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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Mnemonomics of Contractual Screening: The Optimal Menu Under Limited Memory, and When Forgetting Lowers the Low Type's Marginal Price Below Its Perfect-Memory LevelResearch Paper

Contract terms can affect what a buyer remembers when a later purchase decision arrives. In Guo's model, a buyer learns her expected value before signing a contract but loses direct access to that information before deciding whether to trade. She can infer her earlier value from the contract she chose. A seller therefore designs prices and upfront fees for…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Capacity Rights and Full-Cost Transfer Pricing: With Fungible Capacity, a Negotiated Gatekeeper Contract on Capacity Rights and the Transfer Price p(k2) + w2·q2t Achieve Strong Goal CongruenceResearch Paper

A firm with two operating divisions may let one division buy shared productive capacity while the other uses part of it. The firm wants capacity to be chosen for its total value, but each manager is judged by a divisional performance measure. If capacity is reallocated after revenues become known, the investing division may anticipate surrendering part of…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Negative Advertising and Competitive Positioning: When Negative Advertising Is Permitted, There Is an Equilibrium in Which the Entrant Co-Locates and Both Firms Prioritize Positive AdvertisingResearch Paper

Negative advertising (comparative advertising that points to a rival's flaw) is used both in product markets and in political campaigns, and its regulation differs across jurisdictions: until the 1990s it was not permitted in numerous countries of the European Union (Anderson and Renault, 2009). Many models of advertising take the products' positions as…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Extensive vs. Intensive Risk: Under CPE, First-Price Revenue Exceeds Second-Price Revenue iff Bidders Are Loss-Averse in MoneyResearch Paper

A seller choosing between a first-price auction (FPA) and a second-price auction (SPA) needs to know whether the payment rule changes expected revenue. In the classical independent private-value benchmark, the two formats can be revenue equivalent. Balzer and Rosato examine a different setting: a bidder’s value depends on other bidders’ private signals, and…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Control TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Market Making and Incentives Design in the Presence of a Dark Pool: Existence and Uniqueness of the Continuous Viscosity Solution of the Exchange's HJB EquationResearch Paper

Exchanges increasingly operate several venues side by side: a lit pool, where the limit order book is visible, and a dark pool, where orders are hidden and trades execute at the mid-price. Liquidity on both venues is supplied largely by market makers, and exchanges steer that supply through make-take fees: rebates paid to liquidity providers and fees…

3 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Extended Producer Responsibility for Pharmaceuticals: End-of-Pipe Control Maximizes Total Welfare for Medicines with High Health Benefit, High Collection Cost and High Environmental DisutilityResearch Paper

Unused prescription medicines create disposal and public health costs, while a patient may use less medicine than a doctor prescribes. A regulator can make the pharmaceutical producer collect unused medicine, or charge a fee on dispensed medicine and use the proceeds to fund collection. These two policies charge the producer for different quantities. Alev,…

17 thms2 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Inducing Compliance with Postmarket Studies for Drugs Under FDA’s Accelerated Approval Pathway: The Compliance Cost-Type Threshold Increases with Enforceability and with Success ProbabilityResearch Paper

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's accelerated approval pathway permits some drugs to reach patients before their clinical benefit has been fully confirmed. A manufacturer then promises a post-market study, but completion requires costly effort that the regulator cannot directly observe. If the study becomes overdue, withdrawal is a process rather than…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Profit Effects of Consumers’ Identity Management: A Dynamic Model: Under Full Information Acquisition, Active and Unserved Consumers Exist if and only if the Privacy Cost Is Below a ThresholdResearch Paper

Firms that track their customers can charge a returning customer according to what they have learned about her, while a newcomer pays an introductory price. Consumers can respond by identity management: deleting cookies, using new accounts or anonymising tools, so that they keep being treated as newcomers. The economics of this behaviour-based price…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing: Under Variation in Bidding the Unique Minimax Loss Bid Equalizes Both Maximal Losses and Increases in nResearch Paper

