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Operations Research

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The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Convex Optimization I: Under the Nesting Condition, a Worst-Case Expectation Constraint over a Standardized Ambiguity Set Is Equivalent to a Finite Conic SystemResearch Paper

Motivation

A constraint E[v(x,z~)]≤w\mathbb E[v(x,\tilde z)] \le wE[v(x,z~)]≤w on a decision xxx requires the distribution of the random vector z~\tilde zz~. In practice that distribution is known only partially: its support, a few moments, or the probability mass of some regions estimated from data. Distributionally robust optimization asks that the constraint hold for every distribution consistent with this information. Wiesemann, Kuhn and Sim (Optimization Online 3757, 2013; Oper. Res. 62(6), 2014) proposed one standardized format for this information. Their format contains, as special cases, many ambiguity sets used earlier: support and moment information (Delage and Ye, 2010), and mean–covariance and directional-deviation information (Goh and Sim, 2010). They then characterized exactly when a worst-case expectation constraint over such a set has a finite conic reformulation. This mission formalizes that characterization: the paper's Theorem 1 and the steps of its proof.

Setting

The uncertain parameters are z~∈RP\tilde z \in \mathbb R^Pz~∈RP, and an auxiliary random vector u~∈RQ\tilde u \in \mathbb R^Qu~∈RQ may be added to describe structure of z~\tilde zz~. A proper cone K\mathcal KK is a closed convex cone with K∩(−K)={0}\mathcal K \cap(-\mathcal K) = \{0\}K∩(−K)={0} and nonempty interior. Write x≼Kyx \preccurlyeq_{\mathcal K} yx≼K​y for y−x∈Ky - x \in \mathcal Ky−x∈K, and K⋆={y:x⊤y≥0 ∀x∈K}\mathcal K^\star = \{y : x^\top y \ge 0\ \forall x \in \mathcal K\}K⋆={y:x⊤y≥0 ∀x∈K} for the dual cone. For indices i∈I={1,…,I}i \in \mathcal I = \{1,\dots,I\}i∈I={1,…,I} the confidence sets are

Ci={(z,u):Ciz+Diu≼Kici},\mathcal C_i = \{(z,u) : C_i z + D_i u \preccurlyeq_{\mathcal K_i} c_i\},Ci​={(z,u):Ci​z+Di​u≼Ki​​ci​},

with matrices Ci,DiC_i, D_iCi​,Di​, vectors cic_ici​ and proper cones Ki\mathcal K_iKi​. The ambiguity set is

P={P:EP[Az~+Bu~]=b,  P[(z~,u~)∈Ci]∈[p‾i,p‾i]  ∀i∈I},\mathcal P = \Big\{\mathbb P : \mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[A\tilde z + B\tilde u] = b,\ \ \mathbb P[(\tilde z,\tilde u) \in \mathcal C_i] \in [\underline p_i,\overline p_i]\ \ \forall i \in \mathcal I\Big\},P={P:EP​[Az~+Bu~]=b,  P[(z~,u~)∈Ci​]∈[p​i​,p​i​]  ∀i∈I},

where 0≤p‾i≤p‾i≤10 \le \underline p_i \le \overline p_i \le 10≤p​i​≤p​i​≤1. The paper imposes three conditions:

  • (C1) CI\mathcal C_ICI​ is bounded and p‾I=p‾I=1\underline p_I = \overline p_I = 1p​I​=p​I​=1;
  • (C2) some P∈P\mathbb P \in \mathcal PP∈P meets every non-degenerate probability bound strictly;
  • (C3) the constraint function is a maximum of finitely many bi-affine pieces,
v(x,z)=max⁡l=1,…,L[(Slz+sl)⊤x+tl⊤z+tl].v(x,z) = \max_{l = 1,\dots,L} \big[(S_l z + s_l)^\top x + \mathbf t_l^\top z + t_l\big].v(x,z)=l=1,…,Lmax​[(Sl​z+sl​)⊤x+tl⊤​z+tl​].

The distributionally robust constraint (3) is EP[v(x,z~)]≤w\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[v(x,\tilde z)] \le wEP​[v(x,z~)]≤w for all P∈P\mathbb P \in \mathcal PP∈P.

A set AAA is strictly included in BBB, written A⋐BA \Subset BA⋐B, if AAA lies in the interior of BBB. The nesting condition (N) requires that any two distinct confidence sets be strictly nested or disjoint. For each iii, A(i)={i}∪{i′:Ci⋐Ci′}\mathcal A(i) = \{i\} \cup \{i' : \mathcal C_i \Subset \mathcal C_{i'}\}A(i)={i}∪{i′:Ci​⋐Ci′​} indexes the confidence sets containing Ci\mathcal C_iCi​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (pp. 10–11)

