in μ\muμ (Proposition 3.2, last sentence); the finite-graph variance formula (2.7); monotonicity and concavity of fμf_\mufμ​ (Proposition 3.3, first sentence); correlation decay (Proposition 2.12) for distinct vertices; the relation between degrees and the spectral limit (Lemma 7.1); the Gaussian Poincaré bound (7.3) and the concentration (7.1) of the empirical measure; and the spectral form (2.9) of the value.

Significance

Theorem 2.6 reduces the large-population behaviour of a network game to one spectral object. For complete graphs μ=δ−1\mu = \delta_{-1}μ=δ−1​ and the limit is the mean field game; for sparse sequences such as cycles, tori, or random regular graphs, μ\muμ is a non-degenerate measure and the limiting variance and value differ from the mean field ones. The theorem thereby gives a quantitative criterion for when a mean field approximation of a network game is accurate, and it shows propagation of chaos in both regimes: in the dense case because interactions are weak, in the sparse case because typical players are far apart in the graph.

The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been machine-checked. A complete formalization requires a Lean account of Gaussian laws of linear SDEs with additive noise, of weak convergence of spectral measures of graph Laplacians, and of a Gaussian Poincaré inequality, none of which is currently in Mathlib in the needed form. Each of these is reusable well beyond this mission.

Difficulty

Parts (2) and (4) follow from the finite-graph formulas once fGn→fμf_{G_n}\to f_\mufGn​​→fμ​ uniformly, but that convergence requires stability of a nonlinear ODE whose vector field is defined through the spectral measure, uniformly over a class of measures. The harder step is (3). Convergence of one player's law does not imply convergence of the empirical measure: the players are correlated, and on sparse graphs every player has a bounded number of strong neighbours, so the correlations do not vanish uniformly. Bounding them requires an estimate that decays in the graph distance and in the degree, and combining it with the growth of graph balls, which is controlled differently in the dense and in the sparse regime. The usual mean field route is closed: unless the graph is complete, the state vector is not exchangeable, so propagation-of-chaos arguments based on exchangeability do not apply.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in namespace GraphLQGame.Asymptotics.

  • Vertices {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n} are Fin n; a graph sequence is G : ∀ k, SimpleGraph (Fin (N k)) with Nk→∞N_k\to\inftyNk​→∞.
  • LGL_GLG​ is the random-walk Laplacian above, not Mathlib's lapMatrix. μG\mu_GμG​ is built from the real roots of the characteristic polynomial of LGL_GLG​, with multiplicity.
  • Weak convergence of measures on R\mathbb RR is convergence of ∫h dμk\int h\,d\mu_k∫hdμk​ for every bounded continuous hhh. Weak convergence in probability of the empirical measure is convergence in probability of ∫h dmGn(t)\int h\,dm^{G_n}(t)∫hdmGn​(t) for every bounded continuous hhh.
  • A state process is a pathwise strong solution of (2.1) on its own probability space, driven by a standard Brownian motion and adapted to its completed filtration. Statements about several graphs are statements about laws.
  • Costs are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued lower integrals; the value is computed after asserting finiteness.
  • In PGP_GPG​, fG′(T−t)f_G'(T-t)fG′​(T−t) is written as its ODE value c QG′(fG(T−t))c\,Q_G'(f_G(T-t))cQG′​(fG​(T−t)). ODE solutions are constrained on [0,T][0,T][0,T] (or on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ for Propositions 3.2 and 3.3), with uniqueness stated on that domain.
  • The Gaussian law N(0,V)\mathcal N(0,V)N(0,V) is gaussianReal 0 V.toNNReal; Vμ(t)≥0V_\mu(t)\ge0Vμ​(t)≥0.

The goal quantifies over every solution fGnf_{G_n}fGn​​, fμf_\mufμ​ and every equilibrium state process, and also asserts that the graph ODE solutions and the state processes exist, so it cannot be discharged vacuously. Proposition 2.12 is stated for distinct vertices: as printed, (2.17) is also claimed for u=vu = vu=v, where it fails on complete graphs of large degree; the off-diagonal case is the one the proof of Theorem 2.6 uses. Theorem 2.5 (mission I) is not restated here; a solver proves what is needed of it.

Contributions are welcome at every level: Gaussian laws of linear SDEs, spectral measures of graph matrices, ODE stability, a Gaussian Poincaré inequality, and the milestones themselves.

Selected references

  • D. Lacker, A. Soret, A case study on stochastic games on large graphs in mean field and sparse regimes, arXiv:2005.14102v2, 2021; published in Math. Oper. Res., 2022, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1179. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14102
  • F. Chung, Spectral Graph Theory, CBMS Regional Conference Series in Mathematics 92, AMS, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1090/cbms/092
  • S. Boucheron, G. Lugosi, P. Massart, Concentration Inequalities: A Nonasymptotic Theory of Independence, Oxford University Press, 2013 (Theorem 3.20, Gaussian Poincaré inequality). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535255.001.0001
  • R. Carmona, F. Delarue, Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I, Springer, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58920-6
17 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Case Study on Stochastic Games on Large Graphs in Mean Field and Sparse Regimes III: The Mean Field Game Control Is an ε-Nash Equilibrium on Any Finite Graph, With ε_v ∝ deg(v)^(-1/2)Research Paper

Why mean field approximations on graphs need a threshold

Mean field games (MFGs) describe the limit of symmetric stochastic differential games as the number of players tends to infinity, when every player interacts with the empirical distribution of all the others. Their main practical use is the converse direction: an equilibrium of the limiting game supplies a simple, decentralized control that is an approximate Nash equilibrium of the game with finitely many players. For the complete graph, where everybody interacts with everybody, this is classical, with the standard rate O(1/n)O(1/\sqrt n)O(1/n​) (Carmona and Delarue, Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games, Vol. II, §6.1; Huang, Malhamé and Caines 2006, Theorem 12), as recalled on p. 10 of the paper.

Many interacting systems are not complete graphs: players see only their neighbours in a network. The question is then how dense the network must be for the mean field approximation to remain valid. Lacker and Soret (arXiv:2005.14102v2) answer it exactly for a linear-quadratic "flocking" game, where explicit computations are possible. This mission formalizes their Theorem 2.11, which applies to every finite graph, with no transitivity or regularity assumed.

Setting

Let GGG be a finite simple graph on the vertex set V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n}; u∼vu\sim vu∼v means uuu and vvv are adjacent and deg⁡G(v)\deg_G(v)degG​(v) is the number of neighbours of vvv. Fix a horizon T>0T>0T>0, a volatility σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and a cost weight c>0c>0c>0. Each player v∈Vv\in Vv∈V controls a real state XvX_vXv​ through

dXv(t)=αv(t,X(t)) dt+σ dWv(t),t∈[0,T],dX_v(t)=\alpha_v(t,\boldsymbol X(t))\,dt+\sigma\,dW_v(t),\qquad t\in[0,T],dXv​(t)=αv​(t,X(t))dt+σdWv​(t),t∈[0,T],

where W1,…,WnW_1,\dots,W_nW1​,…,Wn​ are independent standard Brownian motions and X=(Xu)u∈V\boldsymbol X=(X_u)_{u\in V}X=(Xu​)u∈V​. A Markovian control αv∈AG\alpha_v\in\mathcal A_Gαv​∈AG​ is a Borel function of time and the full state X(t)∈RV\boldsymbol X(t)\in\mathbb R^VX(t)∈RV, of linear growth. The cost of player vvv under a profile α=(αu)u∈V\boldsymbol\alpha=(\alpha_u)_{u\in V}α=(αu​)u∈V​ is

Jv(α)=12 E[∫0T∣αv(t,X(t))∣2 dt+c ∣Xv(T)−1deg⁡G(v)∑u∼vXu(T)∣2],J_v(\boldsymbol\alpha)=\frac12\,\mathbb E\Big[\int_0^T|\alpha_v(t,\boldsymbol X(t))|^2\,dt+c\,\Big|X_v(T)-\frac1{\deg_G(v)}\sum_{u\sim v}X_u(T)\Big|^2\Big],Jv​(α)=21​E[∫0T​∣αv​(t,X(t))∣2dt+c​Xv​(T)−degG​(v)1​u∼v∑​Xu​(T)​2],

and 12E[∫0T∣αv∣2dt+c∣Xv(T)∣2]\frac12\mathbb E[\int_0^T|\alpha_v|^2dt+c|X_v(T)|^2]21​E[∫0T​∣αv​∣2dt+c∣Xv​(T)∣2] for an isolated vertex: each player wants to end near the average of its neighbours at minimal quadratic effort. For a vector ε∈R+V\boldsymbol\varepsilon\in\mathbb R^V_+ε∈R+V​, a profile is a Markovian ε\boldsymbol\varepsilonε-Nash equilibrium if no player vvv can lower its cost by more than εv\varepsilon_vεv​ by switching unilaterally to another control β∈AG\beta\in\mathcal A_Gβ∈AG​, written (β,α−v)(\beta,\boldsymbol\alpha^{-v})(β,α−v).

The mean-field control is

αMF(t,y)=−cy1+c(T−t),αvMF(t,x)=αMF(t,xv):\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}(t,y)=\frac{-cy}{1+c(T-t)},\qquad \alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}_v(t,\boldsymbol x)=\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}(t,x_v):αMF(t,y)=1+c(T−t)−cy​,αvMF​(t,x)=αMF(t,xv​):

each player looks only at its own state, as if its neighbours' average were frozen at its mean.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.11

Define ϵvG=σ2cT1+cTcT(2+cT)deg⁡G(v)\epsilon^G_v=\sigma^2\frac{cT}{1+cT}\sqrt{\frac{cT(2+cT)}{\deg_G(v)}}ϵvG​=σ21+cTcT​degG​(v)cT(2+cT)​​ if deg⁡G(v)≥1\deg_G(v)\ge1degG​(v)≥1 and ϵvG=0\epsilon^G_v=0ϵvG​=0 if deg⁡G(v)=0\deg_G(v)=0degG​(v)=0, and with the minimal degree δ(G)=min⁡vdeg⁡G(v)\delta(G)=\min_v\deg_G(v)δ(G)=minv​degG​(v),

ϵG=σ2cT1+cTcT(2+cT)1∨δ(G).\epsilon_G=\sigma^2\frac{cT}{1+cT}\sqrt{\frac{cT(2+cT)}{1\vee\delta(G)}}.ϵG​=σ21+cTcT​1∨δ(G)cT(2+cT)​​.

Then, with zero initial states, the state equation for (αvMF)v∈V(\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}_v)_{v\in V}(αvMF​)v∈V​ has a solution, and

(αvMF)v∈V is an ϵG-Nash equilibrium and an ϵG-Nash equilibrium on G.(\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}_v)_{v\in V}\ \text{is an } \epsilon^G\text{-Nash equilibrium and an } \epsilon_G\text{-Nash equilibrium on } G.(αvMF​)v∈V​ is an ϵG-Nash equilibrium and an ϵG​-Nash equilibrium on G.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 7.2: αMF\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}αMF is optimal for the one-player problem min⁡12E[∫0Tβ2dt+c∣Y(T)∣2]\min\frac12\mathbb E[\int_0^T\beta^2dt+c|Y(T)|^2]min21​E[∫0T​β2dt+c∣Y(T)∣2], dY=β dt+σdWdY=\beta\,dt+\sigma dWdY=βdt+σdW, over all progressively measurable β\betaβ.
  2. Isolated vertices (p. 40): Jv(α)=inf⁡βJv(β,α−v)J_v(\boldsymbol\alpha)=\inf_\beta J_v(\beta,\boldsymbol\alpha^{-v})Jv​(α)=infβ​Jv​(β,α−v) when deg⁡G(v)=0\deg_G(v)=0degG​(v)=0.
  3. (7.7): under αMF\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}αMF, (Xu(T))u(X_u(T))_u(Xu​(T))u​ are i.i.d. N(0,σ2T/(1+cT))N(0,\sigma^2T/(1+cT))N(0,σ2T/(1+cT)), so the neighbour average has second moment σ2T/(deg⁡G(v)(1+cT))\sigma^2T/(\deg_G(v)(1+cT))σ2T/(degG​(v)(1+cT)).
  4. Steps (1), (2), (3) (p. 41): a lower bound on Jv(β,α−v)J_v(\beta,\boldsymbol\alpha^{-v})Jv​(β,α−v), an energy bound for deviations no worse than the zero control, and the comparison with Jv(αMF)J_v(\boldsymbol\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}})Jv​(αMF).
  5. (7.5): for deg⁡G(v)≥1\deg_G(v)\ge1degG​(v)≥1 and every admissible β\betaβ, Jv(β,α−v)≥Jv(α)−ϵvGJ_v(\beta,\boldsymbol\alpha^{-v})\ge J_v(\boldsymbol\alpha)-\epsilon^G_vJv​(β,α−v)≥Jv​(α)−ϵvG​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.11 gives an explicit threshold for the mean field approximation on networks: along any sequence of graphs whose minimal degree diverges, the decentralized control αMF\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}αMF is an ϵGn\epsilon_{G_n}ϵGn​​-Nash equilibrium with ϵGn→0\epsilon_{G_n}\to0ϵGn​​→0, and the vector form says more: if the average of (1∨deg⁡Gn(v))−1/2(1\vee\deg_{G_n}(v))^{-1/2}(1∨degGn​​(v))−1/2 over vertices tends to zero, the per-player errors vanish on average (the paper's (2.16)). The rate deg⁡G(v)−1/2\deg_G(v)^{-1/2}degG​(v)−1/2 quantifies how the accuracy of the approximation depends on denseness. In the same paper, transitive graphs whose degrees stay bounded lead to equilibria that do not agree with the mean field one, so a denseness condition cannot be dropped.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no part of it is machine-checked. A formal development needs, beyond the statement, a verification argument for a one-dimensional linear-quadratic control problem with additive noise, Gaussian computations for linear SDEs driven by Brownian motion, and the comparison of costs between the equilibrium system and a system with one deviating player. The one-player result (Lemma 7.2) and the Gaussian facts of (7.7) are reusable well beyond this mission.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares a deviating player with an isolated player and treats the neighbour average as noise independent of the deviation. Two things stand in the way. The cost of player vvv couples its terminal state with the neighbours' average through a cross term E[1deg⁡G(v)∑u∼vXu(T) Yv(T)]\mathbb E[\frac1{\deg_G(v)}\sum_{u\sim v}X_u(T)\,Y_v(T)]E[degG​(v)1​∑u∼v​Xu​(T)Yv​(T)], and the deviation β(t,Y(t))\beta(t,\boldsymbol Y(t))β(t,Y(t)) may look at the neighbours' states, so the cross term does not vanish; it has to be bounded through the size of the deviation's energy. And an arbitrary deviation has no a priori energy bound: one is available only for deviations that do at least as well as the zero control, which is why the argument passes through a (near-)optimal deviation. Lemma 7.2 itself requires a verification theorem over all progressively measurable controls, not only feedback ones.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace GraphLQGame.DenseApprox and uses the shared encoding of this series:

  • vertices are Fin n (the paper's {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n} become {0,…,n−1}\{0,\dots,n-1\}{0,…,n−1}), the state space is EthierKurtz.SDEState n, and GGG is any SimpleGraph (Fin n); isolated vertices are allowed;
  • controls are Borel with linear growth on [0,T][0,T][0,T] only; their values at other times are never used, and the formula for αMF\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}αMF outside [0,T][0,T][0,T] is evaluated with Lean's total division;
  • a solution of the state equation is a pathwise strong solution carrying its own probability space and an nnn-dimensional standard Brownian motion; costs are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued lower Lebesgue integrals, and the Nash inequality is required for every solution of the profile and of each deviation (faithful by strong uniqueness);
  • T,σ,c>0T,\sigma,c>0T,σ,c>0 are the standing assumptions of §2.1;
  • initial states are zero. The printed theorem does not mention X(0)X(0)X(0); the paper fixes non-random initial states that are "in many cases" zero, and the whole proof is for X(0)=0X(0)=0X(0)=0. With non-zero initial states the claim fails in general, so this is a disclosed hypothesis;
  • the goal also asserts that the state equation for αMF\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}αMF has a solution, so the Nash property cannot hold vacuously; Lemma 7.2 is stated over every continuous adapted solution of its SDE, and Step (2) carries, as an explicit hypothesis, the comparison with the zero control that its proof uses.

A formalization in which αMF\alpha^{\mathrm{MF}}αMF is compared only with deviations depending on the player's own state, or in which the costs are Bochner integrals that vanish when not integrable, would be trivially or wrongly satisfied; both are ruled out by the encoding above.

Welcome contributions: the verification argument for Lemma 7.2, the Gaussian law of linear SDEs with additive noise, and proofs of the three steps. Related missions in this series: I (an explicit Nash equilibrium on transitive graphs) and II (large-graph limits).

Selected references

  • D. Lacker, A. Soret, A case study on stochastic games on large graphs in mean field and sparse regimes, arXiv:2005.14102v2, 2021; Math. Oper. Res. 47 (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14102
  • R. Carmona, F. Delarue, Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications II, Springer, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56436-4
  • M. Huang, R. P. Malhamé, P. E. Caines, Large population stochastic dynamic games: closed-loop McKean–Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence principle, Commun. Inf. Syst. 6 (2006), 221–252. https://doi.org/10.4310/CIS.2006.v6.n3.a5
  • H. Pham, Continuous-time Stochastic Control and Optimization with Financial Applications, Springer, 2009 (verification theorem, Theorem 3.5.2). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89500-8
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Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Stochastic Gradient Tracking Methods II: With Stepsizes θ/(m+k), DSGT's Mean-Square Error Is at Most 2θ²σ²/(n(θμ−1)(m+k)) Plus Higher-Order TermsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many learning and estimation problems are solved by a group of computing agents that each hold part of the data and can talk only to their neighbours in a communication network. Each agent iii has a private cost fif_ifi​, and the group wants a minimizer of the average f=1n∑ifif=\frac1n\sum_i f_if=n1​∑i​fi​ without a central coordinator. In machine learning the agents usually cannot evaluate exact gradients either; they draw noisy stochastic gradients from samples, as in stochastic gradient descent (SGD).

Pu and Nedić (Math. Program. 187 (2021) 409–457) study distributed stochastic gradient tracking (DSGT), where each agent keeps an auxiliary variable that tracks the network-average gradient. With deterministic gradients, gradient tracking achieves linear convergence under a constant stepsize (Nedić, Olshevsky and Shi 2017; Qu and Li 2018). The question for the stochastic setting is whether a network of nnn agents, each with noisy gradients, matches centralized SGD that averages nnn samples per step. This mission is the second of two on the paper: it covers the diminishing stepsize αk=θ/(m+k)\alpha_k=\theta/(m+k)αk​=θ/(m+k) and Theorem 2, which gives an O(1/k)O(1/k)O(1/k) rate whose leading constant does not depend on the network.

