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Operations Research

2,232 missions · 1,108 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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ProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Matroid Prophet Inequalities 3: Stopping at the First Value Above E[max X_i]/2 Earns at Least Half the Prophet's Expected MaximumResearch Paper

Motivation

A prophet inequality compares two players facing the same random sequence of rewards X1,X2,…,XnX_1, X_2, \dots, X_nX1​,X2​,…,Xn​. The gambler sees the values one at a time and must decide, as each value arrives, whether to stop and collect it; a value passed over is lost. The prophet knows the whole sequence in advance and simply takes its maximum. In 1978 Krengel, Sucheston and Garling showed that when the XiX_iXi​ are independent, non-negative and E[max⁡iXi]<∞\mathbb E[\max_i X_i] < \inftyE[maxi​Xi​]<∞, the gambler has a stopping rule τ\tauτ with

2 E[Xτ]  ≥  E[max⁡iXi],2\,\mathbb E[X_\tau] \;\ge\; \mathbb E\big[\max_i X_i\big],2E[Xτ​]≥E[imax​Xi​],

and that the factor 222 cannot be improved. This inequality, labelled (1) in Kleinberg and Weinberg's Matroid Prophet Inequalities (arXiv:1201.4764, STOC 2012), is the starting point of optimal stopping theory's prophet inequalities and, more recently, of a large literature in online algorithms and algorithmic mechanism design, where it is the reason that a single posted price can extract a constant fraction of the optimal welfare or revenue.

Timeline.

  • 1977: Krengel and Sucheston prove the inequality with factor 4 in place of 2 (Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 83).
  • 1978: Krengel and Sucheston publish the result attributed to Krengel, Sucheston and Garling, the factor-2 inequality (1) for independent non-negative rewards with E[max⁡iXi]<∞\mathbb E[\max_i X_i] < \inftyE[maxi​Xi​]<∞; the factor 222 cannot be improved.
  • 1984: Samuel-Cahn shows that a single threshold suffices: stopping at the first value above a threshold TTT with Pr⁡[max⁡iXi>T]=12\Pr[\max_i X_i > T] = \tfrac12Pr[maxi​Xi​>T]=21​ (a median of max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​) already achieves the factor 222 (doi:10.1214/aop/1176993223).
  • 2012: Kleinberg and Weinberg, introducing the matroid prophet inequality, give in §3.1 a second single-threshold rule, with threshold T=E[max⁡iXi]/2T = \mathbb E[\max_i X_i]/2T=E[maxi​Xi​]/2, and a half-page proof that it earns at least TTT. This rule and its analysis are the rank-one case of their matroid algorithm.

This mission formalizes that §3.1 result.

Setting

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, \mathbb P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1. Let X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ be real random variables on Ω\OmegaΩ that are independent (as a family), non-negative, and such that the prophet's value max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​ has finite expectation. Define

T=12 E[max⁡iXi],p=Pr⁡[max⁡iXi≥T].T = \tfrac12\,\mathbb E\big[\max_i X_i\big], \qquad p = \Pr\big[\max_i X_i \ge T\big].T=21​E[imax​Xi​],p=Pr[imax​Xi​≥T].

The single-threshold rule observes X1,X2,…X_1, X_2, \dotsX1​,X2​,… in order and stops at the first time τ\tauτ with Xτ≥TX_\tau \ge TXτ​≥T, collecting XτX_\tauXτ​. If no XiX_iXi​ reaches TTT, the rule accepts nothing and collects 000. Write XτX_\tauXτ​ for the amount collected; it equals Xτ(ω)(ω)X_{\tau(\omega)}(\omega)Xτ(ω)​(ω) on the event {max⁡iXi≥T}\{\max_i X_i \ge T\}{maxi​Xi​≥T}, which has probability ppp, and 000 off it.

In Lean the variables are X : Fin n → Ω → ℝ with [NeZero n]; max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​ is maxX X, TTT is thr P X, ppp is stopProb P X, and XτX_\tauXτ​ is reward P X, all in the namespace MatroidProphetKW.RankOne.

Formalization targets

Goal: the half-mean threshold rule

E[Xτ]  ≥  T  =  12 E[max⁡iXi].\mathbb E[X_\tau] \;\ge\; T \;=\; \tfrac12\,\mathbb E\big[\max_i X_i\big].E[Xτ​]≥T=21​E[imax​Xi​].

This is inequality (1) for an explicit rule, which is stronger than (1)'s existence statement. The constant 12\tfrac1221​ is sharp, so the goal is stated with it.

Milestones (in the order the paper's argument uses them)

  1. Tail bound, for every x>Tx > Tx>T:
Pr⁡[Xτ>x]  ≥  (1−p)∑i=1nPr⁡[Xi>x].\Pr[X_\tau > x] \;\ge\; (1-p)\sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[X_i > x].Pr[Xτ​>x]≥(1−p)i=1∑n​Pr[Xi​>x].
  1. Comparison with the prophet's tail, for every x>Tx > Tx>T:
Pr⁡[Xτ>x]  ≥  (1−p) Pr⁡[max⁡iXi>x].\Pr[X_\tau > x] \;\ge\; (1-p)\,\Pr\big[\max_i X_i > x\big].Pr[Xτ​>x]≥(1−p)Pr[imax​Xi​>x].
  1. The prophet's upper tail:
∫T∞Pr⁡[max⁡iXi>x] dx  ≥  T.\int_T^\infty \Pr\big[\max_i X_i > x\big]\,dx \;\ge\; T.∫T∞​Pr[imax​Xi​>x]dx≥T.
  1. The gambler's lower tail:
∫0TPr⁡[Xτ>x] dx  ≥  pT.\int_0^T \Pr[X_\tau > x]\,dx \;\ge\; pT.∫0T​Pr[Xτ​>x]dx≥pT.

Significance

The result. A threshold that depends on the distributions only through one number, E[max⁡iXi]\mathbb E[\max_i X_i]E[maxi​Xi​], already matches the optimal worst-case guarantee of the best stopping rule. Because it is a single price, the rule translates directly into a posted-price mechanism: a seller who posts the price TTT to arriving buyers obtains half of the expected maximum value. The same accounting, in which accepted value is charged against the threshold and rejected value against the probability of having accepted nothing, is what Kleinberg and Weinberg generalize to matroids (missions 1 and 2 of this series).

Formalizing it. The result is proved and classical; the work here is to formalize its known proof. No machine-checked proof of the factor-2 prophet inequality is in Mathlib, and none was found among the platform's published theorems in October 2026. A completed development provides the inequality itself, the tail comparisons, and the layer-cake bookkeeping for a stopped reward, all of which are reusable for other single-threshold prophet inequalities (Samuel-Cahn's median rule, kkk-choice and posted-price variants).

Difficulty

The expected reward of the rule is not a function of the marginals of the individual XiX_iXi​ alone in an obvious way: the event that the rule is still running when XiX_iXi​ arrives depends on X1,…,Xi−1X_1, \dots, X_{i-1}X1​,…,Xi−1​, and the reward is XτX_\tauXτ​ at a random index. The natural first attempt, comparing XτX_\tauXτ​ and max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​ pointwise, fails, since on a given outcome the rule may stop early at a value just above TTT while the maximum comes later. The comparison has to be made between distributions, at each level xxx, and it has to use independence to decouple "nothing accepted before time iii" from "Xi>xX_i > xXi​>x". The rest is measure-theoretic bookkeeping that is routine on paper and not routine in Lean: expressing expectations of non-negative variables as integrals of tail probabilities, splitting them at TTT, and keeping track of integrability.

Formalization scope

  • Probability space. Ω with a MeasurableSpace, P : Measure Ω with [IsProbabilityMeasure P].
  • Variables. X : Fin n → Ω → ℝ, [NeZero n]; each X i measurable; iIndepFun X P (mutual independence); 0 ≤ X i ω for all i, ω; Integrable (maxX X) P, which is the paper's E[max⁡iXi]<∞\mathbb E[\max_i X_i] < \inftyE[maxi​Xi​]<∞.
  • Maximum. Finset.sup' over the nonempty index set; no junk supremum.
  • Expectations and probabilities. Bochner integrals (∫ ω, … ∂P) and Measure.real probabilities. Tail integrals are Lebesgue integrals of x↦Pr⁡[⋅>x]x \mapsto \Pr[\cdot > x]x↦Pr[⋅>x] over (T,∞)(T, \infty)(T,∞) and (0,T](0, T](0,T].
  • Weak and strict inequalities are as printed: the rule stops at Xτ≥TX_\tau \ge TXτ​≥T, p=Pr⁡[max⁡iXi≥T]p = \Pr[\max_i X_i \ge T]p=Pr[maxi​Xi​≥T], tails are Pr⁡[⋅>x]\Pr[\cdot > x]Pr[⋅>x], for x>Tx > Tx>T.
  • The rule may accept nothing. The reward is 000 when no value reaches TTT; the rule is not forced to stop at XnX_nXn​.

The threshold TTT is a definition, E[max⁡iXi]/2\mathbb E[\max_i X_i]/2E[maxi​Xi​]/2, not a free parameter constrained by hypotheses; a formalization in which TTT is arbitrary and the upper-tail bound is assumed would make the goal a rearrangement of its hypotheses, and is ruled out.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs, and that is welcome as separate contributions: the layer-cake formula E[Y]=∫0∞Pr⁡[Y>x] dx\mathbb E[Y] = \int_0^\infty \Pr[Y > x]\,dxE[Y]=∫0∞​Pr[Y>x]dx for non-negative integrable YYY split at a level TTT (Mathlib has the unsplit form, MeasureTheory.integral_eq_integral_meas_lt); measurability and integrability of the stopped reward (it is dominated by max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​); and the probability of the event "the first i−1i-1i−1 values are below TTT and Xi>xX_i > xXi​>x" as a product under iIndepFun.

Selected references

  • Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg, Matroid Prophet Inequalities, STOC 2012, pp. 123–136; preprint arXiv:1201.4764v1, 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.4764 (doi:10.1145/2213977.2213991)
  • Ulrich Krengel and Louis Sucheston, Semiamarts and finite values, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 83, 1977, pp. 745–747.
  • Ulrich Krengel and Louis Sucheston, On semiamarts, amarts, and processes with finite value, Advances in Probability and Related Topics 4, 1978, pp. 197–266.
  • Ester Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables, Annals of Probability 12(4), 1984, pp. 1213–1216. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993223
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Convex OptimizationFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimization of Convex Risk Functions 2: On a Banach Lattice, a Proper Convex Monotone Risk Function Is Continuous and Subdifferentiable on the Interior of Its DomainResearch Paper

Motivation

Risk-averse stochastic optimization replaces the expected cost E[X]\mathbb E[X]E[X] of an uncertain outcome XXX by a risk function ρ(X)\rho(X)ρ(X): conditional value-at-risk, mean–semideviation and mean–upper-semideviation models, and the coherent and convex risk measures of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath and of Föllmer and Schied. Ruszczyński and Shapiro, Optimization of convex risk functions (Math. Oper. Res. 31, 2006), develop the convex analysis of such functions on general spaces of random variables, so that they can be used inside optimization problems min⁡z∈Sρ(F(z))\min_{z\in S}\rho(F(z))minz∈S​ρ(F(z)).

Optimality conditions, duality and sensitivity analysis for such problems need two regularity properties of ρ\rhoρ: continuity, and the existence of subgradients that are continuous linear functionals. For extended-valued convex functions on infinite-dimensional spaces neither comes for free. The standard sufficient condition, boundedness from above on a neighbourhood of a point (Ioffe and Tikhomirov), often cannot be used: the paper notes (p. 436) that the cone of nonnegative functions in Lp(Rm,B,μ)\mathcal L_p(\mathbb R^m,\mathcal B,\mu)Lp​(Rm,B,μ), p∈[1,+∞)p\in[1,+\infty)p∈[1,+∞), μ\muμ a continuous probability measure, has empty interior. Section 3.1 shows instead that for monotone convex risk functions on a Banach lattice both properties follow from convexity and monotonicity alone. This mission formalizes that result, Proposition 3.1, and its Lp\mathcal L_pLp​ instance, Corollary 3.1.

Setting

Let X\mathcal XX be a real vector space with a partial order ⪰\succeq⪰, and R‾=[−∞,+∞]\overline{\mathbb R}=[-\infty,+\infty]R=[−∞,+∞]. Outcomes are costs: smaller is better. A function ρ:X→R‾\rho:\mathcal X\to\overline{\mathbb R}ρ:X→R has domain dom⁡ρ={X:ρ(X)<+∞}\operatorname{dom}\rho=\{X:\rho(X)<+\infty\}domρ={X:ρ(X)<+∞} and is proper if ρ(X)>−∞\rho(X)>-\inftyρ(X)>−∞ for all XXX and dom⁡ρ≠∅\operatorname{dom}\rho\neq\emptysetdomρ=∅. The paper's axioms used here are

  • (A1) convexity: ρ(αX+(1−α)Y)≤αρ(X)+(1−α)ρ(Y)\rho(\alpha X+(1-\alpha)Y)\le\alpha\rho(X)+(1-\alpha)\rho(Y)ρ(αX+(1−α)Y)≤αρ(X)+(1−α)ρ(Y) for all X,Y∈XX,Y\in\mathcal XX,Y∈X and α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1];
  • (A2) monotonicity: if Y⪰XY\succeq XY⪰X then ρ(Y)≥ρ(X)\rho(Y)\ge\rho(X)ρ(Y)≥ρ(X).

A linear functional l:X→Rl:\mathcal X\to\mathbb Rl:X→R, not necessarily continuous, is an algebraic subgradient of ρ\rhoρ at Xˉ\bar XXˉ if

ρ(X)≥ρ(Xˉ)+l(X−Xˉ)∀X∈X.(3.1)\rho(X)\ge\rho(\bar X)+l(X-\bar X)\qquad\forall X\in\mathcal X.\tag{3.1}ρ(X)≥ρ(Xˉ)+l(X−Xˉ)∀X∈X.(3.1)

When X\mathcal XX is a Banach space it carries its norm topology and is paired with its dual Y:=X∗\mathcal Y:=\mathcal X^*Y:=X∗. The subdifferential ∂ρ(Xˉ)\partial\rho(\bar X)∂ρ(Xˉ) is the set of continuous l∈X∗l\in\mathcal X^*l∈X∗ satisfying (3.1), and ρ\rhoρ is subdifferentiable at Xˉ\bar XXˉ if ∂ρ(Xˉ)≠∅\partial\rho(\bar X)\neq\emptyset∂ρ(Xˉ)=∅.

A Banach lattice is a real Banach space X\mathcal XX whose order makes it a lattice, compatible with addition, such that ∣X1∣≤∣X2∣|X_1|\le|X_2|∣X1​∣≤∣X2​∣ implies ∥X1∥≤∥X2∥\|X_1\|\le\|X_2\|∥X1​∥≤∥X2​∥. Every Lp(Ω,F,μˉ)\mathcal L_p(\Omega,\mathcal F,\bar\mu)Lp​(Ω,F,μˉ​), p∈[1,+∞]p\in[1,+\infty]p∈[1,+∞], with the almost-everywhere order, is one.

In Lean everything lives in the namespace ConvexRiskFn.Cont: dom, IsProper, A1, A2, IsAlgSubgradient and subdiff are defined in the setting file.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.1 (p. 437)

Let X\mathcal XX be a Banach lattice and ρ:X→R‾\rho:\mathcal X\to\overline{\mathbb R}ρ:X→R proper, satisfying (A1) and (A2). Then

ρ is continuous on int⁡(dom⁡ρ),∂ρ(Xˉ)≠∅  for every Xˉ∈int⁡(dom⁡ρ).\rho \text{ is continuous on } \operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\rho), \qquad \partial\rho(\bar X)\neq\emptyset \ \text{ for every } \bar X\in\operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\rho).ρ is continuous on int(domρ),∂ρ(Xˉ)=∅  for every Xˉ∈int(domρ).

Milestones (the steps of the paper's argument, pp. 436–437)

  1. At Xˉ∈int⁡(dom⁡ρ)\bar X\in\operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\rho)Xˉ∈int(domρ) the directional derivative δ(X)=ρ′(Xˉ,X)=lim⁡t↓0(ρ(Xˉ+tX)−ρ(Xˉ))/t\delta(X)=\rho'(\bar X,X)=\lim_{t\downarrow0}(\rho(\bar X+tX)-\rho(\bar X))/tδ(X)=ρ′(Xˉ,X)=limt↓0​(ρ(Xˉ+tX)−ρ(Xˉ))/t is finite, positively homogeneous and convex, and ρ(X)≥ρ(Xˉ)+δ(X−Xˉ)\rho(X)\ge\rho(\bar X)+\delta(X-\bar X)ρ(X)≥ρ(Xˉ)+δ(X−Xˉ).
  2. ρ\rhoρ has an algebraic subgradient at every Xˉ∈int⁡(dom⁡ρ)\bar X\in\operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\rho)Xˉ∈int(domρ).
  3. Under (A2) an algebraic subgradient is positive: l(X)≥0l(X)\ge0l(X)≥0 for X⪰0X\succeq0X⪰0.
  4. (Levin) Every positive linear functional on a Banach lattice is continuous.
  5. If l∈∂ρ(Xˉ)l\in\partial\rho(\bar X)l∈∂ρ(Xˉ), then ρ\rhoρ is lower semicontinuous at Xˉ\bar XXˉ.
  6. (Phelps) A proper convex ρ\rhoρ on a Banach space that is lower semicontinuous at every point of int⁡(dom⁡ρ)\operatorname{int}(\operatorname{dom}\rho)int(domρ) is continuous there.

Companions

  • Corollary 3.1 (p. 437): for X=Lp(Ω,F,μˉ)\mathcal X=\mathcal L_p(\Omega,\mathcal F,\bar\mu)X=Lp​(Ω,F,μˉ​), p∈[1,+∞)p\in[1,+\infty)p∈[1,+∞), paired with Lq\mathcal L_qLq​, the same conclusion, with subgradients represented by g∈Lqg\in\mathcal L_qg∈Lq​ through ∫g (X−Xˉ) dμˉ\int g\,(X-\bar X)\,d\bar\mu∫g(X−Xˉ)dμˉ​.
  • Real-valued case (p. 437): if moreover ρ(X)<+∞\rho(X)<+\inftyρ(X)<+∞ for every XXX, then ρ\rhoρ is continuous on all of X\mathcal XX and subdifferentiable everywhere.

Significance

Proposition 3.1 removes lower semicontinuity from the list of assumptions a modeller has to check. In the paper's framework, the dual representation ρ(X)=sup⁡μ∈A{⟨μ,X⟩−ρ∗(μ)}\rho(X)=\sup_{\mu\in\mathcal A}\{\langle\mu,X\rangle-\rho^*(\mu)\}ρ(X)=supμ∈A​{⟨μ,X⟩−ρ∗(μ)} (Theorem 2.2) requires lower semicontinuity. The subdifferential formulas, the Hadamard directional differentiability of composite functions ρ(F(z))\rho(F(z))ρ(F(z)) and the optimality conditions of §§3.2 and 6 require continuity or subdifferentiability at the point of interest. On Lp\mathcal L_pLp​ spaces, Corollary 3.1 gives all of these on the interior of the domain from (A1) and (A2) alone, for example for real-valued convex monotone risk functions such as the mean–upper-semideviation and conditional value-at-risk models of §4.

The result is proved in the paper, so the formalization adds no new mathematics. It does add two classical functional-analytic facts that the paper cites without proof: automatic continuity of positive functionals on Banach lattices, and continuity of lower semicontinuous convex functions on open subsets of Banach spaces, here for extended-real-valued functions. As far as a search of Mathlib and of the platform shows, neither is formalized in this generality. Mathlib's continuity result for convex functions is finite-dimensional. Mathlib has the Hahn–Banach extension theorem but no theory of positive functionals on Banach lattices.

Difficulty

An algebraic subgradient exists at an interior point by Hahn–Banach applied to the directional derivative, and in a general Banach space it may be discontinuous. Continuity cannot come from local boundedness either: the usual criterion (bounded above near a point) is exactly what fails for natural examples, since positive cones in Lp\mathcal L_pLp​, p<∞p<\inftyp<∞, have empty interior. The order structure has to do the work. Monotonicity forces the subgradient to be positive, and positivity forces continuity on a Banach lattice. That last step needs completeness and solidity of the norm. Without them, positive linear functionals need not be continuous, for example on the space of finitely supported sequences.

The second difficulty is passing from lower semicontinuity at each interior point to continuity on the interior. For a convex function this needs a Baire category argument on the Banach space, and completeness cannot be dropped.

Formalization scope

  • The Banach lattice is abstract: a type E with NormedAddCommGroup, NormedSpace ℝ, CompleteSpace, Lattice, HasSolidNorm (the solidity condition) and IsOrderedAddMonoid. This is the paper's definition, and it contains the paper's function spaces, so the formal goal is a generalization. Compatibility of the order with multiplication by nonnegative scalars is not assumed; it follows from these axioms.
  • R‾\overline{\mathbb R}R is EReal. Convexity (A1) is written with EReal arithmetic, which agrees with the paper's for proper functions. Continuity on the interior is continuity of an EReal-valued function in the order topology. On the interior the function is finite, so this is ordinary continuity.
  • Subgradients in the goal are continuous linear functionals E →L[ℝ] ℝ, i.e. Y=X∗\mathcal Y=\mathcal X^*Y=X∗. A version stating only an algebraic (possibly discontinuous) subgradient would be the easy half of the result and is not the goal; it is milestone 2.
  • The interior of the domain may be empty. The goal is then vacuous, as on the page. The domain is never assumed to be all of X\mathcal XX, except in the real-valued companion, where the page assumes it.
  • Corollary 3.1 uses Mathlib's Lp ℝ p μbar (a.e. classes) with a finite measure μˉ\bar\muμˉ​ (the paper's measures are finite, p. 434) and p≠∞p\neq\inftyp=∞. Its subgradient is a function ggg with MemLp g q μbar for the Hölder conjugate qqq, paired by the integral.
  • Needed infrastructure: one-sided directional derivatives of extended-valued convex functions, Hahn–Banach for sublinear functionals (exists_extension_of_le_sublinear in Mathlib), positive functionals on Banach lattices, and the Baire-category continuity theorem for convex lower semicontinuous functions. The last two are reusable well beyond risk functions. Contributions proving any milestone, or proving the Phelps or Levin step in greater generality, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ruszczyński, A. Shapiro, Optimization of convex risk functions, Mathematics of Operations Research 31(3):433–452, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1050.0186
  • V. L. Levin, Convex Analysis in Spaces of Measurable Functions and Its Applications in Economics, Nauka, Moscow, 1985 (cited as [11]: Lemma 1.1, Theorem 0.12).
  • R. R. Phelps, Convex Functions, Monotone Operators and Differentiability, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1364, Springer, 1989 (cited as [19]: Theorem 3.3).
  • A. D. Ioffe, V. M. Tihomirov, Theory of Extremal Problems, North-Holland, 1979 (cited as [9]).
  • P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber, D. Heath, Coherent measures of risk, Mathematical Finance 9(3):203–228, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9965.00068
  • H. Föllmer, A. Schied, Convex measures of risk and trading constraints, Finance and Stochastics 6(4):429–447, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/s007800200072
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Convex OptimizationFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimization of Convex Risk Functions 1: Dual Representation of a Lower Semicontinuous Convex Risk Function, with Monotonicity, Translation Equivariance and Homogeneity Read Off Its Dual DomainResearch Paper

Motivation

A risk function assigns to an uncertain cost XXX (a function of the random state ω\omegaω) a single number ρ(X)\rho(X)ρ(X) that a decision maker can minimize. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (Math. Finance 9, 1999) singled out four axioms, convexity, monotonicity, translation equivariance and positive homogeneity, and called real-valued functions satisfying all four coherent. Föllmer and Schied (Finance Stoch. 6, 2002) and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin dropped homogeneity to obtain convex risk measures. In each of these works, a central result is a dual representation: the risk function is a supremum of expectations under a family of probability measures, possibly with a penalty.

Ruszczyński and Shapiro (Math. Oper. Res. 31, 2006) place these representations inside general conjugate duality. Their Theorem 2.2 shows that, for any proper, lower semicontinuous, convex risk function on a locally convex space of measurable functions paired with a space of signed measures, the representation holds over the domain of the conjugate, and each remaining axiom corresponds exactly to a property of the measures in that domain. The paper then builds its optimization theory (subdifferentials of composite risk functions, optimality conditions, duality for nonanticipativity constraints) on this representation.

Timeline. Artzner et al. (1999): the coherent axioms, with a representation for finite Ω\OmegaΩ. Delbaen (2002): coherent measures on L∞L^\inftyL∞ under the Fatou property. Föllmer–Schied (2002): convex risk measures on bounded functions. Cheridito, Delbaen and Kupper (2004): spaces of processes. Rockafellar, Uryasev and Zabarankin (2002–2006): the risk envelope in L2\mathcal L_2L2​. Ruszczyński–Shapiro (2006): the general paired-space statement formalized here.

Setting

Outcomes are costs: smaller values of XXX are better. Let (Ω,F)(\Omega,\mathcal F)(Ω,F) be a measurable space and Y\mathbb YY the space of finite signed measures on it. The mission fixes

  1. a real locally convex topological vector space X\mathcal XX of F\mathcal FF-measurable functions X:Ω→RX:\Omega\to\mathbb RX:Ω→R, with its own topology (for instance a norm), not necessarily pointwise convergence;
  2. a linear subspace Y⊆Y\mathcal Y\subseteq\mathbb YY⊆Y with ∫Ω∣X∣ d∣μ∣<∞\int_\Omega|X|\,d|\mu|<\infty∫Ω​∣X∣d∣μ∣<∞ for all X∈XX\in\mathcal XX∈X, μ∈Y\mu\in\mathcal Yμ∈Y, where ∣μ∣=μ++μ−|\mu|=\mu^++\mu^-∣μ∣=μ++μ−;
  3. the pairing ⟨μ,X⟩=∫ΩX dμ=∫X dμ+−∫X dμ−\langle\mu,X\rangle=\int_\Omega X\,d\mu=\int X\,d\mu^+-\int X\,d\mu^-⟨μ,X⟩=∫Ω​Xdμ=∫Xdμ+−∫Xdμ−, compatible with the topology of X\mathcal XX: every ⟨μ,⋅⟩\langle\mu,\cdot\rangle⟨μ,⋅⟩ is continuous, and every continuous linear functional on X\mathcal XX is some ⟨μ,⋅⟩\langle\mu,\cdot\rangle⟨μ,⋅⟩, μ∈Y\mu\in\mathcal Yμ∈Y.

Write X+\mathcal X_+X+​ for the nonnegative functions, Y⪰XY\succeq XY⪰X for Y(ω)≥X(ω)Y(\omega)\ge X(\omega)Y(ω)≥X(ω) for all ω\omegaω, Y+\mathcal Y_+Y+​ for the nonnegative measures in Y\mathcal YY, and P\mathcal PP for the probability measures in Y\mathcal YY. Condition (C) requires that every μ∈Y∖Y+\mu\in\mathcal Y\setminus\mathcal Y_+μ∈Y∖Y+​ have ⟨μ,X⟩<0\langle\mu,X\rangle<0⟨μ,X⟩<0 for some X∈X+X\in\mathcal X_+X∈X+​.

A risk function ρ:X→R‾\rho:\mathcal X\to\overline{\mathbb R}ρ:X→R is proper if it never equals −∞-\infty−∞ and is finite somewhere. The axioms are

  • (A1) ρ(αX+(1−α)Y)≤αρ(X)+(1−α)ρ(Y)\rho(\alpha X+(1-\alpha)Y)\le\alpha\rho(X)+(1-\alpha)\rho(Y)ρ(αX+(1−α)Y)≤αρ(X)+(1−α)ρ(Y), α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1];
  • (A2) Y⪰X⇒ρ(Y)≥ρ(X)Y\succeq X\Rightarrow\rho(Y)\ge\rho(X)Y⪰X⇒ρ(Y)≥ρ(X);
  • (A3) ρ(X+a)=ρ(X)+a\rho(X+a)=\rho(X)+aρ(X+a)=ρ(X)+a, a∈Ra\in\mathbb Ra∈R;
  • (A4) ρ(tX)=tρ(X)\rho(tX)=t\rho(X)ρ(tX)=tρ(X), t>0t>0t>0.

The conjugate is ρ∗(μ)=sup⁡X∈X{⟨μ,X⟩−ρ(X)}\rho^*(\mu)=\sup_{X\in\mathcal X}\{\langle\mu,X\rangle-\rho(X)\}ρ∗(μ)=supX∈X​{⟨μ,X⟩−ρ(X)}, the biconjugate ρ∗∗(X)=sup⁡μ∈Y{⟨μ,X⟩−ρ∗(μ)}\rho^{**}(X)=\sup_{\mu\in\mathcal Y}\{\langle\mu,X\rangle-\rho^*(\mu)\}ρ∗∗(X)=supμ∈Y​{⟨μ,X⟩−ρ∗(μ)}, the dual domain A=dom⁡ρ∗={μ∈Y:ρ∗(μ)<+∞}\mathcal A=\operatorname{dom}\rho^*=\{\mu\in\mathcal Y:\rho^*(\mu)<+\infty\}A=domρ∗={μ∈Y:ρ∗(μ)<+∞}, and lsc⁡(ρ)(X)=lim inf⁡Z→Xρ(Z)\operatorname{lsc}(\rho)(X)=\liminf_{Z\to X}\rho(Z)lsc(ρ)(X)=liminfZ→X​ρ(Z) the lower semicontinuous hull. In Lean these are pair, PairedSpaces, CondC, IsProper, A1–A4, conj, biconj, dualDom and lscHull in ConvexRiskFn.Dual.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.2 (p. 435)

Under condition (C), for ρ\rhoρ proper, lower semicontinuous and convex,

ρ(X)=sup⁡μ∈A{⟨μ,X⟩−ρ∗(μ)}∀X,(2.6)\rho(X)=\sup_{\mu\in\mathcal A}\{\langle\mu,X\rangle-\rho^*(\mu)\}\quad\forall X,\qquad(2.6)ρ(X)=μ∈Asup​{⟨μ,X⟩−ρ∗(μ)}∀X,(2.6)

and (i) (A2) holds iff every μ∈A\mu\in\mathcal Aμ∈A is nonnegative; (ii) when X\mathcal XX contains the constant function 111, (A3) holds iff μ(Ω)=1\mu(\Omega)=1μ(Ω)=1 for all μ∈A\mu\in\mathcal Aμ∈A; (iii) (A4) holds iff ρ(X)=sup⁡μ∈A⟨μ,X⟩\rho(X)=\sup_{\mu\in\mathcal A}\langle\mu,X\rangleρ(X)=supμ∈A​⟨μ,X⟩ for all XXX (2.7).

Milestones

  1. Under (C), Y+={μ∈Y:⟨μ,X⟩≥0 ∀X∈X+}\mathcal Y_+=\{\mu\in\mathcal Y:\langle\mu,X\rangle\ge0\ \forall X\in\mathcal X_+\}Y+​={μ∈Y:⟨μ,X⟩≥0 ∀X∈X+​} (p. 434).
  2. Theorem 2.1 (Fenchel–Moreau): ρ∗∗=lsc⁡(ρ)\rho^{**}=\operatorname{lsc}(\rho)ρ∗∗=lsc(ρ) for convex proper ρ\rhoρ with lsc⁡(ρ)>−∞\operatorname{lsc}(\rho)>-\inftylsc(ρ)>−∞.
  3. The representation (2.6) by itself.
  4. Under (C) and (A2), ρ∗(μ)=+∞\rho^*(\mu)=+\inftyρ∗(μ)=+∞ for μ∉Y+\mu\notin\mathcal Y_+μ∈/Y+​.
  5. Under (A3), ρ∗(μ)=+∞\rho^*(\mu)=+\inftyρ∗(μ)=+∞ when μ(Ω)≠1\mu(\Omega)\ne1μ(Ω)=1.
  6. Under (A4), ρ∗\rho^*ρ∗ is the indicator function of {μ∈Y:⟨μ,⋅⟩≤ρ}\{\mu\in\mathcal Y:\langle\mu,\cdot\rangle\le\rho\}{μ∈Y:⟨μ,⋅⟩≤ρ}.

Companion: the risk envelope (2.8), p. 436

Under (A1)–(A3), (2.6) holds with A⊆P\mathcal A\subseteq\mathcal PA⊆P; adding (A4), ρ∗\rho^*ρ∗ is the indicator of A={μ∈P:⟨μ,X⟩≤ρ(X) ∀X}\mathcal A=\{\mu\in\mathcal P:\langle\mu,X\rangle\le\rho(X)\ \forall X\}A={μ∈P:⟨μ,X⟩≤ρ(X) ∀X}.

Significance

Theorem 2.2 is the unifying statement behind the dual representations of coherent and convex risk measures: one theorem covers bounded measurable functions paired with all finite signed measures, Lp\mathcal L_pLp​ paired with Lq\mathcal L_qLq​, and weak topologies. Downstream, the paper uses it to describe subdifferentials of risk functions as subsets of A\mathcal AA, to derive optimality conditions for min⁡zρ(F(z))\min_z\rho(F(z))minz​ρ(F(z)), and to obtain the risk envelope (2.8) used in distributionally robust optimization.

The result is proved in the paper, assuming Fenchel–Moreau in locally convex spaces as a cited theorem. As far as is known, neither Theorem 2.2 nor Fenchel–Moreau for extended-real functions on a general locally convex space has a machine-checked proof. At the pinned revision Mathlib has geometric Hahn–Banach separation in locally convex spaces but no Fenchel conjugate at all. A formal proof of the goal would yield, in particular, a reusable Fenchel–Moreau theorem for extended-real convex functions under a measure pairing.

Difficulty

The characterizations (i)–(iii) are short once (2.6) is available; the weight sits in (2.6), that is, in Fenchel–Moreau. Its proof separates a point below the epigraph from the closed convex epigraph in X×R\mathcal X\times\mathbb RX×R, which needs Hahn–Banach in a locally convex space, the identification of the separating functional with a measure in Y\mathcal YY through the compatibility assumption, and a careful case analysis when the separating hyperplane is vertical, a case that occurs because ρ\rhoρ may take the value +∞+\infty+∞. The extended-real arithmetic (r−(+∞)=−∞r-(+\infty)=-\inftyr−(+∞)=−∞, 0⋅(+∞)=00\cdot(+\infty)=00⋅(+∞)=0) has to be tracked through every supremum. A finite-dimensional argument does not transfer: X\mathcal XX is an arbitrary locally convex space, and lower semicontinuity is with respect to its own topology.

