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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Sufficiency of Markov Policies for Continuous-Time Jump Markov Decision Processes: The Induced Markov Policy Has State-Action Marginals No Larger than the Policy, Equal When NonexplosiveResearch Paper

Markov policies in continuous-time decision processes

In a Markov decision process a controller chooses actions over time to influence a random system. A basic question for every such model is whether the controller loses anything by ignoring the past: whether, for every policy that uses the full history, some Markov policy (one that looks only at the current state and time) performs equally well. For discrete-time models the answer goes back to Derman and Strauch (1966): the Markov policy that randomizes according to the conditional distribution of the action given the current state has the same state-action marginals as the original policy, and therefore the same expected costs for any criterion that depends on these marginals.

In continuous-time jump Markov decision processes (CTJMDPs) with unbounded transition rates the question is harder, because the process may explode: infinitely many jumps can accumulate in finite time, after which the process leaves the state space. Earlier sufficiency results assumed bounded rates or nonexplosive processes (Kitaev 1985; Kitaev and Rykov 1995; Guo and Song 2011; Piunovskiy and Zhang 2014). Feinberg, Mandava and Shiryaev (arXiv:2003.01342) proved the continuous-time analogue of Derman and Strauch's result with no such assumption: the induced Markov policy has state-action marginals no larger than those of the original policy, and equal ones as long as it does not explode.

Setting

A CTJMDP is given by a state space XXX and an action space AAA, both standard Borel spaces; nonempty sets A(x)⊆AA(x)\subseteq AA(x)⊆A of actions available at each state xxx, whose graph Gr(A)\mathrm{Gr}(A)Gr(A) is measurable and contains the graph of a measurable selector; and transition rates q~(x,a,⋅)\tilde q(x,a,\cdot)q~​(x,a,⋅), where Z↦q~(x,a,Z∖{x})Z\mapsto\tilde q(x,a,Z\setminus\{x\})Z↦q~​(x,a,Z∖{x}) is a finite measure, measurable in (x,a)(x,a)(x,a). The jump intensity is q~(x,a)=q~(x,a,X∖{x})\tilde q(x,a)=\tilde q(x,a,X\setminus\{x\})q~​(x,a)=q~​(x,a,X∖{x}), and Assumption 2.1 requires qˉ(x)=sup⁡a∈A(x)q~(x,a)<∞\bar q(x)=\sup_{a\in A(x)}\tilde q(x,a)<\inftyqˉ​(x)=supa∈A(x)​q~​(x,a)<∞ for every xxx. A probability measure ppp on AAA acts through q~(x,p)=∫q~(x,a) p(da)\tilde q(x,p)=\int\tilde q(x,a)\,p(da)q~​(x,p)=∫q~​(x,a)p(da) and q~(x,p,Z)=∫q~(x,a,Z) p(da)\tilde q(x,p,Z)=\int\tilde q(x,a,Z)\,p(da)q~​(x,p,Z)=∫q~​(x,a,Z)p(da).

A trajectory is ω=(x0,t1,x1,t2,x2,… )\omega=(x_0,t_1,x_1,t_2,x_2,\dots)ω=(x0​,t1​,x1​,t2​,x2​,…), with jump epochs 0=t0<t1<t2<⋯≤∞0=t_0<t_1<t_2<\cdots\le\infty0=t0​<t1​<t2​<⋯≤∞ and post-jump states xnx_nxn​; the process is ξt=xn\xi_t=x_nξt​=xn​ for tn≤t<tn+1t_n\le t<t_{n+1}tn​≤t<tn+1​ and leaves XXX at t∞=lim⁡ntnt_\infty=\lim_nt_nt∞​=limn​tn​. A policy π\piπ chooses, between the nnnth and (n+1)(n+1)(n+1)st jump, the action distribution πn(⋅∣x0,t1,…,tn,xn,t−tn)\pi_n(\cdot\mid x_0,t_1,\dots,t_n,x_n,t-t_n)πn​(⋅∣x0​,t1​,…,tn​,xn​,t−tn​), concentrated on A(xn)A(x_n)A(xn​). A Markov policy is a transition probability ϕ(⋅∣z,t)\phi(\cdot\mid z,t)ϕ(⋅∣z,t) from X×(0,∞)X\times(0,\infty)X×(0,∞) to AAA with ϕ(A(z)∣z,t)=1\phi(A(z)\mid z,t)=1ϕ(A(z)∣z,t)=1. An initial distribution γ\gammaγ and a policy π\piπ define the law Pγπ\mathbb P^\pi_\gammaPγπ​ of the process: from xnx_nxn​ the next jump occurs at hazard rate q~(xn,πs)\tilde q(x_n,\pi_s)q~​(xn​,πs​) and lands in dydydy with intensity q~(xn,πs,dy∖{xn})\tilde q(x_n,\pi_s,dy\setminus\{x_n\})q~​(xn​,πs​,dy∖{xn​}).

The state marginal and the state-action marginal are

Pγπ(t,Z)=Pγπ(ξt∈Z),Pγπ(t,Z,B)=Eγπ[I{ξt−∈Z} π(B∣ω,t)],P^\pi_\gamma(t,Z)=\mathbb P^\pi_\gamma(\xi_t\in Z),\qquad P^\pi_\gamma(t,Z,B)=\mathbb E^\pi_\gamma\big[I\{\xi_{t-}\in Z\}\,\pi(B\mid\omega,t)\big],Pγπ​(t,Z)=Pγπ​(ξt​∈Z),Pγπ​(t,Z,B)=Eγπ​[I{ξt−​∈Z}π(B∣ω,t)],

for t>0t>0t>0, Z⊆XZ\subseteq XZ⊆X, B⊆AB\subseteq AB⊆A. A Markov policy ϕ\phiϕ satisfies (16) for (γ,π)(\gamma,\pi)(γ,π) if

Pγπ(t,Z,B)=∫Zϕ(B∣z,t) Pγπ(t,dz)for all t>0, Z, B,P^\pi_\gamma(t,Z,B)=\int_Z\phi(B\mid z,t)\,P^\pi_\gamma(t,dz)\qquad\text{for all }t>0,\ Z,\ B,Pγπ​(t,Z,B)=∫Z​ϕ(B∣z,t)Pγπ​(t,dz)for all t>0, Z, B,

that is, ϕ(⋅∣z,t)\phi(\cdot\mid z,t)ϕ(⋅∣z,t) is the conditional distribution of the action given ξt−=z\xi_{t-}=zξt−​=z under π\piπ. The process under ϕ\phiϕ is nonexplosive when Pγϕ(t,X)=1P^\phi_\gamma(t,X)=1Pγϕ​(t,X)=1 for all t>0t>0t>0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

If ϕ\phiϕ is a Markov policy satisfying (16) for (γ,π)(\gamma,\pi)(γ,π), then

Pγϕ(t,Z,B)≤Pγπ(t,Z,B)for all t>0, Z, B,P^\phi_\gamma(t,Z,B)\le P^\pi_\gamma(t,Z,B)\qquad\text{for all }t>0,\ Z,\ B,Pγϕ​(t,Z,B)≤Pγπ​(t,Z,B)for all t>0, Z, B,

with equality for t∈ ]0,s]t\in\,]0,s]t∈]0,s] whenever Pγϕ(s,X)=1P^\phi_\gamma(s,X)=1Pγϕ​(s,X)=1, and equality for all t>0t>0t>0 when the process under ϕ\phiϕ is nonexplosive.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof: existence and uniqueness of Pγπ\mathbb P^\pi_\gammaPγπ​ (§2); the compensator identities (8) and Lemma 3; the forward identity (37) for (x,π)(x,\pi)(x,π)-bounded sets (Lemma 4); Feller's minimal solution of Kolmogorov's forward equation (Theorem 3), its identification with the marginal of a Markov policy ((31), Corollary 5); the occupation identities (49)–(50); the state-marginal comparison (Lemma 2) and Theorem 1 for one initial state (Lemma 5); the characterization (19) of (16) (Corollary 1); the scaling identity (58)–(59) and the claim (19) for the extended model (p. 16); and the existence of ϕ\phiϕ (Lemma 1).

Significance

Theorem 1 with Lemma 1 shows that Markov policies are sufficient in CTJMDPs with unbounded rates. Every cost criterion that is a monotone functional of state-action marginals with nonnegative costs (expected total discounted costs, finite-horizon costs, average costs per unit time, and the corresponding constrained problems) is no larger under the Markov policy, which is the content of §6 of the paper. Equality holds whenever the Markov policy does not explode, for example when the rates are bounded (Corollary 2), and two Markov policies satisfying (16) have the same law (Corollary 3). The intermediate results, in particular Lemma 4 (the forward identity for possibly explosive processes) and Feller's minimal-solution theorem, are tools in their own right for continuous-time Markov chains on general state spaces.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open mathematically. No part of it is formalized: Mathlib has no jump processes, compensators of point processes, Kolmogorov forward equations on general state spaces, or Feller's construction of minimal transition functions. The mission produces a machine-checked account of these foundations and of the sufficiency theorem built on them, with every measure-theoretic step (the law of the process, the disintegration, the minimality argument) made explicit.

Difficulty

The direct argument for discrete time compares the two marginals step by step through the one-step transition law. In continuous time there is no first step, and the natural replacement, comparing the forward equations satisfied by the two marginals, breaks down twice. First, with unbounded rates the integrals in the forward equation (37) can be infinite, so the equation is not even well defined for all sets, and the standard derivations assume nonexplosiveness. Second, forward equations need not have unique solutions when the process can explode, so showing that both marginals solve the same equation does not make them equal. The paper handles the first point with the class of (x,π)(x,\pi)(x,π)-bounded sets and the second with Feller's minimal solution, which yields only an inequality in general; equality needs the probability-one condition. Passing from an initial state to an initial distribution is a further step: the forward equation is stated for a point initial condition, and the reduction goes through an extended model with an added state.

Formalization scope

All quantities take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. Rates are given by off-diagonal finite jump measures, with q~:=0\tilde q:=0q~​:=0 off Gr(A)\mathrm{Gr}(A)Gr(A). A trajectory is an element of X × (ℕ → ℝ≥0∞ × X); the cemetery point is not a separate state, and xnx_nxn​ is ignored once tn=∞t_n=\inftytn​=∞. A policy is a family πn(⋅∣ω,s)\pi_n(\cdot\mid\omega,s)πn​(⋅∣ω,s) that depends only on the history up to the nnnth jump. Marginals read the process at ξt−\xi_{t-}ξt−​, which equals ξt\xi_tξt​ almost surely at each fixed ttt.

The law Pγπ\mathbb P^\pi_\gammaPγπ​ is a hypothesis of each statement: any probability measure on trajectories with initial law γ\gammaγ whose one-step conditional laws are the explicit sojourn/jump kernel (the Ionescu-Tulcea construction (75)–(76) of the paper) is admitted, and a milestone states that exactly one such measure exists. The paper characterizes the same measure through Jacod's compensator theorem. The compensator properties (8) and Lemma 3 are stated as (8) for every stopping time of the natural filtration σ(ξs:0≤s≤t)\sigma(\xi_s: 0\le s\le t)σ(ξs​:0≤s≤t). Kolmogorov's forward equations are written additively, with the subtracted integral finite, which is equivalent to the real equation. In the extended model of the proof the added state and actions are Sum.inr points of X ⊕ Unit and A ⊕ Bool; the policy (55) is evaluated on the observed part of the path and chooses the absorbing action off the set Ω′(u)\Omega'(u)Ω′(u), which is a null set.

A formalization in which the law is never shown to exist, or in which (16) cannot be satisfied, would make Theorem 1 vacuous; the existence-and-uniqueness milestone and Lemma 1 rule this out.

A complete development needs the Ionescu-Tulcea construction of the law, compensators of multivariate point processes, the forward equation and Feller's series on a standard Borel space, and disintegration of measures. The first three are reusable for any continuous-time Markov chain or CTJMDP on a general state space, and contributions to them are welcome on their own.

Selected references

  • E. A. Feinberg, M. Mandava, A. N. Shiryaev, Sufficiency of Markov policies for continuous-time jump Markov decision processes, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022; arXiv:2003.01342v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.01342
  • E. A. Feinberg, M. Mandava, A. N. Shiryaev, Kolmogorov's equations for jump Markov processes with unbounded jump rates, Annals of Operations Research, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2538-8
  • E. A. Feinberg, M. Mandava, A. N. Shiryaev, On solutions of Kolmogorov's equations for nonhomogeneous jump Markov processes, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 411(1):261–270, 2014.
  • J. Jacod, Multivariate point processes: predictable projection, Radon–Nikodym derivatives, representation of martingales, Probability Theory and Related Fields 31:235–253, 1975.
  • M. Kitaev, V. Rykov, Controlled Queueing Systems, CRC Press, 1995.
  • X. Guo, X. Song, Discounted continuous-time constrained Markov decision processes in Polish spaces, Annals of Applied Probability 21(5):2016–2049, 2011.
  • A. Piunovskiy, Y. Zhang, Discounted continuous-time Markov decision processes with unbounded rates and randomized history-dependent policies: the dynamic programming approach, 4OR 12:49–75, 2014.
  • C. Derman, R. Strauch, A note on memoryless rules for controlling sequential control processes, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 37:276–278, 1966.
  • W. Feller, On the integro-differential equations of purely-discontinuous Markoff processes, Transactions of the AMS 48:488–515, 1940.
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Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Analytical Solution to a Discrete-Time Model for Dynamic Learning and Decision Making: the two-action frontier difference equations have a unique closed-form solution with explicit det YResearch Paper

Learning while doing, and the frontier of continuation values

Many sequential decisions trade off immediate reward against information: a firm prices without knowing which demand regime it faces, a clinician treats without knowing a patient's type, a bandit player pulls a risky arm to learn its mean. Formally these are partially observed Markov decision problems (POMDPs) with a hidden but fixed state. Their value function is the upper envelope of a set of linear functions of the belief, one continuation-value vector per policy. The efficient frontier of these vectors describes the optimal policy for every prior at once. Except for special cases, the frontier of a POMDP has to be computed numerically.

Hao Zhang (Management Science, 2021; accepted version SSRN 3847049) treats the case of two states, two actions and two signals. Under a commensurability condition on the signals, the extreme points of the frontier satisfy linear difference equations with constant coefficients (Theorems 2 and 4 of the paper). The paper solves these equations in closed form. Theorem 3 covers the case where the second action reveals nothing, so that it acts as a stopping action. Theorem 6 covers the case where both actions are informative. This mission formalizes the solution of the difference equations, including the explicit determinant of the coupling matrix that Appendix B states as Theorem 6 (Complete).

Setting

The hidden state is θ∈{1,2}\theta \in \{1, 2\}θ∈{1,2}, the actions are AAA and BBB, and the signals are γ\gammaγ and γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​. In each period, action aaa in state θ\thetaθ produces signal γ\gammaγ with probability pθ(a,γ)p_\theta(a, \gamma)pθ​(a,γ) and an expected reward rθ(a)r_\theta(a)rθ​(a), and rewards are discounted by δ∈(0,1)\delta \in (0, 1)δ∈(0,1). The anchor points u^θa=(1−δ)−1rθ(a)\hat u^a_\theta = (1-\delta)^{-1} r_\theta(a)u^θa​=(1−δ)−1rθ​(a) are the values of always playing aaa. Write pθA=pθ(A,γ)p^A_\theta = p_\theta(A,\gamma)pθA​=pθ​(A,γ) and pθB=pθ(B,γ)p^B_\theta = p_\theta(B,\gamma)pθB​=pθ​(B,γ).

The signal quality indices are integers n(A,γ)=nA>0n(A,\gamma) = n^A > 0n(A,γ)=nA>0, n(A,γˉ)=−nˉA<0n(A,\bar\gamma) = -\bar n^A < 0n(A,γˉ​)=−nˉA<0, n(B,γ)=nB>0n(B,\gamma) = n^B > 0n(B,γ)=nB>0 and n(B,γˉ)=−nˉB<0n(B,\bar\gamma) = -\bar n^B < 0n(B,γˉ​)=−nˉB<0. Their absolute values are relatively prime, and for some μ>1\mu > 1μ>1 each log-likelihood ratio ln⁡(p1(a,s)/p2(a,s))\ln(p_1(a,s)/p_2(a,s))ln(p1​(a,s)/p2​(a,s)) equals n(a,s)ln⁡μn(a,s) \ln\mun(a,s)lnμ (Definition 3).

For each θ\thetaθ the paper's boundary-value problem (28)–(31) asks for real sequences vA,vBv^A, v^BvA,vB on k=0,1,2,…k = 0, 1, 2, \dotsk=0,1,2,… satisfying four conditions:

vA(k+nA)−δ−1(pθA)−1vA(k)+(pθA)−1(1−pθA) vA(k−nˉA)=0(k≥nˉA),v^A(k+n^A) - \delta^{-1}(p^A_\theta)^{-1} v^A(k) + (p^A_\theta)^{-1}(1-p^A_\theta)\, v^A(k-\bar n^A) = 0 \quad (k \ge \bar n^A),vA(k+nA)−δ−1(pθA​)−1vA(k)+(pθA​)−1(1−pθA​)vA(k−nˉA)=0(k≥nˉA), vB(k+nˉB)−δ−1(1−pθB)−1vB(k)+(1−pθB)−1pθB vB(k−nB)=0(k≥nB),v^B(k+\bar n^B) - \delta^{-1}(1-p^B_\theta)^{-1} v^B(k) + (1-p^B_\theta)^{-1} p^B_\theta\, v^B(k-n^B) = 0 \quad (k \ge n^B),vB(k+nˉB)−δ−1(1−pθB​)−1vB(k)+(1−pθB​)−1pθB​vB(k−nB)=0(k≥nB),

the coupling condition vA(k)+u^θA=vB(nˉA+nB−1−k)+u^θBv^A(k) + \hat u^A_\theta = v^B(\bar n^A + n^B - 1 - k) + \hat u^B_\thetavA(k)+u^θA​=vB(nˉA+nB−1−k)+u^θB​ for k=0,…,nˉA+nB−1k = 0, \dots, \bar n^A + n^B - 1k=0,…,nˉA+nB−1, and decay, vA(k),vB(k)→0v^A(k), v^B(k) \to 0vA(k),vB(k)→0.

The characteristic polynomials are

fθA(z)=znA+nˉA−δ−1(pθA)−1znˉA+(pθA)−1(1−pθA),fθB(z)=znB+nˉB−δ−1(1−pθB)−1znB+(1−pθB)−1pθB.f^A_\theta(z) = z^{n^A+\bar n^A} - \delta^{-1}(p^A_\theta)^{-1} z^{\bar n^A} + (p^A_\theta)^{-1}(1-p^A_\theta), \qquad f^B_\theta(z) = z^{n^B+\bar n^B} - \delta^{-1}(1-p^B_\theta)^{-1} z^{n^B} + (1-p^B_\theta)^{-1}p^B_\theta.fθA​(z)=znA+nˉA−δ−1(pθA​)−1znˉA+(pθA​)−1(1−pθA​),fθB​(z)=znB+nˉB−δ−1(1−pθB​)−1znB+(1−pθB​)−1pθB​.

ZunitaZ^a_{unit}Zunita​ is the set of their roots with ∣z∣<1|z| < 1∣z∣<1, and mzam^a_zmza​ is the multiplicity of the root zzz. From these roots the paper builds a square matrix Y=(YA,YB)Y = (Y^A, Y^B)Y=(YA,YB). Its A-columns are (kτ)zk−τ\binom{k}{\tau}z^{k-\tau}(τk​)zk−τ and its B-columns are (nˉA+nB−1−kτ)znˉA+nB−1−k−τ\binom{\bar n^A+n^B-1-k}{\tau}z^{\bar n^A+n^B-1-k-\tau}(τnˉA+nB−1−k​)znˉA+nB−1−k−τ, in a fixed column order.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (Complete), EC p. 11

For each θ\thetaθ, under the standing assumptions of §5, the goal asserts four things:

  1. ∑z∈ZunitAmzA=nˉA\sum_{z\in Z^A_{unit}} m^A_z = \bar n^A∑z∈ZunitA​​mzA​=nˉA and ∑z∈ZunitBmzB=nB\sum_{z\in Z^B_{unit}} m^B_z = n^B∑z∈ZunitB​​mzB​=nB.
  2. For every enumeration of the roots,
det⁡Y=∏i<l(zlA−ziA)miAmlA∏i,l(1−ziAzlB)miAmlB∏i<l(ziB−zlB)miBmlB.\det Y = \prod_{i<l}(z^A_l - z^A_i)^{m^A_i m^A_l}\prod_{i,l}(1 - z^A_i z^B_l)^{m^A_i m^B_l}\prod_{i<l}(z^B_i - z^B_l)^{m^B_i m^B_l}.detY=i<l∏​(zlA​−ziA​)miA​mlA​i,l∏​(1−ziA​zlB​)miA​mlB​i<l∏​(ziB​−zlB​)miB​mlB​.
  1. det⁡Y≠0\det Y \ne 0detY=0.
  2. The problem (28)–(31) has exactly one real solution. That solution is the root expansion vθa(k)=∑z∈Zunita∑τ<mzaαz,τa(kτ)zk−τv^a_\theta(k) = \sum_{z \in Z^a_{unit}}\sum_{\tau<m^a_z}\alpha^a_{z,\tau}\binom{k}{\tau}z^{k-\tau}vθa​(k)=∑z∈Zunita​​∑τ<mza​​αz,τa​(τk​)zk−τ, whose coefficients are given by (αA;−αB)=(u^θB−u^θA)Y−11(\boldsymbol\alpha^A; -\boldsymbol\alpha^B) = (\hat u^B_\theta - \hat u^A_\theta)Y^{-1}\mathbf 1(αA;−αB)=(u^θB​−u^θA​)Y−11.

Milestones

  • Eq. (18): the general solution of a constant-coefficient linear recurrence with repeated characteristic roots.
  • Eq. (19): the determinant of the generalized (confluent) Vandermonde matrix.
  • From the proof of Theorem 3: zn+nˉ−δ−1p−1znˉ+p−1(1−p)z^{n+\bar n} - \delta^{-1}p^{-1}z^{\bar n} + p^{-1}(1-p)zn+nˉ−δ−1p−1znˉ+p−1(1−p) has exactly nˉ\bar nnˉ roots in the open unit disk, counted with multiplicity.
  • From the proof of Theorem 3: decay of an exponential polynomial forces zero coefficients on every root with ∣z∣≥1|z| \ge 1∣z∣≥1.
  • Theorem 3: the one-sided problem (13)–(15), when action BBB is uninformative.
  • The base case and the inductive step of the determinant computation in the proof of Theorem 6 (Complete).

Significance

The result turns the efficient frontier of this class of POMDPs into explicit algebra. Each extreme point is a finite sum over the roots of two trinomials in the unit disk, and the coefficients come from one linear solve. The paper uses this to explain the shape of the frontier: how many extreme points the two actions contribute, and how quickly they accumulate at the anchor points. It also shows that the coupled two-sided problem is always well posed, because YYY is nonsingular.

The paper proves the results in prose; none of them is machine-checked. The mission contributes a checked proof of the solution formula and of the determinant identity. The identity is a confluent Vandermonde-type evaluation with a reflected second block. Several pieces are general mathematics that Mathlib lacks: the solution space of a linear recurrence with repeated roots in binomial form, the confluent Vandermonde determinant, root counting in the unit disk, and the decay lemma for exponential polynomials.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to write down the general solution, discard the growing modes and match the boundary data. It runs into three problems. First, the count of roots in the disk is what makes YYY square. It comes from Rouché's theorem, which Mathlib does not have, so it must be proved or replaced by a polynomial argument. Second, roots on the unit circle are not excluded a priori, so the decay argument has to handle polynomially weighted unimodular terms. Third, and hardest, is det⁡Y≠0\det Y \ne 0detY=0. YYY is not a confluent Vandermonde matrix: its B-block is reflected (N−1−kN-1-kN−1−k in place of kkk). The paper reduces the simple-root case to a Vandermonde matrix in the inverted points 1/zjB1/z^B_j1/zjB​, and then handles each repeated B-root by differentiating with respect to a "nominal root". Making that induction precise requires care with column orders and signs.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace LearnDoFrontier.TwoAction. A Model carries δ\deltaδ, pθAp^A_\thetapθA​, pθBp^B_\thetapθB​, the rewards rθ(a,s)r_\theta(a,s)rθ​(a,s) and the four indices, with the negative indices stored as the positive naturals nˉA,nˉB\bar n^A, \bar n^BnˉA,nˉB. States, actions and signals are Fin 2, and index 0 stands for θ=1\theta = 1θ=1, AAA and γ\gammaγ. Model.Standing collects the assumptions of §5: 0<δ<10<\delta<10<δ<1, General Position, Informative Actions A and B, and Definition 3, with "relatively prime" read as a joint gcd of 111. Sequences are real and indexed by N\mathbb NN, while the roots, coefficients and YYY are complex. The solution formula is an equality in C\mathbb CC. Root enumerations are arbitrary bijections onto ZunitaZ^a_{unit}Zunita​, universally quantified, and the columns of YYY follow the paper's order: A-columns first, roots first, then τ\tauτ ascending for A and descending for B. Exponents use natural-number subtraction, which is harmless because the binomial factor vanishes whenever k<τk<\tauk<τ. The determinant milestones are stated for arbitrary distinct points rather than roots, as the paper's induction uses them.

No formalization may make the targets hold by definition. ZunitZ_{unit}Zunit​ and mzm_zmz​ are the actual roots and multiplicities, never "the first nˉA\bar n^AnˉA roots". Uniqueness ranges over all real sequences satisfying (28)–(31), not only over root expansions. The coefficients are given by Y−1Y^{-1}Y−1, not chosen to fit the boundary.

The link from the POMDP's efficient frontier to (13)–(15) and (28)–(31) (Theorems 2 and 4) is not formalized. Its proofs are geometric sketches, and Theorem 4 assumes a two-segment frontier structure that the paper itself calls a conjecture. The mission is about the difference equations exactly as the paper poses them. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and the recurrence, Vandermonde and root-count lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • Hao Zhang, Analytical Solution to a Discrete-Time Model for Dynamic Learning and Decision Making, Management Science, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4194 ; accepted version with E-Companion: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3847049
  • Saber Elaydi, An Introduction to Difference Equations, 3rd ed., Springer, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-27602-5
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Control TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Driving Supply to Marketplaces: Optimal Platform Pricing When Suppliers Share Inventory: The Supplier Shares Its n-th Unit Exactly When the Time-to-Go Is at Most a Threshold tₙResearch Paper

Motivation

Online marketplaces such as Zalando, Amazon or Farfetch let brands sell through the platform's storefront in addition to their own stores. One common arrangement is inventory sharing: the brand keeps ownership of its stock, but makes it visible to the platform's customers, and pays the platform a commission on every unit the platform sells. For a supplier with a fixed stock and a finite selling season, this creates a timing question. Sharing brings more customers, but each platform sale earns less than a direct one. Early in the season there is plenty of time to sell the stock at full margin; late in the season unsold units are worth nothing.

Martínez-de-Albéniz, Pinto and Amorim (SSRN 3643261, 2020; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022) model this problem as a continuous-time optimal control problem with Poisson demand, solve the supplier's problem, and use the solution to study how the platform should set its commission. The supplier's problem is a binary-control relative of the dynamic pricing problem of Gallego and van Ryzin (Management Science 1994): sharing switches the effective price and the demand rate between two values. Its solution is the building block for the paper's platform-pricing results.

Setting

A supplier sells a single item during a season. Time is measured as the time-to-go t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 until the end of the season (t=0t = 0t=0 at the end). The item sells at the price π>0\pi > 0π>0. Customers of the supplier's own (direct) channel arrive as a Poisson process of rate λD>0\lambda_D > 0λD​>0; customers of the platform arrive at rate λP>0\lambda_P > 0λP​>0. On a direct sale the supplier earns π\piπ; on a platform sale it keeps (1−θ)π(1-\theta)\pi(1−θ)π, where θ∈[0,1]\theta \in [0,1]θ∈[0,1] is the commission. Revenue is discounted at rate r≥0r \ge 0r≥0, and leftover units are worth nothing.

At every moment the supplier chooses z∈{0,1}z \in \{0,1\}z∈{0,1}: z=1z = 1z=1 shares the inventory with the platform, z=0z = 0z=0 does not. Write Vn(t)V_n(t)Vn​(t) for the revenue-to-go with nnn units left and time-to-go ttt, and ΔVn(t)=Vn(t)−Vn−1(t)\Delta V_n(t) = V_n(t) - V_{n-1}(t)ΔVn​(t)=Vn​(t)−Vn−1​(t) for the marginal revenue-to-go of the nnn-th unit. The revenue-to-go solves the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation (3)

dVndt=sup⁡z∈{0,1}[(πλD+z(1−θ)πλP)−(λD+zλP) ΔVn(t)−rVn(t)],n≥1,\frac{dV_n}{dt} = \sup_{z\in\{0,1\}}\Bigl[\bigl(\pi\lambda_D + z(1-\theta)\pi\lambda_P\bigr) - (\lambda_D + z\lambda_P)\,\Delta V_n(t) - rV_n(t)\Bigr], \qquad n \ge 1,dtdVn​​=z∈{0,1}sup​[(πλD​+z(1−θ)πλP​)−(λD​+zλP​)ΔVn​(t)−rVn​(t)],n≥1,

with V0≡0V_0 \equiv 0V0​≡0 and Vn(0)=0V_n(0) = 0Vn​(0)=0. A decision is optimal for unit nnn at time ttt if it attains this supremum. The threshold of unit nnn is

tn=sup⁡{t≥0:ΔVn(t)≤(1−θ)π}∈[0,∞],t0=0,t_n = \sup\{t \ge 0 : \Delta V_n(t) \le (1-\theta)\pi\} \in [0, \infty], \qquad t_0 = 0,tn​=sup{t≥0:ΔVn​(t)≤(1−θ)π}∈[0,∞],t0​=0,

which is ∞\infty∞ when ΔVn\Delta V_nΔVn​ never exceeds the platform margin (1−θ)π(1-\theta)\pi(1−θ)π. In Lean these objects are Params, hamiltonian, hjbRHS, IsRevenueToGo, marginal, IsOptimalDecision and threshold in the namespace MarketplaceSharing.Threshold.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 9)

For every revenue-to-go VVV and every n≥1n \ge 1n≥1:

ΔVn is strictly increasing on [0,∞),ΔVn(t)=(1−θ)π  ⟺  t=tn,\Delta V_n \text{ is strictly increasing on } [0,\infty), \qquad \Delta V_n(t) = (1-\theta)\pi \iff t = t_n,ΔVn​ is strictly increasing on [0,∞),ΔVn​(t)=(1−θ)π⟺t=tn​, z=1 is optimal at (t,n)  ⟺  t≤tn,t>tn  ⟹  z=0 is optimal and z=1 is not,z = 1 \text{ is optimal at } (t, n) \iff t \le t_n, \qquad t > t_n \implies z = 0 \text{ is optimal and } z = 1 \text{ is not},z=1 is optimal at (t,n)⟺t≤tn​,t>tn​⟹z=0 is optimal and z=1 is not,

and on each interval Inj=[tj−1,tj]I_{nj} = [t_{j-1}, t_j]Inj​=[tj−1​,tj​], 1≤j≤n1 \le j \le n1≤j≤n, and on In,n+1=[tn,∞)I_{n,n+1} = [t_n, \infty)In,n+1​=[tn​,∞), there are constants with

Vn(t)=Cnj+∑i=0n−jAnji tie−(λD+λP+r)t+∑i=0j−2Bnji tie−(λD+r)t.(4)V_n(t) = C_{nj} + \sum_{i=0}^{n-j} A_{nji}\,t^i e^{-(\lambda_D+\lambda_P+r)t} + \sum_{i=0}^{j-2} B_{nji}\,t^i e^{-(\lambda_D+r)t}. \tag{4}Vn​(t)=Cnj​+i=0∑n−j​Anji​tie−(λD​+λP​+r)t+i=0∑j−2​Bnji​tie−(λD​+r)t.(4)

The coefficients are existential, as on the page; their recursions are not part of the goal.

Milestones

In attack order: well-posedness of (3) (a solution exists and is unique on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞)); the sharing condition of p. 8, z=1z = 1z=1 optimal   ⟺  ΔVn(t)≤(1−θ)π\iff \Delta V_n(t) \le (1-\theta)\pi⟺ΔVn​(t)≤(1−θ)π; Lemma 1, Vn+1≥VnV_{n+1} \ge V_nVn+1​≥Vn​; Lemma 2, ΔVn+1≤ΔVn\Delta V_{n+1} \le \Delta V_nΔVn+1​≤ΔVn​; Lemma 3, VnV_nVn​ nondecreasing in ttt; Lemma 4, ΔVn\Delta V_nΔVn​ nondecreasing in ttt; the explicit t1t_1t1​ of footnote 4 (at r=0r = 0r=0); the first bullet of Theorem 1; and Corollary 1, tn+1≥tnt_{n+1} \ge t_ntn+1​≥tn​.

Significance

Theorem 1 reduces the supplier's policy, a function of time and stock, to one number per unit: share the nnn-th remaining unit exactly when the time-to-go is at most tnt_ntn​. Corollary 1 orders these numbers, so the season splits into an early period of direct-only sales and a late period of sharing, which begins earlier the more stock is left. The closed form (4) makes VnV_nVn​ and the thresholds computable. The paper's analysis of the platform's commission (Theorems 2 and 3) takes this policy as the supplier's best response.

The results are proved in the paper, by an induction on nnn that runs through Lemmas 1–4. None of it has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces a checked proof of a threshold structure for a two-mode Poisson control problem, a checked statement of where the printed text needs correcting (see below), and reusable pieces: well-posedness of a recursive system of Lipschitz ODEs and comparison arguments for HJB equations of this type.

Difficulty

The HJB system (3) is a recursive family of ODEs whose right-hand side switches between two affine laws according to the sign of (1−θ)π−ΔVn(t)(1-\theta)\pi - \Delta V_n(t)(1−θ)π−ΔVn​(t). The monotonicity statements are comparison results for such switched systems: the obvious argument (differentiate ΔVn\Delta V_nΔVn​ and read off the sign) gives an equation for ΔVn′\Delta V_n'ΔVn′​ that involves ΔVn−1′\Delta V_{n-1}'ΔVn−1′​ and the switching times of both units, so monotonicity in ttt and in nnn have to be established together, unit by unit. The closed form (4) then needs the switching times of all lower units to be ordered (Corollary 1) before the ODE on each interval has constant decisions, and the polynomial factors tit^iti come from repeated resonance of the exponential e−(λD+λP+r)te^{-(\lambda_D+\lambda_P+r)t}e−(λD​+λP​+r)t across units.

Formalization scope

The paper defines VnV_nVn​ by a stochastic control problem (2) over Poisson sales processes and derives (3) informally. The mission works with (3) only: the revenue-to-go is any family V:N→R→RV : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}V:N→R→R satisfying IsRevenueToGo (V0=0V_0 = 0V0​=0 on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), Vn(0)=0V_n(0) = 0Vn​(0)=0, and the HJB equation for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 as a derivative within [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), one-sided at 000), and every theorem takes this as a hypothesis. The well-posedness milestone shows such a family exists and is unique on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), so no theorem is vacuous. Values at t<0t < 0t<0 are unconstrained. Decisions are Booleans (true = share).

Conventions and added hypotheses: π>0\pi > 0π>0, λD>0\lambda_D > 0λD​>0, λP>0\lambda_P > 0λP​>0 and r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 are standing hypotheses (with λP=0\lambda_P = 0λP​=0 or π=0\pi = 0π=0 the two decisions tie everywhere and the threshold statement fails); θ∈[0,1]\theta \in [0,1]θ∈[0,1] is printed. The paper's range n∈{1,…,N}n \in \{1,\dots,N\}n∈{1,…,N} is read as n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, since VnV_nVn​ does not depend on NNN. The threshold lives in the extended reals with tn=∞t_n = \inftytn​=∞ when ΔVn=(1−θ)π\Delta V_n = (1-\theta)\piΔVn​=(1−θ)π has no solution (p. 10); the literal "there is an unique tnt_ntn​" fails for instance at θ=0\theta = 0θ=0. Three printed formulas are corrected and disclosed: the exponents of (4) carry rrr, as the proof on p. 30 does (the printed form is exact only at r=0r = 0r=0); Lemma 4 is stated in the direction of its words and proof, ΔVn(t1)≤ΔVn(t2)\Delta V_n(t_1) \le \Delta V_n(t_2)ΔVn​(t1​)≤ΔVn​(t2​) for t2≥t1>0t_2 \ge t_1 > 0t2​≥t1​>0 (the printed display is reversed); and the t1t_1t1​ formula of footnote 4 is stated at r=0r = 0r=0 (with θ>0\theta > 0θ>0), the only case in which it is exact.

The encoding rules out the trivializing readings: "optimal" is attainment of the supremum in (3), not membership in [0,tn][0, t_n][0,tn​]; tnt_ntn​ is the supremum of a sublevel set that always contains 000, not a solution of ΔVn=(1−θ)π\Delta V_n = (1-\theta)\piΔVn​=(1−θ)π that could make uniqueness definitional; monotonicity of ΔVn\Delta V_nΔVn​ is a conclusion of the goal, never a hypothesis; and the hypothesis IsRevenueToGo is satisfiable by the well-posedness milestone.

Not formalized: the stochastic formulation (2) and its identification with (3); the recursions for AnjiA_{nji}Anji​, BnjiB_{nji}Bnji​, CnjC_{nj}Cnj​ (pp. 31–32); the numerical study of §3.3; and the platform-pricing results (Theorems 2 and 3, §4) and §5. A complete development needs one-dimensional ODE existence and uniqueness (Picard–Lindelöf and Grönwall, available in Mathlib), comparison of solutions of scalar ODEs, and calculus with tie−ctt^i e^{-ct}tie−ct. Proofs of any milestone, and reusable comparison lemmas for switched affine ODEs, are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Martínez-de-Albéniz, C. Pinto, P. Amorim, Driving Supply to Marketplaces: Optimal Platform Pricing When Suppliers Share Inventory, SSRN 3643261, version of June 30, 2020; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3643261
  • G. Gallego, G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8), 999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • V. Martínez-de-Albéniz, K. Talluri, Dynamic Price Competition with Fixed Capacities, Management Science 57(6), 1078–1093, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1337
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Learning Benefits of Resource Flexibility: At the Break-Even Cost of Flexibility, the Flexible System Is More Profitable Below a Profit-Margin Threshold and Less Profitable Above ItResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm that sells several products must decide, before demand is known, how much capacity to build. It can build dedicated capacity, one resource per product, or a single flexible resource that can serve any product but costs more per unit. The classical argument for flexibility is risk pooling: one pooled resource absorbs the fluctuations of several demands, as studied by Fine and Freund (1990) and Van Mieghem (1998).

Chod, Markakis and Trichakis (SSRN 3212177, published in Management Science, 2021) identify a second, independent benefit. A firm usually observes its sales, not its demand: when a product stocks out, the firm learns only that demand exceeded capacity. This is demand censoring. Because flexible capacity can be shifted to whichever product is in demand, it stocks out less often for each product, and so the firm learns more about demand from a flexible system than from a dedicated one. When demand is correlated over time, that information is worth money in later periods. The paper calls this the learning benefits of flexibility and asks when they are positive.

