Approximation Algorithms for Product Framing and Pricing 3: Under MNL Pricing, Optimal Framing Fills Pages in Descending Quality Order with One Price per PageResearch Paper
Motivation
Online retailers show their catalogue on a sequence of pages, and most visitors never reach the last one. Which products appear on the first page, and at what prices, therefore decides what a typical consumer can buy at all. Gallego, Li, Truong and Wang (Operations Research, 2020) model this as the product framing problem: the consideration set of a consumer is the set of products on the pages that consumer is willing to view, and the number of pages viewed is random. Their Section 7 adds prices to the problem and asks how a retailer should frame and price jointly when consumers choose by the multinomial logit (MNL) model.
The question connects two literatures. In assortment pricing under MNL with a common price sensitivity, the optimal prices of all offered products are known to be equal (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992; Gallego and Stefanescu, as cited on p. 16 of the paper), and the nested-logit extension of Gallego and Wang (Operations Research, 2014) keeps an adjusted markup constant across nests. In search and ranking models, the order in which products are shown changes which ones are bought. The paper's structural results say what survives of the equal-price rule once consideration sets are nested by page, and which products belong on the early pages.
Setting
There are products, , and pages, each holding at most products. A framing places each product on one page or leaves it undisplayed. A consumer views the first pages, where is random with law , independent of the framing. A consumer who views pages considers , the products on pages , so .
Product has a quality and a price , and the price sensitivity is . The mean utility of product is , and the outside option has utility . Under the MNL model a consumer with consideration set buys with probability
and for . The expected revenue from that consumer is , and the total expected revenue of a framing and a price vector is
For a fixed framing, denotes the optimal value of this quantity over all price vectors, as a function of the quality vector .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 17)
The goal is the existence of an optimal joint solution with the paper's structure: there are a feasible framing and prices such that no feasible framing with any prices earns more, and
Pages are filled in order until all products are displayed, and the products appear in descending order of quality.
Milestones
- (15), p. 43. The partial derivative of the total expected revenue in the price of a displayed product:
- (17), p. 43. At every optimal price vector, each displayed price is plus a weighted average of the revenues , .
- Theorem 5, p. 16. For a fixed framing, every optimal price vector is constant on each page, , with .
- (19), p. 44. The optimal value is nondecreasing in the quality of any displayed product.
Significance
Theorem 5 reduces the pricing problem of a fixed framing from prices to page prices and says that later pages carry higher prices; this is the page-level analogue of the constant-markup property of MNL pricing, and it runs opposite to the ordering found in oligopoly search models (Arbatskaya 2007). Theorem 6 removes the framing decision almost entirely: a joint optimum is obtained by sorting the products by quality and filling pages in that order, leaving only page prices to choose. The paper's approximation algorithm for joint pricing and framing (Theorem 7, NEST-P, with guarantee ) starts from this structure.
None of these statements has a machine-checked proof. A complete development would give the first formal treatment of MNL price optimization with nested consideration sets, including the existence of optimal prices, which the paper takes for granted. The paper's argument for the monotonicity and its envelope-theorem step (19) are informal; a formal proof has to supply both.
Difficulty
The expected revenue is not concave in the prices, even with two products on two pages (Example 1, p. 17), so the first-order condition alone does not identify the optimum, and existence of an optimal price vector has to be argued from the behaviour of the revenue as prices tend to . The within-page equality of prices follows from the first-order condition, but the ordering of page prices needs a global comparison of revenues across consideration sets. In Theorem 6, the obvious exchange argument (swap a higher-quality product forward) does not obviously keep revenue from decreasing when the swapped products have different prices; the paper splits into two cases, and in one of them the improvement comes from continuously moving qualities, which requires control of the optimal value as a function of rather than of a fixed price vector.
Formalization scope
Products are Fin n, pages are the natural numbers with , and capacities satisfy . A framing is f : Fin n → ℕ with page f i ∈ [m] for displayed products and f i = 0 for undisplayed ones (the paper's ); feasibility means at most products per page. The law of is a nonnegative function on summing to one. Prices are finite reals: the paper's priced-out products () coincide with undisplayed ones, which the framing already allows. "Descending order" and "increases" are read weakly.
Theorem 5 and (17) are stated for every maximizing price vector and only for products on pages that some consumer reaches (), a restriction the paper never discusses: a product on a page no consumer reaches can carry any price at an optimum. They do not assert that a maximizer exists. Theorem 6 is read existentially ("some optimal solution has this structure"); the universal reading is false when some , because exchanging products between pages and then changes no revenue. (19) is formalized as its stated consequence, the monotonicity of the optimal value , together with the boundedness of the revenues; the envelope identity itself would need a differentiable selection of optimal prices that the paper does not establish.
A trivializing formalization of the goal would take the optimum over framings that are already sorted, over a single fixed framing, or over prices fixed in advance; the goal's optimality clause ranges over all feasible framings and all real price vectors. The development needs elementary calculus of the MNL revenue (HasDerivAt, Real.exp), finite sums over pages, and a compactness or limiting argument for the existence of optimal prices. Pages are those of the authors' accepted manuscript, which differ from the journal typesetting. Proofs of any milestone, and lemmas on MNL pricing reusable beyond this paper (boundedness of , existence of optimal MNL prices, the constant-price property for a single assortment), are welcome.
Selected references
- G. Gallego, A. Li, V.-A. Truong, X. Wang, Approximation Algorithms for Product Framing and Pricing, Operations Research 68(1), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1875
- S. P. Anderson, A. de Palma, J.-F. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation, MIT Press, 1992 (book; cited by the paper for the equal-price property of MNL pricing).
- G. Gallego, R. Wang, Multiproduct Price Optimization and Competition under the Nested Logit Model with Product-Differentiated Price Sensitivities, Operations Research 62(2), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2013.1249
- M. Arbatskaya, Ordered Search, The RAND Journal of Economics 38(1), 2007. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25046295