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Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Single-Loop Algorithm for Decentralized Bilevel Optimization: O(1/K) Stationarity and Consensus Rates of SLDBO without Heterogeneity AssumptionsResearch Paper

Bilevel problems on a network

Bilevel optimization chooses an upper-level variable xxx to minimize an objective that depends on the solution y∗(x)y^*(x)y∗(x) of a lower-level problem. Hyperparameter tuning and meta-learning are the standard examples (Franceschi et al. 2018; Ghadimi and Wang 2018). In the decentralized version the data are split among nnn agents. Each agent sees only its own upper- and lower-level functions FiF_iFi​ and fif_ifi​, and it can talk only to its neighbours in a communication network. The paper's example is nnn hospitals tuning a regularization weight of a logistic-regression model. No hospital may share its patients' data, but the hyperparameter has to be good for the pooled data.

Decentralized bilevel algorithms before this paper converged only under a heterogeneity assumption, a bound on how much the agents' functions may differ. DSBO (Chen, Huang and Ma 2024) assumes i.i.d. local data, MA-DSBO (Chen et al. 2023) a uniform bound on ∥∇2fi−∇2f∥\|\nabla_2 f_i - \nabla_2 f\|∥∇2​fi​−∇2​f∥, and SLAM (Lu et al. 2022) Lipschitz-type closeness of the local Hessians. Such assumptions fail exactly when the agents' data differ, which is the case that motivates decentralization in the first place. Dong, Ma, Yang and Yin propose SLDBO, a single-loop method that needs no such assumption, and prove an O(1/K)O(1/K)O(1/K) rate for it.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 agents. Agent iii holds Fi,fi:Rp×Rq→RF_i,f_i:\mathbb R^p\times\mathbb R^q\to\mathbb RFi​,fi​:Rp×Rq→R. Write F=1n∑iFiF=\frac1n\sum_iF_iF=n1​∑i​Fi​ and f=1n∑ifif=\frac1n\sum_if_if=n1​∑i​fi​. Problem (6) is

min⁡x∈Rp Φ(x)=F(x,y∗(x)),y∗(x)=arg⁡min⁡y∈Rqf(x,y).\min_{x\in\mathbb R^p}\ \Phi(x)=F(x,y^*(x)),\qquad y^*(x)=\arg\min_{y\in\mathbb R^q}f(x,y).x∈Rpmin​ Φ(x)=F(x,y∗(x)),y∗(x)=argy∈Rqmin​f(x,y).

Assumption 2.1 gives constants σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and LF,0,LF,1,Lf,1,Lf,2≥0L_{F,0},L_{F,1},L_{f,1},L_{f,2}\ge0LF,0​,LF,1​,Lf,1​,Lf,2​≥0. Each fi(x,⋅)f_i(x,\cdot)fi​(x,⋅) is σ\sigmaσ-strongly convex. FiF_iFi​ is LF,0L_{F,0}LF,0​-Lipschitz with an LF,1L_{F,1}LF,1​-Lipschitz gradient. fif_ifi​ is twice differentiable with an Lf,1L_{f,1}Lf,1​-Lipschitz gradient and an Lf,2L_{f,2}Lf,2​-Lipschitz Hessian. Under these conditions y∗y^*y∗ is well defined and Φ\PhiΦ is differentiable, with the hypergradient (7)

∇Φ(x)=∇1F(x,y∗(x))−∇122f(x,y∗(x)) v∗(x),v∗(x)=[∇222f(x,y∗(x))]−1∇2F(x,y∗(x)).\nabla\Phi(x)=\nabla_1F(x,y^*(x))-\nabla^2_{12}f(x,y^*(x))\,v^*(x),\qquad v^*(x)=\big[\nabla^2_{22}f(x,y^*(x))\big]^{-1}\nabla_2F(x,y^*(x)).∇Φ(x)=∇1​F(x,y∗(x))−∇122​f(x,y∗(x))v∗(x),v∗(x)=[∇222​f(x,y∗(x))]−1∇2​F(x,y∗(x)).

Here ∇1,∇2\nabla_1,\nabla_2∇1​,∇2​ are the partial gradients, ∇222f\nabla^2_{22}f∇222​f is the Hessian of fff in yyy, and ∇122f\nabla^2_{12}f∇122​f is the Jacobian of ∇1f\nabla_1f∇1​f in yyy.

Assumption 2.2. The agents communicate through a nonnegative, symmetric, doubly stochastic mixing matrix W=(wij)W=(w_{ij})W=(wij​), and ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1 bounds the contraction of WWW away from consensus.

SLDBO (Algorithm 1) keeps three local iterates xik,yik,vikx^k_i,y^k_i,v^k_ixik​,yik​,vik​ per agent. Agent iii computes the local directions dy,ik=∇2fid^k_{y,i}=\nabla_2f_idy,ik​=∇2​fi​, dv,ik=∇2Fi−∇222fi vikd^k_{v,i}=\nabla_2F_i-\nabla^2_{22}f_i\,v^k_idv,ik​=∇2​Fi​−∇222​fi​vik​ and dx,ik=∇1Fi−∇122fi vikd^k_{x,i}=\nabla_1F_i-\nabla^2_{12}f_i\,v^k_idx,ik​=∇1​Fi​−∇122​fi​vik​ at (xik,yik)(x^k_i,y^k_i)(xik​,yik​). It feeds them into gradient-tracking variables t⋅,ik=∑jwijt⋅,jk−1+d⋅,ik−d⋅,ik−1t^k_{\cdot,i}=\sum_jw_{ij}t^{k-1}_{\cdot,j}+d^k_{\cdot,i}-d^{k-1}_{\cdot,i}t⋅,ik​=∑j​wij​t⋅,jk−1​+d⋅,ik​−d⋅,ik−1​, which estimate the network averages of the directions. It then takes one mixed step on each iterate with constant step sizes β,η,α\beta,\eta,\alphaβ,η,α. The step on vvv is followed by the projection Prv\mathcal P_{r_v}Prv​​ onto the ball of radius rv=LF,0/σr_v=L_{F,0}/\sigmarv​=LF,0​/σ, which contains every v∗(x)v^*(x)v∗(x). All agents start from common points with t−1=d−1=0t^{-1}=d^{-1}=0t−1=d−1=0 (BOX 1). Bars denote averages over agents, e.g. xˉk=1n∑ixik\bar x^k=\frac1n\sum_ix^k_ixˉk=n1​∑i​xik​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

The step sizes have thresholds depending only on (σ,LF,0,LF,1,Lf,1,Lf,2,ρ)(\sigma,L_{F,0},L_{F,1},L_{f,1},L_{f,2},\rho)(σ,LF,0​,LF,1​,Lf,1​,Lf,2​,ρ): first βˉ\bar\betaβˉ​, then ηˉ\bar\etaηˉ​ given β\betaβ, then αˉ\bar\alphaαˉ given β,η\beta,\etaβ,η. Below these thresholds, every instance with Φ\PhiΦ bounded below has a constant CCC such that for all K≥1K\ge1K≥1

min⁡0≤k≤K−1∥∇Φ(xˉk)∥2≤CK,min⁡0≤k≤K−11n∑i=1n∥zik−zˉk∥2≤CK(z∈{x,y,v}).\min_{0\le k\le K-1}\|\nabla\Phi(\bar x^k)\|^2\le\frac CK,\qquad \min_{0\le k\le K-1}\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n\|z^k_i-\bar z^k\|^2\le\frac CK\quad(z\in\{x,y,v\}).0≤k≤K−1min​∥∇Φ(xˉk)∥2≤KC​,0≤k≤K−1min​n1​i=1∑n​∥zik​−zˉk∥2≤KC​(z∈{x,y,v}).

The goal fixes no explicit step sizes and no explicit constant CCC; it asserts the rate.

Milestones

These are the paper's own statements, in attack order:

  • the hypergradient formula (7);
  • the mixing and projection lemmas A.1–A.2;
  • the tracking identity (25);
  • the consensus recursions A.3–A.4 with Remarks A.1–A.2;
  • the bounds A.5–A.7 with Remark A.3 (A.5 and A.7 are included as supporting statements rather than milestones);
  • the Lipschitz continuity of y∗y^*y∗ and v∗v^*v∗ (A.11) and of ∇Φ\nabla\Phi∇Φ;
  • the descent inequality for Φ\PhiΦ (A.8);
  • the contractions of ∥yˉk−y∗(xˉk)∥\|\bar y^k-y^*(\bar x^k)\|∥yˉ​k−y∗(xˉk)∥ and ∥vˉk−v∗(xˉk)∥\|\bar v^k-v^*(\bar x^k)\|∥vˉk−v∗(xˉk)∥ (A.9–A.10).

Significance

The theorem shows that a single-loop decentralized method reaches the O(1/K)O(1/K)O(1/K) stationarity rate known for centralized single-loop bilevel methods (Ji et al. 2022; Dagréou et al. 2022). Each iteration needs Θ(1)\Theta(1)Θ(1) communication rounds and one Hessian- and one Jacobian-vector product, with no heterogeneity bound. The consensus clauses add that the agents agree at the same rate.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing about it is formalized. The mission adds three things. First, a machine-checked statement with explicit conventions. Second, a check of the constants. The printed LΦL_\PhiLΦ​ in (8) has a term that is not homogeneous in the scale of FFF, and the explicit step-size bounds (62) do not make the Lyapunov coefficient A2A_2A2​ nonnegative (checked numerically). The goal is therefore stated in a form the argument supports. Third, reusable lemmas for gradient-tracking analyses: the mixing-matrix contraction, the projected-consensus inequality, the tracking identity and the hypergradient formula.

Difficulty

The obvious analysis of a decentralized SOBA-type method bounds the change of the directions dx,ikd^k_{x,i}dx,ik​ and dv,ikd^k_{v,i}dv,ik​ between iterations by the change of the iterates. Those directions contain ∇2fi vik\nabla^2f_i\,v^k_i∇2fi​vik​. Without control of ∥vik∥\|v^k_i\|∥vik​∥, their variation is bounded only by assuming the local Hessians are close, which is the heterogeneity assumption. The projection removes the need for it. The price is that vˉk\bar v^kvˉk no longer follows the averaged direction, so the consensus and error recursions for vvv have to be derived separately. All of these recursions are then combined into one Lyapunov function (15) whose coefficients must be balanced against three coupled step sizes. Most of the work, and the published constants' main failure, is in that balancing.

Formalization scope

Vectors live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d). Lipschitz conditions in (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) use ∥x−x′∥2+∥y−y′∥2\sqrt{\|x-x'\|^2+\|y-y'\|^2}∥x−x′∥2+∥y−y′∥2​, never Lean's sup norm on a product. The model and the added hypotheses:

  • Hessian condition. It is imposed on the two blocks ∇122fi\nabla^2_{12}f_i∇122​fi​ and ∇222fi\nabla^2_{22}f_i∇222​fi​ in the operator norm. This is weaker than the paper's Frobenius-Lipschitz full Hessian.
  • Mixing rate. ρ\rhoρ is any bound of WWW on 1⊥\mathbf 1^\perp1⊥; the paper's eigenvalue ρ\rhoρ is the least one.
  • Lower-level solution. y∗y^*y∗ is a given map with y∗(x)y^*(x)y∗(x) minimizing f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) for every xxx.
  • Hypergradient. v∗v^*v∗ is defined through ContinuousLinearMap.inverse, and ∇Φ\nabla\Phi∇Φ is the formula (7). A milestone proves that (7) is the gradient of Φ\PhiΦ.
  • Algorithm. Algorithm 1 with BOX 1 is one deterministic function run. Its state at index kkk holds (xk,yk,vk,tk−1,dk−1)(x^k,y^k,v^k,t^{k-1},d^{k-1})(xk,yk,vk,tk−1,dk−1).
  • Rate. "O(1/K)O(1/K)O(1/K)" is one constant CCC, fixed after the instance and before KKK; the minimum over 0≤k≤K−10\le k\le K-10≤k≤K−1 is an existential k<Kk<Kk<K.
  • Φ\PhiΦ bounded below. This is added to the goal. Without it the claim fails: Fi(x,y)=−xF_i(x,y)=-xFi​(x,y)=−x and fi(x,y)=y2/2f_i(x,y)=y^2/2fi​(x,y)=y2/2 satisfy Assumption 2.1, yet ∇Φ≡−1\nabla\Phi\equiv-1∇Φ≡−1.
  • Lemma A.5 is posed for k≥1k\ge1k≥1. At k=0k=0k=0 it would claim d0=0d^0=0d0=0.
  • Lemmas A.9 and A.10 carry the two bounds of (62) their proofs use, βLf,1<1\beta L_{f,1}<1βLf,1​<1 and ηLf,1<1\eta L_{f,1}<1ηLf,1​<1.
  • LΦL_\PhiLΦ​ is (LF,1+Lf,2rv)(1+Lf,1/σ)2(L_{F,1}+L_{f,2}r_v)(1+L_{f,1}/\sigma)^2(LF,1​+Lf,2​rv​)(1+Lf,1​/σ)2, which is (8) with LF,02L_{F,0}^2LF,02​ corrected to LF,0L_{F,0}LF,0​.
  • Step sizes. The goal is stated with nested thresholds instead of (62).

The goal would become trivial if the thresholds were chosen after the instance or CCC after KKK, and false without Φ\PhiΦ bounded below; the statement rules both out. All hypotheses are satisfiable: a two-agent instance with ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0 and fi=∥y∥2/2f_i=\|y\|^2/2fi​=∥y∥2/2 is checked in Lean.

A complete development needs the implicit-function theorem for y∗y^*y∗, the descent lemma, strong-convexity inequalities for gradient steps, and the gradient-tracking bookkeeping. The mixing-matrix and tracking lemmas are reusable for other gradient-tracking methods. Proofs of any milestone, and repaired explicit step-size conditions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Dong, S. Ma, J. Yang, C. Yin, A Single-Loop Algorithm for Decentralized Bilevel Optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2311.08945v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.08945
  • M. Dagréou, P. Ablin, S. Vaiter, T. Moreau, A framework for bilevel optimization that enables stochastic and global variance reduction algorithms, NeurIPS 35, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.13409
  • S. Ghadimi, M. Wang, Approximation methods for bilevel programming, arXiv:1802.02246, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.02246
  • X. Chen, M. Huang, S. Ma, Decentralized bilevel optimization, Optimization Letters, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.05670
  • X. Chen, M. Huang, S. Ma, K. Balasubramanian, Decentralized stochastic bilevel optimization with improved per-iteration complexity, ICML 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.12839
  • S. Lu, S. Zeng, X. Cui, M. Squillante, L. Horesh, B. Kingsbury, J. Liu, M. Hong, A stochastic linearized augmented Lagrangian method for decentralized bilevel optimization, NeurIPS 35, 2022. https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2022 (pp. 30638–30650)
  • K. Ji, M. Liu, Y. Liang, L. Ying, Will bilevel optimizers benefit from loops, NeurIPS 35, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14224
  • S. Pu, A. Nedić, Distributed stochastic gradient tracking methods, Mathematical Programming 187, 409–457, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.11454
  • L. Franceschi, P. Frasconi, S. Salzo, R. Grazzi, M. Pontil, Bilevel programming for hyperparameter optimization and meta-learning, ICML 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.04910
17 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Graphical Convergence of Subgradients in Nonconvex Optimization and Learning: Uniform Concentration of Empirical Bregman Proximal Points for Weakly Convex RisksResearch Paper

Motivation

A learner who minimizes a regularized population risk

φ(x)=Ez∼P[f(x,z)]+r(x)\varphi(x)=\mathbb E_{z\sim P}[f(x,z)]+r(x)φ(x)=Ez∼P​[f(x,z)]+r(x)

usually has access to PPP only through an i.i.d. sample S=(z1,…,zm)S=(z_1,\dots,z_m)S=(z1​,…,zm​), and so works with the empirical risk φS(x)=1m∑i=1mf(x,zi)+r(x)\varphi_S(x)=\frac1m\sum_{i=1}^m f(x,z_i)+r(x)φS​(x)=m1​∑i=1m​f(x,zi​)+r(x) instead. The question this mission formalizes is how well the first-order behaviour of φS\varphi_SφS​ reflects that of φ\varphiφ when the loss is neither smooth nor convex. This matters because the algorithms used in practice for such problems (stochastic subgradient, proximal point and Gauss–Newton methods) find only approximately stationary points, and a uniform estimate of the gap between empirical and population stationarity tells one when further optimization of the empirical problem stops improving the population one.

For convex losses with strongly convex regularization, Shalev-Shwartz, Shamir, Srebro and Sridharan (COLT 2009) showed that the regularized empirical minimizer is stable and generalizes at a dimension-free rate. For smooth nonconvex losses, Mei, Bai and Montanari (Ann. Statist. 2018) and Foster, Sekhari and Sridharan (NeurIPS 2018) proved uniform convergence of gradients. For nonsmooth nonconvex losses, pointwise convergence of the stationarity measure dist⁡(0,∂φ(x))\operatorname{dist}(0,\partial\varphi(x))dist(0,∂φ(x)) was known, but uniform results were asymptotic and needed extra structure, because x↦dist⁡(0,∂φ(x))x\mapsto\operatorname{dist}(0,\partial\varphi(x))x↦dist(0,∂φ(x)) is highly discontinuous. Davis and Drusvyatskiy (arXiv:1810.07590, Mathematics of Operations Research 2022) replace it by a smoothed measure, the gradient of a Moreau-type envelope, and prove finite-sample uniform bounds for it. The losses covered are the weakly convex ones: phase retrieval, blind deconvolution, robust PCA, censored block models, conditional value-at-risk and sparse dictionary learning all fit (Table 1 of the paper).

Setting

Fix a finite-dimensional real normed space EEE with norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ and dual norm ∥⋅∥∗\|\cdot\|_*∥⋅∥∗​. Extended-valued functions g:E→R∪{+∞}g:E\to\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}g:E→R∪{+∞} are described by their domain dom⁡g\operatorname{dom} gdomg and their values there.

A Legendre function Φ\PhiΦ is proper, closed and strictly convex, differentiable on the nonempty interior of its domain, and its gradient norm blows up at the boundary of the domain. It induces the Bregman divergence

DΦ(y,x)=Φ(y)−Φ(x)−⟨∇Φ(x),y−x⟩,x∈int⁡(dom⁡Φ),D_\Phi(y,x)=\Phi(y)-\Phi(x)-\langle\nabla\Phi(x),y-x\rangle,\qquad x\in\operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\Phi),DΦ​(y,x)=Φ(y)−Φ(x)−⟨∇Φ(x),y−x⟩,x∈int(domΦ),

and its symmetrization DΦsym(x,y)=DΦ(x,y)+DΦ(y,x)D^{\mathrm{sym}}_\Phi(x,y)=D_\Phi(x,y)+D_\Phi(y,x)DΦsym​(x,y)=DΦ​(x,y)+DΦ​(y,x). For Φ=12∥⋅∥22\Phi=\frac12\|\cdot\|_2^2Φ=21​∥⋅∥22​, DΦ(y,x)=12∥y−x∥22D_\Phi(y,x)=\frac12\|y-x\|_2^2DΦ​(y,x)=21​∥y−x∥22​. A function ggg is ρ\rhoρ-weakly convex relative to Φ\PhiΦ if g+ρΦg+\rho\Phig+ρΦ is convex, and compatible with Φ\PhiΦ if ri⁡(dom⁡g)⊆int⁡(dom⁡Φ)\operatorname{ri}(\operatorname{dom} g)\subseteq\operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\Phi)ri(domg)⊆int(domΦ). For ρˉ>0\bar\rho>0ρˉ​>0 the Φ-proximal map and Φ-envelope are

prox⁡g/ρˉΦ(x)=argmin⁡y{g(y)+ρˉDΦ(y,x)},g1/ρˉΦ(x)=inf⁡y{g(y)+ρˉDΦ(y,x)}.\operatorname{prox}^\Phi_{g/\bar\rho}(x)=\operatorname*{argmin}_y\{g(y)+\bar\rho D_\Phi(y,x)\},\qquad g^\Phi_{1/\bar\rho}(x)=\inf_y\{g(y)+\bar\rho D_\Phi(y,x)\}.proxg/ρˉ​Φ​(x)=yargmin​{g(y)+ρˉ​DΦ​(y,x)},g1/ρˉ​Φ​(x)=yinf​{g(y)+ρˉ​DΦ​(y,x)}.

The standing assumptions are: (A1) Φ\PhiΦ is Legendre, compatible with rrr, and α2∥y−x∥2≤DΦ(x,y)\frac\alpha2\|y-x\|^2\le D_\Phi(x,y)2α​∥y−x∥2≤DΦ​(x,y) on dom⁡r∩int⁡(dom⁡Φ)\operatorname{dom} r\cap\operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\Phi)domr∩int(domΦ); (A2) for a.e. zzz, f(⋅,z)+rf(\cdot,z)+rf(⋅,z)+r is ρ\rhoρ-weakly convex relative to Φ\PhiΦ and bounded below; (A3) ∣f(x,z)−f(y,z)∣≤L(z)DΦsym(x,y)|f(x,z)-f(y,z)|\le L(z)\sqrt{D^{\mathrm{sym}}_\Phi(x,y)}∣f(x,z)−f(y,z)∣≤L(z)DΦsym​(x,y)​ with L≥0L\ge0L≥0 and EL2≤σ\sqrt{\mathbb E L^2}\le\sigmaEL2​≤σ. Finally ψεL(λ)=log⁡E eλεL(z)\psi_{\varepsilon L}(\lambda)=\log\mathbb E\,e^{\lambda\varepsilon L(z)}ψεL​(λ)=logEeλεL(z) for an independent Rademacher sign ε\varepsilonε, and ψεL⋆\psi^\star_{\varepsilon L}ψεL⋆​ is its Fenchel conjugate.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4 (concentration of the stationarity measure)

For every C⊆int⁡(dom⁡Φ)C\subseteq\operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\Phi)C⊆int(domΦ), δ>0\delta>0δ>0, s≥0s\ge0s≥0 and ρˉ>ρ\bar\rho>\rhoρˉ​>ρ, with probability at least 1−N(C,Φ,δ)exp⁡(−m ψεL⋆(s/m))1-\mathcal N(C,\Phi,\delta)\exp(-m\,\psi^\star_{\varepsilon L}(s/\sqrt m))1−N(C,Φ,δ)exp(−mψεL⋆​(s/m​)),

sup⁡y∈C∥prox⁡φS/ρˉΦ(y)−prox⁡φ/ρˉΦ(y)∥≤4(σ+s)2α(ρˉ−ρ)2m+2ρˉδα(ρˉ−ρ),\sup_{y\in C}\big\|\operatorname{prox}^\Phi_{\varphi_S/\bar\rho}(y)-\operatorname{prox}^\Phi_{\varphi/\bar\rho}(y)\big\|\le\sqrt{\frac{4(\sigma+s)^2}{\alpha(\bar\rho-\rho)^2m}}+\frac{2\bar\rho\delta}{\alpha(\bar\rho-\rho)},y∈Csup​​proxφS​/ρˉ​Φ​(y)−proxφ/ρˉ​Φ​(y)​≤α(ρˉ​−ρ)2m4(σ+s)2​​+α(ρˉ​−ρ)2ρˉ​δ​,

where N(C,Φ,δ)\mathcal N(C,\Phi,\delta)N(C,Φ,δ) is the covering number of CCC in the metric ∥∇Φ(x)−∇Φ(y)∥∗\|\nabla\Phi(x)-\nabla\Phi(y)\|_*∥∇Φ(x)−∇Φ(y)∥∗​. If Φ\PhiΦ is twice differentiable, the same probability bounds the event sup⁡y∈C∥∇(φS)1/2ρΦ(y)−∇φ1/2ρΦ(y)∥y∗≤16(σ+s)2/(αm)+8ρδ/α\sup_{y\in C}\|\nabla(\varphi_S)^\Phi_{1/2\rho}(y)-\nabla\varphi^\Phi_{1/2\rho}(y)\|^*_y\le\sqrt{16(\sigma+s)^2/(\alpha m)}+8\rho\delta/\alphasupy∈C​∥∇(φS​)1/2ρΦ​(y)−∇φ1/2ρΦ​(y)∥y∗​≤16(σ+s)2/(αm)​+8ρδ/α in the local dual norm.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.1: the Φ-proximal point of a closed, lower-bounded, weakly convex, compatible ggg is unique and interior, and the envelope has gradient 1λ∇2Φ(x)(x−prox⁡λgΦ(x))\frac1\lambda\nabla^2\Phi(x)(x-\operatorname{prox}^\Phi_{\lambda g}(x))λ1​∇2Φ(x)(x−proxλgΦ​(x)).
  2. Theorem 4.1: stability of Bregman-regularized ERM, DΦsym(A(S),A(Si))≤L(zi)+L(zi′)(ρˉ−ρ)m\sqrt{D^{\mathrm{sym}}_\Phi(\mathcal A(S),\mathcal A(S^i))}\le\frac{L(z_i)+L(z_i')}{(\bar\rho-\rho)m}DΦsym​(A(S),A(Si))​≤(ρˉ​−ρ)mL(zi​)+L(zi′​)​, and the expectation bounds (4.2), (4.3).
  3. Theorem 4.2: McDiarmid's inequality with data-dependent differences ωi(zi,zi′)\omega_i(z_i,z_i')ωi​(zi​,zi′​), in log-MGF form (4.7) and tail form (4.8).
  4. Lemma 4.3: prox⁡g/ρˉΦ\operatorname{prox}^\Phi_{g/\bar\rho}proxg/ρˉ​Φ​ is ρˉα(ρˉ−ρ)\frac{\bar\rho}{\alpha(\bar\rho-\rho)}α(ρˉ​−ρ)ρˉ​​-Lipschitz from the metric ∥∇Φ(x)−∇Φ(y)∥∗\|\nabla\Phi(x)-\nabla\Phi(y)\|_*∥∇Φ(x)−∇Φ(y)∥∗​ to ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥.

Significance

The result gives a sample size beyond which approximate stationarity of the empirical problem certifies approximate stationarity of the population problem, uniformly over a region, with an explicit dependence on the sample size mmm and on the covering number of the region. Because the graph of the proximal map is linearly isomorphic to the graph of the subdifferential, it also bounds the Hausdorff distance between gph⁡∂φ\operatorname{gph}\partial\varphigph∂φ and gph⁡∂φS\operatorname{gph}\partial\varphi_Sgph∂φS​ (Theorem 4.5 of the paper, not part of this mission). The Bregman setting covers non-Euclidean geometries (an ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-setup) and losses that are only locally Lipschitz with polynomial growth. Theorem 4.2 is reusable on its own: it is a McDiarmid inequality for unbounded, light-tailed differences.

The paper's proofs are complete; nothing here is open. None of the statements has been formalized before. Mathlib has the Fréchet derivative, product measures, cumulant generating functions and convexity, but no Legendre functions, Bregman proximal maps or envelopes, and no McDiarmid inequality with data-dependent differences; the platform has McDiarmid only with constant differences.

Difficulty

The naive route, McDiarmid's inequality applied to ∥prox⁡φS/ρˉΦ(y)−prox⁡φ/ρˉΦ(y)∥\|\operatorname{prox}^\Phi_{\varphi_S/\bar\rho}(y)-\operatorname{prox}^\Phi_{\varphi/\bar\rho}(y)\|∥proxφS​/ρˉ​Φ​(y)−proxφ/ρˉ​Φ​(y)∥, needs a bounded difference constant, and the stability estimate (4.1) gives only L(zi)+L(zi′)L(z_i)+L(z_i')L(zi​)+L(zi′​), which is unbounded unless the data are. The concentration step therefore needs a version of McDiarmid's inequality whose differences are random. A second obstacle is that the empirical objects are random sets: proving that the proximal points are single-valued, interior, and measurable in the sample is a step the paper takes for granted. Third, uniformity over CCC comes through Lemma 4.3 in the mirror metric ∥∇Φ(x)−∇Φ(y)∥∗\|\nabla\Phi(x)-\nabla\Phi(y)\|_*∥∇Φ(x)−∇Φ(y)∥∗​, not in the norm of EEE.

Formalization scope

The space is a finite-dimensional real normed space EEE; gradients are Fréchet derivatives, the dual norm is the operator norm, and ∇2Φ(y)\nabla^2\Phi(y)∇2Φ(y) is the second Fréchet derivative, a map E→E∗E\to E^*E→E∗. Extended-valued functions are pairs (domain, real values), so no extended-real arithmetic occurs. Proximal maps are sets of minimizers; envelopes are real infima, used only where Theorem 3.1 guarantees attainment. "With probability 1−p1-p1−p" is an outer-measure bound on the failure set under PmP^mPm. The covering number is replaced by the size of an arbitrary finite δ\deltaδ-net fixed before the sample, and exp⁡(−mψ⋆(t))\exp(-m\psi^\star(t))exp(−mψ⋆(t)) by exp⁡(−m(λt−ψ(λ)))\exp(-m(\lambda t-\psi(\lambda)))exp(−m(λt−ψ(λ))) for an arbitrary λ\lambdaλ with cosh⁡(λL)\cosh(\lambda L)cosh(λL) integrable; both replacements are equivalent to the page. Hypotheses the paper uses without stating are explicit: ρˉ>0\bar\rho>0ρˉ​>0, m≥1m\ge1m≥1, dom⁡r\operatorname{dom} rdomr nonempty and convex, f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) measurable and integrable, closedness of f(⋅,z)+rf(\cdot,z)+rf(⋅,z)+r and of φ\varphiφ, φ\varphiφ bounded below; the second display of the goal assumes ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 and an invertible Hessian on CCC. Theorem 4.1 is read, as its proof is, with A∗\mathcal A^*A∗ and A(S)\mathcal A(S)A(S) the proximal points at yyy.

A pointwise version (fixed yyy), a version where the net may depend on the sample, a bound for one fixed λ\lambdaλ, or the Euclidean case Φ=12∥⋅∥22\Phi=\frac12\|\cdot\|_2^2Φ=21​∥⋅∥22​ alone would each be a strictly weaker theorem and does not close the goal.

A complete development needs: Legendre-function theory (coercivity of DΦ(⋅,x)D_\Phi(\cdot,x)DΦ​(⋅,x), interiority of Bregman proximal points), Danskin-type differentiation of the envelope, measurability of argmin maps, the extended McDiarmid inequality, and a covering/union bound. The McDiarmid extension and the Bregman proximal-point lemmas are reusable well beyond this paper. Proofs of the milestones, sanity instances of (A1)–(A3), and intermediate lemmas from the paper's proofs are all welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Davis, D. Drusvyatskiy, Graphical Convergence of Subgradients in Nonconvex Optimization and Learning, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. arXiv:1810.07590
  • D. Davis, D. Drusvyatskiy, K. J. MacPhee, Stochastic model-based minimization under high-order growth, 2018. arXiv:1807.00255
  • H. H. Bauschke, M. N. Dao, S. B. Lindstrom, Regularizing with Bregman–Moreau envelopes, SIAM J. Optim., 2018. arXiv:1705.06019
  • S. Shalev-Shwartz, O. Shamir, N. Srebro, K. Sridharan, Stochastic Convex Optimization, COLT, 2009. https://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~colt2009/papers/018.pdf
  • C. McDiarmid, On the method of bounded differences, Surveys in Combinatorics, LMS Lecture Note Ser. 141, 1989. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107359949.008
  • A. Kontorovich, Concentration in unbounded metric spaces and algorithmic stability, ICML, 2014. arXiv:1309.1007
  • S. Mei, Y. Bai, A. Montanari, The landscape of empirical risk for nonconvex losses, Ann. Statist., 2018. arXiv:1607.06534
  • D. J. Foster, A. Sekhari, K. Sridharan, Uniform convergence of gradients for non-convex learning and optimization, NeurIPS, 2018. arXiv:1810.11059
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Control TheoryQuantum InformationQuantum Mechanics·Captain: mikedeng1

How Far do Lindbladians Go?: Single-Qubit Amplitude Damping and Dephasing with Hörmander Unitary Control Make the Closed Channel Class TransitiveResearch Paper

Motivation

The state of a finite-dimensional quantum system is a density: a positive semidefinite matrix of trace one. Under coherent (Hamiltonian) control the evolution is unitary, ρ↦UρU∗\rho\mapsto U\rho U^*ρ↦UρU∗, and preserves the eigenvalues of ρ\rhoρ. Even with full unitary control, a state can therefore only be moved within its unitary orbit. A mixed state cannot be purified, and a pure state cannot be made mixed. Dissipation, modelled by Lindblad generators (Gorini–Kossakowski–Sudarshan 1976, Lindblad 1976), is what breaks these spectral invariants. Engineered dissipation is a standard tool for state preparation (Verstraete–Wolf–Cirac 2009).

This raises a basic control question: how much dissipation must be added to full unitary control before every state can be steered to every other state? Cai, Govindarajan and Junge (arXiv:2504.04883v2) answer it for kkk qubits. One amplitude-damping jump and one dephasing operator, both acting on a single qubit, suffice.

Timeline.

  • Brockett (1972) and Jurdjevic–Sussmann (1972) established the Lie-algebra rank condition for controllability on compact Lie groups. This settled the closed (unitary) case.
  • Altafini (2003) began the controllability analysis of Markovian master equations driven by coherent controls.
  • Dirr, Helmke, Kurniawan and Schulte-Herbrüggen (2009) described Markovian channels through Lie semigroups and Lie wedges.
  • Araiza, Chen, Junge and Wu (2023) studied resource-dependent classes of channels generated by a resource set SSS. The present mission's class Channel(S)‾\overline{\mathrm{Channel}(S)}Channel(S)​ follows that approach.
  • Cai, Govindarajan and Junge (2025) proved Theorem 2.12: Channel(S)‾\overline{\mathrm{Channel}(S)}Channel(S)​ is transitive once SSS contains a single-qubit amplitude-damping jump and a single-qubit dephasing operator. With a convex hull, Theorem 2.8 of the same paper needs only the amplitude-damping jump.

Setting

Let H=C2kH=\mathbb C^{2^k}H=C2k be the space of kkk qubits, with computational basis ∣ω⟩|\omega\rangle∣ω⟩, ω∈{0,1}k\omega\in\{0,1\}^kω∈{0,1}k. A superoperator is a linear map on kkk-qubit matrices. Densities form the set D(H)={ρ:ρ=ρ∗, ρ≥0, tr⁡ρ=1}\mathcal D(H)=\{\rho:\rho=\rho^*,\ \rho\ge0,\ \operatorname{tr}\rho=1\}D(H)={ρ:ρ=ρ∗, ρ≥0, trρ=1}.

For an operator aaa, the Lindblad generator with rate 222 is

La(ρ)=2aρa∗−a∗aρ−ρa∗a.L_a(\rho)=2a\rho a^*-a^*a\rho-\rho a^*a .La​(ρ)=2aρa∗−a∗aρ−ρa∗a.

For every t≥0t\ge0t≥0, etLae^{tL_a}etLa​ is a quantum channel.