To separate learning from pooling, the paper compares the two systems at the break-even cost of flexibility, the unit cost of flexible capacity at which both systems earn the same profit in a single period. Any difference that remains in a two-period model is then due to learning alone (Eq. (14) of the paper).

Setting

There are two products with a common unit price ppp. Dedicated capacity costs ccc per unit and flexible capacity costs cFc_FcF​ per unit, with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p. The first-period demands D11,D21D^1_1, D^1_2D11​,D21​ are independent and each uniform on [x,x+U][x, x+U][x,x+U], with x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and U>0U > 0U>0. The profit margin is (p−c)/p(p-c)/p(p−c)/p.

Static model. With dedicated capacities Q=(Q1,Q2)\mathbf Q = (Q_1, Q_2)Q=(Q1​,Q2​), product iii sells min⁡{Di,Qi}\min\{D_i, Q_i\}min{Di​,Qi​}, and the expected profit is πN(Q)=p E[min⁡{D1,Q1}+min⁡{D2,Q2}]−c(Q1+Q2)\pi_N(\mathbf Q) = p\,\mathbb E[\min\{D_1,Q_1\} + \min\{D_2,Q_2\}] - c(Q_1+Q_2)πN​(Q)=pE[min{D1​,Q1​}+min{D2​,Q2​}]−c(Q1​+Q2​). With flexible capacity QFQ_FQF​, product 1 is served first: it sells SF,1=min⁡{D1,QF}S_{F,1} = \min\{D_1, Q_F\}SF,1​=min{D1​,QF​} and product 2 sells SF,2=min⁡{D2,QF−SF,1}S_{F,2} = \min\{D_2, Q_F - S_{F,1}\}SF,2​=min{D2​,QF​−SF,1​}; the expected profit is πF(cF)(QF)=p E[SF,1+SF,2]−cFQF\pi_F(c_F)(Q_F) = p\,\mathbb E[S_{F,1} + S_{F,2}] - c_F Q_FπF​(cF​)(QF​)=pE[SF,1​+SF,2​]−cF​QF​. The optimal static profits are

πˉN=sup⁡Q∈R+2πN(Q),πˉF(cF)=sup⁡QF≥0πF(cF)(QF),\bar\pi_N = \sup_{\mathbf Q \in \mathbb R^2_+} \pi_N(\mathbf Q), \qquad \bar\pi_F(c_F) = \sup_{Q_F \ge 0} \pi_F(c_F)(Q_F),πˉN​=Q∈R+2​sup​πN​(Q),πˉF​(cF​)=QF​≥0sup​πF​(cF​)(QF​),

and cFc_FcF​ is a break-even cost when πˉF(cF)=πˉN\bar\pi_F(c_F) = \bar\pi_NπˉF​(cF​)=πˉN​.

Learning. A product that had qqq units available and demand ddd reveals ddd exactly if d<qd < qd<q; otherwise the firm learns only that D≥qD \ge qD≥q and conditions its prior on that event. The firm's belief after period 1 is the product of the two products' posteriors. In period 2 demand repeats (Di2=Di1D^2_i = D^1_iDi2​=Di1​), and both systems build dedicated capacity against the posterior belief G\mathbb GG, earning

V2(G)=sup⁡Q∈R+2EG[pmin⁡{D1,Q1}+pmin⁡{D2,Q2}−c(Q1+Q2)].V^2(\mathbb G) = \sup_{\mathbf Q \in \mathbb R^2_+} \mathbb E_{\mathbb G}\big[p\min\{D_1,Q_1\} + p\min\{D_2,Q_2\} - c(Q_1+Q_2)\big].V2(G)=Q∈R+2​sup​EG​[pmin{D1​,Q1​}+pmin{D2​,Q2​}−c(Q1​+Q2​)].

The two-period optimal profits are

VN=sup⁡Q∈R+2(πN(Q)+E[V2(P(⋅∣SN1))]),VF(cF)=sup⁡QF≥0(πF(cF)(QF)+E[V2(P(⋅∣SF1))]).V_N = \sup_{\mathbf Q \in \mathbb R^2_+} \Big(\pi_N(\mathbf Q) + \mathbb E\big[V^2(\mathbb P(\cdot \mid \mathbf S^1_N))\big]\Big), \qquad V_F(c_F) = \sup_{Q_F \ge 0} \Big(\pi_F(c_F)(Q_F) + \mathbb E\big[V^2(\mathbb P(\cdot \mid \mathbf S^1_F))\big]\Big).VN​=Q∈R+2​sup​(πN​(Q)+E[V2(P(⋅∣SN1​))]),VF​(cF​)=QF​≥0sup​(πF​(cF​)(QF​)+E[V2(P(⋅∣SF1​))]).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1

Take x=0x = 0x=0. There is a threshold ζ∈(0,1)\zeta \in (0,1)ζ∈(0,1) such that for all p,c,U,cFp, c, U, c_Fp,c,U,cF​ with 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p, U>0U > 0U>0, c≤cF<pc \le c_F < pc≤cF​<p and πˉF(cF)=πˉN\bar\pi_F(c_F) = \bar\pi_NπˉF​(cF​)=πˉN​,

p−cp≤ζ  ⟹  VF(cF)≥VN,p−cp>ζ  ⟹  VF(cF)≤VN.\frac{p-c}{p} \le \zeta \implies V_F(c_F) \ge V_N, \qquad \frac{p-c}{p} > \zeta \implies V_F(c_F) \le V_N.pp−c​≤ζ⟹VF​(cF​)≥VN​,pp−c​>ζ⟹VF​(cF​)≤VN​.

The goal fixes no numerical value of ζ\zetaζ; the paper reports ζ≈0.5904\zeta \approx 0.5904ζ≈0.5904.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3: the uniform newsvendor optimum Qˉ=x+U(p−c)/p\bar Q = x + U(p-c)/pQˉ​=x+U(p−c)/p with profit (p−c)x+U2(p−c)2/p(p-c)x + \tfrac U2 (p-c)^2/p(p−c)x+2U​(p−c)2/p.
  2. The static non-flexible optimum πˉN=2(p−c)x+U(p−c)2/p\bar\pi_N = 2(p-c)x + U(p-c)^2/pπˉN​=2(p−c)x+U(p−c)2/p.
  3. The static flexible optimum QˉF(cF)\bar Q_F(c_F)Qˉ​F​(cF​), πˉF(cF)\bar\pi_F(c_F)πˉF​(cF​) in the two branches p≥2cFp \ge 2c_Fp≥2cF​ and p<2cFp < 2c_Fp<2cF​.
  4. Eq. (8): the pooling benefits πˉF(cF)−πˉN\bar\pi_F(c_F) - \bar\pi_NπˉF​(cF​)−πˉN​ are strictly decreasing in cFc_FcF​, and the break-even cost exists and is unique in [c,p)[c, p)[c,p).
  5. The two-period non-flexible optimum: VN=4x(p−c)+U(p−c)2(3c+2p)/ΔV_N = 4x(p-c) + U(p-c)^2(3c+2p)/\DeltaVN​=4x(p−c)+U(p−c)2(3c+2p)/Δ with Δ=(p−c)(p+c)+cp\Delta = (p-c)(p+c) + cpΔ=(p−c)(p+c)+cp.
  6. The flexible case QF≥2x+UQ_F \ge 2x + UQF​≥2x+U: concavity, the right derivative (−c2+cp+p(p−2cF))/(2p)(-c^2 + cp + p(p-2c_F))/(2p)(−c2+cp+p(p−2cF​))/(2p) at 2x+U2x+U2x+U, and the price threshold p~\tilde pp~​.

Significance

Proposition 1 says that learning favours flexibility when margins are low or moderate and favours dedicated capacity when margins are high. Combined with the risk-pooling analysis, it shows that the value of flexibility in a dynamic setting is not captured by static pooling models: a firm choosing a technology by comparing single-period profits misjudges it in both directions, depending on the margin. The comparison at the break-even cost is the cleanest available measurement of the information value of a capacity structure under censored demand.

The paper proves Proposition 1 by computing closed forms of all the value functions and then certifying a polynomial inequality over a semialgebraic parameter set with sum-of-squares methods (p. A8). No machine-checked proof exists. A formalization would replace a computer-algebra certificate whose details are not printed with a checked argument, and would fix the value-function closed forms (milestones 2–6), which the paper derives in a few lines each. The milestones are of independent use: Lemma 3 and the censored-sales posterior are standard in inventory learning models.

Difficulty

The value functions VNV_NVN​ and VF(cF)V_F(c_F)VF​(cF​) are suprema of first-period profit plus the expectation of a second-period value under a posterior that depends on whether each product stocked out. In the flexible system the capacity left for product 2 depends on product 1's realized demand, so the posterior of product 2 depends on product 1's demand, and the objective vFv_FvF​ splits into regimes with different formulas; it is not concave in general (the paper notes "optimization of non-concave functions", p. 12). The break-even cost is defined implicitly by an equation involving square roots, so the final comparison is between two functions of (p,c)(p, c)(p,c) along an implicit curve; the obvious approach of comparing closed forms branch by branch needs a sign certificate for a polynomial system rather than a one-line inequality.

Formalization scope

Everything is real-valued. The uniform prior is U−1U^{-1}U−1 times Lebesgue measure on [x,x+U][x, x+U][x,x+U]; the joint prior is the product measure. The stock-out posterior is Mathlib's conditional measure cond of the prior on {D≥q}\{D \ge q\}{D≥q}, an exact observation is a Dirac measure, and a demand is observed exactly iff it is strictly below the available capacity (p. 9). The joint posterior is the product of the per-product posteriors, which is exact because the observation is a product event given product 1's demand. All optima are real suprema of images over nonnegative capacities, never closed forms. The symmetric case of §3 is built in (p1=p2=pp_1 = p_2 = pp1​=p2​=p, common ccc, i.i.d. uniform demands), as is ξ=0\xi = 0ξ=0 (second-period demand equals first-period demand); at x=0x = 0x=0 the paper's noise U[−ξx,ξx]U[-\xi x, \xi x]U[−ξx,ξx] is zero for every ξ\xiξ, so the goal loses nothing. Added hypotheses, disclosed in each statement: U>0U > 0U>0, 0≤c<p0 \le c < p0≤c<p, c≤cF<pc \le c_F < pc≤cF​<p, and in the goal 0<ζ<10 < \zeta < 10<ζ<1.

The values must not be defined by their closed forms or by the paper's case split j=1,2,3j = 1, 2, 3j=1,2,3; that would make the goal a statement about polynomials rather than about the Bellman problems.

A complete development needs: integrals of piecewise-linear functions against uniform laws and their products, conditional uniform laws, measurability of the posterior-dependent second-period value, and a sign certificate for the final polynomial comparison. The newsvendor and censored-posterior lemmas are reusable in other inventory-learning models. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, on alternative proofs of the final comparison, and on the regime j=3j = 3j=3 of the flexible objective, which the milestones do not cover.

Selected references

  • J. Chod, M. G. Markakis, N. Trichakis, On the Learning Benefits of Resource Flexibility, SSRN preprint 3212177 (December 6, 2019); published in Management Science, 2021. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3212177, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3795
  • C. H. Fine, R. M. Freund, Optimal Investment in Product-Flexible Manufacturing Capacity, Management Science 36(4), 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.4.449
  • J. A. Van Mieghem, Investment Strategies for Flexible Resources, Management Science 44(8), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1071
  • P. A. Parrilo, Semidefinite programming relaxations for semialgebraic problems, Mathematical Programming 96, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0387-5
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Time Consistency of the Mean-Risk Problem: The Upper Images of the Dynamic Mean-Risk Problem Satisfy a Set-Valued Bellman RecursionResearch Paper

Motivation

Markowitz's mean-variance problem trades off the expected terminal wealth of a portfolio against its risk. Over several periods the scalarized form of this problem is time inconsistent: a strategy that is optimal today for a fixed risk-aversion parameter is generally no longer optimal tomorrow for the same parameter, so the investor would deviate from her own plan (Björk & Murgoci 2014; Björk, Murgoci & Zhou 2014). The literature has responded by redefining optimality (equilibrium strategies) or by searching for a time- and state-dependent risk aversion that restores consistency (Karnam, Ma & Zhang, Annals of Applied Probability 27, 2017). Dynamic convex risk measures and their time consistency are developed in Detlefsen & Scandolo 2005 and Riedel 2004.

Kováčová and Rudloff (arXiv:1806.10981, Operations Research 2021) take a different route. They keep both objectives, measure risk by a time consistent dynamic convex risk measure, and treat the dynamic mean-risk problem as a family of vector optimization problems. They show that this family is time consistent with respect to weak minimizers and that its value functions, the upper images, satisfy a set-valued Bellman principle. This mission formalizes that Bellman principle.

Setting

Fix a horizon TTT and a finite probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Ω,F,P) with a filtration (Ft)t=0T(\mathcal F_t)_{t=0}^T(Ft​)t=0T​, F0\mathcal F_0F0​ trivial, FT=F\mathcal F_T=\mathcal FFT​=F, and P(A)>0\mathbb P(A)>0P(A)>0 for every nonempty event AAA. Lt(D)L_t(D)Lt​(D) denotes the Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable random vectors with values in DDD; orders between random vectors are pointwise and componentwise.

A market has ddd assets with adapted discounted prices Ss∈Ls(Rd)S_s\in L_s(\mathbb R^d)Ss​∈Ls​(Rd). An investor holds positions ψs∈Ls(Rd)\psi_s\in L_s(\mathbb R^d)ψs​∈Ls​(Rd) on [s,s+1)[s,s+1)[s,s+1), subject to closed, conditionally convex constraint sets Φs⊆Ls(Rd)\Phi_s\subseteq L_s(\mathbb R^d)Φs​⊆Ls​(Rd). With wealth vt∈Ltv_t\in L_tvt​∈Lt​ at time ttt, the feasible portfolios are

Ψt(vt)={(ψs)s=tT−1∣St⊤ψt=vt, ψt∈Φt, Ss⊤ψs−1=Ss⊤ψs, ψs∈Φs, s=t+1,…,T−1},\Psi_t(v_t)=\{(\psi_s)_{s=t}^{T-1}\mid S_t^\top\psi_t=v_t,\ \psi_t\in\Phi_t,\ S_s^\top\psi_{s-1}=S_s^\top\psi_s,\ \psi_s\in\Phi_s,\ s=t+1,\dots,T-1\},Ψt​(vt​)={(ψs​)s=tT−1​∣St⊤​ψt​=vt​, ψt​∈Φt​, Ss⊤​ψs−1​=Ss⊤​ψs​, ψs​∈Φs​, s=t+1,…,T−1},

that is, self-financing strategies with initial value vtv_tvt​ that respect the constraints. The terminal wealth is vT=ST⊤ψT−1v_T=S_T^\top\psi_{T-1}vT​=ST⊤​ψT−1​ and VT(ψ)=(vT,vT)V_T(\psi)=(v_T,v_T)VT​(ψ)=(vT​,vT​).

Risk is measured by a dynamic convex risk measure (ρt)t=0T(\rho_t)_{t=0}^T(ρt​)t=0T​: each ρt:LT→Lt\rho_t:L_T\to L_tρt​:LT​→Lt​ is normalized, conditionally translation invariant, monotone (decreasing) and conditionally convex. It is time consistent: ρt+1(X)=ρt+1(Y)\rho_{t+1}(X)=\rho_{t+1}(Y)ρt+1​(X)=ρt+1​(Y) implies ρt(X)=ρt(Y)\rho_t(X)=\rho_t(Y)ρt​(X)=ρt​(Y). The mean-risk function is

Γt(X)=(−Et(X1), ρt(X2)),X∈LT(R2),\Gamma_t(X)=\big(-\mathbb E_t(X_1),\ \rho_t(X_2)\big),\qquad X\in L_T(\mathbb R^2),Γt​(X)=(−Et​(X1​), ρt​(X2​)),X∈LT​(R2),

and the mean-risk problem Dt(vt)D_t(v_t)Dt​(vt​) minimizes Γt(VT(ψ))\Gamma_t(V_T(\psi))Γt​(VT​(ψ)) over ψ∈Ψt(vt)\psi\in\Psi_t(v_t)ψ∈Ψt​(vt​) with respect to the cone Lt(R+2)L_t(\mathbb R^2_+)Lt​(R+2​). Its upper image is

Pt(vt)=cl⁡(Γt(Ψt(vt))+Lt(R+2)),t<T,\mathcal P_t(v_t)=\operatorname{cl}\big(\Gamma_t(\Psi_t(v_t))+L_t(\mathbb R^2_+)\big),\qquad t<T,Pt​(vt​)=cl(Γt​(Ψt​(vt​))+Lt​(R+2​)),t<T,

and at the terminal time PT(vT)={(−vT,−vT)}+LT(R+2)\mathcal P_T(v_T)=\{(-v_T,-v_T)\}+L_T(\mathbb R^2_+)PT​(vT​)={(−vT​,−vT​)}+LT​(R+2​) (5.2).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (set-valued Bellman equation)

For every t=0,…,T−1t=0,\dots,T-1t=0,…,T−1 and every Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable vtv_tvt​,

Pt(vt)=cl⁡{Γt(−x) | St⊤ψt=vt, ψt∈Φt, x∈Pt+1(St+1⊤ψt)}.\mathcal P_t(v_t)=\operatorname{cl}\left\{\Gamma_t(-x)\ \middle|\ S_t^\top\psi_t=v_t,\ \psi_t\in\Phi_t,\ x\in\mathcal P_{t+1}\big(S_{t+1}^\top\psi_t\big)\right\}.Pt​(vt​)=cl{Γt​(−x) ​ St⊤​ψt​=vt​, ψt​∈Φt​, x∈Pt+1​(St+1⊤​ψt​)}.

The right side has a closure and no ordering cone.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1 (second and third bullets): time consistency is equivalent to recursiveness ρt(X)=ρt(−ρt+1(X))\rho_t(X)=\rho_t(-\rho_{t+1}(X))ρt​(X)=ρt​(−ρt+1​(X)); a convex risk measure on a finite space is continuous.
  2. Lemma 3.1: ψ∈Ψt(vt)\psi\in\Psi_t(v_t)ψ∈Ψt​(vt​) iff St⊤ψt=vtS_t^\top\psi_t=v_tSt⊤​ψt​=vt​, ψt∈Φt\psi_t\in\Phi_tψt​∈Φt​ and (ψs)s≥t+1∈Ψt+1(St+1⊤ψt)(\psi_s)_{s\ge t+1}\in\Psi_{t+1}(S_{t+1}^\top\psi_t)(ψs​)s≥t+1​∈Ψt+1​(St+1⊤​ψt​).
  3. Lemma B.1: Γt\Gamma_tΓt​ is conditionally translation invariant, monotone, conditionally convex, recursive (Γt(X)=Γt(−Γt+1(X))\Gamma_t(X)=\Gamma_t(-\Gamma_{t+1}(X))Γt​(X)=Γt​(−Γt+1​(X))), local and continuous; upper images are monotone with respect to their cone.
  4. Lemma B.2: Γt(Ψt(vt))\Gamma_t(\Psi_t(v_t))Γt​(Ψt​(vt​)) equals the image of the auxiliary problem Dˉt(vt)\bar D_t(v_t)Dˉt​(vt​), in which xxx ranges over Γt+1(Ψt+1(St+1⊤ψt))\Gamma_{t+1}(\Psi_{t+1}(S_{t+1}^\top\psi_t))Γt+1​(Ψt+1​(St+1⊤​ψt​)).
  5. Lemma 5.2: the upper image P~t(vt)\tilde{\mathcal P}_t(v_t)P~t​(vt​) of the one-time-step problem D~t(vt)\tilde D_t(v_t)D~t​(vt​), in which xxx ranges over Pt+1(St+1⊤ψt)\mathcal P_{t+1}(S_{t+1}^\top\psi_t)Pt+1​(St+1⊤​ψt​), equals Pt(vt)\mathcal P_t(v_t)Pt​(vt​).

Significance

The upper image is the infimum of Dt(vt)D_t(v_t)Dt​(vt​) in the complete lattice of closed upper sets, so it is the natural value function of a vector optimization problem. Theorem 5.1 expresses the value function at time ttt through the value functions at time t+1t+1t+1 by a one-period problem, exactly as a scalar Bellman equation does. Computationally this is what makes the problem tractable: one solves a convex one-period vector optimization problem per node, backwards in time, and recovers the whole efficient frontier at every node and an efficient strategy forward along the realized path (Sections 6 and 7 of the paper do this for 2,500 periods). Conceptually, it shows that the mean-risk problem is time consistent in the set-valued sense without computing the moving scalarization in advance.

The paper proves Theorem 5.1; no machine-checked version exists. Formalizing it produces a Lean development of dynamic convex risk measures on finite filtrations, of conditional vector optimization in Lt(R2)L_t(\mathbb R^2)Lt​(R2), and of upper images, none of which is currently on the platform beyond the static conditional convex risk measure reused here.

Difficulty

The equality has two halves of different character. Replacing the image Γt+1(Ψt+1)\Gamma_{t+1}(\Psi_{t+1})Γt+1​(Ψt+1​) by the upper image Pt+1\mathcal P_{t+1}Pt+1​ enlarges the feasible set of the one-period problem, and the new points must be shown to be limits of points already attained: this needs monotonicity of Γt\Gamma_tΓt​ together with its continuity, which holds only because Ω\OmegaΩ is finite. Removing the cone from the right-hand side needs translation invariance of Γt\Gamma_tΓt​ with an Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable shift and the monotonicity of Pt+1\mathcal P_{t+1}Pt+1​ with respect to the larger cone Lt+1(R+2)L_{t+1}(\mathbb R^2_+)Lt+1​(R+2​). Both closures matter: without them the identity fails in general, since the image of a closed set under Γt\Gamma_tΓt​ need not be closed. The natural first idea, to define Pt\mathcal P_tPt​ recursively, proves nothing: the content of the theorem is that the upper image built from whole multi-period strategies agrees with the recursion.

Formalization scope

  • Ω\OmegaΩ is a Fintype with an ambient σ-algebra F\mathcal FF; the filtration is a Mathlib Filtration ℕ with FT=F\mathcal F_T=\mathcal FFT​=F and F0=⊥\mathcal F_0=\botF0​=⊥; P\mathbb PP is a probability measure with P(A)>0\mathbb P(A)>0P(A)>0 for every nonempty measurable AAA.
  • Each ρt\rho_tρt​, t≤Tt\le Tt≤T, satisfies the published CondConvexRisk.Representation.IsCondConvexRiskMeasure with respect to Ft\mathcal F_tFt​ (axioms a.s. on L∞L^\inftyL∞); time consistency is stated pointwise for measurable arguments. On a finite space with positive probabilities, a.s. equality of measurable functions is equality, so all of the mission's own statements are pointwise.
  • Random vectors in R2\mathbb R^2R2 are functions Ω→R×R\Omega\to\mathbb R\times\mathbb RΩ→R×R; the cone Lt(R+2)L_t(\mathbb R^2_+)Lt​(R+2​) is the set of nonnegative Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable ones; closures are in the product topology. Et\mathbb E_tEt​ is Mathlib's condExp.
  • Strategies are sequences indexed by N\mathbb NN; only the indices t,…,T−1t,\dots,T-1t,…,T−1 are constrained or read.
  • Assumption 2.2 item 3 (Ψ0(v0)≠∅\Psi_0(v_0)\neq\emptysetΨ0​(v0​)=∅) is not assumed by any statement; Theorem 5.1 holds for empty feasible sets as well.
  • Pt\mathcal P_tPt​ for t<Tt<Tt<T is the closure of the image of whole strategies plus the cone; only PT\mathcal P_TPT​ is given by (5.2). A recursive definition of Pt\mathcal P_tPt​, or a cone on the right of (5.1), would make the goal trivial or turn it into Lemma 5.2, and is ruled out.
  • Not formalized here: Theorem 3.2 (time consistency w.r.t. weak minimizers), the scalarization results of §4, the coherent case of §6, and the node-wise algorithms of Appendix A.

A complete development needs: conditional expectation on finite filtrations (tower property, pull-out of Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable factors), continuity of convex functions on finite-dimensional spaces, and elementary closure arguments in Ω→R×R\Omega\to\mathbb R\times\mathbb RΩ→R×R. The results on dynamic risk measures (Lemma 2.1) and on Γt\Gamma_tΓt​ (Lemma B.1) are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • G. Kováčová, B. Rudloff, Time consistency of the mean-risk problem, Operations Research, 2021. Preprint arXiv:1806.10981v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.10981
  • A. H. Hamel, F. Heyde, A. Löhne, B. Rudloff, C. Schrage, Set optimization — a rather short introduction, in Set Optimization and Applications, Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48670-2_3
  • A. Löhne, Vector Optimization with Infimum and Supremum, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18351-5
  • K. Detlefsen, G. Scandolo, Conditional and dynamic convex risk measures, Finance and Stochastics 9(4), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-005-0159-6
  • F. Riedel, Dynamic coherent risk measures, Stochastic Processes and their Applications 112(2), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spa.2004.03.004
  • T. Björk, A. Murgoci, A theory of Markovian time-inconsistent stochastic control in discrete time, Finance and Stochastics 18(3), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-013-0227-1
  • T. Björk, A. Murgoci, X. Y. Zhou, Mean-variance portfolio optimization with state-dependent risk aversion, Mathematical Finance 24(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.2011.00515.x
  • C. Karnam, J. Ma, J. Zhang, Dynamic approaches for some time-inconsistent optimization problems, Annals of Applied Probability 27, 3435–3477, 2017.
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Sequential Product Development and Introduction by Cash-Constrained Start-Ups: the Startup's Optimal Launch and Development Strategy Below the Established Firm's Deferral ThresholdResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that develop technology in generations face a recurring choice: sell the product they already have, or hold it back while the next generation is developed. Selling it earns revenue now, but once the advanced product arrives, the earlier product cannibalizes part of its market. An established firm makes this choice by weighing development risk against cannibalization. A cash-constrained start-up faces a third pressure: it can only keep developing while it can pay for development, and selling the on-hand product is also a way to finance the next period.

Bhaskaran, Erzurumlu and Ramachandran (SSRN 3255345; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0895) model both firms as infinite-horizon dynamic programs and compare their optimal strategies. For the established firm, the answer is governed by two thresholds on the per-period probability of development success. For the start-up, the paper relates its strategy to the same thresholds and to its cash. This mission formalizes the start-up's strategy in the low and intermediate success-probability regimes, together with the established-firm benchmark it is built on.

Setting

A firm holds an on-hand product that pays vov_ovo​ per period once launched, and develops an advanced product that pays va≥vov_a \ge v_ova​≥vo​ per period once developed. Each period of development costs c>voc > v_oc>vo​ and succeeds with probability ppp. Payoffs are discounted by δ∈(0,1)\delta \in (0,1)δ∈(0,1), so the lifetime values are Vo=vo/(1−δ)V_o = v_o/(1-\delta)Vo​=vo​/(1−δ) and Va=va/(1−δ)V_a = v_a/(1-\delta)Va​=va​/(1−δ). If the advanced product is launched after the on-hand product, it earns only (1−α)va(1-\alpha)v_a(1−α)va​ per period, where α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1] is the cannibalization factor.

In each period the firm chooses among three actions: launch the on-hand product and stop development (LS), launch it and continue development (LC), or defer its launch and continue development (DC). Once the on-hand product is launched, only LS and LC remain.

Established firm. Its values Π0\Pi_0Π0​ (on-hand product not yet launched) and Π1\Pi_1Π1​ (launched) satisfy equations (1)–(2):

Π0=max⁡{ΠLS,ΠLC,ΠDC},Π1=max⁡{ΠLS,ΠLC},\Pi_0 = \max\{\Pi_{LS},\Pi_{LC},\Pi_{DC}\},\qquad \Pi_1 = \max\{\Pi_{LS},\Pi_{LC}\},Π0​=max{ΠLS​,ΠLC​,ΠDC​},Π1​=max{ΠLS​,ΠLC​},

with ΠLS=Vo\Pi_{LS} = V_oΠLS​=Vo​, ΠLC=vo−c+p(1−α)δVa+(1−p)δΠ1\Pi_{LC} = v_o - c + p(1-\alpha)\delta V_a + (1-p)\delta\Pi_1ΠLC​=vo​−c+p(1−α)δVa​+(1−p)δΠ1​ and ΠDC=−c+p δVa+(1−p)δΠ0\Pi_{DC} = -c + p\,\delta V_a + (1-p)\delta\Pi_0ΠDC​=−c+pδVa​+(1−p)δΠ0​.

Start-up. It holds cash EEE, and unused cash earns interest at rate (1−δ)/δ(1-\delta)/\delta(1−δ)/δ. After a period of development, its cash is ED=(E−c)/δE_D = (E-c)/\deltaED​=(E−c)/δ if it deferred the launch and EL=(E+vo−c)/δE_L = (E+v_o-c)/\deltaEL​=(E+vo​−c)/δ if it launched. Its value functions R0,R1R_0, R_1R0​,R1​ of the cash level satisfy equations (3)–(5):

R0(E)=max⁡{RLS(E),RDC(E),RLC(E)},R1(E)=max⁡{RLS(E),RLC(E)},R_0(E) = \max\{R_{LS}(E), R_{DC}(E), R_{LC}(E)\},\qquad R_1(E) = \max\{R_{LS}(E), R_{LC}(E)\},R0​(E)=max{RLS​(E),RDC​(E),RLC​(E)},R1​(E)=max{RLS​(E),RLC​(E)}, RLS(E)=E+Vo,RLC(E)=p(E+vo−c+δ(1−α)Va)+(1−p)δR1(EL),R_{LS}(E) = E + V_o,\qquad R_{LC}(E) = p\bigl(E + v_o - c + \delta(1-\alpha)V_a\bigr) + (1-p)\delta R_1(E_L),RLS​(E)=E+Vo​,RLC​(E)=p(E+vo​−c+δ(1−α)Va​)+(1−p)δR1​(EL​),

and RDC(E)=p(E−c+δVa)+(1−p)δR0(ED)R_{DC}(E) = p(E - c + \delta V_a) + (1-p)\delta R_0(E_D)RDC​(E)=p(E−c+δVa​)+(1−p)δR0​(ED​) when E≥cE \ge cE≥c, and RDC(E)=ER_{DC}(E) = ERDC​(E)=E when E<cE < cE<c.

The established firm's thresholds p1≤p2p_1 \le p_2p1​≤p2​ (Proposition 1) are defined by its strategy: launch and stop for p≤p1p \le p_1p≤p1​, launch and continue for p1<p≤p2p_1 < p \le p_2p1​<p≤p2​, and defer and continue for p>p2p > p_2p>p2​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (i)–(ii)

For every cash level E≥0E \ge 0E≥0:

  1. if p<p1p < p_1p<p1​ or c>E+voc > E + v_oc>E+vo​, then launching and stopping is strictly optimal:
R0(E)=RLS(E)>max⁡{RDC(E), RLC(E)};R_0(E) = R_{LS}(E) > \max\{R_{DC}(E),\,R_{LC}(E)\};R0​(E)=RLS​(E)>max{RDC​(E),RLC​(E)};
  1. if p1≤p<p2p_1 \le p < p_2p1​≤p<p2​ and c<E+voc < E + v_oc<E+vo​, then launching and continuing is optimal, and continuing stays optimal after the launch at every funded cash level:
R0(E)=RLC(E),R1(E′)=RLC(E′)  whenever c≤E′+vo.R_0(E) = R_{LC}(E),\qquad R_1(E') = R_{LC}(E')\ \text{ whenever } c \le E' + v_o .R0​(E)=RLC​(E),R1​(E′)=RLC​(E′)  whenever c≤E′+vo​.

Milestones

  • the value functions ΠI\Pi_IΠI​ and RIR_IRI​ exist and are unique;
  • Proposition 1 (i)–(iii): thresholds p1≤p2p_1 \le p_2p1​≤p2​ exist;
  • Lemma 1(i): if p<p1p < p_1p<p1​, then RLS(E)>max⁡[RDC(E),RLC(E)]R_{LS}(E) > \max[R_{DC}(E), R_{LC}(E)]RLS​(E)>max[RDC​(E),RLC​(E)] for all E>0E > 0E>0;
  • Lemma 1(ii), corrected: if p1<p2p_1 < p_2p1​<p2​, p>p1p > p_1p>p1​ and c≤E+voc \le E + v_oc≤E+vo​, then RLC(E)>RLS(E)R_{LC}(E) > R_{LS}(E)RLC​(E)>RLS​(E);
  • the corrected limit claim of the proof of Proposition 2(ii): R1(E)=E+Π1R_1(E) = E + \Pi_1R1​(E)=E+Π1​ for E≥(c−vo)/(1−δ)E \ge (c-v_o)/(1-\delta)E≥(c−vo​)/(1−δ) and R0(E)=E+Π0R_0(E) = E + \Pi_0R0​(E)=E+Π0​ for E≥c/(1−δ)E \ge c/(1-\delta)E≥c/(1−δ).

Significance

Proposition 2 answers the managerial question the paper poses: a cash-constrained start-up should behave like the established firm when development is unlikely to succeed, and must stop when it cannot fund the current period. In the intermediate regime it, too, should launch the on-hand product and keep developing. The established firm's thresholds of Proposition 1 therefore also organize the start-up's decision, and the start-up's cash enters only through whether development can be funded.

The paper also states a third part: above p2p_2p2​, a cash threshold EˉL\bar E_LEˉL​ below which the start-up launches. This part is false: with vo=6/5v_o = 6/5vo​=6/5, va=6v_a = 6va​=6, c=24/5c = 24/5c=24/5, δ=15/16\delta = 15/16δ=15/16, α=27/100\alpha = 27/100α=27/100 and p=8/25>p2=1/12p = 8/25 > p_2 = 1/12p=8/25>p2​=1/12, deferring is strictly optimal at E=6E = 6E=6 and E=9E = 9E=9 and launching at E=7E = 7E=7. Lemma 2, the route the paper takes to (iii), fails for the same instance. Lemma 1(ii) as printed also fails: when p1=p2p_1 = p_2p1​=p2​, launching and continuing need not beat launching and stopping. The mission states the corrected forms, so a machine-checked proof here settles exactly which parts of the characterization hold. No part of this paper has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The start-up's equations are a functional fixed-point problem in which the action sets depend on the state: the defer option changes form at E=cE = cE=c and launching-and-continuing requires c≤E+voc \le E + v_oc≤E+vo​, so R0R_0R0​ and R1R_1R1​ have jumps. Comparisons between actions therefore cannot be read off a single closed form. They must hold uniformly along the cash trajectories E↦EDE \mapsto E_DE↦ED​ and E↦ELE \mapsto E_LE↦EL​, which shrink below the interest break-even and grow above it.

The paper's own argument for (ii) goes through Lemma 2, a single-crossing property of RDC−RLCR_{DC} - R_{LC}RDC​−RLC​ in the cash level, and that property is false. A proof of (ii) must instead show directly that deferral never beats launch-and-continue below p2p_2p2​, at every cash level, including those where the start-up can afford only a few periods of development. The threshold p1p_1p1​ itself is defined by the established firm, so one must also relate the start-up's finite-horizon comparisons to the established firm's infinite-horizon ones.

Formalization scope

Everything is real-valued. The expectations in (1)–(5) are explicit two-outcome sums, and no probability or MDP library is used. The parameters form a structure with the standing assumptions 0<vo≤va0 < v_o \le v_a0<vo​≤va​, vo<cv_o < cvo​<c, 0<δ<10 < \delta < 10<δ<1 and 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1, and p∈[0,1]p \in [0,1]p∈[0,1]. The paper allows δ=1\delta = 1δ=1, but VoV_oVo​ needs δ<1\delta < 1δ<1; vo>0v_o > 0vo​>0 is also assumed.

  • Value functions are hypothesized solutions. Every theorem quantifies over all solutions (Π0,Π1)(\Pi_0,\Pi_1)(Π0​,Π1​) of (1)–(2) and all solutions (R0,R1)(R_0,R_1)(R0​,R1​) of (3)–(5). A milestone states that each system has exactly one solution, so these statements are neither vacuous nor about different objects.
  • The start-up's equations hold at every real EEE. Launching and continuing is available only when c≤E+voc \le E + v_oc≤E+vo​; otherwise R1(E)=RLS(E)R_1(E) = R_{LS}(E)R1​(E)=RLS​(E). Printed (4) says "when Et>cE_t > cEt​>c"; the funded reading is the one Lemma 1(iii) and Proposition 2(i) use. Lemma 1(iii) holds by definition under this reading and is not a milestone.
  • Bounded selection. Above the interest break-even the recursion never terminates and (3)–(5) admit spurious unbounded solutions. The value function is selected by requiring R0(E)−ER_0(E) - ER0​(E)−E and R1(E)−ER_1(E) - ER1​(E)−E to be bounded.
  • Thresholds by behaviour. p1,p2p_1, p_2p1​,p2​ are any pair inducing Proposition 1's strategy on q∈[0,1]q \in [0,1]q∈[0,1], normalized so that p1≤1p_1 \le 1p1​≤1 and p2=1p_2 = 1p2​=1 when p1=1p_1 = 1p1​=1. They are never defined by the proof's closed forms, whose printed pCp_CpC​ is wrong. The strategies are "attains the maximum in every solution", which is correct at the tie points q=p1q = p_1q=p1​, q=p2q = p_2q=p2​.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: R0R_0R0​ and R1R_1R1​ are not given by closed forms, launch-and-continue is not available without funding, (i) asserts strict optimality, and (ii) asserts continuation at every later funded cash level, not only at the current one.

Not formalized: Proposition 1(iv) (comparative statics of p1,p2p_1, p_2p1​,p2​), Proposition 2(iii) and Lemma 2 (false), Propositions 3–6 (built on the threshold EˉL\bar E_LEˉL​ or on approximations), and the extensions of §5. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones. The well-posedness milestone concerns a generic two-state discounted recursion with a state-dependent action set, and its proof is reusable beyond this paper.

Selected references

  • S. Bhaskaran, S. S. Erzurumlu, K. Ramachandran, Sequential product development and introduction by cash-constrained start-ups, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020 (manuscript of February 2020). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3255345, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0895
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Average Cost Optimality in Partially Observed Lost-Sales Inventory Systems: A Stationary Average-Cost Optimal Policy Satisfying the ACOI Exists When Inventory Is Observed Only at ZeroResearch Paper

Inventory control when stock is seen only at zero

In many retail settings, recorded inventory is not reliable. Shrinkage, misplacement and recording errors mean the shelf count is unknown, but a stock-out is visible. Bai, Chen and Stolyar (SSRN 3865728; Operations Research Technical Note, 2022, doi:10.1287/opre.2022.2305) study the extreme version of this: a single-item lost-sales system whose inventory level is observed only when it is zero.

For the discounted cost criterion, Bensoussan, Çakanyıldırım and Sethi (2007) showed that optimal feedback policies exist for this model. Whether a stationary policy minimizes the long-run average cost was left open. Average-cost problems for partially observable systems are harder because of the vanishing-discount argument they rely on. It needs a uniform bound on relative value functions, and on a space of beliefs such bounds are not automatic. The paper settles the question for this model.

