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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Strategic Bank Liability Structure Under Capital Requirements: the value-maximizing bank sets its endogenous default boundary equal to the regulatory total capital boundary, in closed formResearch Paper

A bank funds its assets with two kinds of debt that a nonbank firm does not mix in the same way: insured deposits, which earn the bank a service profit but cost a risk-based insurance premium, and nondeposit debt (bonds), which carries a credit spread. Regulators close a bank whose total capital falls below a fixed fraction of its assets, and the deposit…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Managing Competition from Within and Outside: Using Strategic Inventory and Network Externality to Combat Copycats: equilibria of both contracts and the strategic-inventory cutoff h1Research Paper

A brand-name product sold through a supplier and a retailer suffers from double marginalization: each firm adds its own margin, so the retail price is too high and both firms earn less than an integrated firm would. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that, in a two-period channel where the supplier sets each period's wholesale price…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice: below w*_f the unique symmetric bonus-and-commission equilibrium has advice cutoffs independent of liabilityResearch Paper

Financial products, insurance and many other goods are sold through advisors whose pay comes from the product providers. A large policy literature asks whether such advice is biased and how regulation should respond; a common answer is liability: make the advisor bear more of the cost of an unsuitable recommendation, through penalties, fiduciary duties or…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: iris

Commitment Against Front-Running Attacks: the commit-reveal protocol has an equilibrium without front running iff βπ ≤ c, and otherwise every equilibrium carries a front-running threatResearch Paper

On public blockchains, pending transactions wait in a public mempool before a block includes them. Anyone who sees a profitable transaction there can send a competing one with a higher fee and have it executed first. This is front running. It is a large, measured source of losses on decentralized exchanges and in other smart contracts (Daian et al., 2020).…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Dark Knights: The Rise in Firm Intervention by Credit Default Swap Investors: an intervening CDS seller raises equilibrium firm value, with full hedging, no liquidation and a positive CDS premiumResearch Paper

A credit default swap (CDS) insures a lender against the default of a borrower: the protection buyer (the lender) pays an upfront premium, and the protection seller (a dealer) pays the insured amount if a credit event occurs. Because the payment depends on whether the firm is liquidated, both sides of the contract have a stake in how a distressed firm is…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation: every k-ticket lottery equilibrium allocation is (2 − 1/k)-trade efficientResearch Paper

Alaska allocates scarce big-game hunting permits through a draw in which each applicant may buy up to six tickets and spread them across the permit lotteries of her choice; an applicant drawn in several lotteries keeps the permit she ranks highest. Designs of this kind, parallel lotteries, are simple to run and give applicants freedom to express intensity…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Competitive Investment with Bayesian Learning: Choice of Business Size and Timing: for large volatility the leader's equilibrium profit strictly decreases in the prior belief of a favorable marketResearch Paper

A firm that enters a new market first does not know how profitable that market is, and neither does its rival. The rival watches the first mover's earnings, learns from them, and decides when to follow and how large to enter. The first mover therefore controls not only its own profit but also what its competitor learns: a small investment caps its earnings…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Pride or Guilt? Impacts of Consumers’ Socially Influenced Recycling Behaviors on Closed-Loop Supply Chains: in Ω4 pride raises optimal profit; guilt lowers it iff τ*_m < b1/b0Research Paper

Manufacturers of phones, appliances and packaging increasingly take back used products and remanufacture them, paying consumers a recycling reward (a trade-in credit or gift card). Whether a consumer returns a used product depends not only on money and effort but on social feelings: the pride of recycling when others do not, and the guilt of not recycling…

30 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Axiomatizing the Bayesian Paradigm in Parallel Small Worlds: Axioms PSW1–PSW16 give, in every small world, subjective expected utility with probabilities calibrated on a common reference experimentResearch Paper

Scenario planning asks a decision maker to consider several possible futures side by side: a world in which a technology matures, one in which regulation tightens, one shaped by a dramatic event. Decision analysts who support such exercises want to run a Bayesian analysis inside each scenario, but the classical foundations of subjective expected utility…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

The Benefit of the Doubt: Decision Making under Strategic Obfuscation: the sponsor's payoff falls with reviewer resources exactly when pV > c, resources are moderate and induced obfuscation dominatesResearch Paper

Patent offices, grant agencies and journals screen proposals with limited reviewer time. A reviewer who cannot find concrete evidence about a proposal leaves the decision maker with a choice: reject it and possibly lose a good idea, or give it the benefit of the doubt and possibly fund a bad one. Figueroa and Lemus (SSRN 3840423, version of April 4, 2022)…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

When Should Control Be Shared?: with limits on transfers, a better-informed stakeholder raises the surplus of shared control and leaves that of undivided control unchangedResearch Paper

Corporate law and contract design decide who controls a firm's decisions. A manager may hold undivided control, the unfettered right to implement a project, or control may be shared, with a stakeholder (a creditor, an employee group, a minority shareholder) holding a contractual veto. The trade-off is old: veto rights protect stakeholders from…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Implied Ambiguity: Mean-Variance Inefficiency and Pricing Errors: the smallest ambiguity aversion making a portfolio optimal is an explicit decreasing function of its normalized Sharpe ratioResearch Paper

Observed portfolios, from mutual fund holdings to market capitalization weights, are rarely mean-variance efficient: their Sharpe ratio falls short of that of the tangency portfolio. In a classical CARA–normal model this cannot happen, so the gap needs an explanation. Hara and Honda (working paper, 2018; Management Science, 2022) explain it by ambiguity…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationRevenue Management and Pricing·Captain: mikeh

