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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 3: The Marketplace Bans Buyer–Seller Communication Above Π*/(v − c), Below η_L When q > c/(v − Π*), and Always When q Is Close to OneResearch Paper

Online marketplaces match buyers with sellers and charge a fee per transaction. Once a buyer has found a seller on the platform, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central concern for service marketplaces such as Upwork, Thumbtack or AngelList, and…

17 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Strategies in Network Markets: Under Potential Maximization the Equilibrium Quality Equates Marginal Cost to n Times the Harmonic-Mean Valuation Times the Uniform Average of ∂f(i,q)/∂qResearch Paper

A firm that sells a network good (a platform, a communication service, a standard) faces consumers whose benefit from buying grows with the number of other buyers. When these network effects are strong, the buying decisions form a coordination game: everybody buying and nobody buying can both be equilibria at the same price and quality. The firm's choice of…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Providing Data Samples for Free: Free Samples Strictly Beat Selling in One Round When the Seller-Side Drift of the Buyer's Bayes Risk Is Initially PositiveResearch Paper

Firms that own data increasingly sell it as a product: market research panels, consulting reports, datasets for training demand models. A common commercial practice is to hand out a free sample of the data before quoting a price for the rest. Under standard Bayesian reasoning this practice looks self-defeating. Every free data point reduces the buyer's…

16 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets 1: With Privacy Rights the Monopoly Equilibrium Has Four Breach-Cost Regimes Separated by c = δσ/2, δσ/√2 and δσResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) and the California Consumer Privacy Act give consumers privacy rights over the personal data that firms collect: data may be collected only with explicit consent (opt-in), consent is separated from the purchase itself, and a consumer may later have her data deleted (erasure, the "right to…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption I: Blockchain Adoption Raises Total Welfare for Large Horizontal Differentiation Yet Is Not an EquilibriumResearch Paper

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger that only invited parties may write to. In supply chains it is promoted as a way to make the provenance and quality of goods verifiable by the end consumer: a manufacturer who joins records how a good was produced, and consumers can read that record. Joining is costly, and the parties who pay the cost are not the…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model II: Interoperability Mitigates Dominance, as Lower Interoperability Admits a Duopoly Equilibrium with an Even Larger Dominant PlatformResearch Paper

Digital markets with strong network effects (messaging, social networks, app stores) tend to concentrate: a platform with more users is worth more to each user. Interoperability, the ability of a platform's users to interact with the users of rival platforms, is a central remedy in current competition policy; the EU Digital Markets Act (2022) mandates it…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model I: Adding a Third Platform Can Produce an Equilibrium Whose Dominant Platform Outsizes Every Platform of Every Duopoly EquilibriumResearch Paper

Markets organized by platforms (social networks, marketplaces, messaging services) exhibit network effects: a user values a platform more when more users join it. A standing concern in competition policy is that such markets "tip" towards one dominant platform, and the usual remedy proposed is to foster entry. Ekmekci, White and Wu (Platform Competition and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? III: Under Partial Multihoming, the Equilibrium Price and Profit Are Hump-Shaped in the Network EffectResearch Paper

Video-game consoles, streaming services and messaging apps share two features: users value a platform more when more people use it (network effects), and some users buy access to more than one platform (multihoming). In the standard Hotelling model where every consumer buys exactly one good, network effects intensify competition: a stronger network effect…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 2: On a Nonempty Open Set of Distributions Some Nonintersectional Policy Achieves Representation along Every Identity DimensionResearch Paper

Admissions offices and employers that run affirmative action usually measure representation one identity dimension at a time: the share of women among those admitted, the share of Black applicants, and so on. Applicants, however, belong to intersectional groups (Black women, white men, …), and a policy that looks balanced along every dimension can still…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts 2: The High-Quality Influencer's Defensive Fake-Account Purchase Falls in Antifake Effort If Condition (22) Holds, and Otherwise Rises Then FallsResearch Paper

Fake follower accounts are sold openly to social media influencers, who buy them because advertisers and new followers read a large follower count as a sign of quality. Platforms respond with antifake effort: detection, removal and registration hurdles that make fake accounts more expensive to operate, but that also impose a nuisance cost on legitimate…

13 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 1: For Generic Score Distributions No Nonintersectional Policy Yields a Representative Outcome but an Intersectional One DoesResearch Paper

Affirmative action policies are usually designed reductively: one adjustment for women, another for a racial minority, a third for applicants from low-income families. An applicant who belongs to several categories gets the combined adjustments. A long literature in sociology and law, beginning with Crenshaw's account of intersectionality (1989), argues…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Monetary Easing, Leveraged Payouts, and Lack of Investment I: With Unregulated Leverage the Optimal Date-0 Rate Is at Most R and Date-0 Investment Falls Strictly Short of the First-BestResearch Paper