Setting

In each period ttt the inventory level is xt∈R+x_t\in\mathbb R_+xt​∈R+​. The decision maker orders at∈A=[0,K]a_t\in\mathbb A=[0,K]at​∈A=[0,K], with K>0K>0K>0. The order arrives at once and ordering costs nothing. Then an i.i.d. demand Dt∼DD_t\sim DDt​∼D is realized, and unmet demand is lost:

xt+1=(xt+at−Dt)+.x_{t+1}=(x_t+a_t-D_t)^+ .xt+1​=(xt​+at​−Dt​)+.

The period cost is the holding and lost-sales cost h+(xt+at−Dt)++h−(xt+at−Dt)−h^+(x_t+a_t-D_t)^+ + h^-(x_t+a_t-D_t)^-h+(xt​+at​−Dt​)++h−(xt​+at​−Dt​)−, with h+,h−>0h^+,h^->0h+,h−>0. Its expectation given (x,a)(x,a)(x,a) is c(x,a)c(x,a)c(x,a). The demand DDD is nonnegative, has a density fff with distribution function FFF, a finite positive mean and a positive variance.

Only the signal yt=1{xt>0}y_t=\mathbf 1\{x_t>0\}yt​=1{xt​>0} is observed. The decision maker therefore acts on a belief zzz, the conditional distribution of the current inventory level. After ordering aaa from belief zzz, the next belief is δ0\delta_0δ0​ if y=0y=0y=0. If y=1y=1y=1 it is the posterior H(z,a,1)H(z,a,1)H(z,a,1), the law of (x+a−D)+(x+a-D)^+(x+a−D)+ (with x∼zx\sim zx∼z) conditioned on being positive. The probability of y=1y=1y=1 is R(1∣z,a)R(1\mid z,a)R(1∣z,a).

This yields a completely observable MDP (COMDP). Its states are beliefs with finite second moment, ∫x2 z(dx)<∞\int x^2\,z(dx)<\infty∫x2z(dx)<∞ (Assumption 1), taken with the topology of weak convergence. Its cost is cˉ(z,a)=∫c(x,a) z(dx)\bar c(z,a)=\int c(x,a)\,z(dx)cˉ(z,a)=∫c(x,a)z(dx) and its transition kernel is

q(⋅∣z,a)=R(0∣z,a) δδ0+R(1∣z,a) δH(z,a,1).q(\cdot\mid z,a)=R(0\mid z,a)\,\delta_{\delta_0}+R(1\mid z,a)\,\delta_{H(z,a,1)}.q(⋅∣z,a)=R(0∣z,a)δδ0​​+R(1∣z,a)δH(z,a,1)​.

For a policy π\piπ, vαπv^\pi_\alphavαπ​ is its α\alphaα-discounted cost and wπw^\piwπ its average cost per period (a lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup). The optima are vα=inf⁡πvαπv_\alpha=\inf_\pi v^\pi_\alphavα​=infπ​vαπ​ and w=inf⁡πwπw=\inf_\pi w^\piw=infπ​wπ over all history-dependent randomized policies. Write mα=inf⁡zvα(z)m_\alpha=\inf_z v_\alpha(z)mα​=infz​vα​(z), uα=vα−mαu_\alpha=v_\alpha-m_\alphauα​=vα​−mα​ and w∗=inf⁡zw(z)w^*=\inf_z w(z)w∗=infz​w(z).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 9)

There are a sequence αn↑1\alpha_n\uparrow 1αn​↑1 and a measurable stationary policy φ\varphiφ that is average-cost optimal among all policies. With w∗w^*w∗ finite and

u(z)=lim inf⁡n→∞, s→zuαn(s)u(z)=\liminf_{n\to\infty,\ s\to z}u_{\alpha_n}(s)u(z)=n→∞, s→zliminf​uαn​​(s)

finite, φ\varphiφ satisfies the average cost optimality inequality (ACOI)

w∗+u(z) ≥ cˉ(z,φ(z))+∫u(s) q(ds∣z,φ(z))for every belief z.w^*+u(z)\ \ge\ \bar c(z,\varphi(z))+\int u(s)\,q(ds\mid z,\varphi(z))\qquad\text{for every belief }z .w∗+u(z) ≥ cˉ(z,φ(z))+∫u(s)q(ds∣z,φ(z))for every belief z.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. §3.1, p. 10. qqq is a measurable stochastic kernel, so the COMDP exists.
  2. Lemma 3, p. 12. Assumption B(i): w∗<∞w^*<\inftyw∗<∞.
  3. §3.2, p. 12. Assumption (W*): cˉ\bar ccˉ is K\mathbb KK-inf-compact and qqq is weakly continuous.
  4. Lemma 2, p. 12 (Feinberg 2016, for a general MDP on Borel spaces). Under (W*) and (B), w∗=lim⁡α↑1(1−α)vαw^*=\lim_{\alpha\uparrow1}(1-\alpha)v_\alphaw∗=limα↑1​(1−α)vα​, and a stationary average-cost optimal policy satisfies the ACOI.
  5. Lemma 4, p. 14. For two inventory paths started at x′≥x≥0x'\ge x\ge 0x′≥x≥0, sharing demands and an arbitrary control rule ζ\zetaζ: Vαζ(x)−Vαζ(x′)≤h−(x′−x)−1{x′−x≥C}h′(x′−x)≤h−CV^\zeta_\alpha(x)-V^\zeta_\alpha(x')\le h^-(x'-x)-\mathbf 1\{x'-x\ge C\}h'(x'-x)\le h^-CVαζ​(x)−Vαζ​(x′)≤h−(x′−x)−1{x′−x≥C}h′(x′−x)≤h−C, with C,α∗,h′>h−C,\alpha_*,h'>h^-C,α∗​,h′>h− uniform.
  6. Display (12), corrected, pp. 13–14. vα(δ0)−vαπ(z′)≤Cˉv_\alpha(\delta_0)-v^\pi_\alpha(z')\le\bar Cvα​(δ0​)−vαπ​(z′)≤Cˉ, uniformly in α∈[α∗,1)\alpha\in[\alpha_*,1)α∈[α∗​,1), in beliefs z′z'z′ and in stationary π\piπ. The paper prints vαπ(δ0)v^\pi_\alpha(\delta_0)vαπ​(δ0​) as the first term. Its proof bounds the cost of a different policy (the "pursuing" policy) started at δ0\delta_0δ0​, and the derivation of (11) uses the optimal value. The printed form, with the same π\piπ at δ0\delta_0δ0​, is not what the proof establishes.
  7. Display (11), p. 13. sup⁡α∈[α∗,1)uα(δ0)<∞\sup_{\alpha\in[\alpha_*,1)}u_\alpha(\delta_0)<\inftysupα∈[α∗​,1)​uα​(δ0​)<∞.
  8. Theorem 2, p. 13. Assumption B(ii): sup⁡α∈[α∗,1)uα(z)<∞\sup_{\alpha\in[\alpha_*,1)}u_\alpha(z)<\inftysupα∈[α∗​,1)​uα​(z)<∞ for every belief zzz.

Significance

Theorem 1 gives existence of a stationary average-cost optimal policy for a partially observed inventory system with lost sales. In that setting the belief space is infinite-dimensional and the state is never fully revealed except at zero. The ACOI also supplies the structure needed to study such a policy. The paper leaves open whether the ACOE (the equality form) holds.

The reduction is reusable. Feinberg's general conditions, (W*) and (B), apply to many belief MDPs. The problem-specific work is the uniform bound B(ii), obtained here through a coupling estimate (Lemma 4) for lost-sales paths under arbitrary, even anticipating, controls.

The paper proves Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. Lemma 2 and the (W*) claim are cited from Feinberg (2016) and Feinberg, Kasyanov and Zgurovsky (2016) and are not proved in the paper. As far as is known, none of these results has a machine-checked proof; the general vanishing-discount theory for MDPs on Borel spaces is itself not yet formalized.

Difficulty

The obvious route to B(ii) compares vα(z)v_\alpha(z)vα​(z) with vα(δ0)v_\alpha(\delta_0)vα​(δ0​) by running from zzz the policy that is optimal from δ0\delta_0δ0​. This fails: a policy is a function of the belief, and the beliefs generated from zzz and from δ0\delta_0δ0​ differ, so the same policy produces different orders. The paper goes the other way and bounds vα(δ0)v_\alpha(\delta_0)vα​(δ0​) above by vαπ(z′)+Cˉv^\pi_\alpha(z')+\bar Cvαπ​(z′)+Cˉ. This needs a policy started from δ0\delta_0δ0​ that mimics π\piπ's orders while the two systems have not yet merged. The constant must be uniform in α\alphaα close to 111, so per-period estimates that grow like 1/(1−α)1/(1-\alpha)1/(1−α) are useless.

The (W*) claim has its own difficulty. The observation kernel 1{x>0}\mathbf 1\{x>0\}1{x>0} is discontinuous at 000, so the known criterion for weak continuity of belief kernels, which needs observations continuous in total variation, does not apply. Continuity has to come from the density of DDD.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace PartialLostSales.ACOI. It reuses the published FeinbergLiang.ACOE layer: MDP, history-dependent randomized Policy, vDisc, vOpt, avgCost, wOpt, IsAvgOptimal, uRel, uTilde, IsDiscountSeq, KInfCompact and AssumptionWStar. All costs and values lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. Its conventions are:

  • Spaces. Inventory lives in ℝ≥0 with the Euclidean topology, and actions in the subtype [0,K][0,K][0,K].
  • Beliefs. Beliefs form the subtype of ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0 with finite second moment. They carry the weak topology and Mathlib's (Giry) σ-algebra, which is the Borel σ-algebra here.
  • COMDP. "The COMDP" is any MDP satisfying IsCOMDP, which pins the lower bound 000, the cost cˉ\bar ccˉ and the kernel qqq pointwise; milestone 1 shows one exists.
  • Assumption (B). It is the paper's version, with sup⁡\supsup over [α∗,1)[\alpha_*,1)[α∗​,1).
  • Policies. "Stationary" means a measurable map from beliefs to actions.

The paper states that COMDP and POMDP policies correspond with equal values (Feinberg, Kasyanov and Zgurovsky 2016). The goal is stated in the COMDP, and that equivalence is not formalized.

Added hypotheses. Demand is nonnegative. Lemma 4's control rule is measurable, but adaptedness is not required.

Totality devices. The posterior when R(1∣z,a)=0R(1\mid z,a)=0R(1∣z,a)=0, and the map of a posterior back into the belief subtype, have else branches that are never used.

Indexing. Lemma 4 indexes periods from 000 with weight αt\alpha^tαt. Its costs are realized costs, since controls may anticipate.

Trivializing formalizations. Several encodings would make statements trivial, and none is used. The kernel and cost of the MDP are never left free. The ACOI carries explicit finiteness of w∗w^*w∗ and uuu, so it is not an [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] inequality that holds when u=∞u=\inftyu=∞. Optimality is over all policies, not only stationary ones. The ACOI uses w∗w^*w∗, not lim sup⁡(1−α)mα\limsup(1-\alpha)m_\alphalimsup(1−α)mα​ or a free constant.

Not formalized.

  • Lemma 1, already open on the platform as FKZAvg.WStar.theorem_2 (v).
  • Theorem 3, p. 20, and the pursuing-policy construction of §4.1.
  • The POMDP–COMDP equivalence.
  • The extensions of §5.

Contributions of general value include Feinberg's average-cost theory on Borel spaces (Lemma 2) and weak continuity of belief kernels with discontinuous observations.

Selected references

  • X. Bai, X. Chen, A. L. Stolyar, Average Cost Optimality in Partially Observed Lost-Sales Inventory Systems, SSRN preprint 3865728; Operations Research Technical Note, 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3865728, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2305
  • E. A. Feinberg, Optimality conditions for inventory control, in Optimization Challenges in Complex, Networked and Risky Systems (INFORMS TutORials in Operations Research), 14–45, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/educ.2016.0145
  • E. A. Feinberg, P. O. Kasyanov, M. Z. Zgurovsky, Partially observable total-cost Markov decision processes with weakly continuous transition probabilities, Mathematics of Operations Research 41(2), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0746
  • E. A. Feinberg, P. O. Kasyanov, N. V. Zadoianchuk, Average cost Markov decision processes with weakly continuous transition probabilities, Mathematics of Operations Research 37(4), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0555
  • A. Bensoussan, M. Çakanyıldırım, S. P. Sethi, Partially observed inventory systems: the case of zero-balance walk, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 46(1), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1137/040620321
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Dissemination through Dealer Markets: The Strategies Built from the Collected Demand Function Form a Rank-Free EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

Many assets, such as corporate and municipal bonds, securitized products and new issues, trade over the counter: there is no central exchange, and an asset reaches its final buyers through a sequence of bilateral trades between dealers. Empirical work on these markets documents intermediation chains, in which a block of securities passes through several dealers, each of whom keeps part of it for her own customers and sells the rest onwards: in US municipal bonds, Li and Schürhoff (2019) find that chains account for 82% of the trades that start with a customer selling to a dealer, and in registered securitizations Hollifield, Neklyudov and Spatt (2017) find that about 27% of customer sales give rise to a sequence involving more than one dealer (figures as reported by Colliard and Demange, p. 1). Colliard and Demange (SSRN 3244321, forthcoming in Management Science) build a model of this process in which the length of the chain, the prices and the quantities are all equilibrium outcomes, and the friction that makes the chain finite is asymmetric information about how much each dealer's customers want to buy.

The equilibrium of that model rests on one object, the collected demand Ω\OmegaΩ, defined by a functional equation. This mission formalizes the existence and properties of Ω\OmegaΩ and the theorem that the strategies built from it form an equilibrium of the dealer game.

Setting

An asset pays a sure return ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 per unit. Dealers D1,D2,…D_1,D_2,\dotsD1​,D2​,… arrive in sequence. Each is available to trade with probability q∈(0,1)q\in(0,1)q∈(0,1), independently. Dealer DnD_nDn​'s customers buy up to vnCv^C_nvnC​ units at price ρ\rhoρ; the customer demand ωn=ρvnC\omega_n=\rho v^C_nωn​=ρvnC​ is private information of DnD_nDn​ and is drawn i.i.d. from a distribution GGG on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ with finite mean. Write H(ω)=Pr⁡(ω~≥ω)H(\omega)=\Pr(\tilde\omega\ge\omega)H(ω)=Pr(ω~≥ω). GGG may have atoms. Dealers borrow cash at the funding spread r>0r>0r>0.

A dealer of type ω\omegaω who accepts a take-it-or-leave-it offer (p,v)(p,v)(p,v) (volume vvv at unit price ppp) sells to her customers and has financing needs y=max⁡(pv−ω,0)y=\max(pv-\omega,0)y=max(pv−ω,0), which she covers by borrowing or by making a new offer (pn,vn)(p_n,v_n)(pn​,vn​) to the next dealer, with 0≤vn≤v0\le v_n\le v0≤vn​≤v. If the next dealer accepts with probability Φ(pn,vn)\Phi(p_n,v_n)Φ(pn​,vn​), her expected profit (5) is

π=(ρ−p)v−ry+q Φ(pn,vn)[rmin⁡(pnvn,y)−(ρ−pn)vn].\pi=(\rho-p)v-ry+q\,\Phi(p_n,v_n)\bigl[r\min(p_nv_n,y)-(\rho-p_n)v_n\bigr].π=(ρ−p)v−ry+qΦ(pn​,vn​)[rmin(pn​vn​,y)−(ρ−pn​)vn​].

A rank-free equilibrium (Definition 1) is a strategy (an acceptance rule A(p,v,ω)A(p,v,\omega)A(p,v,ω) and a new-offer rule (P,V)(P,V)(P,V)) that does not depend on the dealer's position in the chain, such that Φ\PhiΦ is the acceptance probability induced by AAA, the new offer maximizes π\piπ over all feasible offers, and a dealer accepts exactly when this maximal profit is non-negative.

The collected demand is the function Ω\OmegaΩ on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ solving

Ω(0)=0,Ω(y)=sup⁡0≤ω≤yqH(ω)(ω+Ω(y−ω))(y>0).(9)\Omega(0)=0,\qquad \Omega(y)=\sup_{0\le\omega\le y} qH(\omega)\bigl(\omega+\Omega(y-\omega)\bigr)\quad(y>0).\tag{9}Ω(0)=0,Ω(y)=0≤ω≤ysup​qH(ω)(ω+Ω(y−ω))(y>0).(9)

The maximizers form the set T(y)\mathcal T(y)T(y) of targeted values (10); a selection is a function TTT with T(y)∈T(y)T(y)\in\mathcal T(y)T(y)∈T(y) for all y≥0y\ge0y≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For Ω\OmegaΩ bounded, continuous and solving (9), and any selection TTT, put π∗(p,v,y)=(ρ−p)v−ry+rΩ(y)\pi^*(p,v,y)=(\rho-p)v-ry+r\Omega(y)π∗(p,v,y)=(ρ−p)v−ry+rΩ(y). The strategy "accept (p,v)(p,v)(p,v) iff π∗(p,v,y)≥0\pi^*(p,v,y)\ge0π∗(p,v,y)≥0; on acceptance with y>0y>0y>0 offer (P(y),V(y))(P(y),V(y))(P(y),V(y)) with

P(y)V(y)=y,(ρ−P(y))V(y)−ry+r(T(y)+Ω(y−T(y)))=0(14)P(y)V(y)=y,\qquad (\rho-P(y))V(y)-ry+r\bigl(T(y)+\Omega(y-T(y))\bigr)=0\tag{14}P(y)V(y)=y,(ρ−P(y))V(y)−ry+r(T(y)+Ω(y−T(y)))=0(14)

(and no offer when y=0y=0y=0)" is a rank-free equilibrium. Moreover P(y)≤ρP(y)\le\rhoP(y)≤ρ, 0≤V(y)≤v−ω/ρ0\le V(y)\le v-\omega/\rho0≤V(y)≤v−ω/ρ, the offer's expected transaction payoff is rΩ(y)r\Omega(y)rΩ(y), and the dealer's profit is π∗(p,v,y)\pi^*(p,v,y)π∗(p,v,y).

Milestones

  1. Ψ(β)(y)=max⁡0≤ω≤yqH(ω)(ω+β(y−ω))\Psi(\beta)(y)=\max_{0\le\omega\le y}qH(\omega)(\omega+\beta(y-\omega))Ψ(β)(y)=max0≤ω≤y​qH(ω)(ω+β(y−ω)) maps bounded continuous non-negative β\betaβ with β(0)=0\beta(0)=0β(0)=0 to such functions and is a qqq-contraction in sup-norm (proof of Theorem 1).
  2. Theorem 1: a unique bounded continuous solution of (9) exists; the supremum in (9) is reached; Ω\OmegaΩ is qqq-Lipschitz and non-decreasing; hence Ω(z)≤qz\Omega(z)\le qzΩ(z)≤qz and z↦z−Ω(z)z\mapsto z-\Omega(z)z↦z−Ω(z) is non-negative and increasing.
  3. Lemma A.2: for fff non-decreasing and qqq-Lipschitz on R+\mathbb R_+R+​, min⁡(pv,y)+f(pv−ω)≤pv+f(y−ω)\min(pv,y)+f(pv-\omega)\le pv+f(y-\omega)min(pv,y)+f(pv−ω)≤pv+f(y−ω) whenever ω≤pv\omega\le pvω≤pv, ω≤y\omega\le yω≤y.
  4. The three points of the proof of Theorem 2: the offer is feasible; no offer yields a transaction payoff above rΩ(y)r\Omega(y)rΩ(y); the offer (P(y),V(y))(P(y),V(y))(P(y),V(y)) is accepted exactly by types ω≥T(y)\omega\ge T(y)ω≥T(y) and achieves rΩ(y)r\Omega(y)rΩ(y).

Significance

Theorem 2 is the existence result on which the rest of the paper is built. The comparative statics of dissemination length, customer purchases and prices along the chain (Propositions 1–4, Implications 1–6) are all statements about this equilibrium. It shows that the infinite-horizon screening problem of each dealer, against a chain of unknown length, reduces to the one-dimensional equation (9), and that the reduction is exact: the expected transaction payoff from the new offer is rΩ(y)r\Omega(y)rΩ(y).

The paper proves Theorem 2 in Appendix A; Lemma A.2 is proved in an Online Appendix that is not part of the source. To the knowledge of this mission, none of these results has a machine-checked proof. The mission's output is a checked existence-and-optimality argument for a dynamic screening game with a discontinuous survival function, together with the fixed-point theory of the operator Ψ\PsiΨ, which is not an expectation operator and does not fall under standard Bellman-operator results.

Difficulty

The operator Ψ\PsiΨ takes a supremum over the moving interval [0,y][0,y][0,y] of a product with the survival function HHH, which jumps downward at every atom of GGG. Standard dynamic-programming theorems assume a continuous kernel or a finite state space; here attainment of the supremum and continuity of Ψ(β)\Psi(\beta)Ψ(β) rely on HHH being left-continuous and non-increasing, and on ω+β(y−ω)≥0\omega+\beta(y-\omega)\ge0ω+β(y−ω)≥0. In the equilibrium part, the natural first step, verifying optimality only against the strategy's own offer or against offers accepted with a fixed probability, does not work: a deviation changes the set of types that accept it, so the acceptance probability must be recomputed from the acceptance rule for every candidate offer. The deviation can change both its unit margin and its probability of acceptance, making a uniform payoff bound the central difficulty.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace DealerDissem.RankFree, in one definitions file. Parameters ρ,r,q\rho,r,qρ,r,q are bundled with ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, r>0r>0r>0, 0<q<10<q<10<q<1. GGG is a Measure ℝ that is a probability measure, gives no mass to (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0) and has an integrable identity; H(ω)H(\omega)H(ω) is the measure of [ω,∞)[\omega,\infty)[ω,∞) (closed, so acceptance probabilities are exact at atoms). Ω\OmegaΩ, TTT, PPP, VVV are functions ℝ → ℝ; every hypothesis and conclusion about them is restricted to [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and uniqueness in Theorem 1 is equality on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Suprema in (9) and (46) range over 0≤ω≤y0\le\omega\le y0≤ω≤y. Acceptance rules are predicates A(p,v,ω)A(p,v,\omega)A(p,v,ω), and Φ\PhiΦ is computed as the GGG-measure of the acceptance set. V(y)V(y)V(y) is (14) solved for VVV (the paper's (16)), and P(y)=y/V(y)P(y)=y/V(y)P(y)=y/V(y); at y=0y=0y=0, V=0V=0V=0 and Lean's value P(0)=0/0=0P(0)=0/0=0P(0)=0/0=0 is irrelevant.

Definition 1 (ii) is encoded as: after acceptance the strategy's offer is feasible and maximizes (5) over every feasible offer; and acceptance holds iff some feasible offer gives a non-negative profit. The equilibrium predicate requires measurable acceptance events for feasible offers, so the quantity called a probability in Definition 1 (i) has that meaning. Added hypotheses, each where the printed sentence is false otherwise: v>0v>0v>0 in "this case surely occurs for p>ρp>\rhop>ρ"; y>0y>0y>0 for the bound 0≤V(y)≤v−ω/ρ0\le V(y)\le v-\omega/\rho0≤V(y)≤v−ω/ρ; non-negative β\betaβ in the contraction milestone.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: Φ\PhiΦ is never a free parameter, optimality is against all feasible offers rather than the strategy's own, Ω\OmegaΩ must solve (9) at every y>0y>0y>0, and T(y)T(y)T(y) must be a maximizer, not merely a point of [0,y][0,y][0,y].

A complete development needs suprema over compact intervals of upper semicontinuous functions, the Banach fixed-point theorem on bounded continuous functions on R+\mathbb R_+R+​, and Markov's inequality for ωH(ω)≤Eω~\omega H(\omega)\le\mathbb E\tilde\omegaωH(ω)≤Eω~. The fixed-point machinery for sup-over-interval operators is reusable for other sequential search and screening models. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as is a proof of Theorem 2 from the milestones.

Selected references

  • J.-E. Colliard and G. Demange, Asset Dissemination through Dealer Markets, Management Science (forthcoming; authors' version of September 17, 2020), SSRN 3244321. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244321 — published version: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3779
  • D. Li and N. Schürhoff, Dealer Networks, The Journal of Finance 74(1), 91–144, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12728
  • B. Hollifield, A. Neklyudov and C. Spatt, Bid-Ask Spreads, Trading Networks, and the Pricing of Securitizations, The Review of Financial Studies 30(9), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx027
  • N. L. Stokey and R. E. Lucas, with E. C. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, 1989 (Theorem 3.3, Blackwell's sufficient conditions). https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674750968
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices VIII: Index Theorems for Non-Preemptive Jobs under Precedence Constraints and Out-ForestsTextbook

Motivation

Scheduling jobs on a single machine under precedence constraints ("job iii must be completed before job jjj may be started") is one of the oldest problems of operations research, and with random service times and discounted rewards it is a family of alternative bandit processes that is not simple: the set of jobs that may be served changes as jobs are completed. The Gittins index theorem for a simple family therefore does not apply as it stands. Section 4.6 of Gittins, Glazebrook and Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices (2nd ed., Wiley 2011), shows that an index theorem survives for ordinary jobs served non-preemptively, provided the index is taken over the whole family rather than over single jobs.

Timeline. For deterministic jobs and undiscounted weighted completion time, Sidney (1975) showed that an optimal sequence can be built from initial sets of maximal ratio of weight to processing time, the "Sidney decomposition"; Lawler (1978) gave the algorithm for series–parallel constraints. Kadane and Simon (1977) and Glazebrook and Gittins (1981) obtained partial results for stochastic jobs. The book's Theorem 4.9 states the result for stochastic, discounted, non-preemptive ordinary jobs under arbitrary acyclic precedence constraints, as a three-way identity of policy classes.

This mission continues Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices I–VI, whose goals are all proved, and is part VIII of the series.

Setting

There are nnn jobs on a single machine. Job iii yields the reward Vie−γCiV_i e^{-\gamma C_i}Vi​e−γCi​ at its completion time CiC_iCi​, where Vi>0V_i > 0Vi​>0 and γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0, and no other reward. Its service time σi\sigma_iσi​ is random with a given law and P(σi>0)=1P(\sigma_i > 0) = 1P(σi​>0)=1; the service times of different jobs are independent. A relation i≺ji \prec ji≺j without circuits gives the precedence constraints. There are no arrivals, and service is non-preemptive: once started, a job is served until it is completed.

A policy ggg starts from a set AAA of already completed jobs and, each time the machine becomes free, chooses the next job as a function of the jobs completed so far and their observed service times. It is feasible if every job it starts is uncompleted and has all its predecessors completed. Its payoff is

Rg(F)=E∑i∉AVie−γCi,R_g(\mathscr F) = E\sum_{i \notin A} V_i e^{-\gamma C_i},Rg​(F)=Ei∈/A∑​Vi​e−γCi​,

and it is optimal if no feasible policy has a larger payoff.

A stage (g,τ)(g, \tau)(g,τ) is a policy together with a positive stopping time, checked after each completion. With TTT the time at which the stage ends, Rgτ(F)R_{g\tau}(\mathscr F)Rgτ​(F) is the expected discounted reward collected before TTT and Wgτ(F)=γ−1E(1−e−γT)W_{g\tau}(\mathscr F) = \gamma^{-1}E(1 - e^{-\gamma T})Wgτ​(F)=γ−1E(1−e−γT) the expected discounted time. The index of the family is

ν(F)=sup⁡g,τRgτ(F)Wgτ(F)(4.15).\nu(\mathscr F) = \sup_{g,\tau}\frac{R_{g\tau}(\mathscr F)}{W_{g\tau}(\mathscr F)} \qquad (4.15).ν(F)=g,τsup​Wgτ​(F)Rgτ​(F)​(4.15).

A stage attaining the supremum is the first stage of a modified forwards induction (FI*) policy; an FI* policy repeats such stages for the family that remains. A forwards induction (FI) policy starts, at every decision time, a job with which such a stage begins. An ε-FI* policy uses stages whose ratio is only within ε\varepsilonε of the index.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.9

For every family F\mathscr FF as above and every initial set AAA of completed jobs, the classes of index policies (read as FI* policies), forwards induction policies, and optimal policies are identical:

π is FI∗  ⟺  π is FI  ⟺  Rπ(F)=max⁡g feasibleRg(F).\pi \text{ is FI}^* \iff \pi \text{ is FI} \iff R_\pi(\mathscr F) = \max_{g \text{ feasible}} R_g(\mathscr F).π is FI∗⟺π is FI⟺Rπ​(F)=g feasiblemax​Rg​(F).

Milestones

  1. Eq. (4.16), for the static first stage of an FI* policy (a fixed set of jobs served in a fixed order), as the proof of Theorem 4.9 establishes it: under any feasible policy ggg, the rewards of that stage's jobs and the discounted time they occupy satisfy
Rgπσ(F)≤Wgπσ(F) ν(F).R_{g\pi\sigma}(\mathscr F) \le W_{g\pi\sigma}(\mathscr F)\,\nu(\mathscr F).Rgπσ​(F)≤Wgπσ​(F)ν(F).
  1. The remaining family (p. 98): if G\mathscr GG is what remains of F\mathscr FF when an FI* first stage ends, then almost surely ν(G)≤ν(F)\nu(\mathscr G) \le \nu(\mathscr F)ν(G)≤ν(F); for a suitably chosen first stage the inequality is strict.
  2. Corollary 4.17: an ε-FI* policy hhh satisfies
Rh(F)≥R(F)−εγ−1,R_h(\mathscr F) \ge R(\mathscr F) - \varepsilon\gamma^{-1},Rh​(F)≥R(F)−εγ−1,

R(F)R(\mathscr F)R(F) the optimal payoff.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.9 reduces the optimal non-preemptive schedule of a stochastic precedence-constrained job family to a sequence of ratio maximizations over initial portions of the family, the stochastic and discounted counterpart of the Sidney decomposition. It also marks the limit of the index approach: Section 4.7 shows that the same identity fails when preemption is allowed (Example 4.1), and the conditions E and F of §4.6 are the book's attempt to say what survives. Corollary 4.17 turns the theorem into a robustness statement: a schedule whose stages are only ε-close to the index loses at most εγ−1\varepsilon\gamma^{-1}εγ−1, the total discounted time.

Formalizing it. None of these statements has a machine-checked proof, and the platform holds no model of stochastic scheduling under precedence constraints. The related platform items LawlerWCT.SeriesPar.theorem_1 and theorem_2 (open) concern deterministic, undiscounted, series–parallel constraints, a different statement. A formal proof would make precise the "promotion" and "freezing" rearrangements of §4.5–4.6 in a setting where the family is not simple.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is an interchange argument on job sequences, as for the simple family. It fails because a single job is not the right unit: a low-reward job may precede a high-reward one, so the index must be taken over initial portions of the whole family, and the competing policy ggg may interleave the jobs of the first FI* stage with other jobs, adaptively, in an order the stage does not prescribe. Showing that collecting those rewards later cannot raise their rate above ν(F)\nu(\mathscr F)ν(F) is the content of (4.16). The printed proof argues the inclusion "FI* policies are optimal" only; the converse inclusion, and the identification of FI with FI* policies, are not argued on the page. The printed proof also treats only first stages that serve a fixed set in a fixed order, while first stages attaining (4.15) may be adaptive when there are ties.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin n. The service-time law of job iii is a ProbabilityMeasure ℝ with no mass on (−∞,0](-\infty, 0](−∞,0], and realizations ω=(σ1,…,σn)\omega = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n)ω=(σ1​,…,σn​) have the product law. A policy is a deterministic function from histories (completed jobs with their observed service times) to the next job, measurable in the service times for each history length; it never idles and never chooses a completed job. Feasibility is required for every realization. A stage's stopping rule is checked after each completion, and a stage serves at least one job. The index ν\nuν is a real supremum over feasible stages; for a family with an uncompleted job the set of ratios is nonempty and bounded above. Payoffs and indices are in the book's continuous-time units (W=γ−1E(1−e−γT)W = \gamma^{-1}E(1 - e^{-\gamma T})W=γ−1E(1−e−γT)): no unit conversion is made anywhere in this mission, and the bound of Corollary 4.17 is εγ−1\varepsilon\gamma^{-1}εγ−1 exactly as printed. The book does not define index policies for a family that is not simple; the goal reads them as FI* policies built from (4.15), which the book identifies with modified index policies (p. 33). The FI, FI* and ε-FI* properties are required with probability one over the service times, since changing an optimal policy on a null set of realizations leaves it optimal.

The goal must not be weakened to its proved half ("FI* policies are optimal"), and the competing policies must not be restricted to static job orders: a competitor may choose its next job from the completion times observed so far.

Beyond the paper: no variant items are posed.

A complete development needs product measures and integrals of finitely many functions of the service times, conditioning on the history at a decision time, and the freezing-rule inequality of Lemma 4.5 (drafted in mission VII of this series), here for a stream of several jobs. The model (histories, non-preemptive policies, stages, the family index) is reusable for the out-forest results of §4.7.

Selected references

  • J. Gittins, K. Glazebrook, R. Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011, §3.2, §4.6, §4.10. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470980033
  • J. B. Sidney, Decomposition algorithms for single-machine sequencing with precedence relations and deferral costs, Operations Research 23 (1975) 283–298. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.23.2.283
  • J. B. Kadane, H. A. Simon, Optimal strategies for a class of constrained sequential problems, Annals of Statistics 5 (1977) 237–255. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343791
  • E. L. Lawler, Sequencing jobs to minimize total weighted completion time subject to precedence constraints, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 2 (1978) 75–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70323-6
  • K. D. Glazebrook, J. C. Gittins, On single-machine scheduling with precedence relations and linear or discounted costs, Operations Research 29 (1981) 161–173. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.1.161
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Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

A Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme for Sequential Batch Testing of Series Systems: The Dynamic Program over Great-Looking States Finds a Testing Scheme Within Factor 1 + O(ε) of OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A series system works only if every one of its components works. Deciding whether it works by inspecting components one at a time, in the order that minimizes the expected inspection cost, is the classic sequential testing problem for series systems (Mitten 1960; Butterworth 1972; Simon & Kadane 1975). It is solved by sorting the components by the ratio ci/(1−pi)c_i/(1-p_i)ci​/(1−pi​). In medical diagnosis, quality control and software testing, tests are often run in batches: a laboratory charges a fixed shipping-and-handling fee per batch on top of the per-test fees. Daldal, Gamzu, Segev & Ünlüyurt (Naval Research Logistics, 2016) introduced this sequential batch testing problem and gave a (6.829+ϵ)(6.829+\epsilon)(6.829+ϵ)-approximation. Segev and Shaposhnik (SSRN 3277805, 2018; Operations Research) settled its approximability up to 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ with a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS).

Timeline:

  • 1960–1975: the single-test problem is solved by a ratio rule (Mitten; Butterworth; Simon–Kadane).
  • 2016: batch testing with a set-up cost; a 6.829+ϵ6.829+\epsilon6.829+ϵ approximation (Daldal et al.).
  • 2018: a quasi-PTAS and then a PTAS (Segev & Shaposhnik), the results of this mission.

Setting

Let X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ be independent Bernoulli variables with Pr⁡[Xi=1]=pi\Pr[X_i=1]=p_iPr[Xi​=1]=pi​. Testing XiX_iXi​ costs ci>0c_i>0ci​>0, and each batch also costs a set-up cost β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0. A testing scheme is an ordered partition S=(S1,…,ST)S=(S_1,\dots,S_T)S=(S1​,…,ST​) of [n][n][n]. Batch StS_tSt​ is inspected only if every earlier batch found no zero, which happens with probability φ(S,t)=∏τ<t∏i∈Sτpi\varphi(S,t)=\prod_{\tau<t}\prod_{i\in S_\tau}p_iφ(S,t)=∏τ<t​∏i∈Sτ​​pi​. The expected cost is

E(S)=∑t=1Tφ(S,t)(β+∑i∈Stci),E(S)=\sum_{t=1}^{T}\varphi(S,t)\Big(\beta+\sum_{i\in S_t}c_i\Big),E(S)=t=1∑T​φ(S,t)(β+i∈St​∑​ci​),

and the problem is to minimize E(S)E(S)E(S) over all testing schemes.

The algorithm first scales the costs by cmin⁡=min⁡icic_{\min}=\min_i c_icmin​=mini​ci​ and rounds each ci/cmin⁡c_i/c_{\min}ci​/cmin​ up to a power (1+ϵ)r(1+\epsilon)^r(1+ϵ)r. The variables then fall into cost classes C0,…,CRC_0,\dots,C_RC0​,…,CR​ of equal rounded cost. A state is a vector N=(N0,…,NR)N=(N_0,\dots,N_R)N=(N0​,…,NR​) in F=∏r{0,…,∣Cr∣}F=\prod_r\{0,\dots,|C_r|\}F=∏r​{0,…,∣Cr​∣}: it records that the NrN_rNr​ lowest-probability variables of each class CrC_rCr​ have been tested. P0(N)P_0(N)P0​(N) is the product of their pip_ipi​. An action Δ⪈0\Delta\gneq0Δ⪈0 costs C(Δ)=β+∑rΔr(1+ϵ)rC(\Delta)=\beta+\sum_r\Delta_r(1+\epsilon)^rC(Δ)=β+∑r​Δr​(1+ϵ)r, in normalized units. For a set of states GGG, a GGG-path runs 0→⋯→N(all)=(∣C0∣,…,∣CR∣)0\to\cdots\to N^{(\mathrm{all})}=(|C_0|,\dots,|C_R|)0→⋯→N(all)=(∣C0​∣,…,∣CR​∣) through GGG with strictly increasing states, and costs ∑tP0(N(t−1)) C(N(t)−N(t−1))\sum_t P_0(N^{(t-1)})\,C(N^{(t)}-N^{(t-1)})∑t​P0​(N(t−1))C(N(t)−N(t−1)). OPTG\mathrm{OPT}_GOPTG​ is the least such cost.