Setting

There are nnn agents and a decision space Rp\mathbb R^pRp with p≥1p\ge1p≥1. Agent iii has a differentiable cost fi:Rp→Rf_i:\mathbb R^p\to\mathbb Rfi​:Rp→R that is μ\muμ-strongly convex with LLL-Lipschitz gradient (Assumption 2); x∗x^*x∗ denotes the minimizer of f=1n∑ifif=\frac1n\sum_if_if=n1​∑i​fi​. A query of agent iii at a point xxx returns gi(x,ξi)g_i(x,\xi_i)gi​(x,ξi​), where ξi∈Rd\xi_i\in\mathbb R^dξi​∈Rd is a random sample. The samples ξi,k\xi_{i,k}ξi,k​ (agent iii, iteration kkk) are mutually independent, and for every fixed xxx

E[gi(x,ξi,k)]=∇fi(x),E∥gi(x,ξi,k)−∇fi(x)∥2≤σ2\mathbb E[g_i(x,\xi_{i,k})]=\nabla f_i(x),\qquad \mathbb E\|g_i(x,\xi_{i,k})-\nabla f_i(x)\|^2\le\sigma^2E[gi​(x,ξi,k​)]=∇fi​(x),E∥gi​(x,ξi,k​)−∇fi​(x)∥2≤σ2

(Assumption 1). Agents communicate through a nonnegative coupling matrix W=[wij]\mathbf W=[w_{ij}]W=[wij​] that is doubly stochastic, has some positive diagonal entry, and whose positive off-diagonal entries form a connected undirected graph (Assumptions 3–4). Write ρw\rho_wρw​ for the spectral norm of W−1n11⊤\mathbf W-\frac1n\mathbf 1\mathbf 1^\topW−n1​11⊤; it is below 111 (Lemma 1).

Stack the local variables as x=[x1,…,xn]⊤∈Rn×p\mathbf x=[x_1,\dots,x_n]^\top\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}x=[x1​,…,xn​]⊤∈Rn×p, let xˉ=1n∑ixi\bar x=\frac1n\sum_ix_ixˉ=n1​∑i​xi​, and use the Frobenius norm, so that ∥x−1xˉ∥2=∑i∥xi−xˉ∥2\|\mathbf x-\mathbf 1\bar x\|^2=\sum_i\|x_i-\bar x\|^2∥x−1xˉ∥2=∑i​∥xi​−xˉ∥2 is the consensus error. DSGT (4) starts from an arbitrary deterministic x0\mathbf x_0x0​ and yi,0=gi(xi,0,ξi,0)y_{i,0}=g_i(x_{i,0},\xi_{i,0})yi,0​=gi​(xi,0​,ξi,0​), and iterates

xi,k+1=∑jwij (xj,k−αkyj,k),yi,k+1=∑jwij yj,k+gi(xi,k+1,ξi,k+1)−gi(xi,k,ξi,k),x_{i,k+1}=\sum_j w_{ij}\,(x_{j,k}-\alpha_k y_{j,k}),\qquad y_{i,k+1}=\sum_jw_{ij}\,y_{j,k}+g_i(x_{i,k+1},\xi_{i,k+1})-g_i(x_{i,k},\xi_{i,k}),xi,k+1​=j∑​wij​(xj,k​−αk​yj,k​),yi,k+1​=j∑​wij​yj,k​+gi​(xi,k+1​,ξi,k+1​)−gi​(xi,k​,ξi,k​),

with stepsize αk=θ/(m+k)\alpha_k=\theta/(m+k)αk​=θ/(m+k).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 418)

Let θ>1/μ\theta>1/\muθ>1/μ and let mmm satisfy condition (14) of the paper: mmm exceeds θ2(μ+L)\frac\theta2(\mu+L)2θ​(μ+L) and 4θLρw2+2θLρw1+3ρw21−ρw2\frac{4\theta L\rho_w^2+2\theta L\rho_w\sqrt{1+3\rho_w^2}}{1-\rho_w^2}1−ρw2​4θLρw2​+2θLρw​1+3ρw2​​​, and a second explicit inequality in θ,m,μ,L,ρw\theta,m,\mu,L,\rho_wθ,m,μ,L,ρw​ and ∥W−I∥\|\mathbf W-\mathbf I\|∥W−I∥ holds. Then there are constants C1,C2,C3C_1,C_2,C_3C1​,C2​,C3​, independent of kkk, such that for all k≥0k\ge0k≥0

E∥xˉk−x∗∥2≤2θ2σ2n(θμ−1)(m+k)+C1(m+k)θμ+C2(m+k)2,E∥xk−1xˉk∥2≤C3(m+k)2.\mathbb E\|\bar x_k-x^*\|^2\le\frac{2\theta^2\sigma^2}{n(\theta\mu-1)(m+k)}+\frac{C_1}{(m+k)^{\theta\mu}}+\frac{C_2}{(m+k)^2},\qquad \mathbb E\|\mathbf x_k-\mathbf 1\bar x_k\|^2\le\frac{C_3}{(m+k)^2}.E∥xˉk​−x∗∥2≤n(θμ−1)(m+k)2θ2σ2​+(m+k)θμC1​​+(m+k)2C2​​,E∥xk​−1xˉk​∥2≤(m+k)2C3​​.

The constants may depend on every datum of the run (network, costs, noise law, starting point, θ\thetaθ, mmm), but not on kkk.

Milestones

  1. (29)–(30), p. 425. The mean-square errors Uk=E∥xˉk−x∗∥2U_k=\mathbb E\|\bar x_k-x^*\|^2Uk​=E∥xˉk​−x∗∥2, Xk=E∥xk−1xˉk∥2X_k=\mathbb E\|\mathbf x_k-\mathbf 1\bar x_k\|^2Xk​=E∥xk​−1xˉk​∥2, Yk=E∥yk−1yˉk∥2Y_k=\mathbb E\|\mathbf y_k-\mathbf 1\bar y_k\|^2Yk​=E∥yk​−1yˉ​k​∥2 satisfy a componentwise linear system Vk+1≤AkVk+bkV_{k+1}\le\mathbf A_kV_k+b_kVk+1​≤Ak​Vk​+bk​ with an explicit 3×33\times33×3 matrix Ak\mathbf A_kAk​.
  2. (31), p. 425. The positivity of βk\beta_kβk​, used in Ak\mathbf A_kAk​, reduces to an explicit lower bound on mmm.
  3. (32)–(36), pp. 425–427. By induction, Uk≤U^/(m+k)U_k\le\hat U/(m+k)Uk​≤U^/(m+k), Xk≤X^/(m+k)2X_k\le\hat X/(m+k)^2Xk​≤X^/(m+k)2 and YkY_kYk​ is bounded, with explicit U^\hat UU^ and X^\hat XX^.
  4. p. 427. The refined recursion Uk+1≤(1−αkμ)Uk+2αkL2μnXk+αk2σ2nU_{k+1}\le(1-\alpha_k\mu)U_k+\frac{2\alpha_kL^2}{\mu n}X_k+\frac{\alpha_k^2\sigma^2}nUk+1​≤(1−αk​μ)Uk​+μn2αk​L2​Xk​+nαk2​σ2​.
  5. p. 427. Product bounds ∏t=0k−1(1−θμm+t)≤mθμ/(m+k)θμ\prod_{t=0}^{k-1}(1-\frac{\theta\mu}{m+t})\le m^{\theta\mu}/(m+k)^{\theta\mu}∏t=0k−1​(1−m+tθμ​)≤mθμ/(m+k)θμ and their tail versions.
  6. p. 427. Sum–integral bounds for ∑t<k(m+t)θμ−3\sum_{t<k}(m+t)^{\theta\mu-3}∑t<k​(m+t)θμ−3 and ∑t<k(m+t)θμ−2\sum_{t<k}(m+t)^{\theta\mu-2}∑t<k​(m+t)θμ−2.

Significance

The leading term 2θ2σ2/(n(θμ−1)(m+k))2\theta^2\sigma^2/(n(\theta\mu-1)(m+k))2θ2σ2/(n(θμ−1)(m+k)) involves neither ρw\rho_wρw​ nor the graph: after a transient, the network-average iterate behaves like centralized SGD run on nnn samples per step, and the error decreases as 1/n1/n1/n with the number of agents (Remark 3 of the paper). The consensus error decays one order faster, as 1/k21/k^21/k2. The result is a reference point for later analyses of stochastic gradient tracking, which refine the transient time and the dependence on the network.

The theorem is proved in the paper; to the best of current knowledge no part of it is machine-checked. A complete development formalizes the stacked stochastic model, the conditional-expectation estimates behind the linear system, the induction with tuned constants, and the elementary analytic bounds. Two steps of the printed proof need extra care (see Formalization scope), and repairing them is part of the work.

Difficulty

The estimate for the tracker error YkY_kYk​ couples all three quantities: bounding Yk+1Y_{k+1}Yk+1​ requires UkU_kUk​ and XkX_kXk​, and Xk+1X_{k+1}Xk+1​ requires YkY_kYk​. A direct estimate of any single error therefore does not close, and the rate for UkU_kUk​ cannot be read off from a scalar recursion until Xk=O(1/k2)X_k=O(1/k^2)Xk​=O(1/k2) is known. The induction closes only for the constants of the paper and under condition (14), which must be checked to hold for all kkk at once. The probabilistic estimates need independence of the samples across agents and times, since the variance bound σ2/n\sigma^2/nσ2/n for the averaged noise uses that the agents' noises are uncorrelated. Finally, the products and sums of real powers (m+t)θμ−2(m+t)^{\theta\mu-2}(m+t)θμ−2 must be bounded uniformly in kkk, including the regimes θμ<2\theta\mu<2θμ<2 and θμ>2\theta\mu>2θμ>2.

Formalization scope

Points of Rp\mathbb R^pRp are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p); stacked variables are functions Fin n → E p, and every matrix norm ∥x∥\|\mathbf x\|∥x∥ is the Frobenius sum ∑i∥xi∥2\sum_i\|x_i\|^2∑i​∥xi​∥2, never the sup norm of the product type. ∥W−I∥\|\mathbf W-\mathbf I\|∥W−I∥ is the Frobenius norm and ρw\rho_wρw​ the operator norm of Matrix.toEuclideanCLM applied to W−1n11⊤\mathbf W-\frac1n\mathbf 1\mathbf 1^\topW−n1​11⊤. The noise space is Rd\mathbb R^dRd (the paper's Rm\mathbb R^mRm; mmm is the stepsize offset). Expectations are Bochner integrals, and every bounded expectation comes with an integrability conjunct, so a non-integrable error cannot satisfy a bound by having integral 000. Powers with real exponents are Real.rpow.

Standing assumptions and additions, all stated in the items:

  • Assumptions 1–4 hold in every run statement; the paper's Theorem 2 cites only Assumptions 1 and 2, but ρw<1\rho_w<1ρw​<1 rests on Assumptions 3–4.
  • Assumption 1's "each random vector is independent" is read as mutual independence of all ξi,k\xi_{i,k}ξi,k​; its conditional moments given a deterministic xxx become unconditional moments for each fixed xxx. The oracle gig_igi​ is jointly measurable.
  • p≥1p\ge1p≥1, and ρw>0\rho_w>0ρw​>0 (condition (14) and CCC divide by ρw2\rho_w^2ρw2​).
  • The linear system (29) and the induction carry 3αkL≤13\alpha_kL\le13αk​L≤1 (respectively 3θL≤m3\theta L\le m3θL≤m), which the derivation of Lemma 4 (20) uses on p. 445 without stating it. The sum bound for ∑(m+t)θμ−3\sum(m+t)^{\theta\mu-3}∑(m+t)θμ−3 carries θμ≠2\theta\mu\ne2θμ=2. The goal carries neither: its constants absorb a finite transient.

The constants C1,C2,C3C_1,C_2,C_3C1​,C2​,C3​ of the goal are quantified after all data and before kkk; a statement with the constants chosen after kkk would be trivially true and is not this theorem. The goal mentions only the iterates, x∗x^*x∗, θ\thetaθ, mmm and the constants of the page, not the auxiliary quantities of the proof.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the analytic milestones (products, sums), the conditional-expectation estimates behind (29), and the repair of the two gaps of the printed proof. The model definitions are shared with the companion mission on constant stepsizes.

Selected references

  • S. Pu and A. Nedić, Distributed stochastic gradient tracking methods, Mathematical Programming 187 (2021) 409–457. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-020-01487-0
  • A. Nedić, A. Olshevsky and W. Shi, Achieving geometric convergence for distributed optimization over time-varying graphs, SIAM Journal on Optimization 27 (2017) 2597–2633. https://doi.org/10.1137/16M1084316
  • G. Qu and N. Li, Harnessing smoothness to accelerate distributed optimization, IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems 5 (2018) 1245–1260. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCNS.2017.2698261
  • A. Nemirovski, A. Juditsky, G. Lan and A. Shapiro, Robust stochastic approximation approach to stochastic programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 19 (2009) 1574–1609. https://doi.org/10.1137/070704277
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Online Matching, Assortment, and Pricing with Tight Weight-Dependent Competitive Ratios I: Multi-price Balance Is minᵢ F̃ᵢ-Competitive, F̃ᵢ Bounded via F(𝒫ᵢ), G(𝒫ᵢ)/2 and kᵢResearch Paper

Motivation

Online matching and its revenue-management variants model a firm that allocates limited inventory to customers who arrive one at a time, without knowing who comes next. Classical results in this area assume each item has a single price, or weight. For a single price and large inventories, the BALANCE algorithm of Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs (2000) and its generalizations by Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani and Vazirani (2007), Buchbinder, Jain and Naor (2007) and Golrezaei, Nazerzadeh and Rusmevichientong (2014) achieve the competitive ratio 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e, which is best possible.

Firms that can also choose a price for each sale face a different problem. Selling an item cheaply now uses inventory that a later customer might have paid more for. Ma and Simchi-Levi (2020) study this setting. Each item can be offered at one of finitely many prices, and the attainable competitive ratio depends on those prices. Their Multi-price Balance algorithm attains, as inventories grow, a ratio that their Theorem 3 shows no online algorithm can beat. This mission formalizes their Theorem 1, the guarantee of Multi-price Balance for finite inventories.

Setting

A firm sells items iii from a finite set. Item iii starts with ki≥1k_i\ge1ki​≥1 units and has a price set Pi\mathcal P_iPi​ of mi≥1m_i\ge1mi​≥1 prices 0<ri(1)<⋯<ri(mi)0<r_i^{(1)}<\dots<r_i^{(m_i)}0<ri(1)​<⋯<ri(mi​)​, with ri(0):=0r_i^{(0)}:=0ri(0)​:=0. Customers t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T arrive one by one. On arrival of customer ttt the firm learns pt,i(j)∈[0,1]p^{(j)}_{t,i}\in[0,1]pt,i(j)​∈[0,1], the probability that ttt buys item iii at price jjj. It offers at most one item, at one price. The customer accepts with that probability, and a sale earns ri(j)r_i^{(j)}ri(j)​ and uses one unit. An online algorithm decides using only the setup, the past, and the present customer's probabilities.

The benchmark is the linear program (5):

OPT=max⁡∑t,i,jpt,i(j)ri(j)xt,i(j)  s.t.  ∑t,jpt,i(j)xt,i(j)≤ki,  ∑i,jxt,i(j)≤1,  x≥0.\mathrm{OPT}=\max\sum_{t,i,j}p^{(j)}_{t,i}r_i^{(j)}x^{(j)}_{t,i}\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ \sum_{t,j}p^{(j)}_{t,i}x^{(j)}_{t,i}\le k_i,\ \ \sum_{i,j}x^{(j)}_{t,i}\le1,\ \ x\ge0 .OPT=maxt,i,j∑​pt,i(j)​ri(j)​xt,i(j)​  s.t.  t,j∑​pt,i(j)​xt,i(j)​≤ki​,  i,j∑​xt,i(j)​≤1,  x≥0.

An algorithm is ccc-competitive on a setup if E[ALG]≥c⋅OPT\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]\ge c\cdot\mathrm{OPT}E[ALG]≥c⋅OPT for every arrival sequence (6).

For a price set P\mathcal PP, the booking limits α(1),…,α(m)\alpha^{(1)},\dots,\alpha^{(m)}α(1),…,α(m) are the unique positive numbers summing to 111 with

1−e−α(1)=1−e−α(j)1−r(j−1)/r(j)(j=2,…,m),1-e^{-\alpha^{(1)}}=\frac{1-e^{-\alpha^{(j)}}}{1-r^{(j-1)}/r^{(j)}}\qquad(j=2,\dots,m),1−e−α(1)=1−r(j−1)/r(j)1−e−α(j)​(j=2,…,m),

and the values σ(j)\sigma^{(j)}σ(j) are the unique positive numbers summing to 111 with σ(1)=σ(j)/(1−r(j−1)/r(j))\sigma^{(1)}=\sigma^{(j)}/(1-r^{(j-1)}/r^{(j)})σ(1)=σ(j)/(1−r(j−1)/r(j)) (Proposition 1). Write F(P)=1−e−α(1)F(\mathcal P)=1-e^{-\alpha^{(1)}}F(P)=1−e−α(1) and G(P)=σ(1)G(\mathcal P)=\sigma^{(1)}G(P)=σ(1), and L(j)=α(1)+⋯+α(j)L^{(j)}=\alpha^{(1)}+\dots+\alpha^{(j)}L(j)=α(1)+⋯+α(j).

Multi-price Balance (Algorithm 1) gives each item random segment borders 0=L~i(0)≤⋯≤L~i(mi)=10=\tilde L_i^{(0)}\le\dots\le\tilde L_i^{(m_i)}=10=L~i(0)​≤⋯≤L~i(mi​)​=1 in {0,1/ki,…,1}\{0,1/k_i,\dots,1\}{0,1/ki​,…,1} and a nondecreasing value function Φ~i\tilde\Phi_iΦ~i​ on that grid with Φ~i(0)=0\tilde\Phi_i(0)=0Φ~i​(0)=0. Both are drawn from a randomized procedure, independently across items. With NiN_iNi​ units of item iii sold, customer ttt is offered a pair (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) maximizing

pt,i(j)(Φ~i(L~i(j))−Φ~i(Ni/ki))p^{(j)}_{t,i}\big(\tilde\Phi_i(\tilde L_i^{(j)})-\tilde\Phi_i(N_i/k_i)\big)pt,i(j)​(Φ~i​(L~i(j)​)−Φ~i​(Ni​/ki​))

when this maximum is positive. Two procedures are used. Definition 3 draws one uniform seed WWW and rounds every L(j)kL^{(j)}kL(j)k up or down with it, then sets Φ~\tilde\PhiΦ~ by formula (20). The procedure (45), for k=1k=1k=1, draws configuration ddd with probability σ(d)\sigma^{(d)}σ(d) and sets Φ~(1)=r(d)/σ(1)\tilde\Phi(1)=r^{(d)}/\sigma^{(1)}Φ~(1)=r(d)/σ(1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 16)

Give each item a mode. A perturbed item uses Definition 3. A split item is replaced by kik_iki​ single-unit copies, each using (45). With

bi=F(Pi)(1+ki)(e1/ki−1) (i),bi=G(Pi)2 (ii, split),bi=1−1/e(1+ki)(1−e−1/ki) (iii, if ∣Pi∣=1),b_i=\frac{F(\mathcal P_i)}{(1+k_i)(e^{1/k_i}-1)}\ \text{(i)},\qquad b_i=\frac{G(\mathcal P_i)}{2}\ \text{(ii, split)},\qquad b_i=\frac{1-1/e}{(1+k_i)(1-e^{-1/k_i})}\ \text{(iii, if }|\mathcal P_i|=1),bi​=(1+ki​)(e1/ki​−1)F(Pi​)​ (i),bi​=2G(Pi​)​ (ii, split),bi​=(1+ki​)(1−e−1/ki​)1−1/e​ (iii, if ∣Pi​∣=1),

Multi-price Balance with those modes satisfies, for every arrival sequence, every tie-breaking rule and every feasible xxx of (5),

(min⁡ibi)∑t,i,jpt,i(j)ri(j)xt,i(j)≤E[ALG].\Big(\min_i b_i\Big)\sum_{t,i,j}p^{(j)}_{t,i}r_i^{(j)}x^{(j)}_{t,i}\le\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}].(imin​bi​)t,i,j∑​pt,i(j)​ri(j)​xt,i(j)​≤E[ALG].

