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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations: Homogeneous Organization Optimal for Weak Signals, Heterogeneous Optimal Above a Threshold in k for Strong SignalsResearch Paper

In most organizations the person who decides is not the person who carries the decision out. A board ratifies a product and engineers build it; a studio approves a film and a director makes it. The implementer usually also knows more, or can learn more, about which course of action will work. A long literature in organizational economics asks whether such…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Contracting with Unobservable Managerial Hedging: The Principal's Value Solves a Concave Free-Boundary HJB Problem and the Contract Reflected at the Payment Boundary Is OptimalResearch Paper

A manager can influence a project's output through effort, but the owner observes output rather than effort. When the manager can also trade privately in a financial market, a contract based on output and market returns changes both effort incentives and the manager's ability to hedge risk. The owner must decide what the contract pays, how sensitive it is…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Curbing Emissions: Environmental Regulations and Product Offerings Across Markets: Horizontal Negotiation Unifies a Split Market at the Exact Global Standard and Lowers Total EmissionsResearch Paper

Energy-efficiency and emission standards for products such as vehicles and appliances are set by regulators whose jurisdictions overlap a single manufacturer's markets. The best-known case is United States fuel-economy regulation. California has long been allowed to set stricter vehicle standards than the federal government, and the 2019 dispute between…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Credit, Business Cycle, and Portfolio Selection: Under Limited Commitment the Credit Limit Is a Closed-Form Multiple m* of Income, and Below It the Household Defaults at OnceResearch Paper

A household can borrow against expected future income only while repayment remains preferable to default. In the baseline model of Choi, Koo, Lim and Yoo, this choice is imposed through a participation condition at every date: the household's remaining utility from its planned consumption must be at least its remaining utility after default. The constraint…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships: Effort and Bonus Weakly Decrease and the Upfront Wage Weakly Increases over the Course of EmploymentResearch Paper

Most employment relationships rely on incentives that no court enforces. A relational contract is a self-enforcing promise: the employer pays a discretionary bonus after observing effort, and keeps the promise because reneging would destroy the value of the future relationship (Bull 1987; MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; Levin 2003). This mechanism has a…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Plumbing of Securities Markets: The Impact of Post-trade Fees on Trading and Welfare: Neither Uniform nor Trade-Specific Post-Trade Fees Maximize Welfare at Every Post-Trade CostResearch Paper

Securities traders commonly pay for clearing and settlement after a trade is executed. A fee that is the same for every transaction is simple to administer, but processing a transaction between customers of the same broker can cost less than processing one between brokers. Degryse, Van Achter, and Wuyts ask whether charging everyone the same fee, or…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Queueing Systems with Rationally Inattentive Customers: Existence and Uniqueness of the Customer EquilibriumResearch Paper

Whether a customer joins a queue depends on how congested she believes it is. Classical strategic queueing studies two extremes. In the visible queue of Naor (1969) every arrival sees the queue length and joins exactly when her net payoff is nonnegative; in the invisible queue of Edelson and Hildebrand (1975) arrivals see nothing and act on the stationary…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Does Competition Improve Analysts’ Forecast Informativeness?: Competition Lowers Informativeness Exactly When Payoffs Are Convex in Rank, Signals Are Correlated and Prior Uncertainty Is HighResearch Paper

Sell-side analysts are ranked against each other. Published rankings, such as Institutional Investor's annual "All-Star" ranking cited in the paper, and the career outcomes tied to them, reward an analyst for being more accurate than peers, not only for being accurate. A common intuition holds that such competition disciplines analysts and makes their…

32 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing of Vice Goods for Goal-Driven Consumers: Personal Goals Raise the Monopoly Price of a More Unhealthy Vice Good and Lower That of a Less Unhealthy OneResearch Paper

A seller of a product that gives immediate pleasure and delayed harm faces consumers who may plan to limit consumption and then consume more than planned. This setting applies to the paper's examples of cookies, soft drinks, cigarettes, and alcohol. A personal consumption goal is one way a consumer may restrain overconsumption. The question for the seller…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Turning the Tables in R&D Licensing Contracts: Once Both Parties Acquire the Other's Capability, the Reciprocal Option's Optimal Strike Price Is γV2/2, with Pure or Mixed Offer StrategiesResearch Paper

Research and development partners may begin a project with different capabilities, then learn to perform some of each other's work. A contract written before that learning must govern who develops the product after the parties discover what they can do. A fixed buyout price can leave development with a party that implemented the new capability poorly.…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Voting with Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism: Bond Voting Is Robustly v-ImplementableResearch Paper

Blockchain platforms and decentralized autonomous organizations take governance decisions by token-weighted voting: an account's influence grows with the governance tokens it stakes. Two problems are associated with this design (Buterin 2021). The first is plutocracy: holders of many tokens control decisions. The second is the Sybil attack (Douceur 2002):…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Knowledge Sharing in Alliances and Alliance Portfolios: Knowledge Sharing Can Be Feasible in an Alliance Portfolio Although It Is Not Feasible in a Single AllianceResearch Paper

Firms that collaborate on research and development must share proprietary knowledge to make the collaboration work, yet the knowledge they share can later be used against them: a partner that has learned from the alliance can walk away and use what it learned on a rival project. Management research calls this the appropriability hazard of alliances. Arora,…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Competition for Context-Sensitive Consumers: When Consumers Underestimate Their Context-Sensitivity, Competitive Retailers Attract with a Loss Leader and Use Store Context to Up-Sell or Down-SellResearch Paper