Let ψ(N)\psi(N)ψ(N) be the largest class with Nr≥1N_r\ge1Nr​≥1, and let κ=⌈log⁡1+ϵ(n/ϵ)⌉\kappa=\lceil\log_{1+\epsilon}(n/\epsilon)\rceilκ=⌈log1+ϵ​(n/ϵ)⌉. A state is nice-looking if every class r≤ψ(N)−κr\le\psi(N)-\kappar≤ψ(N)−κ is exhausted. It is great-looking if, in addition, on each of the κ\kappaκ middle classes ψ(N)−κ<r≤ψ(N)\psi(N)-\kappa<r\le\psi(N)ψ(N)−κ<r≤ψ(N) it holds

Nr=min⁡{⌊μr⋅ϵ2κ⋅P2[(1+ϵ)ρ] / (1+ϵ)r⌋, ∣Cr∣}N_r=\min\Big\{\Big\lfloor\mu_r\cdot\tfrac{\epsilon^2}{\kappa}\cdot P_2[(1+\epsilon)^\rho]\,/\,(1+\epsilon)^r\Big\rfloor,\ |C_r|\Big\}Nr​=min{⌊μr​⋅κϵ2​⋅P2​[(1+ϵ)ρ]/(1+ϵ)r⌋, ∣Cr​∣}

for some integer 0≤ρ≤R+⌈log⁡1+ϵn⌉0\le\rho\le R+\lceil\log_{1+\epsilon}n\rceil0≤ρ≤R+⌈log1+ϵ​n⌉ and non-negative integers μr\mu_rμr​ with ∑rμr≤3κ/ϵ2\sum_r\mu_r\le3\kappa/\epsilon^2∑r​μr​≤3κ/ϵ2. Here P2[x]P_2[x]P2​[x] rounds xxx down to a power of 2. FniceF_{\mathrm{nice}}Fnice​ and FgreatF_{\mathrm{great}}Fgreat​ denote these sets.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 6), in algorithm-output form

For 0<ϵ≤10<\epsilon\le10<ϵ≤1: the dynamic program over FgreatF_{\mathrm{great}}Fgreat​ has an optimal path. The testing scheme SπS_\piSπ​ of any optimal path π\piπ satisfies, with the original costs,

E(Sπ)≤(1+ϵ) K(ϵ) E(S)  for every testing scheme S,K(ϵ)=(1+3ϵ)(1+ϵ)2+2ϵ(1+ϵ)4,E(S_\pi)\le(1+\epsilon)\,K(\epsilon)\,E(S)\ \text{ for every testing scheme }S,\qquad K(\epsilon)=(1+3\epsilon)(1+\epsilon)^2+2\epsilon(1+\epsilon)^4,E(Sπ​)≤(1+ϵ)K(ϵ)E(S)  for every testing scheme S,K(ϵ)=(1+3ϵ)(1+ϵ)2+2ϵ(1+ϵ)4,

and ∣Fgreat∣≤(n+1) (R+⌈log⁡1+ϵn⌉+1)(⌊3κ/ϵ2⌋+κκ)|F_{\mathrm{great}}|\le(n+1)\,(R+\lceil\log_{1+\epsilon}n\rceil+1)\binom{\lfloor3\kappa/\epsilon^2\rfloor+\kappa}{\kappa}∣Fgreat​∣≤(n+1)(R+⌈log1+ϵ​n⌉+1)(κ⌊3κ/ϵ2⌋+κ​).

Milestones, in proof order

  • Rounding: Ec(S)≤Ec^(S)≤(1+ϵ)Ec(S)E_c(S)\le E_{\hat c}(S)\le(1+\epsilon)E_c(S)Ec​(S)≤Ec^​(S)≤(1+ϵ)Ec​(S) (§2.1, p. 8).
  • Greedy-within-class: every scheme is matched by an FFF-path (pp. 8–10). Path cost equals the expected cost of the path's scheme (eqs. (1), (3)).
  • Lemmas 1–2 and Theorem 2: OPTFnice≤(1+ϵ) OPTF\mathrm{OPT}_{F_{\mathrm{nice}}}\le(1+\epsilon)\,\mathrm{OPT}_FOPTFnice​​≤(1+ϵ)OPTF​ (pp. 12–14).
  • Lemmas 3–4, on the bucketing by powers of 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ in probability (p. 18).
  • Lemma 5 and Properties A–C, on the great-looking construction (pp. 19–24).
  • Theorem 3: OPTF≤OPTFgreat≤K(ϵ) OPTF\mathrm{OPT}_F\le\mathrm{OPT}_{F_{\mathrm{great}}}\le K(\epsilon)\,\mathrm{OPT}_FOPTF​≤OPTFgreat​​≤K(ϵ)OPTF​ (p. 17).
  • The explicit count of ∣Fgreat∣|F_{\mathrm{great}}|∣Fgreat​∣ (pp. 16–17).

Significance

The PTAS shows that batch testing of series systems can be approximated to within any factor 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ in polynomial time for fixed ϵ\epsilonϵ, improving the earlier constant factor 6.829+ϵ6.829+\epsilon6.829+ϵ. Its ingredients are general tools of approximate dynamic programming: a structural ordering that turns schemes into count vectors, a collapse of the state space by exhausting cheap classes, and a rounding of the middle classes onto a coarse power-of-two grid. Local charging arguments control the error of the last two. These tools apply beyond this problem.

The result is proved on paper; nothing in it has a machine-checked proof that we know of. A formalization produces a checked chain from the testing model to the approximation guarantee, including the delicate parts: the rounding interplay in Lemma 5, the double-sum exchange in the proof of Theorem 3, and the case analysis of inequalities (8)–(12). It also makes explicit what the paper leaves as 1+O(ϵ)1+O(\epsilon)1+O(ϵ) and O(n)O(n)O(n). The resulting library of testing schemes, count-vector dynamic programs and restricted state spaces can be reused for other sequential testing models.

Difficulty

Restricting the dynamic program to a small set of states can only make it worse. The work is showing it is not much worse, and the obvious charging fails. Exhausting all cheap classes at once (Theorem 2) costs only a factor 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ, but it leaves nO(κ)n^{O(\kappa)}nO(κ) states, which is quasi-polynomial. Rounding the middle classes onto a grid shrinks the state space to polynomial size, but a per-step rounding error is not small compared with that step's own cost. It must be charged to the cost of all earlier steps. That charge is affordable only because the bucketing makes the probabilities of successive steps decrease geometrically (Lemma 4). The grid must also be nested from step to step so that rounding never forces a count to decrease (Lemma 5, which relies on the power-of-two operator P2P_2P2​). Any single per-step argument loses a factor that does not tend to 111.

Formalization scope

All objects are defined from scratch in one file in BatchTesting.PTAS. The model and its conventions:

  • Instance. An instance is (p,c,β)(p,c,\beta)(p,c,β) on Fin n, with standing assumptions n≥1n\ge1n≥1, pi∈[0,1]p_i\in[0,1]pi​∈[0,1], ci>0c_i>0ci​>0 and β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0. Of these, ci>0c_i>0ci​>0 is the paper's own (p. 8); the other three are added. Every statement also assumes 0<ϵ≤10<\epsilon\le10<ϵ≤1; ϵ≤1\epsilon\le1ϵ≤1 is used in the proofs of Property A and inequality (12).
  • Normalization. The normalization min⁡ici=1\min_i c_i=1mini​ci​=1 is carried out by the definitions, never assumed. The goal compares expected costs of the original instance.
  • Testing schemes and paths. Testing schemes are lists of Finsets, and may contain empty batches. Paths are lists of states with strictly increasing steps. Every DP statement is in path form ("for every path there is a path with cost at most …"), not as an infimum over paths.
  • Classes. Class arithmetic (ψ\psiψ, κ\kappaκ, the middle range) is in Z\mathbb ZZ, and ψ(0)=−∞\psi(0)=-\inftyψ(0)=−∞ is encoded as −1-1−1. Ties within a class are broken by index.
  • Constructions. The constructions of §3.4, §4.3 and §4.5 are definitions, so Lemmas 1–5 and Properties A–C are about the page's objects. Steps with P0=0P_0=0P0​=0 form one extra last bucket. The §4.5 action is integer-valued, so Lemma 5 has content.

The paper's "1+O(ϵ)1+O(\epsilon)1+O(ϵ)" is the explicit K(ϵ)K(\epsilon)K(ϵ) of its own chain on pp. 19–20. Its "within factor 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ" is the factor (1+ϵ)K(ϵ)(1+\epsilon)K(\epsilon)(1+ϵ)K(ϵ), which reaches 1+ϵ′1+\epsilon'1+ϵ′ after rescaling ϵ\epsilonϵ. The running time is not formalized: the inputs are real numbers and the exponent is O(1/ϵ3)O(1/\epsilon^3)O(1/ϵ3). The explicit bound on ∣Fgreat∣|F_{\mathrm{great}}|∣Fgreat​∣ stands in for it.

The statement "some testing scheme is within 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ of optimal" is trivially true, because an optimal scheme exists. The goal therefore concerns the scheme read off an optimal path over FgreatF_{\mathrm{great}}Fgreat​, and it carries the state count.

A complete development needs finite products over nested Finsets, an exchange argument for the greedy order, and list manipulations of paths (removing zero actions, subsequences). The counting milestone needs a stars-and-bars bound. The testing-scheme and path layer can be reused for other sequential testing problems. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments with better constants, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Segev, Y. Shaposhnik, A Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme for Sequential Batch Testing of Series Systems, SSRN preprint 3277805, 2018; published in Operations Research. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277805, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1967
  • R. Daldal, I. Gamzu, D. Segev, T. Ünlüyurt, Approximation algorithms for sequential batch-testing of series systems, Naval Research Logistics 63(4):275–286, 2016.
  • L. Mitten, An analytic solution to the least cost testing sequence problem, Journal of Industrial Engineering 11(1):17, 1960.
  • R. Butterworth, Some reliability fault-testing models, Operations Research 20(2):335–343, 1972.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Dynamic Appointment Scheduling of Base and Surge Capacity: The First-Available Policy Is Optimal When Surge Capacity Is Cheap Relative to the Discounted Cost of Delaying an AppointmentResearch Paper

Motivation

Many service providers are paid under a contract that makes them responsible for a customer's costly failures over a fixed window: a hospital penalized for heart-failure readmissions within 30 days, or a maintenance contractor responsible for engine replacements. A preventative appointment lowers the chance of such a failure, and the sooner it takes place the fewer customers fail while waiting. Capacity for appointments is limited. A clinic plans a fixed number of base slots per period at no incremental cost, and can add a limited number of surge slots (overtime, external staff) at a cost per slot. The scheduler therefore trades the cost of surge capacity against the discounted cost of failures caused by delay.

B. Grant, I. Gurvich, R. K. Mutharasan and J. A. Van Mieghem (SSRN 3092667; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021, doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0932) model this trade-off as an infinite-horizon discounted dynamic program, motivated by follow-up appointments for heart-failure patients at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. Their first optimality result, Proposition 1, identifies when the simplest policy, booking every request in the earliest period with a free slot, is optimal.

Setting

Time is divided into periods. The appointment book at the start of a period is S=(S0,…,SD)\mathbf S = (S_0, \dots, S_D)S=(S0​,…,SD​), where SdS_dSd​ is the number of appointments already booked ddd periods ahead and D≥1D \ge 1D≥1 is the booking horizon. Each period has K=Kb+KsK = K_b + K_sK=Kb​+Ks​ slots: KbK_bKb​ base slots and KsK_sKs​ surge slots. A valid book has Sd≤KS_d \le KSd​≤K for every ddd and SD=0S_D = 0SD​=0.

At the start of each period aaa new requests arrive, i.i.d. across periods with law P(A=a)\mathbb P(A = a)P(A=a) supported on {0,…,M}\{0, \dots, M\}{0,…,M}. The scheduler books them: an action u=(u0,…,uD)\mathbf u = (u_0, \dots, u_D)u=(u0​,…,uD​) is admissible (1) if u0=0u_0 = 0u0​=0 (no same-period booking), ud+Sd≤Ku_d + S_d \le Kud​+Sd​≤K for 1≤d≤D1 \le d \le D1≤d≤D, and ∑d=1Dud=a\sum_{d=1}^D u_d = a∑d=1D​ud​=a. If the requests do not fit, every free slot is filled and the nOn_OnO​ remaining overflow requests are sent elsewhere at cost cFc_FcF​ each.

Between periods each booked customer independently fails with probability pFp_FpF​, at cost cFc_FcF​, and leaves the book; the others move one period closer, so the next book is a product of binomial thinnings of S~=S+u\tilde{\mathbf S} = \mathbf S + \mathbf uS~=S+u with survival probability pFˉ=1−pFp_{\bar F} = 1 - p_FpFˉ​=1−pF​ (4). A customer who reaches the appointment shows with probability pSp_SpS​ and afterwards fails within the contract window with probability pF∣Sp_{F|S}pF∣S​; a no-show (probability pSˉ=1−pSp_{\bar S} = 1 - p_SpSˉ​=1−pS​) fails with probability pF∣Sˉ>pF∣Sp_{F|\bar S} > p_{F|S}pF∣Sˉ​>pF∣S​. Serving S0S_0S0​ appointments costs h(S0)=csmax⁡{S0−Kb,0}h(S_0) = c_s \max\{S_0 - K_b, 0\}h(S0​)=cs​max{S0​−Kb​,0} (5). The expected one-period cost (7) is

g=h(S0)+βcF E[failures before the next period]+S0 cF (pSpF∣S+pSˉpF∣Sˉ)+cF nO,g = h(S_0) + \beta c_F\,\mathbb E[\text{failures before the next period}] + S_0\,c_F\,(p_S p_{F|S} + p_{\bar S}p_{F|\bar S}) + c_F\,n_O ,g=h(S0​)+βcF​E[failures before the next period]+S0​cF​(pS​pF∣S​+pSˉ​pF∣Sˉ​)+cF​nO​,

and a policy π\piπ is valued by its expected total discounted cost Vπ(S0)=∑t≥0βt E[gt]V_\pi(\mathbf S^0) = \sum_{t \ge 0} \beta^t\,\mathbb E[g_t]Vπ​(S0)=∑t≥0​βtE[gt​] (9), with discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta \in (0, 1)β∈(0,1).

The First-Available (FA) policy books the requests into periods 1,2,…,D1, 2, \dots, D1,2,…,D in order, filling every free slot of a period (base, then surge) before using the next.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 12)

If

cscF≤min⁡1≤d<d′≤D(pFˉd′−dβd′−d−1)(pSpF∣S+pSˉpF∣Sˉ)+∑i=dd′−1βi+1pFpFˉipFˉdβd,(13)\frac{c_s}{c_F} \le \min_{1 \le d < d' \le D} \big(p_{\bar F}^{d'-d}\beta^{d'-d} - 1\big)\big(p_S p_{F|S} + p_{\bar S} p_{F|\bar S}\big) + \frac{\sum_{i=d}^{d'-1}\beta^{i+1}p_F p_{\bar F}^{i}}{p_{\bar F}^{d}\beta^{d}}, \qquad (13)cF​cs​​≤1≤d<d′≤Dmin​(pFˉd′−d​βd′−d−1)(pS​pF∣S​+pSˉ​pF∣Sˉ​)+pFˉd​βd∑i=dd′−1​βi+1pF​pFˉi​​,(13)

then FA is optimal: VFA(S0)≤Vπ(S0)V_{\mathrm{FA}}(\mathbf S^0) \le V_\pi(\mathbf S^0)VFA​(S0)≤Vπ​(S0) for every admissible policy π\piπ and every valid book S0\mathbf S^0S0.

Milestones

  1. (8): the expected one-period cost is bounded, g≤hˉ+cF(βDK+K+M)g \le \bar h + c_F(\beta D K + K + M)g≤hˉ+cF​(βDK+K+M).
  2. Policy evaluation (§6.2): the value of a stationary admissible policy solves Vσ(S)=∑aP(A=a)(g+β∑S′P(S′∣S+σ(S,a))Vσ(S′))V_\sigma(\mathbf S) = \sum_a \mathbb P(A = a)\big(g + \beta\sum_{\mathbf S'}\mathbb P(\mathbf S' \mid \mathbf S + \sigma(\mathbf S, a))V_\sigma(\mathbf S')\big)Vσ​(S)=∑a​P(A=a)(g+β∑S′​P(S′∣S+σ(S,a))Vσ​(S′)).
  3. (11): the optimal value V∗V^*V∗ solves the Bellman equation, and a stationary policy minimizing its right-hand side exists and is optimal.
  4. (18) ⟺ (13): for each pair d<d′d < d'd<d′, the comparison (18) of the bounds (15) at ddd and (16) at d′d'd′ is equivalent to the (d,d′)(d, d')(d,d′) term of (13).
  5. (18) ⟹ (17), (19), (20): the single inequality (18) implies the other three comparisons of the bounds.

Significance

Proposition 1 gives a closed-form, state-independent and arrival-independent sufficient condition under which the scheduler needs no optimization at all: book every request as early as possible, using surge capacity whenever base capacity is full. The paper's numerical study finds FA optimal in a large fraction of realistic scenarios, so the condition marks out a regime in which a hospital can use the simplest rule without loss. Together with Propositions 2 and 3 of the paper (base-first and base-first/last-surge policies) it maps out which simple policy to use as the surge cost varies.

The paper's argument for Proposition 1 compares the expected discounted cost of one customer booked at delay ddd with surge against the same customer at delay d′>dd' > dd′>d without surge, and concludes optimality from the comparison. That step is an incremental-cost heuristic: the passage from the four inequalities (17)–(20) to optimality of FA in the dynamic program is asserted in one sentence, not proved. Milestones 4 and 5 formalize the algebra the paper does carry out; the bridge from (17)–(20) to optimality of the policy is the open part of this mission. As far as is known, no machine-checked proof of this result or of any optimality result for appointment scheduling with surge capacity exists.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is the paper's: each request is cheaper earlier, so book it earlier. In the dynamic program the requests interact. A customer booked early occupies a slot that a later arrival could have used; failures free slots again; surge cost is charged on the realized number of customers present at the appointment, after failures; and overflow depends on how full the book was left by earlier decisions. A single-customer comparison does not account for any of these, and the per-customer cost of FA (12) need not even be monotone in the delay for every parameter choice. Any argument has to account for the whole state of the book, not one customer at a time.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace SurgeAppt.FirstAvail. Costs and probabilities are real numbers and counts are natural numbers. A book is a function {0,…,D}→N\{0, \dots, D\} \to \mathbb N{0,…,D}→N, indexed as on the page; the transition reads S~d+1\tilde S_{d+1}S~d+1​ into Sd′S'_dSd′​ and sets SD′=0S'_D = 0SD′​=0. The cost (7) is computed with the surge cost (5) and the expected failure term written as a finite sum over next books. A policy is a sequence of decision rules Ut(S,a)U^t(\mathbf S, a)Ut(S,a) (Markov deterministic, possibly non-stationary); it is admissible if each decision at a valid book with a≤Ma \le Ma≤M satisfies (1), including the forced action when (1) is empty. The value (9) is the series ∑tβt E[gt]\sum_t \beta^t\,\mathbb E[g_t]∑t​βtE[gt​] over the law of the book at time ttt; it is never defined as a fixed point. Condition (13)'s minimum is read as "for every pair 1≤d<d′≤D1 \le d < d' \le D1≤d<d′≤D", which is vacuous when D=1D = 1D=1.

Hypotheses added to the page and disclosed in every statement: D≥1D \ge 1D≥1, cs≥0c_s \ge 0cs​≥0, cF>0c_F > 0cF​>0, 0<pF<10 < p_F < 10<pF​<1, and pS,pF∣S,pF∣Sˉ∈[0,1]p_S, p_{F|S}, p_{F|\bar S} \in [0, 1]pS​,pF∣S​,pF∣Sˉ​∈[0,1]; the page's pF∣S<pF∣Sˉp_{F|S} < p_{F|\bar S}pF∣S​<pF∣Sˉ​, β∈(0,1)\beta \in (0, 1)β∈(0,1) and P(A≤M)=1\mathbb P(A \le M) = 1P(A≤M)=1 with M≥1M \ge 1M≥1 are kept. History-dependent and randomized policies are not modelled; the paper's remark after (11) that a stationary optimal policy exists licenses comparing FA against Markov policies.

The goal is not trivialized: the competitors are every admissible Markov policy, not only first-available-like ones; the admissibility of FA is part of the conclusion, so a rule that skipped bookings could not qualify; and the value is a convergent series of bounded nonnegative costs, not a junk value.

A complete development needs: finite discounted MDP facts (milestones 2 and 3, reusable for any finite-state model with constrained actions), properties of the product-binomial kernel, and a comparison argument for the goal. Proofs of any milestone, alternative arguments for the goal, and counterexample searches that probe the boundary of (13) are welcome.

Selected references

  • B. Grant, I. Gurvich, R. K. Mutharasan, J. A. Van Mieghem, Optimal dynamic appointment scheduling of base and surge capacity, SSRN 3092667, revised July 1, 2020. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3092667
  • The same, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0932
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
  • A. F. Hernandez et al., Relationship between early physician follow-up and 30-day readmission among Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized for heart failure, JAMA 303(17), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2010.533
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard, and Default Risk: Greater Availability of Evidence Raises Firm Value and Lowers the Credit Spread, Strictly Above the First Termination ThresholdResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms are run by managers who know more about cash flows than investors do. In the dynamic agency literature that started with DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), a manager can divert cash by under-reporting output, and investors deter diversion with a contract that promises future pay after good reports and threatens liquidation after bad ones. Liquidation destroys value, so the threat itself is costly; the gap between the firm's value under the optimal contract and its first-best value is an agency cost, and in this class of models it is also the firm's credit spread.

Fu and Trigilia ask what happens when the manager can, from time to time, produce hard evidence that a low cash flow was bad luck rather than diversion. Disclosure is voluntary: evidence can be hidden, so the contract must reward disclosing it. The question is whether better information technology, a higher probability of evidence, makes the firm more valuable and less likely to default. The paper's answer (Proposition 4(a)) is used by the rest of the paper: by the analysis of when to invest in the technology (§7) and by the claims about default risk at initiation.

Setting

A firm produces i.i.d. cash flows xt∈{h,l}x_t \in \{h, l\}xt​∈{h,l} with h>l>0h > l > 0h>l>0 and P(xt=h)=p∈(0,1)P(x_t = h) = p \in (0,1)P(xt​=h)=p∈(0,1). Investors and the manager are risk neutral and discount at rate r∈(0,1)r \in (0,1)r∈(0,1). Reporting a high cash flow as low lets the manager divert Δ=h−l\Delta = h - lΔ=h−l, of which the manager keeps the private benefit δ=λΔ\delta = \lambda\Deltaδ=λΔ with λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1]. Write μ=ph+(1−p)l\mu = ph + (1-p)lμ=ph+(1−p)l. Each period, with probability π∈[0,1)\pi \in [0,1)π∈[0,1), the manager also receives evidence of the true cash flow, which he may disclose or hide; π=0\pi = 0π=0 is the classical model without evidence.

The contract is written recursively in the manager's promised utility v≥0v \ge 0v≥0. At state vvv it chooses a liquidation probability θ∈[0,1]\theta \in [0,1]θ∈[0,1], cash payments uah≥0u_{ah} \ge 0uah​≥0, ual≥0u_{al} \ge 0ual​≥0 and continuation utilities wah,wal≥0w_{ah}, w_{al} \ge 0wah​,wal​≥0, indexed by a∈{d,n}a \in \{d, n\}a∈{d,n} (evidence disclosed or not) and by the reported cash flow. Writing Uai=uai+wai/(1+r)U_{ai} = u_{ai} + w_{ai}/(1+r)Uai​=uai​+wai​/(1+r), it must satisfy

Udh≥Unh (ICg),Udl≥Unl (ICb),Unh≥δ+Unl (ICn),U_{dh} \ge U_{nh}\ (IC_g),\qquad U_{dl} \ge U_{nl}\ (IC_b),\qquad U_{nh} \ge \delta + U_{nl}\ (IC_n),Udh​≥Unh​ (ICg​),Udl​≥Unl​ (ICb​),Unh​≥δ+Unl​ (ICn​), v=(1−θ)[π(pUdh+(1−p)Udl)+(1−π)(pUnh+(1−p)Unl)] (PK).v = (1-\theta)\big[\pi(pU_{dh} + (1-p)U_{dl}) + (1-\pi)(pU_{nh} + (1-p)U_{nl})\big]\ (PK).v=(1−θ)[π(pUdh​+(1−p)Udl​)+(1−π)(pUnh​+(1−p)Unl​)] (PK).

The firm value s(v)s(v)s(v) (total surplus) is the fixed point of the Bellman operator

Tq(v)=sup⁡ (1−θ)μ+1−θ1+r{π[pq(wdh)+(1−p)q(wdl)]+(1−π)[pq(wnh)+(1−p)q(wnl)]}Tq(v) = \sup\ (1-\theta)\mu + \frac{1-\theta}{1+r}\Big\{\pi[pq(w_{dh}) + (1-p)q(w_{dl})] + (1-\pi)[pq(w_{nh}) + (1-p)q(w_{nl})]\Big\}Tq(v)=sup (1−θ)μ+1+r1−θ​{π[pq(wdh​)+(1−p)q(wdl​)]+(1−π)[pq(wnh​)+(1−p)q(wnl​)]}

over feasible policies, in the class F\mathcal FF of continuous functions on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ with 0≤q≤s∗0 \le q \le s^*0≤q≤s∗, where s∗=(1+r)μ/rs^* = (1+r)\mu/rs∗=(1+r)μ/r is the first-best value. The credit spread is 1−s(v)/s∗1 - s(v)/s^*1−s(v)/s∗. Two thresholds organise the solution: the cash payout boundary vˉ=(1+r)pδ/r\bar v = (1+r)p\delta/rvˉ=(1+r)pδ/r, above which s=s∗s = s^*s=s∗, and the first termination threshold v1(π)=r^vˉ/(1+r^)v^1(\pi) = \hat r\bar v/(1+\hat r)v1(π)=r^vˉ/(1+r^) with r^=r/(1−(1−p)π)\hat r = r/(1-(1-p)\pi)r^=r/(1−(1−p)π), below which the optimal contract liquidates with positive probability.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4(a), corrected

For 0≤π<π′<10 \le \pi < \pi' < 10≤π<π′<1, with sss, s′s's′ the firm values for π\piπ and π′\pi'π′, a firm value exists for each evidence probability and

s(v)≤s′(v)and1−s′(v)s∗≤1−s(v)s∗(v≥0),s(v) \le s'(v)\quad \text{and}\quad 1 - \tfrac{s'(v)}{s^*} \le 1 - \tfrac{s(v)}{s^*}\qquad (v \ge 0),s(v)≤s′(v)and1−s∗s′(v)​≤1−s∗s(v)​(v≥0), s(v)<s′(v)and1−s′(v)s∗<1−s(v)s∗(v1(π)<v<vˉ).s(v) < s'(v)\quad \text{and}\quad 1 - \tfrac{s'(v)}{s^*} < 1 - \tfrac{s(v)}{s^*}\qquad (v^1(\pi) < v < \bar v).s(v)<s′(v)and1−s∗s′(v)​<1−s∗s(v)​(v1(π)<v<vˉ).

The paper states the strict inequality for every v<vˉv < \bar vv<vˉ. That is false below v1(π)v^1(\pi)v1(π) when p≤rp \le rp≤r: there firm value is linear through the origin with slope s(v1)/v1=(1+r)(r+p)μ/(r2vˉ)s(v^1)/v^1 = (1+r)(r+p)\mu/(r^2\bar v)s(v1)/v1=(1+r)(r+p)μ/(r2vˉ), which does not depend on π\piπ, so s(⋅ ;π)s(\cdot\,;\pi)s(⋅;π) and s(⋅ ;π′)s(\cdot\,;\pi')s(⋅;π′) coincide on [0,v1(π)][0, v^1(\pi)][0,v1(π)]. The goal is the corrected statement: weak everywhere, strict above the first termination threshold of the smaller evidence probability.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma A.1 (p. 38): TTT maps the functions in F\mathcal FF equal to s∗s^*s∗ on [vˉ,∞)[\bar v, \infty)[vˉ,∞) into themselves.
  2. Proposition A.1 (p. 38): the fixed point exists, is unique, nondecreasing, concave and equal to s∗s^*s∗ on [vˉ,∞)[\bar v, \infty)[vˉ,∞).
  3. Proposition 2 (p. 16): inf⁡{v:s(v)=s∗}=vˉ\inf\{v : s(v) = s^*\} = \bar vinf{v:s(v)=s∗}=vˉ.
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 18): for 0<v<vˉ0 < v < \bar v0<v<vˉ, every optimal policy has (ICg)(IC_g)(ICg​), (ICn)(IC_n)(ICn​) binding and (ICb)(IC_b)(ICb​) strict.
  5. Proposition 3, bullets 1–2 (p. 19): explicit optimal θ\thetaθ, wnlw_{nl}wnl​, wdlw_{dl}wdl​, whw_hwh​ on (0,v1](0, v^1](0,v1] and (v1,vˉ](v^1, \bar v](v1,vˉ].
  6. Linearity below v1v^1v1 (p. 19): s(v)=(v/v1)s(v1)s(v) = (v/v^1)s(v^1)s(v)=(v/v1)s(v1) on [0,v1][0, v^1][0,v1].

Significance

The result says that the value of a firm run under moral hazard, and its default risk, respond monotonically to the quality of information about cash flows, even though the information is controlled by the party whose incentives are the problem. It underlies the paper's analysis of when investors should pay for the information technology and how the credit spread varies with it. The correction also identifies precisely where better evidence is worthless: in the liquidation region below v1v^1v1 when p≤rp \le rp≤r, where the firm reaches the payout boundary after a single high cash flow.

These results are proved in the paper (with the gap noted above) and none has a machine-checked proof. A complete formalization gives a verified treatment of a discrete-time dynamic contracting problem: the Bellman operator of a constrained recursive contract, the shape of its fixed point, the binding incentive constraints and the closed-form optimal contract.

Difficulty

The value function is defined only implicitly, as the fixed point of an operator whose feasible set is not convex in the obvious variables: promise keeping multiplies the liquidation probability by the promised utility. Comparing two fixed points for different π\piπ requires knowing their shape, which in turn requires the explicit optimal policy. The paper's comparative-statics argument differentiates in π\piπ through an envelope condition at points where sss has kinks, and treats the region below v1v^1v1 by continuity; but v1v^1v1 itself moves with π\piπ, so the argument does not transfer from above v1v^1v1 to below it, and the strict claim fails there for p≤rp \le rp≤r. Any proof must handle the moving threshold explicitly.

Formalization scope

All objects are in the namespace VolDisclosure.Evidence. Parameters are a structure with fields h,l,p,rh, l, p, rh,l,p,r and lam (λ\lambdaλ), with the standing assumptions 0<l<h0 < l < h0<l<h, 0<p<10 < p < 10<p<1, 0<r<10 < r < 10<r<1, 0<λ≤10 < \lambda \le 10<λ≤1. A policy is nine real numbers (θ\thetaθ, four cash payments, four continuation utilities). The conventions are:

  • the "max" of (T) is the supremum over all feasible policies; attainment is part of Proposition 3, not of the definition;
  • π\piπ is a parameter of (T), not a choice variable (p. 37 lists it under the max by mistake);
  • continuation utilities are nonnegative (p. 10, "wt≥0w_t \ge 0wt​≥0"); (LL) covers the cash payments;
  • membership in F\mathcal FF and the fixed-point equation are required on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ only;
  • π\piπ ranges over [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), including the no-evidence benchmark π=0\pi = 0π=0; Lemma 1 additionally needs 0<v0 < v0<v and 0<π0 < \pi0<π, both disclosed in its statement;
  • "increasing" in Proposition A.1 means nondecreasing.

The firm value must be the fixed point of (T) over all feasible policies. Defining it from Proposition 3's policy, or dropping (ICn)(IC_n)(ICn​) (under which s≡s∗s \equiv s^*s≡s∗), would make the goal trivial; the goal also asserts existence of a firm value, so it cannot hold vacuously.

Not formalized: Proposition 2's cash formula (5) and the half of definition (3) that involves the investment-option problem (F); Proposition 3's third bullet (nnn-period thresholds); Proposition 4(b)–(d), of which (c) and (d) are misprinted; the two-period model, the investment option (§7) and the default-risk results at initiation (Proposition 7).

A complete development needs a contraction fixed-point argument on bounded continuous functions on R+\mathbb R_+R+​, the shape results for the fixed point, and the explicit policy; contributions of any milestone are welcome, and the fixed-point layer is reusable for other recursive contracting models.

Selected references

  • S. Fu and G. Trigilia, Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard and Default Risk, working paper, August 28, 2019; published in Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4860
  • P. M. DeMarzo and M. J. Fishman, Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting, Review of Financial Studies 20(6), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhm031
  • P. M. DeMarzo and Y. Sannikov, Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model, Journal of Finance 61(6), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01049.x
8 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Operations of a Hog Farm Facing Volatile Markets: Optimality of the Price-Dependent Multi-Threshold Hold-Fulfill-Sell Sales Allocation PolicyResearch Paper

Why the sales allocation problem matters

A hog producer selling to both a meatpacker and an open market faces a weekly allocation choice. The meatpacker contracts for a fixed quantity, pays different rates for underweight and regular-weight hogs, and charges for any shortfall. The open market has separate prices for the two weight classes. Holding an underweight hog costs money now but makes it regular-weight next week. These features make a single “sell or hold” rule inadequate: fulfilling the contract changes the value of the next hog allocated to either market. Kouvelis, Liu, Qiu and Turcic model this setting and state a price-dependent, multiple-threshold sales policy in Proposition 1 of their March 6, 2023 preprint.

The stated policy is of direct interest for inventory decisions with quality upgrading and contractual penalties. It also provides a precise test case for dynamic programming with continuous stock decisions, stochastic prices, and a capacity-constrained contract. The mission concerns the mathematical policy statement, rather than the paper’s empirical estimates or numerical comparisons.

Setting and notation

At the start of period t∈{1,…,tM}t\in\{1,\ldots,t_M\}t∈{1,…,tM​}, the producer observes st=(st1,st2)s_t=(s^1_t,s^2_t)st​=(st1​,st2​) underweight and regular-weight hogs and the price vector Pt=(ptC,pt1,pt2,ctH,ctP)P_t=(p^C_t,p^1_t,p^2_t,c^H_t,c^P_t)Pt​=(ptC​,pt1​,pt2​,ctH​,ctP​). The contract requires qqq hogs. A regular-weight hog sent to the contract earns ptCp^C_tptC​; an underweight one earns (1−α)ptC(1-\alpha)p^C_t(1−α)ptC​. Open-market prices are pt1≤pt2p^1_t\le p^2_tpt1​≤pt2​. Holding costs ctHc^H_tctH​ per hog, and a contract shortfall costs ctPc^P_tctP​ per missing hog. The discount factor is β\betaβ.

The decision is yt=(yt1,yt2)y_t=(y^1_t,y^2_t)yt​=(yt1​,yt2​) sent to the contract and zt=(zt1,zt2)z_t=(z^1_t,z^2_t)zt​=(zt1​,zt2​) held. Open-market sales are xti=sti−yti−ztix^i_t=s^i_t-y^i_t-z^i_txti​=sti​−yti​−zti​. Every decision is nonnegative; yt1+yt2≤qy^1_t+y^2_t\le qyt1​+yt2​≤q and yti+zti≤stiy^i_t+z^i_t\le s^i_tyti​+zti​≤sti​. The immediate reward is

rt=ptC(yt2+(1−α)yt1)+∑i=12pti(sti−yti−zti)−ctH(zt1+zt2)−ctP(q−yt1−yt2).r_t=p^C_t\bigl(y^2_t+(1-\alpha)y^1_t\bigr) +\sum_{i=1}^{2}p^i_t(s^i_t-y^i_t-z^i_t) -c^H_t(z^1_t+z^2_t)-c^P_t(q-y^1_t-y^2_t).rt​=ptC​(yt2​+(1−α)yt1​)+i=1∑2​pti​(sti​−yti​−zti​)−ctH​(zt1​+zt2​)−ctP​(q−yt1​−yt2​).

Newly available hogs next period are Wt+1=(Wt+11,Wt+12)W_{t+1}=(W^1_{t+1},W^2_{t+1})Wt+1​=(Wt+11​,Wt+12​). Both classes of held hogs enter the regular-weight pool, so St+1=(Wt+11,Wt+12+zt1+zt2)S_{t+1}=(W^1_{t+1},W^2_{t+1}+z^1_t+z^2_t)St+1​=(Wt+11​,Wt+12​+zt1​+zt2​). The value function VtV_tVt​ is the maximum expected discounted reward from periods ttt through tMt_MtM​, with VtM+1=0V_{t_M+1}=0VtM​+1​=0, as in equations (4) and (7a)–(7c) of the preprint.

For total holding ZZZ, write Gt(Z)=βEt[Vt+1(Wt+11,Wt+12+Z)]−ctHZG_t(Z)=\beta\mathbb E_t[V_{t+1}(W^1_{t+1},W^2_{t+1}+Z)]-c^H_t ZGt​(Z)=βEt​[Vt+1​(Wt+11​,Wt+12​+Z)]−ctH​Z. Its increments are the holding margin. The fulfillment margins are (1−α)ptC+ctP(1-\alpha)p^C_t+c^P_t(1−α)ptC​+ctP​ and ptC+ctPp^C_t+c^P_tptC​+ctP​; the spot margins are pt1p^1_tpt1​ and pt2p^2_tpt2​. A break-even level for margin vvv is the least nonnegative ZZZ at which every forward increment of GtG_tGt​ is no greater than vvv times the increment. The mission uses this level truncated at st1+st2s^1_t+s^2_tst1​+st2​.

Formalization targets

The first targets are concavity of the value and action-value functions (Lemma 1), preservation of concavity in total holdings (Proposition 1, proof Step 1), and the holding-margin bound corresponding to Lemma 2(1). The one-period attainment result from Proposition 1, proof Step 2, connects those properties to the explicit actions. These are the four milestones.

The goal is the corrected part of Proposition 1, Cases 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b). In each case, the indicated action must satisfy the feasibility constraints and attain the dynamic-programming value:

vt(yt,zt;st,Pt)=Vt(st,Pt).v_t(y_t,z_t;s_t,P_t)=V_t(s_t,P_t).vt​(yt​,zt​;st​,Pt​)=Vt​(st​,Pt​).

The cases split first on pt2>ptC+ctPp^2_t>p^C_t+c^P_tpt2​>ptC​+ctP​ or pt2≤ptC+ctPp^2_t\le p^C_t+c^P_tpt2​≤ptC​+ctP​, then on the underweight fulfillment and spot margins. The explicit quantities are in the goal theorem. Its thresholds are computed from GtG_tGt​ and the observed stock and prices, so the target is a policy for the original dynamic program. Proposition 1 also prints Case 2(c), but its multi-period formula is false under the paper’s stated assumptions and the additional no-arbitrage bound below; this mission does not assert it.

What the result provides

The result identifies feasible, optimal contract, spot-market, and holding quantities in four observable price regimes. It gives a policy rather than an existence statement: a producer can determine the action from the current stock, prices, and three break-even levels. The holding thresholds are linked to the actual continuation value, which matters when future penalties or regular-weight prices change.

The preprint supplies a proof on paper; these particular Lean statements do not yet have verified proofs. Formalizing them would yield a checked dynamic program and reusable facts about a concave continuation value, a shared holding pool, and a linear contract capacity. The corrected statement also separates the regimes that the available numerical checks support from the printed Case 2(c), which has a concrete counterexample. The four milestones expose the mathematical obligations needed to complete the verified result.

Main difficulty

The continuation value depends on the sum zt1+zt2z^1_t+z^2_tzt1​+zt2​, while the two pools have different fulfillment and spot prices and share one contract capacity. A comparison of each pool’s holding and selling margins in isolation therefore does not settle the allocation: holding one pool changes the marginal value of holding the other. The dynamic value is also defined by a supremum over a continuous feasible polytope and an expectation over future data. The central difficulty is obtaining a well-defined, concave value function and then showing that each explicit threshold action attains it. The paper’s no-arbitrage assumption controls expected contract and spot price changes, but does not control a jump in the next period’s contract penalty; Lemma 2(1) fails without an additional bound.