Fix a resource set SSS of operators with S=S∗S=S^*S=S∗. The closed class Channel(S)‾\overline{\mathrm{Channel}(S)}Channel(S)​ is the smallest closed set C\mathcal CC of superoperators with three properties:

  • (UN) Ad⁡etX∈C\operatorname{Ad}_{e^{tX}}\in\mathcal CAdetX​∈C, where Ad⁡U(ρ)=UρU∗\operatorname{Ad}_U(\rho)=U\rho U^*AdU​(ρ)=UρU∗, for every anti-Hermitian X=iHX=iHX=iH in the complex span of SSS and every t≥0t\ge0t≥0;
  • (JU) etLa∈Ce^{tL_a}\in\mathcal CetLa​∈C for every a∈Sa\in Sa∈S and every t≥0t\ge0t≥0;
  • (CO) C\mathcal CC is closed under composition.

SSS generates a Hörmander system if the real Lie algebra generated by the anti-Hermitian part of span⁡S\operatorname{span}SspanS contains su(2k)\mathfrak{su}(2^k)su(2k), the traceless anti-Hermitian matrices. A set OOO of superoperators is transitive if for all ρ,σ∈D(H)\rho,\sigma\in\mathcal D(H)ρ,σ∈D(H) some Φ∈O\Phi\in OΦ∈O satisfies Φ(ρ)=σ\Phi(\rho)=\sigmaΦ(ρ)=σ. The range of ρ\rhoρ is DS(ρ)={Φ(ρ):Φ∈Channel(S)‾}D_S(\rho)=\{\Phi(\rho):\Phi\in\overline{\mathrm{Channel}(S)}\}DS​(ρ)={Φ(ρ):Φ∈Channel(S)​}.

On one qubit, Z=diag⁡(1,−1)Z=\operatorname{diag}(1,-1)Z=diag(1,−1), ∣0⟩⟨1∣|0\rangle\langle1|∣0⟩⟨1∣ is the amplitude-damping jump, and E∞E_\inftyE∞​ keeps the diagonal of a 2×22\times22×2 matrix and deletes the rest. The replacer channel is Rσ(ρ)=tr⁡(ρ) σ\mathcal R_\sigma(\rho)=\operatorname{tr}(\rho)\,\sigmaRσ​(ρ)=tr(ρ)σ, and ∣0k⟩=∣0⋯0⟩|0_k\rangle=|0\cdots0\rangle∣0k​⟩=∣0⋯0⟩.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.12

If S=S∗S=S^*S=S∗ generates a Hörmander system on C2k\mathbb C^{2^k}C2k and

∣0⟩⟨1∣⊗I⊗(k−1)∈S,Z⊗I⊗(k−1)∈S,|0\rangle\langle1|\otimes I^{\otimes(k-1)}\in S,\qquad Z\otimes I^{\otimes(k-1)}\in S,∣0⟩⟨1∣⊗I⊗(k−1)∈S,Z⊗I⊗(k−1)∈S,

then

∀ ρ,σ∈D(H)∃ Φ∈Channel(S)‾: Φ(ρ)=σ.\forall\,\rho,\sigma\in\mathcal D(H)\quad \exists\,\Phi\in\overline{\mathrm{Channel}(S)}:\ \Phi(\rho)=\sigma .∀ρ,σ∈D(H)∃Φ∈Channel(S)​: Φ(ρ)=σ.

The goal asserts reachability only. It places no bound on time or on the number of compositions.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.2(i), as used. Ad⁡U∈Channel(S)‾\operatorname{Ad}_U\in\overline{\mathrm{Channel}(S)}AdU​∈Channel(S)​ for every unitary UUU.
  2. Proposition 2.2(iii). etLuau∗e^{tL_{uau^*}}etLuau∗​ and et∑jLujajuj∗e^{t\sum_jL_{u_ja_ju_j^*}}et∑j​Luj​aj​uj∗​​ lie in the class for a,aj∈Sa,a_j\in Sa,aj​∈S, unitaries u,uju,u_ju,uj​ and t≥0t\ge0t≥0.
  3. Amplitude-damping semigroup ([CW16], p. 8). For a=∣0⟩⟨1∣a=|0\rangle\langle1|a=∣0⟩⟨1∣ on one qubit, etLae^{tL_a}etLa​ has the closed form (ρ00+(1−e−2t)ρ11, e−tρ01; e−tρ10, e−2tρ11)\big(\rho_{00}+(1-e^{-2t})\rho_{11},\ e^{-t}\rho_{01};\ e^{-t}\rho_{10},\ e^{-2t}\rho_{11}\big)(ρ00​+(1−e−2t)ρ11​, e−tρ01​; e−tρ10​, e−2tρ11​).
  4. Dephasing generator (p. 8). On one qubit, LZ=4(E∞−id)L_Z=4(E_\infty-\mathrm{id})LZ​=4(E∞​−id) and etLZ→E∞e^{tL_Z}\to E_\inftyetLZ​→E∞​.
  5. Lemma 2.11(ii). If Z1∈SZ_1\in SZ1​∈S, then E∞⊗idk−1E_\infty\otimes\mathrm{id}^{k-1}E∞​⊗idk−1 and E∞⊗kE_\infty^{\otimes k}E∞⊗k​ lie in the class.
  6. Replacer claim (proof of Theorem 2.12). etLa→R∣0⟩⟨0∣⊗ide^{tL_a}\to\mathcal R_{|0\rangle\langle0|}\otimes\mathrm{id}etLa​→R∣0⟩⟨0∣​⊗id, and both R∣0⟩⟨0∣⊗id\mathcal R_{|0\rangle\langle0|}\otimes\mathrm{id}R∣0⟩⟨0∣​⊗id and R∣0k⟩⟨0k∣\mathcal R_{|0_k\rangle\langle0_k|}R∣0k​⟩⟨0k​∣​ lie in the class.
  7. Lemma 2.11(iii). DS(∣0k⟩⟨0k∣)=D(H)D_S(|0_k\rangle\langle0_k|)=\mathcal D(H)DS​(∣0k​⟩⟨0k​∣)=D(H).

Significance

The result. Full unitary control alone cannot change the spectrum of a state. Theorem 2.12 shows that two dissipative resources acting on one qubit already remove every obstruction. This is close to optimal: Proposition 2.7 of the paper shows that self-adjoint jumps alone produce only unital channels, which fix the maximally mixed state, so at least one non-self-adjoint resource is necessary. The result also needs no convexity. The class contains genuine Markovian semigroups, their compositions and their limits, but no mixtures. The surrounding statements are reusable on their own:

  • every unitary is generated by a Hörmander system (Chow's theorem in the form used here);
  • the pinching and the reset are limits of Lindblad semigroups;
  • the pure state ∣0k⟩|0_k\rangle∣0k​⟩ reaches every density.

Formalizing it. The paper's proof is short, but several steps are stated without detail: "by assumption", "using the conjugation trick and products", and Chow's theorem cited for a semigroup rather than a group. A formal proof fixes exactly what the closure (CL) contributes. It supplies the negative-time unitaries (milestone 1) and the conditional expectations E∞E_\inftyE∞​ and R\mathcal RR (milestones 4–6), none of which is of the form etLe^{tL}etL. No machine-checked proof of these statements is known (a search of the Prove2Me library in October 2026 found none). Mathlib has the matrix exponential, the operator norm on superoperators and Lie subalgebras. It has neither Chow's theorem nor the correspondence between Lie subalgebras and connected subgroups of U(d)U(d)U(d).

Difficulty

The one hard step is milestone 1. (UN) supplies only the forward flows etXe^{tX}etX, t≥0t\ge0t≥0, of the directions in the span of SSS. The Hörmander condition is a statement about the Lie algebra they generate, while the class is a semigroup closed under limits. The naive argument applies the Lie-algebra/Lie-group correspondence directly, but that correspondence speaks about the group generated by the flows etXe^{tX}etX, t∈Rt\in\mathbb Rt∈R. The class contains only nonnegative times and their compositions and limits, so the step from the generated group to the closed semigroup is exactly what has to be supplied.

The remaining milestones are explicit matrix analysis: exponentials of explicit superoperators on one qubit and their limits as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞, and register swaps. Milestone 7 has two halves. The inclusion ⊇\supseteq⊇ is the construction. The inclusion ⊆\subseteq⊆ requires every element of the closed class, limits included, to be positive and trace-preserving.

Formalization scope

  • Carrier. The basis of C2k\mathbb C^{2^k}C2k is indexed by bit strings Fin k → Bool, with false =∣0⟩=|0\rangle=∣0⟩. Operators are complex matrices on this index set. Superoperators are continuous C\mathbb CC-linear maps with the operator norm over the L2L^2L2-operator norm on matrices. In finite dimension every norm gives the same topology, so closedness and limits do not depend on this choice. Exponentials are NormedSpace.exp on matrices and on superoperators. Milestones 3 and 4 are stated on 2×22\times22×2 matrices indexed by Fin 2, with basis order (∣0⟩,∣1⟩)(|0\rangle,|1\rangle)(∣0⟩,∣1⟩).

  • The class. Channel(S)‾\overline{\mathrm{Channel}(S)}Channel(S)​ is the intersection of all closed sets with (UN), (JU) and (CO). A formalization in which some class with these properties is merely assumed to exist would make the goal trivial (take all superoperators), and is ruled out. Likewise, the Hörmander hypothesis is containment of su(2k)\mathfrak{su}(2^k)su(2k) in the generated real Lie algebra, not in the span of SSS.

  • Conventions committed to.

    • The dissipator has the standard sign 2aρa∗−a∗aρ−ρa∗a2a\rho a^*-a^*a\rho-\rho a^*a2aρa∗−a∗aρ−ρa∗a. The page prints (JU) with the opposite sign, but every computation in the paper uses this one.
    • S=S∗S=S^*S=S∗ means a∈S⇒a∗∈Sa\in S\Rightarrow a^*\in Sa∈S⇒a∗∈S.
    • k≥1k\ge1k≥1 is assumed wherever the first qubit is named; the first qubit is index 000.
    • Proposition 2.2(i) is posed for every unitary UUU, as its proof and its uses read it.
    • The middle term of the page's LZL_ZLZ​ display is a slip; the outer identity LZ=4(E∞−id)L_Z=4(E_\infty-\mathrm{id})LZ​=4(E∞​−id) is posed.
    • In Lemma 2.11(iii), the printed "∣0⟩⟨I∣⊗1k−1|0\rangle\langle I|\otimes 1^{k-1}∣0⟩⟨I∣⊗1k−1" is read as ∣0⟩⟨1∣⊗I⊗(k−1)|0\rangle\langle1|\otimes I^{\otimes(k-1)}∣0⟩⟨1∣⊗I⊗(k−1).
  • Infrastructure needed.

    • Generation of SU(d)SU(d)SU(d) from one-parameter subgroups of a Lie-generating set.
    • Positivity and trace preservation of etLe^{tL}etL for Lindblad LLL, and stability of complete positivity under limits.
    • Exponentials of superoperators that act diagonally on matrix units.
    • Swap and tensor-product manipulations on bit-string indices.

    The first two are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones, and of general lemmas on Lindblad semigroups, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Cai, A. Govindarajan, M. Junge, How Far do Lindbladians Go?, arXiv preprint, v2, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.04883
  • V. Gorini, A. Kossakowski, E. C. G. Sudarshan, Completely positive dynamical semigroups of N-level systems, J. Math. Phys. 17 (1976) 821–825. https://doi.org/10.1063/1.522979
  • G. Lindblad, On the generators of quantum dynamical semigroups, Comm. Math. Phys. 48 (1976) 119–130. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01608499
  • W.-L. Chow, Über Systeme von linearen partiellen Differentialgleichungen erster Ordnung, Math. Ann. 117 (1940) 98–105. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01450011
  • R. W. Brockett, System theory on group manifolds and coset spaces, SIAM J. Control 10 (1972) 265–284. https://doi.org/10.1137/0310021
  • V. Jurdjevic, H. J. Sussmann, Control systems on Lie groups, J. Differential Equations 12 (1972) 313–329. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0396(72)90035-6
  • R. Cleve, C. Wang, Efficient quantum algorithms for simulating Lindblad evolution, arXiv preprint, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.09512
  • R. Araiza, Y. Chen, M. Junge, P. Wu, Resource-dependent complexity of quantum channels, arXiv preprint, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.11304
  • F. Verstraete, M. M. Wolf, J. I. Cirac, Quantum computation and quantum-state engineering driven by dissipation, Nature Physics 5 (2009) 633–636. https://doi.org/10.1038/nphys1342
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Operations ResearchProbabilityReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Relaxed Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Markov Decision Processes: A Relaxed Equilibrium Exists in Discrete Time without Convexity, via Vanishing Entropy RegularizationResearch Paper

Time inconsistency and equilibrium controls

An agent who maximizes an expected sum of rewards over time is time-inconsistent when the plan that is optimal today stops being optimal tomorrow. This happens as soon as discounting is not exponential: with hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting, a reward far in the future is weighed differently at time 0 and at time 1, and the agent's future selves want to revise today's plan. Strotz (Strotz 1955) proposed to treat the problem as a game between the current self and all future selves and to look for a strategy that no self wants to deviate from: an equilibrium. Non-exponential discounting is documented in experimental economics (Laibson 1997), and equilibrium controls are the standard solution concept for such problems in mathematical finance and stochastic control (Björk, Khapko, Murgoci 2017).

The basic question is whether an equilibrium exists. For a Markov decision process on a finite state space with a general action set, Huang and Zhou proved existence when the actions available in each state form a closed convex set and the reward is concave in the action. Without convexity there need not be an equilibrium among deterministic feedback controls. Bayraktar, Huang, Wang and Zhou show that existence is restored for relaxed (randomized) controls, under only Lipschitz continuity and a geometric condition on the action space. This mission formalizes their discrete-time result.

Setting

The action space is a compact set U⊂RℓU\subset\mathbb R^\ellU⊂Rℓ with positive Lebesgue measure Leb(U)>0\mathrm{Leb}(U)>0Leb(U)>0, and the state space is S={1,…,d}\mathcal S=\{1,\dots,d\}S={1,…,d}. Each action u∈Uu\in Uu∈U has a transition matrix pu=(piju)p^u=(p^u_{ij})pu=(piju​), with iii-th row piup^u_ipiu​. A reward function f(t,i,u)f(t,i,u)f(t,i,u) depends on the time difference t∈N0t\in\mathbb N_0t∈N0​, the state and the action.

A relaxed feedback control is a map π:S→P(U)\pi:\mathcal S\to\mathcal P(U)π:S→P(U): in state iii the agent samples an action from the probability measure π(i)\pi(i)π(i). The set of relaxed controls is Π\PiΠ. The chain then moves with the averaged matrix pijπ=∫Upiju (π(i))(du)p^\pi_{ij}=\int_U p^u_{ij}\,(\pi(i))(du)pijπ​=∫U​piju​(π(i))(du), and the value is

Jπ(i)=Ei[∑k≥0fπ(Xk)(k,Xk)],fμ(t,i)=∫Uf(t,i,u) μ(du).J^\pi(i)=\mathbb E_i\Big[\sum_{k\ge0}f^{\pi(X_k)}(k,X_k)\Big],\qquad f^\mu(t,i)=\int_U f(t,i,u)\,\mu(du).Jπ(i)=Ei​[k≥0∑​fπ(Xk​)(k,Xk​)],fμ(t,i)=∫U​f(t,i,u)μ(du).

For π,π′∈Π\pi,\pi'\in\Piπ,π′∈Π, the concatenation π′⊗1π\pi'\otimes_1\piπ′⊗1​π uses π′\pi'π′ at time 000 and π\piπ afterwards. A control π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π is a relaxed equilibrium if

Jπ′⊗1π(i)−Jπ(i)≤0for all i∈S, π′∈Π.J^{\pi'\otimes_1\pi}(i)-J^\pi(i)\le0\qquad\text{for all } i\in\mathcal S,\ \pi'\in\Pi .Jπ′⊗1​π(i)−Jπ(i)≤0for all i∈S, π′∈Π.

The paper also uses an entropy-regularized problem. A control is regular (π∈Πr\pi\in\Pi_rπ∈Πr​) if each π(i)\pi(i)π(i) has a density ρi\rho_iρi​ on UUU whose differential entropy H(ρi)=−∫Uρiln⁡ρi du\mathcal H(\rho_i)=-\int_U\rho_i\ln\rho_i\,duH(ρi​)=−∫U​ρi​lnρi​du is finite. For λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and a discount function δ\deltaδ, the regularized value JλπJ^\pi_\lambdaJλπ​ adds λδ(k)H(π(Xk))\lambda\delta(k)\mathcal H(\pi(X_k))λδ(k)H(π(Xk​)) to the reward at time kkk. A regular control is a regular relaxed equilibrium if no regular deviation π′\pi'π′ improves JλJ_\lambdaJλ​. The Gibbs density

Γλ(y,i)(u)=e1λ(f(0,i,u)+piu⋅y)∫Ue1λ(f(0,i,v)+piv⋅y) dv,y∈Rd,\Gamma_\lambda(y,i)(u)=\frac{e^{\frac1\lambda(f(0,i,u)+p^u_i\cdot y)}}{\int_U e^{\frac1\lambda(f(0,i,v)+p^v_i\cdot y)}\,dv},\qquad y\in\mathbb R^d,Γλ​(y,i)(u)=∫U​eλ1​(f(0,i,v)+piv​⋅y)dveλ1​(f(0,i,u)+piu​⋅y)​,y∈Rd,

defines the map Ψλ(y)=VλΓλ(y,⋅)\Psi_\lambda(y)=V_\lambda^{\Gamma_\lambda(y,\cdot)}Ψλ​(y)=VλΓλ​(y,⋅)​, where VλV_\lambdaVλ​ is the continuation value from time 111.

The assumptions are the following.

  • Assumption 2.1: ∑t(sup⁡i,u∣f(t,i,u)∣+δ(t))<∞\sum_t\big(\sup_{i,u}|f(t,i,u)|+\delta(t)\big)<\infty∑t​(supi,u​∣f(t,i,u)∣+δ(t))<∞.
  • Assumption 2.2: u↦f(t,i,u)u\mapsto f(t,i,u)u↦f(t,i,u) and u↦piuu\mapsto p^u_iu↦piu​ are Lipschitz, uniformly in (t,i)(t,i)(t,i), with constant Θ\ThetaΘ.
  • Assumption 2.3: a uniform cone condition. Some cone of fixed angle ι\iotaι and fixed height ϑ\varthetaϑ with vertex at any point of UUU lies in UUU. Polyhedra and ellipsoids satisfy it.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.2

Under Assumptions 2.1–2.3, there exists π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π with

Jπ′⊗1π(i)≤Jπ(i)∀i∈S, ∀π′∈Π.J^{\pi'\otimes_1\pi}(i)\le J^\pi(i)\qquad\forall i\in\mathcal S,\ \forall\pi'\in\Pi.Jπ′⊗1​π(i)≤Jπ(i)∀i∈S, ∀π′∈Π.

The statement fixes no constants and assumes no convexity.

Regularized problem (milestones, in attack order)

  1. The one-step decomposition Jλπ′⊗1π(i)=fπ′(i)(0,i)+λH(π′(i))+Ei[Vλπ(X1π′)]J^{\pi'\otimes_1\pi}_\lambda(i)=f^{\pi'(i)}(0,i)+\lambda\mathcal H(\pi'(i))+\mathbb E_i[V^\pi_\lambda(X^{\pi'}_1)]Jλπ′⊗1​π​(i)=fπ′(i)(0,i)+λH(π′(i))+Ei​[Vλπ​(X1π′​)] (p. 6).
  2. Γλ(y,i)\Gamma_\lambda(y,i)Γλ​(y,i) is the unique maximizer of the one-step objective (2.11)–(2.12).
  3. Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.1: regular relaxed equilibria correspond to fixed points Φλ(π)=π\Phi_\lambda(\pi)=\piΦλ​(π)=π, and their values to fixed points Ψλ(y)=y\Psi_\lambda(y)=yΨλ​(y)=y.
  4. Lemma 2.1: sup⁡i∣H(Γλ(y,i))∣≤κ+ℓln⁡(1+∣y∣)\sup_i|\mathcal H(\Gamma_\lambda(y,i))|\le\kappa+\ell\ln(1+|y|)supi​∣H(Γλ​(y,i))∣≤κ+ℓln(1+∣y∣) (2.17), and ≤κ1+κ2∣ln⁡λ∣+ℓln⁡(1+∣y∣)\le\kappa_1+\kappa_2|\ln\lambda|+\ell\ln(1+|y|)≤κ1​+κ2​∣lnλ∣+ℓln(1+∣y∣) for small λ\lambdaλ (2.18).
  5. Continuity of Ψλ\Psi_\lambdaΨλ​, then Theorem 2.1: for every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, Ψλ\Psi_\lambdaΨλ​ has a fixed point, which gives a regular relaxed equilibrium.

Vanishing regularization

  1. Lemma 2.2: fixed points yn=Ψλn(yn)y^n=\Psi_{\lambda_n}(y^n)yn=Ψλn​​(yn) stay bounded as λn↓0\lambda_n\downarrow0λn​↓0.
  2. Proposition 2.2: π\piπ is a relaxed equilibrium iff π∈Φ(π)=Γ(Vπ)\pi\in\Phi(\pi)=\Gamma(V^\pi)π∈Φ(π)=Γ(Vπ), where Γ(y)\Gamma(y)Γ(y) collects the controls carried by arg⁡max⁡u{f(0,i,u)+piu⋅y}\arg\max_u\{f(0,i,u)+p^u_i\cdot y\}argmaxu​{f(0,i,u)+piu​⋅y}.
  3. Two steps of the limit argument (pp. 22–23). Weak limits of Gibbs controls lie in Γ(y∞)\Gamma(y^\infty)Γ(y∞), and their regularized values converge, VλnΓλn(yn,⋅)→Vπ∗V^{\Gamma_{\lambda_n}(y^n,\cdot)}_{\lambda_n}\to V^{\pi^*}Vλn​Γλn​​(yn,⋅)​→Vπ∗ (A.12)–(A.13).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.2 removes the convexity and concavity assumptions of the earlier existence theorem for discrete-time time-inconsistent MDPs. Its price is randomization. The action space may be a finite union of polytopes, for example, and the reward need not be concave in the action. Theorem 2.1 is of independent interest for reinforcement learning, where entropy-regularized objectives are the standard way to encourage exploration (Ziebart et al. 2008). With non-exponential discounting, the theorem guarantees a randomized policy that all future selves uphold. The regularized equilibria are fixed points of a single-valued map, and the paper (Remark 2.6) points to them as a computational route to relaxed equilibria.

The formalization. The results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and this mission produces the first. Along the way it requires a formal treatment of relaxed controls as measure-valued maps, of the differential entropy of densities on a subset of Rℓ\mathbb R^\ellRℓ, and of Gibbs variational principles for such densities.

Difficulty

The obvious route to existence is a fixed-point theorem for the best-response correspondence on deterministic controls. It needs convex values, hence a convex action set and a concave reward, and both are absent here. Relaxing to measures restores convexity of each best-response set. However, the unregularized best response π↦Γ(Vπ)\pi\mapsto\Gamma(V^\pi)π↦Γ(Vπ) is set-valued on an infinite-dimensional space, and the value VπV^\piVπ depends nonlinearly on π\piπ through the whole future of the chain. The regularized problem has a single-valued best response, but a fixed point needs a uniform bound on entropies of Gibbs densities. That bound must grow only logarithmically in ∣y∣|y|∣y∣ (otherwise no ball is invariant) and stay controlled as λ→0\lambda\to0λ→0. The geometric Assumption 2.3 enters exactly there, and again in the limit, where Gibbs measures must concentrate on maximizers that a cusp or isolated point of UUU would otherwise hide.

Formalization scope

Actions are points of EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin ℓ) with ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0. The state space is Fin d, value vectors are Fin d → ℝ, and every norm ∣y∣|y|∣y∣ on Rd\mathbb R^dRd (and ∣piu1−piu2∣|p^{u_1}_i-p^{u_2}_i|∣piu1​​−piu2​​∣) is Euclidean. A control is a family of measures on Rℓ\mathbb R^\ellRℓ:

  • relaxed means probability measures carried by UUU;
  • regular adds absolute continuity with respect to Lebesgue measure on UUU and integrability of ρln⁡ρ\rho\ln\rhoρlnρ for the Radon–Nikodym density ρ\rhoρ.

Expected values are infinite sums through products of the averaged transition matrices (Remark 2.1), and the concatenation π′⊗1π\pi'\otimes_1\piπ′⊗1​π is the control sequence (π′,π,π,… )(\pi',\pi,\pi,\dots)(π′,π,π,…). The p. 6 decomposition is therefore a theorem, not a definition. Weak convergence is tested against bounded continuous functions on Rℓ\mathbb R^\ellRℓ. Constants that the paper says depend on (ℓ,λ,Leb(U),ι,ϑ,Θ)(\ell,\lambda,\mathrm{Leb}(U),\iota,\vartheta,\Theta)(ℓ,λ,Leb(U),ι,ϑ,Θ) are quantified before ddd, UUU, fff, ppp and yyy.

Disclosed conventions:

  • each pup^upu is a stochastic matrix;
  • Θ>0\Theta>0Θ>0;
  • the cone of Assumption 2.3 has one nappe and the ball is open (weaker than the printed double cone, which no polyhedron vertex satisfies);
  • measurability of fff and ppp is assumed where only Assumption 2.1 is cited;
  • supp⁡π(i)⊆E\operatorname{supp}\pi(i)\subseteq Esuppπ(i)⊆E is written π(i)(Ec)=0\pi(i)(E^c)=0π(i)(Ec)=0.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out. Equilibria quantify over all relaxed deviations, Dirac controls included. Jπ′⊗1πJ^{\pi'\otimes_1\pi}Jπ′⊗1​π is computed from the process, not from the one-step formula. The hypotheses of the goal are satisfiable: a verified instance with ℓ=d=1\ell=d=1ℓ=d=1 and U=[−1,1]U=[-1,1]U=[−1,1] exists in the development.

Needed infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission:

  • entropy and Gibbs principles for densities on subsets of Rℓ\mathbb R^\ellRℓ;
  • lower bounds on Lebesgue measure of cone sections;
  • weak convergence on compact metric spaces;
  • Brouwer's fixed-point theorem.

Proofs of any milestone and of reusable lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. Bayraktar, Y.-J. Huang, Z. Wang, Z. Zhou, Relaxed Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2307.04227v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.04227
  • Y.-J. Huang, Z. Zhou, Strong and weak equilibria for time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous time, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(2), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.09243
  • R. H. Strotz, Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization, Review of Economic Studies 23(3), 1955. https://doi.org/10.2307/2295722
  • D. Laibson, Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555253
  • T. Björk, M. Khapko, A. Murgoci, On time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous time, Finance and Stochastics 21(2), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-017-0327-5
  • B. D. Ziebart, A. Maas, J. A. Bagnell, A. K. Dey, Maximum entropy inverse reinforcement learning, AAAI 2008. https://cdn.aaai.org/AAAI/2008/AAAI08-227.pdf
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenizing Discretion in Disclosures: No Information System Against a Weak Union, Disclosure Discretion Against an Intermediate-Strength Union, Committed Public Disclosure Against a Strong UnionResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms disclose information to capital markets, but the same disclosures are read by other parties with a stake in the firm's cash flows. Labor unions are a leading example: anticipated good performance is associated with more aggressive union demands (evidence cited in Arya and Ramanan, p. 11: Bova 2013; Chung et al. 2016; Aobdia and Cheng 2018). A firm's choice of information system, that is, whether to gather information at all, whether to commit to publishing it, or whether to keep discretion over what to release, therefore trades off stock-market valuation against the union's bargaining posture.

Arya and Ramanan (Endogenizing Discretion in Disclosures, Management Science; authors' manuscript SSRN 3935991) make this choice endogenous. The ex post discretionary branch builds on the single-threshold disclosure equilibrium of Dye (1985); the ex ante branch relates to information design in the sense of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). The paper's main result says which information system the firm's CEO installs as a function of the union's strength.

Setting

A firm's cash flow ccc is uniform on [0,cˉ][0,\bar c][0,cˉ]. The CEO sells her shares at an interim date and maximizes the stock price ℘\wp℘. A union observes every public signal; bargaining costs it k>0k>0k>0 and, if undertaken, transfers an expected fraction t∈(0,1)t\in(0,1)t∈(0,1) of the cash flow (in the paper t=λt′t=\lambda t't=λt′, a success probability times a share).

The CEO first chooses an information system I∈{N,P,D}I\in\{N,P,D\}I∈{N,P,D}:

  • NNN: nothing is learned; the public signal is s=ϕs=\phis=ϕ (silence).
  • PPP: the system learns ccc with probability p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1) and publishes it; otherwise s=ϕs=\phis=ϕ.
  • DDD: the CEO privately learns ccc with probability ppp and then chooses, truthfully, whether to disclose it (s=cs=cs=c) or stay silent (s=ϕs=\phis=ϕ).

The union bargains if E[c∣I,s]>k/tE[c\mid I,s]>k/tE[c∣I,s]>k/t, does not if E[c∣I,s]<k/tE[c\mid I,s]<k/tE[c∣I,s]<k/t, and mixes with any probability q∈[0,1]q\in[0,1]q∈[0,1] at equality (Lemma 1); the price is ℘(I,s)=[q(1−t)+1−q] E[c∣I,s]\wp(I,s)=[q(1-t)+1-q]\,E[c\mid I,s]℘(I,s)=[q(1−t)+1−q]E[c∣I,s] (Lemma 2). Throughout, cˉ>k/[t(1−t)]\bar c>k/[t(1-t)]cˉ>k/[t(1−t)].

Under DDD, write x=cϕ=E[c∣D,ϕ]x=c^\phi=E[c\mid D,\phi]x=cϕ=E[c∣D,ϕ] for the value of silence and qqq for the union's bargaining probability after silence. The price of a disclosed ccc is V(c)=cV(c)=cV(c)=c for c≤k/tc\le k/tc≤k/t and (1−t)c(1-t)c(1−t)c for c>k/tc>k/tc>k/t, and the silence price is [q(1−t)+1−q] x[q(1-t)+1-q]\,x[q(1−t)+1−q]x. A DDD-subgame equilibrium is a pair (x,q)(x,q)(x,q) such that qqq is a Lemma 1 best response to xxx, and xxx is the Bayes posterior mean of ccc given silence when the informed CEO withholds exactly the ccc with V(c)V(c)V(c) below the silence price. The CEO's ex ante objective is the expected price E[℘(I,s)]E[\wp(I,s)]E[℘(I,s)], written ENE_NEN​, EPE_PEP​, and ED(x,q)E_D(x,q)ED​(x,q).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 9

With k2A=tcˉ[(1−p)(1−pt2)−(1−p)]/(p[1−t2])k_{2A}=t\bar c[\sqrt{(1-p)(1-pt^2)}-(1-p)]/(p[1-t^2])k2A​=tcˉ[(1−p)(1−pt2)​−(1−p)]/(p[1−t2]):

k≥tcˉ2⇒N,k2A≤k<tcˉ2⇒D,k<k2A⇒P.k\ge \tfrac{t\bar c}{2}\Rightarrow N,\qquad k_{2A}\le k<\tfrac{t\bar c}{2}\Rightarrow D,\qquad k<k_{2A}\Rightarrow P .k≥2tcˉ​⇒N,k2A​≤k<2tcˉ​⇒D,k<k2A​⇒P.

Concretely: (a) for k≥tcˉ/2k\ge t\bar c/2k≥tcˉ/2, EP<ENE_P<E_NEP​<EN​ and ED(x,q)<ENE_D(x,q)<E_NED​(x,q)<EN​ at every DDD-subgame equilibrium; (b) for k2A≤k<tcˉ/2k_{2A}\le k<t\bar c/2k2A​≤k<tcˉ/2, some equilibrium has ED>max⁡(EN,EP)E_D>\max(E_N,E_P)ED​>max(EN​,EP​), and every equilibrium does when k>k2Ak>k_{2A}k>k2A​; (c) for k<k2Ak<k_{2A}k<k2A​, EN<EPE_N<E_PEN​<EP​, some equilibrium has ED<EPE_D<E_PED​<EP​, and every equilibrium with x>k/tx>k/tx>k/t does.

Milestones

  • Propositions 1–4: the four equilibrium regimes of the DDD-subgame (single-tailed disclosure, Cases 2A, 2B, and the mixed Case 2C), with the closed forms c1ϕc_1^\phic1ϕ​, c2Aϕc^\phi_{2A}c2Aϕ​, c2Bϕc^\phi_{2B}c2Bϕ​, q2Cq_{2C}q2C​ and the cutoffs k1A,k2A,k2B,k1Bk_{1A},k_{2A},k_{2B},k_{1B}k1A​,k2A​,k2B​,k1B​.
  • Existence of a DDD-subgame equilibrium for every admissible kkk (§3.1, p. 22).
  • Proposition 7: the expected prices under NNN, PPP, and DDD in closed form.
  • Proposition 8: the conditions k<tcˉ/2k<t\bar c/2k<tcˉ/2 and cϕ≤k/tc^\phi\le k/tcϕ≤k/t for discretion to be optimal, in the form in which they are true.

Significance

The result says that discretion over disclosure, usually viewed as costly because the market discounts silence, can be the optimal design when a third party reacts to disclosures. The mechanism is that the CEO's ex post wish to inflate valuation lowers the value of silence, and a value of silence below the bargaining threshold k/tk/tk/t disciplines the union. Against a weak union no information is best; against a strong one, committed public disclosure is best because it reveals all low cash flows that deter bargaining.

The result is proved in the paper by explicit computation. To our knowledge none of it is machine-checked. Formalizing it requires solving the Bayes fixed-point equations (1)–(4) for each regime, evaluating the expected prices, and comparing them across the parameter space; it also makes precise a point the paper passes over, namely that the DDD-subgame equilibrium is not unique near k2Ak_{2A}k2A​.

Difficulty

The value of silence is defined by a fixed point: the nondisclosure set depends on the silence price, which depends on the value of silence, which depends on the nondisclosure set. The set is a union of two intervals whose endpoints move with kkk, and the regime changes at four cutoffs, with a mixed-strategy regime in which the union's indifference pins x=k/tx=k/tx=k/t and the fixed point is solved for qqq instead. Each regime yields a quadratic whose relevant root must be shown to satisfy the regime's inequalities, with square roots whose radicands must be shown nonnegative.

