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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 1: Every Loopless Matroid Polytope Has a (b, 1−b)-Selectable Deterministic Greedy OCRSResearch Paper

Motivation

In online selection, items reveal information one at a time, and each decision to accept an item is irrevocable. A matroid constraint permits some subsets and excludes others; it covers choices such as selecting linearly independent vectors or acyclic edges. A fractional solution can assign an acceptance probability to each item, but independent activations can produce a set that violates the constraint. An online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) turns these activations into a feasible selection while respecting the order in which items arrive. The matroid result of Feldman, Svensson and Zenklusen gives a guarantee that survives even when an adversary knows all random outcomes before choosing the arrival order.

This mission concerns the paper's matroid theorem, Theorem 2.1. The same paper develops schemes for matching and knapsack constraints and a rule for combining schemes for intersecting constraints. Those results are separate missions in this series. Here the central question is how much of a fractional matroid point can be retained by a deterministic greedy rule as each active item is revealed.

Setting

Let NNN be a finite ground set and let MMM be a matroid on NNN. Its independent subsets form a down-closed family F\mathcal FF: if III is independent, every subset of III is independent. The rank r(S)r(S)r(S) of S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N is the maximum size of an independent subset of SSS. The matroid independence polytope is

PF={x∈R≥0N:x(S):=∑e∈Sxe≤r(S) for all S⊆N}.P_{\mathcal F}=\left\{x\in\mathbb R^N_{\ge0}:x(S):=\sum_{e\in S}x_e\le r(S)\text{ for all }S\subseteq N\right\}.PF​={x∈R≥0N​:x(S):=e∈S∑​xe​≤r(S) for all S⊆N}.

Its points have 0≤xe≤10\le x_e\le10≤xe​≤1. For a point xxx, the active set R(x)R(x)R(x) contains each eee independently with probability xex_exe​. A deterministic greedy OCRS assigns a down-closed family Fx⊆F\mathcal F_x\subseteq\mathcal FFx​⊆F to xxx and accepts an active element when adding it to the already accepted set stays in Fx\mathcal F_xFx​. The empty set belongs to every Fx\mathcal F_xFx​. The rule depends on xxx before the active set and arrival order are revealed.

An element eee is selectable for an active set AAA if I∪{e}∈FxI\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal F_xI∪{e}∈Fx​ for every I⊆AI\subseteq AI⊆A with I∈FxI\in\mathcal F_xI∈Fx​. A greedy OCRS is (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-selectable if this event has probability at least ccc for every x∈bPFx\in bP_{\mathcal F}x∈bPF​ and every e∈Ne\in Ne∈N. The event implies that eee can be added regardless of which eligible active elements arrived first. These definitions are from §1.1 of the paper.

Formalization targets

Matroid OCRS

For every b∈[0,1]b\in[0,1]b∈[0,1] and every finite loopless matroid MMM, the target is a deterministic greedy OCRS with

Pr⁡[I∪{e}∈Fx for all I⊆R(x), I∈Fx]≥1−bfor every x∈bPF, e∈N.\Pr\left[I\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal F_x\text{ for all }I\subseteq R(x),\ I\in\mathcal F_x\right]\ge 1-b \quad\text{for every }x\in bP_{\mathcal F},\ e\in N.Pr[I∪{e}∈Fx​ for all I⊆R(x), I∈Fx​]≥1−bfor every x∈bPF​, e∈N.

The loopless condition is a disclosed correction to the printed Theorem 2.1: a loop cannot belong to any independent singleton, so its selectability is zero. The printed bound would demand positive selectability for that loop whenever b<1b<1b<1. The theorem keeps the paper's constant 1−b1-b1−b exactly.

Supporting targets

The milestones reproduce six statements from §2.1–2.1.1, in attack order: validity of a family defined by a chain ∅=Nℓ⊊⋯⊊N0=N\varnothing=N_\ell\subsetneq\cdots\subsetneq N_0=N∅=Nℓ​⊊⋯⊊N0​=N of matroid minors (independence of the union of layer-wise independent sets is Soto, Theorem 5.1); a characterization of selectability through span in one layer; monotonicity of the first chain set as coordinates of xxx increase; the description of the base polytope PB={x∈PF:x(N)=r(N)}P_{\mathcal B}=\{x\in P_{\mathcal F}:x(N)=r(N)\}PB​={x∈PF​:x(N)=r(N)} as the set of maximal vectors of PFP_{\mathcal F}PF​; the weighted span bound of Lemma 2.4,

∑e∈NxePr⁡[e∈span⁡(R(x)∪S)]≤b⋅(x(N)+(1−b) r(S)),\sum_{e\in N}x_e\Pr[e\in\operatorname{span}(R(x)\cup S)]\le b\cdot\bigl(x(N)+(1-b)\,r(S)\bigr),e∈N∑​xe​Pr[e∈span(R(x)∪S)]≤b⋅(x(N)+(1−b)r(S)),

strict when S≠∅S\neq\varnothingS=∅; and the proper-inclusion conclusion S⊊NS\subsetneq NS⊊N of Corollary 2.5. They expose the distinct matroid and probability claims on which the main theorem rests.

Significance

The theorem gives a fixed greedy family for each fractional point, with a per-element probability guarantee that is independent of the arrival order. Offline contention resolution schemes for matroids were introduced by Chekuri, Vondrák and Zenklusen; the online, almighty-adversary version here is stronger. A solver can use that guarantee as the matroid component in larger online selection problems. In the source paper it feeds the intersection and application results; those applications require further models and statements beyond this mission. The factor 1−b1-b1−b makes the tradeoff explicit: using a more heavily scaled fractional point raises the risk of contention.

The result is proved in the cited paper. This mission asks for a machine-checked Lean proof of its corrected statement and the source's supporting claims. A successful development would add reusable finite representations of independent activation, matroid polytope inequalities, span probabilities, and chain families. It would also make the loop boundary explicit, preventing a formally false version of the printed theorem from being published as a target.

Difficulty

Independent activation does not itself respect matroid independence. A greedy family that simply contains every independent set can make an element unavailable after earlier active elements are accepted, and the arrival order can expose the worst such history. The central issue is therefore a uniform selectability event: the same element must remain addable after every feasible subset of the active set. The paper measures that obstruction through spans in successive matroid minors. The first chain set must be proper so that the construction can continue, which is why the strict part of the weighted span inequality matters.

Formalization scope

The ground set is a finite Lean type, subsets are Finsets, and Mathlib's Matroid supplies independence, closure, contraction and restriction. Matroid rank is converted from Mathlib's extended natural rank to a real number; finiteness makes this conversion finite on every subset. The independence and base polytopes are defined by the paper's inequalities. The scalar multiple bPbPbP is pointwise set scalar multiplication, including b=0b=0b=0.

Probabilities are finite sums of product weights over all active sets. In particular, the event in Lemma 2.4 uses span⁡(R(x)∪S)\operatorname{span}(R(x)\cup S)span(R(x)∪S), whereas the recurrence defining SSS uses span⁡((R(x)∪Si)∖{e})\operatorname{span}((R(x)\cup S_i)\setminus\{e\})span((R(x)∪Si​)∖{e}). These are separate definitions. Every point used for activation lies in [0,1]N[0,1]^N[0,1]N, as enforced by the polytope and b∈[0,1]b\in[0,1]b∈[0,1]. The base-polytope condition on Corollary 2.5 is the standing assumption stated before the lemma in the source.

The loopless condition applies to the goal, to Corollary 2.5, and to the strict clause of Lemma 2.4 only; its non-strict clause, the chain statements and the monotonicity statement hold for every matroid and are stated without it. Three trivializing formalizations are ruled out: every greedy family must contain the empty set, so an empty family cannot satisfy selectability vacuously; every member of a greedy family must be independent in MMM, so Fx=2N\mathcal F_x=2^NFx​=2N is not admissible; and every point used for activation lies in [0,1]N[0,1]^N[0,1]N, so Pr⁡[R(x)=A]\Pr[R(x)=A]Pr[R(x)=A] is a genuine probability. The quantified scheme depends only on xxx, and its success condition ranges over every feasible subset of the realized active set. Contributions that establish the chain family's independence, finite probability identities, and rank or closure facts are within scope. Polynomial-time implementation and the Monte Carlo estimates of Lemma 2.6 are outside this mission's mathematical target.

Selected references

  • Moran Feldman, Ola Svensson and Rico Zenklusen, Online Contention Resolution Schemes, arXiv:1508.00142v2, 2015; published as Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2021. Preprint.
  • Chandra Chekuri, Jan Vondrák and Rico Zenklusen, Submodular Function Maximization via the Multilinear Relaxation and Contention Resolution Schemes, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2014. arXiv:1105.4593.
  • José A. Soto, Matroid Secretary Problem in the Random-Assignment Model, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2013. arXiv:1007.2140.
10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Cost Flows in Graphs with Unit Capacities: When the Second Phase of a Cost Scale Starts, at Most 3λ Excess Is Left for λ = √m and 36λ for λ = n^(2/3)Research Paper

Motivation

Minimum-cost flow is a standard model for routing a quantity through a network while paying a cost on each arc. Unit capacities arise when each input arc can carry at most one unit; they include flow formulations of several matching and assignment problems. Goldberg, Kaplan, Hed and Tarjan analyze a cost-scaling algorithm for this setting. Their second-phase argument depends on a bound on the excess left in a pseudoflow when every excess vertex has undergone enough potential increases. This mission formalizes that bound, Lemma 5 of their STACS 2015 paper. The published paper gives an O(min⁡{m1/2,n2/3} mlog⁡(nC))O(\min\{m^{1/2},n^{2/3}\}\,m\log(nC))O(min{m1/2,n2/3}mlog(nC)) running-time bound for its unit-capacity algorithm; the running-time statement itself is outside this mission.

Setting

A network has a finite vertex set VVV and an arc set EEE that contains both orientations of each input arc. Write n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣. Every input arc has capacity one; its reverse has capacity zero and opposite cost. Write mmm for the number of input arcs, so ∣E∣=2m|E|=2m∣E∣=2m. The paper assumes no parallel or antiparallel input arcs, allowing an arc to be identified by its ordered endpoints. Costs are antisymmetric between orientations.

A pseudoflow fff assigns an antisymmetric quantity to each arc and respects its capacity. Its excess at vvv is the sum ef(v)e_f(v)ef​(v) of incoming flow. Positive excess means that vvv has flow to discharge; negative excess is a deficit. A circulation is a pseudoflow with zero excess at every vertex. An arc is residual for fff when its residual capacity uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w) is positive. For vertex prices ppp, its reduced cost is cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A pseudoflow is ε\varepsilonε-optimal at ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. These are the paper's conventions on p. 408.

At the start of a cost scale, let f′f'f′ be a circulation that is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal at prices p′p'p′. During the scale, fff is a pseudoflow that is ε\varepsilonε-optimal at prices ppp. The potential increase in scale units is d(v)=(p(v)−p′(v))/εd(v)=(p(v)-p'(v))/\varepsilond(v)=(p(v)−p′(v))/ε. Put λ=min⁡{m,n2/3}\lambda=\min\{\sqrt m,n^{2/3}\}λ=min{m​,n2/3}. The second phase begins when every excess vertex has d(v)≥λd(v)\ge\lambdad(v)≥λ; the paper also states that every deficit then has d(v)=0d(v)=0d(v)=0 and that the levels d(v)d(v)d(v) are integral. The remaining excess is X(f)=∑v:ef(v)>0ef(v)X(f)=\sum_{v:e_f(v)>0}e_f(v)X(f)=∑v:ef​(v)>0​ef​(v).

The comparison graph has arcs E+={(v,w)∈E:f′(v,w)>f(v,w)}E^+=\{(v,w)\in E:f'(v,w)>f(v,w)\}E+={(v,w)∈E:f′(v,w)>f(v,w)} and vertices VVV. An excess–deficit cut Y⊆E+Y\subseteq E^+Y⊆E+ meets every path in this graph from an excess vertex to a deficit vertex. Thus a cut is measured among comparison arcs, not among arbitrary arcs of the original network. Lemmas 3 and 4 of the paper establish the level and cut bounds on which the excess estimate rests.

Formalization targets

The goal is Lemma 5 on p. 410, stated with both constants obtained in its proof. Under the cost-scale conditions above, and the divisibility conventions in footnotes 5–6, its two cases are

λ=m⟹X(f)≤3λ,\lambda=\sqrt m\quad\Longrightarrow\quad X(f)\le 3\lambda,λ=m​⟹X(f)≤3λ, λ=n2/3⟹X(f)≤36λ.\lambda=n^{2/3}\quad\Longrightarrow\quad X(f)\le36\lambda.λ=n2/3⟹X(f)≤36λ.

The second case also assumes that six divides the integer λ\lambdaλ; the first uses divisibility by three. The goal keeps the two conclusions separate so that the stronger 3λ3\lambda3λ bound is retained when m\sqrt mm​ determines the scale. Its milestone list follows the paper: Lemma 3 bounds d(v)−d(w)d(v)-d(w)d(v)−d(w) by three on an arc of E+E^+E+; Lemma 4 bounds total excess by a cut; and the proof of Lemma 5 supplies the cut bands and the two size estimates. The bands use the exact three-level and six-level ranges printed on p. 410.

Significance

The result connects a condition on price increases to a numerical bound on the amount of flow still needing discharge. Combined with the paper's time per unit of remaining excess, this is the bound needed for its second-phase running-time estimate. The two regimes show how the same cost-scale state can be controlled by either the number of input arcs or the number of vertices. Without the excess bound, the paper's argument gives no comparable limit on the remaining work at the phase transition.

The paper proves Lemma 5, but this particular unit-capacity excess argument has no matching theorem in the platform catalog checked for this mission. The network, circulation and pseudoflow interfaces are already published as reusable definitions from earlier cost-scaling work. A completed machine-checked development would add the cut argument and band counts to those interfaces. Those facts can also support other analyses that compare an entry circulation with an intermediate pseudoflow; this mission does not claim to formalize the algorithm's entire execution or its running-time model.

Difficulty

The main obstacle is linking local price inequalities to a global bound on excess. A reduced-cost inequality controls a single residual arc, while excess may move through a path and is measured over many vertices. The comparison graph G+G^+G+ is essential: on a residual arc outside E+E^+E+, the level difference used by Lemma 3 is not available. Counting all residual arcs as if they were comparison arcs would therefore not justify the cut bound. There is a separate counting issue: the represented network has both directions of each input arc, so using ∣E∣|E|∣E∣ for mmm changes the constant in the square-root case.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the network by a finite symmetric arc set with real capacities and antisymmetric real costs. A local unit-capacity predicate marks each reverse pair as capacities (1,0)(1,0)(1,0) or (0,1)(0,1)(0,1); mmm counts the capacity-one orientations. Flows are real valued as on p. 408. Integer costs on that page are generalized to real costs because Lemmas 3–5 use only antisymmetry and reduced-cost inequalities. No result here depends on cost integrality.

The formalization takes the cost-scale state as hypotheses: ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, entry circulation and 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimality, current ε\varepsilonε-optimality, integral levels, level at least λ\lambdaλ at excess vertices, and zero level at deficits. It takes λ\lambdaλ as a natural number equal to min⁡{m,n2/3}\min\{\sqrt m,n^{2/3}\}min{m​,n2/3} and records the paper's divisibility simplifications. The indexed pigeonhole milestones also require λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 so their index ranges are nonempty; the goal includes the zero-arc boundary without requiring an index. Cuts use reachability after deleting a subset of E+E^+E+, equivalent to meeting every excess-to-deficit path. The proof of Lemma 5 prints “cut in GfG_fGf​”; the formalized claim uses G+G^+G+, the graph for which Lemma 3 gives the required level control and Lemma 4 states its bound.

The definition layer, path-cut lemma and finite counting arguments are the reusable infrastructure. Contributions that establish these exact statements, their necessary elementary flow identities, or a machine-checked goal proof are in scope. Counting mmm with reverse arcs, allowing cuts outside E+E^+E+, using arbitrary real levels in place of integral ones, or replacing both cases by the weaker 36λ36\lambda36λ bound does not express this target.

Selected references

  • A. V. Goldberg, H. Kaplan, S. Hed and R. E. Tarjan, Minimum Cost Flows in Graphs with Unit Capacities, 32nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LIPIcs 30, pp. 406–419, 2015. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2015.406.
9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Information TheoryMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making I: Subadditivity of Squared Hellinger Distance for Sequential Laws, D²_H(P,Q) ≤ 10² log(n)·E_P[Σᵢ D²_H(P⁽ⁱ⁾, Q⁽ⁱ⁾)] for n ≥ 2Research Paper

Motivation

Lower bounds for interactive decision making (bandits, reinforcement learning, and the general decision making with structured observations framework of Foster, Kakade, Qian and Rakhlin, arXiv:2112.13487) compare what a learner observes under two different environments. A learner's whole interaction history is generated one step at a time: each observation is drawn from a conditional law that depends on everything seen before. Statistical estimation guarantees, by contrast, are stated one step at a time, as bounds on the divergence between the conditional laws at each round. Passing from the per-step guarantees to a statement about the laws of entire histories requires a chain rule for the divergence in use.

For the Kullback–Leibler divergence the chain rule is an identity. The paper's guarantees, however, are stated in the squared Hellinger distance, which is bounded, symmetric, and the natural loss for density estimation with the logarithmic loss. Hellinger distance has no exact chain rule. Lemma A.13 of the paper (App. A.2, p. 73) supplies an approximate one, losing a factor logarithmic in the number of steps, and the paper uses it in the proof of its main regret lower bound (Theorem 3.2, via App. C.1.3).

Setting

Fix n∈Nn \in \mathbb Nn∈N and finite sets X1,…,Xn\mathcal X_1, \dots, \mathcal X_nX1​,…,Xn​. A sequence is x=(x1,…,xn)x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)x=(x1​,…,xn​) with xi∈Xix_i \in \mathcal X_ixi​∈Xi​, and x1:i−1=(x1,…,xi−1)x_{1:i-1} = (x_1, \dots, x_{i-1})x1:i−1​=(x1​,…,xi−1​) denotes its prefix; X(i−1)=∏t=1i−1Xt\mathcal X^{(i-1)} = \prod_{t=1}^{i-1} \mathcal X_tX(i−1)=∏t=1i−1​Xt​.

For probability distributions p,qp, qp,q on a finite set, the squared Hellinger distance, the Hellinger distance and the Kullback–Leibler divergence are

DH2(p,q)=∑a(p(a)−q(a))2,DH=DH2,DKL(p ∥ q)=∑ap(a)log⁡p(a)q(a),D^2_{\mathrm H}(p, q) = \sum_a \big(\sqrt{p(a)} - \sqrt{q(a)}\big)^2, \qquad D_{\mathrm H} = \sqrt{D^2_{\mathrm H}}, \qquad D_{\mathrm{KL}}(p\,\|\,q) = \sum_a p(a) \log\frac{p(a)}{q(a)},DH2​(p,q)=a∑​(p(a)​−q(a)​)2,DH​=DH2​​,DKL​(p∥q)=a∑​p(a)logq(a)p(a)​,

the last one set to +∞+\infty+∞ when ppp charges a point that qqq does not. Note that the paper's DH2D^2_{\mathrm H}DH2​ carries no factor 12\tfrac1221​, so 0≤DH2≤20 \le D^2_{\mathrm H} \le 20≤DH2​≤2.

A family of sequential kernels P=(P(i))i=1nP = (P^{(i)})_{i=1}^nP=(P(i))i=1n​ assigns to each iii and each prefix x1:i−1x_{1:i-1}x1:i−1​ a probability distribution P(i)(⋅∣x1:i−1)P^{(i)}(\cdot \mid x_{1:i-1})P(i)(⋅∣x1:i−1​) on Xi\mathcal X_iXi​. Its sequential law is the law of X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ under Xi∼P(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1)X_i \sim P^{(i)}(\cdot \mid X_{1:i-1})Xi​∼P(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1​):

P(x)=∏i=1nP(i)(xi∣x1:i−1).\mathbb P(x) = \prod_{i=1}^n P^{(i)}(x_i \mid x_{1:i-1}).P(x)=i=1∏n​P(i)(xi​∣x1:i−1​).

For a second family QQQ with law Q\mathbb QQ, the quantity controlled by per-step estimation is

EP[∑i=1nDH2(P(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1),Q(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1))].\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n D^2_{\mathrm H}\big(P^{(i)}(\cdot \mid X_{1:i-1}), Q^{(i)}(\cdot \mid X_{1:i-1})\big)\Big].EP​[i=1∑n​DH2​(P(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1​),Q(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1​))].

In Lean these are IsSeqKernel, seqLaw and condHellingerSum, with hellingerSq and klDivDiscrete the published discrete divergences.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma A.13, (97), for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2

DH2(P,Q)≤102log⁡(n)⋅EP[∑i=1nDH2(P(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1),Q(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1))].D^2_{\mathrm H}(\mathbb P, \mathbb Q) \le 10^2 \log(n) \cdot \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n D^2_{\mathrm H}\big(P^{(i)}(\cdot \mid X_{1:i-1}), Q^{(i)}(\cdot \mid X_{1:i-1})\big)\Big].DH2​(P,Q)≤102log(n)⋅EP​[i=1∑n​DH2​(P(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1​),Q(i)(⋅∣X1:i−1​))].

The constant 10210^2102 is the paper's; the shape that matters downstream is the logarithmic dependence on nnn with no assumption on the kernels beyond their being probability kernels.

Companion: Lemma A.13, (98)

If V≥eV \ge eV≥e and P(i)(A∣x1:i−1)≤V Q(i)(A∣x1:i−1)P^{(i)}(A \mid x_{1:i-1}) \le V\, Q^{(i)}(A \mid x_{1:i-1})P(i)(A∣x1:i−1​)≤VQ(i)(A∣x1:i−1​) for every iii, prefix and event AAA, then DH2(P,Q)≤3log⁡(V)⋅EP[∑iDH2(P(i),Q(i))]D^2_{\mathrm H}(\mathbb P, \mathbb Q) \le 3\log(V) \cdot \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\sum_i D^2_{\mathrm H}(P^{(i)}, Q^{(i)})]DH2​(P,Q)≤3log(V)⋅EP​[∑i​DH2​(P(i),Q(i))].

Milestones

  1. Lemma A.10 (p. 72): DKL(p ∥ q)≤(2+log⁡V) DH2(p,q)D_{\mathrm{KL}}(p\,\|\,q) \le (2 + \log V)\, D^2_{\mathrm H}(p, q)DKL​(p∥q)≤(2+logV)DH2​(p,q) under a likelihood-ratio bound VVV (referenced, finite case).
  2. Lemma A.5 (p. 71): DTV2≤DH2≤DKLD^2_{\mathrm{TV}} \le D^2_{\mathrm H} \le D_{\mathrm{KL}}DTV2​≤DH2​≤DKL​ (referenced, finite case).
  3. The triangle inequality for DHD_{\mathrm H}DH​ (proof of Lemma A.13, p. 73).
  4. The chain rule DKL(Q ∥ P)=EQ[∑iDKL(Q(i) ∥ P(i))]D_{\mathrm{KL}}(\mathbb Q\,\|\,\mathbb P) = \mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[\sum_i D_{\mathrm{KL}}(Q^{(i)}\,\|\,P^{(i)})]DKL​(Q∥P)=EQ​[∑i​DKL​(Q(i)∥P(i))] for sequential laws (p. 73).
  5. Convexity of DH2D^2_{\mathrm H}DH2​ in its second argument (p. 74).
  6. Lemma A.11 (p. 72), the multiplicative Pinsker-type inequality: ∣EPh−EQh∣≤2R(EPh+EQh)DH2(P,Q)|\mathbb E_P h - \mathbb E_Q h| \le \sqrt{2R(\mathbb E_P h + \mathbb E_Q h) D^2_{\mathrm H}(P, Q)}∣EP​h−EQ​h∣≤2R(EP​h+EQ​h)DH2​(P,Q)​ and EPh≤3EQh+4R DH2(P,Q)\mathbb E_P h \le 3\mathbb E_Q h + 4R\, D^2_{\mathrm H}(P, Q)EP​h≤3EQ​h+4RDH2​(P,Q) for 0≤h≤R0 \le h \le R0≤h≤R.

Significance

The result. Inequality (97) converts per-round Hellinger estimation error into a bound on the Hellinger distance between the laws of complete interaction histories, under no boundedness assumption on likelihood ratios. In the paper this is the step that lets the lower bound of Theorem 3.2 relate any algorithm's behaviour under a reference model to its behaviour under alternatives, and hence express the minimax regret through the decision-estimation coefficient. Without it, only the KL chain rule is available, which requires bounded likelihood ratios (the situation of (98)) or loses more than a logarithmic factor. Lemma A.11, a milestone here, is used independently in the same lower bound and in the paper's tabular reinforcement learning analysis.

Formalizing it. The lemma is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof exists. The published layer on the platform has the discrete divergences and the comparisons of Lemmas A.5 and A.10; the sequential-law objects, the triangle inequality, the convexity of DH2D^2_{\mathrm H}DH2​, the discrete chain rule and Lemma A.11 are new. A completed development gives a reusable chain-rule toolkit for any later formalization of lower bounds over adaptive interaction histories.

Difficulty

The squared Hellinger distance does not tensorize along adaptive sequences: the natural attempt to write 1−12DH2(P,Q)1 - \tfrac12 D^2_{\mathrm H}(\mathbb P, \mathbb Q)1−21​DH2​(P,Q) as a product of conditional affinities fails because the conditional affinities are random, depending on the prefix, and their expectation does not factor. Bounding DH2D^2_{\mathrm H}DH2​ by DKLD_{\mathrm{KL}}DKL​ and applying the KL chain rule fails in the other direction: the conditional KL divergences are not controlled by the conditional Hellinger distances unless the likelihood ratios are bounded, and in (97) they are not. The difficulty is to obtain a bound that pays only log⁡n\log nlogn for an unbounded ratio, with explicit constants that survive the final numerical comparison.

Formalization scope

  • Finite alphabets. The paper works over measurable spaces. This mission formalizes the finite-alphabet case, as the published FoundationsRL divergence layer does: each Xi\mathcal X_iXi​ is a Fintype, distributions are probability vectors, expectations are finite sums. Coordinates are indexed by Fin n (0-based) and the alphabets may differ from coordinate to coordinate.
  • Kernels. A kernel family is a function P i x of the whole sequence that is a probability vector and depends only on the coordinates j < i; this is what makes seqLaw P the law the paper describes.
  • Added hypothesis n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 in (97). The paper states (97) for every nnn; at n=1n = 1n=1 the right side vanishes because log⁡1=0\log 1 = 0log1=0 while the left side is positive whenever P(1)≠Q(1)P^{(1)} \ne Q^{(1)}P(1)=Q(1), and the proof's last step 2(6log⁡(96n)+1896n)≤102log⁡n2(6\log(96n) + \tfrac{18}{96n}) \le 10^2\log n2(6log(96n)+96n18​)≤102logn holds only for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. The goal is stated for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, with the constant unchanged.
  • Likelihood ratios are stated multiplicatively, P(A)≤V Q(A)P(A) \le V\,Q(A)P(A)≤VQ(A), so that a zero denominator does not make a hypothesis vacuous; KL divergences are compared to Hellinger distances in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞].
  • Lemma A.11 holds "almost surely under PPP and QQQ", which becomes: 0≤h≤R0 \le h \le R0≤h≤R at every point charged by PPP or QQQ.
  • Ruling out trivial forms. The goal's hypotheses are satisfiable with P≠Q\mathbb P \ne \mathbb QP=Q and n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 (checked in a sanity file). A formalization in which the kernels may read coordinates beyond the prefix, in which log⁡\loglog is applied to n≤1n \le 1n≤1, or in which the ratio bound of (98) is checked through a quotient that is vacuous at zero denominators, is not the paper's statement.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone and of the fact that seqLaw is a probability vector.

Selected references

  • D. J. Foster, S. M. Kakade, J. Qian, A. Rakhlin, The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making, arXiv:2112.13487v3, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.13487
  • Y. Yang, A. Barron, An asymptotic property of model selection criteria, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 44(1), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1109/18.650993
  • Y. Polyanskiy, Y. Wu, Lecture Notes on Information Theory, 2014. https://people.lids.mit.edu/yp/homepage/data/itlectures_v5.pdf
  • D. J. Foster, A. Rakhlin, Foundations of Reinforcement Learning and Interactive Decision Making, arXiv:2312.16730v1, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.16730
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Certifying Some Distributional Robustness with Principled Adversarial Training 1: SGD on the Wasserstein Penalty Surrogate Finds an Approximate Stationary Point at Rate 4σ√(L_φΔ_F/T)Research Paper

Motivation

Neural networks trained by empirical risk minimization are sensitive to small, deliberately chosen perturbations of their inputs ("adversarial examples"). A standard defence is adversarial training: at each step, perturb the training example to increase the loss, then take a gradient step at the perturbed point. Sinha, Namkoong, Volpi and Duchi (arXiv:1710.10571, ICLR 2018) recast adversarial training as distributionally robust optimization over a Wasserstein ball around the data distribution, and replaced the hard ball constraint by a Lagrangian penalty. The resulting procedure perturbs each example by solving a penalized inner maximization, and the paper shows that, when the penalty is large enough relative to the smoothness of the loss, this inner problem is strongly concave and therefore tractable.

This mission formalizes the paper's computational guarantee, Theorem 2: stochastic gradient descent on the penalized robust objective, with an inexact adversary, reaches an approximate stationary point at the rate of smooth nonconvex stochastic optimization. The analysis follows Ghadimi and Lan's argument for nonconvex SGD (arXiv:1309.5549), adapted to a gradient oracle that is biased by the inexact inner maximization.

Setting

Parameters θ\thetaθ live in Θ=Rd\Theta=\mathbb R^dΘ=Rd and data in a set Z⊆RmZ\subseteq\mathbb R^mZ⊆Rm; both spaces carry the Euclidean norm ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​. Data are drawn from a probability distribution P0P_0P0​ on ZZZ.

A transportation cost c:Z×Z→[0,∞)c:Z\times Z\to[0,\infty)c:Z×Z→[0,∞) measures how expensive it is to move a data point z0z_0z0​ to zzz. Assumption A: ccc is continuous, c(z,z)=0c(z,z)=0c(z,z)=0, and for each z0∈Zz_0\in Zz0​∈Z the map z↦c(z,z0)z\mapsto c(z,z_0)z↦c(z,z0​) is 111-strongly convex. The canonical example is c(z,z0)=12∥z−z0∥22c(z,z_0)=\tfrac12\|z-z_0\|_2^2c(z,z0​)=21​∥z−z0​∥22​.

A loss ℓ(θ;z)\ell(\theta;z)ℓ(θ;z) has partial gradients ∇θℓ\nabla_\theta\ell∇θ​ℓ and ∇zℓ\nabla_z\ell∇z​ℓ. Assumption B: these gradients are Lipschitz in each argument,

∥∇θℓ(θ;z)−∇θℓ(θ′;z)∥≤Lθθ∥θ−θ′∥,∥∇zℓ(θ;z)−∇zℓ(θ;z′)∥≤Lzz∥z−z′∥,\|\nabla_\theta\ell(\theta;z)-\nabla_\theta\ell(\theta';z)\|\le L_{\theta\theta}\|\theta-\theta'\|,\quad \|\nabla_z\ell(\theta;z)-\nabla_z\ell(\theta;z')\|\le L_{zz}\|z-z'\|,∥∇θ​ℓ(θ;z)−∇θ​ℓ(θ′;z)∥≤Lθθ​∥θ−θ′∥,∥∇z​ℓ(θ;z)−∇z​ℓ(θ;z′)∥≤Lzz​∥z−z′∥, ∥∇θℓ(θ;z)−∇θℓ(θ;z′)∥≤Lθz∥z−z′∥,∥∇zℓ(θ;z)−∇zℓ(θ′;z)∥≤Lzθ∥θ−θ′∥.\|\nabla_\theta\ell(\theta;z)-\nabla_\theta\ell(\theta;z')\|\le L_{\theta z}\|z-z'\|,\quad \|\nabla_z\ell(\theta;z)-\nabla_z\ell(\theta';z)\|\le L_{z\theta}\|\theta-\theta'\|.∥∇θ​ℓ(θ;z)−∇θ​ℓ(θ;z′)∥≤Lθz​∥z−z′∥,∥∇z​ℓ(θ;z)−∇z​ℓ(θ′;z)∥≤Lzθ​∥θ−θ′∥.

For a penalty γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, the robust surrogate and the robust objective are

φγ(θ;z0)=sup⁡z∈Z{ℓ(θ;z)−γc(z,z0)},F(θ)=EP0[φγ(θ;Z)].\varphi_\gamma(\theta;z_0)=\sup_{z\in Z}\{\ell(\theta;z)-\gamma c(z,z_0)\},\qquad F(\theta)=\mathbb E_{P_0}[\varphi_\gamma(\theta;Z)].φγ​(θ;z0​)=z∈Zsup​{ℓ(θ;z)−γc(z,z0​)},F(θ)=EP0​​[φγ​(θ;Z)].

By Wasserstein duality, F(θ)F(\theta)F(θ) equals the worst-case expected loss over all distributions PPP, penalized by γ\gammaγ times the transport distance from PPP to P0P_0P0​.

Algorithm 1 (with Θ=Rd\Theta=\mathbb R^dΘ=Rd and constant stepsize α\alphaα): from θ0\theta^0θ0, for t=0,…,T−1t=0,\dots,T-1t=0,…,T−1, draw zt∼P0z^t\sim P_0zt∼P0​ independently, find an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate maximizer z^t∈Z\hat z^t\in Zz^t∈Z, meaning ℓ(θt;z^t)−γc(z^t,zt)≥φγ(θt;zt)−ϵ\ell(\theta^t;\hat z^t)-\gamma c(\hat z^t,z^t)\ge\varphi_\gamma(\theta^t;z^t)-\epsilonℓ(θt;z^t)−γc(z^t,zt)≥φγ​(θt;zt)−ϵ, and set θt+1=θt−α∇θℓ(θt;z^t)\theta^{t+1}=\theta^t-\alpha\nabla_\theta\ell(\theta^t;\hat z^t)θt+1=θt−α∇θ​ℓ(θt;z^t).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 6)

Let γ>Lzz\gamma>L_{zz}γ>Lzz​, Lφ=Lθθ+LθzLzθ/(γ−Lzz)L_\varphi=L_{\theta\theta}+L_{\theta z}L_{z\theta}/(\gamma-L_{zz})Lφ​=Lθθ​+Lθz​Lzθ​/(γ−Lzz​), ΔF≥F(θ0)−inf⁡θF(θ)\Delta_F\ge F(\theta^0)-\inf_\theta F(\theta)ΔF​≥F(θ0)−infθ​F(θ), and assume E∥∇F(θ)−∇θφγ(θ;Z)∥22≤σ2\mathbb E\|\nabla F(\theta)-\nabla_\theta\varphi_\gamma(\theta;Z)\|_2^2\le\sigma^2E∥∇F(θ)−∇θ​φγ​(θ;Z)∥22​≤σ2 for all θ\thetaθ. With α=ΔF/(LφTσ2)\alpha=\sqrt{\Delta_F/(L_\varphi T\sigma^2)}α=ΔF​/(Lφ​Tσ2)​ and T≥LφΔF/σ2T\ge L_\varphi\Delta_F/\sigma^2T≥Lφ​ΔF​/σ2,

1T∑t=0T−1E[∥∇F(θt)∥22]−4Lθz2γ−Lzz ϵ≤4σLφΔFT.\frac1T\sum_{t=0}^{T-1}\mathbb E\big[\|\nabla F(\theta^t)\|_2^2\big]-\frac{4L_{\theta z}^2}{\gamma-L_{zz}}\,\epsilon\le4\sigma\sqrt{\frac{L_\varphi\Delta_F}{T}}.T1​t=0∑T−1​E[∥∇F(θt)∥22​]−γ−Lzz​4Lθz2​​ϵ≤4σTLφ​ΔF​​​.