Under (C1)–(C3), (N) and the two regularity conditions (S1)–(S2) described below, the constraint (3) holds if and only if there are β∈RK\beta \in \mathbb R^Kβ∈RK, κ,λ∈R+I\kappa,\lambda \in \mathbb R^I_+κ,λ∈R+I​ and ϕil∈Ki⋆\phi_{il} \in \mathcal K_i^\starϕil​∈Ki⋆​ such that, for all i∈Ii \in \mathcal Ii∈I and lll,

b⊤β+∑i[p‾iκi−p‾iλi]≤w,ci⊤ϕil+sl⊤x+tl≤∑i′∈A(i)[κi′−λi′],b^\top\beta + \sum_{i}\big[\overline p_i\kappa_i - \underline p_i\lambda_i\big] \le w,\qquad c_i^\top\phi_{il} + s_l^\top x + t_l \le \sum_{i' \in \mathcal A(i)}[\kappa_{i'} - \lambda_{i'}],b⊤β+i∑​[p​i​κi​−p​i​λi​]≤w,ci⊤​ϕil​+sl⊤​x+tl​≤i′∈A(i)∑​[κi′​−λi′​], Ci⊤ϕil+A⊤β=Sl⊤x+tl,Di⊤ϕil+B⊤β=0.C_i^\top\phi_{il} + A^\top\beta = S_l^\top x + \mathbf t_l,\qquad D_i^\top\phi_{il} + B^\top\beta = 0.Ci⊤​ϕil​+A⊤β=Sl⊤​x+tl​,Di⊤​ϕil​+B⊤β=0.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1, sufficiency. The system implies (3), under (C1), (C3) and (N) alone.
  2. Lemma 1 (p. 34). For a strictly feasible conic confidence set, the semi-infinite constraint v(x,z)+f⊤z+g⊤u≤hv(x,z) + f^\top z + g^\top u \le hv(x,z)+f⊤z+g⊤u≤h on the set holds iff multipliers ϕl∈K⋆\phi_l \in \mathcal K^\starϕl​∈K⋆ exist with c⊤ϕl+sl⊤x+tl≤hc^\top\phi_l + s_l^\top x + t_l \le hc⊤ϕl​+sl⊤​x+tl​≤h, C⊤ϕl=Sl⊤x+tl+fC^\top\phi_l = S_l^\top x + \mathbf t_l + fC⊤ϕl​=Sl⊤​x+tl​+f and D⊤ϕl=gD^\top\phi_l = gD⊤ϕl​=g.
  3. The dual of the moment problem (p. 35). Constraint (3) holds iff some β\betaβ, κ,λ≥0\kappa,\lambda \ge 0κ,λ≥0 have objective value ≤w\le w≤w and satisfy [Az+Bu]⊤β+∑i1Ci(z,u)[κi−λi]≥v(x,z)[Az+Bu]^\top\beta + \sum_i \mathbf 1_{\mathcal C_i}(z,u)[\kappa_i - \lambda_i] \ge v(x,z)[Az+Bu]⊤β+∑i​1Ci​​(z,u)[κi​−λi​]≥v(x,z) on CI\mathcal C_ICI​.
  4. The partition step (p. 35). Under (N), the indicator constraint on CI\mathcal C_ICI​ is equivalent to constraints with the constant ∑A(i)\sum_{\mathcal A(i)}∑A(i)​ on the pieces C‾i=Ci∖⋃Ci′⋐CiCi′\overline{\mathcal C}_i = \mathcal C_i \setminus \bigcup_{\mathcal C_{i'} \Subset \mathcal C_i} \mathcal C_{i'}Ci​=Ci​∖⋃Ci′​⋐Ci​​Ci′​.
  5. The boundary step (pp. 35–36). The iii-th constraint holds on C‾i\overline{\mathcal C}_iCi​ iff it holds on all of Ci\mathcal C_iCi​.

Significance

When the Ki\mathcal K_iKi​ are orthants, second-order cones or semidefinite cones, Theorem 1 turns the semi-infinite, measure-valued constraint (3) into a linear, conic-quadratic or semidefinite system of size polynomial in the data. The paper's Theorem 2 shows that when nesting fails, even checking P≠∅\mathcal P \neq \emptysetP=∅ is strongly NP-hard. Theorem 1 is therefore the tractable side of a sharp dividing line. The paper builds its conservative approximation for non-nested sets (Theorem 3) and its lifting results (Section 3) on it.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. The formalization contributes two things. First, the duality theory for finite moment problems over measures on a compact set, and conic strong duality for strictly feasible sets: neither exists in Mathlib as stated. Second, a corrected statement. As printed, the "only if" direction of Theorem 1 is false, because (C2) does not give the strong duality the proof attributes to it. No machine-checked version of Theorem 1 is known.

Difficulty

The sufficiency half is weak duality: a pointwise inequality on CI\mathcal C_ICI​ integrated against any P∈P\mathbb P \in \mathcal PP∈P. The necessity half needs three facts.

  • Strong duality, with attainment, for an infinite-dimensional linear program over nonnegative measures. Here the obvious reference to a general conic duality theorem needs a constraint qualification on all moment constraints jointly, and (C2) controls only the probability bounds.
  • A geometric step: under (N), a constraint imposed on C‾i\overline{\mathcal C}_iCi​ extends to all of Ci\mathcal C_iCi​. This uses convexity of vvv in (z,u)(z,u)(z,u) together with the compactness of Ci\mathcal C_iCi​ and the strict inclusion of its descendants.
  • Conic duality with dual attainment for each confidence set (Lemma 1), which fails without strict feasibility.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, products are Matrix.mulVec and dotProduct, and the outcome space is (Fin nP → ℝ) × (Fin nQ → ℝ) with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra. The index set is Fin (nI + 1), 0-based, with CI\mathcal C_ICI​ = Fin.last nI. Probabilities are μ.real. Constraint (3) is stated in its "for all P\mathbb PP" form, so no supremum of reals appears. The scalar tlt_ltl​ and the vector tl\mathbf t_ltl​ are separate fields.

