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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Control TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Extrapolation Bias and Dynamic Liquidity Management: Ambiguity-Averse Worst-Case Beliefs Shift Pessimism toward Temporary Cash-Flow Shocks as Cash Runs LowResearch Paper

A firm can have valuable operations yet fail when a temporary cash shortfall leaves it unable to pay its bills. Cash reserves protect the firm, but holding them is costly. In Lee and Rivera’s study, the manager also doubts the probability model for future shocks. The manager evaluates a policy under the least favorable model within a prescribed set of…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Impact of Information Asymmetry and Limited Production Capacity on Business Interruption Insurance: The Low-Demand Firm's Optimal Contract Has Weakly Higher Coverage and PremiumResearch Paper

Business-interruption (BI) insurance reimburses a firm for the revenue it loses while a disruption (a flood, a fire, a supplier failure) keeps its capacity down. The 2011 Thailand floods and the Tōhoku earthquake made such losses large and visible for manufacturers, and BI cover is now a standard part of commercial property insurance. Two information…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

How Should We Score Athletes and Candidates: Geometric Scoring Rules: A Scoring Rule Is Independent of Unanimous Winners and of Unanimous Losers if and only if It Is a Geometric Scoring RuleResearch Paper

Season-long sports competitions (the biathlon World Cup, Formula One, the motorcycle Grand Prix, golf's FedEx Cup) rank athletes by adding up points awarded for the positions they take in individual races. The same mechanism, under the name positional scoring rule, is one of the oldest objects of social choice theory: Borda's rule, plurality and…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tail Risk and Robust Portfolio Decisions: Under Jump Ambiguity the Robust Optimal Portfolio Splits into a Closed-Form Diffusion Exposure and a Jump Exposure Solving a Reduced ProblemResearch Paper

Investors who hold risky assets face losses from occasional jumps in prices. Such jumps are infrequent, so their frequency and size distribution can be harder to estimate than ordinary price fluctuations. Jin, Luo, and Zeng study how a portfolio changes when an investor treats both the arrival rate and the size distribution of jumps as uncertain. Their 2017…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Sunk Cost Bias and Time Inconsistency: A Strategic Analysis of Pricing Decisions: A Small Sunk Cost Bias Weakly Raises Monopoly Profit, Consumer Welfare and Social WelfareResearch Paper

Many products deliver their value only after the buyer exerts effort: a gym membership has to be used, furniture assembled, software learned, a ticket redeemed by attending. Consumers with present bias discount future benefits relative to present costs and so often fail to exert that effort, even when it would pay off in the long run (DellaVigna and…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Mnemonomics of Contractual Screening: The Optimal Menu Under Limited Memory, and When Forgetting Lowers the Low Type's Marginal Price Below Its Perfect-Memory LevelResearch Paper

Contract terms can affect what a buyer remembers when a later purchase decision arrives. In Guo's model, a buyer learns her expected value before signing a contract but loses direct access to that information before deciding whether to trade. She can infer her earlier value from the contract she chose. A seller therefore designs prices and upfront fees for…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Liquidity Provision with Adverse Selection and Inventory Costs: The Solution of a Nonlinear ODE for Marginal Prices Is the Unique Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of K Competing DealersResearch Paper

Much of the trading in options, bonds and other over-the-counter products does not go through a limit order book. A client approaches several dealers, each dealer quotes a price schedule (the total price for each trade size), and the client splits the order among them. The dealers face two costs. The first is adverse selection: clients who trade large…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard, and Default Risk: Greater Availability of Evidence Raises Firm Value and Lowers the Credit Spread, Strictly Above the First Termination ThresholdResearch Paper

Firms are run by managers who know more about cash flows than investors do. In the dynamic agency literature that started with DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), a manager can divert cash by under-reporting output, and investors deter diversion with a contract that promises future pay after good reports and threatens liquidation…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Capacity Rights and Full-Cost Transfer Pricing: With Fungible Capacity, a Negotiated Gatekeeper Contract on Capacity Rights and the Transfer Price p(k2) + w2·q2t Achieve Strong Goal CongruenceResearch Paper