Formalization scope

X\mathcal XX is an abstract real vector space with a topology and the instances IsTopologicalAddGroup, ContinuousSMul ℝ, LocallyConvexSpace ℝ (no Hausdorff assumption), mapped injectively and linearly into Ω→R\Omega\to\mathbb RΩ→R. Y\mathcal YY is a Submodule ℝ (SignedMeasure Ω). The pairing is the difference of the Bochner integrals against the Jordan parts; integrability against ∣μ∣|\mu|∣μ∣ is a field of the structure, so the pairing is never the junk value of a non-integrable integral. The topology of Y\mathcal YY is not modelled, since no statement uses it. Risk functions take values in EReal, and every supremum is an iSup in EReal. The order ⪰\succeq⪰ is pointwise, not almost everywhere. The constant aaa in (A3) is a⋅1a\cdot\mathbf 1a⋅1 for an element 1∈X\mathbf 1\in\mathcal X1∈X equal to the constant function 111. Condition (C) is a separate hypothesis, assumed where it is used.

Two statements depart from the page, and both departures are disclosed in their items. Theorem 2.1 carries the extra hypothesis lsc⁡(ρ)>−∞\operatorname{lsc}(\rho)>-\inftylsc(ρ)>−∞, without which the printed statement is false in infinite dimension; Theorem 2.1 is a cited result, and the goal does not depend on this choice. The indicator-function milestone names the set {μ:⟨μ,⋅⟩≤ρ}\{\mu:\langle\mu,\cdot\rangle\le\rho\}{μ:⟨μ,⋅⟩≤ρ} explicitly instead of "a closed convex subset of Y\mathcal YY".

The goal mentions neither ρ∗∗\rho^{**}ρ∗∗ nor lsc⁡(ρ)\operatorname{lsc}(\rho)lsc(ρ): it is stated about ρ\rhoρ, ρ∗\rho^*ρ∗ and A\mathcal AA alone, and a proof must establish (2.6) from the hypotheses, not assume it. The hypotheses are satisfiable: a one-point Ω\OmegaΩ with X=R{∗}\mathcal X=\mathbb R^{\{\ast\}}X=R{∗}, Y=Y\mathcal Y=\mathbb YY=Y and ρ(X)=X(∗)\rho(X)=X(\ast)ρ(X)=X(∗) meets all of them, including (C) and (A1)–(A4).

Contributions are welcome at every level: Fenchel–Moreau for EReal-valued convex functions on locally convex spaces (reusable well beyond this mission), lemmas about the pairing (linearity, ⟨μ,1⟩=μ(Ω)\langle\mu,1\rangle=\mu(\Omega)⟨μ,1⟩=μ(Ω), positivity), and the milestones in the order listed.

Selected references

  • A. Ruszczyński, A. Shapiro, Optimization of convex risk functions, Mathematics of Operations Research 31(3):433–452, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1050.0186
  • P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber, D. Heath, Coherent measures of risk, Mathematical Finance 9(3):203–228, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9965.00068
  • H. Föllmer, A. Schied, Convex measures of risk and trading constraints, Finance and Stochastics 6(4):429–447, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/s007800200072
  • F. Delbaen, Coherent risk measures on general probability spaces, in Advances in Finance and Stochastics, Springer, 2002, 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04790-3_1
  • P. Cheridito, F. Delbaen, M. Kupper, Coherent and convex monetary risk measures for bounded càdlàg processes, Stochastic Processes and their Applications 112(1):1–22, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spa.2004.01.009
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Conjugate Duality and Optimization, SIAM, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970524
  • R. T. Rockafellar, S. Uryasev, M. Zabarankin, Generalized deviations in risk analysis, Finance and Stochastics 10(1):51–74, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-005-0165-8
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimization of Convex Risk Functions 3: A Distribution-Invariant Risk Function Is Consistent with the Increasing Convex Order Iff It Is Monotone and Risk AverseResearch Paper

Motivation

Risk-averse optimization replaces the expected cost E[X]\mathbb E[X]E[X] of a random outcome by a risk function ρ(X)\rho(X)ρ(X) that also penalizes dispersion: mean–deviation, mean–semideviation, conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) and their combinations are the standard examples in stochastic programming and portfolio selection. A decision maker who uses ρ\rhoρ should not prefer an outcome that every risk-averse expected-utility maximizer rejects. For costs, the order that expresses this agreement among risk-averse agents is the increasing convex order: X2X_2X2​ is worse than X1X_1X1​ if E[u(X2)]≥E[u(X1)]\mathbb E[u(X_2)]\ge\mathbb E[u(X_1)]E[u(X2​)]≥E[u(X1​)] for every increasing convex disutility uuu. It is the counterpart, for costs, of second-order stochastic dominance.

Whether a given mean–risk model is consistent with stochastic dominance was settled model by model: Ogryczak and Ruszczyński for mean–semideviation models (Eur. J. Oper. Res. 1999, Math. Program. 2001, SIAM J. Optim. 2002) and Pflug for CVaR (2000). Ruszczyński and Shapiro (Math. Oper. Res. 31, 2006) gave a single criterion, Theorem 5.1, which contains these results as special cases: among risk functions that depend only on the distribution of the outcome, consistency with the increasing convex order is equivalent to two structural properties, monotonicity and risk aversion.

Setting

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space and p∈[1,∞)p\in[1,\infty)p∈[1,∞). The space of outcomes is X=Lp(Ω,F,P)\mathcal X=\mathcal L_p(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)X=Lp​(Ω,F,P), the real random variables with E∣X∣p<∞\mathbb E|X|^p<\inftyE∣X∣p<∞. An outcome is a cost: smaller is better. A risk function is a map ρ:X→R\rho:\mathcal X\to\mathbb Rρ:X→R.

  • The cdf of XXX is FX(t)=P(X≤t)F_X(t)=P(X\le t)FX​(t)=P(X≤t). ρ\rhoρ is distribution invariant (Definition 5.2) if FX1=FX2F_{X_1}=F_{X_2}FX1​​=FX2​​ implies ρ(X1)=ρ(X2)\rho(X_1)=\rho(X_2)ρ(X1​)=ρ(X2​).
  • ρ\rhoρ satisfies (A2) (monotonicity) if X≤YX\le YX≤Y almost surely implies ρ(X)≤ρ(Y)\rho(X)\le\rho(Y)ρ(X)≤ρ(Y).
  • ρ\rhoρ is risk averse (Definition 5.1) if for every σ\sigmaσ-algebra G⊂F\mathcal G\subset\mathcal FG⊂F and every X∈XX\in\mathcal XX∈X,
ρ(X) ≥ ρ(E[X∣G]),\rho(X)\ \ge\ \rho\big(\mathbb E[X\mid\mathcal G]\big),ρ(X) ≥ ρ(E[X∣G]),

for every version of the conditional expectation.

  • For random variables X1,X2X_1,X_2X1​,X2​, the usual stochastic order X2⪰stX1X_2\succeq_{\mathrm{st}}X_1X2​⪰st​X1​ holds if E[u(X2)]≥E[u(X1)]\mathbb E[u(X_2)]\ge\mathbb E[u(X_1)]E[u(X2​)]≥E[u(X1​)] for every nondecreasing u:R→Ru:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Ru:R→R for which both expectations exist; the increasing convex order X2⪰icxX1X_2\succeq_{\mathrm{icx}}X_1X2​⪰icx​X1​ is the same with uuu ranging over the increasing convex functions.
  • ρ\rhoρ is consistent with an order ⪰\succeq⪰ if X2⪰X1X_2\succeq X_1X2​⪰X1​ implies ρ(X2)≥ρ(X1)\rho(X_2)\ge\rho(X_1)ρ(X2​)≥ρ(X1​) for all X1,X2∈XX_1,X_2\in\mathcal XX1​,X2​∈X.

The paper places one more standing assumption on §5.2: the space is rich enough to carry a uniform random variable, a measurable U:Ω→RU:\Omega\to\mathbb RU:Ω→R with P(U≤t)=tP(U\le t)=tP(U≤t)=t for all t∈[0,1]t\in[0,1]t∈[0,1].

In Lean these are IsUniformRV, cdfOf, cdfInv, DistInvariant, A2, RiskAverse, StLE, ConsistentSt and ConsistentIcx in the namespace ConvexRiskFn.Order; the increasing convex order is the published StochasticOrders.MonotoneConvex.IcxOrder P P X₁ X₂, read as X1⪯icxX2X_1\preceq_{\mathrm{icx}}X_2X1​⪯icx​X2​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (p. 446)

Under the standing assumptions, for every distribution-invariant ρ:X→R\rho:\mathcal X\to\mathbb Rρ:X→R,

ρ consistent with ⪰icx⟺ρ satisfies (A2) and is risk averse.\rho\ \text{consistent with}\ \succeq_{\mathrm{icx}}\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \rho\ \text{satisfies (A2) and is risk averse}.ρ consistent with ⪰icx​⟺ρ satisfies (A2) and is risk averse.

No convexity, translation equivariance or positive homogeneity of ρ\rhoρ is assumed.

Milestones

  1. The usual stochastic order and the cdf (§5.2, p. 445): X2⪰stX1X_2\succeq_{\mathrm{st}}X_1X2​⪰st​X1​ iff FX2(t)≤FX1(t)F_{X_2}(t)\le F_{X_1}(t)FX2​​(t)≤FX1​​(t) for all ttt.
  2. The quantile coupling (proof of Lemma 5.1, p. 446): FX−1(U)F_X^{-1}(U)FX−1​(U) has the law of XXX, and FX2≤FX1F_{X_2}\le F_{X_1}FX2​​≤FX1​​ gives FX1−1(U)≤FX2−1(U)F_{X_1}^{-1}(U)\le F_{X_2}^{-1}(U)FX1​−1​(U)≤FX2​−1​(U) almost surely.
  3. Lemma 5.1 (p. 445): a distribution-invariant ρ\rhoρ is consistent with ⪰st\succeq_{\mathrm{st}}⪰st​ iff it satisfies (A2).
  4. Conditional expectation is icx-smaller (proof of Theorem 5.1, p. 446): E[X∣G]∈X\mathbb E[X\mid\mathcal G]\in\mathcal XE[X∣G]∈X and E[X∣G]⪯icxX\mathbb E[X\mid\mathcal G]\preceq_{\mathrm{icx}}XE[X∣G]⪯icx​X.
  5. Strassen's coupling on Ω\OmegaΩ (proof of Theorem 5.1, p. 446): if X1⪯icxX2X_1\preceq_{\mathrm{icx}}X_2X1​⪯icx​X2​, there are X^1∼DX1\widehat X_1\overset{D}{\sim}X_1X1​∼DX1​, X^2∼DX2\widehat X_2\overset{D}{\sim}X_2X2​∼DX2​ on the same Ω\OmegaΩ with X^1≤E[X^2∣X^1]\widehat X_1\le\mathbb E[\widehat X_2\mid\widehat X_1]X1​≤E[X2​∣X1​] a.s.

Significance

Theorem 5.1 reduces a property quantified over all pairs of ordered distributions to two properties that can be checked on the risk function directly. Monotonicity is usually immediate, and risk aversion follows for the main examples from the dual representation of the risk function (the paper verifies it for mean–semideviation and for CVaR-based models in §5.1). The theorem then yields at once the consistency of these models with the increasing convex order, which was previously proved case by case. It also explains the failures: a law-invariant risk function that violates (A2), such as mean–deviation for p>1p>1p>1 under the paper's condition (∗)(*)(∗), cannot be consistent with any increasing integral stochastic order.

The result has a complete published proof. What the mission adds is a machine-checked version of it on the paper's own space Lp(Ω,F,P)\mathcal L_p(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)Lp​(Ω,F,P), together with reusable pieces of stochastic-order theory: the cdf characterization of the usual stochastic order, the quantile coupling, conditional Jensen in increasing-convex form, and Strassen's martingale coupling realized on a given space carrying a uniform random variable. Mathlib has conditional Jensen for convex functions (ConvexOn.map_condExp_le_univ) but not the stochastic orders, the quantile coupling or Strassen's theorem. Strassen's theorem for laws on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, with a coupling on some probability space, is posed separately on Prove2Me but not proved.

Difficulty

The forward direction is short given milestone 4. The reverse direction is where the work is. Consistency compares ρ(X1)\rho(X_1)ρ(X1​) and ρ(X2)\rho(X_2)ρ(X2​) for random variables that are related only through their laws: X1⪯icxX2X_1\preceq_{\mathrm{icx}}X_2X1​⪯icx​X2​ says nothing about X1(ω)X_1(\omega)X1​(ω) versus X2(ω)X_2(\omega)X2​(ω), so neither (A2) nor risk aversion applies to the pair as given. The argument has to replace the pair by another pair, with the same laws, on the same space Ω\OmegaΩ, related by a conditional expectation; only then can monotonicity and risk aversion be chained. Producing that pair is Strassen's theorem, a nonconstructive existence result about martingale couplings, and it has to be realized on the given Ω\OmegaΩ, not on a product space built for the purpose, because ρ\rhoρ is defined only on Lp(Ω,F,P)\mathcal L_p(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)Lp​(Ω,F,P). That is the role of the uniform random variable, and transporting the coupling onto Ω\OmegaΩ through it is a separate measure-theoretic step. The first-order analogue, Lemma 5.1, needs the same kind of transfer, through quantile functions, whose values at 000 and 111 must be handled.

Formalization scope

  • Lp\mathcal L_pLp​ is encoded by functions Ω→R\Omega\to\mathbb RΩ→R satisfying MemLp X p P with 1 ≤ p and p ≠ ⊤, not by almost-everywhere classes. ρ\rhoρ is a function (Ω → ℝ) → ℝ; every definition quantifies only over MemLp arguments, so its values elsewhere play no role. ρ\rhoρ is real valued, as in Definition 5.2.
  • The order in (A2) is the almost-sure order, the order of Lp\mathcal L_pLp​ (p. 434).
  • "For which the expectations exist" is integrability of u∘X1u\circ X_1u∘X1​ and u∘X2u\circ X_2u∘X2​, as in the published increasing convex order.
  • Risk aversion quantifies over every sub-σ\sigmaσ-algebra G⊆F\mathcal G\subseteq\mathcal FG⊆F and every G\mathcal GG-measurable version of Mathlib's conditional expectation P[X|m].
  • The uniform random variable and p∈[1,∞)p\in[1,\infty)p∈[1,∞) appear as hypotheses of the goal, of Lemma 5.1 and of milestone 5, exactly where the paper's standing assumptions of §5.2 apply. Milestones 1 and 4 do not need them.
  • The quantile F−1(t)=inf⁡{s:F(s)≥t}F^{-1}(t)=\inf\{s:F(s)\ge t\}F−1(t)=inf{s:F(s)≥t} is a real infimum, which is 000 where the paper's value is ±∞\pm\infty±∞ (t∉(0,1)t\notin(0,1)t∈/(0,1)); milestone 2 is therefore stated almost surely.
  • The goal mentions neither quantiles, nor UUU beyond its existence, nor any coupling. A statement that assumed convexity of ρ\rhoρ, dropped distribution invariance, restricted to bounded or pointwise-ordered outcomes, or replaced risk aversion by the single σ\sigmaσ-algebra {∅,Ω}\{\emptyset,\Omega\}{∅,Ω} would be a different and weaker theorem and does not count.

Needed infrastructure: equality in law from equality of cdfs, the quantile transform, conditional Jensen's inequality (in Mathlib) turned into the increasing convex order, and Strassen's theorem in dimension one with the transfer of a coupling to a space carrying a uniform random variable. The last two are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of supporting lemmas such as the cdf characterization of equality in law, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ruszczyński, A. Shapiro, Optimization of convex risk functions, Mathematics of Operations Research 31(3):433–452, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1050.0186
  • A. Müller, D. Stoyan, Comparison Methods for Stochastic Models and Risks, Wiley, 2002 (Theorem 1.2.8, Corollary 1.5.21). https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Comparison+Methods+for+Stochastic+Models+and+Risks-p-9780471494461
  • V. Strassen, The existence of probability measures with given marginals, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36(2):423–439, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177700153
  • D. Blackwell, Equivalent comparisons of experiments, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 24(2):265–272, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729032
  • W. Ogryczak, A. Ruszczyński, Dual stochastic dominance and related mean–risk models, SIAM Journal on Optimization 13(1):60–78, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400375075
  • M. Shaked, J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders, Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34675-5
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Implementing a Primal-Dual Interior-Point Method for Conic Quadratic Optimization III: A Newton Step Scales the Homogeneous Residuals and the Complementarity Gap by 1 − α(1 − γ)Research Paper

Motivation

Conic quadratic optimization — linear optimization over products of quadratic (second-order, Lorentz) cones — covers robust linear programming, portfolio problems with risk constraints, norm minimization and many engineering design problems. Andersen, Roos and Terlaky describe the primal-dual interior-point method implemented in the MOSEK optimizer for this problem class (Math. Program. 95 (2003)). Their algorithm does not solve the primal and dual problems directly. It solves the homogeneous model, an embedding that has a solution whether or not the original problem is feasible, and from which either an optimal pair or a certificate of infeasibility is read off.

The convergence argument of such a method rests on one algebraic property of its search direction: a step along the Newton direction reduces the infeasibility of the homogeneous model and its complementarity gap at the same rate. For linear programming this is classical (Xu, Hung and Ye, 1996; Andersen and Andersen, 2000). This mission formalizes the conic quadratic version, Lemma 4.1 of the paper, in which the diagonal complementarity products of linear programming are replaced by arrow-head matrices.

Setting

The cone is a product K=K1×⋯×KkK = K^1\times\cdots\times K^kK=K1×⋯×Kk. Each factor Ki⊆RniK^i\subseteq\mathbb R^{n^i}Ki⊆Rni is one of three kinds:

  • the half-line R+={x∈R:x≥0}\mathbb R_+ = \{x\in\mathbb R : x\ge0\}R+​={x∈R:x≥0}, with ni=1n^i = 1ni=1;
  • the quadratic cone Kq={x∈Rn:x12≥∥x2:n∥2, x1≥0}K^q = \{x\in\mathbb R^{n} : x_1^2\ge\|x_{2:n}\|^2,\ x_1\ge0\}Kq={x∈Rn:x12​≥∥x2:n​∥2, x1​≥0}, with ni≥1n^i\ge1ni≥1;
  • the rotated quadratic cone Kr={x∈Rn:2x1x2≥∥x3:n∥2, x1,x2≥0}K^r = \{x\in\mathbb R^{n} : 2x_1x_2\ge\|x_{3:n}\|^2,\ x_1,x_2\ge0\}Kr={x∈Rn:2x1​x2​≥∥x3:n​∥2, x1​,x2​≥0}, with ni≥2n^i\ge2ni≥2.

Vectors are partitioned by cones, x=(x1;… ;xk)x = (x^1;\dots;x^k)x=(x1;…;xk), and xTs=∑i(xi)Tsix^Ts = \sum_i (x^i)^Ts^ixTs=∑i​(xi)Tsi. To each cone is attached a symmetric orthogonal matrix TiT^iTi: the identity for R+\mathbb R_+R+​ and KqK^qKq, and for KrK^rKr the identity with its leading 2×22\times22×2 block replaced by 12[111−1]\frac{1}{\sqrt2}\begin{bmatrix}1&1\\1&-1\end{bmatrix}2​1​[11​1−1​]. For v∈Rdv\in\mathbb R^dv∈Rd the arrow-head matrix is

mat⁡(v)=[v1v2:dTv2:dv1I].\operatorname{mat}(v) = \begin{bmatrix} v_1 & v_{2:d}^T\\ v_{2:d} & v_1 I\end{bmatrix}.mat(v)=[v1​v2:d​​v2:dT​v1​I​].

At a point (x,s)(x,s)(x,s) put Xi=mat⁡(Tixi)X^i = \operatorname{mat}(T^ix^i)Xi=mat(Tixi), Si=mat⁡(Tisi)S^i = \operatorname{mat}(T^is^i)Si=mat(Tisi), and let XXX, SSS, TTT be block diagonal with blocks XiX^iXi, SiS^iSi, TiT^iTi. Let eie^iei be the first unit vector of Rni\mathbb R^{n^i}Rni and e=(e1;… ;ek)e = (e^1;\dots;e^k)e=(e1;…;ek).

The data are A∈Rm×nA\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n, b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm, c∈Rnc\in\mathbb R^nc∈Rn. A current point is (x(0),τ(0),y(0),s(0),κ(0))(x^{(0)},\tau^{(0)},y^{(0)},s^{(0)},\kappa^{(0)})(x(0),τ(0),y(0),s(0),κ(0)), with

μ(0)=(x(0))Ts(0)+τ(0)κ(0)k+1.\mu^{(0)} = \frac{(x^{(0)})^Ts^{(0)} + \tau^{(0)}\kappa^{(0)}}{k+1}.μ(0)=k+1(x(0))Ts(0)+τ(0)κ(0)​.

For a centering parameter γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] the Newton direction (dx,dτ,dy,ds,dκ)(d_x,d_\tau,d_y,d_s,d_\kappa)(dx​,dτ​,dy​,ds​,dκ​) solves the linear system (22):

Adx−bdτ=(γ−1)(Ax(0)−bτ(0)),ATdy+ds−cdτ=(γ−1)(ATy(0)+s(0)−cτ(0)),−cTdx+bTdy−dκ=(γ−1)(−cTx(0)+bTy(0)−κ(0)),X(0)Tds+S(0)Tdx=−X(0)S(0)e+γμ(0)e,τ(0)dκ+κ(0)dτ=−τ(0)κ(0)+γμ(0).\begin{aligned} A d_x - b d_\tau &= (\gamma-1)(Ax^{(0)} - b\tau^{(0)}),\\ A^Td_y + d_s - c d_\tau &= (\gamma-1)(A^Ty^{(0)} + s^{(0)} - c\tau^{(0)}),\\ -c^Td_x + b^Td_y - d_\kappa &= (\gamma-1)(-c^Tx^{(0)} + b^Ty^{(0)} - \kappa^{(0)}),\\ X^{(0)}Td_s + S^{(0)}Td_x &= -X^{(0)}S^{(0)}e + \gamma\mu^{(0)}e,\\ \tau^{(0)}d_\kappa + \kappa^{(0)}d_\tau &= -\tau^{(0)}\kappa^{(0)} + \gamma\mu^{(0)}. \end{aligned}Adx​−bdτ​ATdy​+ds​−cdτ​−cTdx​+bTdy​−dκ​X(0)Tds​+S(0)Tdx​τ(0)dκ​+κ(0)dτ​​=(γ−1)(Ax(0)−bτ(0)),=(γ−1)(ATy(0)+s(0)−cτ(0)),=(γ−1)(−cTx(0)+bTy(0)−κ(0)),=−X(0)S(0)e+γμ(0)e,=−τ(0)κ(0)+γμ(0).​

The new point is (x(1),τ(1),y(1),s(1),κ(1))=(x(0),τ(0),y(0),s(0),κ(0))+α(dx,dτ,dy,ds,dκ)(x^{(1)},\tau^{(1)},y^{(1)},s^{(1)},\kappa^{(1)}) = (x^{(0)},\tau^{(0)},y^{(0)},s^{(0)},\kappa^{(0)}) + \alpha(d_x,d_\tau,d_y,d_s,d_\kappa)(x(1),τ(1),y(1),s(1),κ(1))=(x(0),τ(0),y(0),s(0),κ(0))+α(dx​,dτ​,dy​,ds​,dκ​) for a step size α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] (23).

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 4.1 (p. 13)

Under (22) and (23),

Ax(1)−bτ(1)=(1−α(1−γ))(Ax(0)−bτ(0)),ATy(1)+s(1)−cτ(1)=(1−α(1−γ))(ATy(0)+s(0)−cτ(0)),−cTx(1)+bTy(1)−κ(1)=(1−α(1−γ))(−cTx(0)+bTy(0)−κ(0)),dxTds+dτdκ=0,(x(1))Ts(1)+τ(1)κ(1)=(1−α(1−γ))((x(0))Ts(0)+τ(0)κ(0)).\begin{aligned} Ax^{(1)} - b\tau^{(1)} &= (1-\alpha(1-\gamma))(Ax^{(0)} - b\tau^{(0)}),\\ A^Ty^{(1)} + s^{(1)} - c\tau^{(1)} &= (1-\alpha(1-\gamma))(A^Ty^{(0)} + s^{(0)} - c\tau^{(0)}),\\ -c^Tx^{(1)} + b^Ty^{(1)} - \kappa^{(1)} &= (1-\alpha(1-\gamma))(-c^Tx^{(0)} + b^Ty^{(0)} - \kappa^{(0)}),\\ d_x^Td_s + d_\tau d_\kappa &= 0,\\ (x^{(1)})^Ts^{(1)} + \tau^{(1)}\kappa^{(1)} &= (1-\alpha(1-\gamma))\big((x^{(0)})^Ts^{(0)} + \tau^{(0)}\kappa^{(0)}\big). \end{aligned}Ax(1)−bτ(1)ATy(1)+s(1)−cτ(1)−cTx(1)+bTy(1)−κ(1)dxT​ds​+dτ​dκ​(x(1))Ts(1)+τ(1)κ(1)​=(1−α(1−γ))(Ax(0)−bτ(0)),=(1−α(1−γ))(ATy(0)+s(0)−cτ(0)),=(1−α(1−γ))(−cTx(0)+bTy(0)−κ(0)),=0,=(1−α(1−γ))((x(0))Ts(0)+τ(0)κ(0)).​

Milestones

  1. (25), p. 13: with η=1−γ\eta = 1-\gammaη=1−γ, the shifted point η(x(0),τ(0),y(0),s(0),κ(0))+d\eta(x^{(0)},\tau^{(0)},y^{(0)},s^{(0)},\kappa^{(0)}) + dη(x(0),τ(0),y(0),s(0),κ(0))+d satisfies the three linear equations of the homogeneous model.
  2. (26), p. 13: 0=(ηx(0)+dx)T(ηs(0)+ds)+(ητ(0)+dτ)(ηκ(0)+dκ)0 = (\eta x^{(0)}+d_x)^T(\eta s^{(0)}+d_s) + (\eta\tau^{(0)}+d_\tau)(\eta\kappa^{(0)}+d_\kappa)0=(ηx(0)+dx​)T(ηs(0)+ds​)+(ητ(0)+dτ​)(ηκ(0)+dκ​), and its expansion in powers of η\etaη.
  3. (61), p. 36: eTXSe=∑i(Tixi)TTisi=xTse^TXSe = \sum_i (T^ix^i)^TT^is^i = x^TseTXSe=∑i​(Tixi)TTisi=xTs for all xxx, sss.
  4. p. 14, first equality: (x(0))Tds+(s(0))Tdx=eT(X(0)Tds+S(0)Tdx)(x^{(0)})^Td_s + (s^{(0)})^Td_x = e^T(X^{(0)}Td_s + S^{(0)}Td_x)(x(0))Tds​+(s(0))Tdx​=eT(X(0)Tds​+S(0)Tdx​), for all vectors.
  5. p. 14, the chain's value: (x(0))Tds+(s(0))Tdx+τ(0)dκ+κ(0)dτ=(γ−1)μ(0)(k+1)(x^{(0)})^Td_s + (s^{(0)})^Td_x + \tau^{(0)}d_\kappa + \kappa^{(0)}d_\tau = (\gamma-1)\mu^{(0)}(k+1)(x(0))Tds​+(s(0))Tdx​+τ(0)dκ​+κ(0)dτ​=(γ−1)μ(0)(k+1).
  6. p. 14, orthogonality: dxTds+dτdκ=0d_x^Td_s + d_\tau d_\kappa = 0dxT​ds​+dτ​dκ​=0.

Significance

Lemma 4.1 is what makes the homogeneous algorithm analyzable. Because the three residuals and the gap shrink by the same factor 1−α(1−γ)1-\alpha(1-\gamma)1−α(1−γ), their ratios are invariant along the iterates, and a step with γ<1\gamma<1γ<1 and α>0\alpha>0α>0 makes measurable progress toward a solution of the homogeneous model. The paper notes (p. 14) that all properties stated in Lemma 4.1 hold for the Nesterov–Todd-scaled direction (27) as well, the direction actually implemented, for which polynomial complexity is shown by Monteiro and Tsuchiya (2000).

The result is proved on the page; it is not open. As far as the platform's catalogue shows, it has not been formalized. Machine-checked versions exist only for linear-programming analogues, with diagonal complementarity products in place of arrow-head matrices. The formalization adds two things. First, it fixes three printed slips: the third line of (22) prints κ\kappaκ for κ(0)\kappa^{(0)}κ(0); the fourth identity of (24) prints dxTdsTd_x^Td_s^TdxT​dsT​; and the proof's evaluation on p. 14 ends with (γ−1)μ(0)k(\gamma-1)\mu^{(0)}k(γ−1)μ(0)k where (γ−1)μ(0)(k+1)(\gamma-1)\mu^{(0)}(k+1)(γ−1)μ(0)(k+1) is correct, since eTe=ke^Te = keTe=k and the τκ\tau\kappaτκ equation contributes the extra μ(0)\mu^{(0)}μ(0). Second, the arrow-head identities (61) and the p. 14 equality are reusable for missions on the complementarity conditions (Lemma 3.1) and the scaled directions of the same paper.

Difficulty

The first three identities of (24) are linear and follow from the first three lines of (22) alone. The content is in the last two. They need an inner-product identity that turns the fourth line of (22), a statement about arrow-head matrix products, into a statement about the scalar quantity (x(0))Tds+(s(0))Tdx(x^{(0)})^Td_s + (s^{(0)})^Td_x(x(0))Tds​+(s(0))Tdx​. The naive reading treats X(0)TdsX^{(0)}Td_sX(0)Tds​ as an abstract linear image of dsd_sds​ and loses exactly this link. What is needed is that the first row of mat⁡(v)\operatorname{mat}(v)mat(v) is vTv^TvT, that mat⁡(u)mat⁡(v)e1\operatorname{mat}(u)\operatorname{mat}(v)e_1mat(u)mat(v)e1​ has first entry uTvu^TvuTv, and that every TiT^iTi is symmetric and orthogonal. The last fails for the rotated cone when ni<2n^i<2ni<2, so the dimension conventions are not decoration. The bookkeeping constant eTe=ke^Te = keTe=k must also be tracked correctly; the page itself gets it wrong.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Blocks are indexed by Fin k; block iii is Fin (n i) → ℝ, and indices are 0-based (the paper's v1v_1v1​ is v 0). AAA is given by its column blocks AiA^iAi, so Ax=∑iAixiAx = \sum_iA^ix^iAx=∑i​Aixi, (ATy)i=(Ai)Ty(A^Ty)^i = (A^i)^Ty(ATy)i=(Ai)Ty and cTx=∑i(ci)Txic^Tx = \sum_i (c^i)^Tx^icTx=∑i​(ci)Txi. The second line of (22) and of (24), and the fourth line of (22), are stated block by block; this is equivalent because XXX, SSS, TTT are block diagonal.
  • Definitions. The shared module ConicQuadIPM.Complementarity.Setting provides the cone kinds, TiT^iTi (Tmat), mat⁡(v)\operatorname{mat}(v)mat(v) (arrow), eie^iei (e1) and the predicate WellFormed; this mission's ConicQuadIPM.NewtonStep.Setting adds μ(0)\mu^{(0)}μ(0) (mu0) and the system (22) (NewtonSystem). WellFormed is the paper's implicit dimension convention (ni=1n^i = 1ni=1, ≥1\ge1≥1, ≥2\ge2≥2 for the three kinds).
  • Hypotheses. Every theorem assumes WellFormed. This is a disclosed addition: the paper never states the dimensions, and without them a block of dimension 000 breaks eTe=ke^Te = keTe=k. The ranges α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] and γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] are kept as on the page, although the identities hold for all real values. No interiority or cone membership of the current point is assumed, because Lemma 4.1 does not use any. The κ\kappaκ of (22)'s third line is κ(0)\kappa^{(0)}κ(0).
  • No trivialization. The fourth line of (22) must stay in terms of arrow and Tmat. Replacing X(0)TdsX^{(0)}Td_sX(0)Tds​ by an abstract linear map, or by (x(0))Tds(x^{(0)})^Td_s(x(0))Tds​ directly, would turn milestone 4 into a definition and empty the goal. Milestone 5 states the corrected constant k+1k+1k+1; the printed kkk is false whenever γ≠1\gamma\ne1γ=1 and μ(0)≠0\mu^{(0)}\ne0μ(0)=0.
  • Reusable parts. The arrow-head lemmas (first row of mat⁡(v)\operatorname{mat}(v)mat(v), e1Tmat⁡(u)mat⁡(v)e1=uTve_1^T\operatorname{mat}(u)\operatorname{mat}(v)e_1 = u^Tve1T​mat(u)mat(v)e1​=uTv, symmetry and orthogonality of TiT^iTi) are useful beyond this mission. Contributions of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. D. Andersen, C. Roos, T. Terlaky, On implementing a primal-dual interior-point method for conic quadratic optimization, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003) 249–277; cited from the authors' preprint of 18 December 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0349-3
  • X. Xu, P.-F. Hung, Y. Ye, A simplified homogeneous and self-dual linear programming algorithm and its implementation, Annals of Operations Research 62 (1996) 151–171. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02206815
  • E. D. Andersen, K. D. Andersen, The MOSEK interior point optimizer for linear programming: an implementation of the homogeneous algorithm, in High Performance Optimization, Kluwer (2000) 197–232. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3216-0_8
  • R. D. C. Monteiro, T. Tsuchiya, Polynomial convergence of primal-dual algorithms for the second-order cone program based on the MZ-family of directions, Mathematical Programming 88 (2000) 61–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00011378
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Implementing a Primal-Dual Interior-Point Method for Conic Quadratic Optimization II: Points of a Product of Quadratic and Rotated Cones Are Complementary Iff Their Arrow-Head Products VanishResearch Paper

Motivation

Conic quadratic optimization (also called second-order cone programming) minimizes a linear function over the intersection of an affine subspace with a product of quadratic cones. It contains linear programming, convex quadratically constrained programming, robust linear programming with ellipsoidal uncertainty and many problems from engineering design; see Lobo, Vandenberghe, Boyd and Lebret (1998). Primal–dual interior-point methods solve these problems in practice; E. D. Andersen, C. Roos and T. Terlaky describe one such method, and an implementation of it linked to the MOSEK optimizer, in On implementing a primal-dual interior-point method for conic quadratic optimization (Math. Program., 2003).