Milestones

  1. (4), p. 4: for γ≥Lzz\gamma\ge L_{zz}γ≥Lzz​, z↦ℓ(θ;z)−γc(z,z0)z\mapsto\ell(\theta;z)-\gamma c(z,z_0)z↦ℓ(θ;z)−γc(z,z0​) is (γ−Lzz)(\gamma-L_{zz})(γ−Lzz​)-strongly concave.
  2. Lemma 1, p. 5: the supremum fˉ(θ)=sup⁡z∈Zf(θ,z)\bar f(\theta)=\sup_{z\in Z}f(\theta,z)fˉ​(θ)=supz∈Z​f(θ,z) of a λ\lambdaλ-strongly concave family satisfying Assumption B is differentiable, with ∇fˉ(θ)=∇θf(θ,z⋆(θ))\nabla\bar f(\theta)=\nabla_\theta f(\theta,z_\star(\theta))∇fˉ​(θ)=∇θ​f(θ,z⋆​(θ)), a (Lzθ/λ)(L_{z\theta}/\lambda)(Lzθ​/λ)-Lipschitz maximizer and a (Lθθ+LθzLzθ/λ)(L_{\theta\theta}+L_{\theta z}L_{z\theta}/\lambda)(Lθθ​+Lθz​Lzθ​/λ)-Lipschitz gradient.
  3. §2.1, p. 6: φγ(⋅;z0)\varphi_\gamma(\cdot;z_0)φγ​(⋅;z0​) has LφL_\varphiLφ​-Lipschitz gradient ∇θφγ(θ;z0)=∇θℓ(θ;z⋆(z0,θ))\nabla_\theta\varphi_\gamma(\theta;z_0)=\nabla_\theta\ell(\theta;z_\star(z_0,\theta))∇θ​φγ​(θ;z0​)=∇θ​ℓ(θ;z⋆​(z0​,θ)).
  4. (31) and (32), p. 40: the descent inequality for an LφL_\varphiLφ​-smooth objective, and its form with the bias δ=g−∇θφγ\delta=g-\nabla_\theta\varphi_\gammaδ=g−∇θ​φγ​ separated, for α≤1/Lφ\alpha\le1/L_\varphiα≤1/Lφ​.
  5. The bias bound, p. 41: ∥δ∥22≤2Lθz2ϵ/(γ−Lzz)\|\delta\|_2^2\le 2L_{\theta z}^2\epsilon/(\gamma-L_{zz})∥δ∥22​≤2Lθz2​ϵ/(γ−Lzz​).
  6. The one-step bound in conditional expectation and the averaged bound, p. 41:
1T∑t<TE∥∇F(θt)∥22≤2ϵ^+2ΔFαT+2Lφασ2,ϵ^=2Lθz2γ−Lzzϵ,\frac1T\sum_{t<T}\mathbb E\|\nabla F(\theta^t)\|_2^2\le2\hat\epsilon+\frac{2\Delta_F}{\alpha T}+2L_\varphi\alpha\sigma^2,\qquad\hat\epsilon=\frac{2L_{\theta z}^2}{\gamma-L_{zz}}\epsilon,T1​t<T∑​E∥∇F(θt)∥22​≤2ϵ^+αT2ΔF​​+2Lφ​ασ2,ϵ^=γ−Lzz​2Lθz2​​ϵ,

for every constant stepsize 0<α≤1/Lφ0<\alpha\le1/L_\varphi0<α≤1/Lφ​. The goal is this bound at the balancing stepsize.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 certifies that the robust training procedure is no harder, in iteration count, than ordinary nonconvex SGD: the stationarity measure decays as T−1/2T^{-1/2}T−1/2, and the inexactness of the adversary enters only as an additive term proportional to ϵ\epsilonϵ, independent of TTT. This is what licenses running a few steps of gradient ascent for the inner problem rather than solving it exactly. It also explains the role of the penalty: the guarantee requires γ>Lzz\gamma>L_{zz}γ>Lzz​, so smoothness of the loss in the data (smooth activations rather than ReLUs) is what makes the robust problem tractable.

Formalizing it. The result and its proof are published; nothing here is open. To our knowledge none of it is machine-checked. A formal proof would add a verified Danskin-type theorem for strongly concave suprema with explicit Lipschitz constants (Lemma 1), which is reusable well beyond this paper, and a verified nonconvex SGD analysis with a biased oracle, including the measure-theoretic bookkeeping (independence of the fresh sample from the current iterate, differentiation under the integral) that the paper's proof compresses into one line.

Difficulty

The deterministic inequalities (31), (32) and the bias bound are short. The weight sits elsewhere. First, Lemma 1 requires differentiability of a supremum over a possibly unbounded set, with the maximizer depending on θ\thetaθ; the paper invokes a Danskin-type theorem that is not in Mathlib, and the cost ccc is not assumed differentiable, so the first-order optimality conditions for the inner problem must be derived from strong convexity alone. Second, the expectation step uses E[∇θφγ(θt;zt)∣θt]=∇F(θt)\mathbb E[\nabla_\theta\varphi_\gamma(\theta^t;z^t)\mid\theta^t]=\nabla F(\theta^t)E[∇θ​φγ​(θt;zt)∣θt]=∇F(θt), which needs both differentiation under the integral sign for FFF and the independence of ztz^tzt from θt\theta^tθt along the run. Third, finiteness of every expectation along the run is not assumed and must be propagated from step to step.

Formalization scope

Lean representation: Θ\ThetaΘ and Rm\mathbb R^mRm are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m); ZZZ is a set in the latter. The loss is a function on all of Rd×Rm\mathbb R^d\times\mathbb R^mRd×Rm; its partial gradients are required at points of ZZZ and the Lipschitz conditions on ZZZ only. Strong convexity is Mathlib's StrongConvexOn, whose modulus convention matches the paper. Suprema are sSup over the image of ZZZ. FFF is a Bochner integral, and φγ(θ;⋅)\varphi_\gamma(\theta;\cdot)φγ​(θ;⋅) is assumed P0P_0P0​-integrable for every θ\thetaθ. The run is driven by (z0,…,zT−1)∼P0⊗T(z^0,\dots,z^{T-1})\sim P_0^{\otimes T}(z0,…,zT−1)∼P0⊗T​ (Measure.pi). The expectations in the conclusion and in the variance hypothesis are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the ϵ\epsilonϵ-term of Theorem 2 is moved to the right-hand side.

Hypotheses made explicit that the paper leaves implicit: γ>Lzz\gamma>L_{zz}γ>Lzz​ (the paper writes γ≥Lzz\gamma\ge L_{zz}γ≥Lzz​ but divides by γ−Lzz\gamma-L_{zz}γ−Lzz​); ZZZ nonempty, convex and closed; Lipschitz constants nonnegative; σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, ΔF>0\Delta_F>0ΔF​>0, T≥1T\ge1T≥1, ϵ≥0\epsilon\ge0ϵ≥0; FFF bounded below (so inf⁡θF\inf_\theta Finfθ​F is a real number); integrability of φγ(θ;⋅)\varphi_\gamma(\theta;\cdot)φγ​(θ;⋅); P0(Z)=1P_0(Z)=1P0​(Z)=1; joint measurability of the oracle (θ,z0)↦z^(θ,z0)(\theta,z_0)\mapsto\hat z(\theta,z_0)(θ,z0​)↦z^(θ,z0​); and, in (32) and the later milestones, 0<α≤1/Lφ0<\alpha\le1/L_\varphi0<α≤1/Lφ​, which the paper assumes "in the rest of the proof". Lemma 1 is specialized to the Euclidean norm, the case Theorem 2 uses. The cost ccc is not assumed differentiable.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the run uses an oracle tied to φγ\varphi_\gammaφγ​ by the ϵ\epsilonϵ-gap and to ZZZ by membership, φγ\varphi_\gammaφγ​ is the supremum of the penalized loss over ZZZ, FFF is its P0P_0P0​-integral, and the hypotheses are satisfiable (for instance ℓ(θ;z)=12∥θ∥2\ell(\theta;z)=\tfrac12\|\theta\|^2ℓ(θ;z)=21​∥θ∥2, c(z,z0)=12∥z−z0∥2c(z,z_0)=\tfrac12\|z-z_0\|^2c(z,z0​)=21​∥z−z0​∥2, Z=RmZ=\mathbb R^mZ=Rm, P0P_0P0​ a point mass, ϵ=0\epsilon=0ϵ=0). Expectations as lower integrals prevent a non-integrable ∥∇F(θt)∥2\|\nabla F(\theta^t)\|^2∥∇F(θt)∥2 from being read as 000.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: the descent lemma for functions with Lipschitz gradient; first-order characterizations of strong concavity on a convex set; a Danskin/envelope theorem for strongly concave suprema; differentiation under the integral for FFF; and conditional-expectation bookkeeping for Markov-type recursions driven by i.i.d. samples on a finite product space. The first three are reusable in any minimax or bilevel analysis. Contributions to any milestone, or to these supporting facts as separate lemmas, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Sinha, H. Namkoong, R. Volpi, J. Duchi, Certifying Some Distributional Robustness with Principled Adversarial Training, ICLR 2018; arXiv:1710.10571v5, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10571
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 23(4), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1137/120880811
  • J. F. Bonnans, A. Shapiro, Perturbation Analysis of Optimization Problems, Springer, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1394-9
  • R. Gao, A. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, Mathematics of Operations Research 48(2), 2023; arXiv:1604.02199. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization 3: On a Finite Support the Empirical DRO Equals the Burg-Divergence DRO with χ²₁ RadiusResearch Paper

Motivation

Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) evaluates a decision against a collection of probability distributions near an empirical one. In a finite scenario model, the familiar construction puts a divergence ball around the histogram of observed scenarios. Lam's empirical construction instead gives one weight to each observation, even when several observations have the same value. The distinction matters because a sample can contain repeated values and can omit some points of the stated support. The paper uses a Burg-entropy ball on those observation weights to recover statistical guarantees for an expected loss, despite the empirical ball having low probability of containing the true distribution. Lam, §§2.1–2.3, pp. 5–9.

Proposition 1 identifies what this observation-level construction becomes when the random quantity has finite support: its lower and upper DRO values coincide with values from a Burg-divergence ball on the support histogram. This links a method defined on individual data points to the standard finite-scenario formulation. The radius uses a one-degree-of-freedom chi-square quantile because the paper calibrates an expected value at a fixed decision; it does not use the k−1k-1k−1 degrees of freedom associated with estimating a full kkk-point distribution. Lam, Proposition 1, p. 11, and the discussion on pp. 8–9.

Setting

Fix a decision xxx and a real loss h(x;si)h(x;s_i)h(x;si​) at each of kkk support points s1,…,sks_1,\ldots,s_ks1​,…,sk​. A sample of size nnn has an assignment c(j)c(j)c(j) telling which support point produced observation jjj. Write nin_ini​ for the number of assignments to point iii and p^i=ni/n\hat p_i=n_i/np^​i​=ni​/n for the empirical histogram. The support points need not all appear in the sample. The decision and loss only determine a finite vector of loss values; no probability space is needed for this deterministic comparison. Lam, §2.1, p. 6, and Proposition 1, p. 11.

The empirical Burg ball Un(η)\mathcal U_n(\eta)Un​(η) consists of observation weights w1,…,wnw_1,\ldots,w_nw1​,…,wn​ that are nonnegative, sum to one, and obey −n−1∑jlog⁡(nwj)≤η-n^{-1}\sum_j\log(nw_j)\le\eta−n−1∑j​log(nwj​)≤η. The support Burg ball UBurg′(η)\mathcal U'_{\mathrm{Burg}}(\eta)UBurg′​(η) consists of support weights p1,…,pkp_1,\ldots,p_kp1​,…,pk​ that are nonnegative, sum to one, are absolutely continuous with respect to p^\hat pp^​, and obey −∑ip^ilog⁡(pi/p^i)≤η-\sum_i\hat p_i\log(p_i/\hat p_i)\le\eta−∑i​p^​i​log(pi​/p^​i​)≤η. At an observed point, finite Burg divergence requires pi>0p_i>0pi​>0; at an unobserved point, absolute continuity requires pi=0p_i=0pi​=0. Lam, (13)–(15), pp. 5–6; (19), p. 8; (28), p. 11.

For a support weight vector ppp, the expected loss is ∑ipih(x;si)\sum_i p_i h(x;s_i)∑i​pi​h(x;si​). For an observation weight vector www, it is ∑jwjh(x;sc(j))\sum_j w_j h(x;s_{c(j)})∑j​wj​h(x;sc(j)​). The empirical lower and upper values are the minimum and maximum over Un(η)\mathcal U_n(\eta)Un​(η); the support values use UBurg′(η)\mathcal U'_{\mathrm{Burg}}(\eta)UBurg′​(η). The same empirical ball is used for both bounds. Lam, (26)–(28), p. 11.

Formalization targets

The goal is Proposition 1. For every n>0n>0n>0, every assignment of the sample to finite support points, every fixed decision xxx, and every κ≥0\kappa\ge0κ≥0, set η=κ/(2n)\eta=\kappa/(2n)η=κ/(2n). Then

min⁡w∈Un(η)∑j=1nwjh(x;sc(j))=min⁡p∈UBurg′(η)∑i=1kpih(x;si),\min_{w\in\mathcal U_n(\eta)}\sum_{j=1}^n w_jh(x;s_{c(j)}) =\min_{p\in\mathcal U'_{\mathrm{Burg}}(\eta)}\sum_{i=1}^k p_ih(x;s_i),w∈Un​(η)min​j=1∑n​wj​h(x;sc(j)​)=p∈UBurg′​(η)min​i=1∑k​pi​h(x;si​), max⁡w∈Un(η)∑j=1nwjh(x;sc(j))=max⁡p∈UBurg′(η)∑i=1kpih(x;si).\max_{w\in\mathcal U_n(\eta)}\sum_{j=1}^n w_jh(x;s_{c(j)}) =\max_{p\in\mathcal U'_{\mathrm{Burg}}(\eta)}\sum_{i=1}^k p_ih(x;s_i).w∈Un​(η)max​j=1∑n​wj​h(x;sc(j)​)=p∈UBurg′​(η)max​i=1∑k​pi​h(x;si​).

The printed proposition takes κ=χ1,1−α2\kappa=\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}κ=χ1,1−α2​. The deterministic identity holds at every nonnegative κ\kappaκ, including zero. The two milestones record the source proof's statements that a feasible support vector gives a feasible observation vector with the same objective value, and conversely that a feasible observation vector gives a feasible support vector with the same objective value. Lam, Proposition 1, p. 11, proof p. 24.

Significance

The identity lets a finite-support user compute the empirical DRO values with one variable per distinct support point instead of one per observation, without changing either bound. It also shows precisely how Lam's empirical calibration relates to a conventional histogram-based divergence model: the ambiguity sets have different coordinates, but the resulting extrema of any loss constant on each class agree. This is the finite-support interpretation stated immediately after Theorem 2, and it explains the radius comparison on pp. 8–9. Lam, pp. 8–9 and Proposition 1, p. 11.

The result is proved in the paper; the remaining task is a machine-checked proof of the two transformations and the equality of extrema. The published formal library already contains the observation-level ϕ\phiϕ-divergence ball and its robust upper mean, and a shared setting supplies the Burg generator and lower empirical value. This mission adds the support histogram, its Burg ball, and the bridge between the two representations. Those definitions and transformations can also be reused for other finite-support losses. The paper's separate pointwise coverage and consistency results are goals of other missions in this series. Lam, Theorems 2–3 and Proposition 1, pp. 11–12.

Difficulty

Repeated observations make the two weight spaces different: the empirical problem has nnn coordinates and the support problem has kkk. Simply identifying coordinates loses multiplicities in both the normalization and the logarithmic divergence. Empty classes create a second boundary case, since no observation weight can be assigned to an unobserved support point. A statement that silently permits such mass changes the support optimization value. The full reduction must preserve feasible objective values in both directions, for the lower and upper extrema. Lam, proof of Proposition 1, p. 24.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin n for observations and Fin k for support points, with zero-based indices, a class map ccc, real loss values, and the paper's Burg generator valued in EReal. Nonpositive likelihood ratios receive +∞+\infty+∞. The empirical ball reuses the published PhiDivRobust.Counterpart.probUncertaintySet; its upper value is the published GenEmpLik.Expansion.robustMean. The lower value is a real infimum over the same ball. The condition n>0n>0n>0 and the nonnegative radius make both feasible value sets nonempty and bounded, so the real infimum and supremum mean the paper's minimum and maximum. The histogram can have zero entries. Lam, (19), (26)–(28), pp. 8, 11.

Display (28) omits a condition from the preceding definition of a divergence ball: ppp must be absolutely continuous with respect to p^\hat pp^​. Without it, an unobserved support point can receive positive mass and Proposition 1 is false. The formal support ball includes p^i=0⇒pi=0\hat p_i=0\Rightarrow p_i=0p^​i​=0⇒pi​=0 from (13)–(14). It also requires pi>0p_i>0pi​>0 where p^i>0\hat p_i>0p^​i​>0, because Lean's real logarithm returns zero at zero whereas the paper's Burg divergence is infinite there. These conditions, together with n>0n>0n>0, exclude trivial values from empty balls, division by zero, and logarithms at invalid weights. The decision set Θ\ThetaΘ is omitted because the paper fixes one xxx and the result holds for every such xxx. Lam, (13)–(14), pp. 5–6, and (28), p. 11.

The development needs finite-sum identities, elementary properties of the probability simplex, the logarithm's concavity, and bounds on the extrema of bounded nonempty finite-dimensional value sets. Contributions that establish the two direction statements, or reusable facts about aggregation of finite probability weights, directly advance this mission. The paper's uniform calibration theorem, Theorem 4, is outside this scope: it needs a Donsker class, a data-dependent chi-square process, and its supremum quantile, none of which enters Proposition 1. Lam, Theorem 4, pp. 13–14.

Selected references

  • Henry Lam, Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization, arXiv:1605.09349v1, 2016; published in Operations Research 67(4), 2019. arXiv, DOI.
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Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs II: Posted Expected Weakly (α, β₁, β₂)-Balanced Prices Earn 1/(α(2β₁ + 4β₂)) of the Expected Welfare of ALGResearch Paper

Motivation

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random inputs one at a time and must commit irrevocably, with a "prophet" who sees all inputs in advance. The classic single-item version (Krengel–Sucheston, Samuel-Cahn) says that a well-chosen fixed threshold earns at least half of the expected maximum. In mechanism design the same statement reads: a posted-price mechanism, which offers each arriving buyer a take-it-or-leave-it menu of prices, extracts a constant fraction of the optimal expected welfare, and does so in a way that is truthful, simple and order oblivious.

Dütting, Feldman, Kesselheim and Lucier (SIAM J. Comput. 49 (2020)) reduce the construction of such prices to a deterministic question. If, for every fixed valuation profile vvv, one can find prices pvp^vpv that are balanced — high enough to pay for the welfare an early allocation destroys, low enough that whatever is still feasible stays affordable — then the expected prices Ev~[pv~]\mathbb E_{\tilde v}[p^{\tilde v}]Ev~​[pv~], suitably scaled, give a prophet inequality. This is their Theorem 3.2 for (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-balanced prices. For combinatorial auctions with bundles of size at most ddd, MPH-kkk valuations and related settings, the natural prices only satisfy a weaker condition, in which the affordability bound may also spend a multiple of the benchmark welfare. Theorem 3.5, the subject of this mission, is the extension theorem for that weak balancedness; it is what turns the paper's Theorem 4.1 (bundle size ddd) and Theorem 1.6 (MPH-kkk) into O(d)O(d)O(d)- and O(k)O(k)O(k)-approximate posted-price mechanisms.

Setting

There are nnn agents N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Agent iii has an outcome space XiX_iXi​ containing a null outcome ∅\emptyset∅; outcome profiles are x∈X=X1×⋯×Xnx\in X=X_1\times\cdots\times X_nx∈X=X1​×⋯×Xn​. For S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, xSx_SxS​ gives xix_ixi​ to the agents in SSS and ∅\emptyset∅ to the others, and x[i−1]x_{[i-1]}x[i−1]​ keeps only the agents before iii. The feasible profiles form a set F⊆X\mathcal F\subseteq XF⊆X that is downward closed (x∈F⇒xS∈Fx\in\mathcal F\Rightarrow x_S\in\mathcal Fx∈F⇒xS​∈F).

Agent iii has a valuation vi:Xi→[0,1]v_i:X_i\to[0,1]vi​:Xi​→[0,1], drawn independently from a known distribution Di\mathcal D_iDi​; D=∏iDi\mathcal D=\prod_i\mathcal D_iD=∏i​Di​. The welfare of xxx is v(x)=∑ivi(xi)v(x)=\sum_i v_i(x_i)v(x)=∑i​vi​(xi​), and v(OPT(v,S))=sup⁡x∈Sv(x)v(\mathrm{OPT}(v,S))=\sup_{x\in S}v(x)v(OPT(v,S))=supx∈S​v(x) (zero on S=∅S=\emptysetS=∅). An allocation rule ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG maps every valuation profile to a feasible outcome.

A pricing rule assigns prices pi(xi∣y)∈[0,∞]p_i(x_i\mid y)\in[0,\infty]pi​(xi​∣y)∈[0,∞] to outcome xix_ixi​ offered to agent iii given the partial allocation yyy, with pi(xi∣y)=∞p_i(x_i\mid y)=\inftypi​(xi​∣y)=∞ when (xi,y−i)∉F(x_i,y_{-i})\notin\mathcal F(xi​,y−i​)∈/F. In the posted-price mechanism the agents are approached in index order; agent iii sees the prices pi(⋅∣x[i−1])p_i(\cdot\mid x_{[i-1]})pi​(⋅∣x[i−1]​) and buys a utility-maximizing outcome, utility being vi(xi)−pi(xi∣x[i−1])v_i(x_i)-p_i(x_i\mid x_{[i-1]})vi​(xi​)−pi​(xi​∣x[i−1]​).

A family (Fx)x∈X(\mathcal F_x)_{x\in X}(Fx​)x∈X​ of sets of profiles is exchange compatible if (yi,x−i)∈F(y_i,x_{-i})\in\mathcal F(yi​,x−i​)∈F for every x∈Xx\in Xx∈X, y∈Fxy\in\mathcal F_xy∈Fx​ and iii. Given α>0\alpha>0α>0 and β1,β2≥0\beta_1,\beta_2\ge0β1​,β2​≥0, a pricing rule pvp^vpv is weakly (α,β1,β2)(\alpha,\beta_1,\beta_2)(α,β1​,β2​)-balanced (Definition 3.4) with respect to ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG and (Fx)(\mathcal F_x)(Fx​) if for every x∈Fx\in\mathcal Fx∈F

(a)∑ipiv(xi∣x[i−1]) ≥ 1α(v(ALG(v))−v(OPT(v,Fx))),\text{(a)}\quad \sum_i p^v_i(x_i\mid x_{[i-1]})\ \ge\ \tfrac1\alpha\bigl(v(\mathrm{ALG}(v))-v(\mathrm{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x))\bigr),(a)i∑​piv​(xi​∣x[i−1]​) ≥ α1​(v(ALG(v))−v(OPT(v,Fx​))), (b)∑ipiv(xi′∣x[i−1]) ≤ β1 v(OPT(v,Fx))+β2 v(ALG(v))for all x′∈Fx.\text{(b)}\quad \sum_i p^v_i(x'_i\mid x_{[i-1]})\ \le\ \beta_1\,v(\mathrm{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x))+\beta_2\,v(\mathrm{ALG}(v))\quad\text{for all }x'\in\mathcal F_x.(b)i∑​piv​(xi′​∣x[i−1]​) ≤ β1​v(OPT(v,Fx​))+β2​v(ALG(v))for all x′∈Fx​.

A collection (pv)v(p^v)_{v}(pv)v​ is weakly balanced if one exchange-compatible family works for every vvv.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.5 (p. 551)

If (pv)v(p^v)_v(pv)v​ is weakly (α,β1,β2)(\alpha,\beta_1,\beta_2)(α,β1​,β2​)-balanced with β1+β2≥1/α\beta_1+\beta_2\ge1/\alphaβ1​+β2​≥1/α, then with

δ=1β1+max⁡{2β2,1/α},pi(xi∣y)=Ev~[piv~(xi∣y)],\delta=\frac1{\beta_1+\max\{2\beta_2,1/\alpha\}},\qquad p_i(x_i\mid y)=\mathbb E_{\tilde v}\bigl[p^{\tilde v}_i(x_i\mid y)\bigr],δ=β1​+max{2β2​,1/α}1​,pi​(xi​∣y)=Ev~​[piv~​(xi​∣y)],

the posted-price mechanism with prices δp\delta pδp, approaching agents in index order, satisfies

Ev[∑ivi(xi(v))] ≥ 1α(2β1+4β2) Ev[v(ALG(v))].\mathbb E_v\Bigl[\sum_i v_i(x_i(v))\Bigr]\ \ge\ \frac1{\alpha(2\beta_1+4\beta_2)}\,\mathbb E_v\bigl[v(\mathrm{ALG}(v))\bigr].Ev​[i∑​vi​(xi​(v))] ≥ α(2β1​+4β2​)1​Ev​[v(ALG(v))].

Milestones (Appendix A, pp. 559–560)

  1. Each agent's utility in the run is nonnegative.
  2. (A.1): the total expected utility is at least the value of a ghost-sample deviation x′(v,v′)∈Fx(v)x'(v,v')\in\mathcal F_{x(v)}x′(v,v′)∈Fx(v)​ minus its expected price.
  3. (A.2): property (b) bounds that price by δβ1E[v~(OPT(v~,Fx(v)))]+δβ2E[v~(ALG(v~))]\delta\beta_1\mathbb E[\tilde v(\mathrm{OPT}(\tilde v,\mathcal F_{x(v)}))]+\delta\beta_2\mathbb E[\tilde v(\mathrm{ALG}(\tilde v))]δβ1​E[v~(OPT(v~,Fx(v)​))]+δβ2​E[v~(ALG(v~))].
  4. (A.3): E[∑iui]≥(1−δβ1) E[v~(OPT(v~,Fx(v)))]−δβ2 E[v~(ALG(v~))]\mathbb E[\sum_iu_i]\ge(1-\delta\beta_1)\,\mathbb E[\tilde v(\mathrm{OPT}(\tilde v,\mathcal F_{x(v)}))]-\delta\beta_2\,\mathbb E[\tilde v(\mathrm{ALG}(\tilde v))]E[∑i​ui​]≥(1−δβ1​)E[v~(OPT(v~,Fx(v)​))]−δβ2​E[v~(ALG(v~))].
  5. (A.4): property (a) bounds the expected revenue from below.
  6. Case 1, β2≥1/(2α)\beta_2\ge1/(2\alpha)β2​≥1/(2α), δ=1/(β1+2β2)\delta=1/(\beta_1+2\beta_2)δ=1/(β1​+2β2​): the goal's bound.
  7. Case 2, β2<1/(2α)\beta_2<1/(2\alpha)β2​<1/(2α), δ=1/(β1+1/α)\delta=1/(\beta_1+1/\alpha)δ=1/(β1​+1/α): the bound with constant (1−αβ2)/(1+αβ1)(1-\alpha\beta_2)/(1+\alpha\beta_1)(1−αβ2​)/(1+αβ1​).
  8. Case 2's last step: (1−αβ2)/(1+αβ1)≥1/(α(2β1+4β2))(1-\alpha\beta_2)/(1+\alpha\beta_1)\ge1/(\alpha(2\beta_1+4\beta_2))(1−αβ2​)/(1+αβ1​)≥1/(α(2β1​+4β2​)) under the theorem's constraints.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.5 is the second of the paper's two extension theorems. Its hypothesis is a deterministic, full-information property of prices, which is often checkable by a direct combinatorial argument; its conclusion is a Bayesian guarantee for an online, truthful mechanism. The paper instantiates it with weakly (1,1,d−1)(1,1,d-1)(1,1,d−1)-balanced fractional prices for combinatorial auctions with bundle size at most ddd (Theorem 4.1) and for MPH-kkk valuations (Theorem 1.6), obtaining approximation ratios linear in ddd and kkk, where (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-balancedness alone would not apply.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper; no machine-checked version exists. The mission produces a formal account of the sequential posted-price mechanism with history-dependent prices (an online run defined by recursion over the agents), of the ghost-sample argument, and of the case analysis in δ\deltaδ. The definitions are general enough that the paper's applications — and other balanced-price arguments — can be stated on top of them. The printed proof has a slip: (A.1) is printed as an equality but only the inequality "≥\ge≥" holds; the formalization states the inequality.

Difficulty

Two steps carry the content. First, the utility bound (A.1): agent iii could have bought its part of the deviation x′(v,v′)x'(v,v')x′(v,v′), but that deviation is defined from the run on a different profile. The argument needs that the partial allocation x[i−1](v)x_{[i-1]}(v)x[i−1]​(v) does not depend on viv_ivi​ — the mechanism is online — and that exchanging viv_ivi​ with an independent copy vi′v'_ivi′​ preserves the joint law. Making this exchange rigorous on a product measure, and handling an empty Fx(v)\mathcal F_{x(v)}Fx(v)​ (where no deviation exists and the bound must come from ui≥0u_i\ge0ui​≥0), is where the work lies. Second, v(OPT(v,Fx))v(\mathrm{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x))v(OPT(v,Fx​)) is a supremum that need not be attained, so "buy your part of OPT" must be replaced by near-optimal selections and a limit.

The tempting shortcut of treating weak balancedness as (α,β1+β2)(\alpha,\beta_1+\beta_2)(α,β1​+β2​)-balancedness and applying Theorem 3.2 does not work: property (b) of Definition 3.1 bounds prices by a multiple of v(OPT(v,Fx))v(\mathrm{OPT}(v,\mathcal F_x))v(OPT(v,Fx​)) alone, which can be zero while v(ALG(v))v(\mathrm{ALG}(v))v(ALG(v)) is not.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n, 0-based: the paper's agent iii is index i−1i-1i−1, and "the order they are indexed" is the order of Fin n. Prices take values in ENNReal with ∞=⊤\infty=\top∞=⊤; price sums are never converted to reals, and property (a) passes its right side through ENNReal.ofReal (a negative bound becomes 000, which is the page's meaning). v(OPT(v,S))v(\mathrm{OPT}(v,S))v(OPT(v,S)) is the real supremum sSup, zero on the empty set, meaningful because values lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Valuations are given by type spaces ViV_iVi​ and an evaluation vali(w,xi)∈[0,1]\mathrm{val}_i(w,x_i)\in[0,1]vali​(w,xi​)∈[0,1]. The type spaces are countable with discrete σ-algebras — a disclosed restriction of the paper's general distributions, which makes every function measurable and every bounded one integrable. The null outcome is assumed free at feasible partial allocations (piv~(∅∣y)=0p^{\tilde v}_i(\emptyset\mid y)=0piv~​(∅∣y)=0 for y∈Fy\in\mathcal Fy∈F): every pricing rule in the paper has this property, and the proof needs its consequence ui(v)≥0u_i(v)\ge0ui​(v)≥0. Exchange compatibility is required for all x∈Xx\in Xx∈X, as printed. The agents' behaviour is a choice rule that sees only the agent's own type and the earlier agents' outcomes and maximizes utility at every feasible partial allocation; at infeasible ones no requirement is made. The constant δ\deltaδ is written literally inside the posted prices, never as a free parameter.

The milestones (A.1)–(A.4) are stated for an arbitrary δ>0\delta>0δ>0, and (A.1)–(A.2) for an arbitrary selector into Fx(v)\mathcal F_{x(v)}Fx(v)​ in place of the maximizer, with an explicit zero when Fx(v)=∅\mathcal F_{x(v)}=\emptysetFx(v)​=∅; both are generalizations of the printed steps. A statement in which the agents' optimality hypothesis can never be met, or in which an infinite price sum is read as 000, would make the goal vacuous; the encoding above excludes both, and a sorry-free one-agent instance in the workspace confirms that all hypotheses of the goal can hold together.

Needed infrastructure: product measures and the swap of one coordinate with an independent copy, lower integrals of ENNReal-valued prices, the recursion defining the run, and near-maximizers of bounded suprema. The model and mechanism definitions are reusable for the paper's other extension theorem (Theorem 3.2) and its applications. Contributions are welcome on any milestone; the pure inequality of Case 2 is self-contained.

Selected references

  • P. Dütting, M. Feldman, T. Kesselheim, B. Lucier, Prophet inequalities made easy: Stochastic optimization by pricing nonstochastic inputs, SIAM Journal on Computing 49(3):540–582, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1137/20M1323850
  • U. Krengel, L. Sucheston, Semiamarts and finite values, Bulletin of the AMS 83(4):745–747, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1977-14378-4
  • E. Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables, Annals of Probability 12(4):1213–1216, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993150
  • R. Kleinberg, S. M. Weinberg, Matroid prophet inequalities, STOC 2012, 123–136. https://doi.org/10.1145/2213977.2213991
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Optimization-Based Scenario Reduction for Data-Driven Two-Stage Stochastic Optimization II: Under a Symmetric Uncertainty Law the Mean Solves the Convex Upper-Bound Scenario ProblemResearch Paper

Why reduce scenarios with the cost in view

A two-stage stochastic programme chooses a decision zzz before an uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ is revealed and pays a cost c(z;ξ)c(z;\xi)c(z;ξ). When ξ\xiξ is known only through nnn data points, or through a law with many atoms, the expected cost is expensive to optimize, and practitioners replace the law by a small set of mmm reduced scenarios. Classical scenario reduction chooses these scenarios to be close to the data in a Wasserstein distance, without looking at the cost (Dupačová, Gröwe-Kuska and Römisch, 2003; Rujeerapaiboon, Schindler, Kuhn and Wiesemann, 2022). Bertsimas and Mundru (Operations Research, 2023) propose problem-dependent scenario reduction: the distance between two scenarios measures how much the optimal decision for one costs when evaluated on the other. Their method needs, for each cluster of data, the scenario that minimizes a cost-dependent dissimilarity, which they replace by a convex upper bound, problem (16).

