Motivation
Finite games in strategic form are the basic model of strategic interaction in economics, engineering and computer science. Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, DOI 10.1006/game.1996.0044) are the class with the most tractable equilibrium behaviour: every finite potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and simple learning dynamics converge to one.
Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo (arXiv:1005.2405; Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3), 2011, DOI 10.1287/moor.1110.0500) decompose every finite game canonically into a potential, a harmonic and a nonstrategic component, by viewing the payoff differences of a game as a flow on a graph and applying the combinatorial Helmholtz decomposition. Harmonic games are the complement of potential games, and their equilibria behave in the opposite way: they generically have no pure Nash equilibrium. This mission formalizes the paper's positive result on the harmonic side. In every harmonic game, whatever the number of players and strategies, the profile in which every player randomizes uniformly over its strategies is a mixed Nash equilibrium. Rock–paper–scissors and matching pennies are the familiar two-player instances.
Setting
A finite game has a finite set of players M and, for each player m, a nonempty finite strategy set Em with hm=∣Em∣ elements. A strategy profile is p=(pm)m∈E=∏mEm. We write p−m for the strategies of the players other than m, E−m=∏k=mEk, and (qm,p−m) for p with player m's strategy replaced by qm. A game is identified with its utilities u=(um)m, um:E→R, which form an element of C0M, where C0={f:E→R} carries ⟨φ1,φ2⟩0=∑pφ1(p)φ2(p).
Two profiles are m-comparable if they are distinct and differ only in player m's strategy. The game graph has the profiles as nodes and joins every comparable pair. An edge flow is a function X on ordered pairs of profiles with X(p,q)=−X(q,p) on edges and X=0 off edges. The space C1 of edge flows carries ⟨X,Y⟩1=21∑(p,q)∈AX(p,q)Y(p,q). The combinatorial gradient is (δ0φ)(p,q)=W(p,q)(φ(q)−φ(p)), with W the edge indicator, and δ0∗ is its adjoint. Restricting to m-comparable pairs gives Dm:C0→C1, and Du=∑mDmum is the flow of payoff differences of u. With Πm=Dm†Dm (Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse) and Π=diag(Π1,…,ΠM), Definition 4.2 of the paper sets
H={u∣u=Πu, Du∈kerδ0∗},N=kerD.
A game is a harmonic game if u∈H⊕N, and a normalized harmonic game if u∈H.
A mixed strategy of player m is a probability vector xm∈ΔEm, and a mixed strategy profile is x={xm}m∈∏mΔEm. The mixed extension is um(x)=∑p∈Eum(p)∏kxk(pk) (34). The payoff of the pure strategy qm against x−m is um(qm,x−m)=∑p−mum(qm,p−m)∏k=mxk(pk) (35). A mixed Nash equilibrium (Definition 5.1.1) is a mixed profile with um(xm,x−m)≥um(pm,x−m) for every m and pm∈Em. A probability distribution x∈ΔE on profiles is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 5.1.2) if ∑p−m(um(pm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m))x(pm,p−m)≥0 for all m and pm,qm. The uniformly mixed strategy profile (Definition 5.2) has xm(qm)=1/hm for every m and qm.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 5.4
For every harmonic game u∈H⊕N, the uniformly mixed strategy profile x is a mixed Nash equilibrium:
um(xm,x−m)≥um(pm,x−m)for all m∈M, pm∈Em.
Milestones
- Lemma A.1: for every edge flow X^ and every set of profiles S^, ∑p∈S^(δ0∗X^)(p)=−∑p∈S^∑q∈S^cX^(p,q).
- Lemma 5.2: in a harmonic game, ∑p−m∈E−m(um(rm,p−m)−um(qm,p−m))=0 for all m and qm,rm.
- Proposition 5.2: in a normalized harmonic game, a distribution x∈ΔE is a correlated equilibrium iff all the inequalities of Definition 5.1.2 hold with equality (36), iff ∑p−mum(qm,p−m)x(pm,p−m)=0 for all m,pm,qm (37).
- Remark after Proposition 5.2: the equivalence of correlated equilibrium with (36) holds for all harmonic games.
- Corollary 5.2: in a harmonic game, a mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium iff um(xm,x−m)=um(pm,x−m) for all m and pm (42).
Significance
Theorem 5.4 is the counterpart, for harmonic games, of the existence of pure equilibria in potential games. It exhibits an explicit equilibrium that does not depend on the payoffs at all, only on the strategy counts hm. Corollary 5.2, a milestone here, adds that at any mixed equilibrium of a harmonic game every player is indifferent among all its pure strategies, including those outside the support. That is much stronger than the usual support condition. Proposition 5.2 shows that the correlated equilibria of a normalized harmonic game are the points of the probability simplex in a linear subspace determined by the utilities. The paper uses that description in its later analysis of two-player harmonic games.
The results are proved in the paper; none of them is machine-checked. The formalization connects the paper's operator layer (flows on the game graph, the gradient and its adjoint with the 21-weighted inner product, pseudoinverses) with standard equilibrium notions on finite games. It reuses published definitions of lotteries, the mixed extension and correlated equilibria.
Difficulty
The equilibrium statement follows quickly once Lemma 5.2 is available. The difficulty lies in translating the harmonic condition, a statement about the adjoint of an operator on edge flows, into an identity about payoffs. That needs the explicit form of δ0∗, which depends on the 21 in the inner product of C1. It also needs the fact that D kills the nonstrategic component, and a computation of the flow of Du across the boundary of the set of profiles in which player m plays rm. Corollary 5.2 needs the passage from mixed profiles to product distributions on profiles and a careful accounting of sums over p−m against sums over full profiles.
The first idea, to use the normalization ∑qmum(qm,p−m)=0, is not available. The goal concerns all harmonic games, not only normalized ones, and normalization alone does not give indifference against uniform opponents: the harmonic condition is essential.
Formalization scope
Players form a finite type ι with decidable equality, and the strategy sets E m are nonempty finite types, as in the paper (Em={1,…,hm}). The hypothesis [∀ m, Nonempty (E m)] is stated explicitly on the game theorems, because the uniform profile 1/hm is a probability vector only if hm≥1. A game is an element of PiLp 2 (fun _ => EuclideanSpace ℝ (∀ k, E k)) with the unweighted sum inner product of p. 14. C1 is the subspace of edge flows with the inner product 21∑ of (7). δ0∗ is Mathlib's adjoint, and the pseudoinverse is defined directly. H and N are defined by (28), and harmonic games are the submodule H ⊔ N. Lotteries, mixed profiles and the mixed extension (34) come from the published agt_games definitions; correlated equilibrium is the published HartSchmeidler.Finite.IsCorrelatedEq. The pure-deviation payoff (35), mixed Nash equilibrium with pure deviations (Definition 5.1.1, as printed), and the uniform profile are defined in the mission. Sums over p−m are written as sums over the profiles with player m's strategy fixed, so each p−m is counted once.
The goal concerns mixed Nash equilibria. Stating it for the uniform product distribution as a correlated equilibrium, or for normalized games only, would be a weaker statement and is not the target. No hypothesis is added beyond the nonemptiness of the strategy sets.
Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and general lemmas on adjoints of graph gradients and on product distributions that are reusable beyond this mission.
Selected references
- O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, P. A. Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, arXiv:1005.2405v2, 2010; Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3), 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2405, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0500
- D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
- S. Hart, D. Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Mathematics of Operations Research 14(1), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.1.18