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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 1: Every Pareto-Efficient Signaling Mechanism Has a Threshold Structure at or Below the Full-Information ThresholdResearch Paper

Many social services are rationed by waiting rather than by price: public health clinics, food banks, shelters, legal aid. Users who need the service most often have no outside option, while users with less need could be served elsewhere but join the queue anyway and lengthen everyone's wait. The provider usually cannot force anyone to leave, and charging…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Right to Repair: Pricing, Welfare, and Environmental Implications: The Manufacturer's Optimal New-Product and Repair Prices and the Resulting No-, Partial- or Full-Repair Equilibrium (Table 1)Research Paper

Repair access changes more than the cost of fixing a broken product. It also changes how many used products reach a resale market, what those products sell for, and whether a manufacturer prefers to sell another new unit or earn a repair margin. Jin, Yang, and Zhu study these connected pricing decisions in a two-period durable-goods model in Right to…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Conceptual Flaws of Decentralized Automated Market Making: Constant Product Pricing Admits Profitable Front-Running and Multi-Venue ArbitrageResearch Paper

Decentralized exchanges on public blockchains do not match buyers with sellers through an order book. Most of them trade against a liquidity pool: a smart contract that holds reserves of two tokens and quotes a price by a fixed formula. The most widely used formula is the constant product rule of Uniswap (Adams, Zinsmeister and Robinson, 2020), under which…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? III: When Payment Postponement Helps or Hurts the Retailer, the Supplier and the ConsumersResearch Paper

A retailer can pay a supplier when it places an order or after the supplier delivers it. When production yield is uncertain, the choice changes who bears the cost of missing units. It can also change the supplier's production decision and, through the amount available for sale, the surplus received by consumers. Geng, Guo, Xiao and Yang study these effects…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? II: Under Reliable Yield the Postponements Are Complements Only at Intermediate CostResearch Paper

A retailer that buys from a supplier with unreliable production has two contractual levers against supply risk, and both postpone a decision until after the yield is known. Payment postponement means paying only for the units actually delivered (pay-by-delivery) instead of the units ordered (pay-by-order). This moves the yield risk upstream. Pricing…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Information TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Human and Machine: The Impact of Machine Input on Decision-Making Under Cognitive Limitations II: Machine Input Never Lowers the Decision-Maker's Accuracy or Expected ValueResearch Paper

Machine-learning systems are increasingly placed beside human experts — physicians reading scans, loan officers screening applications, judges assessing risk — rather than replacing them. The machine processes the structured data it can see; the human also has access to information the algorithm cannot observe, but her attention is limited. Whether such a…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? I: As Cost Rises the Retailer Prefers Payment, Then Pricing, Then Both, Then Pricing PostponementResearch Paper

When a supplier's production is subject to random yield, only part of a planned production run turns into usable output. A retailer sourcing from such a supplier bears the resulting shortage risk unless the contract or the selling strategy moves it elsewhere. Random yield is a classical topic in production planning (Yano and Lee, 1995), and postponing a…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Information TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Human and Machine: The Impact of Machine Input on Decision-Making Under Cognitive Limitations I: The Rationally Inattentive Decision-Maker's Optimal Choice Probability in Closed FormResearch Paper

A person using a machine's advice may decide more accurately, but attention is costly. Before asking what a machine changes, the baseline decision has to be understood: how often would the person choose the action associated with a good state without machine input? Boyacı, Canyakmaz, and de Véricourt study this question in a model of a decision maker who…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Climate Impact Investing 2: With Poisson Climate Uncertainty λ, If the Green Portfolio Is Green Then y*_λ Rises to 1 in λ, So Equilibrium Emissions Rise as Uncertainty GrowsResearch Paper

Climate impact investing refers to investors who tilt their portfolios away from companies with large greenhouse-gas emissions. Its stated aim goes beyond aligning portfolios with values: by raising the cost of capital of polluting companies, it is meant to change what those companies do. De Angelis, Tankov and Zerbib (SSRN 3562534, published in Management…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition II: Unconstrained R&D Race: Best Responses Rise on Accelerable Projects and a Symmetric Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Two firms developing competing innovations face a decision that a single firm does not: a rival's discovery can end the value of continuing the project. If the first discovery wins the payoff, each firm chooses how much to spend per period while knowing that greater spending may change both its payoff on success and its speed of discovery. The investment…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 3: Under Topics-Style Category Tracking Both Advertisers Bid on ADX1 Exactly When the Inaccuracy τ Is Below an Explicit Threshold τ̃ > 1Research Paper

Online display advertising is sold through ad exchanges, and much of its value comes from targeting: showing an ad to consumers known to be interested in the advertised product. For two decades the main tracking technology was the third-party cookie, under which an exchange can follow a consumer only after an advertiser agrees to share the data from its own…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 3: The Midpoint Fixed-Fraction Rule Is the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of the Liability GameResearch Paper

