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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices: With Costly Price Interpretation There Is a Unique Linear Financial Market Equilibrium, and Its Price Carries Endogenous NoiseResearch Paper

A central question of financial economics is how much of the information dispersed among traders ends up in market prices. The workhorse model is the noisy rational expectations equilibrium (REE): investors with private signals trade a risky asset, the price aggregates their information, and each investor learns from the price as well as from her own signal…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design for Managing Hidden Rebates and Inflated Quotes of a Procurement Service Provider: Paying a Fee Equal to the Hidden Rebate Is the Optimal Truthful Contract for Small RebatesResearch Paper

Retailers that source apparel and other consumer goods from contract manufacturers in developing countries often work through a procurement service provider, an intermediary that solicits quotes, negotiates and manages production on the retailer's behalf. A documented problem in this industry is the hidden rebate: some manufacturers pay the intermediary a…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Price/Advertising Menus for Two-Sided Media Platforms: In Duopoly with Multi-Item Menus the Unique Equilibrium Is a Symmetric Two-Item Menu on Which Both Consumer Types Multi-HomeResearch Paper

Ad-supported media and digital services (streaming music and video, news sites, social platforms) sell to two sides at once. Consumers value the content, advertisers value the consumers' attention, and consumers usually regard advertising as a nuisance whose cost differs from one person to the next. Many such platforms answer this with menu pricing: a free…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing of Debt and Equity in a Financial Network with Comonotonic Endowments: Closed-Form Default Probabilities and Expected Wealth, Debt Payments and Equity under Bankruptcy CostsResearch Paper

Banks hold claims on one another. When one bank cannot pay, its creditors receive less, which can push them into default in turn. Clearing models compute the payments and wealths that are consistent across the whole network. Regulators and researchers use them to measure systemic risk and to price interbank debt. The basic model is that of Eisenberg and Noe…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multiregional Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints: The Capacity-Constrained Cournot Game Has a Unique Equilibrium, Implementing the Unique Fixed Point of the Marginal-Profit Best ResponseResearch Paper

Firms that serve several geographic markets must decide both how much to produce and where to sell it. A capacity limit couples those regional decisions: an extra unit sent to one region cannot also be sent to another. Different transport costs and demand curves make a collection of independent single-region Cournot models inadequate. Alsabah, Bernard,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Co-Opetition in Service Clusters with Waiting-Area Entertainment: With an Even Cost Split, Co-Opetition Is at Least as Profitable as Local Monopoly iff Price Competition Is Below a ThresholdResearch Paper

Restaurants, clinics and amusement venues that announce a waiting-time standard compete not only on price but on how unpleasant the wait feels. Waiting-area entertainment (a piano player, a television, a play area) lowers the perceived cost of waiting, and when several providers sit in one service cluster, a food court, a mall, a strip of restaurants, a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Financial Intermediation Chains in an Over-the-Counter Market: For Search Costs Below the Threshold c*, There Is a Unique Steady-State Equilibrium with an Intermediary SectorResearch Paper

Many financial assets (corporate and municipal bonds, swaps, asset-backed securities) trade over the counter (OTC): there is no central exchange, and a trade requires that a buyer and a seller find each other. Empirically, a large share of OTC volume passes through intermediation chains, in which an asset moves from the original seller to the final buyer…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Social Responsibility in Multitier Supply Chains: The Buyer's Optimal Strategy Is Control, Delegation or No Effort, Decided by Thresholds in the Loss-Adjusted Effort CostsResearch Paper

A buyer can face public and financial losses when a remote supplier violates labor, safety, or environmental standards, even if the buyer did not cause the violation directly. The buyer and an intermediate supplier can spend resources to help the remote supplier reduce this risk. Their incentives depend on who pays for the effort and who bears the loss when…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies: Full Transfers to Immediate Predecessors Form the Unique Decentralized Socially Optimal Allocation SchemeResearch Paper

