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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Management in Service Systems: Customer Control over Information Weakly Lowers Total Customer Surplus versus Full Disclosure under SPT Priority and Weakly Raises It under LPTResearch Paper

Many service providers can infer how long a customer's request will take when the customer shares personal information. A customer who withholds that information may instead enter a queue as an unidentified request. Hu, Momot, and Wang study the resulting conflict between an individual's choice to disclose and the waiting times experienced by the whole…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Effect of Outsourcing Pricing Algorithms on Market Competition: With Small Demand Variation, Minimal-Equilibrium Prices Rise in the Probability That Both Firms Adopt the AlgorithmResearch Paper

Firms increasingly price with algorithms they do not write themselves. A retailer, a hotel or a gas station often licenses its pricing software from a third-party vendor, and competing firms may license the same product. Competition authorities have asked whether this matters: if the vendor designs its algorithm knowing that the algorithm may end up setting…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Labor Welfare in On-Demand Service Platforms: With Delay-Sensitive Customers, Average Labor Welfare First Increases and Then Decreases in the Labor Pool SizeResearch Paper

On-demand service platforms (ride-hailing, delivery, home services) do not employ their workers. They set a price for customers and a wage per unit of work, and independent agents decide how much time to make themselves available. A recurring policy question, raised by regulators and labor advocates alike, is whether platforms should be allowed to recruit…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue-Sharing Allocation Strategies for Two-Sided Media Platforms: Pro-Rata vs. User-Centric: The Ratios π2j/π1j for Which Each Rule Sustains All Artists Form Two Explicit IntervalsResearch Paper

Music and podcast streaming services such as Spotify, Apple Music and Deezer charge every subscriber the same monthly fee and pass a share of the collected revenue to the artists. How that share is split is contested. The industry default, pro-rata, pools all fees and pays each artist her share of total streams. The alternative, user-centric, splits each…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Brand Spillover as a Marketing Strategy: The Weak-Brand Firm Should Commit to Forgo Brand Spillover if and only if the Supplier Would Otherwise Drop It or the Insourcing Cost Is LowResearch Paper

Competing brands often buy their products from the same contract manufacturer (CM). A weaker brand can exploit this. The paper's opening example is the Chinese retailer Netease Yanxuan, which advertises that its goods use "the same materials, the same factories, and the same workers" as international brands such as Adidas, Coach and MUJI. A weak brand that…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Co-opetitive Supply Partnerships with End-Product Rivals: Information Asymmetry, Dual Sourcing and Supply Market Efficiency: The Equilibrium Wholesale Price and When the VI Buys InformationResearch Paper

Firms often buy key components from the very rivals they compete with in the end market. The paper's examples: Lockheed Martin has sourced engine control systems and gearboxes from AgustaWestland, its competitor in national helicopter markets, while avoiding single sourcing from it in markets where it holds an information advantage; vertically integrated…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Regulation on Two-Sided Platforms: Exclusion, Subsidization, and First-Party Applications: Exclusion Is a Special Case of Subsidization and Is Dominated by ItResearch Paper

An application platform can increase average quality by excluding low-quality developers, or it can pay high-quality developers to join. Either choice changes the number of applications, the consumer audience, and the fees the platform can charge. Huang, Lyu, and Xu study these linked effects in a two-sided market with consumers and two developer types.…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design: Minimax Regret Equals T Times the Single-Round Minimax Regret and Repeating a Direct Static Mechanism Is OptimalResearch Paper

A seller who faces the same buyer again and again, a firm that contracts repeatedly with a supplier, or a platform that allocates resources to a returning user can adapt its terms over time. The buyer's behaviour reveals information about their preferences, and mechanisms can link rounds through bundles, discounts and promised future utility. When the…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation: Under Symmetric Bargaining Power the Seller Prefers Price Matching to Simultaneous Negotiation and Both Buyers Prefer the ReverseResearch Paper