A primal–dual method needs the optimality condition "the duality gap is zero" in a form that can be relaxed into a central path and linearized by Newton's method. For linear programming that form is the componentwise product xjsj=0x_js_j=0xj​sj​=0. For quadratic cones the scalar condition xTs=0x^Ts=0xTs=0 is not componentwise, and the paper's Lemma 3.1 gives the replacement: a block-wise system built from arrow-head matrices. This mission formalizes that lemma and the facts its proof uses.

Setting

A vector v∈Rnv\in\mathbb R^nv∈Rn is written v=(v1,…,vn)v=(v_1,\dots,v_n)v=(v1​,…,vn​) and v2:n=(v2,…,vn)v_{2:n}=(v_2,\dots,v_n)v2:n​=(v2​,…,vn​); ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the Euclidean norm. The paper works with three cones (Definition 3.1):

R+={x≥0},Kq={x∈Rn:x12≥∥x2:n∥2, x1≥0},Kr={x∈Rn:2x1x2≥∥x3:n∥2, x1,x2≥0},\mathbb R_+=\{x\ge 0\},\qquad K^q=\{x\in\mathbb R^n: x_1^2\ge\|x_{2:n}\|^2,\ x_1\ge0\},\qquad K^r=\{x\in\mathbb R^n: 2x_1x_2\ge\|x_{3:n}\|^2,\ x_1,x_2\ge0\},R+​={x≥0},Kq={x∈Rn:x12​≥∥x2:n​∥2, x1​≥0},Kr={x∈Rn:2x1​x2​≥∥x3:n​∥2, x1​,x2​≥0},

the nonnegative half-line, the quadratic cone and the rotated quadratic cone. The cone of the problem is a product K=K1×⋯×KkK=K^1\times\cdots\times K^kK=K1×⋯×Kk of such cones, of dimensions n1,…,nkn^1,\dots,n^kn1,…,nk, and a point is partitioned accordingly, x=(x1;… ;xk)x=(x^1;\dots;x^k)x=(x1;…;xk); xTs=∑i(xi)Tsix^Ts=\sum_i(x^i)^Ts^ixTs=∑i​(xi)Tsi.

To each cone the paper attaches two matrices (Definition 3.2): Ti=Qi=1T^i=Q^i=1Ti=Qi=1 for R+\mathbb R_+R+​; Ti=IT^i=ITi=I and Qi=diag⁡(1,−1,…,−1)Q^i=\operatorname{diag}(1,-1,\dots,-1)Qi=diag(1,−1,…,−1) for KqK^qKq; and for KrK^rKr, TiT^iTi is the identity except for the leading block 12(111−1)\tfrac1{\sqrt2}\begin{pmatrix}1&1\\1&-1\end{pmatrix}2​1​(11​1−1​), while QiQ^iQi is −I-I−I except for the leading block (0110)\begin{pmatrix}0&1\\1&0\end{pmatrix}(01​10​). The arrow-head matrix of a vector is

mat⁡(v)=(v1v2:nTv2:nv1I),\operatorname{mat}(v)=\begin{pmatrix}v_1&v_{2:n}^T\\ v_{2:n}&v_1I\end{pmatrix},mat(v)=(v1​v2:n​​v2:nT​v1​I​),

and Xi=mat⁡(Tixi)X^i=\operatorname{mat}(T^ix^i)Xi=mat(Tixi), Si=mat⁡(Tisi)S^i=\operatorname{mat}(T^is^i)Si=mat(Tisi); eie^iei is the first unit vector of Rni\mathbb R^{n^i}Rni.

For the companion statements the paper defines μ=(xTs+τκ)/(k+1)\mu=(x^Ts+\tau\kappa)/(k+1)μ=(xTs+τκ)/(k+1) and the neighbourhood

N(β)={(x,τ,s,κ):(x;τ),(s;κ)∈K×R+, min⁡i(xi)TQixi (si)TQisi≥βμ, τκ≥βμ}.\mathcal N(\beta)=\Bigl\{(x,\tau,s,\kappa):(x;\tau),(s;\kappa)\in K\times\mathbb R_+,\ \min_i\sqrt{(x^i)^TQ^ix^i\,(s^i)^TQ^is^i}\ge\beta\mu,\ \tau\kappa\ge\beta\mu\Bigr\}.N(β)={(x,τ,s,κ):(x;τ),(s;κ)∈K×R+​, imin​(xi)TQixi(si)TQisi​≥βμ, τκ≥βμ}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 3.1 (p. 9)

For x,s∈Kx,s\in Kx,s∈K,

xTs=0  ⟺  XiSiei=SiXiei=0(i=1,…,k).x^Ts=0\iff X^iS^ie^i=S^iX^ie^i=0\quad(i=1,\dots,k).xTs=0⟺XiSiei=SiXiei=0(i=1,…,k).

This is the paper's exact statement; it fixes no constants and covers every mixture of the three cone types.

Milestones

  1. QiQi=IQ^iQ^i=IQiQi=I and TiTi=IT^iT^i=ITiTi=I, with QiQ^iQi, TiT^iTi symmetric (p. 9).
  2. Kq={x:xTQx≥0, x1≥0}K^q=\{x:x^TQx\ge0,\ x_1\ge0\}Kq={x:xTQx≥0, x1​≥0} and Kr={x:xTQx≥0, x1,x2≥0}K^r=\{x:x^TQx\ge0,\ x_1,x_2\ge0\}Kr={x:xTQx≥0, x1​,x2​≥0} (p. 9).
  3. For the rotated cone's TTT: x∈Kq  ⟺  Tx∈Krx\in K^q\iff Tx\in K^rx∈Kq⟺Tx∈Kr (p. 9).
  4. x∈Kx\in Kx∈K implies Tixi∈KqT^ix^i\in K^qTixi∈Kq for every block (Appendix, p. 36).
  5. Identity (61): (ei)TXiSiei=(Tixi)TTisi=(xi)Tsi(e^i)^TX^iS^ie^i=(T^ix^i)^TT^is^i=(x^i)^Ts^i(ei)TXiSiei=(Tixi)TTisi=(xi)Tsi, hence eTXSe=xTse^TXSe=x^TseTXSe=xTs.
  6. The explicit form of (20) for one block: (xi)Tsi=0(x^i)^Ts^i=0(xi)Tsi=0 and (Tixi)1(Tisi)2:n+(Tisi)1(Tixi)2:n=0(T^ix^i)_1(T^is^i)_{2:n}+(T^is^i)_1(T^ix^i)_{2:n}=0(Tixi)1​(Tisi)2:n​+(Tisi)1​(Tixi)2:n​=0 (p. 36).
  7. For x,s∈Kx,s\in Kx,s∈K: xTs=∑i(Tixi)TTisi≥∑i((Tixi)1(Tisi)1−∥(Tixi)2:n∥∥(Tisi)2:n∥)≥∑i(xi)TQixi(si)TQisi≥0x^Ts=\sum_i(T^ix^i)^TT^is^i\ge\sum_i\bigl((T^ix^i)_1(T^is^i)_1-\|(T^ix^i)_{2:n}\|\|(T^is^i)_{2:n}\|\bigr)\ge\sum_i\sqrt{(x^i)^TQ^ix^i(s^i)^TQ^is^i}\ge0xTs=∑i​(Tixi)TTisi≥∑i​((Tixi)1​(Tisi)1​−∥(Tixi)2:n​∥∥(Tisi)2:n​∥)≥∑i​(xi)TQixi(si)TQisi​≥0 (pp. 36–37).
  8. If xTs=0x^Ts=0xTs=0 and (Tixi)1,(Tisi)1≠0(T^ix^i)_1,(T^is^i)_1\ne0(Tixi)1​,(Tisi)1​=0, then (xi)TQixi=(si)TQisi=0(x^i)^TQ^ix^i=(s^i)^TQ^is^i=0(xi)TQixi=(si)TQisi=0 and (Tixi)1(Tisi)1=∥(Tixi)2:n∥∥(Tisi)2:n∥(T^ix^i)_1(T^is^i)_1=\|(T^ix^i)_{2:n}\|\|(T^is^i)_{2:n}\|(Tixi)1​(Tisi)1​=∥(Tixi)2:n​∥∥(Tisi)2:n​∥ (p. 37).
  9. If (xi)Tsi=0(x^i)^Ts^i=0(xi)Tsi=0 and (Tixi)1,(Tisi)1≠0(T^ix^i)_1,(T^is^i)_1\ne0(Tixi)1​,(Tisi)1​=0, then (Tixi)2:n=α(Tisi)2:n(T^ix^i)_{2:n}=\alpha(T^is^i)_{2:n}(Tixi)2:n​=α(Tisi)2:n​ with α=−(Tixi)1/(Tisi)1\alpha=-(T^ix^i)_1/(T^is^i)_1α=−(Tixi)1​/(Tisi)1​, and (20) holds for block iii (p. 37).
  10. Lemma 3.2 ii) (p. 11): a point of N(1)\mathcal N(1)N(1) has XiSiei=μeiX^iS^ie^i=\mu e^iXiSiei=μei and τκ=μ\tau\kappa=\muτκ=μ.
  11. §6.1 (pp. 28–29): the starting point xi(0)=si(0)=Tie1ix^{i(0)}=s^{i(0)}=T^ie^i_1xi(0)=si(0)=Tie1i​, τ(0)=κ(0)=1\tau^{(0)}=\kappa^{(0)}=1τ(0)=κ(0)=1 lies in N(1)\mathcal N(1)N(1).

Significance

Lemma 3.1 is what makes a primal–dual method for conic quadratic problems possible in the familiar form: replacing XiSiei=0X^iS^ie^i=0XiSiei=0 by XiSiei=γμeiX^iS^ie^i=\gamma\mu e^iXiSiei=γμei gives the central path (21), and linearizing it gives the Newton system the paper analyses in §4. Lemma 3.2 ii) identifies N(1)\mathcal N(1)N(1) with that central path, and the §6.1 statement shows the algorithm starts on it. The arrow-head product XiSieiX^iS^ie^iXiSiei is the Jordan product of the Lorentz cone's Euclidean Jordan algebra, so the lemma is also the concrete, coordinate form of complementarity in that algebra (Alizadeh and Goldfarb, 2003).

The lemma is proved in the paper's Appendix and is classical; the mission's contribution is a machine-checked version. To our knowledge no proof assistant library contains complementarity for quadratic or rotated quadratic cones, the rotated-cone transformation, or the arrow-head matrix. The statements here are not yet proved anywhere in Lean.

Difficulty

The forward direction is an identity, (61). The converse is where the work is: xTs=0x^Ts=0xTs=0 is one scalar equation, yet it must force nin^ini equations per block. The argument needs a reverse Cauchy–Schwarz bound inside each quadratic cone, an equality-case analysis that splits on whether a leading coordinate vanishes, and the reduction of the rotated cone to the quadratic one through TTT. A block-by-block argument fails without first showing that each (xi)Tsi(x^i)^Ts^i(xi)Tsi is nonnegative, since only the sum is known to vanish. In Lean, the arithmetic of 1/21/\sqrt21/2​ in TTT and the index bookkeeping of v2:nv_{2:n}v2:n​ inside Fin n add their own friction.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin d → ℝ; the paper's x1x_1x1​ is index 0 and x2x_2x2​ is index 1, read through coord v r. The Euclidean tails are written out as sums, tailSq v 1 =∥v2:n∥2=\|v_{2:n}\|^2=∥v2:n​∥2 and tailSq v 2 =∥v3:n∥2=\|v_{3:n}\|^2=∥v3:n​∥2; Mathlib's norm on Fin d → ℝ is the sup norm and is never used. Points of KKK are stored block by block, x : (i : Fin k) → Fin (n i) → ℝ, with a cone kind kind i ∈ {nonneg, quad, rot} per block; xTsx^TsxTs is ∑ixi⋅si\sum_i x^i\cdot s^i∑i​xi⋅si, and the block-diagonal XXX, SSS are represented by their blocks. Tmat, Qmat, arrow and e1 are defined entrywise from (16)–(19) and p. 9.

Standing assumptions and additions:

  • The paper never states block dimensions; every theorem assumes WellFormed: ni=1n^i=1ni=1 for R+\mathbb R_+R+​, ni≥1n^i\ge1ni≥1 for KqK^qKq, ni≥2n^i\ge2ni≥2 for KrK^rKr (the rotated cone needs x1x_1x1​ and x2x_2x2​).
  • "x,s∈Kx,s\in Kx,s∈K" is taken literally; KKK is self-dual, so no separate dual cone is introduced.
  • The milestones 8 and 9 carry the page's case hypotheses (Tixi)1≠0(T^ix^i)_1\ne0(Tixi)1​=0, (Tisi)1≠0(T^is^i)_1\ne0(Tisi)1​=0.
  • The printed upper limit nnn in (61) is read as kkk; "(x; τ), (s; κ) ∈ N(1)" in Lemma 3.2 ii) is read as (x,τ,s,κ)∈N(1)(x,\tau,s,\kappa)\in\mathcal N(1)(x,τ,s,κ)∈N(1).

The goal is stated with arrow and Tmat, not with the unfolded vector ((Tixi)TTisi; (Tixi)1(Tisi)2:n+(Tisi)1(Tixi)2:n)((T^ix^i)^TT^is^i;\ (T^ix^i)_1(T^is^i)_{2:n}+(T^is^i)_1(T^ix^i)_{2:n})((Tixi)TTisi; (Tixi)1​(Tisi)2:n​+(Tisi)1​(Tixi)2:n​): replacing the arrow-head matrices by that vector, or dropping the rotated cone, would remove the content the lemma is about. Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, and reusable lemmas on tailSq (Cauchy–Schwarz for tails, its equality case) and on the arrow-head matrix.

Selected references

  • E. D. Andersen, C. Roos, T. Terlaky, On implementing a primal-dual interior-point method for conic quadratic optimization, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0349-3
  • F. Alizadeh, D. Goldfarb, Second-order cone programming, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003), 3–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0339-5
  • M. S. Lobo, L. Vandenberghe, S. Boyd, H. Lebret, Applications of second-order cone programming, Linear Algebra and its Applications 284 (1998), 193–228. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-3795(98)10032-0
  • Yu. E. Nesterov, M. J. Todd, Primal-dual interior-point methods for self-scaled cones, SIAM Journal on Optimization 8 (1998), 324–364. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623495290209
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Combinatorial Algorithm Minimizing Submodular Functions in Strongly Polynomial Time II: Minimizing a Submodular Function over a Ring Family Reduces to Minimizing over All SubsetsResearch Paper

Motivation

A submodular function on a finite set VVV is a function fff on subsets of VVV with f(X∪Y)+f(X∩Y)≤f(X)+f(Y)f(X \cup Y) + f(X \cap Y) \le f(X) + f(Y)f(X∪Y)+f(X∩Y)≤f(X)+f(Y). Minimizing such a function is one of the central tractable problems of combinatorial optimization: it contains minimum cuts in directed graphs, matroid intersection and polymatroid problems, and many scheduling and facility-location subproblems. Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver showed in 1981 that it can be done in polynomial time with the ellipsoid method; in 2000, Schrijver (JCTB 80, 346–355) and, simultaneously, Iwata, Fleischer and Fujishige (J. ACM 48, 2001) gave the first combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithms.

In many applications the function is not defined on all subsets of VVV but only on a ring family: a collection closed under union and intersection, such as the order ideals of a precedence relation in scheduling, or the sets of a closure system. The last section of Schrijver's paper (§6, pp. 353–354) shows that nothing is lost: any algorithm minimizing submodular functions on all subsets of VVV also minimizes a submodular function given only on a ring family. This mission formalizes that reduction.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite set. A collection C\mathcal CC of subsets of VVV is a ring family if X∪Y∈CX \cup Y \in \mathcal CX∪Y∈C and X∩Y∈CX \cap Y \in \mathcal CX∩Y∈C whenever X,Y∈CX, Y \in \mathcal CX,Y∈C. A real function fff is submodular on C\mathcal CC if

f(X∪Y)+f(X∩Y)≤f(X)+f(Y)(X,Y∈C).f(X \cup Y) + f(X \cap Y) \le f(X) + f(Y) \qquad (X, Y \in \mathcal C).f(X∪Y)+f(X∩Y)≤f(X)+f(Y)(X,Y∈C).

Following the paper, C\mathcal CC is normalized: ∅∈C\emptyset \in \mathcal C∅∈C, V∈CV \in \mathcal CV∈C, and Mu≠MvM_u \ne M_vMu​=Mv​ for all u≠vu \ne vu=v, where MvM_vMv​ is the smallest set of C\mathcal CC containing vvv. (Elements with the same MvM_vMv​ can be identified.) Under this normalization C\mathcal CC is the family of lower ideals of a partial order on VVV.

For X⊆VX \subseteq VX⊆V, the closure X‾\overline XX is the smallest set of C\mathcal CC containing XXX. For v∈Vv \in Vv∈V, LvL_vLv​ is the largest set of C\mathcal CC not containing vvv. The paper defines weights

c(v):=max⁡{0, f(Lv)−f(Lv∪{v})}(23)c(v) := \max\{0,\ f(L_v) - f(L_v \cup \{v\})\} \qquad (23)c(v):=max{0, f(Lv​)−f(Lv​∪{v})}(23)

with the modular extension c(X):=∑v∈Xc(v)c(X) := \sum_{v \in X} c(v)c(X):=∑v∈X​c(v), and the function on all subsets of VVV

g(X):=f(X‾)+c(X‾)(X⊆V).(26)g(X) := f(\overline X) + c(\overline X) \qquad (X \subseteq V). \qquad (26)g(X):=f(X)+c(X)(X⊆V).(26)

In Lean, VVV is a type with [Fintype V] [DecidableEq V], subsets are Finset V, C\mathcal CC is C : Set (Finset V), and the objects above are IsRingFamily C, SubmodularOn C f, closure C X, M C v, L C v, cw C f v (for c(v)c(v)c(v)), csum C f X (for c(X)c(X)c(X)) and g C f X, all in the namespace SchrijverSFM.Ring.

Formalization targets

Goal: the reduction

Under the normalization above, for fff submodular on C\mathcal CC:

g is submodular on all subsets of V,g \text{ is submodular on all subsets of } V,g is submodular on all subsets of V,

and, if U⊆VU \subseteq VU⊆V minimizes g(U)−c(U)g(U) - c(U)g(U)−c(U) over all subsets of VVV, then U‾∈C\overline U \in \mathcal CU∈C and

f(U‾)≤f(T)for all T∈C.f(\overline U) \le f(T) \qquad \text{for all } T \in \mathcal C.f(U)≤f(T)for all T∈C.

Both conjuncts are needed: the second alone follows almost from the definitions, while the first is what makes an all-subsets algorithm applicable to g−cg - cg−c in the first place.

Milestones

  1. C\mathcal CC is the collection of all lower ideals of some partial order on VVV (p. 353).
  2. LvL_vLv​ is the largest set in C\mathcal CC not containing vvv, equal to the union of the MuM_uMu​ not containing vvv, and Lv∪{v}∈CL_v \cup \{v\} \in \mathcal CLv​∪{v}∈C (p. 353, (23)).
  3. The one-element step (25): f(X)≤f(Y)+c(v)f(X) \le f(Y) + c(v)f(X)≤f(Y)+c(v) for X,Y∈CX, Y \in \mathcal CX,Y∈C, Y=X∪{v}Y = X \cup \{v\}Y=X∪{v}, v∉Xv \notin Xv∈/X.
  4. Monotonicity (24): f(Y)+c(Y)≥f(X)+c(X)f(Y) + c(Y) \ge f(X) + c(X)f(Y)+c(Y)≥f(X)+c(X) for X⊆YX \subseteq YX⊆Y in C\mathcal CC.
  5. The closure identities X‾∪Y‾=X∪Y‾\overline X \cup \overline Y = \overline{X \cup Y}X∪Y=X∪Y and X‾∩Y‾⊇X∩Y‾\overline X \cap \overline Y \supseteq \overline{X \cap Y}X∩Y⊇X∩Y.
  6. Display (27): ggg is submodular.
  7. Transfer of minimizers: if UUU minimizes g−cg - cg−c over 2V2^V2V, then U‾\overline UU minimizes fff over C\mathcal CC.

Significance

The reduction means that a single algorithm for unconstrained submodular minimization serves for every ring family, given only the sets MvM_vMv​. This is how ring-family constrained problems (for example minimum-cost closures and precedence-constrained scheduling objectives) are routinely handed to general submodular-minimization codes, and it is the standard justification for stating submodular minimization algorithms over 2V2^V2V only.

On the formal side, the mission produces a small reusable layer on ring families of finite sets (closure operator, the lower-ideal representation, the largest set avoiding an element) together with the monotonization trick (24), which is of independent use whenever a function on a lattice of sets has to be made monotone by a modular correction. The result is classical and its proof in the paper is complete; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. Companion mission I of this series formalizes the algorithm of §§2–5 itself; this mission does not depend on it, since the algorithm enters only as the hypothesis that a minimizer UUU of g−cg - cg−c is given.

Difficulty

Every step is elementary, but two points are easy to get wrong. First, (24) is proved on the page by assuming Y=X∪{v}Y = X \cup \{v\}Y=X∪{v}; reducing the general case X⊆YX \subseteq YX⊆Y to such one-element steps inside C\mathcal CC requires the normalization Mu≠MvM_u \ne M_vMu​=Mv​: without it a ring family can jump by more than one element (for C={∅,V}\mathcal C = \{\emptyset, V\}C={∅,V} with ∣V∣=2|V| = 2∣V∣=2 the inequality (24) fails for suitable fff). Second, the weights c(v)c(v)c(v) evaluate fff at Lv∪{v}L_v \cup \{v\}Lv​∪{v}, which belongs to C\mathcal CC only because of the same normalization; a formalization that drops it lets values of fff outside C\mathcal CC leak into ccc and ggg. The submodularity proof (27) also needs the asymmetric closure facts — equality for unions but only containment for intersections — which is exactly why the monotonicity (24) is required.

Formalization scope

  • VVV is a finite type with decidable equality; subsets are Finset V; C\mathcal CC is a Set (Finset V).
  • fff is a real function on all of Finset V; only its values on C\mathcal CC matter, and under the hypotheses no other value enters ccc, ggg or the conclusions. The paper allows any ordered field; the formalization uses R\mathbb RR.
  • The normalization of p. 353 is assumed as hypotheses: ∅ ∈ C, Finset.univ ∈ C, and M C u ≠ M C v for u ≠ v. No hypothesis f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0 is made; §6 does not use it.
  • The closure is the intersection (Finset.inf) of the sets of C\mathcal CC containing XXX, and LvL_vLv​ the union (Finset.sup) of the sets of C\mathcal CC avoiding vvv; their default values on an empty family are never reached under the hypotheses.
  • c(X)c(X)c(X) is the modular extension ∑v∈Xc(v)\sum_{v \in X} c(v)∑v∈X​c(v); the max⁡{0,⋅}\max\{0, \cdot\}max{0,⋅} in (23) is kept, so c≥0c \ge 0c≥0.
  • Submodularity of ggg on all subsets is the published platform definition NonmonotoneSubmod.Shared.Submodular.
  • Not formalized: the running-time claims of §6 ("we can find ccc by 2∣V∣2|V|2∣V∣ oracle calls", strongly polynomial time) and the oracle model; there is no machine model.
  • The goal does not assume (24) or (27), and it is not the minimizer-transfer statement alone, which would be near-definitional.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in the order listed, general lemmas on closure operators of ring families of Finsets, and the lower-ideal representation, which is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Schrijver, A combinatorial algorithm minimizing submodular functions in strongly polynomial time, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 80 (2000), 346–355. https://doi.org/10.1006/jctb.2000.1989
  • S. Iwata, L. Fleischer, S. Fujishige, A combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm for minimizing submodular functions, J. ACM 48 (2001), 761–777. https://doi.org/10.1145/502090.502096
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, The ellipsoid method and its consequences in combinatorial optimization, Combinatorica 1 (1981), 169–197. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579273
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AnalysisStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

The Power of Two Choices in Randomized Load Balancing II: T_d(λ)/log T_1(λ) → 1/log d as λ → 1⁻, an Exponential Improvement over One ChoiceResearch Paper

Motivation

A dispatcher assigns each arriving job to one of nnn servers. Sending it to a uniformly random server is simple but produces long queues near capacity; sending it to the globally shortest queue requires full state information. The power of ddd choices sits between the two: each job samples ddd servers at random and joins the shortest of them. Mitzenmacher's analysis of this supermarket model (IEEE TPDS 12(10), 2001) together with the balls-into-bins result of Azar, Broder, Karlin and Upfal (SIAM J. Comput. 29(1), 1999), established that a second random choice changes the behaviour of the system qualitatively. The idea underlies load balancers, hashing schemes and distributed schedulers.

This mission formalizes the paper's quantitative statement of that improvement in heavy traffic, the regime where the arrival rate per server λ\lambdaλ approaches the service rate 111.

Setting

Customers arrive as a Poisson stream of rate λn\lambda nλn with 0≤λ<10\le\lambda<10≤λ<1, service times are exponential with mean 111, and each customer joins the shortest of ddd queues sampled uniformly with replacement. As n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞ the fraction of queues with at least iii customers follows a deterministic limiting system with fixed point πi=λ(di−1)/(d−1)\pi_i=\lambda^{(d^i-1)/(d-1)}πi​=λ(di−1)/(d−1). Corollary 2 of the paper shows that, for d≥2d\ge2d≥2, the expected time a customer spends in that limiting system converges to

Td(λ)=∑i=1∞λdi−dd−1.T_d(\lambda)=\sum_{i=1}^{\infty}\lambda^{\frac{d^i-d}{d-1}} .Td​(λ)=i=1∑∞​λd−1di−d​.

With a single choice the system is nnn independent M/M/1 queues, and the expected time is

T1(λ)=11−λ.T_1(\lambda)=\frac{1}{1-\lambda}.T1​(λ)=1−λ1​.

This mission takes these two formulas as its definitions; the limiting system itself and the convergence to Td(λ)T_d(\lambda)Td​(λ) are the subject of the companion mission (part I). The auxiliary function of Lemma 3 is

Fd(λ)=∑i=0∞λdilog⁡11−λ.F_d(\lambda)=\frac{\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}\lambda^{d^i}}{\log\frac{1}{1-\lambda}} .Fd​(λ)=log1−λ1​∑i=0∞​λdi​.

Throughout, d≥2d\ge2d≥2 is an integer and logarithms are natural.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4, limit clause (p. 1099)

lim⁡λ→1−Td(λ)log⁡T1(λ)=1log⁡d(d≥2).\lim_{\lambda\to1^-}\frac{T_d(\lambda)}{\log T_1(\lambda)}=\frac{1}{\log d}\qquad(d\ge2).λ→1−lim​logT1​(λ)Td​(λ)​=logd1​(d≥2).

Milestones, in the order the paper's argument uses them

  1. The rewriting of TdT_dTd​ (proof of Theorem 4): with λ′=λ1/(d−1)\lambda'=\lambda^{1/(d-1)}λ′=λ1/(d−1) and 0<λ<10<\lambda<10<λ<1,
Td(λ)=∑i=1∞(λ′)diλd/(d−1).T_d(\lambda)=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\infty}(\lambda')^{d^i}}{\lambda^{d/(d-1)}} .Td​(λ)=λd/(d−1)∑i=1∞​(λ′)di​.
  1. The product identity (proof of Lemma 3): for 0≤λ<10\le\lambda<10≤λ<1,
∏i=0∞(1+λdi+λ2di+⋯+λ(d−1)di)=11−λ.\prod_{i=0}^{\infty}\bigl(1+\lambda^{d^i}+\lambda^{2d^i}+\dots+\lambda^{(d-1)d^i}\bigr)=\frac{1}{1-\lambda}.i=0∏∞​(1+λdi+λ2di+⋯+λ(d−1)di)=1−λ1​.
  1. Lemma 3:
lim⁡λ→1−Fd(λ)=1log⁡d.\lim_{\lambda\to1^-}F_d(\lambda)=\frac{1}{\log d}.λ→1−lim​Fd​(λ)=logd1​.

The goal is a statement about the shape of the growth, not a constant: it pins the leading behaviour Td(λ)∼log⁡d11−λT_d(\lambda)\sim\log_d\frac{1}{1-\lambda}Td​(λ)∼logd​1−λ1​.

Significance

Theorem 4 makes "exponential improvement" precise. With one choice the expected time grows like 11−λ\frac1{1-\lambda}1−λ1​ as the load approaches capacity; with d≥2d\ge2d≥2 choices it grows like log⁡11−λlog⁡d\frac{\log\frac1{1-\lambda}}{\log d}logdlog1−λ1​​. It also quantifies the diminishing return of extra choices: going from d=2d=2d=2 to ddd only divides the leading term by log⁡2d\log_2 dlog2​d, while going from one choice to two changes its order. These constants are the benchmark against which later heavy-traffic analyses of join-the-shortest-of-ddd policies are compared.

The result is proved in the paper (the limit clause; see Difficulty for the other clause). No machine-checked version is known to exist. The formalization yields a self-contained Lean development of the lacunary series ∑ixdi\sum_i x^{d^i}∑i​xdi near x=1x=1x=1 and of the base-ddd product identity, both of which are classical analytic facts with uses outside queueing (lacunary power series, digit expansions).

Difficulty

The obvious approach compares ∑iλdi\sum_i\lambda^{d^i}∑i​λdi with an integral, but the terms are not monotone images of a smooth function of a continuous index in a way that controls the error uniformly as λ→1−\lambda\to1^-λ→1−: the number of terms close to 111 grows like log⁡d11−λ\log_d\frac{1}{1-\lambda}logd​1−λ1​ and each of them contributes nearly 111, so the error terms are of the same order as the quantity being measured. The difficulty is to obtain matching upper and lower bounds with constants tending to 1/log⁡d1/\log d1/logd, uniformly as λ→1−\lambda\to1^-λ→1−. Passing from Lemma 3 to Theorem 4 additionally requires controlling the change of variable λ↦λ1/(d−1)\lambda\mapsto\lambda^{1/(d-1)}λ↦λ1/(d−1) inside the logarithm.

Theorem 4 as printed also contains a first clause, Td(λ)≤cdlog⁡T1(λ)T_d(\lambda)\le c_d\log T_1(\lambda)Td​(λ)≤cd​logT1​(λ) for all λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1]. It is false as printed near λ=0\lambda=0λ=0: Td(λ)≥1T_d(\lambda)\ge1Td​(λ)≥1 while log⁡T1(λ)→0\log T_1(\lambda)\to0logT1​(λ)→0. The paper does not prove it, and this mission does not pose it.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. λ\lambdaλ is a real number (lam), ddd a natural number with the hypothesis 2≤d2\le d2≤d on every statement. TdT_dTd​, T1T_1T1​ and FdF_dFd​ are real-valued definitions in one definition file.
  • Exponents. TdT_dTd​'s iii-th term uses the natural-number exponent ∑1≤k<idk=di−dd−1\sum_{1\le k<i}d^k=\frac{d^i-d}{d-1}∑1≤k<i​dk=d−1di−d​, so its i=1i=1i=1 term is λ0=1\lambda^0=1λ0=1. The series runs over i∈Ni\in\mathbb Ni∈N with the i=0i=0i=0 term equal to 000. λ′=λ1/(d−1)\lambda'=\lambda^{1/(d-1)}λ′=λ1/(d−1) and λd/(d−1)\lambda^{d/(d-1)}λd/(d−1) are real powers.
  • Series and junk values. All series are real tsums; they converge for 0≤λ<10\le\lambda<10≤λ<1. Outside that range Lean's conventions (a divergent series sums to 000, x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0, log⁡x=0\log x=0logx=0 for x≤0x\le0x≤0) produce meaningless values, so every statement either restricts λ\lambdaλ to [0,1)[0,1)[0,1) or (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) or is a limit along λ<1\lambda<1λ<1.
  • Limits. "λ→1−\lambda\to1^-λ→1−" is the one-sided filter 𝓝[<] 1; the limit 1/log⁡d1/\log d1/logd uses Real.log.
  • Infinite product. The product identity is stated with HasProd (unconditional convergence of finite subproducts), which for factors ≥1\ge1≥1 is the same as convergence of the partial products.
  • Not trivializable. Because every limit is one-sided at 111 and the denominators log⁡T1(λ)\log T_1(\lambda)logT1​(λ) and log⁡11−λ\log\frac1{1-\lambda}log1−λ1​ are positive there, no statement can be satisfied by Lean's junk values at λ≥1\lambda\ge1λ≥1 or at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0; the summability of the rewritten series is asserted explicitly.
  • Infrastructure. Useful general lemmas: asymptotics of ∑ixdi\sum_i x^{d^i}∑i​xdi as x→1−x\to1^-x→1−, products of finite geometric sums, change of variables in one-sided limits. These are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of any of the milestones, or of alternative proofs of Lemma 3, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Mitzenmacher, The Power of Two Choices in Randomized Load Balancing, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems 12(10), 2001, pp. 1094–1104. https://doi.org/10.1109/71.963420
  • Y. Azar, A. Z. Broder, A. R. Karlin, E. Upfal, Balanced Allocations, SIAM Journal on Computing 29(1), 1999, pp. 180–200. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539795288490
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 7: Without Gross Substitutes a Market with Two Firms and Three Workers Has No Core AllocationResearch Paper

Motivation

In a labor market where firms hire sets of workers and salaries are negotiated pair by pair, the natural stability notion is the core: an assignment of workers to firms, with salaries, that no firm and group of workers can improve upon by agreeing among themselves. Kelso and Crawford (Econometrica 50 (1982) 1483–1504) proved that the core is nonempty, and that an ascending salary-adjustment process reaches it, when every firm regards workers as gross substitutes (GS): raising some workers' salaries never makes a firm withdraw an offer from a worker whose salary has not risen. The condition later became central to the theory of matching with contracts, combinatorial auctions and Walrasian equilibrium with indivisible goods (Gul and Stacchetti, J. Econ. Theory 87 (1999); Hatfield and Milgrom, Amer. Econ. Rev. 95 (2005)).

The question this mission addresses is whether (GS) is needed at all. Section 6 of the paper answers it with a concrete market with two firms and three workers in which every other assumption of the paper holds, each firm's technology is even subadditive, and the core is empty.