Milestones

  1. Weak duality for (5) and its dual (19) (p. 19).
  2. Theorem 4 (p. 19). If every item's procedure satisfies
ki(Φ~i(N+1ki)−Φ~i(Nki))+Φ~i(L~i(j))−Φ~i(Nki)≤ri(j)c  (17),E[Φ~i(L~i(j))]≥ri(j)  (18),k_i\big(\tilde\Phi_i(\tfrac{N+1}{k_i})-\tilde\Phi_i(\tfrac N{k_i})\big)+\tilde\Phi_i(\tilde L_i^{(j)})-\tilde\Phi_i(\tfrac N{k_i})\le\frac{r_i^{(j)}}c\ \ (17),\qquad \mathbb E[\tilde\Phi_i(\tilde L_i^{(j)})]\ge r_i^{(j)}\ \ (18),ki​(Φ~i​(ki​N+1​)−Φ~i​(ki​N​))+Φ~i​(L~i(j)​)−Φ~i​(ki​N​)≤cri(j)​​  (17),E[Φ~i​(L~i(j)​)]≥ri(j)​  (18),

then Algorithm 1 is ccc-competitive. 3. Proposition 3 (p. 21). E[L~(j)]=L(j)\mathbb E[\tilde L^{(j)}]=L^{(j)}E[L~(j)]=L(j), and ∣(L~(j)−L~(j′))−(L(j)−L(j′))∣≤1/k|(\tilde L^{(j)}-\tilde L^{(j')})-(L^{(j)}-L^{(j')})|\le1/k∣(L~(j)−L~(j′))−(L(j)−L(j′))∣≤1/k. 4. (35) (p. 39). r(j−1)/r(j)≤e−α(j)r^{(j-1)}/r^{(j)}\le e^{-\alpha^{(j)}}r(j−1)/r(j)≤e−α(j). 5. Theorem 5 (p. 22). Definition 3 satisfies (17)–(18) with c=F(P)/((1+k)(e1/k−1))c=F(\mathcal P)/((1+k)(e^{1/k}-1))c=F(P)/((1+k)(e1/k−1)), and with c=F(P)/((1+k)(1−e−1/k))c=F(\mathcal P)/((1+k)(1-e^{-1/k}))c=F(P)/((1+k)(1−e−1/k)) when m=1m=1m=1. 6. (45) (p. 44). For k=1k=1k=1, the procedure (45) satisfies (17)–(18) with c=σ(1)/2c=\sigma^{(1)}/2c=σ(1)/2.

Significance

For a single price, bound (iii) improves the dependence on kik_iki​ of the guarantee of Golrezaei et al. (2014). For several prices, bound (i) tends to F(Pi)F(\mathcal P_i)F(Pi​) as ki→∞k_i\to\inftyki​→∞ (Corollary 1). Mission III of this series formalizes Theorem 3, by which no online algorithm beats F(P)F(\mathcal P)F(P), so Theorem 1 makes that ratio tight. Bound (ii) uses a different procedure and gives a guarantee for small inventories that does not rely on perturbing the ideal value function. The paper's Section 6 applies the same framework to the Adwords problem and to assortment problems with multiple prices.

The paper's proofs are in its Appendix B: Theorem 4 by a randomized primal–dual argument, Proposition 3 and Theorem 5 by analysis of the comonotone rounding, (45) by solving a small system, and Theorem 1 by assembling them. None of these results has a machine-checked proof. A complete formalization would yield a reusable, checked primal–dual framework for randomized online allocation: Theorem 4 holds for any family of procedures satisfying (17)–(18).

Difficulty

The primal–dual proof of Theorem 4 sets the dual variables yi=E[Φ~i(NT,i/ki)]y_i=\mathbb E[\tilde\Phi_i(N_{T,i}/k_i)]yi​=E[Φ~i​(NT,i​/ki​)] and zt=E[Zt]z_t=\mathbb E[Z_t]zt​=E[Zt​], where ZtZ_tZt​ is the pseudorevenue. These are expectations over both the initialization and the purchase decisions, and the dual constraint holds only after conditioning on the history and taking expectations. A deterministic value function does not suffice for multiple prices with finite inventory, since the borders L(j)kiL^{(j)}k_iL(j)ki​ are generally not integers. This is why the value functions are random. Rounding each border independently would break the segment-length control. Theorem 5 needs the comonotone bound (22), and an induction over segments with careful bookkeeping of the rounding errors.

Formalization scope

  • Indices. Items form an arbitrary nonempty finite type. Customers are indexed 0,…,T−10,\dots,T-10,…,T−1. Prices are 111-based with r(0)=0r^{(0)}=0r(0)=0. Probabilities pt,i(j)∈[0,1]p^{(j)}_{t,i}\in[0,1]pt,i(j)​∈[0,1], ki≥1k_i\ge1ki​≥1, mi≥1m_i\ge1mi​≥1 and 0<ri(1)<⋯<ri(mi)0<r_i^{(1)}<\dots<r_i^{(m_i)}0<ri(1)​<⋯<ri(mi​)​ are hypotheses.
  • Booking limits. α\alphaα and σ\sigmaσ enter as functions satisfying the defining systems (7) and (8) with positivity and unit sum. By Proposition 1 they are the paper's values.
  • Unit indices. Borders are stored as kL~(j)∈{0,…,k}k\tilde L^{(j)}\in\{0,\dots,k\}kL~(j)∈{0,…,k} and value functions as N↦Φ~(N/k)N\mapsto\tilde\Phi(N/k)N↦Φ~(N/k). In (17) the range of NNN is N<kL~(j)N<k\tilde L^{(j)}N<kL~(j).
  • The algorithm. The offer at customer ttt is computed from that customer's probabilities and the sales counts. The count in (16) is read as min⁡(Ni,ki)\min(N_i,k_i)min(Ni​,ki​), which equals NiN_iNi​ because the algorithm never sells a stocked-out item. Ties are broken by an arbitrary rule returning a maximizer, and every statement holds for every such rule.
  • Expectations. Expected revenue is a finite sum over configurations, weighted by product probabilities, combined with a backward recursion over accept/reject outcomes. Definition 3's configuration probabilities are Lebesgue measures of seed sets.
  • Competitive ratio. The ratio is always stated as c⋅(5a)(x)≤E[ALG]c\cdot(5\mathrm a)(x)\le\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]c⋅(5a)(x)≤E[ALG] for every feasible xxx of the original LP (5). This rules out the trivializations through x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 when OPT=0\mathrm{OPT}=0OPT=0, through an infimum over arrival sequences, and through a benchmark taken on the split setup instead of the original one.
  • F~i\tilde F_iF~i​ is not used. The printed theorem is phrased through F~i\tilde F_iF~i​, the optimum of the problem (44). The proof never shows that this optimum is attained. Its bound (ii) also comes from splitting the item, not from a procedure feasible for (44). The goal is therefore stated with explicit bounds and modes; choosing the better mode per item gives the printed min⁡imax⁡{… }\min_i\max\{\dots\}mini​max{…}.
  • Not posed. Corollaries 1–2 and the optimality and uniqueness claims about (45).

Weak duality is shared with mission II and (35) with mission III; each mission defines its own copy of the model. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and of the goal from them.

Selected references

  • W. Ma, D. Simchi-Levi, Algorithms for Online Matching, Assortment, and Pricing with Tight Weight-dependent Competitive Ratios, arXiv:1905.04770v1 (2019); Operations Research 68(6), 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04770, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1957
  • B. Kalyanasundaram, K. Pruhs, An optimal deterministic algorithm for online b-matching, Theoretical Computer Science 233, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3975(99)00140-1
  • A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, V. Vazirani, AdWords and generalized online matching, Journal of the ACM 54(5), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1145/1284320.1284321
  • N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, J. Naor, Online primal-dual algorithms for maximizing ad-auctions revenue, ESA 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_24
  • N. Golrezaei, H. Nazerzadeh, P. Rusmevichientong, Real-time optimization of personalized assortments, Management Science 60(6), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1939
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Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Stochastic Gradient Tracking Methods I: With a Constant Stepsize, DSGT's Limiting Mean-Square Error Is at Most (Γ+1)ασ²/(Γμn) Plus a Network TermResearch Paper

Distributed learning with noisy gradients

Many learning and estimation problems are solved by a network of agents: each agent holds part of the data, can talk only to its neighbours, and wants to compute the minimizer of the average of all agents' objectives. Examples are sensor networks, multi-robot systems, and data-parallel training without a central server (Nedić and Ozdaglar 2009; Lian et al. 2017). In these settings the agents rarely know their exact gradients; they sample them, one data point or one mini-batch at a time.

Gradient tracking methods let each agent keep, next to its estimate of the minimizer, a running estimate of the network-average gradient. With exact gradients they converge linearly with a constant stepsize (Qu and Li 2018; Nedić, Olshevsky and Shi 2017), which plain distributed gradient descent does not. S. Pu and A. Nedić (Math. Program. 187 (2021) 409–457) analysed the same scheme when every gradient is replaced by an unbiased noisy sample, and called it DSGT (distributed stochastic gradient tracking). This mission formalizes their constant-stepsize result, Theorem 1.

Setting

There are nnn agents. Agent iii holds a cost fi:Rp→Rf_i:\mathbb R^p\to\mathbb Rfi​:Rp→R, and the agents seek

x∗∈arg⁡min⁡x∈Rpf(x),f(x)=1n∑i=1nfi(x).x^*\in\arg\min_{x\in\mathbb R^p} f(x),\qquad f(x)=\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n f_i(x).x∗∈argx∈Rpmin​f(x),f(x)=n1​i=1∑n​fi​(x).

Each fif_ifi​ is μ\muμ-strongly convex with LLL-Lipschitz gradient: ⟨∇fi(x)−∇fi(x′),x−x′⟩≥μ∥x−x′∥2\langle\nabla f_i(x)-\nabla f_i(x'),x-x'\rangle\ge\mu\|x-x'\|^2⟨∇fi​(x)−∇fi​(x′),x−x′⟩≥μ∥x−x′∥2 and ∥∇fi(x)−∇fi(x′)∥≤L∥x−x′∥\|\nabla f_i(x)-\nabla f_i(x')\|\le L\|x-x'\|∥∇fi​(x)−∇fi​(x′)∥≤L∥x−x′∥.

Noisy gradients. At time kkk agent iii draws a random sample ξi,k\xi_{i,k}ξi,k​ and observes gi(x,ξi,k)g_i(x,\xi_{i,k})gi​(x,ξi,k​), with E[gi(x,ξi,k)]=∇fi(x)\mathbb E[g_i(x,\xi_{i,k})]=\nabla f_i(x)E[gi​(x,ξi,k​)]=∇fi​(x) and E∥gi(x,ξi,k)−∇fi(x)∥2≤σ2\mathbb E\|g_i(x,\xi_{i,k})-\nabla f_i(x)\|^2\le\sigma^2E∥gi​(x,ξi,k​)−∇fi​(x)∥2≤σ2; the samples are independent.

The network. Agents are coupled by a nonnegative doubly stochastic matrix W=[wij]\mathbf W=[w_{ij}]W=[wij​] (rows and columns sum to 111), with wij>0w_{ij}>0wij​>0 exactly when iii and jjj communicate, some wii>0w_{ii}>0wii​>0, and a connected undirected communication graph. The number

ρw=∥W−1n11⊤∥2<1,\rho_w=\Big\|\mathbf W-\tfrac1n\mathbf 1\mathbf 1^\top\Big\|_2<1,ρw​=​W−n1​11⊤​2​<1,

the spectral norm, measures how fast one round of averaging brings the agents together.

DSGT. Each agent keeps xi,kx_{i,k}xi,k​ and a tracker yi,ky_{i,k}yi,k​. Stacking them as rows of xk,yk∈Rn×p\mathbf x_k,\mathbf y_k\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}xk​,yk​∈Rn×p and writing G(x,ξ)G(\mathbf x,\boldsymbol\xi)G(x,ξ) for the matrix with rows gi(xi,ξi)g_i(x_i,\xi_i)gi​(xi​,ξi​), the method with constant stepsize α>0\alpha>0α>0 is

xk+1=W(xk−αyk),yk+1=Wyk+G(xk+1,ξk+1)−G(xk,ξk),\mathbf x_{k+1}=\mathbf W(\mathbf x_k-\alpha\mathbf y_k),\qquad \mathbf y_{k+1}=\mathbf W\mathbf y_k+G(\mathbf x_{k+1},\boldsymbol\xi_{k+1})-G(\mathbf x_k,\boldsymbol\xi_k),xk+1​=W(xk​−αyk​),yk+1​=Wyk​+G(xk+1​,ξk+1​)−G(xk​,ξk​),

started from a deterministic x0\mathbf x_0x0​ and y0=G(x0,ξ0)\mathbf y_0=G(\mathbf x_0,\boldsymbol\xi_0)y0​=G(x0​,ξ0​). The two error measures are the distance of the average xˉk=1n∑ixi,k\bar x_k=\frac1n\sum_ix_{i,k}xˉk​=n1​∑i​xi,k​ to x∗x^*x∗ and the consensus error ∥xk−1xˉk∥2=∑i∥xi,k−xˉk∥2\|\mathbf x_k-\mathbf 1\bar x_k\|^2=\sum_i\|x_{i,k}-\bar x_k\|^2∥xk​−1xˉk​∥2=∑i​∥xi,k​−xˉk​∥2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Fix Γ>1\Gamma>1Γ>1 and a stepsize α\alphaα below the explicit threshold (7) of the paper (a minimum of three expressions in ρw\rho_wρw​, ∥W−I∥\|\mathbf W-\mathbf I\|∥W−I∥, μ\muμ, LLL, Γ\GammaΓ). Then a certain explicit 3×33\times33×3 matrix A\mathbf AA has spectral radius ρ(A)<1\rho(\mathbf A)<1ρ(A)<1, and with Mσ=[3α2L2+2(αL+1)(n+1)]σ2M_\sigma=[3\alpha^2L^2+2(\alpha L+1)(n+1)]\sigma^2Mσ​=[3α2L2+2(αL+1)(n+1)]σ2,

lim sup⁡k→∞E∥xˉk−x∗∥2≤Γ+1Γασ2μn+Γ+1Γ−1 4α2L2(1+αμ)(1+ρw2)ρw2μ2n(1−ρw2)3 Mσ,\limsup_{k\to\infty}\mathbb E\|\bar x_k-x^*\|^2\le\frac{\Gamma+1}{\Gamma}\frac{\alpha\sigma^2}{\mu n}+\frac{\Gamma+1}{\Gamma-1}\,\frac{4\alpha^2L^2(1+\alpha\mu)(1+\rho_w^2)\rho_w^2}{\mu^2n(1-\rho_w^2)^3}\,M_\sigma,k→∞limsup​E∥xˉk​−x∗∥2≤ΓΓ+1​μnασ2​+Γ−1Γ+1​μ2n(1−ρw2​)34α2L2(1+αμ)(1+ρw2​)ρw2​​Mσ​, lim sup⁡k→∞E∥xk−1xˉk∥2≤Γ+1Γ−1 4α2(1+ρw2)ρw2(2α2L3σ2+μMσ)μ(1−ρw2)3.\limsup_{k\to\infty}\mathbb E\|\mathbf x_k-\mathbf 1\bar x_k\|^2\le\frac{\Gamma+1}{\Gamma-1}\,\frac{4\alpha^2(1+\rho_w^2)\rho_w^2(2\alpha^2L^3\sigma^2+\mu M_\sigma)}{\mu(1-\rho_w^2)^3}.k→∞limsup​E∥xk​−1xˉk​∥2≤Γ−1Γ+1​μ(1−ρw2​)34α2(1+ρw2​)ρw2​(2α2L3σ2+μMσ​)​.

The constants are the paper's, so the goal is stated with them.

Companion: Corollary 1

Under a further stepsize condition (13), ρ(A)≤1−Γ−1Γ+1αμ\rho(\mathbf A)\le1-\frac{\Gamma-1}{\Gamma+1}\alpha\muρ(A)≤1−Γ+1Γ−1​αμ.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof: the tracking identity (6); Lemma 1 on ρw\rho_wρw​; the one-step conditional estimates of Lemmas 2–4 and the auxiliary Lemmas 8–9; the linear system of inequalities (21) and its iterate (22); the determinant criterion Lemma 5; the bound det⁡(I−A)>0\det(\mathbf I-\mathbf A)>0det(I−A)>0 under the relations (23)–(25); and the lower bound (27) on the auxiliary parameter β\betaβ.

Significance

The first term of the bound on E∥xˉk−x∗∥2\mathbb E\|\bar x_k-x^*\|^2E∥xˉk​−x∗∥2, ασ2/(μn)\alpha\sigma^2/(\mu n)ασ2/(μn) up to the factor (Γ+1)/Γ(\Gamma+1)/\Gamma(Γ+1)/Γ, is the error of centralized stochastic gradient descent that averages nnn samples per step; it does not depend on the network. The network enters only through terms of order α2\alpha^2α2. So for small stepsizes a decentralized method with gradient tracking pays nothing in the limiting error for having no central server. Theorem 1 is one of the standard references for this statement in decentralized stochastic optimization.

The result is proved in the paper, with constants. It has no machine-checked proof that we know of. Formalizing it produces a checked development of the linear-system method for distributed algorithms: conditional moment bounds for coupled stochastic recursions, a 3×33\times33×3 linear system of inequalities between expectations, and a Perron–Frobenius criterion for its stability. The same pattern recurs in the analysis of many gradient-tracking and variance-reduced decentralized methods.

Difficulty

The obvious argument would bound each error by itself, but the three quantities E∥xˉk−x∗∥2\mathbb E\|\bar x_k-x^*\|^2E∥xˉk​−x∗∥2, E∥xk−1xˉk∥2\mathbb E\|\mathbf x_k-\mathbf 1\bar x_k\|^2E∥xk​−1xˉk​∥2 and E∥yk−1yˉk∥2\mathbb E\|\mathbf y_k-\mathbf 1\bar y_k\|^2E∥yk​−1yˉ​k​∥2 feed into one another, and none of them contracts on its own. The tracker error in particular depends on the next iterate, which itself depends on the current noise, so the cross terms do not vanish in conditional expectation and must be estimated separately (Lemmas 8 and 9).

Once the coupled system is set up, its stability needs the spectral radius of a nonnegative 3×33\times33×3 matrix whose entries depend on all constants at once, and the explicit limiting bounds need its inverse. The determinant criterion of Lemma 5 rests on Perron–Frobenius theory, which Mathlib provides only in part.

