Anyone but Him: The Complexity of Precluding an Alternative: Control by Partition of Voters Is Vulnerable or NP-Complete for Plurality, Condorcet and Approval Voting, Depending on Tie-HandlingResearch Paper
Why election control is studied
An election is run by someone — a chair, a committee, an organiser — who can shape it without touching a single ballot: by deciding which candidates appear, which voters are registered, or how the electorate is split into bodies that pre-select nominees. Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick (1992) proposed to measure how well a voting rule protects itself against such manipulation by the computational difficulty of finding a successful manipulation: a rule for which the chair's problem is NP-complete is resistant, one for which it is solvable in polynomial time is vulnerable. They studied constructive control, where the chair wants a given candidate to become the unique winner.
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra and Rothe (arXiv:cs/0507027, Artificial Intelligence 171, 2007) introduced destructive control: the chair wants a despised candidate not to be the unique winner ("anyone but him"). They classified plurality, Condorcet and approval voting under seven control types in both settings. This mission formalizes the last of their main results, Theorem 3.6, on control by partition of voters.
Timeline:
- 1992: Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick define constructive control and its complexity for plurality and Condorcet; for partition of voters they use a model in which ties in subcommittees are forbidden.
- 2005–2007: Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra and Rothe add destructive control, approval voting, and the two tie-handling models below.
- 2026: version v5 of the paper adds Appendix A, a corrected proof of the TP case of Theorem 4.21.
Setting
An election has candidates and voters , each casting a ballot. For plurality and Condorcet voting a ballot is a strict ranking of ; for approval voting it is the set of candidates the voter approves of. The election , with candidates and voters , reads each ballot through the preferences it induces on . Its winner set is:
- plurality: the candidates of ranked first among by a maximum number of voters of ;
- Condorcet: the that beat every other in the pairwise election, (at most one candidate; possibly none);
- approval: the candidates of approved by a maximum number of voters of .
In control by partition of voters the chair splits into two subcommittees and (either may be empty). Each subcommittee holds the subelection and nominates candidates. Under Ties-Promote (TP) it nominates all its winners; under Ties-Eliminate (TE) it nominates its winner if there is exactly one and nobody otherwise. The two-stage election then is
the nominees running against each other before all voters. Given , the constructive problem asks whether some partition gives , the destructive problem whether some partition gives .
Definition 3.1 of the paper: a rule is susceptible to a control type if in some election the chair can change from not being the unique winner to being it (constructive), or from being the unique winner to not being it (destructive). It is vulnerable if it is susceptible and the problem's language is in P; certifiably-vulnerable if it is susceptible and a successful partition can be computed in polynomial time; resistant if it is susceptible and the language is NP-complete.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 3.6
With Hitting Set and Exact Cover by Three-Sets NP-complete (the two facts the paper takes from Garey and Johnson),
Nine clauses, each including its susceptibility part.
Milestones
- Susceptibility witnesses: Examples 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.16, 4.17.
- Polynomial-time algorithms: Theorems 4.18 and 4.19 (plurality, TE), 4.20 (Condorcet), 4.21 (approval, destructive, TE and TP).
- Plurality TP hardness: Claims 4.29 and 4.30 on Construction 4.28; Theorem 4.39 (Restricted Hitting Set is NP-complete); Claims 4.40 and 4.41; Corollary 4.42.
- Approval constructive hardness: Theorems 4.45 (TP) and 4.46 (TE), by reduction from X3C.
Significance
Theorem 3.6 is where the tie-handling model changes the classification: plurality is vulnerable under TE and resistant under TP, for both constructive and destructive control. Under TE at most one candidate leaves each subcommittee; under TP any set of tied candidates may advance. The theorem also shows that approval and Condorcet, which resist constructive control by partition of voters, are vulnerable to its destructive form. Results of this kind underlie the comparison tables of the later control literature (Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra, Control and bribery in voting, 2016).
The paper's proofs are combinatorial algorithms and many-one reductions, stated informally. No part of the paper has been machine-checked. A formal development produces:
- the elections, winner sets on candidate subsets, and the two-stage election, in a form reusable for the other control types of the paper (adding, deleting and partitioning candidates or voters);
- verified polynomial-time algorithms on Cook's Turing-machine model. Several of the printed algorithms have gaps, including the TP case of Theorem 4.21 that the authors corrected in v5, so a checked version settles their correctness;
- verified reductions from Hitting Set and X3C.
Difficulty
The algorithmic clauses need more than correctness of a decision procedure: membership in P and polynomial-time computability are statements about a one-tape Turing machine reading binary codes. An algorithm described by "for each candidate d, check …" has to be compiled to that model, and its running time bounded, which no existing library on the platform does for elections.
The plurality TE algorithms are case analyses: who can be nominated by each part, and how many first-place votes each candidate must surrender. The cases where has no first-place vote, or where a subcommittee is empty, are exactly where the printed algorithms slip. The approval TP destructive algorithm was wrong as first published.
For the hardness clauses the reductions must be shown correct for every instance. Claim 4.41 needs an arithmetic padding condition, which is why the paper first proves Restricted Hitting Set NP-complete (Theorem 4.39) and then reduces from it. NP membership, which the paper calls obvious, still has to be proved in the checking-relation form of NP.
Formalization scope
- Candidates are
Fin mand votersFin n, both possibly empty. A profile isFin n → Ballot m, so the multiset of ballots is a list (one ballot per voter, as the paper assumes on p. 4). - A ranking is
Equiv.Perm (Fin m), read as the position of each candidate. An approval ballot is aFinset. - Winner sets are computed on a candidate subset with the induced preferences. Every election with an empty candidate set has no winner, and an empty subcommittee ties all candidates at score zero.
- A partition is
V₁ : Finset (Fin n)and its complement. - Unique winner means the winner set equals
{c}; an empty winner set is a destructive success. - P, NP-completeness and polynomial-time computability are the published
CookPvsNPnotions. Instance codes are lists of binary numbers over the published alphabetBSym: , then the ballots. - A certificate function must return the code of a partition that works on every yes-instance and the fixed token "control impossible" (
encNats [0]) on every no-instance. - Construction 4.28 is a predicate satisfied by every profile of the stated shape, whatever the "arbitrary" orders.
- The only hypotheses are NP-completeness of Hitting Set (p. 24) and of X3C (p. 28), exactly as the paper states them. Both are true (Garey–Johnson SP8, SP2).
None of these is a trivializing reading. "In P" is a Turing-machine statement, not a Decidable instance. Every vulnerable or resistant clause carries its susceptibility part. A certifiable-vulnerability witness must output a successful partition, which is more than deciding the language.
Welcome contributions: proofs of the examples (finite computations), of Claims 4.29–4.41 (counting arguments), of NP membership of the control languages, and Turing-machine implementations of election-scoring primitives, which later missions can reuse.
Selected references
- E. Hemaspaandra, L. A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe, Anyone but Him: The Complexity of Precluding an Alternative, Artificial Intelligence 171(5–6):255–285, 2007; arXiv:cs/0507027v5, 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0507027 — DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.005
- J. Bartholdi III, C. Tovey, M. Trick, How hard is it to control an election?, Mathematical and Computer Modelling 16(8–9):27–40, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(92)90085-Y
- M. Garey, D. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
- S. Cook, The P versus NP problem, Clay Mathematics Institute problem description. https://www.claymath.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/pvsnp.pdf
- P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. A. Hemaspaandra, Control and bribery in voting, in Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge University Press, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107446984.008