Formalization scope

Lean uses real-valued stocks and decisions, a positive finite horizon, and a time-indexed Markov kernel on an exogenous information state ω\omegaω. Taking ω\omegaω to include the observed history represents the paper’s general adapted price and supply process; the formalization imposes no independence between supply and prices. Prices and supplies are measurable, nonnegative, and uniformly bounded. These are disclosed well-posedness additions that keep the expectations integrable and the real supremum finite. It also assumes 0<β≤10<\beta\le10<β≤1, q>0q>0q>0, 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1, and pt1≤pt2p^1_t\le p^2_tpt1​≤pt2​.

Assumption 1 from page 14 is retained. The added condition A* bounds the discounted expected next-period maximum of the regular-weight fulfillment and spot margins by the present maximum plus holding cost. Without it, a two-period instance with next-week penalty 100100100 makes the printed Lemma 2(1) policy worth −80-80−80 while holding is worth 888. The corrected Case 1(b) holding quantity is the unsold underweight stock capped by its spot break-even level. Case 2 uses a regular-weight holding threshold net of already held underweight hogs. The printed Case 2(c) can yield 878787 when a feasible action yields 103103103, so it is excluded. These departures are recorded item by item in the moderation notes.

The definition layer contains the reward, feasible actions, Bellman recursion, continuation value, and break-even levels. A complete proof also needs measurability and integrability of the recursively defined value, compact feasible sets, concavity under integration and partial maximization, and real infimum properties. Contributions to those reusable results, the four milestones, and the corrected goal are within scope. A formulation with free thresholds or a free value function would make the policy claim empty; both are computed from the model data here.

Selected references

  • P. Kouvelis, Y. Liu, Y. Qiu and D. Turcic, Managing Operations of a Hog Farm Facing Volatile Markets: Inventory and Selling Strategies, SSRN preprint 3912801, March 6, 2023; subsequently Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, DOI 10.1287/msom.2023.1216. Preprint.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Profit or Growth? Dynamic Order Allocation in a Hybrid Workforce: The Variance of the Cross-Network Effect Decides Whether Market Thickness Benefits or Costs the SystemResearch Paper

Motivation

Many firms that run their own delivery or service workforce have started to operate a hybrid workforce: salaried employees serve part of the demand, while a crowd of independent freelancers on a platform owned by the same firm serves the rest. A firm in this position faces a recurring allocation question. Every order sent to the platform pays freelancers and so attracts more of them, which increases the platform's market thickness (the size of its freelancer pool) and with it the platform's own future demand. The same order, served in house, earns the firm's margin today. He and Goh study this trade-off between profit now and platform growth later, with data from the Vietnamese delivery company AhaMove (He & Goh, SSRN 3537700; published in Management Science, 2021, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4177).

The question the mission formalizes is whether a thicker platform is worth having at all. The paper's answer, its Theorem 1, is that it depends on two numbers: the mean μ\muμ and, centrally, the variance σ2\sigma^2σ2 of the cross-network effect β\betaβ, the random number of platform orders generated per freelancer.

Setting

Time runs over periods t=1,…,Tt = 1, \dots, Tt=1,…,T. At the start of a period the platform has M>0M > 0M>0 freelancers and the firm faces D≥0D \ge 0D≥0 orders. The firm chooses a transfer quantity yyy with 0≤y≤D0 \le y \le D0≤y≤D and sends those orders to the platform. Customers pay p>0p > 0p>0 per order; an order served in house earns the firm rrr, with 0≤r<p0 \le r < p0≤r<p. The platform also receives its own demand βM\beta MβM, where β≥0\beta \ge 0β≥0 is random with Eβ2<∞\mathbb E\beta^2 < \inftyEβ2<∞. To serve the total load y+βMy + \beta My+βM it pays freelancers the payout ratio α=R(y+βM)/M\alpha = R(y + \beta M)/Mα=R(y+βM)/M, where R≥1R \ge 1R≥1 measures the inefficiency of freelancers relative to employees. The period profit is r(D−y)+p(1−α)(y+βM)r(D - y) + p(1 - \alpha)(y + \beta M)r(D−y)+p(1−α)(y+βM).

The state then moves to

M′=(ρ+δRβ)M+δRy,D′=ηD+θM+ϵ,M' = (\rho + \delta R\beta)M + \delta R y, \qquad D' = \eta D + \theta M + \epsilon,M′=(ρ+δRβ)M+δRy,D′=ηD+θM+ϵ,

with parameters ρ,δ,η≥0\rho, \delta, \eta \ge 0ρ,δ,η≥0 and shocks θ,ϵ\theta, \epsilonθ,ϵ that are square integrable and independent, with μθ=Eθ≥0\mu_\theta = \mathbb E\theta \ge 0μθ​=Eθ≥0. Future profits are discounted by γ∈[0,1]\gamma \in [0, 1]γ∈[0,1]. The value functions are VT+1=0V_{T+1} = 0VT+1​=0 and

Vt(M,D)=max⁡0≤y≤D r(D−y)+E[p(y+βM)(1−R(y+βM)M)]+γ E[Vt+1(M′,D′)].V_t(M,D) = \max_{0 \le y \le D}\ r(D-y) + \mathbb E\Big[p(y+\beta M)\Big(1 - \frac{R(y+\beta M)}{M}\Big)\Big] + \gamma\, \mathbb E\big[V_{t+1}(M', D')\big].Vt​(M,D)=0≤y≤Dmax​ r(D−y)+E[p(y+βM)(1−MR(y+βM)​)]+γE[Vt+1​(M′,D′)].

Write μ=Eβ\mu = \mathbb E\betaμ=Eβ, σ2=Var⁡β\sigma^2 = \operatorname{Var}\betaσ2=Varβ, μ0=(p−r)/(2pR)\mu_0 = (p - r)/(2pR)μ0​=(p−r)/(2pR) and Δ=γrμθp∑j≥0γjηj\Delta = \frac{\gamma r \mu_\theta}{p}\sum_{j \ge 0}\gamma^j\eta^jΔ=pγrμθ​​∑j≥0​γjηj (which is +∞+\infty+∞ when γη≥1\gamma\eta \ge 1γη≥1). Inside {μ>0,σ2>0}\{\mu > 0, \sigma^2 > 0\}{μ>0,σ2>0} the paper defines three disjoint regions: R1\mathcal R_1R1​ (high variance), σ2>μ/R−μ2+(μ0−μ)+2+Δ/R\sigma^2 > \mu/R - \mu^2 + (\mu_0 - \mu)_+^2 + \Delta/Rσ2>μ/R−μ2+(μ0​−μ)+2​+Δ/R; R2\mathcal R_2R2​ (low variance), σ2<μ/R−μ2\sigma^2 < \mu/R - \mu^2σ2<μ/R−μ2; and R3\mathcal R_3R3​ (moderate variance), strictly between the two bounds. Market thickness benefits the system in period ttt if Vt(M,D)V_t(M, D)Vt​(M,D) is increasing in MMM for every fixed DDD, and is costly if it is decreasing; both in the weak sense.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 15)

(μ,σ)∈R1  ⟹  thickness is costly in every period t∈{1,…,T},(μ,σ)∈R2  ⟹  thickness benefits the system in every period,(μ,σ)∈R3  ⟹  ∃ 1≤τ1≤τ2≤T: benefit for t<τ1, costly as M→∞ for t≥τ2,\begin{aligned} (\mu,\sigma)\in\mathcal R_1 &\implies \text{thickness is costly in every period } t\in\{1,\dots,T\},\\ (\mu,\sigma)\in\mathcal R_2 &\implies \text{thickness benefits the system in every period},\\ (\mu,\sigma)\in\mathcal R_3 &\implies \exists\, 1\le\tau_1\le\tau_2\le T:\ \text{benefit for } t<\tau_1,\ \text{costly as } M\to\infty \text{ for } t\ge\tau_2, \end{aligned}(μ,σ)∈R1​(μ,σ)∈R2​(μ,σ)∈R3​​⟹thickness is costly in every period t∈{1,…,T},⟹thickness benefits the system in every period,⟹∃1≤τ1​≤τ2​≤T: benefit for t<τ1​, costly as M→∞ for t≥τ2​,​

and τ1=τ2\tau_1 = \tau_2τ1​=τ2​ when μ>μ0\mu > \mu_0μ>μ0​. "Costly as M→∞M \to \inftyM→∞" means that for every D>0D > 0D>0, Vt(⋅,D)V_t(\cdot, D)Vt​(⋅,D) is decreasing on some tail [M0,∞)[M_0, \infty)[M0​,∞).

Milestones

The appendix proves the theorem through a structural result and three lemmas, which are the milestones, in attack order:

  • Proposition 1: VtV_tVt​ is jointly concave in (M,D)(M, D)(M,D).
  • Lemma 1(c): the optimal transfer is ytU∧Dy^U_t \wedge DytU​∧D for the threshold ytUy^U_tytU​ of (14).
  • Lemma 1(d): bounds on ∂1Vt+1\partial_1 V_{t+1}∂1​Vt+1​ give the linear bounds (15) on ytUy^U_tytU​.
  • Lemma 1(b): the right partial derivatives of VtV_tVt​ are uniformly bounded.
  • Lemma 1(a): the envelope formulas (13).
  • Lemma 2: the limits K(t)=lim⁡M→∞∂1VtK(t) = \lim_{M\to\infty}\partial_1V_tK(t)=limM→∞​∂1​Vt​ and L(t)=lim⁡M→0∂2VtL(t) = \lim_{M\to 0}\partial_2V_tL(t)=limM→0​∂2​Vt​, and the bounds ∂1Vt≥K(t)\partial_1V_t \ge K(t)∂1​Vt​≥K(t), ∂2Vt≥L(t)\partial_2V_t \ge L(t)∂2​Vt​≥L(t).
  • Lemma 3(a)–(b): the explicit lower bound K(t)≥G(t)K(t) \ge G(t)K(t)≥G(t) of (17), and the single-switch property of GGG.
  • Lemma 3(c), with the hypothesis μ0≤μ\mu_0 \le \muμ0​≤μ: once (μ0−μ)+γδ2pG(t+1)<0(\mu_0 - \mu) + \frac{\gamma\delta}{2p}G(t+1) < 0(μ0​−μ)+2pγδ​G(t+1)<0, the optimal transfer is 000 and ∂1Vs=G(s)\partial_1V_s = G(s)∂1​Vs​=G(s), ∂2Vs=L(s)\partial_2V_s = L(s)∂2​Vs​=L(s) from then on.

Significance

The theorem replaces the intuition that a larger freelancer pool is always an asset with a criterion that a firm can estimate. When β\betaβ is very volatile, matching supply to a random platform demand is expensive, because the wage bill is quadratic in the load, and a thicker market only amplifies that cost; when β\betaβ is stable, thickness pays in every period. In the moderate regime the value of thickness changes sign once over the horizon, which is what drives the paper's later results on the structure of the optimal transfer policy (Proposition 3) and on the gap between the dynamic and the myopic policy (Theorem 2).

The result is proved in the paper. It has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it adds a checked model of a finite-horizon stochastic dynamic program with a continuous two-dimensional state, concavity of value functions under partial maximization, envelope formulas with right derivatives, and an explicit backward recursion for the bound GGG. The formalization also records two printed slips that it corrects (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The obvious argument is a backward induction on the sign of ∂1Vt\partial_1 V_t∂1​Vt​, read off the envelope formula (13). That step does not close by itself: the formula contains the optimal transfer yt∗y^*_tyt∗​, its multiplier and expectations of the next period's partial derivatives at random states, so the induction needs a priori bounds on the derivatives, monotone limits as M→∞M \to \inftyM→∞ and M→0M \to 0M→0, and exchanges of limits with expectations. The value functions are only concave, so all derivatives are one-sided, and the optimal decision can sit on the constraint y=Dy = Dy=D. Part (c) needs, in addition, an explicit lower bound GGG on the asymptotic slope and a proof that GGG switches sign at most once.

Formalization scope

All statements share one definition, HybridOrderAlloc.Thickness.Model. The data are a structure Sys Ω (a measure PPP on Ω\OmegaΩ, shocks β,θ,ϵ:Ω→R\beta, \theta, \epsilon : \Omega \to \mathbb Rβ,θ,ϵ:Ω→R, real parameters p,r,R,ρ,δ,η,γp, r, R, \rho, \delta, \eta, \gammap,r,R,ρ,δ,η,γ and T∈NT \in \mathbb NT∈N) and a predicate Sys.Standing with the page's assumptions. Conventions committed to:

  • One shock vector serves every period, since the shocks are i.i.d. across periods and (5) only uses their one-period law. The joint law of β\betaβ and (θ,ϵ)(\theta, \epsilon)(θ,ϵ) is left free, as on the page.
  • VtV_tVt​ is the recursion (5) itself, defined by the number of periods to go, with the page's maximum written as a supremum over [0,D][0, D][0,D]. It is defined for M>0M > 0M>0, D≥0D \ge 0D≥0; all conclusions are stated on M>0M > 0M>0, D>0D > 0D>0 as in the paper.
  • ∂1Vt\partial_1 V_t∂1​Vt​, ∂2Vt\partial_2 V_t∂2​Vt​ are right partial derivatives, as in the paper's Notation paragraph. Expectations are Bochner integrals and σ2\sigma^2σ2 is Mathlib's variance.
  • "Increasing" and "decreasing" are weak (MonotoneOn, AntitoneOn). GGG is indexed by integers.

Hypotheses added to the page, each disclosed in the statements: r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 (Theorem 1 is false for r<0r < 0r<0, because Δ<0\Delta < 0Δ<0 then puts points where thickness pays into R1\mathcal R_1R1​); ρ+δRβ>0\rho + \delta R\beta > 0ρ+δRβ>0, θ≥0\theta \ge 0θ≥0, ϵ≥0\epsilon \ge 0ϵ≥0 almost surely (so the next state stays in the domain of Vt+1V_{t+1}Vt+1​ for every feasible yyy, which the page takes for granted); T≥1T \ge 1T≥1; and μ0≤μ\mu_0 \le \muμ0​≤μ in Lemma 3(c) alone (the printed lemma fails for μ<μ0\mu < \mu_0μ<μ0​).

VtV_tVt​ is never a free parameter constrained by a Bellman hypothesis, and never a closed formula. Square integrability of β,θ,ϵ\beta, \theta, \epsilonβ,θ,ϵ is assumed, so no integral takes a junk value. The regions carry the guard γη<1\gamma\eta < 1γη<1 wherever Δ\DeltaΔ appears, so a divergent series cannot be read as 000.

A complete development needs: concavity of a partial maximum over a convex graph, one-sided envelope theorems, dominated convergence for the derivative limits, and finite geometric sums. The concavity and envelope steps are reusable for other dynamic programs with continuous states. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are sharper variants that remove the added well-posedness hypotheses.

Selected references

  • E. J. He and J. Goh, Profit or Growth? Dynamic Order Allocation in a Hybrid Workforce, Management Science, 2021; preprint SSRN 3537700 (2020). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3537700, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4177
  • P. Milgrom and I. Segal, Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets, Econometrica 70(2), 583–601, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00296
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Control TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

McKean–Vlasov Optimal Control: Limit Theory and Equivalence Between Different Formulations: The N-Player Common-Noise Control Value Converges to the McKean–Vlasov ValueResearch Paper

Why this limit matters

A controller of a large population may choose a separate action for each participant while all participants experience the same random environment. The resulting optimization problem has a growing state space: with NNN participants, the state records NNN paths and NNN controls. A McKean–Vlasov control problem replaces the empirical distribution of those participants by a conditional distribution given the common noise. Djete, Possamaï and Tan prove that this replacement preserves the optimal value asymptotically, even when the participants have different initial laws and the average of those laws does not converge along the full sequence. Their result is Theorem 3.6(iii) of the 2020 preprint, published in 2022.

The distinction between common and individual noise matters for this claim. Conditional on the common noise, particles can still be correlated through a controller that observes the full particle system. The paper's limit theorem concerns the supremum over all admissible predictable particle controls, rather than one prescribed feedback rule. This is the setting in which a finite population optimization problem can approximate its limiting stochastic control problem. The adjacent Proposition 3.7 describes how the limiting value changes with the initial law.

Setting

Fix a time horizon T>0T>0T>0, state dimension n≥1n\ge1n≥1, individual noise dimension d≥1d\ge1d≥1, and common noise dimension ℓ≥0\ell\ge0ℓ≥0. Let AAA be a nonempty Polish control space with base point a0a_0a0​. A state or noise path belongs to Ck=C([0,T],Rk)C^k=C([0,T],\mathbb R^k)Ck=C([0,T],Rk), with its uniform norm. The coefficients b,σ,σ0b,\sigma,\sigma_0b,σ,σ0​ determine the drift, individual diffusion and common diffusion; LLL and ggg determine running and terminal rewards. The Wasserstein distance Wp\mathcal W_pWp​ measures the discrepancy between probability laws with finite pppth moments.

For an initial law ν\nuν, the strong problem lives on the canonical space Ω=Rn×Cd×Cℓ\Omega=\mathbb R^n\times C^d\times C^\ellΩ=Rn×Cd×Cℓ. Its initial state has law ν\nuν, and W,BW,BW,B are independent Brownian noises relative to the canonical past. An admissible control α\alphaα is predictable and has finite expected integrated pppth power of its distance from a0a_0a0​. The state XαX^\alphaXα solves the controlled equation (2.3). Its coefficients use the conditional law μˉtα\bar\mu_t^\alphaμˉ​tα​ of the stopped state path and current control given the history of BBB; its terminal reward uses the conditional law μTα\mu_T^\alphaμTα​ of the stopped state path. The strong value VS(ν)V_S(\nu)VS​(ν), equation (2.4), is the supremum of expected reward over those controls and their solutions. These definitions appear in Section 2.1.

For N≥1N\ge1N≥1, the particle problem has initial laws ν1,…,νN\nu^1,\ldots,\nu^Nν1,…,νN, separate Brownian noises WiW^iWi, and one shared BBB. Each particle follows equation (2.16) with the empirical state-control law φtN=N−1∑iδ(Xt∧⋅i,αti)\varphi_t^N=N^{-1}\sum_i\delta_{(X^i_{t\wedge\cdot},\alpha_t^i)}φtN​=N−1∑i​δ(Xt∧⋅i​,αti​)​ inside its coefficients. The terminal reward uses the empirical state-path law φtN,X\varphi_t^{N,X}φtN,X​. Equation (2.17) defines VSN(ν1,…,νN)V_S^N(\nu^1,\ldots,\nu^N)VSN​(ν1,…,νN) as the supremum of the average expected reward. The empirical laws are built from the very particles whose equations use them; they are not outside inputs. See Section 2.4.

Formalization targets

The goal is the value comparison in Theorem 3.6(iii), equation (3.3):

lim⁡N→∞∣VSN(ν1,…,νN)−VS ⁣(1N∑i=1Nνi)∣=0.\lim_{N\to\infty}\left|V_S^N(\nu^1,\ldots,\nu^N)-V_S\!\left(\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\nu^i\right)\right|=0.N→∞lim​​VSN​(ν1,…,νN)−VS​(N1​i=1∑N​νi)​=0.

The hypotheses include Assumptions 2.1 and 2.12, an embedding A⊂RjA\subset\mathbb R^jA⊂Rj for some j≥1j\ge1j≥1, continuity of LLL and ggg, and a uniform bound on the averages of the initial p′p'p′th moments, where p′>p≥2p'>p\ge2p′>p≥2. The goal does not assume that the averaged initial laws converge. The milestones are the value lower bounds of Propositions 4.15 and 4.16, the subsequence value limit used in equation (4.44), and the initial-law stability statement (3.4) of Proposition 3.7. Each milestone records the particular clause formalized when its printed result contains additional conclusions. Theorem 3.6 and its proof give the source order.

What the result provides

The theorem compares two optimization problems, rather than only the law of a fixed controlled particle system. The comparison permits heterogeneous initial distributions and keeps the common noise in both models. Proposition 3.7 gives a separate stability statement for the limiting value when initial laws converge in Wp\mathcal W_pWp​ with uniformly bounded p′p'p′th moments. Together these statements identify which finite population values are represented by the limiting control formulation. They are proved in the paper; the open task here is a machine checked derivation from faithful statements.

The formal development fixes the interfaces for conditional laws, predictable controls, path dependent coefficients, Brownian Itô integrals, empirical probability laws and extended real rewards. Those interfaces can support later formalizations of common-noise control and propagation of chaos. The present mission does not state Theorem 3.1(i), the approximation clauses of Theorem 3.1(ii)–(iii), Theorem 3.6(ii), or the “In particular” sentence after Proposition 3.7's equation (3.4). Their different conclusions require further canonical and relaxed-control structures, and the last sentence has a topology ambiguity documented in the paper notes.

Main difficulty

The usual fixed-control convergence question is smaller than the target: particle controls may depend on every observed particle and on the common noise, and the target takes a supremum before comparing values. The conditional law in the limiting equation depends on its own solution, while the empirical law in each particle equation depends on the full coupled particle system. Dropping either dependence changes the optimization problem. Uniform p′p'p′th moment control must also coexist with unbounded rewards and the extended real convention for their expectations. The source proof invokes compactness and equivalence between strong, weak and relaxed formulations; formalizing those links is substantial work beyond compiling the goal statement.

Formalization scope

Lean uses EuclideanSpace and continuous maps on [0,T][0,T][0,T] for the path spaces, and Frobenius norms for diffusion matrices. The control type carries a Polish Borel metric and a base point. Pp\mathcal P_pPp​ is a finite-lintegral moment condition, and Wp\mathcal W_pWp​ takes values in R≥0∪{∞}\mathbb R_{\ge0}\cup\{\infty\}R≥0​∪{∞}. Values are extended real suprema over admissible controls and actual solutions. Rewards use the paper's convention ∞−∞=−∞\infty-\infty=-\infty∞−∞=−∞, rather than a default zero integral. Particle counts are positive; Lean player index zero denotes the paper's player one. The case ℓ=0\ell=0ℓ=0 remains included.

Assumption 2.1 includes the displayed Lipschitz, growth and coercive bounds, Borel measurability, nonanticipativity, and lower semicontinuity. Assumption 2.12 factors the coefficients through the state marginal, with σ0\sigma_0σ0​ independent of the control. The paper leaves the topology behind “continuous” unnamed; the formalization uses sequential Wp\mathcal W_pWp​ continuity on finite-moment laws. Its A⊂RjA\subset\mathbb R^jA⊂Rj is read as an isometric embedding. Solutions have continuous paths and are adapted to the completed canonical filtration, while conditional laws use the raw common-noise filtration. The goal states finiteness of both values so its real absolute difference is defined. Equation (4.44) is posed in the subsequence form used by its proof. These choices and the source's printed slips are detailed in the moderation notes.

The interface rules out a free conditional-law flow, a free particle empirical measure, and an uncharacterized Brownian law. The weak and relaxed formulations appear only as context for the paper's proof; this proposal contains the strong and particle layers needed by the four selected milestones. Contributions to the omitted equivalence and compactness results are welcome once their canonical-space definitions have been audited.

Selected references

  • Mao Fabrice Djete, Dylan Possamaï and Xiaolu Tan, McKean–Vlasov optimal control: limit theory and equivalence between different formulations, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022; arXiv:2001.00925v2. The formal statements use this preprint's pagination and equation numbers.
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Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynamic Model for Managing Volunteer Engagement I: The Bellman Equation of the Drift-Rate Control Problem Has a SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

Non-profit organizations depend on volunteers whose availability they cannot schedule. They can only influence it, through recruiting drives, reminders and recognition events. Ata, Tongarlak, Lee and Field (arXiv:2312.02920) model a food-recovery non-profit's volunteer pool as a queueing network. Repeat volunteers rest between shifts, one-time volunteers arrive at random, and all signed-up volunteers wait on one sign-up list, from which they may abandon. The organization pays for engagement activities that speed up volunteers' return, and it is penalized when tasks go uncovered because the list is empty.

In heavy traffic the problem reduces to a one-dimensional drift-rate control problem. A workload process W≥0W \ge 0W≥0 behaves like a reflected Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process whose drift θ(t)\theta(t)θ(t) the controller chooses from an interval A=[θ0,θL]A = [\theta_0, \theta_L]A=[θ0​,θL​] at cost c(θ(t))c(\theta(t))c(θ(t)), plus a penalty ppp per unit of idleness at W=0W = 0W=0. The analytic core of the paper is the Bellman equation of this problem: a first-order ordinary differential equation on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with an unknown constant. Its solution yields the optimal long-run average cost and a nested threshold policy for when to run each engagement activity.

Setting

There are L≥1L \ge 1L≥1 engagement activities. The data are a lowest drift θ0<0\theta_0 < 0θ0​<0, drift increments η1,…,ηL>0\eta_1, \dots, \eta_L > 0η1​,…,ηL​>0, per-unit-drift costs 0<c1<c2<⋯<cL<p0 < c_1 < c_2 < \dots < c_L < p0<c1​<c2​<⋯<cL​<p, an idleness cost rate p>0p > 0p>0, a mean-reversion rate κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0 and a volatility σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0. The breakpoints are

θl=θ0+∑i=1lηi,l=0,1,…,L,\theta_l = \theta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{l} \eta_i, \qquad l = 0, 1, \dots, L,θl​=θ0​+i=1∑l​ηi​,l=0,1,…,L,

and A=[θ0,θL]A = [\theta_0, \theta_L]A=[θ0​,θL​]. The engagement cost c:A→R+c : A \to \mathbb{R}_+c:A→R+​ is piecewise linear and convex: c(θ0)=0c(\theta_0) = 0c(θ0​)=0, with slope clc_lcl​ on (θl−1,θl](\theta_{l-1}, \theta_l](θl−1​,θl​], so that c(x)=∑i=1l−1ciηi+cl(x−θl−1)c(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{l-1} c_i \eta_i + c_l (x - \theta_{l-1})c(x)=∑i=1l−1​ci​ηi​+cl​(x−θl−1​) for θl−1<x≤θl\theta_{l-1} < x \le \theta_lθl−1​<x≤θl​. Its convex conjugate is

ϕ(y)=sup⁡x∈A{yx−c(x)},y∈R.\phi(y) = \sup_{x \in A} \{ y x - c(x) \}, \qquad y \in \mathbb{R}.ϕ(y)=x∈Asup​{yx−c(x)},y∈R.

The Bellman equation (68)–(69) asks for a constant β>0\beta > 0β>0 and a continuously differentiable function vvv on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) such that

β=12σ2v′(x)+xκ (p−v(x))−ϕ(p−v(x)),x≥0,\beta = \tfrac12 \sigma^2 v'(x) + x\kappa\,(p - v(x)) - \phi(p - v(x)), \qquad x \ge 0,β=21​σ2v′(x)+xκ(p−v(x))−ϕ(p−v(x)),x≥0,

with v(0)=0v(0) = 0v(0)=0, vvv strictly increasing, and lim⁡x→∞v(x)=p\lim_{x\to\infty} v(x) = plimx→∞​v(x)=p.

The milestones use the shooting objects of the paper's Online Supplement §F:

  • the lower bound β‾=−inf⁡{ϕ(y):y≤p}\underline\beta = -\inf\{\phi(y) : y \le p\}β​=−inf{ϕ(y):y≤p};
  • the initial value problem IVP(β\betaβ): the same equation with only the condition v(0)=0v(0) = 0v(0)=0; its solution is vβv_\betavβ​;
  • the set I\mathcal II of β>β‾\beta > \underline\betaβ>β​ for which vβv_\betavβ​ is increasing;
  • the set D\mathcal DD of β>β‾\beta > \underline\betaβ>β​ for which vβv_\betavβ​ is nondecreasing on (0,xβ)(0, x_\beta)(0,xβ​) and nonincreasing on (xβ,∞)(x_\beta, \infty)(xβ​,∞) for some xβx_\betaxβ​;
  • the constant β∗=inf⁡I\beta^* = \inf \mathcal Iβ∗=infI.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 21)

∃ β>0, ∃ v∈C1[0,∞):β=12σ2v′+xκ(p−v)−ϕ(p−v)  (x≥0),v(0)=0,v↑,v(x)→p.\exists\, \beta > 0,\ \exists\, v \in C^1[0,\infty):\quad \beta = \tfrac12\sigma^2 v' + x\kappa(p - v) - \phi(p - v)\ \ (x \ge 0),\quad v(0) = 0,\quad v \uparrow,\quad v(x) \to p.∃β>0, ∃v∈C1[0,∞):β=21​σ2v′+xκ(p−v)−ϕ(p−v)  (x≥0),v(0)=0,v↑,v(x)→p.

The goal asserts existence only. It does not identify β\betaβ with inf⁡I\inf\mathcal IinfI, and it does not claim uniqueness.

Milestones (Online Supplement §F, in attack order)

  1. β‾>0\underline\beta > 0β​>0 (OS p. 13).
  2. Lemma 3: ϕ\phiϕ is Lipschitz with constant max⁡0≤k≤L∣θk∣\max_{0\le k\le L} |\theta_k|max0≤k≤L​∣θk​∣.
  3. Lemma 4: IVP(β\betaβ) has a unique C1C^1C1 solution on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) for β>β‾\beta > \underline\betaβ>β​.
  4. Lemma 6: vβ(x)v_\beta(x)vβ​(x) is strictly increasing in β\betaβ for x>0x > 0x>0 and continuous in β\betaβ.
  5. Corollary 2: vβv_\betavβ​ has no flat pieces.
  6. Lemmas 10, 12, 15, 16: descriptions of D\mathcal DD. Membership in D\mathcal DD is equivalent to vβ′<0v_\beta' < 0vβ′​<0 somewhere, to vβ<0v_\beta < 0vβ​<0 somewhere, and to vβ→−∞v_\beta \to -\inftyvβ​→−∞. D\mathcal DD is closed downward.
  7. Lemmas 13, 14: I,D≠∅\mathcal I, \mathcal D \ne \emptysetI,D=∅, and a characterization of the solutions in I\mathcal II that overshoot ppp.
  8. Lemmas 17, 18, 20: β∗>β‾\beta^* > \underline\betaβ∗>β​, β∗∈I\beta^* \in \mathcal Iβ∗∈I with vβ∗v_{\beta^*}vβ∗​ bounded, and vβ∗(x)→pv_{\beta^*}(x) \to pvβ∗​(x)→p.
  9. Corollary 4: (β∗,vβ∗)(\beta^*, v_{\beta^*})(β∗,vβ∗​) solves (68)–(69).

Significance

The Bellman equation is what makes the paper's policy computable. Theorem 1 provides the constant β∗\beta^*β∗, which the paper's Theorem 2 identifies as the optimal long-run average cost of the workload problem. It also provides the increasing function vvv, whose level sets τl=v−1(p−cl)\tau_l = v^{-1}(p - c_l)τl​=v−1(p−cl​) are the thresholds of the optimal nested policy: engagement activity lll is used when the workload is below τl\tau_lτl​. The companion mission (II) gives vvv in closed form between consecutive thresholds. Both results presuppose the existence proved here.

The paper proves Theorem 1 in its Online Supplement, partly by citation: Lemma 4 is called standard and its proof is omitted. As far as is known, none of these statements has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would also settle two points that the printed argument leaves loose. The lower bound β‾\underline\betaβ​ is written as an infimum over all of R\mathbb{R}R, which is −∞-\infty−∞ when θL<0\theta_L < 0θL​<0. And one step in the proof of Lemma 9 claims that a set of positive measure contains an interval, which is false; the formal chain avoids this step by posing Corollary 2 directly.

Difficulty

The equation is first order but nonlinear through ϕ\phiϕ, and it is posed on an unbounded interval with a boundary condition at infinity. A local existence theorem does not suffice: the right-hand side has linear growth with a coefficient that grows with xxx, so global existence on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and monotone, continuous dependence on β\betaβ must be established separately.

The main difficulty is the shooting step. For a fixed β\betaβ the initial value problem has a solution, but it generally fails the condition v(x)→pv(x) \to pv(x)→p: either it eventually turns down and tends to −∞-\infty−∞, or it crosses ppp and grows without bound. The proof must show the following:

  • the parameter range splits cleanly into these two behaviours, with no third behaviour such as a plateau or a limit strictly between 000 and ppp;
  • both behaviours occur;
  • at the infimum β∗\beta^*β∗ of the increasing regime, the solution is increasing and bounded and converges exactly to ppp.

Continuity in β\betaβ alone does not give the last point: it needs a separate argument at infinity.

Formalization scope

Everything is stated for one fixed parameter set satisfying an explicit predicate Standing: L≥1L \ge 1L≥1, θ0<0\theta_0 < 0θ0​<0, ηl>0\eta_l > 0ηl​>0, 0<c1<⋯<cL<p0 < c_1 < \dots < c_L < p0<c1​<⋯<cL​<p, p,κ,σ>0p, \kappa, \sigma > 0p,κ,σ>0. These are disclosed additions. The paper never restates them for the abstract control problem, but they follow from its queueing primitives ((24), (43), (50), p. 18). No hypothesis θL≥0\theta_L \ge 0θL​≥0 is made.

Conventions:

  • η\etaη and ccc are sequences indexed by N\mathbb{N}N and used at 1,…,L1, \dots, L1,…,L.
  • The cost is (52) written as one sum. It agrees with (52) on AAA, and its values off AAA are never used.
  • ϕ\phiϕ is the real supremum over the compact interval AAA (attained). It is never defined by its closed form.
  • β‾\underline\betaβ​ is −inf⁡{ϕ(y):y≤p}-\inf\{\phi(y) : y \le p\}−inf{ϕ(y):y≤p}. This is the reading the paper's proofs use, and it agrees with the printed −inf⁡y∈Rϕ(y)-\inf_{y \in \mathbb{R}} \phi(y)−infy∈R​ϕ(y) whenever θL≥0\theta_L \ge 0θL​≥0.
  • "Continuously differentiable on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞)" is a pair (v,v′)(v, v')(v,v′): v′v'v′ is continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and is the derivative of vvv within [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) at every point (one-sided at 000).
  • "Increasing" means strictly increasing.
  • β∗=inf⁡I\beta^* = \inf \mathcal Iβ∗=infI is a real infimum. Lemmas 13, 17 and 18 make it meaningful; no property of I\mathcal II is assumed.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. The solution vβv_\betavβ​ is never chosen: every lemma quantifies over all solutions of IVP(β\betaβ). The goal quantifies β\betaβ and vvv existentially and requires all of (69), including the limit ppp and strict monotonicity.

The source is the arXiv preprint v2, including its Online Supplement. The queueing network (§2) and the Brownian control problem (§3) motivate the equation but are not part of any formal statement.

A complete development needs:

  • global existence, uniqueness and comparison for scalar Lipschitz ODEs on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (Mathlib's IsPicardLindelof and Gronwall bounds are the starting point);
  • the elementary theory of the conjugate of a piecewise linear convex function.

Both are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome in any order. Lemmas 3, 4 and 6 are independent of the shooting lemmas.

Selected references

  • B. Ata, M. H. Tongarlak, D. Lee, J. Field, A Dynamic Model for Managing Volunteer Engagement, arXiv:2312.02920v2, 2023 (Operations Research, 2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.02920
  • B. Ata, J. M. Harrison, L. A. Shepp, Drift rate control of a Brownian processing system, Annals of Applied Probability 15(2), 1145–1160, 2005 (cited in the paper for the conjugate's minimal maximizer).
  • H. B. Keller, Numerical Methods for Two-Point Boundary-Value Problems, Dover, 2018 (cited for Lemma 4).
17 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand 6: For Identical Loss-Neutral Substitutes the Optimal Policy Is Cyclic If the Single-Price Policy Is, and Under (26) Even If NotResearch Paper

Motivation

Retail prices are rarely constant over long horizons: promotions, high–low cycles and staggered discounts across similar items are the norm. One explanation in the pricing literature is the reference effect: consumers compare a posted price with a reference price formed from past prices, and react to gains and losses relative to it. Single-product models with reference effects (Popescu and Wu 2007; Hu, Chen and Hu 2016) predict that, for consumers who react symmetrically to gains and losses, the optimal price usually settles to a constant. Guo, Jiang and Shen (SSRN 4189049, published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025) study the same question for several substitutable products sold under multinomial-logit (MNL) demand. Their §4.3 shows that pricing substitutes jointly, rather than at one common price, makes cyclic optimal pricing more likely. This mission formalizes that comparison, Theorem 7, together with the results the paper ties it to.

Setting

A seller offers n≥2n\ge2n≥2 products N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} over periods t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\dotst=0,1,2,…. In period ttt product iii has price pitp_i^tpit​ and reference price ritr_i^trit​, both in P=[0,pH]\mathcal P=[0,p_H]P=[0,pH​] with pH>0p_H>0pH​>0. Reference prices follow exponential smoothing rt+1=αrt+(1−α)ptr^{t+1}=\alpha r^t+(1-\alpha)p^trt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt with memory α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1].

The deterministic utility of product iii is

ui(p,r)=ai−bipi+ci+(ri−pi)+−ci−(pi−ri)+,u_i(p,r)=a_i-b_ip_i+c_i^+(r_i-p_i)_+-c_i^-(p_i-r_i)_+ ,ui​(p,r)=ai​−bi​pi​+ci+​(ri​−pi​)+​−ci−​(pi​−ri​)+​,

with bi>0b_i>0bi​>0 and ci±≥0c_i^\pm\ge0ci±​≥0. The market share is qi(p,r)=eui/(1+∑keuk)q_i(p,r)=e^{u_i}/(1+\sum_k e^{u_k})qi​(p,r)=eui​/(1+∑k​euk​) and the period revenue is Π(p,r)=∑ipi qi(p,r)\Pi(p,r)=\sum_i p_i\,q_i(p,r)Π(p,r)=∑i​pi​qi​(p,r). Product iii is loss-neutral when ci+=ci−=:cic_i^+=c_i^-=:c_ici+​=ci−​=:ci​. The seller maximises ∑tβtΠ(pt,rt)\sum_t\beta^t\Pi(p^t,r^t)∑t​βtΠ(pt,rt) with discount β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1); V⋆(r0)V^\star(r^0)V⋆(r0) is the optimal value. The myopic policy pm(r)p^m(r)pm(r) maximises Π(⋅,r)\Pi(\cdot,r)Π(⋅,r) over Pn\mathcal P^nPn. Throughout, the paper assumes pH≥p^Hp_H\ge\hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​, where p^H\hat p_Hp^​H​ solves its equation (9); this makes the ceiling inactive for the myopic problem.

A policy has a steady state xxx if it maps reference xxx to price xxx. An optimal steady state (Definition 4) is a steady state of an optimal policy, and a policy is cyclic when it has no steady state.