Formalization scope

Stacked variables are Fin n → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p). Every matrix norm is written out: ∥x−1xˉ∥2=∑i∥xi−xˉ∥2\|\mathbf x-\mathbf 1\bar x\|^2=\sum_i\|x_i-\bar x\|^2∥x−1xˉ∥2=∑i​∥xi​−xˉ∥2 (Frobenius), ∥W−I∥\|\mathbf W-\mathbf I\|∥W−I∥ is the Frobenius norm of the n×nn\times nn×n matrix, and ρw\rho_wρw​ is the operator norm of W−1n11⊤\mathbf W-\frac1n\mathbf 1\mathbf 1^\topW−n1​11⊤ on Euclidean Rn\mathbb R^nRn. Spectral radii are taken over C\mathbb CC, so complex eigenvalues count. Expectations are Bochner integrals, and every bounded expectation comes with an integrability conclusion. "lim sup⁡kak≤B\limsup_k a_k\le Blimsupk​ak​≤B" is stated as "for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, eventually ak≤B+εa_k\le B+\varepsilonak​≤B+ε". Fk\mathcal F_kFk​ is the σ-algebra generated by ξ0,…,ξk−1\boldsymbol\xi_0,\dots,\boldsymbol\xi_{k-1}ξ0​,…,ξk−1​, and conditional statements hold almost surely.

Standing assumptions and additions, all stated in the items:

  1. Assumptions 3–4 on W\mathbf WW are hypotheses of every statement about the iterates, although Theorem 1 cites only Assumptions 1–2.
  2. Independence of the noise is mutual independence of all ξi,k\xi_{i,k}ξi,k​; gig_igi​ is jointly measurable; p≥1p\ge1p≥1.
  3. ρw>0\rho_w>0ρw​>0, because β\betaβ, A\mathbf AA and (7) divide by ρw\rho_wρw​.
  4. 3αL≤13\alpha L\le13αL≤1 in (20), (21), (22) and Theorem 1: the last step of the paper's proof of (20) needs it, and (7) does not imply it in general (for ρw=0.01\rho_w=0.01ρw​=0.01, Γ=1.1\Gamma=1.1Γ=1.1, μ=L\mu=Lμ=L it allows α≈0.48/L\alpha\approx0.48/Lα≈0.48/L).

The goal speaks only about the DSGT iterates, x∗x^*x∗ and the matrix A\mathbf AA; it does not assume the linear system (21), ρ(A)<1\rho(\mathbf A)<1ρ(A)<1 or any estimate of the proof. The clause of Theorem 1 that sup⁡l≥kE[⋅]\sup_{l\ge k}\mathbb E[\cdot]supl≥k​E[⋅] approaches the limsup at the rate O(ρ(A)k)\mathcal O(\rho(\mathbf A)^k)O(ρ(A)k) carries an unquantified constant and is not formalized: the paper's proof yields only the envelope (22) and the limit of its right-hand side, not a rate at which sup⁡l≥kE[⋅]\sup_{l\ge k}\mathbb E[\cdot]supl≥k​E[⋅] reaches the limsup; the envelope (22) is a milestone. Theorem 2 (diminishing stepsizes) is the subject of the second mission of the series.

A complete development needs conditional expectations of functions of independent samples, a Frobenius-norm calculus for stacked vectors, the consensus contraction of Lemma 1, and the Perron–Frobenius facts behind Lemma 5. The last two are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the deterministic matrix lemmas in particular, are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • S. Pu, A. Nedić, Distributed stochastic gradient tracking methods, Mathematical Programming 187 (2021) 409–457. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-020-01487-0
  • A. Nedić, A. Olshevsky, W. Shi, Achieving geometric convergence for distributed optimization over time-varying graphs, SIAM J. Optim. 27 (2017) 2597–2633. https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.03218
  • G. Qu, N. Li, Harnessing smoothness to accelerate distributed optimization, IEEE Trans. Control Netw. Syst. 5 (2018) 1245–1260. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.07112
  • A. Nedić, A. Ozdaglar, Distributed subgradient methods for multi-agent optimization, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 54 (2009) 48–61. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2008.2009515
  • X. Lian, C. Zhang, H. Zhang, C.-J. Hsieh, W. Zhang, J. Liu, Can decentralized algorithms outperform centralized algorithms? A case study for decentralized parallel stochastic gradient descent, NeurIPS 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.09056
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Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Case Study on Stochastic Games on Large Graphs in Mean Field and Sparse Regimes I: An Explicit Markovian Nash Equilibrium on Every Finite Transitive GraphResearch Paper

Motivation

Mean field games describe Nash equilibria of large populations in which every player interacts with every other player symmetrically, through the empirical distribution of all states. Many systems of interest are not of this kind: agents in a network interact only with their neighbours, and the interaction structure is a graph rather than a complete graph. Understanding when equilibria on large graphs behave like mean field equilibria, and when they do not, requires models in which the equilibrium on a finite graph can be computed exactly.

Lacker and Soret (arXiv:2005.14102v2, Math. Oper. Res. 2022) introduced such a model: a linear–quadratic flocking game on an arbitrary finite graph, in which each player steers a Brownian particle and pays a terminal penalty for being far from the average of her neighbours. For vertex-transitive graphs they solved the game in closed form, up to a scalar ODE, with an equilibrium that depends on the graph only through the spectrum of its Laplacian. This mission formalizes that finite-graph result, Theorem 2.5 of the paper. Its large-graph consequences are the subject of missions II and III of this series.

Setting

Let GGG be a finite simple graph on vertices V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n}, with adjacency matrix AGA_GAG​ and degree matrix DGD_GDG​. When GGG has no isolated vertices its random-walk Laplacian is

LG:=DG−1AG−I.L_G := D_G^{-1}A_G - I .LG​:=DG−1​AG​−I.

GGG is transitive if for every two vertices u,vu,vu,v there is a graph automorphism mapping uuu to vvv. A transitive graph is regular, so its Laplacian LG=AG/δ(G)−IL_G = A_G/\delta(G) - ILG​=AG​/δ(G)−I is symmetric, with eigenvalues in [−2,0][-2,0][−2,0].

Fix a horizon T>0T>0T>0, a noise level σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and a cost constant c>0c>0c>0. Each vertex vvv is a player with state

dXv(t)=αv(t,X(t)) dt+σ dWv(t),t∈[0,T],dX_v(t) = \alpha_v(t,X(t))\,dt + \sigma\,dW_v(t),\qquad t\in[0,T],dXv​(t)=αv​(t,X(t))dt+σdWv​(t),t∈[0,T],

driven by independent Brownian motions WvW_vWv​, from a non-random initial state X(0)=x0∈RVX(0)=x_0\in\mathbb R^VX(0)=x0​∈RV. A Markovian control αv\alpha_vαv​ is a Borel function of time and the full state vector with at most linear growth. Player vvv minimises

Jv=12 E[∫0T∣αv(t,X(t))∣2 dt+c ∣Xv(T)−1deg⁡(v)∑u∼vXu(T)∣2].J_v = \tfrac12\,\mathbb E\Big[\int_0^T|\alpha_v(t,X(t))|^2\,dt + c\,\Big|X_v(T)-\frac{1}{\deg(v)}\sum_{u\sim v}X_u(T)\Big|^2\Big].Jv​=21​E[∫0T​∣αv​(t,X(t))∣2dt+c​Xv​(T)−deg(v)1​u∼v∑​Xu​(T)​2].

A profile (αv)v(\alpha_v)_v(αv​)v​ is a Markovian Nash equilibrium if no player can lower her cost by switching unilaterally to another Markovian control.

The equilibrium is built from

QG(x):=det⁡(I−xLG)1/n,fG′(t)=c QG′(fG(t)), fG(0)=0,Q_G(x) := \det(I-xL_G)^{1/n},\qquad f_G'(t) = c\,Q_G'(f_G(t)),\ f_G(0)=0,QG​(x):=det(I−xLG​)1/n,fG′​(t)=cQG′​(fG​(t)), fG​(0)=0, PG(t):=−fG′(T−t) LG(I−fG(T−t)LG)−1,αiG(t,x):=−ei⊤PG(t)x.P_G(t) := -f_G'(T-t)\,L_G\big(I-f_G(T-t)L_G\big)^{-1},\qquad \alpha^G_i(t,x) := -e_i^\top P_G(t)x .PG​(t):=−fG′​(T−t)LG​(I−fG​(T−t)LG​)−1,αiG​(t,x):=−ei⊤​PG​(t)x.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.5

For a finite transitive graph GGG without isolated vertices:

  1. QGQ_GQG​ is well defined and continuously differentiable on R+\mathbb R_+R+​, and the ODE has a unique solution fG:[0,T]→R+f_G:[0,T]\to\mathbb R_+fG​:[0,T]→R+​.
  2. (αiG)i(\alpha^G_i)_i(αiG​)i​ is a Markovian Nash equilibrium for every initial state.
  3. For every t∈(0,T]t\in(0,T]t∈(0,T], the equilibrium state X(t)X(t)X(t) is Gaussian with
EX(t)=(I−fG(T−t)LG)(I−fG(T)LG)−1x0,Cov X(t)=σ2(I−fG(T−t)LG)2∫0t(I−fG(T−s)LG)−2 ds.\mathbb E X(t) = (I-f_G(T-t)L_G)(I-f_G(T)L_G)^{-1}x_0,\qquad \mathrm{Cov}\,X(t) = \sigma^2(I-f_G(T-t)L_G)^2\int_0^t(I-f_G(T-s)L_G)^{-2}\,ds .EX(t)=(I−fG​(T−t)LG​)(I−fG​(T)LG​)−1x0​,CovX(t)=σ2(I−fG​(T−t)LG​)2∫0t​(I−fG​(T−s)LG​)−2ds.
  1. The average equilibrium cost satisfies
1n∑vJv=∣PG(0)x0∣22 Tr PG(0)−σ22log⁡Tr PG(0)n fG′(T).\frac1n\sum_{v}J_v = \frac{|P_G(0)x_0|^2}{2\,\mathrm{Tr}\,P_G(0)} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\log\frac{\mathrm{Tr}\,P_G(0)}{n\,f_G'(T)} .n1​v∑​Jv​=2TrPG​(0)∣PG​(0)x0​∣2​−2σ2​lognfG′​(T)TrPG​(0)​.

All four parts are in the goal statement.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof in §2.2, §3 and §4.

  • Graph-spectral facts. Transitive graphs are regular with symmetric LGL_GLG​ (§2.2). The spectrum of LGL_GLG​ lies in [−2,0][-2,0][−2,0] (Remark 2.4). The eigenvalue distribution μG\mu_GμG​ has mean −1-1−1 ((3.2)), and QG=QμGQ_G = Q_{\mu_G}QG​=QμG​​ (§2.3).
  • The ODE. Bounds on QμQ_\muQμ​ and its first two derivatives (Proposition 3.1), and well-posedness of fμ′=cQμ′(fμ)f_\mu' = cQ_\mu'(f_\mu)fμ′​=cQμ′​(fμ​) with explicit bounds (Proposition 3.2).
  • Symmetry. Commutation of LGL_GLG​ with automorphism matrices, and constancy of the diagonal of equivariant matrices (Lemma 4.1).
  • The Riccati system. The properties of PG(t)P_G(t)PG​(t) (§4.4 (i)–(iii)), the reduction of the Nash PDE system to matrix Riccati equations (Lemma 4.2), and the verification that the explicit Fi=(Tr P/n)−1Peiei⊤PF^i = (\mathrm{Tr}\,P/n)^{-1}Pe_ie_i^\top PFi=(TrP/n)−1Pei​ei⊤​P solve them (§4.4).
  • Law and value. The fundamental matrix exp⁡(−∫stP)=(I−f(T−t)L)(I−f(T−s)L)−1\exp(-\int_s^tP) = (I-f(T-t)L)(I-f(T-s)L)^{-1}exp(−∫st​P)=(I−f(T−t)L)(I−f(T−s)L)−1 (§4.5) and the averaged value identity (§4.6).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.5 is one of the few explicit Nash equilibria of a stochastic differential game on a non-complete graph. Two features of it are not visible in mean field theory. The equilibrium controls are nonlocal: each player reacts to the whole state vector, not only to her neighbours. The whole equilibrium (law, value, controls) depends on the graph only through the spectrum of LGL_GLG​. The second feature drives the paper's later results. Weak convergence of the eigenvalue distributions μGn\mu_{G_n}μGn​​ yields limits of the equilibrium, and these separate the dense regime, where the mean field approximation is valid, from the sparse regime, where it is not.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. No machine-checked version of it or of its ingredients exists: the random-walk Laplacian of a graph, linear–quadratic stochastic differential games, verification theorems for Nash systems, and Gaussian laws of linear SDEs with time-dependent coefficients. The mission produces a checked statement of the equilibrium together with reusable layers: spectral facts about D−1A−ID^{-1}A - ID−1A−I, an ODE analysis for QμQ_\muQμ​, and a Riccati reduction for quadratic Nash systems.

Difficulty

Three steps resist a direct approach.

  • The verification theorem. The paper passes from a classical solution of the Nash system (4.1) to a Nash equilibrium by appeal to a standard verification argument. Over the full class of Borel controls with linear growth, this requires Itô's formula for the quadratic value functions, together with integrability of the deviated state processes.
  • The Riccati system. The nnn coupled matrix equations (4.6) have no general closed-form solution. The explicit solution exists only because transitivity forces ei⊤P(t)ei=Tr(P(t))/ne_i^\top P(t)e_i = \mathrm{Tr}(P(t))/nei⊤​P(t)ei​=Tr(P(t))/n for every iii. That identity has to be derived from the action of the automorphism group (Lemma 4.1), not from regularity alone.
  • The law of the state. It requires solving a linear SDE with a time-dependent matrix and identifying its Gaussian law, a step for which the library has little support.

Formalization scope

Lean conventions:

  • Vertices. The vertex set is Fin n, so the paper's 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n become 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1. The state space is the platform's EthierKurtz.SDEState n (Euclidean Rn\mathbb R^nRn).
  • The Laplacian. LGL_GLG​ is the random-walk Laplacian D−1A−ID^{-1}A-ID−1A−I, not Mathlib's D−AD-AD−A.
  • Time and controls. Time is real. Controls are Borel on R×Rn\mathbb R\times\mathbb R^nR×Rn with linear growth on [0,T][0,T][0,T]; their values off [0,T][0,T][0,T] are never used.
  • Solutions of (2.1). A solution is a pathwise strong solution on a probability space that the solution itself carries, adapted to the completed Brownian filtration. Costs are compared across solutions; this is faithful because (2.1) has a unique strong solution.
  • Costs are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued lower Lebesgue integrals. They are converted to reals only after their finiteness is asserted.
  • Existence of the equilibrium state. The goal also asserts that the equilibrium state equation has a solution, so that the Nash property cannot hold vacuously.
  • Derivatives. fG′(T−t)f_G'(T-t)fG′​(T−t) is written as its ODE value cQG′(fG(T−t))cQ_G'(f_G(T-t))cQG′​(fG​(T−t)). The ODE is solved on [0,T][0,T][0,T] with one-sided derivatives at the endpoints, and uniqueness is agreement on [0,T][0,T][0,T].
  • Matrix conventions. Covariance integrals are entrywise. Gaussian laws are Mathlib's multivariateGaussian.
  • Added hypotheses. 0<n0<n0<n is added to three milestones that are false on the empty graph.

A formalization that fixes x0=0x_0=0x0​=0, restricts deviations to linear controls, drops the existence of the equilibrium state process, or replaces LGL_GLG​ by D−AD-AD−A is not this theorem.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs:

  • symmetric-matrix spectral calculus for LGL_GLG​ and for the matrix functions (I−xL)−1(I-xL)^{-1}(I−xL)−1 and log⁡(I−xL)\log(I-xL)log(I−xL);
  • differentiation under the integral for QμQ_\muQμ​;
  • Picard–Lindelöf and Grönwall on R+\mathbb R_+R+​;
  • Itô's formula for quadratic functions of a diffusion with additive noise;
  • the Gaussian law of ∫0tM(t,s) dWs\int_0^t M(t,s)\,dW_s∫0t​M(t,s)dWs​ for deterministic MMM.

The spectral, ODE and Riccati layers are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome; so are general verification theorems for linear–quadratic games.

Selected references

  • D. Lacker, A. Soret, A case study on stochastic games on large graphs in mean field and sparse regimes, arXiv:2005.14102v2, 2021; Math. Oper. Res. 47(2), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14102
  • F. Chung, Spectral Graph Theory, CBMS Regional Conference Series in Mathematics 92, AMS, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1090/cbms/092
  • R. Carmona, F. Delarue, Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I, Springer, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58920-6
  • A. Veretennikov, On strong solutions and explicit formulas for solutions of stochastic integral equations, Math. USSR-Sb. 39(3), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1070/SM1981v039n03ABEH001522
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance: If the Growth Rate κ of Ψ Is Finite, sup{E_μ[Ψ] : W_p(μ, ν) ≤ θ} Equals Its One-Dimensional Dual and Is FiniteResearch Paper

Motivation

Distributionally robust stochastic optimization (DRSO) chooses a decision xxx to minimize the worst expected loss sup⁡μ∈MEμ[Ψ(x,ξ)]\sup_{\mu\in\mathfrak M}\mathbb E_\mu[\Psi(x,\xi)]supμ∈M​Eμ​[Ψ(x,ξ)] over an ambiguity set M\mathfrak MM of probability distributions, instead of the expectation under one estimated distribution. When M\mathfrak MM is a ball around a nominal distribution ν\nuν (often the empirical distribution of data) in the Wasserstein distance, the set contains distributions with supports different from that of ν\nuν, and the worst case is driven by how far mass can be moved and how fast the loss grows along the way. This makes Wasserstein balls a standard choice in data-driven optimization, statistical learning and operations research.

The inner problem, a supremum over an infinite-dimensional set of measures, is not directly computable. Gao and Kleywegt (arXiv:1604.02199v3) show that it equals a minimization over a single scalar multiplier, for an arbitrary Polish space and nominal distribution and a merely measurable loss.

Timeline. Esfahani and Kuhn (2018, doi:10.1007/s10107-017-1172-1) proved a strong duality for p=1p=1p=1 and empirical ν\nuν on Rm\mathbb R^mRm, giving finite convex reformulations for piecewise-affine losses. Blanchet and Murthy (2019, doi:10.1287/moor.2018.0936) proved duality for general optimal transport costs on Polish spaces under upper semicontinuity of the loss, with a dual over pairs (λ,φ)(\lambda,\varphi)(λ,φ). Gao and Kleywegt's result, first posted in 2016 and published in Mathematics of Operations Research (2023, doi:10.1287/moor.2022.1275), covers every order p∈[1,∞)p\in[1,\infty)p∈[1,∞), every nominal ν\nuν and every measurable loss with finite growth rate, with a dual in one variable.

Setting

Let (Ξ,d)(\Xi,d)(Ξ,d) be a Polish space (complete, separable metric) with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra, P(Ξ)\mathcal P(\Xi)P(Ξ) the Borel probability measures, p∈[1,∞)p\in[1,\infty)p∈[1,∞) and θ>0\theta>0θ>0. The decision variable is suppressed: Ψ:Ξ→R\Psi:\Xi\to\mathbb RΨ:Ξ→R is a Borel measurable loss with Ψ∈L1(ν)\Psi\in L^1(\nu)Ψ∈L1(ν) for a fixed nominal distribution ν∈P(Ξ)\nu\in\mathcal P(\Xi)ν∈P(Ξ).

