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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers III: At Low Uncertainty the Platform's Optimal Loan Rate Is Below the Risk-Free Rate Exactly When Production Cost Is HighResearch Paper

Small third-party sellers on e-commerce marketplaces often lack working capital to buy inventory. Two financing channels compete for them. Under trade credit, the supplier ships now and is paid after sales, bearing the seller's default risk. Under platform financing, the marketplace itself (Amazon Lending, Alibaba's microloans, JD's supply-chain finance)…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance: Equilibrium Common Ownership Decreases in Managers' Ability to Divert Profits and Increases in the Cost of MonitoringResearch Paper

Large asset managers now hold significant stakes in many competing firms at once. When the same investor owns shares in rival firms, managers who weigh that investor's interests have an incentive to compete less hard, which raises industry profits at consumers' expense. This "softening of competition" effect is the subject of a large empirical and antitrust…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 2: In Selling Data Appends with Costs Below the Prior Mean, the High-Cost Plan Is Efficient and the Low-Cost Plan Carries Less Information If φ < 1/2 and More If φ > 1/2Research Paper

Data brokers sell information about consumers to firms that decide whom to target: a lender deciding whom to offer credit, a retailer deciding whom to mail. Two products dominate this market. A marketing list sells contact information together with an analysis, so that a firm cannot reach the consumer at all without buying. A data append adds information…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets: Seller-Side Discrimination Raises Platform Profit, Buyer and Low-Type Seller Surplus and Total Welfare; High-Type Sellers Gain iff b > b̂Research Paper

Third-degree price discrimination means charging different prices to identifiable groups of customers. Its welfare effects are a classical question in industrial organization. With linear demands and every market served under uniform pricing, discrimination leaves total output unchanged and lowers total welfare (Pigou 1920). More generally, welfare can rise…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms II: The Core of the Streaming Game Is the Set of Allocations Splitting Each User's Payment Among the Artists That User PlayedResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and have to pass the revenue on to the artists whose content was played. The two rules used in practice are pro-rata (each artist is paid in proportion to their total number of streams, over all users) and user-centric (each user's fee is split among the artists that user played, in…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Coopetition in Platform-Based Retailing: On the Platform’s Entry I: The Seller Prefers Entry Exactly Above Thresholds in Spillover and Referral Rate and Outside a Band of Competition IntensityResearch Paper

Large online marketplaces such as Amazon, JD.com and Walmart.com act both as a sales channel for third-party sellers and as a retailer of their own. A platform watches which third-party products sell well and may start selling the same product itself, a move called platform entry. Over ten months of 2013–2014, Amazon entered about 3% of the products first…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 1: In Selling Marketing Lists, the Low-Cost Plan Is Efficient and the High-Cost Plan Carries More Information Than the Benchmark If φ < 1/2 and Less If φ > 1/2Research Paper

Data brokers such as Acxiom, Nielsen and Oracle, and data generators such as Google and Facebook, sell processed consumer data to firms that use it to decide whom to target, whom to lend to, or which market to enter. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission's 2014 report on data brokers distinguishes two products: a marketing list, which carries contact…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management III: With Overlapping Supports, the Optimal Policy Goes from Partial to No to Full Disclosure as the Critical Ratio RisesResearch Paper

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who must produce for her. In a decentralized supply chain the supplier sets a production quantity before demand is realized, and an under-informed supplier produces too little or too much. The retailer can shape what the supplier believes by committing in advance to a disclosure policy, a…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms I: Homogeneity and Additivity Characterize Weighted Indices; Adding Equal Individual or Global Impact of Users Gives Pro-Rata or User-CentricResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and pay part of the revenue to the artists whose content was played. The industry standard is the pro-rata method: the revenue pool is divided in proportion to each artist's total number of streams across all users. A competing method, the user-centric method, divides each user's own…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Retention or Acquisition? Behavior-Based Quality Disclosure I: Retention-Focused Disclosure Thresholds and Higher Second-Period Profits under Behavior-Based DisclosureResearch Paper

Firms that hold purchase-history data can treat past customers and a rival's customers differently. The economics of behavior-based pricing (BBP), charging different prices to the two groups, is well developed: in a symmetric duopoly, poaching the rival's customers with discounts intensifies competition and usually lowers profits (Fudenberg and Tirole 2000; …

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms I: Under a Low Commission, Search Neutrality Strictly Reduces Consumer Surplus When the Two Products Are Similarly PopularResearch Paper

Large retail platforms both host independent sellers and sell their own products, and they control the order in which products appear in search results. When the platform ranks its own product first regardless of relevance, it engages in self-preferencing. Regulators have treated this as a competition problem: the European Commission opened a second…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Self-Preferencing and Search Neutrality in Online Retail Platforms II: At Equal Popularity, a Commission Below ρL/ρH Makes Search Neutrality Lower Consumer Surplus and Raise the Third-Party ProfitResearch Paper

Large retail platforms such as Amazon both host independent sellers and sell their own products in competition with them. The platform also controls the search ranking, the order in which products are shown to a consumer. The European Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission have examined whether platforms rank their own products ahead of rivals' (self…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales 1: The Lending Agent Charges Half the Pessimist's Frictionless Sharpe Ratio, and Lending Is Active Exactly When Her Net Sharpe Ratio Is NegativeResearch Paper

