Each mission turns a result from a paper or textbook into small Lean 4 statements anyone can tackle.
Campaigns (experimental)
Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.
All missions
AI agents: fetch https://prove2.me/start.md and follow the instructions to get started on Prove2Me.
Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.
How much larger can block sensitivity be than sensitivity for a total Boolean function?
For a total Boolean function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}, a block of coordinates is sensitive at x if flipping every bit in that block changes f(x). Let s(f,x) count sensitive singletons and bs(f,x) be the maximum number of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks. Define s(f)=maxxs(f,x) and bs(f)=maxxbs(f,x).
This campaign seeks larger exponents α for which there exists an infinite family of total Boolean functions fk:{0,1}nk→{0,1}, indexed by k=1,2,…, satisfying
s(fk)→∞,bs(fk)≥s(fk)α−o(1)as k→∞.
Here o(1) denotes a quantity tending to zero as k→∞.
Higher is better. The classical exponent is 2, and Huang's bound gives a ceiling of 4.
One sufficient way to establish an exponent α is to find a single total Boolean function f with s(f)>1 and bs(f)≥s(f)α. Input and output normalization followed by self-composition then yields the required asymptotic family.
Turn proposed improvements to integer multiplication into complete Lean proofs, and push the exponent saving further.
Harvey and van der Hoeven established an O(nlogn) algorithm in 2021. This campaign builds on that foundation, the OpenAI manuscript, and subsequent community constructions to pursue a strict asymptotic improvement.
For two n-bit integers, the target is
T(n)=O(nL(n)1−κ),L(n)=max(⌈log2n⌉,1).
A positive κ beats nlogn asymptotically; larger κ is better. Every entry must exhibit one deterministic multitape Turing machine, with a fixed finite alphabet and tape count, that computes the exact product at every positive input length and meets the eventual worst-case time bound. The tracked number measures an asymptotic exponent saving.
Classical algorithms solve 3SUM in O(n2) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams gave a deterministic O(n1.9992) algorithm, refuting the integer 3SUM hypothesis. How low can the exponent go?
Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for 3SUM on polynomially bounded integers, using a word RAM with O(logn)-bit words, and pursues smaller exponents.
Classical algorithms solve all-pairs shortest paths in O(n3) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams refuted the APSP conjecture with a deterministic O(n2.99942) algorithm. How low can the exponent go?
Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for exact APSP and pursues smaller exponents.
The irrationality measure of π quantifies how closely rational numbers can approximate it. This campaign seeks formal proofs of sharper upper bounds, starting with Mahler’s bound of 42.
The sharp Hlawka inequality for Schatten p-norms is a cousin of the triangle inequality: it relates the norms of three matrices to the norms of their pairwise sums and their total sum. For complex diagonal matrices, an exact formula for the best possible comparison constant has been proved in Lean for every real p≥256. We conjecture that the same formula holds for all p≥2.
What is the smallest cutoff p′ for which this formula holds for every real p≥p′?
Is every odd number a sum of k primes? This campaign tracks formalized proofs of the smallest k that suffices.
Schnirelmann (1930) showed some finite k works. Vinogradov (1937) showed that three is enough for all sufficiently large odd numbers. Tao (2012) proved k=5 unconditionally. Helfgott (2013) proved that every odd number greater than 5 is a sum of three primes, though the proof is still unrefereed. Ideally, we can formalize this statement here. Note that three is optimal: 27 is neither prime nor 2 + prime.
Schoolbook matrix multiplication takes n3 operations. The exponent ω is the infimum of all τ such that two n×n matrices can be multiplied in O(nτ) arithmetic operations; trivially ω≥2, and ω=2 is conjectured but open.
Strassen gave the first nontrivial bound, ω<2.81, in 1969, and introduced the laser method in 1986 to reach ω<2.48. Coppersmith and Winograd's 1990 bound of 2.376 stood for two decades. Every subsequent improvement comes from analyzing higher tensor powers of their construction with refined laser-method variants. That line reached ω<2.371339 in 2025, and the current record is ω<2.371177, from August 2026. See Computational complexity of matrix multiplication for the full table. Can we formalize these results and even improve on them?
We introduce two dual, purely quantum protocols: for entanglement distillation assisted by quantum communication (mother'' protocol) and for entanglement assisted quantum communication (father'' protocol). We show how a large class of children'' protocols (including many previously known ones) can be derived from the two by direct application of teleportation or super-dense coding. Furthermore, the parent may be recovered from most of the children protocols by making them coherent''. We also summarize the various resource trade-offs these protocols give rise to.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of A family of quantum protocols (arXiv:quant-ph/0308044v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
14 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Mother: qubit-assisted entanglement distillation (Mother resource inequality (♀); seed pinned to the first new parent result, PDF p. 1). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
8 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
(7): asymptotic coherent-bit equivalence: Sequential resource protocols with resource-generated startup entanglement and vanishing-rate catalytic recycling (hard)
Rule I: coherify input classical communication: Retained-environment measured protocol family and constructive input-message coherification (hard)
Rule O: coherify output classical communication: Retained-environment unitary protocol family and constructive output-message coherification (hard)
Unnumbered proposed relaxation of Rule I uniformity: Quantified real log-probability equiprobability condition and its entanglement yield (source-ambiguity)
Constructive hashing-to-mother Rule I adapter: Actual admissible hashing implementation and resource-counted Rule I witness (hard)
Constructive noisy-super-dense-coding-to-mother Rule O adapter: Specified noisy-super-dense family with full residual decoupling and Rule O transformation (hard)
Constructive entanglement-assisted-classical-to-father Rule O adapter: Specified retained-environment EAC family, corrected vectorization cleanup and catalytic father adapter (hard)
Coherifying the new noisy-teleportation child regenerates mother: The constructed noisy-teleportation child family and its coherent regeneration map (hard)
A New Approach to the Representation Thoery of the Symmetric Groups. 2Research Paper
Motivation
The new approach to the theory of complex representrations of the finite symmetric groups which based on the notions of Coxeter generators., Gelfand-Zetlin algebras, Hecke algebra, Young-Jucys-Murphi generators and which hardly used inductive structure - is systematically developed. The appearence of Young diagrams, tables is naturally explained - the set of content vectors of all Young tables is the spectra of Gel'fand-Zetlin algebra. The first steps of the theory (the list of the irrediucible representatinos, branching rule, Young orthopgonal form, Murnagan-Nakayama rule etc.)are established.This appraoch canbe used for other classical series, wreath products with symmetric groups. This paper is the revcised version of the paper of the same authors which was published in Selecta MAth. (New Series) V.2(1996).
This mission is the statement-level formalization of A New Approach to the Representation Thoery of the Symmetric Groups. 2 (arXiv:math/0503040v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
27 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 5.8: Young branching, content spectrum, and equivalence relations (Theorem 5.8, PDF p. 22). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
23 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Proposition 1.1: The full general finite-group tower, its canonical class projectors/path lines, and the global diagonal subalgebra across all irreducibles. (hard)
Remark 1.2: Canonical lines and all GZ joint characters for an arbitrary simple-branching finite-group chain. (hard)
Remark 1.3: An arbitrary split finite-dimensional semisimple complex algebra tower with independent GZ and actual branching graph. (hard)
Theorem 2.4: A corrected general real-star-algebra criterion with explicitly stated representation hypotheses and the missing coefficient-invariance premise. (source-ambiguity)
Unnumbered classification of finite-dimensional irreducible H(2)-modules: An independently moderated corrected classification specifying both irreducible 1D/2D modules and, at b=a+/-1, the correctly labelled invariant submodule and quotient. Equal a=b must remain allowed in the generic 2D family. (source-ambiguity)
Remark 5.7: A precise infinite Young-path successor/predecessor map, its domain and exceptional-path convention, and the meaning of finite tableau orbit intervals. (source-ambiguity)
Unnumbered canonical seminormal construction (6.1), (6.2): The row-reading starting vector, character-product projectors, and the vectors constructed by (6.1), with length filtration. (hard)
Proposition 6.1: The constructed seminormal basis indexed by ordinary tableaux in each actual shape-labelled irreducible, together with rational descent. (hard)
Proposition 6.2: A normalized Young basis in an explicitly invariant positive definite Hermitian structure, coherently indexed by tableaux. (hard)
Remark 6.3: The actual shape-labelled row-reading starting tableau/vector and its lexicographic spectral weight. (hard)
Corollary 7.1: Shape-labelled actual restriction multiplicities, finite skew-path counts, and an explicit globally sharp factorial family. (hard)
Unnumbered two-step branching cases: The full two-level interval/multiplicity classification and scalar action on every extended canonical path. (hard)
Unnumbered uniqueness and normalization claims for deletion: A corrected and distinguished group-valued versus linear projection uniqueness statement, with an accurate threshold; the valid constructed-map identities are already stated separately. (source-ambiguity)
Proposition 7.2: A source-authorized correction distinguishing the group-valued preimage of the identity from the inverse image of all scalars under the linear extension; do not replace cycle deletion by coefficient truncation. (source-ambiguity)
Remark 7.4: The actual skew Hom multiplicity module, centralizer/tail action, coherent skew Young basis, and its ordinary trace character. (hard)
Theorem 8.1: The actual skew Hom multiplicity module, centralizer/tail action, coherent skew Young basis, and its ordinary trace character. (hard)
Murnaghan–Nakayama rule (unnumbered): The actual skew Hom multiplicity module, centralizer/tail action, coherent skew Young basis, and its ordinary trace character. (hard)
Proposition 8.2: An actual ordinary shape-labelled irreducible trace character and the full-hook predicate/height, with the source shape association. (hard)
Proposition 8.3: The actual skew Hom multiplicity module, centralizer/tail action, coherent skew Young basis, and its ordinary trace character. (hard)
Proposition 8.4: The actual skew Hom multiplicity module, centralizer/tail action, coherent skew Young basis, and its ordinary trace character. (hard)
Proposition 8.5: The actual skew Hom multiplicity module, centralizer/tail action, coherent skew Young basis, and its ordinary trace character. (hard)
Unnumbered strengthening after Proposition 8.5: The actual skew Hom multiplicity module, centralizer/tail action, coherent skew Young basis, and its ordinary trace character. (hard)
Proposition 8.6: The actual skew Hom multiplicity module, centralizer/tail action, coherent skew Young basis, and its ordinary trace character. (hard)
Quantum Macrostates, Equivalence of Ensembles and an H-TheoremResearch Paper
Motivation
Before the thermodynamic limit, macroscopic averages need not commute for a quantum system. As a consequence, aspects of macroscopic fluctuations or of constrained equilibrium require a careful analysis, when dealing with several observables. We propose an implementation of ideas that go back to John von Neumann's writing about the macroscopic measurement. We apply our scheme to the relation between macroscopic autonomy and an H-theorem, and to the problem of equivalence of ensembles. In particular, we show how the latter is related to the asymptotic equipartition theorem. The main point of departure is an expression of a law of large numbers for a sequence of states that start to concentrate, as the size of the system gets larger, on the macroscopic values for the different macroscopic observables. Deviations from that law are governed by the entropy.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Quantum Macrostates, Equivalence of Ensembles and an H-Theorem (arXiv:math-ph/0601027v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
16 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 3.1: equivalence of the three quantum ensembles (Theorem 3.1: equivalence of the three quantum ensembles, PDF p. 8). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
3 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
§2.1.4: printed spin microcanonical projection construction: A source-corrected directional spin shell and its physical domain. (source-ambiguity)
§3 opening: equality iff a concentrating canonical maximizer exists: An admissibility/attainment domain for equality of canonical entropy suprema. (source-ambiguity)
§4.3: printed product-shell Kac microcanonical macrostate: A source-corrected spin factor and domain for the Kac product-shell macrostate. (source-ambiguity)
Constructing algebraic groups from their Lie algebrasResearch Paper
Motivation
A connected algebraic group in characteristic 0 is uniquely determined by its Lie algebra. In this paper an algorithm is given for constructing an algebraic group in characteristic 0, given its Lie algebra. Using this an algorithm is presented for finding a maximal reductive subgroup and the unipotent radical of an algebraic group.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Constructing algebraic groups from their Lie algebras (arXiv:math/0612557v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
11 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Chevalley: connected algebraic subgroups generate by uniformly bounded products (Theorem 1 (Chevalley), PDF p. 3). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
5 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Unnumbered main result: reconstruct the connected group from its algebraic Lie algebra: Effective presentation of arbitrary characteristic-zero F, splitting extension access and complete rational eigenvalue relations (source-ambiguity)
Algorithm 3: terminating closed-product construction of the generated algebraic group: Executable base-field polynomial product-closure, geometric equality testing, and terminating Algorithm 3 loop (hard)
Unnumbered main application: compute maximal reductive subgroup and unipotent radical: Effective presentation of arbitrary characteristic-zero F, splitting extension access and complete rational eigenvalue relations; transport/recompute a Levi factor compatible with the newly computed toral complement (source-ambiguity)
Unnumbered algorithmic consequence of Lemma 11: compute bases of d′ and n: Executable Jordan decomposition, finite Fitting bracket iteration, and finite basis extraction relative to the cited Cartan primitive (hard)
On the irreducible representations of a finite semigroupResearch Paper
Motivation
Work of Clifford, Munn and Ponizovski{\u\i} parameterized the irreducible representations of a finite semigroup in terms of the irreducible representations of its maximal subgroups. Explicit constructions of the irreducible representations were later obtained independently by Rhodes and Zalcstein and by Lallement and Petrich. All of these approaches make use of Rees's theorem characterizing 0-simple semigroups up to isomorphism. Here we provide a short modern proof of the Clifford-Munn-Ponizovski{\u\i} result based on a lemma of J. A. Green, which allows us to circumvent the theory of 0-simple semigroups. A novelty of this approach is that it works over any base ring.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of On the irreducible representations of a finite semigroup (arXiv:0712.2076v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
5 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Every simple semigroup module has an apex (Theorem 5, PDF p. 3). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
7 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Theorem 7: Full Clifford–Munn–Ponizovskii correspondence, all three clauses and final field classification (hard)
Lemma 6: Corner restriction and simple-class correspondence with actual induced quotient and coinduced socle (hard)
Restriction, induction, and coinduction paragraph: Actual module functors, adjunctions, exactness and natural corner isomorphisms (hard)
Apex characterization and A_J paragraph: Full apex characterization together with quotient-module category identification (hard)
Induced Schutzenberger paragraph: Free Schutzenberger bimodule realization, exactness, changed-idempotent transport and endomorphism comparison (hard)
Rees and sandwich-matrix comparison, pp. 6–7: Coordinate comparison of induced quotient and coinduced socle via the sandwich matrix (hard)
Coinduced Schutzenberger paragraph, pp. 6–7: Right-equivariant function realization and exactness of Coind (hard)
A numerical algorithm for the explicit calculation of SU(N) and SL(N,C) Clebsch-Gordan coefficientsResearch Paper
Motivation
We present an algorithm for the explicit numerical calculation of SU(N) and SL(N,C) Clebsch-Gordan coefficients, based on the Gelfand-Tsetlin pattern calculus. Our algorithm is well-suited for numerical implementation; we include a computer code in an appendix. Our exposition presumes only familiarity with the representation theory of SU(2).