Every member of P\mathcal PP is a probability measure with finite first moment, so EP[Az~+Bu~]\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[A\tilde z + B\tilde u]EP​[Az~+Bu~] is a genuine integral and not Lean's default value 000. The expectation EP[v(x,z~)]\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[v(x,\tilde z)]EP​[v(x,z~)] is genuine as well, since vvv grows at most linearly. Hypothesis (C2) keeps P\mathcal PP nonempty, so (3) cannot hold vacuously. A sorry-free sanity file exhibits two nested intervals for which all hypotheses of the goal hold at once.

Hypotheses added to the paper's, each needed for a true statement:

  • (S1) moment-problem regularity. Every small common shift of bbb and of each probability interval stays feasible over finite measures on CI\mathcal C_ICI​. It is needed because with C1\mathcal C_1C1​ the unit disk, E[z~1]=1\mathbb E[\tilde z_1] = 1E[z~1​]=1, v=z2v = z_2v=z2​ and w=0w = 0w=0, constraint (3) holds but the system has no solution.
  • (S2) strict feasibility of every confidence set. It is needed because a confidence set that is a single boundary point of a second-order cone constraint admits no dual multipliers in Lemma 1.
  • Ci⊆CI\mathcal C_i \subseteq \mathcal C_ICi​⊆CI​ and P+Q≥1P + Q \ge 1P+Q≥1 in the partition and boundary steps. In dimension zero a set is strictly included in itself and C‾i\overline{\mathcal C}_iCi​ can be empty.

(S1) also excludes some instances the page allows: p‾i=0\overline p_i = 0p​i​=0 or p‾i=1\underline p_i = 1p​i​=1 for i≠Ii \ne Ii=I, and expectation rows that cannot be shifted in every direction by measures on CI\mathcal C_ICI​.

The sufficiency milestone drops (C2) and the standing bounds 0≤p‾i≤p‾i≤10 \le \underline p_i \le \overline p_i \le 10≤p​i​≤p​i​≤1, which only strengthens it.

Needed infrastructure, all reusable: conic duality for closed convex cones, Lagrangian duality for linear programs over finite measures on a compact set, and the extension of a convex inequality from the boundary of a compact set. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn, M. Sim, Distributionally Robust Convex Optimization, Optimization Online preprint 3757, version of September 22, 2013. https://optimization-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/3757.pdf ; Operations Research 62(6):1358–1376, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1314
  • A. Shapiro, On duality theory of conic linear problems, in Semi-Infinite Programming, chapter 7, Kluwer, 2001 (reference [56] of the paper; the result the proof of Theorem 1 cites as Proposition 3.4).
  • E. Delage, Y. Ye, Distributionally robust optimization under moment uncertainty with application to data-driven problems, Operations Research 58(3):595–612, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • J. Goh, M. Sim, Distributionally robust optimization and its tractable approximations, Operations Research 58(4):902–917, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0712
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Lectures on Modern Convex Optimization, SIAM, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718829
7 thms1 active userReviewed
Algebraic GeometryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality Conditions and Finite Convergence of Lasserre's Hierarchy II: Off a Proper Zariski-Closed Set of Input Data, the Classical Optimality Conditions Hold at Every Local MinimizerResearch Paper

Motivation

Lasserre's hierarchy is a sequence of semidefinite relaxations for minimizing a polynomial over a set defined by polynomial equations and inequalities (Lasserre 2001). Under the archimedean condition its optimal values converge to the true minimum, but only asymptotically in general; in practice the hierarchy is often exact at a small relaxation order. J. Nie's paper (arXiv:1206.0319v2, Math. Program. 146 (2014)) explains this gap in two steps. Its Theorem 1.1 shows that finite convergence follows when the classical optimality conditions of nonlinear programming hold at every global minimizer. Its Theorem 1.2, the subject of this mission, shows that those optimality conditions hold at every local minimizer for all input data outside the zero set of finitely many polynomials in the coefficients. Together the two results give finite convergence of Lasserre's hierarchy for generic archimedean problems.

The genericity statement is also of independent interest in nonlinear programming: it says that degenerate local minimizers (failing constraint qualification, strict complementarity or second order sufficiency) are an algebraically exceptional phenomenon for polynomial data of fixed degrees.