§4.3 takes nnn perfect substitutes: ai=aa_i=aai​=a, bi=bb_i=bbi​=b, ci=cc_i=cci​=c for all iii, loss-neutral. The single-product-based policy psp^sps solves the problem (25) restricted to one common price yt1y^t\mathbf 1yt1 for all products, from a uniform reference rt1r^t\mathbf 1rt1. The common myopic steady state pm⋆=Πm⋆+1/(b+c)p^{m\star}=\Pi^{m\star}+1/(b+c)pm⋆=Πm⋆+1/(b+c) comes from Corollary 2, where Πm⋆\Pi^{m\star}Πm⋆ solves Π=nb+cea−bΠ−b/(b+c)\Pi=\frac{n}{b+c}e^{a-b\Pi-b/(b+c)}Π=b+cn​ea−bΠ−b/(b+c). The constants are

ζ1=ea+log⁡n+c pm⋆,ζ2=2αb+c(α+1)(αb+c)(b+c),κ=1−β1−αβ.\zeta_1=e^{a+\log n+c\,p^{m\star}},\quad \zeta_2=\frac{2\alpha b+c(\alpha+1)}{(\alpha b+c)(b+c)},\quad \kappa=\frac{1-\beta}{1-\alpha\beta}.ζ1​=ea+logn+cpm⋆,ζ2​=(αb+c)(b+c)2αb+c(α+1)​,κ=1−αβ1−β​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 25)

For identical loss-neutral products with n≥2n\ge2n≥2:

  1. if psp^sps has no steady state, the optimal policy has no steady state;
  2. if
pH[1−ζ1e−(b+c)pH]−ζ1ζ2e−(b+c)pH≤ζ2(26a)p_H\big[1-\zeta_1e^{-(b+c)p_H}\big]-\zeta_1\zeta_2e^{-(b+c)p_H}\le\zeta_2 \quad(26a)pH​[1−ζ1​e−(b+c)pH​]−ζ1​ζ2​e−(b+c)pH​≤ζ2​(26a)

and

[(1−κ)2+β(1−ακ)2]c2−(1+βα2)(b+cκ)2≥(b+c)2+β(αb+c)2n−1(26b)\big[(1-\kappa)^2+\beta(1-\alpha\kappa)^2\big]c^2-(1+\beta\alpha^2)(b+c\kappa)^2\ge\frac{(b+c)^2+\beta(\alpha b+c)^2}{n-1}\quad(26b)[(1−κ)2+β(1−ακ)2]c2−(1+βα2)(b+cκ)2≥n−1(b+c)2+β(αb+c)2​(26b)

hold, then psp^sps has a steady state and the optimal policy has none.

Milestones

  • Corollary 2 (p. 16): for loss-neutral products, the myopic policy has the unique steady state pim⋆=Πm⋆+1/(bi+ci)p_i^{m\star}=\Pi^{m\star}+1/(b_i+c_i)pim⋆​=Πm⋆+1/(bi​+ci​), with Πm⋆\Pi^{m\star}Πm⋆ the unique root of (18). This is where pm⋆p^{m\star}pm⋆ and ζ1\zeta_1ζ1​ come from.
  • Corollary 4 (p. 23): a loss-neutral optimal steady state, if it exists, is unique and equals Π⋆⋆+1/(bi+ciκ)\Pi^{\star\star}+1/(b_i+c_i\kappa)Π⋆⋆+1/(bi​+ci​κ), with Π⋆⋆\Pi^{\star\star}Π⋆⋆ the unique root of (24).
  • Remark 3 (p. 26): if both psp^sps and the optimal policy have steady states, they coincide.
  • Remark 4 (p. 27): for loss-neutral products with possibly different parameters, the condition ∃i: κi,1−κi,2>(2κi,1−κi,2) qi(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)\exists i:\ \kappa_{i,1}-\kappa_{i,2}>(2\kappa_{i,1}-\kappa_{i,2})\,q_i(p^{\star\star},p^{\star\star})∃i: κi,1​−κi,2​>(2κi,1​−κi,2​)qi​(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆) (28) rules out an optimal steady state. For identical products, qi(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)<1/nq_i(p^{\star\star},p^{\star\star})<1/nqi​(p⋆⋆,p⋆⋆)<1/n, and (26b) yields (28).

Significance

Theorem 7 separates two models that coincide in their steady states (Remark 3) but differ in whether a steady state exists. Joint pricing can sustain asynchronous cycles, in which some substitutes are discounted while others are not, and these keep total purchase probability high. A single common price can only cycle synchronously. Part 1 says the multi-product optimum never settles when the single-price one does not. Part 2 gives explicit parameter regions, strong reference effects (large ccc), short memory (small α\alphaα) and patient sellers (large β\betaβ), where the single-price model predicts a constant price but the true optimum is cyclic. Practically, a retailer who prices similar items at one price can misjudge whether long-run promotions are optimal at all.

The paper's proofs are in its online supplement (Appendix C.6), which is not part of the source file used for this mission. To our knowledge none of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would check the inequality algebra behind (26)–(28) and pin down exactly what "the optimal policy is cyclic" means when optimal policies need not be unique.

Difficulty

The statements compare two infinite-horizon problems, each with a continuous state, through the existence of fixed points of their optimal policies. Neither problem has a closed-form value function. A steady state is optimal only if no deviation, however long, improves on the constant path, so ruling it out requires a profitable deviation, and establishing it for psp^sps requires a global optimality argument for (25). Stationarity conditions at a steady state only produce candidates (Corollaries 2 and 4); they do not decide whether a candidate is optimal, so the obvious argument stops exactly where the theorem starts. The revenue Π\PiΠ is not concave in prices, the reference dynamics couple all periods, and the comparison must hold uniformly over every optimal policy, not one computed policy.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (index i−1i-1i−1 for the paper's product iii), and parameters are functions Fin n → ℝ; the identical-products results use constant functions of scalars a,b,ca,b,ca,b,c. The market share (3) is defined directly, without the Gumbel derivation. V⋆V^\starV⋆ is the supremum of the discounted revenue over all price sequences in [0,pH]n[0,p_H]^n[0,pH​]n, and the single-price value is the supremum over uniform sequences yt1y^t\mathbf 1yt1 from a uniform reference. Steady states are in sequence form: xxx is an optimal steady state when the constant path xxx from reference xxx attains V⋆(x)V^\star(x)V⋆(x), and similarly for psp^sps. "Cyclic" is the universal statement that no point is a steady state. A myopic policy is any maximising selection, and every statement about it quantifies over all selections.

Standing hypotheses in every theorem: b>0b>0b>0, c±≥0c^\pm\ge0c±≥0, α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1), pH>0p_H>0pH​>0, and pH≥p^Hp_H\ge\hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​ stated as "some root of (9) is at most pHp_HpH​". Added hypotheses: n≥2n\ge2n≥2 (the setting of §4.3); αb+c>0\alpha b+c>0αb+c>0 in Theorem 7.2, so that ζ2\zeta_2ζ2​ is defined (it excludes only α=c=0\alpha=c=0α=c=0, where (26b) fails anyway); α<1\alpha<1α<1 for the limit claims of Corollary 2 (at α=1\alpha=1α=1 the reference never moves). Quantities the paper calls "the unique solution" are bound as variables solving their equation, never chosen. Remark 4 evaluates (28) at the candidate p⋆⋆p^{\star\star}p⋆⋆ of Corollary 4, because the conclusion is that no optimal steady state exists.

A trivial formalization is ruled out: "cyclic" may not be read as a statement about one chosen policy or one initial reference price, and the single-price problem may not be replaced by the n=1n=1n=1 problem, since it keeps all nnn products and the shared MNL denominator.

A complete development needs: summability and boundedness of discounted revenue, the Bellman characterisation of steady states, analysis of the myopic MNL problem (Theorems 1–2 of the paper), and the second-order analysis behind (28). The MNL revenue lemmas and the sequence-form steady-state calculus are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the parts of Theorem 7 separately, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. A. Guo, H. Jiang, Z.-J. M. Shen, Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand, SSRN 4189049 (version of 2024-05-25); Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189049, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0801
  • I. Popescu, Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0352
  • Z. Hu, X. Chen, P. Hu, Dynamic Pricing with Gain-Seeking Reference Price Effects, Operations Research 64(1), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1446
  • D. McFadden, Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior, in Frontiers in Econometrics, 1974.
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Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Resources for Shared Micromobility: Approximate Optimality in Large-Scale Systems: The Transient-Horizon Mean-Field Policy Has Optimality Gap at Most γCγᵀ/(1 − γ)Research Paper

Rebalancing shared vehicles at scale

Shared bike and scooter systems (micromobility) must decide, every period, how to move vehicles between stations, which depleted vehicles to recharge, and how many vehicles to source from or return to a central warehouse. Customer trips redistribute the fleet in the meantime, and some vehicles come back with a depleted battery. For a realistic network, the exact Markov decision process has a state space that grows exponentially in the number of stations, so its optimal policy cannot be computed.

Akturk, Candogan and Gupta (Management Science, 2022; preprint SSRN 4155841) group stations into finitely many types and replace the stochastic network by a deterministic mean-field model that tracks, for each type, the fraction of stations holding each number of charged vehicles and the scaled stock of depleted vehicles. They show that the mean-field model is asymptotically exact as the number of stations grows (their Theorem 3.4), and they propose a control algorithm for it whose optimality gap they bound explicitly (their Theorem 4.2). This mission formalizes the second result.

The compact mean-field model

There are e^\hat ee^ station types, with nen_ene​ stations of type eee and n=∑enen = \sum_e n_en=∑e​ne​ in total. A customer leaving a type-e′e'e′ station returns the vehicle at a type-eee station with probability pe′,e=newe′,e/∑e2we′,e2ne2p_{e',e} = n_e w_{e',e}/\sum_{e_2} w_{e',e_2} n_{e_2}pe′,e​=ne​we′,e​/∑e2​​we′,e2​​ne2​​. Demand at a type-eee station has a law DeD^eDe on N0\mathbb N_0N0​ with finite mean and variance; a returned vehicle is still charged with probability qqq, and costs are discounted by γ∈[0,1)\gamma \in [0, 1)γ∈[0,1).

The extended types are 000 (the warehouse), 1,…,e^1, \dots, \hat e1,…,e^ (charged vehicles of each type) and e^+1,…,2e^\hat e + 1, \dots, 2\hat ee^+1,…,2e^ (the depleted stock of each type). Moving one vehicle from extended type e1e_1e1​ to e2e_2e2​ costs ce1,e2c_{e_1,e_2}ce1​,e2​​, with ce1,e2≥ce1,e1/2+ce2,e2/2c_{e_1,e_2} \ge c_{e_1,e_1}/2 + c_{e_2,e_2}/2ce1​,e2​​≥ce1​,e1​​/2+ce2​,e2​​/2.

An action a^∈A^\hat a \in \hat Aa^∈A^ is a post-rebalancing distribution: fractions a^e,d≥0\hat a_{e,d} \ge 0a^e,d​≥0 of stations of type eee holding ddd vehicles, supported on {Le,…,Ue}\{L^e, \dots, U^e\}{Le,…,Ue} and summing to ne/nn_e/nne​/n, and a scaled depleted stock a^e,r∈[Lr,e,Ur,e]\hat a_{e,r} \in [L^{r,e}, U^{r,e}]a^e,r​∈[Lr,e,Ur,e]. A state x˘∈X˘\breve x \in \breve Xx˘∈X˘ records the fractions x˘e,d\breve x_{e,d}x˘e,d​ for d≤Ued \le U^ed≤Ue, the depleted stock x˘e,r\breve x_{e,r}x˘e,r​, and two aggregates x˘e,s,x˘e,u\breve x_{e,s}, \breve x_{e,u}x˘e,s​,x˘e,u​ of the vehicles above UeU^eUe, within the bounds of the paper's Appendix F.

The next state x˘′(a^)\breve x'(\hat a)x˘′(a^) depends on the action only, through the transitions (F.1)–(F.5): demand removes min⁡(b,De)\min(b, D^e)min(b,De) vehicles from a station holding bbb, and an independent Poisson number R^e\hat R^eR^e of charged vehicles arrives, with a rate (3.2) that is linear in the action's expected trips. Each period costs c^2(x˘,a^)+N^(a^)\hat c_2(\breve x, \hat a) + \hat N(\hat a)c^2​(x˘,a^)+N^(a^), where

  • c^2\hat c_2c^2​ (F.6) is a truncated Wasserstein term plus nnn times the optimal value of a min-cost-flow problem between the extended types;
  • N^\hat NN^ (3.4) is the expected holding and shortage cost.

The value function V^(x˘)\hat V(\breve x)V^(x˘) is the infimum over action sequences in A^\hat AA^ of ∑k≥0γk(c^2(x˘k,ak)+N^(ak))\sum_{k \ge 0}\gamma^k(\hat c_2(\breve x^k, a_k) + \hat N(a_k))∑k≥0​γk(c^2​(x˘k,ak​)+N^(ak​)), where x˘0=x˘\breve x^0 = \breve xx˘0=x˘ and x˘k+1=x˘′(ak)\breve x^{k+1} = \breve x'(a_k)x˘k+1=x˘′(ak​).

The algorithm. Given x˘\breve xx˘ and a transient horizon T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, solve the finite program (4.1): choose a~0,…,a~T∈A^\tilde a^0, \dots, \tilde a^T \in \hat Aa~0,…,a~T∈A^ to minimize

∑k=0T−1γk(c^2(x˘k,a~k)+N^(a~k))+γTc^2(x˘T,a~T)+γT1−γ(γc^2(x˘T+1,a~T)+N^(a~T)),\sum_{k=0}^{T-1}\gamma^k\big(\hat c_2(\breve x^k, \tilde a^k) + \hat N(\tilde a^k)\big) + \gamma^T\hat c_2(\breve x^T, \tilde a^T) + \frac{\gamma^T}{1-\gamma}\big(\gamma\hat c_2(\breve x^{T+1}, \tilde a^T) + \hat N(\tilde a^T)\big),k=0∑T−1​γk(c^2​(x˘k,a~k)+N^(a~k))+γTc^2​(x˘T,a~T)+1−γγT​(γc^2​(x˘T+1,a~T)+N^(a~T)),

then play a~0,…,a~T−1\tilde a^0, \dots, \tilde a^{T-1}a~0,…,a~T−1 and repeat a~T\tilde a^Ta~T forever ((4.2)–(4.3)). Call this policy π~\tilde\piπ~ and its discounted cost V^π~(x˘)\hat V_{\tilde\pi}(\breve x)V^π~​(x˘).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2

For every T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, every x˘∈X˘\breve x \in \breve Xx˘∈X˘ and every minimizer of (4.1),

V^π~(x˘)−V^(x˘)≤γ1−γ C γT,and, if q=0,V^π~(x˘)−V^(x˘)≤C γT,\hat V_{\tilde\pi}(\breve x) - \hat V(\breve x) \le \frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}\,C\,\gamma^T, \qquad\text{and, if } q = 0,\qquad \hat V_{\tilde\pi}(\breve x) - \hat V(\breve x) \le C\,\gamma^T,V^π~​(x˘)−V^(x˘)≤1−γγ​CγT,and, if q=0,V^π~​(x˘)−V^(x˘)≤CγT,

where

C=2∑e=1e^(nemax⁡(c0,e,ce,0)(Ue−Le)+nmax⁡(c0,e^+e,ce^+e,0)(Ur,e−Lr,e)).C = 2\sum_{e=1}^{\hat e}\Big(n_e\max(c_{0,e}, c_{e,0})(U^e - L^e) + n\max(c_{0,\hat e+e}, c_{\hat e+e,0})(U^{r,e} - L^{r,e})\Big).C=2e=1∑e^​(ne​max(c0,e​,ce,0​)(Ue−Le)+nmax(c0,e^+e​,ce^+e,0​)(Ur,e−Lr,e)).

Milestones

  1. (3.6): V^\hat VV^ satisfies the Bellman equation V^(x˘)=min⁡a^∈A^c^2(x˘,a^)+N^(a^)+γV^(x˘′(a^))\hat V(\breve x) = \min_{\hat a \in \hat A}\hat c_2(\breve x, \hat a) + \hat N(\hat a) + \gamma\hat V(\breve x'(\hat a))V^(x˘)=mina^∈A^​c^2​(x˘,a^)+N^(a^)+γV^(x˘′(a^)) on X˘\breve XX˘, with the minimum attained.
  2. §4.1, p. 26: the cost of π~\tilde\piπ~ equals the optimal value of (4.1).
  3. Lemma H.7: c^2(x˘,a^)≤c^2(x˘,z^)+c^2(z^,a^)\hat c_2(\breve x, \hat a) \le \hat c_2(\breve x, \hat z) + \hat c_2(\hat z, \hat a)c^2​(x˘,a^)≤c^2​(x˘,z^)+c^2​(z^,a^), an action read as a state.
  4. Lemma H.9: c^2(a^1,a^2)≤C/2\hat c_2(\hat a^1, \hat a^2) \le C/2c^2​(a^1,a^2)≤C/2 for all a^1,a^2∈A^\hat a^1, \hat a^2 \in \hat Aa^1,a^2∈A^.
  5. Lemma H.8: under the triangle inequality, there is an optimal policy with π^∗(π^∗(x˘))=π^∗(x˘)\hat\pi^*(\hat\pi^*(\breve x)) = \hat\pi^*(\breve x)π^∗(π^∗(x˘))=π^∗(x˘).
  6. Proposition H.3: for q=0q = 0q=0, the dynamic program has a fixed point x˘f=x˘′(a^f)\breve x^f = \breve x'(\hat a^f)x˘f=x˘′(a^f) with a^f\hat a^fa^f optimal at x˘f\breve x^fx˘f (Definition H.1).

Significance

Theorem 4.2 makes the algorithm a certified approximation scheme. It turns an infinite-horizon problem into a finite program of T+1T + 1T+1 actions, and the loss from doing so decays geometrically in TTT, uniformly over the initial state, with a constant that depends only on the rebalancing costs and the action bounds. For q=0q = 0q=0 the transitions are affine, the program (4.1) becomes a linear program (the paper's Appendix G), and the sharper bound CγTC\gamma^TCγT applies.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix H), but not formalized anywhere. A formal proof combines a triangle inequality for an LP-valued cost, a dynamic-programming principle with attainment on a compact action set, and a fixed-point argument for a convex deterministic dynamic program. The paper has several small printed slips on this path (for example, Proposition H.10 states the q=0q = 0q=0 constant without the factor 222 that its proof produces); the formal statements fix the corrected reading.

Difficulty

The bound is not a truncation estimate. Cutting the discounted sum at TTT gives a gap proportional to the per-period cost, not to CCC. The comparison has to be made against an optimal action sequence, whose first T+1T + 1T+1 actions are feasible for (4.1). After period TTT, the optimal sequence and π~\tilde\piπ~ diverge, and the cost of that divergence must be controlled by the cost of moving between two actions, which requires:

  • the triangle inequality for c^2\hat c_2c^2​, whose flow component is the value of a linear program, not a closed form;
  • the fact that, once rebalanced to an optimal action, staying there is optimal (Lemma H.8);
  • the bound of Lemma H.9 on the cost between any two feasible actions.

The q=0q = 0q=0 bound needs, in addition, a steady state of the controlled system (Proposition H.3), which rests on a fixed-point theorem for convex deterministic dynamic programs (Flynn 1979). The Bellman equation itself is not free: with V^\hat VV^ defined as an infimum over sequences, attainment of the minimum needs continuity of c^2\hat c_2c^2​, N^\hat NN^, the transition and V^\hat VV^ on the compact action set.

Formalization scope

Types are Fin ê (0-based) and the extended types are Fin (2ê+1) with chg e and dep e for the paper's eee and e^+e\hat e + ee^+e. Level vectors are functions N→R\mathbb N \to \mathbb RN→R that vanish outside their support. P[b−min⁡(b,De)+R^e=d]\mathbb P[b - \min(b, D^e) + \hat R^e = d]P[b−min(b,De)+R^e=d] is the convolution of the demand law with the Poisson law, so DeD^eDe and R^e\hat R^eR^e are independent, as the paper presupposes. V^\hat VV^ is the infimum over the subtype of A^\hat AA^-valued sequences (p. 18 and Proposition F.3), and (3.6) is posed as a milestone rather than used as a definition. X˘\breve XX˘ is formalized as printed on p. A-22. The policy cost is the discounted cost of a~0,…,a~T−1,a~T,a~T,…\tilde a^0, \dots, \tilde a^{T-1}, \tilde a^T, \tilde a^T, \dotsa~0,…,a~T−1,a~T,a~T,…, where a~\tilde aa~ is a hypothesis-given minimizer of (4.1). Everything is time-homogeneous and stated at t=0t = 0t=0.

Standing assumptions, as one predicate on the model: 0≤γ<10 \le \gamma < 10≤γ<1, 0≤q≤10 \le q \le 10≤q≤1, ne≥1n_e \ge 1ne​≥1, w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 with positive normalizers, Le≤UeL^e \le U^eLe≤Ue, 0≤Lr,e≤Ur,e0 \le L^{r,e} \le U^{r,e}0≤Lr,e≤Ur,e, finite second moments of DeD^eDe, the cost assumption ce1,e2≥ce1,e1/2+ce2,e2/2c_{e_1,e_2} \ge c_{e_1,e_1}/2 + c_{e_2,e_2}/2ce1​,e2​​≥ce1​,e1​​/2+ce2​,e2​​/2, c0,0=0c_{0,0} = 0c0,0​=0, ce^+e,e^+e=0c_{\hat e+e,\hat e+e} = 0ce^+e,e^+e​=0. Two additions are disclosed: γ≥0\gamma \ge 0γ≥0, and ce1,e2≥0c_{e_1,e_2} \ge 0ce1​,e2​​≥0, without which Lemma H.9 and the goal fail (the right-hand side could be negative).

Trivializing formalizations are excluded: V^\hat VV^ ranges only over A^\hat AA^-valued sequences, the policy is tied to a minimizer of (4.1) and to no other objective, the flow value is an infimum over a nonempty set bounded below (warehouse routing is always feasible), and CCC uses c0,ec_{0,e}c0,e​, ce,0c_{e,0}ce,0​, c0,e^+ec_{0,\hat e+e}c0,e^+e​, ce^+e,0c_{\hat e+e,0}ce^+e,0​ with the paper's indexing and the factor 222.

Two general objects are separate definitions on which the model is built: a discounted deterministic dynamic program (trajectory, discounted cost, value as an infimum over admissible action sequences) and the uncapacitated transshipment LP on a complete digraph with free nodes. Both are reusable beyond this mission. A complete development further needs Poisson tail sums, subadditivity of the flow value, compactness of A^\hat AA^, a dynamic-programming principle and a fixed-point theorem for convex deterministic programs. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for the q=0q = 0q=0 fixed point, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Akturk, O. Candogan, V. Gupta, Managing Resources for Shared Micromobility: Approximate Optimality in Large-Scale Systems, Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02023 (read as SSRN 4155841, version of 2024-05-22: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4155841)
  • J. Flynn, Steady state policies for deterministic dynamic programs, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 37(1):128–147, 1979 (as cited in the paper's appendix references).
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Machine LearningOperations ResearchReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

The Role of Lookahead and Approximate Policy Evaluation in Reinforcement Learning with Linear Value Function Approximation: Error Bound for Least-Squares Policy Iteration with LookaheadResearch Paper

Motivation

Approximate policy iteration is the template behind most practical reinforcement-learning systems for large state spaces: alternate between choosing a policy that looks good under the current value estimate and estimating the value of that policy, with errors in both steps. Game-playing systems such as AlphaZero add two ingredients to this template: a multi-step lookahead (tree search) when choosing the policy, and a linear or neural value-function approximation fitted from a few evaluated states. Classical error bounds for approximate policy iteration (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996) assume that each evaluation error is bounded by a fixed δ\deltaδ; Efroni, Dalal, Scherrer and Mannor (2019) extended them to HHH-step lookahead policies. Neither analysis asks whether a fitted value function actually meets such a bound.

Winnicki, Lubars, Livesay and Srikant (arXiv:2109.13419, Operations Research, 2025) show that it need not: with least-squares fitting on a subset of states, the iterates of approximate policy iteration can diverge (their Section 3.2). They then prove that sufficient lookahead HHH and rollout length mmm restore convergence, with an explicit finite-time error bound. This mission formalizes that bound.

Setting

A Markov decision process (S,A,P,r,α)(\mathcal S,\mathcal A,P,r,\alpha)(S,A,P,r,α) has a finite set of states S\mathcal SS, a finite set of actions A\mathcal AA, transition probabilities Pij(a)P_{ij}(a)Pij​(a) of moving from state iii to state jjj under action aaa, mean rewards r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1], and a discount factor α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). A deterministic policy is a map μ:S→A\mu:\mathcal S\to\mathcal Aμ:S→A. Its value is the expected discounted reward

Jμ(s)=E[∑k≥0αkr(sk,μ(sk)) ∣ s0=s],J^\mu(s)=E\Big[\sum_{k\ge0}\alpha^k r(s_k,\mu(s_k))\,\Big|\,s_0=s\Big],Jμ(s)=E[k≥0∑​αkr(sk​,μ(sk​))​s0​=s],

and the optimal reward-to-go is J∗(s)=max⁡μJμ(s)J^*(s)=\max_\mu J^\mu(s)J∗(s)=maxμ​Jμ(s). Vectors J∈R∣S∣J\in\mathbb R^{|\mathcal S|}J∈R∣S∣ are compared in the sup norm ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​. The policy operator and the Bellman operator are

(TμJ)(s)=r(s,μ(s))+α∑jPsj(μ(s))J(j),(TJ)(s)=max⁡a{r(s,a)+α∑jPsj(a)J(j)}.(T_\mu J)(s)=r(s,\mu(s))+\alpha\sum_jP_{sj}(\mu(s))J(j),\qquad (TJ)(s)=\max_{a}\Big\{r(s,a)+\alpha\sum_jP_{sj}(a)J(j)\Big\}.(Tμ​J)(s)=r(s,μ(s))+αj∑​Psj​(μ(s))J(j),(TJ)(s)=amax​{r(s,a)+αj∑​Psj​(a)J(j)}.

Each state iii has a feature vector ϕ(i)∈Rd\phi(i)\in\mathbb R^dϕ(i)∈Rd; Φ\PhiΦ is the matrix with rows ϕ(i)\phi(i)ϕ(i). For a set of states D\mathcal DD, ΦD\Phi_{\mathcal D}ΦD​ keeps the rows indexed by D\mathcal DD and PD\mathcal P_{\mathcal D}PD​ selects the entries of a vector indexed by D\mathcal DD.

Algorithm 2 starts from an arbitrary J0J_0J0​ and, at iteration kkk, (i) picks a policy μk+1\mu_{k+1}μk+1​ with ∥THJk−Tμk+1TH−1Jk∥∞≤εLA\|T^HJ_k-T_{\mu_{k+1}}T^{H-1}J_k\|_\infty\le\varepsilon_{LA}∥THJk​−Tμk+1​​TH−1Jk​∥∞​≤εLA​ (an inexact HHH-step lookahead); (ii) forms the noisy return J^μk+1(i)=Tμk+1mTH−1Jk(i)+wk+1(i)\hat J^{\mu_{k+1}}(i)=T^m_{\mu_{k+1}}T^{H-1}J_k(i)+w_{k+1}(i)J^μk+1​(i)=Tμk+1​m​TH−1Jk​(i)+wk+1​(i) on an evaluation set Dk\mathcal D_kDk​; (iii) fits θk+1\theta_{k+1}θk+1​ by least squares on Dk\mathcal D_kDk​ and sets Jk+1=Φθk+1J_{k+1}=\Phi\theta_{k+1}Jk+1​=Φθk+1​. Assumption 1 asks that the features of Dk\mathcal D_kDk​ have rank ddd for every kkk and that ∥wk∥∞≤εPE\|w_k\|_\infty\le\varepsilon_{PE}∥wk​∥∞​≤εPE​. Under it the fit is linear, Jk+1=Mk+1J^μk+1J_{k+1}=\mathcal M_{k+1}\hat J^{\mu_{k+1}}Jk+1​=Mk+1​J^μk+1​ with M=Φ(ΦD⊤ΦD)−1ΦD⊤PD\mathcal M=\Phi(\Phi_{\mathcal D}^\top\Phi_{\mathcal D})^{-1}\Phi_{\mathcal D}^\top\mathcal P_{\mathcal D}M=Φ(ΦD⊤​ΦD​)−1ΦD⊤​PD​, and the paper defines

δFV=sup⁡k∥Mk∥∞,δapp=sup⁡k,μ∥MkJμ−Jμ∥∞,β=αm+H−1δFV,τ=αm+αm+H−11−αδFV+δapp+δFVεPE.\delta_{FV}=\sup_k\|\mathcal M_k\|_\infty,\qquad \delta_{app}=\sup_{k,\mu}\|\mathcal M_kJ^\mu-J^\mu\|_\infty,\qquad \beta=\alpha^{m+H-1}\delta_{FV},\qquad \tau=\frac{\alpha^m+\alpha^{m+H-1}}{1-\alpha}\delta_{FV}+\delta_{app}+\delta_{FV}\varepsilon_{PE}.δFV​=ksup​∥Mk​∥∞​,δapp​=k,μsup​∥Mk​Jμ−Jμ∥∞​,β=αm+H−1δFV​,τ=1−ααm+αm+H−1​δFV​+δapp​+δFV​εPE​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 14, eq. (10))

If m+H−1>log⁡(δFV)/log⁡(1/α)m+H-1>\log(\delta_{FV})/\log(1/\alpha)m+H−1>log(δFV​)/log(1/α), then under Assumption 1 every run of Algorithm 2 satisfies, for every k≥0k\ge0k≥0,

∥Jμk−J∗∥∞≤αkH1−α+2αH∥Jμ0−J0∥∞1−α kmax⁡(αH,β)k−1+2αHτ1−β+εLA(1−αH)(1−α).\|J^{\mu_k}-J^*\|_\infty\le\frac{\alpha^{kH}}{1-\alpha}+\frac{2\alpha^H\|J^{\mu_0}-J_0\|_\infty}{1-\alpha}\,k\max(\alpha^H,\beta)^{k-1}+\frac{2\alpha^H\frac{\tau}{1-\beta}+\varepsilon_{LA}}{(1-\alpha^H)(1-\alpha)}.∥Jμk​−J∗∥∞​≤1−ααkH​+1−α2αH∥Jμ0​−J0​∥∞​​kmax(αH,β)k−1+(1−αH)(1−α)2αH1−βτ​+εLA​​.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. Section 2: the Bellman equations Jμ=TμJμJ^\mu=T_\mu J^\muJμ=Tμ​Jμ (unique solution) and J∗=TJ∗J^*=TJ^*J∗=TJ∗ (eq. (2)); the contraction ∥TJ−J∗∥∞≤α∥J−J∗∥∞\|TJ-J^*\|_\infty\le\alpha\|J-J^*\|_\infty∥TJ−J∗∥∞​≤α∥J−J∗∥∞​; shift and monotonicity of TTT, TμT_\muTμ​ (eqs. (3)–(4)).
  2. Section 3.1, eq. (6): the closed form Jk+1=Mk+1J^μk+1J_{k+1}=\mathcal M_{k+1}\hat J^{\mu_{k+1}}Jk+1​=Mk+1​J^μk+1​ of the least-squares step.
  3. Appendix A, eq. (15): one lookahead step with evaluation error δk\delta_kδk​,
∥Jμk+1−J∗∥∞≤αH∥Jμk−J∗∥∞+2αHδk+εLA1−α.\|J^{\mu_{k+1}}-J^*\|_\infty\le\alpha^H\|J^{\mu_k}-J^*\|_\infty+\frac{2\alpha^H\delta_k+\varepsilon_{LA}}{1-\alpha}.∥Jμk+1​−J∗∥∞​≤αH∥Jμk​−J∗∥∞​+1−α2αHδk​+εLA​​.
  1. Proposition 1 (p. 13): the bound for Algorithm 3, an abstract scheme whose evaluation error at step kkk is at most δk\delta_kδk​, in three displays: the general bound, the bound under δk≤βkδ0+μ\delta_k\le\beta^k\delta_0+\muδk​≤βkδ0​+μ, and its limsup.
  2. Appendix B, eq. (19): for Algorithm 2, δk=∥Jk−Jμk∥∞\delta_k=\|J_k-J^{\mu_k}\|_\inftyδk​=∥Jk​−Jμk​∥∞​ satisfies δk≤βδk−1+τ\delta_k\le\beta\delta_{k-1}+\tauδk​≤βδk−1​+τ and, if β<1\beta<1β<1, δk≤βkδ0+τ/(1−β)\delta_k\le\beta^k\delta_0+\tau/(1-\beta)δk​≤βkδ0​+τ/(1−β).

Significance

Theorem 1 states a sufficient condition for convergence that does not depend on the size of the state space: lookahead plus rollout depth must exceed log⁡δFV/log⁡(1/α)\log\delta_{FV}/\log(1/\alpha)logδFV​/log(1/α), where δFV\delta_{FV}δFV​ depends only on the features and the evaluation sets. Paired with the divergence example of Section 3.2, it shows that lookahead is not merely a heuristic improvement but can be what makes approximate policy iteration with linear function approximation stable. Proposition 1 is a reusable interface: any policy-evaluation scheme whose errors satisfy a geometric-plus-floor bound inherits the same convergence guarantee; the paper's gradient-descent variant is obtained this way.

The result is proved on paper; it has not been machine-checked. The Prove2Me platform has the finite-MDP layer used here (transition kernels, policy values as discounted series, the Bellman optimality operator), exact modified policy iteration, and a one-step bound for greedy approximate policy iteration with QQQ-functions (H=1H=1H=1, no lookahead error). It has no lookahead bound, no least-squares value-function fit, and no finite-time bound for approximate policy iteration with function approximation. A complete development would add the Bellman equations for deterministic policies, the lookahead step (15), the least-squares projection identity, and the error recursion, all of which are reusable for other analyses of approximate dynamic programming.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the evaluation step. Classical analyses treat ∥Jk−Jμk∥∞≤δ\|J_k-J^{\mu_k}\|_\infty\le\delta∥Jk​−Jμk​∥∞​≤δ as given; here the error is produced by the algorithm and fed back: the fitted JkJ_kJk​ is the input of the next lookahead, and the least-squares operator can amplify sup-norm errors by a factor δFV\delta_{FV}δFV​, which is at least 111 whenever d≥1d\ge1d≥1. The error recursion therefore contracts only when αm+H−1δFV<1\alpha^{m+H-1}\delta_{FV}<1αm+H−1δFV​<1. A second point is the lookahead step (15), which must hold for an arbitrary previous policy and an inexact lookahead, and rests on the increase of TnJμT^nJ^\muTnJμ in nnn rather than on contraction alone. Finally, combining the geometric decay of the evaluation errors with the αH\alpha^HαH-contraction of (15) requires a convolution estimate that yields the factor kmax⁡(αH,β)k−1k\max(\alpha^H,\beta)^{k-1}kmax(αH,β)k−1.

Formalization scope

States and actions are finite nonempty types; the transition kernel is the published IsTransitionKernel, JμJ^\muJμ is the published PolicyValue (a discounted series of expected rewards, not a fixed point of TμT_\muTμ​) of the point-mass policy at μ\muμ, TTT is the published BellmanOperator, and J∗J^*J∗ is the maximum of JμJ^\muJμ over the finitely many deterministic policies. Rewards enter only through their means r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1]. Vectors are functions S→R\mathcal S\to\mathbb RS→R with the sup norm; matrix norms are Mathlib's ℓ∞\ell^\inftyℓ∞ operator norm (maximum absolute row sum). The rank condition of Assumption 1 is det⁡(ΦDk⊤ΦDk)≠0\det(\Phi_{\mathcal D_k}^\top\Phi_{\mathcal D_k})\ne0det(ΦDk​⊤​ΦDk​​)=0 for every kkk; Lean's matrix inverse is zero on singular matrices, so no statement relies on it without this hypothesis.

Conventions fixed where the page is loose: Algorithms 2 and 3 are predicates on whole runs, quantified over every admissible lookahead policy, noise and minimiser. μ0\mu_0μ0​, which Algorithm 2 never produces, is free, so every bound holds for every deterministic μ0\mu_0μ0​. Mk\mathcal M_kMk​ is the operator of Dk\mathcal D_kDk​ (eq. (6) calls it Mk+1\mathcal M_{k+1}Mk+1​; the suprema agree). δapp\delta_{app}δapp​ is the supremum over all kkk and all deterministic policies. Algorithm 3 is stated with ∥Jk−Jμk∥∞≤δk\|J_k-J^{\mu_k}\|_\infty\le\delta_k∥Jk​−Jμk​∥∞​≤δk​, the index of (15) and Appendix B, and without the representation Jk=ΦθkJ_k=\Phi\theta_kJk​=Φθk​, which Proposition 1 does not use. Proposition 1's first display divides by 1−αH−11-\alpha^{H-1}1−αH−1 and is stated for H≥2H\ge2H≥2; the other results take H≥1H\ge1H≥1. The noise bound ∥wk∥∞≤εPE\|w_k\|_\infty\le\varepsilon_{PE}∥wk​∥∞​≤εPE​ is imposed on the whole vector instead of setting wk(i)=0w_k(i)=0wk​(i)=0 off Dk\mathcal D_kDk​; off Dk\mathcal D_kDk​ it constrains only entries the run never reads. The limsup is stated as "for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, eventually ≤\le≤ bound +ε+\varepsilon+ε". The hypothesis of Theorem 1 is kept with the real logarithm as printed; for δFV>0\delta_{FV}>0δFV​>0 it is equivalent to β<1\beta<1β<1, and when δFV=0\delta_{FV}=0δFV​=0 (possible only if d=0d=0d=0) it reads m+H−1>0m+H-1>0m+H−1>0.

A formalization that fixes the lookahead policy to an exact argmax, the noise to zero, or μ0\mu_0μ0​ to a convenient policy proves a special case and is ruled out; so is defining JμJ^\muJμ or J∗J^*J∗ as a fixed point, which would make eq. (2) definitional.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the Section 2 milestones from the series definition of JμJ^\muJμ, the least-squares identity (6), the lookahead step (15), and the recursions of Proposition 1 and Appendix B. Theorem 2 of the paper (gradient-descent fitting) is not part of this mission: its Assumption 2 places no lower bound on the step size, and the statement fails for negative step sizes.

Selected references

  • A. Winnicki, J. Lubars, M. Livesay, R. Srikant, The Role of Lookahead and Approximate Policy Evaluation in Reinforcement Learning with Linear Value Function Approximation, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2109.13419v7. https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.13419
  • Y. Efroni, G. Dalal, B. Scherrer, S. Mannor, How to Combine Tree-Search Methods in Reinforcement Learning, AAAI, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.01843
  • D. P. Bertsekas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Neuro-Dynamic Programming, Athena Scientific, 1996.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Reinforcement Learning and Optimal Control, Athena Scientific, 2019.
  • M. G. Lagoudakis, R. Parr, Least-Squares Policy Iteration, Journal of Machine Learning Research 4, 2003. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v4/lagoudakis03a.html
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Markov Decision Processes with Observation Costs: Framework and Computation with a Penalty Scheme: The Quasi-Variational Inequality with Inspection Operator Has a Unique Bounded SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

In many sequential decision problems the state of a system is not observed for free. A controller monitoring a machine, a patient or an inventory must pay to inspect it, and between inspections it acts on a belief rather than on the state. The observation cost model (OCM) makes this precise for a finite Markov chain: at each time the controller either pays a fixed cost cobs>0c_{\mathrm{obs}}>0cobs​>0 to observe the state and choose a new action, or keeps the previous action without observing. Reisinger and Tam (arXiv:2201.07908v3, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) show that, after augmenting the state with the time elapsed since the last observation, the dynamic programming equation of the discounted OCM is a discrete quasi-variational inequality (QVI): an obstacle problem whose obstacle depends on the unknown itself.