Setting

There are workers i∈Wi \in Wi∈W and firms j∈Fj \in Fj∈F, both finite. Worker iii's utility of working for firm jjj at salary sss is ui(j;s)u^i(j; s)ui(j;s); firm jjj produces yj(C)y^j(C)yj(C) with the set of workers CCC, and its profit at the salary vector sj=(sij)is^j = (s_{ij})_isj=(sij​)i​ is

πj(C;sj)=yj(C)−∑i∈Csij.\pi^j(C; s^j) = y^j(C) - \sum_{i \in C} s_{ij}.πj(C;sj)=yj(C)−i∈C∑​sij​.

A set CCC is demanded at sjs^jsj if it maximizes πj(⋅ ;sj)\pi^j(\cdot\,; s^j)πj(⋅;sj). Each pair has a reservation salary σij\sigma_{ij}σij​.

An allocation assigns each worker iii to a firm f(i)f(i)f(i) with salary sif(i)s_{if(i)}sif(i)​; Cj=f−1(j)C^j = f^{-1}(j)Cj=f−1(j). It is individually rational if sif(i)≥σif(i)s_{if(i)} \ge \sigma_{if(i)}sif(i)​≥σif(i)​ and πj(Cj;sj)≥0\pi^j(C^j; s^j) \ge 0πj(Cj;sj)≥0 for all iii, jjj. A firm jjj and a set CCC of workers strictly improve upon it if some salaries rijr_{ij}rij​ give every i∈Ci \in Ci∈C strictly more utility than at the allocation and give firm jjj strictly more profit than πj(Cj;sj)\pi^j(C^j; s^j)πj(Cj;sj). A core allocation (definition D3 of the paper) is an individually rational allocation that no such coalition can strictly improve upon. When salaries vary continuously, the rijr_{ij}rij​ range over R\mathbb{R}R.

The example. Workers 1,2,31, 2, 31,2,3; firms j,kj, kj,k; σij=σik=0\sigma_{ij} = \sigma_{ik} = 0σij​=σik​=0; ui(j;s)=ui(k;s)=su^i(j; s) = u^i(k; s) = sui(j;s)=ui(k;s)=s (equation (23)); and

CCC∅\emptyset∅{1}\{1\}{1}{2}\{2\}{2}{3}\{3\}{3}{1,2}\{1,2\}{1,2}{1,3}\{1,3\}{1,3}{2,3}\{2,3\}{2,3}{1,2,3}\{1,2,3\}{1,2,3}
yj(C)y^j(C)yj(C)0004444444144\tfrac14441​7127\tfrac12721​777777999
yk(C)y^k(C)yk(C)0004144\tfrac14441​4444447777777127\tfrac12721​999

Firm kkk is firm jjj with workers 111 and 333 interchanged. In Lean, noCoreMarket : Market (Fin 3) (Fin 2) is this market, techJ and techK are the two technologies, and Market.IsCore anySalary is D3 with real salaries.

Formalization targets

Goal: the example has no core allocation

¬ ∃A, A is a core allocation of the example with continuously variable salaries.\neg\,\exists A,\ A \text{ is a core allocation of the example with continuously variable salaries.}¬∃A, A is a core allocation of the example with continuously variable salaries.

Milestones, in the order the paper uses them

  1. At sj=(3,3,3)s^j = (3,3,3)sj=(3,3,3) firm jjj's unique demanded set is {1,2}\{1,2\}{1,2} (profit 1121\tfrac12121​); at s~j=(3,4,3)\tilde s^j = (3,4,3)s~j=(3,4,3) it is {3}\{3\}{3} (profit 1141\tfrac14141​).
  2. Firm jjj's technology is subadditive and satisfies (MP) and (NFL) with σij=0\sigma_{ij} = 0σij​=0, but violates (GS).
  3. In any market with ui(j;s)=su^i(j; s) = sui(j;s)=s and σ=0\sigma = 0σ=0, every core allocation maximizes total product ∑jyj(f−1(j))\sum_j y^j(f^{-1}(j))∑j​yj(f−1(j)) over all assignments.
  4. In the example the maximal total product is 111211\tfrac121121​, attained exactly by j←{1}, k←{2,3}j \leftarrow \{1\},\ k \leftarrow \{2,3\}j←{1}, k←{2,3} and by j←{1,2}, k←{3}j \leftarrow \{1,2\},\ k \leftarrow \{3\}j←{1,2}, k←{3}.
  5. For the first of these assignments, if the coalitions (j;{3})(j;\{3\})(j;{3}), (j;{1,2})(j;\{1,2\})(j;{1,2}), (k;{1})(k;\{1\})(k;{1}), (k;{3})(k;\{3\})(k;{3}) cannot strictly improve, inequalities (24)–(27) hold.
  6. Hence the first assignment carries no core allocation (s2k=312s_{2k} = 3\tfrac12s2k​=321​ is forced and (24′), (26′) contradict each other).

The goal then follows by the symmetry of the example.

Significance

The paper's existence results (Theorems 1 and 2: the salary-adjustment process converges to a core allocation; a strict core allocation exists with continuous salaries) all assume (GS). This example shows that the assumption cannot simply be dropped, and that the weaker and more familiar condition of subadditivity does not replace it once there are three or more workers, although it does with two (p. 1500). It is the reason gross substitutes, rather than a convexity-like condition on technologies, became the standard hypothesis for existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities.

The result is proved in the paper by a short computation. It has not been machine-checked before: nothing of this paper was on Prove2Me before this series. The mission contributes a checked counterexample, a general efficiency lemma for core allocations with transferable utility (milestone 3), and the computational facts about firm jjj that show (GS) fails. The paper's further remark that the example also has no competitive equilibrium relies on the core–equilibrium equivalence of p. 1487 and is not part of this mission.

This is mission 7 of a series on the same paper; missions 1–6 treat the salary-adjustment process (1), the continuous strict core (2), one-sided markets (3), the firm-optimal allocation (4), comparative statics (5) and the characterization of (GS) for identical workers (6). This mission does not depend on them.

Difficulty

The obstacle is the quantifier over all allocations with real salaries: emptiness of the core is a claim about infinitely many candidates, and checking finitely many salary vectors proves nothing. A direct attempt to find an improving coalition for each allocation by case analysis on salaries does not close, because which coalition improves depends on the salaries. The printed inequality (24) also carries a sign misprint (≤\le≤ in place of ≥\ge≥), and copying it would break the contradiction.

Formalization scope

  • Workers 1,2,31,2,31,2,3 are 0, 1, 2 : Fin 3; firms j,kj, kj,k are 0, 1 : Fin 2. 414=17/44\tfrac14 = 17/4441​=17/4 and 712=15/27\tfrac12 = 15/2721​=15/2.
  • An allocation is a total function from workers to firms with each worker's salary at his or her own firm; every worker is employed, as in D1. Individual rationality is part of "core allocation".
  • "Core" is D3 (no coalition can strictly improve), with real salaries ("when salaries can vary continuously"), not the strict core D2 and not a discrete grid.
  • "Unique preferred set" is stated as: a set is profit-maximizing over all eight subsets iff it equals the named set.
  • (GS) "fails" is the negation of (GS) for firm jjj over all real salary vectors.
  • Inequality (24) is formalized as 4−s1j+s3k≥4144 - s_{1j} + s_{3k} \ge 4\tfrac144−s1j​+s3k​≥441​, the reading the paper's own (24′) requires; the milestone text keeps the printed version.
  • Milestone 3 is stated for every finite market with ui(j;s)=su^i(j; s) = sui(j;s)=s and σ=0\sigma = 0σ=0, the two properties the paper's sentence invokes.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the core includes individual rationality and real-valued coalition salaries, the technologies are the printed tables, milestones 1, 2 and 4 have no hypotheses, and the hypotheses of milestones 3 and 5 are each satisfiable.

Contributions welcome: proofs of each milestone, and a statement and proof of the symmetry (workers 1↔31 \leftrightarrow 31↔3, firms j↔kj \leftrightarrow kj↔k) used to exclude the second efficient assignment.

Selected references

  • A. S. Kelso, Jr. and V. P. Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50(6), 1982, 1483–1504. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913392
  • V. P. Crawford and E. M. Knoer, Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers, Econometrica 49(2), 1981, 437–450. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913320
  • L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, The assignment game I: the core, International Journal of Game Theory 1, 1971, 111–130. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753437
  • F. Gul and E. Stacchetti, Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes, Journal of Economic Theory 87, 1999, 95–124. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2531
  • J. W. Hatfield and P. R. Milgrom, Matching with contracts, American Economic Review 95(4), 2005, 913–935. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466
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Machine LearningTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

The Weighted Majority Algorithm 5: With Pool Predictions in [0,1], the Binary Master WMG Makes at Most log(w_init/w_fin)/log(2/(1+β)) MistakesResearch Paper

Motivation

Prediction with expert advice asks how a learner should combine the forecasts of a pool of prediction algorithms when nothing is assumed about the data: the instances and labels may be chosen by an adversary, and the learner's performance is compared with that of the pool. Littlestone and Warmuth's The Weighted Majority Algorithm (Inform. and Comput. 108, 1994) introduced the multiplicative-weights master algorithm WM for binary pool predictions and proved that its number of mistakes is at most logarithmic in the pool size plus a constant times the mistakes of the best pool member. The same multiplicative update now underlies boosting, online convex optimization and approximate solvers for linear programs and zero-sum games (Arora, Hazan, Kale 2012).

In many applications the pool members do not output a bit but a degree of confidence in [0,1][0,1][0,1], while the master must still commit to a binary decision. Section 5 of the paper treats exactly this setting with the algorithm WMG, and shows that WM's mistake bound survives unchanged.

Setting

A nonempty pool of nnn prediction algorithms is run on a finite sequence of trials. In trial kkk the pool member iii predicts xk,i∈[0,1]x_{k,i}\in[0,1]xk,i​∈[0,1], the master predicts λk∈{0,1}\lambda_k\in\{0,1\}λk​∈{0,1}, and then the binary label ρk∈{0,1}\rho_k\in\{0,1\}ρk​∈{0,1} is revealed. The master keeps a non-negative weight wk,iw_{k,i}wk,i​ per pool member, with positive initial weights. Write

sk=∑i=1nwk,i,γk=∑i=1nwk,i xk,isk,s_k=\sum_{i=1}^n w_{k,i},\qquad \gamma_k=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n w_{k,i}\,x_{k,i}}{s_k},sk​=i=1∑n​wk,i​,γk​=sk​∑i=1n​wk,i​xk,i​​,

and winit=s0w_{\mathrm{init}}=s_0winit​=s0​, wfinw_{\mathrm{fin}}wfin​ the total weight after the last trial.

WMG with parameter 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1 predicts λk=1\lambda_k=1λk​=1 if γk>1/2\gamma_k>1/2γk​>1/2 and λk=0\lambda_k=0λk​=0 if γk<1/2\gamma_k<1/2γk​<1/2; at γk=1/2\gamma_k=1/2γk​=1/2 either prediction is allowed. A mistake is a trial with λk≠ρk\lambda_k\ne\rho_kλk​=ρk​, and mmm is the number of mistakes. An update step multiplies every weight by a factor

wk+1,i=F wk,i,β∣xk,i−ρk∣≤F≤1−(1−β) ∣xk,i−ρk∣(5.1)w_{k+1,i}=F\,w_{k,i},\qquad \beta^{|x_{k,i}-\rho_k|}\le F\le 1-(1-\beta)\,|x_{k,i}-\rho_k| \tag{5.1}wk+1,i​=Fwk,i​,β∣xk,i​−ρk​∣≤F≤1−(1−β)∣xk,i​−ρk​∣(5.1)

with 00=10^0=100=1. WMG executes an update step in every trial, or only in mistake trials; more generally (footnote 8 of the paper) in every mistake trial and possibly in others. Outside update steps the weights do not change. When the xk,ix_{k,i}xk,i​ are binary, WMG coincides with WM.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (pp. 234–235)

For every run of WMG with 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1, whatever the tie-breaking, the update criterion and the factors in (5.1), if wfin>0w_{\mathrm{fin}}>0wfin​>0 then

m≤ln⁡(winit/wfin)ln⁡(2/(1+β)).m\le\frac{\ln(w_{\mathrm{init}}/w_{\mathrm{fin}})}{\ln\bigl(2/(1+\beta)\bigr)}.m≤ln(2/(1+β))ln(winit​/wfin​)​.

The bound involves only the total weights, not the losses of individual pool members; Corollary 5.1 of the paper, which compares mmm with the total absolute loss mim_imi​ of each pool member, follows from it and from the lower bound in (5.1).

Milestones

  1. Appendix, p. 256. In a mistake trial the total weight drops by at least a factor (1+β)/2(1+\beta)/2(1+β)/2: sk+1≤1+β2sks_{k+1}\le\frac{1+\beta}{2}s_ksk+1​≤21+β​sk​.
  2. §5, p. 235. Unless β=0\beta=0β=0 and ∣γk−ρk∣=1|\gamma_k-\rho_k|=1∣γk​−ρk​∣=1 in some update trial,
∑k updateln⁡(1−(1−β)∣γk−ρk∣)≤∑k mistakeln⁡(1−(1−β)∣γk−ρk∣)≤mln⁡(12+12β).\sum_{k\ \text{update}}\ln\bigl(1-(1-\beta)|\gamma_k-\rho_k|\bigr)\le\sum_{k\ \text{mistake}}\ln\bigl(1-(1-\beta)|\gamma_k-\rho_k|\bigr)\le m\ln\bigl(\tfrac12+\tfrac12\beta\bigr).k update∑​ln(1−(1−β)∣γk​−ρk​∣)≤k mistake∑​ln(1−(1−β)∣γk​−ρk​∣)≤mln(21​+21​β).

The paper gives two proofs of Theorem 5.1, one through each milestone; the second also uses Lemma 5.2, the potential lemma shared with the continuous master WMC, which is posed in the companion mission on WMC.

Significance

Theorem 5.1 says that the master's mistake count is controlled by how much total weight the pool loses, with the same constant 1/ln⁡(2/(1+β))1/\ln(2/(1+\beta))1/ln(2/(1+β)) as for binary pools. With equal initial weights it gives Corollary 5.1: WMG makes at most (log⁡n+milog⁡(1/β))/log⁡(2/(1+β))(\log n+m_i\log(1/\beta))/\log(2/(1+\beta))(logn+mi​log(1/β))/log(2/(1+β)) mistakes for every pool member iii, so pool members may report graded confidences at no cost in the master's guarantee. The same weight-potential argument is the template for the randomized master WMR of §6 and for later analyses of exponential weights.

The result is classical and proved in the paper. What this mission adds is a machine-checked statement and proof against the paper's own model: a relation that covers both update criteria, all tie-breaks at γ=1/2\gamma=1/2γ=1/2 and the whole interval of admissible factors, rather than a single deterministic instance. No formalization of WMG or of Theorem 5.1 is known; the platform's existing weighted-majority results (Hazan's textbook version) concern binary experts, unit initial weights and a fixed update factor.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, copied from WM, tracks the weight q0q_0q0​ of members predicting 000 and the weight q1q_1q1​ of members predicting 111. With predictions in [0,1][0,1][0,1] a member supports both outcomes, and the update factor is only constrained to an interval, so the two-bucket bookkeeping must be redone for fractional contributions. The factor's upper bound 1−(1−β)r1-(1-\beta)r1−(1−β)r is affine in r=∣x−ρ∣r=|x-\rho|r=∣x−ρ∣, while the natural exponential factor βr\beta^rβr is convex; the argument must use the right one of the two bounds of (5.1). A further subtlety is the case β=0\beta=0β=0: a factor may be 000, the total weight can vanish, and both the logarithmic bound and the weighted average γ\gammaγ degenerate.

Formalization scope

  • The pool is Fin n with n>0n>0n>0, and the trials are Fin T, all trials of the sequence; weights are w : ℕ → Fin n → ℝ, with w 0 the initial and w T the final weights.
  • Pool predictions are real numbers in [0,1][0,1][0,1], labels and master predictions are real numbers in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}.
  • The update criterion is a Boolean flag per trial that must be set in every mistake trial; the factor is an arbitrary real number in the interval (5.1) for each trial and member, where βr\beta^{r}βr is Real.rpow (so 00=10^0=100=1).
  • The paper writes a ratio of logarithms with the base omitted; Real.log is used.
  • The case wfin=0w_{\mathrm{fin}}=0wfin​=0, where the paper's bound is +∞+\infty+∞, is excluded by the hypothesis 0<wfin0<w_{\mathrm{fin}}0<wfin​. Without it, Lean's Real.log 0 = 0 would turn the paper's vacuous bound into the false claim m≤0m\le0m≤0; with it, no Lean junk value enters the statement.
  • The goal must be stated for the relation, not for a single run: fixing the tie-break, updating in every trial only, or fixing FFF to one endpoint of (5.1) would state a special case. Stating the theorem only for binary pool predictions would state Theorem 2.1 instead.

A complete development needs only finite sums, real logarithms and real powers from Mathlib. Proofs of either milestone, of the existence of a run for every input (using Lemma 5.1, βr≤1+r(β−1)\beta^r\le1+r(\beta-1)βr≤1+r(β−1)), and of Corollary 5.1 on top of the goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Littlestone, M. K. Warmuth, The Weighted Majority Algorithm, Information and Computation 108(2), 212–261, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1006/inco.1994.1009
  • N. Littlestone, M. K. Warmuth, The Weighted Majority Algorithm, Proc. 30th IEEE FOCS, 256–261, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1989.63487
  • V. Vovk, Aggregating Strategies, Proc. 3rd COLT, 371–383, 1990. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/92571.92672
  • S. Arora, E. Hazan, S. Kale, The Multiplicative Weights Update Method: a Meta-Algorithm and Applications, Theory of Computing 8, 121–164, 2012. https://doi.org/10.4086/toc.2012.v008a006
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games 4: An Efficient Solution Is the Shapley Value on the Subgames of v If and Only If the Participation Game Γ(ψ, c, v) Is a Potential GameResearch Paper

Motivation

The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is the most widely used single-valued solution of cooperative games with transferable utility. It is usually justified axiomatically, from cooperative principles. A recurring question in game theory, sometimes called the Nash program, asks whether cooperative solution concepts can also be recovered from the strategic behaviour of players in a non-cooperative game.

Section 6 of Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games (Games and Economic Behavior 14, 1996), gives such a recovery through the notion of a potential game, the central object of that paper. With every solution ψ\psiψ, vector of outside options ccc and TU game vvv it associates a simple non-cooperative participation game, in which each player decides whether to join. The Shapley value is then characterised, among efficient solutions, as exactly the solution for which every such participation game is a potential game. The characterisation rests on the potential of a TU game introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), whose marginal contributions are the Shapley value; Monderer and Shapley connect that cooperative potential to the strategic one of their paper.

Setting

Let N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} be a finite set of players.

A game in strategic form Γ(u1,…,un)\Gamma(u^1, \dots, u^n)Γ(u1,…,un) has strategy sets YiY^iYi and payoff functions ui:Y→Ru^i : Y \to \mathbb Rui:Y→R on Y=Y1×⋯×YnY = Y^1 \times \dots \times Y^nY=Y1×⋯×Yn. Writing (y−i,x)(y^{-i}, x)(y−i,x) for the profile yyy with player iii's strategy replaced by xxx, a function P:Y→RP : Y \to \mathbb RP:Y→R is an exact potential if

ui(y−i,x)−ui(y−i,z)=P(y−i,x)−P(y−i,z)u^i(y^{-i}, x) - u^i(y^{-i}, z) = P(y^{-i}, x) - P(y^{-i}, z)ui(y−i,x)−ui(y−i,z)=P(y−i,x)−P(y−i,z)

for every iii, every y−iy^{-i}y−i and all x,z∈Yix, z \in Y^ix,z∈Yi (condition (2.2) with unit weights). A game with an exact potential is a potential game.

For a coalition S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N, G(S)G(S)G(S) is the space of TU games on SSS: real functions vvv on the subsets of SSS with v(∅)=0v(\emptyset) = 0v(∅)=0. A solution ψ\psiψ assigns to every v∈G(S)v \in G(S)v∈G(S) a payoff vector ψ(v)∈RS\psi(v) \in \mathbb R^Sψ(v)∈RS. It is efficient if ∑i∈Sψ(v)(i)=v(S)\sum_{i \in S} \psi(v)(i) = v(S)∑i∈S​ψ(v)(i)=v(S) for every SSS and every v∈G(S)v \in G(S)v∈G(S). For v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N), vS∈G(S)v_S \in G(S)vS​∈G(S) is its restriction to the subsets of SSS. The Shapley value of w∈G(S)w \in G(S)w∈G(S) is

φi(w)=∑T⊆S∖{i}∣T∣! (∣S∣−∣T∣−1)!∣S∣!(w(T∪{i})−w(T)),i∈S.\varphi_i(w) = \sum_{T \subseteq S \setminus \{i\}} \frac{|T|!\,(|S|-|T|-1)!}{|S|!}\bigl(w(T \cup \{i\}) - w(T)\bigr), \qquad i \in S.φi​(w)=T⊆S∖{i}∑​∣S∣!∣T∣!(∣S∣−∣T∣−1)!​(w(T∪{i})−w(T)),i∈S.

Given a solution ψ\psiψ, a vector c∈RNc \in \mathbb R^Nc∈RN and v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N), the participation game Γ(ψ,c,v)\Gamma(\psi, c, v)Γ(ψ,c,v) has player set NNN and strategy sets Yi={0,1}Y^i = \{0, 1\}Yi={0,1}. Player iii either stays out (0) and receives cic^ici, or participates (1). With S(ε)={i:εi=1}S(\varepsilon) = \{i : \varepsilon^i = 1\}S(ε)={i:εi=1} the set of participants at the profile ε\varepsilonε,

ui(ε)={ci,εi=0,ψ(vS(ε))(i),εi=1.u^i(\varepsilon) = \begin{cases} c^i, & \varepsilon^i = 0,\\ \psi(v_{S(\varepsilon)})(i), & \varepsilon^i = 1.\end{cases}ui(ε)={ci,ψ(vS(ε)​)(i),​εi=0,εi=1.​

For S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N, εS\varepsilon_SεS​ is the profile in which exactly the members of SSS participate.

In Lean these are IsPotential, IsPotentialGame, Solution, IsEfficient, shapleyOn, joiners (S(ε)S(\varepsilon)S(ε)), profileOf (εS\varepsilon_SεS​) and participationPayoff, all in the namespace MondererShapley.Participation.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.1 (p. 137)

For every efficient solution ψ\psiψ, every c∈RNc \in \mathbb R^Nc∈RN and every v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N),

ψ(vS)(i)=φi(vS)  ∀S⊆N, ∀i∈S⟺Γ(ψ,c,v) is a potential game.\psi(v_S)(i) = \varphi_i(v_S)\ \ \forall S \subseteq N,\ \forall i \in S \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \Gamma(\psi, c, v)\ \text{is a potential game}.ψ(vS​)(i)=φi​(vS​)  ∀S⊆N, ∀i∈S⟺Γ(ψ,c,v) is a potential game.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 6.1, p. 137)

  1. (6.1) For every iii and ε\varepsilonε, with S={j≠i:εj=1}S = \{j \ne i : \varepsilon^j = 1\}S={j=i:εj=1},
ui(ε−i,1)−ui(ε−i,0)=ψ(vS∪{i})(i)−ci.u^i(\varepsilon^{-i}, 1) - u^i(\varepsilon^{-i}, 0) = \psi(v_{S \cup \{i\}})(i) - c^i.ui(ε−i,1)−ui(ε−i,0)=ψ(vS∪{i}​)(i)−ci.
  1. (6.2) Γ(ψ,c,v)\Gamma(\psi, c, v)Γ(ψ,c,v) is a potential game iff there is Q:Y→RQ : Y \to \mathbb RQ:Y→R with Q(εS)−Q(εS∖{i})=ψ(vS∪{i})(i)−ciQ(\varepsilon_S) - Q(\varepsilon_{S \setminus \{i\}}) = \psi(v_{S\cup\{i\}})(i) - c^iQ(εS​)−Q(εS∖{i}​)=ψ(vS∪{i}​)(i)−ci for every SSS and i∈Si \in Si∈S.
  2. (6.3) With P(εS)=Q(εS)+∑i∈SciP(\varepsilon_S) = Q(\varepsilon_S) + \sum_{i \in S} c^iP(εS​)=Q(εS​)+∑i∈S​ci, QQQ satisfies (6.2) iff P(εS)−P(εS∖{i})=ψ(vS∪{i})(i)P(\varepsilon_S) - P(\varepsilon_{S\setminus\{i\}}) = \psi(v_{S\cup\{i\}})(i)P(εS​)−P(εS∖{i}​)=ψ(vS∪{i}​)(i) for every SSS and i∈Si \in Si∈S.
  3. The last step of the proof. For efficient ψ\psiψ and v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N), a function PPP on coalitions satisfying (6.3) exists iff ψ(vS)(i)=φi(vS)\psi(v_S)(i) = \varphi_i(v_S)ψ(vS​)(i)=φi​(vS​) for all SSS and i∈Si \in Si∈S. The paper obtains this from Theorem A of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989); that theorem is not a result of this paper.

Further: Theorem 6.2 (p. 137)

An efficient ψ\psiψ is the Shapley value on all of G=⋃SG(S)G = \bigcup_S G(S)G=⋃S​G(S) iff Γ(ψ,c,v)\Gamma(\psi, c, v)Γ(ψ,c,v) is a potential game for every v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N).

Significance

Theorem 6.1 is a local characterisation: for a single game vvv it identifies the Shapley value of all subgames of vvv through a property of one non-cooperative game, for any outside options ccc. Theorem 6.2 turns it into a global axiomatisation of the Shapley value among efficient solutions, with "every participation game has a potential" in place of the usual symmetry, null-player and additivity axioms. It links the cooperative potential of Hart and Mas-Colell to the strategic potentials of Monderer and Shapley, and through the latter to the existence of pure equilibria and the convergence of improvement dynamics in the participation games.

Both theorems are proved in the paper, on the basis of Hart and Mas-Colell's Theorem A. To the curators' knowledge no machine-checked proof exists: neither the Hart–Mas-Colell potential nor its identification with the Shapley value of subgames is formalized on Prove2Me or in Mathlib. A complete development therefore formalizes the paper's reduction (milestones 1–3) and, as its substantial part, the Hart–Mas-Colell characterisation (milestone 4), which is reusable for any later work on cooperative potentials, consistency and the Shapley value.

Difficulty

Milestones 1–3 are bookkeeping on profiles in {0,1}N\{0,1\}^N{0,1}N; the obstacle is the identification of the potential of a game on {0,1}N\{0,1\}^N{0,1}N with a function of coalitions, which is a translation between two indexings rather than an idea. The substance is milestone 4, which is Hart and Mas-Colell's Theorem A specialised to the subgames vSv_SvS​. The condition (6.3) speaks of marginal differences of an unknown function on coalitions, while the Shapley value is a closed weighted sum over subsets of SSS whose weights depend on ∣S∣|S|∣S∣; relating the two requires a genuine combinatorial identity over the subset lattice of every coalition, in both directions, and efficiency of ψ\psiψ on every subgame is used essentially. Unfolding the definitions does not suffice for either direction.

Formalization scope

  • Players are a finite type ι with decidable equality; the strategy set {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} is Bool (false = 0, true = 1). (ε−i,x)(\varepsilon^{-i}, x)(ε−i,x) is Function.update ε i x.
  • A coalition is a Finset ι; a TU game is w : Finset ι → ℝ, with "w∈G(S)w \in G(S)w∈G(S)" encoded as w ∅ = 0 and only the values on subsets of SSS meant. A solution is ψ : Finset ι → (Finset ι → ℝ) → ι → ℝ, ψ S w standing for ψ(w∣2S)\psi(w|_{2^S})ψ(w∣2S​); only the coordinates i∈Si \in Si∈S are read. This admits solutions that look at values of w outside 2S2^S2S, so the Lean statements cover every solution of the paper and more; "ψ\psiψ is the Shapley value on {vS}\{v_S\}{vS​}" is ∀ S, ∀ i ∈ S, ψ S v i = shapleyOn S v i.
  • Efficiency is required for every coalition and every game, not only for vvv, as in the paper.
  • The Shapley value formula shapleyOn is supplied: the paper uses the Shapley value without defining it. Its weights use ∣S∣|S|∣S∣, the size of the subgame's player set.
  • The page writes ψ(vS∪{i})\psi(v_{S\cup\{i\}})ψ(vS∪{i}​) with i∈Si \in Si∈S in (6.2) and (6.3); this equals ψ(vS)\psi(v_S)ψ(vS​) and is kept literally. The PPP of (6.3) is stated as a function of coalitions, P(S)P(S)P(S) for the page's P(εS)P(\varepsilon_S)P(εS​).
  • The outside options ccc are arbitrary reals; no sign or normalisation is assumed.
  • Trivializations ruled out: ψ\psiψ is an arbitrary efficient solution, never replaced by the Shapley value itself; v ∅ = 0 is kept as the meaning of v∈G(N)v \in G(N)v∈G(N) (without it, efficiency does not constrain ψ S v); and the potential is an exact potential on all of {0,1}N\{0,1\}^N{0,1}N, not only on profiles of a special form.
  • Welcome contributions: a general Hart–Mas-Colell potential for TU games, with its uniqueness and its identification with the Shapley value, stated so that it applies to subgames; proofs of milestones 1–3; Theorem 6.2 from Theorem 6.1.
  • Not included: Theorem 6.3 (weighted Shapley values), for which the paper gives no proof and does not define the weighted value.

Selected references

  • D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14 (1996), 124–143. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
  • S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, Potential, Value, and Consistency, Econometrica 57 (1989), 589–614. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911054
  • L. S. Shapley, A Value for n-Person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, Princeton University Press (1953), 307–317. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-018
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonlinear Proximal Point Algorithms Using Bregman Functions, with Applications to Convex Programming 5: Nonquadratic Proximal Methods of Multipliers Converge to a Saddle PointResearch Paper

Motivation

The method of multipliers (augmented Lagrangian method) solves a constrained convex program by alternating an unconstrained minimization in the primal variables with an explicit update of the Lagrange multipliers. Rockafellar showed in 1976 that the classical quadratic version is the proximal point algorithm applied to the dual problem, and that a variant which also adds a proximal term in the primal variables, the proximal method of multipliers, is the proximal point algorithm applied to the saddle operator of the Lagrangian (Rockafellar 1976, Math. Oper. Res.). The primal proximal term makes each subproblem strictly convex, so its minimizer is unique, and the theory gives convergence of the primal and dual iterates together.

Penalty functions other than the quadratic one, such as the exponential multiplier method, were used in practice and studied by Bertsekas, Kort and Tseng, but their convergence theory was separate from the proximal point framework. Eckstein's 1993 paper (Math. Oper. Res. 18(1), 202–226) replaces the squared distance in the proximal point algorithm by the D-function of a Bregman function. Its §5 obtains the first nonquadratic generalization of the proximal method of multipliers and proves that it converges to a saddle point. This mission formalizes that theorem, Theorem 8.

  • 1967: Bregman introduces D-functions for convex feasibility (Bregman 1967).
  • 1976: Rockafellar proves convergence of the quadratic method of multipliers and the proximal method of multipliers via the proximal point algorithm.
  • 1990–1992: Censor and Zenios propose the proximal minimization algorithm with D-functions.
  • 1993: Eckstein proves convergence of the Bregman proximal point algorithm for maximal monotone operators (Theorem 1) and derives nonquadratic multiplier methods (Theorems 6–8).

Setting

A convex program of the form (10) is

min⁡f(x)subject togi(x)≤0 (i=1,…,m), x∈C,\min f(x)\quad\text{subject to}\quad g_i(x)\le0\ (i=1,\dots,m),\ x\in C,minf(x)subject togi​(x)≤0 (i=1,…,m), x∈C,

where C⊆RnC\subseteq\mathbb R^nC⊆Rn is closed, nonempty and convex, and f,g1,…,gm:Rn→(−∞,+∞]f,g_1,\dots,g_m:\mathbb R^n\to(-\infty,+\infty]f,g1​,…,gm​:Rn→(−∞,+∞] are proper lower semicontinuous convex functions, finite on CCC. Write g(x)=(g1(x),…,gm(x))g(x)=(g_1(x),\dots,g_m(x))g(x)=(g1​(x),…,gm​(x)) and Ω+‾={p∈Rm:p≥0}\overline{\Omega^+}=\{p\in\mathbb R^m:p\ge0\}Ω+={p∈Rm:p≥0}. The Lagrangian is l(x,p)=f(x)+∑ipigi(x)l(x,p)=f(x)+\sum_ip_ig_i(x)l(x,p)=f(x)+∑i​pi​gi​(x) for x∈Cx\in Cx∈C, p≥0p\ge0p≥0; l(x,p)=−∞l(x,p)=-\inftyl(x,p)=−∞ for x∈Cx\in Cx∈C, p≱0p\not\ge0p≥0; l(x,p)=+∞l(x,p)=+\inftyl(x,p)=+∞ for x∉Cx\notin Cx∈/C. A saddle pair (x∗,p∗)(x^*,p^*)(x∗,p∗) satisfies l(x∗,p)≤l(x∗,p∗)≤l(x,p∗)l(x^*,p)\le l(x^*,p^*)\le l(x,p^*)l(x∗,p)≤l(x∗,p∗)≤l(x,p∗) for all x,px,px,p; the paper calls these optimal solution–Lagrange multiplier pairs. The saddle operator on Rn+m\mathbb R^{n+m}Rn+m is K(x,p)=∂xl(x,p)×(−∂^pl(x,p))K(x,p)=\partial_xl(x,p)\times(-\hat\partial_pl(x,p))K(x,p)=∂x​l(x,p)×(−∂^p​l(x,p)), where ∂x\partial_x∂x​ is the subdifferential of the convex function l(⋅,p)l(\cdot,p)l(⋅,p) and ∂^p\hat\partial_p∂^p​ the set of supergradients of the concave function l(x,⋅)l(x,\cdot)l(x,⋅).

For a differentiable hhh, the D-function is Dh(x,y)=h(x)−h(y)−⟨∇h(y),x−y⟩D_h(x,y)=h(x)-h(y)-\langle\nabla h(y),x-y\rangleDh​(x,y)=h(x)−h(y)−⟨∇h(y),x−y⟩. A Bregman function with open zone SSS is a function h:S‾→Rh:\overline S\to\mathbb Rh:S→R, continuously differentiable on SSS, strictly convex and continuous on S‾\overline SS, whose partial level sets of DhD_hDh​ are bounded, and which satisfies two sequential conditions relating Dh→0D_h\to0Dh​→0 to convergence (Definition 1). For h:Rm→Rh:\mathbb R^m\to\mathbb Rh:Rm→R, the monotone conjugate is h∗+(z)=sup⁡p≥0{⟨p,z⟩−h(p)}h^{*+}(z)=\sup_{p\ge0}\{\langle p,z\rangle-h(p)\}h∗+(z)=supp≥0​{⟨p,z⟩−h(p)}.