Theorem 3 of the paper is the sanity check for that upper bound. For the simplest cost to which it applies and a single reduced scenario (m=1m=1m=1), under a symmetry assumption on the law, the minimizer of the upper bound is the mean of ξ\xiξ, which is also what Wasserstein scenario reduction returns for m=1m=1m=1. This mission formalizes that statement.

Setting

Decisions and parameters both live in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, with the Euclidean inner product z′ξz'\xiz′ξ. The feasible set is a polytope

Z={z∈R+d:Pz≤q},\mathcal Z = \{ z\in\mathbb R^d_+ : Pz\le q\},Z={z∈R+d​:Pz≤q},

for a matrix P∈Rr×dP\in\mathbb R^{r\times d}P∈Rr×d and a vector q∈Rrq\in\mathbb R^rq∈Rr, assumed nonempty and bounded. The cost is c(z;ξ)=max⁡{z′ξ,0}c(z;\xi)=\max\{z'\xi,0\}c(z;ξ)=max{z′ξ,0}, a special case of the piecewise bilinear costs max⁡1≤t≤kz′Atξ\max_{1\le t\le k} z'A_t\ximax1≤t≤k​z′At​ξ of (15) (take k=2k=2k=2, A1=IA_1=IA1​=I, A2=0A_2=0A2​=0).

An optimal-decision map is any function z∗:Rd→Rdz^*:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb R^dz∗:Rd→Rd with z∗(ξ)∈arg⁡min⁡z∈Zz′ξz^*(\xi)\in\arg\min_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'\xiz∗(ξ)∈argminz∈Z​z′ξ for every ξ\xiξ; for a vector vvv, Z∗(v)=arg⁡min⁡z∈Zz′v\mathcal Z^*(v)=\arg\min_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'vZ∗(v)=argminz∈Z​z′v is the whole set of minimizers. The set of cost-reducing parameters is

U={ξ:min⁡z∈Zz′ξ<0}.\mathcal U=\Big\{\xi : \min_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'\xi<0\Big\}.U={ξ:z∈Zmin​z′ξ<0}.

For a candidate reduced scenario ζ∈Rd\zeta\in\mathbb R^dζ∈Rd, the per-scenario upper-bound loss is

L(ξ,ζ)=max⁡{max⁡z∈Zz′(ξ−2ζ), 0}+2max⁡{z∗(ξ)′ζ, 0}.L(\xi,\zeta)=\max\Big\{\max_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'(\xi-2\zeta),\,0\Big\}+2\max\{z^*(\xi)'\zeta,\,0\}.L(ξ,ζ)=max{z∈Zmax​z′(ξ−2ζ),0}+2max{z∗(ξ)′ζ,0}.

For this cost it is the optimal value, in the auxiliary variables (λ,θ,γ)(\lambda,\theta,\gamma)(λ,θ,γ), of the per-point linear programme in (16). With a random parameter ξ\xiξ of law μ\muμ, the upper-bound objective for m=1m=1m=1 is E[L(ξ,ζ)]\mathbb E[L(\xi,\zeta)]E[L(ξ,ζ)]. The squared cost for Wasserstein reduction to one atom is W(ζ)=∫∥ξ−ζ∥22 dμW(\zeta)=\int\|\xi-\zeta\|_2^2\,d\muW(ζ)=∫∥ξ−ζ∥22​dμ; (4) takes its square root, which preserves minimizers.

Assumption 5 (p. 24) asks:

  • (a) ξ\xiξ has a continuous distribution on U\mathcal UU and density 000 elsewhere;
  • (b) the mean ξˉ=E[ξ]\bar\xi=\mathbb E[\xi]ξˉ​=E[ξ] is finite and z∗(ξˉ)′ξˉ>0z^*(\bar\xi)'\bar\xi>0z∗(ξˉ​)′ξˉ​>0;
  • (c) the law of ξ\xiξ is symmetric about ξˉ\bar\xiξˉ​, that is, ξ\xiξ and 2ξˉ−ξ2\bar\xi-\xi2ξˉ​−ξ are equal in distribution.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 24)

Under Assumption 5, for every measurable optimal-decision map z∗z^*z∗,

E[L(ξ,ξˉ)]  ≤  E[L(ξ,ζ)]andW(ξˉ)≤W(ζ)for all ζ∈Rd.\mathbb E\big[L(\xi,\bar\xi)\big]\;\le\;\mathbb E\big[L(\xi,\zeta)\big]\quad\text{and}\quad W(\bar\xi)\le W(\zeta)\qquad\text{for all }\zeta\in\mathbb R^d.E[L(ξ,ξˉ​)]≤E[L(ξ,ζ)]andW(ξˉ​)≤W(ζ)for all ζ∈Rd.

The page's "the solution … is simply the mean" is read as "the mean is a minimizer", which is what the proof concludes; uniqueness is not claimed.

Milestones (steps of the proof, pp. 24–25)

  1. For each ξ\xiξ, ζ↦L(ξ,ζ)\zeta\mapsto L(\xi,\zeta)ζ↦L(ξ,ζ) is convex.
  2. L(ξ,ζ)≤∣max⁡z∈Zz′(ξ−2ζ)∣+2∣ζ′z∗(ξ)∣≤(∥ξ−2ζ∥1+2∥ζ∥1)max⁡z∈Z∥z∥∞≤(∥ξ∥1+4∥ζ∥1)max⁡z∈Z∥z∥∞L(\xi,\zeta)\le\big|\max_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'(\xi-2\zeta)\big|+2|\zeta'z^*(\xi)|\le(\|\xi-2\zeta\|_1+2\|\zeta\|_1)\max_{z\in\mathcal Z}\|z\|_\infty\le(\|\xi\|_1+4\|\zeta\|_1)\max_{z\in\mathcal Z}\|z\|_\inftyL(ξ,ζ)≤​maxz∈Z​z′(ξ−2ζ)​+2∣ζ′z∗(ξ)∣≤(∥ξ−2ζ∥1​+2∥ζ∥1​)maxz∈Z​∥z∥∞​≤(∥ξ∥1​+4∥ζ∥1​)maxz∈Z​∥z∥∞​.
  3. With probability one, 2ξˉ−ξ∈U2\bar\xi-\xi\in\mathcal U2ξˉ​−ξ∈U and Z∗(2ξˉ−ξ)\mathcal Z^*(2\bar\xi-\xi)Z∗(2ξˉ​−ξ) is a singleton.
  4. Under symmetry, E[z∗(2ξˉ−ξ)]=E[z∗(ξ)]\mathbb E[z^*(2\bar\xi-\xi)]=\mathbb E[z^*(\xi)]E[z∗(2ξˉ​−ξ)]=E[z∗(ξ)].
  5. If z∗(ξˉ)′ξˉ>0z^*(\bar\xi)'\bar\xi>0z∗(ξˉ​)′ξˉ​>0 then z′ξˉ≥z∗(ξˉ)′ξˉ>0z'\bar\xi\ge z^*(\bar\xi)'\bar\xi>0z′ξˉ​≥z∗(ξˉ​)′ξˉ​>0 for every z∈Zz\in\mathcal Zz∈Z.

Significance

The upper bound (16) is the computational core of the paper's Algorithm 1: each alternating-minimization step solves one instance of it per cluster. Theorem 3 is the only result in the paper that identifies its minimizer in closed form, and it shows that, in a symmetric case, the cost-aware reduction agrees with the classical one at m=1m=1m=1. It is the paper's justification that the upper bound is a sensible surrogate and not an arbitrary convex relaxation.

The argument is a variant of the mean-minimizes-the-surrogate result of Elmachtoub and Grigas for the SPO+ loss (Management Science, 2022, Proposition 6(a)), with both terms clipped at zero and with a law living only on U\mathcal UU instead of all of Rd\mathbb R^dRd. Theorem 3 is proved on paper; it has not been formalized, and on Prove2Me the Elmachtoub–Grigas statement is posed but open. The work here is to formalize the known proof, including the measure-theoretic steps the paper treats in one sentence each: integrability of the loss, exchange of the subdifferential and the expectation, and the almost-sure uniqueness of linear minimizers over a polytope.

Difficulty

Convexity of the objective and a vanishing subgradient at ξˉ\bar\xiξˉ​ would settle the theorem, but two steps of that argument are not routine. First, the objective is not differentiable everywhere, and the subdifferential of ζ↦E[L(ξ,ζ)]\zeta\mapsto\mathbb E[L(\xi,\zeta)]ζ↦E[L(ξ,ζ)] is not in general the expectation of the pointwise subdifferentials: the exchange needs the integrable bound of milestone 2 and the almost-sure uniqueness of milestone 3. Second, that uniqueness is a statement about the geometry of polytopes and about the law of the reflected parameter 2ξˉ−ξ2\bar\xi-\xi2ξˉ​−ξ together: neither convexity nor absolute continuity alone gives it. The clipping at zero adds a third point: one has to check that it is inactive at ζ=ξˉ\zeta=\bar\xiζ=ξˉ​ almost surely, which is where Assumption 5a's support condition on U\mathcal UU and Assumption 5b enter. Dropping either half of Assumption 5a breaks the argument: a two-atom symmetric law can put both atoms where Z∗(2ξˉ−ξ)\mathcal Z^*(2\bar\xi-\xi)Z∗(2ξˉ​−ξ) is a whole edge, and a law charging the complement of U\mathcal UU can make the first clipping active at ξˉ\bar\xiξˉ​.

Formalization scope

  • Rd\mathbb R^dRd is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and z′ξz'\xiz′ξ is ⟪z, ξ⟫_ℝ. Decision and parameter spaces coincide (nz=dn_z=dnz​=d), as the cost z′ξz'\xiz′ξ requires.
  • Z\mathcal ZZ is polytope P qv, with the hypotheses that it is nonempty and bounded (§1 of the paper assumes Z\mathcal ZZ nonempty and compact; the polytope is closed).
  • The maximum and minimum of z′vz'vz′v over Z\mathcal ZZ and the argmin set are the published definitions SmartPTO.Fisher.xi, SmartPTO.Fisher.zstar and SmartPTO.Fisher.Wstar; "symmetric about its mean" is the published SmartPTO.Fisher.CentrallySymmetric.
  • z∗z^*z∗ is a function zsel with the hypothesis that zsel ξ is a minimizer for every ξ\xiξ, and it is assumed measurable (needed for E[z∗(ξ)]\mathbb E[z^*(\xi)]E[z∗(ξ)]; not on the page). The theorem holds for every such selection; uniqueness of minimizers is not assumed.
  • The law is a probability measure μ\muμ. Assumption 5a is two hypotheses: μ≪\mu\llμ≪ Lebesgue and μ(Rd∖U)=0\mu(\mathbb R^d\setminus\mathcal U)=0μ(Rd∖U)=0. Full support is not assumed and would contradict the second. Assumption 5b is integrability of ξ\xiξ plus z∗(ξˉ)′ξˉ>0z^*(\bar\xi)'\bar\xi>0z∗(ξˉ​)′ξˉ​>0 with ξˉ=∫ξ dμ\bar\xi=\int\xi\,d\muξˉ​=∫ξdμ.
  • The goal is stated on E[L(ξ,ζ)]\mathbb E[L(\xi,\zeta)]E[L(ξ,ζ)], the first display of the proof, not on the linear programme (16) with its auxiliary variables; for this cost the two coincide by LP duality (Proposition 3's proof), and Theorem 3 is the population, m=1m=1m=1 version.
  • Expectations are Bochner integrals, which return 000 for non-integrable integrands. Under the stated hypotheses ξ↦L(ξ,ζ)\xi\mapsto L(\xi,\zeta)ξ↦L(ξ,ζ) is dominated by (∥ξ∥1+4∥ζ∥1)max⁡z∈Z∥z∥∞(\|\xi\|_1+4\|\zeta\|_1)\max_{z\in\mathcal Z}\|z\|_\infty(∥ξ∥1​+4∥ζ∥1​)maxz∈Z​∥z∥∞​ and is integrable, so the goal is not satisfied by junk values; integrability and measurability hypotheses must not be weakened.
  • The Wasserstein clause uses an extended nonnegative integral for WWW. This expresses the theorem without adding a second-moment hypothesis absent from Assumption 5. With a finite second moment it is the usual squared Wasserstein objective; with an infinite second moment every one-atom value is infinite, so the clause has only the extended-value meaning.

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: support functions of polytopes and their directional derivatives; the fact that a linear function has a unique minimizer over a polytope for Lebesgue-almost every cost vector; differentiation of convex integral functionals under the integral sign. Contributions of any of these as stand-alone lemmas are welcome.

The source is the authors' accepted manuscript (MIT DSpace, "Submitted to Operations Research"), not the published article; all page and theorem numbers refer to the manuscript, whose printed page numbers equal its PDF page numbers.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas and N. Mundru, Optimization-based Scenario Reduction for Data-Driven Two-stage Stochastic Optimization, Operations Research, 2023 (author manuscript, MIT DSpace). https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2265
  • A. N. Elmachtoub and P. Grigas, Smart "Predict, then Optimize", Management Science 68(1), 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3922
  • J. Dupačová, N. Gröwe-Kuska and W. Römisch, Scenario reduction in stochastic programming: an approach using probability metrics, Mathematical Programming 95, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0331-0
  • N. Rujeerapaiboon, K. Schindler, D. Kuhn and W. Wiesemann, Scenario Reduction Revisited: Fundamental Limits and Guarantees, Mathematical Programming 191, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-018-1269-1
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret in Online Combinatorial Optimization I: For Every Learning Rate the Exponentially Weighted Forecaster EXP2 Has Full-Information Regret at Least 0.01 d^{3/2}√n on Some Action SetResearch Paper

Motivation

Online combinatorial optimization is a repeated game in which a learner selects, round after round, a structured object (a subset of fixed size, a path, a matching, a spanning tree) encoded as a 0/1 vector, and an adversary assigns a cost to every coordinate. It models routing, ranking, scheduling and many other sequential decision problems in operations research and machine learning, and it contains prediction with expert advice as the special case of one-hot vectors.

The most widely used algorithm for this game is the exponentially weighted forecaster, which keeps a weight on every action and multiplies it by exp⁡(−η⋅loss)\exp(-\eta\cdot\text{loss})exp(−η⋅loss) after each round. Applied to a combinatorial action set it is called EXP2 (Audibert, Bubeck and Lugosi), or Expanded Hedge in the full-information case (Koolen, Warmuth and Kivinen, COLT 2010). Its standard analysis gives regret of order m3/2nlog⁡(d/m)m^{3/2}\sqrt{n\log(d/m)}m3/2nlog(d/m)​, while online mirror descent with the negative entropy (Component Hedge) achieves mnlog⁡(d/m)m\sqrt{n\log(d/m)}mnlog(d/m)​, which is optimal. Koolen, Warmuth and Kivinen left open whether a better tuning or a better analysis of EXP2 could close this gap.

Timeline.

  • 1997: Freund and Schapire analyse Hedge for experts.
  • 2010: Koolen, Warmuth and Kivinen introduce Component Hedge, prove the mnlog⁡(d/m)m\sqrt{n\log(d/m)}mnlog(d/m)​ bound, and ask whether Expanded Hedge can match it.
  • 2012–2014: Audibert, Bubeck and Lugosi (arXiv:1204.4710; Math. Oper. Res. 39(1), 2014) answer negatively: Theorem 1 exhibits an action set on which EXP2's full-information regret is at least 0.01 d3/2n0.01\,d^{3/2}\sqrt n0.01d3/2n​ for every learning rate.

Setting

Fix integers ddd (the dimension) and nnn (the number of rounds). An action set is a nonempty finite set A⊆{0,1}d\mathcal A\subseteq\{0,1\}^dA⊆{0,1}d whose elements all have the same number mmm of ones: ∥a∥1=m\|a\|_1=m∥a∥1​=m for every a∈Aa\in\mathcal Aa∈A. At each round t=1,…,nt=1,\dots,nt=1,…,n:

  1. the player chooses a probability distribution ptp_tpt​ on A\mathcal AA and draws at∼pta_t\sim p_tat​∼pt​;
  2. simultaneously, the adversary chooses a loss vector zt∈[0,1]dz_t\in[0,1]^dzt​∈[0,1]d;
  3. the player pays at⊤zta_t^\top z_tat⊤​zt​ and, in the full-information game, observes ztz_tzt​.

The regret after nnn rounds is

Rn=E∑t=1nat⊤zt−min⁡a∈AE∑t=1na⊤zt.R_n=\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n a_t^\top z_t-\min_{a\in\mathcal A}\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n a^\top z_t .Rn​=Et=1∑n​at⊤​zt​−a∈Amin​Et=1∑n​a⊤zt​.

EXP2 with learning rate η\etaη starts from the uniform distribution p1p_1p1​ on A\mathcal AA and updates, for every a∈Aa\in\mathcal Aa∈A,

pt+1(a)=exp⁡(−η a⊤zt) pt(a)∑b∈Aexp⁡(−η b⊤zt) pt(b).p_{t+1}(a)=\frac{\exp(-\eta\,a^\top z_t)\,p_t(a)}{\sum_{b\in\mathcal A}\exp(-\eta\,b^\top z_t)\,p_t(b)} .pt+1​(a)=∑b∈A​exp(−ηb⊤zt​)pt​(b)exp(−ηa⊤zt​)pt​(a)​.

In the Lean development IsBinaryActionSet A m is the action-set condition, exp2Weights A η z t is pt+1p_{t+1}pt+1​, and exp2Regret A η z n is RnR_nRn​ against a fixed loss sequence zzz. thmOneSet d, adv1 d and adv2 d ε are the action set and the two adversaries of the paper's proof.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 6)

For n≥dn\ge dn≥d with ddd a multiple of 444, there is an action set A⊆{0,1}d\mathcal A\subseteq\{0,1\}^dA⊆{0,1}d with constant ∥a∥1\|a\|_1∥a∥1​ such that for every η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0 some adversary with losses in [0,1]d[0,1]^d[0,1]d makes EXP2 pay

Rn ≥ 0.01 d3/2n.R_n\ \ge\ 0.01\,d^{3/2}\sqrt n .Rn​ ≥ 0.01d3/2n​.

The action set is chosen before the learning rate, and the adversary after it.

Milestones (App. A and App. C)

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 19): for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and 1≤c≤21\le c\le 21≤c≤2,
∑i=0k(1−i/k)(ki)2ci∑i=0k(ki)2ci ≥ 13.\frac{\sum_{i=0}^k(1-i/k)\binom ki^2c^i}{\sum_{i=0}^k\binom ki^2c^i}\ \ge\ \frac13 .∑i=0k​(ik​)2ci∑i=0k​(1−i/k)(ik​)2ci​ ≥ 31​.
  1. First adversary (p. 15): on the action set of App. A, against the alternating adversary, Rn=nd16tanh⁡ηd8R_n=\frac{nd}{16}\tanh\frac{\eta d}{8}Rn​=16nd​tanh8ηd​ for nnn even.
  2. Second adversary (p. 16): against the constant adversary with ε=min⁡(log⁡2/(ηn),1)\varepsilon=\min(\log2/(\eta n),1)ε=min(log2/(ηn),1), Rn≥min⁡(dlog⁡212η,nd12)R_n\ge\min\bigl(\frac{d\log2}{12\eta},\frac{nd}{12}\bigr)Rn​≥min(12ηdlog2​,12nd​) for η>0\eta>0η>0.
  3. Optimization over η\etaη (pp. 14–15): for every η>0\eta>0η>0,
max⁡(nd16tanh⁡ηd8, min⁡(dlog⁡212η,nd12)) ≥ min⁡(0.04 nd, 0.01 d3/2n).\max\Bigl(\tfrac{nd}{16}\tanh\tfrac{\eta d}{8},\ \min\bigl(\tfrac{d\log2}{12\eta},\tfrac{nd}{12}\bigr)\Bigr)\ \ge\ \min\bigl(0.04\,nd,\ 0.01\,d^{3/2}\sqrt n\bigr).max(16nd​tanh8ηd​, min(12ηdlog2​,12nd​)) ≥ min(0.04nd, 0.01d3/2n​).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 shows that the gap between EXP2 and mirror descent with the negative entropy is not an artefact of the analysis: on an action set with m=d/2m=d/2m=d/2, where the optimal rate is of order dnd\sqrt ndn​, no learning rate brings EXP2 below 0.01 d3/2n0.01\,d^{3/2}\sqrt n0.01d3/2n​. Exponential weights over the actions are therefore provably suboptimal in online combinatorial optimization, which motivates working with the convex hull of A\mathcal AA (mirror descent) rather than with the actions themselves. The construction is also a template for algorithm-specific lower bounds: two adversaries, one punishing large and one punishing small learning rates.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper (App. A, with Lemma 3 in App. C); to our knowledge none of it is machine-checked. A formalization yields a checked algorithm-specific lower bound for exponential weights, an exact closed-form regret computation for EXP2 on a structured action set, and a rigorous proof of Lemma 3, whose printed proof checks k≤106k\le10^6k≤106 numerically before an asymptotic argument with Stirling's formula.

Difficulty

The statements are elementary, but each step hides a real computation. The first adversary requires the exact distribution of EXP2 on a set of 2(d/2d/4)2\binom{d/2}{d/4}2(d/4d/2​) actions over alternating rounds, and a regret identity rather than a bound. The second requires controlling EXP2's expected loss over all nnn rounds against a constant adversary on the same exponentially large set. Lemma 3 is the hardest piece: at c=2c=2c=2 it is tight at k=1k=1k=1, while the ratio tends to 1−2/(1+2)≈0.4141-\sqrt2/(1+\sqrt2)\approx0.4141−2​/(1+2​)≈0.414 as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞; the printed proof verifies k≤106k\le10^6k≤106 numerically, so a formal proof needs an argument valid for every kkk. A naive attempt to prove the goal with a single adversary fails: one adversary only defeats either large or small learning rates.

Formalization scope

  • Actions are real vectors Fin d → ℝ with entries in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}, so a⊤za^\top za⊤z is the dot product. Coordinates and rounds are 0-based: the paper's odd rounds are the even indices.
  • EXP2 is defined by the recursion of Figure 2 with z~t=zt\tilde z_t=z_tz~t​=zt​, starting uniform on A\mathcal AA; its closed form pt(a)∝exp⁡(−η∑s<ta⊤zs)p_t(a)\propto\exp(-\eta\sum_{s<t}a^\top z_s)pt​(a)∝exp(−η∑s<t​a⊤zs​) is a consequence, not the definition.
  • The regret is defined against a deterministic, oblivious loss sequence, for which the expectation is a finite sum. Exhibiting such an adversary proves the paper's sup⁡adversary\sup_{\text{adversary}}supadversary​, since it is a special case of the paper's adaptive adversaries.
  • The minimum over A\mathcal AA is a Finset.inf'; every statement requires A\mathcal AA nonempty, so no junk value enters.
  • Added hypotheses: 4∣d4\mid d4∣d in the goal (the proof's own simplifying assumption; the printed statement fails at d=1d=1d=1, where any constant-norm A\mathcal AA is a singleton); η>0\eta>0η>0 and n≥1n\ge1n≥1 wherever 1/η1/\eta1/η or 1/(ηn)1/(\eta n)1/(ηn) appears. The goal does not assume nnn even, although App. A does; the second-adversary milestone does not need it either.
  • The action set of App. A is printed with "or"; it is formalized with exactly one of the two intervals filled, as the prose and the constant norm ∥a∥1=d/2\|a\|_1=d/2∥a∥1​=d/2 require.
  • Ruled out: an existential over η\etaη, an adversary chosen before η\etaη, an action set depending on η\etaη, unbounded losses, and an empty action set with a junk minimum would each make the goal trivial or different; the statement quantifies as above.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a proof of Lemma 3 by any method, and reusable lemmas on exponential weights (normalization, closed form, monotonicity of weights along a constant adversary). The paper's proofs are in its App. A and App. C.

Selected references

  • J.-Y. Audibert, S. Bubeck, G. Lugosi, Regret in Online Combinatorial Optimization, Math. Oper. Res. 39(1), 2014; arXiv:1204.4710v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4710
  • W. M. Koolen, M. K. Warmuth, J. Kivinen, Hedging Structured Concepts, Proceedings of COLT 2010 (reference [26] of the paper above).
  • Y. Freund, R. E. Schapire, A Decision-Theoretic Generalization of On-Line Learning and an Application to Boosting, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 55(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcss.1997.1504
  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Found. Trends Mach. Learn. 5(1), 2012; arXiv:1204.5721. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5721
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: visuddhi

Information Limits of Multistage Inventory Control: BoundsResearch Paper

Motivation

An inventory policy specifies how much stock to hold before demand arrives. Its financial value is the expected sum of holding and shortage costs. Learning a useful policy and estimating its value are different statistical tasks. This proposal starts the formalization of the principal bounds in Qin, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, Information Limits of Multistage Inventory Control, using the September 29, 2026 arXiv version as a fixed source.

Setting

There are TTT periods, independent bounded demands, positive holding and shortage costs, zero ordering costs, zero lead time, and zero terminal salvage. An action yyy must satisfy y≥max⁡(x,0)y\ge\max(x,0)y≥max(x,0). The one-period cost is h(y−d)++p(d−y)+h(y-d)^++p(d-y)^+h(y−d)++p(d−y)+. Backlog has next state y−dy-dy−d; lost sales has next state (y−d)+(y-d)^+(y−d)+ and observes only min⁡(d,y)\min(d,y)min(d,y). An error tolerance always refers to total expected cost, not average cost per period. A scalar observation is counted once even if an algorithm reuses it in several periods.

The first fully specified statistical target is the stationary valuation lower bound. Holding and shortage costs are both one, the initial inventory is one, and IID demands equal zero with probability ρ\rhoρ and one otherwise. The optimal value is defined by the actual finite-horizon Bellman infimum over feasible real actions. It is not defined to equal the formula being proved. An arbitrary randomized estimator is a Markov kernel from the finite binary archive to the real line; the same kernel is used under both laws. This includes deterministic estimators as point-mass kernels.

Formalization targets

The first target is Theorem 3.7, including its confidence dependence. Put ρ±=1−1/(2T)±128ϵ/T2\rho_\pm=1-1/(2T)\pm128\epsilon/T^2ρ±​=1−1/(2T)±128ϵ/T2. For T≥8T\ge8T≥8, 0<ϵ≤T/10240<\epsilon\le T/10240<ϵ≤T/1024, and 0<η<1/20<\eta<1/20<η<1/2, simultaneous ϵ\epsilonϵ-accuracy on the two instances with probability at least 1−η1-\eta1−η requires

M≥T3360448ϵ2(1−2η)log⁡1−ηη.M\ge\frac{T^3}{360448\epsilon^2}(1-2\eta)\log\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}.M≥360448ϵ2T3​(1−2η)logη1−η​.

Its milestones establish zero-base-stock optimality, the exact value polynomial, its derivative and quadratic sensitivity, value separation, the KL bound, and the testing reduction. The derivative has a complete local Lean proof; the other statistical proof obligations remain open. The numerical constant is retained to match the source exactly.

The complete requested program also retains the adaptive full-observation policy lower bound (Theorem 3.1), the censored lower bound and integer-count correction (Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 3.5), the stationary policy upper bound (Proposition 4.5 and Corollary 4.7), the Product ERM benchmark, and the censored upper and matching minimax rate (Section 5.4). Their full statistical encodings have not yet been added to this initial draft. They must not be inferred from the first target or from the elementary supporting lemmas. The local source map records their assumptions and dependencies.

Significance

The valuation family has a common known optimal policy, yet estimating its cost requires a cubic number of scalar observations in the horizon at fixed accuracy and confidence. This gives a concrete distinction between identifying an action and measuring its consequences. The first target preserves both the inherited-stock condition and the full confidence factor; replacing inherited stock by an empty start would change the claim.

Five additional supporting statements isolate qualified recensoring, one-period truncation, cap closure, ERM regret transfer, and optimal-value stability. They are shared by later bounds. These five results and the value-polynomial derivative have passed local Lean checking in the pinned environment; their axiom audits show only propext, Classical.choice, and Quot.sound, with no sorryAx. This is local evidence, not server verification. A correct proof of the one-period truncation identity alone does not establish dynamic optimality, statistical coverage, or a minimax rate. Likewise a deterministic ERM inequality does not prove uniform convergence.

Difficulty

The information lower bounds quantify over data-dependent randomized procedures. Encoding only a fixed allocation or a deterministic output would lose part of the intended theorem. The full policy lower bound additionally permits adaptive sampling and randomized deployment, so it needs a different transcript model from the IID stationary valuation module. Censored upper bounds require conditional independence given the entire boundary array; ordinary predictability is insufficient. The 1/r1/r1/r factor counts all prescribed logs, including discarded observations.

Upper bounds depend on the horizon-normalized convergence result from Xie, Ma and Xin, now included in the companion draft VC Theory for Inventory Policies: Xie–Ma–Xin Bounds. The source cited here as Corollary 4 is Corollary 4.10 in that paper's v3; Theorem 4.9 is its inventory fat-shattering ingredient. The companion also retains stationary and (s,S) upper and lower bound families and Product ERM. Its Lemma 4.12 cyclic partition has a complete local Lean proof. Statistical convergence, two-sided and periodwise-cost extensions, high-probability product transfer, and the censoring reductions remain open proof obligations. Neither this draft nor its companion assumes those results have already been formally proved.

Formalization scope

The environment is Lean 4.33.1 with Mathlib revision 0df444a360eaa60ab8c11dca51a86af692955474. Draft theorem statements contain sorry because they are proof targets. Definition files contain no unproved assertions. Locally checked solution files must be distinguished from platform-verified proofs; a draft upload performs no server verification. Independent read-backs accompany the items so their quantifiers, domains, and total-function conventions can be reviewed directly.

The Bellman definition uses real infima. Proving nonemptiness and lower boundedness of the feasible objective set belongs to its optimality proof. Probability interpretations of finite sample weights apply only when ρ∈[0,1]\rho\in[0,1]ρ∈[0,1]; the hard-instance parameter bounds enforce an interior interval. The zero-sample case remains available to the testing theorem. No hypothesis assumes the desired lower bound, optimal-value formula, or derivative bound.

This is an editable initial draft, with the stationary valuation module and common algebraic foundations. It is not a certificate that all bounds in the paper have been formally proved, nor a launch-ready encoding of the complete bounds program.

Selected references

  • Hanzhang Qin, David Simchi-Levi and Ruihao Zhu, Information Limits of Multistage Inventory Control: Learning, Valuation, and Censoring, arXiv:2609.37380v1, 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.37380v1
  • Yaqi Xie, Will Ma and Linwei Xin, VC Theory for Inventory Policies, arXiv:2404.11509v3, 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.11509v3
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Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming 1: The Randomized Stochastic Gradient Method Has (1/L)E‖∇f(x_R)‖² ≤ (D_f² + σ²Σγ_k²)/Σ(2γ_k − Lγ_k²)Research Paper

Motivation

Stochastic gradient methods are the standard tool for minimizing an objective that can only be accessed through noisy gradient samples. Training a machine-learning model on sampled data, simulation-based optimization, and stochastic programs with endogenous uncertainty are all of this kind. In many of these applications the objective is nonconvex: the loss or the regularizer of a learning problem may be nonconvex, as may the expected cost of a simulation model.

Before 2013 the complexity theory of stochastic approximation (SA) was essentially a convex theory. Robbins and Monro (1951) introduced the method. Polyak and Juditsky (1992) and Nemirovski, Juditsky, Lan and Shapiro (2009) established optimal rates for convex problems, and Lan (2012) unified the smooth, nonsmooth and stochastic convex cases. None of these results covered nonconvex objectives. Ghadimi and Lan (2013) gave the first non-asymptotic complexity bound for a stochastic gradient method on a smooth nonconvex problem. The bound is stated for the expected squared gradient norm at a randomly chosen iterate, and it is the result this mission formalizes.

Setting

The problem is

f∗=inf⁡x∈Rnf(x),f^*=\inf_{x\in\mathbb R^n} f(x),f∗=x∈Rninf​f(x),

where f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf:Rn→R is differentiable and bounded below, and its gradient is LLL-Lipschitz: ∥∇f(y)−∇f(x)∥≤L∥y−x∥\|\nabla f(y)-\nabla f(x)\|\le L\|y-x\|∥∇f(y)−∇f(x)∥≤L∥y−x∥ for all x,yx,yx,y. This class is written CL1,1(Rn)\mathcal C^{1,1}_L(\mathbb R^n)CL1,1​(Rn). The function need not be convex.

The gradient is accessible only through a stochastic first-order oracle: at the kkk-th query point xkx_kxk​ it returns G(xk,ξk)G(x_k,\xi_k)G(xk​,ξk​), where ξ1,ξ2,…\xi_1,\xi_2,\dotsξ1​,ξ2​,… are random variables and GGG is a Borel function. Assumption A1 asks that for every k≥1k\ge1k≥1, conditionally on the past, G(xk,ξk)G(x_k,\xi_k)G(xk​,ξk​) is an unbiased estimate of ∇f(xk)\nabla f(x_k)∇f(xk​), and that its error δk=G(xk,ξk)−∇f(xk)\delta_k=G(x_k,\xi_k)-\nabla f(x_k)δk​=G(xk​,ξk​)−∇f(xk​) has second moment E∥δk∥2≤σ2\mathbb E\|\delta_k\|^2\le\sigma^2E∥δk​∥2≤σ2. The noise variables need not be independent of each other or of the iterates.

The randomized stochastic gradient (RSG) method takes an initial point x1x_1x1​, an iteration limit NNN, stepsizes γk\gamma_kγk​ and a probability mass function PRP_RPR​ on {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}. It draws a random index R∼PRR\sim P_RR∼PR​, runs

xk+1=xk−γk G(xk,ξk),k=1,…,R,x_{k+1}=x_k-\gamma_k\,G(x_k,\xi_k),\qquad k=1,\dots,R,xk+1​=xk​−γk​G(xk​,ξk​),k=1,…,R,

and outputs xRx_RxR​. The mass function used in the main theorem is

PR(k)=2γk−Lγk2∑j=1N(2γj−Lγj2),k=1,…,N.P_R(k)=\frac{2\gamma_k-L\gamma_k^2}{\sum_{j=1}^N(2\gamma_j-L\gamma_j^2)},\qquad k=1,\dots,N.PR​(k)=∑j=1N​(2γj​−Lγj2​)2γk​−Lγk2​​,k=1,…,N.

The constants are Df=[2(f(x1)−f∗)/L]1/2D_f=[2(f(x_1)-f^*)/L]^{1/2}Df​=[2(f(x1​)−f∗)/L]1/2 and, in the convex case with minimizer x∗x^*x∗, DX=∥x1−x∗∥D_X=\|x_1-x^*\|DX​=∥x1​−x∗∥.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 a)

If 0<γk<2/L0<\gamma_k<2/L0<γk​<2/L for k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N, N≥1N\ge1N≥1, and RRR has the mass function above, then under Assumption A1

1L E[∥∇f(xR)∥2]≤Df2+σ2∑k=1Nγk2∑k=1N(2γk−Lγk2),\frac1L\,\mathbb E\big[\|\nabla f(x_R)\|^2\big]\le\frac{D_f^2+\sigma^2\sum_{k=1}^N\gamma_k^2}{\sum_{k=1}^N(2\gamma_k-L\gamma_k^2)},L1​E[∥∇f(xR​)∥2]≤∑k=1N​(2γk​−Lγk2​)Df2​+σ2∑k=1N​γk2​​,

where the expectation is over RRR and the noise. Any stepsize sequence below 2/L2/L2/L is allowed, so the goal does not fix a step rule, and the step rules of the paper's corollaries follow from it.