The Wasserstein distance of order ppp is given by

Wpp(μ,ν)=inf⁡{∫Ξ×Ξdp(ξ,ζ) γ(dξ,dζ): γ∈P(Ξ×Ξ), π#1γ=μ, π#2γ=ν}.W_p^p(\mu,\nu)=\inf\Big\{\int_{\Xi\times\Xi}d^p(\xi,\zeta)\,\gamma(d\xi,d\zeta):\ \gamma\in\mathcal P(\Xi\times\Xi),\ \pi^1_\#\gamma=\mu,\ \pi^2_\#\gamma=\nu\Big\}.Wpp​(μ,ν)=inf{∫Ξ×Ξ​dp(ξ,ζ)γ(dξ,dζ): γ∈P(Ξ×Ξ), π#1​γ=μ, π#2​γ=ν}.

The primal value is the worst-case expectation over the Wasserstein ball,

vP=sup⁡μ∈P(Ξ){∫ΞΨ dμ: Wp(μ,ν)≤θ}.v_P=\sup_{\mu\in\mathcal P(\Xi)}\Big\{\int_\Xi\Psi\,d\mu:\ W_p(\mu,\nu)\le\theta\Big\}.vP​=μ∈P(Ξ)sup​{∫Ξ​Ψdμ: Wp​(μ,ν)≤θ}.

The regularization operator is Φ(λ,ζ)=inf⁡ξ∈Ξ{λdp(ξ,ζ)−Ψ(ξ)}∈R∪{−∞}\Phi(\lambda,\zeta)=\inf_{\xi\in\Xi}\{\lambda d^p(\xi,\zeta)-\Psi(\xi)\}\in\mathbb R\cup\{-\infty\}Φ(λ,ζ)=infξ∈Ξ​{λdp(ξ,ζ)−Ψ(ξ)}∈R∪{−∞}, the dual objective is h(λ)=λθp−∫ΞΦ(λ,ζ) ν(dζ)h(\lambda)=\lambda\theta^p-\int_\Xi\Phi(\lambda,\zeta)\,\nu(d\zeta)h(λ)=λθp−∫Ξ​Φ(λ,ζ)ν(dζ), and the dual value is vD=inf⁡λ≥0h(λ)v_D=\inf_{\lambda\ge0}h(\lambda)vD​=infλ≥0​h(λ). The growth rate of Ψ\PsiΨ is

κ=inf⁡{λ≥0:∫ΞΦ(λ,ζ) ν(dζ)>−∞}∈[0,∞],\kappa=\inf\Big\{\lambda\ge0:\int_\Xi\Phi(\lambda,\zeta)\,\nu(d\zeta)>-\infty\Big\}\in[0,\infty],κ=inf{λ≥0:∫Ξ​Φ(λ,ζ)ν(dζ)>−∞}∈[0,∞],

with κ=∞\kappa=\inftyκ=∞ if no λ\lambdaλ qualifies. The lemmas also use the near-optimal distances D‾(λ,ζ)\overline D(\lambda,\zeta)D(λ,ζ) and D‾(λ,ζ)\underline D(\lambda,\zeta)D​(λ,ζ), the limits as ε↓0\varepsilon\downarrow0ε↓0 of the largest and smallest dp(ξ,ζ)d^p(\xi,\zeta)dp(ξ,ζ) over ε\varepsilonε-minimizers ξ\xiξ of λdp(⋅,ζ)−Ψ\lambda d^p(\cdot,\zeta)-\Psiλdp(⋅,ζ)−Ψ.

In Lean these objects are DRSOWass.Duality.wassPow, vP, Phi, dualObj, vD, growthRate, DUpper, DLower.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 17)

If κ<∞\kappa<\inftyκ<∞, then

vP=vD<∞.v_P=v_D<\infty.vP​=vD​<∞.

This is the printed theorem: an equality of values together with finiteness. It fixes no constant and needs no regularity of Ψ\PsiΨ beyond measurability and integrability.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1, weak duality vP≤vDv_P\le v_DvP​≤vD​ (no growth condition).
  2. Lemma 3(i), (ii), (v): ν\nuν-measurability of Φ(λ,⋅)\Phi(\lambda,\cdot)Φ(λ,⋅), D‾\overline DD, D‾\underline DD​, D‾0\overline D_0D0​, D‾0\underline D_0D​0​, and ν\nuν-measurable selections of near-optimal and far points.
  3. Lemma 4(i)–(iii): monotonicity, upper semicontinuity and concavity of Φ(⋅,ζ)\Phi(\cdot,\zeta)Φ(⋅,ζ), the bound (λ2−λ1)D‾(λ2,ζ)≤−Ψ(ζ)−Φ(λ1,ζ)(\lambda_2-\lambda_1)\overline D(\lambda_2,\zeta)\le-\Psi(\zeta)-\Phi(\lambda_1,\zeta)(λ2​−λ1​)D(λ2​,ζ)≤−Ψ(ζ)−Φ(λ1​,ζ), and one-sided derivative bounds.
  4. Lemma 5: hhh is ∞\infty∞ on [0,κ)[0,\kappa)[0,κ), finite on (κ,∞)(\kappa,\infty)(κ,∞), convex, lower semicontinuous, coercive, and has a minimizer λ∗∈[κ,∞)\lambda^*\in[\kappa,\infty)λ∗∈[κ,∞).
  5. Lemmas 6 and 7: explicit ε\varepsilonε-optimal distributions in the ball, built from push-forwards of ν\nuν, in the cases λ∗>κ\lambda^*>\kappaλ∗>κ, λ∗=κ=0\lambda^*=\kappa=0λ∗=κ=0 and λ∗=κ>0\lambda^*=\kappa>0λ∗=κ>0.

Significance

The result. Strong duality turns the worst-case expectation over a Wasserstein ball into a convex problem in one scalar, min⁡λ≥0{λθp−∫Φ(λ,ζ) ν(dζ)}\min_{\lambda\ge0}\{\lambda\theta^p-\int\Phi(\lambda,\zeta)\,\nu(d\zeta)\}minλ≥0​{λθp−∫Φ(λ,ζ)ν(dζ)}, where Φ\PhiΦ is a Moreau–Yosida-type regularization of −Ψ-\Psi−Ψ. For finite-supported ν\nuν this yields finite-dimensional reformulations of DRSO; the paper derives from it the structure of worst-case distributions (Corollaries 1 and 2) and applications to two-stage problems, point processes and Gaussian nominal distributions. The growth rate κ\kappaκ separates the finite case (this theorem) from the case vP=∞v_P=\inftyvP​=∞ (Proposition 2).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to the best of current knowledge none of it is machine-checked. The mission produces a formal statement of the duality on general Polish spaces, together with reusable pieces: extended-valued integrals, the regularization operator and its one-sided derivatives, measurable selection on Polish spaces, and push-forward constructions of near-optimal measures. Formal proofs of Lemma 3 also give measurable-selection tools that Mathlib does not yet provide in this form.

Difficulty

Weak duality is a one-line Lagrangian argument. The difficulty is attainment from the primal side: one must construct, for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, a distribution in the ball whose expectation is within ε\varepsilonε of vDv_DvD​. A worst-case distribution need not exist (when λ∗=κ>0\lambda^*=\kappa>0λ∗=κ>0 mass escapes to infinity), so a compactness argument on P(Ξ)\mathcal P(\Xi)P(Ξ) fails; and Ψ\PsiΨ is only measurable, so the infimum defining Φ(λ,ζ)\Phi(\lambda,\zeta)Φ(λ,ζ) cannot be reduced to a countable one, and the measurability of Φ(λ,⋅)\Phi(\lambda,\cdot)Φ(λ,⋅) and of near-optimal transport maps needs projection and measurable-selection theorems for analytic sets. The case analysis on whether the dual minimizer exceeds κ\kappaκ is forced by the possible non-differentiability of hhh at κ\kappaκ.

Formalization scope

  • Ξ\XiΞ carries MetricSpace, CompleteSpace, SecondCountableTopology and BorelSpace instances; ν\nuν is a probability measure; dpd^pdp is dist ξ ζ ^ p with real p≥1p\ge1p≥1.
  • Ψ\PsiΨ is assumed Borel measurable in addition to Ψ∈L1(ν)\Psi\in L^1(\nu)Ψ∈L1(ν); the paper's p. 5 states the theorem for a measurable Ψ\PsiΨ, and ∫Ψ dμ\int\Psi\,d\mu∫Ψdμ for μ≠ν\mu\ne\nuμ=ν requires it.
  • WppW_p^pWpp​ is the published RWPI.SqrtLasso.transportCost with cost dpd^pdp, an infimum over probability couplings in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; Wp(μ,ν)≤θW_p(\mu,\nu)\le\thetaWp​(μ,ν)≤θ is written Wpp(μ,ν)≤θpW_p^p(\mu,\nu)\le\theta^pWpp​(μ,ν)≤θp.
  • Integrals that may be infinite are the published ModelRiskOT.Duality.extIntegral, ∫φ+−∫φ−\int\varphi^+-\int\varphi^-∫φ+−∫φ− in [−∞,∞][-\infty,\infty][−∞,∞] (with ∞−∞=−∞\infty-\infty=-\infty∞−∞=−∞). Φ\PhiΦ, hhh, vPv_PvP​, vDv_DvD​ are EReal-valued; κ\kappaκ, D‾\overline DD, D‾\underline DD​ are ENNReal-valued, so κ=∞\kappa=\inftyκ=∞ is representable and the empty infimum is ∞\infty∞.
  • lim sup⁡ε↓0\limsup_{\varepsilon\downarrow0}limsupε↓0​ and lim inf⁡ε↓0\liminf_{\varepsilon\downarrow0}liminfε↓0​ in D‾\overline DD, D‾\underline DD​ are written as the monotone infimum and supremum over ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0. ν\nuν-measurability is null-measurability for functions and almost-everywhere measurability for maps Ξ→Ξ\Xi\to\XiΞ→Ξ.
  • Repaired or adjusted statements: Lemma 4(i)'s sup inequality is stated for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 (the printed ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0 case fails when an arg min is empty); in Lemma 6, (7)'s weights p1,p2p_1,p_2p1​,p2​ are read as p1ε,p2εp_1^\varepsilon,p_2^\varepsilonp1ε​,p2ε​; Lemma 5(v) carries κ<∞\kappa<\inftyκ<∞; Lemma 4(iii)'s right derivative is a limit in (−∞,∞](-\infty,\infty](−∞,∞].
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: integrals are not Bochner integrals (which would give a non-integrable μ\muμ the value 000), κ\kappaκ is not a real infimum (which would give 000 when no λ\lambdaλ qualifies), and the supremum in vPv_PvP​ ranges over probability measures in the ball only, which is nonempty because it contains ν\nuν.

A complete development needs couplings and gluing in Mathlib's measure theory, the measurable projection theorem and a measurable selection theorem on Polish spaces, and one-sided derivatives of concave extended-valued functions; the first three are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, alternative proofs of the goal (e.g. through the Blanchet–Murthy dual), and the companion result Proposition 2 (κ=∞⇒vP=vD=∞\kappa=\infty\Rightarrow v_P=v_D=\inftyκ=∞⇒vP​=vD​=∞) are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Gao, A. J. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, arXiv:1604.02199v3, 2022; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric: performance guarantees and tractable reformulations, Mathematical Programming 171, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-017-1172-1
  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying distributional model risk via optimal transport, Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0936
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 3: With Social Learning, Responsive Pricing Beats Pre-Announced Pricing When Consumers Are ImpatientResearch Paper

Motivation

A recurring question in revenue management with strategic consumers is whether a seller gains from price commitment. When customers are forward-looking, a seller who announces its whole price path in advance (pre-announced pricing) removes the customers' incentive to wait for a markdown the seller would otherwise be tempted to give; a seller who keeps the freedom to set later prices after observing the market (responsive pricing) cannot credibly promise not to cut prices. In the classical models without learning, commitment is valuable: Aviv and Pazgal (2008) find that announced pricing extracts more profit than contingent pricing from forward-looking customers, and Besanko and Winston (1990) analyse the responsive monopolist facing rational consumers.

Papanastasiou and Savva (Management Science, 2017) add social learning (SL): early buyers post product reviews, and the customers still in the market update their beliefs about the product's quality before deciding whether to buy later. The reviews create an informational reason to wait, and they also give the responsive seller something to respond to. This mission formalizes the paper's §7, which asks whether commitment remains valuable once learning is present, and its answer: for impatient consumers it is not.

Setting

A monopolist sells over two periods to a continuum of consumers of mass one. Consumer iii has a preference xix_ixi​, uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Mean product quality is unknown; consumers share the prior q~p∼N(0,σp2)\tilde q_p \sim N(0,\sigma_p^2)q~​p​∼N(0,σp2​), and reviews carry noise of variance σq2\sigma_q^2σq2​. The SL parameter is γ=σp2/σq2≥0\gamma = \sigma_p^2/\sigma_q^2 \ge 0γ=σp2​/σq2​≥0. Consumers discount second-period utility by δc∈[0,1]\delta_c \in [0,1]δc​∈[0,1]; the firm does not discount; the unit cost is c∈[0,1)c \in [0,1)c∈[0,1).

If a mass n1n_1n1​ of consumers buys in period 1, the posterior mean quq_uqu​ that the remaining consumers see is, before the reviews arrive, distributed as

qu∼N(0, σp2 n1γn1γ+1),q_u \sim N\Big(0,\ \sigma_p^2\,\frac{n_1\gamma}{n_1\gamma+1}\Big),qu​∼N(0, σp2​n1​γ+1n1​γ​),

the pre-posterior law (Lemma 1); when n1γ=0n_1\gamma = 0n1​γ=0 it is the point mass at 000. A remaining consumer of type xxx who buys in period 2 at price p2p_2p2​ gets x+qu−p2x + q_u - p_2x+qu​−p2​.

  • Pre-announced pricing. The firm commits to {p1,p2}\{p_1,p_2\}{p1​,p2​}. A measurable set B⊆[0,1]B\subseteq[0,1]B⊆[0,1] of first-period buyers is a purchasing equilibrium if each x∈Bx\in Bx∈B weakly prefers buying now, x−p1≥max⁡(0, δcE[(x+qu−p2)+])x-p_1 \ge \max\big(0,\ \delta_c E[(x+q_u-p_2)^+]\big)x−p1​≥max(0, δc​E[(x+qu​−p2​)+]), and each other type weakly prefers to wait, where quq_uqu​ has the pre-posterior law for n1=∣B∣n_1 = |B|n1​=∣B∣. The profit is (p1−c)∣B∣+(p2−c) E ∣{x∉B:x+qu≥p2}∣(p_1-c)|B| + (p_2-c)\,E\,|\{x\notin B : x+q_u\ge p_2\}|(p1​−c)∣B∣+(p2​−c)E∣{x∈/B:x+qu​≥p2​}∣.
  • Responsive pricing. The firm sets p1p_1p1​, observes quq_uqu​ and then sets p2=s(qu)p_2 = s(q_u)p2​=s(qu​), where sss must maximize the second-period profit (p2−c) ∣{x∉B:x+qu≥p2}∣(p_2-c)\,|\{x\notin B: x+q_u\ge p_2\}|(p2​−c)∣{x∈/B:x+qu​≥p2​}∣ at every quq_uqu​; BBB is a purchasing equilibrium given sss. Lemma 3 identifies the optimal second-period price p2∗(qu,xˉ)p_2^*(q_u,\bar x)p2∗​(qu​,xˉ) of equation (6), where xˉ\bar xxˉ is the remaining mass.

The optimal values πp∗\pi^*_pπp∗​ and πr∗\pi^*_rπr∗​ are the suprema of expected profit over all prices and all equilibria. In Lean these are preValue P and respValue P for a parameter record P : Params, and P.withδc d is the same model with discount factor ddd; "absence of SL" is P.noSL, the same model with γ=0\gamma = 0γ=0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8

In the presence of SL there is a threshold T(γ)∈(0,1]T(\gamma)\in(0,1]T(γ)∈(0,1] such that

πp∗(δc)<πr∗(δc)for all δc∈[0,T(γ)],\pi^*_p(\delta_c) < \pi^*_r(\delta_c)\qquad\text{for all }\delta_c\in[0,T(\gamma)],πp∗​(δc​)<πr∗​(δc​)for all δc​∈[0,T(γ)],

with σp\sigma_pσp​, γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 and ccc fixed on both sides. The threshold is not specified; only its positivity is claimed.

Milestones

  1. For δc=0\delta_c = 0δc​=0 the pre-announced purchasing threshold is θ(p1,p2)=p1\theta(p_1,p_2) = p_1θ(p1​,p2​)=p1​ (proof of Example 1).
  2. Lemma 3: the second-period price (6) is optimal for every quq_uqu​, xˉ\bar xxˉ, uniquely so outside the exit region.
  3. For δc=0\delta_c = 0δc​=0 the responsive purchasing threshold is ζ(p1)=p1\zeta(p_1) = p_1ζ(p1​)=p1​ (proof of Lemma 4).
  4. With SL and δc=0\delta_c = 0δc​=0: πp∗<πr∗\pi^*_p < \pi^*_rπp∗​<πr∗​.
  5. With SL, πp∗\pi^*_pπp∗​ and πr∗\pi^*_rπr∗​ are finite and continuous in δc∈[0,1]\delta_c\in[0,1]δc​∈[0,1].

Companion: Proposition 7

Without SL (γ=0\gamma = 0γ=0), both values are finite and

πbp∗−πbr∗=δc2(1−c)2(1−δc)4(9−2δc2−3δc)≥0,\pi^*_{bp}-\pi^*_{br} = \frac{\delta_c^2(1-c)^2(1-\delta_c)}{4(9-2\delta_c^2-3\delta_c)} \ge 0,πbp∗​−πbr∗​=4(9−2δc2​−3δc​)δc2​(1−c)2(1−δc​)​≥0,

strictly positive for δc∈(0,1)\delta_c\in(0,1)δc​∈(0,1).

Significance

The two propositions together reverse a standard prediction. Without learning, commitment weakly dominates (Proposition 7, consistent with Aviv and Pazgal 2008). With learning and impatient consumers, flexibility strictly dominates (Proposition 8): the value of reacting to reviews outweighs the cost of being unable to commit. The paper's numerical study (Figure 4) suggests that the threshold equals one for moderate γ\gammaγ, so that responsive pricing wins for every discount factor; that numerical claim is not a theorem of the paper and is not posed here.

The results are proved in the paper; to the best of current knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires a rigorous treatment of a continuum purchasing game whose equilibrium is defined through a Gaussian law whose variance depends on the equilibrium itself, the subgame-perfect second-period pricing rule, and the continuity of optimal values in a parameter.

Difficulty

The comparison at δc=0\delta_c = 0δc​=0 is elementary in spirit: myopic consumers buy early exactly when x≥p1x\ge p_1x≥p1​, so the two regimes produce the same reviews for the same p1p_1p1​, and the responsive firm can only do better state by state. Turning this into a strict inequality between two suprema requires a uniform gap, not just a pointwise one, because the paper's argument assumes an optimal pre-announced plan exists.

The step that extends the result to δc>0\delta_c > 0δc​>0 is the paper's appeal to the Maximum Theorem. It needs the expected profit to be jointly continuous in the prices and in δc\delta_cδc​ over a compact set of relevant plans. But the expected profit depends on δc\delta_cδc​ through the equilibrium threshold, which is defined implicitly by an indifference equation whose Gaussian kernel itself depends on the threshold (equations (3) and (9)), and equilibria are sets of types, not numbers. Continuity of the optimal value therefore requires continuity and uniqueness of these implicit thresholds, and a reduction of both suprema to compact sets of prices.