The comparison in Proposition 9 then compares piecewise closed forms across these regimes. The first idea, that discretion is optimal exactly when the paper's selected equilibrium has cϕ≤k/tc^\phi\le k/tcϕ≤k/t, does not settle the statement for every equilibrium: just below k2Ak_{2A}k2A​ there are mixed equilibria at which discretion beats public disclosure, and at k=k2Ak=k_{2A}k=k2A​ there is a pure equilibrium at which it does not.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Everything is in ℝ. The uniform prior is encoded by Lebesgue integrals over subsets of [0,cˉ][0,\bar c][0,cˉ] divided by cˉ\bar ccˉ; no probability space is introduced. The parameter t=λt′t=\lambda t't=λt′ enters only as t∈(0,1)t\in(0,1)t∈(0,1). The standing assumptions 0<t<10<t<10<t<1, k>0k>0k>0, 0<p<10<p<10<p<1, cˉ>k/[t(1−t)]\bar c>k/[t(1-t)]cˉ>k/[t(1−t)] are a single predicate Standing carried by every statement. Under it, the weak-union part (a) is vacuous for t≥1/2t\ge1/2t≥1/2, as in the paper.
  • Ties follow the paper: the informed CEO discloses at indifference (p. 16); the union does not bargain after a disclosed c=k/tc=k/tc=k/t, nor under NNN or PPP silence when E[c]=k/tE[c]=k/tE[c]=k/t (Propositions 5–6). The union's mixing probability qqq after silence under DDD is part of the equilibrium.
  • Multiplicity. The DDD-subgame can have several equilibria near k2Ak_{2A}k2A​. Example: cˉ=1\bar c=1cˉ=1, t=0.4t=0.4t=0.4, p=0.8p=0.8p=0.8, k=k2A−0.001k=k_{2A}-0.001k=k2A​−0.001 has a Case 2A equilibrium and two mixed ones; the mixed one with q≈0.567q\approx0.567q≈0.567 gives ED≈0.333>EP≈0.317E_D\approx0.333>E_P\approx0.317ED​≈0.333>EP​≈0.317. The goal is therefore stated per equilibrium: universally in (a), in (b) for k>k2Ak>k_{2A}k>k2A​, and in (c) for equilibria with x>k/tx>k/tx>k/t; existentially elsewhere. Likewise Proposition 8's sufficiency is stated for every equilibrium with cϕ<k/tc^\phi<k/tcϕ<k/t and for the paper's own mixed equilibrium, and the uniqueness half of the §3.1 remark is not formalized.
  • The cutoff k2Bk_{2B}k2B​. Its printed formula is undefined at t=1/2t=1/2t=1/2 and wherever (1−p)[1−2t+(1−p)t2]<0(1-p)[1-2t+(1-p)t^2]<0(1−p)[1−2t+(1−p)t2]<0; the statements that use k2Bk_{2B}k2B​ (Propositions 3, 4, the corresponding cases of 7(c), and part 3 of Proposition 8) assume these conditions. The goal does not use k2Bk_{2B}k2B​.
  • Printed slips are not copied: Proposition 4(c) prints ℘(D,ϕ)=k/t\wp(D,\phi)=k/t℘(D,ϕ)=k/t where the price is [1−tq2C]k/t[1-tq_{2C}]k/t[1−tq2C​]k/t (the value of silence is k/tk/tk/t), and Proposition 7(c) prints qqq for q2Cq_{2C}q2C​.
  • No trivialization. The expected price under DDD is defined from an equilibrium profile through the best-response integral, never by Proposition 7's closed forms, and the goal quantifies over all pairs satisfying the Bayes fixed-point condition rather than over a given closed-form equilibrium; a statement about a single closed-form solution, or with the fixed-point condition replaced by its solution, is not this theorem.
  • Infrastructure. The development needs integrals of piecewise-linear functions over unions of intervals, and the solution of quadratic fixed points with sign control of square-root radicands. Contributions of any of the milestones, of lemmas computing the nondisclosure set and the expected price for a given silence price, and of proofs of the cutoff ordering k1A≤k2A<tcˉ/2k_{1A}\le k_{2A}<t\bar c/2k1A​≤k2A​<tcˉ/2 are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Arya and R. N. V. Ramanan, Endogenizing Discretion in Disclosures, Management Science (2022/23); authors' manuscript, June 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3935991, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4505
  • R. A. Dye, Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information, Journal of Accounting Research 23(1), 1985. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490910
  • E. Kamenica and M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
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Optimal Subscription Planning for Digital Goods: Under Condition 2, a Single Grand Subscription Set With a Suitable Fee Achieves the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

Digital-goods platforms (video, music, e-books, software) sell access in two ways at once: subscriptions, which give unlimited use of a set of items for a period, and rentals, which charge per use. A platform with a large catalogue could offer many subscription sets at different fees, but most platforms offer a single all-inclusive subscription. Alaei, Makhdoumi and Malekian (Optimal Subscription Planning for Digital Goods, Operations Research 2023; working paper SSRN 3476296) ask when that practice is revenue-optimal. Users differ not only in how they value items but in how often they consume (their usage rate), and it is this second dimension that makes the question nontrivial: a frequent user values unlimited access more, even with the same per-use tastes.

The paper's first main result, Theorem 2, gives a condition on the value distributions under which a single grand subscription (all items, one fee), together with the rental prices, earns as much as any menu of subscription sets, whatever the masses and usage rates of the user types.

Setting

There are nnn user types i∈Ni \in \mathcal Ni∈N and mmm item types j∈Mj \in \mathcal Mj∈M. On a probability space, VijV_{ij}Vij​ is the value of one watch of item jjj to a user of type iii and V0V_0V0​ is the value of an outside option. Type iii has mass qi≥0q_i \ge 0qi​≥0 with ∑iqi=1\sum_i q_i = 1∑i​qi​=1, and watches at usage rate λi>0\lambda_i > 0λi​>0 over a period of length T>0T > 0T>0.

A subscription planning (Definition 1) is a pair (p,r)(p, \mathbf r)(p,r): a fee p(S)p(S)p(S) for each subscription set S⊆MS \subseteq \mathcal MS⊆M, and a rental price rjr_jrj​ for each item. A user subscribed to SSS gets utility VijV_{ij}Vij​ from an item j∈Sj \in Sj∈S, Vij−rjV_{ij} - r_jVij​−rj​ from an item j∉Sj \notin Sj∈/S, and V0V_0V0​ from the outside option, and takes the best of these on each watch. Two per-watch quantities summarise this choice:

  • the subscription gain SubGain(i,S,r)\mathrm{SubGain}(i,S,\mathbf r)SubGain(i,S,r), the expected best utility under SSS minus the expected best utility without a subscription;
  • the rental revenue Rent(i,S,r)\mathrm{Rent}(i,S,\mathbf r)Rent(i,S,r), the expected rental price paid.

By Proposition 2, for fixed r\mathbf rr the platform chooses fees and an assignment i↦Sii \mapsto S_ii↦Si​ to maximise the revenue

∑iqi(p(Si)+λiT Rent(i,Si,r))\sum_{i} q_i\big(p(S_i) + \lambda_i T\,\mathrm{Rent}(i,S_i,\mathbf r)\big)i∑​qi​(p(Si​)+λi​TRent(i,Si​,r))

subject to the incentive constraints λiT SubGain(i,Si,r)−p(Si)≥λiT SubGain(i,S,r)−p(S)\lambda_i T\,\mathrm{SubGain}(i,S_i,\mathbf r) - p(S_i) \ge \lambda_i T\,\mathrm{SubGain}(i,S,\mathbf r) - p(S)λi​TSubGain(i,Si​,r)−p(Si​)≥λi​TSubGain(i,S,r)−p(S) for all iii and SSS. Such (p,S)(p, S)(p,S) with p(∅)=0p(\emptyset) = 0p(∅)=0 is a feasible planning. In the grand subscription only M\mathcal MM is offered, at a fee PPP, and each type subscribes or not according to its incentive.

Condition 2 (p. 12) requires, for every i,i′i, i'i,i′ and SSS,

SubGain(i,S,r)Rent(i,∅,r)−Rent(i,S,r)≤SubGain(i,M,r)Rent(i,∅,r),SubGain(i,S,r)SubGain(i,M,r)=SubGain(i′,S,r)SubGain(i′,M,r).\frac{\mathrm{SubGain}(i,S,\mathbf r)}{\mathrm{Rent}(i,\emptyset,\mathbf r) - \mathrm{Rent}(i,S,\mathbf r)} \le \frac{\mathrm{SubGain}(i,\mathcal M,\mathbf r)}{\mathrm{Rent}(i,\emptyset,\mathbf r)}, \qquad \frac{\mathrm{SubGain}(i,S,\mathbf r)}{\mathrm{SubGain}(i,\mathcal M,\mathbf r)} = \frac{\mathrm{SubGain}(i',S,\mathbf r)}{\mathrm{SubGain}(i',\mathcal M,\mathbf r)}.Rent(i,∅,r)−Rent(i,S,r)SubGain(i,S,r)​≤Rent(i,∅,r)SubGain(i,M,r)​,SubGain(i,M,r)SubGain(i,S,r)​=SubGain(i′,M,r)SubGain(i′,S,r)​.

The first part says the grand set has the best trade-off between subscription gain and lost rentals; the second says all types rank sets by the same relative gain.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, first bullet (p. 13)

If r≥0\mathbf r \ge 0r≥0 satisfies Condition 2, then for all q\mathbf qq and λ\boldsymbol\lambdaλ there are a fee PPP and incentive-compatible subscription decisions σ\sigmaσ such that

revenue(p,S)≤grandRevenue(P,σ)for every feasible planning (p,S).\mathrm{revenue}(p, S) \le \mathrm{grandRevenue}(P, \sigma) \quad\text{for every feasible planning } (p, S).revenue(p,S)≤grandRevenue(P,σ)for every feasible planning (p,S).

Since the grand subscription is itself feasible, it achieves the optimal revenue.

Milestones

In attack order:

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 10): SubGain(i,M,r)≥SubGain(i,S,r)+Rent(i,S,r)\mathrm{SubGain}(i,\mathcal M,\mathbf r) \ge \mathrm{SubGain}(i,S,\mathbf r) + \mathrm{Rent}(i,S,\mathbf r)SubGain(i,M,r)≥SubGain(i,S,r)+Rent(i,S,r).
  2. Lemma 5 (pp. 21–22): Rent(i,∅,r)≥Rent(i,S,r)\mathrm{Rent}(i,\emptyset,\mathbf r) \ge \mathrm{Rent}(i,S,\mathbf r)Rent(i,∅,r)≥Rent(i,S,r) and SubGain(i,M,r)≥Rent(i,∅,r)\mathrm{SubGain}(i,\mathcal M,\mathbf r) \ge \mathrm{Rent}(i,\emptyset,\mathbf r)SubGain(i,M,r)≥Rent(i,∅,r).
  3. Claim 1 of the proof of Lemma 3 (p. 28): a type choosing a set of larger relative gain pays a weakly larger fee.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 13), with a strict hypothesis: types with larger λi SubGain(i,M,r)\lambda_i\,\mathrm{SubGain}(i,\mathcal M,\mathbf r)λi​SubGain(i,M,r) choose larger relative gains and pay larger fees.
  5. Lemma 4 (p. 13): at an optimum, each type is indifferent between its set and the next lower type's set.
  6. Mechanism 1 (p. 14): a lottery over the grand fees λkT SubGain(k,M,r)\lambda_k T\,\mathrm{SubGain}(k,\mathcal M,\mathbf r)λk​TSubGain(k,M,r) earns at least the revenue of any feasible planning.

Significance

The result separates what a menu of subscription sets can do from what the grand subscription does. Under Condition 2, which holds for instance for values with item-dependent Gumbel distributions (Example 2 of the paper), a platform loses nothing by offering a single subscription at a single fee, whatever the distribution of usage rates. The optimal fee is then one of nnn candidates, λkT SubGain(k,M,r)\lambda_k T\,\mathrm{SubGain}(k,\mathcal M,\mathbf r)λk​TSubGain(k,M,r), so the platform's problem collapses from a menu over 2m2^m2m sets to a one-dimensional choice.

The theorem has a published proof; this mission formalizes it. No part of it is machine-checked yet. A formal development would also settle the boundary cases the printed argument passes over: ties in the per-watch choice, ties among usage-weighted gains, and types with zero subscription gain.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is the single-type one: with one user type, Lemma 2 shows the grand set dominates. With several types, a menu can screen them by usage rate: frequent users buy large sets at high fees, infrequent users buy small sets or rent. The grand subscription cannot screen, and any single grand fee either excludes infrequent users (losing their fees) or undercharges frequent ones. So no single grand fee can be compared with a screening menu type by type. Any comparison has to cover rental revenue as well as fees: a menu that sells small sets keeps collecting rentals from the types it screens, while the grand subscription collects rentals only from non-subscribers. The menu's structure is also not explicit: the sets chosen by different types need not be nested, and without a common ranking of sets across types (part 2 of Condition 2) the menu's revenue does not decompose along the order of usage rates at all.

Formalization scope

All statements live in the namespace SubscriptionPlanning.GrandOptimal. User types are Fin n, item types Fin m, sets Finset (Fin m), and the values are real random variables on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), measurable and integrable. The model bundles qi≥0q_i \ge 0qi​≥0, ∑iqi=1\sum_i q_i = 1∑i​qi​=1, λi>0\lambda_i > 0λi​>0 and T>0T > 0T>0 (the paper's standing assumptions, p. 4). The values may have any joint law; the paper draws them independently, and nothing in Theorem 2 uses independence.

Committed conventions, each disclosed in the item statements:

  • Tie-break. The per-watch choice is the first maximizer in a fixed order (outside option, then items by index). Rent\mathrm{Rent}Rent is the expected rental price of the chosen item. This equals the printed formula when ties have probability zero; the printed "≥\ge≥" counts every tied maximizer and makes Lemma 2 false for atomic laws.
  • Added hypotheses. r≥0\mathbf r \ge 0r≥0 (Lemmas 2 and 5 fail for negative prices) and p(∅)=0p(\emptyset) = 0p(∅)=0 (the paper's convention in the proof of Theorem 2).
  • Condition 2 cross-multiplied. With positive denominators it is the printed condition. Relative gains are real divisions with Lean's x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0.
  • No supremum. Optimality is domination of every feasible planning.
  • The factor TTT. It is kept wherever (3) has it, including Lemma 4 and Mechanism 1, where the page drops it.
  • Lemma 3 is posed with a strict hypothesis, since it is false on ties as printed. Lemma 4 adds qi>0q_i > 0qi​>0.
  • Mechanism 1 is posed as a revenue inequality for every feasible planning, under the orderings the paper assumes without loss of generality.

Trivializing readings. The goal is not "some grand fee beats some planning"; it is not stated with feasibility lacking any incentive constraint; and it does not fix all types to subscribe or let σ\sigmaσ ignore incentives. The goal quantifies the fee before every feasible planning, and σ\sigmaσ must respect each type's incentive.

Not posed. Theorem 2 opens with "if and only if", but only the first bullet (sufficiency) is posed. The second bullet (necessity) is false as printed. With a single user type the grand subscription is always optimal by Lemmas 2 and 5, yet part 1 of Condition 2 can fail. Theorem 3, Propositions 1–3 and Lemma 6 are also out of scope.

Infrastructure and contributions. A complete development needs expectations of maxima of finitely many integrable random variables, measurability of the first-maximizer choice, and finite telescoping sums; the per-watch choice lemmas (Lemmas 2 and 5) are reusable for any model of menus with per-use prices. Proofs of the milestones, alternative arguments for the goal, and sanity examples (e.g. Gumbel values) are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Alaei, A. Makhdoumi, A. Malekian, Optimal Subscription Planning for Digital Goods, Operations Research, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2468 ; working paper SSRN 3476296, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3476296
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CombinatoricsNumber Theory·Captain: Ethan Cheung Wang

Erdős #195: monotone 444-term APs in permutations of Z\mathbb{Z}ZOpen Problem

Motivation

A permutation of Z\mathbb{Z}Z in the sense of Erdős and Graham is a one-sided arrangement a0,a1,a2,…a_0, a_1, a_2, \ldotsa0​,a1​,a2​,… in which every integer appears exactly once. Erdős Problem 195 (erdosproblems.com/195) asks for the largest kkk such that every such arrangement contains a monotone kkk-term arithmetic progression: indices i1<⋯<iki_1 < \cdots < i_ki1​<⋯<ik​ for which ai1,…,aika_{i_1}, \ldots, a_{i_k}ai1​​,…,aik​​ is an increasing or a decreasing arithmetic progression. The question sits in the Ramsey-type study of how much arithmetic structure an ordering is forced to preserve, alongside its companion Problem 196 for permutations of N\mathbb{N}N.

Timeline of the known results:

  • 1977. Davis, Entringer, Graham and Simmons (Acta Arith. 34) proved that every permutation of the positive integers contains a monotone 3-term progression, and that the positive integers can be permuted to avoid monotone 5-term progressions. Since the positive entries of a permutation of Z\mathbb{Z}Z form a permutation of the positive integers, every permutation of Z\mathbb{Z}Z contains a monotone 3-term progression.
  • 2019. Geneson (Discrete Math. 342) constructed a permutation of Z\mathbb{Z}Z with no monotone 6-term progression, so the answer is at most 5.
  • 2022–2024. Adenwalla (arXiv:2211.04451, Discrete Math. 347 (2024) 114183) constructed a permutation of Z\mathbb{Z}Z with no monotone 5-term progression, so the answer is at most 4.
  • 2026. Ho (arXiv:2609.12780) constructed a permutation of N\mathbb{N}N with no monotone 4-term progression, settling Problem 196, with a complete Lean 4 proof (github.com/boonsuan/4ap). Geneson (arXiv:2608.12604) proved βZ(4)=1\beta_{\mathbb{Z}}(4)=1βZ​(4)=1: there are sets of integers with lower density arbitrarily close to 111 that can be permuted to avoid monotone 4-term progressions.

The answer to Problem 195 is therefore 333 or 444, and it is 333 exactly when some permutation of Z\mathbb{Z}Z avoids monotone 4-term progressions.

Setting

A permutation of Z\mathbb{Z}Z is a bijection f:N→Zf : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{Z}f:N→Z. A list of values is an arithmetic progression of length kkk if it equals a,a+d,…,a+(k−1)da, a+d, \ldots, a+(k-1)da,a+d,…,a+(k−1)d or the same list reversed. The function fff has a monotone kkk-AP if there are indices b1<⋯<bkb_1 < \cdots < b_kb1​<⋯<bk​ such that f(b1),…,f(bk)f(b_1), \ldots, f(b_k)f(b1​),…,f(bk​) is an arithmetic progression of length kkk. For a bijection the common difference is automatically nonzero when k≥2k \ge 2k≥2.

Auxiliary objects used by the milestones:

  1. For ε:N→{true,false}\varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \to \{\mathrm{true},\mathrm{false}\}ε:N→{true,false}, the ε\varepsilonε-order ≺ε\prec_\varepsilon≺ε​ on Z\mathbb{Z}Z: for x≠yx \ne yx=y, let k=ν2(y−x)k = \nu_2(y-x)k=ν2​(y−x) be the lowest binary position at which the two's-complement expansions of xxx and yyy differ; then x≺εyx \prec_\varepsilon yx≺ε​y iff the kkk-th digit of xxx is 111 exactly when ε(k)\varepsilon(k)ε(k) is true. With ε≡true\varepsilon \equiv \mathrm{true}ε≡true this is the extension to Z\mathbb{Z}Z of the order used by Ho.
  2. For a relation RRR and a finite duplicate-free word PPP of integers, the completion C(P)C(P)C(P) lists PPP first, in order, followed by all other integers ordered by RRR. The word PPP is safe if C(P)C(P)C(P) has no monotone 4-term progression.
  3. (No3AP): RRR has no monotone 3-term progression. (Star): aRa+r  ⟺  a+2rRa+3ra \mathrel{R} a+r \iff a+2r \mathrel{R} a+3raRa+r⟺a+2rRa+3r for every aaa and every r≠0r \ne 0r=0.

Formalization targets

Goal

∃f:N≃Z, f has no monotone 4-term arithmetic progression.\exists f : \mathbb{N} \simeq \mathbb{Z},\ f \text{ has no monotone 4-term arithmetic progression.}∃f:N≃Z, f has no monotone 4-term arithmetic progression.

Together with the known bounds this is equivalent to the answer to Problem 195 being 333. A disproof would show that the answer is 444.

Literature milestones

∀f:N≃Z, f has a monotone 3-AP,∃f:N≃Z with no monotone 5-AP,∃f:N≃N with no monotone 4-AP,\forall f : \mathbb{N} \simeq \mathbb{Z},\ f \text{ has a monotone 3-AP}, \qquad \exists f : \mathbb{N}\simeq\mathbb{Z} \text{ with no monotone 5-AP}, \qquad \exists f : \mathbb{N} \simeq \mathbb{N} \text{ with no monotone 4-AP},∀f:N≃Z, f has a monotone 3-AP,∃f:N≃Z with no monotone 5-AP,∃f:N≃N with no monotone 4-AP,

and the reduction: the supremum in the formal-conjectures statement equals 333 iff the goal holds.

Structural milestones

The ε\varepsilonε-orders are strict total orders with no monotone 3-term progression that satisfy (Star). They have no endpoints when ε\varepsilonε is not eventually constant. In every ε\varepsilonε-order, a word listed in reverse order is safe. Conversely, a least element blocks every exhaustive chain of safe words, and the two's-complement order has least element −1-1−1.

Significance

A proof of the goal resolves Problem 195, determines the answer as 333, and completes the classification of monotone progressions in one-sided permutations of N\mathbb{N}N and Z\mathbb{Z}Z. A disproof gives the answer 444 and is the first known statement separating the two problems. The formal-conjectures repository (195.lean) records the problem as open with an unspecified answer. The literature milestones have pen-and-paper proofs. Among them, only Ho's theorem for N\mathbb{N}N has a machine-checked proof, in an external repository, so porting it is part of the work.

Difficulty

The natural first attempt transfers Ho's construction for N\mathbb{N}N to Z\mathbb{Z}Z. Ho's argument builds the permutation as a limit of finite safe words. Each extension step uses that all values are nonnegative: for a progression a,b,c,da, b, c, da,b,c,d with ccc and ddd not yet placed, the bound d=2c−b≤2cd = 2c - b \le 2cd=2c−b≤2c controls which elements are forced. On Z\mathbb{Z}Z this bound is lost. With the two's-complement completion order the obstruction is concrete: −1-1−1 is the least element, and once it is placed no later element can be the maximum or minimum of a safe word, so no chain of safe words can exhaust Z\mathbb{Z}Z. Any approach along these lines must therefore change the completion order between stages, for example through orders without endpoints, or use a different construction entirely.

Formalization scope

Permutations are f : ℕ ≃ ℤ. HasMonotoneAP, ListIsAPOfLength and ListIsAPOfLengthWith copy the formal-conjectures definitions verbatim, so the goal and the reduction milestone use the same objects as Erdos195.erdos_195. Progressions may be listed forwards or backwards, which covers increasing and decreasing ones. A zero common difference never arises because f is injective. Digits are two's-complement digits x / 2^k % 2 with floor division, and ν₂ is padicValInt 2. Safe quantifies over all integers a and all nonzero r of either sign. Everything lives in the namespace Erdos195.

The development needs only Mathlib's integers, lists and ppp-adic valuations. The ε\varepsilonε-order lemmas and the completion lemmas are reusable for related arrangement problems, including Problem 196 and doubly infinite variants. Contributions are welcome on the literature milestones (in particular a port of Ho's Lean proof), on new orders with no endpoints, and on the goal in either direction.

Selected references

  • J. A. Davis, R. C. Entringer, R. L. Graham, G. J. Simmons, On permutations containing no long arithmetic progressions, Acta Arith. 34 (1977), 81–90. https://doi.org/10.4064/aa-34-1-81-90
  • J. Geneson, Forbidden arithmetic progressions in permutations of subsets of the integers, Discrete Math. 342 (2019), 1489–1491. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disc.2019.02.004
  • S. Adenwalla, Avoiding monotone arithmetic progressions in permutations of integers, Discrete Math. 347 (2024), 114183. https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04451
  • B. S. Ho, A 4AP-free permutation of the positive integers, arXiv:2609.12780 (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12780 ; Lean proof https://github.com/boonsuan/4ap
  • J. Geneson, Density bounds for permutations avoiding monotone arithmetic progressions, arXiv:2608.12604 (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12604
  • Erdős Problem 195, https://www.erdosproblems.com/195 ; formal-conjectures ErdosProblems/195.lean.
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Dynamic ProgrammingLinear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analytical Solution to a Discrete-Time Model for Dynamic Learning and Decision Making: the two-action frontier difference equations have a unique closed-form solution with explicit det YResearch Paper

Learning while doing, and the frontier of continuation values

Many sequential decisions trade off immediate reward against information: a firm prices without knowing which demand regime it faces, a clinician treats without knowing a patient's type, a bandit player pulls a risky arm to learn its mean. Formally these are partially observed Markov decision problems (POMDPs) with a hidden but fixed state. Their value function is the upper envelope of a set of linear functions of the belief, one continuation-value vector per policy. The efficient frontier of these vectors describes the optimal policy for every prior at once. Except for special cases, the frontier of a POMDP has to be computed numerically.

Hao Zhang (Management Science, 2021; accepted version SSRN 3847049) treats the case of two states, two actions and two signals. Under a commensurability condition on the signals, the extreme points of the frontier satisfy linear difference equations with constant coefficients (Theorems 2 and 4 of the paper). The paper solves these equations in closed form. Theorem 3 covers the case where the second action reveals nothing, so that it acts as a stopping action. Theorem 6 covers the case where both actions are informative. This mission formalizes the solution of the difference equations, including the explicit determinant of the coupling matrix that Appendix B states as Theorem 6 (Complete).

Setting

The hidden state is θ∈{1,2}\theta \in \{1, 2\}θ∈{1,2}, the actions are AAA and BBB, and the signals are γ\gammaγ and γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​. In each period, action aaa in state θ\thetaθ produces signal γ\gammaγ with probability pθ(a,γ)p_\theta(a, \gamma)pθ​(a,γ) and an expected reward rθ(a)r_\theta(a)rθ​(a), and rewards are discounted by δ∈(0,1)\delta \in (0, 1)δ∈(0,1). The anchor points u^θa=(1−δ)−1rθ(a)\hat u^a_\theta = (1-\delta)^{-1} r_\theta(a)u^θa​=(1−δ)−1rθ​(a) are the values of always playing aaa. Write pθA=pθ(A,γ)p^A_\theta = p_\theta(A,\gamma)pθA​=pθ​(A,γ) and pθB=pθ(B,γ)p^B_\theta = p_\theta(B,\gamma)pθB​=pθ​(B,γ).

The signal quality indices are integers n(A,γ)=nA>0n(A,\gamma) = n^A > 0n(A,γ)=nA>0, n(A,γˉ)=−nˉA<0n(A,\bar\gamma) = -\bar n^A < 0n(A,γˉ​)=−nˉA<0, n(B,γ)=nB>0n(B,\gamma) = n^B > 0n(B,γ)=nB>0 and n(B,γˉ)=−nˉB<0n(B,\bar\gamma) = -\bar n^B < 0n(B,γˉ​)=−nˉB<0. Their absolute values are relatively prime, and for some μ>1\mu > 1μ>1 each log-likelihood ratio ln⁡(p1(a,s)/p2(a,s))\ln(p_1(a,s)/p_2(a,s))ln(p1​(a,s)/p2​(a,s)) equals n(a,s)ln⁡μn(a,s) \ln\mun(a,s)lnμ (Definition 3).

For each θ\thetaθ the paper's boundary-value problem (28)–(31) asks for real sequences vA,vBv^A, v^BvA,vB on k=0,1,2,…k = 0, 1, 2, \dotsk=0,1,2,… satisfying four conditions:

vA(k+nA)−δ−1(pθA)−1vA(k)+(pθA)−1(1−pθA) vA(k−nˉA)=0(k≥nˉA),v^A(k+n^A) - \delta^{-1}(p^A_\theta)^{-1} v^A(k) + (p^A_\theta)^{-1}(1-p^A_\theta)\, v^A(k-\bar n^A) = 0 \quad (k \ge \bar n^A),vA(k+nA)−δ−1(pθA​)−1vA(k)+(pθA​)−1(1−pθA​)vA(k−nˉA)=0(k≥nˉA), vB(k+nˉB)−δ−1(1−pθB)−1vB(k)+(1−pθB)−1pθB vB(k−nB)=0(k≥nB),v^B(k+\bar n^B) - \delta^{-1}(1-p^B_\theta)^{-1} v^B(k) + (1-p^B_\theta)^{-1} p^B_\theta\, v^B(k-n^B) = 0 \quad (k \ge n^B),vB(k+nˉB)−δ−1(1−pθB​)−1vB(k)+(1−pθB​)−1pθB​vB(k−nB)=0(k≥nB),

the coupling condition vA(k)+u^θA=vB(nˉA+nB−1−k)+u^θBv^A(k) + \hat u^A_\theta = v^B(\bar n^A + n^B - 1 - k) + \hat u^B_\thetavA(k)+u^θA​=vB(nˉA+nB−1−k)+u^θB​ for k=0,…,nˉA+nB−1k = 0, \dots, \bar n^A + n^B - 1k=0,…,nˉA+nB−1, and decay, vA(k),vB(k)→0v^A(k), v^B(k) \to 0vA(k),vB(k)→0.

The characteristic polynomials are

fθA(z)=znA+nˉA−δ−1(pθA)−1znˉA+(pθA)−1(1−pθA),fθB(z)=znB+nˉB−δ−1(1−pθB)−1znB+(1−pθB)−1pθB.f^A_\theta(z) = z^{n^A+\bar n^A} - \delta^{-1}(p^A_\theta)^{-1} z^{\bar n^A} + (p^A_\theta)^{-1}(1-p^A_\theta), \qquad f^B_\theta(z) = z^{n^B+\bar n^B} - \delta^{-1}(1-p^B_\theta)^{-1} z^{n^B} + (1-p^B_\theta)^{-1}p^B_\theta.fθA​(z)=znA+nˉA−δ−1(pθA​)−1znˉA+(pθA​)−1(1−pθA​),fθB​(z)=znB+nˉB−δ−1(1−pθB​)−1znB+(1−pθB​)−1pθB​.

ZunitaZ^a_{unit}Zunita​ is the set of their roots with ∣z∣<1|z| < 1∣z∣<1, and mzam^a_zmza​ is the multiplicity of the root zzz. From these roots the paper builds a square matrix Y=(YA,YB)Y = (Y^A, Y^B)Y=(YA,YB). Its A-columns are (kτ)zk−τ\binom{k}{\tau}z^{k-\tau}(τk​)zk−τ and its B-columns are (nˉA+nB−1−kτ)znˉA+nB−1−k−τ\binom{\bar n^A+n^B-1-k}{\tau}z^{\bar n^A+n^B-1-k-\tau}(τnˉA+nB−1−k​)znˉA+nB−1−k−τ, in a fixed column order.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (Complete), EC p. 11

For each θ\thetaθ, under the standing assumptions of §5, the goal asserts four things:

  1. ∑z∈ZunitAmzA=nˉA\sum_{z\in Z^A_{unit}} m^A_z = \bar n^A∑z∈ZunitA​​mzA​=nˉA and ∑z∈ZunitBmzB=nB\sum_{z\in Z^B_{unit}} m^B_z = n^B∑z∈ZunitB​​mzB​=nB.
  2. For every enumeration of the roots,
det⁡Y=∏i<l(zlA−ziA)miAmlA∏i,l(1−ziAzlB)miAmlB∏i<l(ziB−zlB)miBmlB.\det Y = \prod_{i<l}(z^A_l - z^A_i)^{m^A_i m^A_l}\prod_{i,l}(1 - z^A_i z^B_l)^{m^A_i m^B_l}\prod_{i<l}(z^B_i - z^B_l)^{m^B_i m^B_l}.detY=i<l∏​(zlA​−ziA​)miA​mlA​i,l∏​(1−ziA​zlB​)miA​mlB​i<l∏​(ziB​−zlB​)miB​mlB​.
  1. det⁡Y≠0\det Y \ne 0detY=0.
  2. The problem (28)–(31) has exactly one real solution. That solution is the root expansion vθa(k)=∑z∈Zunita∑τ<mzaαz,τa(kτ)zk−τv^a_\theta(k) = \sum_{z \in Z^a_{unit}}\sum_{\tau<m^a_z}\alpha^a_{z,\tau}\binom{k}{\tau}z^{k-\tau}vθa​(k)=∑z∈Zunita​​∑τ<mza​​αz,τa​(τk​)zk−τ, whose coefficients are given by (αA;−αB)=(u^θB−u^θA)Y−11(\boldsymbol\alpha^A; -\boldsymbol\alpha^B) = (\hat u^B_\theta - \hat u^A_\theta)Y^{-1}\mathbf 1(αA;−αB)=(u^θB​−u^θA​)Y−11.

Milestones

  • Eq. (18): the general solution of a constant-coefficient linear recurrence with repeated characteristic roots.
  • Eq. (19): the determinant of the generalized (confluent) Vandermonde matrix.
  • From the proof of Theorem 3: zn+nˉ−δ−1p−1znˉ+p−1(1−p)z^{n+\bar n} - \delta^{-1}p^{-1}z^{\bar n} + p^{-1}(1-p)zn+nˉ−δ−1p−1znˉ+p−1(1−p) has exactly nˉ\bar nnˉ roots in the open unit disk, counted with multiplicity.
  • From the proof of Theorem 3: decay of an exponential polynomial forces zero coefficients on every root with ∣z∣≥1|z| \ge 1∣z∣≥1.
  • Theorem 3: the one-sided problem (13)–(15), when action BBB is uninformative.
  • The base case and the inductive step of the determinant computation in the proof of Theorem 6 (Complete).

Significance

The result turns the efficient frontier of this class of POMDPs into explicit algebra. Each extreme point is a finite sum over the roots of two trinomials in the unit disk, and the coefficients come from one linear solve. The paper uses this to explain the shape of the frontier: how many extreme points the two actions contribute, and how quickly they accumulate at the anchor points. It also shows that the coupled two-sided problem is always well posed, because YYY is nonsingular.

The paper proves the results in prose; none of them is machine-checked. The mission contributes a checked proof of the solution formula and of the determinant identity. The identity is a confluent Vandermonde-type evaluation with a reflected second block. Several pieces are general mathematics that Mathlib lacks: the solution space of a linear recurrence with repeated roots in binomial form, the confluent Vandermonde determinant, root counting in the unit disk, and the decay lemma for exponential polynomials.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to write down the general solution, discard the growing modes and match the boundary data. It runs into three problems. First, the count of roots in the disk is what makes YYY square. It comes from Rouché's theorem, which Mathlib does not have, so it must be proved or replaced by a polynomial argument. Second, roots on the unit circle are not excluded a priori, so the decay argument has to handle polynomially weighted unimodular terms. Third, and hardest, is det⁡Y≠0\det Y \ne 0detY=0. YYY is not a confluent Vandermonde matrix: its B-block is reflected (N−1−kN-1-kN−1−k in place of kkk). The paper reduces the simple-root case to a Vandermonde matrix in the inverted points 1/zjB1/z^B_j1/zjB​, and then handles each repeated B-root by differentiating with respect to a "nominal root". Making that induction precise requires care with column orders and signs.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace LearnDoFrontier.TwoAction. A Model carries δ\deltaδ, pθAp^A_\thetapθA​, pθBp^B_\thetapθB​, the rewards rθ(a,s)r_\theta(a,s)rθ​(a,s) and the four indices, with the negative indices stored as the positive naturals nˉA,nˉB\bar n^A, \bar n^BnˉA,nˉB. States, actions and signals are Fin 2, and index 0 stands for θ=1\theta = 1θ=1, AAA and γ\gammaγ. Model.Standing collects the assumptions of §5: 0<δ<10<\delta<10<δ<1, General Position, Informative Actions A and B, and Definition 3, with "relatively prime" read as a joint gcd of 111. Sequences are real and indexed by N\mathbb NN, while the roots, coefficients and YYY are complex. The solution formula is an equality in C\mathbb CC. Root enumerations are arbitrary bijections onto ZunitaZ^a_{unit}Zunita​, universally quantified, and the columns of YYY follow the paper's order: A-columns first, roots first, then τ\tauτ ascending for A and descending for B. Exponents use natural-number subtraction, which is harmless because the binomial factor vanishes whenever k<τk<\tauk<τ. The determinant milestones are stated for arbitrary distinct points rather than roots, as the paper's induction uses them.