A firm with two operating divisions may let one division buy shared productive capacity while the other uses part of it. The firm wants capacity to be chosen for its total value, but each manager is judged by a divisional performance measure. If capacity is reallocated after revenues become known, the investing division may anticipate surrendering part of…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Negative Advertising and Competitive Positioning: When Negative Advertising Is Permitted, There Is an Equilibrium in Which the Entrant Co-Locates and Both Firms Prioritize Positive AdvertisingResearch Paper

Negative advertising (comparative advertising that points to a rival's flaw) is used both in product markets and in political campaigns, and its regulation differs across jurisdictions: until the 1990s it was not permitted in numerous countries of the European Union (Anderson and Renault, 2009). Many models of advertising take the products' positions as…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Extensive vs. Intensive Risk: Under CPE, First-Price Revenue Exceeds Second-Price Revenue iff Bidders Are Loss-Averse in MoneyResearch Paper

A seller choosing between a first-price auction (FPA) and a second-price auction (SPA) needs to know whether the payment rule changes expected revenue. In the classical independent private-value benchmark, the two formats can be revenue equivalent. Balzer and Rosato examine a different setting: a bidder’s value depends on other bidders’ private signals, and…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Control TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Market Making and Incentives Design in the Presence of a Dark Pool: Existence and Uniqueness of the Continuous Viscosity Solution of the Exchange's HJB EquationResearch Paper

Exchanges increasingly operate several venues side by side: a lit pool, where the limit order book is visible, and a dark pool, where orders are hidden and trades execute at the mid-price. Liquidity on both venues is supplied largely by market makers, and exchanges steer that supply through make-take fees: rebates paid to liquidity providers and fees…

3 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing, and the Spread of an Infection: Greater Testing Raises the Equilibrium Infection Probability of the Type That Mixes Its Social ActivityResearch Paper

Testing makes an infected person less likely to pass an infection to someone else. In a society whose contacts depend on voluntary social activity, that direct benefit changes behavior: an agent who expects fewer infections may choose more contacts. The central question is whether the added contacts can outweigh the direct benefit of testing in equilibrium.…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Extended Producer Responsibility for Pharmaceuticals: End-of-Pipe Control Maximizes Total Welfare for Medicines with High Health Benefit, High Collection Cost and High Environmental DisutilityResearch Paper

Unused prescription medicines create disposal and public health costs, while a patient may use less medicine than a doctor prescribes. A regulator can make the pharmaceutical producer collect unused medicine, or charge a fee on dispensed medicine and use the proceeds to fund collection. These two policies charge the producer for different quantities. Alev,…

17 thms2 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Inducing Compliance with Postmarket Studies for Drugs Under FDA’s Accelerated Approval Pathway: The Compliance Cost-Type Threshold Increases with Enforceability and with Success ProbabilityResearch Paper

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's accelerated approval pathway permits some drugs to reach patients before their clinical benefit has been fully confirmed. A manufacturer then promises a post-market study, but completion requires costly effort that the regulator cannot directly observe. If the study becomes overdue, withdrawal is a process rather than…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Profit Effects of Consumers’ Identity Management: A Dynamic Model: Under Full Information Acquisition, Active and Unserved Consumers Exist if and only if the Privacy Cost Is Below a ThresholdResearch Paper

Firms that track their customers can charge a returning customer according to what they have learned about her, while a newcomer pays an introductory price. Consumers can respond by identity management: deleting cookies, using new accounts or anonymising tools, so that they keep being treated as newcomers. The economics of this behaviour-based price…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing: Under Variation in Bidding the Unique Minimax Loss Bid Equalizes Both Maximal Losses and Increases in nResearch Paper