Low policy rates are meant to stimulate corporate investment. Acharya and Plantin document that in the low-rate decade after the 2008 crisis, U.S. firms used much of their new borrowing for share buybacks and dividends rather than for investment: leveraged payouts. Their paper (SSRN 3484935; Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01440) builds a…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms III: When No User Plays Every Artist, Homogeneity, Additivity and Core Selection Characterize the User-Centric IndexResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and pass a large share of the revenue to the artists. How that money is divided has become a policy question. Most platforms use the pro-rata rule: all fees are pooled and each artist is paid in proportion to their share of all streams. The main alternative is the user-centric rule: each…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts 1: A Purely Profit-Driven Platform Optimally Chooses Zero Antifake EffortResearch Paper

Fake accounts (purchased followers, likes and engagement) are a large part of influencer marketing on social media, and platforms say they invest in detecting and removing them. Huang and Liu (Management Science 71(10), 2025) model this market as a signaling game. An influencer of unknown quality buys fake followers to look popular, consumers decide whether…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? I: Under Partial Multihoming, Weak Network Effects Raise Each Firm's Demand, Price and ProfitResearch Paper

Video-game consoles, streaming services, ride-hailing apps and payment systems are sold in markets where the value of a product grows with the number of people who use it. In the classical analysis of such markets every consumer buys exactly one of the competing products (singlehoming). Under that assumption, a stronger network effect intensifies price…

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration 1: A Pure Human-Driver Market Has a Unique Maximal Stable Equilibrium, Increasing in Market SizeResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms match riders with drivers who choose for themselves whether to work. Autonomous vehicles (AVs) would replace part of this self-scheduling labor with capital whose fleet size the platform chooses. Lian and van Ryzin study when, and under which market configuration, the cost savings of AVs reach riders. Their comparison needs a…

18 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Bright Side of the GDPR: Welfare-Improving Privacy Management II: A Firm with Small Data-Based Revenue Earns More Profit After the GDPRResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) requires a firm to obtain a consumer's explicit consent before it collects personal data. The common expectation, in policy debate and in much of the empirical literature, is that consent requirements cost firms money: they shrink the pool of consumer data that can be monetized through…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Bright Side of the GDPR: Welfare-Improving Privacy Management I: The Equilibrium Price Is Higher After the GDPR for Every Opt-in Benefit and Data RevenueResearch Paper

The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, in force since 2018) requires a firm to obtain a consumer's explicit opt-in consent before it collects her personal data. Most of the economic literature reads such consent rules as a cost to data-driven firms. Choe, Matsushima and Shekhar (ISER Discussion Paper No. 1246, Osaka University, June…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales 2: With One Risky Asset the Equilibrium Shorting Cost and Lending Yield Are Explicit, Increasing and Convex in the Belief GapResearch Paper

Short selling is never free. To sell a share short, an investor borrows it from a holder and pays that holder a lending fee, and the size of these fees has been documented empirically for decades (D'Avolio 2002; Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen 2002). Most equilibrium models of asset pricing either forbid short sales or take the fee as exogenous. Evgeniou,…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues: With Only Online Customers, Upgrading Raises the Optimal Revenue Exactly When Bₛ − Bₐ > α(p(λₕ) − p(λₗ))Research Paper

Amusement parks and similar attractions sell two kinds of ticket for the same ride: a regular ticket, which joins a first-come-first-served queue, and a fast-track ticket, which joins a separate queue served with non-preemptive priority. Increasingly these tickets are sold online in advance, before the customer knows whether the park will be crowded on the…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Captain: LG

Marginal Utility I: The Law of Diminishing Marginal UtilityTextbook

Marginal utility is the change in utility (pleasure or satisfaction) that results from consuming one more unit of a good or service. It is the basic quantity of the marginalist theory of value, which explains prices and consumer choice by the additional satisfaction provided by each extra unit rather than by total usefulness. The law of diminishing marginal…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Power and Limitations of Multiple Intermediaries for Single-Item AuctionsResearch Paper

A seller may be unable to receive buyers' bids directly. Intermediaries can control access to its auction and charge bidders for the right to participate. Competition between those intermediaries might reduce exclusion, but it need not transfer their revenue back to the seller. These are different questions: whether the item reaches the buyer who values it…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Fair Team ContractsResearch Paper

A firm, a research group or an open-source project often pays a team for a joint outcome it cannot observe in detail: it sees whether the project succeeded, not who worked. Combinatorial contract theory models this as a principal who offers each hired agent a linear contract, a share of the success reward, and lets the agents decide whether to exert costly…

28 thms3 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Maximizing Unobserved Welfare: Logarithmic Regret from PurchasesResearch Paper

A seller who produces goods and posts prices to a stream of buyers usually wants revenue. A planner who runs a public market, such as a food bank, a cooperative or a platform with a welfare mandate, wants something else: the total utility of the buyers minus the cost of production. The difficulty is that utility is never observed. The seller sees only what…

25 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: iris

Incentive-Aware Models of Financial Networks: A Stable Network of Contracts and Prices Exists iff a Linear System in the Prices Is Solvable, and Is Unique When Its Matrix Has Full RankResearch Paper

Financial institutions are linked by bilateral contracts: loans, interest rate swaps, insurance, derivative trades. The resulting network of exposures determines how shocks propagate, and most of the literature on systemic risk (for example the clearing model of Eisenberg and Noe) takes this network as given. Jalan, Chakrabarti and Sarkar (arXiv:2212.06808,…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
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