Setting

Fix nnn variables x=(x1,…,xn)x=(x_1,\dots,x_n)x=(x1​,…,xn​) and write R[x]d\mathbb R[x]_dR[x]d​ for the real polynomials of degree at most ddd. Problem (1.1) is

min⁡f(x)s.t.hi(x)=0 (i∈[m1]),gj(x)≥0 (j∈[m2]),\min f(x)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad h_i(x)=0\ (i\in[m_1]),\qquad g_j(x)\ge 0\ (j\in[m_2]),minf(x)s.t.hi​(x)=0 (i∈[m1​]),gj​(x)≥0 (j∈[m2​]),

with feasible set KKK. For u∈Ku\in Ku∈K the active set is J(u)={j:gj(u)=0}J(u)=\{j: g_j(u)=0\}J(u)={j:gj​(u)=0}. At uuu:

  • the constraint qualification condition (CQC) holds if ∇h1(u),…,∇hm1(u),∇gj(u)\nabla h_1(u),\dots,\nabla h_{m_1}(u),\nabla g_j(u)∇h1​(u),…,∇hm1​​(u),∇gj​(u) (j∈J(u)j\in J(u)j∈J(u)) are linearly independent;
  • Lagrange multipliers λ,μ\lambda,\muλ,μ satisfy (1.3) ∇f(u)=∑iλi∇hi(u)+∑jμj∇gj(u)\nabla f(u)=\sum_i\lambda_i\nabla h_i(u)+\sum_j\mu_j\nabla g_j(u)∇f(u)=∑i​λi​∇hi​(u)+∑j​μj​∇gj​(u) and (1.4) μjgj(u)=0\mu_jg_j(u)=0μj​gj​(u)=0, μj≥0\mu_j\ge0μj​≥0;
  • strict complementarity (1.5) is μj+gj(u)>0\mu_j+g_j(u)>0μj​+gj​(u)>0 for all jjj;
  • with L=f−∑iλihi−∑j∈J(u)μjgjL=f-\sum_i\lambda_ih_i-\sum_{j\in J(u)}\mu_jg_jL=f−∑i​λi​hi​−∑j∈J(u)​μj​gj​, the second order sufficiency condition (1.7) is vT∇2L(u)v>0v^T\nabla^2L(u)v>0vT∇2L(u)v>0 for every v≠0v\neq0v=0 orthogonal to all active constraint gradients.

The input data are the coefficient vectors of (f,h,g)∈R[x]d0×∏iR[x]di×∏jR[x]dj′(f,h,g)\in\mathbb R[x]_{d_0}\times\prod_i\mathbb R[x]_{d_i}\times\prod_j\mathbb R[x]_{d'_j}(f,h,g)∈R[x]d0​​×∏i​R[x]di​​×∏j​R[x]dj′​​; a polynomial in the coefficients is a real polynomial evaluated at that vector. The paper's Condition 4.3 lists four families of such polynomials: resultants Res\mathrm{Res}Res and discriminants Δ\DeltaΔ (§2.4) of subsets of the constraints, and the polynomials R\mathscr RR of (4.6) and D\mathscr DD of (4.11), which detect a complex projective solution of the homogenised critical-point systems (4.5) and (4.10). Homogenisation is p~(x~)=x0dp(x/x0)\tilde p(\tilde x)=x_0^{d}p(x/x_0)p~​(x~)=x0d​p(x/x0​) at the nominal degree ddd, with x~=(x0,…,xn)\tilde x=(x_0,\dots,x_n)x~=(x0​,…,xn​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.2

For positive degrees d0,di,dj′d_0,d_i,d'_jd0​,di​,dj′​ there are polynomials ϕ1,…,ϕL\phi_1,\dots,\phi_Lϕ1​,…,ϕL​ in the coefficients such that

∃ (f,h,g) admissible with ∏lϕl≠0,and∏lϕl(f,h,g)≠0 ⟹ CQC, (1.5), (1.7) at every local minimizer of (1.1).\exists\,(f,h,g)\text{ admissible with }\textstyle\prod_l\phi_l\neq0,\qquad\text{and}\qquad \prod_l\phi_l(f,h,g)\neq0\ \Longrightarrow\ \text{CQC, (1.5), (1.7) at every local minimizer of (1.1).}∃(f,h,g) admissible with ∏l​ϕl​=0,and∏l​ϕl​(f,h,g)=0 ⟹ CQC, (1.5), (1.7) at every local minimizer of (1.1).

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4.1: there is R\mathscr RR with R(p0,…,pk;q)=0\mathscr R(p_0,\dots,p_k;q)=0R(p0​,…,pk​;q)=0 iff (4.5) has a solution 0≠x~∈Cn+10\neq\tilde x\in\mathbb C^{n+1}0=x~∈Cn+1; and R≠0\mathscr R\neq0R=0 excludes solutions of (4.4) in Cn\mathbb C^nCn.
  2. Proposition 4.2: there is D\mathscr DD with D(p0,…,pk)=0\mathscr D(p_0,\dots,p_k)=0D(p0​,…,pk​)=0 iff (4.10) has a solution with x~≠0\tilde x\neq0x~=0, y≠0y\neq0y=0; and D≠0\mathscr D\neq0D=0 makes the KKT system (4.2) nonsingular.
  3. Proposition 4.4: at u∈Ku\in Ku∈K with multipliers satisfying (1.3) and μjgj(u)=0\mu_jg_j(u)=0μj​gj​(u)=0, items (a)–(d) of Condition 4.3 give at most n−m1n-m_1n−m1​ active constraints, CQC, λi≠0\lambda_i\neq0λi​=0 and μj≠0\mu_j\neq0μj​=0 on J(u)J(u)J(u), and det⁡H(u)≠0\det H(u)\neq0detH(u)=0 for H(u)=[∇2L(u)G(u)TG(u)0]H(u)=\left[\begin{smallmatrix}\nabla^2L(u)&G(u)^T\\G(u)&0\end{smallmatrix}\right]H(u)=[∇2L(u)G(u)​G(u)T0​].
  4. Lemma 4.6: at a local minimizer where G(u)G(u)G(u) has full rank, (1.7) holds iff det⁡H(u)≠0\det H(u)\neq0detH(u)=0.
  5. Proposition 4.5: Condition 4.3 implies CQC, strict complementarity and SOSC at every local minimizer.
  6. Appendix A: R\mathscr RR and D\mathscr DD do not vanish identically on the input space of given positive degrees.

