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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Reputation, Competition, and Lies in Labor Market Recommendations: The Equilibrium Hiring Probability Rises with the Adviser's Reputation in Top-Heavy Markets and Falls in Bottom-Heavy MarketsResearch Paper

Hiring decisions often rest on a recommendation from someone who knows the candidate: a thesis adviser, a former supervisor, a colleague. Referrals are a common channel of labor market matching, and their value depends on whether the recommender can be trusted. An adviser who cares about his candidate has a reason to overstate the candidate's quality, and…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Volatility Under Uncertain Network Effects: The Worst-Case Relative Revenue Change over ε-Perturbed Networks Equals αλmax·ε/(1 − αλmax(1 + ε))Research Paper

A seller of a good with network externalities (a social app, a telecom plan, a game console) gains from knowing how strongly each consumer's demand depends on the consumption of others. Candogan, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar (Operations Research, 2012) showed that, on a known network, the optimal price vector of a monopolist and the resulting revenue have closed…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Naive Learning Through Probability Overmatching: Along Any Vanishing-Influence Network Sequence, Extremization DeGroot Processes Eventually Agree on the True State with Probability Tending to OneResearch Paper

Models of naive social learning ask whether agents who update by simple averaging rules, rather than by Bayes' rule, can still aggregate dispersed information. In the classic DeGroot model every agent repeatedly replaces her belief by a weighted average of her neighbours' beliefs. Golub and Jackson (2010) showed that when agents communicate real-valued…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Competition and Opacity in the Financial System: Intense Competition Lowers Disclosure Precision Exactly When Investors' Private Information Is PreciseResearch Paper

Banks and other financial institutions are notoriously hard to see into: their loan books are complex and their public reports are coarse. A long-standing policy question is whether competition among financial institutions makes them more or less transparent. One view holds that competition for funding disciplines institutions into disclosing more; another…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Bonus Season: A Theory of Periodic Labor Markets and Coordinated Bonuses: A Periodic Equilibrium Exists if and only if the Importance of Match Quality Lies Between Two ThresholdsResearch Paper

Large bonuses in some industries are paid within a few weeks of each other across firms: banks in a given region announce bonuses in the same months, and top-tier US law firms announce theirs almost simultaneously. Van Wesep and Waters (SSRN 3124536, published in Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4076) explain this coordination with a search…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Beta and Coskewness Pricing: Perspective from Probability Weighting: The Rank-Dependent Equilibrium Pricing Kernel and the Three-Moment CAPMResearch Paper

Asset-pricing models relate an asset's expected return to the risks it shares with the market. A familiar covariance term measures exposure to the market return, while a coskewness term measures exposure to the square of that return. Shi, Cui and Zhou ask how these two coefficients change when investors weight probabilities as well as valuing outcomes.…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Disclosing Delivery Performance Information When Consumers Are Sensitive to Promised Delivery Time, Delivery Reliability, and Price: Full or No Information-Quality Effort Is OptimalResearch Paper

Online retailers and service providers quote a promised delivery time and are judged on how often they meet it. Platforms increasingly publish delivery-performance information, such as on-time ratings or conformance scores, so that consumers can weigh a quoted time against the firm's record. Producing accurate information is costly: the firm must track…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Product Selling vs. Pay-Per-Use Service: A Strategic Analysis of Competing Business Models: Pay-Per-Use Out-Earns Selling in Duopoly Equilibrium Iff the Delivery Cost Is Below a ThresholdResearch Paper

A firm can sell a product outright or charge customers each time they use it. Selling collects one payment and transfers the asset to the customer. Pay-per-use service (PPU) keeps control of the asset, earns revenue from each use, and incurs a delivery or operating cost each time. These arrangements coexist for equipment, vehicles, and other products whose…

12 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Donations for Refugee Crises: In-kind Versus Cash Assistance: A Price-Dependent Cash Assistance Policy Makes the Target Price Optimal for the RetailerResearch Paper