First-price sealed-bid auctions are used for procurement contracts, treasury securities, timber, and, since 2019, most display advertising. The classical advice for how to bid comes from Bayes–Nash equilibrium: each bidder knows the distribution of the others' values, and everyone plays the equilibrium. Practitioners rarely have that information. In a…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Collateralized Networks: With Liquid Collateral and Bounded Aggregate Derivatives Leverage, Full Contract Termination Leaves No Larger Payment Shortfall than Selective TerminationResearch Paper

When a financial institution fails, its counterparties on over-the-counter derivatives are exempt from the automatic stay of bankruptcy: they may terminate their contracts at once, accelerate what is owed to them, and seize posted collateral. Whether this exemption stabilizes or destabilizes the system has been debated since the 1990s, and the failure of…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Uniqueness of Clearing Payment Matrices in Financial Networks: Endowment and Monotonicity Conditions on Cyclical Agents Imply a Unique Clearing Payment MatrixResearch Paper

A financial network can contain firms or other agents that owe money to one another. Each agent's capacity to pay depends on what it receives from the others, so a payment decision at one agent can change the resources available elsewhere in the network. A clearing payment matrix describes a set of payments consistent with those interdependent resources and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Principal Trading Arrangements: When Are Common Contracts Optimal?: The Guaranteed VWAP Contract Is an Optimal Contract for the Client in the Specialized ModelResearch Paper

A client who needs to buy a security may hire a dealer to execute the purchase. The client can observe market prices and trading volume but cannot observe the dealer's trades or the market conditions known to the dealer before trading. A contract based on the closing price or another benchmark can therefore change the dealer's incentives. Baldauf, Frei, and…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Two-Sided Incentive Program for Coordinating the Influenza Vaccine Supply Chain: The Modified Program Coordinates Supply and Demand, Is Ex-Ante Budget-Neutral and Splits Welfare ArbitrarilyResearch Paper

Influenza vaccine is made in fertilized chicken eggs, and how many doses an egg yields is not known until production is under way. By the time the season begins, the realized supply can fall short of, or exceed, what a planner would want. Two inefficiencies then compound. On the supply side, a manufacturer paid a wholesale price per dose sold carries all…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Customer Search via Bundling: With One Mature and One New Product, Bundling Earns Higher Revenue than Selling Separately if and only if the Search Cost Is at Most 25/512Research Paper

A seller deciding whether to offer two products separately or as one bundle also changes what customers need to learn before buying. A customer can know what a familiar product is worth to her while remaining uncertain about a new one. She may pay to inspect the new product, buy it without inspection, or leave. The seller's price can move customers between…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Reference Pricing for Healthcare Services: Each Provider Prices Higher Under Variable Payment Than Under Reference Pricing if and only if the Patient Cost Share Is Below a ThresholdResearch Paper

Health insurers pay providers in one of a few ways, and the choice shapes what providers charge. Under variable payment (co-insurance) the patient pays a fixed fraction of the provider's price. Under reference pricing the insurer announces a cap p∗p^*p∗ for a procedure: the patient pays a fixed co-payment at any provider charging at most p∗p^*p∗, and in addition…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Advance Market Commitments for New Vaccines: A Framework AMC with Temporary Subsidy Adds No Incentive for a Monopoly Firm to Invest in CapacityResearch Paper

An advance market commitment (AMC) is a promise to pay for a product if it is developed and supplied. For vaccines intended for low-income countries, a donor may use an AMC to encourage a manufacturer to invest before demand is certain. The investment decision happens before the firm and donor negotiate actual purchases. This timing creates a hold-up problem…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategic Inventories under Supply Chain Competition: Under Fierce Chain-to-Chain Competition, Strategic Inventories Leave All Manufacturers and Retailers Strictly Worse OffResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sells through an independent retailer charges a wholesale price above cost, and the retailer then adds its own margin: the double marginalization problem of vertical contracting. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that in a two-period monopoly chain the retailer can blunt this by buying more than it sells in the…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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