Given Bregman functions hxh_xhx​ on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and hph_php​ on Rm\mathbb R^mRm and step sizes ck>0c_k>0ck​>0, the nonquadratic proximal method of multipliers (12) is

xk+1=arg⁡min⁡x∈C{f(x)+1ckhp∗+(∇hp(pk)+ckg(x))+1ckDhx(x,xk)},pk+1=∇hp∗+(∇hp(pk)+ckg(xk+1)).x^{k+1}=\arg\min_{x\in C}\Big\{f(x)+\tfrac1{c_k}h_p^{*+}\big(\nabla h_p(p^k)+c_kg(x)\big)+\tfrac1{c_k}D_{h_x}(x,x^k)\Big\},\qquad p^{k+1}=\nabla h_p^{*+}\big(\nabla h_p(p^k)+c_kg(x^{k+1})\big).xk+1=argx∈Cmin​{f(x)+ck​1​hp∗+​(∇hp​(pk)+ck​g(x))+ck​1​Dhx​​(x,xk)},pk+1=∇hp∗+​(∇hp​(pk)+ck​g(xk+1)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8

Assume ckc_kck​ positive and bounded away from zero, hxh_xhx​ a Bregman function with zone Sx⊇CS_x\supseteq CSx​⊇C, hph_php​ a Bregman function with zone Sp⊇Ω+‾S_p\supseteq\overline{\Omega^+}Sp​⊇Ω+ and im⁡∇hp=Rm\operatorname{im}\nabla h_p=\mathbb R^mim∇hp​=Rm, and {(xk,pk)}\{(x^k,p^k)\}{(xk,pk)} conforming to (12). Then

∃ saddle pair ⟹ (xk,pk)→(x∗,p∗) for some saddle pair (x∗,p∗),\exists\text{ saddle pair}\ \Longrightarrow\ (x^k,p^k)\to(x^*,p^*)\ \text{for some saddle pair }(x^*,p^*),∃ saddle pair ⟹ (xk,pk)→(x∗,p∗) for some saddle pair (x∗,p∗), ∄ saddle pair ⟹ {xk} or {pk} is unbounded.\nexists\text{ saddle pair}\ \Longrightarrow\ \{x^k\}\text{ or }\{p^k\}\text{ is unbounded}.∄ saddle pair ⟹ {xk} or {pk} is unbounded.

Existence clause

For the same step-size assumption, if in addition im⁡∇hx=Rn\operatorname{im}\nabla h_x=\mathbb R^nim∇hx​=Rn, a sequence conforming to (12) exists from every (x0,p0)∈C×Ω+‾(x^0,p^0)\in C\times\overline{\Omega^+}(x0,p0)∈C×Ω+. This is the third sentence of Theorem 8, stated as a separate item.

Milestones

Lemma 2 (four descriptions of h∗+h^{*+}h∗+, monotonicity), Lemma 3 (h∗+h^{*+}h∗+ finite and differentiable), Lemma A4 (a subdifferential chain rule), (14) (the xxx-step is a Bregman proximal step on ∂xl\partial_xl∂x​l), the formula ∂^pl(x,p)={g(x)}−∂δ+(p)\hat\partial_pl(x,p)=\{g(x)\}-\partial\delta^+(p)∂^p​l(x,p)={g(x)}−∂δ+(p), maximal monotonicity of KKK, saddle pairs === zeros of KKK, hx⊕hph_x\oplus h_phx​⊕hp​ is a Bregman function with zone Sx×Sp⊇dom⁡K‾S_x\times S_p\supseteq\overline{\operatorname{dom}K}Sx​×Sp​⊇domK, the identity (13), Theorem 1 restated on Rn+m\mathbb R^{n+m}Rn+m, Theorem 4 restated, and the existence clause.

Significance

Theorem 8 gives a family of primal–dual methods for convex programs, parametrized by two Bregman functions, each with the convergence guarantee of the quadratic proximal method of multipliers: convergence of both sequences to a saddle point when one exists, and divergence otherwise. Choosing hph_php​ to match the orthant (for instance entropy-like functions) yields exponential-type multiplier updates, and choosing hxh_xhx​ to match CCC adapts the primal regularization to the feasible set. The uniqueness of the primal minimizer, which the dual method of §4.2 lacks, is what allows convergence of the primal iterates without further assumptions.

The result is proved in the paper, with some steps asserted rather than proved (that hx⊕hph_x\oplus h_phx​⊕hp​ is a Bregman function; the maximality of KKK, cited from Rockafellar). No machine-checked proof of Theorem 8, of Theorem 1, or of the monotone-conjugate lemmas is known. A formalization would check the reduction of (12) to (13) carefully, including the extended-value conventions of the Lagrangian, and would provide reusable statements about Bregman functions on product spaces and about saddle operators of convex programs.

Difficulty

The reduction of Theorem 8 to Theorem 1 is short on the page but uses several nontrivial facts. The xxx-step is a constrained minimization of a composite function; turning its optimality condition into the inclusion (14) in ∂xl(xk+1,pk+1)\partial_xl(x^{k+1},p^{k+1})∂x​l(xk+1,pk+1) needs a chain rule for a nondecreasing differentiable outer function composed with extended-valued convex functions (Lemma A4), together with properties of the monotone conjugate (Lemmas 2 and 3) that rest on recession arguments in the Appendix. The ppp-step requires identifying ∂[hp∗+]∗\partial[h_p^{*+}]^*∂[hp∗+​]∗ with ∇hp+∂δ+\nabla h_p+\partial\delta^+∇hp​+∂δ+, which uses Sp⊇Ω+‾S_p\supseteq\overline{\Omega^+}Sp​⊇Ω+. Maximal monotonicity of KKK is a theorem about closed saddle functions, not a consequence of monotonicity alone. Theorem 1 itself is the main theorem of the paper and depends on all six conditions of Definition 1.

A natural first idea, applying Theorem 1 to KKK directly with an arbitrary Bregman function on Rn+m\mathbb R^{n+m}Rn+m, does not describe (12): the method is the specific instance h=hx⊕hph=h_x\oplus h_ph=hx​⊕hp​, and the identification of its steps with (∇h+ckK)−1(\nabla h+c_kK)^{-1}(∇h+ck​K)−1 is the content of (13).

Formalization scope

  • Rk\mathbb R^kRk is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin k); Rn+m\mathbb R^{n+m}Rn+m is WithLp 2 (E n × E m), which carries the Euclidean inner product. The §2 objects (Bregman function, DhD_hDh​, runs of (3) written through the equivalent inclusion (4)) are defined over any finite-dimensional real inner product space so that Theorem 1 applies on Rn+m\mathbb R^{n+m}Rn+m.
  • Extended-real functions are EReal-valued; properness, convexity (of the epigraph) and subgradients use published definitions. hp∗+h_p^{*+}hp∗+​ is EReal-valued; the recursion (12) uses its real value and the gradient of that real function, which is exact because Lemma 3, a milestone, proves finiteness and differentiability.
  • "Optimal solution–Lagrange multiplier pair" is the saddle inequality, as identified on p. 220. "Converges to one" means both sequences converge, to the two components of one saddle pair; "unbounded" means the range is not bounded.
  • The xxx-step is a minimality predicate over CCC rather than arg⁡min⁡\arg\minargmin (equivalent; the minimizer is unique). A run requires x0∈Sxx^0\in S_xx0∈Sx​, not x0∈Cx^0\in Cx0∈C, and pk∈Spp^k\in S_ppk∈Sp​, so that every gradient in (12) is defined.
  • Corrected typos: the page's "Sp⊃Ω+‾S_p\supset\overline{\Omega^+}Sp​⊃Ω+" is read as ⊇\supseteq⊇; in Lemma A4, "Lemma 5" is Lemma 2 and "f(x)∈Rnf(x)\in\mathbb R^nf(x)∈Rn" is Rm\mathbb R^mRm; Theorem 1's "monontone" is monotone; the supergradient formula's "δ+(p)\delta^+(p)δ+(p)" denotes ∂δ+(p)\partial\delta^+(p)∂δ+(p); the existence clause's extra parenthesis is dropped. In Lemma A4 a term yi∂fi(x0)y_i\partial f_i(x^0)yi​∂fi​(x0) with yi=0y_i=0yi​=0 is {0}\{0\}{0}, following the proof.
  • The §4.2 assumption that the dual functional is not everywhere −∞-\infty−∞ is not assumed; §5 does not use it.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal's hypotheses are satisfiable (with hx=hp=12∥⋅∥2h_x=h_p=\frac12\|\cdot\|^2hx​=hp​=21​∥⋅∥2, C=RC=\mathbb RC=R, f(x)=x2f(x)=x^2f(x)=x2, g1(x)=x−1g_1(x)=x-1g1​(x)=x−1 there is a saddle pair, checked in Lean), h∗+h^{*+}h∗+ is not replaced by a real supremum with junk values, and the saddle predicate quantifies over all of Rn×Rm\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^mRn×Rm.
  • Infrastructure a full development needs: Bregman functions on products, the monotone conjugate and its smoothness, a subdifferential sum and chain rule for extended-valued functions, maximal monotonicity of saddle operators, and Theorem 1. The monotone conjugate lemmas and Theorem 1 are shared with the companion missions of this series. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, including proofs of the restated Theorems 1 and 4 independent of the companion missions.

Selected references

  • J. Eckstein, Nonlinear proximal point algorithms using Bregman functions, with applications to convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 18(1), 1993, 202–226. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.1.202
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Augmented Lagrangians and applications of the proximal point algorithm in convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 1(2), 1976, 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.2.97
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
  • L. M. Bregman, The relaxation method of finding the common point of convex sets and its application to the solution of problems in convex programming, USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics 7(3), 1967, 200–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/0041-5553(67)90040-7
  • Y. Censor and S. A. Zenios, Proximal minimization algorithm with D-functions, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 73(3), 1992, 451–464. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00940051
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management 3: Under Box Uncertainty, Worst-Case CVaR Minimization (16)–(20) Is Equivalent to the Linear Program (24)–(30)Research Paper

Motivation

Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) is the expected loss in the worst (1−β)(1-\beta)(1−β) fraction of outcomes. Rockafellar and Uryasev showed that, for a finite set of scenarios, minimizing CVaR is a linear program whenever the loss is linear in the decision (Rockafellar–Uryasev 2000; 2002). That linear program needs the scenario probabilities, and in practice they are estimates. Zhu and Fukushima (2009) replace the single distribution by a set of distributions and minimize the worst-case CVaR over that set. The resulting problem, (16)–(20) below, contains a maximization over distributions inside a constraint, which no standard solver accepts directly.

This mission treats the first of the two cases the paper works out explicitly: the scenario probabilities are only known to lie in a box around a nominal distribution. Proposition 2 of the paper shows that the worst-case problem is then equivalent to a single problem, (24)–(30), with finitely many explicit constraints. The tool is linear programming duality applied to the inner maximization.

Setting

A decision x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn is chosen from a set X⊆Rn\mathcal X \subseteq \mathbb R^nX⊆Rn. The random vector takes one of SSS values y[1],…,y[S]∈Rmy_{[1]}, \dots, y_{[S]} \in \mathbb R^my[1]​,…,y[S]​∈Rm, and f(x,y)f(x, y)f(x,y) is the loss of decision xxx in outcome yyy. A distribution over the scenarios is a vector π∈RS\pi \in \mathbb R^Sπ∈RS. Vectors are compared componentwise, eee is the all-ones vector, and β∈(0,1)\beta \in (0,1)β∈(0,1) is the confidence level.

The box uncertainty set (21) is built from a nominal distribution π0\pi^0π0 and bounds η‾,η‾∈RS\underline\eta, \overline\eta \in \mathbb R^Sη​,η​∈RS:

PπB={π:π=π0+η, e⊤η=0, η‾≤η≤η‾}.\mathcal P_\pi^B = \{\pi : \pi = \pi^0 + \eta,\ e^\top\eta = 0,\ \underline\eta \le \eta \le \overline\eta\}.PπB​={π:π=π0+η, e⊤η=0, η​≤η≤η​}.

Problem (16)–(20) minimizes θ\thetaθ over (x,u,α,θ)∈Rn×RS×R×R(x, u, \alpha, \theta) \in \mathbb R^n \times \mathbb R^S \times \mathbb R \times \mathbb R(x,u,α,θ)∈Rn×RS×R×R subject to

x∈X,max⁡π∈PπBα+11−βπ⊤u≤θ,uk≥f(x,y[k])−α,uk≥0 (k=1,…,S).x \in \mathcal X,\qquad \max_{\pi \in \mathcal P_\pi^B} \alpha + \tfrac{1}{1-\beta}\pi^\top u \le \theta,\qquad u_k \ge f(x, y_{[k]}) - \alpha,\quad u_k \ge 0\ (k = 1, \dots, S).x∈X,π∈PπB​max​α+1−β1​π⊤u≤θ,uk​≥f(x,y[k]​)−α,uk​≥0 (k=1,…,S).

By Theorem 2 of the paper its optimal value is the minimum of the worst-case CVaR over X\mathcal XX.

For fixed uuu, the worst case over the box involves the linear program (22) and its dual (23):

γ∗(u)=max⁡η{u⊤η:e⊤η=0, η‾≤η≤η‾},min⁡(z,ξ,ω){η‾⊤ξ+η‾⊤ω:ez+ξ+ω=u, ξ≥0, ω≤0}.\gamma^*(u) = \max_{\eta}\{u^\top\eta : e^\top\eta = 0,\ \underline\eta \le \eta \le \overline\eta\},\qquad \min_{(z,\xi,\omega)}\{\overline\eta^\top\xi + \underline\eta^\top\omega : e z + \xi + \omega = u,\ \xi \ge 0,\ \omega \le 0\}.γ∗(u)=ηmax​{u⊤η:e⊤η=0, η​≤η≤η​},(z,ξ,ω)min​{η​⊤ξ+η​⊤ω:ez+ξ+ω=u, ξ≥0, ω≤0}.

Problem (24)–(30) minimizes θ\thetaθ over (x,u,z,ξ,ω,α,θ)(x, u, z, \xi, \omega, \alpha, \theta)(x,u,z,ξ,ω,α,θ) subject to x∈Xx \in \mathcal Xx∈X,

α+11−β(π0)⊤u+11−β(η‾⊤ξ+η‾⊤ω)≤θ,ez+ξ+ω=u,ξ≥0,ω≤0,\alpha + \tfrac{1}{1-\beta}(\pi^0)^\top u + \tfrac{1}{1-\beta}(\overline\eta^\top\xi + \underline\eta^\top\omega) \le \theta,\qquad e z + \xi + \omega = u,\quad \xi \ge 0,\quad \omega \le 0,α+1−β1​(π0)⊤u+1−β1​(η​⊤ξ+η​⊤ω)≤θ,ez+ξ+ω=u,ξ≥0,ω≤0,

and the same constraints uk≥f(x,y[k])−αu_k \ge f(x, y_{[k]}) - \alphauk​≥f(x,y[k]​)−α, uk≥0u_k \ge 0uk​≥0. A point solves a problem when it is feasible and no feasible point has a smaller θ\thetaθ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 1159)

  1. If (x∗,u∗,z∗,ξ∗,ω∗,α∗,θ∗)(x^*, u^*, z^*, \xi^*, \omega^*, \alpha^*, \theta^*)(x∗,u∗,z∗,ξ∗,ω∗,α∗,θ∗) solves (24)–(30), then (x∗,u∗,α∗,θ∗)(x^*, u^*, \alpha^*, \theta^*)(x∗,u∗,α∗,θ∗) solves (16)–(20).
  2. If (x~∗,u~∗,α~∗,θ~∗)(\tilde x^*, \tilde u^*, \tilde\alpha^*, \tilde\theta^*)(x~∗,u~∗,α~∗,θ~∗) solves (16)–(20) and (z~∗,ξ~∗,ω~∗)(\tilde z^*, \tilde\xi^*, \tilde\omega^*)(z~∗,ξ~​∗,ω~∗) is an optimal solution of (23) with u=u~∗u = \tilde u^*u=u~∗, then (x~∗,u~∗,z~∗,ξ~∗,ω~∗,α~∗,θ~∗)(\tilde x^*, \tilde u^*, \tilde z^*, \tilde\xi^*, \tilde\omega^*, \tilde\alpha^*, \tilde\theta^*)(x~∗,u~∗,z~∗,ξ~​∗,ω~∗,α~∗,θ~∗) solves (24)–(30).
  3. In the situation of 2, an optimal solution of (23) exists.

Milestones, in the order the paper's argument uses them

  • The decomposition before (22) (p. 1159): if (22) is feasible, then
max⁡π∈PπBα+11−βπ⊤u=α+11−β(π0)⊤u+γ∗(u)1−β,\max_{\pi \in \mathcal P_\pi^B} \alpha + \tfrac{1}{1-\beta}\pi^\top u = \alpha + \tfrac{1}{1-\beta}(\pi^0)^\top u + \tfrac{\gamma^*(u)}{1-\beta},π∈PπB​max​α+1−β1​π⊤u=α+1−β1​(π0)⊤u+1−βγ∗(u)​,

and both maxima are attained.

  • Weak duality for (22)–(23): u⊤η≤η‾⊤ξ+η‾⊤ωu^\top\eta \le \overline\eta^\top\xi + \underline\eta^\top\omegau⊤η≤η​⊤ξ+η​⊤ω for feasible points of the two programs, hence γ∗(u)≤η‾⊤ξ+η‾⊤ω\gamma^*(u) \le \overline\eta^\top\xi + \underline\eta^\top\omegaγ∗(u)≤η​⊤ξ+η​⊤ω.
  • Strong duality for (22)–(23): if (22) is feasible, (23) has an optimal solution, with value γ∗(u)\gamma^*(u)γ∗(u).
  • Feasibility transfer from (24)–(30) to (16)–(20), by projection.
  • Feasibility transfer from (16)–(20) to (24)–(30), by appending an optimal solution of (23).

Significance

Proposition 2 makes worst-case CVaR minimization under box uncertainty computable with standard software. When fff is linear in xxx and X\mathcal XX is a polyhedron, (24)–(30) is a linear program whose size grows only linearly in SSS, and when fff is convex in xxx and X\mathcal XX is convex it is a convex program. The robust portfolio models of §3 of the paper rest on this reformulation. Setting η‾=η‾=0\underline\eta = \overline\eta = 0η​=η​=0 recovers the Rockafellar–Uryasev linear program (Remark 2 of the paper).

Proposition 2 is proved in the paper. As far as is known, neither it nor the duality pair (22)–(23) has a machine-checked proof; this mission would supply one. The development also exercises LP duality for a specific bounded-variable program, one with a single equality constraint, in a form that can be reused by other robust-optimization reformulations over boxes.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says "replace the max by its dual". Two steps need care. First, the inner maximum is over a polytope that may be empty, and the substitution of (18) by (26)–(28) is correct only when the box is nonempty; it must be shown that an optimal solution of either problem forces the box to be nonempty. Second, the equivalence is a statement about optimal solutions, not feasible ones, so both directions need the comparison of objective values over all feasible points of the other problem. The printed proof assumes in each direction that some optimal solution with a smaller objective exists, where only a feasible one is available; the argument must be run with feasible points. Strong duality for (22)–(23) is a genuine LP duality theorem: Mathlib does not provide it in this form, and it must be derived from a general duality or Farkas-type result.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin S → ℝ and Fin n → ℝ, compared pointwise, with zero-based indices. Dot products are ⬝ᵥ, and e⊤ηe^\top\etae⊤η is ∑ k, η k. Points of the three problems are structures (Var16, Var24, Dual23) with fields named as in the paper. The factor 11−β\frac{1}{1-\beta}1−β1​ is (1 - β)⁻¹, and every theorem assumes 0<β<10 < \beta < 10<β<1.

Committed readings:

  • Constraint (18), printed as "max⁡π∈PπB…≤θ\max_{\pi \in \mathcal P_\pi^B} \ldots \le \thetamaxπ∈PπB​​…≤θ", is stated as "for all π∈PπB\pi \in \mathcal P_\pi^Bπ∈PπB​". The two agree whenever the maximum exists, and the ∀\forall∀ form stays correct on an empty box. A real supremum there would silently become the constraint 0≤θ0 \le \theta0≤θ.
  • γ∗(u)\gamma^*(u)γ∗(u) is a real supremum, and every statement using it assumes (22) feasible.
  • "Solves" means feasible and minimal in θ\thetaθ (IsMinOn). Feasibility alone would make the proposition trivial and is ruled out.
  • Clause 3 of the goal states the existence of an optimal solution of (23). Without it, clause 2 could hold vacuously.
  • No hypothesis is placed on fff, X\mathcal XX, π0\pi^0π0, η‾\underline\etaη​ or η‾\overline\etaη​. The paper intends π0+η‾≥0\pi^0 + \underline\eta \ge 0π0+η​≥0 and π0\pi^0π0 a distribution, but Proposition 2 holds without these assumptions.

Needed infrastructure: LP strong duality for the pair (22)–(23), derivable from Mathlib's Farkas lemma or from LP duality theorems already on the platform; finite sums and dot products. Proofs of the milestones, of the goal from the milestones, and of a general bounded-variable LP duality lemma are all welcome.

Not in scope: the ellipsoidal case (31)–(40), Remark 2, and the portfolio instances of §3.

Selected references

  • S. Zhu, M. Fukushima, Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management, Operations Research 57(5):1155–1168, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0684
  • R. T. Rockafellar, S. Uryasev, Optimization of Conditional Value-at-Risk, Journal of Risk 2:21–41, 2000. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
  • R. T. Rockafellar, S. Uryasev, Conditional Value-at-Risk for General Loss Distributions, Journal of Banking & Finance 26:1443–1471, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00271-6
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust Optimization — Methodology and Applications, Mathematical Programming Ser. B 92:453–480, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/s101070100286
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Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management 2: For a Compact Convex Set of Discrete Distributions, Worst-Case CVaR Equals min_α max_π G_β(x, α, π)Research Paper

Motivation

Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) is the standard coherent measure of tail risk in portfolio selection and risk-averse optimization: for a confidence level β\betaβ it is, roughly, the expected loss in the worst (1−β)(1-\beta)(1−β) fraction of outcomes. Its practical appeal comes from the representation of Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000, 2002), which writes CVaR as the minimum over a scalar threshold α\alphaα of a convex function, so that minimizing CVaR over decisions becomes a single convex (often linear) program.

That representation presupposes that the distribution of the uncertain data is known exactly. In practice the scenario probabilities are estimated, and decisions that are optimal for the estimate can perform poorly under a nearby distribution. Zhu and Fukushima (Oper. Res. 57(5), 2009) study the worst-case CVaR: the largest CVaR over a set of distributions that the decision maker considers plausible. For a finite scenario model they show (Theorem 2) that when the plausible set of probability vectors is compact and convex, the worst-case CVaR again has a min–max representation in the threshold α\alphaα. This is what makes worst-case CVaR minimization tractable: under box uncertainty it becomes a linear program and under ellipsoidal uncertainty a second-order cone program (§2.2.1–2.2.2 of the paper).

Setting

A decision x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn incurs the loss f(x,y)f(x,y)f(x,y), where y∈Rmy \in \mathbb R^my∈Rm is random. In the discrete model yyy takes the finitely many values y[1],…,y[S]y_{[1]},\dots,y_{[S]}y[1]​,…,y[S]​, the scenarios, with probabilities π1,…,πS\pi_1,\dots,\pi_Sπ1​,…,πS​, where πk≥0\pi_k \ge 0πk​≥0 and ∑kπk=1\sum_k \pi_k = 1∑k​πk​=1. Fix a confidence level 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 and write [t]+=max⁡{t,0}[t]^+ = \max\{t,0\}[t]+=max{t,0}. The Rockafellar–Uryasev function for the distribution π\piπ is

Gβ(x,α,π)=α+11−β∑k=1Sπk [f(x,y[k])−α]+,α∈R,G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi) = \alpha + \frac{1}{1-\beta}\sum_{k=1}^S \pi_k\,[f(x,y_{[k]})-\alpha]^+, \qquad \alpha\in\mathbb R,Gβ​(x,α,π)=α+1−β1​k=1∑S​πk​[f(x,y[k]​)−α]+,α∈R,

and the CVaR of the loss at xxx under π\piπ is

CVaRβ(x,π)=min⁡α∈RGβ(x,α,π).\mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x,\pi) = \min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi).CVaRβ​(x,π)=α∈Rmin​Gβ​(x,α,π).

The distribution is not known; it is only known to lie in an ambiguity set Pπ⊆RS\mathcal P_\pi \subseteq \mathbb R^SPπ​⊆RS of probability vectors. The worst-case CVaR at xxx is

WCVaRβ(x)=sup⁡π∈PπCVaRβ(x,π)=sup⁡π∈Pπmin⁡α∈RGβ(x,α,π).\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x) = \sup_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}\mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x,\pi) = \sup_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi).WCVaRβ​(x)=π∈Pπ​sup​CVaRβ​(x,π)=π∈Pπ​sup​α∈Rmin​Gβ​(x,α,π).

In the Lean development these objects are WorstCaseCVaR.Discrete.G, cvar and wcvar, with the scenarios given as ys : Fin S → (Fin m → ℝ) and Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ as a set P of vectors Fin S → ℝ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 1159)

If Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ is a nonempty compact convex set of probability vectors, then for each xxx

WCVaRβ(x)=min⁡α∈Rmax⁡π∈PπGβ(x,α,π),\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x) = \min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}\max_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi),WCVaRβ​(x)=α∈Rmin​π∈Pπ​max​Gβ​(x,α,π),

with the inner maximum attained for every α\alphaα and the outer minimum attained at some α0\alpha_0α0​. The statement fixes no constants and no particular ambiguity set.

Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof, p. 1167)

  1. Gβ(x,α,π)G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi)Gβ​(x,α,π) is convex in α\alphaα for each probability vector π\piπ and affine in π\piπ for each α\alphaα.
  2. There is one nonempty closed bounded interval A\mathcal AA such that, for every π∈Pπ\pi\in\mathcal P_\piπ∈Pπ​, min⁡α∈RGβ(x,α,π)=min⁡α∈AGβ(x,α,π)\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi) = \min_{\alpha\in\mathcal A} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi)minα∈R​Gβ​(x,α,π)=minα∈A​Gβ​(x,α,π).
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 1157, Ky Fan's minimax theorem): for convex–concave, suitably semicontinuous ϕ\phiϕ on a product of nonempty compact convex sets, min⁡xmax⁡yϕ=max⁡ymin⁡xϕ\min_x\max_y\phi = \max_y\min_x\phiminx​maxy​ϕ=maxy​minx​ϕ.
  4. Lemma 1 on A×Pπ\mathcal A\times\mathcal P_\piA×Pπ​: max⁡π∈Pπmin⁡α∈AGβ=min⁡α∈Amax⁡π∈PπGβ\max_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}\min_{\alpha\in\mathcal A}G_\beta = \min_{\alpha\in\mathcal A}\max_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}G_\betamaxπ∈Pπ​​minα∈A​Gβ​=minα∈A​maxπ∈Pπ​​Gβ​.
  5. The min-max inequality inf⁡α∈Rsup⁡π∈PπGβ(x,α,π)≥sup⁡π∈Pπmin⁡α∈RGβ(x,α,π)\inf_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}\sup_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi) \ge \sup_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi)infα∈R​supπ∈Pπ​​Gβ​(x,α,π)≥supπ∈Pπ​​minα∈R​Gβ​(x,α,π).

Significance

Theorem 2 converts a supremum over distributions of a minimum over thresholds into a minimum over thresholds of a worst case of a function that is affine in π\piπ. Minimizing WCVaRβ(x)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)WCVaRβ​(x) over decisions xxx is therefore the single minimization problem (16)–(20) of the paper in the variables (x,u,α,θ)(x,u,\alpha,\theta)(x,u,α,θ), whose only nonstandard constraint is max⁡π∈Pπ(α+11−βπTu)≤θ\max_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}(\alpha+\frac{1}{1-\beta}\pi^Tu)\le\thetamaxπ∈Pπ​​(α+1−β1​πTu)≤θ. For box and ellipsoidal ambiguity sets that constraint is dualized into linear or conic constraints, which gives the robust portfolio models of §§2.2.1–3 of the paper. The same exchange of sup⁡π\sup_\pisupπ​ and min⁡α\min_\alphaminα​ underlies many later distributionally robust CVaR models.

The result is proved in the paper (appendix, p. 1167) and is not open. The mission produces a machine-checked proof of it, which to our knowledge does not exist. Mathlib contains Sion's minimax theorem (Sion.exists_isSaddlePointOn), which covers Lemma 1; what is missing is the CVaR-specific part: the convexity of GβG_\betaGβ​ in α\alphaα, the reduction of the threshold to a compact interval uniform over Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​, and the passage from the compact interval back to all of R\mathbb RR.

Difficulty

The obvious approach applies a minimax theorem directly to GβG_\betaGβ​ on R×Pπ\mathbb R\times\mathcal P_\piR×Pπ​. That fails because R\mathbb RR is not compact, and minimax equalities on a noncompact factor can fail; the threshold must first be confined to a bounded interval, and the interval must work for every π∈Pπ\pi\in\mathcal P_\piπ∈Pπ​ simultaneously. After the exchange on the interval, the minimum over the interval has to be identified with the infimum over all of R\mathbb RR, which needs the min-max inequality on the unrestricted line. A second subtlety is attainment: every "min" and "max" in the statement is a claim that an extremum exists, and in the real-valued formalization each must be exhibited rather than read off from a supremum.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in the Lean statements:

  • Scenarios are indexed zero-based by Fin S; probability vectors are elements of stdSimplex ℝ (Fin S).
  • The confidence level satisfies 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 in every statement (the paper says only that β\betaβ is a confidence level, usually above 0.90.90.9).
  • CVaRβ(x,π)\mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x,\pi)CVaRβ​(x,π) is defined as the paper does for discrete distributions, as the minimum of Gβ(x,⋅,π)G_\beta(x,\cdot,\pi)Gβ​(x,⋅,π), encoded as the real infimum of its values; WCVaRβ(x)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)WCVaRβ​(x) is the real supremum of the image of Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​. Both are true infima and suprema under the hypotheses carried by every theorem.
  • Theorem 2's hypothesis "Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ is a compact convex set" is completed by two standing assumptions of §2.2: Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ consists of probability vectors, and it is nonempty. Without the first, Gβ(x,⋅,π)G_\beta(x,\cdot,\pi)Gβ​(x,⋅,π) can be unbounded below and the real infimum returns a junk value; without the second the supremum is over the empty set.
  • Lemma 1 is stated with lower semicontinuity in xxx and upper semicontinuity in yyy, which the paper omits and which are needed for the extrema to exist; its conclusion is a saddle point, equivalent to the attained min–max equality.
  • In the goal, the right-hand side exhibits an explicit minimizer α0\alpha_0α0​ and the inner maximum is shown to be attained; neither is replaced by a bare infimum or supremum.

No vacuous version of the goal is admissible: the ambiguity set must be nonempty and consist of probability vectors, and the minimum over α\alphaα must be witnessed.

The development needs only finite sums, convexity on R\mathbb RR and on the simplex, compactness of Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ and of closed intervals, and Mathlib's minimax theorem. The reduction to a bounded interval and the min-max inequality are reusable for other finite-scenario CVaR results. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of the goal that avoid the interval reduction.

Selected references

  • S. Zhu and M. Fukushima, Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management, Operations Research 57(5):1155–1168, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0684
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Optimization of Conditional Value-at-Risk, Journal of Risk 2(3):21–41, 2000. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Conditional Value-at-Risk for General Loss Distributions, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7):1443–1471, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00271-6
  • K. Fan, Minimax Theorems, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 39(1):42–47, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.1.42
  • M. Sion, On General Minimax Theorems, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 8(1):171–176, 1958. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management 1: Under Mixture Distribution Uncertainty, Worst-Case CVaR Equals the Minimum over α of max_i F^i_β(x, α)Research Paper

Motivation

Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) is the standard coherent measure of tail risk in portfolio selection, insurance and stochastic programming. Its practical appeal comes from a variational formula of Rockafellar and Uryasev (J. Risk 2000; J. Banking Finance 2002): CVaR at level β\betaβ is the minimum over a scalar α\alphaα of a convex function, so that minimizing CVaR over decisions becomes a single convex program, a linear program when the distribution is given by scenarios.

The formula needs the distribution of the random returns, and in practice that distribution is estimated and uncertain. Zhu and Fukushima (Oper. Res. 57(5), 2009) introduce the worst-case CVaR: the supremum of CVaR over a set P\mathcal PP of candidate distributions. They show it is again a coherent risk measure and that, for several natural choices of P\mathcal PP, minimizing it remains a tractable convex program. This mission formalizes the first of these results, for P\mathcal PP the set of all mixtures of finitely many given distributions, a model used in robust statistics and in finance to describe returns under several market regimes.

Setting

A decision x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn and a random vector y∈Rmy\in\mathbb R^my∈Rm determine a loss f(x,y)∈Rf(x,y)\in\mathbb Rf(x,y)∈R. A confidence level β\betaβ satisfies 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 (in applications β≥0.9\beta\ge0.9β≥0.9). Write [t]+=max⁡{t,0}[t]^+=\max\{t,0\}[t]+=max{t,0}.

