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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Investment Strategies for Sourcing a New Technology in the Presence of a Mature Technology: When Equity Induces a Higher Probability of Technical Success Than a LoanResearch Paper

Manufacturers that depend on a component often fund a new supplier whose technology could replace the incumbent one, while keeping the incumbent as a backup. Apple's 2013 prepayment to GT Advanced Technologies for sapphire production, which ended in the supplier's bankruptcy, and Intel's 2012 equity stake in ASML to accelerate extreme-ultraviolet…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Role of Problem Specification in Crowdsourcing Contests for Design Problems: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis: Unique Symmetric Equilibrium and Participation Monotone in Disclosed ObjectivesResearch Paper

Firms increasingly source design work (logos, packaging, product sketches) through crowdsourcing contests: a seeker posts a problem statement and an award, independent designers submit entries, and the best entry wins. The problem statement is the seeker's main lever. It can list conceptual objectives (what the design should convey) and execution guidelines…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Insider Trading, Competition, and Real Activities Manipulation: With Subsequent Kyle Insider Trading, a Monopoly Has a Unique Linear Equilibrium, with Output E[a|s]/2 + (1/(4ω))√(ΣuΣaΣθ/(Σa+Σθ))Research Paper

Managers who run a firm also trade its stock. Accounting and finance research has long asked how the opportunity to trade on private information changes what managers do inside the firm. Real activities manipulation means that a manager distorts operating choices (production, investment, discretionary spending) rather than accounting numbers. The usual…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Business of Healthcare: The Role of Physician Integration in Bundled Payments: Payers, Hospitals and Physicians All Benefit from Bundling Below the Physician-Integration ThresholdsResearch Paper

Under fee-for-service payment, a hospital and its physicians receive separate payments for treating a patient. Under a bundled payment, a payer makes one payment for an episode of care, leaving the hospital to pay the physicians and cover the treatment costs. A bundled contract can reward the use of a less costly clinical pathway, but the hospital and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Ad Blocking: Total Consumer Surplus Is Lower with an Adblocker When Consumers Are Heterogeneous Enough in Ad or Quality Sensitivity, and Higher Only When Both Are Nearly HomogeneousResearch Paper

Advertising pays for content that many readers receive without a direct subscription charge. An adblocker changes two parts of that arrangement: some readers see fewer ads, and the publisher may earn less from investing in content quality. Readers can benefit from the first change and lose from the second. A comparison of consumer surplus therefore has to…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Resource Allocation Among Competing Innovators: Optimal Allocation Between Investing in One and Investing in Two InnovatorsResearch Paper

Research funders and investors choose how many innovators to support and how much to give each one. The allocation affects an innovator's chance of success, but it also changes the competition that successful innovators face. Gao, Fan, Huang and Chen study this interaction in a two-stage model: a principal allocates an essential resource, then two agents…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Provision and Farmer Welfare in Developing Economies: Giving the Public Signal to One Farmer or to None Maximizes Total Farmer WelfareResearch Paper

Farmers who sell the same crop can benefit from better forecasts of the market price, but their production decisions also affect one another through the price. A forecast sent to one farmer may improve that farmer’s decision; a forecast sent to many farmers can make their output responses move together. A planner choosing who receives a common forecast…

20 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity II: With a Secondary Market, Liquid LPs Stay Out of the Primary Market Below a Threshold and Their Capital Share Pins Down the Discount to NAVResearch Paper

Private equity funds ask investors to commit capital before the timing of their own cash needs is known. If an investor needs liquidity before the fund pays out, selling a partnership claim can be more useful than holding it to maturity. The price at which such claims trade therefore affects both the return investors demand when a fund is raised and the way…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Economic Advantage: A Quantum Computing Firm Can Out-Invest a Cheaper-to-Scale Classical Rival in Subgame-Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Quantum algorithms can reduce the work needed for some computations, but a provider also has to build hardware capable of serving a market. Bova, Goldfarb, and Melko model these two costs separately in Quantum Economic Advantage. Their question is whether a quantum provider can choose more market-creating investment than a classical rival even when building…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity I: Debt Financing Has a Unique Break-Even Repayment Between the Set-Up Cost and the Maximal Monopoly Profit, and the Entrepreneur Earns the Venture's NPVResearch Paper

Since 2017, billions of dollars have been raised through the issuance of crypto-assets, many of them tokens: digital claims on a future product or service, issued before the product exists. Malinova and Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity (SSRN 3286825; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4882), ask when such a pre-sale is a better way to…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies II: With Personalized Pricing by the Manufacturer, Dual Distribution Is Optimal Iff β > β_PZ(α), and β_PU(α) > β_PP(α)Research Paper

A manufacturer can sell directly to consumers and also supply an independent retailer. The retailer reaches consumers for whom its distribution service is more valuable, but its presence can also force the manufacturer to lower direct-channel prices. Jullien, Reisinger and Rey study when the additional sales justify dual distribution under different…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Social Media and News: Content Bundling and News Quality II: Negotiated Content Bundling Raises News Quality over the Benchmark iff c > β/Λ and over Unilateral Bundling iff c > c†Research Paper

Social platforms show news articles to their users without sending them to the publisher's site. Publishers argue that this diverts readers and advertising revenue, and so weakens their incentive to invest in journalism. Several regulators have responded by requiring dominant platforms to negotiate payments with news publishers: France transposed the EU…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization II: Under O-Learning, the Cheap-Signaling Separating Equilibrium Exists If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΛResearch Paper