No formalization may make the targets hold by definition. ZunitZ_{unit}Zunit​ and mzm_zmz​ are the actual roots and multiplicities, never "the first nˉA\bar n^AnˉA roots". Uniqueness ranges over all real sequences satisfying (28)–(31), not only over root expansions. The coefficients are given by Y−1Y^{-1}Y−1, not chosen to fit the boundary.

The link from the POMDP's efficient frontier to (13)–(15) and (28)–(31) (Theorems 2 and 4) is not formalized. Its proofs are geometric sketches, and Theorem 4 assumes a two-segment frontier structure that the paper itself calls a conjecture. The mission is about the difference equations exactly as the paper poses them. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and the recurrence, Vandermonde and root-count lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • Hao Zhang, Analytical Solution to a Discrete-Time Model for Dynamic Learning and Decision Making, Management Science, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4194 ; accepted version with E-Companion: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3847049
  • Saber Elaydi, An Introduction to Difference Equations, 3rd ed., Springer, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-27602-5
  • Richard D. Smallwood and Edward J. Sondik, The Optimal Control of Partially Observable Markov Processes over a Finite Horizon, Operations Research 21(5), 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.5.1071
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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

What Is the Impact of Nonrandomness on Random Choice Models?: Revenue-Ordered Assortments Are Optimal When One Product's Utility Is DeterministicResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers choose which products to show a customer, and the customer chooses at most one of them. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximizes expected revenue, given a model of how customers choose. Under the multinomial logit (MNL) model every alternative, the no-purchase option included, carries an independent Gumbel noise term of the same scale, and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) showed that the optimal set is then a revenue-ordered assortment: the nnn most expensive products, for some nnn. This structure turns an exponential search over subsets into a comparison of NNN candidates, and it is the reason MNL-based assortment optimization is used in practice.

Equal randomness for all alternatives is a strong assumption. A product a consumer has bought many times, or a well-advertised one, is known; its utility carries little or no noise. Wang (SSRN 3579781; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021) studies the extreme case in which exactly one alternative has a deterministic utility. The choice probabilities for that case go back to Besanko, Perry and Spady (1990) and are no longer MNL once that alternative is offered. The paper asks what this does to the standard operations problems. Its answer for assortment planning splits in two: if the deterministic alternative is a product, revenue-ordered assortments remain optimal (Theorem 5); if it is the no-purchase option, the feasibility version of the assortment problem is NP-complete (Theorem 6). This mission formalizes the first half.

Setting

Let N={1,…,N}\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,N\}N={1,…,N} be the products and 000 the no-purchase option, always available. Utilities are Ui=ui+ξiU_i=u_i+\xi_iUi​=ui​+ξi​ for i∈N∖{i′}i\in\mathcal N\setminus\{i'\}i∈N∖{i′} and U0=u0+ξ0U_0=u_0+\xi_0U0​=u0​+ξ0​, with the ξ\xiξ's independent Gumbel of scale μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and mean zero; one product i′i'i′ has deterministic utility Ui′=ui′U_{i'}=u_{i'}Ui′​=ui′​. Product iii has price pip_ipi​. Write

  • ai=exp⁡(ui/μ)a_i=\exp(u_i/\mu)ai​=exp(ui​/μ) and a0=exp⁡(u0/μ)a_0=\exp(u_0/\mu)a0​=exp(u0​/μ) for the attraction values;
  • Λ=exp⁡(−ui′/μ−γ)\Lambda=\exp(-u_{i'}/\mu-\gamma)Λ=exp(−ui′​/μ−γ), with γ\gammaγ the Euler–Mascheroni constant;
  • Ψ(S+/{i′})=a0+∑j∈S∖{i′}aj\Psi(S^+/\{i'\})=a_0+\sum_{j\in S\setminus\{i'\}}a_jΨ(S+/{i′})=a0​+∑j∈S∖{i′}​aj​ for an offer set S⊆NS\subseteq\mathcal NS⊆N.

If i′∉Si'\notin Si′∈/S the choice probabilities are MNL: qi(S)=ai/(a0+∑j∈Saj)q_i(S)=a_i/(a_0+\sum_{j\in S}a_j)qi​(S)=ai​/(a0​+∑j∈S​aj​). If i′∈Si'\in Si′∈S, with Ψ=Ψ(S+/{i′})\Psi=\Psi(S^+/\{i'\})Ψ=Ψ(S+/{i′}), they are given by model (1):

qi(S)=aiΨ[1−e−ΛΨ] (i∈S∖{i′}),qi′(S)=e−ΛΨ,q_i(S)=\frac{a_i}{\Psi}\bigl[1-e^{-\Lambda\Psi}\bigr]\ (i\in S\setminus\{i'\}),\qquad q_{i'}(S)=e^{-\Lambda\Psi},qi​(S)=Ψai​​[1−e−ΛΨ] (i∈S∖{i′}),qi′​(S)=e−ΛΨ,

and q0(S)=1−∑i∈Sqi(S)q_0(S)=1-\sum_{i\in S}q_i(S)q0​(S)=1−∑i∈S​qi​(S). The expected revenue (12) is R(S)=∑i∈Spiqi(S)R(S)=\sum_{i\in S}p_iq_i(S)R(S)=∑i∈S​pi​qi​(S), which on the page reads

R(S)={∑i∈Spiaia0+∑j∈Saj,i′∉S,∑i∈S∖{i′}piaiΨ[1−e−ΛΨ]+pi′e−ΛΨ,i′∈S.R(S)=\begin{cases}\dfrac{\sum_{i\in S}p_ia_i}{a_0+\sum_{j\in S}a_j}, & i'\notin S,\\[1.5ex]\dfrac{\sum_{i\in S\setminus\{i'\}}p_ia_i}{\Psi}\bigl[1-e^{-\Lambda\Psi}\bigr]+p_{i'}e^{-\Lambda\Psi}, & i'\in S.\end{cases}R(S)=⎩⎨⎧​a0​+∑j∈S​aj​∑i∈S​pi​ai​​,Ψ∑i∈S∖{i′}​pi​ai​​[1−e−ΛΨ]+pi′​e−ΛΨ,​i′∈/S,i′∈S.​

The assortment problem (13) is max⁡S⊆NR(S)\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}R(S)maxS⊆N​R(S). When the products, i′i'i′ included, are labelled so that p1≥p2≥⋯≥pNp_1\ge p_2\ge\dots\ge p_Np1​≥p2​≥⋯≥pN​, the sets Sn={1,…,n}S_n=\{1,\dots,n\}Sn​={1,…,n} are the revenue-ordered assortments.

In Lean the products are Fin N, and attr, attr0, Lam, Psi, choiceProb, revenue12 and roSet N n are aia_iai​, a0a_0a0​, Λ\LambdaΛ, Ψ\PsiΨ, qi(S)q_i(S)qi​(S), R(S)R(S)R(S) and SnS_nSn​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 14)

For μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and prices p1≥⋯≥pN≥0p_1\ge\dots\ge p_N\ge0p1​≥⋯≥pN​≥0,

∃ n∈{1,…,N}:R(S)≤R(Sn)for all S⊆N.\exists\,n\in\{1,\dots,N\}:\qquad R(S)\le R(S_n)\quad\text{for all }S\subseteq\mathcal N .∃n∈{1,…,N}:R(S)≤R(Sn​)for all S⊆N.

The statement fixes no constants; it asserts only the structure of an optimal set.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 28). For any regular choice model in which each qi(S)q_i(S)qi​(S), i∈Si\in Si∈S, is a nonnegative convex function of q0(S)q_0(S)q0​(S), and prices p1≥⋯≥pNp_1\ge\dots\ge p_Np1​≥⋯≥pN​, some SnS_nSn​, n∈{0,…,N}n\in\{0,\dots,N\}n∈{0,…,N}, maximizes R(S)=∑i∈Spiqi(S)R(S)=\sum_{i\in S}p_iq_i(S)R(S)=∑i∈S​pi​qi​(S).
  2. q0q_0q0​ is increasing and concave in qi′q_{i'}qi′​ (p. 29). With a0=1a_0=1a0​=1, q0=hΛ(qi′)q_0=h_\Lambda(q_{i'})q0​=hΛ​(qi′​) where hΛ(y)=Λ(1−y)/(−log⁡y)h_\Lambda(y)=\Lambda(1-y)/(-\log y)hΛ​(y)=Λ(1−y)/(−logy), increasing and concave on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).
  3. qi′q_{i'}qi′​ is increasing and convex in q0q_0q0​ (p. 29). The inverse of hΛh_\LambdahΛ​ is increasing and convex on the range of hΛh_\LambdahΛ​.
  4. The model satisfies Lemma 1 (pp. 14, 29). The model above is regular, each qiq_iqi​ is a nonnegative convex function of q0q_0q0​, and (12) equals ∑i∈Spiqi(S)\sum_{i\in S}p_iq_i(S)∑i∈S​pi​qi​(S).

Significance

Theorem 5 says that a deterministic product utility, which destroys the MNL form of the choice probabilities, does not destroy the nested structure of the optimal assortment. The problem therefore stays solvable by checking NNN sets, in contrast with the companion case of a deterministic no-purchase utility, whose feasibility version is NP-complete. Lemma 1 is a criterion of independent use: any regular choice model whose choice probabilities are convex functions of the no-purchase probability has a revenue-ordered optimal assortment, and the MNL model is the case of linear functions.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge none of it has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a checked version of the convex-in-q0q_0q0​ criterion on top of the platform's published regular-choice-model definitions, and a checked treatment of model (1), which is also the model of truncated utilities (Corollary 2 of the paper).

Difficulty

The classical MNL argument uses the fact that R(S)R(S)R(S) is a ratio of sums linear in the attraction values, so optimality reduces to a threshold on prices. Model (1) is not of that form once i′i'i′ is offered: qi′=e−ΛΨq_{i'}=e^{-\Lambda\Psi}qi′​=e−ΛΨ and the other probabilities carry the factor (1−e−ΛΨ)/Ψ(1-e^{-\Lambda\Psi})/\Psi(1−e−ΛΨ)/Ψ, so a direct exchange argument on the revenue fails. The work lies in the analytic step: expressing qi′q_{i'}qi′​ as a function of q0q_0q0​ only through the implicit relation q0=Λ(1−qi′)/(−log⁡qi′)q_0=\Lambda(1-q_{i'})/(-\log q_{i'})q0​=Λ(1−qi′​)/(−logqi′​), and establishing that this function is convex, which requires sign control of a second derivative involving log⁡\loglog near both ends of (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). A formal proof must also check regularity of the model, which the printed proof uses but does not verify.

Formalization scope

The model is encoded as in the Setting: products Fin N (the label kkk is index k−1k-1k−1), the deterministic product as a parameter ip, and the no-purchase option outside Fin N. RRR is the two-branch revenue (12), written literally, not the MNL revenue, and optimality is over all subsets of N\mathcal NN; the MNL special case alone is not the goal. Committed conventions:

  • μ>0\mu>0μ>0 (implicit on p. 5) and the Euler–Mascheroni constant Real.eulerMascheroniConstant in Λ\LambdaΛ; ai′a_{i'}ai′​ plays no role;
  • p1≥⋯≥pNp_1\ge\dots\ge p_Np1​≥⋯≥pN​ is Antitone p, and SnS_nSn​ is the set of the first nnn indices (ties in prices do not change SnS_nSn​);
  • the goal adds pi≥0p_i\ge0pi​≥0: with all prices negative, ∅\emptyset∅ is the unique optimum and no SnS_nSn​ with n≥1n\ge1n≥1 is optimal;
  • Lemma 1 uses the published RevenueOrdered.Ratio.IsRegular, whose monotonicity includes the no-purchase option, as the proof uses; "qi=qi(q0)q_i=q_i(q_0)qi​=qi​(q0​) convex" means fif_ifi​ nonnegative and convex on a convex set DiD_iDi​ containing q0(S)q_0(S)q0​(S) for every S∋iS\ni iS∋i; its conclusion allows S0=∅S_0=\emptysetS0​=∅;
  • milestones 2 and 3 are stated on the open interval 0<qi′<10<q_{i'}<10<qi′​<1, since the formula is 0/00/00/0 at qi′=1q_{i'}=1qi′​=1.

A complete development needs elementary real analysis of log⁡\loglog and exp⁡\expexp (monotonicity and concavity via derivatives, inverse functions on intervals) and finite-sum algebra; Lemma 1 is reusable for any regular choice model. Contributions on the analytic lemmas and on regularity of model (1) are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Wang, What Is the Impact of Non-Randomness on Random Choice Models?, SSRN 3579781; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3579781, doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0951
  • D. Besanko, M. K. Perry, R. H. Spady, The logit model of monopolistic competition: Brand diversity, The Journal of Industrial Economics 38(4), 397–415, 1990 (reference as listed in Wang's bibliography, p. 31).
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • G. Berbeglia, G. Joret, Assortment optimisation under a general discrete choice model: a tight analysis of revenue-ordered assortments, Algorithmica 82, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.01371
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Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationMechanism Design+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms: The STP Mechanism Is Subgame-Perfect Incentive Compatible, Welfare-Optimal, Envy-Free and Core-Selecting from Any HistoryResearch Paper

Motivation

Ridesharing platforms set prices and dispatch drivers over a road network whose demand changes within minutes: a stadium empties, rush hour starts, a neighbourhood goes quiet. Drivers are not employees. They may decline a dispatch, drive somewhere else, or stop working, and the platform pays no one in advance for staying in place. Prices that look only at the current moment (myopic pricing) jump sharply in space and time and reward drivers who wait for a surge instead of taking the dispatch they are given (Ma, Fang, Parkes 2022, §2).

H. Ma, F. Fang and D. C. Parkes ask for a dynamic mechanism under which following the platform's dispatches is in every driver's interest at every moment, including after other drivers have deviated, while the outcome stays efficient and fair. Their answer, the spatio-temporal pricing (STP) mechanism, was published in Operations Research in 2022 and builds on the competitive-equilibrium theory of assignment and flow markets (Shapley and Shubik 1971; Murota 2003).

Setting

Time runs over t=0,1,…,Tt = 0, 1, \dots, Tt=0,1,…,T. There is a finite set L\mathcal LL of locations and travel times δ(a,b)≥1\delta(a,b) \ge 1δ(a,b)≥1 with δ(a,a)=1\delta(a,a) = 1δ(a,a)=1. A trip (a,b,t)(a,b,t)(a,b,t) leaves aaa at time ttt and arrives at bbb at time t+δ(a,b)t + \delta(a,b)t+δ(a,b); it costs the driver ca,b,t≥0c_{a,b,t} \ge 0ca,b,t​≥0, and the trips that end by TTT form the set T\mathcal TT. A driver who stops working Δ\DeltaΔ periods before TTT pays κΔ≥0\kappa_\Delta \ge 0κΔ​≥0, with κ0=0\kappa_0 = 0κ0​=0.

Each driver iii has a type (βi,ℓi,τi)(\beta_i, \ell_i, \tau_i)(βi​,ℓi​,τi​): she can start at location ℓi\ell_iℓi​ at time τi\tau_iτi​, and βi=1\beta_i = 1βi​=1 if she is already working, βi=0\beta_i = 0βi​=0 if she still decides whether to enter (not entering costs nothing). Each rider jjj asks for the single trip (oj,dj,τj)∈T(o_j, d_j, \tau_j) \in \mathcal T(oj​,dj​,τj​)∈T and values it at vj≥0v_j \ge 0vj​≥0. A path of driver iii is a chain of trips starting at (ℓi,τi)(\ell_i,\tau_i)(ℓi​,τi​); its cost λ\lambdaλ is the sum of its trip costs plus the early-exit cost at its end. A dispatching assigns each driver a path and each picked-up rider to a driver whose path covers her trip; its welfare is the value of the riders picked up minus the drivers' costs, and W(D,R)W(\mathcal D, \mathcal R)W(D,R) is the largest welfare over all dispatchings.

Anonymous trip prices pa,b,tp_{a,b,t}pa,b,t​ charge every picked-up rider the price of her trip and pay it to the driver who carries her. Together with a dispatching they form a competitive equilibrium (CE) when every rider who values her trip above its price is picked up, nobody pays more than her value, and every driver's utility is the best that any of her paths could earn at these prices. The welfare gain from an additional driver at (a,t)(a,t)(a,t) is

Φa,t=W(D∪{(1,a,t)})−W(D).\Phi_{a,t} = W(\mathcal D \cup \{(1,a,t)\}) - W(\mathcal D).Φa,t​=W(D∪{(1,a,t)})−W(D).

The STP mechanism computes a welfare-optimal dispatching, dispatches every available driver along it, and prices every trip by

pa,b,t=Φa,t−Φb, t+δ(a,b)+ca,b,t.p_{a,b,t} = \Phi_{a,t} - \Phi_{b,\,t+\delta(a,b)} + c_{a,b,t}.pa,b,t​=Φa,t​−Φb,t+δ(a,b)​+ca,b,t​.

It recomputes the dispatching and the prices on the remaining economy E(t)(st)E^{(t)}(s_t)E(t)(st​) whenever some driver has deviated at time t−1t-1t−1. A driver who declines a dispatch is paid nothing in that period and pays no penalty.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For every rule that picks a welfare-optimal dispatching, the STP mechanism

  • is temporally consistent: after a deviation, the new plan is the plan the mechanism would compute at time 000 for the remaining economy;
  • is subgame-perfect incentive compatible (SPIC): from every history, no driver gains from any strategy while the others follow the dispatches,
∑t′=tT−1π^i,t′(σi∗∣ht,σ−i∗∣ht) ≥ ∑t′=tT−1π^i,t′(σi∣ht,σ−i∗∣ht);\sum_{t'=t}^{T-1} \hat\pi_{i,t'}(\sigma^*_i|_{h_t}, \sigma^*_{-i}|_{h_t}) \ \ge\ \sum_{t'=t}^{T-1} \hat\pi_{i,t'}(\sigma_i|_{h_t}, \sigma^*_{-i}|_{h_t});t′=t∑T−1​π^i,t′​(σi∗​∣ht​​,σ−i∗​∣ht​​) ≥ t′=t∑T−1​π^i,t′​(σi​∣ht​​,σ−i∗​∣ht​​);
  • is individually rational for riders and strictly budget balanced for every strategy profile;
  • produces, from every history onward, an outcome that is welfare-optimal, in the core, envy-free for drivers and riders, and individually rational for drivers.

Milestones

The static theory of §3 comes first: Lemma 1 (non-negative prices), Lemma 6 (relocation trips have non-positive price), Lemma 2 (integrality of the LP relaxation), Lemma 3 (welfare theorem), Lemma 7 (correspondence of the two dual LPs), Lemma 4 (CE driver utilities form a lattice with bottom ΦDi\Phi_{D_i}ΦDi​​ and top ΨDi\Psi_{D_i}ΨDi​​) and Lemma 5 (core equivalence). The proof of Theorem 2 then contributes:

  • Step 1: the STP prices make every welfare-optimal plan a CE in which driver iii earns ΦDi\Phi_{D_i}ΦDi​​;
  • its consequence, a driver's continuation utility under the current plan;
  • the three inequalities (i)–(iii) of Step 2 between replica gains Φa,t(t)(st)\Phi^{(t)}_{a,t}(s_t)Φa,t(t)​(st​) of successive time-shifted economies.

Significance

Theorem 2 shows that a platform can align incentives without long-term contracts, penalties or the threat of firing: the deviating driver's payoff is computed from a re-planned economy, and the replica-gain prices make that payoff no larger than the payoff of following the dispatch. The paper also proves that no mechanism with these properties makes following the dispatch a dominant-strategy equilibrium (Theorem 3), so subgame perfection is the right notion here.

The result is proved in the paper; it has not been formalized. A search of the Prove2Me library found no machine-checked statement of a dynamic ridesharing mechanism, of the CE lattice of a path economy, or of the replica-gain characterization of the driver-pessimal CE. A complete development would give a checked welfare theorem and core equivalence for a flow-based market, a lattice of CE utilities identified with marginal welfare gains, and a subgame-perfection argument for a re-planning mechanism.

Difficulty

The static part reduces to linear programming over paths, whose number grows exponentially with ∣L∣|\mathcal L|∣L∣ and TTT. Integrality and the lattice structure come from a translation to a minimum-cost flow problem and its dual, which has to be set up and connected back to paths.

The dynamic part is harder. A naive argument would compare a deviating driver's payoff against prices fixed at time 000, but STP re-plans after the deviation: the deviator's later payments come from a different economy, computed with different prices. Recomputing a driver-pessimal CE at every step breaks incentive compatibility (Example 3). STP is incentive compatible only because of an exchange inequality between replica gains (part (iii)). It says that adding a driver at the node a deviator drives to lowers the marginal value of another driver there at least as much as the deviator's planned position does. This is a local exchange property of M♮-concave functions, the optimal values of flow problems (Murota 2016), and has no counterpart in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Lean represents an economy by a finite type of locations, drivers indexed by a finite type ι, riders indexed by a finite type κ, times in ℕ with explicit ≤ T guards, and money in ℝ. The replica of a driver is the index none of Option ι, removal is the subtype {k // k ≠ i}, and a coalition is a pair of subsets. W is the supremum of the welfares of feasible integral dispatchings, a finite nonempty set for every valid economy.

The conventions that the formalization commits to:

  • Under assumption (S1) every driver stays until TTT, so the exit time τˉi\bar\tau_iτˉi​ is dropped and the replica in Φa,t\Phi_{a,t}Φa,t​ is the type (1,a,t)(1,a,t)(1,a,t).
  • Every requested trip lies in T\mathcal TT, part of a valid economy.
  • A blocking coalition must use a budget-balanced plan among its members.
  • In the time-shifted economy, an available driver who has not entered keeps β=0\beta = 0β=0. This corrects a slip on p. 20, and the proof uses it.
  • Definitions 8–10 bundle SPIC as condition (i). Here SPIC is stated once and the other properties state their condition (ii).
  • Rider envy-freeness (26) is read from the history hτjh_{\tau_j}hτj​​.
  • Theorem 2 is claimed for every selector of welfare-optimal dispatchings, since Definition 12 leaves the choice of optimum open.

The goal must not be trivialized. It is not satisfied by some unspecified mechanism, by SPIC only at time 000, by SPIC only against one-shot deviations along the equilibrium path, or by one fixed selector. Temporal consistency compares the mechanism's plan after a deviation with its own time-000 plan of a different economy, so it is not a comparison of STP with itself.

A complete development needs:

  • path enumeration and the reduction to minimum-cost flow;
  • LP duality and complementary slackness for the flow problem;
  • integrality of flows;
  • the M♮-concavity of flow values;
  • a principle of optimality for continuations of optimal plans.

The CE, core and lattice layers do not depend on ridesharing. Contributions to any milestone, or to these general tools, are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Ma, F. Fang, D. C. Parkes, Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms, Operations Research, 2022; read here as arXiv:1801.04015v5, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.04015v5
  • L. S. Shapley, M. Shubik, The assignment game I: The core, International Journal of Game Theory 1, 1971. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753437
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
  • K. Murota, Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1(1), 2016. https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2016.12.005
  • M. J. Osborne, A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.
16 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Policies for Single-Leg Revenue Management with Limited Demand Information: the Valuation Tracking Pricing Policy Is c*(P)-CompetitiveResearch Paper

Motivation

Single-leg revenue management asks how a seller holding kkk units of a perishable item (seats on one flight leg, rooms for one night) should price or ration them to customers who arrive one at a time. The classical theory assumes a demand forecast. When no forecast is available, a standard robust criterion is competitiveness: an online policy is ccc-competitive if, on every arrival sequence, its expected revenue is at least ccc times the revenue of an offline optimum that knows the whole sequence in advance.

Two earlier lines of work found the best possible constant c∗(P)c^*(\mathcal P)c∗(P) for a discrete price set P\mathcal PP, each in a model that gives the seller more power than posted pricing. Ball and Queyranne (2009) studied booking limits: customers arrive with a fare class that the seller observes before accepting or rejecting. Eren and Maglaras (2010) studied price skimming with a known number of customers. Both show that no online algorithm can be more than c∗(P)c^*(\mathcal P)c∗(P)-competitive. Ma, Simchi-Levi and Teo (arXiv:1810.10900v2; Operations Research 2021) ask whether the same ratio is achievable by dynamic posted pricing, where the seller commits to a price before seeing the customer's valuation and does not know the horizon. Their answer is yes, through a randomized policy built on a new valuation tracking subroutine.

Setting

Fix m≥1m\ge1m≥1 prices 0<r(1)<⋯<r(m)0<r^{(1)}<\dots<r^{(m)}0<r(1)<⋯<r(m) and set r(0)=0r^{(0)}=0r(0)=0 (no customer) and r(m+1)=∞r^{(m+1)}=\inftyr(m+1)=∞ (shutting off demand). The firm holds k≥1k\ge1k≥1 units. Customers t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T arrive in order; TTT is unknown to the firm. Customer ttt has a deterministic valuation Vt=r(jt)V_t=r^{(j_t)}Vt​=r(jt​), jt∈{0,…,m}j_t\in\{0,\dots,m\}jt​∈{0,…,m}, chosen by an adversary. Before seeing VtV_tVt​, the firm posts a price Pt∈{r(1),…,r(m+1)}P_t\in\{r^{(1)},\dots,r^{(m+1)}\}Pt​∈{r(1),…,r(m+1)} that may depend only on V1,…,Vt−1V_1,\dots,V_{t-1}V1​,…,Vt−1​ and the past prices; the customer buys (Xt=1X_t=1Xt​=1) iff Vt≥PtV_t\ge P_tVt​≥Pt​. The revenue is ALG=∑t=1TPtXt\mathsf{ALG}=\sum_{t=1}^T P_tX_tALG=∑t=1T​Pt​Xt​. The offline optimum OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the sum of the min⁡{k,T}\min\{k,T\}min{k,T} largest valuations. An online algorithm is ccc-competitive if

E[ALG(V1,…,VT)] ≥ c⋅OPT(V1,…,VT)for all T≥1, (V1,…,VT)∈(P∪{0})T.\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}(V_1,\dots,V_T)]\ \ge\ c\cdot \mathrm{OPT}(V_1,\dots,V_T)\qquad\text{for all }T\ge1,\ (V_1,\dots,V_T)\in(\mathcal P\cup\{0\})^T .E[ALG(V1​,…,VT​)] ≥ c⋅OPT(V1​,…,VT​)for all T≥1, (V1​,…,VT​)∈(P∪{0})T.

Definition 1 sets q(j)=1−r(j−1)/r(j)q^{(j)}=1-r^{(j-1)}/r^{(j)}q(j)=1−r(j−1)/r(j) for j∈[m]j\in[m]j∈[m], q=∑j=1mq(j)q=\sum_{j=1}^m q^{(j)}q=∑j=1m​q(j) and c∗(P)=1/qc^*(\mathcal P)=1/qc∗(P)=1/q.

Algorithm 1 (valuation tracking). Each unit iii carries a level ℓi∈{0,…,m}\ell_{i}\in\{0,\dots,m\}ℓi​∈{0,…,m} (initially 000) and a flag sold[i]\mathtt{sold}[i]sold[i] (initially false). Customer ttt is assigned to a unit iti_tit​ of minimal level; let ℓ=ℓit\ell=\ell_{i_t}ℓ=ℓit​​. If sold[it]\mathtt{sold}[i_t]sold[it​] is false, the algorithm posts r(p)r^{(p)}r(p), ℓ<p≤m\ell<p\le mℓ<p≤m, with probability q(p)/∑j=ℓ+1mq(j)q^{(p)}/\sum_{j=\ell+1}^m q^{(j)}q(p)/∑j=ℓ+1m​q(j); otherwise it posts ∞\infty∞. After observing VtV_tVt​ it sets ℓit←max⁡{ℓ,jt}\ell_{i_t}\leftarrow\max\{\ell,j_t\}ℓit​​←max{ℓ,jt​} and marks iti_tit​ sold if a sale occurred. The levels ℓi,t\ell_{i,t}ℓi,t​ and the assignments iti_tit​ are deterministic functions of the valuations; only the sold vector (S1,t,…,Sk,t)(S_{1,t},\dots,S_{k,t})(S1,t​,…,Sk,t​) is random.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 14)

E[ALG(V1,…,VT)] ≥ 1q OPT(V1,…,VT)for every valuation sequence,\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}(V_1,\dots,V_T)]\ \ge\ \frac1q\,\mathrm{OPT}(V_1,\dots,V_T)\quad\text{for every valuation sequence},E[ALG(V1​,…,VT​)] ≥ q1​OPT(V1​,…,VT​)for every valuation sequence,

i.e. Algorithm 1 is c∗(P)c^*(\mathcal P)c∗(P)-competitive, for every price grid, every inventory kkk, and every minimal-level tie-break.

Milestones (Appendix B, pp. ec1–ec5)

  1. The remark of §3.3 (p. 13): a unit at level mmm is sold with probability 111, so line 8 is never reached with ℓt=m\ell_t=mℓt​=m.
  2. Lemma EC.1: E[Si,t]=1q∑j=1ℓi,tq(j)\mathbb E[S_{i,t}]=\frac1q\sum_{j=1}^{\ell_{i,t}}q^{(j)}E[Si,t​]=q1​∑j=1ℓi,t​​q(j).
  3. Lemma EC.2: if jt>ℓit,t−1j_t>\ell_{i_t,t-1}jt​>ℓit​,t−1​ then E[PtXt]=1q(r(jt)−r(ℓit,t−1))\mathbb E[P_tX_t]=\frac1q\bigl(r^{(j_t)}-r^{(\ell_{i_t,t-1})}\bigr)E[Pt​Xt​]=q1​(r(jt​)−r(ℓit​,t−1​)), and E[PtXt]=0\mathbb E[P_tX_t]=0E[Pt​Xt​]=0 otherwise.
  4. Lemma EC.3: ∑t′=1tE[Pt′Xt′]=1q∑i=1kr(ℓi,t)\sum_{t'=1}^t\mathbb E[P_{t'}X_{t'}]=\frac1q\sum_{i=1}^k r^{(\ell_{i,t})}∑t′=1t​E[Pt′​Xt′​]=q1​∑i=1k​r(ℓi,t​).
  5. OPT=∑i=1kMik(T)\mathrm{OPT}=\sum_{i=1}^k M^k_i(T)OPT=∑i=1k​Mik​(T), where Mk(t)M^k(t)Mk(t) lists the kkk largest of V1,…,VtV_1,\dots,V_tV1​,…,Vt​ padded with zeros (Definition EC.2).
  6. Lemma EC.4: (r(ℓ1,t),…,r(ℓk,t))(r^{(\ell_{1,t})},\dots,r^{(\ell_{k,t})})(r(ℓ1,t​),…,r(ℓk,t​)) is a permutation of Mk(t)M^k(t)Mk(t).
  7. The closing display of the proof: OPT=∑i=1kr(ℓi,T)=q⋅E[ALG]\mathrm{OPT}=\sum_{i=1}^k r^{(\ell_{i,T})}=q\cdot\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}]OPT=∑i=1k​r(ℓi,T​)=q⋅E[ALG], the exact-ratio form of Theorem 1.

Significance

Theorem 1 shows that the competitive ratio of single-leg revenue management under public posted pricing with deterministic valuations equals c∗(P)c^*(\mathcal P)c∗(P), the same constant as for booking limits and for price skimming with a known horizon. The seller loses nothing, in the worst case, by committing to a price before seeing the customer and by not knowing TTT. The paper builds on Theorem 1 directly: an inventory-state version of Algorithm 1 (Theorem 2), the structural monotonicity of its prices (Theorem 3), and the extension to stochastic valuations (Theorems 4 and 5) all start from it.

The result is proved in the paper. This mission produces a machine-checked version of the full argument of Appendix B: an explicit model of a randomized online pricing policy as a finite Markov chain on the sold vector, the probability invariant of Lemma EC.1, the per-step revenue identity, and the combinatorial fact that the levels of the algorithm track the kkk largest valuations. None of these has a formal proof on the platform.

Difficulty

The obvious policies fail: booking limits implemented by price, or price skimming with an unknown horizon, lose a constant factor against a single high-value customer who arrives while the price is low (§3.1). The difficulty of Theorem 1 is that the algorithm must earn, in each step, exactly 1/q1/q1/q of the increase of OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT without seeing VtV_tVt​. In the formal proof the two hard parts are: maintaining Lemma EC.1 as an exact identity on the law of the sold vector (a statement about a distribution on {0,1}k\{0,1\}^k{0,1}k pushed forward through a randomized transition), and Lemma EC.4, a permutation invariant between the level vector and a sorted, zero-padded list, which holds only because each customer is assigned to a unit of minimal level.

Formalization scope

  • Prices are a function r:N→Rr:\mathbb N\to\mathbb Rr:N→R with hypotheses r(0)=0r(0)=0r(0)=0 and r(j)<r(j+1)r(j)<r(j+1)r(j)<r(j+1) for j<mj<mj<m; values above mmm are never used, and r(m+1)=∞r^{(m+1)}=\inftyr(m+1)=∞ is encoded as "no offer".
  • Valuations are indices: a sequence is a list over {0,…,m}\{0,\dots,m\}{0,…,m}. TTT is the list length and is never read by the algorithm. Every theorem holds for every list, including the empty one; this is a strengthening of the paper's T≥1T\ge1T≥1.
  • Units are Fin k\mathrm{Fin}\,kFink with k≥1k\ge1k≥1, m≥1m\ge1m≥1.
  • Tie-break. Line 4's arg⁡min⁡\arg\minargmin is a selector function on level vectors; theorems quantify over every selector that returns a unit of minimal level.
  • Randomness. The law of the sold vector is an explicit probability mass function on Fin k→Bool\mathrm{Fin}\,k\to\mathrm{Bool}Fink→Bool, built by one transition per customer. E[PtXt]\mathbb E[P_tX_t]E[Pt​Xt​] is computed from the law after t−1t-1t−1 customers and from VtV_tVt​ only, so the price is online. E[ALG]=∑t=1TE[PtXt]\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}]=\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E[P_tX_t]E[ALG]=∑t=1T​E[Pt​Xt​].
  • Line 8. The printed last offer probability ℓt+1/q_tot is a typo; the definition uses q(m)/qtotq^{(m)}/q_{\mathrm{tot}}q(m)/qtot​, as the text and proofs do. At a unit of level mmm the step is a rejection; milestone 1 shows this case never matters.
  • OPT is the offline maximum of ∑t∈SVt\sum_{t\in S}V_t∑t∈S​Vt​ over sets SSS of at most kkk customers; Mk(t)M^k(t)Mk(t) is a sorted, zero-padded list.
  • q>0q>0q>0 is not assumed; it follows from q(1)=1q^{(1)}=1q(1)=1.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: E[ALG]\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}]E[ALG] must be computed from the law of Algorithm 1's random prices and purchases, and OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT as the offline maximum. Defining either through the levels (e.g. E[ALG]:=1q∑ir(ℓi,T)\mathbb E[\mathsf{ALG}]:=\frac1q\sum_i r^{(\ell_{i,T})}E[ALG]:=q1​∑i​r(ℓi,T​)) would make the goal true by definition.