For a probability distribution PPP of yyy under which f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) is integrable, the Rockafellar–Uryasev function is

Fβ(x,α)=α+11−β∫Rm[f(x,y)−α]+ dP(y),α∈R,(1)F_\beta(x,\alpha)=\alpha+\frac1{1-\beta}\int_{\mathbb R^m}[f(x,y)-\alpha]^+\,dP(y),\qquad\alpha\in\mathbb R, \tag{1}Fβ​(x,α)=α+1−β1​∫Rm​[f(x,y)−α]+dP(y),α∈R,(1)

and CVaR is its minimum over α\alphaα:

CVaRβ(x)=min⁡α∈RFβ(x,α).(2)\mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x)=\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}F_\beta(x,\alpha). \tag{2}CVaRβ​(x)=α∈Rmin​Fβ​(x,α).(2)

Fix l≥1l\ge1l≥1 likelihood distributions P1,…,PlP^1,\dots,P^lP1,…,Pl on Rm\mathbb R^mRm and let Λ={λ∈Rl:λi≥0, ∑iλi=1}\Lambda=\{\lambda\in\mathbb R^l:\lambda_i\ge0,\ \sum_i\lambda_i=1\}Λ={λ∈Rl:λi​≥0, ∑i​λi​=1} be the probability simplex. The ambiguity set is the set of mixtures

PM={∑i=1lλiPi: λ∈Λ},\mathcal P_M=\Big\{\textstyle\sum_{i=1}^l\lambda_iP^i:\ \lambda\in\Lambda\Big\},PM​={∑i=1l​λi​Pi: λ∈Λ},

and the worst-case CVaR of xxx is

WCVaRβ(x)=sup⁡λ∈Λ CVaRβ(x)  under  ∑iλiPi.(3)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)=\sup_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\ \mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x)\ \text{ under }\ \textstyle\sum_i\lambda_iP^i. \tag{3}WCVaRβ​(x)=λ∈Λsup​ CVaRβ​(x)  under  ∑i​λi​Pi.(3)

Write Fβi(x,α)F^i_\beta(x,\alpha)Fβi​(x,α) for the function (1) with P=PiP=P^iP=Pi, FβL(x,α)=max⁡i∈LFβi(x,α)F^{\mathcal L}_\beta(x,\alpha)=\max_{i\in\mathcal L}F^i_\beta(x,\alpha)FβL​(x,α)=maxi∈L​Fβi​(x,α) with L={1,…,l}\mathcal L=\{1,\dots,l\}L={1,…,l}, and Hβ(x,α,λ)H_\beta(x,\alpha,\lambda)Hβ​(x,α,λ) for the function (1) of the mixture ∑iλiPi\sum_i\lambda_iP^i∑i​λi​Pi.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every xxx with f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) integrable under every PiP^iPi,

WCVaRβ(x)=min⁡α∈R max⁡i∈LFβi(x,α),\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)=\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}\ \max_{i\in\mathcal L}F^i_\beta(x,\alpha),WCVaRβ​(x)=α∈Rmin​ i∈Lmax​Fβi​(x,α),

with the minimum attained. The supremum over infinitely many distributions on the left becomes a minimum of the pointwise maximum of lll functions on the right.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's appendix proof (pp. 1166–1167) in order:

  1. (53): Hβ(x,α,λ)=∑iλiFβi(x,α)H_\beta(x,\alpha,\lambda)=\sum_i\lambda_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)Hβ​(x,α,λ)=∑i​λi​Fβi​(x,α) for λ∈Λ\lambda\in\Lambdaλ∈Λ.
  2. (54): WCVaRβ(x)=max⁡λ∈Λmin⁡αHβ(x,α,λ)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)=\max_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\min_{\alpha}H_\beta(x,\alpha,\lambda)WCVaRβ​(x)=maxλ∈Λ​minα​Hβ​(x,α,λ), both extrema attained.
  3. The minimizer set of Fβ(x,⋅)F_\beta(x,\cdot)Fβ​(x,⋅) is a nonempty closed bounded interval [α‾∗,α‾∗][\underline\alpha^*,\overline\alpha^*][α​∗,α∗].
  4. Minimizers of a nonnegative combination of two convex functions on R\mathbb RR lie between the extreme endpoints of their minimizer intervals.
  5. Every minimizer of Hβ(x,⋅,λ)H_\beta(x,\cdot,\lambda)Hβ​(x,⋅,λ) lies in A=[min⁡iα‾i∗,max⁡iα‾i∗]\mathcal A=[\min_i\underline\alpha^*_i,\max_i\overline\alpha^*_i]A=[mini​α​i∗​,maxi​αi∗​], and the minimum over R\mathbb RR is attained in A\mathcal AA.
  6. Lemma 1, the minimax equality for convex–concave functions on compact convex sets.
  7. (55): max⁡λmin⁡RHβ=max⁡λmin⁡AHβ=min⁡Amax⁡λHβ\max_\lambda\min_{\mathbb R}H_\beta=\max_\lambda\min_{\mathcal A}H_\beta=\min_{\mathcal A}\max_\lambda H_\betamaxλ​minR​Hβ​=maxλ​minA​Hβ​=minA​maxλ​Hβ​.
  8. (56)–(57): WCVaRβ(x)=min⁡α∈Rmax⁡λ∈Λ∑iλiFβi(x,α)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)=\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}\max_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\sum_i\lambda_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)WCVaRβ​(x)=minα∈R​maxλ∈Λ​∑i​λi​Fβi​(x,α).
  9. (58)–(59): max⁡λ∈Λ∑iλiFβi(x,α)=max⁡iFβi(x,α)\max_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\sum_i\lambda_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)=\max_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)maxλ∈Λ​∑i​λi​Fβi​(x,α)=maxi​Fβi​(x,α).

An additional item states Corollary 1: (x∗,α∗)(x^*,\alpha^*)(x∗,α∗) minimizes FβLF^{\mathcal L}_\betaFβL​ over X×R\mathcal X\times\mathbb RX×R exactly when x∗x^*x∗ minimizes WCVaRβ\mathrm{WCVaR}_\betaWCVaRβ​ over X\mathcal XX and α∗\alpha^*α∗ minimizes FβL(x∗,⋅)F^{\mathcal L}_\beta(x^*,\cdot)FβL​(x∗,⋅).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 makes worst-case CVaR under mixture uncertainty no harder to optimize than ordinary CVaR. Since each FβiF^i_\betaFβi​ is jointly convex in (x,α)(x,\alpha)(x,α) when fff is convex in xxx, FβLF^{\mathcal L}_\betaFβL​ is convex, and Corollary 1 turns robust CVaR minimization into one convex program in (x,α)(x,\alpha)(x,α); with sampled scenarios it is a linear program (the paper's (10)–(15)). It is the starting point for the paper's robust portfolio models (§3), whose ambiguity sets are mixtures of a few estimated return distributions.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof contributes a measure-theoretic treatment of the Rockafellar–Uryasev function for arbitrary distributions (the paper argues with densities and appeals to Remark 1 for the general case), a reusable statement that the minimizer set of FβF_\betaFβ​ is a compact interval, and a worked instance of the minimax theorem in Mathlib (Sion) applied to a problem with an unbounded variable.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to exchange sup⁡λ\sup_\lambdasupλ​ and min⁡α\min_\alphaminα​ in sup⁡λmin⁡α∑iλiFβi(x,α)\sup_\lambda\min_\alpha\sum_i\lambda_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)supλ​minα​∑i​λi​Fβi​(x,α), since the function is convex in α\alphaα and affine in λ\lambdaλ. Minimax theorems for this exchange need compactness of one of the two sets, and the variable α\alphaα ranges over all of R\mathbb RR. The step that has to be supplied is a localization: all minimizers in α\alphaα, for every λ\lambdaλ at once, lie in one compact interval A\mathcal AA determined by the minimizer sets of the components. This in turn requires knowing that each Fβi(x,⋅)F^i_\beta(x,\cdot)Fβi​(x,⋅) has a nonempty bounded minimizer set, which uses 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 and integrability of the loss: at β=0\beta=0β=0 the minimizer set can be a half-line and the localization fails. A second point is attainment: the outer supremum over Λ\LambdaΛ is a maximum only because the inner minimum depends continuously on λ\lambdaλ.

Formalization scope

  • Distributions are probability measures on Fin m → ℝ (not densities); Remark 1 of the paper extends all results to general distributions, and a density is a special case. Decisions are Fin n → ℝ, the loss is f : (Fin n → ℝ) → (Fin m → ℝ) → ℝ, and the likelihood distributions are P : Fin l → Measure (Fin m → ℝ) with indices zero-based and [NeZero l].
  • Every theorem assumes 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1, that each PiP^iPi is a probability measure, and that f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) is integrable under each PiP^iPi (the paper's E∣f(x,y)∣<∞E|f(x,y)|<\inftyE∣f(x,y)∣<∞).
  • CVaR is defined by (2) as the infimum of the values of Fβ(x,⋅)F_\beta(x,\cdot)Fβ​(x,⋅); the tail-mean definition and the Rockafellar–Uryasev identity between the two are not part of the mission. The mixture is the finite sum of measures ∑iλiPi\sum_i\lambda_iP^i∑i​λi​Pi, Λ\LambdaΛ is Mathlib's stdSimplex, and WCVaR is the supremum of the image of Λ\LambdaΛ.
  • Every min and max in the paper is stated as attained, with an explicit minimizer or as IsGreatest/IsLeast; no real sInf or sSup is evaluated on an empty or unbounded set, so no statement can hold through Lean's junk value 000.
  • Lemma 1 is stated with lower semicontinuity in xxx and upper semicontinuity in yyy, which the printed statement omits and without which the extrema need not exist.
  • The definitions FβF_\betaFβ​, CVaR, mixture and WCVaR are reusable for any risk-measure development; the interval property of arg⁡min⁡Fβ\arg\min F_\betaargminFβ​ is of independent use. Proofs of any milestone, and lemmas on the Rockafellar–Uryasev function for general measures, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Zhu and M. Fukushima, Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management, Operations Research 57(5):1155–1168, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0684
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Optimization of conditional value-at-risk, Journal of Risk 2(3):21–41, 2000. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7):1443–1471, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00271-6
  • K. Fan, Minimax theorems, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 39(1):42–47, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.1.42
  • P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber and D. Heath, Coherent measures of risk, Mathematical Finance 9(3):203–228, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9965.00068
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research III: Minimum Average Journey Time on Alternative Routes — Equal Marginal Times ε and the Closed Forms (32)–(33)Research Paper

Motivation

J. G. Wardrop's 1952 paper Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research (DOI 10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259) introduced the two criteria that still organise traffic assignment. When a flow of traffic can choose between several routes from one origin to one destination, the paper (p. 345) considers two ways the traffic might divide:

  1. the journey times on all the routes actually used are equal, and less than those that a single vehicle would experience on any unused route;
  2. the average journey time is a minimum.

The first is now called Wardrop's first principle, or user equilibrium: no driver can shorten their trip by switching route. The second, Wardrop's second principle, is the system optimum: it "minimizes the vehicle-hours spent on the journey". The gap between the two is the quantity later studied as the price of anarchy of selfish routing (Roughgarden and Tardos, J. ACM 2002), and the marginal-cost characterisation of the system optimum underlies congestion pricing (Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, 1956).

This mission formalizes the paper's solution of criterion (2) on parallel routes, section (2) Minimum Average Time, pp. 345–347. Mission II of the same series treats criterion (1) on the same model.

Setting

A total additional flow QQQ is divided among DDD alternative routes i=1,…,Di = 1, \dots, Di=1,…,D. Route iii carries an additional flow qiq_iqi​ and has journey time, equation (22),

ti(qi)=bi1−qi/pi,t_i(q_i) = \frac{b_i}{1 - q_i/p_i},ti​(qi​)=1−qi​/pi​bi​​,

where bi>0b_i > 0bi​>0 is the journey time on route iii with no additional flow and pi>0p_i > 0pi​>0 is the additional flow at which its speed would fall to zero (routeTime b p i x). A feasible split of QQQ is a vector qqq with 0≤qi<pi0 \le q_i < p_i0≤qi​<pi​ for every iii and ∑iqi=Q\sum_i q_i = Q∑i​qi​=Q (IsFeasible p Q q).

The number of additional vehicles on route iii at an instant is zi=qitiz_i = q_i t_izi​=qi​ti​, and Z=∑iziZ = \sum_i z_iZ=∑i​zi​ (totalExtra b p q). The average journey time is, equations (25)–(26),

T=∑i=1DqitiQ=ZQT = \sum_{i=1}^D \frac{q_i t_i}{Q} = \frac{Z}{Q}T=i=1∑D​Qqi​ti​​=QZ​

(avgTime b p Q q). Criterion (2) asks for a feasible split qqq with T(q)≤T(z)T(q) \le T(z)T(q)≤T(z) for every feasible split zzz (IsMinAvgTime b p Q q).

The marginal journey time of route iii is d(qiti)/dqid(q_i t_i)/dq_id(qi​ti​)/dqi​, the rate at which ZZZ grows when flow is added to that route. For a threshold ε\varepsilonε, U(ε)={i:bi<ε}U(\varepsilon) = \{i : b_i < \varepsilon\}U(ε)={i:bi​<ε} (usedSet b ε) is the set of routes whose marginal time at zero flow lies below ε\varepsilonε; with the routes labelled so that b1<⋯<bDb_1 < \dots < b_Db1​<⋯<bD​ it is the paper's "first jjj routes".

Formalization targets

Goal: the closed forms (32)–(33)

For bi,pi>0b_i, p_i > 0bi​,pi​>0 and 0<Q<∑ipi0 < Q < \sum_i p_i0<Q<∑i​pi​, every split qqq minimizing TTT admits a threshold ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0 with ∑i∈Upi>Q\sum_{i \in U} p_i > Q∑i∈U​pi​>Q, where U=U(ε)U = U(\varepsilon)U=U(ε), such that

qh={ph{1−(∑i∈Upi−Q)bh∑i∈Upibi},bh<ε,0,otherwise,T=1Q{(∑i∈Upibi)2∑i∈Upi−Q−∑i∈Upibi}.q_h = \begin{cases} p_h\left\{1 - \dfrac{\left(\sum_{i\in U} p_i - Q\right)\sqrt{b_h}}{\sum_{i\in U} p_i\sqrt{b_i}}\right\}, & b_h < \varepsilon,\\[1ex] 0, & \text{otherwise,}\end{cases} \qquad T = \frac1Q\left\{\frac{\left(\sum_{i\in U} p_i\sqrt{b_i}\right)^2}{\sum_{i\in U} p_i - Q} - \sum_{i\in U} p_i b_i\right\}.qh​=⎩⎨⎧​ph​{1−∑i∈U​pi​bi​​(∑i∈U​pi​−Q)bh​​​},0,​bh​<ε,otherwise,​T=Q1​{∑i∈U​pi​−Q(∑i∈U​pi​bi​​)2​−i∈U∑​pi​bi​}.

Milestones

  1. (29)–(30): d(qiti)/dqi=bi/(1−qi/pi)2d(q_i t_i)/dq_i = b_i/(1 - q_i/p_i)^2d(qi​ti​)/dqi​=bi​/(1−qi​/pi​)2, equal to bib_ibi​ at qi=0q_i = 0qi​=0.
  2. (27)–(28): at a minimum, all routes in use have the same marginal time ε\varepsilonε.
  3. A route jjj with bj≥εb_j \ge \varepsilonbj​≥ε is not used.
  4. The routes in use are exactly those with bi<εb_i < \varepsilonbi​<ε, and on them 1−qi/pi=bi/ε1 - q_i/p_i = \sqrt{b_i/\varepsilon}1−qi​/pi​=bi​/ε​.
  5. (31): ∑i∈Upi−Q=∑i∈Upibi/ε\sum_{i\in U} p_i - Q = \sum_{i\in U} p_i\sqrt{b_i/\varepsilon}∑i∈U​pi​−Q=∑i∈U​pi​bi​/ε​.

A companion theorem states that a minimizing split exists whenever 0<Q<∑ipi0 < Q < \sum_i p_i0<Q<∑i​pi​.

Significance

The closed forms give the system-optimal assignment on parallel routes with the travel-time law (22) explicitly: which routes carry traffic, how much, and the resulting average time. Together with the equal-times solution (23)–(24) of mission II they quantify, for this model, how much average time selfish route choice costs; the paper's Fig. 8 compares the two numerically and finds the difference small in its example. The marginal-time conditions (27)–(28) are the parallel-route instance of the general statement that a system optimum is an equilibrium with respect to marginal costs.

The derivation on pp. 346–347 is a first-order argument that the paper does not make rigorous: it assumes a minimizer exists, that it satisfies the stationarity condition, and leaves (32)–(33) to "a few lines of algebra". This mission produces the rigorous version, including existence. No machine-checked statement of (27)–(33) is on the platform; the related platform items on Wardrop equilibria concern the Beckmann potential and atomic congestion games, not the system optimum of this model.

Difficulty

The stationarity condition (27) comes from moving an infinitesimal flow between two routes in use. Turning this into a theorem needs the one-sided version at unused routes, since qj=0q_j = 0qj​=0 is a boundary point and the condition there is an inequality, and needs the constraint ∑iqi=Q\sum_i q_i = Q∑i​qi​=Q to be preserved by the perturbation. The step "only the first jjj routes will be in use" is the converse direction: a route with bi<εb_i < \varepsilonbi​<ε that carries no flow must be shown to contradict minimality, not just to violate the equal-marginals equation.

Existence is not a compactness argument on a closed set: the feasible set is open in the direction qi→piq_i \to p_iqi​→pi​, where qiti→∞q_i t_i \to \inftyqi​ti​→∞, and that coercivity has to be used. The algebra from (31) to (32)–(33) is routine once the set UUU and the value of ε\varepsilonε are fixed.

Formalization scope

Routes are indexed by Fin D; all quantities are real. The standing hypotheses are bi>0b_i > 0bi​>0, pi>0p_i > 0pi​>0, 0<Q0 < Q0<Q and Q<∑ipiQ < \sum_i p_iQ<∑i​pi​; without the last the feasible set is empty and every statement about a minimizer is vacuous, and with Q≤0Q \le 0Q≤0 the average time Z/QZ/QZ/Q is undefined. Feasibility requires qi<piq_i < p_iqi​<pi​, of the minimizer and of every competitor: at qi=piq_i = p_iqi​=pi​ Lean evaluates bi/0b_i/0bi​/0 as 000, which would let a "minimizer" place flow at capacity for free. The paper's labelling b1<⋯<bDb_1 < \dots < b_Db1​<⋯<bD​ is not assumed; "the first jjj routes" is U(ε)U(\varepsilon)U(ε). Marginal times are written in the closed form (29), and milestone 1 identifies that form with the derivative via HasDerivAt. Minimality is stated for TTT, the paper's criterion, not for ZZZ.

Corrected slip. The paper prints the denominator of (33) as ∑i=1jpibi\sum_{i=1}^j p_i b_i∑i=1j​pi​bi​. The formalization uses ∑i=1jpibi\sum_{i=1}^j p_i\sqrt{b_i}∑i=1j​pi​bi​​: from (31), 1/ε=(∑pi−Q)/∑pibi1/\sqrt\varepsilon = (\sum p_i - Q)/\sum p_i\sqrt{b_i}1/ε​=(∑pi​−Q)/∑pi​bi​​, and qh=ph(1−bh/ε)q_h = p_h(1 - \sqrt{b_h/\varepsilon})qh​=ph​(1−bh​/ε​). The printed form is not dimensionally consistent and gives wrong flows, e.g. for b=(4,9)b = (4, 9)b=(4,9), p=(10,10)p = (10, 10)p=(10,10), Q=35/3Q = 35/3Q=35/3. Equation (32) is correct as printed.

The goal cannot be satisfied trivially: the threshold ε\varepsilonε is existential and the flows and TTT are pinned to explicit formulas, and the companion existence theorem shows the hypothesis IsMinAvgTime is met for every admissible QQQ. The route time and feasible split come from the shared WardropTraffic.EqualTimes.Setting definition; this mission adds the total and average time and criterion (2). Proofs of any item, including the existence theorem and a uniqueness statement (the objective is strictly convex), are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, Proc. Instn Civ. Engrs Part II 1 (1952), 325–362. https://doi.org/10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259
  • M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, C. B. Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, Yale University Press, 1956.
  • T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing?, J. ACM 49(2) (2002), 236–259. https://doi.org/10.1145/506147.506153
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem II: Every Equilibrium of Every Choice Mechanism Yields an Incentive-Feasible Allocation, F** = F*Research Paper

Motivation

An arbitrator who must choose among collective options for a group of players usually does not know the players' private characteristics. The arbitrator can only ask, and a player who expects to profit from a false answer may give one. Before designing any procedure, the arbitrator therefore needs to know which expected-payoff allocations can be reached at all once strategic misreporting is taken into account.

Myerson (1979) answers this for Bayesian collective choice problems with finitely many types. Restricting attention to mechanisms that simply ask each player for their type, and that make honest answers optimal, loses nothing: every expected-payoff allocation that any mechanism can produce in equilibrium is already produced honestly by such a direct mechanism, and conversely. This is the revelation principle in the form used throughout Bayesian mechanism design. It is what makes incentive-compatibility constraints the starting point for auction design, bilateral trade, and the bargaining solution in the second half of the same paper.

Timeline. Gibbard (1973) gave the dominant-strategy form of the principle. Rosenthal (Review of Economic Studies, 1978) studied arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty; Myerson notes that Theorem 2 could be derived as a corollary of Rosenthal's Theorem 3. Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) gave general Bayesian implementation results in the same year. Myerson's Theorem 2 states the principle as an equality of interim payoff sets over all finite response sets. Myerson (1982) later extended it to principal–agent problems with moral hazard.

Setting

A Bayesian collective choice problem (C,A1,…,An,U1,…,Un,P)(C,A_1,\dots,A_n,U_1,\dots,U_n,P)(C,A1​,…,An​,U1​,…,Un​,P) has a nonempty finite set of players iii, a nonempty finite set AiA_iAi​ of types for each player, a nonempty finite set CCC of collective choices, utilities Ui(c,α)U_i(c,\alpha)Ui​(c,α) depending on the choice and on the true type profile α=(α1,…,αn)\alpha=(\alpha_1,\dots,\alpha_n)α=(α1​,…,αn​), and a probability distribution PPP on type profiles. With Ri(ai)=∑β:βi=aiP(β)R_i(a_i)=\sum_{\beta:\beta_i=a_i}P(\beta)Ri​(ai​)=∑β:βi​=ai​​P(β) the marginal of type aia_iai​, a player of type aia_iai​ assigns the conditional probability Pi(α∣ai)=P(α)/Ri(ai)P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)=P(\alpha)/R_i(a_i)Pi​(α∣ai​)=P(α)/Ri​(ai​) to profiles with αi=ai\alpha_i=a_iαi​=ai​, and 000 to the others.

A choice mechanism on response sets S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​ (nonempty finite sets of possible answers) is a function π(c∣s)≥0\pi(c\mid s)\ge0π(c∣s)≥0 with ∑cπ(c∣s)=1\sum_{c}\pi(c\mid s)=1∑c​π(c∣s)=1 for every response profile sss. On the standard response sets Si=AiS_i=A_iSi​=Ai​, the payoff of type aia_iai​ who reports bib_ibi​ while the others are honest is

Zi(π,bi∣ai)=∑α∑cPi(α∣ai) π(c∣α−i,bi) Ui(c,α).Z_i(\pi,b_i\mid a_i)=\sum_\alpha\sum_{c}P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)\,\pi(c\mid\alpha_{-i},b_i)\,U_i(c,\alpha).Zi​(π,bi​∣ai​)=α∑​c∑​Pi​(α∣ai​)π(c∣α−i​,bi​)Ui​(c,α).

The mechanism is Bayesian incentive-compatible if Zi(π,ai∣ai)≥Zi(π,bi∣ai)Z_i(\pi,a_i\mid a_i)\ge Z_i(\pi,b_i\mid a_i)Zi​(π,ai​∣ai​)≥Zi​(π,bi​∣ai​) for all i,ai,bii,a_i,b_ii,ai​,bi​. Its honest allocation is the vector V(π)V(\pi)V(π) with coordinates Vi(π∣ai)=Zi(π,ai∣ai)V_i(\pi\mid a_i)=Z_i(\pi,a_i\mid a_i)Vi​(π∣ai​)=Zi​(π,ai​∣ai​), indexed by the disjoint union of the AiA_iAi​. The incentive-feasible set is

F∗={V(π):π a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism on the standard response sets}.F^*=\{V(\pi):\pi\text{ a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism on the standard response sets}\}.F∗={V(π):π a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism on the standard response sets}.

On general response sets, a response plan σi(si∣ai)\sigma_i(s_i\mid a_i)σi​(si​∣ai​) is a probability distribution over SiS_iSi​ for each type aia_iai​. Plans σ=(σ1,…,σn)\sigma=(\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_n)σ=(σ1​,…,σn​) give type aia_iai​ the payoff

Wi(π,σ∣ai)=∑α∑s∑cPi(α∣ai)(∏jσj(sj∣αj))π(c∣s) Ui(c,α).W_i(\pi,\sigma\mid a_i)=\sum_\alpha\sum_s\sum_c P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)\Big(\prod_{j}\sigma_j(s_j\mid\alpha_j)\Big)\pi(c\mid s)\,U_i(c,\alpha).Wi​(π,σ∣ai​)=α∑​s∑​c∑​Pi​(α∣ai​)(j∏​σj​(sj​∣αj​))π(c∣s)Ui​(c,α).

They form a response-plan equilibrium for π\piπ if no type aia_iai​ of any player gains by switching to any other response plan σi′\sigma_i'σi′​. The equilibrium-feasible set F∗∗F^{**}F∗∗ collects W(π,σ)W(\pi,\sigma)W(π,σ) over all choice mechanisms π\piπ, on all nonempty finite response sets, and all response-plan equilibria σ\sigmaσ for π\piπ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

F∗∗=F∗.F^{**}=F^*.F∗∗=F∗.

Both inclusions are asserted for every Bayesian collective choice problem. F∗∗⊆F∗F^{**}\subseteq F^*F∗∗⊆F∗ says equilibrium behaviour under any mechanism can be replicated honestly by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. F∗⊆F∗∗F^*\subseteq F^{**}F∗⊆F∗∗ says honest reporting is itself an equilibrium of every incentive-compatible mechanism.

Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof)

  1. For any choice mechanism π\piπ and response plans σ\sigmaσ, the induced direct mechanism π′(c∣α)=∑sπ(c∣s)∏iσi(si∣αi)\pi'(c\mid\alpha)=\sum_s\pi(c\mid s)\prod_i\sigma_i(s_i\mid\alpha_i)π′(c∣α)=∑s​π(c∣s)∏i​σi​(si​∣αi​) is a choice mechanism and V(π′)=W(π,σ)V(\pi')=W(\pi,\sigma)V(π′)=W(π,σ).
  2. If σ\sigmaσ is a response-plan equilibrium for π\piπ, then π′\pi'π′ is Bayesian incentive-compatible.
  3. If π′\pi'π′ is a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism, the honest plans σi′(bi∣ai)=1[bi=ai]\sigma_i'(b_i\mid a_i)=\mathbf 1[b_i=a_i]σi′​(bi​∣ai​)=1[bi​=ai​] form a response-plan equilibrium for π′\pi'π′, and W(π′,σ′)=V(π′)W(\pi',\sigma')=V(\pi')W(π′,σ′)=V(π′).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 reduces a search over all communication protocols, an unbounded family of response sets and mixed reporting behaviours, to a finite system of linear inequalities in π\piπ on a fixed finite domain. Combined with Theorem 1 of the paper, which shows F∗F^*F∗ is a nonempty compact convex set, it justifies applying a bargaining solution to F∗F^*F∗ rather than to some larger, ill-defined set of attainable outcomes. The same reduction underlies the use of incentive constraints in optimal auctions, bilateral trade and correlated-type mechanism design.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and its proof is short, but it is a statement about all finite response sets at once, and the equality of two sets of payoff vectors is sensitive to the conventions: which plans are allowed as deviations, where the conditioning happens, and whether the induced mechanism is a genuine probability distribution. A machine-checked version pins these down. To our knowledge no formal proof of this finite Bayesian revelation principle exists. The platform has related, unproved items in other models: MechanismDesign.Robust.revelation_principle (Börgers, Prop. 10.2, on a countable Harsanyi type space with PMF lotteries; one inclusion, outcome equivalence) and single-agent, quasi-linear and dominant-strategy revelation principles from the same book. None of them is the statement here.

Difficulty

The mathematics consists of finite sums, but the bookkeeping is the obstacle. Milestone 1 requires exchanging a sum over response profiles with a product over players and using that each plan sums to one. Milestone 2 requires recognizing a lie bib_ibi​ in π′\pi'π′ as a particular whole response plan in π\piπ: the plan that, at every type, behaves as type bib_ibi​ would. Because Pi(α∣ai)P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)Pi​(α∣ai​) vanishes off αi=ai\alpha_i=a_iαi​=ai​, only its value at aia_iai​ matters. For milestone 3, a mixed deviation from honesty has to be bounded by the best pure misreport, a convex-combination argument over AiA_iAi​. Identifying the F∗∗F^{**}F∗∗ side of the goal also needs instances on an existentially chosen family of types.

Formalization scope

All objects live in MyersonBargaining.Revelation. Players form a nonempty finite type ι; types A i, choices C and response sets S i are nonempty finite types in Type. Mechanisms and plans are real-valued functions with the probability constraints as predicates (IsChoiceMechanism, IsResponsePlan), event first and condition second: π c s, σ i s a. Allocation vectors are functions on Σ i, A i. The paper's loose phrases are read as follows:

  • "probability distribution" means nonnegativity and sum one;
  • (3) divides by Ri(ai)R_i(a_i)Ri​(ai​), so the problem requires Ri(ai)>0R_i(a_i)>0Ri​(ai​)>0; individual profiles may have probability zero;
  • the consistent (common-prior) reading of (3)–(4) is formalized, not the subjective reading the paper permits on p. 63;
  • "for every possible alternative response plan" in (14) ranges over all mixed response plans, compared type by type;
  • "π\piπ is a choice mechanism" in (15) ranges over all nonempty finite response sets, with an explicit existential over the family S : ι → Type and its instances;
  • "incentive-compatible mechanism" means a choice mechanism satisfying (6).

The product in (12) is printed with σj(sj∣aj)\sigma_j(s_j\mid a_j)σj​(sj​∣aj​); it is formalized with αj\alpha_jαj​, as the paper's own induced mechanism on p. 66 uses. Milestone 1 is stated for arbitrary response plans, not only for equilibria. Section 6's numerical example is not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out explicitly: fixing Si=AiS_i=A_iSi​=Ai​ in F∗∗F^{**}F∗∗, restricting deviations to pure plans, or stating only F∗∗⊆F∗F^{**}\subseteq F^*F∗∗⊆F∗ would each change the theorem, and none is done.

A complete development needs finite sums over dependent product types (Fintype.piFinset, Finset.prod_univ_sum), Function.update on dependent families, and nothing beyond Mathlib. The two definition modules (the model and the response-plan objects) are reusable by any finite Bayesian mechanism-design formalization. Proofs of any milestone, alternative proofs via Rosenthal's argument, and cleaner restatements as lemmas about stochastic matrices are welcome.

Selected references

  • Roger B. Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47(1), 61–73, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346
  • Robert W. Rosenthal, Arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty, Review of Economic Studies 45(3), 1978 (cited in the source as reference [8], "forthcoming").
  • Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica 41(4), 587–601, 1973. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
  • Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond, Eric Maskin, The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility, Review of Economic Studies 46(2), 185–216, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297045
  • Roger B. Myerson, Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1), 67–81, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Regenerative Stochastic Processes 2: The Ergodic Theorem — a Cumulative Process Satisfies w_t/t → κ₁/μ₁ with Probability OneResearch Paper

Motivation

Many quantities in operations research accumulate over time in a system that periodically starts afresh: the cost incurred by an inventory system that returns to the same stock level, the work completed by a server between successive moments it empties, the reward collected by a machine between repairs. The basic question about such a quantity is its long-run rate: does the amount accumulated by time ttt, divided by ttt, settle down, and to what?

W. L. Smith's 1955 paper Regenerative stochastic processes (DOI 10.1098/rspa.1955.0198) introduced the class of cumulative processes to answer this question, and §5·3 of the paper proves the answer, Theorem 7, which Smith calls "the ergodic theorem": the long-run rate equals the expected accumulation per cycle divided by the expected cycle length. In later textbooks this is the renewal–reward theorem, the standard tool for computing long-run averages of regenerative systems in queueing, inventory and reliability models.

Timeline. Doob (1948) proved the strong law nt/t→1/μ1n_t/t \to 1/\mu_1nt​/t→1/μ1​ for renewal counting processes (Trans. AMS 63). Smith (1955) defined cumulative processes by conditions (C1)–(C2) and proved Theorem 7 under a first-moment condition on the variation per cycle, together with central limit theorems (Theorems 9–10) for the same processes.

Setting

Fix a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, P)(Ω,F,P).

A renewal process is a sequence t1,t2,…t_1, t_2, \dotst1​,t2​,… of independent, identically distributed, non-negative random variables that are not zero with probability one, i.e. P{t1=0}<1P\{t_1 = 0\} < 1P{t1​=0}<1. Write μ1=Et1\mu_1 = E t_1μ1​=Et1​. In this mission the delay is t0=0t_0 = 0t0​=0, the regeneration epochs are Tk=t0+t1+⋯+tkT_k = t_0 + t_1 + \dots + t_kTk​=t0​+t1​+⋯+tk​, and the counting variable

nt=#{k≥0:Tk≤t}n_t = \#\{k \ge 0 : T_k \le t\}nt​=#{k≥0:Tk​≤t}

is the number of regenerations in [0,t][0, t][0,t] (the paper's "greatest integer kkk such that Tk−1≤tT_{k-1} \le tTk−1​≤t"). The forward variable Zt=∑i=1nt+1ti−tZ_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n_t+1} t_i - tZt​=∑i=1nt​+1​ti​−t measures how far ttt is from the regeneration epoch Tnt+1T_{n_t+1}Tnt​+1​.

Let w=(wt)w = (w_t)w=(wt​) be a real-valued process with w0=0w_0 = 0w0​=0. Its cycle increments are yn=wTn−wTn−1y_n = w_{T_n} - w_{T_{n-1}}yn​=wTn​​−wTn−1​​, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, and κ1=Ey1\kappa_1 = E y_1κ1​=Ey1​. On a path of bounded variation on every finite interval, the variation process w~t=∫0t∣dwt∣\tilde w_t = \int_0^t |\mathrm d w_t|w~t​=∫0t​∣dwt​∣ is the total variation of the path over [0,t][0, t][0,t]; the cycle variations are y~n=w~Tn−w~Tn−1\tilde y_n = \tilde w_{T_n} - \tilde w_{T_{n-1}}y~​n​=w~Tn​​−w~Tn−1​​, and κ~p=Ey~1 p\tilde\kappa_p = E \tilde y_1^{\,p}κ~p​=Ey~​1p​.

The process www is a cumulative process when

  • (C1) y1,y2,…y_1, y_2, \dotsy1​,y2​,… are independent and identically distributed, and
  • (C2) with probability one, www is of bounded variation in every finite interval.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (the ergodic theorem)

If www is a cumulative process, μ1<∞\mu_1 < \inftyμ1​<∞, κ~1<∞\tilde\kappa_1 < \inftyκ~1​<∞, t0=0t_0 = 0t0​=0 and w0=0w_0 = 0w0​=0, then

lim⁡t→∞wtt=κ1μ1with probability one.\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{w_t}{t} = \frac{\kappa_1}{\mu_1} \quad \text{with probability one.}t→∞lim​twt​​=μ1​κ1​​with probability one.