Significance

The theorem gives the second half of the paper's explanation of finite convergence: combined with Theorem 1.1, Lasserre's hierarchy converges in finitely many steps for all archimedean problems with input outside a proper algebraic subset. Section 5 of the paper derives further consequences, for instance that Marshall's boundary Hessian condition holds on a Zariski open set of data, and that Putinar-type certificates exist generically on the boundary of the cone of nonnegative polynomials. Beyond polynomial optimization, the statement is a precise algebraic form of the folklore that "generic nonlinear programs are nondegenerate".

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. A formalization fixes the exact quantifier structure (the printed statement is vacuous without a nonvanishing clause, and two items of Proposition 4.4 need an extra hypothesis), and builds reusable infrastructure: projective elimination over C\mathbb CC, homogenisation at a nominal degree, and the bordered-Hessian characterization of second order sufficiency.

Difficulty

The local part (Proposition 4.4, Lemma 4.6, Proposition 4.5) is linear algebra plus first and second order necessary conditions. The global part is not. Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 need the main theorem of elimination theory: the set of coefficient vectors for which a homogeneous (or bihomogeneous) system has a nonzero complex solution is Zariski closed, defined by polynomials in the coefficients. Mathlib has the univariate resultant only. Appendix A, which shows these polynomials do not vanish identically, has to control the homogenised systems both at finite points and at points at infinity (x0=0x_0=0x0​=0), where only the leading forms of the data are seen. Reasoning over R\mathbb RR alone does not suffice: the set of data whose real system is solvable is not the zero set of a polynomial.

Formalization scope

Polynomials are MvPolynomial (Fin n) ℝ, points are Fin n → ℝ, and gradients and Hessians are formal partial derivatives. Homogenised polynomials have complex coefficients in n + 1 variables, variable 0 being x0x_0x0​, and homogenisation uses the nominal degree ddd, not the actual degree. CQC is linear independence of an indexed family (repeated gradients count twice). The optimality conditions are bundled: CQC together with one multiplier pair satisfying (1.3), (1.4), (1.5) and (1.7); under CQC the multipliers are unique.

Condition 4.3 is encoded through the defining properties of Res, Δ, R\mathscr RR and D\mathscr DD (unsolvability of the corresponding complex projective systems) rather than through the polynomials themselves; since the goal is existential in the polynomials, this is not a weakening. Coefficient variables exist for monomials of every degree, so the goal's nonvanishing clause is asserted at an admissible input: a formal polynomial that is nonzero but vanishes on all admissible data (such as the variable of a monomial of degree d0+1d_0+1d0​+1) does not satisfy it. Without that clause the printed theorem would be satisfied by ϕ1=0\phi_1=0ϕ1​=0.

Hypotheses added to the page, each disclosed in the statements: m1≤nm_1\le nm1​≤n in Propositions 4.4 and 4.5 (Condition 4.3's standing assumption; Theorem 1.2 is stated for all m1m_1m1​, as printed), the nonvanishing clause in Theorem 1.2, and item (a) of Condition 4.3 in Proposition 4.4 ii)–iv) (with item (b) alone, n=1n=1n=1, g1=x+x2g_1=x+x^2g1​=x+x2, g2=−x+x2g_2=-x+x^2g2​=−x+x2, u=0u=0u=0 violates CQC). Proposition 4.2's nonsingularity is asserted at all complex critical pairs.

A complete development needs projective elimination theory over C\mathbb CC (reusable well beyond this mission), multivariate resultants and discriminants as polynomial functions of coefficients, Euler's identity for forms, and genericity facts about critical points of polynomial programs. Contributions to any of these, and direct proofs of the local milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Nie, Optimality conditions and finite convergence of Lasserre's hierarchy, Math. Program. 146 (2014); preprint arXiv:1206.0319v2, 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.0319v2, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0680-x
  • J.B. Lasserre, Global optimization with polynomials and the problem of moments, SIAM J. Optim. 11(3) (2001) 796–817. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400366802
  • R. Hartshorne, Algebraic Geometry, GTM 52, Springer, 1977 (Theorem I.5.7A, elimination). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3849-0
  • I. Gelfand, M. Kapranov, A. Zelevinsky, Discriminants, Resultants, and Multidimensional Determinants, Birkhäuser, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4771-1
11 thms1 active userReviewed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality Conditions and Finite Convergence of Lasserre's Hierarchy I: Under Archimedeanness, the Classical Optimality Conditions at Every Global Minimizer Imply Finite ConvergenceResearch Paper

Motivation

Polynomial optimization asks for the global minimum of a polynomial fff over a set K⊆RnK \subseteq \mathbb R^nK⊆Rn cut out by polynomial equations and inequalities. It contains nonconvex quadratic programming, max-cut, and many problems from control and engineering. Lasserre's hierarchy (Lasserre 2001) replaces this problem by a sequence of semidefinite programs whose optimal values fkf_kfk​ increase towards the true minimum fmin⁡f_{\min}fmin​. Under the archimedean condition, Putinar's Positivstellensatz (Putinar 1993) gives asymptotic convergence fk→fmin⁡f_k \to f_{\min}fk​→fmin​.