The mission covers only Section 3: public pricing with deterministic valuations. The stochastic-valuation algorithms of Section 4 (Theorems 4–5), the continuous-price variant of §5.1, and the structural results (Theorems 2–3, Corollary 1) are not formalized. The finite-distribution machinery (pushing a mass function through a randomized transition, top-kkk sums of lists) is reusable for other online-algorithm missions. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome; Lemma EC.4 is pure combinatorics and independent of the probabilistic milestones.

Selected references

  • W. Ma, D. Simchi-Levi, C.-P. Teo, On Policies for Single-Leg Revenue Management with Limited Demand Information, Operations Research, 2021; preprint arXiv:1810.10900v2, 2020 (the version cited throughout). https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.10900v2
  • M. O. Ball, M. Queyranne, Toward Robust Revenue Management: Competitive Analysis of Online Booking, Operations Research 57(4):950–963, 2009.
  • S. S. Eren, C. Maglaras, Monopoly Pricing with Limited Demand Information, Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 9(1–2):23–48, 2010.
9 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Forewarned Is Forearmed? Contingent Sourcing, Shipment Information and Supplier Competition: Contingent Sourcing Makes Both Suppliers Weakly Better Off but Can Make the Buyer Worse OffResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that source from a low-cost but unreliable supplier often hedge with a second, reliable supplier. A recent development is that buyers can now track a shipment in transit (temperature loggers for perishables, GPS and inspection reports) and learn, before the selling season, whether the cheap order has been damaged. With that information the buyer can wait and place an emergency order with the reliable supplier only when the shipment is spoiled. This is contingent sourcing. The operational value of such information is clear for a buyer facing fixed prices. Lu and Tomlin (MSOM, doi:10.1287/msom.2021.0540; author manuscript SSRN 4260604) ask what happens when the suppliers set their prices strategically, anticipating how the buyer will use the information. Their answer is that shipment information softens the price competition between the suppliers, and the buyer can end up worse off with the information than without it.

The model without shipment information reduces to the model of Shan, Li and Sethi (2022), in which a responsive-pricing retailer sources from competing suppliers facing disruptions; Lu and Tomlin add the Time-1 signal and the emergency price.

Setting

A buyer sells a product at the price p(q)=m−qp(q)=m-qp(q)=m−q, with market potential m>0m>0m>0; with an available quantity QQQ its revenue is R(Q)=mQ−Q2R(Q)=mQ-Q^2R(Q)=mQ−Q2 for Q≤m/2Q\le m/2Q≤m/2 and m2/4m^2/4m2/4 otherwise. Supplier U has unit cost cUc_UcU​ and delivers successfully with probability P1∈(0,1)P_1\in(0,1)P1​∈(0,1) (P0=1−P1P_0=1-P_1P0​=1−P1​); the buyer pays U only on delivery. Supplier R is reliable with unit cost cRc_RcR​. Standing assumptions: 0≤cU≤P1m0\le c_U\le P_1m0≤cU​≤P1​m, 0≤cR≤m0\le c_R\le m0≤cR​≤m.

Timing: at Time 0 the suppliers simultaneously set prices, wUw_UwU​ for U and a regular price wRw_RwR​ and emergency price wE≥wRw_E\ge w_RwE​≥wR​ for R, within the strategy spaces cU/P1≤wU≤mc_U/P_1\le w_U\le mcU​/P1​≤wU​≤m and cR≤wR≤wE≤mc_R\le w_R\le w_E\le mcR​≤wR​≤wE​≤m. The buyer then orders QUQ_UQU​ and QRQ_RQR​. At Time 1 it observes a signal s∈{B,G}s\in\{B,G\}s∈{B,G} of accuracy ρ\rhoρ: a spoiled shipment shows BBB with probability ρ\rhoρ, an intact one always shows GGG. It may then order QE(s)Q_E(s)QE​(s) from R at price wEw_EwE​. The buyer maximizes its expected profit (2) over the four nonnegative quantities; its value is the optimum.

Supplier R's payoff is πR=(wR−cR)QR+PB(wE−cR)QE\pi_R=(w_R-c_R)Q_R+P_B(w_E-c_R)Q_EπR​=(wR​−cR​)QR​+PB​(wE​−cR​)QE​ and U's is πU=(P1wU−cU)QU\pi_U=(P_1w_U-c_U)Q_UπU​=(P1​wU​−cU​)QU​, evaluated at the buyer's optimal order (Table 1 of the paper, with footnote 11's tie-break: an indifferent buyer sources contingently). An equilibrium is a Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium: a Nash equilibrium that no other Nash equilibrium improves for both suppliers. Scenario I is ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 (perfect information, contingent sourcing possible); Scenario N is ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0 (no information). The thresholds are

ψ2=P0m+2cU/P1P0+2,ϕ1=(1+P0)m+cU2,t=m−P1m−cU4−P1+P12.\psi_2=\frac{P_0m+2c_U/P_1}{P_0+2},\qquad \phi_1=\frac{(1+P_0)m+c_U}{2},\qquad t=m-\frac{P_1m-c_U}{\sqrt{4-P_1+P_1^2}} .ψ2​=P0​+2P0​m+2cU​/P1​​,ϕ1​=2(1+P0​)m+cU​​,t=m−4−P1​+P12​​P1​m−cU​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4(i)–(iii)

For cR>ψ2c_R>\psi_2cR​>ψ2​ equilibria exist in both scenarios, and for every equilibrium wIw^IwI at ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 and every equilibrium wNw^NwN at ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0, writing πB\pi_BπB​ for the buyer's value:

cR≥ϕ1:πU(wI)=πU(wN), πB(wI)≥πB(wN), πR(wI)≥πR(wN) (strict for cR<m),t<cR<ϕ1:πB,πU,πR all strictly larger at wI,ψ2<cR≤t:πB(wI)≤πB(wN) (strict for cR<t),πU,πR strictly larger at wI.\begin{aligned} &c_R\ge\phi_1: && \pi_U(w^I)=\pi_U(w^N),\ \pi_B(w^I)\ge\pi_B(w^N),\ \pi_R(w^I)\ge\pi_R(w^N)\ \text{(strict for } c_R<m),\\ &t<c_R<\phi_1: && \pi_B,\pi_U,\pi_R \text{ all strictly larger at } w^I,\\ &\psi_2<c_R\le t: && \pi_B(w^I)\le\pi_B(w^N)\ (\text{strict for } c_R<t),\quad \pi_U,\pi_R \text{ strictly larger at } w^I. \end{aligned}​cR​≥ϕ1​:t<cR​<ϕ1​:ψ2​<cR​≤t:​​πU​(wI)=πU​(wN), πB​(wI)≥πB​(wN), πR​(wI)≥πR​(wN) (strict for cR​<m),πB​,πU​,πR​ all strictly larger at wI,πB​(wI)≤πB​(wN) (strict for cR​<t),πU​,πR​ strictly larger at wI.​

The third case is the headline: the buyer loses from information while both suppliers gain.

Milestones

Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 (the buyer's optimal orders), Lemma A.1 (supplier R's best response at ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1), Proposition 2(i) (the equilibria at ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 for cR>ψ2c_R>\psi_2cR​>ψ2​: contingent sourcing at the prices of Table 2) and Proposition 3(i)–(ii) (the equilibria at ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0 for cR>ψ3c_R>\psi_3cR​>ψ3​: sole sourcing from U or diversification at the prices of Table 3).

Significance

The result separates two effects of shipment information: the operational value of reacting to spoilage, and a strategic effect, since the option of a later emergency order lets supplier U raise its price without losing the buyer. The interval (ψ2,t](\psi_2,t](ψ2​,t] is where the second effect dominates. The managerial reading in the paper is that a buyer should make sure the unreliable supplier is cost-efficient enough relative to the reliable one before investing in monitoring.

The mission produces a machine-checked version of the equilibrium analysis of a two-supplier pricing game with a discontinuous buyer response. The paper's results are proved on paper only; nothing in this model is formalized elsewhere. The formal statements also fix a reading of the printed results where the printing is wrong: Proposition 2(ii), Proposition 4(iv) and Lemma A.2(ii)–(iii) of the paper are false as printed (see below), and the mission states only the parts that hold.

Difficulty

The buyer's response is piecewise: four ordering regimes, with boundaries wR=wUw_R=w_UwR​=wU​, wR=η1w_R=\eta_1wR​=η1​ and wR=η2w_R=\eta_2wR​=η2​, and the suppliers' payoffs jump across them. Best responses therefore are not first-order conditions of a smooth payoff; each supplier compares the best interior price in each regime with limit prices that push the buyer to a regime boundary. At ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 the boundary between contingent sourcing and diversification is a tie for the buyer, and the equilibrium (i-b) exists only because of the tie-break. The selection of Pareto-dominant equilibria adds a further layer: at ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 there is a continuum of Nash equilibria (lower wUw_UwU​ with the same R-payoff), and the goal quantifies over all undominated ones. A natural first idea, comparing the closed-form Table 2 and Table 3 payoffs, proves the inequalities only for those particular profiles; the goal also needs that every equilibrium has those payoffs, which is Propositions 2(i) and 3(i)–(ii).

Formalization scope

Everything is real-valued and deterministic: yield and signal enter only through P1P_1P1​, PB=P0ρP_B=P_0\rhoPB​=P0​ρ, PG=1−P0ρP_G=1-P_0\rhoPG​=1−P0​ρ and the posteriors P0G,P1GP_{0G},P_{1G}P0G​,P1G​, with P0B=1P_{0B}=1P0B​=1, P1B=0P_{1B}=0P1B​=0. The accuracy ρ\rhoρ is an argument; the literals 111 and 000 give the two scenarios, and Proposition 3 is the same game at ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0. Parameters are a structure Params with a Standing predicate (0<m0<m0<m, 0<P1<10<P_1<10<P1​<1, 0≤cU≤P1m0\le c_U\le P_1m0≤cU​≤P1​m, 0≤cR≤m0\le c_R\le m0≤cR​≤m; the nonnegativity of mmm and the costs is implicit in the paper). The buyer's value is sSup of (2) over feasible orders, which is meaningful at nonnegative prices, in particular at every equilibrium. The buyer's response in the payoffs is Table 1 by case in the order (iv), (i) with η1≤wR\eta_1\le w_Rη1​≤wR​, (ii), (iii), which is footnote 11's tie-break. Pareto dominance is weak dominance, as in the proof of Proposition 2. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 add nonnegative wU,wRw_U,w_RwU​,wR​ and 0≤ρ≤10\le\rho\le10≤ρ≤1.

Departures from the printed statements, all disclosed in the items:

  • Proposition 4 is stated weakly at three endpoints where the printed strict claims fail (cR=mc_R=mcR​=m: R and the buyer tie; cR=ϕ1c_R=\phi_1cR​=ϕ1​: U is unaffected, covered by case (i); cR=tc_R=tcR​=t: the buyer ties).
  • Proposition 4(iv), Proposition 2(ii) and Lemma A.2(ii)–(iii) are false and omitted. Counterexample: m=10m=10m=10, P1=1/2P_1=1/2P1​=1/2, cU=0c_U=0cU​=0, cR=3/2<ψ2=2c_R=3/2<\psi_2=2cR​=3/2<ψ2​=2. At ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1 the profile (wU,wR,wE)=(3/2,29/8,23/4)(w_U,w_R,w_E)=(3/2,29/8,23/4)(wU​,wR​,wE​)=(3/2,29/8,23/4) is an equilibrium (the buyer is contingent at the tie η1=wR\eta_1=w_Rη1​=wR​) with payoffs U 51/1651/1651/16, R 289/64289/64289/64, alongside the diversification equilibrium (13/7,26/7,⋅)(13/7,26/7,\cdot)(13/7,26/7,⋅) with payoffs U 169/98169/98169/98, R 961/196961/196961/196, which is the unique equilibrium at ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0. Neither dominates the other, so contingent sourcing does change payoffs below ψ2\psi_2ψ2​.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the payoffs and equilibria are defined from the game, not from the Table 2/3 profiles; the goal quantifies over all equilibria and asserts their existence, so it is neither a statement about closed forms nor vacuous; R chooses wEw_EwE​ freely; and the strategy spaces are exactly those of p. 16.

All objects live in one definitions file, ContingentSourcing.Competition.Model. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the omitted Proposition 2(iii) and Proposition 3(iii). A reusable byproduct would be lemmas on piecewise-quadratic two-stage newsvendor-type programs with linear demand.

Selected references

  • T. Lu and B. Tomlin, Forewarned Is Forearmed? Contingent Sourcing, Shipment Information and Supplier Competition, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0540 (author manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4260604)
  • B. Tomlin, On the value of mitigation and contingency strategies for managing supply chain disruption risks, Management Science 52(5), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0515
  • X. Shan, T. Li and S. P. Sethi, A responsive-pricing retailer sourcing from competing suppliers facing disruptions, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 24(1):196–213, 2022 (cited by the paper for Proposition 3).
  • V. Babich, A. N. Burnetas and P. H. Ritchken, Competition and diversification effects in supply chains with supplier default risk, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 9(2), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1060.0122
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Algorithmic Game TheoryBandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

V-Learning—A Simple, Efficient, Decentralized Algorithm for Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Independent V-Learning Finds a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium with Gap O((H²S/K)Ξ(A,K/S,ι) + √(H⁵Sι/K))Research Paper

Motivation

In multi-agent reinforcement learning several agents act in a shared, changing environment, each pursuing its own reward. The standard model is the Markov game (stochastic game), going back to Shapley (1953). When agents learn from experience rather than from a known model, the natural target is an equilibrium of the game, and the natural question is how many episodes of play are needed to find one.

Before V-learning, sample-efficient algorithms for general-sum Markov games were centralized and model-based: they estimated quantities indexed by the joint action, so their sample complexity grew with ∏j=1mAj\prod_{j=1}^m A_j∏j=1m​Aj​, exponentially in the number of players mmm. This is the curse of multiagents. Jin, Liu, Wang and Yu (arXiv:2110.14555, journal version in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) introduced V-learning, in which every agent runs its own simple algorithm, sees only its own reward and the states, and never needs the other agents' actions. Theorem 6 of the paper shows that the agents' combined output is an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) after a number of episodes polynomial in HHH, SSS and max⁡jAj\max_j A_jmaxj​Aj​ only.

Timeline:

  • 2018: Jin, Allen-Zhu, Bubeck and Jordan analyse optimistic Q-learning with the learning rate αt=(H+1)/(H+t)\alpha_t=(H+1)/(H+t)αt​=(H+1)/(H+t), the rate V-learning reuses (arXiv:1807.03765).
  • 2020: Bai and Jin (arXiv:2002.04017) and Xie et al. give the first sample-efficient algorithms for two-player zero-sum Markov games, based on optimistic value iteration. Bai, Jin and Yu (arXiv:2006.12007, NeurIPS 2020) introduce V-learning, coupled with FTRL, for Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games.
  • 2021: Liu, Yu, Bai and Jin (arXiv:2010.01604, ICML 2021) learn Nash, CE and CCE of multi-player general-sum games with a centralized model-based method in O(H4S2∏jAj/ε2)O(H^4S^2\prod_jA_j/\varepsilon^2)O(H4S2∏j​Aj​/ε2) episodes.
  • 2021: the present paper (arXiv v1, 27 October 2021) presents V-learning as a generic class of algorithms with any adversarial bandit subroutine and proves Theorem 6; two concurrent works (references [32] and [47] of the paper) obtain CCE guarantees for V-learning-style algorithms with one more factor of HHH.

Setting

A tabular episodic mmm-player Markov game has SSS states, episodes of HHH steps, and AjA_jAj​ actions for player jjj; A=max⁡jAjA=\max_jA_jA=maxj​Aj​. At step hhh in state sss the players choose actions simultaneously, forming a joint action a\boldsymbol aa; player jjj receives the deterministic reward rj,h(s,a)∈[0,1]r_{j,h}(s,\boldsymbol a)\in[0,1]rj,h​(s,a)∈[0,1], and the next state is drawn from Ph(⋅∣s,a)\mathbb P_h(\cdot\mid s,\boldsymbol a)Ph​(⋅∣s,a). Every episode starts at a fixed state s1s_1s1​.

A joint policy π\piπ may be correlated: the players share a random seed. Vj,1π(s1)V^\pi_{j,1}(s_1)Vj,1π​(s1​) is player jjj's expected total reward. The best response value Vj,1†,π−j(s1)V^{\dagger,\pi_{-j}}_{j,1}(s_1)Vj,1†,π−j​​(s1​) is the largest value player jjj can obtain by switching to a policy of its own, independent of the shared seed, while the others keep playing π−j\pi_{-j}π−j​. A joint policy is an ε\varepsilonε-CCE if max⁡j(Vj,1†,π−j−Vj,1π)(s1)≤ε\max_j\big(V^{\dagger,\pi_{-j}}_{j,1}-V^\pi_{j,1}\big)(s_1)\le\varepsilonmaxj​(Vj,1†,π−j​​−Vj,1π​)(s1​)≤ε.

V-learning (Algorithm 1). Each player keeps, for every state sss and step hhh, a visit count Nh(s)N_h(s)Nh​(s), a value estimate Vj,h(s)V_{j,h}(s)Vj,h​(s) and an adversarial bandit algorithm. After visiting sss at step hhh for the ttt-th time it updates

V~j,h(s)←(1−αt)V~j,h(s)+αt(rj,h+Vj,h+1(sh+1)+βj,t),Vj,h(s)←min⁡{H+1−h,V~j,h(s)},\tilde V_{j,h}(s)\leftarrow(1-\alpha_t)\tilde V_{j,h}(s)+\alpha_t\big(r_{j,h}+V_{j,h+1}(s_{h+1})+\beta_{j,t}\big),\qquad V_{j,h}(s)\leftarrow\min\{H+1-h,\tilde V_{j,h}(s)\},V~j,h​(s)←(1−αt​)V~j,h​(s)+αt​(rj,h​+Vj,h+1​(sh+1​)+βj,t​),Vj,h​(s)←min{H+1−h,V~j,h​(s)},

with αt=(H+1)/(H+t)\alpha_t=(H+1)/(H+t)αt​=(H+1)/(H+t) and a bonus βj,t\beta_{j,t}βj,t​, and feeds the loss (H−rj,h−Vj,h+1(sh+1))/H(H-r_{j,h}-V_{j,h+1}(s_{h+1}))/H(H−rj,h​−Vj,h+1​(sh+1​))/H of its own action to the (s,h)(s,h)(s,h)-th bandit, whose next strategy becomes the policy at (s,h)(s,h)(s,h). The weights αti=αi∏j=i+1t(1−αj)\alpha^i_t=\alpha_i\prod_{j=i+1}^t(1-\alpha_j)αti​=αi​∏j=i+1t​(1−αj​) express V~\tilde VV~ as a weighted average of past updates.

The bandit subroutine must satisfy Assumption 1: against any adaptive adversary with noisy, conditionally unbiased feedback, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ the αti\alpha^i_tαti​-weighted regret after ttt rounds is at most ξ(B,t,log⁡(1/δ))\xi(B,t,\log(1/\delta))ξ(B,t,log(1/δ)), where ξ\xiξ is non-decreasing in the number of arms BBB and has a partial-sum upper bound Ξ(B,t,⋅)\Xi(B,t,\cdot)Ξ(B,t,⋅) concave in ttt.

The output policy π^\hat\piπ^ (Algorithm 3) samples an episode index kkk uniformly from [K][K][K]; at each step, in state sss with t=Nhk(s)t=N^k_h(s)t=Nhk​(s) earlier visits in episodes k1<⋯<ktk^1<\dots<k^tk1<⋯<kt, it samples iii with probability αti\alpha^i_tαti​, sets k←kik\leftarrow k^ik←ki, and plays the policies the players held at the beginning of episode kik^iki. For the CCE all players use the same sample iii (shared seed, §5.1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

With ι=log⁡(mHSAK/δ)\iota=\log(mHSAK/\delta)ι=log(mHSAK/δ) and bonuses satisfying ∑i=1tαtiβj,i=Θ(Hξ(Aj,t,ι)+H3ι/t)\sum_{i=1}^t\alpha^i_t\beta_{j,i}=\Theta\big(H\xi(A_j,t,\iota)+\sqrt{H^3\iota/t}\big)∑i=1t​αti​βj,i​=Θ(Hξ(Aj​,t,ι)+H3ι/t​) for t∈[K]t\in[K]t∈[K], with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ

max⁡j∈[m][Vj,1†,π^−j(s1)−Vj,1π^(s1)]≤O(H2SK Ξ(A,K/S,ι)+H5SιK).\max_{j\in[m]}\Big[V^{\dagger,\hat\pi_{-j}}_{j,1}(s_1)-V^{\hat\pi}_{j,1}(s_1)\Big]\le O\Big(\frac{H^2S}{K}\,\Xi(A,K/S,\iota)+\sqrt{\frac{H^5S\iota}{K}}\Big).j∈[m]max​[Vj,1†,π^−j​​(s1​)−Vj,1π^​(s1​)]≤O(KH2S​Ξ(A,K/S,ι)+KH5Sι​​).

The goal leaves the bandit algorithm abstract: it holds for every subroutine satisfying Assumption 1.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 10: the properties of the weights αti\alpha^i_tαti​.
  2. Lemma 11: V~\tilde VV~ as a weighted sum of past updates.
  3. Lemma 12: Assumption 1 transported to every (s,h,j)(s,h,j)(s,h,j)-bandit of the run, with failure probability δ\deltaδ.
  4. Lemma 13 (optimism): Vj,hk≥Vj,h†,π^−j,hkV^k_{j,h}\ge V^{\dagger,\hat\pi^k_{-j,h}}_{j,h}Vj,hk​≥Vj,h†,π^−j,hk​​.
  5. Lemma 14 (pessimism): V‾j,hk≤Vj,hπ^hk\underline V^k_{j,h}\le V^{\hat\pi^k_h}_{j,h}V​j,hk​≤Vj,hπ^hk​​ for the analysis-only estimate V‾\underline VV​.
  6. The summed gap ∑kmax⁡j[Vj,1k−V‾j,1k](s1)≤O(H2SΞ(A,K/S,ι)+H5SKι)\sum_k\max_j[V^k_{j,1}-\underline V^k_{j,1}](s_1)\le O(H^2S\Xi(A,K/S,\iota)+\sqrt{H^5SK\iota})∑k​maxj​[Vj,1k​−V​j,1k​](s1​)≤O(H2SΞ(A,K/S,ι)+H5SKι​) (p. 24).

Two further steps of the proof of Theorem 6 are included as items without milestone status: the one-step recursion of δhk=max⁡j(Vj,hk−V‾j,hk)(shk)\delta^k_h=\max_j(V^k_{j,h}-\underline V^k_{j,h})(s^k_h)δhk​=maxj​(Vj,hk​−V​j,hk​)(shk​) (p. 23) and the pigeonhole bound on the summed bonus terms (pp. 23–24).

Significance

With the FTRL subroutine of the paper (Corollary 19: Ξ(B,t,log⁡(1/δ))=20HBtlog⁡(B/δ)\Xi(B,t,\log(1/\delta))=20\sqrt{HBt\log(B/\delta)}Ξ(B,t,log(1/δ))=20HBtlog(B/δ)​), Theorem 6 gives an ε\varepsilonε-CCE after O~(H5SA/ε2)\tilde O(H^5SA/\varepsilon^2)O~(H5SA/ε2) episodes, against H4S2∏jAj/ε2H^4S^2\prod_jA_j/\varepsilon^2H4S2∏j​Aj​/ε2 for the earlier centralized method. The same analysis, with a swap-regret subroutine, gives correlated equilibria (Theorem 7) and, specialized to two players with opposite rewards, Nash equilibria of zero-sum games (Theorem 5). The algorithm is decentralized: each agent's computation depends only on the visited states and its own actions and rewards.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no part of it has been machine-checked. A formalization adds a precise statement of what "independent learning finds a CCE" means for non-Markov, history-dependent output policies, and of the adversary class Assumption 1 must cover for the reduction from the Markov game to the bandits to go through. It also makes explicit the boundary cases the paper leaves implicit (first visits, the last step, the initialization of V~\tilde VV~).

Difficulty

The deterministic steps (Lemmas 10–11, the recursion and the pigeonhole bound) are algebra on weighted sums. The difficulty is probabilistic. Lemma 12 must view each (s,h,j)(s,h,j)(s,h,j)-bandit as playing against an adversary formed by the rest of the run: the other players, the transitions and the player's own other bandits, all adapted to the past. Lemmas 13 and 14 need concentration of αti\alpha^i_tαti​-weighted martingale sums over random visit times, uniformly over all states, steps, episodes and players.

The best response is the other obstacle. The output policy is not Markov: it carries a latent episode index. The opponent of π^−j\hat\pi_{-j}π^−j​ may use the whole history of states and joint actions, and the best response to a non-Markov policy is not given by a Bellman equation. Lemma 13's step (v) handles this; the obvious per-state argument does not apply.

Formalization scope

Everything is finite and real-valued. States, players, actions, steps and episodes are Fin types; steps and episodes are 0-based, so the cap H+1−hH+1-hH+1−h is H - h. The bandit rule is a deterministic function from the feedback history to a probability vector, starting uniform. The adversaries of Assumption 1 range over a finitary class: private randomness in an arbitrary finite type, losses chosen from the past before the learner's action, and conditionally unbiased feedback in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The training law is a finite product of policy and transition probabilities, and every probability is a finite sum over episode sequences. The best response is a supremum over deterministic history-dependent deviations, taken outside the average over the output policy's initial index. Θ\ThetaΘ and OOO are read with a universal lower constant c0c_0c0​ before every instance and an OOO-constant depending only on the upper constant c1c_1c1​.

Added hypotheses, each disclosed in its item: nonnegative bonuses; K≥1K\ge1K≥1; per-player bandit rules sharing one ξ\xiξ; ξ≥0\xi\ge0ξ≥0 in the pigeonhole step and the summed-gap milestone; mHSAK≥2mHSAK\ge2mHSAK≥2 in milestone 6, whose printed form is false without it. The output policy's convention at a first visit (t=0t=0t=0) keeps the current index and plays the uniform initial policy.

Two formalizations would trivialize the goal and are ruled out: an Assumption 1 that no algorithm satisfies (a sorry-free check shows every valid rule satisfies it with ξ≡1\xi\equiv1ξ≡1), and a best response averaged per latent index or restricted to Markov deviations.

Needed infrastructure: weighted martingale concentration (Azuma–Hoeffding is on the platform), finite-sum manipulation of the training law, and Jensen's inequality for concave functions. Contributions to any milestone are welcome; the deterministic milestones 1, 2 and 6, and the recursion and pigeonhole steps, are independent of the probabilistic ones.

Selected references

  • C. Jin, Q. Liu, Y. Wang, T. Yu, V-Learning—A Simple, Efficient, Decentralized Algorithm for Multiagent RL, arXiv:2110.14555v1, 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.14555
  • C. Jin, Z. Allen-Zhu, S. Bubeck, M. I. Jordan, Is Q-learning Provably Efficient?, NeurIPS 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.03765
  • Y. Bai, C. Jin, Provable Self-Play Algorithms for Competitive Reinforcement Learning, ICML 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.04017
  • Y. Bai, C. Jin, T. Yu, Near-Optimal Reinforcement Learning with Self-Play, NeurIPS 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.12007
  • Q. Liu, T. Yu, Y. Bai, C. Jin, A Sharp Analysis of Model-based Reinforcement Learning with Self-Play, ICML 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.01604
  • L. S. Shapley, Stochastic Games, PNAS 39(10), 1953. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Disclosure and Promotion Policy Design for Platforms: Under Myopic Pricing, the Long-Run Average Optimal Consumer Surplus Equals the Concavification of the Best Confounding SurplusResearch Paper

Motivation

Online marketplaces decide which products to show first. A promotion puts a seller's product in front of consumers who will not search further, so it changes both the seller's sales and the surplus of the consumers who see it. A seller who is uncertain about the market sets prices from the sales they observe, and the platform's promotion decisions shape what those sales reveal. Gur, Macnamara, Morgenstern and Saban (arXiv:1911.09256, Management Science 2023) study how a platform that maximizes consumer surplus should combine an initial disclosure of information with a dynamic promotion policy when the seller learns and prices myopically.

The question joins two literatures. Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011) describes the value of a one-shot signal by the concave envelope of a value function. Learning-and-earning in dynamic pricing (Harrison, Keskin and Zeevi 2012) studies how a seller's beliefs converge when sales are informative. The paper's central result says what the platform can achieve in the long run when it controls both the starting point and the drift of the seller's belief.

Setting

A fraction ϕ∈{ϕL,ϕH}\phi\in\{\phi_L,\phi_H\}ϕ∈{ϕL​,ϕH​} of consumers is impatient, with 0<ϕL<ϕH<10<\phi_L<\phi_H<10<ϕL​<ϕH​<1; the platform observes ϕ\phiϕ and the seller holds the prior μ0=P(ϕ=ϕH)\mu_0=\mathbb P(\phi=\phi_H)μ0​=P(ϕ=ϕH​). The seller sets prices in a compact interval P\mathcal PP containing 000. In each period t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T one consumer arrives. A patient consumer buys with probability ρˉc(p)\bar\rho_c(p)ρˉ​c​(p). An impatient consumer buys with probability ρˉ0(p)\bar\rho_0(p)ρˉ​0​(p) if the seller is promoted and with probability 000 otherwise. Consumer surplus is Wˉc(p)\bar W_c(p)Wˉc​(p), Wˉ0(p)\bar W_0(p)Wˉ0​(p) or Wˉout\bar W_{\mathrm{out}}Wˉout​ in the three cases. The purchase probabilities are decreasing and Lipschitz, the revenues pρˉc(p)p\bar\rho_c(p)pρˉ​c​(p) and pρˉ0(p)p\bar\rho_0(p)pρˉ​0​(p) are strictly concave, ρˉ0≥ρˉc\bar\rho_0\ge\bar\rho_cρˉ​0​≥ρˉ​c​, and Wˉc,Wˉ0\bar W_c,\bar W_0Wˉc​,Wˉ0​ are decreasing and Lipschitz.

Before the first period the platform commits to a signaling mechanism σ\sigmaσ, a distribution over signals for each value of ϕ\phiϕ, and to a promotion policy α\alphaα, where αt(p,ϕ,hˉt)∈[0,1]\alpha_t(p,\phi,\bar h_t)\in[0,1]αt​(p,ϕ,hˉt​)∈[0,1] is the probability of promoting the seller at price ppp after the history hˉt\bar h_thˉt​ of the signal, past prices and past sales. The seller updates a belief μt\mu_tμt​ about ϕ\phiϕ by Bayes' rule and follows a myopic Bayesian pricing policy π∗\pi^*π∗: in each period they choose a price that maximizes the current expected revenue, breaking ties in favour of the current consumer surplus. The platform's payoff is the expected total consumer surplus WTα,σ,π∗(μ0)W_T^{\alpha,\sigma,\pi^*}(\mu_0)WTα,σ,π∗​(μ0​).

A promotion policy is confounding if it keeps the seller's belief constant, which requires the probability of a sale to be the same under ϕH\phi_HϕH​ and ϕL\phi_LϕL​ at the price the seller sets. Let WC(μ)W^C(\mu)WC(μ) be the largest one-period expected consumer surplus of a confounding policy at belief μ\muμ, and let co(WC)co(W^C)co(WC) be its concavification, the smallest concave function above WCW^CWC on [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every prior μ0∈[0,1]\mu_0\in[0,1]μ0​∈[0,1],

lim⁡T→∞ sup⁡α,σ 1TWTα,σ,π∗(μ0)=co(WC)(μ0),\lim_{T\to\infty}\ \sup_{\alpha,\sigma}\ \frac1T W_T^{\alpha,\sigma,\pi^*}(\mu_0)=co(W^C)(\mu_0),T→∞lim​ α,σsup​ T1​WTα,σ,π∗​(μ0​)=co(WC)(μ0​),

and for every TTT some signal and confounding policy achieve average surplus exactly co(WC)(μ0)co(W^C)(\mu_0)co(WC)(μ0​). The goal is stated as a uniform upper bound for large TTT together with exact attainment at every TTT.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1: under myopic pricing it is without loss to use promotion policies that depend on the history only through the belief, that promote a single price, and two signals.
  2. Proposition 3: for every belief a confounding policy exists.
  3. Lemma 2: a period whose surplus exceeds co(WC)(μ)+ϵco(W^C)(\mu)+\epsilonco(WC)(μ)+ϵ separates the purchase probabilities under ϕH\phi_HϕH​ and ϕL\phi_LϕL​ by some δ(ϵ)>0\delta(\epsilon)>0δ(ϵ)>0.
  4. Lemma 3: the belief converges to the truth exponentially fast in the number of such periods.
  5. Lemma 4: co(Wmax⁡)−co(WC)co(W^{\max})-co(W^C)co(Wmax)−co(WC) is bounded by ϵ/2+Cˉμ\epsilon/2+\bar C\muϵ/2+Cˉμ and by ϵ/2+Cˉ(1−μ)\epsilon/2+\bar C(1-\mu)ϵ/2+Cˉ(1−μ).
  6. Step (a) of (31): beliefs are a martingale and E[co(WC)(μt)]≤co(WC)(μ0)\mathbb E[co(W^C)(\mu_t)]\le co(W^C)(\mu_0)E[co(WC)(μt​)]≤co(WC)(μ0​).
  7. The finite-horizon bound 1TWT<co(WC)(μ)+54ϵ\frac1T W_T<co(W^C)(\mu)+\frac54\epsilonT1​WT​<co(WC)(μ)+45​ϵ for T>TˉT>\bar TT>Tˉ.
  8. The two existence steps: a repeated one-period confounding rule realizes its surplus in every period, and a two-signal mechanism attains co(WC)(μ0)co(W^C)(\mu_0)co(WC)(μ0​).

Significance

The theorem identifies the long-run value of the platform's joint design problem with a static object. The platform's levers act on the belief process: the signal sets its starting point and the promotion policy its drift. The theorem says that, in the long run, the best use of the second lever is to stop the drift. Information is then disclosed only once, as in a persuasion problem with value function WCW^CWC. A consequence is that a policy maximizing the current surplus in every period, which lets the seller learn ϕ\phiϕ, is generally not long-run optimal. The paper quantifies the gap on its uniform-willingness-to-pay example. The characterization is also the basis of the paper's later results on approximately optimal policies without signals and on equilibria with a forward-looking seller.

The result is proved in the paper; no part of it has been machine-checked. The formalization produces a finite, measure-free encoding of a dynamic Bayesian game with history-dependent policies, reusable for other learning-and-earning models, and makes the uniformity of every constant explicit.