Optimal Feature-Based Market Segmentation and PricingResearch Paper

A seller can often predict a customer's willingness to pay from observed features, yet may be limited to a small number of prices. The decisions are then coupled: the seller must choose both the customer groups and the price assigned to each group. Grouping customers first and optimizing prices afterward does not generally solve the joint problem. Cui and…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets: Every Pacing Game Admits a Second Price Pacing EquilibriumResearch Paper

Internet advertising markets sell impressions, clicks and conversions one auction at a time, and most advertisers attach a budget to a whole campaign. Bidding one's full value until the budget runs out is suboptimal: the buyer drops out early and misses later auctions that may offer the same value at a lower price. A widely used remedy is multiplicative…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Personalized Pricing: A Tight Three-Regime Upper Bound on the Personalized-to-Single-Pricing Profit Ratio in Terms of Scale, Margin and Coefficient of DeviationResearch Paper

Firms increasingly observe enough about individual customers to charge them different prices, and regulators, platforms and sellers all ask the same quantitative question: how much more profit can personalization earn than a single posted price? The upper end of that comparison is idealized personalized pricing (first-degree price discrimination), where…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Competition Between Two-Sided Platforms Under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects: Surge Pricing Lowers Customer and Raises Driver Utility, and Near the Base Market Size Beats Fixed Prices for BothResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms such as Uber and Lyft raise prices when demand spikes, a practice known as surge pricing. The practice is controversial: customers see higher fares, and it is not obvious that anyone but the platform gains. Bernstein, DeCroix and Keskin (MSOM 2020; author version SSRN 3250224) study two competing platforms whose customers dislike…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions: Allocate Splits the Target Bundle into Demanded Bundles within |J|·C(n+1,2) IterationsResearch Paper

The product-mix auction was developed in 2007–8 for the Bank of England (Klemperer 2010) to sell many differentiated goods (loans against different qualities of collateral) in a single round. Each bidder submits a list of simple bids, each naming a price for every good and a quantity, and the auctioneer chooses prices and allocations that respect every bid.…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Internal Capital Allocation, Voluntary Disclosure, and Investment Efficiency: When a Multi-Divisional Firm Beats Two Stand-Alone FirmsResearch Paper

Conglomerates and stand-alone firms finance projects differently. A multi-divisional firm runs an internal capital market: headquarters raises funds externally and then decides which division gets them. A stand-alone firm must raise capital project by project. A long line of work in corporate finance asks when the internal market is more efficient: Stein (19…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Decision Forest: A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Irrational Choice: Every Customer Choice Model Is a Decision Forest of Depth at Most N + 1Research Paper

Retailers, airlines and platforms decide which products to offer by predicting how customers substitute among them. Such predictions rest on a discrete choice model: for every set of offered products, a probability distribution over what a customer buys. The classical models are built on random utility maximization (RUM): each customer draws utilities and…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Joint Determination of Haircuts and Interest Rates for Collateralized Loans in Shadow Banking: Better Downside Collateral Quality Lowers the Haircut Iff E[ω | ω > ω*] > (e₀ − e₁)/KResearch Paper

Collateralized short-term loans, repurchase agreements above all, are the funding market of shadow banking. Each such loan carries two terms: an interest rate and a haircut, the fraction of the collateral's value that the lender does not finance. Studies of repo terms by collateral type around the 2007–2009 crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Krishnamurthy,…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Herding in Probabilistic Forecasts: The Normal Forecast with the Morris–Shin Mean and Variance a(x−y)²+d Is an Equilibrium, Unique Among Polynomially Bounded ProfilesResearch Paper

Panels of professional forecasters — the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters, the Federal Reserve's surveys, election and sports forecasters — increasingly report probabilistic forecasts: a whole predictive distribution rather than a single number. Aggregating such panels presumes that each forecast reflects the forecaster's own…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

If It Is Surely Better, Do It More? Implications for Preferences Under Ambiguity: Ambiguity Aversion Toward an Event Breaks Monotonicity in Optimal Mixtures for c-Linearly Biseparable PreferencesResearch Paper

Many economic and managerial decisions are choices of a mixing weight: how much effort to put on one sale rather than another, how much wealth to put in a risky asset, how to split a portfolio between two contracts. A natural comparative-statics requirement is that if one of the two options is improved in every state of the world, the decision maker should…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

What Is the Impact of Nonrandomness on Random Choice Models?: Revenue-Ordered Assortments Are Optimal When One Product's Utility Is DeterministicResearch Paper

Retailers choose which products to show a customer, and the customer chooses at most one of them. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximizes expected revenue, given a model of how customers choose. Under the multinomial logit (MNL) model every alternative, the no-purchase option included, carries an independent Gumbel noise term of the…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Disclosure and Promotion Policy Design for Platforms: Under Myopic Pricing, the Long-Run Average Optimal Consumer Surplus Equals the Concavification of the Best Confounding SurplusResearch Paper

Online marketplaces decide which products to show first. A promotion puts a seller's product in front of consumers who will not search further, so it changes both the seller's sales and the surplus of the consumers who see it. A seller who is uncertain about the market sets prices from the sales they observe, and the platform's promotion decisions shape…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division: Algorithm 1 on the Slope-Rounded Instance Halts in Polynomially Many Iterations with an ε-Envy-Free SolutionResearch Paper

Housemates who share a house must decide who gets which room and how the total rent is split. A solution pairs an assignment of rooms to agents with a rent for each room, and it is envy-free if no agent prefers another room at that room's rent. Envy-free rent division is the textbook example of fair division with money and is the mathematical core of…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
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