Motivation
Mobile devices run applications whose computational load can exceed what the device itself can serve in reasonable time and with reasonable battery drain. Computation offloading sends part of that load elsewhere: to a cloudlet, a small cluster of servers one wireless hop away, or to a distant cloud reached through the wide-area network. The cloudlet is shared, so its response time depends on how much load all users send to it, and each user's best offloading decision depends on everybody else's. Cardellini, De Nitto Personé, Di Valerio, Facchinei, Grassi, Lo Presti and Piccialli (Math. Program., 2016, DOI 10.1007/s10107-015-0881-6) model this as a non-cooperative game between users and study it with the tools of variational inequalities.
The game is a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP): not only the costs but also the feasible sets of the players depend on the other players' choices, because all users share one capacity constraint on the cloudlet. GNEPs with a shared convex constraint (jointly convex games) can be reduced to a single variational inequality, a reduction the paper takes from Facchinei, Fischer and Piccialli (Oper. Res. Lett. 2007, DOI 10.1016/j.orl.2006.03.004); Facchinei and Kanzow survey the area (Ann. Oper. Res. 2010, DOI 10.1007/s10479-009-0653-x). This mission formalizes the first step of the paper's analysis: the game has an equilibrium.
Setting
There are N users u=1,…,N and three tiers I={m,clet,cloud} (mobile device, cloudlet, cloud). User u chooses the fractions xu=(xu,m,xu,clet,xu,cloud) of its tasks run on each tier. A profile is x=(x1,…,xN)∈R3N.
The data are reals αu,βu,γu,δu (arrival rates divided by service or transfer rates), powers Pu,m,Pu,t,Pu,max, the number n≥1 of cloudlet servers, the offloadable fraction χ∈(0,1] and a utilisation cap Umax. Assumption A requires Umax and every αu,δu to lie in (0,1).
User u's private feasible set is
K~u={xu∈R+3: ∑i∈Ixu,i=1, xu,clet+xu,cloud≤χ, αuPu,mxu,m+βuPu,t(xu,clet+xu,cloud)≤Pu,max},
the shared constraint is Ω={x:n1∑vδvxv,clet≤Umax}, and the joint feasible set is K=(∏uK~u)∩Ω. User u minimises the mean response cost
λuRu(xu,x−u)=1−αuxu,mαuxu,m+βuxu,clet+γuxu,cloud+1−n1∑vδvxv,cletδuxu,clet
over {y∈K~u:(y,x−u)∈Ω}. A solution of the GNEP is a profile xˉ∈K at which no user can lower its cost by a deviation that keeps the shared constraint satisfied.
The map F:R3N→R3N stacks the users' partial gradients,
F(x)u=((1−αuxu,m)2αu, βu+δu(1−n1∑vδvxv,clet)21−n1∑v=uδvxv,clet, γu),
and xˉ solves the variational inequality VI(K,F) if xˉ∈K and F(xˉ)⊤(x−xˉ)≥0 for all x∈K. Such solutions are the variational (or normalized) solutions of the game.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 12)
Under Assumption A, and provided every K~u is nonempty,
∃xˉ∈K ∀u ∀y∈K~u with (y,xˉ−u)∈Ω:λuRu(xˉu,xˉ−u)≤λuRu(y,xˉ−u).
Milestones
- F(x)u=∇xuλuRu(x) wherever both denominators are positive (p. 11).
- For fixed x−u, user u's feasible set is convex and its cost is convex on it (p. 11).
- Every solution of VI(K,F) is a solution of the GNEP (proof of Proposition 1).
- F is continuous on K, and K is compact and convex (proof of Proposition 1).
- VI(K,F) has a solution (proof of Proposition 1, citing Facchinei–Pang, Corollary 2.2.5).
Milestones 3 and 5 give the goal; milestones 1 and 2 are what milestone 3 rests on, and milestone 4 is what milestone 5 rests on. The platform's Proved statement of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem (AGT.brouwer_fixed_point) is included as a reference item for milestone 5.
Significance
The result. Existence of an equilibrium is the precondition for everything else in the paper: the monotonicity of F (Theorem 1), the reformulation with a cloudlet price as an extended game (Theorem 2), and the distributed algorithm whose convergence is Theorem 3. Proposition 1 also shows that variational solutions exist, which is the specific equilibrium the paper's algorithm computes.
Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper, in three lines that cite two textbook theorems. The work here is to make those citations machine-checked for this concrete model: that the closed-form F is indeed the stacked partial gradient, that each user's problem is convex despite the rational cost terms, that the VI-to-GNEP reduction holds, and that a VI on a compact convex set with continuous map has a solution. None of these steps is formalized in Mathlib for GNEPs; the last is a finite-dimensional Hartman–Stampacchia theorem, which Mathlib does not contain. No part of this paper has a machine-checked proof.
Difficulty
The obvious argument is to apply Kakutani's theorem to the best-response correspondence. With a shared constraint this needs lower semicontinuity of the feasible-set map x−u↦{y∈K~u:(y,x−u)∈Ω}, which is a separate argument, and Kakutani is not in Mathlib either. The VI route avoids it but has its own points. The cost has the rational terms αuxu,m/(1−αuxu,m) and δuxu,clet/D(x), and convexity and differentiability must be checked on the region where the denominators are positive; on a user's feasible set this needs Assumption A and the shared constraint, not the private constraints alone. The existence of a VI solution needs a fixed-point theorem on a compact convex set, and Mathlib has no Brouwer theorem. That is why the platform's statement of it is attached to this mission.
Formalization scope
Users are Fin N (0-based) and tiers an inductive type Tier with three constructors; a profile is Fin N → Tier → ℝ. The inner product a⊤b is the coordinatewise double sum (not Mathlib's sup norm on Pi types). The cost and F are the paper's closed forms; F is not defined as a derivative, so milestone 1 has content. Lean's x/0=0 makes both formulas junk where a denominator vanishes. Under Assumption A both denominators are positive on K and at every point the GNEP definition compares, and milestone 1 assumes the two positivity conditions explicitly.
Standing hypotheses in every statement: Assumption A, n≥1, 0<χ≤1. Nothing is assumed of βu,γu or the powers, as in the paper. Added hypothesis: every K~u is nonempty, in the goal and in milestone 5. The printed proposition is false without it: if 0<Pu,max<min(αuPu,m,βuPu,t) then K~u=∅, so K=∅. The condition is equivalent to K=∅. Milestone 4 adds convexity of K to the paper's "continuous and compact".
Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: K cannot be empty under the added hypothesis, F is not a derivative by definition, no statement evaluates the cost at a point with a vanishing denominator, and the GNEP keeps the shared constraint in each player's feasible set (dropping it gives a different game, a NEP).
Contributions welcome: a finite-dimensional Hartman–Stampacchia theorem (reusable well beyond this mission), the general VI-implies-GNEP reduction for jointly convex games, and proofs of the model-specific milestones.
Selected references
- V. Cardellini, V. De Nitto Personé, V. Di Valerio, F. Facchinei, V. Grassi, F. Lo Presti, V. Piccialli, A game-theoretic approach to computation offloading in mobile cloud computing, Mathematical Programming (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-015-0881-6 (accepted manuscript: IRIS Sapienza, handle 11573/779661)
- F. Facchinei, A. Fischer, V. Piccialli, On generalized Nash games and variational inequalities, Operations Research Letters 35 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2006.03.004
- F. Facchinei, C. Kanzow, Generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Annals of Operations Research 175 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-009-0653-x
- F. Facchinei, J.-S. Pang, Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementarity Problems, Springer, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/b97543