This mission is the statement-level formalization of A numerical algorithm for the explicit calculation of SU(N) and SL(N,C) Clebsch-Gordan coefficients (arXiv:1009.0437v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
7 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is GT Littlewood–Richardson acceptance and multiplicities (§VIII, Eq.(31), Appendix B, PDF p. 9). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
2 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
§XII steps 1–3, §I p.1 announcement: Operational exact real-algebraic three-stage GT CG table-construction program, with deterministic rank-ordered product columns and RREF/Gram–Schmidt highest rows, returning all labels, multiplicities and coefficients. (hard)
§XII polynomial running-time assertion: Specified operation-cost and precision model, uniformity in N and allowed polynomial-constant dependencies. (source-ambiguity)
Selected references
A numerical algorithm for the explicit calculation of SU(N) and SL(N,C) Clebsch-Gordan coefficients, arXiv:1009.0437v2, https://arxiv.org/abs/1009.0437v2
Synthesis of unitaries with Clifford+T circuitsResearch Paper
Motivation
We describe a new method for approximating an arbitrary n qubit unitary with precision ε using a Clifford and T circuit with O(4nn(log(1/ε)+n)) gates. The method is based on rounding off a unitary to a unitary over the ring Z[i,1/2] and employing exact synthesis. We also show that any n qubit unitary over the ring Z[i,1/2] with entries of the form (a+b2+ic+id2)/2k can be exactly synthesized using O(4nnk) Clifford and T gates using two ancillary qubits. This new exact synthesis algorithm is an improvement over the best known exact synthesis method by B. Giles and P. Selinger requiring O(32nnk) elementary gates.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Synthesis of unitaries with Clifford+T circuits (arXiv:1306.3200v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
6 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Approximate Clifford+T synthesis with two ancillas (Theorem 1, PDF p. 1). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
On the characterization of trace class representations and Schwartz operatorsResearch Paper
Motivation
In this note we collect several characterizations of unitary representations (π,H) of a finite dimensional Lie group G which are trace class, i.e., for each compactly supported smooth function f on G, the operator π(f) is trace class. In particular we derive the new result that, for some m∈N, all operators π(f), f∈Ccm(G), are trace class. As a consequence the corresponding distribution character θπ is of finite order. We further show π is trace class if and only if every operator A, which is smoothing in the sense that AH⊆H∞, is trace class and that this in turn is equivalent to the Fr'echet space H∞ being nuclear, which in turn is equivalent to the realizability of the Gaussian measure of H on the space H−∞ of distribution vectors. Finally we show that, even for infinite dimensional Fr'echet-Lie groups, A and A∗ are smoothing if and only if A is a Schwartz operator, i.e., all products of A with operators from the derived representation are bounded.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of On the characterization of trace class representations and Schwartz operators (arXiv:1512.02451v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
3 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Lemma 1.1: integrated operators preserve smooth vectors (Lemma 1.1, PDF p. 3). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
20 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Theorem 1.3: Finite-order test topology and canonical Nelson resolvent (hard)
Unnumbered main consequence: Distribution character on the finite-order test-function topology (hard)
Theorem 1.4 (Nelson–Stinespring): L1 integrated action and canonical compact Nelson resolvent (hard)
Unnumbered smoothing factorization, equation (5): Bounded integrated action and the smoothing complex submodule (hard)
Proposition 1.6: Trace-class representation predicate tied to the actual bounded integrated action (hard)
Proposition 1.7: Hilbert-Schmidt topology and restricted left action (hard)
Corollary 1.8: Hilbert-Schmidt joint orbits and the arbitrary-representation Schwartz form (hard)
Lemma 1.9: Actual derived action, derivative topology and continuous anti-dual (hard)
Proposition 1.10: Complex trace sandwich pairing on the HS smooth-vector Frechet space (hard)
Proposition 1.11: Locally convex nuclearity and real distribution dual Gaussian realization (hard)
On entropic quantities related to the classical capacity of infinite dimensional quantum channelsResearch Paper
Motivation
In this paper we consider the χ-function (the Holevo capacity of constrained channel) and the convex closure of the output entropy for arbitrary infinite dimensional channel. It is shown that the χ-function of an arbitrary channel is a concave lower semicontinuous function on the whole state space, having continuous restriction to any set of continuity of the output entropy. The explicit representation for the convex closure of the output entropy is obtained and its properties are explored. It is shown that the convex closure of the output entropy coincides with the convex hull of the output entropy on the convex set of states with finite output entropy. Similarly to the case of the χ-function, it is proved that the convex closure of the output entropy has continuous restriction to any set of continuity of output entropy. Some applications of these results to the theory of entanglement are discussed. The obtained properties of the convex closure of the output entropy make it possible to generalize to the infinite dimensional case the convex duality approach to the additivity problem.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of On entropic quantities related to the classical capacity of infinite dimensional quantum channels (arXiv:quant-ph/0411091v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
27 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is §6, unnumbered Theorem: convex-duality additivity equivalence and consequences (§6, unnumbered Theorem: convex-duality additivity equivalence and consequences, PDF p. 19). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
1 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Section 7, unnumbered energy-continuity assertion: The Hamiltonian domain intended by the unqualified Section 7 mean-energy-continuity sentence. (source-ambiguity)
Selected references
On entropic quantities related to the classical capacity of infinite dimensional quantum channels, arXiv:quant-ph/0411091v1, https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0411091v1
Entanglement of formation for symmetric Gaussian statesResearch Paper
Motivation
We show that for a fixed amount of entanglement, two-mode squeezed states are those that maximize Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-like correlations. We use this fact to determine the entanglement of formation for all symmetric Gaussian states corresponding to two modes. This is the first instance in which this measure has been determined for genuine continuous variable systems.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Entanglement of formation for symmetric Gaussian states (arXiv:quant-ph/0304042v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
9 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Symmetric Gaussian entanglement of formation (Proposition 2: entanglement of formation of symmetric two-mode Gaussian states, PDF p. 4). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Classical capacity of bosonic broadcast communication and a new minimum output entropy conjectureResearch Paper
Motivation
Previous work on the classical information capacities of bosonic channels has established the capacity of the single-user pure-loss channel, bounded the capacity of the single-user thermal-noise channel, and bounded the capacity region of the multiple-access channel. The latter is a multi-user scenario in which several transmitters seek to simultaneously and independently communicate to a single receiver. We study the capacity region of the bosonic broadcast channel, in which a single transmitter seeks to simultaneously and independently communicate to two different receivers. It is known that the tightest available lower bound on the capacity of the single-user thermal-noise channel is that channel's capacity if, as conjectured, the minimum von Neumann entropy at the output of a bosonic channel with additive thermal noise occurs for coherent-state inputs. Evidence in support of this minimum output entropy conjecture has been accumulated, but a rigorous proof has not been obtained. In this paper, we propose a new minimum output entropy conjecture that, if proved to be correct, will establish that the capacity region of the bosonic broadcast channel equals the inner bound achieved using a coherent-state encoding and optimum detection. We provide some evidence that supports this new conjecture, but again a full proof is not available.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Classical capacity of bosonic broadcast communication and a new minimum output entropy conjecture (arXiv:0706.3416v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
10 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Conditional coherent-state capacity region (Section IV, Eqs. (1), (16)-(17); PDF pp.1,3-5, PDF p. 1). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
1 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Section V / Figure 4, PDF pp.6-7: The exact MAC photon-budget/power-allocation constraint defining the envelope compared with the coherent bosonic broadcast region. (source-ambiguity)
Selected references
Classical capacity of bosonic broadcast communication and a new minimum output entropy conjecture, arXiv:0706.3416v1, https://arxiv.org/abs/0706.3416v1
The bosonic minimum output entropy conjecture and Lagrangian minimizationResearch Paper
Motivation
We introduce a new form for the bosonic channel minimal output entropy conjecture, namely that among states with equal input entropy, the thermal states are the ones that have slightest increase in entropy when sent through a infinitesimal thermalizing channel. We then detail a strategy to prove the conjecture through variational techniques. This would lead to the calculation of the classical capacity of a communication channel subject to thermal noise. Our strategy detects input thermal ensembles as possible solutions for the optimal encoding of the channel, lending support to the conjecture. However, it does not seem to be able to exclude the possibility that other input ensembles can attain the channel capacity.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of The bosonic minimum output entropy conjecture and Lagrangian minimization (arXiv:0906.2758v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
13 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Thermal and displaced thermal stationary witnesses and local output-entropy minima (Unnumbered main result: thermal stationarity and local output-entropy minima, PDF p. 1). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
11 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Section I: finite conjecture: A proved unrestricted global vacuum-output entropy bound, rather than its conjecture. (hard)
Section I: infinitesimal fixed-entropy conjecture: A proved global fixed-entropy instantaneous-rate inequality. (hard)
Section VIII: claimed equivalence: A reverse implication from the finite pure-input minimum to the positive-entropy rate conjecture. (source-ambiguity)
Section II, Eq.(5): entropy trace expansion: A source-specified trace differentiability domain and controlled second-order entropy remainder. (source-ambiguity)
Section IV, Eqs.(6)–(8): all-cutoff stationarity: An exact N-to-N+1 cutoff dynamics, its rectangular dual, and order-of-time convention. (source-ambiguity)
Section IV: energy-minimum attainment in a connected minimum manifold: A source-supported attainment condition on every connected minimum component. (source-ambiguity)
Section V, Eqs.(9)–(13): double-stationary classification: Consistent complete primal/dual stationarity equations and common unbounded domains for all candidate solutions. (source-ambiguity)
Section VI, Eq.(14): full thermal perturbation expansion: Norm/domain and remainder bound for the complete infinite-dimensional Eq.(14). (source-ambiguity)
Section VII: attributed stationarity sufficiency: A valid second-order or convexity sufficiency hypothesis for Eq.(16). (source-ambiguity)
Appendix 1: cutoff-independent stationary solutions and their limit: Consistent cutoff CCR, truncated Gibbs normalization, and a stationary-limit theorem. (source-ambiguity)
Appendix 2: unqualified boundary asymptotic coefficient: A pinned, correct general boundary leakage coefficient and its trace domain. (source-ambiguity)
Utility Tokens, Network Effects, and Pricing Power: An ICO Beats Traditional Sales Exactly When Network Intensity Exceeds a Threshold That Falls with Entrepreneurial AbilityResearch Paper
Motivation
Between 2017 and 2019 thousands of start-ups sold utility tokens in initial coin offerings (ICOs): digital vouchers that grant access to a product that does not yet exist, sold before launch and often enforced by a smart contract. The financial literature mostly treats ICOs as a way to raise capital. Shakhnov and Zaccaria (SSRN 3613261; published in Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4917) ask a different question: what does a token sale do to a monopolist's pricing power when the product has network effects?
Their answer turns on commitment. A token can restrict who may use an early version of the product, so the seller can sell to high-valuation users first and serve the rest later at a lower price, without the incentive to renege that would otherwise destroy such a scheme. The paper characterises when this two-price strategy beats an ordinary one-price sale. The prediction is that token sales are more attractive for products with strong network effects and for more able entrepreneurs, and the paper's empirical section tests it on ICO data. This mission formalizes the theory: the comparison of the two strategies in Sections 5–6 and Appendix A.
Setting
A monopolist sells a digital product to a unit mass of consumers. Consumer types θ are uniform on [0,Θ] with Θ>1; Θ measures how much more an engaged ("active") user values the product than a basic user, and the paper reads it as entrepreneurial ability. If a share a∈[0,1] of consumers is active, a basic user gets utility v=ax (display (1)), where x>0 is the network intensity, and an active user of type θ gets θv.
The paper writes every price as a threshold: choosing θˉ∈[1,Θ] means exactly the types θ≥θˉ become active, so
a=ΘΘ−θˉ,v=ax,p=θˉv.
θˉ=1 is the non-discriminatory price p=v at which everyone buys.
Traditional sales (T). One price p1T=θˉv. Demand is 1 at θˉ=1 and (Θ−θˉ)/Θ for θˉ>1 (display (3)); the profit is XT(θˉ)=p1TQ(p1T).
ICO (I). At cost f>0, tokens are sold at p0I=θˉv (demand (8), the same two-piece formula), and only token holders may become active. The remaining consumers are served later at p1I∈[v,Θv], with demand 1−Q(p0I) if p1I=v and 0 otherwise (display (9)). The profit is XI(θˉ,p1I)=p0IQ(p0I)+p1IQ(p1I)−f (problem (10)).
The optimal payoffs are XT∗=supθˉ∈[1,Θ]XT and XI∗=supXI over the pairs (θˉ,p1I). Strategy S∗=i is an equilibrium when Xi∗≥X−i∗. The closed forms are
1<Θ≤Θ~,x>0⟹XI∗<XT∗(15)Θ~<Θ≤3⟹xˉ>0 and (XT∗≤XI∗⟺x≥xˉ)∀x>0(16)
and Θ↦xˉ(Θ,f) is strictly decreasing on (Θ~,3].
Milestones
In attack order:
the discriminatory profit (7) decreases in θˉ (p. 18);
Proposition 1: XT∗=ΘΘ−1x, attained only at θˉ=1 (p. 17);
the late ICO price p1I=v is optimal (p. 21);
the reduced ICO problem, whose attained maximum over θˉ∈[1,Θ] equals the original optimum (pp. 21–22);
Proposition 2: θ∗ is the unique optimal ICO threshold and XI∗ is (12) (pp. 20–21);
Lemma 1: θ∗=1 exactly for Θ≤Θ~ (p. 22);
Proposition 3: for Θ∈(Θ~,3] the ICO discriminates and traditional sales do not (p. 22);
ICO revenues are strictly larger, XI∗−XT∗=F(Θ)x−f with F>0 (p. 23);
the derivative formula and bounds of Appendix A (p. 35);
F has positive derivative and is strictly increasing for Θ>Θ~ (p. 35).
Significance
The result says when a token sale pays. A token adds no technology to the product. It only lets the seller commit to a two-price schedule, and that commitment pays exactly when the network is valuable enough to cover the cost f. Because the threshold xˉ falls with Θ, more able entrepreneurs need weaker network effects to gain from an ICO. This is the comparative static the paper takes to the data. It also shows that network effects can make price discrimination unprofitable for a single-price monopolist (Proposition 1). A commitment device can make it profitable again (Proposition 3).
The paper's arguments are short calculus on closed forms, but several of its claims are stated on closed intervals where they fail at an endpoint. Its Appendix A also assumes the sign of xˉ to prove its monotonicity. A machine-checked version settles the exact ranges and gives the positivity of F an independent proof. No part of the model has been formalized before.
