Motivation
Financial constraints, the gap between what a firm could produce and what it can raise from outside investors, are a central object of corporate finance. In moral-hazard models of financing, an entrepreneur must be paid an agency rent to exert unobservable effort, and the investor can only be repaid out of what is left; the agency rent therefore fixes the entrepreneur's pledgeable income and the degree to which the entrepreneur is financially constrained (Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance, 2006).
J. Starmans, Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints (manuscript, February 4, 2022; published in Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4421), asks how an entrepreneur's production technology, meaning which part of the cash-flow distribution the entrepreneur's effort improves, determines the agency rent, and hence which entrepreneur an investor with limited capital prefers to finance. The answer links technology, the form of the optimal security (debt, equity or a combination), and financial constraints in one model. The mission formalizes the paper's general comparison of entrepreneurs (its Proposition 6) together with the closed-form solution of the contracting problem on which it rests.
Setting
There are states Ω={0,…,n} with n>1, and a project pays the cash flow xi in state i, where 0=x0<x1<⋯<xn. If the entrepreneur shirks, the state is drawn from a baseline distribution q with qi>0 for every state. An entrepreneur's type p is the distribution of the state under effort. Write Ew[f]=∑iwifi.
The likelihood ratio of a type is φi(p)=(pi−qi)/qi. The type set P consists of the distributions p such that (Assumption 1) every type creates the same expected value of effort π>0, Ep[x]−Eq[x]=π; (Assumption 2) p first-order stochastically dominates q, with at least one strict tail inequality; and (Assumption 3) φ(p) is single-peaked in the state. The cumulative likelihood ratio is
Φj(p)=∑i=jnqi∑i=jn(pi−qi),Φ∗(p)=j∈ΩmaxΦj(p),
and ιˉ(p) denotes the highest state with pi>qi: the upper end of the region the entrepreneur improves.
A contract s=(si)i∈Ω pays the entrepreneur si in state i. Given the entrepreneur's disutility of effort c, an optimal contract solves problem (1): maximize the investor's expected payoff Ep[x−s] subject to the incentive constraint Ep[s]−c≥Eq[s], the participation constraint Ep[s]−c≥0, limited liability si≥0, and monotonicity of both payoffs, si≥si−1 and xi−si≥xi−1−si−1. The agency rent of an optimal contract is Eq[s]. The tranches sˉik=1{i≥k}(xk−xk−1), k=1,…,n, partition the cash flow.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 6
Let p′,p′′∈P with ιˉ(p′)=1<ιˉ(p′′). For every c∈(0,π] both have optimal contracts, and, writing sc′,sc′′ for any optimal contracts at c:
Φ∗(p′)<Φ∗(p′′) ⟹ ∃cˉ∈(0,π): Eq[sc′′]<Eq[sc′] on (0,cˉ),Eq[sc′]<Eq[sc′′] on (cˉ,π];
Φ∗(p′)>Φ∗(p′′) ⟹ Eq[sc′]<Eq[sc′′] on (0,π].
The threshold cˉ is existential; no constant is fixed.
Milestones
In attack order: the sign facts p0<q0, pn≥qn (Lemma A.1); the sign pattern of φ(p) (Lemma 2) and of Φ(p) (Lemma 3); the greedy optimal contract ∑j<msˉσ(j)+λσ(m)sˉσ(m) with thresholds 0=cˉ0<cˉ1≤⋯≤cˉn=π (Proposition 1); the closed-form agency rent, continuous, increasing, piecewise linear and convex in c (Proposition 2); the bounds s≤min{x,xιˉ(p)} and Eq[s]≤Eq[min{x,xιˉ(p)}] with equality iff c=π (Corollaries 2 and 3); and the two facts of the proof of Proposition 6 (p. 47): the agency rent is c/Φ∗(p) on [0,π] when ιˉ(p)=1, and on an initial interval for every p.
Significance
Proposition 6 says that the peak cumulative likelihood ratio, the informativeness of the most informative tranche, decides which entrepreneur is cheaper to incentivize when effort is cheap, while at high disutility of effort the entrepreneur who improves only the left tail of the distribution (whose optimal contract is equity-like) is cheaper. Its instance with the optimal equity-financed and the optimal debt-financed entrepreneurs is the paper's Proposition 5, which underlies its predictions about which firms are more financially constrained. The milestones give a complete closed-form solution of a linear contracting problem with limited liability and two-sided monotonicity under a single-peaked likelihood ratio, a setting that generalizes the monotone likelihood ratio property.
The results are proved in the paper (Appendix A). As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalog shows, none of them, and no model of security design with tranches, has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces formal proofs of the paper's results; the agency-rent formula of Proposition 2 is a reusable description of a fractional knapsack's value function.
Difficulty
The comparison is not a pointwise statement about two formulas: the agency rent is the value of an optimization problem over all contracts, and only the solution of that problem (Proposition 1) turns it into a piecewise-linear function. The step that does not follow from slopes alone is the comparison at c=π: it needs the identification of the optimal contract at c=π with min{x,xιˉ(p)} (Corollaries 2 and 3), which rests on the sign structure of Lemmas 2 and 3 and therefore on Assumptions 2 and 3 together. The monotonicity constraint on the investor's payoff, xi−si≥xi−1−si−1, is what caps each tranche at weight one; without it (the paper's Appendix C) the agency rent is c/Φ∗(p) for every c and the crossing in case (i) disappears.
Formalization scope
States are Fin (n + 1); types, contracts and cash flows are vectors Fin (n + 1) → ℝ, and all expectations are finite sums. The standing assumptions n>1, 0=x0<⋯<xn, qi>0, ∑iqi=1, π>0 are bundled in Economy.Standing; P is InP, which keeps Assumption 2's strict clause as written. Tranches and positions of the ordering σ are indexed by Fin n, standing for the paper's indices 1,…,n shifted by one. Φ∗ is the maximum over all of Ω, including j=0. ιˉ(p) is defined as the highest state with pi>qi; Lemma 2 shows it is the paper's ιˉ(p). The agency rent function is the infimum of Eq[s] over optimal contracts, and Proposition 2 states that every optimal contract attains it on [0,π].
Conventions disclosed in the statements: "an optimal contract from Proposition 1" in Corollaries 2–3 and in the goal is read as every optimal contract of problem (1) (all optimal contracts share one agency rent, footnote 7, p. 11); existence of optimal contracts is stated explicitly wherever a statement quantifies over them; the investor's capital I and the condition Eq[x]+π−c≥I≥Eq[x] (p. 8) are omitted because problem (1) drops the investor's participation constraint. Each statement carries its own range of c as on its page.
The agency rent is defined through problem (1) over all feasible contracts, never by the formula of Proposition 2 or the construction of Proposition 1; a formalization that defined it by the formula, or that dropped the monotonicity constraint (1f), would make the goal arithmetic or false, and is ruled out.
A complete development needs only finite sums and elementary real analysis (one-sided slopes, convexity on an interval); Mathlib suffices. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a general lemma on fractional knapsack problems (reusable beyond this mission), and the paper's remaining results (Propositions 3–5 and 7).
Selected references
- J. Starmans, Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints, manuscript, February 4, 2022; Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4421
- J. Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, 2006.
- R. D. Innes, Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices, Journal of Economic Theory 52(1), 1990, 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-S
- J. Poblete and D. Spulber, The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability, RAND Journal of Economics 43(2), 2012, 215–234. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00164.x