Motivation
Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal expectation formed from the prices they have seen before. A price below the reference feels like a gain and raises demand, a price above it feels like a loss and lowers demand. Because today's price moves tomorrow's reference price, a firm facing such consumers solves a dynamic problem even when nothing else changes over time. The marketing and revenue management literature has studied this problem since the late 1980s, mostly for linear demand (Kopalle, Rao and Assunção 1996; Fibich, Gavious and Lowengart 2003).
Popescu and Wu (2007) analyse the problem for a general reference-dependent demand model, using structural assumptions (monotonicity, concavity, supermodularity) instead of a parametric form. Their Proposition 1 answers a practical question: what does a firm lose, and how does its behaviour differ, if it ignores the effect of current prices on future expectations? The answer is that such a myopic firm systematically charges too little, and its prices drift monotonically to a single level.
Setting
Prices lie in P=[0,pˉ] with pˉ>0. The data are a base demand d(p), the demand when the price equals the reference price, and a reference effect R(x,r), the change in demand caused by a perceived gain x=r−p at reference price r. Demand is
D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r),
so R(0,r)=0. Short-term profit is Π(p,r)=pD(p,r) (unit cost zero), base profit is π(p)=pd(p), reference profit is ΠR(p,r)=pR(r−p,r), and λ(r)=Rx(0,r) is the slope of the reference effect at zero gain.
Reference prices follow exponential smoothing, memory equation (1): with memory α∈[0,1) and prices pt,
rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt.
The strategic firm maximises discounted profit with discount factor β∈(0,1). Its value function is
V(r0)=(pt)⊂Psupt≥0∑βtΠ(pt,rt),
its Bellman objective is W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p), and its optimal price p∗(r) is the largest maximizer of W(⋅,r) over P. The myopic price p~(r) is the largest maximizer of Π(⋅,r) over P. From a common initial reference price r0, the strategic firm follows rt+1∗=αrt∗+(1−α)p∗(rt∗) and charges pt∗=p∗(rt∗); the myopic firm follows rt+1M=αrtM+(1−α)p~(rtM) and charges ptM=p~(rtM).
The standing hypotheses are the paper's Assumption 1 (on P×P, demand is nonnegative, bounded and continuous, decreasing in p and increasing in r, and R is increasing in the gain), Assumption 2 (R is twice differentiable), and Assumption 3 (π is nonmonotonic and concave on P; π′(r)−rλ(r) is strictly decreasing; ΠR is concave in p and supermodular in (p,r)).
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 1 (Myopic vs. Strategic Firm)
Under the hypotheses above:
∀r∈P: p~(r)≤p∗(r),∀r0∈P, ∀t: ptM≤pt∗,
∃pM∗∈P ∀r0∈P: (ptM)t is monotone and t→∞limptM=pM∗.
The limit pM∗ is one price, the same for every initial reference price.
Milestones
- Remark 2. V is increasing on P (Assumption 1 only).
- Lemma 1. p~ is increasing on P.
- Pointwise underpricing (§A.1): p~(r)≤p∗(r) for every r∈P.
- Underpricing along paths (§A.1): rtM≤rt∗ and ptM≤pt∗ for all t.
- Monotone myopic paths (§A.1): if p~(r0)≥r0 the path ptM is increasing, and if p~(r0)≤r0 it is decreasing.
- Unique myopic steady state (§A.1): at most one p∈P satisfies p~(p)=p.
Significance
Proposition 1 shows that the error a myopic firm makes has a definite sign: it underprices at every state and at every date along its own trajectory, not only on average. The monotone convergence clause means the myopic firm's long-run behaviour is a single price independent of initial expectations, which the paper later uses to bound the strategic firm's steady-state price from below (Theorem 1, pM∗≤p∗∗). The result holds for general reference-dependent demand, which is what distinguishes it from the linear models that preceded it.
A formal development gives machine-checked versions of standard tools that recur throughout dynamic pricing and inventory theory: existence and monotonicity of the largest maximizer under supermodularity (Topkis' theorem on an interval), monotonicity of an infinite-horizon value function defined as a supremum over sequences, and monotone convergence of one-dimensional policy iterations. The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been formalized.
Difficulty
The value function is defined as a supremum over infinite price sequences, not as a given solution of a Bellman equation, so its monotonicity and the existence of a maximizer of W(⋅,r) (which needs continuity of V) have to be established from the sequence problem. The comparison p~≤p∗ depends on the largest-maximizer convention: for arbitrary selections from the two argmax sets the inequality is false, because the sets can overlap without their chosen elements being ordered. The two firms move along different reference-price paths, so the path comparison is not a pointwise statement about one state. Uniqueness of the limit has to cover fixed points of p~ at the endpoints of P, where the first-order condition is only an inequality, and the limit of a myopic path is a priori only a maximizer of Π(⋅,pM∗), not necessarily the largest one.
Formalization scope
The data are functions d:R→R and R:R→R→R; demand is defined from them, and R(0,r)=0 is a hypothesis. The price set is Set.Icc 0 pbar. V is a real ⨆ over sequences N→[0,pˉ] of a tsum; under the hypotheses the family is bounded and every series summable, so the default values of ⨆ and ∑' on unbounded or non-summable input are not reached. Both p∗ and p~ are defined as sSup of their sets of maximizers over P, which is the paper's largest-maximizer convention. That these sets are nonempty is a proof obligation, not a hypothesis. The myopic firm is defined directly from Π, not as problem (2) with β=0.
"Increasing" and "decreasing" are non-strict. "Nonmonotonic" means neither monotone nor antitone on P. "Twice differentiable" means R and its Fréchet derivative are differentiable on R2. Supermodularity of ΠR is the increasing-differences inequality on P×P. One hypothesis is added to the paper's: d is differentiable, because Assumption 3(b) refers to π′ and Lean's deriv returns 0 where a function is not differentiable. Assumptions 2 and 3 hold throughout §§4.1–4.3, so they are hypotheses of every §4 item. They are not hypotheses of Remark 2, which is in §3.
A formalization in which V is an arbitrary increasing function, or p∗ an arbitrary maximizer satisfying p∗≥p~ by hypothesis, would make the goal trivial. The definitions here rule it out, because V, p∗, p~ and both paths are all computed from (d,R,α,β,pˉ). The convergence clause quantifies the limit before the initial state, so a statement in which each path merely converges would not satisfy it. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: pˉ=3/4, d(p)=1−p, R(x,r)=x/4 satisfies all of them.
A complete development needs Topkis-type monotone comparative statics on intervals, continuity and monotonicity of the value function of a bounded discounted problem, and elementary facts on monotone bounded sequences. The first two are reusable across dynamic pricing, inventory and queueing-control missions, and contributions of them as separate lemmas are welcome.
Selected references
- M. Popescu and Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3):413–429, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
- D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
- N. L. Stokey, R. E. Lucas and E. C. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, 1989. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjnrt76
- P. K. Kopalle, A. G. Rao and J. L. Assunção, Asymmetric Reference Price Effects and Dynamic Pricing Policies, Marketing Science 15(1):60–85, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.15.1.60
- G. Fibich, A. Gavious and O. Lowengart, Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects, Operations Research 51(5):721–734, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.5.721.16758