Formalization scope

The model is one shared definition module (SLPricing.Compare.Model), plus the formula (6) as p2Star. Conventions it commits to:

  • Standing assumptions σp>0\sigma_p > 0σp​>0, γ≥0\gamma\ge0γ≥0, δc∈[0,1]\delta_c\in[0,1]δc​∈[0,1], c∈[0,1)c\in[0,1)c∈[0,1); the firm's discount factor is 111; pure strategies.
  • Consumer types are [0,1][0,1][0,1] with Lebesgue measure; equilibria use weak best responses, so buyer sets are unique only up to null sets.
  • The benchmark "absence of SL" is γ=0\gamma = 0γ=0, where the pre-posterior law is the Dirac mass at 000 (the paper's limit γ→0\gamma\to0γ→0).
  • The responsive second-period rule sss is measurable and optimal at every realization of quq_uqu​; in the exit region qu≤c−xˉq_u\le c-\bar xqu​≤c−xˉ any maximizer is allowed, since every one sells nothing.
  • Optimal values are extended-real suprema over all real prices and all equilibria.

Added hypotheses, disclosed in each item: p1∈[0,1]p_1\in[0,1]p1​∈[0,1] in the two threshold milestones; xˉ>0\bar x > 0xˉ>0 for the uniqueness clause of Lemma 3. Proposition 7's "higher" is stated as the proof states it: non-negative gap on [0,1][0,1][0,1], strict on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

The comparison is meaningful only because the responsive firm cannot commit. Enlarging the responsive regime to arbitrary second-period rules, or defining either optimal value as a real supremum (whose junk value is 000 on unbounded sets), would make the goal trivial or empty; both are excluded by the definitions. Hard-wiring the thresholds θ\thetaθ, ζ\zetaζ or the price (6) into the definitions would make the milestones definitional; they are theorems here.

A complete development needs: Gaussian expectations of piecewise-linear functions of quq_uqu​ and their continuity in the variance; the implicit-function argument for the thresholds; a Maximum Theorem (Berge) for the optimal values. The Gaussian convex-order and Maximum-Theorem pieces are reusable well beyond this mission, and contributions of them as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Papanastasiou, N. Savva, Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers, Management Science 63(4):919–939, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2378 (accepted manuscript MS-14-00028.R2, 2016, is the source of all indices).
  • Y. Aviv, A. Pazgal, Optimal pricing of seasonal products in the presence of forward-looking consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • D. Besanko, W. L. Winston, Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers, Management Science 36(5):555–567, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555
  • R. K. Sundaram, A First Course in Optimization Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1996 (Theorem 9.14, the Maximum Theorem). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804526
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Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Single Timescale Stochastic Approximation Method for Nested Stochastic Optimization: NASA with Stepsizes 1/√N Drives the Expected Stationarity Measure E[V(x_R, z_R)] Below C/(√N − 1)Research Paper

Motivation

Many learning and risk-averse decision problems minimize a function of an expectation that is itself passed through another function: F(x)=f(g(x))F(x)=f(g(x))F(x)=f(g(x)) with g(x)=E[G(x,ξ)]g(x)=\mathbb E[G(x,\xi)]g(x)=E[G(x,ξ)]. Examples are mean–deviation risk measures, stochastic variational inequalities rewritten as minimization, and policy evaluation in reinforcement learning. Only noisy samples of ggg, of its Jacobian and of ∇f\nabla f∇f are available, and the plug-in estimate ∇g(x)⊤∇f(G)\nabla g(x)^\top\nabla f(G)∇g(x)⊤∇f(G) of ∇F(x)\nabla F(x)∇F(x) is biased because fff is nonlinear. Classical stochastic gradient analysis does not apply directly.

Timeline of sample complexities for smooth nonconvex two-level problems, measured by the number of samples needed to reach an ε\varepsilonε-stationary point:

  • 2017 — Wang, Fang and Liu (Math. Program.) introduce stochastic compositional gradient descent with two time scales; the unconstrained nonconvex rate is O(ε−4)O(\varepsilon^{-4})O(ε−4) in their measure.
  • 2017 — Wang, Liu and Fang (JMLR) accelerate it to O(ε−2.25)O(\varepsilon^{-2.25})O(ε−2.25) for smooth unconstrained problems, still with two time scales.
  • 2019–2020 — Ghadimi, Ruszczyński and Wang (arXiv:1812.01094, SIAM J. Optim. 2020) propose NASA, a single-time-scale method with one sample per iteration, and prove O(ε−2)O(\varepsilon^{-2})O(ε−2) for constrained problems. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Problem (1.1) is

min⁡x∈XF(x)=f(g(x)),\min_{x\in X} F(x)=f(g(x)),x∈Xmin​F(x)=f(g(x)),

where f:Rm→Rf:\mathbb R^m\to\mathbb Rf:Rm→R and g:Rn→Rmg:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^mg:Rn→Rm are continuously differentiable, X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn is closed and convex, and nothing is convex. Assumption 2 asks that fff, ggg, ∇f\nabla f∇f, ∇g\nabla g∇g be Lipschitz with constants Lf,Lg,L∇f,L∇gL_f,L_g,L_{\nabla f},L_{\nabla g}Lf​,Lg​,L∇f​,L∇g​; then ∇F\nabla F∇F is Lipschitz with L∇F=Lg2L∇f+LfL∇gL_{\nabla F}=L_g^2L_{\nabla f}+L_fL_{\nabla g}L∇F​=Lg2​L∇f​+Lf​L∇g​. F∗F^*F∗ is the infimum of FFF over XXX.

For β>0\beta>0β>0 the subproblem solution is yˉ(x,z,β)=argmin⁡y∈X{⟨z,y−x⟩+β2∥y−x∥2}=ΠX(x−z/β)\bar y(x,z,\beta)=\operatorname{argmin}_{y\in X}\{\langle z,y-x\rangle+\frac\beta2\|y-x\|^2\}=\Pi_X(x-z/\beta)yˉ​(x,z,β)=argminy∈X​{⟨z,y−x⟩+2β​∥y−x∥2}=ΠX​(x−z/β), with ΠX\Pi_XΠX​ the Euclidean projection. A pair (x,z)(x,z)(x,z) is judged by the optimality measure

V(x,z)=∥yˉ(x,z,1)−x∥2+∥z−∇F(x)∥2,V(x,z)=\|\bar y(x,z,1)-x\|^2+\|z-\nabla F(x)\|^2,V(x,z)=∥yˉ​(x,z,1)−x∥2+∥z−∇F(x)∥2,

which vanishes exactly when z=∇F(x)z=\nabla F(x)z=∇F(x) and −∇F(x)-\nabla F(x)−∇F(x) lies in the normal cone to XXX at xxx.

The NASA method (Algorithm 1) keeps three sequences: iterates xk∈Xx^k\in Xxk∈X, gradient averages zkz^kzk and value averages uku^kuk. With parameters a,b>0a,b>0a,b>0, regularization β>0\beta>0β>0 and stepsizes τk∈(0,1/a]\tau_k\in(0,1/a]τk​∈(0,1/a]:

xk+1=xk+τk(yˉ(xk,zk,β)−xk),zk+1=(1−aτk)zk+aτk[Jk+1]⊤sk+1,uk+1=(1−bτk)uk+bτkGk+1.x^{k+1}=x^k+\tau_k(\bar y(x^k,z^k,\beta)-x^k),\quad z^{k+1}=(1-a\tau_k)z^k+a\tau_k[J^{k+1}]^\top s^{k+1},\quad u^{k+1}=(1-b\tau_k)u^k+b\tau_kG^{k+1}.xk+1=xk+τk​(yˉ​(xk,zk,β)−xk),zk+1=(1−aτk​)zk+aτk​[Jk+1]⊤sk+1,uk+1=(1−bτk​)uk+bτk​Gk+1.

Assumption 1 governs the oracle. Given Fk\mathcal F_kFk​, the outputs Gk+1G^{k+1}Gk+1, Jk+1J^{k+1}Jk+1 and sk+1s^{k+1}sk+1 are conditionally unbiased for g(xk+1)g(x^{k+1})g(xk+1), ∇g(xk+1)\nabla g(x^{k+1})∇g(xk+1) and ∇f(uk)\nabla f(u^k)∇f(uk). Their second moments are bounded by σG2,σJ2,σs2\sigma_G^2,\sigma_J^2,\sigma_s^2σG2​,σJ2​,σs2​, and sk+1s^{k+1}sk+1, Jk+1J^{k+1}Jk+1 are conditionally independent. The analysis rests on the merit function W(x,z,u)=a(F(x)−F∗)−η(x,z)+γ2∥g(x)−u∥2W(x,z,u)=a(F(x)-F^*)-\eta(x,z)+\frac\gamma2\|g(x)-u\|^2W(x,z,u)=a(F(x)−F∗)−η(x,z)+2γ​∥g(x)−u∥2, where η\etaη is the optimal value of the subproblem.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2(c), (3.37)

With a=b=1a=b=1a=b=1, β=((1+α)2αLg2+α4)L∇f\beta=\big(\frac{(1+\alpha)^2}{\alpha}L_g^2+\frac\alpha4\big)L_{\nabla f}β=(α(1+α)2​Lg2​+4α​)L∇f​ for some α>0\alpha>0α>0, τ0=1\tau_0=1τ0​=1, τk=1/N\tau_k=1/\sqrt Nτk​=1/N​ for k≥1k\ge1k≥1, N≥2N\ge2N≥2, and RRR uniform on {1,…,N−1}\{1,\dots,N-1\}{1,…,N−1}:

E[V(xR,zR)]≤4N−1(2αL∇f[max⁡(L1,L2)+max⁡(1,β2)][W(x0,z0,u0)+σ^2]+σJ2σs2).\mathbb E[V(x^R,z^R)]\le\frac4{\sqrt N-1}\Big(\frac2{\alpha L_{\nabla f}}\big[\max(L_1,L_2)+\max(1,\beta^2)\big]\big[W(x^0,z^0,u^0)+\hat\sigma^2\big]+\sigma_J^2\sigma_s^2\Big).E[V(xR,zR)]≤N​−14​(αL∇f​2​[max(L1​,L2​)+max(1,β2)][W(x0,z0,u0)+σ^2]+σJ2​σs2​).

The constants L1,L2L_1,L_2L1​,L2​ (3.32) and σ^2\hat\sigma^2σ^2 are explicit in the problem data. This is the paper's headline rate, and every other statement of the mission feeds it.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: ∥yˉ(x,z,1)−x∥≤max⁡(1,β)∥yˉ(x,z,β)−x∥\|\bar y(x,z,1)-x\|\le\max(1,\beta)\|\bar y(x,z,\beta)-x\|∥yˉ​(x,z,1)−x∥≤max(1,β)∥yˉ​(x,z,β)−x∥.
  2. Lemma 2: ∇F\nabla F∇F is L∇FL_{\nabla F}L∇F​-Lipschitz.
  3. Lemma 3: η\etaη has an L∇ηL_{\nabla\eta}L∇η​-Lipschitz gradient in (x,z)(x,z)(x,z).
  4. (3.21): ⟨z,d⟩+β∥d∥2≤0\langle z,d\rangle+\beta\|d\|^2\le0⟨z,d⟩+β∥d∥2≤0 for the subproblem step ddd.
  5. Lemma 4: the pathwise descent inequality c∑τk(∥dk∥2+∥g(xk)−uk∥2)≤W(x0,z0,u0)+∑rk+1c\sum\tau_k(\|d^k\|^2+\|g(x^k)-u^k\|^2)\le W(x^0,z^0,u^0)+\sum r^{k+1}c∑τk​(∥dk∥2+∥g(xk)−uk∥2)≤W(x0,z0,u0)+∑rk+1.
  6. Proposition 1(a): moment bounds on zkz^kzk and dkd^kdk.
  7. Proposition 1(b): ∑E[rk+1]≤σ^2∑τk2\sum\mathbb E[r^{k+1}]\le\hat\sigma^2\sum\tau_k^2∑E[rk+1]≤σ^2∑τk2​.
  8. (3.29): V(x,z)≤max⁡(1,β2)∥d∥2+∥z−∇F(x)∥2V(x,z)\le\max(1,\beta^2)\|d\|^2+\|z-\nabla F(x)\|^2V(x,z)≤max(1,β2)∥d∥2+∥z−∇F(x)∥2.
  9. Theorem 2(a): the weighted gradient-tracking error.
  10. Theorem 2(b): the bound on E[V(xR,zR)]\mathbb E[V(x^R,z^R)]E[V(xR,zR)] for general admissible stepsizes.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2(c) gives E[V(xR,zR)]≤ε\mathbb E[V(x^R,z^R)]\le\varepsilonE[V(xR,zR)]≤ε after O(ε−2)O(\varepsilon^{-2})O(ε−2) iterations with one oracle call each. That matches the complexity of stochastic gradient descent on single-level smooth nonconvex problems, so the nested structure costs only constants. The bound holds with constraints, and zRz^RzR comes with a certified estimate of ∇F(xR)\nabla F(x^R)∇F(xR). The same merit-function technique underlies later single-time-scale methods for multi-level and conditional stochastic optimization.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper, not formalized. A machine-checked proof requires the whole chain, Lemma 4 through Theorem 2, to be stated with constants that the argument actually supports. Several printed constants do not meet that bar (see Formalization scope), so the formalization also certifies a corrected version of the theorem. The deterministic milestones (Lemmas 1–3, (3.21), (3.29)) are general facts about Euclidean projections and value functions of strongly convex subproblems, and other projected-gradient developments can reuse them.

Difficulty

The obvious approach fails. Analyzing F(xk)F(x^k)F(xk) alone does not work because the step uses zkz^kzk, a biased and correlated estimate of ∇F(xk)\nabla F(x^k)∇F(xk), and its error does not vanish at a single time scale. The analysis instead tracks the coupled potential WWW. Each of its three terms needs a different tool: the descent lemma for FFF, the smoothness of the value function η\etaη (Lemma 3, which needs differentiability of a parametric minimum), and a recursion for uku^kuk. These pieces must combine under the single coupling condition (3.16). The probabilistic part is delicate as well. The cross terms vanish only in expectation, they require conditional independence of Jk+1J^{k+1}Jk+1 and sk+1s^{k+1}sk+1, and their integrability is not automatic. Theorem 2(a) adds a weighted unrolling of the zzz-recursion through the products Γk\Gamma_kΓk​ and the summation condition (3.30).

Formalization scope

Points live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m). Jacobians are continuous linear maps with the operator norm, and ∇g(x)⊤\nabla g(x)^\top∇g(x)⊤ is the adjoint. The projection is a function PPP with the published predicate SpectralProjGrad.Shared.IsProjOnto X P, and yˉ(x,z,β)=P(x−β−1z)\bar y(x,z,\beta)=P(x-\beta^{-1}z)yˉ​(x,z,β)=P(x−β−1z). η\etaη is the subproblem objective evaluated at yˉ\bar yyˉ​, and Lemma 3 places (x,z)(x,z)(x,z) in the L2L^2L2 product WithLp 2 (ℝⁿ × ℝⁿ). F∗F^*F∗ is sInf over XXX, and FFF is assumed bounded below on XXX. The regularization βk≡β\beta_k\equiv\betaβk​≡β and the stepsizes are deterministic.

The randomness lives on a standard Borel probability space. Assumption 1 is stated with respect to any filtration to which xk,zk,ukx^k,z^k,u^kxk,zk,uk are adapted, which includes the paper's natural filtration. It requires square-integrable oracle outputs, so that no conditional-expectation hypothesis is vacuous. Statements printed with conditional expectations on the left and constants on the right (Proposition 1, Theorem 2(a)) are stated in total expectation, which is what the proofs establish. Every conclusion about an expectation includes the integrability of the integrand, so a bound cannot hold because a non-integrable integral defaults to 000. E[V(xR,zR)]\mathbb E[V(x^R,z^R)]E[V(xR,zR)] is the τ\tauτ-weighted average of E[V(xk,zk)]\mathbb E[V(x^k,z^k)]E[V(xk,zk)] over k=1,…,N−1k=1,\dots,N-1k=1,…,N−1 (3.34). Lemma 4 is deterministic: it holds along every path of the recursions, whatever the oracle outputs. The recursions tie yky^kyk to the projection and zk,ukz^k,u^kzk,uk to the oracle outputs, so the goal cannot be satisfied by arbitrary sequences or by a vacuous oracle.

Corrections to printed constants, each stated in the item's Formalization Note:

  • (3.18): the noise term of rk+1r^{k+1}rk+1 carries γb2\gamma b^2γb2, not b2b^2b2. The printed Lemma 4 has a counterexample.
  • (3.26): σ^2\hat\sigma^2σ^2 uses aL∇FaL_{\nabla F}aL∇F​, max⁡(σJ2σs2,∥z0∥2)/β2\max(\sigma_J^2\sigma_s^2,\|z^0\|^2)/\beta^2max(σJ2​σs2​,∥z0∥2)/β2 (the k=0k=0k=0 term) and γb2σG2\gamma b^2\sigma_G^2γb2σG2​.
  • (3.33): the coefficient of max⁡(1,β2)σ^2\max(1,\beta^2)\hat\sigma^2max(1,β2)σ^2 is 1/c1/c1/c, not acˉ/ca\bar c/cacˉ/c. The two agree when acˉ=1a\bar c=1acˉ=1.
  • (3.37): the denominator is αL∇f\alpha L_{\nabla f}αL∇f​, not αL∇F\alpha L_{\nabla F}αL∇F​, since the proof sets c=αL∇f/4c=\alpha L_{\nabla f}/4c=αL∇f​/4. The proof also fixes γ=αL∇f\gamma=\alpha L_{\nabla f}γ=αL∇f​ in WWW and σ^2\hat\sigma^2σ^2.
  • Proposition 1(a): the bound E∥zk∥2≤σJ2σs2\mathbb E\|z^k\|^2\le\sigma_J^2\sigma_s^2E∥zk∥2≤σJ2​σs2​ is false conditionally on Fk−1\mathcal F_{k-1}Fk−1​ and is stated in expectation.
  • Hypotheses the proofs use but the statements omit: τk≤1\tau_k\le1τk​≤1, bτk≤1b\tau_k\le1bτk​≤1, aβ≥ca\beta\ge caβ≥c and γb≥2c\gamma b\ge2cγb≥2c, τ0=1/a\tau_0=1/aτ0​=1/a (Theorem 2(a),(b)), N≥2N\ge2N≥2, and L∇f>0L_{\nabla f}>0L∇f​>0.

The second claim (3.38) of Theorem 2(c) is excluded: its printed constant is smaller than what the proof gives. Theorem 3 (asymptotics) and the ASA variant of §4 are out of scope. Contributions are welcome at every milestone. Solvers will need Euclidean projection characterizations, differentiability of the squared distance to a convex set, conditional-independence product rules for conditional expectations, and Abel-type summation for the Γk\Gamma_kΓk​ weights.