Earlier work on the OCM (Anderson and Friedman, 1977; Hajek, Mitzel and Yang, 2008) treated fixed dynamics of the underlying chain. Discrete QVIs with interconnected obstacles and their penalty approximation were analysed by Reisinger and Zhang (2019) for switching problems, with the identity matrix in place of the transition operator QnQ_nQn​. The paper recasts the OCM QVI in an abstract form and proves it is well-posed.

Setting

Let XXX be a finite state space and AAA a finite nonempty action set. The unknown is a function u:N×X→RAu:\mathbb N\times X\to\mathbb R^Au:N×X→RA with components ua(n,x)=ua,xnu_a(n,x)=u^n_{a,x}ua​(n,x)=ua,xn​. A driver is a family Fa:N×X×RA×RN×X→RF_a:\mathbb N\times X\times\mathbb R^A\times\mathbb R^{\mathbb N\times X}\to\mathbb RFa​:N×X×RA×RN×X→R, a∈Aa\in Aa∈A; its third argument is the vector u(n,x)u(n,x)u(n,x) and its fourth the whole function uau_aua​. Given a sequence {Qn}\{Q_n\}{Qn​} of substochastic matrices on XXX (nonnegative entries, row sums at most 111) and a vector c∈RX×Ac\in\mathbb R^{X\times A}c∈RX×A, the inspection operator is

Mu(n,x)=(Qn u1−c‾)x,(u1−c‾)y=max⁡a∈A(ua,y1−ca,y).\mathcal Mu(n,x)=\big(Q_n\,\overline{u^1-c}\big)_x,\qquad \big(\overline{u^1-c}\big)_y=\max_{a\in A}\big(u^1_{a,y}-c_{a,y}\big).Mu(n,x)=(Qn​u1−c​)x​,(u1−c​)y​=a∈Amax​(ua,y1​−ca,y​).

It reads uuu only at time 111 and couples all actions. The QVI (3.1) is

min⁡{Fa(n,x,u(n,x),ua),  ua(n,x)−Mu(n,x)}=0,n∈N, x∈X, a∈A.\min\big\{F_a(n,x,u(n,x),u_a),\;u_a(n,x)-\mathcal Mu(n,x)\big\}=0,\qquad n\in\mathbb N,\ x\in X,\ a\in A.min{Fa​(n,x,u(n,x),ua​),ua​(n,x)−Mu(n,x)}=0,n∈N, x∈X, a∈A.

Assumption 3.2 asks for a constant β>0\beta>0β>0 with Fa(n,x,r,ua+θ)−Fa(n,x,s,va)≥βθF_a(n,x,r,u_a+\theta)-F_a(n,x,s,v_a)\ge\beta\thetaFa​(n,x,r,ua​+θ)−Fa​(n,x,s,va​)≥βθ whenever u≤vu\le vu≤v are bounded and θ=ra−sa=max⁡j(rj−sj)≥0\theta=r_a-s_a=\max_j(r_j-s_j)\ge0θ=ra​−sa​=maxj​(rj​−sj​)≥0, together with boundedness in xxx and uniform continuity in rrr. Assumption 3.12 asks that Fa(n,x,r,ϕ)F_a(n,x,r,\phi)Fa​(n,x,r,ϕ) depend on ϕ\phiϕ only through finitely many values. For the OCM, Fa(n,x,r,ϕ)=ra−γϕ(n+1,x)−(Panra)xF_a(n,x,r,\phi)=r_a-\gamma\phi(n+1,x)-(P^n_ar_a)_xFa​(n,x,r,ϕ)=ra​−γϕ(n+1,x)−(Pan​ra​)x​.

For the computation the paper truncates time to {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}, giving a finite QVI (3.7) for a map F~:RN×L×d→RN×L\tilde F:\mathbb R^{N\times L\times d}\to\mathbb R^{N\times L}F~:RN×L×d→RN×L with the monotonicity property (3.5), and replaces it by the penalised problem (3.8), F~a(u)−ρ π(Mu−ua)=0\tilde F_a(u)-\rho\,\pi(\mathcal Mu-u_a)=0F~a​(u)−ρπ(Mu−ua​)=0, with a continuous non-decreasing penalty π\piπ vanishing exactly on (−∞,0](-\infty,0](−∞,0].

Formalization targets

Goal: well-posedness (Theorem 3.13)

Under Assumptions 3.2 and 3.12, a uniform bound sup⁡a,n,x∣Fa(n,x,0,0)∣<∞\sup_{a,n,x}|F_a(n,x,0,0)|<\inftysupa,n,x​∣Fa​(n,x,0,0)∣<∞, and ca,x>0c_{a,x}>0ca,x​>0:

∃! u:N×X→RA bounded with min⁡{Fa(n,x,u(n,x),ua), ua−Mu}=0 everywhere.\exists!\,u:\mathbb N\times X\to\mathbb R^A\ \text{bounded with}\ \min\{F_a(n,x,u(n,x),u_a),\,u_a-\mathcal Mu\}=0\ \text{everywhere}.∃!u:N×X→RA bounded with min{Fa​(n,x,u(n,x),ua​),ua​−Mu}=0 everywhere.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.5: the restriction of FFF to {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} satisfies (3.5) with the same β\betaβ.
  • Proposition 3.10: for every ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0, a subsolution of (3.8) lies below a supersolution.
  • Lemma 3.11: for c≥0c\ge0c≥0, every solution of (3.8) satisfies ∥uρ∥∞≤∥F~(0)∥∞/β\|u^\rho\|_\infty\le\|\tilde F(0)\|_\infty/\beta∥uρ∥∞​≤∥F~(0)∥∞​/β.
  • Theorem 3.13, truncated part: (3.8) has a unique solution uρ,Nu^{\rho,N}uρ,N, which increases to a limit uNu^NuN as ρ→∞\rho\to\inftyρ→∞; for c>0c>0c>0, uNu^NuN solves (3.7).
  • Proposition 3.8: comparison for the truncated QVI (3.7) when c>0c>0c>0.
  • Proposition 3.3: comparison for bounded sub- and supersolutions of (3.1) when c>0c>0c>0.
  • Corollary 3.4: bounded solutions of the OCM QVI (2.11) are unique.

Significance

The well-posedness theorem identifies the value function of the discounted observation cost model as the unique bounded solution of a QVI, which is what justifies computing it: truncating time and penalising the obstacle gives a sequence of finite nonlinear systems whose solutions converge to it, and these systems are solved in practice by semismooth Newton iterations. The abstract framework covers other models with a non-local, action-coupling obstacle, such as discretised switching problems.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by reference: existence of the penalised solutions and the convergence uρ,N→uNu^{\rho,N}\to u^Nuρ,N→uN are delegated to Reisinger and Zhang (2019, Theorems 2.5 and 2.6), and Lemma 3.11 is stated as "a direct adaptation" of a lemma there. None of the results is formalized. A formal development makes the delegated steps explicit and fixes the hypotheses under which the statements hold (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The comparison principle (Proposition 3.3) is a maximum principle on an infinite index set: the supremum of u−vu-vu−v need not be attained, so the argument works along maximising sequences and needs the uniform continuity of the driver in rrr. In the obstacle branch, the inspection operator transports the maximum to time 111, and excluding that case uses c>0c>0c>0 through a chain argument over the finite set A×XA\times XA×X; with c=0c=0c=0 comparison fails.

Existence is harder. A direct fixed-point argument fails because the driver is only monotone, not a contraction, and the obstacle depends on the unknown. The paper's route goes through two limits, ρ→∞\rho\to\inftyρ→∞ and N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞, each requiring bounds uniform in the other parameter and a passage to the limit in a nonlinear, non-local equation; the N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ limit uses Assumption 3.12 to localise the dependence on ϕ\phiϕ.

Formalization scope

Everything is finite-dimensional or a function on the discrete set N×X\mathbb N\times XN×X; no measure theory is involved. Unknowns are curried as u n x a =ua(n,x)=u_a(n,x)=ua​(n,x), costs as c a x. Time in (3.1) ranges over all of N\mathbb NN, including 000, and u1u^1u1 is u 1. The truncated time set {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} is Fin N with the index kkk standing for time k+1k+1k+1, so u1u^1u1 is u 0. Substochastic means nonnegative entries with row sums at most 111; c>0c>0c>0 and c≥0c\ge0c≥0 are componentwise; norms are sup norms, written out entrywise. Bounded sets of rrr in Assumption 3.2.2 are cubes.

Two additions to the paper's hypotheses are made, each because the statement is false without it. The goal assumes sup⁡a,n,x∣Fa(n,x,0,0)∣<∞\sup_{a,n,x}|F_a(n,x,0,0)|<\inftysupa,n,x​∣Fa​(n,x,0,0)∣<∞: Assumption 3.2.2 only bounds FFF for each fixed nnn, and the driver ra−γϕ(n+1,x)−nr_a-\gamma\phi(n+1,x)-nra​−γϕ(n+1,x)−n satisfies both assumptions yet has no bounded solution. Corollary 3.4 is stated for bounded solutions of (2.11). The truncated QVI is stated without Problem 3.6's time boundary condition ua(N,⋅)=Mu(N,⋅)u_a(N,\cdot)=\mathcal Mu(N,\cdot)ua​(N,⋅)=Mu(N,⋅), which (3.8) does not encode. The continuity of the restricted driver claimed in Lemma 3.5 is not part of that milestone; the truncated part of Theorem 3.13 takes continuity of an abstract F~\tilde FF~ as a hypothesis.

The N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞ clause of Theorem 3.13 ("u=lim⁡N→∞uNu=\lim_{N\to\infty}u^Nu=limN→∞​uN, monotone from below") is not stated: the paper does not define the truncated operator beyond time NNN, and with the zero extension the monotonicity in NNN fails. The goal keeps the clause's well-defined content, existence and uniqueness of the bounded solution. A goal asserting only uniqueness (Proposition 3.3), or existence with the uniform bound hidden inside a definition, would be a different theorem; the bound is an explicit hypothesis.

A complete development needs solvability of finite-dimensional monotone nonlinear systems (the existence result cited from Reisinger and Zhang), monotone convergence in finite dimensions, and maximum-principle arguments on N×X\mathbb N\times XN×X. The comparison principles and the a-priori bound are reusable for other monotone schemes. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative existence arguments for the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Reisinger and J. Tam, Markov decision processes with observation costs: framework and computation with a penalty scheme, arXiv:2201.07908v3, 2023; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.07908v3
  • C. Reisinger and Y. Zhang, A penalty scheme for monotone systems with interconnected obstacles: convergence and error estimates, SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis 57(4):1625–1648, 2019 (reference [28] of the paper).
  • R. F. Anderson and A. Friedman, Optimal inspections in a stochastic control problem with costly observations, Mathematics of Operations Research 2(2):155–190, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.2.155
  • B. Hajek, K. Mitzel and S. Yang, Paging and registration in cellular networks: jointly optimal policies and an iterative algorithm, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 54:608–622, 2008.
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Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity 2: With Polyhedral r-Rectangular Factor Sets, One Deterministic Policy and Factor Matrix Stay Robust-Optimal for All Discount Factors Near 1Research Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process (MDP) models sequential decisions under uncertainty: in each state a decision maker picks an action, collects a reward, and the system moves to a random next state according to a transition kernel. In applications the kernel is estimated from data, and an optimal policy for the estimated kernel can perform poorly under a slightly different one. Robust MDPs replace the single kernel by an uncertainty set and maximize the worst-case discounted reward over that set (Iyengar 2005; Nilim and El Ghaoui 2005; Wiesemann, Kuhn and Rustem 2013).

Goyal and Grand-Clément (arXiv:1811.00215v8) introduce r-rectangular uncertainty sets, in which transitions are mixtures of a small number of uncertain factors chosen independently by an adversary. Beyond the algorithmic results (the subject of the first mission of this series), they prove two structural properties of optimal robust policies in this model: a robust maximum principle and robust Blackwell optimality.

In a classical MDP, a policy is Blackwell optimal if it is optimal for every discount factor close enough to 111 (Blackwell 1962; Puterman 1994, §10.1.2). Blackwell optimal policies are optimal for the long-run average reward and for every finer nnn-discount criterion, so they connect discounted and average-reward control. For two-player perfect-information zero-sum stochastic games the existence of Blackwell optimal strategies is due to Gaubert and Gunawardena (1998). Goyal and Grand-Clément establish the analogous statement for robust MDPs with r-rectangular uncertainty, under the assumption that the factor sets have finitely many extreme points, as polyhedral factor sets do.

Setting

Let S\mathbb SS and A\mathbb AA be finite sets of states and actions, with rewards rsa≥0r_{sa}\ge0rsa​≥0, an initial distribution p0∈Δ(S)p_0\in\Delta(\mathbb S)p0​∈Δ(S), and a discount factor λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1). Fix coefficients usai≥0u^i_{sa}\ge0usai​≥0, i∈[r]i\in[r]i∈[r], with ∑iusai=1\sum_i u^i_{sa}=1∑i​usai​=1. A factor matrix W=(w1,…,wr)W=(w_1,\dots,w_r)W=(w1​,…,wr​) has probability vectors wi∈Δ(S)w_i\in\Delta(\mathbb S)wi​∈Δ(S) as columns and induces the kernel

Psas′=∑i=1rusai wi,s′.P_{sas'}=\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\,w_{i,s'} .Psas′​=i=1∑r​usai​wi,s′​.

The adversary chooses WWW from a nonempty convex compact set W\mathcal WW. Its projections are the factor sets W1,…,Wr\mathcal W^1,\dots,\mathcal W^rW1,…,Wr, and W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular when W=W1×⋯×Wr\mathcal W=\mathcal W^1\times\dots\times\mathcal W^rW=W1×⋯×Wr.

A stationary policy π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π picks πs∈Δ(A)\pi_s\in\Delta(\mathbb A)πs​∈Δ(A) in each state; it is deterministic when each πs\pi_sπs​ is a point mass. With rπ=(∑aπsarsa)sr_\pi=(\sum_a\pi_{sa}r_{sa})_srπ​=(∑a​πsa​rsa​)s​ and L(π,W)ss′=∑aπsaPsas′L(\pi,W)_{ss'}=\sum_a\pi_{sa}P_{sas'}L(π,W)ss′​=∑a​πsa​Psas′​, the value function and the expected reward are

vλπ,W=∑t≥0λtL(π,W)trπ,R(π,W,λ)=p0⊤vλπ,W.v^{\pi,W}_\lambda=\sum_{t\ge0}\lambda^tL(\pi,W)^tr_\pi,\qquad R(\pi,W,\lambda)=p_0^\top v^{\pi,W}_\lambda .vλπ,W​=t≥0∑​λtL(π,W)trπ​,R(π,W,λ)=p0⊤​vλπ,W​.

The worst-case value of π\piπ is zλ(π)=min⁡W∈WR(π,W,λ)z_\lambda(\pi)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W,\lambda)zλ​(π)=minW∈W​R(π,W,λ). A pair (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of the robust MDP problem (1.2) at discount λ\lambdaλ when π∗\pi^*π∗ maximizes zλz_\lambdazλ​ over Π\PiΠ and W∗W^*W∗ attains min⁡W∈WR(π∗,W,λ)\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi^*,W,\lambda)minW∈W​R(π∗,W,λ). The Lean development uses this notation: value, R, z, IsRobustSolution, IsRRect, factorSet, IsDeterministic.

Formalization targets

Goal: robust Blackwell optimality (Proposition 6.2)

If W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular and every factor set Wi\mathcal W^iWi has finitely many extreme points, there exist a deterministic policy π∗\pi^*π∗, a factor matrix W∗∈WW^*\in\mathcal WW∗∈W and λ0∈(0,1)\lambda_0\in(0,1)λ0​∈(0,1) with

∀λ∈(λ0,1):(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount λ.\forall\lambda\in(\lambda_0,1):\quad(\pi^*,W^*)\ \text{is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount }\lambda .∀λ∈(λ0​,1):(π∗,W∗) is an optimal solution of (1.2) at discount λ.

The pair is fixed before λ0\lambda_0λ0​ and does not depend on λ\lambdaλ. The statement fixes no constant and no rate.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 6.1.1: a minimizer W1W^1W1 of R(π,⋅,λ)R(\pi,\cdot,\lambda)R(π,⋅,λ) is a worst case from every initial state, vλ,sπ,W1≤vλ,sπ,W0v^{\pi,W^1}_{\lambda,s}\le v^{\pi,W^0}_{\lambda,s}vλ,sπ,W1​≤vλ,sπ,W0​ for all W0∈WW^0\in\mathcal WW0∈W.
  2. Proposition 6.1.2 (robust maximum principle): if (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) solves (1.2), then vλ,sπ,W1≤vλ,sπ∗,W∗v^{\pi,W^1}_{\lambda,s}\le v^{\pi^*,W^*}_{\lambda,s}vλ,sπ,W1​≤vλ,sπ∗,W∗​ for every policy π\piπ, every minimizer W1W^1W1 of R(π,⋅,λ)R(\pi,\cdot,\lambda)R(π,⋅,λ) and every state sss.
  3. Appendix G.1, p. 26: for each λ\lambdaλ, (1.2) has an optimal solution (πλ,Wλ)(\pi_\lambda,W_\lambda)(πλ​,Wλ​) with πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ deterministic and WλW_\lambdaWλ​ an extreme point of W\mathcal WW.
  4. Appendix G.1, p. 27: vtπ,W=(I−tL(π,W))−1rπv^{\pi,W}_t=(I-tL(\pi,W))^{-1}r_\pivtπ,W​=(I−tL(π,W))−1rπ​ on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and each coordinate is a rational function of ttt whose denominator has no zero in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

Stronger: finitely many breakpoints (Proposition 6.3, optional)

Under the same hypotheses there are 0=λ0<λ1<⋯<λp=10=\lambda_0<\lambda_1<\dots<\lambda_p=10=λ0​<λ1​<⋯<λp​=1 and, for each jjj, a single deterministic pair (πj,Wj)(\pi_j,W_j)(πj​,Wj​) optimal for every λ∈(λj,λj+1)\lambda\in(\lambda_j,\lambda_{j+1})λ∈(λj​,λj+1​).

Significance

The result. Robust Blackwell optimality says that, for polyhedral r-rectangular uncertainty, a decision maker who is patient enough does not need to know the discount factor exactly: one deterministic policy is robust-optimal for all discounts near 111, and the adversary has one matching worst-case factor matrix. This is the robust counterpart of the classical bridge from discounted to average-reward criteria, and it is the natural entry point for a theory of robust MDPs under the long-run average criterion, for which the paper notes no results were known. The robust maximum principle states that an optimal robust policy has the highest worst-case value from every starting state, a comparison that has been used to derive structural properties of robust policies in a healthcare setting (Grand-Clément et al. 2020, cited on p. 13 of the paper).

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none has a machine-checked proof. The nominal analogues (Blackwell 1962, Theorem 5, and the rationality of the discounted value) are posed on Prove2Me as open targets on a different, nominal model and are not reused here. The formalization also corrects two printed statements: Proposition 6.1 is false for an initial distribution with a zero entry and is posed with p0>0p_0>0p0​>0, and the claim in Appendix G.1 that the factor matrix of a solution is an extreme point is posed in its existential form, the form the proof uses.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for the goal is a pigeonhole over the finitely many candidate pairs (deterministic policies and extreme factor matrices): some pair is optimal for discounts λn→1\lambda_n\to1λn​→1. The step that fails is passing from this sequence to a whole interval. Optimality of a pair is not a comparison between two fixed rational functions of λ\lambdaλ: the worst-case value zλ(π)z_\lambda(\pi)zλ​(π) is a minimum over W\mathcal WW, and optimality quantifies over all randomized policies. A comparison of worst-case values at one discount does not by itself give a comparison of value functions that can be propagated to other discounts. The paper bridges this gap with the robust maximum principle, which turns a worst-case comparison into a statewise comparison of two value functions, each rational in λ\lambdaλ. The maximum principle itself rests on the saddle-point structure of r-rectangular robust MDPs (Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 of the paper), which a solver must develop.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the definition FactorRMDP.Blackwell.Model. States and actions are finite types, with A\mathbb AA nonempty. Factors are indexed by Fin r, i.e. 0-based. A factor matrix is a function Fin r → S → ℝ. W\mathcal WW is a nonempty convex compact set of factor matrices with stochastic factors. Its factor sets are its projections, and r-rectangularity is the predicate IsRRect, not built into the structure. Rewards are nonnegative and p0∈Δ(S)p_0\in\Delta(\mathbb S)p0​∈Δ(S). The value function is the discounted series, not a fixed point, so no Bellman identity holds by definition. Minima and maxima are stated with IsLeast/IsGreatest, and statements at a fixed discount assume 0<λ<10<\lambda<10<λ<1. Optimality in (1.2) is over stationary randomized policies, as in the paper's proof, and requires both halves: π∗\pi^*π∗ maximizes zλz_\lambdazλ​ and W∗W^*W∗ attains min⁡WR(π∗,W,λ)\min_W R(\pi^*,W,\lambda)minW​R(π∗,W,λ). "Finitely many extreme points" is Mathlib's Set.extremePoints of each factor set. The second sentence of Assumption 2.4 (an optimization oracle) is not formalized.

Explicit choices relative to the printed text:

  • W\mathcal WW nonempty, A\mathbb AA nonempty and λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) are stated explicitly.
  • Proposition 6.1 (both parts) assumes p0(s)>0p_0(s)>0p0​(s)>0 for every state. As printed, it is false when p0p_0p0​ vanishes on a state.
  • The extreme-point claim of Appendix G.1 is posed as the existence of an optimal pair with an extreme factor matrix.
  • The goal (Proposition 6.2) keeps p0p_0p0​ arbitrary.

A goal in which the pair (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) may depend on λ\lambdaλ would only restate milestone 3 and is not robust Blackwell optimality; the pair is quantified before λ0\lambda_0λ0​.

A complete development needs the saddle-point theory of r-rectangular robust MDPs (shared with the first mission of this series), Neumann series and Cramer's rule for I−tLI-tLI−tL, extreme points of products of compact convex sets, and the finiteness of zeros of a nonzero polynomial. The rationality of discounted values and the extreme-point lemmas are reusable for nominal Blackwell optimality and for other robust models. Proofs of any milestone, of the optional Proposition 6.3, and auxiliary lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Goyal and J. Grand-Clément, Robust Markov Decision Process: Beyond Rectangularity, arXiv:1811.00215v8, 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00215, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1259
  • D. Blackwell, Discrete Dynamic Programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • S. Gaubert and J. Gunawardena, A Non-Linear Hierarchy for Discrete Event Dynamical Systems, 1998 (as cited in Goyal and Grand-Clément, reference list, arXiv:1811.00215v8).
  • G. N. Iyengar, Robust Dynamic Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • A. Nilim and L. El Ghaoui, Robust Control of Markov Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Matrices, Operations Research 53, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn and B. Rustem, Robust Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 38, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0566
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity 1: Under r-Rectangular Factor Uncertainty, Robust Value Iteration Converges to the Optimal Worst-Case Value, Attained by a Deterministic PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process (MDP) is optimized for a transition kernel that, in practice, is estimated from data, and the optimal policy for the estimated kernel can perform poorly under small perturbations of it. The robust MDP approach replaces the single kernel by an uncertainty set of kernels and asks for the policy with the best worst-case expected reward. It goes back to Satia and Lave (1973).

Whether a robust MDP is tractable depends on the shape of the uncertainty set.

  • 2005. Iyengar and Nilim and El Ghaoui treat (s,a)-rectangular sets, in which every row PsaP_{sa}Psa​ is chosen independently. An optimal robust policy is stationary and deterministic, and robust value iteration computes it.
  • 2013. Wiesemann, Kuhn and Rustem treat s-rectangular sets. Optimal robust policies are stationary but may need randomization. For general uncertainty sets, computing an optimal robust policy is strongly NP-hard.
  • 2018. Goh et al. introduce factor-based uncertainty for a medical cost-effectiveness application and evaluate the worst case of a fixed policy.
  • 2021–2023. Goyal and Grand-Clément compute optimal robust policies for factor uncertainty with independent factors. This mission formalizes that result.

Rectangular sets let the adversary choose the transitions out of different states independently, which is conservative when all transitions depend on a few common factors, such as a patient's physiology across health states. Factor uncertainty couples the states, and it is the first coupled model in which an optimal robust policy can still be computed.

Setting

There are finite sets of states S\mathbb SS and actions A\mathbb AA, with S=∣S∣S = |\mathbb S|S=∣S∣ and A=∣A∣A=|\mathbb A|A=∣A∣. The rewards satisfy rsa≥0r_{sa}\ge 0rsa​≥0, p0p_0p0​ is an initial distribution on S\mathbb SS, and λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) is the discount factor. Fix rrr factors indexed by [r][r][r] and coefficients usai≥0u^i_{sa}\ge0usai​≥0 with ∑iusai=1\sum_i u^i_{sa}=1∑i​usai​=1. A factor matrix W=(w1,…,wr)W=(w_1,\dots,w_r)W=(w1​,…,wr​) has probability vectors wiw_iwi​ on S\mathbb SS as columns, and it induces the kernel

Psas′=∑i=1rusai wi,s′.P_{sas'}=\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\,w_{i,s'} .Psas′​=i=1∑r​usai​wi,s′​.

The uncertainty set is a nonempty convex compact set W\mathcal WW of factor matrices. It is r-rectangular if W=W1×⋯×Wr\mathcal W=\mathcal W^1\times\cdots\times\mathcal W^rW=W1×⋯×Wr, so that each factor is chosen independently of the others.

A stationary policy π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π gives a distribution πs\pi_sπs​ on A\mathbb AA at each state. It is deterministic if each πs\pi_sπs​ is a point mass. Write rπ=(∑aπsarsa)sr_\pi=(\sum_a\pi_{sa}r_{sa})_srπ​=(∑a​πsa​rsa​)s​ and Tπ=(∑aπsausai)s,iT_\pi=(\sum_a \pi_{sa}u^i_{sa})_{s,i}Tπ​=(∑a​πsa​usai​)s,i​. The decision maker's value function and the expected discounted reward are

vπ,W=∑t≥0λt(TπW⊤)trπ,R(π,W)=p0⊤vπ,W.v^{\pi,W}=\sum_{t\ge0}\lambda^t (T_\pi W^\top)^t r_\pi, \qquad R(\pi,W)=p_0^\top v^{\pi,W}.vπ,W=t≥0∑​λt(Tπ​W⊤)trπ​,R(π,W)=p0⊤​vπ,W.

The policy evaluation problem computes z(π)=min⁡W∈WR(π,W)z(\pi)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)z(π)=minW∈W​R(π,W). The policy improvement problem computes z∗=max⁡π∈Πz(π)z^*=\max_{\pi\in\Pi}z(\pi)z∗=maxπ∈Π​z(π). Let

F(v)s=max⁡a∈A{rsa+λ∑i=1rusaimin⁡wi∈Wiwi⊤v}.F(v)_s=\max_{a\in\mathbb A}\Big\{r_{sa}+\lambda\sum_{i=1}^r u^i_{sa}\min_{w_i\in\mathcal W^i}w_i^\top v\Big\}.F(v)s​=a∈Amax​{rsa​+λi=1∑r​usai​wi​∈Wimin​wi⊤​v}.

Algorithm VI-PI is the iteration v0=0v^0=0v0=0, vk+1=F(vk)v^{k+1}=F(v^k)vk+1=F(vk).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1, by its mathematical content

Assume W\mathcal WW is r-rectangular. Then FFF has a unique fixed point v∗v^*v∗, and

z∗=max⁡π∈Πmin⁡W∈WR(π,W)=p0⊤v∗,vk→v∗.z^*=\max_{\pi\in\Pi}\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)=p_0^\top v^*,\qquad v^k\to v^* .z∗=π∈Πmax​W∈Wmin​R(π,W)=p0⊤​v∗,vk→v∗.

Write θ(ε)=ε(1−λ)(2λ)−1\theta(\varepsilon)=\varepsilon(1-\lambda)(2\lambda)^{-1}θ(ε)=ε(1−λ)(2λ)−1. If ∥vk+1−vk∥∞<θ(ε)\|v^{k+1}-v^k\|_\infty<\theta(\varepsilon)∥vk+1−vk∥∞​<θ(ε), then ∥vk+1−v∗∥∞≤ε\|v^{k+1}-v^*\|_\infty\le\varepsilon∥vk+1−v∗∥∞​≤ε, and the deterministic policy that VI-PI computes at that iteration is ε\varepsilonε-optimal. The test is passed as soon as λkmax⁡r<θ(ε)\lambda^k\max r<\theta(\varepsilon)λkmaxr<θ(ε).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's route to the goal.

  1. The adversary's Bellman recursion (Proposition 3.1).
  2. The identity W⊤vπ,W=βπ,WW^\top v^{\pi,W}=\beta^{\pi,W}W⊤vπ,W=βπ,W (Lemma 4.3).
  3. The resolvent and linear-programming forms of z(π)z(\pi)z(π) (Lemmas A.2, A.3).
  4. The monotone contraction φ(π,⋅)\varphi(\pi,\cdot)φ(π,⋅) (Appendix A).
  5. The reformulation of z(π)z(\pi)z(π) with constraints βi≤min⁡wiwi⊤(rπ+λTπβ)\beta_i\le\min_{w_i}w_i^\top(r_\pi+\lambda T_\pi\beta)βi​≤minwi​​wi⊤​(rπ​+λTπ​β) (Lemma 3.3).
  6. The existence of a deterministic optimal robust policy (Lemma 4.1).
  7. The saddle point and the min-max duality (Theorem 4.2):
max⁡π∈Πmin⁡W∈WR(π,W)=min⁡W∈Wmax⁡π∈ΠR(π,W).\max_{\pi\in\Pi}\min_{W\in\mathcal W}R(\pi,W)=\min_{W\in\mathcal W}\max_{\pi\in\Pi}R(\pi,W).π∈Πmax​W∈Wmin​R(π,W)=W∈Wmin​π∈Πmax​R(π,W).
  1. The monotone contraction FFF (Lemma E.1).
  2. The fixed-point equation (5.1).

Theorem 3.2, the policy-evaluation analogue of the goal (Algorithm VI-PE), is included as a further item.

Significance

The theorem shows that factor uncertainty, in which transitions out of different states are coupled, is as tractable as (s,a)-rectangular uncertainty, provided the factors are independent. An optimal robust policy exists among deterministic stationary policies, the robust and nominal problems share a saddle point, and value iteration on a λ\lambdaλ-contraction computes the robust value. The structure is also what the companion mission builds on: the robust maximum principle and robust Blackwell optimality are derived from (5.1) and Theorem 4.2.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them is formalized: no factor-matrix robust MDP exists in Lean. The platform's robust-MDP items for (s,a)-rectangular sets (Nilim–El Ghaoui, Iyengar) and s-rectangular sets (Wiesemann et al.) are other uncertainty models and do not specialize to this one. A formal proof would also check a printed statement, since one clause of Theorem 4.2 needs correcting (see below).

Difficulty

The obvious argument writes a robust Bellman equation state by state and appeals to the contraction principle. Here that argument fails. Under factor uncertainty the adversary cannot choose the transitions out of each state separately, because one factor wiw_iwi​ enters every row PsaP_{sa}Psa​ with usai>0u^i_{sa}>0usai​>0. Minimizing state by state therefore yields kernels that need not come from a single feasible WWW. The decision maker's equation for vvv does not close on its own.

The step that requires care links two dynamic programs, the decision maker's over S\mathbb SS and the adversary's over [r][r][r], and shows that factor-wise minimization is feasible. That is where r-rectangularity enters. The paper's Appendix A gives an instance in which the factor-wise minimizers are infeasible once a constraint couples the factors.

Formalization scope

  • States and actions are arbitrary finite types. A\mathbb AA is nonempty, and S\mathbb SS is nonempty because p0p_0p0​ is a distribution. Factors are indexed by Fin r (0-based).
  • W\mathcal WW is a set of maps Fin r → S → ℝ whose values are probability vectors. It is nonempty, convex and compact. Nonemptiness is implicit in the paper and explicit here. Wi\mathcal W^iWi is the projection of W\mathcal WW, and r-rectangularity is a hypothesis (IsRRect). Proposition 3.1, Lemmas 4.3, A.2 and A.3, and both contraction statements are stated without it. Lemma 3.3 is stated with it, since it is false without it.
  • Rewards are nonnegative, as on p. 1. The discount satisfies 0<λ<10<\lambda<10<λ<1 in every statement.
  • vπ,Wv^{\pi,W}vπ,W and the adversary's value βπ,W\beta^{\pi,W}βπ,W are discounted sums, never solutions of a Bellman equation by definition. Defining them as fixed points would make Proposition 3.1, Lemma 4.3 and (5.1) true by definition.
  • Every min and max is attained. Statements use IsLeast/IsGreatest, and Lemma A.2 states the invertibility of I−λW⊤TπI-\lambda W^\top T_\piI−λW⊤Tπ​, because Lean's matrix inverse is 000 on singular matrices.
  • FFF is stated with a maximum over actions. The paper (p. 10) says this is equivalent to its maximum over πs∈Δ\pi_s\in\Deltaπs​∈Δ. Lemma E.1 and the contraction of φ\varphiφ are stated on all of RS\mathbb R^SRS and Rr\mathbb R^rRr.
  • Not formalized: the count of arithmetic operations in Theorems 3.2 and 5.1, and the ε\varepsilonε-optimization oracle of Assumption 2.4 that it counts. The iteration count is stated explicitly instead.
  • Corrections. The paper states (4.6) for every robust solution (π∗,W∗)(\pi^*,W^*)(π∗,W∗) with π∗\pi^*π∗ deterministic. That claim is false: a two-state instance has every policy robust-optimal, yet one robust solution is not nominally optimal against its own W∗W^*W∗. Theorem 4.2 and (5.1) are stated in existence form, which is the form the proof of Theorem 5.1 uses.
  • A goal that kept only the convergence vk→v∗v^k\to v^*vk→v∗ would be a different and weaker theorem. The goal also requires z∗=p0⊤v∗z^*=p_0^\top v^*z∗=p0⊤​v∗, the stopping rule, and the ε\varepsilonε-optimality of the computed deterministic policy.

Reusable infrastructure includes the discounted value of a stationary policy for a stochastic matrix, monotone sup-norm contractions with the standard stopping rule, and minimization of linear forms over compact sets. Contributions to any of these are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Goyal, J. Grand-Clément, Robust Markov Decision Processes: Beyond Rectangularity, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:1811.00215v8, 2021 (the version formalized). https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.00215 · https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1259
  • A. Nilim, L. El Ghaoui, Robust control of Markov decision processes with uncertain transition probabilities, Operations Research 53(5), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • G. Iyengar, Robust dynamic programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn, B. Rustem, Robust Markov decision processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 38(1), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0566
  • J. Goh, M. Bayati, S. A. Zenios, S. Singh, D. Moore, Data uncertainty in Markov chains: application to cost-effectiveness analyses of medical innovations, Operations Research 66(3), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1685
  • J. K. Satia, R. L. Lave, Markov decision processes with uncertain transition probabilities, Operations Research 21(3), 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.3.728
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Convergence Analysis of Sampling-Based Decomposition Methods for Risk-Averse Multistage Stochastic Convex Programs 1: Almost Sure Convergence of the Risk-Averse Sampling-Based Decomposition AlgorithmResearch Paper

Motivation

Multistage stochastic programs model sequential decisions under uncertainty: hydro-thermal scheduling, portfolio management and capacity planning are standard examples. Their dynamic programming equations involve recourse functions (cost-to-go functions) of the decision history, which cannot be computed exactly. Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming (SDDP), introduced by Pereira and Pinto in 1991, approximates each recourse function from below by a maximum of affine cuts, built at trial points generated by simulating sampled scenarios. SDDP is the method of choice in the energy industry for long-horizon stochastic planning.

Two extensions motivate this mission. Risk-averse planning replaces the expectation at each stage by a coherent risk measure (for instance the Conditional Value-at-Risk), and many applications have convex but nonlinear stage problems. Guigues (2016) proves that the risk-averse sampling algorithm for convex stage problems converges almost surely.

Timeline.

  • 1991: Pereira and Pinto introduce SDDP for linear multistage problems.
  • 2008: Philpott and Guan prove almost sure finite convergence of SDDP-type methods for linear problems with finitely many scenarios.
  • 2011: Shapiro analyses the sample-average SDDP method and formulates its risk-averse variant with nested conditional risk measures; 2013: Philpott, de Matos and Finardi treat SDDP with coherent risk measures in dual form.
  • 2015: Girardeau, Leclère and Philpott prove almost sure (asymptotic) convergence of sampling-based decomposition methods for risk-neutral multistage stochastic convex programs.
  • 2016: Guigues extends that analysis to risk-averse problems in dual form, with nonlinear constraints and interstage independent processes (arXiv:1408.4439, SIAM J. Optim.); the convergence theorem is Theorem 4.1.

Setting

There are TTT stages with decisions xt∈Rnx_t\in\mathbb R^nxt​∈Rn and a given x0x_0x0​. A history x1:t=(x1,…,xt)x_{1:t}=(x_1,\dots,x_t)x1:t​=(x1​,…,xt​) is identified with the vector [x1;… ;xt]∈Rnt[x_1;\dots;x_t]\in\mathbb R^{nt}[x1​;…;xt​]∈Rnt with its Euclidean norm. The random data ξt\xi_tξt​ are interstage independent (H1). For t≥2t\ge2t≥2, ξt\xi_tξt​ takes MMM values ξt,1,…,ξt,M\xi_{t,1},\dots,\xi_{t,M}ξt,1​,…,ξt,M​ with probabilities Φt,j>0\Phi_{t,j}>0Φt,j​>0, and ξ1\xi_1ξ1​ is deterministic. A realization ξt,j\xi_{t,j}ξt,j​ consists of a cost ft(⋅,Ψt,j)f_t(\cdot,\Psi_{t,j})ft​(⋅,Ψt,j​) with values in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}, convex constraints gt(x0,⋅,Ψt,j)≤0g_t(x_0,\cdot,\Psi_{t,j})\le0gt​(x0​,⋅,Ψt,j​)≤0 and linear constraints ∑τ=0tAt,τ,jxτ=bt,j\sum_{\tau=0}^tA_{t,\tau,j}x_\tau=b_{t,j}∑τ=0t​At,τ,j​xτ​=bt,j​. Together with a compact set Xt\mathcal X_tXt​, they define the feasible set Xt(x0:t−1,ξt,j)X_t(x_{0:t-1},\xi_{t,j})Xt​(x0:t−1​,ξt,j​).

The risk measure of stage ttt is given in dual form,

ρt(Z)=sup⁡p∈Pt∑j=1MpjΦt,jZj,Pt⊆Dt={p≥0:∑jpjΦt,j=1}.\rho_t(Z)=\sup_{p\in\mathcal P_t}\sum_{j=1}^Mp_j\Phi_{t,j}Z_j,\qquad \mathcal P_t\subseteq\mathcal D_t=\Big\{p\ge0:\sum_jp_j\Phi_{t,j}=1\Big\}.ρt​(Z)=p∈Pt​sup​j=1∑M​pj​Φt,j​Zj​,Pt​⊆Dt​={p≥0:j∑​pj​Φt,j​=1}.