Some organizations grow by asking each member to recruit a successor. The incentive facing a member depends on where the revenue generated by later members goes. A transfer rule may reward the recruiter, keep the revenue with the entrant, or divide it among several predecessors. Hougaard, Moreno-Ternero, and Østerdal ask which fixed rule gives the greatest…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Short-Termism: The No-Underinvestment and No-Overhang Problems Have the Same Solutions, so Committing to Unlevered Long-Term Effort Rules Out Excessive Short-TermismResearch Paper

Managers are often accused of short-termism: boosting current cash flow at the expense of long-run firm value. Hackbarth, Rivera and Wong (Management Science, 2022; working paper SSRN 3060869) study short-termism inside a dynamic-agency model of a levered firm. A risk-averse manager exerts two unobservable efforts: long-term effort aaa, which raises the…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Contracting, Pricing, and Data Collection Under the AI Flywheel Effect: Under Moral Hazard the Firm Collects More (Less) Data Than First Best When the Data Impact Increases (Decreases)Research Paper

Companies often sell a machine-learning product before its model has reached its final quality. Use of the product then yields data that can improve later versions. This feedback is the AI flywheel studied by Gurkan and de Véricourt. A firm may hire a specialist to develop the model, but the specialist's effort is costly and hidden. More customer data can…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Team Composition: Diversity to Foster Implicit Team Incentives: The Specialized–Diverse Wage Gap Falls Until Collusion Binds, Then Rises, and Diverse Teams Are Optimal Below S*(δ)Research Paper

Firms decide not only how to pay workers but whom to put together. A long empirical and theoretical literature on teams asks whether homogeneous ("specialized") or heterogeneous ("diverse") teams perform better. Most arguments for diversity are informational: diverse teams bring different knowledge or perspectives. Glover and Kim (SSRN 3344922, published in …

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

“Un”Fair Machine Learning Algorithms: With Endogenous Learning Effort, Equal Treatment Accepts a Larger Share of the Protected Group's Good Candidates than Equal Opportunity in a Risky MarketResearch Paper

Lenders, employers and insurers increasingly screen applicants with learned scores, and regulators and the fair machine learning literature ask that such screening be fair across demographic groups. Two notions are standard. Equal treatment (ET) asks that the same decision rule be applied to everyone, regardless of group; the paper notes that it is what the…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cover-Up of Vehicle Defects: The Role of Regulator Investigation Announcements: Harm and Signal-Reliability Thresholds Determine When the Manufacturer Covers Up Under the U.S. PolicyResearch Paper

A manufacturer that receives evidence of a product defect must decide whether to disclose it. A regulator that receives a report must decide whether to investigate immediately. The regulator's announcement can itself change consumer demand while the investigation is under way, so a policy intended to reveal defects may change the manufacturer's incentive to…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymmetric Reporting Timeliness and Informational Feedback: Timely Loss Recognition Raises the Speculator's Gains from Selling on Bad News and Widens the Trading RegionResearch Paper

A firm's accounting disclosure affects what traders know. The price produced by their orders can then affect the firm's own investment decision. In this setting, the timing of bad news changes both the speculator's incentive to trade and the information conveyed by market prices. Chen, Huang, Jiang, Zhang and Zhang study this interaction in a finite trading…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Operational Strategies for Distributing Durable Goods in the Base of the Pyramid: At Low Ability to Pay and High Risk Aversion the Profit-Maximizing Allocation Yields the Lowest Consumer SurplusResearch Paper

Durable life-improving products such as solar lamps, water filters and clean cookstoves reach few households in the base of the pyramid (BOP), the low-income markets of developing economies. Two frictions explain much of the gap. Customers cannot afford the product (low ability to pay, ATP), and they are uncertain whether an unfamiliar product is worth its…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Bundling for Flexibility and Variety: An Economic Model for Multiproducer Value Aggregation: The Producers' Output Game Has a Unique Equilibrium, Solved in Closed FormResearch Paper