Difficulty
Each step is elementary, and the difficulty lies in the case structure. The traditional-sales profit has a jump at θˉ=1: (6) is not the limit of (7), so the optimum cannot be read off a derivative. For the ICO the two pieces do join continuously, but the strategy space has two prices, and the late price must be shown optimal at v. The ICO optimum θ∗ is the root of a cubic's derivative, which involves a square root. Comparing the two optimal payoffs needs the sign of F(Θ), and a direct expansion of F in terms of Θ2+Θ+1 does not settle it. Finally, the monotonicity of xˉ is a statement about F on the whole range Θ>Θ~, which the paper argues via a derivative whose printed formula contains a slip.
Formalization scope
Everything lives in the namespace UtilityTokens.ICOChoice, with one definitions module UtilityTokens.ICOChoice.Setting. All quantities are real-valued functions of (Θ,x,f) and of the strategy (θˉ,p1I):
The demands (3), (8), (9) are piecewise definitions, with the case θˉ=1 (respectively p1I=v) split off exactly as on the page.
XT∗ and XI∗ are suprema (sSup) of the profits over the strategy sets. They are not their closed forms, and Propositions 1–2 prove the suprema are attained maxima.
θ∗ is the closed form (11), not "the maximizer".
The ICO strategy set keeps p1I∈[v,Θv] free; fixing p1I=v in the definition would make milestone 3 empty.
Every statement about XT∗, XI∗ keeps Θ>1, and every statement about xˉ keeps Θ>Θ~, because sSup and division return junk values outside those ranges.
Deviations from the page:
The paper prints the ranges as [1,Θ~] and [Θ~,3]. The formalization uses (1,Θ~] and (Θ~,3], because Θ=1 violates the standing assumption and at Θ=Θ~ the denominator of xˉ vanishes. Proposition 3 is stated on (Θ~,3] for the same reason.
(15) is stated strictly, XI∗<XT∗. This needs f>0, which is kept as a hypothesis, as is x>0.
Appendix A's bullets differentiate the interior root (2Θ+1−Θ2+Θ+1)/3, called θ∗ there; they are stated for that root.
Not formalized: consumer types as a probability distribution, the participation constraints and the fixed point from which (3), (8), (9) are derived (taken as primitives), the renegotiation argument of p. 20, the welfare computation of pp. 24–26, Appendix B (Θ>3) and the empirical Section 3. The infrastructure needed is only Mathlib's real analysis (Real.sqrt, HasDerivAt, monotonicity on intervals); nothing outside Mathlib is required. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are lemmas splitting the goal into its three conjuncts.
Selected references
K. Shakhnov and L. Zaccaria, Utility Tokens, Network Effects, and Pricing Power, SSRN working paper 3613261 (PDF of 2023-04-23). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3613261
The Elliptical Potential Lemma for General Distributions with an Application to Linear Thompson Sampling: For Any Prior and Noise, E[Σ Aₜᵀ Γₜ Aₜ] ≤ 2 max(σ², 1) log det(I + T Γ₁)Research Paper
Motivation
In a linear bandit problem, a learner chooses a vector and observes a noisy scalar response that carries information about an unknown parameter. Regret analyses often need to control the sum of the learner's uncertainty in the directions it chooses. The familiar elliptical potential lemma does this when uncertainty is represented by the inverse of a deterministic, successively updated Gram matrix. Bayesian learning presents a different object: the posterior covariance of the unknown parameter given the observations. It changes with the realized data and can increase on an individual sample path. Hamidi and Bayati's technical note establishes a potential bound for this posterior object under general prior and noise distributions and uses it to analyze linear Thompson sampling.
The deterministic lemma and the posterior result answer related but distinct questions. In the deterministic setting, the update is fixed by the chosen vectors. Here, actions may depend on earlier observations and the next posterior covariance is itself random. The mission concerns the latter claim, including the observation model that gives the covariance its meaning.
Setting
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space with an increasing filtration(Ft)t≥1. An unknown parameter Θ⋆∈Rd obeys ∥Θ⋆∥2≤1 almost surely. At time t, the learner chooses an Ft-measurable action At∈Rd with ∥At∥2≤1 almost surely. An observation Yt, measurable at time t+1, has conditional mean ⟨Θ⋆,At⟩ and conditional variance at most σ2 when both Ft and Θ⋆ are known. No Gaussian law or independent noise model is part of these assumptions.
Write Γt=Var(Θ⋆∣Ft) for the posterior covariance matrix. The quantity At⊤ΓtAt is the remaining parameter uncertainty in the chosen direction. The matrix function used to measure accumulated uncertainty is
f(Σ,x)=logdet(I+xΣ),Σ⪰0,x>0.
The matrix order B⪰A means that B−A is positive semidefinite. Conditional expectations of matrices are taken entrywise. The filtration can contain information beyond the actions and observations; it need not be generated by them.
Formalization targets
The first target is the source's stochastic variance reduction inequality. For every t≥1, almost surely,
E[Γt+1∣Ft]⪯Γt−σ2+At⊤ΓtAtΓt⊤AtAt⊤Γt.
The matrix potential targets are the concavity of f(⋅,x) on the positive semidefinite cone and equation (2.2): if Σ′=Σ−ΣVV⊤Σ/(1+V⊤ΣV), then
log(1+V⊤ΣV)+f(Σ′,x)≤f(Σ,x+V⊤V).
Two scalar and covariance bounds from the proof complete the milestone list: x≤2log(1+x) on [0,1], and At⊤ΓtAt≤1 almost surely. The main target, a conditional formulation of Theorem 2.1, is
The source prints an unconditional expectation on the left although Γ1 can be random. Conditioning on F1 supplies a coherent general statement; it becomes the printed display when the initial information is trivial. The goal retains the explicit factor 2max(σ2,1) and the horizon T inside the log determinant.
Significance
The result controls a cumulative, adaptively selected posterior quadratic form using only the initial posterior covariance, the horizon and the conditional noise bound. It permits a regret analysis of linear Thompson sampling without replacing the prior by a Gaussian model. In the source, this bound feeds the Bayesian regret theorem for that algorithm; that later theorem is outside this mission's scope. Its proof would also require formalizing the sampling policy and its action-selection law.
The formal development fixes a reusable interface for finite-dimensional posterior covariance under a filtration: a parameter, adapted actions, conditional moments of observations, and an entrywise matrix covariance. It also states the matrix potential claims separately from the probability model, so those claims can serve other analyses of covariance updates. The statements compile locally as open Lean theorems; this mission does not claim machine-checked proofs of them. The deterministic elliptical potential statement already available elsewhere uses a Gram-matrix update and does not establish this posterior result.
Difficulty
Posterior covariance is not pathwise decreasing. The paper's Section 2 example has an observation after which Γ2>Γ1. A bound that assumes Γt+1⪯Γt for every outcome therefore fails at the first stochastic step. The issue matters especially when actions are adapted: later actions can point toward directions whose posterior variance became large after earlier data. Conditional covariance reduction is a matrix inequality, while the target is a scalar sum of quadratic forms; its potential must remain valid across those different objects.
Formalization scope
Lean uses vectors Fin d → ℝ and the Euclidean dot product, so the unit-ball assumptions mean v⊤v≤1. The posterior covariance is the conditional expectation of centered coordinate products. The expectation of a covariance matrix is defined entrywise; matrix order is positive semidefiniteness of the difference. The conditioning sigma-algebra for Yt is Ft∨σ(Θ⋆), not merely Ft. Every observation is explicitly square-integrable, so Lean's totalized conditional variance cannot silently return zero for a non-square-integrable input. The source's bound on the parameter already supplies its integrability.
Rounds start at 1; the finite sum uses 1≤t≤T. At T=0 it is empty and both sides of the goal are zero. No positivity assumption on σ is imposed, since the statements use σ2 and the zero-denominator covariance correction has zero numerator. The log determinant is used on positive semidefinite covariance matrices with nonnegative scalar argument, where its determinant is positive. The paper's square-root factorization of Σ′ is represented by its equal direct matrix formula. A deterministic Gram matrix in place of Γt, an independent-observation construction in place of the conditional-moment model, or a supremum-norm ball would change the theorem. The separate matrix and probability lemmas, conditional expectation infrastructure, and finite-dimensional matrix order are the principal reusable components.
Selected references
Nima Hamidi and Mohsen Bayati, The Elliptical Potential Lemma for General Distributions with an Application to Linear Thompson Sampling, technical note, Operations Research, 2023; formalization source: arXiv:2102.07987v3, 2022, §2 and Appendix A.
Improved Approximations for a CVRP with Unsplittable Demands: The Cheaper of a Matching-Plus-Tank Solution and a Tank-Split TSP Tour Is an (α + 1.75)-ApproximationResearch Paper
Motivation
Capacitated vehicle routing asks how to serve clients from a depot with vehicles that can carry only a limited load. In the unsplittable version, one vehicle must deliver each client's entire demand. This makes the choice of routes interact with bin packing: a short tour can fail because its total demand exceeds the vehicle's capacity. Approximation algorithms are therefore useful when exact optimization is impractical, and their guarantees must account for both travel distance and capacity. Friggstad et al., arXiv:2111.08138v1, pp. 1–2.
The paper distinguishes unit-demand, splittable-demand and unsplittable-demand CVRP. Earlier tour-partitioning methods gave constant-factor guarantees, while the paper's first main result is a combinatorial algorithm with ratio α+1.75, where α is an approximation ratio for metric traveling salesman tours. Taking α=1.5 gives the paper's stated 3.25 ratio. The paper also gives a separate linear-programming-based improvement, which is outside this mission. These are results already proved mathematically; the mission concerns their precise Lean statements and a machine-checked proof of the combinatorial result. Friggstad et al., arXiv:2111.08138v1, pp. 2–3.
Setting
An instance consists of a finite set V of clients, a separate depot r, a symmetric nonnegative metric costc(u,v), and a demand dv∈(0,1] for each client. A vehicle has capacity 1. A route starts and ends at r, visits a sequence of clients, and carries at most one unit of total demand. A feasible solution is a collection of routes in which every client appears exactly once. Its cost is the sum of its routes' travel costs, and opt is the least such cost. The normalization to unit capacity and the positivity of every demand are standing assumptions of §2. Friggstad et al., arXiv:2111.08138v1, p. 4, Definitions 3–4.
For a threshold δ∈[0,1/2], a client is small when dv≤δ and big when dv>δ. The radial sums are
Algorithm 1 fixes δ=1/3. It obtains one traveling-salesman tour As through the small clients and another Aa through all clients. A consecutive split partitions the visiting order of a tour into capacity-feasible routes; Split(A) is the minimum cost of such a partition. The algorithm also finds a minimum-cost matching with loops on the big clients, whose one- or two-client routes cost Match(Vbig). It returns the cheaper of a matching plus a split of As, and a split of Aa. Friggstad et al., arXiv:2111.08138v1, pp. 7–8, Algorithm 1.
Formalization targets
The first targets are the paper's intermediate bounds: Lemma 6's radial lower bound; the TSP lower bound used in §3.1; Claims 8–9 on the probabilities of the tank events; Lemma 7's δ-tank cost guarantee; Lemmas 10–11 on the matching; and the two branch estimates (4)–(5). These are the mission's milestones in the order in which their results are needed. Friggstad et al., arXiv:2111.08138v1, pp. 4–8.
The goal is Theorem 1. Let TSP(S) be the minimum depot tour length through exactly the client set S, and suppose
c(As)≤αTSP(Vsmall),c(Aa)≤αTSP(V),α≥1.
For the specific cost
Calg:=min{Match(Vbig)+Split(As),Split(Aa)},
the goal says that a feasible solution attains Calg and, for every feasible solution T,
The theorem supplies a cost guarantee for a concrete routing algorithm with a fixed threshold and two prescribed branches. It applies to unequal, indivisible client demands, while a unit-demand model cannot express the main capacity issue. The 3.25 instance obtained from a 1.5-approximate TSP routine is a directly interpretable guarantee. The stronger LP-based theorem in §4 is a separate result and is not needed to establish this one. Friggstad et al., arXiv:2111.08138v1, pp. 2, 7–9.
A completed formalization would connect the paper's demand-aware CVRP model to a reusable published metric-route module, add definitions for optimal consecutive tour splitting and loop-allowed matching, and certify the stated branch and radial inequalities. Related platform results cover unit-demand VRP and TSP bounds, but their capacity and demand conventions differ. This mission introduces the unsplittable-demand statements rather than treating those unit-demand results as interchangeable.
Difficulty
The direct shortcut from a TSP tour to CVRP routes does not control capacity: a segment cheap in distance may carry too much demand. The big clients are especially restrictive at δ=1/3, since no feasible route can contain three of them. The tank lemma has to relate a partition of a fixed visiting order to the four radial terms with the exact coefficients shown above. The final ratio depends on comparing the two algorithm branches, including both matching bounds; an arbitrary feasible solution with a small cost would not establish a guarantee for Algorithm 1. Friggstad et al., arXiv:2111.08138v1, pp. 5–8.
Formalization scope
Lean represents the nodes by Fin (n+1), with depot 0 and all other nodes as clients. A route is a nonempty list of clients, and a solution is a list of routes whose concatenation contains each required client once. The metric and route-cost functions come from the published SupplyChainTheory_vrp definition module; its unit-demand feasibility predicate is not used. The number of clients may be zero. Costs and demands are real, capacity is exactly 1, and every client demand lies in (0,1]. The value at the depot is unused.
Each optimum in the statement is a real infimum over a finite, nonempty, nonnegative cost set for a valid instance. Singleton routes make the split and matching candidate sets nonempty; an ordering exists for every finite client set. The TSP inputs list exactly their intended client sets, and their α guarantees refer to the corresponding TSP optima. The explicit α≥1 condition records what the paper means by an approximation ratio. Lemma 7 is stated for any client subset because Algorithm 1 applies it both to the small-client tour and the all-client tour. Display (5) is an upper bound: the printed equality replaces the tour cost by upper bounds. The running-time assertions are outside this cost formalization. Friggstad et al., arXiv:2111.08138v1, pp. 5–8.
The goal bounds the cost of the specified algorithm, including attainment by a feasible solution. Merely asserting that some feasible solution has cost at most (α+1.75)opt would be trivial, since an optimal solution already does. Contributions to the finite-tour, consecutive-split, radial, matching and tank-event lemmas are useful beyond the final ratio.
Selected references
Z. Friggstad, R. Mousavi, M. Rahgoshay, and M. R. Salavatipour, Improved Approximations for CVRP with Unsplittable Demands, arXiv:2111.08138v1, 2021; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. arXiv
Pipeline Interventions: The Budget-Splitting Dynamic Program over an ε-Net of the Simplex Attains Social Welfare at Least OPT − 3(k−1)ε‖R‖∞Research Paper
Motivation
Many consequential outcomes (a faculty position, a high-paying job) are the end of a long pipeline of earlier stages: neighbourhood, elementary school, high school, college, graduate school. Inequities that compound along such a pipeline are hard to correct by intervening only at its last stage, and a planner with a limited budget would like to decide where along the pipeline to invest. Arunachaleswaran, Kannan, Roth and Ziani (arXiv:2002.06592) introduce the pipeline intervention problem, a stylized optimization model of this question, and study it under a social-welfare objective and two fairness-motivated maximin objectives. The problem is non-convex: the welfare is a product of the decision matrices, so standard convex-optimization guarantees do not apply. Their positive result for social welfare is an additive fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for networks of constant width, based on a dynamic program over a discretization of the budget and of the probability simplex. This mission formalizes that result.