In computations the hierarchy usually reaches fmin⁡f_{\min}fmin​ exactly at a small order (Henrion and Lasserre), while the theory guaranteed only the limit. Known failures of finite convergence were special constructions, for example the Motzkin polynomial on the unit ball. Nie (2014) resolves this gap: finite convergence holds whenever the classical optimality conditions of nonlinear programming hold at every global minimizer.

Timeline. Lasserre (2001) introduces the hierarchy and proves fk→fmin⁡f_k \to f_{\min}fk​→fmin​ under archimedeanness. Laurent (2007) and Nie (2013) prove finite convergence when h=0h = 0h=0 has finitely many complex, respectively real, solutions. Marshall (2006, 2009) introduces the boundary hessian condition and proves that it yields a representation of f−fmin⁡f - f_{\min}f−fmin​ in the quadratic module. Nie (arXiv 2012, Math. Program. 2014) shows that the classical optimality conditions imply the boundary hessian condition, and derives finite convergence.

Setting

Fix polynomials f,h1,…,hm1,g1,…,gm2∈R[x]f, h_1, \dots, h_{m_1}, g_1, \dots, g_{m_2} \in \mathbb R[x]f,h1​,…,hm1​​,g1​,…,gm2​​∈R[x], x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn, and the problem

min⁡f(x)s.t.hi(x)=0 (i∈[m1]),gj(x)≥0 (j∈[m2]),\min f(x) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad h_i(x) = 0 \ (i \in [m_1]),\quad g_j(x) \ge 0 \ (j \in [m_2]),minf(x)s.t.hi​(x)=0 (i∈[m1​]),gj​(x)≥0 (j∈[m2​]),

with feasible set KKK and minimum value fmin⁡f_{\min}fmin​. Put g0:=1g_0 := 1g0​:=1. A polynomial is SOS if it is a sum of squares of polynomials. For k∈Nk \in \mathbb Nk∈N the truncated ideal and the truncated quadratic module are

⟨h⟩2k={∑iϕihi:deg⁡(ϕihi)≤2k},Qk(g)={∑j=0m2σjgj:σj SOS, deg⁡(σjgj)≤2k},\langle h\rangle_{2k} = \Big\{\sum_{i} \phi_i h_i : \deg(\phi_i h_i) \le 2k\Big\}, \qquad Q_k(g) = \Big\{\sum_{j=0}^{m_2} \sigma_j g_j : \sigma_j \text{ SOS},\ \deg(\sigma_j g_j) \le 2k\Big\},⟨h⟩2k​={i∑​ϕi​hi​:deg(ϕi​hi​)≤2k},Qk​(g)={j=0∑m2​​σj​gj​:σj​ SOS, deg(σj​gj​)≤2k},

and Q(g)=⋃kQk(g)Q(g) = \bigcup_k Q_k(g)Q(g)=⋃k​Qk​(g). The order-kkk relaxation is max⁡γ\max \gammamaxγ s.t. f−γ∈⟨h⟩2k+Qk(g)f - \gamma \in \langle h\rangle_{2k} + Q_k(g)f−γ∈⟨h⟩2k​+Qk​(g), with optimal value fkf_kfk​. The archimedean condition asks that R−∑ixi2∈⟨h⟩2t+Qt(g)R - \sum_i x_i^2 \in \langle h\rangle_{2t} + Q_t(g)R−∑i​xi2​∈⟨h⟩2t​+Qt​(g) for some ttt and some R>0R > 0R>0. The hierarchy has finite convergence if fk=fmin⁡f_k = f_{\min}fk​=fmin​ for some kkk.

At a point uuu with active set J(u)={j:gj(u)=0}J(u) = \{j : g_j(u) = 0\}J(u)={j:gj​(u)=0}:

  • the constraint qualification (CQC) asks that ∇hi(u)\nabla h_i(u)∇hi​(u) (i∈[m1]i \in [m_1]i∈[m1​]) and ∇gj(u)\nabla g_j(u)∇gj​(u) (j∈J(u)j \in J(u)j∈J(u)) be linearly independent;
  • multipliers λ,μ\lambda, \muλ,μ satisfy (1.3)–(1.4) if ∇f(u)=∑iλi∇hi(u)+∑jμj∇gj(u)\nabla f(u) = \sum_i \lambda_i \nabla h_i(u) + \sum_j \mu_j \nabla g_j(u)∇f(u)=∑i​λi​∇hi​(u)+∑j​μj​∇gj​(u), μjgj(u)=0\mu_j g_j(u) = 0μj​gj​(u)=0 and μj≥0\mu_j \ge 0μj​≥0;
  • strict complementarity (SCC) asks μj+gj(u)>0\mu_j + g_j(u) > 0μj​+gj​(u)>0 for all jjj;
  • second order sufficiency (SOSC) asks vT∇x2L(u)v>0v^T \nabla^2_x L(u) v > 0vT∇x2​L(u)v>0 for all nonzero vvv orthogonal to every ∇hi(u)\nabla h_i(u)∇hi​(u) and every active ∇gj(u)\nabla g_j(u)∇gj​(u), where L=f−∑iλihi−∑j∈J(u)μjgjL = f - \sum_i \lambda_i h_i - \sum_{j \in J(u)} \mu_j g_jL=f−∑i​λi​hi​−∑j∈J(u)​μj​gj​.