The statement fixes no rate and no constant; it is the exact limit of the paper.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Lemma 7. For i.i.d. xnx_nxn​ with E∣xn∣p<∞E|x_n|^p < \inftyE∣xn​∣p<∞, p>0p > 0p>0: xn/n1/p→0x_n / n^{1/p} \to 0xn​/n1/p→0 with probability one.
  2. Renewal strong law (proof of Lemma 8): nt/t→1/μ1n_t / t \to 1/\mu_1nt​/t→1/μ1​ with probability one when μ1<∞\mu_1 < \inftyμ1​<∞.
  3. Lemma 8. If t0=0t_0 = 0t0​=0, μ1<∞\mu_1 < \inftyμ1​<∞ and κ~p<∞\tilde\kappa_p < \inftyκ~p​<∞ (p>0p > 0p>0), then
lim⁡t→∞wt+Zt−wtt1/p=0with probability one.\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{w_{t+Z_t} - w_t}{t^{1/p}} = 0 \quad \text{with probability one.}t→∞lim​t1/pwt+Zt​​−wt​​=0with probability one.
  1. (5·3·4). ∑i=1nt+1yi/(nt+1)→κ1\sum_{i=1}^{n_t+1} y_i / (n_t + 1) \to \kappa_1∑i=1nt​+1​yi​/(nt​+1)→κ1​ with probability one.
  2. The limit along regeneration epochs. wt+Zt/t→κ1/μ1w_{t+Z_t} / t \to \kappa_1/\mu_1wt+Zt​​/t→κ1​/μ1​ with probability one.

Significance

The ergodic theorem turns a question about a whole sample path into a question about one cycle. Once a system is shown to regenerate, its long-run average cost, throughput or utilization is the ratio of two one-cycle expectations, which can often be computed in closed form. This is how long-run averages are evaluated for M/G/1M/G/1M/G/1-type queues, (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) inventory policies and alternating-renewal reliability models, and it is the first step in average-cost analyses of regenerative Markov decision processes. Lemma 8, with p>1p > 1p>1, also controls the error term in Smith's central limit theorem for cumulative processes.

The result is classical and proved. As far as the platform and Mathlib are concerned, it is not formalized: Mathlib has the strong law of large numbers for i.i.d. sequences (ProbabilityTheory.strong_law_ae) but no renewal counting process, no renewal strong law, and no renewal–reward theorem. A complete development gives machine-checked versions of all three, stated for real time and for cycle lengths that may vanish with positive probability.

Difficulty

The obvious argument writes wt/tw_t / twt​/t as (∑i≤ntyi/nt)⋅(nt/t)\big(\sum_{i \le n_t} y_i / n_t\big) \cdot (n_t / t)(∑i≤nt​​yi​/nt​)⋅(nt​/t) and applies the strong law to each factor. This fails in two places. First, wtw_twt​ is not a sum of whole cycles: the cycle containing ttt is only partly completed, and its contribution has to be shown negligible. The increment yny_nyn​ does not control it, because www may oscillate inside a cycle and return; it is the variation y~n\tilde y_ny~​n​ that bounds the partial contribution, which is why the hypothesis is on κ~1\tilde\kappa_1κ~1​ rather than on κ1\kappa_1κ1​. Second, the strong law is a statement about a deterministic index n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞, while here the index ntn_tnt​ is random and depends on the cycle lengths, which need not be independent of the increments. Transferring almost-sure convergence through the random index requires nt→∞n_t \to \inftynt​→∞ almost surely, which in turn uses P{t1=0}<1P\{t_1 = 0\} < 1P{t1​=0}<1.

Formalization scope

Time is real: every limit is along t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ in R\mathbb RR (Filter.atTop on ℝ), and "with probability one" is an almost-everywhere statement placed outside the limit. Random variables are real-valued. The renewal process is the structure IsRenewalProcess (cycle lengths measurable, mutually independent, identically distributed, non-negative everywhere, P{t1=0}<1P\{t_1 = 0\} < 1P{t1​=0}<1); t0=0t_0 = 0t0​=0 and w0=0w_0 = 0w0​=0 are explicit hypotheses holding at every sample point. Moments are Bochner integrals guarded by integrability hypotheses: μ1<∞\mu_1 < \inftyμ1​<∞ is integrability of t1t_1t1​, κ~p<∞\tilde\kappa_p < \inftyκ~p​<∞ is integrability of y~1 p\tilde y_1^{\,p}y~​1p​. The positivity μ1>0\mu_1 > 0μ1​>0 is never assumed; it follows from P{t1=0}<1P\{t_1 = 0\} < 1P{t1​=0}<1.

The count ntn_tnt​ is a cardinality; on the null event where infinitely many epochs lie below ttt it takes the value 000, and finiteness is never assumed. The variation process is Mathlib's eVariationOn of the path over [0,t][0, t][0,t], set to 000 on paths that are not of bounded variation, exactly as the paper prescribes.

Condition (C1) is read literally: only the increments yny_nyn​ are i.i.d., and no independence between cycle lengths and increments is assumed. In addition the cycle variations y~n\tilde y_ny~​n​ are assumed identically distributed; the paper's notation κ~p\tilde\kappa_pκ~p​ presupposes this. The statement is not trivialized by a stronger model: taking www to be a Lévy process, or a deterministic multiple of ttt, would make the theorem immediate and is not what is formalized.

Two misprints of the paper are corrected in the formal statements and kept in the verbatim milestone text: (5·3·4) prints the limit as ν1\nu_1ν1​, which must be κ1\kappa_1κ1​; and the proof bound (5·3·1) uses y~nt+1\tilde y_{n_t+1}y~​nt​+1​ alone, where the interval [t,t+Zt][t, t+Z_t][t,t+Zt​] also meets cycle ntn_tnt​.

Needed infrastructure: a renewal counting process in continuous time with its strong law; a lemma that almost-sure convergence of a sequence passes to a random index tending to infinity; the comparison ∣wb−wa∣≤w~b−w~a|w_b - w_a| \le \tilde w_b - \tilde w_a∣wb​−wa​∣≤w~b​−w~a​ for paths of bounded variation. All three are reusable well beyond this mission (renewal–reward arguments, regenerative simulation, average-cost Markov decision processes). Contributions of any milestone, and of these general lemmas as separate theorems, are welcome.

Selected references

  • W. L. Smith, Regenerative stochastic processes, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A 232(1188):6–31, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1955.0198
  • J. L. Doob, Renewal theory from the point of view of the theory of probability, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 63(3):422–438, 1948. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1948-0025098-8
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Relationship Between Inventory Costs and Variety Benefits in Retail Assortments I: An Optimal Assortment Always Consists of the k Most Popular Variants for Some kResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer deciding which variants of a product to carry (colors, sizes, flavors) trades the extra sales that variety brings against the inventory cost of stocking many low-volume items. van Ryzin and Mahajan (Management Science 45(11), 1999) gave the first model that couples a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model of consumer substitution with newsvendor inventory costs, and showed that the resulting assortment problem has a simple structure. Their paper is a standard starting point of the assortment-planning literature in operations management: the "popular set" structure it proves is the benchmark that later work on assortment optimization under MNL demand (with capacity constraints, dynamic substitution, or other choice models) compares against.

This mission formalizes the paper's first main result, Theorem 1, together with the facts its proof rests on.

Setting

A store offers a subset SSS of the variants N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} of a category. Each variant jjj has an MNL preference vj>0v_j>0vj​>0, and the option of buying nothing has preference v0>0v_0>0v0​>0. A customer facing SSS buys variant j∈Sj\in Sj∈S with probability

qj(S)=vj∑i∈Svi+v0.q_j(S)=\frac{v_j}{\sum_{i\in S}v_i+v_0}.qj​(S)=∑i∈S​vi​+v0​vj​​.

Variants are labelled so that v1≥v2≥⋯≥vnv_1\ge v_2\ge\cdots\ge v_nv1​≥v2​≥⋯≥vn​, and the most-popular sets are Ai={1,…,i}A_i=\{1,\dots,i\}Ai​={1,…,i}.

The retailer sells at price ppp and buys at unit cost ccc, with 0<c<p0<c<p0<c<p, and stocks xjx_jxj​ units of each variant before the season. The critical fractile is z=Φ−1(1−c/p)z=\Phi^{-1}(1-c/p)z=Φ−1(1−c/p), with Φ\PhiΦ the standard normal distribution function. Two models of aggregate demand YjY_jYj​ are considered, both with store volume λ>0\lambda>0λ>0:

  • Independent population model. YjY_jYj​ is normal with mean λqj\lambda q_jλqj​ and standard deviation σ(λqj)β\sigma(\lambda q_j)^\betaσ(λqj​)β, where σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1. The optimal expected profit max⁡x≥0∑j∈SE[pmin⁡{xj,Yj}−cxj]\max_{x\ge0}\sum_{j\in S}E[p\min\{x_j,Y_j\}-cx_j]maxx≥0​∑j∈S​E[pmin{xj​,Yj​}−cxj​] equals
πI(S,v)=(p−c)λ∑j∈Sqj−pσλβe−z2/22π∑j∈Sqjβ.\pi_I(S,v)=(p-c)\lambda\sum_{j\in S}q_j-\frac{p\sigma\lambda^\beta e^{-z^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{j\in S}q_j^\beta .πI​(S,v)=(p−c)λj∈S∑​qj​−2π​pσλβe−z2/2​j∈S∑​qjβ​.
  • Trend-following population model. All customers make the same choice, so Yj=λY_j=\lambdaYj​=λ with probability qjq_jqj​ and Yj=0Y_j=0Yj​=0 otherwise. The optimal expected profit is
πT(S,v)=∑j∈S(pqj−c)+λ.\pi_T(S,v)=\sum_{j\in S}(pq_j-c)^+\lambda .πT​(S,v)=j∈S∑​(pqj​−c)+λ.

The assortment problem is max⁡S⊆Nπ(S,v)\max_{S\subseteq N}\pi(S,v)maxS⊆N​π(S,v) for π=πI\pi=\pi_Iπ=πI​ or π=πT\pi=\pi_Tπ=πT​.

For Lemma 1, fix SSS and let δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 be the preference of a variant added to it: f(δ)=∑j∈Svj+δ+v0f(\delta)=\sum_{j\in S}v_j+\delta+v_0f(δ)=∑j∈S​vj​+δ+v0​, gIg_IgI​ and gTg_TgT​ are the numerators of the profit after the addition, and hI=gI/fh_I=g_I/fhI​=gI​/f, hT=gT/fh_T=g_T/fhT​=gT​/f.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 1503)

For each demand model there is a most-popular set that is optimal among all 2n2^n2n assortments:

∃ i∈{0,…,n} ∀S⊆N: πI(S,v)≤πI(Ai,v),∃ i∈{1,…,n} ∀S⊆N: πT(S,v)≤πT(Ai,v).\exists\,i\in\{0,\dots,n\}\ \forall S\subseteq N:\ \pi_I(S,v)\le\pi_I(A_i,v),\qquad \exists\,i\in\{1,\dots,n\}\ \forall S\subseteq N:\ \pi_T(S,v)\le\pi_T(A_i,v).∃i∈{0,…,n} ∀S⊆N: πI​(S,v)≤πI​(Ai​,v),∃i∈{1,…,n} ∀S⊆N: πT​(S,v)≤πT​(Ai​,v).

The paper prints i∈{1,…,n}i\in\{1,\dots,n\}i∈{1,…,n} for both models. In the independent model the empty assortment can be the unique optimum (when πI(A1,v)<0\pi_I(A_1,v)<0πI​(A1​,v)<0, for instance at small λ\lambdaλ), so i=0i=0i=0 is allowed there; the trend-following range is the printed one.

Milestones

  1. (4)–(7): under normal demand, xj∗=λqj+zσ(λqj)βx^*_j=\lambda q_j+z\sigma(\lambda q_j)^\betaxj∗​=λqj​+zσ(λqj​)β is the optimal stocking vector and the optimal profit is πI(S,v)\pi_I(S,v)πI​(S,v).
  2. (8): under trend-following demand, stocking λ\lambdaλ exactly when pqj≥cpq_j\ge cpqj​≥c is optimal and the optimal profit is πT(S,v)\pi_T(S,v)πT​(S,v).
  3. Mangasarian (1969): a convex function divided by a positive affine function is quasiconvex.
  4. Appendix: gIg_IgI​ and gTg_TgT​ are convex in δ\deltaδ on [0,v1][0,v_1][0,v1​].
  5. Lemma 1: hIh_IhI​ and hTh_ThT​ are quasi-convex on [0,v1][0,v_1][0,v1​].
  6. §3.1: h(vj)=π(S∪{j},v)h(v_j)=\pi(S\cup\{j\},v)h(vj​)=π(S∪{j},v) for j∉Sj\notin Sj∈/S, and h(0)=π(S,v)h(0)=\pi(S,v)h(0)=π(S,v).

Significance

The search over assortments is a priori a search over 2n2^n2n subsets. Theorem 1 cuts it to the n+1n+1n+1 nested sets A0⊂A1⊂⋯⊂AnA_0\subset A_1\subset\cdots\subset A_nA0​⊂A1​⊂⋯⊂An​, so the optimal assortment is found by comparing n+1n+1n+1 numbers. The result is not obvious: the paper's example (n=8n=8n=8, v1=v2=10v_1=v_2=10v1​=v2​=10, v8=1v_8=1v8​=1) shows that {1,8}\{1,8\}{1,8} can beat {1,2}\{1,2\}{1,2}, so the best assortment of a given size need not be the most popular one, and yet the overall optimum is always a most-popular set. The structure is used in the paper's own comparative statics (how optimal variety moves with price, store volume and the no-purchase preference) and its comparison of fashion categories under majorization, which are the other two missions of this series.

The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge no part of it, nor the closed-form normal newsvendor optimum (7), has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing it fixes the edge cases the printed statement glosses over (the empty assortment, the β=0\beta=0β=0 boundary) and produces reusable pieces: the normal newsvendor profit formula and Mangasarian's ratio criterion for quasiconvexity.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "add variants in order of popularity", fails because adding a variant both brings new sales and cannibalizes the shares of the others, and the inventory term ∑qjβ\sum q_j^\beta∑qjβ​ is concave in the shares, so profit is not monotone or submodular in SSS in any simple sense. The proof instead compares a set with the sets obtained by removing its least popular member or exchanging it for a more popular outside variant, and needs the profit after adding a variant of preference δ\deltaδ to be quasi-convex in δ\deltaδ. That quasi-convexity is not visible from (7) directly; it requires rewriting the profit as a ratio g/fg/fg/f with fff affine and proving gIg_IgI​ convex, which in turn needs concavity of (∑j∈Svjβ+δβ)(∑j∈Svj+δ+v0)1−β(\sum_{j\in S}v_j^\beta+\delta^\beta)(\sum_{j\in S}v_j+\delta+v_0)^{1-\beta}(∑j∈S​vjβ​+δβ)(∑j∈S​vj​+δ+v0​)1−β. The exchange argument must also handle ties among the vjv_jvj​, which the printed proof passes over. Milestone 1 needs the derivative of the normal newsvendor objective and the identity E(Z−z)+=φ(z)−z(1−Φ(z))E(Z-z)^+=\varphi(z)-z(1-\Phi(z))E(Z−z)+=φ(z)−z(1−Φ(z)), neither of which is in Mathlib in this form.

Formalization scope

  • Variants are Fin n, 0-based: the paper's variant jjj is index j−1j-1j−1, AiA_iAi​ is the set of indices below iii, and the paper's v1v_1v1​ is the first entry v ⟨0, _⟩. The no-purchase preference v0v_0v0​ is a separate real v0, never a variant. Preferences are strictly positive and the sorting v1≥⋯≥vnv_1\ge\cdots\ge v_nv1​≥⋯≥vn​ is the hypothesis Antitone v.
  • Standing hypotheses: 0<c<p0<c<p0<c<p, λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1; the goal also assumes n≥1n\ge1n≥1 (the trend-following range 1≤i≤n1\le i\le n1≤i≤n needs it).
  • zzz is defined from ppp and ccc as the least xxx with Φ(x)≥1−c/p\Phi(x)\ge1-c/pΦ(x)≥1−c/p, Φ\PhiΦ the c.d.f. of Mathlib's gaussianReal 0 1; a separate theorem states Φ(z)=1−c/p\Phi(z)=1-c/pΦ(z)=1−c/p and uniqueness.
  • Powers are Real.rpow, so 00=10^0=100=1. At β=0\beta=0β=0 this keeps (7) correct (∑j∈Sqj0=∣S∣\sum_{j\in S}q_j^0=|S|∑j∈S​qj0​=∣S∣), but hI(0)=πI(S,v)h_I(0)=\pi_I(S,v)hI​(0)=πI​(S,v) then fails; that one clause carries β>0\beta>0β>0. The goal keeps 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1.
  • The positive part (⋅)+(\cdot)^+(⋅)+ is max · 0. In (11), λ\lambdaλ multiplies both terms; the printed (11) has it on the sum only, which would break hT(vj)=πT(S∪{j},v)h_T(v_j)=\pi_T(S\cup\{j\},v)hT​(vj​)=πT​(S∪{j},v) unless λ=1\lambda=1λ=1.
  • "Optimal" means π(S,v)≤π(Ai,v)\pi(S,v)\le\pi(A_i,v)π(S,v)≤π(Ai​,v) for every S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, including S=∅S=\emptysetS=∅. A formalization that maximizes only over prefix sets, assumes the optimum nonempty or the profit nonnegative, treats zzz as a free real unrelated to ppp and ccc, or drops one of the two demand models, is a different and weaker statement and does not count.
  • In milestone 1 the order-up-to levels xj∗x^*_jxj∗​ are assumed nonnegative, the formal content of the paper's assumption λ1−βqj≫σqjβ\lambda^{1-\beta}q_j\gg\sigma q_j^\betaλ1−βqj​≫σqjβ​.

Needed infrastructure: the normal loss function and the first-order condition for the newsvendor under gaussianReal; quasiconvexity of convex-over-positive-affine ratios; concavity of weighted geometric means. The newsvendor and quasiconvexity pieces are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative routes to Theorem 1 that avoid Lemma 1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. van Ryzin, S. Mahajan, On the Relationship Between Inventory Costs and Variety Benefits in Retail Assortments, Management Science 45(11):1496–1509, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.11.1496
  • O. L. Mangasarian, Nonlinear Programming, McGraw-Hill, 1969 (reprinted SIAM Classics in Applied Mathematics 10, 1994). https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971255
  • R. D. Luce, Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis, Wiley, 1959.
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Semiconductor Burn-In Operations 5: Full-Batch LPT Is Within 4/3 − 1/(3m) of the Optimal Makespan on Parallel Batch MachinesResearch Paper

Motivation

Burn-in is the final reliability test of integrated circuits: boards loaded with chips are held in an oven at elevated temperature for a minimum specified time, so that marginal devices fail before shipment. An oven holds several boards at once, and a load may stay in the oven longer than its specification but never shorter. Lee, Uzsoy and Martin-Vega (Oper. Res. 40(4), 1992) model such an oven as a batch processing machine and study the resulting scheduling problems. Burn-in is often the bottleneck of the test stage, which is why throughput (makespan) and due-date performance on several ovens in parallel are of practical interest.

This mission covers the paper's makespan result for parallel ovens. On ordinary identical parallel machines, Graham (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17, 1969) proved that the LPT rule (list the jobs longest first and give each to the machine that frees up first) has worst-case ratio 4/3−1/(3m)4/3 - 1/(3m)4/3−1/(3m) on mmm machines. The paper shows that the same factor holds for batch machines once the jobs are first grouped into full batches of the longest jobs.

Setting

There are nnn jobs with processing times pj>0p_j > 0pj​>0, all available at time 000, and m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 identical batch processing machines. Each machine processes up to B≥1B \ge 1B≥1 jobs at the same time. A batch is a set of at most BBB jobs processed together; once started it cannot be interrupted or joined, and its batch time is that of its longest job,

p(P)=max⁡j∈Ppj.p(P) = \max_{j \in P} p_j .p(P)=j∈Pmax​pj​.

A schedule forms the jobs into disjoint nonempty batches covering all jobs, assigns each batch to a machine, and runs every machine's batches back to back from time 000. The makespan is the largest machine load, the total batch time on a machine. The problem of minimizing it is written P/B/Cmax⁡P/B/C_{\max}P/B/Cmax​, and C∗C^*C∗ denotes its optimal value, over every way of forming batches (any sizes up to BBB, any grouping) and every assignment. For B=1B = 1B=1 it is the classical problem P//Cmax⁡P//C_{\max}P//Cmax​.

Algorithm BLPT.

  1. Rank the jobs in nonincreasing order of processing time and cut the ranked list into successive groups of BBB jobs, the last possibly smaller.
  2. Order these batches in nonincreasing order of batch time and assign each in turn to a machine with least current load.

C(BLPT)C(\mathrm{BLPT})C(BLPT) is the resulting makespan.

For the optional lateness result, each job also has a due date dj≥0d_j \ge 0dj​≥0. The maximum lateness of a schedule is Lmax⁡=max⁡j(Cj−dj)L_{\max} = \max_j (C_j - d_j)Lmax​=maxj​(Cj​−dj​), LLL is its value under BLPT, L∗L^*L∗ its optimum and dmax⁡=max⁡jdjd_{\max} = \max_j d_jdmax​=maxj​dj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 773)

C(BLPT)≤(43−13m)C∗.C(\mathrm{BLPT}) \le \left(\frac43 - \frac1{3m}\right) C^* .C(BLPT)≤(34​−3m1​)C∗.

It is claimed for every run of BLPT, whatever order the algorithm gives to equal processing times and equal batch times.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2 (p. 772). With the jobs re-indexed longest first, some optimal schedule has batches of consecutive jobs, all full except possibly the one containing the last job. In other words, its batches are exactly the groups formed in Step 1 of BLPT.
  2. The reduction (§5, p. 772). C∗C^*C∗ equals the optimal makespan of P//Cmax⁡P//C_{\max}P//Cmax​ on the aggregate jobs p(B1),…,p(B⌈n/B⌉)p(B_1), \dots, p(B_{\lceil n/B\rceil})p(B1​),…,p(B⌈n/B⌉​).
  3. Graham's LPT bound, as quoted (p. 772). For jobs q0≥⋯≥qM−1≥0q_0 \ge \dots \ge q_{M-1} \ge 0q0​≥⋯≥qM−1​≥0 on mmm machines, list scheduling in that order has makespan at most (4/3−1/(3m))(4/3 - 1/(3m))(4/3−1/(3m)) times the optimum.
  4. Proposition 5 (p. 773, further result).
L−L∗L∗+dmax⁡≤(13−13m)+dmax⁡L∗+dmax⁡.\frac{L - L^*}{L^* + d_{\max}} \le \left(\frac13 - \frac1{3m}\right) + \frac{d_{\max}}{L^* + d_{\max}} .L∗+dmax​L−L∗​≤(31​−3m1​)+L∗+dmax​dmax​​.

Significance

Proposition 3 gives a constant-factor guarantee for a strongly NP-hard problem. The guarantee does not depend on BBB, whereas arbitrary batch list scheduling only gets B+1−1/mB + 1 - 1/mB+1−1/m (Proposition 1 of the same paper). For one machine the factor is 111, so BLPT is then exact. Proposition 2 is a structural statement: it fixes the batch composition of an optimal schedule before any assignment decision. It turns the batch problem into an ordinary parallel-machine problem, so other results for P//Cmax⁡P//C_{\max}P//Cmax​ transfer as well. Proposition 5 carries the guarantee over to maximum lateness, measured relative to L∗+dmax⁡L^* + d_{\max}L∗+dmax​ because L∗L^*L∗ may be negative.

All results are proved in the paper, Proposition 3 by a one-line appeal to Proposition 2 and Graham. This mission produces machine-checked versions of the reduction and the bound. Graham's LPT bound itself is not formalized anywhere on the platform. Its proof here is a reusable result about the published list-scheduling definitions, independent of batching.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is "batch as in Step 1, then apply Graham". It has two gaps. First, C∗C^*C∗ ranges over all batchings, and an optimal schedule need not use full batches or consecutive jobs. The exchange argument behind Proposition 2 has to move jobs between batches, possibly on different machines, without increasing any machine's load. Ties among equal processing times also have to be handled, since the claim is made for every longest-first ranking. Second, Graham's bound is not on the platform and has to be proved. It is a finite combinatorial statement, but its known proofs are not short. Proposition 5 additionally needs the bound for sub-instances formed by a prefix of the batches.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin n, 0-based. Processing times are real, p : Fin n → ℝ with 0 < p j; due dates (Proposition 5 only) are d : Fin n → ℝ with 0 ≤ d j. A batching is a list of nonempty, pairwise disjoint Finsets of size at most B covering every job. The batch time is the maximum of p over the batch.

Machine loads, assignments, the per-batching optimum and list scheduling reuse the published definitions NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.ListSchedule (firstAvailable, lsLoads, listMakespan) and NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.Makespan (machineLoad, makespan, optMakespan) from the Rinnooy Kan–Stougie mission, applied to the sequence of batch times (padded with zeros beyond the last batch, which these definitions never read). C∗C^*C∗ is the infimum of optMakespan over all valid batchings, never only over the consecutive ones of Step 1, which would assume Proposition 2.

Explicit readings of the paper's phrases:

  • "rank jobs in decreasing order" is any list of all jobs that is nonincreasing in p;
  • the batches of Step 1 are List.toChunks B of that list;
  • "order the batches in nonincreasing order of p(Bk)p(B_k)p(Bk​)" is any permutation of those chunks that is nonincreasing in batch time;
  • every statement is quantified over both choices;
  • "assign them to the machines as they become free" is least-loaded list scheduling with the published lowest-index tie rule. With no idle time, the machine that becomes free first is a least-loaded one, and the tie rule does not change the multiset of loads;
  • "1/3m1/3m1/3m" is 1/(3m)1/(3m)1/(3m);
  • "optimal solution" in Proposition 2 is a valid batching with an assignment whose makespan equals C∗C^*C∗, and "consecutive, all full except the one containing the highest indexed job" is "equal, up to order, to the chunks of the ranked list";
  • schedules on each machine run in list order without idle time, and every processing order is a reordering of the list. For L∗L^*L∗ this covers every semi-active schedule.

Proposition 5 adds the hypothesis dj≥0d_j \ge 0dj​≥0, which the paper's proof uses but does not print. It also makes L∗+dmax⁡L^* + d_{\max}L∗+dmax​ positive, so the printed ratios are well defined. Running times and the paper's other algorithms are out of scope.

A statement with C∗C^*C∗ restricted to consecutive batches, a sorry-free bound obtained from a degenerate m=0m = 0m=0 or empty-job reading, or a BLPT fixed to one convenient tie-break would trivialize or weaken the goal and is ruled out by the statements as posed. Welcome contributions: Graham's LPT bound on the published list-scheduling definitions (reusable for any P//Cmax⁡P//C_{\max}P//Cmax​ work), the exchange lemma behind Proposition 2, and the permutation invariance of optMakespan under reordering of items.

Selected references

  • C.-Y. Lee, R. Uzsoy, L. A. Martin-Vega, Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Semiconductor Burn-In Operations, Operations Research 40(4), 764–775, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.764
  • R. L. Graham, Bounds on Multiprocessing Timing Anomalies, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 17(2), 416–429, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117039
  • A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, L. Stougie, Stochastic Integer Programming, Ch. 8 of Y. Ermoliev, R. J.-B. Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer, 1988 (source of the reused list-scheduling definitions). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
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Machine LearningTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

The Weighted Majority Algorithm 1: WM Makes at Most log(w_init/w_fin)/log(2/(1+β)) Mistakes on Any SequenceResearch Paper

Motivation

In online prediction, a learner makes a forecast before seeing the next label. A collection of other forecasters may offer useful advice, but the learner need not know beforehand which forecaster will perform well. Littlestone and Warmuth's Weighted Majority Algorithm (WM) gives a deterministic way to combine such advice. Its guarantees hold for every finite sequence of instances and labels, including sequences chosen without any probability model. That worst-case setting is useful when the reliability of the forecasters can change or when no data-generating distribution has been justified. The paper develops WM and several variants; this mission isolates its basic mistake bound. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994.

Setting

A finite pool has nnn members, each of which predicts either 000 or 111 on every trial. The true label on trial ttt is ρt∈{0,1}\rho_t\in\{0,1\}ρt​∈{0,1}, and member iii predicts xt,i∈{0,1}x_{t,i}\in\{0,1\}xt,i​∈{0,1}. The master prediction is λt∈{0,1}\lambda_t\in\{0,1\}λt​∈{0,1}. Pool members may themselves be learning algorithms, so their predictions may reflect all earlier labels. The mission treats their prediction vectors and the labels as arbitrary finite sequences; no independence or stationarity is assumed.

Each member begins with a strictly positive real weight w0,iw_{0,i}w0,i​. Before trial ttt, let wt,iw_{t,i}wt,i​ be its current weight. For b∈{0,1}b\in\{0,1\}b∈{0,1}, let qt,bq_{t,b}qt,b​ be the sum of weights of members predicting bbb. WM predicts the value with the larger backing total. When the two totals tie, either binary prediction is allowed. After the label is revealed, WM changes weights only if its own prediction was wrong. On such a trial, each member that predicted the wrong label has its weight multiplied by a fixed factor β\betaβ with 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1; every other member retains its weight. If WM predicted correctly, every weight stays as it was. This is the version of the algorithm stated in §1 of the paper. A footnote there says the bounds also apply to the variant that updates on every trial. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, p. 215.

Write Wt=∑iwt,iW_t=\sum_i w_{t,i}Wt​=∑i​wt,i​ for the total pool weight at a trial boundary. Thus W0=winitW_0=w_{\mathrm{init}}W0​=winit​ and WT=wfinW_T=w_{\mathrm{fin}}WT​=wfin​ after TTT trials. Let mmm count the trials with λt≠ρt\lambda_t\ne\rho_tλt​=ρt​. The default initial weights in the paper are all one, but its Theorem 2.1 permits arbitrary positive initial weights. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, pp. 220–221.

Formalization targets

The two milestones state the weight facts used immediately before and within Theorem 2.1. First, on each trial where WM errs,

Wt+1≤1+β2Wt.W_{t+1}\le \frac{1+\beta}{2}W_t.Wt+1​≤21+β​Wt​.

Across the whole sequence, with mmm master mistakes, the corresponding estimate is

WT≤W0(1+β2)m.W_T\le W_0\left(\frac{1+\beta}{2}\right)^m.WT​≤W0​(21+β​)m.

The goal is the paper's Theorem 2.1, retaining its explicit constant:

m≤log⁡(W0/WT)log⁡ ⁣(2/(1+β))when WT>0.m\le \frac{\log(W_0/W_T)} {\log\!\left(2/(1+\beta)\right)} \qquad\text{when }W_T>0.m≤log(2/(1+β))log(W0​/WT​)​when WT​>0.

The logarithm base is immaterial because the same base occurs above and below the fraction. The paper explicitly uses this convention for ratios of logarithms. The positive-final-weight condition represents the paper's statement that the displayed logarithmic bound is vacuous when all weight has vanished, which can happen for β=0\beta=0β=0. The whole-sequence weight estimate remains meaningful in that case. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, pp. 220–221.

Significance

The result limits the mistakes of a master predictor without assigning probabilities to the predictions or labels. It relates a visible property of the run, the reduction of total weight, to the number of master errors. Later bounds in the paper use this starting point to compare WM with an individual pool member and to analyze related algorithms; this mission fixes the initial, exact-constant result on which those comparisons rest. The β=0\beta=0β=0 case includes the paper's Halving Algorithm interpretation when initial weights are equal. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, pp. 215, 221–222.

The mathematical theorem is proved in the 1994 paper. The remaining task here is to represent its algorithm and finite-sequence bound in Lean and supply machine-checked proofs. A complete development would give later formalizations a reusable finite-pool voting and weight-update model, along with a checked potential estimate. The local draft statements compile; their proofs remain open. A separate, sorry-free local check constructs a run for every finite prediction and label sequence with a nonempty pool and valid weights and parameter, so the quantified run relation has witnesses.

Difficulty

The master can be wrong even when some pool members are right, and members may change their predictions over time. Counting one member's errors therefore does not directly control the master's error count. The exact contraction constant also depends on which side of a weighted vote the master chose, including the permitted tie case. When β=0\beta=0β=0, a single mistake can erase all weight backing the wrong label, so the logarithmic expression must be interpreted with care if no positive weight remains. These are features of the stated algorithm, rather than assumptions about how the sequence was generated.

Formalization scope

The formalization indexes pool members by Fin n and trials by Fin T. Booleans represent binary predictions and labels; weights and β\betaβ are real. A WM run is a relation on the full sequence of weights and master predictions, admitting every choice at a tied vote. Its update rule changes weights only after a master mistake, scales exactly the members that disagreed with the label, and leaves all other weights unchanged. Theorems require 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1 and strictly positive initial member weights. The goal additionally requires WT>0W_T>0WT​>0, while the two weight inequalities permit WT=0W_T=0WT​=0. Natural logarithms instantiate the paper's common-base logarithm convention. Finite sums and a finite mistake count match the paper's finite-sequence convention.

The statement ranges over arbitrary pool predictions and labels, so it cannot be satisfied merely by selecting an easy input sequence. The run relation allows both legal outcomes of a tie; selecting one favorable tie rule would weaken the target. The sorry-free run-existence check also rules out a vacuous theorem caused by an inconsistent update relation. The paper's update-on-every-trial variant, its member-specific corollaries, and its later algorithms are outside this mission's goal.

A completed formalization needs finite sums of real weights, cardinalities of finite sets of mistake trials, a finite induction over trial boundaries, and real logarithm inequalities. The run definition and the first two bounds can be reused in the later parts of this paper's formalization. Contributions that prove the exact stated milestones or supply supporting facts about legal runs and nonnegative weights are within scope.