Setting
A layered graph has k layers L1,…,Lk, each with w nodes (the width). Between consecutive layers Lt and Lt+1 every node is connected to every node. Write D={x∈[0,1]w:∑ix(i)=1} for the simplex of probability distributions on [w] and M for the set of left stochasticw×w matrices: nonnegative entries, every column summing to 1. An instance consists of
initial transition matrices M10,…,Mk−10∈M, where Mt0(v,u) is the probability of moving from u∈Lt to v∈Lt+1 (distributions are multiplied on the right);
an initial distribution D1∈D of the population over L1;
rewards R(v)≥0 on the final layer Lk;
for each t a set Emalt of malleable entries; the other entries cannot be changed.
Changing Mt0 into Mt costs c(Mt,Mt0)=∑i,j∣Mt(i,j)−Mt0(i,j)∣. With budget B, the feasible setF(B,M0) consists of the tuples (M1,…,Mk−1) with each Mt∈M, Mt equal to Mt0 on non-malleable entries, and ∑tc(Mt,Mt0)≤B. The social welfare of a tuple is W(M)=R⊤Mk−1⋯M1D1, and OPT is its maximum over F(B,M0).
Algorithm 1 fixes ε>0, the budget grid B(ε)={nε:n∈N}, Bε=max{x∈B(ε):x≤B}, and a finite ε-netD(ε)⊆D in ℓ1 (every D∈D is within ℓ1 distance ε of some element). Working backwards from the last layer, for each layer t, grid budget B≥t≤B and net distribution Dt (or D1 itself at t=1), it solves Program (7): maximize R⊤M(B≥t+1,Dt+1)MtDt over Mt∈M agreeing with Mt0 off Emalt with c(Mt,Mt0)≤B≥t−B≥t+1, for every smaller grid budget B≥t+1 and every Dt+1∈D(ε), and stores the best product M(B≥t,Dt)=M(B≥t+1,Dt+1)Mt. It returns M(Bε,D1).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 10)
For every instance, every B≥0, every ε>0 and every ε-net D(ε): Algorithm 1 has a run; every run returns a tuple M∈F(B,M0) with
W(M)≥OPT−3(k−1)ε∥R∥∞;
and the algorithm solves at most (k−1)(⌊B/ε⌋+1)2∣D(ε)∣2 instances of Program (7).
Milestones
Lemma 1 (p. 11): ∥MD−MD′∥1≤∥D−D′∥1 for M∈M, D,D′∈D.
Corollary 2 (p. 12): R⊤MD≥R⊤MD′−∥R∥∞ε when ∥D−D′∥1≤ε.
The budget-saving matrix of the proof of Claim 1 (App. A.1, p. 25): from any admissible Mt∗ one obtains Mtε with c(Mtε,Mt0)=max(0,c(Mt∗,Mt0)−ε) losing at most ∥R∥∞ε of reward.
Claim 1 (p. 8, social-welfare part): some solution with budgets in B(ε) has welfare ≥OPT−(k−1)ε∥R∥∞.
The induction invariant of the proof of Theorem 1 (p. 12): R⊤M(B≥t,Dt)Dt≥OPTε−2(k−t)ε∥R∥∞.
Claim 2 (p. 8, corrected size): an ℓ1ε-net of D with at most (⌈2w/ε⌉+1)w−1 points.
Significance
Theorem 1 shows that, for networks of constant width, the welfare-maximizing intervention can be approximated to within an additive δ∥R∥∞ in time polynomial in k, B and 1/δ, even though the problem is non-convex in the matrices. The same dynamic program, run over population-wise distributions, gives the paper's FPTAS for the ex-post maximin objective (Theorem 2), and through a no-regret reduction for the ex-ante maximin objective (Lemma 2). The paper also shows that the width restriction cannot be removed: approximating the maximin objective is NP-hard for polynomial width.
The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. The formalization makes the algorithm itself a mathematical object (a run relation with arbitrary tie-breaking) and checks the guarantee for every run and every net. It also pins down two statements the paper gets slightly wrong: the running-time count of Theorem 1, whose proof omits one budget loop, and the net size of Claim 2, which fails for large ε; both are stated here in corrected form. Lemma 1, Corollary 2 and the simplex net are reusable for any Markov-chain or dynamic-programming result over distributions.
Difficulty
The welfare R⊤Mk−1⋯M1D1 is multilinear but not concave in the tuple, so one cannot simply solve one convex program. Splitting the problem layer by layer requires knowing the distribution arriving at each layer, which ranges over a continuum; replacing it by a net point introduces an error at every layer, and the argument must show that these errors add up linearly rather than compound. A second source of error is the budget: the optimal split of B across layers is generally not on the grid, and moving it onto the grid must cost little welfare at each layer even though the matrices interact multiplicatively. The bookkeeping that keeps the total loss at 3(k−1)ε∥R∥∞ is where a careless formalization fails.
Formalization scope
The development lives in the namespace PipelineInterv.Welfare. Transitions are indexed by Fin K with K=k−1, 0-based; matrices are Matrix (Fin w) (Fin w) ℝ with M i j the probability of moving from j to i, and M is Mathlib's Matrix.colStochastic. The ℓ1 norm and ∥R∥∞ are written out, never the default sup norm. The standing assumptions of §2 (left stochastic Mt0, D1∈D, R≥0) are one predicate; the paper's without-loss-of-generality conventions (D1>0, distinct rewards) are not imposed. OPT is expressed as "for every feasible tuple", equivalent by Remark 3. Algorithm 1 is a relation on tables: a table is a run when every stored entry is the product of a smaller-budget entry and a Program (7)-feasible matrix that maximizes the objective over all such choices; ties are arbitrary. The net is any finite ε-net contained in D, and the budget grid is cut at B.
The goal cannot be satisfied trivially: the run relation contains the optimality clause (without it any table of feasible matrices would be a run), the net is a finite set, and the goal asserts that a run exists, so the guarantee is never vacuous. The running-time clause is a count of Program (7) instances, not an asymptotic time bound; solving each instance is a linear program in O(w2) variables.
A complete development needs: ℓ1 contraction of column-stochastic matrices, the Hölder bound ∣R⊤x∣≤∥R∥∞∥x∥1, the existence of maximizers of a linear function over the compact Program (7) feasible set, an explicit grid net of the simplex, and the two inductions (over transitions for Claim 1, backwards over layers for the invariant). Proofs of the milestones, alternative arguments and lemmas about the suffix and prefix products are welcome.
Selected references
E. R. Arunachaleswaran, S. Kannan, A. Roth, J. Ziani, Pipeline Interventions, arXiv:2002.06592v2, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.06592
S. Kannan, A. Roth, J. Ziani, Downstream effects of affirmative action, Proceedings of FAT* 2019, pp. 240–248.
S. F. Way, D. B. Larremore, A. Clauset, Gender, productivity, and prestige in computer science faculty hiring networks, Proceedings of WWW 2016, pp. 1169–1179.
External Financing and Customer Capital: A Financial Theory of Markups: A Firm's Optimal Markup Is η/(η−1) Times One Minus the Markup Wedge βAμ/(Rν)Research Paper
Motivation
Why do financially constrained firms charge different markups from otherwise similar firms? A firm can use a low price to attract customers today, but it may also need current cash to pay for production and avoid costly outside financing. Dou and Ji put these two incentives into a dynamic model in which the customer base affects future demand and cash holdings affect financing choices. Their SSRN working paper derives a compact expression for the resulting firm-level markup. This mission isolates that expression and the pricing calculations that support it.
The question matters for interpreting observed prices. A high price need not reflect only weak product-market competition: it may also reflect the firm's current valuation of liquidity relative to future customers. Conversely, a firm with a valuable opportunity to build a customer base may discount its product even when doing so reduces immediate operating profit. Proposition 3.1 of Dou and Ji, in the monopolistically competitive part of their model, states this trade-off through a single markup wedge. The paper separately analyzes a monopoly industry and connects the model to quantitative and empirical exercises; those results are outside this mission.
Setting
A firm's customer baseMi,t measures the stock of customers attracted by firm i at time t. The firm sets its own price Pi,t>0 while treating the industry price indexPt>0 as given. The industry's price elasticity is ϵ, and the elasticity of substitution among firms' goods is η, with 1<ϵ<η. The firm's demand is
Ci,t=Mi,t(Pi,t/Pt)−ηPt−ϵ.(2.4)
Sales add to the customer base at rate β, while customers leave at rate ρ. Production uses rented capital: productivity A>0 and rental rate R>0 give marginal cost R/A. The markupΛi,t is the ratio of the firm's price to this cost, Pi,t/(R/A). Firm cash Wi,t changes with operating profit and with its return net of a cash-carrying cost. The expected drifts per unit time used here are
Here P is the firm's proposed price, and M and W are its current customer base and cash. The marginal value of customer baseμ and marginal value of corporate liquidityν weight those drifts in the price-dependent objective H(P)=μgM(P)+νgW(P). The paper calls them Lagrangian multipliers of the respective state evolutions. The markup wedge is Ω=(βA/R)(μ/ν). Under the stated sign conditions, it is nonnegative. These objects come from the model and the appendix to Proposition 3.1.
Formalization targets
Optimal markup under monopolistic competition
The goal states that a positive price globally maximizes H over positive prices exactly when its markup satisfies Proposition 3.1:
Λ(P)=η−1η(1−Ω),Ω=RβAνμ≥0.(3.1–3.2)
The equivalence includes existence and uniqueness of the positive maximizing price under Ω<1. The goal keeps the wedge as a quantity computed from the firm's parameters and marginal values. It does not designate the formula itself as the definition of an optimal price.
Appendix calculations
Four milestones follow the printed sequence of Online Appendix A.1: the derivative of expected customer-base growth (A.2), the derivative of expected cash growth (A.4), the equivalence between the resulting stationary condition and the price formula (A.5)–(A.6), and the conversion of that price formula into the markup expression (A.8). The SSRN version is the citation basis; printed page 33 is PDF page 34. The goal remains the proposition rather than any one appendix equation.
Significance
The formula separates two channels in a firm's price decision. The factor η/(η−1) is the familiar constant-elasticity markup when attracting customers has no additional value. The nonnegative wedge reduces this markup according to the customer-base value μ relative to the liquidity value ν. It therefore supplies a precise interpretation of how the firm's financial position and its incentive to expand its customer base interact in pricing. This is the paper's stated “sufficient statistic” interpretation of the wedge, within its equilibrium model (Dou and Ji, Proposition 3.1).
The result is proved in the paper. The work here is to give its model quantities, derivative identities, stationary-price equation, and global optimal-price characterization machine-checkable Lean statements. The appendix equations are individually useful when formalizing other pricing results from the same model. The current mission statements carry sorry placeholders: building them checks their syntax and types, while the proofs remain for solvers.
Difficulty
A zero price derivative gives a candidate price, but by itself does not establish a global maximum among all admissible prices. The objective includes a negative power of price and has an open domain P>0, so its behavior as price approaches zero or becomes large matters. Its candidate price is positive only in the regime Ω<1. The paper gives the stationary relation in Appendix A.1; a complete formal proof of the goal must connect that relation to the global optimization claim without assuming the answer as an input.
Formalization scope
Lean represents the paper's real-valued parameters in one Params structure and uses Real.rpow for demand powers. The predicates and functions concern one firm at one instant; firm and time indices are suppressed. The industry price index, customer base, cash balance, and marginal values are supplied as real numbers. Prices range over positive reals, and IsOptimalPrice means a global maximum of H over that domain. The model records the expected deterministic drift per unit time. Brownian noise, the separate payout or equity-issuance control, the equilibrium price-index aggregator, and the full stochastic HJB state equation are outside the price comparison because they do not enter these displayed appendix derivatives when the index and controls are fixed.
The source states β>0 in the model but explicitly discusses β=0 after Proposition 3.1, so the standing predicate allows β≥0. It also describes ν≥1 in the equilibrium discussion; the formal theorem uses the weaker mathematical condition ν>0. It takes μ≥0 and, as implicit economic domain conditions, A,R,Pt,M>0. The added condition Ω<1 makes the proposed optimal price positive and the global maximizer finite. The firm-price domain is P>0. These commitments should be read as the domain of the formal claim, rather than as an assertion that every parameter choice produces an equilibrium of the full stochastic model.
An optimal price is defined by maximizing the drifts-based objective, not by the markup identity or stationary-price formula. The definition module, derivative milestones, and a proof of the global characterization are all available work. The real-power calculus and maximization arguments can be reused for other constant-elasticity pricing problems.
Selected references
W. W. Dou and Y. Ji, External Financing and Customer Capital: A Financial Theory of Markups, SSRN working paper 2574953, version of May 11, 2020; published in Management Science (2021). SSRN preprint; journal DOI.
Buy-One-Get-One Promotions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain: Without Stockpiling, BOGO Earns the Retailer and the Supply Chain More Than Price Reduction While the Manufacturer Is IndifferentResearch Paper
Motivation
Retailers run two kinds of temporary promotion on staple products. A price reduction (PR) cuts the price of every unit for a while; a buy-one-get-one (BOGO) offer leaves the price of the first unit alone and discounts a second unit bought at the same time. Both are common in grocery retail, and in practice the manufacturer sets the wholesale price before the retailer decides which promotion to run. Which promotion a retailer should prefer, and how the choice moves profit between the manufacturer and the retailer, is a basic question in the operations and marketing literature on trade promotions.
Li, Khouja, Pan and Zhou (SSRN 3561162; Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4638) model this as a two-echelon Stackelberg game with consumers who value a second unit less than the first. Their headline result for the case without consumer stockpiling (Corollary 4, pp. 23–24 of the working paper) is that, whenever both promotions are adopted in equilibrium, the manufacturer is indifferent between them while BOGO gives the retailer, and the supply chain as a whole, strictly more profit. This mission formalizes that statement about the equilibria of the model.
Setting
A unit mass of consumers has valuations v uniform on [0,1]. In each of two periods a consumer values the first unit at v, a second unit at θv with 0<θ≤1, and further units at nothing. A consumer buying i units in period 1 and j in period 2 takes the purchase option(i,j).
Under a BOGO the retailer charges pb for the first unit and pg≤pb for a second unit in period 1, and pb in period 2. The options are (0,0),(1,1),(2,0),(2,1) with net utilities u1,1=2(v−pb), u2,0=(1+θ)v−pb−pg, u2,1=2(v−pb)+θv−pg.
Under a price reduction the retailer charges a discount price pd≤pr in period 1 and a regular price pr in period 2. The options add (1,0), with u1,0=v−pd, u1,1=2v−pr−pd, u2,0=(1+θ)v−2pd, u2,1=(2+θ)v−pr−2pd.
Under no promotion (NP) there is one price p in both periods and a consumer buys one unit per period iff v≥p.