The boundary hessian condition (BHC) at uuu asks for local parameters t1,…,tℓt_1, \dots, t_\ellt1​,…,tℓ​ of the variety VR(h)V_{\mathbb R}(h)VR​(h) near uuu such that tj=gνjt_j = g_{\nu_j}tj​=gνj​​ for j≤rj \le rj≤r and KKK is locally {t1,…,tr≥0}\{t_1, \dots, t_r \ge 0\}{t1​,…,tr​≥0}. In these parameters the linear part of fff must be a1t1+⋯+artra_1 t_1 + \dots + a_r t_ra1​t1​+⋯+ar​tr​ with all aj>0a_j > 0aj​>0, and its quadratic part on t1=⋯=tr=0t_1 = \dots = t_r = 0t1​=⋯=tr​=0 must be positive definite.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.1

If the archimedean condition holds and CQC, SCC and SOSC hold at every global minimizer of the problem, then

∃ k∈N:fk=fmin⁡.\exists\, k \in \mathbb N : \quad f_k = f_{\min}.∃k∈N:fk​=fmin​.

The goal fixes no order kkk and no rate; it asserts exactly the paper's finite convergence.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.1: at a local minimizer, CQC + SCC + SOSC imply BHC.
  2. Theorem 2.4 (Marshall): archimedean and BHC at every global minimizer imply f−fmin⁡∈I(VR(h))+Q(g)f - f_{\min} \in I(V_{\mathbb R}(h)) + Q(g)f−fmin​∈I(VR​(h))+Q(g).
  3. Real Nullstellensatz: p≡0p \equiv 0p≡0 on VR(h)V_{\mathbb R}(h)VR​(h) implies p2e+σ2∈⟨h⟩p^{2e} + \sigma_2 \in \langle h\ranglep2e+σ2​∈⟨h⟩ for some SOS σ2\sigma_2σ2​.
  4. 1+t+ct2e1 + t + c t^{2e}1+t+ct2e is SOS for some c>0c > 0c>0 (e≥1e \ge 1e≥1).
  5. The ε\varepsilonε-argument: a representation f−fmin⁡∈I(VR(h))+Q(g)f - f_{\min} \in I(V_{\mathbb R}(h)) + Q(g)f−fmin​∈I(VR​(h))+Q(g) makes γ=fmin⁡−ε\gamma = f_{\min} - \varepsilonγ=fmin​−ε feasible at one order k0k_0k0​ for all ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0.
  6. fk≤fmin⁡f_k \le f_{\min}fk​≤fmin​ for all kkk and {fk}\{f_k\}{fk​} is nondecreasing.
  7. Companion, Proposition 3.4: if every relaxation attains its value and the first order condition fails at a global minimizer, there is no finite convergence.

Significance

The theorem turns an algebraic question (does a degree-bounded certificate of f−fmin⁡+εf - f_{\min} + \varepsilonf−fmin​+ε exist uniformly in ε\varepsilonε?) into conditions checkable by linear algebra at the minimizers. Combined with the paper's second main result, that these conditions hold off a proper Zariski-closed set of input data, it shows that finite convergence of Lasserre's hierarchy is generic under archimedeanness. This is the theoretical explanation for the finite convergence observed in practice, and it underlies later work on flat truncation and the detection of optimality in moment relaxations.

Formalizing it produces the first machine-checked statements of Lasserre's hierarchy, truncated quadratic modules and the boundary hessian condition on the platform. The paper's own argument (Theorem 3.1 and the ε\varepsilonε-argument) is short. Two cited results it rests on, Marshall's Theorem 9.5.3 and the Real Nullstellensatz, are proved in the literature but, as far as is known, have no formal proof in Mathlib or elsewhere. The result itself is proved (Nie 2014); none of it is formalized.

Difficulty

The obvious route is Putinar's Positivstellensatz applied to f−fmin⁡+εf - f_{\min} + \varepsilonf−fmin​+ε. It gives a certificate for each ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0, but its degree grows as ε→0\varepsilon \to 0ε→0, so it yields only fk→fmin⁡f_k \to f_{\min}fk​→fmin​. Finite convergence needs a certificate whose degree is bounded uniformly in ε\varepsilonε, which is a statement about f−fmin⁡f - f_{\min}f−fmin​ itself, a polynomial that vanishes on KKK and is therefore not strictly positive. Putinar's theorem says nothing there. Marshall's theorem supplies the missing representation under the boundary hessian condition, and its proof uses local real-analytic geometry at the zeros of f−fmin⁡f - f_{\min}f−fmin​, together with real algebra of quadratic modules.