Milestones

  1. The quadratic bound (1.6): ∣f(y)−f(x)−⟨∇f(x),y−x⟩∣≤L2∥y−x∥2|f(y)-f(x)-\langle\nabla f(x),y-x\rangle|\le\frac L2\|y-x\|^2∣f(y)−f(x)−⟨∇f(x),y−x⟩∣≤2L​∥y−x∥2 (already proved on the platform).
  2. The one-step inequality (2.8) and its pathwise sum (2.9).
  3. The conditional mean-zero property (2.10), E[⟨∇f(xk),δk⟩∣ξ[k−1]]=0\mathbb E[\langle\nabla f(x_k),\delta_k\rangle\mid\xi_{[k-1]}]=0E[⟨∇f(xk​),δk​⟩∣ξ[k−1]​]=0.
  4. The averaged bound (2.11), ∑k(γk−L2γk2) E∥∇f(xk)∥2≤f(x1)−f∗+Lσ22∑kγk2\sum_k(\gamma_k-\frac L2\gamma_k^2)\,\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_k)\|^2\le f(x_1)-f^*+\frac{L\sigma^2}{2}\sum_k\gamma_k^2∑k​(γk​−2L​γk2​)E∥∇f(xk​)∥2≤f(x1​)−f∗+2Lσ2​∑k​γk2​.
  5. The weighting identity: E∥∇f(xR)∥2\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_R)\|^2E∥∇f(xR​)∥2 equals the PRP_RPR​-weighted average of E∥∇f(xk)∥2\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_k)\|^2E∥∇f(xk​)∥2.
  6. For the convex companion: co-coercivity (1.8) (already proved on the platform) and its consequence (2.12), 1L∥∇f(y)∥2≤⟨∇f(y),y−x∗⟩\frac1L\|\nabla f(y)\|^2\le\langle\nabla f(y),y-x^*\rangleL1​∥∇f(y)∥2≤⟨∇f(y),y−x∗⟩ when ∇f(x∗)=0\nabla f(x^*)=0∇f(x∗)=0.

Companion statements

Theorem 2.1 b) bounds E[f(xR)−f∗]\mathbb E[f(x_R)-f^*]E[f(xR​)−f∗] by (DX2+σ2∑γk2)/∑(2γk−Lγk2)(D_X^2+\sigma^2\sum\gamma_k^2)/\sum(2\gamma_k-L\gamma_k^2)(DX2​+σ2∑γk2​)/∑(2γk​−Lγk2​) when fff is convex with a minimizer. Corollary 2.2 specializes both bounds to the stepsizes γk=min⁡{1/L,D~/(σN)}\gamma_k=\min\{1/L,\tilde D/(\sigma\sqrt N)\}γk​=min{1/L,D~/(σN​)}:

1L E∥∇f(xR)∥2≤LDf2N+(D~+Df2D~)σN,\frac1L\,\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_R)\|^2\le\frac{LD_f^2}{N}+\Big(\tilde D+\frac{D_f^2}{\tilde D}\Big)\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt N},L1​E∥∇f(xR​)∥2≤NLDf2​​+(D~+D~Df2​​)N​σ​,

and the analogous bound with DXD_XDX​ for E[f(xR)−f∗]\mathbb E[f(x_R)-f^*]E[f(xR​)−f∗] in the convex case.

Significance

Theorem 2.1 a) is the basic guarantee for stochastic gradient descent on smooth nonconvex objectives. With the stepsizes of Corollary 2.2 it shows that O(σ2/ϵ2)O(\sigma^2/\epsilon^2)O(σ2/ϵ2) oracle calls suffice to reach E∥∇f(xR)∥2≤ϵ\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_R)\|^2\le\epsilonE∥∇f(xR​)∥2≤ϵ. The paper builds two further methods on it: a two-phase variant with large-deviation guarantees, and a zeroth-order variant (RSGF) that uses Gaussian smoothing when only function values are available. Later analyses of variance-reduced and adaptive stochastic methods for nonconvex problems measure their improvements against this bound.

The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. A formalized fixed-step bound of the form "some iterate among the first KKK has small expected squared gradient" exists, but it is a different statement: it has no randomized output and no general stepsizes. A complete formalization would check the measure-theoretic content that the paper treats informally: integrability of the iterates' gradients, the conditional-expectation step under dependent noise, and the role of the independence of RRR.

Difficulty

The algebra of (2.8)–(2.9) is routine. The difficulty is in the probability. The noise may depend on the past, so the cross term ⟨∇f(xk),δk⟩\langle\nabla f(x_k),\delta_k\rangle⟨∇f(xk​),δk​⟩ vanishes only in conditional expectation, and only once xkx_kxk​ is known to be measurable with respect to the past. Its integrability is not assumed anywhere: ∇f(xk)\nabla f(x_k)∇f(xk​) must be shown to have a finite second moment from the recursion, the Lipschitz gradient and Assumption A1. The randomized output adds a second step, where E∥∇f(xR)∥2\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_R)\|^2E∥∇f(xR​)∥2 is rewritten as a weighted average. This needs RRR independent of the noise, and ∥∇f(xk)∥2\|\nabla f(x_k)\|^2∥∇f(xk​)∥2 has to be exhibited as a measurable function of the noise sequence. A proof that replaces xRx_RxR​ by the deterministic weighted average skips exactly this step.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). f∈CL1,1f\in\mathcal C^{1,1}_Lf∈CL1,1​ is the published predicate ConvexOptAlg.SmoothGD.IsBetaSmooth f g L, with the gradient given as a map ggg. f∗f^*f∗ is the greatest lower bound of the range of fff, not an arbitrary lower bound.
  • Indices are 1-based. The iterates satisfy x1x_1x1​ given and xk+1=xk−γkG(xk,ξk)x_{k+1}=x_k-\gamma_kG(x_k,\xi_k)xk+1​=xk​−γk​G(xk​,ξk​) for k≥1k\ge1k≥1, pointwise on the sample space. The noise takes values in a general measurable space.
  • Assumption A1 is stated along the trajectory and in conditional form, with respect to any filtration to which the noise is adapted. The paper's history filtration σ(ξ1,…,ξk)\sigma(\xi_1,\dots,\xi_k)σ(ξ1​,…,ξk​) is one admissible choice. Every conditional expectation and every integral in a hypothesis comes with an integrability clause. Every bounded expectation in a conclusion comes with an integrability conjunct.
  • The output index RRR is a measurable random variable with values in {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} and law PRP_RPR​. It is assumed independent of the whole noise sequence; the paper leaves this implicit (Step 0 draws RRR before any oracle call).
  • Added hypotheses, all implicit on the page: L>0L>0L>0; γk>0\gamma_k>0γk​>0; independence of RRR. In Corollary 2.2 the stepsize (2.13) is read as γk=1/L\gamma_k=1/Lγk​=1/L when σ=0\sigma=0σ=0, the paper's convention D~/0=+∞\tilde D/0=+\inftyD~/0=+∞, because Lean's D~/0=0\tilde D/0=0D~/0=0 would otherwise give γk=0\gamma_k=0γk​=0.
  • The goal concerns the integral of ∥∇f(xR(ω)(ω))∥2\|\nabla f(x_{R(\omega)}(\omega))\|^2∥∇f(xR(ω)​(ω))∥2 over the sample space. A statement about the weighted sum of E∥∇f(xk)∥2\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_k)\|^2E∥∇f(xk​)∥2 with RRR removed, or one that drops the integrability conjunct, would trivialize the randomized output and does not formalize the goal.
  • Infrastructure: measurability of the iterates as functions of the noise, the pull-out property of conditional expectation for inner products, and a second-moment induction along the recursion. These are reusable for the paper's two-phase and zeroth-order methods and for other stochastic-approximation analyses. Proofs of any milestone, or of the integrability lemmas on their own, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Ghadimi and G. Lan, Stochastic first- and zeroth-order methods for nonconvex stochastic programming, SIAM J. Optim. 23(4), 2341–2368, 2013. Preprint arXiv:1309.5549v1 (cited version). https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.5549
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, A stochastic approximation method, Ann. Math. Statist. 22(3), 400–407, 1951. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
  • B. T. Polyak and A. B. Juditsky, Acceleration of stochastic approximation by averaging, SIAM J. Control Optim. 30(4), 838–855, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1137/0330046
  • A. Nemirovski, A. Juditsky, G. Lan and A. Shapiro, Robust stochastic approximation approach to stochastic programming, SIAM J. Optim. 19(4), 1574–1609, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/070704277
  • G. Lan, An optimal method for stochastic composite optimization, Math. Program. 133, 365–397, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-010-0434-y
  • Y. Nesterov, Introductory Lectures on Convex Optimization: A Basic Course, Kluwer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8853-9
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A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness III: With Additive Valuations, Donating the Pool to an Unenvied Agent Yields a 4/7-Groupwise-Maximin-Share AllocationResearch Paper

Motivation

When indivisible goods are shared among people, comparing each person's bundle with another person's bundle is only one way to judge fairness. A second test asks whether a group could repartition the goods it collectively received so that one of its members would reliably obtain more. Groupwise maximin share (GMMS) makes this test for every subgroup. It strengthens the ordinary maximin-share benchmark, which tests only the grand coalition and all goods. Chaudhury, Kavitha, Mehlhorn and Sgouritsa use this distinction to study a complete allocation obtained from their almost envy-free allocation: goods initially left unassigned are given to one unenvied agent. Their Theorem 16 proves that the resulting allocation gives every agent at least four sevenths of her groupwise maximin share under additive valuations. Chaudhury et al., pp. 4–5, 15–16.

The paper first constructs a partial EFX allocation whose unallocated goods have bounded value to every agent. Its Section 3 then assumes additive valuations and derives maximin-share and GMMS guarantees. This mission addresses the GMMS consequence of that construction. The existence of the starting allocation is the subject of the first mission in this series; the present theorem specifies what happens when its pool is donated. Chaudhury et al., Theorems 8 and 16.

Setting

Let NNN be a finite set of agents and MMM a finite set of indivisible goods. Each agent iii has a valuation vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) for a bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M. Here valuations are nonnegative and additive: vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) is the sum of the values of the individual goods in SSS. A partial allocation X=(Xi)i∈NX=(X_i)_{i\in N}X=(Xi​)i∈N​ gives pairwise disjoint bundles to the agents. The remaining goods form its pool, P=M∖⋃i∈NXiP=M\setminus\bigcup_{i\in N}X_iP=M∖⋃i∈N​Xi​. An allocation is complete when its pool is empty. These are the paper's allocation conventions. Chaudhury et al., pp. 3–4.

An allocation is envy-free up to any good (EFX) if, after any single good ggg is removed from agent jjj's bundle, agent iii values that remainder no more than her own bundle: vi(Xj∖{g})≤vi(Xi)v_i(X_j\setminus\{g\})\le v_i(X_i)vi​(Xj​∖{g})≤vi​(Xi​) for all i,ji,ji,j and g∈Xjg\in X_jg∈Xj​. The envy graph has a directed edge i→ji\to ji→j when iii values jjj's bundle more than her own. A source is a vertex with no incoming edge, so nobody envies that agent. Chaudhury et al., pp. 3, 8.

For a set SSS and a positive number kkk of parts, MMS⁡i(k,S)\operatorname{MMS}_i(k,S)MMSi​(k,S) is the largest worst-part value agent iii can secure by partitioning SSS into kkk bundles. A complete allocation YYY is α\alphaα-GMMS when each agent meets an α\alphaα fraction of this benchmark for every subgroup containing her:

vi(Yi)≥αMMS⁡i ⁣(∣N′∣,⋃j∈N′Yj)(N′⊆N, i∈N′).v_i(Y_i)\ge\alpha\operatorname{MMS}_i\!\left(|N'|,\bigcup_{j\in N'}Y_j\right) \qquad(N'\subseteq N,\ i\in N').vi​(Yi​)≥αMMSi​​∣N′∣,j∈N′⋃​Yj​​(N′⊆N, i∈N′).

The benchmark uses only goods allocated to that subgroup. The paper states it both as a complete-allocation property in its introduction and in Definition 15. Chaudhury et al., pp. 5, 15.

Formalization targets

The donated allocation

Assume XXX is partial and EFX, every agent satisfies vi(P)≤vi(Xi)v_i(P)\le v_i(X_i)vi​(P)≤vi​(Xi​), and sss is a source of its envy graph. Define Ys=Xs∪PY_s=X_s\cup PYs​=Xs​∪P and Yj=XjY_j=X_jYj​=Xj​ for j≠sj\ne sj=s. The goal states that YYY is complete, that donation does not lower any agent's own value, and that

vi(Yi)≥47MMS⁡i ⁣(∣N′∣,⋃j∈N′Yj)(N′⊆N, i∈N′).v_i(Y_i)\ge\frac47\operatorname{MMS}_i\!\left(|N'|,\bigcup_{j\in N'}Y_j\right) \qquad(N'\subseteq N,\ i\in N').vi​(Yi​)≥74​MMSi​​∣N′∣,j∈N′⋃​Yj​​(N′⊆N, i∈N′).

This is the GMMS bullet of Theorem 16 applied to the particular allocation the authors define immediately before it. The paper obtains a suitable XXX from Lemma 12, which has the relevant properties of Theorem 8. Chaudhury et al., pp. 11–12, 14–16.

Intermediate results

The milestones are Proposition 13, the reduction step in Theorem 16's proof, and all three parts of Lemma 17. Proposition 13 compares maximin shares after deleting agents and at most as many goods. Lemma 17 bounds the value of each bad good, the donated bundle, and the other good bundles. They retain the constants 222 and 3/23/23/2 used in the paper. Chaudhury et al., pp. 14, 16–17.

Significance

The result turns an almost envy-free partial allocation into a complete allocation with a guarantee for every coalition. A plain maximin-share statement would only compare each agent with a partition of all goods among all agents; here every subgroup and its allocated goods count. The distinction matters even when an ordinary maximin-share bound is easy to meet because there are fewer goods than agents. Chaudhury et al., p. 5.

The paper proves Theorem 16 mathematically. The remaining work for this mission is a machine-checked proof of its stated GMMS consequence and its supporting results. Its definitions of partial allocation, pool, finite maximin share and groupwise guarantee can also serve later formalizations of fair division. The Nash-social-welfare half-guarantee in the printed theorem depends on the starting allocation from Lemma 12; this mission records only the value preservation under donation. Chaudhury et al., pp. 14, 16.

Difficulty

Giving all leftover goods to one agent makes the allocation complete, but it can change how another agent values that enlarged bundle and how a subgroup's benchmark is calculated. EFX alone compares bundles after deleting one good; GMMS compares an agent with every repartition of a subgroup's goods. The difficulty is to control those repartitions while keeping the exact 4/74/74/7 constant. Merely applying an ordinary maximin-share bound to the grand coalition does not establish the required subgroup inequalities. Chaudhury et al., pp. 15–17.

Formalization scope

Agents and goods are represented by Fin n and Fin m; Lean numbers agents from zero, and the paper's “agent 1” is an explicit source sss. Bundles are finite sets. Valuations are real-valued but include nonnegativity alongside additivity, representing the paper's codomain R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​. The pool is computed from XXX, and the donated allocation is a function of XXX and sss. No independent pool or arbitrary completed allocation is allowed. Completeness is a conclusion. The maximin share is a finite maximum of finite minima over labelled partitions, which may have empty parts. Every use has a positive part count; in the GMMS definition this follows from i∈N′i\in N'i∈N′. Cardinality is converted to real numbers before fractions are formed. These choices exclude zero-part maximin shares and integer division. Chaudhury et al., pp. 3–5, 15–16.

The theorem is conditional on the EFX and pool-value properties of the source allocation, rather than repeating its existence proof. It states the conclusion for every such allocation and every source. The paper's half-optimal-Nash-social-welfare bullet is outside this mission because it invokes the separate black-box starting allocation of Lemma 12. Contributions toward finite-partition comparisons, EFX value bounds, and the groupwise estimate are welcome. Chaudhury et al., pp. 14–17.

Selected references

  • B. R. Chaudhury, T. Kavitha, K. Mehlhorn and A. Sgouritsa, A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2021. Formalization source: arXiv:1907.04596v3.
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A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness II: With Additive Valuations Such an Allocation Gives Every Agent Her Maximin Share Divided by 2 − |P|/nResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods

A set of nnn agents must share a set MMM of mmm indivisible goods, each agent valuing bundles of goods by her own valuation. Two fairness notions dominate the literature. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), introduced by Caragiannis, Kurokawa, Moulin, Procaccia, Shah and Wang (EC 2016), asks that no agent prefer another's bundle once any single good is removed from it. The maximin share (MMS), proposed by Budish (JPE 2011), asks that every agent receive at least what she could secure by splitting the goods into nnn bundles herself and taking the worst one.

Neither notion is known to be achievable in full. Whether complete EFX allocations always exist is open in general. Complete MMS allocations need not exist: Procaccia and Wang (EC 2014) gave a counterexample with three agents, and the best known approximation factors for additive valuations are 3/4−ε3/4-\varepsilon3/4−ε (Ghodsi et al., EC 2018) and 3/43/43/4 (Garg and Taki, arXiv:1903.00029). Amanatidis, Birmpas and Markakis (IJCAI 2018) showed that every complete EFX allocation is a 4/74/74/7-MMS allocation.

Caragiannis, Gravin and Huang (EC 2019) showed that EFX can be achieved if some goods are left unallocated, with no bound on how many. Chaudhury, Kavitha, Mehlhorn and Sgouritsa (arXiv:1907.04596, SODA 2020, SIAM J. Comput. 2021) relax completeness instead: some goods may be "donated to charity". Their Theorem 8 produces an EFX partial allocation in which nobody envies the donated set and the donated set has fewer goods than there are unenvied agents. This mission formalizes their Theorem 14: such an allocation also gives every agent a maximin-share guarantee that improves as more goods are donated.

Setting

Agents are N=[n]N=[n]N=[n] and goods are MMM, ∣M∣=m|M|=m∣M∣=m. Agent iii has a valuation vi:2M→R≥0v_i:2^M\to\mathbb{R}_{\ge 0}vi​:2M→R≥0​, assumed additive: vi(S)=∑g∈Svi({g})v_i(S)=\sum_{g\in S}v_i(\{g\})vi​(S)=∑g∈S​vi​({g}) for every S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M.

A (partial) allocation X=⟨X1,…,Xn⟩X=\langle X_1,\dots,X_n\rangleX=⟨X1​,…,Xn​⟩ gives agent iii the bundle Xi⊆MX_i\subseteq MXi​⊆M, the bundles being pairwise disjoint. The pool of unallocated goods is P=M∖⋃iXiP=M\setminus\bigcup_i X_iP=M∖⋃i​Xi​, and k=∣P∣k=|P|k=∣P∣.

  • XXX is EFX if vi(Xi)≥vi(Xj∖{g})v_i(X_i)\ge v_i(X_j\setminus\{g\})vi​(Xi​)≥vi​(Xj​∖{g}) for all agents i,ji,ji,j and every g∈Xjg\in X_jg∈Xj​.
  • The envy graph GXG_XGX​ has the agents as vertices and an edge i→ji\to ji→j exactly when vi(Xi)<vi(Xj)v_i(X_i)<v_i(X_j)vi​(Xi​)<vi​(Xj​). A source is a vertex of indegree zero: an agent nobody envies.
  • The maximin share of agent iii over k′≥1k'\ge1k′≥1 bundles of a set SSS of goods is
MMSi(k′,S)=max⁡(S1,…,Sk′) min⁡1≤j≤k′vi(Sj),\mathrm{MMS}_i(k',S)=\max_{(S_1,\dots,S_{k'})}\ \min_{1\le j\le k'} v_i(S_j),MMSi​(k′,S)=(S1​,…,Sk′​)max​ 1≤j≤k′min​vi​(Sj​),

the maximum over partitions of SSS into k′k'k′ possibly empty bundles. Agent iii's maximin share in the instance is MMSi(n,M)\mathrm{MMS}_i(n,M)MMSi​(n,M).

The three conditions of Theorem 8 on (X,P)(X,P)(X,P) are:

  1. XXX is EFX;
  2. vi(Xi)≥vi(P)v_i(X_i)\ge v_i(P)vi​(Xi​)≥vi​(P) for every agent iii;
  3. ∣P∣|P|∣P∣ is less than the number of sources of GXG_XGX​; in particular ∣P∣<n|P|<n∣P∣<n.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14 (MMS bullet)

For every allocation XXX with pool PPP satisfying conditions 1–3, and every agent iii,

vi(Xi) ≥ MMSi(n,M)2−kn,k=∣P∣.v_i(X_i)\ \ge\ \frac{\mathrm{MMS}_i(n,M)}{2-\frac{k}{n}},\qquad k=|P|.vi​(Xi​) ≥ 2−nk​MMSi​(n,M)​,k=∣P∣.

The factor ranges from 12\tfrac1221​ when P=∅P=\emptysetP=∅ to (1+1n)−1(1+\tfrac1n)^{-1}(1+n1​)−1 when ∣P∣=n−1|P|=n-1∣P∣=n−1.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 13 (quoted by the paper from Garg, McGlaughlin and Taki, SOSA 2019): for N′⊆NN'\subseteq NN′⊆N and M′⊆MM'\subseteq MM′⊆M with ∣N∖N′∣≥∣M∖M′∣|N\setminus N'|\ge|M\setminus M'|∣N∖N′∣≥∣M∖M′∣ and i∈N′i\in N'i∈N′,
MMSi(∣N′∣,M′) ≥ MMSi(∣N∣,M).\mathrm{MMS}_i(|N'|,M')\ \ge\ \mathrm{MMS}_i(|N|,M).MMSi​(∣N′∣,M′) ≥ MMSi​(∣N∣,M).
  1. MMS is at most the proportional share: MMSi(k′,S)≤vi(S)/k′\mathrm{MMS}_i(k',S)\le v_i(S)/k'MMSi​(k′,S)≤vi​(S)/k′ for additive valuations and k′≥1k'\ge1k′≥1.
  2. The EFX half-bound: if XXX is EFX and ∣Xj∣≥2|X_j|\ge2∣Xj​∣≥2, then vi(Xi)≥(1−1/∣Xj∣) vi(Xj)≥12vi(Xj)v_i(X_i)\ge(1-1/|X_j|)\,v_i(X_j)\ge\tfrac12 v_i(X_j)vi​(Xi​)≥(1−1/∣Xj​∣)vi​(Xj​)≥21​vi​(Xj​).
  3. The counting step (summing inequalities (1)–(3) of the proof): with N′N'N′ the sources of GXG_XGX​, agent iii and all agents holding at least two goods, n′=∣N′∣n'=|N'|n′=∣N′∣ and M′=⋃j∈N′XjM'=\bigcup_{j\in N'}X_jM′=⋃j∈N′​Xj​,
(2n′−k) vi(Xi) ≥ vi(M′∪P).(2n'-k)\,v_i(X_i)\ \ge\ v_i(M'\cup P).(2n′−k)vi​(Xi​) ≥ vi​(M′∪P).

Significance

Theorem 14 shows that leaving goods unallocated is not merely a cost: under conditions 1–3, each donated good buys a quantitative improvement of every agent's maximin-share guarantee, interpolating between the factor 12\tfrac1221​ the bound gives when the pool is empty and a factor tending to 111 when nearly nnn goods are donated. Together with Theorem 8 it shows that a single allocation can be simultaneously EFX, envy-free towards the charity, small in its charity, and approximately MMS. The same reduction (Proposition 13 applied to a carefully chosen sub-instance) is the template for the paper's 4/74/74/7-groupwise-maximin-share result, Theorem 16, formalized in mission III of this series.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it, of Proposition 13, or of the existence of EFX allocations with bounded charity is known to exist. The mission produces a formal maximin-share definition on arbitrary subsets of goods with an arbitrary number of bundles, a formal proof of the monotonicity of the maximin share under removal of agents and goods (Proposition 13, which the paper quotes without proof), and the guarantee itself. Combined with mission I of this series (Theorem 8), it yields the printed existence statement.

Difficulty

The guarantee compares an agent's own bundle with a benchmark defined over all partitions of all goods, while EFX and the source condition speak only about the allocation at hand. The obvious attempt, summing vi(Xi)≥12vi(Xj)v_i(X_i)\ge\tfrac12 v_i(X_j)vi​(Xi​)≥21​vi​(Xj​) over all agents and adding the pool, gives only a factor near 12\tfrac1221​ and ignores the pool's size. Agents holding a single good are the obstruction: EFX gives no bound on the value of their bundles relative to vi(Xi)v_i(X_i)vi​(Xi​), and the benchmark MMSi(n,M)\mathrm{MMS}_i(n,M)MMSi​(n,M) is defined on the full instance, which contains them. Proposition 13, the comparison of maximin shares across instances, is a combinatorial statement about all partitions of the original instance and requires nonnegativity of the valuations: with a good of negative value it fails.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n (0-based) and goods Fin m; the set MMM is the whole of Fin m. Valuations are functions Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ; additivity is the sum formula together with nonnegativity, which is the paper's codomain R≥0\mathbb{R}_{\ge0}R≥0​. An allocation is a family of pairwise disjoint finsets and the pool is always computed as the complement of their union, never taken as a free parameter. Sources are agents of indegree zero in the envy graph (nobody envies them), not agents who envy nobody. The maximin share MMS(k′,S)\mathrm{MMS}(k',S)MMS(k′,S) is a supremum over labellings Fin m → Fin k' restricted to SSS of the minimum bundle value; it is used only with k′≥1k'\ge1k′≥1, which every statement has in its hypotheses or derives from them (in the goal, condition 3 forces n≥1n\ge1n≥1). Every cardinality is cast to R\mathbb{R}R before division or subtraction, and 2−k/n>12-k/n>12−k/n>1 under condition 3, so no division by zero occurs.

The goal is posed as an implication for every allocation satisfying conditions 1–3, rather than as the paper's "there exists an allocation"; the paper's proof of the MMS bullet uses only those three conditions, and existence is Theorem 8. The Nash-social-welfare bullet of Theorem 14 is not posed: it depends on Lemma 12, which takes the allocation of an earlier paper as a black box. The goal cannot be trivialized by a free pool, by overlapping bundles, by zero agents (condition 3 excludes them), by a junk maximin share over zero bundles, or by natural-number division; the statement keeps all three conditions, each of which is needed.

Contributions welcome: a library-quality maximin-share API for additive valuations (attainment of the maximum, monotonicity, the proportional bound), which is reusable for other MMS results; proofs of the milestones; and the final assembly.

Selected references

  • B. R. Chaudhury, T. Kavitha, K. Mehlhorn, A. Sgouritsa, A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness, SIAM J. Comput. 50(4), 2021; cited from arXiv:1907.04596v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04596
  • E. Budish, The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes, J. Political Economy 119(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1086/664613
  • I. Caragiannis, D. Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. D. Procaccia, N. Shah, J. Wang, The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare, EC 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940726
  • A. D. Procaccia, J. Wang, Fair Enough: Guaranteeing Approximate Maximin Shares, EC 2014. https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602835
  • M. Ghodsi, M. HajiAghayi, M. Seddighin, S. Seddighin, H. Yami, Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvements and Generalizations, EC 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219238
  • J. Garg, S. Taki, An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Maximin Shares, CoRR abs/1903.00029, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.00029
  • J. Garg, P. McGlaughlin, S. Taki, Approximating Maximin Share Allocations, SOSA 2019. https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.SOSA.2019.20
  • I. Caragiannis, N. Gravin, X. Huang, Envy-Freeness up to Any Item with High Nash Welfare: The Virtue of Donating Items, EC 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329574
  • G. Amanatidis, G. Birmpas, E. Markakis, Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness, IJCAI 2018. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/7
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Linear algebraNumerical AnalysisQuantum Information·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Algorithm for Systems of Linear Equations with Exponentially Improved Dependence on Precision I: A Truncated Odd Chebyshev Series Is 2ε-Close to 1/x on [−1, −1/κ] ∪ [1/κ, 1]Research Paper

Motivation

The quantum linear systems problem asks, given a sparse Hermitian N×NN \times NN×N matrix AAA with condition number κ\kappaκ and a procedure preparing a state ∣b⟩|b\rangle∣b⟩, to prepare a state close to A−1∣b⟩/∥A−1∣b⟩∥A^{-1}|b\rangle / \|A^{-1}|b\rangle\|A−1∣b⟩/∥A−1∣b⟩∥. Harrow, Hassidim and Lloyd (2009) gave a quantum algorithm whose running time is polynomial in log⁡N\log NlogN and κ\kappaκ but grows like 1/ε1/\varepsilon1/ε in the target precision ε\varepsilonε, because it estimates eigenvalues by phase estimation. Childs, Kothari and Somma (arXiv:1511.02306, SIAM J. Comput. 46(6), 2017) reduced the precision dependence to polylog⁡(1/ε)\mathrm{poly}\log(1/\varepsilon)polylog(1/ε), an exponential improvement.

The reduction has two parts. A quantum part implements a linear combination of unitaries applied to AAA, and turns any function that is ε\varepsilonε-close to 1/x1/x1/x on the spectrum of AAA into an approximate preparation of the solution state (Corollary 10 and Proposition 9 of the paper). An analytic part supplies such a function with small degree and small coefficient weight. The paper gives two analytic constructions: a Fourier expansion (Section 3) and an expansion in Chebyshev polynomials (Section 4). This mission formalizes the analytic core of the Chebyshev construction, the input to the paper's Theorem 4. The quantum algorithms and their query and gate counts are not formalized here.

Setting

For a real number κ≥1\kappa \ge 1κ≥1 (a condition number: the ratio of the largest to the smallest singular value), the domain is

Dκ:=[−1,−1/κ]∪[1/κ,1].D_\kappa := [-1, -1/\kappa] \cup [1/\kappa, 1].Dκ​:=[−1,−1/κ]∪[1/κ,1].

A function ggg is ε\varepsilonε-close to hhh on a set D⊆RD \subseteq \mathbb RD⊆R if ∣g(x)−h(x)∣≤ε|g(x) - h(x)| \le \varepsilon∣g(x)−h(x)∣≤ε for all x∈Dx \in Dx∈D.

The Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind are T0(x)=1\mathcal T_0(x) = 1T0​(x)=1, T1(x)=x\mathcal T_1(x) = xT1​(x)=x and Tn+1(x)=2xTn(x)−Tn−1(x)\mathcal T_{n+1}(x) = 2x\mathcal T_n(x) - \mathcal T_{n-1}(x)Tn+1​(x)=2xTn​(x)−Tn−1​(x); those of the second kind Un\mathcal U_nUn​ satisfy the same recursion with U0=1\mathcal U_0 = 1U0​=1, U1=2x\mathcal U_1 = 2xU1​=2x.

For natural numbers b,jb, jb,j let

cb,j:=122b∑i=j+1b(2bb+i),c_{b,j} := \frac{1}{2^{2b}} \sum_{i=j+1}^{b} \binom{2b}{b+i},cb,j​:=22b1​i=j+1∑b​(b+i2b​),

the probability of more than b+jb+jb+j heads in 2b2b2b fair coin flips. The tamed inverse (74) is fb(x)=(1−(1−x2)b)/xf_b(x) = (1 - (1-x^2)^b)/xfb​(x)=(1−(1−x2)b)/x, and the odd Chebyshev series is

Sb,n(x):=4∑j=0n−1(−1)jcb,j T2j+1(x).S_{b,n}(x) := 4 \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} (-1)^j c_{b,j}\, \mathcal T_{2j+1}(x).Sb,n​(x):=4j=0∑n−1​(−1)jcb,j​T2j+1​(x).

In Lean these are Dκ, coeff b j, fTamed b, and chebSum b n in the namespace QuantumLinSys.Chebyshev; bOf κ ε and j0Of b ε are the parameters bbb and j0j_0j0​ below.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 14 (p. 16)

With b=κ2log⁡(κ/ε)b = \kappa^2 \log(\kappa/\varepsilon)b=κ2log(κ/ε) and j0=blog⁡(4b/ε)j_0 = \sqrt{b\log(4b/\varepsilon)}j0​=blog(4b/ε)​, the truncated series

g(x)=4∑j=0j0(−1)jcb,j T2j+1(x)g(x) = 4\sum_{j=0}^{j_0} (-1)^j c_{b,j}\, \mathcal T_{2j+1}(x)g(x)=4j=0∑j0​​(−1)jcb,j​T2j+1​(x)

is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-close to 1/x1/x1/x on DκD_\kappaDκ​, for every κ≥1\kappa \ge 1κ≥1 and ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Lemma 17 (p. 19). For integers d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 and b≥(κd)2log⁡(κd/ε)b \ge (\kappa d)^2\log(\kappa d/\varepsilon)b≥(κd)2log(κd/ε), fbf_bfb​ is ε\varepsilonε-close to 1/x1/x1/x on DκdD_{\kappa d}Dκd​.
  2. Lemma 18 (p. 19). On [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1], fb=Sb,bf_b = S_{b,b}fb​=Sb,b​ exactly:
1−(1−x2)bx=4∑j=0b−1(−1)jcb,j T2j+1(x).\frac{1-(1-x^2)^b}{x} = 4\sum_{j=0}^{b-1}(-1)^j c_{b,j}\,\mathcal T_{2j+1}(x).x1−(1−x2)b​=4j=0∑b−1​(−1)jcb,j​T2j+1​(x).
  1. Display (89) (p. 21). cb,j≤e−j2/bc_{b,j} \le e^{-j^2/b}cb,j​≤e−j2/b.
  2. Lemma 19 (p. 21). The series truncated at j0=blog⁡(4b/ε)j_0 = \sqrt{b\log(4b/\varepsilon)}j0​=blog(4b/ε)​ is ε\varepsilonε-close to fbf_bfb​ on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1].

Two further statements of the same approach are included as companion theorems: Lemma 16 (p. 17), the closed form of the nnn-th power of the 2×22\times 22×2 rotation block in terms of Tn\mathcal T_nTn​ and Un−1\mathcal U_{n-1}Un−1​, and Proposition 9 (p. 9), the 4ε4\varepsilon4ε perturbation bound for normalized states.

Significance

Lemma 14 provides a polynomial of degree O(κlog⁡(κ/ε))O(\kappa\log(\kappa/\varepsilon))O(κlog(κ/ε)) whose Chebyshev coefficients have total weight O(blog⁡(b/ε))O(\sqrt{b\log(b/\varepsilon)})O(blog(b/ε)​), approximating 1/x1/x1/x uniformly on the region where a well-conditioned matrix has its eigenvalues. Applied to a Hermitian matrix through a quantum walk, whose powers implement Tn\mathcal T_nTn​ (Lemma 16), it gives the query complexity O(dκ2log⁡2(dκ/ε))O(d\kappa^2\log^2(d\kappa/\varepsilon))O(dκ2log2(dκ/ε)) of Theorem 4. The same polynomial approximation of 1/x1/x1/x reappears in later work on quantum singular value transformation and matrix inversion.