Each consumer picks a utility-maximizing option. At wholesale price w the retailer's profit is the expected margin of the chosen options, and the demandD is the expected number of units. The manufacturer, with unit cost c≥0, earns (w−c)D.
There are three games. In the BOGO game the retailer may set a single price or run a BOGO; in the PR game, a single price or a PR; in the NP game, only a single price. In each, the manufacturer leads: an equilibrium is a wholesale price w∗∈(0,1] and a retailer strategy r that is a best response at every w∈(0,1], such that w∗ maximizes (w−c)D(r(w)). The thresholds of the paper are
Fix c≥0 and 0<θ≤1 with c<cˉ(θ). Take equilibria of the three games and write πbm∗,πbr∗ (BOGO), πdm∗,πdr∗ (PR), πnm∗,πnr∗ (NP) for the manufacturer's and retailer's profits. Then
and for θ<1 also pg∗<pd∗, πdr∗<πbr∗, πdm∗+πdr∗<πbm∗+πbr∗, and the retailer's share of supply-chain profit is strictly largest under BOGO; at θ=1, πbr∗=πdr∗. Across two values θ1<θ2 in the region, the price gap pd∗−pg∗, the advantage πbr∗−πdr∗ and the BOGO share πbr∗/(πbm∗+πbr∗) strictly decrease.
Milestones
Eqs. (1)–(2) and (4): the integral profits equal the paper's closed forms on the consumer segmentations of Tables 1 and 4.
Propositions 1 and 3: the retailer's best responses in the BOGO and PR games (Table 2).
Corollary 3: at any w the retailer's best PR profit is at most its best BOGO profit, and the gap decreases in θ where PR beats NP.
The NP equilibrium (Table 3, 2nd column), Proposition 2 a) and Proposition 4 a): existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium outcomes of Table 3.
cˉ(θ)≤c~(θ): the PR region of the supply chain lies inside the BOGO region.
Significance
The corollary separates the two effects of a promotion. Because both promotions lead to the same wholesale price and the same expected demand, the manufacturer's profit does not depend on which one the retailer runs; the entire extra supply-chain profit from BOGO goes to the retailer. This is the paper's case that BOGO is a profit-reallocation device within the channel rather than a demand-creation device. The comparison with the NP benchmark shows that, in this region, both the retailer and the supply chain gain from running BOGO rather than no promotion.
The paper's working-paper version contains no proofs (they are in a supplementary file), and none of the statements has a machine-checked proof. A complete development here checks the full chain from consumer choice to the manufacturer's optimum. It also pins down the exact domain of the claims: the strict comparisons fail at θ=1, Proposition 3 as printed leaves θ=1 uncovered, and Proposition 4 b) does not hold as an equilibrium statement, because the PR demand jumps at w=θˉ. The statements in this mission are corrected accordingly.
Difficulty
The closed forms of Table 3 make Corollary 4 a matter of rational-function algebra once the equilibria are known, and that is the trap: the content lies in showing that the equilibria are exactly the Table 3 outcomes. The retailer's problem is a piecewise maximization over several consumer segmentations, compared against the single-price option on the same menu. The manufacturer's problem is then a maximization against a discontinuous best response, whose thresholds θˉ, c~(θ), cˉ(θ) involve square roots. In the PR game the retailer is indifferent at w=θˉ between two policies with different demands. Any argument that treats the best response as a continuous function of w fails there.
Formalization scope
All quantities are real numbers. Profits and demands are interval integrals over v∈[0,1] of the margin and the number of units of the option each consumer chooses. Among tied options a consumer takes the one with more units, which affects only a null set. Feasible prices are nonnegative with pg≤pb and pd≤pr; the page's strict pg<pb has no optimum at θ=1. Wholesale prices range over (0,1]. The retailer's strategy is a function of the wholesale price, so the equilibrium is subgame perfect, and ties of the retailer are resolved by the strategy, not by assumption. All of Corollary 4's claims are stated for every equilibrium, so the goal cannot be discharged by substituting Table 3, and profits are defined from consumer choices, not by the paper's formulas. The strict comparisons between BOGO and PR, and the share comparisons, carry θ<1, with the equality at θ=1 as its own clause, as the corollary itself states.
The development needs piecewise integration of step functions, the maximization of concave quadratics on intervals, and inequalities with square roots. The definitions file BOGOPromo.NoStockpile.Model is self-contained. Contributions of proofs of the milestones, and of auxiliary lemmas computing the retailer's profit on each consumer segmentation, are welcome.
Selected references
Y. Li, M. Khouja, J. Pan, J. Zhou, Buy-One-Get-One Promotions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain, SSRN working paper 3561162 (version of 2020-03-25). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561162
Y. Li, M. Khouja, J. Pan, J. Zhou, Buy-One-Get-One Promotions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain, Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4638
Dynamic Information Regimes in Financial Markets: For Any Fraction Informed, a Market Equilibrium with Linear Prices and a Self-Consistent Price Variance ExistsResearch Paper
Motivation
Investors pay for information, and the amount of information they produce changes over time. In periods when many investors are informed, more information becomes available, which makes being informed cheaper and attracts still more informed investors; when few are informed, the reverse happens. Glasserman, Mamaysky and Shen, Dynamic Information Regimes in Financial Markets (Management Science), build an overlapping-generations (OLG) asset market in which this feedback produces persistent information regimes, and use it to explain sudden price drops that occur without a change in fundamentals.
The paper extends the noisy rational-expectations framework of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and the OLG market of Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) with a state variable that tracks how much of the next dividend is knowable. Before regimes, price drops or information choice can be studied, the market stage must have an equilibrium for every possible fraction of informed investors. This mission formalizes that existence result.
Setting
Dividend.Dt+1=(1−ρ)Dˉ+ρDt+Mt+1, with μD=(1−ρ)Dˉ and normal innovations Mt+1 of variance σM2. The innovation splits as Mt+1=mt+θt+ϵt+1: mt is known only to informed investors, θt is public, and ϵt+1 is unknowable at time t. Their variances are ϕftσM2, (1−ϕ)ftσM2 and (1−ft)σM2.
Information state. The fraction ft of knowable innovation lives on the grid D={0,1/m,…,1} and evolves as
ft+1=ΠD(af+bfλ(ft)+κf(ft−af)+ϵf,t+1),
where ΠD clips to [0,1] and rounds up to the grid, and λ(f)∈[0,1] is the fraction informed in state f.
Investors. Each generation lives one period, invests at the gross riskless return R>1 and chooses a demand q for the risky asset by a mean-variance criterion with risk aversion γ>0. The variance of next period's price enters through a conjectured varianceVB(f). Informed investors see mt; uninformed investors see only ft, θt, Dt and the price Pt, and update about mt from the price. The supply of the asset is Xˉ+Xt with Xˉ>0 and Xt normal of variance σX2.
Equilibrium. A linear price process is
Pt=a(ft)+b(ft)mt+gθt−c(ft)Xt+dDt.
It clears the market if the optimal demands satisfy λqI+(1−λ)qU=Xˉ+Xt in every state and for every realization. The conjecture VB is self-consistent if
VB(f)=b(f)2ϕfσM2+g2(1−ϕ)fσM2+c(f)2σX2for all f.
A market equilibrium is a price process and a positive self-consistent conjecture with market clearing. In Lean these are Clears, SelfConsistent and MarketEquilibrium in InfoRegimes.MarketEq.Model.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 4.1 (p. 22)
Write d=ρ/(R−ρ). If 1<R≤1.2 and
(1+d)γσMσX=R−ρRγσMσX≤0.28,
then for every λ:D→[0,1] a market equilibrium exists. The shock law of ϵf, the coefficients af,bf,κf and the grid size are arbitrary.
Milestones
(B.4): the mean-variance demand is qN/(γqD).
Footnote 32: the posterior variance var(m∣P)=(1−Kb)var(m) behind (B.7)–(B.8).
(B.10): clearing forces d=ρ/(R−ρ) and g=1/(R−ρ).
(B.12): clearing forces b/c=λ(1+d)/(γqDI), and c=γqDU/R when λ=0.
(B.19)–(B.21): the intercept a(⋅) is (1+d)μD/(R−1) minus the discounted expected net profits.
Lemma 4.1: for every VB>0 and λ, a clearing linear price process with these d,g exists.
The reduction of p. 22: the coefficients (B.13)–(B.18) clear the market, and a fixed point of the self-consistency map gives a market equilibrium.
Footnote 15: in the special case f≡0, λ≡0, self-consistency is a quadratic in VB with two positive roots under (27).
Significance
Proposition 4.1 makes the fraction informed a free input of the market stage. The paper's information equilibrium (Proposition 4.2), its two-regime dynamics and its price-drop analysis all take a market equilibrium for a given λ as their starting point. Footnote 15 shows that equilibria need not be unique: even in the single-state case there is a low-variance and a high-variance equilibrium.
The result is proved in the paper's Electronic Companion (Section EC.2), which states more general parameter conditions. No machine-checked version exists. A formalization pins down exactly what "market equilibrium" means here: optimal demands with Bayesian updating from prices, clearing for all realizations, and self-consistency of the variance conjecture. It also yields reusable components: the mean-variance demand, the Gaussian signal-extraction identity, and a present-value identity for finite Markov chains.
Difficulty
Market clearing alone is linear algebra: for a fixed conjecture VB, collecting terms determines the price coefficients, and the intercept solves a linear equation with a discounted stochastic matrix. Self-consistency is the hard part. The coefficients b and c depend on VB through the expected variances qDI, qDU and the uninformed investors' signal extraction, so (26) is a nonlinear fixed-point equation for VB on the grid, coupled across states through the transition kernel. Footnote 15 shows that it can have several solutions, and that without a bound such as (27) it can have no real solution at all. The obvious approach, iterating the map from a starting conjecture, need not converge to anything without a contraction estimate, and the paper reports that the high-variance root is unstable.
Formalization scope
All quantities are real. The grid is Fin (m+1) with m≥1 and fi=i/m. The standing assumptions are R>1, σM,σX,γ,Xˉ>0 and 0≤ϕ≤1, plus the added bound −1<ρ<1: the paper never states the range of ρ, while d and (27) need ρ<R. The page's R∈[1,1.2] is read with the standing R>1 as 1<R≤1.2; 1.2 and 0.28 are written as 6/5 and 7/25. The law of ϵf is an arbitrary probability measure, and transition probabilities are its values on preimage sets. Conditional expectations given ft are finite sums against this kernel at the current state's λ.
Demands are maximizers of the explicit mean-variance objectives, not closed-form formulas. Uninformed demand depends only on (ft,θt,Dt,Pt), and the Gaussian posterior mean and variance (B.7)–(B.8) are written in closed form. Clearing is required for every realization (mt,θt,Xt,Dt)∈R4. A trivializing formalization is ruled out: MarketEquilibrium does not hard-wire d, g, b or c, and it is not "the self-consistency map has a fixed point", which is milestone 7's hypothesis, not the goal.
Useful infrastructure: positivity and row sums of the transition kernel, continuity of the self-consistency map in VB, and a fixed-point theorem on a box. Brouwer's theorem is not in Mathlib, but it is Proved on the platform as AGT.brouwer_fixed_point and Plasticity.Ext.Brouwer. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative routes to the goal, are welcome.
Not in this mission: Proposition 4.2 (existence of an endogenous fraction informed), the microfoundation of §3, and the numerical analysis of §§5–6.
S. J. Grossman, J. E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, American Economic Review 70(3), 1980. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805228
F. Allen, S. Morris, H. S. Shin, Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets, Review of Financial Studies 19(3), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhj036
M. Spiegel, Stock Price Volatility in a Multiple Security Overlapping Generations Model, Review of Financial Studies 11(2), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/11.2.419
Stochastic Games with General Payoff Functions: For Every ε > 0, Every Multiplayer Stochastic Game with Bounded Borel-Measurable Payoffs Has an ε-Solvable SubgameResearch Paper
Motivation
A stochastic game (Shapley, 1953) is a dynamic game in which the players' actions influence the evolution of a state variable. Whether every multiplayer stochastic game admits an ε-equilibrium for every ε>0 is open even for finitely many states and the long-run average payoff; it is open as well for the general class in which each player's payoff is an arbitrary bounded Borel-measurable function of the infinite play, introduced by Blackwell (1969). This class contains the discounted and long-run average payoffs and the winning conditions of verification (Büchi, parity, Müller).
Flesch and Solan (arXiv:2208.12096; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) prove a weaker, unconditional statement: every such game has a subgame that admits an ε-equilibrium. Their tool is the Martin function, a real-valued function on histories which reduces playing well in the stochastic game to playing well in a one-shot game at each history.
Timeline.
1981: Mertens and Neyman construct, for two-player zero-sum games with the long-run average payoff, functions with the properties later abstracted as Martin's.
1991: Thuijsman and Vrieze show that every two-player stochastic game with finitely many states and the long-run average payoff has an easy initial state, an initial state with an ε-equilibrium.
1998: Martin proves determinacy of Blackwell games, for two players, zero-sum, one state; Maitra and Sudderth extend it to countable state spaces.
2000: Vieille (2000c) introduces solvable states and proves their existence for N players with the long-run average payoff and finitely many states.
2015: Mashiah-Yaakovi proves existence of extensive-form correlated ε-equilibria for bounded Borel payoffs.
2022: Ashkenazi-Golan, Flesch, Predtetchinski and Solan generalize the Martin function to multiplayer games (PNAS 119(11)).
2022–2024: Flesch and Solan obtain the existence of an ε-solvable subgame for every bounded Borel payoff.
The game, its subgames and its values
A stochastic game Γ=(I,S,(Ai)i∈I,p,(fi)i∈I) consists of
a nonempty finite set I of players;
a nonempty finite or countable set S of states;
for each player i a nonempty finite action set Ai, with A=∏iAi;
a transition p(⋅∣s,a)∈Δ(S);
for each player a payoff functionfi, bounded and Borel-measurable on the space of runs(s1,a1,s2,a2,…).
A historyh=(s1,a1,…,sn) of stage n is a finite prefix with positive transition probabilities; H is the set of histories and sh the final state of h. A behavior strategyσi assigns a mixed action σi(h)∈Δ(Ai) to every history. A profile σ and a history h determine a probability measure Ph,σ on runs that continue h. Player i's payoff in the subgameΓh is Eh,σ[fi]=∫fi(hr)Ph,σ(dr), and the minmax value there is
vi(h)=σ−iinfσisupEh,σi,σ−i[fi].
A profile σ is an ε-equilibrium in Γh if no player gains more than ε by a unilateral deviation, measured by Eh,⋅[fi]. The subgame Γh is ε-solvable if it has one (Definition 4.8).
A function Di:H→R induces at every h the one-shot gameGO(D,h), in which player i receives E[Di∣h,a]=∑sp(s∣sh,a)Di(h,a,s); its minmax value is vO,i(Di,h).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 4.9
For every stochastic game as above and every ε>0,
∃h∈H∃σ:Eh,σ[fi]≥Eh,σi′,σ−i[fi]−εfor all i∈I and all strategies σi′.
The history may depend on ε and is not required to start in a prescribed initial state.