A seller that supplies several competing buyers may negotiate a wholesale price with each of them independently and simultaneously (simultaneous negotiation, SN), or may commit to charge all of them the same price (price-matching negotiation, PM). PM is the bargaining counterpart of the most-favoured-customer clause, a contractual guarantee that a customer…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices: With Costly Price Interpretation There Is a Unique Linear Financial Market Equilibrium, and Its Price Carries Endogenous NoiseResearch Paper

A central question of financial economics is how much of the information dispersed among traders ends up in market prices. The workhorse model is the noisy rational expectations equilibrium (REE): investors with private signals trade a risky asset, the price aggregates their information, and each investor learns from the price as well as from her own signal…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design for Managing Hidden Rebates and Inflated Quotes of a Procurement Service Provider: Paying a Fee Equal to the Hidden Rebate Is the Optimal Truthful Contract for Small RebatesResearch Paper

Retailers that source apparel and other consumer goods from contract manufacturers in developing countries often work through a procurement service provider, an intermediary that solicits quotes, negotiates and manages production on the retailer's behalf. A documented problem in this industry is the hidden rebate: some manufacturers pay the intermediary a…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Price/Advertising Menus for Two-Sided Media Platforms: In Duopoly with Multi-Item Menus the Unique Equilibrium Is a Symmetric Two-Item Menu on Which Both Consumer Types Multi-HomeResearch Paper

Ad-supported media and digital services (streaming music and video, news sites, social platforms) sell to two sides at once. Consumers value the content, advertisers value the consumers' attention, and consumers usually regard advertising as a nuisance whose cost differs from one person to the next. Many such platforms answer this with menu pricing: a free…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing of Debt and Equity in a Financial Network with Comonotonic Endowments: Closed-Form Default Probabilities and Expected Wealth, Debt Payments and Equity under Bankruptcy CostsResearch Paper

Banks hold claims on one another. When one bank cannot pay, its creditors receive less, which can push them into default in turn. Clearing models compute the payments and wealths that are consistent across the whole network. Regulators and researchers use them to measure systemic risk and to price interbank debt. The basic model is that of Eisenberg and Noe…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multiregional Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints: The Capacity-Constrained Cournot Game Has a Unique Equilibrium, Implementing the Unique Fixed Point of the Marginal-Profit Best ResponseResearch Paper

Firms that serve several geographic markets must decide both how much to produce and where to sell it. A capacity limit couples those regional decisions: an extra unit sent to one region cannot also be sent to another. Different transport costs and demand curves make a collection of independent single-region Cournot models inadequate. Alsabah, Bernard,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Co-Opetition in Service Clusters with Waiting-Area Entertainment: With an Even Cost Split, Co-Opetition Is at Least as Profitable as Local Monopoly iff Price Competition Is Below a ThresholdResearch Paper

Restaurants, clinics and amusement venues that announce a waiting-time standard compete not only on price but on how unpleasant the wait feels. Waiting-area entertainment (a piano player, a television, a play area) lowers the perceived cost of waiting, and when several providers sit in one service cluster, a food court, a mall, a strip of restaurants, a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Financial Intermediation Chains in an Over-the-Counter Market: For Search Costs Below the Threshold c*, There Is a Unique Steady-State Equilibrium with an Intermediary SectorResearch Paper

Many financial assets (corporate and municipal bonds, swaps, asset-backed securities) trade over the counter (OTC): there is no central exchange, and a trade requires that a buyer and a seller find each other. Empirically, a large share of OTC volume passes through intermediation chains, in which an asset moves from the original seller to the final buyer…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Skill Acquisition and Data Sales: Under Uncertain Skill Acquisition and Accurate Data, Higher Skill-Acquisition Costs Raise Data Clarity, Data Price and Price InformativenessResearch Paper

