Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 2: With Competing Retailers, Revenue Sharing Supports the System-Optimal Quantities as a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper
Motivation
A supplier that sells through independent retailers usually loses part of the profit an integrated firm would earn: each retailer orders to maximize its own profit, not the channel's. Supply chain coordination asks which contracts make the decentralized choices coincide with the integrated optimum. Cachon and Lariviere study revenue-sharing contracts, under which a retailer pays a per-unit wholesale price and keeps only a fraction of its revenue, the rest going to the supplier. The contracts were made prominent by the video rental industry around 1998, where studios lowered tape prices in exchange for a share of rental income.
With a single retailer, revenue sharing at the wholesale price coordinates the channel and splits its profit in the proportion . This mission formalizes the extension in Section 3.2 of the paper to competing retailers: several locations whose revenues depend on each other's stock, so that one retailer's order lowers the others' revenue. Competition creates externalities the single-retailer argument does not have, and the question is whether revenue sharing still coordinates, and at what prices. Section 4.1.2 then works out a Cournot example in closed form, measuring how far the supplier's own optimal wholesale price leaves the channel from the integrated profit.
The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000; the published version (Management Science 51(1), 2005) renumbers and revises the results. The working paper numbers no theorem, so results are cited by section, displayed equation and page.
Setting
A single supplier sells one product through locations , each run by an independent retailer. A stocking profile is , and the revenue at location is , which may depend on every location's quantity. The system revenue is , every unit costs the supplier , and the integrated system profit is
Write : the superscript is the variable differentiated, the subscript the revenue function. The paper assumes that each is continuous, that for (locations are substitutes), and that is unimodal in . The system-optimal profile has positive entries and solves the first-order system
Under a revenue-sharing contract retailer earns and the supplier earns ; the wholesale-price contract is , with profits written and . A Nash equilibrium in order quantities is a profile from which no retailer gains by changing its own quantity to any . The coordinating wholesale prices are
The Cournot example (7) is with .
Formalization targets
Goal: revenue sharing supports (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)
For and :
Wholesale-price contracts (Sec. 3.2, pp. 13–14)
An interior equilibrium satisfies (Eq. (8)), so marginal-cost pricing does not support when a location imposes a negative externality; the prices make an equilibrium; when cross-effects are nonpositive; and supports exactly the split .
Revenue sharing (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)
An interior equilibrium satisfies ; the two profit identities hold for every ; and .
The Cournot example (Sec. 4.1.2, pp. 19–20)
At a common price the unique equilibrium is ; the integrated optimum is ; the coordinating price increases in and ; the supplier's optimal price is ; and the efficiency at is
Significance
The goal shows that the single-retailer coordination result survives competition, with one change: the coordinating price must charge each retailer for the externality it imposes on the others, so it depends on every location's revenue function, and exceeds the production cost. The supplier's profit then moves along a line between what wholesale prices alone give her and the whole system profit, which is how revenue sharing provides a profit split that linear prices cannot. The Cournot results make the comparison quantitative: when retailers compete intensely, the supplier's own optimal wholesale price already achieves most of the integrated profit, so revenue sharing, which has administrative costs, is less attractive.
No machine-checked proof of these results is known. The mission produces a reusable formal description of an -player quantity game under per-retailer linear contracts, equilibrium conditions for it, and a fully worked Cournot instance, including a uniqueness claim for equilibria among all (not only symmetric) profiles.
Difficulty
The equilibrium claims are global: a retailer must not gain from any nonnegative deviation, not only from small ones. A first-order condition at does not give this by itself. The page assumes unimodal in , but unimodality does not survive subtracting the linear purchase cost, so the first-order condition is not sufficient under that assumption alone; the formalization uses concavity in the own quantity, under which it is. The participation claim is stated on the page without proof and needs a bound on the revenue of a location that stocks nothing.
In the Cournot example, uniqueness of the equilibrium must exclude asymmetric profiles and profiles where some retailers stock nothing, and the supplier's optimal price must be compared against every equilibrium at every price, including prices at which the retailers order nothing.
Formalization scope
Locations are Fin n; a profile is Fin n → ℝ; revenues are R : Fin n → (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ, and dR i j q is , given as a partial derivative at every profile with all entries positive. A deviation of retailer to is Function.update q i x, and Nash equilibria quantify over all . The standing assumptions of Section 3.2 are fields of the structure Model: ; continuity of on the nonnegative orthant; the partial derivatives; , encoded as " does not increase in "; and concavity of in , which is the formalization's reading of "unimodal in ". The paper's assumption that marginal revenue eventually falls below every is used only for existence of an equilibrium, which is not formalized, and is omitted.
Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item concerned:
- is taken as any positive solution of (6); its optimality for is not used.
- " is a Nash equilibrium" (p. 13) is read as .
- In (p. 14), is read as .
- "" needs a negative externality , which is assumed.
- "" is not a standing assumption, so it is a hypothesis of , and strictness needs some strictly negative cross-effect.
- assumes nonnegative revenue at a location that stocks nothing.
- In the Cournot example the implicit and are hypotheses; all retailers pay a common price; "increasing" is strict exactly where it holds ( for , for ).
A formalization that defines "the prices coordinate" as "the prices satisfy the first-order condition at " restates (6) and is ruled out: every equilibrium claim here is the game-theoretic statement about unilateral deviations. Contributions welcome: proofs of the equilibrium lemmas from concavity and the derivative, the Cournot uniqueness argument, and a general existence theorem for the quantity game.
Selected references
- G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
- D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991 (Theorem 1.2, existence of pure-strategy equilibria).
- F. Bernstein, A. Federgruen, Pricing and Replenishment Strategies in a Distribution System with Competing Retailers, Operations Research 51(3):409–426, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.3.409.14957
- J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988.