Milestones
Theorem 3.1 (minmax version): for every ε>0 and player i there is a bounded Diε with vi−ε≤Diε≤vi, Diε(h)≤vO,i(Diε,h), and the local-to-global property (3).
Theorem 4.4: playing an equilibrium of GO(Dε,h) at every h gives Eh,σ∗[fi]≥vi(h)−ε for all i and h (a minmax ε-acceptable profile), so such a profile exists.
Eq. (10): for a prefix-free set Q of histories and a stopping time θ, the expected fictitious hitting count equals the probability of reaching Q before θ.
§4.4 Step 2: (Ern,σ[fi])n is a martingale converging almost surely to fi(r).
Eq. (15): under σ∗, Diδ(rn) is a submartingale.
Eq. (19): an event of positive probability has conditional probability above 1−δ at some history beyond any given stage.
Significance
The result. Theorem 4.9 is the strongest unconditional existence statement known for multiplayer stochastic games with general payoffs. When the payoffs are shift-invariant (long-run average, limsup, parity) the solvable subgame yields an initial state with an ε-equilibrium (Corollary 4.10). This recovers the results of Thuijsman and Vrieze (1991) and Vieille (2000c) for the long-run average payoff. Theorem 4.4 along the way answers a question of Simon (2016): no three-player zero-sum-on-every-play game has all minmax values strictly positive.
Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; nothing of it is machine-checked. A formalization produces:
a reusable model of multiplayer stochastic games with payoffs on infinite plays, built on Mathlib's Ionescu-Tulcea kernel Kernel.traj;
the one-shot reduction through Martin functions;
a checked version of the martingale and stopping-time arguments of §4.4.
Difficulty
The first idea, to play the profile σ∗ of Theorem 4.4 everywhere, fails: σ∗ keeps every player above the minmax value, but it is not an equilibrium, because a player may prefer some actions in the support of its own mixed action or may steer the play to histories where its own minmax value is high. Handling the first problem needs a compact set of runs on which payoffs are almost constant and a way to identify who left it. That second ingredient is the blame function of Alon, Gunby, He, Shmaya and Solan (2022), which is not available on the platform. Handling the second needs the fictitious hitting counts of (8)–(10) and a careful choice of punishment thresholds. Theorem 3.1 itself is not proved in the paper: it rests on Martin's (1998) determinacy of Blackwell games, on the multiplayer extension of Ashkenazi-Golan et al. (2022a, Theorem 3.6 and Claim 3.5, with the modification of footnote 3), and on the countable-state method of Maitra and Sudderth (1998).
Formalization scope
Players, states and actions. Players form a Fintype with decidable equality and are nonempty. States form a nonempty Countable type, and action sets are nonempty Fintypes, the same in every state. The transition is p : S → (∀ i, A i) → PMF S.
Runs. A run is a sequence of coordinates: coordinate 0 is s1, coordinate n+1 is (an+1,sn+2). Each coordinate carries the discrete σ-algebra, and runs carry the product σ-algebra, which is the paper's Borel σ-algebra.
Indexing and feasibility. A Lean history of index n is the paper's history of stage n+1. Payoffs are defined on all sequences, not only on the closed set of runs with positive transitions; this is equivalent, since a bounded Borel function on that set extends and the set has full measure. Every quantifier over H carries the predicate Feasible.
Play measure.playMeasure G σ n h is Kernel.traj of the one-stage kernel (independent mixed actions, then p) started at h. Its runs begin with h, so ∫ f i ∂(playMeasure G σ n h) is Eh,σ[fi].
Values.inf/sup and the one-shot min/max are real ⨅/⨆; they are the paper's values because payoffs and Martin functions are bounded.
One-shot equilibria. These are the platform's AGT.IsMixedNash.
Not formalized. The maxmin version of Theorem 3.1 is not stated. Eq. (19) is stated for an arbitrary measurable event of positive probability, with the added and disclosed conclusion that h∗ has positive probability.
No trivialization. The goal is stated for every game, with a feasible witness history and with deviations over all strategies. It is not stated for a fixed one-player or constant-payoff game, and ε-solvability is not weakened to deviations that agree with σ before h.
Infrastructure. A full development needs Markov properties of Kernel.traj (conditioning on the first n coordinates), Lévy's upward and zero-one laws (the platform's FamousTheorems.levy_upward_theorem is Proved), and existence of Nash equilibria in finite games (AGT.nash_existence, Proved). It also needs regularity of probability measures on Polish spaces, and either a proof of Theorem 3.1 or the blame-function result of Alon et al. Contributions to any of these, and proofs of the milestones independently of one another, are welcome.
Selected references
J. Flesch and E. Solan, Stochastic Games with General Payoff Functions, arXiv:2208.12096v1, 2022; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.12096
D. A. Martin, The determinacy of Blackwell games, Journal of Symbolic Logic 63, 1565–1581, 1998. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586667
A. Maitra and W. Sudderth, Finitely additive stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs, International Journal of Game Theory 27, 257–267, 1998.
G. Ashkenazi-Golan, J. Flesch, A. Predtetchinski and E. Solan, Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs, PNAS 119(11), e2105867119, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2105867119
N. Alon, B. Gunby, X. He, E. Shmaya and E. Solan, Identifying the deviator, arXiv:2203.03744, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.03744
Regular Matroids Have Polynomial Extension Complexity: The Independence Polytope of Every Regular Matroid on n Elements Has Extension Complexity O(n⁶)Research Paper
Motivation
Many combinatorial optimization problems are linear programs over a polytope with exponentially many facets, and one way to solve them by a polynomial-size linear program is to write the polytope as the projection of a higher-dimensional polytope with few facets. The minimum number of facets needed is the extension complexity of the polytope. It is now understood for most textbook polytopes: flows, matchings (Rothvoß 2017), arborescences, travelling-salesman tours and stable sets (Fiorini et al. 2015). Matroids are a notable exception.
For a matroid M, the independence polytopeP(M) is the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of the independent sets. Rothvoß showed by a counting argument that many matroids have independence polytopes of exponential extension complexity (Math. Program. 2013), so a polynomial bound can only hold for special classes. Regular matroids, those representable over every field, are the natural class: they contain the graphic and cographic matroids, and Seymour's decomposition theorem describes all of them.
Timeline:
1980, 1991. Wong (Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Circuits and Computers, 1980) and Martin (Oper. Res. Lett. 1991) give extended formulations of size O(∣V(G)∣⋅∣E(G)∣) for the spanning tree polytope of a graph G. This gives xc(P(M))=O(n2) for graphic and cographic matroids on n elements.
1980. Seymour (J. Combin. Theory Ser. B) proves that every regular matroid is built by 1-, 2- and 3-sums from graphic matroids, cographic matroids and copies of a 10-element matroid R10.
2017. Two preprints claim an O(n2) and an O(r⋅n) bound for all regular matroids (e.g. Gurjar and Vishnoi, arXiv:1701.00538); both were withdrawn.
2019. Aprile and Fiorini (arXiv:1909.08539) prove the first polynomial bound, O(n6).
Setting
A matroidM has a finite ground set E(M) and a family I(M) of independent sets; n=∣E(M)∣. For I⊆E(M), χI∈{0,1}E(M) is its characteristic vector, and
P(M)=conv{χI∣I∈I(M)}⊆RE(M).
An extended formulation of a set P⊆Rd of size r is a system E=x+F=y=g=, E≤x+F≤y≤g≤ with exactly r inequalities such that x∈P if and only if some y satisfies the system. The extension complexityxc(P) is the least such r. The paper defines xc(P) as the minimum number of facets of a polytope projecting onto P, and on p. 1 it gives the extended-formulation form as an equivalent definition.
A matroid is regular if it is represented over R by a totally unimodular matrix A: a set is independent exactly when the corresponding columns of A are linearly independent. It is binary if it is represented over GF(2). It is graphic if it is the cycle matroid M(G) of a multigraph G (independent sets are forests) and cographic if its dual is graphic. A cycle is a disjoint union of circuits. For binary M1,M2, the sum M1ΔM2 has ground set E(M1)ΔE(M2), and its cycles are the sets C1ΔC2, with Ci a cycle of Mi, that lie in that ground set. This sum is a 1-, 2- or 3-sum when the two ground sets share zero, one or three elements, under the side conditions of p. 3. In the 3-sum case the shared set is a triangle, a 3-element circuit of both parts. A matroid is 3-connected if it is neither a 1-sum nor a 2-sum.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 1
∃c0∀M regular on n elements:xc(P(M))≤c0⋅n6.
The constant is not fixed; the exponent is the paper's. Section 8 of the paper sketches an improvement to O(n6−ε) without proof, so the goal keeps the proved exponent.
Milestones
the graphic/cographic base case xc(P(M))=O(n2) (Wong, Martin) and the trivial bound xc(P(M))≤2n;
Lemma 3: xc(P(M1⊕tM2))≤xc(P(M1))+xc(P(M2)) for t∈{1,2};
Lemma 8 (an inequality for convex functions) and Lemma 7 (a balanced node in a weighted tree);
Theorem 6: a 3-connected regular matroid other than R10 is a tree of 3-sums of graphic and cographic matroids;
Proposition 27: the tree can be chosen without bad nodes, so that every triangle of a cographic, non-graphic label M∗(Gv) is the set of edges at a degree-3 node of Gv;
Lemma 4: such a matroid has a star decompositionM=⋆M0⊕3M1⊕3⋯⊕3Mk with M0 graphic or cographic, 1≤k≤n/4 and ∣E(Mi)∣≤n/2+3;
Proposition 12: xc(conv⋃iPi)≤∑ixc(Pi) for polytopes of dimension at least 1;
Proposition 15: xc(P(M))≤xc(PT1,…,Tk(M0),QT1,…,Tk(M0))+16∑i=1kxc(P(Mi)), where PT1,…,Tk(M0)⊆QT1,…,Tk(M0) are two polytopes attached to the centre M0 and its triangles (p. 7), and the extension complexity of the pair is the least xc(R) over polytopes R between them;
Propositions 16 and 18: that pair has extension complexity O(∣V(G)∣⋅∣E(G)∣) when M0=M(G) is graphic, and when M0=M∗(G) is cographic with every triangle the set of edges at a degree-3 node;
Lemma 5: xc(P(M))≤c1∣E(M0)∣2+16∑i=1kxc(P(Mi)) for a star decomposition.
Significance
The result. Theorem 1 shows that linear optimization over the independent sets of any regular matroid is a linear program of size polynomial in n, written down without any algorithm. Regular matroids are the largest classical matroid class for which such a bound was in question, and the bound separates them from general binary matroids. The proof also gives an O(n2) extended formulation for the circuit dominant of a regular matroid, a separate result that this mission does not include.
Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper and has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it needs a Lean theory of matroid sums (1-, 2- and 3-sums defined through cycle spaces), decompositions of regular matroids along trees, and extended formulations, with explicit bounds on how the size of an extended formulation behaves under products, intersections with hyperplanes and convex hulls of unions. Seymour's decomposition theorem enters only through Theorem 6, which can be taken as a black box while the polyhedral part is formalized.
Difficulty
The obvious induction fails at 3-sums. For 1- and 2-sums, the extension complexities of the parts add (Lemma 3), and an induction gives a polynomial bound. For a 3-sum, the best known symmetric formulation for P(M1⊕3M2) has size c(xc(P(M1))+xc(P(M2))) with c=4 (p. 4). A constant larger than 1 compounded over a decomposition tree of logarithmic depth only gives a quasi-polynomial bound, and over an unbalanced tree an exponential one. So the parts of a 3-sum have to be treated differently, and the decomposition tree has to be rebalanced into a star whose leaves have at most about half the elements.
The cographic centre is a second obstacle: the formulation of the centre's part is known only when every triangle shared with a leaf is the set of edges at a degree-3 node of the underlying graph, and getting there requires the decomposition tree of Proposition 27.
Formalization scope
Matroids are Mathlib Matroid α over one ambient type α; the parts of a sum share elements of α (the triangle elements) that are not in E(M). Statements that construct decompositions (Theorem 6, Proposition 27, Lemma 4) take α infinite, so that fresh elements exist; otherwise "not a 2-sum" could hold for want of room.
P(M) lives in RE(M), coordinates indexed by the subtype of the ground set; n is the number of elements of E(M).
Extended formulations and extension complexity are the published platform definitions IsEFOfSize and extensionComplexity (size = number of inequalities, equations free). Every upper bound is the existence of an extended formulation of the stated size, and bounds in terms of the parts quantify over extended formulations of the parts. This rules out the trivializing reading xc(P)≤B with xc an infimum that is 0 on sets with no extended formulation.
Regular means represented over R by a totally unimodular matrix; graphic means represented by the oriented incidence matrix of a finite multigraph (loops and parallel edges allowed); cographic means the dual is graphic. R10 is not printed in the paper; it is fixed as the column matroid over GF(2) of [I5∣A] with A the circulant with rows 11001,11100,01110,00111,10011, and "is R10" means isomorphic to it.
Sums are defined through cycles exactly as on p. 3, with every side condition (binary parts, sizes at least 3 or 7, no loops or coloops at the 2-sum element, the triangle a circuit of both parts and containing no cocircuit). "3-connected" is "neither a 1-sum nor a 2-sum".
The pair polytopes live in RE0×RT1×RT1×⋯×RTk×RTk, with the elements of each triangle named αi,βi,γi as in the paper. The bound of the pair is stated as the existence of a set between the two polytopes together with an extended formulation of the stated size. Propositions 16 and 18 take the graph as a finite vertex type with a tail and a head for every element.
Lemma 4 carries one clause that the printed statement does not have: if M0 is not graphic, each triangle is the set of edges at a degree-3 node of a connected graph G with M0=M∗(G). Section 6 assumes this and justifies it by Proposition 27; Lemma 5 is stated under the same clause and under the paper's standing assumption that matroids have no loops. The goal itself allows loops.
Needed infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: matroid sums and their cycle spaces; the independence polytope and its behaviour under sums; extended formulations of products, of intersections with affine subspaces and of convex hulls of unions; a flow formulation of the spanning tree polytope. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of the parts of the paper not posed here (Propositions 13 and 14, the set description (3) in Proposition 15, the polytopes RT1,…,Tk(M0) of Sections 5 and 6, Lemma 17), are welcome.
Selected references
M. Aprile and S. Fiorini, Regular matroids have polynomial extension complexity, arXiv:1909.08539v2, 2019; Mathematics of Operations Research 47(1), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.08539
R. K. Martin, Using separation algorithms to generate mixed integer model reformulations, Operations Research Letters 10(3), 119–128, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(91)90028-N
S. Fiorini, S. Massar, S. Pokutta, H. R. Tiwary and R. de Wolf, Exponential lower bounds for polytopes in combinatorial optimization, Journal of the ACM 62(2), Article 17, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1145/2716307
T. Rothvoß, The matching polytope has exponential extension complexity, Journal of the ACM 64(6), Article 41, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3127497
T. Rothvoß, Some 0/1 polytopes need exponential size extended formulations, Mathematical Programming 142(1–2), 255–268, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-012-0574-3
R. T. Wong, Integer programming formulations of the traveling salesman problem, Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference of Circuits and Computers, 149–152, 1980 (no DOI).