All results of this mission are proved in the paper. None of them is machine-checked in Mathlib or on the platform, as far as a search found: Mathlib has the Chebyshev polynomials and the identity Tn(cos⁡θ)=cos⁡nθ\mathcal T_n(\cos\theta) = \cos n\thetaTn​(cosθ)=cosnθ, but no Chebyshev expansion of a rational function, no binomial tail bound in this form, and no approximation theorem for 1/x1/x1/x. The formalization produces a checked uniform approximation of 1/x1/x1/x with explicit, non-asymptotic parameters.

Difficulty

The exact identity (Lemma 18) has no slack: every coefficient, sign and summation bound of (77) must be right for all bbb, and an off-by-one in the inner sum or in the Chebyshev index makes it false. Mathlib's Chebyshev library offers evaluation facts but no expansion of a given polynomial in the Chebyshev basis. The bound (89) is a Chernoff–Hoeffding tail bound for a symmetric binomial distribution, which must be stated for sums of binomial coefficients rather than for random variables. The goal then needs both approximation errors at the page's specific parameters, including the corner cases in which log⁡(κ/ε)\log(\kappa/\varepsilon)log(κ/ε) or log⁡(4b/ε)\log(4b/\varepsilon)log(4b/ε) is negative.

Formalization scope

All functions are real functions of one real variable. Chebyshev polynomials are Mathlib's Polynomial.Chebyshev.T ℝ and Polynomial.Chebyshev.U ℝ, indexed by integers. The sum ∑j=0n−1\sum_{j=0}^{n-1}∑j=0n−1​ is over Finset.range n, so the series of (55)/(88) truncated at j0j_0j0​ is chebSum b (j₀ + 1) and the full series (77) is chebSum b b.

The formalization commits to the following conventions, each disclosed in the item it affects.

  • κ≥1\kappa \ge 1κ≥1 on every statement that mentions DκD_\kappaDκ​, and d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 in Lemma 17. Below these values the domain is empty or contains 000.
  • ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0. No upper bound on ε\varepsilonε is imposed in this mission.
  • The paper's real b=κ2log⁡(κ/ε)b = \kappa^2\log(\kappa/\varepsilon)b=κ2log(κ/ε) is rounded up to a natural number in the goal, and the truncation index j0j_0j0​ is rounded down, the sum running over j=0,…,⌊j0⌋j = 0,\dots,\lfloor j_0\rfloorj=0,…,⌊j0​⌋.
  • In Lemmas 17–19 bbb is a natural number. The page's "integer" exponent cannot be negative without making (1−x2)b(1-x^2)^b(1−x2)b singular.
  • At x=0x = 0x=0, fb(0)f_b(0)fb​(0) is Lean's 0/0=00/0 = 00/0=0, which is the value of its continuous extension. Lemma 18 is therefore stated on all of [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1].
  • Proposition 9 is stated for continuous linear operators on CN\mathbb C^NCN, with ∥C−1∥≤1\|C^{-1}\| \le 1∥C−1∥≤1 given as a two-sided inverse of norm at most 111, and for unit vectors ψ\psiψ.

A trivializing reading is ruled out: the goal fixes the page's bbb, j0j_0j0​ and constant 2ε2\varepsilon2ε, so neither an arbitrarily large truncation nor a weaker constant satisfies it, and the domain DκD_\kappaDκ​ excludes the origin, where Lean's 1/0=01/0 = 01/0=0 would make closeness to 1/x1/x1/x meaningless.

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: Chebyshev expansions of polynomials on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1], binomial tail bounds, and uniform approximation of 1/x1/x1/x. Contributions of general lemmas of this kind are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. M. Childs, R. Kothari and R. D. Somma, Quantum algorithm for systems of linear equations with exponentially improved dependence on precision, SIAM J. Comput. 46(6), 2017; arXiv:1511.02306v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.02306
  • A. W. Harrow, A. Hassidim and S. Lloyd, Quantum algorithm for linear systems of equations, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 150502, 2009. https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3171
  • D. W. Berry, A. M. Childs and R. Kothari, Hamiltonian simulation with nearly optimal dependence on all parameters, FOCS 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.01715
  • W. Hoeffding, Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 58, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A game-theoretic approach to computation offloading in mobile cloud computing III: Variational Solutions Are the Nash Equilibria of the Extended Cloudlet-Pricing GameResearch Paper

Why a cloudlet price matters

Mobile devices can divide work between local execution, a nearby shared cloudlet, and a remote cloud. A cloudlet has limited capacity, so one user's choice changes the delay faced by the others. Cardellini and coauthors model this as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem, in which each user's feasible choices depend on the aggregate cloudlet load. The shared utilization cap makes a direct distributed solution awkward: a user must know how much capacity all other users consume before choosing a feasible deviation. The paper therefore introduces an additional player who sets a cloudlet price. This mission formalizes the relationship between the original coupled game and that extended, ordinary Nash game Cardellini et al., accepted manuscript, pp. 10–16.

The offloading game

There are NNN users and nnn cloudlet servers. User uuu chooses fractions xu,mx_{u,m}xu,m​, xu,cletx_{u,\mathrm{clet}}xu,clet​, and xu,cloudx_{u,\mathrm{cloud}}xu,cloud​ for local, cloudlet, and remote-cloud execution. These fractions are nonnegative and sum to one. At most a fraction χ\chiχ can be offloaded, and a user-specific linear power constraint applies. The set K~u\widetilde K_uKu​ contains these private feasible choices. The cloudlet load and the shared feasible set are

L(x)=1n∑u=1Nδuxu,clet,Ω={x:L(x)≤Umax⁡},K=(∏u=1NK~u)∩Ω.L(x)=\frac1n\sum_{u=1}^{N}\delta_u x_{u,\mathrm{clet}},\qquad \Omega=\{x:L(x)\le U_{\max}\},\qquad K=\left(\prod_{u=1}^{N}\widetilde K_u\right)\cap\Omega.L(x)=n1​u=1∑N​δu​xu,clet​,Ω={x:L(x)≤Umax​},K=(u=1∏N​Ku​)∩Ω.

Each user's cost λuRu\lambda_u R_uλu​Ru​ is the response-time expression on p. 10, with coefficients αu,βu,γu,δu\alpha_u,\beta_u,\gamma_u,\delta_uαu​,βu​,γu​,δu​. The VI map FFF is the stack of the user's partial gradients, written in closed form on p. 11. A variational solution xˉ\bar xxˉ belongs to KKK and satisfies ⟨F(xˉ),x−xˉ⟩≥0\langle F(\bar x),x-\bar x\rangle\ge0⟨F(xˉ),x−xˉ⟩≥0 for every x∈Kx\in Kx∈K. The pairing sums all three coordinates for each user. Section 5 assumes 0<Umax⁡<10<U_{\max}<10<Umax​<1 and 0<αu,δu<10<\alpha_u,\delta_u<10<αu​,δu​<1 for every user; the model also has n>0n>0n>0 and 0<χ≤10<\chi\le10<χ≤1 Cardellini et al., pp. 7, 9–11.

The extended game replaces the joint cap in each user's feasible set by a price. User uuu minimizes λuRu(x)+ρ(δu/n)xu,clet\lambda_uR_u(x)+\rho(\delta_u/n)x_{u,\mathrm{clet}}λu​Ru​(x)+ρ(δu​/n)xu,clet​ over K~u\widetilde K_uKu​. A cloudlet manager chooses ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0 to maximize ρ(L(x)−Umax⁡)\rho(L(x)-U_{\max})ρ(L(x)−Umax​). The manager's choice is part of the Nash equilibrium condition, not a preimposed complementary-slackness equation. The extended game's VI set is Ke=(∏uK~u)×R+K_e=(\prod_u\widetilde K_u)\times\mathbb R_+Ke​=(∏u​Ku​)×R+​ and its map is Fe(x,ρ)=(F(x)+price⁡(ρ),Umax⁡−L(x))F_e(x,\rho)=(F(x)+\operatorname{price}(\rho),U_{\max}-L(x))Fe​(x,ρ)=(F(x)+price(ρ),Umax​−L(x)) Cardellini et al., p. 15.

Formalization targets

The goal is the two-part assertion of Theorem 2. Under the standing assumptions and a strict load bound on the full product of private feasible sets, its equilibrium characterization is

xˉ∈SOL⁡(K,F)⟺∃ρˉ,  (xˉ,ρˉ)∈NE⁡ext.\bar x\in\operatorname{SOL}(K,F) \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \exists\bar\rho,\; (\bar x,\bar\rho)\in\operatorname{NE}_{\mathrm{ext}}.xˉ∈SOL(K,F)⟺∃ρˉ​,(xˉ,ρˉ​)∈NEext​.

The same goal states that monotonicity of FFF on ∏uK~u\prod_u\widetilde K_u∏u​Ku​ implies monotonicity of FeF_eFe​ on KeK_eKe​. The three milestones follow the paper's path: the extended Nash game is equivalent to its VI; the shared affine constraint has a scalar multiplier at a VI solution; and the price-load coupling cancels in the monotonicity pairing. The source states the first as a classical result and gives the last two in its proof Cardellini et al., pp. 15–16.

What the result provides

The characterization lets a variational solution of a game with coupled feasible sets be found as an equilibrium of a game whose NNN users have separate feasible sets. The additional scalar has a concrete interpretation: it is the multiplier of the shared cloudlet-utilization cap. The monotonicity assertion connects the paper's analysis of the original VI to methods for the extended one. The paper uses this relationship as the entry point for its distributed algorithms in the next section Cardellini et al., pp. 16–17.

The result is proved in the paper but is not yet machine checked in this mission. A complete development would give reusable Lean interfaces for a finite-dimensional VI on an intersection of a product polytope and one affine half-space, a multiplier characterization for that intersection, and an equilibrium-to-VI conversion for separable player constraints. Those components could support other capacity-sharing games. The theorem drafts remain proof obligations; the definitions compile locally.

Where the proof is delicate

A Nash equilibrium requires each user to be optimal against every privately feasible deviation, including deviations that violate the original shared cap. Consequently, the user's cloudlet cost must remain well defined throughout K~u\widetilde K_uKu​ for the equivalence to hold. A load bound only on KKK does not cover those deviations. The multiplier comparison must also account for the manager's maximization condition and the sign of the load term in FeF_eFe​. For monotonicity, FeF_eFe​ evaluates FFF on the whole product ∏uK~u\prod_u\widetilde K_u∏u​Ku​, a larger domain than KKK. These domain distinctions explain why the statement needs two explicit repairs to the printed theorem Cardellini et al., pp. 15–16.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the users as Fin N and the three processing locations as a finite tier type. Indices therefore start at zero. The costs, the map FFF, the private sets, Ω\OmegaΩ, and KKK are separate definitions. The Euclidean pairing is written as a finite sum; no Pi-type sup norm is used. The extended Nash predicate quantifies over user deviations in K~u\widetilde K_uKu​ and over every nonnegative manager price. The VI predicates are in their own module so the game is not built into their meaning. The theorem's statement remains meaningful at N=0N=0N=0; no positive-user hypothesis is added to Section 5's assumptions.

The first repair requires L(x)<1L(x)<1L(x)<1 at every x∈∏uK~ux\in\prod_u\widetilde K_ux∈∏u​Ku​. The paper's Theorem 1 condition (18) implies this bound, but is stronger than needed. Without the bound, a private deviation can cross the pole of δuxu,clet/(1−L(x))\delta_u x_{u,\mathrm{clet}}/(1-L(x))δu​xu,clet​/(1−L(x)); Lean's total division then assigns a value at a zero denominator even though the paper's cost has none. In a two-user instance with n=1n=1n=1, δu=0.9\delta_u=0.9δu​=0.9 and Umax⁡=0.5U_{\max}=0.5Umax​=0.5, the pole can lie within one user's private feasible interval. The second repair reads “the original game is monotone” on ∏uK~u\prod_u\widetilde K_u∏u​Ku​, because that is precisely the xxx-domain of KeK_eKe​. Monotonicity on KKK alone is insufficient. Both repairs are disclosed in the item notes, and the source wording remains visible in the milestone quotations.

An empty KKK would make a solution statement vacuous; the formal development should retain concrete feasible parameter instances. The map FFF is the paper's displayed formula, rather than a derivative chosen to make a milestone tautological. The VI uses all user coordinates, and the extended game does not silently reinstate the shared constraint in user deviations. Contributions toward the stated multiplier theorem, Nash-to-VI equivalence, and the cancellation identity are welcome, along with reusable finite-dimensional convex-analysis lemmas.

Selected references

  • V. Cardellini, V. De Nitto Personé, V. Di Valerio, F. Facchinei, V. Grassi, F. Lo Presti, and V. Piccialli, A game-theoretic approach to computation offloading in mobile cloud computing, accepted manuscript for Mathematical Programming, 2015, DOI 10.1007/s10107-015-0881-6.
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Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Double Counting in Supply Chain Carbon Footprinting II: A Carbon Leader Paying Linear Emission-Contingent Rules That Double-Count Internally Earns Its Effort-Contracting ProfitResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms increasingly account for, and offset, the greenhouse-gas emissions of their entire supply chain, not only their own operations. Emissions in a supply chain are often jointly produced: the footprint of one process (transport, packaging, a molten-bulk delivery) depends on the abatement efforts of several firms at once. When each firm is charged for "its" emissions, the question is how to allocate the footprint of a jointly produced process so that every firm has the right incentive to abate.

Caro, Corbett, Tan and Zuidwijk (working paper, 2012; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(4), 2013) model this as a moral-hazard problem in teams. Their §4 shows that a social planner who wants the first-best efforts must, under joint production, double-count emissions: the marginal payments across firms for one process exceed the carbon price. This mission formalizes §5, which looks at a different institutional arrangement observed in practice. One firm, the carbon leader (the paper's example is the cosmetics company Natura), voluntarily pays for all supply-chain emissions at a carbon price ppp and compensates the other firms to induce abatement.

Timeline. Holmström (1982) showed that a budget-balanced sharing rule cannot implement efficient efforts in a team. Strausz (1999) showed that sequential moves can restore efficiency. Battaglini (2006) studied joint production with multidimensional output. Caro et al. (2012) placed the carbon leader in this line: a Stackelberg leader whose commitment plays the role of Strausz's sequential structure.

Setting

There are finite sets of firms N\mathcal NN and processes I\mathcal II. Firm nnn chooses efforts en∈[0,A]mn\mathbf e_n\in[0,A]^{m_n}en​∈[0,A]mn​, one for each of its abatement actions, and the effort profile e\mathbf ee lies in the box [0,A]M[0,A]^M[0,A]M. Firm nnn earns profit Vn(en)V_n(\mathbf e_n)Vn​(en​), which is differentiable, concave and componentwise decreasing: effort is costly. Process iii emits fi(e)≥0f_i(\mathbf e)\ge0fi​(e)≥0, which is differentiable, convex and componentwise decreasing on the box. The influence matrix BBB has bn,i=1b_{n,i}=1bn,i​=1 if firm nnn influences process iii, that is, if ∑j∂fi/∂en,j<0\sum_j\partial f_i/\partial e_{n,j}<0∑j​∂fi​/∂en,j​<0, and bn,i=0b_{n,i}=0bn,i​=0 otherwise.

The first best at carbon price ccc maximizes the social value ∑nVn(en)−c∑ifi(e)\sum_n V_n(\mathbf e_n)-c\sum_i f_i(\mathbf e)∑n​Vn​(en​)−c∑i​fi​(e) over the box. At the societal cost c=pSc=p_Sc=pS​ its maximizer is e∗\mathbf e^*e∗, assumed unique.

The carbon leader is a firm NNN, written L in Lean. Every other firm nnn has a reservation profit πˉn\bar\pi_nπˉn​. The signed transfer gng_ngn​ is recorded as a payment by firm nnn; a negative value means compensation from the leader. The leader faces two problems.

  • PEP_EPE​ (6)–(8): it sets gn(en)g_n(\mathbf e_n)gn​(en​), contingent on firm nnn's own effort. It maximizes VN(eN)−p∑ifi(e)+∑n≠Ngn(en)V_N(\mathbf e_N)-p\sum_i f_i(\mathbf e)+\sum_{n\ne N}g_n(\mathbf e_n)VN​(eN​)−p∑i​fi​(e)+∑n=N​gn​(en​) subject to participation, Vn−gn≥πˉnV_n-g_n\ge\bar\pi_nVn​−gn​≥πˉn​, and incentive compatibility, en\mathbf e_nen​ being a best response. Its optimal value is zEz^EzE, attained at efforts eE\mathbf e^EeE.
  • PFP_FPF​ (9)–(11): the same problem, except that the payments gn(f)g_n(\mathbf f)gn​(f) may depend only on the emissions vector f=f(e)\mathbf f=\mathbf f(\mathbf e)f=f(e), because efforts cannot be verified.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5 (p. 16)

Let (gE,eE)(g^E,\mathbf e^E)(gE,eE) be optimal for PEP_EPE​ and define, for n≠Nn\neq Nn=N,

gn(f)=p∑i∈Ibn,ifi+kn,kn=Vn(enE)−p∑i∈Ibn,ifi(eE)−πˉn.(12)g_n(\mathbf f)=p\sum_{i\in\mathcal I}b_{n,i}f_i+k_n,\qquad k_n=V_n(\mathbf e^E_n)-p\sum_{i\in\mathcal I}b_{n,i}f_i(\mathbf e^E)-\bar\pi_n.\qquad(12)gn​(f)=pi∈I∑​bn,i​fi​+kn​,kn​=Vn​(enE​)−pi∈I∑​bn,i​fi​(eE)−πˉn​.(12)

Then (g,eE)(g,\mathbf e^E)(g,eE) is feasible for PFP_FPF​, its value equals zEz^EzE, and every feasible solution of PFP_FPF​ has value at most zEz^EzE:

max⁡PF  =  zE  =  max⁡PE.\max P_F \;=\; z^E \;=\; \max P_E .maxPF​=zE=maxPE​.

Milestones (proof in App. A.4, p. 26)

  1. Reduction of PEP_EPE​ (p. 15). zE=max⁡e[∑nVn(en)−p∑ifi(e)]−∑n≠Nπˉnz^E=\max_{\mathbf e}\big[\sum_n V_n(\mathbf e_n)-p\sum_i f_i(\mathbf e)\big]-\sum_{n\ne N}\bar\pi_nzE=maxe​[∑n​Vn​(en​)−p∑i​fi​(e)]−∑n=N​πˉn​, attained at eE\mathbf e^EeE.
  2. Participation under (12). Vn(enE)−gn(f(eE))=πˉnV_n(\mathbf e^E_n)-g_n(\mathbf f(\mathbf e^E))=\bar\pi_nVn​(enE​)−gn​(f(eE))=πˉn​ for n≠Nn\ne Nn=N.
  3. First-order identity. ∂Vn(eE)/∂en,j=p∑ibn,i ∂fi(eE)/∂en,j\partial V_n(\mathbf e^E)/\partial e_{n,j}=p\sum_i b_{n,i}\,\partial f_i(\mathbf e^E)/\partial e_{n,j}∂Vn​(eE)/∂en,j​=p∑i​bn,i​∂fi​(eE)/∂en,j​ for n≠Nn\neq Nn=N.
  4. Incentive compatibility under (12). enE\mathbf e^E_nenE​ maximizes Vn(x)−gn(f(e−nE,x))V_n(\mathbf x)-g_n(\mathbf f(\mathbf e^E_{-n},\mathbf x))Vn​(x)−gn​(f(e−nE​,x)) over firm nnn's box.
  5. Upper bound. Every feasible solution of PFP_FPF​ has value at most zEz^EzE.

Companion: Lemma 6 (p. 17)

If 0≤p<pS0\le p<p_S0≤p<pS​, each VnV_nVn​ is supermodular and each fif_ifi​ is submodular, then eE≤e∗\mathbf e^E\le\mathbf e^*eE≤e∗ componentwise.

Significance

The result. Proposition 5 says that, when efforts are unobservable, a carbon leader that can commit loses nothing compared with contracting on efforts. A linear rule, the form footprint accounting already takes in practice, achieves the benchmark. The rule charges each firm the full price ppp on every footprint it influences, so emissions are double-counted internally, yet the supply chain as a whole pays for carbon once. This is how the paper reconciles its §4 impossibility (a planner must double-count) with a footprint-balanced scheme: the leader moves first and is excluded from the incentive constraints. Lemma 6 then says that a leader paying a price below the societal cost induces weakly less effort than the first best.

Formalizing it. Both results are proved in the paper. As far as the platform's catalog shows, neither is machine-checked anywhere. The proof of Proposition 5 combines a reduction of a bilevel problem with a first-order argument for concave games on a box. The appendix compresses these into three sentences, one of which contains a misprint ("since f is concave" for convex). Formalizing it makes the leader–follower conventions explicit: the leader's tie-breaking choice of follower efforts, and the unilateral deviation in (11).

Difficulty

The paper calls PFP_FPF​ a constrained version of PEP_EPE​, but their feasible sets are not literally nested: PFP_FPF​'s payments are functions of the emission vector and PEP_EPE​'s of a firm's own effort. Establishing the common upper bound therefore requires care with the two payment domains and the participation constraint (10).

The incentive compatibility of (12) is the substantive step. It is a global best-response claim on a closed effort box, while the appendix states only a first-order identity at an interior point. The influence indicator bn,i=0b_{n,i}=0bn,i​=0 also has to agree with every action-level derivative, rather than only their sum. For Lemma 6, the optimum at price ppp need not be unique.

Formalization scope

  • Indices. Firms, actions and processes are finite types. Efforts are e : (n : ι) → act n → ℝ, and a unilateral deviation is Function.update.
  • Partial derivatives. A partial derivative is the one-variable deriv along one coordinate. Every theorem that uses one assumes differentiability.
  • Optimality. "Optimal" means feasible with value at least that of every feasible point, never sSup. zEz^EzE is the PEP_EPE​ objective at an optimal pair.
  • Influence matrix. BBB is a real 0/1 matrix, and its defining sign condition is assumed at every profile in the box.
  • Interiority. eE\mathbf e^EeE is assumed interior, the page's "A is a sufficiently large bound to guarantee interior solutions"; the box itself stays closed.
  • Followers' efforts. In PEP_EPE​ and PFP_FPF​ the leader chooses the followers' efforts subject to the best-response constraints, as the page assumes.
  • Hypotheses not imposed. The row and column sums of BBB, the strictness of cnc_ncn​ and gn≤0g_n\le0gn​≤0 are unused and not imposed.

Rule (12) is a function of the emission vector only, and the deviation in (11) moves only firm nnn's efforts. A formalization in which payments may depend on efforts, or in which a deviation also moves the leader, would make the goal trivial and is ruled out. A sorry-free instance with two firms checks that every hypothesis of the goal can be satisfied. Supermodularity reuses the published Supermodularity.Monotonicity.SupermodularOn. All other definitions live in CarbonDoubleCount.Leader.Setting.

Proofs of the milestones, or alternative routes such as a Lagrangian argument for incentive compatibility, are welcome. A general lemma that a concave differentiable function on a box is maximized at an interior stationary point would be reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • F. Caro, C. J. Corbett, T. Tan, R. Zuidwijk, Double-Counting in Supply Chain Carbon Footprinting, working paper dated December 21, 2012; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(4), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2013.0443
  • B. Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2), 1982. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003457
  • R. Strausz, Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships, Journal of Economic Theory 85, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2488
  • M. Battaglini, Joint Production in Teams, Journal of Economic Theory 130(1), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003
  • D. M. Topkis, Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice, Operations Research 26(2), 1978. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.26.2.305
  • R. K. Sundaram, A First Course in Optimization Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804526
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness I: Under Monotone Valuations an EFX Allocation Exists Whose Unenvied Pool Has Fewer Goods Than There Are Unenvied AgentsResearch Paper

Motivation

Allocating indivisible goods fairly is difficult because a single good can change how an agent compares two bundles. Exact envy-freeness can be impossible (one good, two agents), so the field works with relaxations. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) requires each agent to prefer her own bundle to every other agent's bundle after any one good of that other bundle is removed. Whether EFX allocations of all goods always exist is open; the question motivates weakening the requirement that every good be assigned, and asking how little must be left over. Chaudhury, Kavitha, Mehlhorn and Sgouritsa show that leaving a small, unenvied set of goods unallocated (donated to "charity") suffices for every normalized monotone valuation profile (arXiv:1907.04596v3, Theorem 8, pp. 11–12).

Timeline (as recounted on pp. 2–3 of the source):

  • 2004: Lipton, Markakis, Mossel and Saberi introduce the envy-graph and cycle-elimination technique and compute allocations now called EF1 (DOI 10.1145/988772.988792).
  • 2016: Caragiannis, Kurokawa, Moulin, Procaccia, Shah and Wang define EFX (DOI 10.1145/2940716.2940726).
  • 2018: Plaut and Roughgarden prove EFX allocations of all goods exist for two agents, or for any number of agents with identical valuations (arXiv:1707.04769).
  • 2019: Caragiannis, Gravin and Huang introduce EFX with charity: a partial EFX allocation in which each agent gets at least half her value in a Nash-optimal allocation, with no bound on the number or value of donated goods (arXiv:1902.04319).
  • 2020: Chaudhury, Garg and Mehlhorn prove existence of complete EFX allocations for three agents with additive valuations (arXiv:2002.05119).
  • 2020/2021: the present paper bounds the charity: fewer goods than unenvied agents, and no agent envies the donated set. Its SODA 2020 version assumed gross-substitute valuations; the journal version (arXiv v3) needs only normalized monotone valuations (p. 8, §1.4).

The two bounds matter separately. The empty allocation is EFX and donates everything; a cardinality bound alone still lets the donated goods carry most of an agent's value; the value bound alone allows almost all goods to be donated. The paper's later maximin-share and groupwise-maximin-share guarantees (Theorems 14 and 16, treated in the next missions of this series) are derived from exactly the allocation produced here.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 agents, indexed by N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\ldots,n\}N={1,…,n} in the paper, and a finite set MMM of mmm indivisible goods. Agent iii has a valuation vi:2M→R≥0v_i:2^M\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}vi​:2M→R≥0​. It is normalized if vi(∅)=0v_i(\varnothing)=0vi​(∅)=0 and monotone if S⊆TS\subseteq TS⊆T implies vi(S)≤vi(T)v_i(S)\le v_i(T)vi​(S)≤vi​(T). No additivity, submodularity or substitutes condition is assumed. These are the general valuations of §1.1.1, p. 3, and §2 of the source.

A partial allocation X=(Xi)i∈NX=(X_i)_{i\in N}X=(Xi​)i∈N​ consists of pairwise disjoint bundles Xi⊆MX_i\subseteq MXi​⊆M. Its pool is the goods not assigned to anyone,

P(X)=M∖⋃i∈NXi.P(X)=M\setminus\bigcup_{i\in N}X_i.P(X)=M∖i∈N⋃​Xi​.

The allocation is EFX when

vi(Xj∖{g})≤vi(Xi)for all i,j∈N and every g∈Xj.v_i(X_j\setminus\{g\})\le v_i(X_i) \qquad\text{for all }i,j\in N\text{ and every }g\in X_j.vi​(Xj​∖{g})≤vi​(Xi​)for all i,j∈N and every g∈Xj​.

The paper calls allocations partial by default (p. 3, footnote 5). The envy graph GXG_XGX​ has the agents as vertices and an edge i→ji\to ji→j when vi(Xi)<vi(Xj)v_i(X_i)<v_i(X_j)vi​(Xi​)<vi​(Xj​). A source is a vertex with no incoming edge. Its reachability component C(s)C(s)C(s) includes sss itself. The social welfare of XXX is ϕ(X)=∑ivi(Xi)\phi(X)=\sum_i v_i(X_i)ϕ(X)=∑i​vi​(Xi​). These notions are introduced on pp. 8–9 of the source.

For a set SSS of goods, an envied set is one some agent values more than her own bundle. An inclusion-wise minimal envied subset ZZZ is envied, but no strict subset of ZZZ is envied by anyone. An agent who envies such a ZZZ is a most envious agent of SSS; the paper allows ties. The three update rules U0, U1 and U2 use these sets to change an allocation while maintaining EFX (Definition 3 and Algorithm 2, p. 9).

Formalization targets

The goal is the allocation guarantee of Theorem 8:

∃X partial:X is EFX,vi(P(X))≤vi(Xi) (i∈N),∣P(X)∣<∣sources⁡(GX)∣≤n.\exists X\text{ partial}:\quad X\text{ is EFX},\qquad v_i(P(X))\le v_i(X_i)\ (i\in N),\qquad |P(X)|<|\operatorname{sources}(G_X)|\le n.∃X partial:X is EFX,vi​(P(X))≤vi​(Xi​) (i∈N),∣P(X)∣<∣sources(GX​)∣≤n.

Both the stronger source-count bound and its consequence ∣P(X)∣<n|P(X)|<n∣P(X)∣<n are stated. The theorem asserts existence for every normalized, monotone valuation profile, including nonadditive profiles. It does not require the returned envy graph to be acyclic; acyclicity is an invariant used during construction, rather than an additional advertised property of the final allocation.

The attack path consists of the paper's numbered Lemmas 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Lemma 2 concerns removal of envy cycles; its Lean form keeps the page's conditional "if XXX is EFX then X′X'X′ is EFX" and the unconditional strict welfare increase. Lemma 4 records what U0 does and what its failure implies. Lemma 5 records U1's welfare and EFX guarantees. Lemma 6 supplies the finite source, good and agent data required for U2. Lemma 7 states U2's welfare and EFX guarantees. Their source wording and page locations appear in the milestone list; the Lean statements include the exact allocation updates where those lemmas rely on them.

Significance

The theorem guarantees a partial EFX allocation even for general monotone valuations, while limiting the unallocated pool more tightly than the number of agents: its size is below the number of unenvied agents. Every agent also values that entire pool no more than her own bundle. These two bounds distinguish the allocation from a merely EFX partial allocation. They provide the starting point for the paper's later statements on approximate maximin shares under additive valuations (Theorems 14 and 16).

The mathematical result is proved in the paper. The mission asks for a machine-checked proof of its allocation guarantee and of the supporting lemmas, with a reusable Lean account of finite partial allocations, the unallocated pool, envy graphs, minimal envied subsets and the update rules. Such definitions are useful for other fair-division questions involving unallocated indivisible goods.

Difficulty

EFX must hold after the allocation is changed, for every agent pair and for removal of every good from the other agent's new bundle. Simply giving a pool good to an agent may violate that condition, even though it makes the pool smaller. Conversely, replacing a bundle with an envied subset can improve welfare while returning goods to the pool. The source-count bound depends on controlling both kinds of progress. Rule U2 adds a further complication: its bundle moves follow envy paths, so an overlap between selected paths would make the new allocation ambiguous. These are the points at which the straightforward approach of distributing the remaining goods one at a time stops working.

Formalization scope

Lean represents agents by Fin n, goods by Fin m, bundles by finite sets of goods, and valuations by real-valued functions on bundles. The paper's one-based subscripts become zero-based Lean indices. Nonnegative values need no separate hypothesis: normalization and monotonicity imply them. The hypothesis n>0n>0n>0 is explicit because the paper presumes agents and the strict bound ∣P∣<n|P|<n∣P∣<n is false when n=0n=0n=0. The pool is computed as the complement of the union of pairwise disjoint assigned bundles. It is never a free set. EFX ranges over every pair i,ji,ji,j, including i=ji=ji=j, and every good of XjX_jXj​.

The minimal-envied-subset definition checks every strict subset against every agent. The most envious agent is a relation, allowing the paper's arbitrary tie choice. Reachability includes a path of length zero. U2's new allocation is calculated from its paths and chosen subsets. Lemma 6 includes Algorithm 1's acyclic-graph invariant and the ordering property established in its proof. It replaces the printed threshold ∣P∣≥n|P|\ge n∣P∣≥n with ∣P∣≥∣sources⁡(GX)∣|P|\ge|\operatorname{sources}(G_X)|∣P∣≥∣sources(GX​)∣, the exact number of fresh goods its construction needs and the threshold used by the goal. Lemma 7 takes that ordering property to make path assignments unambiguous.

The printed U2 pool expression in Algorithm 2, line 13, is malformed; the formal statement uses the pool of the constructed allocation and the corrected union of leftover goods. Theorem 8's final sentence also asserts an nmV/ΔnmV/\DeltanmV/Δ iteration bound. This mission poses the allocation conclusions, while a future run-level formalization would be needed to state and check the iteration count. The paper's preceding count of U1/U2 steps and successive U0 steps does not by itself imply the printed number. Definitions and the numbered lemma statements are welcome contributions; a purported proof that uses a free empty pool, overlapping bundles, zero agents or an arbitrary replacement allocation would not establish this target.

Selected references

  • B. R. Chaudhury, T. Kavitha, K. Mehlhorn and A. Sgouritsa, A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness, arXiv:1907.04596v3, 2020; published in SIAM Journal on Computing, 2021. Pinned preprint.
  • R. J. Lipton, E. Markakis, E. Mossel and A. Saberi, On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods, ACM EC 2004. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988792
  • I. Caragiannis, D. Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. D. Procaccia, N. Shah and J. Wang, The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare, ACM EC 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940726
  • B. Plaut and T. Roughgarden, Almost envy-freeness with general valuations, SODA 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.04769
  • I. Caragiannis, N. Gravin and X. Huang, Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: the virtue of donating items, ACM EC 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.04319
  • B. R. Chaudhury, J. Garg and K. Mehlhorn, EFX exists for three agents, ACM EC 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.05119
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents 9: Total Completion Time Against a Maximum Cost Has at Most n_A·n_B + 1 Nondominated PairsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many scheduling decisions are not owned by a single decision maker. A machine shared by two departments, a production line serving two customers, or a computing resource shared by two users must process the jobs of two agents, each of which judges a schedule by its own criterion. Agnetis, Mirchandani, Pacciarelli and Pacifici introduced this model in Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents (Operations Research, 2004, doi:10.1287/opre.1030.0092), and it became the starting point of the literature on multi-agent scheduling (surveyed in Agnetis, Billaut, Gawiejnowicz, Pacciarelli and Soukhal, Multiagent Scheduling, Springer, 2014, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41880-8).

When neither agent can impose its criterion on the other, the natural object to compute is the set of compromises that cannot be improved for one agent without hurting the other: the Pareto frontier. Section 11 of the paper asks how large that frontier can be for each pair of criteria it studies, because the size of the frontier decides whether it can be listed in polynomial time. This mission formalizes the answer for one agent minimizing its total completion time against the other agent's maximum cost.