Selected references

  • S. Ghadimi, A. Ruszczyński, M. Wang, A Single Time-Scale Stochastic Approximation Method for Nested Stochastic Optimization, arXiv:1812.01094v2, 2019; SIAM J. Optim. 30(1), 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.01094
  • M. Wang, E. X. Fang, H. Liu, Stochastic compositional gradient descent: algorithms for minimizing compositions of expected-value functions, Math. Program. 161, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1017-3
  • M. Wang, J. Liu, E. X. Fang, Accelerating stochastic composition optimization, JMLR 18(105), 2017. https://jmlr.org/papers/v18/16-504.html
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic first- and zeroth-order methods for nonconvex stochastic programming, SIAM J. Optim. 23(4), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1137/120880811
  • A. Ruszczyński, Nonlinear Optimization, Princeton University Press, 2006.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Trade Credit, Risk Sharing, and Inventory Financing Portfolios: The Optimal Contract Always Uses Trade Credit, with Net Terms for Costless Default or High Cash and Two-Part Terms for Low CashResearch Paper

Why trade credit terms matter

Most business-to-business sales are not paid in cash on delivery. The supplier lets the buyer pay later, which is trade credit, and often offers a discount for paying early. In the classic "2/10 net 30" the buyer gets 2% off for paying within 10 days and otherwise owes the full price in 30 days. Trade credit is a major source of short-term finance for firms. Empirical work documents both forms of contract: net terms, with one price and no discount, and two-part terms, with an early-payment discount. The discounts are large, and they vary a lot from one buyer to another (Petersen and Rajan 1997; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan 2012). The implied interest rate on a forgone discount is often far above a bank loan's. This raises two questions: why do cash-poor buyers use trade credit at all, and when should a supplier offer a discount?

Yang and Birge (Management Science 2018) answer this in a supplier–retailer model with a financially constrained retailer, who can finance inventory with a bank loan, with trade credit, or with both. Their answer is risk sharing. Trade credit is repaid out of realized sales, so the supplier bears part of the demand risk. She can therefore induce a larger order than a price-only contract does. The model builds on the selling-to-the-newsvendor model of Lariviere and Porteus (2001), and it complements the supplier-versus-bank analysis of Kouvelis and Zhao (2012). This mission formalizes the paper's main result on the structure of the optimal contract.

The model

A retailer buys a single good from a supplier at unit cost ccc and sells it at unit price p=1p=1p=1. Demand is random with density fff on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Its distribution function is F(x)=∫0xfF(x)=\int_0^x fF(x)=∫0x​f, the complementary distribution function is Fˉ=1−F\bar F=1-FFˉ=1−F, the failure rate is h=f/Fˉh=f/\bar Fh=f/Fˉ, and the generalized failure rate is g(x)=x h(x)g(x)=x\,h(x)g(x)=xh(x). Demand has an increasing failure rate (IFR). The retailer has cash K>0K>0K>0.

The supplier offers a cash price wcw_cwc​ and a credit price wtw_twt​, with c≤wc≤wt≤1c\le w_c\le w_t\le 1c≤wc​≤wt​≤1. The early-payment discount is dt=1−wc/wtd_t=1-w_c/w_tdt​=1−wc​/wt​. If the retailer's cash does not cover his cash purchases, he borrows from a competitive bank. The bank loan is senior to trade credit. A bank and a supplier recovering a defaulted claim lose fractions αb\alpha_bαb​ and αt\alpha_tαt​ of what they recover, with αb,αt∈[0,1]\alpha_b,\alpha_t\in[0,1]αb​,αt​∈[0,1].

Default is described by two thresholds. The bank-loan default threshold θb\theta_bθb​ is the demand below which the bank is not repaid in full, and it equals the amount owed to the bank. The trade-credit default threshold θt≥θb\theta_t\ge\theta_bθt​≥θb​ is the demand below which the supplier is not repaid in full. The retailer uses a bank loan iff θb>0\theta_b>0θb​>0, and uses trade credit iff θt>θb\theta_t>\theta_bθt​>θb​.

The paper shows (p. 13) that the supplier's problem can be written in the thresholds alone. Let

F^b(x)=Fˉ(x)[1−αbg(x)],C(θ)=K+∫0θF^bF^b(θ)−θ,\hat F_b(x)=\bar F(x)[1-\alpha_b g(x)],\qquad C(\theta)=\frac{K+\int_0^\theta\hat F_b}{\hat F_b(\theta)}-\theta,F^b​(x)=Fˉ(x)[1−αb​g(x)],C(θ)=F^b​(θ)K+∫0θ​F^b​​−θ, Q(θb,θt)=min⁡{q≥0: qFˉ(q)=[θt+C(θb)]Fˉ(θt)}.Q(\theta_b,\theta_t)=\min\{q\ge0:\ q\bar F(q)=[\theta_t+C(\theta_b)]\bar F(\theta_t)\}.Q(θb​,θt​)=min{q≥0: qFˉ(q)=[θt​+C(θb​)]Fˉ(θt​)}.

The retailer orders QQQ, the prices are wt=Fˉ(Q)/Fˉ(θt)w_t=\bar F(Q)/\bar F(\theta_t)wt​=Fˉ(Q)/Fˉ(θt​) and wc=F^b(θb)wtw_c=\hat F_b(\theta_b)w_twc​=F^b​(θb​)wt​, and the discount is dt=1−F^b(θb)d_t=1-\hat F_b(\theta_b)dt​=1−F^b​(θb​). The supplier's expected profit is

Πs=K+∫0θtFˉ(x) dx−c Q(θb,θt)−[αb∫0θbx dF(x)+αt∫θbθt(x−θb) dF(x)].\Pi_s=K+\int_0^{\theta_t}\bar F(x)\,dx-c\,Q(\theta_b,\theta_t)-\Big[\alpha_b\int_0^{\theta_b}x\,dF(x)+\alpha_t\int_{\theta_b}^{\theta_t}(x-\theta_b)\,dF(x)\Big].Πs​=K+∫0θt​​Fˉ(x)dx−cQ(θb​,θt​)−[αb​∫0θb​​xdF(x)+αt​∫θb​θt​​(x−θb​)dF(x)].

She maximizes Πs\Pi_sΠs​ over a domain Θ\ThetaΘ of thresholds. A maximizer is an optimal trade credit contract. Net terms correspond to θb∗=0\theta_b^*=0θb∗​=0, which is dt∗=0d_t^*=0dt∗​=0. Two-part terms correspond to θb∗>0\theta_b^*>0θb∗​>0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 15)

For every optimal contract (θb∗,θt∗)(\theta_b^*,\theta_t^*)(θb∗​,θt∗​):

θt∗>0 ⟹ θb∗<θt∗(trade credit is always used).\theta_t^*>0\ \Longrightarrow\ \theta_b^*<\theta_t^*\qquad(\text{trade credit is always used}).θt∗​>0 ⟹ θb∗​<θt∗​(trade credit is always used).

If αt=0\alpha_t=0αt​=0, or if KKK is sufficiently large, then θb∗=0\theta_b^*=0θb∗​=0 and dt∗=0d_t^*=0dt∗​=0 (net terms, no bank loan). If αt>0\alpha_t>0αt​>0 and KKK is sufficiently small, then

0<θb∗<θt∗,dt∗>0(two-part terms, both bank loan and trade credit).0<\theta_b^*<\theta_t^*,\qquad d_t^*>0\qquad(\text{two-part terms, both bank loan and trade credit}).0<θb∗​<θt∗​,dt∗​>0(two-part terms, both bank loan and trade credit).

"Sufficiently large" and "sufficiently small" are existential thresholds on KKK that depend on the data (f,c,αb,αt)(f,c,\alpha_b,\alpha_t)(f,c,αb​,αt​), not on the contract.

Milestones

They are listed in the order the proof uses them:

  1. Lemma C.4: CCC is increasing, and convex when αb=0\alpha_b=0αb​=0.
  2. Corollary 3: QQQ increases in θb\theta_bθb​ and in θt\theta_tθt​.
  3. Lemma C.8: at αb=0\alpha_b=0αb​=0, Πs\Pi_sΠs​ is concave in θb\theta_bθb​.
  4. Lemma C.7: QQQ increases in αb\alpha_bαb​ and KKK.
  5. Lemma C.9: Πs\Pi_sΠs​ is concave in θt\theta_tθt​.
  6. Proposition 6, first sentence: Πs∗\Pi_s^*Πs∗​ decreases in αb\alpha_bαb​ and αt\alpha_tαt​.

Significance

Proposition 3 is the paper's prediction about inventory financing portfolios. Once the supplier sets the terms, a retailer who needs external financing always uses trade credit. Early-payment discounts appear only when supplier default is costly and the retailer is cash-poor. A discount is then the supplier's way of moving part of the financing to the bank. The paper uses this to explain why discounts go to small, risky buyers, as observed by Klapper et al. (2012). The comparative statics of §5 (Propositions 4–6) are built on the same reduced problem.

The result is proved on paper but has not been formalized. The appendix lemmas it rests on (C.4, C.7, C.8, C.9) are stated without proof ("available upon request"). A machine-checked development would therefore settle whether these lemmas hold on the domain where the paper uses them. It would also produce a reusable library: IFR demand with failure rates, the bank-loan pricing kernel F^b\hat F_bF^b​, and the implicit order quantity QQQ.

Difficulty

The order quantity QQQ is defined implicitly, as the smaller root of a unimodal equation, and the paper's arguments differentiate through it with the implicit function theorem. Every derivative of Πs\Pi_sΠs​ therefore involves 1/(Fˉ(Q)[1−g(Q)])1/(\bar F(Q)[1-g(Q)])1/(Fˉ(Q)[1−g(Q)]), which blows up at the edge of Θ\ThetaΘ where Q=g−1(1)Q=g^{-1}(1)Q=g−1(1). The density is only assumed continuous, so F^b\hat F_bF^b​ and CCC need not be differentiable when αb>0\alpha_b>0αb​>0. Monotonicity and concavity have to be argued from the integral forms, or under a smoothness assumption the paper does not state.

The obvious argument for "sufficiently large KKK" also fails. It perturbs the optimum at KKK just below M∗=g−1(1)Fˉ(g−1(1))M^*=g^{-1}(1)\bar F(g^{-1}(1))M∗=g−1(1)Fˉ(g−1(1)), but there the domain shrinks to a sliver near θt=0\theta_t=0θt​=0, and the derivative of Πs\Pi_sΠs​ in θt\theta_tθt​ at θt=0\theta_t=0θt​=0 can be negative. For exponential demand it tends to −∞-\infty−∞ as K→M∗K\to M^*K→M∗. The proof's claim that θt∗>0\theta_t^*>0θt∗​>0 there is not part of the theorem. Part 1 for general αb\alpha_bαb​ is reduced to αb=0\alpha_b=0αb​=0 through Proposition 6, which requires comparing optima over domains that themselves depend on αb\alpha_bαb​.

Formalization scope

All objects live in TradeCredit.Terms.Model.

Demand. Demand is a density f:R→Rf:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rf:R→R that is continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), positive on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), zero on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0), integrable with total mass 111, and has a weakly increasing failure rate on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). FFF is the interval integral of fff from 000. The normalizations are p=1p=1p=1 and s=0s=0s=0. The parameters satisfy 0<c<10<c<10<c<1, αb,αt∈[0,1]\alpha_b,\alpha_t\in[0,1]αb​,αt​∈[0,1] and K>0K>0K>0.

Domain. Θ\ThetaΘ is the printed set of Corollary 3 (θt≥θb≥0\theta_t\ge\theta_b\ge0θt​≥θb​≥0 and [θt+C(θb)]Fˉ(θt)≤M∗[\theta_t+C(\theta_b)]\bar F(\theta_t)\le M^*[θt​+C(θb​)]Fˉ(θt​)≤M∗) plus two pinned constraints: θt≤Q(θb,θt)\theta_t\le Q(\theta_b,\theta_t)θt​≤Q(θb​,θt​) (that is, wt≤1w_t\le1wt​≤1) and c≤wcc\le w_cc≤wc​. These are the image under (11) of §3.1's c≤wc≤wt≤1c\le w_c\le w_t\le 1c≤wc​≤wt​≤1, which the printed Θ\ThetaΘ omits.

Statements. QQQ is the infimum of the nonnegative roots. "The optimal contract" means every maximizer of Πs\Pi_sΠs​ on Θ\ThetaΘ. Existence of a maximizer is not asserted; the paper does not prove it. Monotonicity is weak, and concavity is Mathlib's ConcaveOn on the sections of Θ\ThetaΘ. Proposition 6 is stated by comparing attained values with Πs∗=sup⁡ΘΠs\Pi_s^*=\sup_\Theta\Pi_sΠs∗​=supΘ​Πs​.

Not in scope. The retailer's best response (Proposition 1) and the bijection between thresholds and contracts are not formalized. The goal is about the paper's own reduced problem. Lemma 1's first-order conditions are not a milestone: as printed they fail at a corner optimum θb∗=θt∗=0\theta_b^*=\theta_t^*=0θb∗​=θt∗​=0, and they need C′C'C′, which is not defined under a merely continuous density.

Ruling out trivialization. The large-KKK clause quantifies over K∈[K‾,M∗)K\in[\underline K,M^*)K∈[K​,M∗) with K‾<M∗\underline K<M^*K​<M∗. For K≥M∗K\ge M^*K≥M∗ the domain Θ\ThetaΘ has no point with θt>0\theta_t>0θt​>0 and every "for every optimal contract" statement holds vacuously, so a large-KKK clause that reached only those values would be empty.

Welcome contributions. Lemmas on IFR densities (positivity of Fˉ\bar FFˉ, finiteness of the mean, monotonicity of ggg and existence of g−1(1)g^{-1}(1)g−1(1)), the root structure of qFˉ(q)q\bar F(q)qFˉ(q), and boundedness of Πs\Pi_sΠs​ on Θ\ThetaΘ are reusable beyond this paper.

Source. The source PDF is the authors' accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online, eprint 801). All page numbers are the manuscript's.

Selected references

  • S. A. Yang, J. R. Birge, Trade Credit, Risk Sharing, and Inventory Financing Portfolios, Management Science 64(8), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2799
  • M. A. Lariviere, E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
  • P. Kouvelis, W. Zhao, Financing the Newsvendor: Supplier vs. Bank, and the Structure of Optimal Trade Credit Contracts, Operations Research 60(3), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1040
  • M. A. Petersen, R. G. Rajan, Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence, Review of Financial Studies 10(3), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/10.3.661
  • L. Klapper, L. Laeven, R. Rajan, Trade Credit Contracts, Review of Financial Studies 25(3), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr122
8 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 2: Under Responsive Pricing, Social Learning Raises Optimal Expected Profit When Consumers Are Impatient or PatientResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm launching a new experience good does not know how good the product is, and neither do its customers. Early buyers post reviews, and customers who wait learn from them: this is social learning (SL). Forward-looking customers anticipate this and may delay their purchase until reviews are available, which cuts into the firm's early sales. Papanastasiou and Savva (Management Science 2017) ask whether SL helps or hurts a monopolist facing such strategic consumers.

This mission formalizes their answer for responsive pricing, where the firm cannot commit to a second-period price and instead sets it after observing the reviews. Without learning, this is the classical price-skimming game of Besanko and Winston (1990), in which a firm without commitment power is hurt by consumer patience. With learning, two effects compete: reviews make the second-period market more informative (an informational effect the firm can exploit by repricing), and the option to learn makes waiting more attractive (a behavioral effect that hurts the firm).

Setting

A monopolist sells over two periods at unit cost c∈[0,1)c\in[0,1)c∈[0,1) to a unit mass of consumers with preference types xxx uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The mean quality is unknown, with prior N(0,σp2)N(0,\sigma_p^2)N(0,σp2​), and reviews are noisy with variance σq2\sigma_q^2σq2​; the SL influence parameter is γ=σp2/σq2≥0\gamma=\sigma_p^2/\sigma_q^2\ge0γ=σp2​/σq2​≥0. Consumers discount second-period utility by δc∈[0,1]\delta_c\in[0,1]δc​∈[0,1]; the firm does not discount.

If a set B⊆[0,1]B\subseteq[0,1]B⊆[0,1] of types buys in period 1, its mass ∣B∣|B|∣B∣ is the mass of reviews, and the posterior mean quq_uqu​, seen from period 1, has the pre-posterior law N(0,σp2 ∣B∣γ∣B∣γ+1)N\big(0,\sigma_p^2\,\tfrac{|B|\gamma}{|B|\gamma+1}\big)N(0,σp2​∣B∣γ+1∣B∣γ​) (Lemma 1 and Definition 1 of the paper). In period 2 the remaining types value the product at x+qux+q_ux+qu​.

Under responsive pricing the firm sets p1p_1p1​; consumers decide whether to buy now or wait; reviews realize quq_uqu​; the firm sets p2=s(qu)p_2=s(q_u)p2​=s(qu​) to maximize the second-period profit

π2(p2)=(p2−c) ∣{x∈[0,1]∖B: x+qu≥p2}∣.\pi_2(p_2)=(p_2-c)\,\big|\{x\in[0,1]\setminus B:\ x+q_u\ge p_2\}\big|.π2​(p2​)=(p2​−c)​{x∈[0,1]∖B: x+qu​≥p2​}​.

An equilibrium after p1p_1p1​ is a measurable buyer set BBB and a measurable rule sss that is optimal at every quq_uqu​, such that every type in BBB weakly prefers x−p1x-p_1x−p1​ to the discounted expected value δc E[(x+qu−s(qu))+]\delta_c\,\mathbb E[(x+q_u-s(q_u))^+]δc​E[(x+qu​−s(qu​))+] of waiting, and every type outside BBB weakly prefers waiting. The firm's expected profit is πr=(p1−c)∣B∣+E[π2(s(qu))]\pi_r=(p_1-c)|B|+\mathbb E[\pi_2(s(q_u))]πr​=(p1​−c)∣B∣+E[π2​(s(qu​))], and πr∗\pi_r^*πr∗​ is its supremum over all p1p_1p1​ and all equilibria. The benchmark "absence of SL" (γ→0\gamma\to0γ→0 in the paper) is the same model at γ=0\gamma=0γ=0, where qu=0q_u=0qu​=0 with certainty.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6

γ>0 ⟹ ∃ Δlr∈(0,1], Δhr∈[0,1):δc≤Δlr or δc≥Δhr ⟹ πr∗∣γ>πr∗∣γ=0.\gamma>0\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,\Delta_{lr}\in(0,1],\ \Delta_{hr}\in[0,1):\quad \delta_c\le\Delta_{lr}\ \text{or}\ \delta_c\ge\Delta_{hr}\ \Longrightarrow\ \pi_r^*\big|_{\gamma}>\pi_r^*\big|_{\gamma=0}.γ>0 ⟹ ∃Δlr​∈(0,1], Δhr​∈[0,1):δc​≤Δlr​ or δc​≥Δhr​ ⟹ πr∗​​γ​>πr∗​​γ=0​.