Difficulty

The obvious argument treats each period separately: the surplus of a period is at most Wmax⁡(μt)W^{\max}(\mu_t)Wmax(μt​), and by Jensen's inequality the average is at most co(Wmax⁡)(μ0)co(W^{\max})(\mu_0)co(Wmax)(μ0​). This bound is too weak, because Wmax⁡W^{\max}Wmax exceeds WCW^CWC at interior beliefs. The proof must show that periods whose surplus exceeds co(WC)co(W^C)co(WC) by ϵ\epsilonϵ cannot recur often. This requires two quantitative statements that hold uniformly over all beliefs, policies and signals: each such period reveals information about ϕ\phiϕ by a fixed amount, and beliefs then concentrate exponentially fast. The surplus gained before concentration must also be controlled near the degenerate beliefs. The myopic tie-break makes the one-period problems discontinuous in the policy, so the compactness arguments behind WCW^CWC need care.

Formalization scope

The game is encoded without measure theory. The state is a Boolean, the signal set is Fin n for an arbitrary nnn, pricing policies are deterministic, and the expectation WTW_TWT​ is a finite sum over the state, the signal and the sale outcomes, with path probabilities given by products of the sale probabilities. Beliefs follow Bayes' rule, and a probability-zero observation leaves the belief unchanged. Definitions 1–3 quantify over histories whose recorded prices lie in P\mathcal PP. The tie-break of Definition 1 uses the current expected surplus under the seller's belief. WCW^CWC and Wmax⁡W^{\max}Wmax are real suprema over one-period rules and myopic responses. cococo is the supremum over the convex hull of the hypograph restricted to [0,1][0,1][0,1] and is used only on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The standing assumptions add 0≤ρˉc0\le\bar\rho_c0≤ρˉ​c​ and ρˉ0≤1\bar\rho_0\le1ρˉ​0​≤1, since these are probabilities. Only policies admitting a myopic response are considered, as the paper presumes. Constants in Lemmas 2 and 3 and in the finite-horizon bound are chosen before the horizon, the signal and the policies.

WCW^CWC is the one-period version of (10) under myopic pricing with the tie-break, not the static program (11). The goal quantifies over all history-dependent promotion policies, all finite signals and all myopic pricing policies, so it cannot be trivialized by restricting the policy class or stating only the upper bound. The attainment conjunct requires a confounding policy with a myopic response at every history.

The paper asserts that T⋅WC(μ1)T\cdot W^C(\mu_1)T⋅WC(μ1​) is attained for every μ1\mu_1μ1​. Under the tie-break the supremum defining WC(μ1)W^C(\mu_1)WC(μ1​) can fail to be attained, so the corresponding milestone states only the repetition step. Proposition 1 is stated with the prior fixed before the policies are chosen.

A complete development needs Bayesian updating on finite trees, the martingale property and Jensen's inequality for finite mixtures, concave envelopes on an interval and their attainment by two-point splits, Berge-type continuity of constrained one-period optima, and exponential concentration of posteriors under separated likelihoods. The last three are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone, and to general lemmas on concave envelopes and posterior concentration, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Gur, G. Macnamara, I. Morgenstern, D. Saban, Information Disclosure and Promotion Policy Design for Platforms, Management Science, 2023; arXiv:1911.09256v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.09256
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • J. M. Harrison, N. B. Keskin, A. Zeevi, Bayesian Dynamic Pricing Policies: Learning and Earning Under a Binary Prior Distribution, Management Science 58(3), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1426
  • R. J. Aumann, M. Maschler, Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, MIT Press, 1995. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262011471/
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Calculus of VariationsMachine LearningOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Game on Random Environment, Mean-Field Langevin System, and Neural Networks: First-Order Condition for Entropy-Regularized Minimization over Probability Measures with a Fixed MarginalResearch Paper

Motivation

Several problems in machine learning and game theory are optimization problems over probability measures. Training a wide two-layer neural network can be viewed as minimizing a functional F(ν)F(\nu)F(ν) of the distribution ν\nuν of the network's parameters (Mei, Montanari, Nguyen, PNAS 2018; Hu, Ren, Šiška, Szpruch, arXiv:1905.07769). Adding a relative-entropy penalty ηH(ν)\eta H(\nu)ηH(ν) makes the problem strictly convex in the density and connects its minimizers to the invariant measures of Langevin-type diffusions, the mean-field Langevin dynamics. The first-order condition for the unconstrained problem is Hu et al., Proposition 2.4.

Conforti, Kazeykina and Ren (arXiv:2004.02457v2) add a random environment: a variable yyy with a fixed law m\mathsf mm that every player observes, such as the time index in a dynamic game or a shared signal. The strategies are then probability measures on Rd×Y\mathbb R^d\times\mathbb YRd×Y whose Y\mathbb YY-marginal is prescribed. Their Theorem 3.1 extends the first-order condition to this constrained problem. The introduction names it "one of our main contributions": it gives the necessary condition for Nash equilibria of games on a random environment (Corollary 3.3), and it identifies the invariant measure of the mean-field Langevin system studied in the rest of the paper.

Setting

Let Y\mathbb YY be a Polish space with a probability measure m\mathsf mm, and let p≥1p\ge1p≥1. Write Rˉd=Rd×Y\bar{\mathbb R}^d=\mathbb R^d\times\mathbb YRˉd=Rd×Y and xˉ=(x,y)\bar x=(x,y)xˉ=(x,y). The strategy set is

Π={πˉ∈Pp(Rˉd): πˉ(Rd,⋅)=m},\Pi=\{\bar\pi\in\mathcal P_p(\bar{\mathbb R}^d):\ \bar\pi(\mathbb R^d,\cdot)=\mathsf m\},Π={πˉ∈Pp​(Rˉd): πˉ(Rd,⋅)=m},

the probability measures on Rˉd\bar{\mathbb R}^dRˉd with finite ppp-th moment and Y\mathbb YY-marginal m\mathsf mm. By disintegration, πˉ(dxˉ)=π(dx∣y) m(dy)\bar\pi(d\bar x)=\pi(dx|y)\,\mathsf m(dy)πˉ(dxˉ)=π(dx∣y)m(dy).

A function F:Π→RF:\Pi\to\mathbb RF:Π→R has a linear functional derivative δFδπˉ:Π×Rˉd→R\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}:\Pi\times\bar{\mathbb R}^d\to\mathbb RδπˉδF​:Π×Rˉd→R if for all ν,ν′∈Π\nu,\nu'\in\Piν,ν′∈Π

F(ν′)−F(ν)=∫01∫RˉdδFδπˉ((1−λ)ν+λν′,xˉ) (ν′−ν)(dxˉ) dλ.(2.1)F(\nu')-F(\nu)=\int_0^1\int_{\bar{\mathbb R}^d}\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}\big((1-\lambda)\nu+\lambda\nu',\bar x\big)\,(\nu'-\nu)(d\bar x)\,d\lambda. \tag{2.1}F(ν′)−F(ν)=∫01​∫Rˉd​δπˉδF​((1−λ)ν+λν′,xˉ)(ν′−ν)(dxˉ)dλ.(2.1)

Assumption 2.1 asks that FFF have such a derivative, that FFF and δFδπˉ(⋅,xˉ)\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\cdot,\bar x)δπˉδF​(⋅,xˉ) be continuous for the ppp-Wasserstein distance Wp\mathcal W_pWp​, that δFδπˉ(πˉ,⋅,y)\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi,\cdot,y)δπˉδF​(πˉ,⋅,y) be continuously differentiable in xxx, and that sup⁡πˉ∈Π∣δFδπˉ(πˉ,xˉ)∣≤C(1+∣xˉ∣p)\sup_{\bar\pi\in\Pi}|\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi,\bar x)|\le C(1+|\bar x|^p)supπˉ∈Π​∣δπˉδF​(πˉ,xˉ)∣≤C(1+∣xˉ∣p).

The regularizer is the relative entropy with respect to Leb×m\mathrm{Leb}\times\mathsf mLeb×m: if πˉ\bar\piπˉ has density π(x∣y)\pi(x|y)π(x∣y) with respect to Leb×m\mathrm{Leb}\times\mathsf mLeb×m, then H(πˉ)=∫ln⁡π(x∣y) πˉ(dxˉ)H(\bar\pi)=\int\ln\pi(x|y)\,\bar\pi(d\bar x)H(πˉ)=∫lnπ(x∣y)πˉ(dxˉ), and H(πˉ)=+∞H(\bar\pi)=+\inftyH(πˉ)=+∞ otherwise. For η>0\eta>0η>0 the objective is

V(πˉ)=F(πˉ)+ηH(πˉ).V(\bar\pi)=F(\bar\pi)+\eta H(\bar\pi).V(πˉ)=F(πˉ)+ηH(πˉ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 4)

If πˉ∗∈argmin⁡πˉ∈ΠV(πˉ)\bar\pi^*\in\operatorname{argmin}_{\bar\pi\in\Pi}V(\bar\pi)πˉ∗∈argminπˉ∈Π​V(πˉ), then πˉ∗\bar\pi^*πˉ∗ has a density π∗(x∣y)\pi^*(x|y)π∗(x∣y) which, for m\mathsf mm-a.e. yyy, is positive with ln⁡π∗(⋅∣y)\ln\pi^*(\cdot|y)lnπ∗(⋅∣y) differentiable and

∇xδFδπˉ(πˉ∗,x,y)+η∇xln⁡π∗(x∣y)=0for all x∈Rd.(3.1)\nabla_x\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi^*,x,y)+\eta\nabla_x\ln\pi^*(x|y)=0\qquad\text{for all }x\in\mathbb R^d. \tag{3.1}∇x​δπˉδF​(πˉ∗,x,y)+η∇x​lnπ∗(x∣y)=0for all x∈Rd.(3.1)

Conversely, if FFF is also convex on Π\PiΠ, every πˉ∗∈Π\bar\pi^*\in\Piπˉ∗∈Π satisfying (3.1) minimizes VVV over Π\PiΠ. The goal states both directions, as printed.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 3.1, §5.1, pp. 9–11)

  1. Step 1 (p. 9): for πˉ,πˉ∗∈Π\bar\pi,\bar\pi^*\in\Piπˉ,πˉ∗∈Π and πˉλ=λπˉ+(1−λ)πˉ∗\bar\pi^\lambda=\lambda\bar\pi+(1-\lambda)\bar\pi^*πˉλ=λπˉ+(1−λ)πˉ∗, 1ε∫0ε∫δFδπˉ(πˉλ,⋅) d(πˉ−πˉ∗) dλ→∫δFδπˉ(πˉ∗,⋅) d(πˉ−πˉ∗)\frac1\varepsilon\int_0^\varepsilon\int\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi^\lambda,\cdot)\,d(\bar\pi-\bar\pi^*)\,d\lambda\to\int\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi^*,\cdot)\,d(\bar\pi-\bar\pi^*)ε1​∫0ε​∫δπˉδF​(πˉλ,⋅)d(πˉ−πˉ∗)dλ→∫δπˉδF​(πˉ∗,⋅)d(πˉ−πˉ∗).
  2. (5.1) (p. 10): for a minimizer πˉ∗\bar\pi^*πˉ∗ and πˉ∈Π\bar\pi\in\Piπˉ∈Π with H(πˉ)<∞H(\bar\pi)<\inftyH(πˉ)<∞, 0≤∫(δFδπˉ(πˉ∗,⋅)+ηln⁡π∗) d(πˉ−πˉ∗)0\le\int\big(\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi^*,\cdot)+\eta\ln\pi^*\big)\,d(\bar\pi-\bar\pi^*)0≤∫(δπˉδF​(πˉ∗,⋅)+ηlnπ∗)d(πˉ−πˉ∗).
  3. (5.2) (p. 10): for a minimizer, Ξy=δFδπˉ(πˉ∗,⋅,y)+ηln⁡π∗(⋅∣y)\Xi_y=\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi^*,\cdot,y)+\eta\ln\pi^*(\cdot|y)Ξy​=δπˉδF​(πˉ∗,⋅,y)+ηlnπ∗(⋅∣y) is π∗(⋅∣y)\pi^*(\cdot|y)π∗(⋅∣y)-a.s. constant for m\mathsf mm-a.e. yyy.
  4. Step 3 (p. 11): a minimizer is equivalent to Leb×m\mathrm{Leb}\times\mathsf mLeb×m.
  5. Sufficiency, FFF-part (p. 11): for convex FFF, F(πˉ)−F(πˉ∗)≥∫δFδπˉ(πˉ∗,⋅) d(πˉ−πˉ∗)F(\bar\pi)-F(\bar\pi^*)\ge\int\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi^*,\cdot)\,d(\bar\pi-\bar\pi^*)F(πˉ)−F(πˉ∗)≥∫δπˉδF​(πˉ∗,⋅)d(πˉ−πˉ∗).
  6. Sufficiency, entropy part (p. 11): under (3.1), H(πˉ)−H(πˉ∗)≥∫ln⁡π∗ d(πˉ−πˉ∗)H(\bar\pi)-H(\bar\pi^*)\ge\int\ln\pi^*\,d(\bar\pi-\bar\pi^*)H(πˉ)−H(πˉ∗)≥∫lnπ∗d(πˉ−πˉ∗).

Significance

Theorem 3.1 says that each fibre of an entropy-regularized minimizer is a Gibbs measure, π∗(x∣y)∝exp⁡(−1ηδFδπˉ(πˉ∗,x,y))\pi^*(x|y)\propto\exp\big(-\frac1\eta\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}(\bar\pi^*,x,y)\big)π∗(x∣y)∝exp(−η1​δπˉδF​(πˉ∗,x,y)). In the paper this yields the Nash-equilibrium condition (3.2) for nnn-player games on a random environment, the uniqueness of equilibria under a monotonicity condition (Corollary 3.4), and the identification of the stationary measures of the mean-field Langevin system (2.2) with these equilibria, the basis of the convergence results (Theorems 3.8–3.12). For a one-player problem it is the optimality condition behind gradient-descent training of mean-field neural networks with an environment variable.

The result is proved in the paper; it is not formalized anywhere known. The mission produces the first machine-checked first-order condition for optimization over probability measures, with or without a marginal constraint, and the supporting objects: the strategy set Π\PiΠ, the linear functional derivative, and relative entropy with respect to the infinite reference measure Leb×m\mathrm{Leb}\times\mathsf mLeb×m. The unconstrained case (Y\mathbb YY a point) is a special case.

Difficulty

The sufficiency direction is two convexity inequalities and a cancellation of the yyy-dependent constants, which uses the common marginal m\mathsf mm. The necessity direction is harder. The first variation of VVV at πˉ∗\bar\pi^*πˉ∗ gives only an inequality (5.1) in the directions πˉ−πˉ∗\bar\pi-\bar\pi^*πˉ−πˉ∗ with H(πˉ)<∞H(\bar\pi)<\inftyH(πˉ)<∞, and the entropy's difference quotient is not dominated where π∗\pi^*π∗ is small, so the limit requires a one-sided Fatou argument. The inequality (5.1) is not yet a pointwise equation. Converting it into "Ξy\Xi_yΞy​ is constant" needs admissible competitors with bounded density relative to πˉ∗\bar\pi^*πˉ∗, built fibre by fibre in yyy, and these only reach the support of πˉ∗\bar\pi^*πˉ∗. Ruling out zeros of π∗\pi^*π∗ (Step 3) needs a separate competitor that charges a set where π∗\pi^*π∗ vanishes. Finally (3.1) concerns a smooth version of the density, which has to be produced from an almost-everywhere identity. The obvious idea of differentiating VVV along πˉ∗+εφ\bar\pi^*+\varepsilon\varphiπˉ∗+εφ for a signed perturbation φ\varphiφ fails: such perturbations leave Π\PiΠ unless they preserve positivity and the Y\mathbb YY-marginal.

Formalization scope

Rd\mathbb R^dRd is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with Lebesgue measure; Y\mathbb YY is a complete separable metric space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra (a Polish space with a fixed compatible metric, needed to state moments and Wp\mathcal W_pWp​); Rˉd\bar{\mathbb R}^dRˉd carries the max product metric, and ∣xˉ∣|\bar x|∣xˉ∣ in the growth bound is the distance to a base point (0,y0)(0,y_0)(0,y0​), with CCC and y0y_0y0​ fixed once for all πˉ∈Π\bar\pi\in\Piπˉ∈Π. Wp\mathcal W_pWp​ is the coupling infimum over this metric, valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and continuity is the ε\varepsilonε–δ\deltaδ notion on Π\PiΠ. FFF and δFδπˉ\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}δπˉδF​ are functions on all measures of which only the values on Π\PiΠ matter; δFδπˉ\frac{\delta F}{\delta\bar\pi}δπˉδF​ is part of the data and the theorem holds for every derivative satisfying (2.1). The definition of the derivative makes explicit what (2.1) presupposes: joint measurability in xˉ\bar xxˉ and integrability in λ\lambdaλ. Mixtures are (1−t)ν+tν′(1-t)\nu+t\nu'(1−t)ν+tν′ for t∈[0,1]t\in[0,1]t∈[0,1], and convexity of FFF is along these mixtures. HHH and VVV take values in (−∞,+∞](-\infty,+\infty](−∞,+∞], with H=+∞H=+\inftyH=+∞ off absolute continuity. (3.1) is required of some measurable version of the density, for m\mathsf mm-a.e. yyy and every xxx, together with positivity and differentiability of ln⁡π∗(⋅∣y)\ln\pi^*(\cdot|y)lnπ∗(⋅∣y).

The Lean logarithm satisfies ln⁡0=0\ln 0=0ln0=0, a non-integrable Bochner integral is 000, and the gradient of a non-differentiable function is 000. These would trivialize the statements, so (3.1) demands differentiability, and the milestones that integrate ln⁡π∗\ln\pi^*lnπ∗ assert integrability and that πˉ\bar\piπˉ does not charge {π∗=0}\{\pi^*=0\}{π∗=0}, which is what the paper's convention ln⁡0=−∞\ln0=-\inftyln0=−∞ encodes.

A complete development needs: mixtures and moments of measures in Π\PiΠ; Wp\mathcal W_pWp​-convergence of mixtures; dominated convergence along mixtures; the entropy of a mixture and its one-sided derivative; disintegration with respect to the Y\mathbb YY-marginal; and the passage from an a.e. identity to a smooth version of the density. The mixture, moment and entropy lemmas are reusable for any mean-field optimization problem. Contributions of any of these intermediate results, and of proofs of the milestones in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Conforti, A. Kazeykina, Z. Ren, Game on random environment, mean-field Langevin system and neural networks, arXiv:2004.02457v2, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.02457v2
  • K. Hu, Z. Ren, D. Šiška, L. Szpruch, Mean-field Langevin dynamics and energy landscape of neural networks, arXiv:1905.07769, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07769
  • S. Mei, A. Montanari, P.-M. Nguyen, A mean field view of the landscape of two-layer neural networks, PNAS 115 (2018), E7665–E7671. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1806579115
  • P. Cardaliaguet, F. Delarue, J.-M. Lasry, P.-L. Lions, The master equation and the convergence problem in mean field games, arXiv:1509.02505, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.02505
  • R. Jordan, D. Kinderlehrer, F. Otto, The variational formulation of the Fokker–Planck equation, SIAM J. Math. Anal. 29 (1998), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0036141096303359
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On the Learning Benefits of Resource Flexibility: At the Break-Even Cost of Flexibility, the Flexible System Is More Profitable Below a Profit-Margin Threshold and Less Profitable Above ItResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm that sells several products must decide, before demand is known, how much capacity to build. It can build dedicated capacity, one resource per product, or a single flexible resource that can serve any product but costs more per unit. The classical argument for flexibility is risk pooling: one pooled resource absorbs the fluctuations of several demands, as studied by Fine and Freund (1990) and Van Mieghem (1998).

Chod, Markakis and Trichakis (SSRN 3212177, published in Management Science, 2021) identify a second, independent benefit. A firm usually observes its sales, not its demand: when a product stocks out, the firm learns only that demand exceeded capacity. This is demand censoring. Because flexible capacity can be shifted to whichever product is in demand, it stocks out less often for each product, and so the firm learns more about demand from a flexible system than from a dedicated one. When demand is correlated over time, that information is worth money in later periods. The paper calls this the learning benefits of flexibility and asks when they are positive.

To separate learning from pooling, the paper compares the two systems at the break-even cost of flexibility, the unit cost of flexible capacity at which both systems earn the same profit in a single period. Any difference that remains in a two-period model is then due to learning alone (Eq. (14) of the paper).

Setting

There are two products with a common unit price ppp. Dedicated capacity costs ccc per unit and flexible capacity costs cFc_FcF​ per unit, with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p. The first-period demands D11,D21D^1_1, D^1_2D11​,D21​ are independent and each uniform on [x,x+U][x, x+U][x,x+U], with x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and U>0U > 0U>0. The profit margin is (p−c)/p(p-c)/p(p−c)/p.

Static model. With dedicated capacities Q=(Q1,Q2)\mathbf Q = (Q_1, Q_2)Q=(Q1​,Q2​), product iii sells min⁡{Di,Qi}\min\{D_i, Q_i\}min{Di​,Qi​}, and the expected profit is πN(Q)=p E[min⁡{D1,Q1}+min⁡{D2,Q2}]−c(Q1+Q2)\pi_N(\mathbf Q) = p\,\mathbb E[\min\{D_1,Q_1\} + \min\{D_2,Q_2\}] - c(Q_1+Q_2)πN​(Q)=pE[min{D1​,Q1​}+min{D2​,Q2​}]−c(Q1​+Q2​). With flexible capacity QFQ_FQF​, product 1 is served first: it sells SF,1=min⁡{D1,QF}S_{F,1} = \min\{D_1, Q_F\}SF,1​=min{D1​,QF​} and product 2 sells SF,2=min⁡{D2,QF−SF,1}S_{F,2} = \min\{D_2, Q_F - S_{F,1}\}SF,2​=min{D2​,QF​−SF,1​}; the expected profit is πF(cF)(QF)=p E[SF,1+SF,2]−cFQF\pi_F(c_F)(Q_F) = p\,\mathbb E[S_{F,1} + S_{F,2}] - c_F Q_FπF​(cF​)(QF​)=pE[SF,1​+SF,2​]−cF​QF​. The optimal static profits are

πˉN=sup⁡Q∈R+2πN(Q),πˉF(cF)=sup⁡QF≥0πF(cF)(QF),\bar\pi_N = \sup_{\mathbf Q \in \mathbb R^2_+} \pi_N(\mathbf Q), \qquad \bar\pi_F(c_F) = \sup_{Q_F \ge 0} \pi_F(c_F)(Q_F),πˉN​=Q∈R+2​sup​πN​(Q),πˉF​(cF​)=QF​≥0sup​πF​(cF​)(QF​),

and cFc_FcF​ is a break-even cost when πˉF(cF)=πˉN\bar\pi_F(c_F) = \bar\pi_NπˉF​(cF​)=πˉN​.

Learning. A product that had qqq units available and demand ddd reveals ddd exactly if d<qd < qd<q; otherwise the firm learns only that D≥qD \ge qD≥q and conditions its prior on that event. The firm's belief after period 1 is the product of the two products' posteriors. In period 2 demand repeats (Di2=Di1D^2_i = D^1_iDi2​=Di1​), and both systems build dedicated capacity against the posterior belief G\mathbb GG, earning

V2(G)=sup⁡Q∈R+2EG[pmin⁡{D1,Q1}+pmin⁡{D2,Q2}−c(Q1+Q2)].V^2(\mathbb G) = \sup_{\mathbf Q \in \mathbb R^2_+} \mathbb E_{\mathbb G}\big[p\min\{D_1,Q_1\} + p\min\{D_2,Q_2\} - c(Q_1+Q_2)\big].V2(G)=Q∈R+2​sup​EG​[pmin{D1​,Q1​}+pmin{D2​,Q2​}−c(Q1​+Q2​)].

The two-period optimal profits are

VN=sup⁡Q∈R+2(πN(Q)+E[V2(P(⋅∣SN1))]),VF(cF)=sup⁡QF≥0(πF(cF)(QF)+E[V2(P(⋅∣SF1))]).V_N = \sup_{\mathbf Q \in \mathbb R^2_+} \Big(\pi_N(\mathbf Q) + \mathbb E\big[V^2(\mathbb P(\cdot \mid \mathbf S^1_N))\big]\Big), \qquad V_F(c_F) = \sup_{Q_F \ge 0} \Big(\pi_F(c_F)(Q_F) + \mathbb E\big[V^2(\mathbb P(\cdot \mid \mathbf S^1_F))\big]\Big).VN​=Q∈R+2​sup​(πN​(Q)+E[V2(P(⋅∣SN1​))]),VF​(cF​)=QF​≥0sup​(πF​(cF​)(QF​)+E[V2(P(⋅∣SF1​))]).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1

Take x=0x = 0x=0. There is a threshold ζ∈(0,1)\zeta \in (0,1)ζ∈(0,1) such that for all p,c,U,cFp, c, U, c_Fp,c,U,cF​ with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p, U>0U > 0U>0, c≤cF<pc \le c_F < pc≤cF​<p and πˉF(cF)=πˉN\bar\pi_F(c_F) = \bar\pi_NπˉF​(cF​)=πˉN​,

p−cp≤ζ  ⟹  VF(cF)≥VN,p−cp>ζ  ⟹  VF(cF)≤VN.\frac{p-c}{p} \le \zeta \implies V_F(c_F) \ge V_N, \qquad \frac{p-c}{p} > \zeta \implies V_F(c_F) \le V_N.pp−c​≤ζ⟹VF​(cF​)≥VN​,pp−c​>ζ⟹VF​(cF​)≤VN​.

The goal fixes no numerical value of ζ\zetaζ; the paper reports ζ≈0.5904\zeta \approx 0.5904ζ≈0.5904.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3: the uniform newsvendor optimum Qˉ=x+U(p−c)/p\bar Q = x + U(p-c)/pQˉ​=x+U(p−c)/p with profit (p−c)x+U2(p−c)2/p(p-c)x + \tfrac U2 (p-c)^2/p(p−c)x+2U​(p−c)2/p.
  2. The static non-flexible optimum πˉN=2(p−c)x+U(p−c)2/p\bar\pi_N = 2(p-c)x + U(p-c)^2/pπˉN​=2(p−c)x+U(p−c)2/p.
  3. The static flexible optimum QˉF(cF)\bar Q_F(c_F)Qˉ​F​(cF​), πˉF(cF)\bar\pi_F(c_F)πˉF​(cF​) in the two branches p≥2cFp \ge 2c_Fp≥2cF​ and p<2cFp < 2c_Fp<2cF​.
  4. Eq. (8): the pooling benefits πˉF(cF)−πˉN\bar\pi_F(c_F) - \bar\pi_NπˉF​(cF​)−πˉN​ are strictly decreasing in cFc_FcF​, and the break-even cost exists and is unique in [c,p)[c, p)[c,p).
  5. The two-period non-flexible optimum: VN=4x(p−c)+U(p−c)2(3c+2p)/ΔV_N = 4x(p-c) + U(p-c)^2(3c+2p)/\DeltaVN​=4x(p−c)+U(p−c)2(3c+2p)/Δ with Δ=(p−c)(p+c)+cp\Delta = (p-c)(p+c) + cpΔ=(p−c)(p+c)+cp.
  6. The flexible case QF≥2x+UQ_F \ge 2x + UQF​≥2x+U: concavity, the right derivative (−c2+cp+p(p−2cF))/(2p)(-c^2 + cp + p(p-2c_F))/(2p)(−c2+cp+p(p−2cF​))/(2p) at 2x+U2x+U2x+U, and the price threshold p~\tilde pp~​.

Significance

Proposition 1 says that learning favours flexibility when margins are low or moderate and favours dedicated capacity when margins are high. Combined with the risk-pooling analysis, it shows that the value of flexibility in a dynamic setting is not captured by static pooling models: a firm choosing a technology by comparing single-period profits misjudges it in both directions, depending on the margin. The comparison at the break-even cost is the cleanest available measurement of the information value of a capacity structure under censored demand.

The paper proves Proposition 1 by computing closed forms of all the value functions and then certifying a polynomial inequality over a semialgebraic parameter set with sum-of-squares methods (p. A8). No machine-checked proof exists. A formalization would replace a computer-algebra certificate whose details are not printed with a checked argument, and would fix the value-function closed forms (milestones 2–6), which the paper derives in a few lines each. The milestones are of independent use: Lemma 3 and the censored-sales posterior are standard in inventory learning models.

Difficulty

The value functions VNV_NVN​ and VF(cF)V_F(c_F)VF​(cF​) are suprema of first-period profit plus the expectation of a second-period value under a posterior that depends on whether each product stocked out. In the flexible system the capacity left for product 2 depends on product 1's realized demand, so the posterior of product 2 depends on product 1's demand, and the objective vFv_FvF​ splits into regimes with different formulas; it is not concave in general (the paper notes "optimization of non-concave functions", p. 12). The break-even cost is defined implicitly by an equation involving square roots, so the final comparison is between two functions of (p,c)(p, c)(p,c) along an implicit curve; the obvious approach of comparing closed forms branch by branch needs a sign certificate for a polynomial system rather than a one-line inequality.

Formalization scope

Everything is real-valued. The uniform prior is U−1U^{-1}U−1 times Lebesgue measure on [x,x+U][x, x+U][x,x+U]; the joint prior is the product measure. The stock-out posterior is Mathlib's conditional measure cond of the prior on {D≥q}\{D \ge q\}{D≥q}, an exact observation is a Dirac measure, and a demand is observed exactly iff it is strictly below the available capacity (p. 9). The joint posterior is the product of the per-product posteriors, which is exact because the observation is a product event given product 1's demand. All optima are real suprema of images over nonnegative capacities, never closed forms. The symmetric case of §3 is built in (p1=p2=pp_1 = p_2 = pp1​=p2​=p, common ccc, i.i.d. uniform demands), as is ξ=0\xi = 0ξ=0 (second-period demand equals first-period demand); at x=0x = 0x=0 the paper's noise U[−ξx,ξx]U[-\xi x, \xi x]U[−ξx,ξx] is zero for every ξ\xiξ, so the goal loses nothing. Added hypotheses, disclosed in each statement: U>0U > 0U>0, 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p, c≤cF<pc \le c_F < pc≤cF​<p, and in the goal 0<ζ<10 < \zeta < 10<ζ<1.

The values must not be defined by their closed forms or by the paper's case split j=1,2,3j = 1, 2, 3j=1,2,3; that would make the goal a statement about polynomials rather than about the Bellman problems.

A complete development needs: integrals of piecewise-linear functions against uniform laws and their products, conditional uniform laws, measurability of the posterior-dependent second-period value, and a sign certificate for the final polynomial comparison. The newsvendor and censored-posterior lemmas are reusable in other inventory-learning models. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, on alternative proofs of the final comparison, and on the regime j=3j = 3j=3 of the flexible objective, which the milestones do not cover.

Selected references

  • J. Chod, M. G. Markakis, N. Trichakis, On the Learning Benefits of Resource Flexibility, SSRN preprint 3212177 (December 6, 2019); published in Management Science, 2021. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3212177, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3795
  • C. H. Fine, R. M. Freund, Optimal Investment in Product-Flexible Manufacturing Capacity, Management Science 36(4), 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.4.449
  • J. A. Van Mieghem, Investment Strategies for Flexible Resources, Management Science 44(8), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1071
  • P. A. Parrilo, Semidefinite programming relaxations for semialgebraic problems, Mathematical Programming 96, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0387-5
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Machine LearningOptimizationReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Neural Temporal-Difference and Q-Learning Provably Converge to Global Optima: Neural TD with Stochastic Semigradients Converges to the Global Optimum of the MSPBE at Rate 1/√TResearch Paper

Why neural temporal-difference learning needs a convergence theory

Temporal-difference (TD) learning estimates the value of a policy in a Markov decision process from sampled transitions, by repeatedly moving a parametrized value function towards a one-step bootstrapped target (Sutton, 1988). With a linear parametrization its behaviour is well understood: TD converges to the fixed point of the projected Bellman equation (Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997), with finite-sample rates for projected and stochastic variants (Bhandari, Russo and Singal, 2018). With a nonlinear parametrization the same update can diverge: Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1997) give an example, and the TD direction is not the gradient of any objective. Deep reinforcement learning nonetheless runs TD with neural networks as a matter of course.

Cai, Yang, Lee and Wang (arXiv:1905.10027v2, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) prove that TD with an overparametrized two-layer ReLU network, projected onto a ball around its random initialization, converges at rate T−1/2T^{-1/2}T−1/2 to the global optimum of the mean-squared projected Bellman error (MSPBE) over a function class that becomes richer as the width grows. This mission formalizes that theorem for the stochastic-semigradient algorithm (Theorem 4.6 of the paper).

Setting

Transitions are tuples (x,r,x′)(x, r, x')(x,r,x′) drawn i.i.d. from a sampling law μ\muμ: x,x′∈Rdx, x' \in \mathbb R^dx,x′∈Rd are feature vectors of the current and next state–action pair, with ∥x∥2=∥x′∥2=1\|x\|_2 = \|x'\|_2 = 1∥x∥2​=∥x′∥2​=1, the reward satisfies ∣r∣≤rˉ|r| \le \bar r∣r∣≤rˉ, and xxx and x′x'x′ have the same distribution (they are drawn from the stationary distribution of the policy). The discount factor is 0≤γ<10 \le \gamma < 10≤γ<1 and d≥3d \ge 3d≥3.

The value function is the two-layer network

Q^(x;W)=1m∑r=1mbr σ(Wr⊤x),σ(y)=max⁡{0,y},\widehat Q(x; W) = \frac{1}{\sqrt m}\sum_{r=1}^m b_r\,\sigma(W_r^\top x), \qquad \sigma(y) = \max\{0, y\},Q​(x;W)=m​1​r=1∑m​br​σ(Wr⊤​x),σ(y)=max{0,y},

of width mmm, with hidden weights W=(W1,…,Wm)∈RmdW = (W_1, \dots, W_m) \in \mathbb R^{md}W=(W1​,…,Wm​)∈Rmd and output weights b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm. At initialization br∼Unif{−1,1}b_r \sim \mathrm{Unif}\{-1, 1\}br​∼Unif{−1,1} and Wr(0)∼N(0,Id/d)W_r(0) \sim N(0, I_d/d)Wr​(0)∼N(0,Id​/d), all independent; only WWW is trained. The training set is the ball SB={W:∥W−W(0)∥2≤B}S_B = \{W : \|W - W(0)\|_2 \le B\}SB​={W:∥W−W(0)∥2​≤B}.

Algorithm 1 (neural TD) samples a tuple at each step t=0,…,T−2t = 0, \dots, T-2t=0,…,T−2, forms the Bellman residual δ=Q^(x;W(t))−r−γQ^(x′;W(t))\delta = \widehat Q(x; W(t)) - r - \gamma \widehat Q(x'; W(t))δ=Q​(x;W(t))−r−γQ​(x′;W(t)), takes the semigradient step W(t)−η δ ∇WQ^(x;W(t))W(t) - \eta\,\delta\,\nabla_W \widehat Q(x; W(t))W(t)−ηδ∇W​Q​(x;W(t)), projects it onto SBS_BSB​, and outputs Q^out=Q^(⋅ ;W‾)\widehat Q_{\mathrm{out}} = \widehat Q(\cdot\,; \overline W)Q​out​=Q​(⋅;W) with W‾=1T∑t=0T−1W(t)\overline W = \frac1T \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} W(t)W=T1​∑t=0T−1​W(t).