Setting

Agent AAA owns jobs J1A,…,JnAAJ^A_1,\dots,J^A_{n_A}J1A​,…,JnA​A​ and agent BBB owns jobs J1B,…,JnBBJ^B_1,\dots,J^B_{n_B}J1B​,…,JnB​B​, with nB≥1n_B\ge 1nB​≥1. Every job JjJ_jJj​ has a positive processing time pjp_jpj​, is available at time 000, and is processed without interruption on a single machine that handles one job at a time. Since both criteria below are nondecreasing in completion times, a schedule σ\sigmaσ is a sequence of all nA+nBn_A+n_BnA​+nB​ jobs processed in that order from time 000 without idle time, and Cj(σ)C_j(\sigma)Cj​(σ) denotes the completion time of JjJ_jJj​.

  • Agent AAA wants to minimize its total completion time ∑h=1nAChA(σ)\sum_{h=1}^{n_A} C^A_h(\sigma)∑h=1nA​​ChA​(σ).
  • Each BBB-job has a nondecreasing cost function fkBf^B_kfkB​ of its completion time, and agent BBB wants to minimize its maximum cost fmax⁡B(σ)=max⁡kfkB(CkB(σ))f^B_{\max}(\sigma)=\max_k f^B_k(C^B_k(\sigma))fmaxB​(σ)=maxk​fkB​(CkB​(σ)).

A schedule σ\sigmaσ is nondominated if no schedule σˉ\bar\sigmaσˉ has ∑ChA(σˉ)≤∑ChA(σ)\sum C^A_h(\bar\sigma)\le\sum C^A_h(\sigma)∑ChA​(σˉ)≤∑ChA​(σ) and fmax⁡B(σˉ)≤fmax⁡B(σ)f^B_{\max}(\bar\sigma)\le f^B_{\max}(\sigma)fmaxB​(σˉ)≤fmaxB​(σ) with at least one inequality strict. Its nondominated pair is (∑ChA(σ),fmax⁡B(σ))\bigl(\sum C^A_h(\sigma),f^B_{\max}(\sigma)\bigr)(∑ChA​(σ),fmaxB​(σ)). The constrained problem 1∥∑CiA:fmax⁡B≤Q1\|\sum C^A_i : f^B_{\max}\le Q1∥∑CiA​:fmaxB​≤Q asks for a schedule with fkB(CkB)≤Qf^B_k(C^B_k)\le QfkB​(CkB​)≤Q for every BBB-job that minimizes ∑ChA\sum C^A_h∑ChA​ among such schedules; such a schedule is optimal for the bound QQQ.

The AAA-jobs of a schedule follow the SPT order when they appear by nondecreasing processing time, equal lengths in index order. A BBB-job overtakes an AAA-job when it moves from after it to before it.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 11.6, corrected

∣{(∑ChA(σ), fmax⁡B(σ)):σ nondominated}∣ ≤ nA nB+1.\bigl|\{(\textstyle\sum C^A_h(\sigma),\,f^B_{\max}(\sigma)) : \sigma\ \text{nondominated}\}\bigr|\ \le\ n_A\,n_B+1.​{(∑ChA​(σ),fmaxB​(σ)):σ nondominated}​ ≤ nA​nB​+1.

The paper prints the bound nAnBn_An_BnA​nB​. That bound is false: with one job per agent, unit processing times and fB(t)=tf^B(t)=tfB(t)=t, the schedules ABABAB and BABABA give the two nondominated pairs (1,2)(1,2)(1,2) and (2,1)(2,1)(2,1). The corrected bound nAnB+1n_An_B+1nA​nB​+1 is the one the printed argument supports.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 5.4 (p. 234): if no BBB-job can complete last within the bound, every optimal schedule ends with a longest AAA-job. This is the reason the AAA-jobs of optimal schedules are in SPT order.
  2. Lemma 11.4 (p. 240): for Q′<QQ'<QQ′<Q and optimal schedules σ,σ′\sigma,\sigma'σ,σ′ for QQQ and Q′Q'Q′ whose AAA-jobs follow the SPT order, Cj(σ′)≥Cj(σ)C_j(\sigma')\ge C_j(\sigma)Cj​(σ′)≥Cj​(σ) for every AAA-job jjj.
  3. Lemma 11.5 (p. 240): under the same hypotheses, if a BBB-job precedes an AAA-job in σ\sigmaσ, it precedes it also in σ′\sigma'σ′.

Significance

A frontier of size at most nAnB+1n_An_B+1nA​nB​+1 means that the scheme the paper calls PP, which solves the constrained problem for a decreasing sequence of bounds, lists every nondominated pair with polynomially many calls to a polynomial algorithm (Theorem 5.5 of the paper). The contrast with the other criteria of §11 is the point: for two total-completion-time agents the paper exhibits an exponential frontier (Example 11.7). The bound therefore separates criteria whose compromises can be negotiated over an explicit list from those where they cannot.

Formalizing it adds three things. First, the printed statements need corrections: the bound is off by one, and Lemmas 11.4 and 11.5 are false when identical AAA-jobs may be ordered differently in the two schedules. A machine-checked version fixes the exact hypotheses. Second, the monotonicity of overtakes (Lemma 11.5) is a reusable structural fact about parametric scheduling under a tightening constraint. Third, no part of this paper or of two-agent scheduling has been machine-checked before, to our knowledge; the published sequence model the mission builds on comes from the formalization of Moore's 1968 algorithm.

Difficulty

The obvious argument counts overtakes: as the bound decreases, each BBB-job overtakes each AAA-job at most once, so consecutive frontier points differ by at least one new overtake. The step that does not go through as printed is "at most once". Optimal schedules for a given bound are not unique, and two optimal schedules can disagree on the order of identical AAA-jobs and on the position of a BBB-job between them. Then an "overtake" can be undone between two bounds without any change in the objectives. The counting is valid only for a consistently chosen family of schedules, and turning the comparison of optimal schedules for two different bounds into a strict improvement needs an exchange argument with careful bookkeeping of which jobs shift. A second, smaller gap is the base case: the first schedule of the chain carries no overtake and must be counted separately.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin nA ⊕ Fin nB, 0-based, and a schedule is a duplicate-free list of all jobs; completion times come from the published definition MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionTime (Moore 1968 series), referenced rather than redefined. Processing times are real and strictly positive, the paper's standing convention, which the exchange arguments use. The bound QQQ is real; the paper's integer QQQ is a special case. Feasibility for the bound is stated job by job. The maximum cost fmax⁡Bf^B_{\max}fmaxB​ is a finite maximum and requires nB≥1n_B\ge 1nB​≥1.

Explicit readings of the paper's phrases:

  • "Nondominated schedules" in Theorem 11.6 is read as nondominated pairs, one schedule per pair, as §11 defines the set it enumerates. Counting schedules would count swaps of identical jobs separately.
  • The count is Set.encard of a set of real pairs, so the goal asserts finiteness as well as the bound; it is not a Set.ncard, which would be 000 on an infinite set.
  • "The AAA-jobs are always SPT ordered" (p. 240) is read as the SPT order with ties broken by index, imposed as a hypothesis on both schedules in Lemmas 11.4 and 11.5. Without a fixed tie-break both lemmas are false.
  • Lemma 5.4 is restated with nA≥1n_A\ge 1nA​≥1, since an empty schedule has no last job. It is also a milestone of mission 3 of this series and is restated here identically because draft items cannot import each other.

Nothing in the statements is trivial by construction. The goal is about every instance with positive data, its hypotheses are satisfiable, and the counterexample to the printed bound is checked in Lean. The milestones' SPT hypotheses are met by some optimal schedule of every feasible instance, so they are not vacuous. Running times, including the polynomiality of PP and the choice of the decrement ϵ\epsilonϵ in Figure 4, are not formalized.

A complete development needs exchange lemmas for single-machine sequences (moving a job, swapping two adjacent jobs, and their effect on completion times), the existence of SPT-ordered optimal schedules, and a chain-counting argument for nested sets of overtakes. The exchange lemmas are reusable for any single-machine sequencing mission. Contributions of any of these, and of a proof of the corrected bound that avoids the scheme PP, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Agnetis, P. B. Mirchandani, D. Pacciarelli, A. Pacifici, Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents, Operations Research 52(2), 229–242, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0092
  • J. M. Moore, An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs, Management Science 15(1), 102–109, 1968. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.1.102
  • A. Agnetis, J.-C. Billaut, S. Gawiejnowicz, D. Pacciarelli, A. Soukhal, Multiagent Scheduling: Models and Algorithms, Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41880-8
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents 3: The Least-Cost Backward Rule Gives a Nondominated Schedule Minimizing Total Completion Time Under a Maximum-Cost BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

Many scheduling situations involve more than one decision maker sharing a resource. Two departments of a firm may share a machine shop, two clients may share a contractor, or two users may share a processor, and each cares only about how its own jobs are served. Agnetis, Mirchandani, Pacciarelli and Pacifici (Oper. Res. 52(2), 2004) introduced a systematic study of such two-agent scheduling problems. Their framework has two questions. The constrained problem asks for the best schedule for one agent among those that keep the other agent's cost below a bound. The Pareto problem asks for the schedules whose cost pair cannot be improved for one agent without hurting the other. The paper settles the complexity of these questions for the standard scheduling objectives and gave rise to a large literature on multi-agent scheduling (see the survey by Perez-Gonzalez and Framinan, EJOR 235, 2014).

This mission covers §5.2 of the paper: agent AAA minimizes the total completion time of its jobs, and agent BBB requires that the maximum of its jobs' regular costs stay below a bound QQQ.

Setting

Agent AAA owns jobs J1A,…,JnAAJ^A_1,\dots,J^A_{n_A}J1A​,…,JnA​A​ and agent BBB owns jobs J1B,…,JnBBJ^B_1,\dots,J^B_{n_B}J1B​,…,JnB​B​. Job JjJ_jJj​ has a processing time pj>0p_j>0pj​>0. All jobs are available at time 000 and are processed one at a time, without interruption, on a single machine. Because every objective here is nondecreasing in the completion times, the machine is never left idle, and a schedule σ\sigmaσ is simply a sequence of all nA+nBn_A+n_BnA​+nB​ jobs; the completion time Cj(σ)C_j(\sigma)Cj​(σ) of a job is the total processing time of that job and the jobs before it. Write PAP_APA​ and PBP_BPB​ for the total processing times of the two agents.

Agent AAA's objective is the total completion time ∑hChA(σ)\sum_h C^A_h(\sigma)∑h​ChA​(σ). Each BBB-job has a nondecreasing cost function fkBf^B_kfkB​, and agent BBB's objective is the maximum cost

fmax⁡B(σ)=max⁡kfkB(CkB(σ)).f^B_{\max}(\sigma)=\max_k f^B_k\bigl(C^B_k(\sigma)\bigr).fmaxB​(σ)=kmax​fkB​(CkB​(σ)).

Given a bound QQQ, a schedule is feasible for the problem 1∥∑CiA:fmax⁡B≤Q1\|\sum C^A_i : f^B_{\max}\le Q1∥∑CiA​:fmaxB​≤Q if fkB(CkB)≤Qf^B_k(C^B_k)\le QfkB​(CkB​)≤Q for every BBB-job, and optimal if it is feasible and minimizes ∑ChA\sum C^A_h∑ChA​ among feasible schedules. The instance is feasible if a feasible schedule exists. A schedule is nondominated if no schedule is at least as good for both agents and strictly better for one.

The paper solves the problem with a backward rule (Figure 1). Fill the sequence from the end. With τ\tauτ the total length of the jobs not yet placed, place last any unplaced BBB-job with fkB(τ)≤Qf^B_k(\tau)\le QfkB​(τ)≤Q. If there is none, place last a longest unplaced AAA-job. If neither exists, the instance is infeasible. The least-cost variant of §5.2.1 chooses, among the BBB-jobs, one minimizing fkB(τ)f^B_k(\tau)fkB​(τ) over all unplaced BBB-jobs. A B-block of a schedule is a maximal run of consecutive BBB-jobs.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.7

On a feasible instance with nB≥1n_B\ge1nB​≥1, every schedule σ~\tilde\sigmaσ~ produced by the least-cost variant, under any tie-breaking, satisfies

σ~ is optimal for 1∥∑CiA:fmax⁡B≤Qandσ~ is nondominated for (∑CiA, fmax⁡B).\tilde\sigma \text{ is optimal for } 1\|\textstyle\sum C^A_i : f^B_{\max}\le Q \quad\text{and}\quad \tilde\sigma \text{ is nondominated for } \bigl(\textstyle\sum C^A_i,\ f^B_{\max}\bigr).σ~ is optimal for 1∥∑CiA​:fmaxB​≤Qandσ~ is nondominated for (∑CiA​, fmaxB​).

The nondominance is the printed theorem; the optimality is how the paper introduces σ~\tilde\sigmaσ~, and rests on Theorem 5.5.

Milestones

  • Lemma 5.3: if some BBB-job JkˉBJ^B_{\bar k}JkˉB​ has fkˉB(PA+PB)≤Qf^B_{\bar k}(P_A+P_B)\le QfkˉB​(PA​+PB​)≤Q, some optimal schedule ends with JkˉBJ^B_{\bar k}JkˉB​ and no optimal schedule ends with an AAA-job.
  • Lemma 5.4: if every BBB-job has fkB(PA+PB)>Qf^B_k(P_A+P_B)>QfkB​(PA​+PB​)>Q, every optimal schedule ends with a longest AAA-job.
  • Theorem 5.5 (correctness): on a feasible instance every schedule of Figure 1 is optimal, and Figure 1 runs to completion exactly on feasible instances.
  • Lemma 5.6: all optimal schedules have the same partition of the BBB-jobs into B-blocks, and each B-block occupies the same time interval in all of them.

Significance

Theorem 5.5 shows that the constrained problem with total completion time against a maximum cost is solvable by sorting, in contrast to its weighted version, which the same section shows NP-hard. Lemma 5.6 describes all optimal schedules: they agree on the completion times of the AAA-jobs (up to permuting identical jobs) and on the B-blocks, and differ only inside each block. Theorem 5.7 turns this into a nondominated schedule. It is the building block for the Pareto problem 1∥∑CiA∘fmax⁡B1\|\sum C^A_i\circ f^B_{\max}1∥∑CiA​∘fmaxB​ of §11.2, where solving the constrained problem for a sequence of bounds enumerates the nondominated pairs.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof that we know of. The mission formalizes the statements and asks for their proofs. The proof of Theorem 5.7 invokes "the very same proof of Lawler's algorithm (Lawler 1973) restricted to 1∥fmax⁡1\|f_{\max}1∥fmax​", applied inside each B-block. Lawler's rule is a separate statement on the platform, LawlerPrec.MinMax.lawler_rule_optimal, currently open. A solver may prove it and adapt it, but the goal does not need it in that exact form.

Difficulty

The interchange arguments of Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 are short. The obstacle is Lemma 5.6. Two optimal schedules can differ in which BBB-job is placed at each step, and in the order of AAA-jobs of equal length. The paper's argument compares the completion time of each AAA-job across two optimal schedules and shows it cannot move earlier. That needs the fact that a BBB-job finishing before an AAA-job could not have been placed at that AAA-job's completion time, which comes from applying Lemma 5.3 to a prefix of the schedule. Formalizing it requires restricting optimality to prefixes and sub-instances, which the bare sequence model does not provide. The tempting shortcut of proving Theorem 5.7 from Lawler's rule on the whole schedule fails, since the bound QQQ and agent AAA's objective change which jobs may be placed where; the reduction is only to one Lawler instance per block.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin nA ⊕ Fin nB (0-based). A schedule is a duplicate-free list of all jobs, with completion times from the published sequence model MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionTime (Moore 1968 series), which this mission reuses. Processing times are real and strictly positive. Without positivity the second claim of Lemma 5.3 fails, because a zero-length BBB-job can sit anywhere. Cost functions are real-valued and nondecreasing, and QQQ is real (the paper's integer QQQ is a special case). Feasibility is stated job by job; fmax⁡Bf^B_{\max}fmaxB​ is a finite maximum and requires nB≥1n_B\ge1nB​≥1, which the goal assumes. Lemma 5.4 assumes nA≥1n_A\ge1nA​≥1, since "a longest AAA-job" presupposes one.

The paper's loose phrases are read as follows:

  • "the algorithm" is a property of a finished sequence. At position mmm, with the jobs at positions 0,…,m0,\dots,m0,…,m unplaced and τ\tauτ their total length, the job at mmm must be a choice the rule allows.
  • "Ties are broken arbitrarily" means that every sequence satisfying the rule is covered.
  • "no solution exists, STOP" leaves no allowed choice. Running to completion therefore means that some sequence satisfies the rule.
  • "the optimal schedule generated in this way" puts optimality into the goal as a conclusion, not a hypothesis.
  • "a longest A-job" is an AAA-job of maximal length; when several are tied, no statement fixes which one.
  • Nondominance quantifies over all schedules, not only those feasible for QQQ.
  • A B-block's interval runs from the earliest start to the latest completion of its jobs.

The running times of Theorems 5.5 and 5.8 (O(nAlog⁡nA+nBlog⁡nB)O(n_A\log n_A+n_B\log n_B)O(nA​lognA​+nB​lognB​) and O(nAlog⁡nA+nB2)O(n_A\log n_A+n_B^2)O(nA​lognA​+nB2​)) are not formalized. Nor is the claim (3) inside the proof of Lemma 5.6.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: feasibility of the instance is a hypothesis and not built into the rule, the rule constrains every position, and the goal asserts nondominance against all schedules.

Useful infrastructure includes interchange lemmas for the sequence model (moving one job to the end, swapping two jobs), restriction of a schedule to a prefix, and Lawler's rule for 1∥fmax⁡1\|f_{\max}1∥fmax​ on a fixed time window. The interchange lemmas and the prefix restriction are reusable across the whole two-agent series.

Selected references

  • A. Agnetis, P. B. Mirchandani, D. Pacciarelli, A. Pacifici, Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents, Operations Research 52(2), 229–242, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0092
  • E. L. Lawler, Optimal Sequencing of a Single Machine Subject to Precedence Constraints, Management Science 19(5), 544–546, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.19.5.544
  • J. M. Moore, An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs, Management Science 15(1), 102–109, 1968. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.1.102
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and Approximation in Deterministic Sequencing and Scheduling: A Survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5, 287–326, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • P. Perez-Gonzalez, J. M. Framinan, A common framework and taxonomy for multicriteria scheduling problems with interfering and competing jobs: Multi-agent scheduling problems, European Journal of Operational Research 235(1), 1–16, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.017
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Numerical AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Steepest Descent, Newton's and Regularized Newton's Methods for Nonconvex Unconstrained Optimization Problems 1: Steepest Descent Can Need ε^(−2+τ) Iterations to Reach |g| ≤ εResearch Paper

Motivation

Steepest descent is the oldest method for unconstrained minimization: to minimize a smooth function fff, it moves from the current point xkx_kxk​ along the negative gradient −gk=−∇f(xk)-g_k = -\nabla f(x_k)−gk​=−∇f(xk​). It is the prototype of every first-order method, and its worst-case evaluation complexity — how many iterations it may need before the gradient norm drops below a tolerance ϵ\epsilonϵ — is the reference point against which faster methods are measured.

For a function that is bounded below and has a Lipschitz continuous gradient, steepest descent with a suitable step-length rule reaches ∥gk∥≤ϵ\|g_k\| \le \epsilon∥gk​∥≤ϵ within O(ϵ−2)O(\epsilon^{-2})O(ϵ−2) iterations (Nesterov, Introductory Lectures on Convex Optimization, 2004, p. 29). Whether this bound is tight on nonconvex problems remained open until Cartis, Gould and Toint (preprint 15 October 2009; SIAM J. Optim. 20(6), 2010) built explicit one-dimensional examples showing that it is essentially sharp. The same paper shows that Newton's method can be as slow, and that the O(ϵ−3/2)O(\epsilon^{-3/2})O(ϵ−3/2) bound of cubically regularized Newton methods is also tight; those results are the other missions of this series.

Timeline:

  • 1983: Dennis and Schnabel, Numerical Methods for Unconstrained Optimization and Nonlinear Equations, Theorem 6.3.3 — global convergence of steepest descent with a Goldstein–Armijo linesearch under twice continuous differentiability, boundedness below and a Lipschitz gradient.
  • 2004: Nesterov's textbook states the O(ϵ−2)O(\epsilon^{-2})O(ϵ−2) iteration bound for gradient methods on nonconvex functions with Lipschitz gradient.
  • 2009/2010: Cartis, Gould and Toint construct, for every τ>0\tau > 0τ>0, examples on which steepest descent needs at least ⌊ϵ−(2−τ)⌋\lfloor \epsilon^{-(2-\tau)} \rfloor⌊ϵ−(2−τ)⌋ iterations.

Setting

Let f:R→Rf : \mathbb R \to \mathbb Rf:R→R be twice continuously differentiable, bounded below, with a derivative f′f'f′ that is bounded and Lipschitz continuous. The paper calls these standing assumptions AS.0. Write g(x)=f′(x)g(x) = f'(x)g(x)=f′(x) for the gradient.

Steepest descent with step lengths (αk)k≥0(\alpha_k)_{k\ge0}(αk​)k≥0​ starts at x0=0x_0 = 0x0​=0 and sets

xk+1=xk−αk g(xk),k≥0.x_{k+1} = x_k - \alpha_k\, g(x_k), \qquad k \ge 0.xk+1​=xk​−αk​g(xk​),k≥0.

The step lengths are only required to lie in a fixed interval (condition (2.6))

0<α‾≤αk≤α‾<2.0 < \underline\alpha \le \alpha_k \le \overline\alpha < 2 .0<α​≤αk​≤α<2.

Such step lengths can be produced by a Goldstein–Armijo linesearch, which accepts a step when the decrease f(xk)−f(xk+1)f(x_k) - f(x_{k+1})f(xk​)−f(xk+1​) lies between a αk∣gk∣2a\,\alpha_k|g_k|^2aαk​∣gk​∣2 and b αk∣gk∣2b\,\alpha_k|g_k|^2bαk​∣gk​∣2 for fixed constants 0<a<b<10 < a < b < 10<a<b<1.

Fix τ∈(0,1)\tau \in (0,1)τ∈(0,1) and put η=η(τ)=12−τ−12=τ4−2τ\eta = \eta(\tau) = \frac{1}{2-\tau} - \frac12 = \frac{\tau}{4-2\tau}η=η(τ)=2−τ1​−21​=4−2ττ​. The mission's definitions (namespace SlowConvergence.SteepestDescent) record the paper's prescribed data: iterates xk, steps sk, values fk, gradients gk=−(1/(k+1))12+ηg_k = -(1/(k+1))^{\frac12+\eta}gk​=−(1/(k+1))21​+η (gk), and the quintic pieces p with the quantities ψk\psi_kψk​, ϕk\phi_kϕk​, μk\mu_kμk​ of (2.11)–(2.15).

Formalization targets

Goal: steepest descent can need ⌊ϵ−(2−τ)⌋\lfloor \epsilon^{-(2-\tau)}\rfloor⌊ϵ−(2−τ)⌋ iterates

For every τ∈(0,1)\tau \in (0,1)τ∈(0,1), every 0<α‾≤α‾<20 < \underline\alpha \le \overline\alpha < 20<α​≤α<2 and every step-length sequence with α‾≤αk≤α‾\underline\alpha \le \alpha_k \le \overline\alphaα​≤αk​≤α, there is fff satisfying AS.0 on all of R\mathbb RR on which the steepest descent run from x0=0x_0 = 0x0​=0 has

∣f′(xk)∣=(1k+1)12−τ(k≥0),hence∣f′(xk)∣≤ϵ<1  ⟹  k+1≥⌊1ϵ2−τ⌋.|f'(x_k)| = \Big(\frac{1}{k+1}\Big)^{\frac{1}{2-\tau}} \quad (k \ge 0), \qquad\text{hence}\qquad |f'(x_k)| \le \epsilon < 1 \;\Longrightarrow\; k+1 \ge \Big\lfloor \frac{1}{\epsilon^{2-\tau}} \Big\rfloor .∣f′(xk​)∣=(k+11​)2−τ1​(k≥0),hence∣f′(xk​)∣≤ϵ<1⟹k+1≥⌊ϵ2−τ1​⌋.

No constant (Lipschitz constant, gradient bound, lower bound) is fixed in the goal; only its existence is asserted.

Milestones

  1. (2.10) and (2.3): η>0\eta > 0η>0 and ∣gk∣=(1/(k+1))1/(2−τ)|g_k| = (1/(k+1))^{1/(2-\tau)}∣gk​∣=(1/(k+1))1/(2−τ).
  2. The Goldstein–Armijo remark (p. 4): for 2(1−b)≤αk≤2(1−a)2(1-b) \le \alpha_k \le 2(1-a)2(1−b)≤αk​≤2(1−a) the prescribed decrease satisfies both linesearch conditions.
  3. (2.12)–(2.14): the quintic pkp_kpk​ meets its six Hermite conditions on [0,μk][0,\mu_k][0,μk​].
  4. (2.15): 0<ψk<10 < \psi_k < 10<ψk​<1.
  5. (2.17): ∣pk′′(t)∣≤1+150∣ϕk∣≤1+150max⁡[1,α‾]/α‾|p_k''(t)| \le 1 + 150|\phi_k| \le 1 + 150\max[1,\overline\alpha]/\underline\alpha∣pk′′​(t)∣≤1+150∣ϕk​∣≤1+150max[1,α]/α​ on [0,μk][0,\mu_k][0,μk​].
  6. Lower bound (p. 5): fk−fk+1≤12(1/(k+1))1+2ηf_k - f_{k+1} \le \frac12 (1/(k+1))^{1+2\eta}fk​−fk+1​≤21​(1/(k+1))1+2η and fk≥0f_k \ge 0fk​≥0.

Significance

The result. Since τ>0\tau > 0τ>0 is arbitrary, the example shows that the O(ϵ−2)O(\epsilon^{-2})O(ϵ−2) upper bound for steepest descent cannot be improved to O(ϵ−2+τ)O(\epsilon^{-2+\tau})O(ϵ−2+τ) for any τ>0\tau > 0τ>0 under AS.0, even with a standard Goldstein–Armijo linesearch. It separates steepest descent from second-order methods with better worst-case bounds, and it is the template for the Newton and regularized-Newton examples of the same paper. A matching upper bound for gradient descent with step 1/L1/L1/L is formalized elsewhere on the platform (ShiOptRates.gd_exact_rate); together the two describe the complexity of the method up to the exponent τ\tauτ.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. The mission adds a statement in which the method, the function class and the iteration count are fixed precisely. It also corrects three printed slips that a formal check exposes: the iteration count is off by one, the Goldstein–Armijo interval is printed reversed, and an intermediate step of (2.17) is false while its end bounds hold.

Difficulty

Matching prescribed values fkf_kfk​ and gradients gkg_kgk​ at the iterates is easy one point at a time. The difficulty is doing it with uniform control. The interval lengths μk\mu_kμk​ shrink like (k+1)−1/(2−τ)(k+1)^{-1/(2-\tau)}(k+1)−1/(2−τ), so a naive interpolant has second derivatives growing with kkk, and the gradient is then not globally Lipschitz. The prescribed values must also decrease at a rate whose sum stays finite, or the function is unbounded below. Both constraints pin the exponent: the construction works only because 12+η<1\frac12 + \eta < 121​+η<1 makes the iterates escape to infinity while 1+2η>11 + 2\eta > 11+2η>1 keeps ∑k(fk−fk+1)\sum_k (f_k - f_{k+1})∑k​(fk​−fk+1​) finite. A further step remains: the paper's function lives on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and must be extended to all of R\mathbb RR without losing any property of AS.0.

Formalization scope

The problem is one-dimensional: f : ℝ → ℝ, the gradient is deriv f, and the second derivative is iteratedDeriv 2. AS.0 is ContDiff ℝ 2 f, BddBelow (Set.range f), a global bound on |deriv f|, and LipschitzWith L (deriv f). Every property holds on all of R\mathbb RR; the paper constructs fff on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and says it extends smoothly to the negative reals, and that extension is part of the goal.

Conventions:

  • τ∈(0,1)\tau \in (0,1)τ∈(0,1): the construction needs it, and for ϵ<1\epsilon < 1ϵ<1 smaller τ\tauτ gives larger counts, so the paper's "any τ>0\tau > 0τ>0" follows.
  • The count is k+1≥⌊ϵ−(2−τ)⌋k + 1 \ge \lfloor \epsilon^{-(2-\tau)} \rfloork+1≥⌊ϵ−(2−τ)⌋ (natural floor), the number of iterates x0,…,xkx_0, \dots, x_kx0​,…,xk​; the printed "iterations" count kkk is off by one.
  • Exponents are Real.rpow with base 1/(k+1)>01/(k+1) > 01/(k+1)>0.
  • The real zeta function is the series ∑n≥0(1/(n+1))t\sum_{n\ge0} (1/(n+1))^t∑n≥0​(1/(n+1))t, used only at t=1+2η>1t = 1 + 2\eta > 1t=1+2η>1.
  • The step lengths are universally quantified before fff, and the steepest-descent run is part of the conclusion, tied to fff by xk+1=xk−αkf′(xk)x_{k+1} = x_k - \alpha_k f'(x_k)xk+1​=xk​−αk​f′(xk​). A goal asserting slow gradients along some sequence unrelated to fff, or for one convenient step-length sequence only, would be trivial or weaker and is not the statement.

Infrastructure needed: quintic Hermite interpolation on intervals, gluing piecewise polynomials into a C2C^2C2 function on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) along an unbounded increasing knot sequence, a C2C^2C2 extension to the negative reals, and bounds for real ppp-series. The gluing lemma and the extension are reusable for the Newton and regularized-Newton missions of the series. Contributions of any milestone, of a construction of the glued function f1f_1f1​ of (2.16), or of a direct proof of the goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Cartis, N. I. M. Gould, Ph. L. Toint, On the complexity of steepest descent, Newton's and regularized Newton's methods for nonconvex unconstrained optimization problems, SIAM J. Optim. 20(6), 2833–2852, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1137/090774100 (preprint 15 Oct 2009: https://people.maths.ox.ac.uk/cartis/papers/cgt36.pdf)
  • J. E. Dennis, R. B. Schnabel, Numerical Methods for Unconstrained Optimization and Nonlinear Equations, Prentice-Hall, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971200
  • Yu. Nesterov, Introductory Lectures on Convex Optimization: A Basic Course, Kluwer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8853-9
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Functional AnalysisNumerical AnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Some Numerical Experiments with Variable-Storage Quasi-Newton Algorithms: The Update (A.7) Is the Unique Least-Change Self-Adjoint Secant Update in a Weighted Hilbert–Schmidt NormResearch Paper

Motivation

Quasi-Newton methods replace a costly exact Hessian with an operator updated from successive changes in position and gradient. A secant update must map the observed step sss to the observed gradient difference yyy. Many operators satisfy that one equation, so the choice of update needs another criterion. Gilbert and Lemaréchal's working paper studies variable-storage quasi-Newton algorithms and, in its Annex, characterizes familiar update formulas by how little they change the previous operator. The Annex treats real Hilbert spaces, rather than only matrices on Euclidean space, and allows the underlying scalar product and the weighting operator to vary. Its least-change characterization is the subject of this mission.

The source is the August 1988 IIASA Working Paper WP-88-121. A revised journal article appeared in 1989, but the theorem numbers and printed page references here belong to the working paper. The work is a formalization of a result proved in that paper; the mathematical question is not open.

Setting

Let H\mathcal HH be a complete real inner-product space. A continuous linear operator BBB is the current Hessian approximation. A step s∈Hs\in\mathcal Hs∈H and a gradient difference y∈Hy\in\mathcal Hy∈H determine the quasi-Newton equation B+s=yB_+s=yB+​s=y for the updated operator B+B_+B+​. Write B+=B+PB_+=B+PB+​=B+P, where PPP is the perturbation. The source restricts PPP to the Hilbert–Schmidt class L2(H)L_2(\mathcal H)L2​(H), so its size can be measured by an orthonormal basis (ei)i∈I(e_i)_{i\in I}(ei​)i∈I​:

∥P∥HS=(∑i∈I∥Pei∥2)1/2.\|P\|_{\mathrm{HS}}=\left(\sum_{i\in I}\|Pe_i\|^2\right)^{1/2}.∥P∥HS​=(i∈I∑​∥Pei​∥2)1/2.

The index set III need not be countable; membership in L2(H)L_2(\mathcal H)L2​(H) means the displayed family is summable. The value is independent of the chosen orthonormal basis. For u,v∈Hu,v\in\mathcal Hu,v∈H, the paper's bracket operator is [u,v]d=⟨v,d⟩u[u,v]d=\langle v,d\rangle u[u,v]d=⟨v,d⟩u. The order of its arguments matters.

The nonsymmetric feasible set is Π={P∈L2(H):(B+P)s=y}\Pi=\{P\in L_2(\mathcal H):(B+P)s=y\}Π={P∈L2​(H):(B+P)s=y}. For a self-adjoint BBB, the symmetric problem uses ΠS={P∈L2(H):P=P∗, (B+P)s=y}\Pi_S=\{P\in L_2(\mathcal H):P=P^*,\ (B+P)s=y\}ΠS​={P∈L2​(H):P=P∗, (B+P)s=y}. A bijective continuous operator RRR weights the symmetric objective ∥R∗PR∥HS\|R^*PR\|_{\mathrm{HS}}∥R∗PR∥HS​. The vector c=R−∗R−1sc=R^{-*}R^{-1}sc=R−∗R−1s records how this weight changes the update. Both the feasible set and the weighted objective matter: taking a minimum over every bounded operator would change the problem.

Formalization targets

The goal is Proposition A.2 on printed p. 28 of the working paper. Suppose B=B∗B=B^*B=B∗, RRR is bijective, and s≠0s\ne0s=0. With r=y−Bsr=y-Bsr=y−Bs and c=R−∗R−1sc=R^{-*}R^{-1}sc=R−∗R−1s, define

Pc=[r,c]+[c,r]⟨c,s⟩−⟨r,s⟩⟨c,s⟩2[c,c].P_c=\frac{[r,c]+[c,r]}{\langle c,s\rangle} -\frac{\langle r,s\rangle}{\langle c,s\rangle^2}[c,c].Pc​=⟨c,s⟩[r,c]+[c,r]​−⟨c,s⟩2⟨r,s⟩​[c,c].

The target asserts that PcP_cPc​ belongs to ΠS\Pi_SΠS​ and is the unique minimizer of ∥R∗PR∥HS\|R^*PR\|_{\mathrm{HS}}∥R∗PR∥HS​ over P∈ΠSP\in\Pi_SP∈ΠS​. Its formula depends on RRR only through ccc. No positivity condition on BBB or on ⟨y,s⟩\langle y,s\rangle⟨y,s⟩ is part of this result.