When one breached contract forces the next party to breach its own contract, a single failure travels down a loss chain: agent 1 (the initiator) causes a loss ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ to agent 2, which can then no longer honour its agreement with agent 3 and causes it a loss ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​, and so on until agent nnn causes a loss ℓn\ell_nℓn​ to a final victim. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 4: The Threshold Equilibrium Investment in New Mining Hardware, with Entry Decreasing in the Fixed CostResearch Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin pay a block reward to the miner that first solves a computational puzzle. The chance of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total computing power (hash rate), so mining is a contest in which every miner pays for hash rate and the reward is split in proportion to it. Over time mining moved from…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Climate Impact Investing 1: With an Average-Emissions Interaction Effect the Unique Equilibrium Emission Schedule Is ψ* − ε/(2n+ε)·(ψ* + 2n²ψ̄*/(2n+(n+1)ε)), Below the Schedule Without InteractionResearch Paper

Green investors hold a growing share of financial wealth, and the stated purpose of much of this capital is to change how companies behave, not only to avoid exposure to climate risk. Whether exclusionary or impact-oriented portfolios actually move corporate emissions is an equilibrium question: investors' preferences shift the cost of capital, and…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 1: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration Under Triangular Valuations When Independent or Herding Backers DominateResearch Paper

Reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter let a project creator collect pledges from the public for a fixed period. Two numbers are fixed before launch and cannot be changed afterwards: the pledge level ppp each backer pays, and the campaign duration TTT. A high pledge level earns more per backer but deters backers with low valuations; a long…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition I: Comparative Statics of an Unconstrained Monopoly's Optimal R&D IntensityResearch Paper

Firms deciding how much to spend on research and development face two different kinds of return to spending. More money can make the eventual innovation more valuable, or it can make the innovation arrive sooner. Lin (Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4503) calls these two properties scalability and accelerability, and shows that they predict…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying the Impact of Impact Investing I: Mean and Variance of an Impact-Ranked Portfolio's Excess Return under IID Bivariate-Normal Impact Factors and AlphasResearch Paper

Impact investing selects securities by a non-financial characteristic: an ESG rating, a carbon-intensity metric, a "sin stock" flag. A recurring question in finance is whether such a selection costs or earns the investor anything, and by how much. Lo and Zhang (SSRN 3944367; Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01168) give a closed-form answer in a…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 1: The Ad Exchange Allows Cross-Targeting Exactly When (No Leave) and (No Leave & Snipe) Hold, and Both Advertisers Always Share Data With ItResearch Paper

Display advertising on the open web runs through ad exchanges, intermediaries that sell ad impressions on third-party publisher sites to advertisers. A large share of these ads is retargeting: an advertiser shows ads to consumers who recently visited its own website and so revealed purchase intent. Retargeting needs tracking data (a cookie or pixel placed…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 4: On Loss Trees the Same Four Axioms Characterize the Fixed-Fraction RulesResearch Paper

When one agent breaches a contract, the breach often forces its counterparty to breach its own contracts in turn, and the losses propagate. Supply chains are the standard example: a supplier that fails to deliver makes its customer fail to deliver to its own customers. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (Management Science 70(3), 2024) ask how the total loss of…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 1: The Mining Game Has a Unique Equilibrium Whose Number of Active Miners Is Fixed by an Explicit Cost ConditionResearch Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep their ledger secure by a contest: miners spend computing power ("hash rate") to solve a cryptographic puzzle, and the miner who solves it first earns the block reward. The probability of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total hash rate, so mining is a rent-seeking contest in the sense of…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 2: Signs of the Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates and Hash Rate Shares to Mining CostsResearch Paper

In a proof-of-work cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, miners spend computing power (hash rate) to win the right to add the next block and collect a reward. Whether this competition stays decentralized depends on how individual hash rates react to differences in mining costs: if a cost advantage translates into an ever larger share of the total hash rate,…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 2: Anonymity, Order Preservation, Winner Strict Endowment Monotonicity and Local Consistency Characterize Single-Parametric RulesResearch Paper

Tournaments, races, poker finals and sports leagues end with a ranking of the participants and a sum of prize money to be split among them. The split is usually fixed by a published schedule, and different events use very different schedules: some pay almost everything to the winner, some pay many places, some decay geometrically from one place to the next.…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 3: Anonymity, Order Preservation, Winner Strict Endowment Monotonicity and Top Consistency Characterize Parametric RulesResearch Paper

Rank-order competitions — sports tournaments, poker final tables, golf tours, crowdsourcing contests, sales leagues — end with a ranking of the participants and a pot of prize money that has to be split according to that ranking. Organisers publish prize tables that change with the number of entrants and with the size of the purse, and these tables are…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost II: Condition 2, High Switching Cost, Not-Hiring Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Firms that outsource work to an agent whose effort they cannot observe often punish poor performance by suspending the relationship for a while, even though restarting costs money: a new set-up, re-training, re-mobilisation. Cao, Sun and Tian (Management Science, 2024) study this trade-off in a continuous-time principal–agent model with Poisson arrivals and…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces I: The Marketplace Is Stable Exactly When M ≤ w* Under Tight Labor Supply (p* ≤ w*) and M ≤ H(R(p*)) Under Loose SupplyResearch Paper

Minimum hourly earnings rules for ride-hailing drivers are meant to protect income during periods when drivers spend part of their time idle. A platform pays a wage per hour carrying riders, yet drivers care about earnings per hour logged onto the platform. When many drivers enter after a wage increase, utilization can fall and offset the increase. A…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
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