The recourse functions satisfy QT+1≡0\mathcal Q_{T+1}\equiv0QT+1​≡0 and, for t=T,…,2t=T,\dots,2t=T,…,2,

Qt(x1:t−1,ξt,j)=inf⁡xt∈Xt(x0:t−1,ξt,j)ft(x1:t,Ψt,j)+Qt+1(x1:t),Qt(x1:t−1)=ρt(Qt(x1:t−1,ξt)).\mathfrak Q_t(x_{1:t-1},\xi_{t,j})=\inf_{x_t\in X_t(x_{0:t-1},\xi_{t,j})}f_t(x_{1:t},\Psi_{t,j})+\mathcal Q_{t+1}(x_{1:t}),\qquad \mathcal Q_t(x_{1:t-1})=\rho_t\big(\mathfrak Q_t(x_{1:t-1},\xi_t)\big).Qt​(x1:t−1​,ξt,j​)=xt​∈Xt​(x0:t−1​,ξt,j​)inf​ft​(x1:t​,Ψt,j​)+Qt+1​(x1:t​),Qt​(x1:t−1​)=ρt​(Qt​(x1:t−1​,ξt​)).

The first-stage value is Q1(x0)=Q1(x0,ξ1)\mathcal Q_1(x_0)=\mathfrak Q_1(x_0,\xi_1)Q1​(x0​)=Q1​(x0​,ξ1​). Assumption (H2) requires convexity, lower semicontinuity and properness of the data, and fixes an ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 such that the costs are finite and the feasible sets nonempty on the ε\varepsilonε-fattening [X1×⋯×Xt−1]ε[\mathcal X_1\times\dots\times\mathcal X_{t-1}]^\varepsilon[X1​×⋯×Xt−1​]ε. It also asks for a relative-interior point of the nonlinear constraints.

Algorithm 1 keeps cutting-plane models Qtk\mathcal Q^k_tQtk​, starting from Qt0≡−∞\mathcal Q^0_t\equiv-\inftyQt0​≡−∞. At iteration kkk it computes decisions xmkx^k_mxmk​ at every node mmm of the scenario tree, by solving the stage problems with Qt+1k−1\mathcal Q^{k-1}_{t+1}Qt+1k−1​ in place of Qt+1\mathcal Q_{t+1}Qt+1​. It then samples one scenario n1k,…,nTkn^k_1,\dots,n^k_Tn1k​,…,nTk​, with indices ξtk\xi^k_tξtk​ satisfying the independence assumption (H3), and adds at each sampled node one cut

θtk+⟨βtk, ⋅−x[nt−1k]k⟩,θtk=∑mpk,mΦmQtk−1(x[n]k,ξm),βtk=∑mpk,mΦmπk,m.\theta^k_t+\langle\beta^k_t,\,\cdot-x^k_{[n^k_{t-1}]}\rangle,\qquad \theta^k_t=\sum_mp_{k,m}\Phi_m\mathfrak Q^{k-1}_t(x^k_{[n]},\xi_m),\quad\beta^k_t=\sum_mp_{k,m}\Phi_m\pi_{k,m}.θtk​+⟨βtk​,⋅−x[nt−1k​]k​⟩,θtk​=m∑​pk,m​Φm​Qtk−1​(x[n]k​,ξm​),βtk​=m∑​pk,m​Φm​πk,m​.

Here pkp^kpk attains the supremum in ρt\rho_tρt​, and πk,m\pi_{k,m}πk,m​ is a subgradient of Qtk−1(⋅,ξm)\mathfrak Q^{k-1}_t(\cdot,\xi_m)Qtk−1​(⋅,ξm​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1 (p. 12)

Almost surely, for t=2,…,T+1t=2,\dots,T+1t=2,…,T+1 and every node nnn of stage t−1t-1t−1,

lim⁡k→∞Qt(x[n]k)−Qtk(x[n]k)=0.\lim_{k\to\infty}\mathcal Q_t(x^k_{[n]})-\mathcal Q^k_t(x^k_{[n]})=0.k→∞lim​Qt​(x[n]k​)−Qtk​(x[n]k​)=0.

Almost surely, moreover, Q1k(x0,ξ1)→Q1(x0)\mathfrak Q^k_1(x_0,\xi_1)\to\mathcal Q_1(x_0)Q1k​(x0​,ξ1​)→Q1​(x0​), and every accumulation point of the first-stage decisions (x1k)(x^k_1)(x1k​) is an optimal solution of the first-stage problem.

Milestones

  • Proposition 2.2: subgradient bound ∥s∥≤(M0−m0)/ε\|s\|\le(M_0-m_0)/\varepsilon∥s∥≤(M0​−m0​)/ε for the value function of a convex program.
  • Proposition 3.1: Qt\mathcal Q_tQt​ is convex, finite and continuous on [X1×⋯×Xt−1]ε^[\mathcal X_1\times\dots\times\mathcal X_{t-1}]^{\hat\varepsilon}[X1​×⋯×Xt−1​]ε^, 0<ε^<ε0<\hat\varepsilon<\varepsilon0<ε^<ε.
  • Lemma 3.2: valid cuts Qtk≤Qt\mathcal Q^k_t\le\mathcal Q_tQtk​≤Qt​, bounded cut coefficients and slopes, and Lipschitz models for k≥T−t+1k\ge T-t+1k≥T−t+1.
  • Lemma 3.4: Qtk(x[nt−1k]k)=θtk\mathcal Q^k_t(x^k_{[n^k_{t-1}]})=\theta^k_tQtk​(x[nt−1k​]k​)=θtk​.
  • Lemma 3.5: a uniform Lipschitz constant LLL for the models.
  • (4.26), (4.28), (4.29), (4.31): the steps of the proof of Theorem 4.1. These are the error propagation along the tree, the limit along the iterations through a node, the almost sure limit along the other iterations, and the first-stage bound.

Significance

Theorem 4.1 guarantees that the algorithm's lower bound Q1k(x0,ξ1)\mathfrak Q^k_1(x_0,\xi_1)Q1k​(x0​,ξ1​) converges to the true risk-averse optimal value, and that its first-stage decisions approach optimal ones. It covers nonlinear convex stages, where finite convergence arguments for polyhedral problems do not apply. It also covers every risk measure with a dual representation, including CV@R and its combinations with expectation. Practitioners rely on this to justify stopping rules based on the lower bound.

The result is proved on paper. To our knowledge neither Theorem 4.1 nor its risk-neutral counterpart (Girardeau–Leclère–Philpott, Theorem 3.1) has been machine-checked; the risk-neutral statements are posed, unproved, on this platform. A formalization would check a proof that combines convex analysis (value functions of convex programs, subgradient bounds, Lipschitz continuity on fattenings), cutting-plane bookkeeping and a probabilistic argument (strong law of large numbers along a predictable subsequence).

Difficulty

The cuts are built only along sampled scenarios, so at a given node the approximation is refined only at the iterations whose scenario passes through it. The obvious induction argument controls the error Qt−Qtk\mathcal Q_t-\mathcal Q^k_tQt​−Qtk​ only along those iterations. Extending it to all iterations is the probabilistic core (4.29). It needs the samples to be independent of everything the algorithm has computed so far, and it needs a strong law of large numbers along the subsequence of iterations at which the error is still large. A second difficulty is passing from the current model Qt+1k\mathcal Q^k_{t+1}Qt+1k​ to the previous one Qt+1k−1\mathcal Q^{k-1}_{t+1}Qt+1k−1​. This needs uniform Lipschitz bounds on the models (Lemmas 3.2, 3.5), which in turn rest on the fattening in (H2) and on the subgradient bound of Proposition 2.2.

Formalization scope

  • Histories and norms. Histories are L2L^2L2 products of copies of Rn\mathbb R^nRn (PiLp 2), so fattenings, inner products and Lipschitz constants use the Euclidean norm on Rn(t−1)\mathbb R^{n(t-1)}Rn(t−1). Fattenings are closed thickenings.
  • Extended reals. Values are in EReal, infima are +∞+\infty+∞ on empty feasible sets, and weights pjΦt,jp_j\Phi_{t,j}pj​Φt,j​ are real numbers (with 0⋅(±∞)=00\cdot(\pm\infty)=00⋅(±∞)=0). Limits of gaps are taken in EReal, so that convergence to 000 forces the gaps to become finite.
  • Data and indices. The recourse functions are constructed by the backward recursion from the data. The scenario tree is the product tree indexed by histories of realization indices, so (H1) is built into the model. Stage 1 uses the data of the first realization index.
  • Runs. A run is pinned to fixed deterministic choice rules (minimizers, maximizing pkp^kpk, subgradients), so it uses only present and past samples. The goal holds for every choice of rules.
  • Departures from the printed text, disclosed in the items.
    • The cut slope πk,m\pi_{k,m}πk,m​ is any subgradient of Qtk−1(⋅,ξm)\mathfrak Q^{k-1}_t(\cdot,\xi_m)Qtk−1​(⋅,ξm​). The printed formula on p. 9 uses a partial subgradient of ftf_tft​, which is not a subgradient when ftf_tft​ is nonsmooth, and the proof only uses the subgradient property.
    • Pt≠∅\mathcal P_t\ne\emptysetPt​=∅ is assumed; it is implicit, because ρt\rho_tρt​ is a real-valued coherent risk measure.
    • In Proposition 2.2, M0M_0M0​ is an extended-real supremum. The proof's claim that M0M_0M0​ is finite does not follow from lower semicontinuity.
    • Lemma 3.2's vacuous "almost surely" is dropped.
    • One ε\varepsilonε serves all stages in (H2).
  • Ruled out. A formalization in which the decisions or cuts ignore the models, or in which Pt=∅\mathcal P_t=\emptysetPt​=∅ or every stage value is +∞+\infty+∞, would make the limits trivial. The decisions must minimize against Qt+1k−1\mathcal Q^{k-1}_{t+1}Qt+1k−1​, the cut must use the attained supremum, and the companion item run_exists shows that under (H2), with closed Pt\mathcal P_tPt​, rules producing a run exist for every sample path.
  • Infrastructure and contributions. A complete development needs value functions of parametric convex programs, subgradient bounds for convex functions on fattenings, Lipschitz continuity of finite maxima of affine functions, and a strong law of large numbers along predictably selected subsequences (Lemma A.3 of Girardeau–Leclère–Philpott). The last two are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone, or to these general lemmas, are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Guigues, Convergence analysis of sampling-based decomposition methods for risk-averse multistage stochastic convex programs, SIAM J. Optim. 26(4), 2016; preprint arXiv:1408.4439v4. https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.4439
  • P. Girardeau, V. Leclère, A. B. Philpott, On the convergence of decomposition methods for multistage stochastic convex programs, Math. Oper. Res. 40(1), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0664
  • M. V. F. Pereira, L. M. V. G. Pinto, Multi-stage stochastic optimization applied to energy planning, Math. Program. 52, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582895
  • A. B. Philpott, Z. Guan, On the convergence of stochastic dual dynamic programming and related methods, Oper. Res. Lett. 36(4), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2008.01.013
  • A. B. Philpott, V. L. de Matos, E. Finardi, On solving multistage stochastic programs with coherent risk measures, Oper. Res. 61(4), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2013.1175
  • A. Shapiro, Analysis of stochastic dual dynamic programming method, European J. Oper. Res. 209(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.007
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Decomposition Methods for Multistage Stochastic Convex Programs 2: Under τ-Admissible Random Node Selection, Cuts Become Exact Almost Surely at Every Tree NodeResearch Paper

Motivation

Stochastic dual dynamic programming (SDDP) and its relatives are the standard algorithms for multistage stochastic programs: hydro-thermal scheduling, energy storage and long-horizon capacity planning are solved with them in industry. They approximate each future cost function from below by a maximum of affine cuts, compute new cuts only at a few randomly chosen nodes of the scenario tree, and use the current approximations to simulate decisions forward. Whether such sampled cutting-plane schemes converge, and in what sense, decides whether their bounds can be trusted.

  • Pereira and Pinto (1991) introduced SDDP for multistage stochastic linear programs.
  • Chen and Powell (1999) proposed CUPPS, which samples a single scenario per iteration.
  • Philpott and Guan (2008) proved almost-sure convergence in finitely many iterations of DOASA and SDDP-type methods for linear stage problems with stagewise independent data, using the finiteness of the set of possible cuts.
  • Girardeau, Leclère and Philpott (2015) removed linearity: stage problems are convex with compact feasible sets, the data need not be stagewise independent, and the node selection is any τ-admissible random process. Convergence is then asymptotic, not finite.

This mission formalizes the stochastic part (§3) of the 2015 paper. Mission 1 of the series covers its deterministic part (§2).

Setting

A finite scenario tree has nodes N\mathcal NN, root 000, parent map ppp, children r(n)r(n)r(n), leaves L\mathcal LL, and node probabilities Φn>0\Phi_n>0Φn​>0 with Φ0=1\Phi_0=1Φ0​=1 and Φn=∑m∈r(n)Φm\Phi_n=\sum_{m\in r(n)}\Phi_mΦn​=∑m∈r(n)​Φm​. Every node m≠0m\neq0m=0 carries a control multifunction Um:Rd⇉Rp\mathcal U_m:\mathbb R^d\rightrightarrows\mathbb R^pUm​:Rd⇉Rp, a cost Cm(x,u)∈R∪{+∞}C_m(x,u)\in\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}Cm​(x,u)∈R∪{+∞} and linear dynamics xm=fm(xp(m),um)x_m=f_m(x_{p(m)},u_m)xm​=fm​(xp(m)​,um​); every node carries a compact convex stock set Xn\mathcal X_nXn​; leaves carry final costs VmV_mVm​. The future cost functions are defined backwards by (20):

Vn(x)=∑m∈r(n)ΦmΦnmin⁡u∈Um(x)Cm(x,u)+Vm(fm(x,u))⏟Wm(x,u),x∈Xn.V_n(x)=\sum_{m\in r(n)}\frac{\Phi_m}{\Phi_n}\min_{u\in\mathcal U_m(x)}\underbrace{C_m(x,u)+V_m\big(f_m(x,u)\big)}_{W_m(x,u)},\qquad x\in\mathcal X_n .Vn​(x)=m∈r(n)∑​Φn​Φm​​u∈Um​(x)min​Wm​(x,u)Cm​(x,u)+Vm​(fm​(x,u))​​,x∈Xn​.

Assumptions (H2)(H_2)(H2​) ask for convex, lower semicontinuous, proper costs, convex compact-valued convex multifunctions Um\mathcal U_mUm​, Lipschitz final costs, and an extended relatively complete recourse condition: feasibility and finite cost on a δ\deltaδ-neighbourhood of every Xn\mathcal X_nXn​.

The algorithm keeps approximations VnkV^{k}_nVnk​, starting from Vn−1≡−∞V^{-1}_n\equiv-\inftyVn−1​≡−∞. At iteration kkk it simulates the whole tree with Vk−1V^{k-1}Vk−1, producing stocks xnkx^k_nxnk​ and controls umku^k_mumk​. Cuts θnk+⟨βnk,⋅−xnk⟩\theta^k_n+\langle\beta^k_n,\cdot-x^k_n\rangleθnk​+⟨βnk​,⋅−xnk​⟩ are computed at the selected nodes by solving the stage problems (21) at their children and averaging optimal values and Lagrange multipliers with weights Φm/Φn\Phi_m/\Phi_nΦm​/Φn​. Every approximation is then updated by (22), Vnk=max⁡(Vnk−1,cut)V^k_n=\max(V^{k-1}_n,\text{cut})Vnk​=max(Vnk−1​,cut). The selections ynk∈{0,1}y^k_n\in\{0,1\}ynk​∈{0,1} form a random process. It is τ-admissible (Definition 1) when, inside each block of τ\tauτ iterations, cuts are computed backwards along the tree, and when the block indicators y~nk=max⁡κ<τynkτ+κ\tilde y^k_n=\max_{\kappa<\tau}y^{k\tau+\kappa}_ny~​nk​=maxκ<τ​ynkτ+κ​ are i.i.d. in kkk, independent of the past, and equal to 111 with positive probability.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

Under (H2)(H_2)(H2​) and a τ-admissible selection process, almost surely, for every non-leaf node nnn and every node nnn respectively,

lim⁡k→∞∑m∈r(n)ΦmΦnWm(xnkτ,umkτ)−Vn(xnkτ)=0,lim⁡k→∞Vn(xnkτ)−Vnkτ(xnkτ)=0.\lim_{k\to\infty}\sum_{m\in r(n)}\frac{\Phi_m}{\Phi_n}W_m\big(x^{k\tau}_n,u^{k\tau}_m\big)-V_n\big(x^{k\tau}_n\big)=0,\qquad \lim_{k\to\infty}V_n\big(x^{k\tau}_n\big)-V^{k\tau}_n\big(x^{k\tau}_n\big)=0 .k→∞lim​m∈r(n)∑​Φn​Φm​​Wm​(xnkτ​,umkτ​)−Vn​(xnkτ​)=0,k→∞lim​Vn​(xnkτ​)−Vnkτ​(xnkτ​)=0.

The decisions become optimal for the true problem and the approximations become exact at the visited stocks. Nothing is claimed about exactness elsewhere in the state space.

Milestones

  • (26): every new cut is tight at the stock where it is computed.
  • Lemma 3.1 (i)–(iii): the VnV_nVn​ are convex and Lipschitz on Xn\mathcal X_nXn​; the approximations are lower bounds; finite approximations are uniformly Lipschitz.
  • Lemma 3.2: exact approximations at the children make the decisions at a node asymptotically optimal.
  • Lemma 5.3: under Definition 1 (i), a node selected inside a block is visited at the stock and with the approximation it had at the start of the block.
  • Lemma 5.4: the terms of an i.i.d. sequence selected by a predictable rule are again i.i.d. with the same law.
  • (32): exactness along the iterations at which a node is selected.

Significance

The theorem covers in one statement CUPPS (1-admissible), DOASA and SDDP ((T−1)(T-1)(T−1)-admissible), and many other sampling schemes, for stage problems that are convex rather than linear and for scenario trees without stagewise independence. It shows that the lower bound produced by these methods converges to the optimal value along the simulated trajectories.

The result is proved on paper. It is not formalized anywhere: no proof assistant library contains SDDP-type algorithms for convex stage problems. This mission makes the algorithm, the τ-admissibility notion and the convergence statement precise. Formalizing them corrects slips of the printed statements: the lower-bound property holds on the affine hull of Xn\mathcal X_nXn​ only, the boundedness of the cut slopes concerns finite cuts only, and the theorem's two limits concern different node sets. The rest of the work is the formalization of the published proof.

Difficulty

The deterministic argument (mission 1) shows exactness at stage ttt from exactness at stage t+1t+1t+1 along the whole iteration sequence. In the stochastic case a node is updated only at the random iterations at which it is selected, while its stock xnkτx^{k\tau}_nxnkτ​ moves at every iteration. Exactness along the selected iterations (32) does not transfer to the others: a selection rule that updated a node only when its stock lay in a given region would leave the approximation inexact elsewhere. The proof has to show that the iterations at which the approximation is still ε\varepsilonε-inexact are, by independence, selected with positive frequency. This requires the event "kkk is ε\varepsilonε-inexact" to be measurable with respect to the past selections, so the algorithm's choices among multiple minimisers and multipliers must be deterministic (footnote 6). It also requires the optional-skipping Lemma 5.4 and the strong law of large numbers. The first idea of conditioning on the stocks directly fails because the stocks depend on all past selections.

Formalization scope

  • Spaces and values. Stocks in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), controls in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p). Costs and value functions take values in EReal; convexity is epigraph convexity; Vn=+∞V_n=+\inftyVn​=+∞ off Xn\mathcal X_nXn​; the initial approximation is −∞-\infty−∞. Limits are EReal limits, so convergence to 000 forces the differences to be finite eventually.
  • Tree. The platform definition StochasticProg.Multistage.Tree (a finite rooted tree with stages) is referenced; leaves, ascendents and node probabilities are defined on it. Costs are indexed by the child node as in (19a) and (20).
  • Standing assumptions, all disclosed in the items: (H2)(1)(H_2)(1)(H2​)(1)–(6)(6)(6) clause by clause, with the full ball B(δ)B(\delta)B(δ) of (H2)(6)(H_2)(6)(H2​)(6) as printed; x0∈X0x_0\in\mathcal X_0x0​∈X0​; Φ\PhiΦ are node probabilities.
  • Algorithm. A run is a predicate on the generated data (stocks, controls, cut values and slopes, approximations). Minimisers, Lagrange multipliers and subgradients are chosen by fixed rules, functions of the stage problem only (footnote 6), so a run is determined by its selection path. Lagrange multipliers of (21b) are encoded by the subgradient inequality of the optimal value of (21) on Aff⁡(Xn)\operatorname{Aff}(\mathcal X_n)Aff(Xn​), with the multiplier in its direction space. The Lean index is shifted: Vc k is the paper's Vk−1V^{k-1}Vk−1.
  • Selections. yky^kyk are measurable Bool-valued maps on a probability space; Definition 1 (i) holds on every path; (ii) is per node, i.i.d. in kkk and independent of σ(yk′:k′<kτ)\sigma(y^{k'}:k'<k\tau)σ(yk′:k′<kτ), with no independence across nodes.
  • Ruling out trivializations. The goal's hypotheses are only (H2)(H_2)(H2​), the choice rules, a run on every sample path, measurable selections and τ-admissibility. The companion statement run_exists shows that runs exist for every selection path, and a sanity check shows (H2)(H_2)(H2​) and τ-admissibility are satisfiable, so the goal is not vacuous. Its conclusion mentions none of the proof's auxiliary objects.
  • Infrastructure. The development needs marginal functions of convex problems over convex multifunctions, subdifferentiability of finite convex functions on affine hulls, Lipschitz bounds for maxima of affine functions, and the optional-skipping Lemma 5.4. Lemma 5.4 is a self-contained probability statement and is reusable on its own. Lemma 5.2 of the paper (a Dini-type lemma) is posed in mission 1. Proofs of any milestone, and of auxiliary lemmas on EReal-valued convex functions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Girardeau, V. Leclère, A. B. Philpott, On the Convergence of Decomposition Methods for Multistage Stochastic Convex Programs, Mathematics of Operations Research 40(1), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0664 (author's version: https://hal.science/hal-01208295v1)
  • A. B. Philpott, Z. Guan, On the convergence of stochastic dual dynamic programming and related methods, Operations Research Letters 36(4), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2008.01.013
  • Z. L. Chen, W. B. Powell, Convergent cutting-plane and partial-sampling algorithm for multistage stochastic linear programs with recourse, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 102(3), pp. 497–524, 1999 (reference [1] of the paper).
  • M. V. F. Pereira, L. M. V. G. Pinto, Multi-stage stochastic optimization applied to energy planning, Mathematical Programming 52, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582895
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Control TheoryPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Viscosity Solutions to Parabolic Master Equations and McKean–Vlasov SDEs with Closed-Loop Controls 3: The Closed-Loop McKean–Vlasov Value Function Is a Viscosity Solution of the HJB Master EquationResearch Paper

Motivation

Mean field control asks a central planner to steer a large population of interacting agents. Each agent's state follows a stochastic differential equation whose coefficients depend on the agent's own state and on the empirical distribution of the population; as the population grows, the system is described by a single McKean–Vlasov equation whose coefficients depend on the law of the solution itself. The planner's value is then a function V(t,μ)V(t,\mu)V(t,μ) of time and of a probability measure, and its dynamic programming equation, the HJB master equation, is a partial differential equation on the Wasserstein space of measures.

C. Wu and J. Zhang (Ann. Appl. Probab. 30(2), 2020) develop a viscosity theory for such master equations in a path-dependent setting and apply it to McKean–Vlasov control with closed-loop controls, i.e. controls that depend on the observed state path rather than on the driving Brownian motion. Closed-loop information is the natural one when the noise is not observable, and it is the information structure relevant for games; but the value function is then not known to be smooth, so classical solutions are out of reach. This mission formalizes the paper's §5: the value function of the closed-loop problem with piecewise constant controls is a viscosity solution of the HJB master equation.

Setting

Fix d≥1d\ge1d≥1 and a horizon TTT. The path space is Ω=C([0,T],Rd)\Omega=C([0,T],\mathbb R^d)Ω=C([0,T],Rd) with the uniform norm, the canonical process is Xs(ω)=ωsX_s(\omega)=\omega_sXs​(ω)=ωs​, and F=(Ft)\mathbb F=(\mathcal F_t)F=(Ft​) is its natural filtration. P2\mathcal P_2P2​ is the set of probability measures μ\muμ on Ω\OmegaΩ with Eμ[∥X∥2]<∞\mathbb E^\mu[\|X\|^2]<\inftyEμ[∥X∥2]<∞; μ[0,t]\mu_{[0,t]}μ[0,t]​ is the law of the stopped path Xt∧⋅X_{t\wedge\cdot}Xt∧⋅​. On Θ=[0,T]×P2\Theta=[0,T]\times\mathcal P_2Θ=[0,T]×P2​ the pseudometric is

W2((t,μ),(t′,μ′))=(∣t−t′∣+W22(μ[0,t],μ[0,t′]′))1/2,\mathcal W_2\big((t,\mu),(t',\mu')\big)=\big(|t-t'|+\mathcal W_2^2(\mu_{[0,t]},\mu'_{[0,t']})\big)^{1/2},W2​((t,μ),(t′,μ′))=(∣t−t′∣+W22​(μ[0,t]​,μ[0,t′]′​))1/2,

with W2\mathcal W_2W2​ the 2-Wasserstein distance on laws of paths.

The data are a control set AAA and coefficients b(t,ω,μ,a)∈Rdb(t,\omega,\mu,a)\in\mathbb R^db(t,ω,μ,a)∈Rd, σ(t,ω,μ,a)∈Rd×d\sigma(t,\omega,\mu,a)\in\mathbb R^{d\times d}σ(t,ω,μ,a)∈Rd×d, f(t,ω,μ,a)∈Rf(t,\omega,\mu,a)\in\mathbb Rf(t,ω,μ,a)∈R, g(ω,μ)∈Rg(\omega,\mu)\in\mathbb Rg(ω,μ)∈R satisfying Assumption 5.1: measurability and adaptedness, boundedness of b,σb,\sigmab,σ by C0C_0C0​, Lipschitz continuity of b,σb,\sigmab,σ and uniform continuity of f,gf,gf,g in (ω,μ)(\omega,\mu)(ω,μ), local uniform continuity in ttt, and positive definiteness of σσ⊤\sigma\sigma^\topσσ⊤.

An admissible control α∈At\alpha\in\mathcal A_tα∈At​ (5.3) is piecewise constant: αs=∑i<nhi1[ti,ti+1)(s)\alpha_s=\sum_{i<n}h_i\mathbf 1_{[t_i,t_{i+1})}(s)αs​=∑i<n​hi​1[ti​,ti+1​)​(s) for a partition t=t0<⋯<tn=Tt=t_0<\dots<t_n=Tt=t0​<⋯<tn​=T, with hi:Ω→Ah_i:\Omega\to Ahi​:Ω→A Fti\mathcal F_{t_i}Fti​​-measurable. The controlled law Pt,μ,α∈P2\mathbb P^{t,\mu,\alpha}\in\mathcal P_2Pt,μ,α∈P2​ agrees with μ\muμ on [0,t][0,t][0,t] and solves, for a Brownian motion BαB^\alphaBα,

Xs=Xt+∫tsb(r,Xr∧⋅,P[0,r]t,μ,α,αr)dr+∫tsσ(r,Xr∧⋅,P[0,r]t,μ,α,αr)dBrα,s∈[t,T].X_s=X_t+\int_t^s b\big(r,X_{r\wedge\cdot},\mathbb P^{t,\mu,\alpha}_{[0,r]},\alpha_r\big)dr+\int_t^s\sigma\big(r,X_{r\wedge\cdot},\mathbb P^{t,\mu,\alpha}_{[0,r]},\alpha_r\big)dB^\alpha_r,\quad s\in[t,T].Xs​=Xt​+∫ts​b(r,Xr∧⋅​,P[0,r]t,μ,α​,αr​)dr+∫ts​σ(r,Xr∧⋅​,P[0,r]t,μ,α​,αr​)dBrα​,s∈[t,T].

The value function (3.20) is

V(t,μ)=sup⁡α∈AtEPt,μ,α[g(X,Pt,μ,α)+∫tTf(s,X,Pt,μ,α,αs) ds],V(t,\mu)=\sup_{\alpha\in\mathcal A_t}\mathbb E^{\mathbb P^{t,\mu,\alpha}}\Big[g(X,\mathbb P^{t,\mu,\alpha})+\int_t^Tf(s,X,\mathbb P^{t,\mu,\alpha},\alpha_s)\,ds\Big],V(t,μ)=α∈At​sup​EPt,μ,α[g(X,Pt,μ,α)+∫tT​f(s,X,Pt,μ,α,αs​)ds],

and V0V_0V0​ is the same supremum over the controls At0\mathcal A^0_tAt0​ (5.12) whose pieces depend on the path before ttt only through finitely many values Xs1,…,XsmX_{s_1},\dots,X_{s_m}Xs1​​,…,Xsm​​.

The HJB master equation (3.22) is LV=0\mathbb LV=0LV=0 with LV(t,μ)=∂tV(t,μ)+G(t,μ,∂μV(t,μ,⋅),∂ω∂μV(t,μ,⋅))\mathbb LV(t,\mu)=\partial_tV(t,\mu)+G(t,\mu,\partial_\mu V(t,\mu,\cdot),\partial_\omega\partial_\mu V(t,\mu,\cdot))LV(t,μ)=∂t​V(t,μ)+G(t,μ,∂μ​V(t,μ,⋅),∂ω​∂μ​V(t,μ,⋅)), where

G(t,μ,Z,Γ)=Eμ[sup⁡a∈A(12Γ(X):σσ⊤(t,X,μ,a)+Z(X)⋅b(t,X,μ,a)+f(t,X,μ,a))].G(t,\mu,Z,\Gamma)=\mathbb E^\mu\Big[\sup_{a\in A}\Big(\tfrac12\Gamma(X):\sigma\sigma^\top(t,X,\mu,a)+Z(X)\cdot b(t,X,\mu,a)+f(t,X,\mu,a)\Big)\Big].G(t,μ,Z,Γ)=Eμ[a∈Asup​(21​Γ(X):σσ⊤(t,X,μ,a)+Z(X)⋅b(t,X,μ,a)+f(t,X,μ,a))].

Viscosity solutions (Definition 4.4) are defined by test functions φ\varphiφ that satisfy a functional Itô formula on [t,t+δ]×PL(t,μ)[t,t+\delta]\times\mathcal P_L(t,\mu)[t,t+δ]×PL​(t,μ), where PL(t,μ)\mathcal P_L(t,\mu)PL​(t,μ) is the set of laws agreeing with μ\muμ on [0,t][0,t][0,t] under which XXX is a semimartingale on [t,T][t,T][t,T] with drift and diffusion bounded by LLL, and touch VVV from above or below at (t,μ)(t,\mu)(t,μ) on that set.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.8

Under Assumption 5.1, VVV is finite on Θ\ThetaΘ and is a viscosity solution of (3.22).

Milestones

  • (4.1)(4.1)(4.1): sup⁡P∈PL(t,μ)EP[sup⁡t≤s≤t+δ∣Xt,s∣p]≤Cp,Lδp/2\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_L(t,\mu)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}[\sup_{t\le s\le t+\delta}|X_{t,s}|^p]\le C_{p,L}\delta^{p/2}supP∈PL​(t,μ)​EP[supt≤s≤t+δ​∣Xt,s​∣p]≤Cp,L​δp/2.
  • Remark 5.4(i): (3.18) has a unique solution, and it lies in PL(t,μ)\mathcal P_L(t,\mu)PL​(t,μ) for L≥C0∨12C02L\ge C_0\vee\frac12C_0^2L≥C0​∨21​C02​.
  • Remark 5.4(ii): the dynamic programming principle (3.21),
V(t1,μ)=sup⁡α∈At1[V(t2,Pt1,μ,α)+∫t1t2EPt1,μ,α[f(s,X,Pt1,μ,α,αs)]ds].V(t_1,\mu)=\sup_{\alpha\in\mathcal A_{t_1}}\Big[V(t_2,\mathbb P^{t_1,\mu,\alpha})+\int_{t_1}^{t_2}\mathbb E^{\mathbb P^{t_1,\mu,\alpha}}[f(s,X,\mathbb P^{t_1,\mu,\alpha},\alpha_s)]ds\Big].V(t1​,μ)=α∈At1​​sup​[V(t2​,Pt1​,μ,α)+∫t1​t2​​EPt1​,μ,α[f(s,X,Pt1​,μ,α,αs​)]ds].
  • Lemma 5.11: a coupling construction with an independent Brownian motion.
  • Lemma 5.13: ∣V0(t,μ)−V0(t,ν)∣≤ρ(W2(μ[0,t],ν[0,t]))|V_0(t,\mu)-V_0(t,\nu)|\le\rho(\mathcal W_2(\mu_{[0,t]},\nu_{[0,t]}))∣V0​(t,μ)−V0​(t,ν)∣≤ρ(W2​(μ[0,t]​,ν[0,t]​)) for a modulus ρ\rhoρ.
  • Lemma 5.14: V=V0V=V_0V=V0​.
  • Theorem 5.7: ∣V(t1,μ)−V(t2,ν)∣≤Cρ(W2((t1,μ),(t2,ν)))+C[1+W2(μ[0,t1],δ{0})][t2−t1]|V(t_1,\mu)-V(t_2,\nu)|\le C\rho(\mathcal W_2((t_1,\mu),(t_2,\nu)))+C[1+\mathcal W_2(\mu_{[0,t_1]},\delta_{\{0\}})][t_2-t_1]∣V(t1​,μ)−V(t2​,ν)∣≤Cρ(W2​((t1​,μ),(t2​,ν)))+C[1+W2​(μ[0,t1​]​,δ{0}​)][t2​−t1​], and uniform continuity when fff is bounded.

Significance

The result characterizes the closed-loop value function through a PDE on the space of path laws without assuming any smoothness of VVV. Combined with a comparison principle for (3.22), which the paper leaves open, it would identify the closed-loop and open-loop values (Remark 5.9). The regularity result (Theorem 5.7) is itself delicate: Example 5.6 shows that a natural restricted class of closed-loop controls produces a value function that is discontinuous in μ\muμ, and the piecewise constant class (5.3) is chosen to avoid this.

The theorems are proved in the paper; none of them is formalized. A formalization would supply a machine-checked path from a path-dependent McKean–Vlasov control problem to its HJB master equation, together with reusable statements on weak solutions of path-dependent McKean–Vlasov equations, their uniform moment bounds, and the dynamic programming principle in the Wasserstein space.

Difficulty

Definition 4.4 requires V∈C0(Θ)V\in C^0(\Theta)V∈C0(Θ), and the central difficulty is continuity in μ\muμ. Closed-loop controls are functions of the observed path; changing the initial law from μ\muμ to ν\nuν changes the information available to the control, and when ν[0,t]\nu_{[0,t]}ν[0,t]​ is degenerate a control adapted to μ\muμ cannot be written as a function of the ν\nuν-path. The obvious argument, transporting an ε\varepsilonε-optimal control for μ\muμ along an optimal coupling of μ\muμ and ν\nuν, fails for exactly this reason (Example 5.6).

Formalization scope

Time is R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​ and every statement quantifies over t≤Tt\le Tt≤T and μ∈P2\mu\in\mathcal P_2μ∈P2​. Paths are continuous maps [0,T]→Rd[0,T]\to\mathbb R^d[0,T]→Rd with the sup norm and Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra; W2\mathcal W_2W2​ is the published WassersteinDRO.Duality.wassersteinDistance with p=2p=2p=2. Brownian motion and Itô integrals are the published EthierKurtz.IsStandardBrownian and EthierKurtz.HasBrownianItoIntegral.

Committed conventions:

  • The control set AAA is a nonempty Polish space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra (the paper says "some appropriate set AAA"); this provides continuity in aaa, measurability of hih_ihi​ and of ω↦sup⁡aG2\omega\mapsto\sup_aG_2ω↦supa​G2​.
  • "Progressively measurable in all variables" is joint measurability (Giry σ\sigmaσ-algebra on laws) plus adaptedness in ω\omegaω and μ\muμ. The bound ∣σ∣≤C0|\sigma|\le C_0∣σ∣≤C0​ uses the Frobenius norm; the joint Lipschitz bound on (b,σ)(b,\sigma)(b,σ) is two bounds with the same L0L_0L0​. δ{0}\delta_{\{0\}}δ{0}​ is the Dirac mass at the zero path.
  • (3.18) is solved in the weak sense: a law with a semimartingale representation, carrying its own Brownian motion, whose characteristics are the controlled coefficients on [t,T)[t,T)[t,T). PL(t,μ)\mathcal P_L(t,\mu)PL​(t,μ) is defined through the same representations.
  • VVV and V0V_0V0​ are suprema in the extended reals over admissible pairs; statements that subtract values or use VVV as a real function assert finiteness explicitly.
  • Test functions carry their derivatives as witnesses; the Itô formula of Definition 4.2 is stated in drift form for every representation; "inf⁡(φ−V)=0\inf(\varphi-V)=0inf(φ−V)=0" is read as φ−V≥0\varphi-V\ge0φ−V≥0 on the test set with equality at (t,μ)(t,\mu)(t,μ), and the test function's data at (t,μ)(t,\mu)(t,μ) are those at (t,P)(t,\mathbb P)(t,P) for P∈PL(t,μ)\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_L(t,\mu)P∈PL​(t,μ).
  • Statements are for general ddd; §5.3 of the paper argues for d=1d=1d=1 only.

The test classes are not vacuous: constant functions satisfy every clause of the test-function class, and Assumption 5.1 holds for b≡0b\equiv0b≡0, σ≡I\sigma\equiv Iσ≡I, f≡g≡0f\equiv g\equiv0f≡g≡0. A formalization that makes PL(t,μ)\mathcal P_L(t,\mu)PL​(t,μ) or the admissible set empty, or that lets VVV be −∞-\infty−∞, does not prove the theorem.

Needed infrastructure: weak existence and uniqueness for path-dependent McKean–Vlasov SDEs with Lipschitz coefficients; Burkholder–Davis–Gundy-type moment bounds; measurable selection on Polish spaces; couplings and gluing on P2\mathcal P_2P2​ of a path space. The moment bound and the McKean–Vlasov well-posedness are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Wu, J. Zhang, Viscosity solutions to parabolic master equations and McKean–Vlasov SDEs with closed-loop controls, Ann. Appl. Probab. 30(2), 936–986, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1214/19-AAP1521
  • R. Carmona, F. Delarue, Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I, Springer, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58920-6
  • D. Lacker, Limit theory for controlled McKean–Vlasov dynamics, SIAM J. Control Optim. 55(3), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1137/16M1095895
  • I. Ekren, N. Touzi, J. Zhang, Viscosity solutions of fully nonlinear parabolic path dependent PDEs: Part I, Ann. Probab. 44(2), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1214/14-AOP999
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