First-price sealed-bid auctions are used for procurement contracts, treasury securities, timber, and, since 2019, most display advertising. The classical advice for how to bid comes from Bayes–Nash equilibrium: each bidder knows the distribution of the others' values, and everyone plays the equilibrium. Practitioners rarely have that information. In a…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Collateralized Networks: With Liquid Collateral and Bounded Aggregate Derivatives Leverage, Full Contract Termination Leaves No Larger Payment Shortfall than Selective TerminationResearch Paper

When a financial institution fails, its counterparties on over-the-counter derivatives are exempt from the automatic stay of bankruptcy: they may terminate their contracts at once, accelerate what is owed to them, and seize posted collateral. Whether this exemption stabilizes or destabilizes the system has been debated since the 1990s, and the failure of…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Uniqueness of Clearing Payment Matrices in Financial Networks: Endowment and Monotonicity Conditions on Cyclical Agents Imply a Unique Clearing Payment MatrixResearch Paper

A financial network can contain firms or other agents that owe money to one another. Each agent's capacity to pay depends on what it receives from the others, so a payment decision at one agent can change the resources available elsewhere in the network. A clearing payment matrix describes a set of payments consistent with those interdependent resources and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Principal Trading Arrangements: When Are Common Contracts Optimal?: The Guaranteed VWAP Contract Is an Optimal Contract for the Client in the Specialized ModelResearch Paper

A client who needs to buy a security may hire a dealer to execute the purchase. The client can observe market prices and trading volume but cannot observe the dealer's trades or the market conditions known to the dealer before trading. A contract based on the closing price or another benchmark can therefore change the dealer's incentives. Baldauf, Frei, and…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Two-Sided Incentive Program for Coordinating the Influenza Vaccine Supply Chain: The Modified Program Coordinates Supply and Demand, Is Ex-Ante Budget-Neutral and Splits Welfare ArbitrarilyResearch Paper

Influenza vaccine is made in fertilized chicken eggs, and how many doses an egg yields is not known until production is under way. By the time the season begins, the realized supply can fall short of, or exceed, what a planner would want. Two inefficiencies then compound. On the supply side, a manufacturer paid a wholesale price per dose sold carries all…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Customer Search via Bundling: With One Mature and One New Product, Bundling Earns Higher Revenue than Selling Separately if and only if the Search Cost Is at Most 25/512Research Paper

A seller deciding whether to offer two products separately or as one bundle also changes what customers need to learn before buying. A customer can know what a familiar product is worth to her while remaining uncertain about a new one. She may pay to inspect the new product, buy it without inspection, or leave. The seller's price can move customers between…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Reference Pricing for Healthcare Services: Each Provider Prices Higher Under Variable Payment Than Under Reference Pricing if and only if the Patient Cost Share Is Below a ThresholdResearch Paper

Health insurers pay providers in one of a few ways, and the choice shapes what providers charge. Under variable payment (co-insurance) the patient pays a fixed fraction of the provider's price. Under reference pricing the insurer announces a cap p∗p^*p∗ for a procedure: the patient pays a fixed co-payment at any provider charging at most p∗p^*p∗, and in addition…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Advance Market Commitments for New Vaccines: A Framework AMC with Temporary Subsidy Adds No Incentive for a Monopoly Firm to Invest in CapacityResearch Paper

An advance market commitment (AMC) is a promise to pay for a product if it is developed and supplied. For vaccines intended for low-income countries, a donor may use an AMC to encourage a manufacturer to invest before demand is certain. The investment decision happens before the firm and donor negotiate actual purchases. This timing creates a hold-up problem…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Management in Service Systems: Customer Control over Information Weakly Lowers Total Customer Surplus versus Full Disclosure under SPT Priority and Weakly Raises It under LPTResearch Paper