The thresholds are left unspecified; the statement asserts only that SL raises the optimal profit near both ends of the patience range.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3: the second-period price p2∗(qu,xˉ)p_2^*(q_u,\bar x)p2∗​(qu​,xˉ) of (6) is optimal when [0,xˉ)[0,\bar x)[0,xˉ) remains.
  2. (5): without SL, the first-period buyers are the types x≥χ(p1)=2p1−cδc2−δcx\ge\chi(p_1)=\frac{2p_1-c\delta_c}{2-\delta_c}x≥χ(p1​)=2−δc​2p1​−cδc​​.
  3. Proposition 4: the benchmark optimum p1∗=2c+δc2(1−c)+4(1−δc)6−4δcp_1^*=\frac{2c+\delta_c^2(1-c)+4(1-\delta_c)}{6-4\delta_c}p1∗​=6−4δc​2c+δc2​(1−c)+4(1−δc​)​, p2∗=χ(p1∗)+c2p_2^*=\frac{\chi(p_1^*)+c}{2}p2∗​=2χ(p1∗​)+c​, and monotonicity in δc\delta_cδc​.
  4. Lemma 4: with SL, the first-period threshold ζ(p1)\zeta(p_1)ζ(p1​) solves the implicit equation (7).
  5. (8): the expected profit as a function of the threshold (with a corrected integrand).
  6. Proposition 5: adoption inertia is never optimal; the on-path second-period price.
  7. Example 3: the endpoint δc=0\delta_c=0δc​=0.
  8. Continuity of πr∗\pi_r^*πr∗​ in δc∈[0,1]\delta_c\in[0,1]δc​∈[0,1] (proof of Proposition 6).

Significance

The result shows that the benefit of reviews to a firm that reprices dynamically, previously established for non-strategic consumers, survives when consumers strategically wait for information. It is one half of the paper's comparison between commitment and responsiveness: under SL the firm's flexibility to react to reviews becomes valuable, which reverses the classical ranking of pre-announced over responsive pricing.

The paper proves the result on paper only. This mission produces a machine-checked model of a two-period game with a continuum of consumers, Bayesian learning and subgame-perfect pricing, and machine-checked versions of the equilibrium characterizations. The paper's numerical evidence that the result holds for all δc\delta_cδc​ is not part of the goal.

Difficulty

The first-period threshold is defined implicitly: in (7) the law of quq_uqu​ has a variance that depends on the threshold itself, and the second-period price inside the integral is a piecewise function of both. Existence, uniqueness and the comparison with the benchmark all go through this fixed-point equation.

The endpoint δc=1\delta_c=1δc​=1 relies on Proposition 5(i), that inducing adoption inertia is strictly suboptimal. At δc=1\delta_c=1δc​=1 the alternative price used in the printed proof yields exactly the inertia profit, so this endpoint is not settled by the page's witness. Passing from the two endpoints to the thresholds requires continuity of an optimal value taken over an unbounded price set and over implicitly defined equilibria; the paper cites the Maximum Theorem, whose hypotheses must be established.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in namespace SLPricing.Resp. The model file is shared, verbatim, with the two other missions of this series. Conventions:

  • Standing assumptions: σp>0\sigma_p>0σp​>0, γ≥0\gamma\ge0γ≥0, δc∈[0,1]\delta_c\in[0,1]δc​∈[0,1], c∈[0,1)c\in[0,1)c∈[0,1); firm discount factor 111; pure strategies.
  • Best responses are weak, so buyer sets are unique only up to null sets.
  • The second-period rule must be optimal at every realization and measurable. In the exit region qu≤c−xˉq_u\le c-\bar xqu​≤c−xˉ every optimal price sells nothing; (6)'s value ccc is a convention there.
  • Optimal values are suprema in EReal over all real prices and all their equilibria, so neither an empty nor an unbounded family produces a junk value. Defining πr∗\pi_r^*πr∗​ as the profit at a closed-form price, or the benchmark by dropping the second period, would make the goal circular; the formalization does neither.
  • The thresholds are in the half-open intervals of the page; closed intervals would make the goal trivial.

Hypotheses added or restricted relative to the page, each disclosed in its item:

  • (5) assumes p1≥cp_1\ge cp1​≥c (the printed formula is wrong below cost) and states uniqueness for δc<1\delta_c<1δc​<1 (at δc=1\delta_c=1δc​=1 non-threshold equilibria exist).
  • Proposition 4 states uniqueness only for δc<1\delta_c<1δc​<1 (at δc=1\delta_c=1δc​=1 every p1≥(1+c)/2p_1\ge(1+c)/2p1​≥(1+c)/2 is optimal).
  • Lemma 4 assumes p1≥0p_1\ge0p1​≥0; its monotonicity sentence is not posed.
  • Lemma 3's uniqueness assumes xˉ>0\bar x>0xˉ>0 and qu>c−xˉq_u>c-\bar xqu​>c−xˉ.
  • (8) is stated with last integrand ζ(qu−c)\zeta(q_u-c)ζ(qu​−c); the page prints ζqu\zeta q_uζqu​, which contradicts the proof of Lemma 3.

Contributions welcome: Gaussian integral estimates for (7), the second-period optimization of Lemma 3, a witness against inertia at δc=1\delta_c=1δc​=1, and a continuity argument for optimal values over parametrized equilibria, which is reusable for the series' other missions.

Selected references

  • Y. Papanastasiou, N. Savva, Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers, Management Science 63(4):919–939, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2378 (cited from the accepted manuscript MS-14-00028.R2, 2016)
  • D. Besanko, W. L. Winston, Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers, Management Science 36(5):555–567, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555
  • Y. Aviv, A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • R. K. Sundaram, A First Course in Optimization Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804526
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Control TheoryOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Solvabilities for Stochastic Linear Quadratic Optimal Control Problems 1: The Cost Is Uniformly Convex iff the Riccati Equation Has a Strongly Regular SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

The stochastic linear quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem asks to steer a linear stochastic differential equation by a control so as to minimize a quadratic cost. It is the basic model of stochastic control: Wonham studied it in 1968 (Wonham 1968), and it is the model on which feedback design, mean-field control and LQ differential games are built (Yong–Zhou 1999).

Classically the cost weights are assumed nonnegative and the control weight RRR uniformly positive definite, the standard conditions (1.4). Under them the Riccati equation has a unique solution and the optimal control is a linear state feedback. A stochastic problem can however be well posed when RRR is indefinite, because the diffusion term also penalizes the control.

Timeline:

  • 1998: Chen, Li and Zhou observe that a stochastic LQ problem can be solvable with an indefinite RRR (SIAM J. Control Optim. 36).
  • 2002: Ait Rami, Moore and Zhou introduce a generalized Riccati equation with a pseudoinverse and algebraic constraints (SIAM J. Control Optim. 40).
  • 2014: Sun and Yong prove that closed-loop solvability is equivalent to the existence of a regular solution of that Riccati equation (SIAM J. Control Optim. 52).
  • 2016: Sun, Li and Yong characterize strongly regular solvability by the uniform convexity of the cost functional (SIAM J. Control Optim. 54, Theorem 4.5). This mission is that theorem.

Setting

A probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Ω,F,P) carries a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion WWW. Its natural filtration, augmented by the P\mathbb PP-null sets, is F\mathbb FF. Fix a horizon T>0T>0T>0 and deterministic coefficients A,C∈Rn×nA,C\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}A,C∈Rn×n, B,D∈Rn×mB,D\in\mathbb R^{n\times m}B,D∈Rn×m, weights Q∈SnQ\in\mathbb S^nQ∈Sn, S∈Rm×nS\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}S∈Rm×n, R∈SmR\in\mathbb S^mR∈Sm (functions of time) and G∈SnG\in\mathbb S^nG∈Sn. The admissible controls U[t,T]\mathcal U[t,T]U[t,T] are the F\mathbb FF-progressively measurable processes uuu with E∫tT∣u∣2ds<∞\mathbb E\int_t^T|u|^2ds<\inftyE∫tT​∣u∣2ds<∞. The state from the initial pair (t,x)(t,x)(t,x) solves

dX=(AX+Bu+b) ds+(CX+Du+σ) dW,X(t)=x,dX=(AX+Bu+b)\,ds+(CX+Du+\sigma)\,dW,\qquad X(t)=x,dX=(AX+Bu+b)ds+(CX+Du+σ)dW,X(t)=x,

and the cost is

J(t,x;u)=E{⟨GX(T),X(T)⟩+2⟨g,X(T)⟩+∫tT[⟨QX,X⟩+2⟨SX,u⟩+⟨Ru,u⟩+2⟨q,X⟩+2⟨ρ,u⟩]ds}.J(t,x;u)=\mathbb E\Big\{\langle GX(T),X(T)\rangle+2\langle g,X(T)\rangle+\int_t^T\big[\langle QX,X\rangle+2\langle SX,u\rangle+\langle Ru,u\rangle+2\langle q,X\rangle+2\langle\rho,u\rangle\big]ds\Big\}.J(t,x;u)=E{⟨GX(T),X(T)⟩+2⟨g,X(T)⟩+∫tT​[⟨QX,X⟩+2⟨SX,u⟩+⟨Ru,u⟩+2⟨q,X⟩+2⟨ρ,u⟩]ds}.

Standing assumptions (H1)–(H2): A∈L1A\in L^1A∈L1, B,C∈L2B,C\in L^2B,C∈L2, D∈L∞D\in L^\inftyD∈L∞, Q∈L1Q\in L^1Q∈L1, S∈L2S\in L^2S∈L2, R∈L∞R\in L^\inftyR∈L∞ on (0,T)(0,T)(0,T), and square-integrability of the random terms b,σ,q,ρ,gb,\sigma,q,\rho,gb,σ,q,ρ,g. No sign condition is imposed on GGG, QQQ or RRR. The homogeneous problem (SLQ)0^00 sets b,σ,g,q,ρ=0b,\sigma,g,q,\rho=0b,σ,g,q,ρ=0; its cost is J0J^0J0.

The map u↦J0(0,0;u)u\mapsto J^0(0,0;u)u↦J0(0,0;u) is uniformly convex if, for some λ>0\lambda>0λ>0,

J0(0,0;u) ≥ λ E∫0T∣u(s)∣2ds∀u∈U[0,T].(4.2)J^0(0,0;u)\ \ge\ \lambda\,\mathbb E\int_0^T|u(s)|^2ds\qquad\forall u\in\mathcal U[0,T].\qquad(4.2)J0(0,0;u) ≥ λE∫0T​∣u(s)∣2ds∀u∈U[0,T].(4.2)

With ΣP=R+D⊤PD\Sigma_P=R+D^\top PDΣP​=R+D⊤PD and KP=B⊤P+D⊤PC+SK_P=B^\top P+D^\top PC+SKP​=B⊤P+D⊤PC+S, the Riccati equation is

P˙+PA+A⊤P+C⊤PC+Q−KP⊤ΣP†KP=0,P(T)=G,(4.6)\dot P+PA+A^\top P+C^\top PC+Q-K_P^\top\Sigma_P^\dagger K_P=0,\qquad P(T)=G,\qquad(4.6)P˙+PA+A⊤P+C⊤PC+Q−KP⊤​ΣP†​KP​=0,P(T)=G,(4.6)

with †\dagger† the Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse. A solution P∈C([0,T];Sn)P\in C([0,T];\mathbb S^n)P∈C([0,T];Sn) is strongly regular if ΣP≥λI\Sigma_P\ge\lambda IΣP​≥λI a.e. for some λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 (4.10).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.5

∃λ>0: J0(0,0;u)≥λ E ⁣∫0T ⁣∣u∣2ds  ∀u∈U[0,T]  ⟺  (4.6) admits a strongly regular solution.\exists\lambda>0:\ J^0(0,0;u)\ge\lambda\,\mathbb E\!\int_0^T\!|u|^2ds\ \ \forall u\in\mathcal U[0,T]\iff(4.6)\text{ admits a strongly regular solution.}∃λ>0: J0(0,0;u)≥λE∫0T​∣u∣2ds  ∀u∈U[0,T]⟺(4.6) admits a strongly regular solution.

The goal fixes no constant: the λ\lambdaλ on each side is existential.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.2: the cost of a feedback control ΘX+u\Theta X+uΘX+u, written through the solution of a Lyapunov equation.
  2. Lemma 2.3: u↦u−ΘX(u)u\mapsto u-\Theta X^{(u)}u↦u−ΘX(u) is bounded below, E∫∣u−ΘX(u)∣2≥γ E∫∣u∣2\mathbb E\int|u-\Theta X^{(u)}|^2\ge\gamma\,\mathbb E\int|u|^2E∫∣u−ΘX(u)∣2≥γE∫∣u∣2.
  3. Proposition 4.1: uniform convexity gives unique open-loop solvability and V0(t,x)≥α∣x∣2V^0(t,x)\ge\alpha|x|^2V0(t,x)≥α∣x∣2.
  4. Proposition 4.4: every Lyapunov solution satisfies R+D⊤PD≥λIR+D^\top PD\ge\lambda IR+D⊤PD≥λI and P≥αIP\ge\alpha IP≥αI, with the same λ,α\lambda,\alphaλ,α.
  5. (4.20) and the monotonicity P1≥Pi≥Pi+1≥αIP_1\ge P_i\ge P_{i+1}\ge\alpha IP1​≥Pi​≥Pi+1​≥αI of the iteration (4.18)–(4.19).
  6. Uniform convergence of the iteration to a strongly regular solution.
  7. The completion of squares J0(0,0;u)=E∫⟨ΣP(u−ΘX(u)),u−ΘX(u)⟩dsJ^0(0,0;u)=\mathbb E\int\langle\Sigma_P(u-\Theta X^{(u)}),u-\Theta X^{(u)}\rangle dsJ0(0,0;u)=E∫⟨ΣP​(u−ΘX(u)),u−ΘX(u)⟩ds.

Companion items: Remark 4.6 (the same λ\lambdaλ bounds ΣP\Sigma_PΣP​), the well-posedness of the state equation and the cost (Sun–Yong 2014, Proposition 2.1), and Proposition 3.5 (the standard conditions (1.4) imply uniform convexity).

Significance

Theorem 4.5 gives a checkable sufficient condition for the classical structure of LQ control: under (4.2) the Riccati equation has a solution whose gain matrix R+D⊤PDR+D^\top PDR+D⊤PD is uniformly positive definite, so the optimal control is a state feedback with an invertible gain. It covers indefinite weights, and Proposition 3.5 shows that it contains the classical case (1.4). Combined with Sun–Yong's equivalence it yields Corollary 4.7, the feedback representation of the open-loop optimal control, which later missions of this series use.

The results are proved in the paper. As far as is known they have no machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires stochastic calculus for controlled SDEs (Itô's formula for quadratic forms of a state process) linked to matrix ODE theory. The definitions this mission fixes (the LQ problem, the Riccati and Lyapunov equations with a pseudoinverse) can be reused by the other missions of the series and by any stochastic LQ formalization.

Difficulty

The direction (ii) ⇒ (i) is a completion of squares followed by Lemma 2.3. Lemma 2.3 is not obvious: it asserts a bounded inverse for an operator defined through an SDE.

The direction (i) ⇒ (ii) is the hard one. The obvious approach would solve (4.6) directly, but (4.6) is nonlinear and its coefficient ΣP†\Sigma_P^\daggerΣP†​ may be singular. No sign condition gives a priori bounds. The paper instead builds a policy-iteration sequence of linear Lyapunov equations. The difficulty is to show that every iterate keeps R+D⊤PiD≥λIR+D^\top P_iD\ge\lambda IR+D⊤Pi​D≥λI, so that the next gain is defined, and stays bounded below. These bounds come from the cost functional (Proposition 4.4), not from the matrix equation. Uniform convergence of the iterates then needs integrable estimates under the weak integrability of (H1).

Formalization scope

  • Basis. The paper's (Ω,F,P,W)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P,W)(Ω,F,P,W) is a probability measure with a standard Brownian motion IsStdBrownian (Mathlib's IsBrownianReal per coordinate, published module Peng1990.SMP.Stochastic). F\mathbb FF is augmentedFiltration (published ReflectedBSDE.Existence.Setting).
  • State and cost. The state from (t,x)(t,x)(t,x) is an Itô solution from time 000 whose coefficients are switched on at ttt, with continuous paths and Esup⁡∣X∣2<∞\mathbb E\sup|X|^2<\inftyEsup∣X∣2<∞. JJJ is evaluated along a chosen solution, which is unique; the item state_wellposed poses existence, uniqueness and integrability of the cost. Expectations are Bochner integrals, and ∣u∣2|u|^2∣u∣2 is the Euclidean u⋅uu\cdot uu⋅u.
  • Integrability and values. LpL^pLp conditions on matrix functions are entrywise. The diffusion coefficients C,DC,DC,D are taken Borel measurable on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (a measurable representative of their class), so that the Itô integrand CX+Du+σCX+Du+\sigmaCX+Du+σ of (1.1) is progressively measurable. VVV is an EReal infimum over admissible controls.
  • Matrix ODEs. The Riccati and Lyapunov equations are in integral form: continuous symmetric PPP, an integrable right-hand side, and P(t)=G+∫tTF(s,P(s))dsP(t)=G+\int_t^TF(s,P(s))dsP(t)=G+∫tT​F(s,P(s))ds. The pseudoinverse is the published HarmonicGames.Decomposition.pinv. Where the paper prints (⋅)−1(\cdot)^{-1}(⋅)−1 ((4.19), p. 2290) Lean's matrix inverse is used; it is invertible there by R+D⊤PD≥λIR+D^\top PD\ge\lambda IR+D⊤PD≥λI.
  • The iteration. The sequence of milestones 5–6 is given by hypotheses: P0P_0P0​ solves (4.18) and Pi+1P_{i+1}Pi+1​ the Lyapunov equation of Θi\Theta_iΘi​. Lyapunov solutions are unique, so this is the paper's sequence.
  • Constants. λ\lambdaλ and α\alphaα in Proposition 4.4 and Remark 4.6 are the constants of (4.2) and (4.1), passed as parameters.

Ruling out trivial forms. Uniform convexity is not defined through the operator M2(0)M_2(0)M2​(0) of (3.8), and strong regularity includes the integral Riccati equation. A formalization that drops the Riccati equation, or reads uniform convexity off a matrix condition, is a different theorem. No positivity of GGG, QQQ or RRR is assumed anywhere except in Proposition 3.5, whose hypothesis (1.4) is exactly that.

Contributions welcome: Itô's formula for ⟨P(s)X(s),X(s)⟩\langle P(s)X(s),X(s)\rangle⟨P(s)X(s),X(s)⟩ with a C1C^1C1 (or absolutely continuous) matrix PPP; existence and uniqueness for linear SDEs with L1/L2L^1/L^2L1/L2 coefficients; existence and uniqueness for linear matrix ODEs; the Penrose identities for pinv.

Selected references

  • J. Sun, X. Li, J. Yong, Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Solvabilities for Stochastic Linear Quadratic Optimal Control Problems, SIAM J. Control Optim. 54 (2016), 2274–2308. https://doi.org/10.1137/15M103532X
  • J. Sun, J. Yong, Linear Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games: Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Saddle Points, SIAM J. Control Optim. 52 (2014), 4082–4121. https://doi.org/10.1137/140953642
  • M. Ait Rami, J. B. Moore, X. Y. Zhou, Indefinite Stochastic Linear Quadratic Control and Generalized Differential Riccati Equation, SIAM J. Control Optim. 40 (2002), 1296–1311. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0363012900371083
  • S. Chen, X. Li, X. Y. Zhou, Stochastic Linear Quadratic Regulators with Indefinite Control Weight Costs, SIAM J. Control Optim. 36 (1998), 1685–1702. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0363012996310478
  • W. M. Wonham, On a Matrix Riccati Equation of Stochastic Control, SIAM J. Control 6 (1968), 681–697. https://doi.org/10.1137/0306044
  • J. Yong, X. Y. Zhou, Stochastic Controls: Hamiltonian Systems and HJB Equations, Springer, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1466-3
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