Firms that customize products, especially in business-to-business and service markets, need to learn what each customer wants before designing for that customer. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (SSRN 3994319; published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025) compares two ways a seller can learn a customer's preference.…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Softening Competition Through Unilateral Sharing of Customer Data: For Every Monotone-Hazard-Rate Distribution, Sharing Data on [z^N, b′] Makes Both Firms Strictly Better OffResearch Paper

Large platforms that also sell their own products (Amazon, JD.com, app stores) hold detailed data on consumers and sometimes share part of it with the independent sellers they compete with. The usual view in the personalized-pricing literature is that information is a competitive weapon: a firm that knows more about consumers can price discriminate and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization IV: The A-Learning Threshold Δ Exceeds the O-Learning Threshold Λ If and Only If γ < max{2s/(2s+k), (√(s²+4sk) − s)/(2k)}Research Paper

A seller who customizes products for buyers must learn what each buyer wants, and buyers have private information about how much they value quality. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025; author copy SSRN 3994319) compares two ways of learning those preferences. Under A-Learning ("asking")…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? IV: When Pricing Postponement Helps or Hurts the Retailer, the Supplier and the ConsumersResearch Paper

Production in agriculture, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and many other industries suffers from random yield: only a random fraction of a planned production run turns out usable. When a retailer buys from such a supplier, someone in the chain bears the risk that less arrives than was ordered. Geng, Guo, Xiao and Yang (SSRN 3546872; Manufacturing & Service…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 3: The Marketplace Bans Buyer–Seller Communication Above Π*/(v − c), Below η_L When q > c/(v − Π*), and Always When q Is Close to OneResearch Paper

Online marketplaces match buyers with sellers and charge a fee per transaction. Once a buyer has found a seller on the platform, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central concern for service marketplaces such as Upwork, Thumbtack or AngelList, and…

17 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Strategies in Network Markets: Under Potential Maximization the Equilibrium Quality Equates Marginal Cost to n Times the Harmonic-Mean Valuation Times the Uniform Average of ∂f(i,q)/∂qResearch Paper

A firm that sells a network good (a platform, a communication service, a standard) faces consumers whose benefit from buying grows with the number of other buyers. When these network effects are strong, the buying decisions form a coordination game: everybody buying and nobody buying can both be equilibria at the same price and quality. The firm's choice of…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Providing Data Samples for Free: Free Samples Strictly Beat Selling in One Round When the Seller-Side Drift of the Buyer's Bayes Risk Is Initially PositiveResearch Paper

Firms that own data increasingly sell it as a product: market research panels, consulting reports, datasets for training demand models. A common commercial practice is to hand out a free sample of the data before quoting a price for the rest. Under standard Bayesian reasoning this practice looks self-defeating. Every free data point reduces the buyer's…

16 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets 1: With Privacy Rights the Monopoly Equilibrium Has Four Breach-Cost Regimes Separated by c = δσ/2, δσ/√2 and δσResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) and the California Consumer Privacy Act give consumers privacy rights over the personal data that firms collect: data may be collected only with explicit consent (opt-in), consent is separated from the purchase itself, and a consumer may later have her data deleted (erasure, the "right to…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption I: Blockchain Adoption Raises Total Welfare for Large Horizontal Differentiation Yet Is Not an EquilibriumResearch Paper

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger that only invited parties may write to. In supply chains it is promoted as a way to make the provenance and quality of goods verifiable by the end consumer: a manufacturer who joins records how a good was produced, and consumers can read that record. Joining is costly, and the parties who pay the cost are not the…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model II: Interoperability Mitigates Dominance, as Lower Interoperability Admits a Duopoly Equilibrium with an Even Larger Dominant PlatformResearch Paper

Digital markets with strong network effects (messaging, social networks, app stores) tend to concentrate: a platform with more users is worth more to each user. Interoperability, the ability of a platform's users to interact with the users of rival platforms, is a central remedy in current competition policy; the EU Digital Markets Act (2022) mandates it…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model I: Adding a Third Platform Can Produce an Equilibrium Whose Dominant Platform Outsizes Every Platform of Every Duopoly EquilibriumResearch Paper

Markets organized by platforms (social networks, marketplaces, messaging services) exhibit network effects: a user values a platform more when more users join it. A standing concern in competition policy is that such markets "tip" towards one dominant platform, and the usual remedy proposed is to foster entry. Ekmekci, White and Wu (Platform Competition and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? III: Under Partial Multihoming, the Equilibrium Price and Profit Are Hump-Shaped in the Network EffectResearch Paper

Video-game consoles, streaming services and messaging apps share two features: users value a platform more when more people use it (network effects), and some users buy access to more than one platform (multihoming). In the standard Hotelling model where every consumer buys exactly one good, network effects intensify competition: a stronger network effect…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 2: On a Nonempty Open Set of Distributions Some Nonintersectional Policy Achieves Representation along Every Identity DimensionResearch Paper

Admissions offices and employers that run affirmative action usually measure representation one identity dimension at a time: the share of women among those admitted, the share of Black applicants, and so on. Applicants, however, belong to intersectional groups (Black women, white men, …), and a policy that looks balanced along every dimension can still…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
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