Many service providers can infer how long a customer's request will take when the customer shares personal information. A customer who withholds that information may instead enter a queue as an unidentified request. Hu, Momot, and Wang study the resulting conflict between an individual's choice to disclose and the waiting times experienced by the whole…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Effect of Outsourcing Pricing Algorithms on Market Competition: With Small Demand Variation, Minimal-Equilibrium Prices Rise in the Probability That Both Firms Adopt the AlgorithmResearch Paper

Firms increasingly price with algorithms they do not write themselves. A retailer, a hotel or a gas station often licenses its pricing software from a third-party vendor, and competing firms may license the same product. Competition authorities have asked whether this matters: if the vendor designs its algorithm knowing that the algorithm may end up setting…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Labor Welfare in On-Demand Service Platforms: With Delay-Sensitive Customers, Average Labor Welfare First Increases and Then Decreases in the Labor Pool SizeResearch Paper

On-demand service platforms (ride-hailing, delivery, home services) do not employ their workers. They set a price for customers and a wage per unit of work, and independent agents decide how much time to make themselves available. A recurring policy question, raised by regulators and labor advocates alike, is whether platforms should be allowed to recruit…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue-Sharing Allocation Strategies for Two-Sided Media Platforms: Pro-Rata vs. User-Centric: The Ratios π2j/π1j for Which Each Rule Sustains All Artists Form Two Explicit IntervalsResearch Paper

Music and podcast streaming services such as Spotify, Apple Music and Deezer charge every subscriber the same monthly fee and pass a share of the collected revenue to the artists. How that share is split is contested. The industry default, pro-rata, pools all fees and pays each artist her share of total streams. The alternative, user-centric, splits each…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Brand Spillover as a Marketing Strategy: The Weak-Brand Firm Should Commit to Forgo Brand Spillover if and only if the Supplier Would Otherwise Drop It or the Insourcing Cost Is LowResearch Paper

Competing brands often buy their products from the same contract manufacturer (CM). A weaker brand can exploit this. The paper's opening example is the Chinese retailer Netease Yanxuan, which advertises that its goods use "the same materials, the same factories, and the same workers" as international brands such as Adidas, Coach and MUJI. A weak brand that…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Co-opetitive Supply Partnerships with End-Product Rivals: Information Asymmetry, Dual Sourcing and Supply Market Efficiency: The Equilibrium Wholesale Price and When the VI Buys InformationResearch Paper

Firms often buy key components from the very rivals they compete with in the end market. The paper's examples: Lockheed Martin has sourced engine control systems and gearboxes from AgustaWestland, its competitor in national helicopter markets, while avoiding single sourcing from it in markets where it holds an information advantage; vertically integrated…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Regulation on Two-Sided Platforms: Exclusion, Subsidization, and First-Party Applications: Exclusion Is a Special Case of Subsidization and Is Dominated by ItResearch Paper

An application platform can increase average quality by excluding low-quality developers, or it can pay high-quality developers to join. Either choice changes the number of applications, the consumer audience, and the fees the platform can charge. Huang, Lyu, and Xu study these linked effects in a two-sided market with consumers and two developer types.…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design: Minimax Regret Equals T Times the Single-Round Minimax Regret and Repeating a Direct Static Mechanism Is OptimalResearch Paper

A seller who faces the same buyer again and again, a firm that contracts repeatedly with a supplier, or a platform that allocates resources to a returning user can adapt its terms over time. The buyer's behaviour reveals information about their preferences, and mechanisms can link rounds through bundles, discounts and promised future utility. When the…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation: Under Symmetric Bargaining Power the Seller Prefers Price Matching to Simultaneous Negotiation and Both Buyers Prefer the ReverseResearch Paper

A seller that supplies several competing buyers may negotiate a wholesale price with each of them independently and simultaneously (simultaneous negotiation, SN), or may commit to charge all of them the same price (price-matching negotiation, PM). PM is the bargaining counterpart of the most-favoured-customer clause, a contractual guarantee that a customer…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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