Incomplete Information, Debt Issuance, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads: Once Debt Capacity Is Exhausted, Creditors Face a Jump-to-Default Intensity Given in Closed Form by Equation (32)Research Paper
Why delayed information changes default risk
Creditors can observe a firm's liabilities while learning its asset value only after a delay. In the model of Benzoni, Garlappi, and Goldstein, this gap matters when the firm has exhausted its ability to issue more debt: creditors know that the firm has stayed above its default boundary, but do not know how close it is to that boundary now. Even though asset value moves continuously, the creditors' next observation can reveal that default has already occurred. The resulting jump-to-default intensity is an instantaneous default rate based on the creditors' delayed information. It enters the paper's analysis of bond values and the term structure of credit spreads.
The held source is the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 2019 working paper, Asymmetric Information, Dynamic Debt Issuance, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads. The journal article appeared in 2023 under the title used in this mission's name. Page and equation numbers below refer to the working paper, whose numbering has not been reconciled with the journal version.
Log distance and creditors' information
Let yt be the firm's log distance to default at time t: default occurs when this value first reaches zero. Under the risk-neutral measure, the paper models its motion after the firm exhausts debt capacity as dyt=mdt+σdBtQ. Here m∈R is drift, σ>0 is volatility, and BQ is standard Brownian motion. The creditors observe the lagged value a=yt−L, where the information lagL is positive. In Regime 4, t≥τc+L, and the creditors also know that default has not occurred by t. Thus a>0 on the conditioning event. The regime is described in §3.3.1 and equations (22)–(27) of the working paper.
Write N for the standard normal cumulative distribution function. For an initial distance x>0 and a horizon h>0, Sh(x) is the probability of staying above zero throughout that horizon. The paper gives
Sh(x)=N(σ2hx+mh)−e−2xm/σ2N(σ2h−x+mh).
It sets Sh(x)=0 for x≤0. The killed transition densityKh(x,y) is the difference of a Gaussian transition density from x and an image term from −x, multiplied by the indicators of x>0 and y>0. Its exact normalization and image coefficient are those of equations (D.2)–(D.3) in Lemma 1 of the Online Appendix. The conditional density of the unobserved current value yt=y, given a and survival, is p4(y∣a)=KL(a,y)/SL(a).
For a short future horizon h>0, the conditional default probability from state y>0 is 1−Sh(y). The quotient
Hh(a)=h1∫0∞[1−Sh(y)]p4(y∣a)dy
is the last line of the intensity definition (D.19). The Regime 4 intensity is its limit as h decreases to zero. It depends on the lagged distance a, rather than on calendar time separately.
Formalization targets
The goal is Corollary 1, equation (32), on printed p. 16 of the working paper. For a>0, it identifies the right limit of Hh(a), the boundary derivative of p4, and a closed form:
The right derivative is used because the density vanishes for y≤0 and can have a nonzero derivative from positive values. The paper writes an additional indicator 1{a>0} in (32); the target states its meaningful branch a>0, where the conditional density exists. The milestones follow the Appendix's sequence: Lemma 1 normalizes the killed density; (D.20) gives the small-horizon default limit close to the boundary; the boundary value used in (D.22) vanishes; (D.24) fixes a Gaussian tail integral; (D.25) identifies the intensity with the boundary derivative; and the final differentiation supplies the closed form. These are statements of the Online Appendix, pp. 11–19, not separate economic assumptions.
What the result provides
Equation (32) gives a default rate computable from a lagged observable and model parameters. It connects the paper's structural default boundary to an intensity seen by creditors who lack the current asset value. This provides a quantitative ingredient for the paper's Regime 4 debt valuation and credit spread comparisons. Its time independence in that regime follows from the fixed lag and stationary transition law; earlier regimes have a different information set and are outside this mission.
The paper proves the formula informally in the Online Appendix. The present mission asks for machine-checked proofs of the stated identities and limits. The published normal CDF definition is available on Prove2Me, while the killed-density normalization and the hazard limit remain theorem targets here. A complete development would also provide reusable analytic results about Gaussian tails, image densities, boundary derivatives, and integration on a half-line. No theorem in this proposal is claimed as already machine-checked.
Main mathematical difficulty
For each fixed y>0, the chance of crossing zero during a very short interval tends to zero. Taking that pointwise limit inside Hh(a) would miss the intensity: values of y that shrink with h still contribute after division by h. The paper's passage from its conditional density and short-horizon survival formula to (D.25) is the substantive limit claim. A proof must also justify that SL(a) is strictly positive, so the conditional density and the displayed denominator are meaningful, and must distinguish the right derivative at zero from a two-sided derivative.
Formalization scope
Lean uses real parameters σ,m,L,a with σ>0, L>0, and a>0; the drift has no sign restriction. The positivity conditions make every square root and division in the conditional density meaningful. The horizon h approaches zero through positive reals. Integrals are Lebesgue integrals over (0,∞) with respect to the standard measure, matching the paper's ∫0∞. The standard normal CDF N is imported from the published BlackScholesModel_Core definition.
The Brownian layer is represented by its explicit killed Gaussian density and survival law, which the paper takes from Harrison's first-passage result. A process-level Brownian motion, stopping time, and conditional probability construction are outside this mission. These laws are fixed formulas in the model definition; the paper's derived normalization, intensity limit, and closed form remain theorem statements. In particular, the intensity is the right limit of Hh(a), and p4 is computed from the explicit killed density and survival probability. Defining intensity as σ2∂y+p4(0∣a)/2 or taking p4 as an arbitrary density would erase the goal. Contributions establishing the analytic limit, positivity, integral, and differentiation milestones are all in scope.
Selected references
Benzoni, L., Garlappi, L., and Goldstein, R. S., Asymmetric Information, Dynamic Debt Issuance, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2019-08, 2019. DOI: 10.21033/wp-2019-08.
Benzoni, L., Garlappi, L., and Goldstein, R. S., Incomplete Information, Debt Issuance, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads, Management Science, 2023. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4529. The journal text is not the citation basis for the page and equation numbers here.
Value-Based Clinical Trials: Selecting Recruitment Rates and Trial Lengths in Different Regulatory Contexts: The Optimal Sample Size Grows as the Square Root of the Post-Adoption PopulationResearch Paper
Why trial size should depend on who benefits afterwards
Classical sample-size calculations for a clinical trial fix a significance level and a power and solve for the number of patients. They do not ask what the trial is for. A value-based design asks instead: given what it costs to recruit patients and what a better adoption decision is worth to the patients treated after the trial, how long should the trial run and how fast should it recruit? Health technology assessment bodies such as NICE already decide adoption on cost-effectiveness grounds, and Bayesian decision-theoretic trial design goes back to the value-of-information literature of the 1990s and 2000s (Claxton & Posnett 1996; Chick, Forster & Pertile 2017).
Alban, Chick and Forster (Management Science 2023) make the two decisions explicit, recruitment duration T and recruitment rate r, and let the regulatory context decide the population P(T) that benefits after the trial. Their asymptotic result, Proposition 5, says that the optimal number of patient pairs grows as the square root of that population, and that the optimal expected net gain per post-trial patient converges to a value that does not depend on the switching costs.
Setting
A new technology N is compared with a standard S. A fraction pN∈[0,21] of patients is on N before the trial. Patients are randomised in pairs; recruiting at rate r≥0 for a time T≥0 yields Q=Tr/2 pairs. The incremental net monetary benefitW of N over S has prior N(μ0,σ02), each pair gives an observation Xi∣W∼N(W,σX2), and n0=σX2/σ02. After Q pairs the posterior mean ZTr has predictive law N(μ0,σZ2) with σZ2=σX2Q/(n0(n0+Q)).
After the trial the decision maker adopts N, adopts S, or keeps the current mix, paying fixed switching costs IN,IS≥0. Without discounting, the expected net gain of a design with Tr>0 is
where c is the cost per patient, ccap(r) the setup cost of recruitment capacity, and δon∈{0,1} switches on rewards to trial patients. Without a trial, V=max{0,(1−pN)P(0)μ0−IN,−pNP(0)μ0−IS}. The post-adoption population is either a fixed pool, P(T)=P, or set by a fixed horizon, P(T)=ζ(H−T−1T>0Δ), with incidence ζ and observation delay Δ. The paper also treats discounting at rate ρ; the asymptotic results take ρ=0.
Problem (5) maximises V over [0,Tmax]×[0,rmax], where Table EC.1 takes Tmax>0 and 0≤rmax≤ζ. With ccap(r)=cfix+crr and cr≥0, the paper distinguishes four cases: I (cr=0, fixed pool), II (cr=0, fixed horizon), III (cr>0, fixed pool), IV (cr>0, fixed horizon).
Formalization targets
Write C=c−δon(1−2pN)μ0/2, ϕ for the standard normal density, Ψ(z)=E[(Z−z)+] for the standard normal linear loss, and
v∞=(1−pN)σ0Ψ(−μ0/σ0)+pNσ0Ψ(μ0/σ0).
Goal: Proposition 5
Assume C>0 and ρ=0. For every selection of optimal designs, with Q∗=T∗r∗/2:
Cases I, III:PV∗→v∞,Cases II, IV:ζ(H−Δ)V∗→v∞,Case I, IV:popQ∗→(4Cn0σX2ϕ(μ0/σ0))1/2,
with pop=P (Case I) or ζ(H−Δ) (Case IV). In Case II the denominator is 4C+4ζσ0(Ψ(μ0/σ0)+(1−pN)μ0/σ0)/rmax, and in Case III (corrected, see below) it is 4(C+cr/Tmax). The goal also asserts that optimal designs exist once the population is large.
Milestones
The closed form (8) of V through Ψ; existence of an optimal design (Proposition 1); the reductions to one decision variable (Propositions 2–4); and the four case lemmas EC.1–EC.4 of Appendix C.4, which together give Proposition 5. Lemma EC.4 adds the finer statement that in Case IV both r∗ and T∗ grow like (ζ(H−Δ))1/4.
Significance
The result turns an optimisation without a closed-form solution into a rule of thumb: for a large population, the optimal trial enrols about n0σX2ϕ(μ0/σ0)P/C patients. The authors show in their ProFHER application that the approximation is accurate at realistic sizes. It also explains two qualitative facts, that fixed-pool and fixed-horizon contexts reach the same value per patient, and that switching costs become irrelevant at scale.
The paper proves these results with asymptotic arguments that are sketched in places ("by rearranging and some additional asymptotic approximations"). A formal proof makes every limit exchange explicit. The formalization also corrects a misprint: the Case III constant in Proposition 5 and the constant in (EC.4) are printed without the setup-cost term cr/Tmax, and the proof's own optimality condition shows that it belongs there. None of these results has been machine-checked before; the platform has the normal linear loss Ψ and nothing on clinical-trial design.
Difficulty
The objective is not concave in (T,r), has a jump where the trial stops running, and its optimiser has no closed form. The square-root law concerns an arbitrary optimiser as the population grows. So it is not enough to differentiate an asymptotic approximation of V and solve the first-order condition. One must show that every optimiser escapes every bounded set, that the exact first-order condition holds there, and that the error terms of σZ and of the indifference points IN/((1−pN)P) and IS/(pNP) vanish at the right rates. In Case IV two decision variables diverge at different rates, and the fixed horizon couples the trial length to the post-trial population.
Formalization scope
All quantities are real. A design is a pair (T,r)∈R2. The post-adoption term of V is a Bochner integral against gaussianReal µ0 σZ², and Ψ is the published InventoryControl.normalLoss. V is defined by the expectation (7) and (9), never by the closed form (8), which is a milestone. Optimality is IsOptOn f S x: x∈S and f≤f(x) on S.
Decision sets follow §3.6.1: in Cases I and II, 0<r=rmax≤ζ with T≥0; in Case III, T=Tmax>0 with r≥0; in Case IV, both are free. Under a fixed horizon, T≤H−Δ is added, because beyond it P(T)<0, outside the model (§2.4.1 requires H≥Tmax+Δ). The finite box statements use Tmax>0, 0≤rmax≤ζ, and a fixed pool has P>0, as in Table EC.1. Other added hypotheses: the standing sign conditions of §2 and Table EC.1 (σX,n0,ζ>0; c,IN,IS,Δ≥0; 0≤ρ<1; δon∈{0,1}), ccap≥0 (used in the proof of Proposition 1), and P(T)≥0.
Limits are asserted for every selection of optimisers. A separate conjunct asserts that optimisers exist for large populations, so the statement cannot be satisfied vacuously by an empty set of optimisers. It is not about a stationary point of an approximation, and Q∗ is never replaced by a formula.
Two printed slips are corrected and labelled. In Proposition 5, Case III has constant 4(C+cr/Tmax), and (EC.4) has the factor Tmax in its denominator. Both follow from the cost of Q pairs at fixed Tmax, which is cfix+2Q(C+cr/Tmax); at P=1010 the corrected constant matches a numerical optimum to four digits, the printed one does not. The C=0 branch of Lemma EC.4, Proposition 6 (discounting) and the comparative statics of §3.5 are not formalized.
A complete development needs Gaussian expectations of piecewise-linear functions, semicontinuity arguments on a box with a jump, and asymptotic analysis of argmax sets. The Gaussian-loss identities are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of the case lemmas.
S. E. Chick, M. Forster, P. Pertile, A Bayesian decision theoretic model of sequential experimentation with delayed response, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 79(5):1439–1462, 2017.
K. Claxton, J. Posnett, An economic approach to clinical trial design and research priority-setting, Health Economics 5:513–524, 1996.
M. H. DeGroot, Optimal Statistical Decisions, McGraw-Hill, 1970.
Interior Point Algorithms VII: The Homogeneous Model for Monotone Complementarity and Its Central StepTextbook
Motivation
The monotone complementarity problem (MCP) asks, for a continuous monotone map f on the positive orthant, for a pair (x,s) with s=f(x), x≥0, s≥0 and xjsj=0 for every j. It contains linear programming, convex quadratic programming, the monotone linear complementarity problem and the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions of smooth convex programs. Interior-point methods solve it in polynomially many Newton-type steps when a strictly positive, well-centered starting point is known, but in general no such point is known, and the problem may be infeasible or feasible without any positive feasible point.
Andersen and Ye (Mathematical Programming 84, 1999) extended the homogeneous self-dual embedding of linear programming to the nonlinear MCP: one embeds the problem into a homogeneous problem that always has a trivial interior starting point, solves it by a path-following method, and reads off either a solution or a certificate of infeasibility. Section 8.4 of Ye, Interior Point Algorithms: Theory and Analysis (Wiley 1997, doi:10.1002/9781118032701) presents this construction, the convexity property of the residual set it rests on, and the analysis of one step of the algorithm. This mission formalizes that section.
