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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers I: The Seller's Interest-Rate Threshold Never Exceeds the Supplier's, So Platform Loans Are Win-Win, Lose-Win or Lose-LoseResearch Paper

Small third-party sellers on e-commerce marketplaces (Amazon, JD.com, Alibaba) typically have little capital and limited credit history, so they finance procurement through short-term credit. The traditional source is trade credit: the supplier ships the goods and is paid after the sales. Since about 2011 the platforms themselves lend to their sellers (the…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize 1: The Optimal Endorsement Policy Is Authentic Until a Threshold Awareness, Then Permanently InauthenticResearch Paper

Social media influencers earn money by endorsing products to their followers. An influencer who endorses only products that fit her organic content keeps her audience; one who accepts every sponsorship offer earns more per follower today but loses part of her audience and grows more slowly. Practitioners describe this as the choice between growing and…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability I: Banks' Risk-Exposure Choices Are Strategic Complements in Every Financial NetworkResearch Paper

Banks lend to each other. When one bank's investments fail, it may be unable to repay its interbank debt, and its creditors then receive less. Since Eisenberg and Noe (2001), the standard way to compute who pays whom after such losses has been a clearing vector: a fixed point of a system in which every bank pays the smaller of what it owes and what it has.…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Crowdfunding Effects on Venture Capital Investment: The Crowdfunding Option Lowers Expected VC Investment Exactly When a VC-Fundable Startup Prefers Investment After the CampaignResearch Paper

Reward-based crowdfunding and venture capital are two of the main sources of early-stage finance, and the empirical record on how they interact points both ways: some studies find that more crowdfunding activity is followed by more VC investment, others find the opposite. Hu, Jin and Keppo (SSRN 3512638; Management Science, 2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.00994)…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Merger Decisions Among Competitors: Impact of Limited Capacity and Loyal Segments: The Mixed Merger Is the Equilibrium Iff α(1−2α)/(1−3α) < k < 1−2α, Else No MergerResearch Paper

Antitrust authorities review horizontal mergers by asking whether the merged firm will raise prices. A prior question is which mergers firms will choose to form at all. When several firms can merge, the identity of the partner matters: a large firm may absorb a small rival, or two small rivals may combine to face the large one. Wang, Wu, Tang and Dai (Manage…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 3: Under the Rotation Order, Marketing Lists Serve Low-Cost Marketers Efficiently and Over- (Under-) Supply High-Cost Ones Below (Above) the Rotation PointResearch Paper

Data brokers sell two kinds of products to marketers. A marketing list supplies the contacts a marketer needs in order to act at all; a data append enriches a list the marketer already holds. In both cases the broker can also choose how informative its accompanying analytics are, and it can price a menu of plans of different informativeness to marketers…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Retention or Acquisition? Behavior-Based Quality Disclosure II: Behavior-Based Disclosure Raises Total Two-Period Profits Exactly When the Disclosure Cost Exceeds a CutoffResearch Paper

Firms that sell to the same customers over time learn who bought from whom. Behavior-based pricing (BBP) — charging a firm's own past customers one price and the rival's past customers another — has been studied since Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Villas-Boas (1999). A second instrument is the disclosure of product quality: free samples, demonstrations…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management IV: With Disjoint Supports, Full Disclosure Is Optimal When 2(b₀ − a₀) ≥ b₁ − a₁, Else No Disclosure at p₀ ≥ p̃ and Partial BelowResearch Paper

A retailer usually knows more about her future demand than the supplier who has to produce for her. If the supplier must commit to a production quantity before the order arrives, the retailer bears the cost of every unit he fails to produce. She cannot pay him or contract on quantities, but she can decide how much of her demand information to share, and she…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management II: Under Partial Disclosure the Value of Information Is Unimodal in p₀ and Falling in ξ Against No Disclosure, the Reverse Against FullResearch Paper

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who produces for her. When the supplier must commit to a production quantity before demand is realized, what the retailer tells him shapes how much he produces, and therefore how much demand she can serve. Information design (Bayesian persuasion, Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) asks how a…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management I: With Nested Uniform Demand Supports, Full, No or Two-Message Partial Disclosure Is Optimal According to Critical-Ratio ThresholdsResearch Paper

A retailer who sees her own demand before her supplier does can decide how much of that knowledge to pass upstream. Sharing everything is not obviously best: the supplier uses the information to set his production quantity for his own benefit, and the retailer bears a cost when he under-produces. Candogan and Gurkan (SSRN 4378997; published in Management…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 4: Under the Rotation Order, Data Appends with Costs Below the Prior Mean Serve High-Cost Marketers Efficiently and Under- (Over-) Supply Low-Cost Ones Below (Above) v⁺Research Paper

Data brokers sell consumer data to firms that use it to decide whom to target, whom to lend to, or where to open a store. Two kinds of products are common: a marketing list, which supplies contact information without which the buyer cannot act at all, and a data append, which enriches information about consumers the buyer can already reach (Federal Trade…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Contract Design in the Presence of Double Moral Hazard: One of Three Tenure-and-Termination Contracts γⁱ(wⁱ) Is Optimal Among Contracts Inducing Full Effort and Truth-TellingResearch Paper