The milestones follow the source's supporting statements in order. They establish that the Hilbert–Schmidt sum is independent of the orthonormal basis and defines a norm on its domain; that the operator norm is bounded by this norm and the Hilbert–Schmidt class is stable under multiplication by bounded operators; the bracket identity ∥[u,v]∥HS=∥[u,v]∥op=∥u∥∥v∥\|[u,v]\|_{\mathrm{HS}}=\|[u,v]\|_{\mathrm{op}}=\|u\|\|v\|∥[u,v]∥HS​=∥[u,v]∥op​=∥u∥∥v∥; the two bracket composition identities; Proposition A.1, the unique nonsymmetric least-change update for ∥R1PR2∥HS\|R_1PR_2\|_{\mathrm{HS}}∥R1​PR2​∥HS​; and its instance R2=IR_2=IR2​=I, Broyden's update (A.5). The goal adds self-adjointness and a single two-sided weight.

The Annex then draws consequences of the goal, which are further milestones: the instance R=IR=IR=I is the psb (Powell symmetric Broyden) update; Proposition A.3 states that for nonzero y,sy,sy,s a self-adjoint positive operator (⟨Bu,u⟩>0\langle Bu,u\rangle>0⟨Bu,u⟩>0 for u≠0u\ne0u=0) with Bs=yBs=yBs=y exists if and only if y=C∗Csy=C^*Csy=C∗Cs for a bijective CCC, if and only if ⟨y,s⟩>0\langle y,s\rangle>0⟨y,s⟩>0; with R=C−1R=C^{-1}R=C−1 the weight becomes c=yc=yc=y and (A.7) becomes the dfp (Davidon–Fletcher–Powell) update (A.8); and (A.9) is a product form of the dfp update from which its positivity follows when BBB is self-adjoint positive and ⟨y,s⟩>0\langle y,s\rangle>0⟨y,s⟩>0.

Significance

The theorem gives a precise optimization property to a rank-two symmetric secant formula. It identifies the operator selected by the weighted least-change criterion and guarantees there is no other feasible minimizer with the same value. Taking the weight to be the identity yields the psb update, and taking R=C−1R=C^{-1}R=C−1 with C∗Cs=yC^*Cs=yC∗Cs=y yields the dfp update, so two of the classical symmetric secant formulas are least-change updates for different weights. Proposition A.1 similarly characterizes the rank-one update that becomes Broyden's formula when its right weight is the identity. These consequences explain why the familiar formulas arise from a common variational question, as the Annex states.

The paper supplies a mathematical proof. The remaining formalization work is to represent the Hilbert–Schmidt class, its norm and ideal property, the weighted objectives, and the exact minimization claims in Lean, then prove those claims. Mathlib supplies Hilbert spaces, Hilbert bases, bounded linear maps, adjoints, and the rank-one operator corresponding to the paper's bracket. The statements drafted for this mission compile, but they carry sorry and have no machine-checked proof from this mission yet. A completed development would leave reusable Hilbert–Schmidt and rank-one operator results beyond this quasi-Newton application.

Difficulty

The secant equation alone fixes an operator on only one vector. Even in two dimensions, a rank-one perturbation can satisfy that equation while failing to preserve self-adjointness. Requiring self-adjointness leaves many candidates, and minimizing the two-sided weighted Hilbert–Schmidt norm must distinguish exactly one of them. In infinite-dimensional spaces the norm also has a domain: some bounded operators have an infinite square sum. A formulation that silently assigns a finite default value to a nonsummable operator could turn the least-change claim into a different assertion. These are the mathematical and formal obstacles the milestone list exposes.

Formalization scope

Lean uses an arbitrary complete real inner-product space, with no finite-dimensional or separability assumption, and an arbitrary HilbertBasis index type. Each theorem takes a basis parameter; the basis-independence milestone states why this represents the paper's basis-free norm. The reusable definitions for the bracket and the Hilbert–Schmidt square sum are separate from the paper-specific feasible sets. bracket u v abbreviates Mathlib's rankOne ℝ u v, with vvv paired with the input. A bijective bounded operator is represented by a continuous linear equivalence R:H≃HR:\mathcal H\simeq\mathcal HR:H≃H; the bounded inverse theorem makes this equivalent to the paper's bijective member of L(H)L(\mathcal H)L(H). The definition of ccc applies the adjoint of R−1R^{-1}R−1 to R−1sR^{-1}sR−1s.

Lean's real tsum has a default value when the family is not summable, so the Hilbert–Schmidt norm is used as a norm only for operators satisfying the explicit summability predicate. Both Π\PiΠ and ΠS\Pi_SΠS​ include that predicate. The ideal-property milestone covers the weighted operators in the two objectives. The hypothesis s≠0s\ne0s=0 is exactly the proposition's condition; it entails ⟨c,s⟩=∥R−1s∥2>0\langle c,s\rangle=\|R^{-1}s\|^2>0⟨c,s⟩=∥R−1s∥2>0, so no extra nonzero-denominator hypothesis is imposed. The statement spells out “unique solution” as feasibility, minimality over every feasible perturbation, and equality of every feasible minimizer with PcP_cPc​. The paper prints “problem (A.5)” in Proposition A.2, but (A.5) labels Broyden's displayed formula; its preceding paragraph defines the relevant symmetric minimization as (A.6). This mission formalizes (A.6).

In Proposition A.3 and (A.9), "positive" is the paper's strict notion ⟨Bu,u⟩>0\langle Bu,u\rangle>0⟨Bu,u⟩>0 for u≠0u\ne0u=0, not the non-strict positivity of Mathlib. The identity (A.9) is stated for self-adjoint BBB and ⟨y,s⟩≠0\langle y,s\rangle\ne0⟨y,s⟩=0, the setting of the Annex's symmetric problem; the paper's sentence before the psb formula repeats the "(A.5)" misprint and is read as (A.6) in the same way.

The definition layer, basis independence, operator-ideal property, bracket results, both least-change propositions, and the Broyden, psb, dfp and positivity statements are welcome proof targets. The scaling results of §4.1 are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Jean Charles Gilbert and Claude Lemaréchal, Some numerical experiments with variable-storage quasi-Newton algorithms, IIASA Working Paper WP-88-121, August 1988, §2.1 and Annex, printed pp. 3 and 26–30. Working paper PDF.
  • Jean Charles Gilbert and Claude Lemaréchal, Some numerical experiments with variable-storage quasi-Newton algorithms, Mathematical Programming 45 (1989), 407–435. DOI 10.1007/BF01589113. Cited for publication history; all statement indices above follow the working paper.
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AlgebraTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Polynomial Factorization and Modular Composition 1: The Inverse Kronecker Map ψ Reduces Modular Composition f(g₀, …, g_{m−1}) mod h to One Multivariate Multipoint EvaluationResearch Paper

Motivation

Modular composition asks, given univariate polynomials f,g,hf, g, hf,g,h over a ring, for f(g(X)) mod h(X)f(g(X)) \bmod h(X)f(g(X))modh(X). It is the bottleneck step in the classical algorithms for factoring univariate polynomials over finite fields (Cantor–Zassenhaus, von zur Gathen–Shoup, Kaltofen–Shoup), for irreducibility testing and for computing minimal polynomials. Brent and Kung (1978) gave an algorithm using O(n(ω+1)/2)O(n^{(\omega+1)/2})O(n(ω+1)/2) operations for degree nnn, and for three decades no algorithm with a near-linear operation count was known in general.

Kedlaya and Umans (Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 08381, 2008; journal version SIAM J. Comput. 40(6), 2011, doi:10.1137/08073408X) obtained near-linear modular composition over finite fields, and with it asymptotically faster algorithms for factoring polynomials over finite fields. Their route has two halves: a reduction of modular composition to multivariate multipoint evaluation (Section 3), and new fast algorithms for the latter (Sections 4 and 6). This mission formalizes the correctness of the first half, Theorem 3.1. The paper notes that Shoup and Smolensky used essentially the same transformation in an unpublished 1992 manuscript.

Setting

Throughout, RRR is an arbitrary commutative ring. Variables are indexed from 000.

MULTIVARIATE MULTIPOINT EVALUATION (Problem 2.1): given f∈R[X0,…,Xm−1]f \in R[X_0, \dots, X_{m-1}]f∈R[X0​,…,Xm−1​] with individual degrees at most d−1d-1d−1 and points α0,…,αN−1∈Rm\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_{N-1} \in R^mα0​,…,αN−1​∈Rm, output f(α0),…,f(αN−1)f(\alpha_0), \dots, f(\alpha_{N-1})f(α0​),…,f(αN−1​).

MODULAR COMPOSITION (Problem 2.2): given f∈R[X0,…,Xm−1]f \in R[X_0, \dots, X_{m-1}]f∈R[X0​,…,Xm−1​] with individual degrees at most d−1d-1d−1, and g0,…,gm−1,h∈R[X]g_0, \dots, g_{m-1}, h \in R[X]g0​,…,gm−1​,h∈R[X] of degree at most N−1N-1N−1 with the leading coefficient of hhh a unit, output f(g0(X),…,gm−1(X)) mod h(X)f(g_0(X), \dots, g_{m-1}(X)) \bmod h(X)f(g0​(X),…,gm−1​(X))modh(X), the unique rrr with deg⁡r<deg⁡h\deg r < \deg hdegr<degh and h∣f(g0,…,gm−1)−rh \mid f(g_0, \dots, g_{m-1}) - rh∣f(g0​,…,gm−1​)−r.

The inverse Kronecker map (Definition 2.3) ψh,ℓ:R[X0,…,Xm−1]→R[Y0,0,…,Ym−1,ℓ−1]\psi_{h,\ell} : R[X_0, \dots, X_{m-1}] \to R[Y_{0,0}, \dots, Y_{m-1,\ell-1}]ψh,ℓ​:R[X0​,…,Xm−1​]→R[Y0,0​,…,Ym−1,ℓ−1​] is the RRR-linear map that sends the monomial ∏iXiei\prod_i X_i^{e_i}∏i​Xiei​​ to ∏i∏j<ℓYi,jai,j\prod_i \prod_{j<\ell} Y_{i,j}^{a_{i,j}}∏i​∏j<ℓ​Yi,jai,j​​, where ei=∑j≥0ai,jhje_i = \sum_{j \ge 0} a_{i,j} h^jei​=∑j≥0​ai,j​hj is the base-hhh expansion. It trades individual degree for number of variables: every individual degree of ψh,ℓ(f)\psi_{h,\ell}(f)ψh,ℓ​(f) is below hhh.

The algorithm of Theorem 3.1 takes 2≤d0<d2 \le d_0 < d2≤d0​<d, sets ℓ=⌈log⁡d0d⌉\ell = \lceil \log_{d_0} d \rceilℓ=⌈logd0​​d⌉ and N′=Nmℓd0N' = N m \ell d_0N′=Nmℓd0​, receives points β0,…,βN′−1∈R\beta_0, \dots, \beta_{N'-1} \in Rβ0​,…,βN′−1​∈R whose differences are units, and

  1. computes f′=ψd0,ℓ(f)f' = \psi_{d_0,\ell}(f)f′=ψd0​,ℓ​(f);
  2. computes gi,j=gid0 j mod hg_{i,j} = g_i^{d_0^{\,j}} \bmod hgi,j​=gid0j​​modh for all iii and j<ℓj < \ellj<ℓ;
  3. computes αi,j,k=gi,j(βk)\alpha_{i,j,k} = g_{i,j}(\beta_k)αi,j,k​=gi,j​(βk​);
  4. computes f′(α0,0,k,…,αm−1,ℓ−1,k)f'(\alpha_{0,0,k}, \dots, \alpha_{m-1,\ell-1,k})f′(α0,0,k​,…,αm−1,ℓ−1,k​) for k<N′k < N'k<N′ (one multivariate multipoint evaluation);
  5. interpolates these N′N'N′ values at the nodes βk\beta_kβk​;
  6. outputs the result modulo hhh.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1, correctness

algorithm(d0,d,f,g,h,β)  =  f(g0(X),…,gm−1(X)) mod h(X),\mathrm{algorithm}(d_0, d, f, g, h, \beta) \;=\; f\bigl(g_0(X), \dots, g_{m-1}(X)\bigr) \bmod h(X),algorithm(d0​,d,f,g,h,β)=f(g0​(X),…,gm−1​(X))modh(X),

for all m,N≥1m, N \ge 1m,N≥1, 2≤d0<d2 \le d_0 < d2≤d0​<d, fff with individual degrees ≤d−1\le d-1≤d−1, gi,hg_i, hgi​,h of degree ≤N−1\le N-1≤N−1 with lc(h)\mathrm{lc}(h)lc(h) a unit, and β0,…,βN′−1\beta_0, \dots, \beta_{N'-1}β0​,…,βN′−1​ distinct with unit differences. The right-hand side is stated through the characterization of the remainder (divisibility by hhh and degree below deg⁡h\deg hdegh).

Milestones (in the order the proof uses them)

  • Definition 2.3, remark: if every individual degree of fff is at most hℓ−1h^\ell - 1hℓ−1, then ψh,ℓ(f)(X0h0,…,Xm−1hℓ−1)=f\psi_{h,\ell}(f)\bigl(X_0^{h^0}, \dots, X_{m-1}^{h^{\ell-1}}\bigr) = fψh,ℓ​(f)(X0h0​,…,Xm−1hℓ−1​)=f.
  • Definition 2.3, remark: ψh,ℓ\psi_{h,\ell}ψh,ℓ​ is injective on such polynomials (not used by the goal).
  • Proof of Theorem 3.1: f′(g0,0,…,gm−1,ℓ−1)≡f(g0,…,gm−1)(modh)f'(g_{0,0}, \dots, g_{m-1,\ell-1}) \equiv f(g_0, \dots, g_{m-1}) \pmod{h}f′(g0,0​,…,gm−1,ℓ−1​)≡f(g0​,…,gm−1​)(modh).
  • Proof of Theorem 3.1, Step 5: deg⁡f′(g0,0(X),…,gm−1,ℓ−1(X))<N′\deg f'(g_{0,0}(X), \dots, g_{m-1,\ell-1}(X)) < N'degf′(g0,0​(X),…,gm−1,ℓ−1​(X))<N′.

A supporting theorem states that the interpolation formula over a commutative ring (Figure 1) recovers every polynomial of degree <n< n<n from its values at nnn nodes with unit differences.

Significance

Theorem 3.1 says that modular composition is no harder than one multivariate multipoint evaluation with mℓm\ellmℓ variables, individual degrees below d0d_0d0​, and N′N'N′ points, up to quasi-linear univariate work. Combined with the paper's fast multipoint evaluation algorithms this gives modular composition over Fq\mathbb F_qFq​ in n1+o(1)log⁡1+o(1)qn^{1+o(1)}\log^{1+o(1)} qn1+o(1)log1+o(1)q bit operations, and from there the paper's improved bounds for polynomial factorization, irreducibility testing, minimal polynomials and modular power projection (Sections 7–8). The converse reduction (Theorem 3.3) shows the two problems are essentially equivalent.

The paper's proof of correctness is a short paragraph; the operation counts are the paper's main concern. This mission makes the correctness exact: the algorithm is defined step for step, and its output is proved equal to the specification. As far as the platform's corpus shows, neither the inverse Kronecker map nor this reduction has a machine-checked statement; the running-time half is not part of this mission.

Difficulty

The obvious argument substitutes gid0jg_i^{d_0^j}gid0j​​ for Yi,jY_{i,j}Yi,j​ and invokes the inverse Kronecker identity. Two points keep this from being immediate. First, ψh,ℓ\psi_{h,\ell}ψh,ℓ​ is linear but not multiplicative, and it discards base-hhh digits beyond position ℓ−1\ell-1ℓ−1; the identity holds only for individual degrees at most hℓ−1h^\ell - 1hℓ−1, which here requires d≤d0⌈log⁡d0d⌉d \le d_0^{\lceil \log_{d_0} d\rceil}d≤d0⌈logd0​​d⌉​. Second, the algorithm never sees f′(g0,0,… )f'(g_{0,0}, \dots)f′(g0,0​,…) itself, only its values at N′N'N′ points: interpolation recovers it only if its degree is below N′N'N′, which is why Step 2 reduces modulo hhh before substituting, and interpolation over a ring (not a field) needs the unit-difference hypothesis throughout. Mathlib's Lagrange interpolation is stated over fields, so the ring version must be handled directly.

Formalization scope

  • RRR is any commutative ring (CommRing R); there is no field or nontriviality assumption.
  • Variables are Fin m; the new variables Yi,jY_{i,j}Yi,j​ are Fin m × Fin ℓ; points are Fin N'.
  • Individual degrees are MvPolynomial.degreeOf; "degree at most N−1N-1N−1" is natDegree ≤ N - 1.
  • ℓ\ellℓ is Nat.clog d₀ d and N′=Nmℓd0N' = N m \ell d_0N′=Nmℓd0​; ℓ\ellℓ is not a free parameter.
  • "mod hhh" for hhh with unit leading coefficient is the remainder on division by the monic associate h⋅lc(h)−1h \cdot \mathrm{lc}(h)^{-1}h⋅lc(h)−1; interpolation is the Lagrange formula with Ring.inverse of the node differences.
  • Step 4 is MvPolynomial.eval, which is exactly the output of Problem 2.1.
  • Added hypotheses: m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 and N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 (the paper does not consider m=0m = 0m=0, where N′=0N' = 0N′=0, or N=0N = 0N=0, where "degree at most N−1N - 1N−1" would collapse in natural-number arithmetic).
  • In the goal, "deg⁡r<deg⁡h\deg r < \deg hdegr<degh" is weakened to "deg⁡r<deg⁡h\deg r < \deg hdegr<degh or r=0r = 0r=0" only to cover the zero ring; in any nontrivial ring the two agree.
  • Only correctness is formalized. Operation counts, the O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) and polylog⁡\mathrm{poly}\logpolylog bounds, and the count of invocations are out of scope.

Step 5 is the interpolation formula applied to the N′N'N′ computed values and nodes alone; it is not defined as the polynomial f′(g0,0,…,gm−1,ℓ−1)f'(g_{0,0}, \dots, g_{m-1,\ell-1})f′(g0,0​,…,gm−1,ℓ−1​), and the goal is the six-step output, not the congruence alone, so the statement cannot be closed by unfolding definitions.

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: base-hhh digit manipulation of exponent vectors, Lagrange interpolation over commutative rings with unit node differences, and remainders modulo polynomials with unit leading coefficient. Proofs of any milestone, and of the supporting interpolation theorem, are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • K. S. Kedlaya, C. Umans, Fast polynomial factorization and modular composition, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 08381, 2008. http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1777
  • K. S. Kedlaya, C. Umans, Fast polynomial factorization and modular composition, SIAM J. Comput. 40(6):1767–1802, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1137/08073408X
  • R. P. Brent, H. T. Kung, Fast algorithms for manipulating formal power series, J. ACM 25(4):581–595, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1145/322092.322099
  • J. von zur Gathen, J. Gerhard, Modern Computer Algebra, Cambridge University Press, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139856065
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Numerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Branch-and-Bound Performance Estimation Programming: A Unified Methodology for Constructing Optimal Optimization Methods: Subgradient Rate L̃²(2√(4κ²(N+1)+1)−1)/(N+1) on Weakly Convex FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many objectives in statistics and machine learning are neither smooth nor convex, yet are well behaved in a weaker sense: robust phase retrieval, blind deconvolution, robust PCA and training with piecewise-linear losses all lead to weakly convex functions, functions that become convex after adding a fixed quadratic. For such functions the plain subgradient method xk+1=xk−h f′(xk)x_{k+1}=x_k-h\,f'(x_k)xk+1​=xk​−hf′(xk​) remains the method of choice, and the natural question is how fast it reaches approximate stationarity. Davis and Drusvyatskiy (SIAM J. Optim. 2019) gave the first such rate, measured by the gradient of the Moreau envelope, of order L~2 4κ/N+1\widetilde L^2\,4\kappa/\sqrt{N+1}L24κ/N+1​.

Das Gupta, Van Parys and Ryu (Math. Program. 204 (2024) 567–639) introduced BnB-PEP, a branch-and-bound method for solving nonconvex performance-estimation problems to global optimality, and used it to construct optimal and efficient first-order methods. Their one fully analytical result (§6.3) is a new potential-function analysis of the subgradient method on weakly convex functions with bounded subgradients. It produces an explicit stepsize and a rate that strictly improves on the Davis–Drusvyatskiy bound for all large enough NNN. The certificate was found numerically; the paper then gives a classical proof that can be checked by hand. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Work in Rd\mathbb R^dRd with the Euclidean norm. A function f:Rd→Rf:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb Rf:Rd→R is ρ\rhoρ-weakly convex if f+ρ2∥⋅∥2f+\frac{\rho}{2}\|\cdot\|^2f+2ρ​∥⋅∥2 is convex. For such fff, a vector ggg is a subgradient of fff at xxx, written g∈∂f(x)g\in\partial f(x)g∈∂f(x), when

f(y)≥f(x)+⟨g,y−x⟩−ρ2∥y−x∥2∀y∈Rd.f(y)\ge f(x)+\langle g,y-x\rangle-\frac{\rho}{2}\|y-x\|^2\qquad\forall y\in\mathbb R^d .f(y)≥f(x)+⟨g,y−x⟩−2ρ​∥y−x∥2∀y∈Rd.

The class Wρ,L\mathcal W_{\rho,L}Wρ,L​ consists of the ρ\rhoρ-weakly convex fff whose subgradients all satisfy ∥g∥≤L\|g\|\le L∥g∥≤L. Since f∈Wρ,Lf\in\mathcal W_{\rho,L}f∈Wρ,L​ exactly when f/ρ∈W1,L/ρf/\rho\in\mathcal W_{1,L/\rho}f/ρ∈W1,L/ρ​, the paper sets ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 and writes L~=L/ρ\widetilde L=L/\rhoL=L/ρ; here the normalized bound is written LLL (Lean: InWeakClass 1 L f, with subgradients IsWeakSubgrad 1 f x g).

For ρ^>1\hat\rho>1ρ^​>1 the proximal point prox(1/ρ^)f(x)\mathrm{prox}_{(1/\hat\rho)f}(x)prox(1/ρ^​)f​(x) is the unique minimizer of y↦f(y)+ρ^2∥y−x∥2y\mapsto f(y)+\frac{\hat\rho}{2}\|y-x\|^2y↦f(y)+2ρ^​​∥y−x∥2, and the Moreau envelope is the minimum value

f(1/ρ^)(x)=min⁡y{f(y)+ρ^2∥y−x∥2}f_{(1/\hat\rho)}(x)=\min_{y}\Big\{f(y)+\frac{\hat\rho}{2}\|y-x\|^2\Big\}f(1/ρ^​)​(x)=ymin​{f(y)+2ρ^​​∥y−x∥2}

(Lean: SAGA.Convex.IsProxPoint f (1/ρ̂) x y and moreauEnv ρ̂ f x). The envelope is continuously differentiable, and its gradient ∇f(1/ρ^)(x)=ρ^(x−y)\nabla f_{(1/\hat\rho)}(x)=\hat\rho(x-y)∇f(1/ρ^​)​(x)=ρ^​(x−y) is a subgradient of fff at the prox point yyy. With ρ^=2\hat\rho=2ρ^​=2, the paper's choice, ∥∇f(1/2)(x)∥\|\nabla f_{(1/2)}(x)\|∥∇f(1/2)​(x)∥ small means that xxx is near a point yyy that is nearly stationary for fff.

The method is xk+1=xk−h f′(xk)x_{k+1}=x_k-h\,f'(x_k)xk+1​=xk​−hf′(xk​) for k∈[0:N]k\in[0:N]k∈[0:N], where each f′(xk)∈∂f(xk)f'(x_k)\in\partial f(x_k)f′(xk​)∈∂f(xk​) is arbitrary. One writes yk=prox(1/2)f(xk)y_k=\mathrm{prox}_{(1/2)f}(x_k)yk​=prox(1/2)f​(xk​), f′(yk)=2(xk−yk)f'(y_k)=2(x_k-y_k)f′(yk​)=2(xk​−yk​), assumes a global minimizer x⋆x_\starx⋆​ and the initial condition f(y0)−f(x⋆)+∥x0−y0∥2≤R2f(y_0)-f(x_\star)+\|x_0-y_0\|^2\le R^2f(y0​)−f(x⋆​)+∥x0​−y0​∥2≤R2, and sets κ=R/L\kappa=R/Lκ=R/L.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1 (p. 625)

For the stepsize h=4κ2(N+1)+1 / (2(N+1))h=\sqrt{4\kappa^2(N+1)+1}\,/\,(2(N+1))h=4κ2(N+1)+1​/(2(N+1)), provided h≤12h\le\frac12h≤21​,

1N+1∑i=0N∥∇f(1/2)(xi)∥2 ≤ L2(24κ2(N+1)+1−1)N+1.\frac{1}{N+1}\sum_{i=0}^{N}\|\nabla f_{(1/2)}(x_i)\|^2\ \le\ \frac{L^2\big(2\sqrt{4\kappa^2(N+1)+1}-1\big)}{N+1}.N+11​i=0∑N​∥∇f(1/2)​(xi​)∥2 ≤ N+1L2(24κ2(N+1)+1​−1)​.

The bound holds for every choice of subgradients along the run.

Theorem 1 (p. 623)

For h∈(0,12]h\in(0,\frac12]h∈(0,21​], bN+1=0b_{N+1}=0bN+1​=0, bk=4+(1−2h)bk+1b_k=4+(1-2h)b_{k+1}bk​=4+(1−2h)bk+1​ and ck=h2bk+1c_k=h^2b_{k+1}ck​=h2bk+1​, the potentials ψk=bk(f(yk)−f(x⋆)+∥xk−yk∥2)\psi_k=b_k\big(f(y_k)-f(x_\star)+\|x_k-y_k\|^2\big)ψk​=bk​(f(yk​)−f(x⋆​)+∥xk​−yk​∥2) satisfy

∥f′(yk)∥2+ψk+1−ψk≤ck∥f′(xk)∥2(k∈[0:N]),1N+1∑i=0N∥∇f(1/2)(xi)∥2≤1N+1(L2∑i=0Nci+b0R2).\|f'(y_k)\|^2+\psi_{k+1}-\psi_k\le c_k\|f'(x_k)\|^2\quad(k\in[0:N]),\qquad \frac{1}{N+1}\sum_{i=0}^{N}\|\nabla f_{(1/2)}(x_i)\|^2\le\frac{1}{N+1}\Big(L^2\sum_{i=0}^{N}c_i+b_0R^2\Big).∥f′(yk​)∥2+ψk+1​−ψk​≤ck​∥f′(xk​)∥2(k∈[0:N]),N+11​i=0∑N​∥∇f(1/2)​(xi​)∥2≤N+11​(L2i=0∑N​ci​+b0​R2).

Milestones

In proof order: the Moreau-envelope facts of §6.3.1; the one-step inequality (32) for an arbitrary point; the telescoping display after (32); the closed form (44) of bkb_kbk​ with nonnegativity; Theorem 1; the closed form (45) of its bound in hhh; the majorant (46) with Bernoulli's upper bound; and the minimizer hub⋆h^\star_{\mathrm{ub}}hub⋆​ of (46) with its value.

Significance

The result. Corollary 1 gives an explicit, non-asymptotic rate for the most basic method of nonsmooth nonconvex optimization, with explicit constants and an explicit stepsize. As N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ the bound is asymptotic to 4κL2/N+14\kappa L^2/\sqrt{N+1}4κL2/N+1​, and the paper shows it is strictly below the earlier bound L2 4κ/N+1L^2\,4\kappa/\sqrt{N+1}L24κ/N+1​ once N>(9−64κ2)/(64κ2)N>(9-64\kappa^2)/(64\kappa^2)N>(9−64κ2)/(64κ2). It also bounds min⁡i≤N∥∇f(1/2)(xi)∥2\min_{i\le N}\|\nabla f_{(1/2)}(x_i)\|^2mini≤N​∥∇f(1/2)​(xi​)∥2. It shows that computer-assisted performance estimation can produce closed-form guarantees beyond the convex, interpolable function classes where PEP is usually applied.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper twice (pp. 622–627), but nothing about weakly convex functions, their subdifferential or the Moreau envelope in the nonconvex regime is formalized on the platform, and the convergence analysis has not been machine-checked. A complete development formalizes the potential-function proof and supplies reusable facts about weakly convex functions and the Moreau envelope.

Difficulty

The scalar part of the argument ((44)–(46) and the plug-in) is elementary algebra and one Bernoulli inequality. The analytic weight sits in two places. First, the Moreau envelope of a nonconvex function: showing that the real infimum is attained at the prox point, that the envelope is differentiable with gradient ρ^(x−y)\hat\rho(x-y)ρ^​(x−y), and that this gradient is a subgradient of fff at yyy with the weak-convexity modulus 111 (not the modulus ρ^\hat\rhoρ^​ that the prox inequality gives directly). Second, inequality (32): it is not a consequence of convexity, since fff is not convex, and it must hold for an arbitrary current point and an arbitrary subgradient, with parameters bk,ckb_k,c_kbk​,ck​ fixed in advance. The obvious route through descent of fff itself fails: f(xk)−f(x⋆)f(x_k)-f(x_\star)f(xk​)−f(x⋆​) need not decrease for nonconvex fff, which is why the potential uses the envelope at the iterates.

Formalization scope

The carrier is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), and fff is real-valued and defined everywhere. The weak-convexity modulus is normalized to ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1, and the Lean name L is the paper's L~\widetilde LL; the general class Wρ,L\mathcal W_{\rho,L}Wρ,L​ follows by scaling and is not stated. The subdifferential is the weak-convexity inequality above. For weakly convex fff it equals the Clarke, Fréchet and limiting subdifferentials, so it is the paper's abstract ∂f\partial f∂f in every admissible instance. The convex subdifferential of fff is not used: it can be empty for nonconvex fff and would make the statements vacuous. The run is given by sequences x g y : ℕ → E, with g k an arbitrary subgradient at x k for k≤Nk\le Nk≤N, and y k tied to x k by IsProxPoint f (1/2) for k≤N+1k\le N+1k≤N+1. f′(yk)f'(y_k)f′(yk​) is not free: it is 2(xk−yk)2(x_k-y_k)2(xk​−yk​). The Moreau envelope is a real ⨅; it is finite and attained in this regime, and the first milestone proves this. The parameters b,cb,cb,c of Theorem 1 are pinned by hypotheses, not chosen existentially.

Two hypotheses are made explicit. Corollary 1 is stated "in the setup of Theorem 1", which requires h∈(0,12]h\in(0,\frac12]h∈(0,21​]; for the prescribed stepsize this is 4κ2(N+1)+1≤(N+1)24\kappa^2(N+1)+1\le(N+1)^24κ2(N+1)+1≤(N+1)2, and it is carried as the hypothesis h≤12h\le\frac12h≤21​. It fails for N=0N=0N=0 and whenever κ\kappaκ is large relative to NNN. Inequality (32) is stated for one arbitrary step, under the nonnegativity of the alternate proof's weights (h≥0h\ge0h≥0, bk+1≥0b_{k+1}\ge0bk+1​≥0, hbk+1≤2hb_{k+1}\le2hbk+1​≤2). The minimizer x⋆x_\starx⋆​ is assumed, as in the paper; the remark on p. 627 that inf⁡f>−∞\inf f>-\inftyinff>−∞ suffices is not used.

Useful contributions include basic lemmas on weakly convex functions (existence of subgradients, strong convexity of the prox subproblem), differentiability of the Moreau envelope for ρ^>ρ\hat\rho>\rhoρ^​>ρ, the weighted-sum identity behind (32), and Bernoulli's upper bound (1+a)r≤1/(1−ra)(1+a)^r\le 1/(1-ra)(1+a)r≤1/(1−ra) for a∈[−1,0]a\in[-1,0]a∈[−1,0].

Selected references

  • S. Das Gupta, B. P. G. Van Parys, E. K. Ryu, Branch-and-bound performance estimation programming: a unified methodology for constructing optimal optimization methods, Mathematical Programming 204 (2024) 567–639. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-023-01973-1
  • D. Davis, D. Drusvyatskiy, Stochastic model-based minimization of weakly convex functions, SIAM Journal on Optimization 29(1) (2019) 207–239. https://doi.org/10.1137/18M1178244
  • Y. Drori, M. Teboulle, Performance of first-order methods for smooth convex minimization: a novel approach, Mathematical Programming 145 (2014) 451–482. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0653-0
  • A. B. Taylor, J. M. Hendrickx, F. Glineur, Smooth strongly convex interpolation and exact worst-case performance of first-order methods, Mathematical Programming 161 (2017) 307–345. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-0985-6
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 4: The Fixed Points of the Division-Free Map G_I(x)ij = max(x_ij + u_i((i:j); x−i) − t_i, 0) Are Exactly the Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

Motivation

Nash's existence theorem for finite games is a fixed-point theorem: one writes down a continuous map from the set of mixed strategy profiles to itself whose fixed points are exactly the Nash equilibria, and applies Brouwer's theorem. Nash's own map (Nash 1951) divides by 1+∑jmax⁡(0,⋅)1+\sum_j \max(0,\cdot)1+∑j​max(0,⋅), and the choice of map matters as soon as the question is computational rather than existential.

Etessami and Yannakakis (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)) introduce the class FIXP of fixed-point search problems whose maps are given by algebraic circuits over {+,−,∗,/,max⁡,min⁡}\{+,-,*,/,\max,\min\}{+,−,∗,/,max,min} and rational constants, and show that computing a Nash equilibrium of a 3-player game is FIXP-complete. In Section 4 they ask which gates are really needed. Since the Nash problem is complete, it suffices to find, for every game, a map with the same fixed points and a cheaper circuit. They define a division-free map GIG_IGI​, prove that its fixed points are precisely the Nash equilibria (Lemma 20), show that it is computed by a circuit with gates {+,−,∗,max⁡,min⁡}\{+,-,*,\max,\min\}{+,−,∗,max,min} (Lemma 21), and conclude that FIXP is unchanged if circuits use only {+,∗,max⁡}\{+,*,\max\}{+,∗,max} and rational constants (Theorem 22). The same map, defined as a Euclidean projection, appears earlier in Gul, Pearce and Stacchetti (1993).

This mission formalizes the game-theoretic content of that section: the map GIG_IGI​, its well-definedness, and Lemma 20.

Setting

A finite game III has a finite set of players iii; each player has a finite, nonempty set SiS_iSi​ of pure strategies, and a payoff function uiu_iui​ assigns a real number to every pure strategy profile. A mixed strategy of player iii is a vector (xij)j∈Si(x_{ij})_{j\in S_i}(xij​)j∈Si​​ with xij≥0x_{ij}\ge0xij​≥0 and ∑jxij=1\sum_{j}x_{ij}=1∑j​xij​=1; a mixed profile xxx is one mixed strategy per player, and Δ\DeltaΔ denotes the set of mixed profiles (the product of the players' unit simplices). The expected payoff ui(x)u_i(x)ui​(x) is the expectation of uiu_iui​ when the players draw their strategies independently according to xxx. For j∈Sij\in S_ij∈Si​, ui((i:j);x−i)u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})ui​((i:j);x−i​) is player iii's expected payoff when iii plays jjj and the others play according to xxx. A Nash equilibrium is a mixed profile xxx such that no player can raise ui(x)u_i(x)ui​(x) by switching unilaterally to another mixed strategy.