Shoppers judge products differently inside a store than outside it. Lighting, the color of price tags, the position of a product on the shelf, the presence of a decoy: each of these can change how much weight a consumer puts on quality or on price at the moment of purchase. A large literature in behavioral economics documents such effects and models them.…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed 3D Printing of Spare Parts via IP Licensing: Optimal Standard License, OEM Profit and Channel Selection for Two Nonidentical BuyersResearch Paper

Spare parts for capital goods (aircraft, defence systems, industrial machinery) are slow-moving and expensive to stock, and an unplanned stock-out idles the equipment they serve. Industrial additive manufacturing (3D printing) lets a part be produced close to where it is used, with short lead times and small batches. An original equipment manufacturer (OEM)…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Model of Cryptocurrencies: With Observable Fundamentals the Market Has Two, One or No Cutoff Equilibria as A + ξ Is Above, At or Below a Threshold, and the Two Equilibria Respond OppositelyResearch Paper

A cryptocurrency launched through an initial coin offering is often sold before the platform it serves has users. Its value to a buyer then depends on who else buys: a token that gives access to a trading network is worth more when many households with large endowments join. Sockin and Xiong (preliminary draft, March 2018, later published in Management…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Duration of Innovation Contests: For a Patient Organizer, the Optimal Contest Duration Increases with the Scale of the Agent Uncertainty and Decreases with the Productivity ExponentResearch Paper

An innovation contest gives several agents a fixed period to submit solutions and awards prizes according to their final ranks. A platform choosing that period faces two practical effects: more time lets agents improve their submissions, while it delays the value of the best solution and can make the effort needed to participate more costly overall. The…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning in a Post-Truth World: Below a Misinformation Threshold Bayesian Societies Mislearn No More Often than DeGroot Societies, and Above It Strictly More OftenResearch Paper

People receive both informative reports and messages that are unrelated to the truth. A standard question in social learning is whether sharing beliefs helps a population identify the correct state. The question changes when everyone knows misinformation exists but does not know its ideological direction. Mostagir and Siderius study this setting and show…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Engineering Social Learning: Information Design of Time-Locked Sales Campaigns for Online Platforms: Optimal Revenue over All Information Policies Equals a Recommendation-Policy Linear ProgramResearch Paper

An online platform can know more about a product than a customer arriving for a short sales campaign. It sees earlier customers' purchase decisions and the messages it sent them, while a new customer sees only her own message and private assessment. Choosing what to disclose can raise immediate sales, but a customer's response can also reveal information…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Agency or Wholesale? The Role of Retail Pass-Through: Under Nonnegative Cross-Brand Pass-Through Agency Selling Favors the E-tailer; Under Negative, Wholesale Is Cheaper iff θ^W < θ^B min{K^B, 1}Research Paper

An online retailer may buy products from suppliers and resell them, or let suppliers sell directly while collecting a commission. The choice changes who sets retail prices and how a wholesale price change for one product affects the prices of competing products. In the first arrangement, the retailer sets all retail prices; in the second, suppliers set…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of ICOs: Diversification, Agency, and Information Asymmetry: Tokens Have a Signaling Advantage over Equity Exactly for Moderate Venture Heterogeneity and for Moderate Payoff VolatilityResearch Paper

An entrepreneur who knows more about a venture than its investors can convey information through the share of the venture that she keeps. A larger retained share exposes her to more of its uncertain payoff. The cost of this signal depends on what investors buy: an equity claim receives revenue after production costs, while a token claim receives a share of…

16 thms3 active users
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Non-Ownership Business Models for Solar Energy: When a Solar Power Company Optimally Offers Power Purchase Agreements, Leasing and SalesResearch Paper

Residential solar panels can reach customers through a purchase, a lease, or a power purchase agreement (PPA), under which the customer pays for the electricity the panels generate. These arrangements allocate panel ownership, subsidy receipts, and generation risk differently. A company choosing prices for all three therefore also chooses which customers…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Two-Sided Platform Competition in a Sharing Economy: Which Wage Scheme Maximizes Platform Profit Is Decided by Demand- versus Supply-Side CompetitionResearch Paper

Sharing-economy platforms (ride-sharing, car-sharing, peer-to-peer lending) sit between two groups. They charge consumers a price and pay self-scheduling workers a wage, and they compete with rival platforms on both sides at once. How a platform pays its workers is a design choice that varies across the industry: some announce a fixed wage per job, some a…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Wolf Pack Activism: Competition for Flow Sustains Successful Engagement Where Delegation Without Flow or Proprietary Blocks CannotResearch Paper

Shareholder engagement with corporate management is a public good: when a change of policy raises firm value, every shareholder gains, but only the shareholders who engage pay the cost. Since Grossman and Hart (1980) this free-rider problem has been the standard explanation for why dispersed owners under-monitor management. In practice, however, engagement…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Waiting for the Payday? The Market for Startups and the Timing of Entrepreneurial Exit: Low-Capability Startups Commit Early, High-Capability Startups Commit Late, Intermediate Ones Stay FlexibleResearch Paper

Most technology startups that exit successfully are acquired by incumbents rather than taken public. A founder therefore faces a timing question: sell early, while the company is still an invention that only a few incumbents can evaluate, or wait until the invention has been developed into an innovation that every potential buyer can value, at the risk of…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Model of Queue-Scalping: A Single Queue-Scalper Enters the Queue if and only if the Demand Volume Is IntermediateResearch Paper

A customer who is short of time may pay for a better place in a service queue. Unlike resale of a fixed ticket, this transaction changes the waits faced by later customers, and those customers' choices then change the value of the position being sold. Yang, Wang, and Cui study this feedback in an unobservable queue with a firm that repeatedly sells its…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
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