Humanitarian organizations (HOs) have long helped refugees with in-kind assistance: food, hygiene and shelter items bought at wholesale cost and handed out. Cash assistance, money that refugees spend at local stores, has grown quickly. In 2014 it was 6% of the $25 billion of humanitarian assistance worldwide; by 2019, cash and vouchers were 18% (High Level…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

I Don’t “Recall”: The Decision to Delay Innovation Launch to Avoid Costly Product Failure: Neither, Both, or Exactly One of Two Identical Firms Tests, by Failure-Probability CutoffsResearch Paper

Product recalls are frequent and costly. A firm that launches an innovation without thorough quality assurance testing gains time on the market but risks a recall, which brings direct costs (repairs, refunds, legal settlements) and lasting damage to the product's reputation. Testing removes the risk but delays the launch, and while a firm tests, a rival can…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chains and Antitrust Governance: Under the Illinois Brick Ruling, Only the Wholesale-Price-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract Lets Competing Manufacturers ColludeResearch Paper

In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (431 U.S. 720, 1977) the U.S. Supreme Court held that only direct purchasers may recover antitrust damages; an indirect purchaser, who bought the overpriced goods through an intermediary, may not sue on the ground that the overcharge was passed on to it. In a three-tier supply chain of manufacturers, retailers and…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Off-Platform Threats in On-Demand Services: At the Optimal Payout Ratios, a Provider Type Leaks Off the Platform if and only if the Counterparty Risk Lies in the Leakage Interval (a^j, b^j)Research Paper

On-demand service platforms (home cleaning, tutoring, handyman and care services) match customers with independent providers and keep a commission on every transaction. Once a customer and a provider have met through the platform, both can save the commission by transacting directly the next time. This platform leakage (also called disintermediation) is a…

16 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

“Zero Cost” Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains: Under Congestion, a Miner With Less Than Half the Hash Power Gains From a Majority Attack Even With Nothing to Double-SpendResearch Paper

A majority attack lets a miner create blocks on a private branch of a permissionless blockchain and later publish that branch as the accepted transaction history. The familiar motive is a private benefit from changing the record, such as a double-spend. Gans and Halaburda show that this motive need not be present: when transactions compete for limited block…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Experimental Choice and Disruptive Technologies: The Optimal Experiment Is Biased Toward the Firm's Own Predisposition — w-Biased If the Prior Exceeds p̂, n-Biased If It Falls BelowResearch Paper

Firms facing a new technology rarely decide in the dark: they run pilots, prototypes and market tests before committing. The management literature on disruptive technologies (Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, 1997) argues that incumbents fail because they evaluate new opportunities with tests tuned to their existing business, and that entrants succeed…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Leadership Styles and Labor Market Conditions: Under a Binding Wage Floor the Optimal Leadership Style Is Pure Monetary Incentives, Friendly, Unfriendly, or Carrot-and-Stick by Explicit ThresholdsResearch Paper

A firm may motivate a worker with pay, with a supervisor's praise, or with the threat of a supervisor's disapproval. A wage floor changes the mix: when base pay cannot fall, a worker can receive a rent above the value of an outside job. That rent affects whether the firm finds praise or scolding cheaper than a bonus. Dur, Kvaløy, and Schöttner study this…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Spillovers in Experience Goods Competition: In Every Symmetric Equilibrium Each Firm Earns Exactly the Discounted Second-Period Profit from Switching ConsumersResearch Paper

An experience good is a product whose value a consumer learns only by consuming it: a new streaming service, a meal-kit brand, a novel drug. When two firms launch competing experience goods in a new product category, every first-period sale does two things. It earns a first-period margin, and it creates a repeat consumer whom the firm can price to in the…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Only the Ugly Face? A Theoretical Model of Brand Dilution: At the Intensive Margin, Switching from In-House Development to Licensing Raises Extension Quality and Lowers the Risk of Brand DilutionResearch Paper