Many businesses are run by an agent on behalf of an owner who cannot see everything the agent does. Two frictions arise together. The agent may shirk, saving the cost of the effort that brings customers in, and the agent may divert cash, pocketing the fee of a customer the owner never sees: a plumbing franchise whose offline jobs bypass the head office, or…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: LG

Rural Hospitals Theorem (Wikipedia): All Stable Matchings Fill the Same PositionsTextbook

In centralized labour markets such as the US National Resident Matching Program, doctors are assigned to hospital residency positions by a mechanism that produces a stable matching. There are more positions than doctors, so some hospitals end up with empty positions; these are typically rural hospitals, which are less sought after than urban ones. This…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: LG

Stable Matching Problem (Wikipedia) I: The Gale–Shapley AlgorithmTextbook

The stable matching problem asks for a pairing between two equally sized groups in which no two participants would both rather be matched with each other than with their assigned partners. It was posed and solved by Gale and Shapley in 1962 in the context of college admissions and marriage (Gale–Shapley 1962). Their deferred acceptance algorithm underlies…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Captain: LG

Supply and Demand I: Comparative Statics of Market EquilibriumTextbook

Supply and demand is the basic model of price determination in a perfectly competitive market: holding everything else fixed, the price of a good adjusts until the quantity buyers want equals the quantity sellers offer. The model is the standard first chapter of microeconomics, it underlies partial-equilibrium policy analysis (taxes, subsidies, price…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Captain: LG

Comparative Advantage I: Gains from Trade in the Ricardian ModelTextbook

Comparative advantage is the principle that two parties can both gain from trade even when one of them is more productive at producing every good. It is usually credited to David Ricardo's On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), with earlier formulations in an anonymous 1814 pamphlet and in Robert Torrens' Essay on the External Corn Trade…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Captain: LG

Okun's Law: Growth-Rate Form from the Gap VersionTextbook

Okun's law is an empirically observed relationship between unemployment and losses in a country's production, named after Arthur M. Okun, who proposed it in 1962 (Okun 1962). It appears in two standard forms. The gap version relates the output gap to the unemployment gap; the difference (or growth-rate) version relates year-to-year changes in output to…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Captain: LG

Gresham's Law I: Bad Money Drives Out GoodTextbook

Gresham's law is the monetary principle usually summarised as "bad money drives out good": when two kinds of coin circulate side by side and the law obliges everyone to accept both at the same face value, the coin whose metal is worth more tends to vanish from circulation, while the debased coin stays in use. The principle was named in 1857–58 by Henry…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Captain: LG

Say's Law I: No General Glut in a Barter EconomyTextbook

Say's law, or the law of markets, is the classical claim that production is the source of demand. Jean-Baptiste Say wrote in his Treatise on Political Economy (1803) that "a product is no sooner created, than it, from that instant, affords a market for other products to the full extent of its own value". The doctrine was restated by James Mill ("the…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 1: Under Pre-Announced Pricing, Social Learning Raises Optimal Expected Profit When Consumers Are Impatient or PatientResearch Paper

Online reviews let consumers learn about a new product from the experience of earlier buyers. For a firm selling to strategic consumers, who time their purchases, this social learning (SL) cuts two ways. Reviews reveal quality, which can raise second-period demand; but a consumer who expects reviews also has a new reason to wait, and every consumer who…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 2: Every Competitive Equilibrium Gives Each Agent Her ℓ-out-of-d Maximin Share for Every Rational ℓ/d at Most Her BudgetResearch Paper

Competitive equilibrium is a way to divide goods when each participant has a budget reflecting her entitlement. With divisible goods, proportional value is a natural fairness target. Indivisible goods make that target unavailable in some markets: a single item cannot give two agents positive fractions of its value. The question becomes what fairness a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 1: Two Additive Agents with Almost Equal but Unequal Budgets Have a Competitive Equilibrium Giving Each Agent Her Truncated ShareResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide indivisible goods among agents who are entitled to different shares but cannot pay with real money: course seats among students, shifts among workers, inherited items among heirs. A standard mechanism gives each agent a budget of artificial currency and lets a market run. When budgets are equal this is the competitive…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Fair and Efficient Balanced Allocations for Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible items among agents with additive valuations is the core model of fair division, with applications from inheritance and divorce settlements to course allocation and shift scheduling. The standard fairness relaxation is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and the standard efficiency notion is Pareto optimality (PO), strengthened to fraction…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee ElectionsResearch Paper

In an approval-based committee election, each of nnn voters reports the set of candidates she approves, and a committee of kkk candidates must be chosen. Proportional representation asks that every group of voters large enough to "deserve" some seats, and united enough to agree on candidates, gets them. The strongest standard axiom of this kind is the core: no…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus RedistributionResearch Paper

An automated market maker (AMM) is a smart contract that holds reserves of two tokens XXX and YYY and trades with anyone along a fixed pricing curve. On a blockchain the trades of one block are sequenced by a builder, who may also insert trades of its own. Ordering power yields maximal extractable value (MEV): in a sandwich attack the builder buys before a…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
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