The linearization of the network at initialization is

Q^0(x;W)=1m∑r=1mbr 1{Wr(0)⊤x>0} Wr⊤x,\widehat Q_0(x; W) = \frac{1}{\sqrt m}\sum_{r=1}^m b_r\,\mathbb 1\{W_r(0)^\top x > 0\}\, W_r^\top x,Q​0​(x;W)=m​1​r=1∑m​br​1{Wr​(0)⊤x>0}Wr⊤​x,

a linear function of WWW with random features. Writing δ0\delta_0δ0​ for the Bellman residual of Q^0\widehat Q_0Q​0​, an approximate stationary point is a W∗∈SBW^* \in S_BW∗∈SB​ with

Eμ[δ0(x,r,x′;W∗) ∇WQ^0(x;W∗)]⊤(W−W∗)≥0for all W∈SB.\mathbb E_\mu\big[\delta_0(x, r, x'; W^*)\,\nabla_W \widehat Q_0(x; W^*)\big]^\top (W - W^*) \ge 0 \quad \text{for all } W \in S_B .Eμ​[δ0​(x,r,x′;W∗)∇W​Q​0​(x;W∗)]⊤(W−W∗)≥0for all W∈SB​.

The function Q^0(⋅ ;W∗)\widehat Q_0(\cdot\,; W^*)Q​0​(⋅;W∗) solves the projected Bellman equation over the class FB,m={Q^0(⋅ ;W):W∈SB}\mathcal F_{B,m} = \{\widehat Q_0(\cdot\,; W) : W \in S_B\}FB,m​={Q​0​(⋅;W):W∈SB​}. The regularity condition (Assumption 4.3) asks for c0>0c_0 > 0c0​>0 with μ(∣w⊤x∣≤τ)≤c0τ\mu(|w^\top x| \le \tau) \le c_0 \tauμ(∣w⊤x∣≤τ)≤c0​τ for every unit vector www and every τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.6

With η=min⁡{(1−γ)/8, 1/T}\eta = \min\{(1-\gamma)/8,\ 1/\sqrt T\}η=min{(1−γ)/8, 1/T​} and under Assumption 4.3, there is a constant C=C(c0,d,rˉ,γ)C = C(c_0, d, \bar r, \gamma)C=C(c0​,d,rˉ,γ) such that for all m≥1m \ge 1m≥1, B≥1B \ge 1B≥1, T≥1T \ge 1T≥1 and every approximate stationary point W∗W^*W∗,

Einit,μ[(Q^out(x)−Q^0(x;W∗))2]≤16 (B2+σg2)(1−γ)2T+C(B3m−1/2+B5/2m−1/4),\mathbb E_{\mathrm{init},\mu}\Big[\big(\widehat Q_{\mathrm{out}}(x) - \widehat Q_0(x; W^*)\big)^2\Big] \le \frac{16\,(B^2 + \sigma_g^2)}{(1-\gamma)^2\sqrt T} + C\big(B^3 m^{-1/2} + B^{5/2} m^{-1/4}\big),Einit,μ​[(Q​out​(x)−Q​0​(x;W∗))2]≤(1−γ)2T​16(B2+σg2​)​+C(B3m−1/2+B5/2m−1/4),

where σg2=12+12B2+3rˉ2\sigma_g^2 = 12 + 12B^2 + 3\bar r^2σg2​=12+12B2+3rˉ2 and the expectation is over the initialization, the samples of the run and a fresh x∼μx \sim \mux∼μ.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4.2: approximate stationary points exist for every initialization; Q^0(⋅ ;W∗)\widehat Q_0(\cdot\,; W^*)Q​0​(⋅;W∗) is unique μ\muμ-a.e. and is the MSPBE optimum over FB,m\mathcal F_{B,m}FB,m​.
  2. Lemmas H.1, H.2: the expected fraction of hidden units whose activation can flip inside SBS_BSB​ is O(Bm−1/2)O(B m^{-1/2})O(Bm−1/2), alone and weighted by Eμ[Q^(x;W(0))2]\mathbb E_\mu[\widehat Q(x; W(0))^2]Eμ​[Q​(x;W(0))2].
  3. Lemmas 5.1, 5.2: the network and its population semigradient stay within O(B3m−1/2)O(B^3 m^{-1/2})O(B3m−1/2) (in mean square) of their linearizations, for every random parameter in SBS_BSB​.
  4. Lemma 4.5: the stochastic semigradient has variance at most σg2\sigma_g^2σg2​.
  5. (C.16): the linearized population semigradient is monotone with modulus 1−γ1-\gamma1−γ in the μ\muμ-norm.
  6. Lemma 5.4: the stochastic descent inequality for E∥W(t)−W∗∥22\mathbb E\|W(t) - W^*\|_2^2E∥W(t)−W∗∥22​.

Significance

The theorem gives a non-asymptotic guarantee for TD with a nonlinear function class, a setting in which the algorithm can diverge without further structure. The limit object Q^0(⋅ ;W∗)\widehat Q_0(\cdot\,; W^*)Q​0​(⋅;W∗) is a projected Bellman fixed point over a class that, as m→∞m \to \inftym→∞, approaches a ball in the reproducing kernel Hilbert space of the neural tangent kernel; the paper uses this to bound the distance to the true value function QπQ^\piQπ (Proposition 4.7) and to analyze neural Q-learning and policy gradient methods (Section 6). The argument is an instance of the "lazy training" or neural-tangent-kernel regime, in which an overparametrized network trained from a random initialization stays close to its linearization.

The result is proved in the paper and, to our knowledge, has no machine-checked proof. A formalization would also produce reusable components: Gaussian anti-concentration of random ReLU activation patterns (Lemmas H.1–H.2), the linearization error of wide two-layer networks (Lemma 5.1), and a projected stochastic-approximation template with averaged iterates. The appendix proofs are short and pass over several measure-theoretic steps (conditioning on the current iterate, independence of the samples from the initialization, Jensen for the averaged iterate), which a formal proof has to supply.

Difficulty

The TD update is not a gradient, so the convergence proof cannot be a descent argument on an objective. The paper's route is to compare the update with that of the linear TD problem defined by Q^0\widehat Q_0Q​0​, whose population semigradient is monotone, and to control the difference by overparametrization. The obvious first approach, linearizing the network in a deterministic neighbourhood of W(0)W(0)W(0), fails: the ReLU activation pattern 1{Wr⊤x>0}\mathbb 1\{W_r^\top x > 0\}1{Wr⊤​x>0} can change for some units whatever mmm is. The comparison holds only in expectation over the random initialization and a fresh input, through Assumption 4.3 and the finiteness of E ∥w∥2−2\mathbb E\,\|w\|_2^{-2}E∥w∥2−2​ for w∼N(0,Id/d)w \sim N(0, I_d/d)w∼N(0,Id​/d), which is where d≥3d \ge 3d≥3 enters. The iterates and W∗W^*W∗ depend on the initialization, so these bounds are needed for random parameters that are correlated with W(0)W(0)W(0) but independent of the evaluation point.

Formalization scope

Lean represents points as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and parameters as PiLp 2 over Fin m, so all norms on Rmd\mathbb R^{md}Rmd are ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​. The MDP, the policy and the feature map are not modelled; the statements see only the sampling law μ\muμ on tuples (x,r,x′)(x, r, x')(x,r,x′) with the properties listed above. The run's samples form an N\mathbb NN-indexed i.i.d. sequence (product measure) independent of the initialization, and the evaluation tuple is a fresh draw. Expectations of nonnegative quantities are lower Lebesgue integrals, so non-integrability cannot make a bound hold vacuously. The ReLU semigradient uses the strict convention 1{Wr⊤x>0}\mathbb 1\{W_r^\top x > 0\}1{Wr⊤​x>0} and keeps the factor m−1/2m^{-1/2}m−1/2 of (3.2).

Conventions and readings fixed by the formalization, all disclosed in the item statements:

  • the paper's "σg2=O(B2)\sigma_g^2 = O(B^2)σg2​=O(B2)" is pinned to the value 12+12B2+3rˉ212 + 12B^2 + 3\bar r^212+12B2+3rˉ2 produced by its proof;
  • the paper's O(B3m−1/2+B5/2m−1/4)O(B^3 m^{-1/2} + B^{5/2} m^{-1/4})O(B3m−1/2+B5/2m−1/4) is a constant CCC depending only on (c0,d,rˉ,γ)(c_0, d, \bar r, \gamma)(c0​,d,rˉ,γ) and chosen before mmm, BBB, TTT, μ\muμ and W∗W^*W∗, with B≥1B \ge 1B≥1 so that lower powers of BBB are absorbed;
  • approximate stationary points are required to lie in SBS_BSB​, as the proof uses;
  • Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 are posed for every random parameter in SBS_BSB​ (the paper's proofs need nothing else and apply them to W‾\overline WW);
  • Lemma 5.4 carries the coefficient 4ηB4\eta B4ηB, which is what its proof establishes (∥W(t)−W∗∥2≤2B\|W(t) - W^*\|_2 \le 2B∥W(t)−W∗∥2​≤2B), in place of the printed 2ηB2\eta B2ηB.

A formalization in which the comparison point W∗W^*W∗ may lie outside SBS_BSB​, the expectation is a Bochner integral of a possibly non-integrable function, or the constant CCC may depend on mmm, TTT or μ\muμ, would not express the theorem and is excluded. Approximate stationary points are compared through Q^0(⋅ ;W∗)\widehat Q_0(\cdot\,; W^*)Q​0​(⋅;W∗), never through Q^(⋅ ;W∗)\widehat Q(\cdot\,; W^*)Q​(⋅;W∗).

A complete development needs Gaussian measures on Rd\mathbb R^dRd with the integrability of ∥w∥2−2\|w\|_2^{-2}∥w∥2−2​ for d≥3d \ge 3d≥3, product and infinite-product probability measures with conditioning on the past of a sequence, existence of solutions to variational inequalities on compact convex sets, and nonexpansiveness of Euclidean projection onto a ball. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently; Lemmas H.1, 5.1 and (C.16) are self-contained.

Selected references

  • Q. Cai, Z. Yang, J. D. Lee, Z. Wang, Neural temporal-difference and Q-learning provably converge to global optima, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024; arXiv:1905.10027v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.10027
  • R. S. Sutton, Learning to predict by the methods of temporal differences, Machine Learning 3, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00115009
  • J. N. Tsitsiklis, B. Van Roy, An analysis of temporal-difference learning with function approximation, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 42(5), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1109/9.580874
  • J. Bhandari, D. Russo, R. Singal, A finite time analysis of temporal difference learning with linear function approximation, COLT 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.02450
  • A. Jacot, F. Gabriel, C. Hongler, Neural tangent kernel: convergence and generalization in neural networks, NeurIPS 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.07572
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Surge Pricing and Its Spatial Supply Response: Within an Attraction Region, Supply Fills the Congestion Bound Outward from the Sink at Locally Optimal Prices Without Loss of RevenueResearch Paper

Spatial pricing on ride-hailing platforms

Ride-hailing platforms change prices by location in real time, and drivers respond by moving. A price increase at one location changes where drivers go, how congested each location becomes, and therefore what every driver earns everywhere else. Besbes, Castro and Lobel, Surge Pricing and its Spatial Supply Response (SSRN 3124571, version of May 17, 2019; later published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3622), model this as a platform choosing prices over a continuous two-dimensional city, with non-atomic drivers who then relocate in equilibrium. Earlier work on ride-hailing pricing took space into account only in reduced form (e.g. Castillo, Knoepfle and Weyl, EC 2017) or on a finite network (Bimpikis, Candogan and Saban, Operations Research 2019). The platform's problem in this model is an infinite-dimensional optimization problem with equilibrium constraints. The paper's main result, the goal of this mission, characterizes optimal prices and supply locally, inside the regions drivers move into.

This mission formalizes that result from the SSRN preprint of May 17, 2019. Its online appendix contains the proofs, and every page and label cited here refers to it.

Setting

The city C⊆R2\mathcal C\subseteq\mathbb R^2C⊆R2 is convex and compact. It carries a finite city measure Γ\GammaΓ, a finite potential demand measure Λ\LambdaΛ and a finite initial supply measure Θ\ThetaΘ, all concentrated on C\mathcal CC, with Λ,Θ≪Γ\Lambda,\Theta\ll\GammaΛ,Θ≪Γ. The demand density is λ=dΛ/dΓ\lambda=d\Lambda/d\Gammaλ=dΛ/dΓ, which is positive Γ\GammaΓ-a.e. At location yyy the riders' willingness to pay has CDF FyF_yFy​, strictly increasing on its support [0,Vˉ][0,\bar V][0,Vˉ], with Fˉy=1−Fy\bar F_y=1-F_yFˉy​=1−Fy​ and a continuous, unimodal revenue curve q↦qFˉy(q)q\mapsto q\bar F_y(q)q↦qFˉy​(q). The driver receives a fraction α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1) of each fare.

The platform chooses a measurable price mapping p:C→[0,Vˉ]p:\mathcal C\to[0,\bar V]p:C→[0,Vˉ]. Drivers relocate according to a flow T\mathcal TT, a measure on C×C\mathcal C\times\mathcal CC×C with first marginal Θ\ThetaΘ and second marginal T2≪Γ\mathcal T_2\ll\GammaT2​≪Γ. The post-relocation supply is sT=dT2/dΓs^{\mathcal T}=d\mathcal T_2/d\GammasT=dT2​/dΓ. A driver who ends at yyy is matched with probability R=min⁡{1,λ(y)Fˉy(p(y))/sT(y)}R=\min\{1,\lambda(y)\bar F_y(p(y))/s^{\mathcal T}(y)\}R=min{1,λ(y)Fˉy​(p(y))/sT(y)} (with conventions at zero supply), earns U(y,p(y),sT(y))=α p(y) RU(y,p(y),s^{\mathcal T}(y))=\alpha\,p(y)\,RU(y,p(y),sT(y))=αp(y)R, and pays travel cost ∥y−x∥\|y-x\|∥y−x∥ when coming from xxx. The best utility available from xxx is the Γ\GammaΓ-essential supremum

V(x∣p,T)=ess sup⁡y∈C(U(y,p(y),sT(y))−∥y−x∥).V(x\mid p,\mathcal T)=\operatorname*{ess\,sup}_{y\in\mathcal C}\big(U(y,p(y),s^{\mathcal T}(y))-\|y-x\|\big).V(x∣p,T)=y∈Cesssup​(U(y,p(y),sT(y))−∥y−x∥).

T\mathcal TT is a supply equilibrium if almost every driver goes to a destination attaining this value. Problem (P2) maximizes γ∫CV(x∣p,T) sT(x) dΓ(x)\gamma\int_{\mathcal C}V(x\mid p,\mathcal T)\,s^{\mathcal T}(x)\,d\Gamma(x)γ∫C​V(x∣p,T)sT(x)dΓ(x), with γ=(1−α)/α\gamma=(1-\alpha)/\alphaγ=(1−α)/α, over price–equilibrium pairs; the paper shows (P2) is equivalent to maximizing platform revenue.

A single location run as a capacitated monopoly with supply sss has revenue Rxloc(s)=max⁡q∈[0,Vˉ]qmin⁡{s,λ(x)Fˉx(q)}R^{loc}_x(s)=\max_{q\in[0,\bar V]}q\min\{s,\lambda(x)\bar F_x(q)\}Rxloc​(s)=maxq∈[0,Vˉ]​qmin{s,λ(x)Fˉx​(q)} and optimal price ρxloc(s)\rho^{loc}_x(s)ρxloc​(s). The congestion function ψx(s)=αRxloc(s)/s\psi_x(s)=\alpha R^{loc}_x(s)/sψx​(s)=αRxloc​(s)/s, with ψx(0)=αVˉ\psi_x(0)=\alpha\bar Vψx​(0)=αVˉ, is the utility per driver at that location. The indifference region of xxx is IR(x)={y∈C:V(y)−∥y−x∥=V(x)}\mathcal{IR}(x)=\{y\in\mathcal C:V(y)-\|y-x\|=V(x)\}IR(x)={y∈C:V(y)−∥y−x∥=V(x)}. The attraction region of zzz is A(z∣p,T)={x∈C:z∈IR(x)}A(z\mid p,\mathcal T)=\{x\in\mathcal C:z\in\mathcal{IR}(x)\}A(z∣p,T)={x∈C:z∈IR(x)}. The point zzz is a sink if A(z)≠∅A(z)\neq\emptysetA(z)=∅ and z∉A(z′)z\notin A(z')z∈/A(z′) for every z′≠zz'\neq zz′=z. Along each ray aaa from zzz, Xa(z∣p,T)X_a(z\mid p,\mathcal T)Xa​(z∣p,T) is the last point of A(z)A(z)A(z).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 18)

For every feasible (p,T)(p,\mathcal T)(p,T) of (P2) and every sink zzz, there are a feasible (p^,T^)(\hat p,\hat{\mathcal T})(p^​,T^) with at least the same (P2) value, points ra∈[z,Xa(z∣p,T)]r_a\in[z,X_a(z\mid p,\mathcal T)]ra​∈[z,Xa​(z∣p,T)] and numbers sa≥0s_a\ge0sa​≥0, such that on A(z∣p,T)A(z\mid p,\mathcal T)A(z∣p,T)

sT^(x)={ψx−1(V(z∣p,T)−∥x−z∥)x∈⋃a[z,ra),sax=ra,0otherwise,p^(x)={ρxloc(sT^(x))x∉⋃a{ra},pax=ra,s^{\hat{\mathcal T}}(x)=\begin{cases}\psi_x^{-1}\big(V(z\mid p,\mathcal T)-\|x-z\|\big)&x\in\bigcup_a[z,r_a),\\ s_a&x=r_a,\\0&\text{otherwise},\end{cases}\qquad \hat p(x)=\begin{cases}\rho^{loc}_x(s^{\hat{\mathcal T}}(x))&x\notin\bigcup_a\{r_a\},\\ p_a&x=r_a,\end{cases}sT^(x)=⎩⎨⎧​ψx−1​(V(z∣p,T)−∥x−z∥)sa​0​x∈⋃a​[z,ra​),x=ra​,otherwise,​p^​(x)={ρxloc​(sT^(x))pa​​x∈/⋃a​{ra​},x=ra​,​

where U(ra,pa,sa)=V(ra∣p,T)U(r_a,p_a,s_a)=V(r_a\mid p,\mathcal T)U(ra​,pa​,sa​)=V(ra​∣p,T).

Milestones

In order: Lemma 1 (p. 13, VBV_BVB​ is 1-Lipschitz); Lemma A-1 (bounds [−H,αVˉ][-H,\alpha\bar V][−H,αVˉ] on VBV_BVB​; V≥0V\ge0V≥0 on the support of Γ\GammaΓ); Lemma A-2 (equilibrium utilities); Lemma A-3 (ψx\psi_xψx​ strictly decreasing); Proposition 2 (p. 15, the congestion bound V(x)≤ψx(sT(x))V(x)\le\psi_x(s^{\mathcal T}(x))V(x)≤ψx​(sT(x)) Γ\GammaΓ-a.e.); Lemma B-2 (indifference propagates along segments); Lemma B-1 (attraction regions are closed unions of segments [z,Xa][z,X_a][z,Xa​]); Lemma B-3 (positive flow contains an indifferent pair); Proposition B-1 (flow separation at the endpoints and at the sink); Proposition B-2 (pasting a local equilibrium into an attraction region).

Significance

Theorem 1 shows that, within any attraction region, an optimal solution has a simple structure. Supply is filled ray by ray outward from the sink up to the congestion bound, and each location is priced as a local monopolist given its supply. It reduces the platform's infinite-dimensional problem with equilibrium constraints to a choice of one cutoff point per ray. In the paper it is an ingredient of the explicit global solution of the one-dimensional demand-shock family of §8 (Theorem 3).

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix C). None of it has been formalized. A formal proof would check a long measure-theoretic argument (Appendix C, about nine pages) that works with densities, essential suprema and a.e. statements throughout. The milestones are smaller results with short proofs, and are self-contained targets.

Difficulty

The goal is an existence statement over flows, so the new equilibrium T^\hat{\mathcal T}T^ must be constructed and its equilibrium property checked. Changing supply inside A(z)A(z)A(z) changes utilities at every location whose drivers could move there. The supply and prices therefore cannot be optimized pointwise and pasted back without controlling flows that cross the boundary of the region. Matching the drivers available in A(z)A(z)A(z) to the congestion bound along each ray must work for an arbitrary finite Γ\GammaΓ, which may have atoms or be concentrated on curves. Every density identity holds only Γ\GammaΓ-a.e., and the region boundaries ⋃a{Xa}\bigcup_a\{X_a\}⋃a​{Xa​} or ⋃a{ra}\bigcup_a\{r_a\}⋃a​{ra​} can carry positive measure.

Formalization scope

The plane is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin 2). The paper says "a norm", but the ray geometry of Appendix B needs a strictly convex one. Measures are measures on R2\mathbb R^2R2 concentrated on C\mathcal CC, and flows are measures on R2×R2\mathbb R^2\times\mathbb R^2R2×R2. Densities are Radon–Nikodym derivatives converted to reals, so every pointwise claim about sTs^{\mathcal T}sT, λ\lambdaλ or prices built from them is stated Γ\GammaΓ-a.e. VBV_BVB​ is the Mathlib essSup with respect to Γ∣B\Gamma|_BΓ∣B​; it is finite under the standing assumptions, so no boundedness hypothesis is added. Rays are indexed by unit vectors.

The standing assumptions of §3.1 are one hypothesis, Market.Standing, of every theorem. It contains: convex compact city; finite measures concentrated on it, with Λ,Θ≪Γ\Lambda,\Theta\ll\GammaΛ,Θ≪Γ; Vˉ>0\bar V>0Vˉ>0; 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1; FyF_yFy​ a CDF supported on [0,Vˉ][0,\bar V][0,Vˉ] and strictly increasing there; continuous, unimodal revenue; λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 Γ\GammaΓ-a.e.; joint measurability of (y,q)↦Fy(q)(y,q)\mapsto F_y(q)(y,q)↦Fy​(q). The last assumption and the CDF properties are implicit in the paper and are added openly. A sanity file shows that these assumptions hold for a one-point city.

In Theorem 1, ψx−1(v)\psi_x^{-1}(v)ψx−1​(v) is written as ψx(sT^(x))=v\psi_x(s^{\hat{\mathcal T}}(x))=vψx​(sT^(x))=v. The supply cases are read in the printed order at the sink. Prices ρxloc\rho^{loc}_xρxloc​ come from (5), so ρxloc(0)=Vˉ\rho^{loc}_x(0)=\bar Vρxloc​(0)=Vˉ. In Proposition B-1, the printed ⋃a[z,Xa\bigcup_a[z,X_a⋃a​[z,Xa​ is read as the half-open {z}∪⋃a[z,Xa)\{z\}\cup\bigcup_a[z,X_a){z}∪⋃a​[z,Xa​) used in its proof. Proposition B-2 adds Γ(A)>0\Gamma(A)>0Γ(A)>0, the precondition of Definition 3.

Two formalizations would make the goal trivial, and both are excluded. Dropping the equilibrium condition from feasibility would let any flow "dominate". Taking VVV as a pointwise supremum or sTs^{\mathcal T}sT as a free function would decouple the objective from the flow. Feasibility includes Definition 1, VVV is an essential supremum, and sTs^{\mathcal T}sT is the density of the flow.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, general lemmas on essential suprema of Lipschitz families, and general measure-theoretic results about finite planar measures and rays from a point, which can be reused outside this mission.

Selected references

  • O. Besbes, F. Castro, I. Lobel, Surge Pricing and its Spatial Supply Response, SSRN 3124571, version of May 17, 2019. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124571 (published: Management Science, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3622)
  • K. Bimpikis, O. Candogan, D. Saban, Spatial pricing in ride-sharing networks, Operations Research, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1800
  • J. C. Castillo, D. Knoepfle, G. Weyl, Surge pricing solves the wild goose chase, Proceedings of EC, 2017, pp. 241–242. https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085098
  • L. Ambrosio, A. Pratelli, Existence and stability results in the L¹ theory of optimal transportation, in Optimal Transportation and Applications, Springer LNM 1813, 2003, pp. 123–160. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-44857-0_5
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsLinear Optimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division: Algorithm 1 on the Slope-Rounded Instance Halts in Polynomially Many Iterations with an ε-Envy-Free SolutionResearch Paper

Fair rent division beyond quasilinear utilities

Housemates who share a house must decide who gets which room and how the total rent is split. A solution pairs an assignment of rooms to agents with a rent for each room, and it is envy-free if no agent prefers another room at that room's rent. Envy-free rent division is the textbook example of fair division with money and is the mathematical core of two-sided matching markets with transfers, where an envy-free solution is a competitive equilibrium.

For quasilinear utilities (a room's value minus its rent) envy-free solutions are computed by an assignment problem and a linear program (Aragones, 1995), and this method is in practical use. Real preferences are often not quasilinear: an agent may have a budget, or be less sensitive to rent at low prices. Existence of envy-free solutions for general continuous, decreasing utilities was established by Svensson (1983) and by Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991), whose perturbation lemma lowers the rents of an envy-free solution while keeping it envy-free. Alkan (1989) gave an algorithm that finds an equilibrium in finite time, with no polynomial bound. Arunachaleswaran, Barman and Rathi (arXiv:1807.04163; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022) give the first fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for continuous, decreasing piecewise-linear utilities. They also show that the exact problem lies in PPAD ∩ PLS.

Setting

There are nnn agents and nnn rooms. Agent aaa's utility for room rrr at rent x≥0x\ge0x≥0 is va(r,x)v_a(r,x)va​(r,x), given by a base value va(r,0)v_a(r,0)va​(r,0) (of either sign), break points 0=b1<b2<⋯<bt0=b_1<b_2<\dots<b_t0=b1​<b2​<⋯<bt​ and slope magnitudes λ1,…,λt>0\lambda_1,\dots,\lambda_t>0λ1​,…,λt​>0, so that va(r,⋅)v_a(r,\cdot)va​(r,⋅) is continuous, strictly decreasing and linear with slope −λi-\lambda_i−λi​ on [bi,bi+1][b_i,b_{i+1}][bi​,bi+1​] (the last piece is unbounded). The total number of pieces is ℓ\ellℓ, and β\betaβ bounds ∣log⁡λ∣|\log\lambda|∣logλ∣ over all slopes. A solution (π,p)(\pi,p)(π,p) is a bijection π\piπ from agents to rooms and a rent vector ppp. It is envy-free if va(π(a),pπ(a))≥va(r,pr)v_a(\pi(a),p_{\pi(a)})\ge v_a(r,p_r)va​(π(a),pπ(a)​)≥va​(r,pr​) for all a,ra,ra,r. For ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 it is ε\varepsilonε-EF (Definition 2) if every agent with nonnegative utility satisfies (1+ε) va(π(a),pπ(a))≥va(r,pr)(1+\varepsilon)\,v_a(\pi(a),p_{\pi(a)})\ge v_a(r,p_r)(1+ε)va​(π(a),pπ(a)​)≥va​(r,pr​) for all rrr, and every agent with negative utility satisfies va(π(a),pπ(a))≥(1+ε) va(r,pr)v_a(\pi(a),p_{\pi(a)})\ge(1+\varepsilon)\,v_a(r,p_r)va​(π(a),pπ(a)​)≥(1+ε)va​(r,pr​) for all rrr.

Algorithm 1 works on a modified instance I^\hat{\mathcal I}I^: above a threshold MMM with va(r,M)<va(r′,0)v_a(r,M)<v_a(r',0)va​(r,M)<va​(r′,0) for all a,r,r′a,r,r'a,r,r′, every utility is continued with slope 111 (equation (1)). It starts from any envy-free solution of I^\hat{\mathcal I}I^ with all rents at least MMM. While all rents are positive it (i) takes a maximum-weight perfect matching πi\pi^{i}πi of the first-choice graph at pi−1p^{i-1}pi−1, with the weight of edge (a,r)(a,r)(a,r) equal to log⁡\loglog of the current slope of va(r,⋅)v_a(r,\cdot)va​(r,⋅); (ii) sets pip^{i}pi to a minimum-total-rent solution of the linear program that keeps πi\pi^iπi envy-free, keeps the rents nonnegative, and keeps them inside the current linear domain (the box of rents between consecutive slope changes, Definition 1).

The approximation scheme rounds every slope up to a power of (1+ε)(1+\varepsilon)(1+ε), λˉ=(1+ε)⌈log⁡1+ελ⌉\bar\lambda=(1+\varepsilon)^{\lceil\log_{1+\varepsilon}\lambda\rceil}λˉ=(1+ε)⌈log1+ε​λ⌉. Each piece is replaced by two pieces of slopes λˉ/(1+ε)\bar\lambda/(1+\varepsilon)λˉ/(1+ε) and λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ that meet the original function at the piece's end points, after the zero of each utility has been made a break point. The resulting instance is Iˉ\bar{\mathcal I}Iˉ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 9, restated p. 18)

There is a constant ccc such that for every instance with n≥1n\ge1n≥1, every ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon\in(0,1)ε∈(0,1) and every admissible threshold MMM for Iˉ\bar{\mathcal I}Iˉ, Algorithm 1 run on Iˉ\bar{\mathcal I}Iˉ

  1. has a run that halts;
  2. halts in every run after at most
T≤c (n+ℓ+β+1/ε+1)cT\le c\,(n+\ell+\beta+1/\varepsilon+1)^cT≤c(n+ℓ+β+1/ε+1)c

iterations, whatever Step 2 solution, matchings and LP optima are chosen; 3. outputs rents pT≥0p^T\ge0pT≥0 such that (πT,pT)(\pi^T,p^T)(πT,pT) is an ε\varepsilonε-EF solution of the original instance.

The polynomial is left unspecified; the paper's proof gives a small explicit one, and any polynomial establishes the scheme.

Milestones

The proof has two halves. Theorem 1 (p. 9, proof pp. 13–14) is the same statement with "envy-free" in place of "ε\varepsilonε-EF" for any instance whose slopes are already powers of (1+ε)(1+\varepsilon)(1+ε). It rests on Lemma 16 (quasilinear envy-free allocations are the maximum-weight matchings), Lemma 18 (its multiplicative form), the perturbation Lemma 2, the run invariants Lemmas 3–5 and the per-domain count (3), ∣S∣≤6βn/ε|S|\le 6\beta n/\varepsilon∣S∣≤6βn/ε. Lemma 9 (p. 17) states that every envy-free solution of Iˉ\bar{\mathcal I}Iˉ with nonnegative rents is ε\varepsilonε-EF for the original instance, through Lemmas 6–8 on the rounded functions.

Significance

Theorem 2 gives an efficient algorithm for approximately fair rent division under general piecewise-linear utilities: budgets, rent-sensitive valuations and concave utilities. Exact envy-free solutions for this class are only known to lie in PPAD ∩ PLS. Because envy-free solutions are equilibria of unit-demand markets with money, the theorem also yields approximate equilibria for such markets with non-quasilinear utilities. Theorem 1 gives an exact polynomial algorithm whenever slopes are powers of (1+ε)(1+\varepsilon)(1+ε).

The result is proved in the paper. None of it has been machine-checked: there is no formal model of envy-free rent division, of the perturbation lemma, or of a price-descent algorithm of this kind in Mathlib or on the platform. A complete development would give a checked proof that a fair-division algorithm terminates within a polynomial number of iterations with a fairness guarantee.

Difficulty

Envy-freeness of the output is not the hard part: every iterate of Algorithm 1 is envy-free for I^\hat{\mathcal I}I^ by construction, and the rounding lemmas are elementary inequalities on single pieces. The difficulty is termination with a polynomial bound. Lowering rents by the perturbation lemma alone need not stop: Alkan gives an instance in which the perturbations do not converge. A bound has to control how many iterations the algorithm spends inside one linear domain and how many domains it visits. The first count fails for arbitrary slopes, where up to n!n!n! matchings of distinct weight can occur in one domain; the power-of-(1+ε)(1+\varepsilon)(1+ε) structure is what the rounding provides. The perturbation lemma is also needed in the form of Lemma 2, for every maximum-weight matching of the weighted first-choice graph, not only for one matching it produces. A formal proof must further show that each step can be carried out: the matching exists and each linear program attains its minimum.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. A utility is a base value and a list of (start, slope) pieces. Standing requires first start 000, strictly increasing starts and positive slopes. Agents and rooms are Fin n, allocations are Equiv.Perm (Fin n), rents are real. log⁡\loglog is the natural logarithm. β\betaβ bounds ∣log⁡λ∣|\log\lambda|∣logλ∣ and stands in for the bit complexity of the slopes. Base values may be negative.
  • The run. Algorithm 1 is a predicate on sequences (πi,pi)(\pi^i,p^i)(πi,pi). Every choice the pseudocode leaves open (the Step 2 solution, the maximum-weight matching, the LP optimum) is quantified universally in the bound and the output guarantee. Halting means some rent is ≤0\le0≤0. Only the number of while-iterations is bounded. The cost of one iteration (computing Iˉ\bar{\mathcal I}Iˉ and MMM, a matching, a linear program) and the bit length of the input are not formalized.
  • Conventions. Linear-domain boundaries are the break points where some slope actually changes, plus the rent 000. Below rent 000 (used only by Lemma 2, whose rents may be negative) each utility continues its first piece. The paper describes the rounding only for bounded pieces. The unbounded last piece is rounded down to slope λˉ/(1+ε)\bar\lambda/(1+\varepsilon)λˉ/(1+ε); after the zero split its utility is nonpositive, and this choice keeps Lemmas 6, 7 and 9 true. Lemmas 6 and 9 are stated for nonnegative rents, the paper's convention for solutions. Lemma 7 (d), (e) are stated on the open piece, because the printed closed-interval form fails at an end point equal to the zero of the utility. Lemma 4 and (3) assume the next iteration exists, which the page takes for granted. n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon\in(0,1)ε∈(0,1) are assumed where the paper assumes them.
  • Ruled out. The goal is about Algorithm 1 run on the explicitly constructed Iˉ\bar{\mathcal I}Iˉ. The bare existence of an ε\varepsilonε-EF solution (which follows from exact existence theorems) does not establish it, and the constant ccc is fixed before the instance.
  • Infrastructure. Piecewise-linear functions on lists of pieces, assignment duality for permutations (Lemmas 16 and 18) and existence of optima of linear programs over closed sets are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so are independent proofs of Lemma 16 from LP duality.