Many digital goods are sold as bundles assembled from the output of many independent producers: a streaming service carries films from many studios, a music subscription carries many labels, a news or software aggregator carries many publishers. One retailer (the aggregator) prices the bundle and keeps a share of the revenue. The producers split the rest in…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Risk, Ambiguity, and the Value of Diversification: Increasing or Constant Absolute Ambiguity Aversion Lowers the Smooth-Model Value of Diversification Below Its Ambiguity-Neutral LevelResearch Paper

Diversification is the oldest prescription of decision theory. Bernoulli (1738) used the example of a merchant, Sempronius, who can send his goods on one ship or split them over two ships, and showed that an expected-utility maximizer with concave utility prefers to split. Portfolio choice, insurance and supply-chain sourcing all rest on the same principle:…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly: Under Economies of Scale Every Participating Miner's Equilibrium Market Share Is at Least 1 − (1/α)(c_i/c_j)Research Paper

Proof-of-work mining allocates a fixed reward among miners whose investments determine their chances of receiving it. The resulting distribution of mining power matters for decentralization: if a few miners control most of the investment, the economic mechanism does not support a diffuse set of participants. Arnosti and Weinberg study this question in a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Disclosure Under Consumer Loss Aversion: In a Duopoly with Costly Disclosure, Stronger Loss Aversion Lowers the Disclosure Threshold and Raises Each Firm's Ex Ante ProfitResearch Paper

A seller can disclose privately known product quality, but credible disclosure costs money. In a market with competing sellers, disclosure changes both what consumers believe about a silent seller and how aggressively the sellers can price. Zhang and Li study this interaction when consumers are loss averse about quality: learning that a product falls below…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Trade Credit Insurance: Operational Value and Contract Choice: With an Attractive Outside Option, the Cancelable Contract δ = 0, p = f = c/θ₁ + β₁r Is Optimal and Recovers the Full Value of TCIResearch Paper

Suppliers often let buyers pay after delivery. If the buyer defaults, the supplier loses the credit sale revenue and may also face a financing cost from the resulting cash shortfall. Trade credit insurance transfers part of this loss to an insurer, but the insurer may possess information about the buyer that the supplier cannot observe. The insurer can use…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Financing and Disclosure: Truthfully Revealing Whether Cash Flows Exceed the Threshold at Which the Financing Constraint Binds Is an Optimal Disclosure PolicyResearch Paper

A firm that needs outside money to start a project knows more about the project than its investors do, and it can usually choose how much of that knowledge to reveal before raising funds: which audits to commission, which metrics to report, how informative an analyst's report will be. The security-design literature studies the security side of this problem,…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Renewable Power and Electricity Prices: The Impact of Forward Markets: With Skewed, Variable Wind Output the Expected Spot Price First Falls and Then Rises in Wind CapacityResearch Paper

Wind and solar generation have near-zero marginal cost. In a wholesale electricity market where prices are set by the marginal producer, adding such capacity displaces expensive conventional generation and lowers the spot price: the merit-order effect. Regulators and system planners rely on this effect when projecting the price impact of renewable…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Delegating Innovation Projects with Deadline: Committed vs. Flexible Stopping: Commitment Beats Flexibility Exactly When the Evaluation Cost Is Intermediate and p ≥ (c_h − c_l)/(μ_h − μ_l)Research Paper

Firms increasingly delegate the generation of new concepts (product designs, advertising campaigns, engineering prototypes) to outside providers such as design agencies and engineering consultancies. The client cannot dictate how hard the provider works; it can only decide when to stop asking for new solutions. Two practices are common. Under a flexible…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing on Retail Platforms: Under Asymmetric Full Sharing the Platform Optimally Shares All Signals Truthfully with Floor or Ceiling of min(2/b - 1, N) SellersResearch Paper

Online retail platforms such as Amazon, Alibaba's Tmall and JD.com host thousands of third-party sellers and observe every customer interaction with each of them. From these interactions the platform learns about market demand far better than any single seller can, and it sells or gives away part of that knowledge through analytics tools (Alibaba's Business…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
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