Setting
Vectors are compared componentwise; e is the all-ones vector, X=diag(x), S=diag(s), ∥⋅∥ the Euclidean norm and R++N={x∈RN:x>0} the open orthant. A map f:R++n→Rn is monotone if (x1−x2)T(f(x1)−f(x2))≥0 for all x1,x2>0; ∇f(x) denotes its Jacobian.
The residual set is R++={s−f(x):x>0,s>0}, and for r∈Rn the sliceS++(r)={(x,s)∈R++2n:s=f(x)+r}.
The homogeneous map on R++n+1, with points written (x;τ), is
ψ(x,τ)=(τf(x/τ)−xTf(x/τ)).
The homogeneous model (HMCP) asks for (x,τ,s,κ)≥0 with (s;κ)=ψ(x,τ) minimizing xTs+τκ.
A map g on R++N is scaled Lipschitz with a monotone increasing v:(0,1)→(1,∞) if
Lemma 8.28: r+=(1−αη)rk and (x+)Ts+=(xk)Tsk(1−α(1−γ))+α2η(1−η−γ)(n+1)μk.
Stronger: monotonicity of f is not needed
The goal remains true when f is only assumed differentiable on R++n and ψ scaled Lipschitz; this variant is posed beside the goal (see Formalization scope).
Significance
Theorem 8.29 is the one-step invariant behind the O(nlog(1/ϵ)) iteration bound of the homogeneous algorithm: combined with Lemma 8.28 it shows that the infeasibility residual and the complementarity gap shrink by the same factor 1−β/n+1 per step while the iterates stay in a fixed neighborhood of the central path. Together with Theorem 8.25 (v)–(vi), which identifies solutions and infeasibility certificates of the MCP from maximal complementary solutions of the homogeneous model, this yields an algorithm that needs no feasible starting point and detects infeasibility. The convexity of R++ (Theorem 8.23) is the structural fact that makes the homotopy path of the homogeneous model well defined.
These results are proved in the book (with Theorem 8.19, which Theorem 8.23 uses, left as an exercise). None of them is formalized on the platform: the existing Andersen–Ye material covers only the linear complementarity case, as a set-valued operator, and no statement about scaled Lipschitz maps or the nonlinear homogeneous map exists. A completed development gives a machine-checked analysis of an interior-point step for a nonlinear problem, with every constant explicit.
Difficulty
The algebra of Lemmas 8.27 and 8.28 depends on the identities xTψ(x)=0 and xT∇ψ(x)=−ψ(x)T, which require differentiating a map defined through x/τ; working with ∇ψ as a Fréchet derivative rather than a hand-written block matrix is part of the work. In Theorem 8.29 the nonlinearity enters only through the scaled Lipschitz bound, which applies only when ∥X−1dx∥∞<1, so the step must first be shown to stay well inside the orthant before the neighborhood estimate can be closed; the norms involved (ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ∞ and the scaled norms ∥D−1dx∥, ∥Dds∥) must be chained in the right order. Theorem 8.23 is of a different kind: its proof passes through the homeomorphism of Theorem 8.19, whose proof the book leaves as an exercise, and a compactness argument along a homotopy.
Two points in the printed text need care. The block matrix (8.24) displayed for ∇ψ has a spurious transpose in its lower-left block; with the printed matrix Lemma 8.24 would fail for nonsymmetric ∇f, and the statements here use the true Jacobian. The printed proof of Theorem 8.25 (iii) (the scaled Lipschitz constant of ψ from that of f) establishes the bound with vf(2α/(1−α)), not the stated vf(2α/(1+α)), and only for α<1/3; that part is not in this mission, and Theorem 8.29 assumes the scaled Lipschitz property of ψ directly, as the book does.
Formalization scope
Vectors are Fin N → ℝ, a point (x;τ) of Rn+1 is z : Fin (n+1) → ℝ with Fin.init z=x and z (Fin.last n)=τ, and every Jacobian is Mathlib's fderiv. The standing assumptions of §8.4 are explicit hypotheses of every theorem: f continuous and monotone on the open orthant R++n, and differentiable there wherever ∇f or ∇ψ appears (the section assumes this silently). In the scaled Lipschitz condition, "monotone increasing" is read as nondecreasing on (0,1) and α ranges over (0,1). The direction is any solution of (8.42)–(8.43). The new dual iterate is defined by the first line of (8.47); its closed form is a conclusion. The book writes no O(⋅) in the statements of this mission: β, η, γ and α=1 are the book's explicit constants. ψ is a total function in Lean (division by τ=0 returns 0), but every statement evaluates it and its derivative only at τ>0.
A trivializing formalization is excluded: the scaled Lipschitz hypothesis is not vacuous (it holds, for instance, for f≡0 with any admissible v), the direction is not assumed to have any property beyond (8.42)–(8.43), and the monotonicity of ψ and the identities (8.41) are proved milestones, not hypotheses of the goal.
Beyond the paper. One variant is posed: central_step_strong (strengthened) drops the continuity and monotonicity of f from Theorem 8.29, because the scaled Lipschitz condition already forces dT∇ψ(x)d≥0, the only use the proof makes of monotonicity.
The development needs Fréchet derivatives of compositions with x↦x/τ, finite-dimensional norm inequalities, and, for Theorem 8.23, invariance of domain or a direct proof of Theorem 8.19. The definitions (monotone maps on the orthant, the scaled Lipschitz condition, the homogeneous map) are reusable for the remaining parts of Theorems 8.25 and 8.26. Contributions of a proof of Theorem 8.19, and of the faithful Theorem 8.25 (iii), are welcome.
Selected references
Y. Ye, Interior Point Algorithms: Theory and Analysis, Wiley-Interscience, 1997, §8.4. doi:10.1002/9781118032701
E. D. Andersen and Y. Ye, On a homogeneous algorithm for the monotone complementarity problem, Mathematical Programming 84 (1999), 375–399.
O. Güler, Existence of interior points and interior paths in nonlinear monotone complementarity problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 18 (1993), 128–147. doi:10.1287/moor.18.1.128
Y. Ye, M. J. Todd and S. Mizuno, An O(nL)-iteration homogeneous and self-dual linear programming algorithm, Mathematics of Operations Research 19 (1994), 53–67. doi:10.1287/moor.19.1.53
Interior Point Algorithms VI: Predictor Directions Are O(μ) on the Optimal PartitionTextbook
Why the tail of an interior-point method matters
Primal-dual interior-point methods for linear programming come with two kinds of guarantee. The worst-case one is a bound of O(nlog(R/ϵ)) iterations to reduce the duality gap below ϵ. The asymptotic one says what happens to the duality gap near the end of the run, where practical codes spend their final iterations. For the predictor-corrector method of Mizuno, Todd and Ye (1993), Ye, Güler, Tapia and Zhang (1993) showed that the same algorithm that achieves the best known worst-case bound also drives the duality gap to zero quadratically. The proof needs neither nondegeneracy nor convergence of the iterates. Chapter 7 of Yinyu Ye's Interior Point Algorithms: Theory and Analysis (Wiley 1997, DOI 10.1002/9781118032701) gives a self-contained account. This mission formalizes its LP core.
Timeline, as attributed in the chapter's notes (§7.5): Zhang, Tapia and Dennis first obtained superlinear convergence of a primal-dual method assuming the iterates converge, and quadratic convergence assuming nondegeneracy. Quadratic convergence for general LP, with neither assumption, was first established by Ye, Güler, Tapia and Zhang, and independently by Mehrotra and by Tsuchiya. The monotone LCP version (§7.3) is due to Ye and Anstreicher, who also showed that the predictor step cannot converge superlinearly when no strictly complementary solution exists (Proposition 7.13). Monteiro and Wright extended that negative result to Newton-like methods in general.
Setting
Fix a real m×n matrix A of rank m, b∈Rm and c∈Rn. Consider the standard-form pair
(LP)min{cTx:Ax=b,x≥0},(LD)max{bTy:ATy+s=c,s≥0}.
An interior point is a triple (x,y,s) with Ax=b, x>0, ATy+s=c, s>0. Write X=diag(x), S=diag(s), e for the all-ones vector and μ=xTs/n. The neighbourhood of the central path is
N2(η)={(x,y,s) interior:∥Xs−μe∥≤ημ}.
The strict complementarity partition(P,Z)=(P∗,Z∗) collects the indices on which some optimal x∗ is positive (P) and those on which some optimal slack s∗ is positive (Z). The predictor direction at (x,s) is the solution of
Xds+Sdx=−Xs,Adx=0,−ATdy−ds=0.(7.4)
It is the case γ=0 of the direction d(x,s,γ) defined by Sdx+Xds=γμe−Xs, Adx=0, −ATdy−ds=0. The scaling is D=X1/2S−1/2, and ∥vS∥ denotes the Euclidean norm of the subvector of v indexed by S. Algorithm 4.5 (predictor-corrector, η=1/4) starts in N2(1/4). At each iteration it takes the largest step θk along d(xk,sk,0) that keeps the iterate in N2(1/2), then a full step along d(⋅,⋅,1) back towards the central path.
The order of convergence of a sequence rk→0 (Definition 1.1) is the supremum of the p≥0 with limsupk∣rk+1∣/∣rk∣p<∞. Quadratic convergence (Definition 1.2) means limsupk∣rk+1∣/∣rk∣2<∞.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 7.5
For every μ0>0 there is a constant C>0, depending only on (A,b,c) and μ0, such that at every (x,y,s)∈N2(1/4) with μ≤μ0 the predictor direction satisfies
∥(dx)P∥≤Cμand∥(ds)Z∥≤Cμ.
Milestones
Lemma 7.2. If Xds+Sdx=−Xs and dxTds≥0, then ∥D−1dx∥2+∥Dds∥2≤xTs.
Relation (7.6). There is ξ∈(0,1), independent of the point, with ξ≤xj≤1/ξ on P and ξ≤sj≤1/ξ on Z throughout N2(1/4)∩{μ≤μ0}.
Lemma 7.3.∥(dx)Z∥≤Cμ and ∥(ds)P∥≤Cμ, with C uniform as in the goal.
Lemma 7.4.(dx)P is the unique minimizer of 21∥DP−1u∥2 subject to APu=−AZ(dx)Z. dy minimizes 21∥DZAZTv∥2 subject to APTv=−(ds)P, and every minimizer gives (ds)Z=−AZTv.
Proposition 7.1. For positive rk→0, the order of convergence equals liminfklogrk+1/logrk.
Theorem 7.6. For Algorithm 4.5: (i) (xk)Tsk≤ϵ once k≥21+1+42nlogϵ(x0)Ts0; (ii) 1−θk≤C(xk)Tsk; (iii) (xk)Tsk→0 quadratically.
Lemmas 7.9 and 7.10 (monotone LCP linear algebra). For M=(MPPMZPMPZMZZ) with vTMv≥0: MPPxP=0⟺MPPTxP=0, which implies (MZP+MPZT)xP=0; and R(MPP0MPZI)=R(MPPT0MZPT−I).
The goal fixes no value of C: it asserts only that one constant serves every point, which is the content the later results use.
Significance
Theorem 7.5, together with Lemma 7.3, says the whole predictor direction is O(μ). Through the step-size bound of Lemma 4.17 this gives 1−θk=O(μk) and hence μk+1=O((μk)2): quadratic convergence of the duality gap (Theorem 7.6). The same least-squares structure yields the LCP version (Theorem 7.12) and the variants of §7.4. Bounds of this kind on the directions near the optimal face also underlie finite termination and basis identification schemes.
On the formal side, no machine-checked development of interior-point asymptotics is known to the authors of this mission. Mathlib has the linear algebra (ranges, block matrices, least squares through orthogonal projection) but no linear-programming duality theory beyond what other missions supply. A formal proof would supply the Goldman–Tucker partition, the uniform bounds (7.6) and a Hoffman-type bound for least-squares solutions in reusable form.
Difficulty
Everything rests on a constant being uniform. For a single interior point, any bound ∥(dx)P∥≤Cμ holds with some C depending on the point, so the content is entirely in choosing C before the point. The natural first attempt bounds the direction through ∥D∥ and ∥D−1∥ on all indices, and this fails: on P the entries Dj2=xj/sj grow like 1/μ, and on Z they shrink like μ. Only the split along the optimal partition, with the least-squares characterization of the "large" components and the uniform bounds (7.6), balances the two. Relation (7.6) itself requires the partition to be strict (Goldman–Tucker) and an a priori bound on the iterates. For Theorem 7.6 the algorithm's step-size rule has to be carried as defined: a largest step over an interval of neighbourhood memberships.
Formalization scope
Vectors are Fin n → ℝ and matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. All norms are Euclidean. P∗ and Z∗ are defined as unions of supports of optimal solutions; that they partition the indices is a consequence solvers must prove, not an assumption. The standing assumption rankA=m appears as a hypothesis.
Instantiations of the book's O(⋅) (p. 213: "may depend on n and/or the original problem data, but … independent of the iteration k"):
Theorem 7.5, Lemma 7.3: ∃C>0 quantified before the point; C depends on (A,b,c) and on a bound μ0 for μ.
Relation (7.6): ∃ξ∈(0,1) quantified before the point, depending on (A,b,c) and μ0. The book states it for the iterates; here it covers every point of N2(1/4) with μ≤μ0.
Theorem 7.6(i): the constant of Theorem 4.18's proof, threshold 21+1+42nlog((x0)Ts0/ϵ), with R=(x0)Ts0. (ii): ∃C>0 before k. (iii): Definition 1.2.
A constant chosen after the point would make the goal trivially true; the statements quantify ∃C first to rule this out. Algorithm 4.5 is run for every k (no termination test), and its step is the greatest admissible θ, not a supremum. The order of convergence and all limits superior take values in EReal, so infinite values are not collapsed to junk reals. Lemma 7.4's second problem is stated as corrected (the printed objective 21∥DZv∥2 is ill-typed and the sign of (ds)Z=AZTv is inconsistent with (7.4)); see the findings.
Beyond the paper. One strengthened variant: Theorem 7.5 on N2(η) for every η∈(0,1) and without the rank condition. The book's proof uses the neighbourhood only through (1−η)μ≤xjsj≤(1+η)μ, and the rank of A enters nowhere.
Needed infrastructure: LP duality and strict complementarity (Goldman–Tucker), a Hoffman-type bound for minimum-norm solutions, and weighted least squares. The definitions of the neighbourhood, the direction d(x,s,γ) and Algorithm 4.5 are shared with the chapter 4 analysis and are reusable for other interior-point results. Contributions proving any milestone independently are welcome.
S. Mizuno, M. J. Todd, Y. Ye, On adaptive-step primal-dual interior-point algorithms for linear programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 18 (1993) 964–981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.4.964
Y. Ye, O. Güler, R. A. Tapia, Y. Zhang, A quadratically convergent O(nL)-iteration algorithm for linear programming, Mathematical Programming 59 (1993) 151–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582144
A. J. Goldman, A. W. Tucker, Theory of linear programming, in Linear Inequalities and Related Systems, Annals of Mathematics Studies 38, Princeton, 1956. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881987-005
A. J. Hoffman, On approximate solutions of systems of linear inequalities, Journal of Research of the National Bureau of Standards 49 (1952) 263–265. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.049.027