For a vector xxx indexed by pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), let v(x)ij=ui((i:j);x−i)v(x)_{ij}=u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})v(x)ij​=ui​((i:j);x−i​) and h(x)=x+v(x)h(x)=x+v(x)h(x)=x+v(x). For each player iii define the function of a real variable

fi,x(t)=∑j∈Simax⁡(hij(x)−t, 0).f_{i,x}(t)=\sum_{j\in S_i}\max\bigl(h_{ij}(x)-t,\,0\bigr).fi,x​(t)=j∈Si​∑​max(hij​(x)−t,0).

It is continuous, nonincreasing, strictly decreasing below max⁡jhij(x)\max_j h_{ij}(x)maxj​hij​(x) and zero above it, so there is a unique threshold tit_iti​ with fi,x(ti)=1f_{i,x}(t_i)=1fi,x​(ti​)=1. The division-free map is

GI(x)ij=max⁡(hij(x)−ti, 0).G_I(x)_{ij}=\max\bigl(h_{ij}(x)-t_i,\,0\bigr).GI​(x)ij​=max(hij​(x)−ti​,0).

In the Lean development, v(x)ijv(x)_{ij}v(x)ij​ is DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff u x i j, hhh is hVal, fi,xf_{i,x}fi,x​ is fSum, tit_iti​ is threshold and GIG_IGI​ is G, all in the namespace FixpNash.DivFree.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 20 (p. 47)

For every finite game with nonempty strategy sets and every x∈Δx\in\Deltax∈Δ,

GI(x)=x  ⟺  x is a Nash equilibrium of I.G_I(x)=x\iff x\text{ is a Nash equilibrium of }I.GI​(x)=x⟺x is a Nash equilibrium of I.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. The threshold is well defined (p. 47): for every real xxx and every player with Si≠∅S_i\neq\emptysetSi​=∅, fi,x(t)=1f_{i,x}(t)=1fi,x​(t)=1 has exactly one solution, and it is tit_iti​.
  2. GIG_IGI​ maps into Δ\DeltaΔ (p. 47): ∑j∈SiGI(x)ij=1\sum_{j\in S_i}G_I(x)_{ij}=1∑j∈Si​​GI​(x)ij​=1 for every iii, so GI(x)∈ΔG_I(x)\in\DeltaGI​(x)∈Δ.
  3. Pure deviations suffice (p. 11): xxx is a Nash equilibrium iff x∈Δx\in\Deltax∈Δ and ui((i:j);x−i)≤ui(x)u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})\le u_i(x)ui​((i:j);x−i​)≤ui​(x) for all iii and j∈Sij\in S_ij∈Si​.
  4. Fixed points equalize the support (proof of Lemma 20, p. 47): if x∈Δx\in\Deltax∈Δ and GI(x)=xG_I(x)=xGI​(x)=x, then ui((i:j);x−i)=tiu_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})=t_iui​((i:j);x−i​)=ti​ when xij>0x_{ij}>0xij​>0 and ui((i:j);x−i)≤tiu_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})\le t_iui​((i:j);x−i​)≤ti​ when xij=0x_{ij}=0xij​=0.
  5. At an equilibrium the threshold is the payoff (proof of Lemma 20, p. 47): if xxx is a Nash equilibrium then ti=ui(x)t_i=u_i(x)ti​=ui​(x) for every iii.
  6. Closed form of the threshold (proof of Lemma 21, p. 48): if zi1≥⋯≥ziniz_{i1}\ge\dots\ge z_{in_i}zi1​≥⋯≥zini​​ is hi(x)h_i(x)hi​(x) sorted in decreasing order, then
ti=max⁡{1l(∑j=1lzij−1):l=1,…,ni}.t_i=\max\Bigl\{\tfrac1l\Bigl(\sum_{j=1}^{l}z_{ij}-1\Bigr):l=1,\dots,n_i\Bigr\}.ti​=max{l1​(j=1∑l​zij​−1):l=1,…,ni​}.

This last milestone is off the goal's path; it is the formula behind the division-free circuit.

Significance

Lemma 20, with Brouwer's theorem and the continuity of GIG_IGI​, gives an elementary proof of Nash's theorem. With Lemma 21 it shows that the Nash equilibrium problem, and therefore every FIXP problem, is represented by circuits without division; the paper uses this to obtain Theorem 22. The pure-deviation criterion of milestone 3 is the standard test for equilibria and is used throughout equilibrium computation. The closed form of milestone 6 is the threshold of the Euclidean projection onto the simplex, used widely in optimization.

All of these results are proved in the paper. The mission produces machine-checked versions. No platform item states Lemma 20 or the pure-deviation criterion for AGT.IsMixedNash. Related posed items, with other conventions, are credited below rather than reused: the thresholds of the simplex projection in the Condat 2015 series (SimplexProj.Condat.simplex_projection_threshold, threshold_root_bracket, subsequence_mean_le_threshold, stated for the projection on RN\mathbb R^NRN with a radius), and the best-response fixed-point characterization in supermodular games (Supermodularity.Games.equilibrium_iff_fixed_point_v2, a different map). The paper also remarks, without proof, that GI(x)G_I(x)GI​(x) is the point of Δ\DeltaΔ closest to h(x)h(x)h(x). That remark is not a target here.

Difficulty

The map GIG_IGI​ is defined through an implicitly determined threshold. In the formalization the threshold has to be a definition that does not depend on a proof, and every statement about it rests on the existence and uniqueness of the root of fi,x(t)=1f_{i,x}(t)=1fi,x​(t)=1. This is an intermediate-value argument for a piecewise linear function of a finite sum of max⁡\maxmax terms. Its strict monotonicity holds only below max⁡jhij(x)\max_j h_{ij}(x)maxj​hij​(x), and the argument must use that SiS_iSi​ is nonempty.

The equivalence itself needs the multilinearity of the expected payoff: ui(x)=∑jxij ui((i:j);x−i)u_i(x)=\sum_j x_{ij}\,u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})ui​(x)=∑j​xij​ui​((i:j);x−i​) and, more generally, the payoff of a deviation to a mixed strategy yiy_iyi​ is ∑jyij ui((i:j);x−i)\sum_j y_{ij}\,u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})∑j​yij​ui​((i:j);x−i​). In the agt_games representation the expected payoff is a sum over all pure profiles of products of probabilities, so this identity must be extracted from the product structure rather than read off.

Formalization scope

The game uses the published agt_games vocabulary: players form a finite type ι with decidable equality, the strategies of player i a finite type S i, payoffs are real (the paper's are rational, so this is a generalization), mixed profiles are real weight functions satisfying AGT.IsMixedProfile, and Nash equilibrium is AGT.IsMixedNash (no profitable deviation to any lottery). The pure-strategy payoff ui((i:j);x−i)u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})ui​((i:j);x−i​) is the published DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff.

The following readings are explicit in the Lean and implicit on the page:

  • every strategy set is nonempty (∀ i, Nonempty (S i)). The paper assumes this tacitly; without it Δ\DeltaΔ is empty and tit_iti​ does not exist;
  • the threshold is defined as ti=inf⁡{t:fi,x(t)≤1}t_i=\inf\{t: f_{i,x}(t)\le1\}ti​=inf{t:fi,x​(t)≤1}. Milestone 1 proves that this is the paper's "unique value of ttt where fi,x(ti)=1f_{i,x}(t_i)=1fi,x​(ti​)=1". A formalization in which tit_iti​ is a free parameter, or is set to ui(x)u_i(x)ui​(x), would make Lemma 20 nearly definitional. That is ruled out: GIG_IGI​ is defined from the game alone, and tit_iti​ is the root of fi,x(t)=1f_{i,x}(t)=1fi,x​(t)=1;
  • hhh, fi,xf_{i,x}fi,x​, tit_iti​ and GIG_IGI​ are given by the same formulas for every real vector xxx. Milestones 1, 2 and 6 hold in that generality, while the goal and milestones 4–5 are stated on Δ\DeltaΔ, as on the page;
  • "fixed point of GIG_IGI​" means a point x∈Δx\in\Deltax∈Δ with GI(x)=xG_I(x)=xGI​(x)=x;
  • "it is sufficient to check switches to pure strategies only" becomes an equivalence between AGT.IsMixedNash and the pure-deviation inequalities for a mixed profile;
  • in milestone 6, the sorted order is a bijection eee from {0,…,n}\{0,\dots,n\}{0,…,n} onto SiS_iSi​ along which hi,e(l)(x)h_{i,e(l)}(x)hi,e(l)​(x) is nonincreasing, so ni=n+1n_i=n+1ni​=n+1 and the paper's index lll is l+1l+1l+1.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone. The multilinearity of AGT.expectedPayoff in one player's strategy, and the existence and uniqueness of the threshold of a finite sum of hinge functions, are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • K. Etessami and M. Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, SIAM J. Comput. 39(6) (2010) 2531–2597; author manuscript, Section 4, pp. 47–48. https://doi.org/10.1137/080720826
  • J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
  • F. Gul, D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti, A bound on the proportion of pure strategy equilibria in generic games, Mathematics of Operations Research 18(3) (1993) 548–552. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.3.548
  • L. Condat, Fast projection onto the simplex and the ℓ1 ball, Mathematical Programming 158 (2016) 575–585. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-015-0946-6
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 2: Block Matching Pennies Gives Every Block the Same Probability and the Matching Player Full Support in Every Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

Reductions that prove hardness for Nash equilibrium computation encode a computation (a circuit, a fixed-point problem) into the probabilities that players put on their strategies in every equilibrium. For the encoding to be meaningful, the designer has to control how each player distributes probability across groups of strategies, independently of the incentives that carry the computation. A standard tool for this is a generalized matching pennies game: each "computing" player is paired with an adversary who is penalized for guessing which group the computing player is playing, and who therefore forces that player to spread probability evenly over the groups. Versions of this device appear in the PPAD-hardness reductions of Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou and of Chen and Deng, and in Etessami and Yannakakis's Theorem 4, which reduces the SQRT-SUM and PosSLP problems to deciding, with a promised gap, whether the unique Nash equilibrium of a 4-player (or 3-player) game plays a given pure strategy (Etessami–Yannakakis, SIAM J. Comput. 2010).

This mission formalizes the version of the device that Etessami and Yannakakis isolate as Lemma 6 (p. 24 of the authors' manuscript), with the explicit constants of their construction.

Setting

A finite game has a finite set of players; each player ppp has a finite set SpS_pSp​ of pure strategies, and receives payoff up(s)∈Ru_p(s)\in\mathbb Rup​(s)∈R at each pure profile s=(sq)qs=(s_q)_qs=(sq​)q​. A mixed profile xxx assigns to each player ppp a probability vector xpx_pxp​ on SpS_pSp​; players randomize independently, and up(x)u_p(x)up​(x) is ppp's expected payoff. Write up((p:j);x−p)u_p((p{:}j);x_{-p})up​((p:j);x−p​) for the expected payoff of ppp when ppp plays the pure strategy jjj and everyone else plays according to xxx. A Nash equilibrium is a mixed profile xxx such that no player can raise their expected payoff by switching unilaterally to another mixed strategy.

Fix two players i≠i′i\ne i'i=i′. The pure strategies of iii are partitioned into blocks, in one-to-one correspondence with the pure strategies of i′i'i′. This is recorded by a surjective map β:Si→Si′\beta:S_i\to S_{i'}β:Si​→Si′​: the block of a strategy jjj of iii corresponds to the strategy β(j)\beta(j)β(j) of i′i'i′. The total probability of block k∈Si′k\in S_{i'}k∈Si′​ under xxx is

bk(x)=∑j∈Si: β(j)=kxi(j).b_k(x)=\sum_{j\in S_i:\ \beta(j)=k}x_i(j).bk​(x)=j∈Si​: β(j)=k∑​xi​(j).

The payoffs of i,i′i,i'i,i′ have the block matching-pennies form with first term μ\muμ, constant MMM and parameter nnn when

ui(s)=μ(s)+M⋅[β(si)=si′],ui′(s)=−M⋅[si′=β(si)],u_i(s)=\mu(s)+M\cdot[\beta(s_i)=s_{i'}],\qquad u_{i'}(s)=-M\cdot[s_{i'}=\beta(s_i)],ui​(s)=μ(s)+M⋅[β(si​)=si′​],ui′​(s)=−M⋅[si′​=β(si​)],

μ(s)\mu(s)μ(s) does not depend on si′s_{i'}si′​, M>6nmax⁡s∣μ(s)∣M>6n\max_s|\mu(s)|M>6nmaxs​∣μ(s)∣, and i′i'i′ has at most 3n3n3n strategies. Player iii is rewarded MMM for "matching" the strategy of i′i'i′ with the block it plays; player i′i'i′ loses MMM when matched. The term μ\muμ is arbitrary otherwise: in the paper it carries the gate gadgets of the circuit.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 6

For every Nash equilibrium xxx of a game in which i,i′i,i'i,i′ have the block matching-pennies form,

bk(x)=bk′(x)  for all k,k′∈Si′,andxi′(k)≠0  for all k∈Si′.b_k(x)=b_{k'}(x)\ \text{ for all }k,k'\in S_{i'},\qquad\text{and}\qquad x_{i'}(k)\ne0\ \text{ for all }k\in S_{i'} .bk​(x)=bk′​(x)  for all k,k′∈Si′​,andxi′​(k)=0  for all k∈Si′​.

Part 1 says iii divides its probability evenly among its blocks (each block gets 1/∣Si′∣1/|S_{i'}|1/∣Si′​∣); part 2 says the matching player uses every strategy.

Milestones

  1. Support property (p. 26, used twice on p. 24): in a Nash equilibrium every pure strategy of every player earns at most the equilibrium payoff, with equality on the support.
  2. The matching player avoids the most probable blocks (p. 24): if the block probabilities are not all equal, xi′(k)=0x_{i'}(k)=0xi′​(k)=0 for every kkk whose block has maximum probability.
  3. The two payoff bounds (p. 24), for any mixed profile: if xi′(β(j))=0x_{i'}(\beta(j))=0xi′​(β(j))=0 then ui((i:j);x−i)≤max⁡s∣μ(s)∣u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})\le\max_s|\mu(s)|ui​((i:j);x−i​)≤maxs​∣μ(s)∣; if β(j′)\beta(j')β(j′) is a maximum-probability strategy of i′i'i′ then ui((i:j′);x−i)≥M/(3n)−max⁡s∣μ(s)∣u_i((i{:}j');x_{-i})\ge M/(3n)-\max_s|\mu(s)|ui​((i:j′);x−i​)≥M/(3n)−maxs​∣μ(s)∣.
  4. Lemma 6, part 1 (p. 24): all blocks have the same total probability.

Significance

In the paper, Lemma 6 is what makes every unprimed player of the 10-player game GGG of Section 3 spread probability 1/n1/n1/n (or 1/(3n)1/(3n)1/(3n)) on each block, so that the split of probability inside a block can carry the value of a circuit gate, and the gate gadgets of Lemma 7 act on correctly normalized quantities. Without it, the gadgets' analysis does not apply. The lemma is stated for an arbitrary game containing such a pair, so it is reusable for any reduction that pairs computing players with matching-pennies adversaries.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in it is open. As far as the platform and its index show, no machine-checked version exists: the platform has the 2×2 matching pennies game (PotentialGames.matchingPennies_no_pureNash, which shows it has no pure equilibrium) and our CalibratedCE.Convergence.MatchingPennies (Foster–Vohra's example), neither of which is the block game. This mission produces a checked version of the lemma with the paper's constants, together with the support property of mixed Nash equilibria for the agt_games vocabulary, a basic fact other game-theory missions can import.

Difficulty

The argument is short; the difficulty is in the accounting. The expected payoff of a pure strategy of iii mixes the arbitrary term μ\muμ, evaluated under the product distribution of all other players, with the matching term, which depends only on xi′x_{i'}xi′​. Separating the two requires that ui′u_{i'}ui′​ depends only on si,si′s_i,s_{i'}si​,si′​ and that the expected-payoff sum factors over independent players. The constants also interact: the lower bound uses that i′i'i′ has at most 3n3n3n strategies, so that some strategy of i′i'i′ has probability at least 1/(3n)1/(3n)1/(3n), and the comparison of the two bounds needs M/(3n)−max⁡∣μ∣>max⁡∣μ∣M/(3n)-\max|\mu|>\max|\mu|M/(3n)−max∣μ∣>max∣μ∣, which is exactly M>6nmax⁡∣μ∣M>6n\max|\mu|M>6nmax∣μ∣. A tempting shortcut, comparing bkb_kbk​ only with the average block probability, does not identify which strategies of i′i'i′ vanish; the argument goes through the set of maximum-probability blocks.

Formalization scope

The game uses the published agt_games vocabulary: players and strategies are arbitrary finite types ι, S : ι → Type*, payoffs are real (u : ι → (∀ k, S k) → ℝ), mixed profiles are families of probability vectors, and AGT.IsMixedNash allows deviations to arbitrary mixed strategies. The pure-strategy payoff up((p:j);x−p)u_p((p{:}j);x_{-p})up​((p:j);x−p​) is the published DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff. The block structure is a surjective map β:Si→Si′\beta:S_i\to S_{i'}β:Si​→Si′​; surjectivity is the "1-1 correspondence" of blocks with strategies of i′i'i′ (an empty block would make the lemma vacuous). The definition item packages the form "given above" as FixpNash.Blocks.IsBlockPair.

Explicit readings of the page:

  • "the payoffs of i,i′i,i'i,i′ are of the form given above" is the conjunction of the two payoff identities, the bound M>6nmax⁡s∣μ(s)∣M>6n\max_s|\mu(s)|M>6nmaxs​∣μ(s)∣, and ∣Si′∣≤3n|S_{i'}|\le3n∣Si′​∣≤3n. The last is taken from the proof ("since i′i'i′ has at most 3n3n3n strategies"); in the abstract lemma nnn is a parameter, not the number of circuit gates.
  • "μi(s)\mu_i(s)μi​(s) depends only on the strategies of the unprimed players" is stated as: μ\muμ does not depend on si′s_{i'}si′​. The proof does not use it.
  • max⁡s∣μ(s)∣\max_s|\mu(s)|maxs​∣μ(s)∣ is the supremum of ∣μ(s)∣|\mu(s)|∣μ(s)∣ over the finite set of pure profiles; M/3nM/3nM/3n is M/(3n)M/(3n)M/(3n).
  • "Nonzero probability" is xi′(k)≠0x_{i'}(k)\ne0xi′​(k)=0; "in the support" is xp(j)>0x_p(j)>0xp​(j)>0.
  • The support property is stated for every player of every finite game, rather than for players 2 and 3 of the gadget of p. 26.
  • The payoff bounds are stated for any mixed profile; "a strategy in a block in RRR" enters only through xi′(β(j))=0x_{i'}(\beta(j))=0xi′​(β(j))=0.

The degenerate case max⁡s∣μ(s)∣=0\max_s|\mu(s)|=0maxs​∣μ(s)∣=0 is allowed and reads M>0M>0M>0. A formalization in which i′i'i′ has no strategies, or a block is empty, would make the lemma vacuous; the surjectivity of β\betaβ and the definition of a mixed profile exclude this. Contributions welcome: proofs of the support property (reusable well beyond this mission), of the two payoff bounds (a factorization of the expected payoff over independent players), and of the lemma.

Selected references

  • K. Etessami and M. Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, SIAM J. Comput. 39(6) (2010) 2531–2597. https://doi.org/10.1137/080720826 (cited from the authors' manuscript, Lemma 6, p. 24).
  • C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg and C. H. Papadimitriou, The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium, SIAM J. Comput. 39(1) (2009) 195–259. https://doi.org/10.1137/070699652
  • X. Chen and X. Deng, Settling the complexity of two-player Nash equilibrium, FOCS 2006, 261–272. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2006.69
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Numerical AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Adaptive Cubic Regularisation Methods for Unconstrained Optimization. Part II: Worst-Case Function- and Derivative-Evaluation Complexity 1: Basic ARC Reaches ‖g‖ ≤ ε in O(ε^(−2)) IterationsResearch Paper

Motivation

Methods for smooth unconstrained minimization, min⁡x∈Rnf(x)\min_{x\in\mathbb R^n} f(x)minx∈Rn​f(x), are compared by how many evaluations of fff and of its gradient they need, in the worst case, to reach an approximately first-order critical point, an iterate with ∥∇f(xk)∥≤ϵ\|\nabla f(x_k)\|\le\epsilon∥∇f(xk​)∥≤ϵ. For steepest descent with a Lipschitz gradient the answer is O(ϵ−2)O(\epsilon^{-2})O(ϵ−2) (Nesterov, Introductory Lectures on Convex Optimization, 2004, p. 29). Nesterov and Polyak (2006) showed that globally minimizing a cubic regularisation of the second-order model, with the exact Hessian and a global Lipschitz constant, improves this to O(ϵ−3/2)O(\epsilon^{-3/2})O(ϵ−3/2).

The adaptive regularisation with cubics (ARC) framework of Cartis, Gould and Toint makes that idea practical: the Hessian is replaced by an approximation BkB_kBk​, the Lipschitz constant by an adaptive weight σk\sigma_kσk​, and the global model minimizer by any step that does at least as well as a Cauchy point. Part I (Math. Program. 127, 2011) proved global convergence; Part II (Math. Program. 130, 2011) counts evaluations. This mission covers the first count of Part II (§§2–3): with only the Cauchy condition on the step, ARC needs O(ϵ−2)O(\epsilon^{-2})O(ϵ−2) iterations, the same order as steepest descent and as trust-region methods (Gratton, Sartenaer and Toint, SIAM J. Optim. 19, 2008).

Setting

Let f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf:Rn→R be continuously differentiable (AF.1), g(x)=∇f(x)g(x)=\nabla f(x)g(x)=∇f(x), and ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ the Euclidean norm. At iterate xkx_kxk​, with a symmetric matrix BkB_kBk​ and a weight σk>0\sigma_k>0σk​>0, the cubic model is

mk(s)=f(xk)+sTgk+12sTBks+13σk∥s∥3,gk=g(xk).m_k(s)=f(x_k)+s^Tg_k+\tfrac12 s^TB_ks+\tfrac13\sigma_k\|s\|^3,\qquad g_k=g(x_k).mk​(s)=f(xk​)+sTgk​+21​sTBk​s+31​σk​∥s∥3,gk​=g(xk​).

Algorithm 2.1 (ARC) takes parameters γ2≥γ1>1\gamma_2\ge\gamma_1>1γ2​≥γ1​>1, 1>η2≥η1>01>\eta_2\ge\eta_1>01>η2​≥η1​>0, σ0>0\sigma_0>0σ0​>0 and a starting point x0x_0x0​. At iteration kkk it

  1. picks any step sks_ksk​ satisfying the Cauchy condition mk(sk)≤mk(−αgk)m_k(s_k)\le m_k(-\alpha g_k)mk​(sk​)≤mk​(−αgk​) for every α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0;
  2. computes ρk=(f(xk)−f(xk+sk))/(f(xk)−mk(sk))\rho_k=\big(f(x_k)-f(x_k+s_k)\big)/\big(f(x_k)-m_k(s_k)\big)ρk​=(f(xk​)−f(xk​+sk​))/(f(xk​)−mk​(sk​));
  3. sets xk+1=xk+skx_{k+1}=x_k+s_kxk+1​=xk​+sk​ if ρk≥η1\rho_k\ge\eta_1ρk​≥η1​ (a successful iteration), and xk+1=xkx_{k+1}=x_kxk+1​=xk​ otherwise (unsuccessful);
  4. picks σk+1\sigma_{k+1}σk+1​ in (0,σk](0,\sigma_k](0,σk​] if ρk>η2\rho_k>\eta_2ρk​>η2​ (very successful), in [σk,γ1σk][\sigma_k,\gamma_1\sigma_k][σk​,γ1​σk​] if η1≤ρk≤η2\eta_1\le\rho_k\le\eta_2η1​≤ρk​≤η2​, and in [γ1σk,γ2σk][\gamma_1\sigma_k,\gamma_2\sigma_k][γ1​σk​,γ2​σk​] otherwise.

For j≥0j\ge0j≥0, Sj\mathcal S_jSj​ and Uj\mathcal U_jUj​ are the successful and unsuccessful iterations among 0,…,j0,\dots,j0,…,j. The complexity results use three assumptions: AM.1, ∥Bk∥≤κB\|B_k\|\le\kappa_B∥Bk​∥≤κB​ for all kkk; AF.4, ∥g(x)−g(y)∥≤κH∥x−y∥\|g(x)-g(y)\|\le\kappa_H\|x-y\|∥g(x)−g(y)∥≤κH​∥x−y∥ on an open convex set XXX, with κH≥1\kappa_H\ge1κH​≥1; and a lower bound f(xk)≥flowf(x_k)\ge f_{\rm low}f(xk​)≥flow​. Optionally, (2.10): σk+1≥γ3σk\sigma_{k+1}\ge\gamma_3\sigma_kσk+1​≥γ3​σk​ on very successful iterations, for some γ3∈(0,1]\gamma_3\in(0,1]γ3​∈(0,1]. The constants are

κHB=10821−η2(κH+κB),αC=[62max⁡(1+κB,2max⁡(σ0,κHBγ2))]−1,\kappa_{HB}=\frac{108\sqrt2}{1-\eta_2}(\kappa_H+\kappa_B),\qquad \alpha_C=\Big[6\sqrt2\max\big(1+\kappa_B,2\max(\sqrt{\sigma_0},\kappa_{HB}\sqrt{\gamma_2})\big)\Big]^{-1},κHB​=1−η2​1082​​(κH​+κB​),αC​=[62​max(1+κB​,2max(σ0​​,κHB​γ2​​))]−1, κCs=f(x0)−flowη1αC,κCu=1log⁡γ1max⁡(1,γ2κHB2σ0),κC=(1−log⁡γ3log⁡γ1)κCs+κCu.\kappa^s_C=\frac{f(x_0)-f_{\rm low}}{\eta_1\alpha_C},\qquad \kappa^u_C=\frac{1}{\log\gamma_1}\max\Big(1,\frac{\gamma_2\kappa_{HB}^2}{\sigma_0}\Big),\qquad \kappa_C=\Big(1-\frac{\log\gamma_3}{\log\gamma_1}\Big)\kappa^s_C+\kappa^u_C.κCs​=η1​αC​f(x0​)−flow​​,κCu​=logγ1​1​max(1,σ0​γ2​κHB2​​),κC​=(1−logγ1​logγ3​​)κCs​+κCu​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 3.4

Let ϵ∈(0,1]\epsilon\in(0,1]ϵ∈(0,1] with ∥g0∥>ϵ\|g_0\|>\epsilon∥g0​∥>ϵ, and let j1≤∞j_1\le\inftyj1​≤∞ be the first iteration with ∥gj1+1∥≤ϵ\|g_{j_1+1}\|\le\epsilon∥gj1​+1​∥≤ϵ. Then

∣Sj1∣≤L1s=⌈κCs ϵ−2⌉,|\mathcal S_{j_1}|\le L^s_1=\big\lceil\kappa^s_C\,\epsilon^{-2}\big\rceil,∣Sj1​​∣≤L1s​=⌈κCs​ϵ−2⌉,

and, if (2.10) holds,

j1≤L1=⌈κC ϵ−2⌉.j_1\le L_1=\big\lceil\kappa_C\,\epsilon^{-2}\big\rceil .j1​≤L1​=⌈κC​ϵ−2⌉.

The constants are kept exactly as printed. The first bound counts gradient evaluations and the second counts all iterations, which is the number of function evaluations.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.1: under (2.10) and σk≤σˉ\sigma_k\le\bar\sigmaσk​≤σˉ, the bound ∣Uj∣≤⌈−(log⁡γ3/log⁡γ1)∣Sj∣+log⁡(σˉ/σ0)/log⁡γ1⌉|\mathcal U_j|\le\lceil-(\log\gamma_3/\log\gamma_1)|\mathcal S_j|+\log(\bar\sigma/\sigma_0)/\log\gamma_1\rceil∣Uj​∣≤⌈−(logγ3​/logγ1​)∣Sj​∣+log(σˉ/σ0​)/logγ1​⌉, and its variant (2.14) when σk≥σmin⁡\sigma_k\ge\sigma_{\min}σk​≥σmin​.
  2. Theorem 2.2: a model decrease of αϵp\alpha\epsilon^pαϵp on a set So\mathcal S_oSo​ of successful iterations gives ∣So∣≤⌈(f(x0)−flow)ϵ−p/(η1α)⌉|\mathcal S_o|\le\lceil(f(x_0)-f_{\rm low})\epsilon^{-p}/(\eta_1\alpha)\rceil∣So​∣≤⌈(f(x0​)−flow​)ϵ−p/(η1​α)⌉.
  3. Lemma 3.1: the Cauchy decrease (3.3) and the step bound (3.4).
  4. Lemma 3.2: σk∥gk∥>κHB\sqrt{\sigma_k\|g_k\|}>\kappa_{HB}σk​∥gk​∥​>κHB​ makes iteration kkk very successful.
  5. Lemma 3.3: σk≤max⁡(σ0,γ2κHB2/ϵ)\sigma_k\le\max(\sigma_0,\gamma_2\kappa_{HB}^2/\epsilon)σk​≤max(σ0​,γ2​κHB2​/ϵ) while ∥gk∥>ϵ\|g_k\|>\epsilon∥gk​∥>ϵ.
  6. (3.20), (3.21), (3.22) of the proof of Corollary 3.4: the decrease αCϵ2\alpha_C\epsilon^2αC​ϵ2, the first half of the corollary, and the bound on ∣Uj1∣|\mathcal U_{j_1}|∣Uj1​​∣.

Significance

The corollary establishes that the ARC framework, whatever step it takes beyond the Cauchy point and whatever symmetric BkB_kBk​ it uses, is never worse than steepest descent in evaluation count. It is the baseline against which Part II measures its second-order variant ARC(S), whose O(ϵ−3/2)O(\epsilon^{-3/2})O(ϵ−3/2) bound is the subject of a separate mission in this series. Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 are generic: they convert any per-iteration model decrease and any bound on σk\sigma_kσk​ into iteration counts, and are reused verbatim for ARC(S).

The results are proved in the paper. No machine-checked proof of any of them exists on Prove2Me or, to our knowledge, elsewhere. The work here is to formalize the known proofs: the Cauchy-point analysis of Part I (quoted, not reproved, in Part II), the Taylor-remainder estimate of Lemma 3.2, and the counting arguments. Formalizing also checks the printed statements: two of them need a small correction (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Each step is elementary, but the statements are about a nondeterministic algorithm: sks_ksk​ and σk+1\sigma_{k+1}σk+1​ are choices, so every bound must hold for all admissible choices, not for one convenient run. The constants are explicit, and the ceilings interact: the printed proof of (3.17) adds the ceilings of (3.15) and (3.22), which does not by itself give ⌈κCϵ−2⌉\lceil\kappa_C\epsilon^{-2}\rceil⌈κC​ϵ−2⌉; the bound must be derived from the unrounded estimates. Lemma 3.1 i) requires a careful one-dimensional analysis of α↦mk(−αgk)\alpha\mapsto m_k(-\alpha g_k)α↦mk​(−αgk​) with an indefinite BkB_kBk​. The ratio ρk\rho_kρk​ is a quotient, and its denominator must be shown positive before any comparison with η1\eta_1η1​, η2\eta_2η2​ is meaningful.

Formalization scope

The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); ggg is Mathlib's gradient f; BkB_kBk​ is a continuous linear operator with IsSelfAdjoint, and ∥Bk∥\|B_k\|∥Bk​∥ is the operator norm. A run is a predicate IsARCRun on the sequences x,s,σ,Bx,s,\sigma,Bx,s,σ,B; the Cauchy condition is stated as mk(sk)≤mk(−αgk)m_k(s_k)\le m_k(-\alpha g_k)mk​(sk​)≤mk​(−αgk​) for all α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0, which is equivalent to comparing with the Cauchy point and avoids defining an argmin. The run is infinite; a run that the paper would stop at gk=0g_k=0gk​=0 extends trivially, and every statement only concerns iterations with ∥gk∥>ϵ\|g_k\|>\epsilon∥gk​∥>ϵ. Lean's x / 0 = 0 gives ρk=0\rho_k=0ρk​=0 (unsuccessful) when f(xk)=mk(sk)f(x_k)=m_k(s_k)f(xk​)=mk​(sk​); Theorem 2.2 assumes (2.6), mk(sk)<f(xk)m_k(s_k)<f(x_k)mk​(sk​)<f(xk​), up to its horizon, and §3's results need nothing extra because gk≠0g_k\neq0gk​=0 makes the denominator positive.

"j1≤Lj_1\le Lj1​≤L" is stated as: every jjj with ∥gk∥>ϵ\|g_k\|>\epsilon∥gk​∥>ϵ for all k≤jk\le jk≤j satisfies j≤Lj\le Lj≤L (and similarly for ∣Sj∣|\mathcal S_j|∣Sj​∣). This asserts that j1j_1j1​ is finite without presupposing it. Statements with j≤∞j\le\inftyj≤∞ are given for every finite jjj.

Two corrections to the printed text are built in. In Theorem 2.1 the bound σk≤σˉ\sigma_k\le\bar\sigmaσk​≤σˉ is assumed for k≤j+1k\le j+1k≤j+1: as printed (k≤jk\le jk≤j) the theorem fails for j=0j=0j=0, iteration 000 unsuccessful, σˉ=σ0\bar\sigma=\sigma_0σˉ=σ0​. In AF.4 the set XXX must contain the trial points xk+skx_k+s_kxk​+sk​ as well as the iterates, because Lemma 3.2 applies the Lipschitz bound on the segment [xk,xk+sk][x_k,x_k+s_k][xk​,xk​+sk​].

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal quantifies over every admissible step and weight update rather than one particular choice, keeps (2.10) out of the first conclusion, and keeps every constant as printed rather than replacing it by an existential.

A complete development needs the one-dimensional cubic analysis behind Lemma 3.1, a mean-value bound for C1C^1C1 functions along a segment, and finite counting over Finset.range. The generic counting results (Theorems 2.1, 2.2) are reusable for every ARC variant. Proofs of any milestone, and of the goal from the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Cartis, N. I. M. Gould, Ph. L. Toint, Adaptive cubic regularisation methods for unconstrained optimization. Part II: worst-case function- and derivative-evaluation complexity, Math. Program. 130(2):295–319, 2011 (preprint rev. 15 Sep 2009 used here). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-009-0337-y
  • C. Cartis, N. I. M. Gould, Ph. L. Toint, Adaptive cubic regularisation methods for unconstrained optimization. Part I: motivation, convergence and numerical results, Math. Program. 127(2):245–295, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-009-0286-5
  • Yu. Nesterov, B. T. Polyak, Cubic regularization of Newton method and its global performance, Math. Program. 108(1):177–205, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0706-8
  • S. Gratton, A. Sartenaer, Ph. L. Toint, Recursive trust-region methods for multiscale nonlinear optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 19(1):414–444, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/050644043
  • Yu. Nesterov, Introductory Lectures on Convex Optimization, Kluwer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8853-9
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