Asset managers increasingly buy alternative data: satellite images, credit-card panels, web traffic. Raw data of this kind is worthless until someone has the skills to process it, and those skills are costly and uncertain to acquire. A fund can hire data scientists and still find that its models extract little. Huang, Xiong and Yang (Management Science, 2022…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Social Responsibility in Multitier Supply Chains: The Buyer's Optimal Strategy Is Control, Delegation or No Effort, Decided by Thresholds in the Loss-Adjusted Effort CostsResearch Paper

A buyer can face public and financial losses when a remote supplier violates labor, safety, or environmental standards, even if the buyer did not cause the violation directly. The buyer and an intermediate supplier can spend resources to help the remote supplier reduce this risk. Their incentives depend on who pays for the effort and who bears the loss when…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies: Full Transfers to Immediate Predecessors Form the Unique Decentralized Socially Optimal Allocation SchemeResearch Paper

Some organizations grow by asking each member to recruit a successor. The incentive facing a member depends on where the revenue generated by later members goes. A transfer rule may reward the recruiter, keep the revenue with the entrant, or divide it among several predecessors. Hougaard, Moreno-Ternero, and Østerdal ask which fixed rule gives the greatest…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Short-Termism: The No-Underinvestment and No-Overhang Problems Have the Same Solutions, so Committing to Unlevered Long-Term Effort Rules Out Excessive Short-TermismResearch Paper

Managers are often accused of short-termism: boosting current cash flow at the expense of long-run firm value. Hackbarth, Rivera and Wong (Management Science, 2022; working paper SSRN 3060869) study short-termism inside a dynamic-agency model of a levered firm. A risk-averse manager exerts two unobservable efforts: long-term effort aaa, which raises the…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Contracting, Pricing, and Data Collection Under the AI Flywheel Effect: Under Moral Hazard the Firm Collects More (Less) Data Than First Best When the Data Impact Increases (Decreases)Research Paper

Companies often sell a machine-learning product before its model has reached its final quality. Use of the product then yields data that can improve later versions. This feedback is the AI flywheel studied by Gurkan and de Véricourt. A firm may hire a specialist to develop the model, but the specialist's effort is costly and hidden. More customer data can…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Team Composition: Diversity to Foster Implicit Team Incentives: The Specialized–Diverse Wage Gap Falls Until Collusion Binds, Then Rises, and Diverse Teams Are Optimal Below S*(δ)Research Paper

Firms decide not only how to pay workers but whom to put together. A long empirical and theoretical literature on teams asks whether homogeneous ("specialized") or heterogeneous ("diverse") teams perform better. Most arguments for diversity are informational: diverse teams bring different knowledge or perspectives. Glover and Kim (SSRN 3344922, published in …

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

“Un”Fair Machine Learning Algorithms: With Endogenous Learning Effort, Equal Treatment Accepts a Larger Share of the Protected Group's Good Candidates than Equal Opportunity in a Risky MarketResearch Paper

Lenders, employers and insurers increasingly screen applicants with learned scores, and regulators and the fair machine learning literature ask that such screening be fair across demographic groups. Two notions are standard. Equal treatment (ET) asks that the same decision rule be applied to everyone, regardless of group; the paper notes that it is what the…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cover-Up of Vehicle Defects: The Role of Regulator Investigation Announcements: Harm and Signal-Reliability Thresholds Determine When the Manufacturer Covers Up Under the U.S. PolicyResearch Paper

A manufacturer that receives evidence of a product defect must decide whether to disclose it. A regulator that receives a report must decide whether to investigate immediately. The regulator's announcement can itself change consumer demand while the investigation is under way, so a policy intended to reveal defects may change the manufacturer's incentive to…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymmetric Reporting Timeliness and Informational Feedback: Timely Loss Recognition Raises the Speculator's Gains from Selling on Bad News and Widens the Trading RegionResearch Paper

A firm's accounting disclosure affects what traders know. The price produced by their orders can then affect the firm's own investment decision. In this setting, the timing of bad news changes both the speculator's incentive to trade and the information conveyed by market prices. Chen, Huang, Jiang, Zhang and Zhang study this interaction in a finite trading…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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