Selected references

  • Nick Littlestone and Manfred K. Warmuth, The Weighted Majority Algorithm, Information and Computation 108(2), 212–261, 1994. DOI: 10.1006/inco.1994.1009.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Semiconductor Burn-In Operations 3: Dynamic Program DP3 Minimizes the Number of Tardy Equal-Length Jobs on a Batch Machine with Agreeable Release and Due DatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Semiconductor burn-in tests hold several jobs in an oven at once. A production planner must decide which jobs share each oven run and in what order those runs take place. A job may become available only after earlier manufacturing steps, and a due date marks when its test should finish. The planning objective here is to minimize how many jobs finish after their due dates. Lee, Uzsoy, and Martin-Vega studied this batch scheduling problem and gave a dynamic program for the case of equal processing times and compatible release and due-date orders (Lee, Uzsoy, and Martin-Vega 1992, §4, pp. 770–771).

Setting

There are nnn jobs and one batch processing machine with capacity B≥1B\ge1B≥1. Job jjj has release time rjr_jrj​, due date djd_jdj​, and processing time pjp_jpj​. In the main problem every processing time equals a common value ppp. A batch is a nonempty set of at most BBB jobs. Its processing time is the longest processing time among its members; it begins only after all its jobs have been released and the previous batch has finished. Processing is uninterrupted. A schedule is an ordered list of disjoint batches that covers every job. Each batch starts at the earliest time allowed by these conditions.

The completion time Cj(S)C_j(S)Cj​(S) of job jjj in schedule SSS is the completion time of its batch. A job is on time when Cj(S)≤djC_j(S)\le d_jCj​(S)≤dj​ and tardy when dj<Cj(S)d_j<C_j(S)dj​<Cj​(S). Write U(S)=#{j:dj<Cj(S)}U(S)=\#\{j:d_j<C_j(S)\}U(S)=#{j:dj​<Cj​(S)} and let U∗U^*U∗ be the minimum of U(S)U(S)U(S) over all valid complete batch schedules. Tardy jobs still belong to a schedule and consume machine time. An on-time batch is one whose every member is on time.

For the structural lemmas, agreeable release times and due dates mean that ri<rjr_i<r_jri​<rj​ implies di≤djd_i\le d_jdi​≤dj​. For the dynamic program, jobs are indexed so that both rjr_jrj​ and djd_jdj​ are nondecreasing. A batch is in batch-EDD order relative to later batches when no job in it has a later due date than a job in a later batch. A batch of consecutive jobs contains exactly an index interval. These are the paper's Lemmas 4 and 5 and Definition 1 (pp. 767, 770).

Formalization targets

Structural optimal schedules

Lemma 4 asserts that some optimum has an initial list of wholly on-time batches in batch-EDD order, followed by batches containing only tardy jobs. Lemma 5 asserts that some optimum has every wholly on-time batch made of consecutive indexed jobs. These are existence statements about schedules of all jobs; neither restricts the feasible schedules over which U∗U^*U∗ is defined.

Correctness of Algorithm DP3

Let f(i,j)f(i,j)f(i,j) be the table defined by Algorithm DP3 for the first jjj jobs and a selected count iii of on-time jobs. Its boundary values are f(0,j)=0f(0,j)=0f(0,j)=0 and f(i,j)=+∞f(i,j)=+\inftyf(i,j)=+∞ for i>ji>ji>j. For 1≤i≤j1\le i\le j1≤i≤j, it takes the minimum of f(i,j−1)f(i,j-1)f(i,j−1) and the eligible transitions that append a batch of kkk jobs, 1≤k≤min⁡(B,i)1\le k\le\min(B,i)1≤k≤min(B,i). A transition uses max⁡{f(i−k,j−k),rj}+p\max\{f(i-k,j-k),r_j\}+pmax{f(i−k,j−k),rj​}+p and is eligible when that completion time does not exceed dj−k+1d_{j-k+1}dj−k+1​. The main target is

U∗=n−max⁡{i∈{0,…,n}:f(i,n)<+∞}.U^*=n-\max\{i\in\{0,\ldots,n\}:f(i,n)<+\infty\}.U∗=n−max{i∈{0,…,n}:f(i,n)<+∞}.

The maximum includes zero, which is always feasible in the table. The printed range begins at one and has no value when every job is tardy. This is the corrected boundary reading of the displayed answer on p. 771 (source).

Unequal processing times

The paper also gives a variant for jobs available at time zero, with nondecreasing processing times and due dates. Its transition replaces the release-time maximum and common ppp by f(i−k,j−k)+pjf(i-k,j-k)+p_jf(i−k,j−k)+pj​. The corresponding correctness statement is a further milestone (p. 771).

Significance

The structural results connect the optimization over arbitrary complete batch schedules to the restricted arrangements represented by the table. DP3 correctness then identifies the number of tardy jobs from finite table entries, including instances with no on-time job. The variable-time extension covers the related case where each job has its own duration but all jobs are available together.

The paper proves these results informally; this mission leaves their Lean proofs open. A complete formalization would supply reusable definitions of batch schedules, release-limited completion times, tardy-job counts, and a finite dynamic program with an explicit infinite value. The machine-checked statements and the local instance check establish the interface for that work, while the structural and correctness theorems remain solver targets.

Difficulty

The objective ranges over every valid batching and every processing order. The table examines an indexed prefix and places the last on-time batch among consecutive jobs. Establishing that the table's choices preserve the full optimum requires the existence statements in Lemmas 4 and 5. Reordering jobs is delicate because delaying a batch can change release feasibility and can make an earlier on-time job late. Equal due dates also require care: a due-date order alone need not put the latest release of a proposed batch at its last index.

Formalization scope

Jobs use Fin n, with index zero representing the paper's job 1; the table's jjj is a prefix length. Data and completion times are natural numbers, matching the paper's integer-data setting; +∞+\infty+∞ in the table is WithTop ℕ. The schedule model uses nonempty batches of cardinality at most BBB, pairwise disjointness, and complete coverage. A batch starts at the maximum of its latest release and the preceding completion time. This earliest-start convention is sufficient for minimizing the regular tardy-job objective. The empty job set is included: its empty schedule has zero tardy jobs.

The strict implication ri<rj⇒di≤djr_i<r_j\Rightarrow d_i\le d_jri​<rj​⇒di​≤dj​ makes the paper's loose “agreeable” condition precise without forcing equal due dates for tied release times. For the recurrence, both release times and due dates are nondecreasing in job index, including their ties. This ensures that rjr_jrj​ is the last batch's latest release and dj−k+1d_{j-k+1}dj−k+1​ its earliest due date. The variable-time version similarly indexes by nondecreasing processing times and due dates, so the last job gives the batch duration. The table uses a minimum over exactly the paper's range 1≤k≤min⁡(B,i)1\le k\le\min(B,i)1≤k≤min(B,i), with an empty range giving +∞+\infty+∞. Zero is included in the final maximum. Tardy jobs are scheduled in the underlying optimum; defining the optimum as an on-time subset or defining the table as that optimum would erase the two structural claims.

This mission covers correctness only. The paper's O(n2B)O(n^2B)O(n2B) running-time statement and the bisection procedure are outside the formalization because they would need a specified computational cost model. The paper's FBEDD remark for this objective is also excluded: a three-job instance contradicts it. Contributions to the open theorem proofs, schedule-existence facts, and reusable batch scheduling lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • C.-Y. Lee, R. Uzsoy, and L. A. Martin-Vega, Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Semiconductor Burn-In Operations, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 764–775. DOI: 10.1287/opre.40.4.764.
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Application of the Branch and Bound Technique to Some Flow-Shop Scheduling Problems 2: Branch and Bound with the Two-Machine Lower Bound Finds a Sequence of Least Mean Completion TimeResearch Paper

Motivation

In a two-machine flow shop, each of nnn jobs is processed first on machine AAA and then on machine BBB, and the order of the jobs is to be chosen. For the makespan (the finishing time of the last job), Johnson (1954) gave an exact sorting rule. For the sum (equivalently, the mean) of the completion times, no such rule is known: the problem is NP-hard in the strong sense (Garey, Johnson and Sethi, 1976), and exact methods search the n!n!n! sequences implicitly.

Ignall and Schrage (1965) were among the first to apply branch and bound to sequencing. They view the n!n!n! sequences as the leaves of a tree of partial sequences, keep a list of partial sequences ranked by a lower bound, and always extend the most promising one. For the two-machine mean-completion-time problem they introduced a lower bound, built from two relaxations (one where machine AAA is the bottleneck, one where machine BBB is), that became the template for many later flow-shop bounds.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 jobs; job iii has processing time aia_iai​ on machine AAA and bib_ibi​ on machine BBB. A sequence is a permutation σ\sigmaσ of the jobs, processed in that order on both machines with every operation started as early as possible. The completion time di(σ)d_i(\sigma)di​(σ) of job iii is the time machine BBB finishes it, and the objective is ∑i=1ndi(σ)\sum_{i=1}^n d_i(\sigma)∑i=1n​di​(σ).

A node JrJ_rJr​ is a partial sequence of rrr jobs; Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ is the set of the n−rn-rn−r jobs not in it; kkk is the last job of JrJ_rJr​ and dkd_kdk​ its completion time; did_idi​ (i∈Jri\in J_ri∈Jr​) are the completion times of the jobs of JrJ_rJr​. For an ordering (i1,…,in−r)(i_1,\dots,i_{n-r})(i1​,…,in−r​) of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​,

Tr=∑p=1n−r[∑j∈Jraj+(n−r−p+1)aip+bip],T_r=\sum_{p=1}^{n-r}\Big[\sum_{j\in J_r}a_j+(n-r-p+1)a_{i_p}+b_{i_p}\Big],Tr​=p=1∑n−r​[j∈Jr​∑​aj​+(n−r−p+1)aip​​+bip​​],

and for an ordering (j1,…,jn−r)(j_1,\dots,j_{n-r})(j1​,…,jn−r​) of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​,

Sr=∑p=1n−r[max⁡(dk,∑j∈Jraj+min⁡i∈Jˉrai)+(n−r−p+1)bjp].S_r=\sum_{p=1}^{n-r}\Big[\max\Big(d_k,\sum_{j\in J_r}a_j+\min_{i\in\bar J_r}a_i\Big)+(n-r-p+1)b_{j_p}\Big].Sr​=p=1∑n−r​[max(dk​,j∈Jr​∑​aj​+i∈Jˉr​min​ai​)+(n−r−p+1)bjp​​].

T^r\hat T_rT^r​ and S^r\hat S_rS^r​ are their minima over all orderings of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​, and the lower bound of the node is

LB(Jr)=∑i∈Jrdi+max⁡(T^r,S^r).LB(J_r)=\sum_{i\in J_r}d_i+\max(\hat T_r,\hat S_r).LB(Jr​)=i∈Jr​∑​di​+max(T^r​,S^r​).

The procedure starts with a list holding only the empty node. A step removes the first node, creates one child for every unscheduled job by appending it, and inserts the children into the list ranked by LBLBLB (a new node goes before old nodes with equal bound). It stops the first time the first node of the list is terminal, i.e. has scheduled n−1n-1n−1 jobs, so that its last job is forced.

Formalization targets

Goal: the procedure finds a sequence of least mean completion time

For all real data, (i) the procedure reaches a list whose first node PPP is terminal, and (ii) whenever that happens, the sequence σ∗\sigma^\astσ∗ formed by PPP and its one unscheduled job satisfies

∑i=1ndi(σ∗)≤∑i=1ndi(σ)for every sequence σ.\sum_{i=1}^n d_i(\sigma^\ast)\le\sum_{i=1}^n d_i(\sigma)\qquad\text{for every sequence }\sigma .i=1∑n​di​(σ∗)≤i=1∑n​di​(σ)for every sequence σ.

Milestones

  1. For 1≤r≤n−11\le r\le n-11≤r≤n−1 and every sequence σ\sigmaσ beginning with JrJ_rJr​: TrT_rTr​ of the order in which σ\sigmaσ processes Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ is at most ∑i∈Jˉrdi(σ)\sum_{i\in\bar J_r}d_i(\sigma)∑i∈Jˉr​​di​(σ), hence so is T^r\hat T_rT^r​ (pp. 405–406).
  2. An ordering of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ by increasing aia_iai​ attains T^r\hat T_rT^r​ (p. 406).
  3. An ordering of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ by increasing bjb_jbj​ attains S^r\hat S_rS^r​ (p. 406).
  4. The analogue of 1 for SrS_rSr​ and S^r\hat S_rS^r​ (p. 406).
  5. LB(Jr)≤∑idi(σ)LB(J_r)\le\sum_i d_i(\sigma)LB(Jr​)≤∑i​di​(σ) for every σ\sigmaσ beginning with JrJ_rJr​ (p. 406).
  6. At depth n−1n-1n−1, LBLBLB equals the value of the node's unique completion (labelled: what the stopping rule of p. 402 needs).
  7. Without delays, job ipi_pip​ completes at ∑Jraj+ai1+⋯+aip+bip\sum_{J_r}a_j+a_{i_1}+\dots+a_{i_p}+b_{i_p}∑Jr​​aj​+ai1​​+⋯+aip​​+bip​​ and ∑Jˉrdi=Tr\sum_{\bar J_r}d_i=T_r∑Jˉr​​di​=Tr​ (pp. 405–406).
  8. The three-job example of p. 408: 1–2 is optimal for jobs 1, 2, while 3–2–1 is optimal for all three.

Significance

The goal is the correctness of the paper's algorithm for the two-machine problem: the sequence it returns is optimal, not merely good, and it returns one for every input. The lower-bound milestones are the paper's own justification of its bound, and the sorting milestones show that the bound is computable in O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) per node rather than by a minimization over (n−r)!(n-r)!(n−r)! orderings.

On the formal side, no item on the platform treats flow-shop lower bounds or branch and bound over sequences; the nearest is the branch-and-bound mission for jointly constrained biconvex programs (BiconvexProg.BranchBound, Al-Khayyal and Falk 1983), an unrelated algorithm over boxes. The paper's arguments are short and informal ("it should be evident"); the formalization makes explicit that the SrS_rSr​ bound holds for every order and every input, which the paper derives only by analogy with TrT_rTr​. The published definitions of Johnson's as-soon-as-possible schedule (from the Johnson 1954 missions) are reused for the completion times.

Difficulty

The two halves of the bound are relaxations of different kinds. TrT_rTr​ ignores waiting on machine BBB; SrS_rSr​ ignores idle time on machine BBB after its first job of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ and replaces that job's machine-AAA time by the smallest one. The paper's description of SrS_rSr​ as "the sum of the completion times" when min⁡b≥max⁡a\min b\ge\max aminb≥maxa is not an identity, since min⁡a\min amina replaces aj1a_{j_1}aj1​​; only the inequality is true, and it has to be proved for the given order directly. The sorting claims are rearrangement inequalities, with the coefficient n−r−p+1n-r-p+1n−r−p+1 decreasing in the position.

The goal is a statement about all n!n!n! sequences, while the procedure only ever looks at the nodes on its list, whose length changes at every step. The tempting one-line justification, that the first terminal node has the smallest bound, says nothing by itself about sequences that are not descendants of nodes still on the list, nor about whether the bound of a terminal node is the value of its sequence; and termination of the search has to be shown, not assumed.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs are Fin n (the paper's 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n shifted to 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1); processing times are arbitrary reals, with no sign condition; all statements are true without one.
  • Completion times of a full sequence come from Johnson's asapC2 (referenced definition JohnsonFlowShop.TwoStage.asapStart2). The objective is the sum of the completion times; the paper's mean differs by the fixed factor 1/n1/n1/n.
  • A node is a list of jobs; "a sequence begins with JrJ_rJr​" means JrJ_rJr​ is a prefix of its list of jobs.
  • T^r\hat T_rT^r​ and S^r\hat S_rS^r​ are defined as minima over all orderings of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​, not by a sorted order; that sorting attains them is milestones 2 and 3. Defining them by sorting would make those milestones true by definition.
  • At the root (r=0r=0r=0) dkd_kdk​ is read as 000; the root is never ranked, and the lower-bound milestones are stated for 1≤r≤n−11\le r\le n-11≤r≤n−1.
  • Terminal nodes are at depth n−1n-1n−1. The paper says "a node that has scheduled all nnn jobs"; its own example stops at a node with three of four jobs, and its node counts end at level n−1n-1n−1.
  • Explicit readings: "is a lower bound" means ≤\le≤ the objective of every sequence beginning with the node; "will exceed" means ≥\ge≥; "the problem is solved: that node's sequence is an optimal one" means termination plus optimality over all n!n!n! sequences.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the bound is not taken over an unrestricted or empty set of orderings (the set of orderings of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ is nonempty), optimality is over all permutations rather than over the nodes the run visits, and termination is part of the goal.
  • Not formalized: the reduction to permutation schedules (the paper's footnote on p. 401 asserts it for mean completion time without proof, and no platform item proves it), dominance discarding (pp. 403–405), the jobset generator, Tables I–III and the 9-job examples.

Proofs of any milestone, and reusable lemmas on as-soon-as-possible two-machine schedules (completion times of a prefix, monotonicity in the start time), are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. Ignall and L. Schrage, Application of the branch and bound technique to some flow-shop scheduling problems, Operations Research 13(3), 400–412, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.13.3.400
  • S. M. Johnson, Optimal two- and three-stage production schedules with setup times included, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 1(1), 61–68, 1954. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800010110
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson and R. Sethi, The complexity of flowshop and jobshop scheduling, Mathematics of Operations Research 1(2), 117–129, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.2.117
  • A. H. Land and A. G. Doig, An automatic method of solving discrete programming problems, Econometrica 28(3), 497–520, 1960. https://doi.org/10.2307/1910129
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 6: When Workers Are Alike in Production, Gross Substitutes Is Equivalent to Nonincreasing Returns to WorkersResearch Paper

Motivation

Kelso and Crawford's 1982 Econometrica paper studies a labor market in which firms hire sets of heterogeneous workers at individually negotiated salaries. Their existence results for the core and for competitive equilibrium, and the convergence of their salary-adjustment process, all rest on one hypothesis about each firm's technology, the gross-substitutes condition (GS): raising some workers' salaries never makes a firm drop a worker whose salary did not change. The condition has since become central to matching with contracts, ascending auctions and the theory of discrete convexity (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005; Fujishige and Yang 2003). It is defined through the firm's demand correspondence rather than through the production function, so its economic content is not obvious.

Section 6 of the paper explains that content. Its first result, Theorem 6, says that when workers are alike in production, (GS) is exactly the familiar requirement of nonincreasing returns to workers. This mission formalizes Theorem 6, the two halves of its proof, and the companion claim that with two heterogeneous workers (GS) is equivalent to subadditivity.

Setting

Fix a finite set WWW of mmm workers and a single firm. Its production technology is a function y:2W→Ry : 2^W \to \mathbb{R}y:2W→R; y(C)y(C)y(C) is the gross product when the firm hires the set CCC. A salary vector s∈RWs \in \mathbb{R}^Ws∈RW assigns to each worker iii the salary sis_isi​ the firm must pay to hire him or her. The firm's net profit is

π(C;s)=y(C)−∑i∈Csi,\pi(C; s) = y(C) - \sum_{i \in C} s_i ,π(C;s)=y(C)−i∈C∑​si​,

and CCC is demanded at sss, written C∈M(s)C \in M(s)C∈M(s), if it maximizes π( ⋅ ;s)\pi(\,\cdot\,; s)π(⋅;s) over all subsets of WWW (problem (A) of the paper). The technology satisfies (GS) if for all salary vectors s≤s~s \le \tilde ss≤s~ and every C∈M(s)C \in M(s)C∈M(s) there is C~∈M(s~)\tilde C \in M(\tilde s)C~∈M(s~) with

T(C)={ i∈C:s~i=si }⊆C~.T(C) = \{\, i \in C : \tilde s_i = s_i \,\} \subseteq \tilde C .T(C)={i∈C:s~i​=si​}⊆C~.

Workers are alike in production when the product depends only on how many are hired: y(C)=yˉ(∣C∣)y(C) = \bar y(|C|)y(C)=yˉ​(∣C∣) for some yˉ:N→R\bar y : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}yˉ​:N→R. The workers remain distinct individuals, since their salaries can differ. The function yˉ\bar yyˉ​ has nonincreasing returns to workers (DR) if

yˉ(w+1)−yˉ(w)≤yˉ(w)−yˉ(w−1)for every integer w, 1≤w≤m−1.\bar y(w + 1) - \bar y(w) \le \bar y(w) - \bar y(w - 1) \qquad \text{for every integer } w,\ 1 \le w \le m - 1 .yˉ​(w+1)−yˉ​(w)≤yˉ​(w)−yˉ​(w−1)for every integer w, 1≤w≤m−1.

A technology yyy is subadditive if y(C∪D)≤y(C)+y(D)y(C \cup D) \le y(C) + y(D)y(C∪D)≤y(C)+y(D) for disjoint C,D⊆WC, D \subseteq WC,D⊆W.

In the Lean development these are profit, IsDemanded, GrossSubstitutesOn y Set.univ, DR (Fintype.card W) ybar and Subadditive y, in the namespace KelsoCrawford.Returns.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 1499)

For every yˉ:N→R\bar y : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}yˉ​:N→R,

(DR) for yˉ on {0,…,m}  ⟺  C↦yˉ(∣C∣) satisfies (GS) on RW.\text{(DR) for } \bar y \text{ on } \{0, \dots, m\} \iff C \mapsto \bar y(|C|) \text{ satisfies (GS) on } \mathbb{R}^W .(DR) for yˉ​ on {0,…,m}⟺C↦yˉ​(∣C∣) satisfies (GS) on RW.

Milestones

  1. (DR) implies (GS) (proof of Theorem 6, p. 1499).
  2. If (DR) fails, (GS) fails (proof of Theorem 6, pp. 1499–1500): if for some www with 1≤w≤m−11 \le w \le m - 11≤w≤m−1
yˉ(w+1)−yˉ(w)>yˉ(w)−yˉ(w−1),(19)\bar y(w + 1) - \bar y(w) > \bar y(w) - \bar y(w - 1), \tag{19}yˉ​(w+1)−yˉ​(w)>yˉ​(w)−yˉ​(w−1),(19)

then C↦yˉ(∣C∣)C \mapsto \bar y(|C|)C↦yˉ​(∣C∣) violates (GS). 3. Two workers (p. 1500), off the goal's path: if ∣W∣=2|W| = 2∣W∣=2 and y(∅)=0y(\emptyset) = 0y(∅)=0, then yyy satisfies (GS) if and only if yyy is subadditive, that is v1+v2≥v12v_1 + v_2 \ge v_{12}v1​+v2​≥v12​.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 6 gives a production-side reading of (GS): restricted to identical workers it is nonincreasing returns, so (GS) can be viewed as the generalization of that convexity condition to heterogeneous workers. The paper uses this reading to explain why something like (GS) is needed for existence: without it the core and the competitive equilibrium may fail to exist, as the example of Section 6 shows (mission 7 of this series). The two-worker claim locates the boundary further: with two workers (GS) is subadditivity, while with three or more subadditivity is no longer enough.

Formalizing it. Nothing of this paper was on Prove2Me before this series. Theorem 6 is a proved result in the paper. This draft provides compiling Lean statements of both directions, with (GS) in the paper's own form (real salary vectors and the set T(C)T(C)T(C)), and of the two-worker characterization; their proofs remain open. A completed mission would provide machine-checked proofs of those statements. The statements fix the boundary conventions exactly (which www are constrained, what happens with zero or one worker), which the informal argument leaves implicit. The definitions of profit, demand and (GS) are the same as in the other missions of the series (1–5 and 7), so proofs here are reusable there.

Difficulty

For (DR) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (GS), the natural argument sorts workers by salary and observes that a profit-maximizing firm hires the w∗w^*w∗ cheapest workers. With ties among salaries this description is not literally true (any w∗w^*w∗ cheapest workers will do), and after a salary increase the new optimal size and the new ranking change at once; showing that some new maximizer keeps every worker whose salary stayed fixed requires a careful exchange argument rather than a monotone comparison of indices. For the converse, a single failure of (DR) must be turned into an explicit pair of salary vectors; the construction must make one worker strictly demanded before the change and strictly undemanded after it, which requires controlling every competing set, not only the sets of the critical sizes www and w+1w + 1w+1. The two-worker characterization requires a case analysis over the four candidate demands at every salary pair, including ties.

Formalization scope

Workers form an arbitrary finite type W with m = Fintype.card W; a technology is a function Finset W → ℝ, and "alike in production" is the technology fun C => ybar C.card with ybar : ℕ → ℝ. Salaries are arbitrary real vectors W → ℝ, and (GS) is required on all of RW\mathbb{R}^WRW (Set.univ), the continuous version that Theorem 6 is about. A discrete market can satisfy (GS) on its salary grid while its continuous version does not, so the discrete version is a different statement and is not targeted here. (DR) is written for natural numbers with 1 ≤ w and w + 1 ≤ m, so that w - 1 never truncates. For m≤1m \le 1m≤1 it is vacuous, and no lower bound on mmm is imposed. Neither (MP) nor (NFL), yˉ(0)=0\bar y(0) = 0yˉ​(0)=0, is assumed in Theorem 6: the paper uses neither, and adding them would weaken the theorem. The two-worker claim keeps the paper's normalization y(∅)=0y(\emptyset) = 0y(∅)=0 and uses its general definition of subadditivity over disjoint pairs.

A trivializing formalization would restrict (GS) to a single salary vector, quantify demand over a subfamily of sets, or replace "some demanded set contains T(C)T(C)T(C)" by "the given set does", and is ruled out by the definitions above, which follow the paper's (A) and (GS) word for word. The read-out of the goal as two milestones is the paper's own split of its proof.

Infrastructure needed: finite sums over Finset, sorting of a finite salary vector, and elementary facts on concave sequences. Contributions that would be reusable beyond this mission include a general lemma that concave functions of cardinality yield gross-substitutes demand, and the link between (GS) and M♮^\natural♮-concavity of set functions (Murota's gross-substitutes axioms are on Prove2Me as Shuze Chen's DiscreteConvex_MConvexFunctionsC_MNatGS, a related but different object: one price per good and integer bundles). Proofs of either direction, of the two-worker claim, or of intermediate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. S. Kelso, Jr. and V. P. Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50(6) (1982), 1483–1504. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913392
  • V. P. Crawford and E. M. Knoer, Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers, Econometrica 49(2) (1981), 437–450. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913320
  • S. Fujishige and Z. Yang, A note on Kelso and Crawford's gross substitutes condition, Mathematics of Operations Research 28(3) (2003), 463–469. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.28.3.463.16393
  • J. W. Hatfield and P. R. Milgrom, Matching with contracts, American Economic Review 95(4) (2005), 913–935. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Monotone Comparative Statics I: The Argmax Is Monotone Nondecreasing in (t, S) If and Only If f Is Quasisupermodular in x and Has the Single Crossing Property in (x; t)Research Paper

Why monotone comparative statics matters

An optimization problem often changes when a parameter changes: a price rises, a constraint expands, or a strategic environment shifts. Comparative statics asks whether the optimal choice moves in a predictable direction. The usual numerical tools, such as derivatives, can be unavailable when choices form a discrete set or the objective is neither smooth nor concave. Milgrom and Shannon's Monotonicity Theorem gives a condition expressed entirely through order and preference comparisons. It applies to individual optimization problems and supplies the order argument used later in their paper for games with strategic complementarities.

Their 1994 paper moves beyond cardinal conditions such as supermodularity and increasing differences. Those conditions imply useful comparative statics, but they can change under a strictly increasing transformation of the objective even though every argmax set stays the same. Quasisupermodularity and single crossing describe the comparisons that actually govern the argmax. The theorem characterizes these conditions through the behavior of optimizers over all constraint sets, rather than giving only a sufficient test. The historical relationship and the claims in this paragraph are described in Milgrom and Shannon, Sections 1–2.

Ordered choices, constraints, and preferences

Let XXX be a lattice: a partially ordered choice set in which every two choices x,yx,yx,y have a meet x∧yx\wedge yx∧y and a join x∨yx\vee yx∨y. Let TTT be a partially ordered parameter set and f:X×T→Rf:X\times T\to\mathbb Rf:X×T→R an objective. For any constraint set S⊆XS\subseteq XS⊆X, define the possibly empty maximizer set

M(t,S)=argmax⁡x∈Sf(x,t)={x∈S:f(y,t)≤f(x,t) for every y∈S}.M(t,S)=\operatorname{argmax}_{x\in S}f(x,t)=\{x\in S: f(y,t)\le f(x,t)\text{ for every }y\in S\}.M(t,S)=argmaxx∈S​f(x,t)={x∈S:f(y,t)≤f(x,t) for every y∈S}.

The strong set order, written A≤sBA\le_s BA≤s​B, compares subsets of the lattice by requiring a∧b∈Aa\wedge b\in Aa∧b∈A and a∨b∈Ba\vee b\in Ba∨b∈B for every a∈Aa\in Aa∈A and b∈Bb\in Bb∈B. It can compare feasible sets as well as sets of optimizers. On singleton sets it agrees with the order on XXX. It also holds vacuously if either set is empty; it is reflexive at SSS exactly when SSS is a sublattice. These are the paper's conventions on page 159.

A function g:X→Rg:X\to\mathbb Rg:X→R is quasisupermodular if, for every x,y∈Xx,y\in Xx,y∈X, both

g(x∧y)≤g(x)⇒g(y)≤g(x∨y),g(x∧y)<g(x)⇒g(y)<g(x∨y)g(x\wedge y)\le g(x)\Rightarrow g(y)\le g(x\vee y),\qquad g(x\wedge y)<g(x)\Rightarrow g(y)<g(x\vee y)g(x∧y)≤g(x)⇒g(y)≤g(x∨y),g(x∧y)<g(x)⇒g(y)<g(x∨y)

hold. The single crossing property of fff in (x;t)(x;t)(x;t) requires, whenever x′′<x′x''<x'x′′<x′ and t′′<t′t''<t't′′<t′, that a weak or strict preference for x′x'x′ over x′′x''x′′ at t′′t''t′′ remains respectively weak or strict at t′t't′. The strict version sends even a weak preference at t′′t''t′′ to a strict one at t′t't′. These definitions are given on pages 160 and 162.

Formalization targets

Theorem 4: the monotonicity equivalence

The main target is Theorem 4 on page 162:

[∀t≤t′, S≤sS′:M(t,S)≤sM(t′,S′)]⟺[∀t, f(⋅,t) is quasisupermodular on X]∧[f has single crossing in (x;t)].\bigl[\forall t\le t',\ S\le_s S': M(t,S)\le_s M(t',S')\bigr] \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \bigl[\forall t,\ f(\cdot,t)\text{ is quasisupermodular on }X\bigr] \land\bigl[f\text{ has single crossing in }(x;t)\bigr].[∀t≤t′, S≤s​S′:M(t,S)≤s​M(t′,S′)]⟺[∀t, f(⋅,t) is quasisupermodular on X]∧[f has single crossing in (x;t)].

The milestone list records the two necessity claims and the sufficiency claim separately, using the three corresponding passages of the paper's proof. The goal keeps both directions together. It imposes no restriction on which subsets may be used as constraints.

Consequences and the stronger selection statement

Corollary 1 characterizes quasisupermodularity alone through monotonicity as the constraint set changes, with no varying parameter. Corollary 2 says that the maximizers over a sublattice themselves form a sublattice. The reflexivity remark identifies when S≤sSS\le_s SS≤s​S holds. Theorem 4′ uses the strict single crossing property and a nondecreasing feasible-set correspondence S:T→2XS:T\to 2^XS:T→2X to conclude that every selection of maximizers is nondecreasing. These nearby results share the definition layer with the main theorem and give distinct targets for the formal development.

What the result supplies

The equivalence turns an order property of an entire family of optimization problems into two properties of the objective. In particular, its converse shows that if every feasible-set comparison produces monotone maximizers, then quasisupermodularity and single crossing are forced. This matters for problems where an analyst can reason about choice behavior more directly than about algebraic properties of fff. The corollaries also separate the effects of constraints and parameters and describe the structure of the optimal-choice set. The paper develops these consequences on pages 162–163.

The theorem is proved in the paper. The remaining work here is a machine-checked Lean proof of the ordinal characterization, its two directions, and the adjacent consequences. Published Prove2Me definitions already encode the strong set order, and its Topkis series covers related cardinal hypotheses such as supermodularity and increasing differences. This mission adds the paper's quasisupermodularity and single crossing predicates and seeks formal proofs of the distinct ordinal results. The separate characterization and linear-perturbation results of the same paper are targets of the other missions in this series.

Where the proof is difficult

The obstacle is the interaction of two orders. An increase in ttt changes preferences, while an increase in SSS changes which choices can be compared. A pointwise claim that an optimizer rises does not follow from either order condition alone, particularly when maximizers tie or are incomparable. The main theorem concerns sets of maximizers under the strong set order, so both the meet and join of optimizers at two parameter–constraint pairs must land in the correct maximizing sets. Conversely, observing monotonicity for one fixed feasible set cannot establish quasisupermodularity; the equivalence relies on monotonicity across every constraint set. The weak and strict preference clauses have different roles, so replacing either by the other changes the target. These are the distinctions visible in Theorem 4 and its proof.

Formalization scope

Lean represents XXX with Lattice, TTT with PartialOrder, and f:X→T→Rf:X\to T\to\mathbb Rf:X→T→R in curried form. No finiteness, total order, topology, measurability, or maximizer-attainment hypothesis is imposed. The paper's product order for product lattices is Lean's usual componentwise order. The imported Supermodularity.Lattices.InducedSetOrder is exactly the paper's strong set order, including its behavior on empty sets. The definition argmaxOn returns the set of points in SSS whose objective value bounds every value attained in SSS; it may be empty.

Quasisupermodularity is encoded with a reusable set argument but applied to Set.univ in every theorem here, so the property concerns the whole lattice. Single crossing compares strictly ordered choices and strictly ordered parameters and preserves both weak and strict preferences. ArgmaxMonotone compares weakly ordered parameters and all constraint sets under the strong set order. Theorem 4′ encodes a selection on an arbitrary domain D⊆TD\subseteq TD⊆T where maximizers actually exist; it makes no global existence assertion. For Corollary 2, an arbitrary parameter is fixed and its objective is written g:X→Rg:X\to\mathbb Rg:X→R.

These choices rule out easy specializations that would change the theorem: taking XXX to be a chain, restricting quasisupermodularity to a selected feasible set, demanding nonempty argmax sets, or dropping strict preference clauses. The reusable development consists of the maximizer-set definition, the two ordinal predicates, and their relation to the published strong set order. Contributions proving the goal, its three proof-direction milestones, the corollaries, and the selection theorem all fit this scope.

Selected references

  • Paul Milgrom and Chris Shannon, Monotone Comparative Statics, Econometrica 62(1), 1994, 157–180. DOI: 10.2307/2951479.
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