A firm that owns a strong brand can use the brand name on a new product outside its core business. This brand extension can be produced in-house or licensed to a specialized firm against a royalty. Brand licensing is a large business: its revenues reached US$315.5 billion in 2022 (Licensing International, cited in the paper's endnote 2). The marketing…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Order Protection through Delayed Messaging: Unique Market Equilibrium with Closed-Form Shares of Pegged Orders, Market Makers and Snipers when Midpoint Pegs Are ProtectedResearch Paper

Continuous limit-order markets reward speed. When the fundamental value of an asset moves, a trader with a faster connection can trade against stale quotes before the quoting liquidity provider can cancel them. This practice, sniping, is a direct transfer from liquidity providers to fast traders, and it has been documented and analysed as a cost of the…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Government Loan Guarantees, Market Liquidity, and Lending Standards: Loan Insurance Raises the Price of Uninsured Loans and Lowers Screening in the Liquid EquilibriumResearch Paper

Mortgage lenders in the United States and Canada can insure a loan against default when it is originated. In the US the guarantee is typically provided by government-sponsored enterprises, in Canada by government-backed mortgage insurers. Such guarantees are usually discussed as risk-sharing devices, or criticized because they weaken lenders' incentives to…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Collateral Requirements for Central Counterparties: Members Hedge Exactly Above a Strictly Decreasing, Convex Default-Fund Threshold in Initial MarginResearch Paper

After the financial crisis of 2007–2009, standardized over-the-counter derivatives were moved to mandatory central clearing: a central counterparty (CCP) becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer, so that the original counterparties are insulated from each other's default. The CCP in turn protects itself by a default waterfall and…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

How Complementors Benefit from Taking Competition to the System Level: Squeezing the Complementor Makes Launching an Integrated System Profitable Even When the System Itself Loses MoneyResearch Paper

Customers often need several complementary products, such as hardware and software, cars and financing, or jet engines and maintenance, sold by specialist firms that are complementors to one another. A recurring strategic move is for one complementor to launch an integrated system: a single offering that competes with the multi-component system its…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Following the Customers: Dynamic Competitive Repositioning: For Small Repositioning Costs, the Thresholds Rise Infinitely Fast, Increase with σ², Decrease with δ, and Become Independent of rResearch Paper

Firms reposition their products as consumer tastes drift: car makers redesign models, retailers change assortments, media outlets shift their editorial line. Each move costs money, and competitors respond to it. Ning and Villas-Boas (2020) study when two competing firms should incur a fixed cost to move toward consumers whose preferred position follows a…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Ranking Distributions When Only Means and Variances Are Known: Y Dominates X by First-Order Almost Stochastic Dominance for γ ≥ 1/(1 + 2t(t + √(t² + 1))), t = (μ_Y − μ_X)/(σ_Y + σ_X)Research Paper

Decision analysts routinely have to rank two risky prospects, with returns XXX and YYY, when nothing is known about them beyond a mean and a standard deviation for each. The classical tools are of two kinds. First-order stochastic dominance (FSD) ranks YYY above XXX for every increasing utility, but it can never be certified from means and variances alone: with…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Consumer Equilibrium, Demand Effects, and Efficiency in Group Buying: Existence and Uniqueness of the Dynamic Threshold Sign-Up Equilibrium of a Two-Threshold Group Buying EventResearch Paper

In a group-buying event a retailer offers a product at a discount that materializes only if enough customers sign up before a deadline. Platforms such as Taobao and JD run such events with several deal levels: the more customers join, the lower the final price. Each arriving customer must decide whether to join without knowing how many others will follow,…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations: Homogeneous Organization Optimal for Weak Signals, Heterogeneous Optimal Above a Threshold in k for Strong SignalsResearch Paper

In most organizations the person who decides is not the person who carries the decision out. A board ratifies a product and engineers build it; a studio approves a film and a director makes it. The implementer usually also knows more, or can learn more, about which course of action will work. A long literature in organizational economics asks whether such…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
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