Selected references

  • E. R. Arunachaleswaran, S. Barman, N. Rathi, Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division, arXiv:1807.04163v1, 2018; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.04163
  • A. Alkan, G. Demange, D. Gale, Fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice, Econometrica 59(4):1023–1039, 1991 (reference [ADG91] of the paper above).
  • A. Alkan, Existence and computation of matching equilibria, European Journal of Political Economy, 1989 (reference [Alk89]).
  • E. Aragones, A derivation of the money Rawlsian solution, Social Choice and Welfare 12(3):267–276, 1995 (reference [Ara95]).
  • L.-G. Svensson, Large indivisibles: an analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness, Econometrica 51(4):939–954, 1983 (reference [Sve83]).
14 thms1 active userReviewed
Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Bounding the energy-constrained quantum and private capacities of phase-insensitive bosonic Gaussian channelsResearch Paper

Motivation

We establish several upper bounds on the energy-constrained quantum and private capacities of all single-mode phase-insensitive bosonic Gaussian channels. The first upper bound, which we call the "data-processing bound," is the simplest and is obtained by decomposing a phase-insensitive channel as a pure-loss channel followed by a quantum-limited amplifier channel. We prove that the data-processing bound can be at most 1.45 bits larger than a known lower bound on these capacities of the phase-insensitive Gaussian channel. We discuss another data-processing upper bound as well. Two other upper bounds, which we call the "ε\varepsilonε-degradable bound" and the "ε\varepsilonε-close-degradable bound," are established using the notion of approximate degradability along with energy constraints. We find a strong limitation on any potential superadditivity of the coherent information of any phase-insensitive Gaussian channel in the low-noise regime, as the data-processing bound is very near to a known lower bound in such cases. We also find improved achievable rates of private communication through bosonic thermal channels, by employing coding schemes that make use of displaced thermal states. We end by proving that an optimal Gaussian input state for the energy-constrained, generalized channel divergence of two particular Gaussian channels is the two-mode squeezed vacuum state that saturates the energy constraint. What remains open for several interesting channel divergences, such as the diamond norm or the Renyi channel divergence, is to determine whether, among all input states, a Gaussian state is optimal.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Bounding the energy-constrained quantum and private capacities of phase-insensitive bosonic Gaussian channels (arXiv:1708.07257v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

5 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 26: thermal gap bound (Theorem 26, PDF p. 34). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

51 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • Remark 3: Approximate-degradability implication for state-supremum half-diamond errors on arbitrary separable channel systems, with a certified conversion of the cited full-diamond constants. (hard)
  • Lemma 1: Bit-valued conditional entropy for finite first-system entropy, spectral Gibbs entropy envelope, and the cited energy-constrained half-trace-distance continuity result on separable systems. (hard)
  • Theorem 8: As printed the reference R has no entropy restriction. A product of an infinite-entropy state on R and a vacuum input makes BOTH joint entropies infinite, so their displayed difference is undefined. The proof suggests a telescoping conditional-entropy extension, but the source never defines that extension; adding finite H(R) or changing the conclusion silently would change the theorem. (source-ambiguity)
  • Lemma 2: Common admissible parameter sets, finite real optimization suprema and existing regularized limits for both channels, with the uniform all-positive-n absolute difference bound. (hard)
  • Remark 9: Independently defined constrained and unconstrained operational quantum/private capacities with all-large-positive-blocklength achievability. (hard)
  • Theorem 11: Uniform-energy quantum codes and their capacity, state-supremum half-diamond distance, fixed complement, and output Gibbs entropy envelope. (hard)
  • Theorem 12: Uniform-energy operational Q and optimized coherent information for the actually degradable comparison channel, with all-blocklength receiver-energy bounds. (hard)
  • Theorem 13: Finite-dimensional operational private capacity from normalized POVM private codes and a common environment state, plus an attained entropy maximum and fixed complement. (hard)
  • Theorem 14: Operational private capacity with messagewise energy/security and Gibbs entropy envelope on the identified complementary output. (hard)
  • Theorem 15: Operational private capacity and optimized coherent information for the comparison channel, retaining average ensemble energy. (hard)
  • Remark 17: Unconstrained thermal Q and the supremum/limit of the clipped finite-energy expression, with infinity at eta=1. (hard)
  • Theorem 16: Full Fock thermal CPTP receiver and uniform-energy operational quantum capacity. (hard)
  • Remark 18: Operational thermal quantum capacity positivity and its necessary parameter restriction, including zero energy. (hard)
  • Theorem 19: Actual two-mode purified thermal complement and opposite-phase splitter degrading map (5.20), with arbitrary-reference diamond distance. (hard)
  • Theorem 20: The derivation applies Theorem 11 to TWO environment output modes with total photon budget Wprime=(1-eta)NS+(1+eta)NB, but substitutes the ONE-mode entropy g(Wprime/delta). For the natural sum-number Gibbs observable the maximum entropy is 2g(Wprime/(2delta)), generally larger. The source supplies no alternative Gibbs observable justifying (5.42). Neither silently increasing the correction nor assuming a missing entropy bound states the printed result faithfully. (source-ambiguity)
  • Proposition 21: Actual thermal receiver/degrader, saturating thermal state, and attained optimization over every normalized finite-energy input. (hard)
  • Remark 22: The stated conditions omit Gaussian extremality. Phase-averaging need not preserve Gaussianity. Concavity and local-unitary invariance alone do not single out a thermal maximizer among all states, so no faithful general optimizer theorem follows from the supplied bullet list. (source-ambiguity)
  • Remark 24: High-energy TMS output-fidelity limit for full Fock thermal channels at common 0<=eta<1, and its derived half-diamond lower bound. (hard)
  • Theorem 23: Thermal/pure-loss full Fock CPTP receivers at both transmissivity endpoints and arbitrary-reference normalized-state diamond supremum. (hard)
  • Theorem 25: Operational thermal Q with uniform encoder energy and source close-degradable entropy correction. (hard)
  • Unnumbered asserted gap limit: The fixed-channel equality is false: at NB=0 the thermal channel is pure loss and the two scalar expressions agree for every NS, so Delta is identically zero. The source applies a large-argument entropy expansion to a symplectic occupation that stays bounded. The valid inequality of Theorem 26 is kept at the seed; no false saturation limit is assumed. (source-ambiguity)
  • Remark 28: Unconstrained thermal P and the clipped finite-energy supremum/limit, including the infinite eta=1 endpoint. (hard)
  • Theorem 27: Full Fock thermal receiver and messagewise-energy operational private capacity. (hard)
  • Theorem 29: Theorem 29 inherits the unresolved two-environment-mode Gibbs entropy substitution of Theorem 20: it uses g(Wprime/delta) where the cited general theorem with the sum-number observable gives 2g(Wprime/(2delta)). The intended smaller correction is not justified or specified by the source; retain this theorem as deferred rather than quietly enlarging its bound. (source-ambiguity)
  • Unnumbered displaced-thermal private rate: Displaced-thermal Borel ensemble, trace-norm barycenter, private information with average ensemble energy, and achievable private rates; Dirac displacement at s=NS. (hard)
  • Theorem 30: Operational thermal P with messagewise energy/security and source close-degradable entropy correction. (hard)
  • Theorem 31: Full Weyl-action adapter identifying a centered phase-insensitive CPTP channel and constructed amplifier-then-loss maps, including G=1. (hard)
  • Theorem 32: Noisy-amplifier Fock CPTP receiver and both operational energy-constrained capacities. (hard)
  • Remark 33: Both unconstrained amplifier capacities, scalar high-energy supremum/limit, and complete PLOB-bound comparison. (hard)
  • Remark 34: Operational amplifier Q positivity implication using (G-1)NB<1, without division by NB. (hard)
  • Theorem 36: Fixed purified amplifier complement and environment-port degrading squeezer (9.24), with arbitrary-reference half-diamond distance. (hard)
  • Theorem 37: Printed expression is false at the allowed edge NB=NS=0 and G>1: epsilon=0, zeta occupations are G-1 and 0, so as epsilonPrime decreases to zero its RHS tends to -g(G-1)<0 although capacity is zero. The first output entropy omits spontaneous photons G-1; the complementary photon budget also omits them. In addition the two-mode continuity correction has the unresolved issue of Theorem 20. No single silent transcription fix recovers the claimed formula. (source-ambiguity)
  • Theorem 38: Printed expression is false at the allowed edge NB=NS=0 and G>1: epsilon=0, zeta occupations are G-1 and 0, so as epsilonPrime decreases to zero its RHS tends to -g(G-1)<0 although capacity is zero. The first output entropy omits spontaneous photons G-1; the complementary photon budget also omits them. In addition the two-mode continuity correction has the unresolved issue of Theorem 20. No single silent transcription fix recovers the claimed formula. (source-ambiguity)
  • Theorem 39: Noisy/quantum-limited Fock amplifier CPTP receivers and arbitrary-reference normalized-state diamond distance. (hard)
  • Theorem 40: Operational amplifier Q and corrected common receiver photon budget G NS+(G-1)(NB+1); delta denominator 1+epsilonPrime. (hard)
  • Theorem 41: Operational amplifier P and corrected common receiver photon budget G NS+(G-1)(NB+1); delta denominator 1+epsilonPrime. (hard)
  • Remark 43: Additive-noise CPTP channel, both unconstrained operational capacities, and high-energy supremum/limit. (hard)
  • Remark 45: Operational additive-noise quantum/private capacities and the cited converse (nbar-1)/ln2+log2(1/nbar), including its strict comparison on 0<nbar<1. (hard)
  • Theorem 42: Additive-noise CPTP channel and both energy-constrained capacities, with the finite-energy bound. (hard)
  • Theorem 46: Thermal operational Q/P and physical amplifier-then-loss bottleneck with increased encoder energy G NS+G-1 and clipping. (hard)
  • Remark 47: Thermal operational Q/P positivity implication, including zero capacities in entanglement-breaking cases. (hard)
  • Remark 49: The statement uses unquantified low-noise/low-energy regimes and supplies no analytic boundary. Plots and qualitative comparisons cannot be registered as a universal parameter inequality without inventing a threshold. (source-ambiguity)
  • Remark 50: Additive-noise unconstrained Q/P and the clipped high-energy supremum of Theorem 48 for all 0<nbar<1. (hard)
  • Remark 51: The high-noise regime is not quantified and the printed U4 expression is unclipped, whereas an operational bound must be clipped at zero. Choosing an exact threshold or either version without qualification would assert more than the source specifies. (source-ambiguity)
  • Theorem 48: Additive-noise CPTP channel and both operational energy-constrained capacities with max(0,U4). (hard)
  • Lemma 4: Dimension-compatible generalized divergence on actual trace-class systems with data processing and cq direct sums, and the finite/discrete ensemble group-averaging inequality. (hard)
  • Lemma 5: The text extends the finite-group result “by approximation” while requiring only that D is Borel. Borel measurability permits integration but does not give the semicontinuity/continuous-ensemble direct-sum law needed to pass this inequality to a continuous barycenter. The source neither supplies that law nor specifies a divergence class for which the limiting argument is valid; do not silently replace Borel by lower semicontinuous or assume the desired inequality. (source-ambiguity)
  • Proposition 54: The full statement uses the unresolved continuous-ensemble step of Lemma 5 with only Borel regularity. Additionally the Gaussian-attainment argument on p.56 invokes that only thermal Gaussian states are number-diagonal, but phase averaging a Gaussian state need not stay Gaussian (e.g. coherent-state dephasing is Poisson). No general Gaussian-extremality property of an arbitrary D is supplied. Retain BOTH conclusions as the deferred target; do not replace it by only the diagonal-state reduction or assert an unproved Gaussian optimizer. (source-ambiguity)
  • Unnumbered Gaussian diamond and C-distance optimizers: Explicit main corollaries of the deferred Gaussian-attainment clause of Proposition 54; the source has not supplied the missing Gaussian-extremality/continuous-ensemble argument. Keep both target equalities and do not promote them to unrestricted diamond or C-distance optimizer statements. (source-ambiguity)
  • Unnumbered joint displacement-covariance reduction: Same unresolved Borel-versus-continuous-ensemble issue as Lemma 5. The displaced input is purified afresh, and exact energy is a consequence; it cannot be assumed on the original <=NS optimization domain. (source-ambiguity)
  • Unnumbered joint phase-covariance reduction: This explicitly claimed generalization uses the unresolved continuous-group approximation of Lemma 5. Record the <=NS constraint accurately; without a specified divergence regularity/continuous-ensemble law, the stated generality is not pinned down. (source-ambiguity)

Selected references

  • Bounding the energy-constrained quantum and private capacities of phase-insensitive bosonic Gaussian channels, arXiv:1708.07257v3, https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.07257v3
10 thms1 active userReviewed
Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Quantum privacy and quantum coherenceResearch Paper

Motivation

We derive a simple relation between a quantum channel's capacity to convey coherent (quantum) information and its usefulness for quantum cryptography.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Quantum privacy and quantum coherence (arXiv:quant-ph/9709058v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

3 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Fixed-strategy guaranteed privacy is bounded below by Bob information minus environment Holevo information (Equation (8): fixed-strategy guaranteed privacy lower bound, PDF p. 4). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

3 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • Main result, equation (12): optimal guaranteed privacy bounds coherent information: An independently specified operational per-use optimal guaranteed privacy over block strategies (source-ambiguity)
  • Equation (9): optimized privacy lower bound by the Holevo difference: An independently specified operational per-use optimal guaranteed privacy over block strategies (source-ambiguity)
  • Unnumbered consequence: positive coherent information permits secure private transmission: An independently specified operational per-use optimal guaranteed privacy over block strategies; also a quantitative meaning of securely (source-ambiguity)

Selected references

  • Quantum privacy and quantum coherence, arXiv:quant-ph/9709058v2, https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9709058v2
6 thms1 active userReviewed
Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Strong converse for the classical capacity of optical quantum communication channelsResearch Paper

Motivation

We establish the classical capacity of optical quantum channels as a sharp transition between two regimes---one which is an error-free regime for communication rates below the capacity, and the other in which the probability of correctly decoding a classical message converges exponentially fast to zero if the communication rate exceeds the classical capacity. This result is obtained by proving a strong converse theorem for the classical capacity of all phase-insensitive bosonic Gaussian channels, a well-established model of optical quantum communication channels, such as lossy optical fibers, amplifier and free-space communication. The theorem holds under a particular photon-number occupation constraint, which we describe in detail in the paper. Our result bolsters the understanding of the classical capacity of these channels and opens the path to applications, such as proving the security of noisy quantum storage models of cryptography with optical links.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Strong converse for the classical capacity of optical quantum communication channels (arXiv:1401.4161v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

5 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Operational strong converse above the optical classical-capacity threshold (Introduction and Corollary 1, PDF p. 2). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

1 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • Abstract: exponential decay: A valid unconditional exponential success-decay conclusion under only a vanishing occupation tail (source-ambiguity)

Selected references

  • Strong converse for the classical capacity of optical quantum communication channels, arXiv:1401.4161v3, https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.4161v3
11 thms1 active userReviewed
Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

A solution of the Gaussian optimizer conjectureResearch Paper

Motivation

The long-standing conjectures of the optimality of Gaussian inputs for Gaussian channel and Gaussian additivity are solved for a broad class of covariant or contravariant Bosonic Gaussian channels (which includes in particular thermal, additive classical noise, and amplifier channels) restricting to the class of states with finite second moments. We show that the vacuum is the input state which minimizes the entropy at the output of such channels. This allows us to show also that the classical capacity of these channels (under the input energy constraint) is additive and is achieved by Gaussian encodings.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of A solution of the Gaussian optimizer conjecture (arXiv:1312.2251v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

16 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Main result: vacuum optimizer and unconditional Gaussian minimum-output additivity (Main result: vacuum optimizer and unconditional Gaussian minimum-output additivity, PDF p. 1). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

6 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • §3: additivity consequences for contravariant channels: General positive quadratic bosonic Hamiltonian and S2-restricted constrained chi capacity with additive block energy, retaining (23) as well as (20)-(21) (hard)
  • §4: additive energy-constrained capacity, Gaussian encoding and finite-dimensional formula: Independent energy-constrained classical block-code capacity on the common coefficient State model, its regularized-chi bridge, and actual Gaussian coherent encoding attainment (hard)
  • §7: thermal-noise entropy minimum and capacity: Independent energy-constrained classical block-code capacity on the common coefficient State model, its regularized-chi bridge, and actual Gaussian coherent encoding attainment (hard)
  • §7: additive classical-noise entropy minimum and capacity: Independent energy-constrained classical block-code capacity on the common coefficient State model, its regularized-chi bridge, and actual Gaussian coherent encoding attainment (hard)
  • §7: noisy-amplifier entropy minimum and capacity: Independent energy-constrained classical block-code capacity on the common coefficient State model, its regularized-chi bridge, and actual Gaussian coherent encoding attainment (hard)
  • §7: claimed extension to all one-mode BGCs via squeezing: Correct domain or infimum/attainment correction for the universal one-mode squeezed-vacuum optimizer claim, including B1 rank-one additive noise (source-ambiguity)

Selected references

  • A solution of the Gaussian optimizer conjecture, arXiv:1312.2251v2, https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2251v2
21 thms1 active userReviewed
Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Ultimate communication capacity of quantum optical channels by solving the Gaussian minimum-entropy conjectureResearch Paper

Motivation

Optical channels, such as fibers or free-space links, are ubiquitous in today's telecommunication networks. They rely on the electromagnetic field associated with photons to carry information from one point to another in space. As a result, a complete physical model of these channels must necessarily take quantum effects into account in order to determine their ultimate performances. Specifically, Gaussian photonic (or bosonic) quantum channels have been extensively studied over the past decades given their importance for practical purposes. In spite of this, a longstanding conjecture on the optimality of Gaussian encodings has yet prevented finding their communication capacity. Here, this conjecture is solved by proving that the vacuum state achieves the minimum output entropy of a generic Gaussian bosonic channel. This establishes the ultimate achievable bit rate under an energy constraint, as well as the long awaited proof that the single-letter classical capacity of these channels is additive. Beyond capacities, it also has broad consequences in quantum information sciences.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Ultimate communication capacity of quantum optical channels by solving the Gaussian minimum-entropy conjecture (arXiv:1312.6225v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

15 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Finite-energy Gaussian minimum output entropy (Eq. (2), PDF p. 2). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Selected references

  • Ultimate communication capacity of quantum optical channels by solving the Gaussian minimum-entropy conjecture, arXiv:1312.6225v1, https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6225v1
25 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Experimenting in Equilibrium: Local Experimentation Consistently Estimates the Equilibrium Utility Gradient in the Mean-Field LimitResearch Paper

Motivation

Online marketplaces (ride-sharing, delivery, freelance labour) set payments for their suppliers and want to know how a change in payment would change the platform's utility. The standard tool, a randomized A/B test, is biased in a marketplace: treated and control suppliers compete for the same demand, so a payment increase given to the treatment group draws business away from the control group. This interference violates the no-interference assumption of classical causal inference (Hudgens and Halloran, 2008), and it was documented on a large platform by Blake and Coey (2014). Global experimentation, changing the payment for everyone and comparing days, avoids interference but is slow and costly.

Wager and Xu (2021) propose local experimentation: give every supplier a small, symmetric, random payment perturbation, measure how participation responds to one's own perturbation, and correct for the equilibrium feedback using a model of how demand is matched to suppliers. The perturbations are symmetric, so they do not move the market equilibrium at first order. The paper shows that in a large market this recovers the gradient of the platform's equilibrium utility. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 6 of the paper, together with the lemmas on which its proof rests.

Setting

Everything is conditional on a global state A=aA = aA=a (weather, holidays), which is dropped from the notation. In the nnn-th system there are nnn potential suppliers and a random demand D∼F(n)D \sim F^{(n)}D∼F(n) on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with E[D/n]=d>0\mathbb E[D/n] = d > 0E[D/n]=d>0, E[(D/n−d)2]→0\mathbb E[(D/n - d)^2] \to 0E[(D/n−d)2]→0 and P(D/n∉[d/2,2d])=o(1/n)\mathbb P(D/n \notin [d/2, 2d]) = o(1/n)P(D/n∈/[d/2,2d])=o(1/n).

Matching. If ttt suppliers are active and demand is ddd, each active supplier serves on average Ω(d,t)\Omega(d,t)Ω(d,t) units. Ω\OmegaΩ is non-decreasing in ddd, non-increasing in ttt, and Ω(d,t)=ω(d/t)+l(d,t)\Omega(d,t) = \omega(d/t) + l(d,t)Ω(d,t)=ω(d/t)+l(d,t), where the error l≥0l \ge 0l≥0 is bounded and o(1/t+1/d)o(1/\sqrt t + 1/\sqrt d)o(1/t​+1/d​), and ω\omegaω is a regular allocation function: ω:R+→[0,1]\omega : \mathbb R_+ \to [0,1]ω:R+​→[0,1] is smooth, concave, non-decreasing, ω(0+)=0\omega(0^+) = 0ω(0+)=0, lim⁡x→∞ω(x)≤1\lim_{x\to\infty}\omega(x) \le 1limx→∞​ω(x)≤1, ω′(0+)≤1\omega'(0^+) \le 1ω′(0+)≤1.

Choice. Supplier iii has a private feature Bi∼βB_i \sim \betaBi​∼β and is paid PiP_iPi​ per unit served. Given its expected revenue xxx, it becomes active (Zi=1Z_i = 1Zi​=1) with probability fBi(x)f_{B_i}(x)fBi​​(x), where each choice function fbf_bfb​ is [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued, non-decreasing and twice differentiable with uniformly bounded second derivative.

Equilibrium. With X∼Binomial(n,μ)X \sim \mathrm{Binomial}(n,\mu)X∼Binomial(n,μ) independent of DDD, let q(n)(μ)=E[Ω(D,X)]q^{(n)}(\mu) = \mathbb E[\Omega(D,X)]q(n)(μ)=E[Ω(D,X)]. Under a payment law π\piπ, the equilibrium supply fraction μ(n)(π)\mu^{(n)}(\pi)μ(n)(π) solves the balance equation

μ=E[fB(P q(n)(μ))],B∼β, P∼π.\mu = \mathbb E\bigl[f_{B}\bigl(P\,q^{(n)}(\mu)\bigr)\bigr],\qquad B \sim \beta,\ P \sim \pi.μ=E[fB​(Pq(n)(μ))],B∼β, P∼π.

At a fixed payment ppp, μ(n)(p)=μ(n)(δp)\mu^{(n)}(p) = \mu^{(n)}(\delta_p)μ(n)(p)=μ(n)(δp​). The mean-field supply μ(p)\mu(p)μ(p) solves μ=E[fB(p ω(d/μ))]\mu = \mathbb E[f_B(p\,\omega(d/\mu))]μ=E[fB​(pω(d/μ))], and the mean-field platform utility is

u(p)=(r(d/μ(p))−p ω(d/μ(p))) μ(p),u(p) = \bigl(r(d/\mu(p)) - p\,\omega(d/\mu(p))\bigr)\,\mu(p),u(p)=(r(d/μ(p))−pω(d/μ(p)))μ(p),

with rrr the limiting revenue per unit of supply. The marginal response is Δ(p)=ω(d/μ(p)) E[fB′(p ω(d/μ(p)))]\Delta(p) = \omega(d/\mu(p))\,\mathbb E[f_B'(p\,\omega(d/\mu(p)))]Δ(p)=ω(d/μ(p))E[fB′​(pω(d/μ(p)))], and Δ(n)(p)\Delta^{(n)}(p)Δ(n)(p) is its pre-limit analogue.

The experiment. Payments are Pi=p+ζnεiP_i = p + \zeta_n\varepsilon_iPi​=p+ζn​εi​ with independent signs εi=±1\varepsilon_i = \pm 1εi​=±1. From Dˉ=D/n\bar D = D/nDˉ=D/n, Zˉ=1n∑iZi\bar Z = \frac1n\sum_i Z_iZˉ=n1​∑i​Zi​ and the regression slope

Δ^=ζn−1 ∑i(Zi−Zˉ)(εi−εˉ)∑i(εi−εˉ)2,\hat\Delta = \zeta_n^{-1}\,\frac{\sum_i (Z_i - \bar Z)(\varepsilon_i - \bar\varepsilon)}{\sum_i (\varepsilon_i - \bar\varepsilon)^2},Δ^=ζn−1​∑i​(εi​−εˉ)2∑i​(Zi​−Zˉ)(εi​−εˉ)​,

form Υ^=Δ^/(1+pDˉΔ^ ω′(Dˉ/Zˉ)/(Zˉ2ω(Dˉ/Zˉ)))\hat\Upsilon = \hat\Delta / \bigl(1 + p\bar D\hat\Delta\,\omega'(\bar D/\bar Z)/(\bar Z^2\omega(\bar D/\bar Z))\bigr)Υ^=Δ^/(1+pDˉΔ^ω′(Dˉ/Zˉ)/(Zˉ2ω(Dˉ/Zˉ))) and

Γ^=Υ^[r(Dˉ/Zˉ)−p ω(Dˉ/Zˉ)−(r′(Dˉ/Zˉ)−p ω′(Dˉ/Zˉ)) Dˉ/Zˉ]−ω(Dˉ/Zˉ) Zˉ.\hat\Gamma = \hat\Upsilon\bigl[r(\bar D/\bar Z) - p\,\omega(\bar D/\bar Z) - (r'(\bar D/\bar Z) - p\,\omega'(\bar D/\bar Z))\,\bar D/\bar Z\bigr] - \omega(\bar D/\bar Z)\,\bar Z.Γ^=Υ^[r(Dˉ/Zˉ)−pω(Dˉ/Zˉ)−(r′(Dˉ/Zˉ)−pω′(Dˉ/Zˉ))Dˉ/Zˉ]−ω(Dˉ/Zˉ)Zˉ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

For p>0p > 0p>0 with E[fB(p ωˉ)]>0\mathbb E[f_B(p\,\bar\omega)] > 0E[fB​(pωˉ)]>0 (ωˉ=sup⁡ω\bar\omega = \sup\omegaωˉ=supω), ζ>0\zeta > 0ζ>0 and perturbation sizes ζn=ζn−α\zeta_n = \zeta n^{-\alpha}ζn​=ζn−α with 0<α<1/20 < \alpha < 1/20<α<1/2,

lim⁡n→∞P[∣Γ^−u′(p)∣>ε]=0for every ε>0.\lim_{n\to\infty}\mathbb P\Bigl[\bigl|\hat\Gamma - u'(p)\bigr| > \varepsilon\Bigr] = 0 \quad\text{for every } \varepsilon > 0.n→∞lim​P[​Γ^−u′(p)​>ε]=0for every ε>0.

Milestones, in the order of the proof

  1. Lemma 1: the balance equation has a unique solution in [0,1][0,1][0,1], and the active supply is Binomial(n,μ(n)(π))\mathrm{Binomial}(n, \mu^{(n)}(\pi))Binomial(n,μ(n)(π)).
  2. Proposition 10: ddμq(n)(μ)≤0\frac{d}{d\mu}q^{(n)}(\mu) \le 0dμd​q(n)(μ)≤0, and ddμq(n)(μ)→−ω′(d/μ) d/μ2\frac{d}{d\mu}q^{(n)}(\mu) \to -\omega'(d/\mu)\,d/\mu^2dμd​q(n)(μ)→−ω′(d/μ)d/μ2.
  3. Lemma 2 (3.13)–(3.14): μ(n)(p)→μ(p)\mu^{(n)}(p) \to \mu(p)μ(n)(p)→μ(p) and q(n)(μ)→ω(d/μ)q^{(n)}(\mu) \to \omega(d/\mu)q(n)(μ)→ω(d/μ).
  4. Lemma 4: the implicit derivative of μ(n)(p)\mu^{(n)}(p)μ(n)(p) in terms of Δ(n)(p)\Delta^{(n)}(p)Δ(n)(p), and its mean-field limit μ′(p)=Δ(p)/(1+p d Δ(p) ω′(d/μ)/(μ2ω(d/μ)))\mu'(p) = \Delta(p)/(1 + p\,d\,\Delta(p)\,\omega'(d/\mu)/(\mu^2\omega(d/\mu)))μ′(p)=Δ(p)/(1+pdΔ(p)ω′(d/μ)/(μ2ω(d/μ))).
  5. Proposition 11: the perturbed equilibrium μ(n)(p,ζ)\mu^{(n)}(p,\zeta)μ(n)(p,ζ) is flat at ζ=0\zeta = 0ζ=0 with second derivatives bounded uniformly in nnn.
  6. Proposition 12 (second equality): the closed form of u′(p)u'(p)u′(p).
  7. (A.9): ∣ζ−1Covn[Zi,εi]−Δ(n)(p)∣≤ζC|\zeta^{-1}\mathrm{Cov}_n[Z_i,\varepsilon_i] - \Delta^{(n)}(p)| \le \zeta C∣ζ−1Covn​[Zi​,εi​]−Δ(n)(p)∣≤ζC, uniformly in nnn.
  8. (A.7), corrected: Dˉ→d\bar D \to dDˉ→d, Zˉ→μ(p)\bar Z \to \mu(p)Zˉ→μ(p), Δ^→Δ(p)\hat\Delta \to \Delta(p)Δ^→Δ(p) in L2L_2L2​, and Υ^→μ′(p)\hat\Upsilon \to \mu'(p)Υ^→μ′(p) in probability.

Significance

A platform can thus learn the payment sensitivity of its equilibrium utility from one period of data, with perturbations that vanish as the market grows. The gradient estimate is the input to the first-order payment-optimization scheme of §4.2 of the paper, and the decomposition of Lemma 4 separates the measurable marginal response Δ\DeltaΔ from an interference correction that depends only on the matching function ω\omegaω.

None of these results has been machine-checked. A complete formalization gives a verified mean-field limit for a fixed-point equilibrium with binomial supply, a binomial Stein-type identity (Proposition 10), and a consistency proof for a regression estimator under vanishing perturbations. The mission also records two corrections. The L2L_2L2​ claim for Υ^\hat\UpsilonΥ^ in (A.7) is too strong as printed. Lemma 15 (Appendix B.3), used in Proposition 10's proof, omits a factor; Proposition 10 itself is not affected.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says that Δ^\hat\DeltaΔ^ is a regression slope, so it converges by the law of large numbers. It does not apply directly, for two reasons. First, the ZiZ_iZi​ are not sampled at the unperturbed equilibrium: the perturbation itself moves the equilibrium, and the experiment runs at μ(n)(p,ζn)\mu^{(n)}(p,\zeta_n)μ(n)(p,ζn​). Showing that this shift is O(ζn2)O(\zeta_n^2)O(ζn2​) uniformly in nnn (Proposition 11) needs the implicit-function structure of the balance equation and the symmetry of the perturbation. Second, the noise in Δ^\hat\DeltaΔ^ has standard deviation of order 1/(ζnn)1/(\zeta_n\sqrt n)1/(ζn​n​), while its bias is of order ζn\zeta_nζn​. The rate restriction α<1/2\alpha < 1/2α<1/2 balances the two. Finally, the limit of ddμq(n)\frac{d}{d\mu}q^{(n)}dμd​q(n) is a derivative of an expectation over a binomial law in which the error term lll is multiplied by nnn; controlling it needs a Stein-type identity, not term-by-term convergence.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace EquilibriumExperiment.Gradient. A Market B holds the primitives for one global state; Market.Standing bundles Definition 5, Assumptions 1–2, the part of Assumption 3 that concerns rrr, and the demand conditions (3.1)–(3.2). Conventions:

  • One state. The statements are conditional on A=aA = aA=a. The state space is finite with a law independent of nnn, so the paper's unconditional probability is a finite mixture of conditional ones.
  • Domains. Functions on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ are functions on R\mathbb RR whose hypotheses are stated on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); ω\omegaω and rrr are smooth on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). With Lean's d/0=0d/0 = 0d/0=0, the decomposition at t=0t = 0t=0 reads Ω(d,0)=l(d,0)\Omega(d,0) = l(d,0)Ω(d,0)=l(d,0).
  • Added hypotheses, disclosed. d>0d > 0d>0; measurability of Ω(⋅,t)\Omega(\cdot,t)Ω(⋅,t), (b,x)↦fb(x)(b,x)\mapsto f_b(x)(b,x)↦fb​(x) and fb′(x)f_b'(x)fb′​(x); the joint reading of o(1/t+1/d)o(1/\sqrt t + 1/\sqrt d)o(1/t​+1/d​) (for every ε\varepsilonε there is KKK such that the bound holds when d,t≥Kd,t \ge Kd,t≥K); and the positivity condition E[fB(p ωˉ)]>0\mathbb E[f_B(p\,\bar\omega)] > 0E[fB​(pωˉ)]>0, which holds exactly when μ(p)\mu(p)μ(p) exists.
  • Equilibria. q(n)q^{(n)}q(n) is the finite binomial sum. μ(n)\mu^{(n)}μ(n) and μ(p)\mu(p)μ(p) are defined as the solutions of their balance equations; Lemmas 1 and 2 prove that the solutions exist and are unique. Supplier decisions are realized as Zi=1{Ui≤fBi(Pi q(n)(μ(n)(π)))}Z_i = \mathbf 1\{U_i \le f_{B_i}(P_i\,q^{(n)}(\mu^{(n)}(\pi)))\}Zi​=1{Ui​≤fBi​​(Pi​q(n)(μ(n)(π)))} with independent uniforms UiU_iUi​.
  • Limits. Each nnn has its own sample space, so convergence in probability is a limit of the probabilities of deviation events. L2L_2L2​ convergence is eLpNorm … 2 → 0.
  • Ranges. "n∈Nn \in \mathbb Nn∈N" is read as n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, and binomial parameters lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Proposition 10's limit is stated for μ<1\mu < 1μ<1, and Proposition 11 for ζ∈(−p,p)\zeta \in (-p,p)ζ∈(−p,p).

Ruled out: ZiZ_iZi​ independent of the perturbation, μ(n)\mu^{(n)}μ(n) an arbitrary random variable rather than the solution of (A.2), hypotheses on all of R\mathbb RR, or u′(p)u'(p)u′(p) as a deriv of a non-differentiable function (Proposition 12 proves differentiability).

Not in this mission. Theorem 7 (the O(1/T)O(1/T)O(1/T) regret of the first-order method) is false as printed: with σ=1/2\sigma = 1/2σ=1/2, η=101/50\eta = 101/50η=101/50, M=101/100M = 101/100M=101/100, I=[1,3]I = [1,3]I=[1,3], utilities −(p−3)2/4-(p-3)^2/4−(p−3)2/4 and −(p−1)2/4-(p-1)^2/4−(p−1)2/4 in two periods and p1=1p_1 = 1p1​=1, the left side of (4.6) at T=2T = 2T=2, p=5/3p = 5/3p=5/3 equals 7/6>ηM2/27/6 > \eta M^2/27/6>ηM2/2; step (A.10) drops a factor 2. Corollary 8, which rests on it, Theorem 9, Lemma 3 and (3.15), which concern the pre-limit utility, are also excluded. Lemma 15 is false as printed and is not an item.

Contributions are welcome at every milestone; the binomial Stein identity, the implicit-function argument for monotone fixed points and the triangular-array law of large numbers for the slope are reusable.

Selected references

  • S. Wager and K. Xu, Experimenting in Equilibrium, Management Science 67(11), 2021; arXiv:1903.02124v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.02124 (version of record: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3844)
  • M. G. Hudgens and M. E. Halloran, Toward causal inference with interference, Journal of the American Statistical Association 103(482), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1198/016214508000000292
  • T. Blake and D. Coey, Why marketplace experimentation is harder than it seems: the role of test-control interference, ACM EC 2014. https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602837
10 thms1 active userReviewed
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