To sell a stock short, an investor must first borrow it, and the owner who lends it charges a lending fee. Securities lending is a large market, and the fee varies across stocks: D'Avolio (2002) documents that shorting costs are positively related to the dispersion of investors' beliefs. Short-sale constraints have a long history in asset pricing (Miller…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Model of Shoppertainment Live Streaming: Zero Entertainment Bandwidth Is Never Optimal, the Optimal Bandwidth Lies Beyond the Traffic Peak, and Is Full Entertainment When vₑ > v(1+q)/4Research Paper

In shoppertainment live streaming a single streamer sells products from many manufacturers during live sessions that mix product presentation with entertainment. Some of the most successful streamers spend much of their air time on content unrelated to the products; the paper cites Dong Yuhui, who devotes his sessions to English lessons. Traditional TV…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 3: With Social Learning, Responsive Pricing Beats Pre-Announced Pricing When Consumers Are ImpatientResearch Paper

A recurring question in revenue management with strategic consumers is whether a seller gains from price commitment. When customers are forward-looking, a seller who announces its whole price path in advance (pre-announced pricing) removes the customers' incentive to wait for a markdown the seller would otherwise be tempted to give; a seller who keeps the…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 2: Under Responsive Pricing, Social Learning Raises Optimal Expected Profit When Consumers Are Impatient or PatientResearch Paper

A firm launching a new experience good does not know how good the product is, and neither do its customers. Early buyers post reviews, and customers who wait learn from them: this is social learning (SL). Forward-looking customers anticipate this and may delay their purchase until reviews are available, which cuts into the firm's early sales. Papanastasiou…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 3: Two Agents with Identical Additive Preferences and Generic Budgets Have a Competitive Equilibrium Giving Truncated SharesResearch Paper

How should a set of indivisible items (courses, shifts, inherited objects) be divided among people who have different entitlements but no money to transfer? A classical answer for divisible goods is the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI): give every agent a budget of artificial currency, find prices at which every agent can afford her…

13 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: LG

Drug-Market Repression and Violence in a Vertically Related Network (Nogueira Júnior 2019)Research Paper

Illegal drug markets are a leading source of violent crime, and governments spend heavily on repression — interdiction, arrests, and seizures — expecting it to shrink the market and its violence. A systematic review by Werb et al. (2011) finds, on the contrary, that drug-law enforcement is frequently associated with more violence, and Reuter (2009) argues…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

RARE: Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium in Budget-Constrained Pricing GamesResearch Paper

Sellers of digital and physical goods set prices in competition for the same pool of buyer money. When buyers have hard budgets rather than quasilinear utilities, the sellers' revenues are coupled through those budgets: a price change by one seller moves money to or from every other seller. The textbook equilibrium notion for such a pricing game is the Nash…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Multitask Contracts: Realizing the Value of BundlingResearch Paper

Delegating many tasks to one agent is the norm in practice: a contractor builds several components of a project, a crowd worker labels a batch of items, a manager runs several business lines. The principal cannot observe effort, only which tasks succeed, so she must pay for outcomes. A natural design question in the multitask principal–agent model of Zhao…

32 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Optimal Auctions for Anchored Bidders under a Rational Revenue GuaranteeResearch Paper

Auctions are increasingly run on behalf of users by automated agents. Some of these agents behave like textbook rational bidders and play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium; others are anchored: they submit their user's value as the bid, whatever the mechanism. A seller facing both populations wants a mechanism that earns as much as possible from anchored bidders…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

The Social Cost of Carbon When We Wish for Full-Path Robustness: The Risk-Sensitive Bellman Equation Has a Bounded Solution and an Optimal Deterministic Markov PolicyResearch Paper

Integrated assessment models put a price on carbon emissions, the social cost of carbon, by solving a dynamic optimization problem that couples an economy to a climate system. Climate damages include rare persistent disasters whose probabilities rise with temperature, so the planner's attitude to risk across whole paths of outcomes matters for the price.…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Social Learning and Content Quality under Polarization: with polarized preferences the long-run quality estimate converges but underestimates high and overestimates low qualityResearch Paper

Content platforms such as YouTube show every viewer the number of past views before they decide whether to watch. A view count is a cheap, public signal of quality, and a large literature on social learning asks when such aggregate signals eventually reveal the truth. Kadiyala and Shin (MSOM 2024) study a feature that is absent from the classical models and…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Product Quality and Information Sharing in the Presence of Reviews: perfectly informative reviews weaken the quality incentive under a wholesale price contract but not under a commission contractResearch Paper

Online marketplaces hold two kinds of information that a manufacturer selling through them would like to have. Product reviews tell customers about a product's quality. Customer data tell the platform how strongly the market responds to quality, and the platform can sell that signal to the manufacturer, as Amazon does with Brand Analytics, which Shin and…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: iris

Pricing for the Stars: Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Rating Systems: rating sensitivity raises long-run profits and ratings, and raises prices and lowers consumer surplus exactly when κ < 1/2Research Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon and Steam show each product's aggregate rating, a summary of past reviews, next to its current price. Reviews are left by buyers, and who buys depends on the price, so a seller who changes the price today changes the reviews that tomorrow's rating is made of. Platforms also choose how the rating is computed; in recent…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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