Theorem 3.1 asks for a smooth local parametrization of VR(h)V_{\mathbb R}(h)VR​(h) whose first coordinates are prescribed constraint functions, and for control of the Taylor coefficients of fff in those parameters; Mathlib has the analytic ingredients but no such constructions for real varieties. The Real Nullstellensatz depends on the theory of real fields and real ideals. Neither cited result is available in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Polynomials are MvPolynomial (Fin n) ℝ, points are Fin n → ℝ, and the paper's indices 1,…,m1, \dots, m1,…,m are Fin m; m1=0m_1 = 0m1​=0 or m2=0m_2 = 0m2​=0 is allowed. Gradients and Hessians come from formal partial derivatives. SOS is Mathlib's IsSumSq. fkf_kfk​ is a supremum in EReal (it is −∞-\infty−∞ when the relaxation is infeasible). fmin⁡f_{\min}fmin​ is a real number that is the least value of fff on KKK, which excludes only K=∅K = \emptysetK=∅. The archimedean condition is the truncated form of p. 2, equivalent to §2.2's. I(V)I(V)I(V) is Mathlib's vanishingIdeal. The multipliers of SCC and SOSC are the ones that satisfy (1.3)–(1.4). The boundary hessian condition is encoded with a C∞C^\inftyC∞ parametrization Ψ\PsiΨ of VR(h)V_{\mathbb R}(h)VR​(h) near uuu that is an immersion and a homeomorphism onto its image, together with nonsingularity of uuu in the real-algebraic sense (n−ℓn - \elln−ℓ polynomials vanishing on VR(h)V_{\mathbb R}(h)VR​(h) with independent gradients at uuu); Marshall's analytic parameters give the same condition, because both requirements are invariant under a change of parameters that fixes t1,…,trt_1, \dots, t_rt1​,…,tr​.

Several encodings would make the statements trivial or false, and the formalization excludes them. Degree bounds are per term, on each ϕihi\phi_i h_iϕi​hi​ and each σjgj\sigma_j g_jσj​gj​ (including σ0\sigma_0σ0​), never on the sum. fkf_kfk​ is never a real sSup, which would be 000 on an infeasible relaxation. CQC is linear independence of an indexed family, not of a set, so repeated gradients are dependent. The boundary hessian condition is not defined through the chart of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Finite convergence is fk=fmin⁡f_k = f_{\min}fk​=fmin​, not f−fmin⁡∈⟨h⟩2k+Qk(g)f - f_{\min} \in \langle h\rangle_{2k} + Q_k(g)f−fmin​∈⟨h⟩2k​+Qk​(g).

A complete development needs: truncated quadratic modules and their monotonicity; univariate SOS criteria; the Real Nullstellensatz; Marshall's representation theorem; and local parametrizations of real varieties at nonsingular points (Theorem 3.1). The definitions of the hierarchy and of the optimality conditions are reusable for any work on moment-SOS relaxations. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the cited results under weaker hypotheses.

Selected references

  • J. Nie, Optimality conditions and finite convergence of Lasserre's hierarchy, Math. Program. 146 (2014) 97–121; preprint arXiv:1206.0319v2 (2013). https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.0319
  • J. B. Lasserre, Global optimization with polynomials and the problem of moments, SIAM J. Optim. 11 (2001) 796–817. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400366802
  • M. Putinar, Positive polynomials on compact semi-algebraic sets, Indiana Univ. Math. J. 42 (1993) 969–984. https://doi.org/10.1512/iumj.1993.42.42045
  • M. Marshall, Positive Polynomials and Sums of Squares, Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 146, AMS, 2008 (Theorem 9.5.3). https://doi.org/10.1090/surv/146
  • M. Marshall, Representations of non-negative polynomials, degree bounds and applications to optimization, Canad. J. Math. 61 (2009) 205–221. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-2009-010-4
  • J. Bochnak, M. Coste, M.-F. Roy, Real Algebraic Geometry, Springer, 1998 (Corollary 4.1.8). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03718-8
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A Stochastic Control Approach to No-Arbitrage Bounds Given Marginals, with an Application to Lookback Options: The Robust Superhedging Bound of g(X*_T) Given the Law of X_T Equals μ^HL(g)Research Paper

Model-free bounds for lookback options

A lookback option pays a function of the running maximum of the underlying asset over the life of the contract. When the prices of European call options of all strikes at the maturity are quoted, the risk-neutral law μ\muμ of the terminal price is known, but the law of the whole path is not. The robust (model-free) superhedging cost of the lookback payoff is the cheapest initial capital that, combined with a static position in the quoted calls and dynamic trading in the underlying, dominates the payoff in every model consistent with μ\muμ.

Hobson (Finance Stoch. 1998) computed this cost for g(x)=xg(x)=xg(x)=x by a pathwise inequality, and identified the extremal model through the Azéma–Yor solution of the Skorokhod embedding problem (Azéma–Yor 1979). Galichon, Henry-Labordère and Touzi (Ann. Appl. Probab. 2014, arXiv:1401.3921) recast model-free bounds as a dual stochastic control problem in which the marginal constraint is penalised by a Lagrange multiplier λ\lambdaλ. Their Theorem 3.1 recovers Hobson's bound for every C1C^1C1 nondecreasing ggg from that dual, with an explicit optimal multiplier and stopping time. The result is one of the founding examples of martingale optimal transport.

Setting

Let BBB be a real Brownian motion with continuous paths and B0=0B_0=0B0​=0, adapted to a filtration (Ft)t≥0(\mathcal F_t)_{t\ge0}(Ft​)t≥0​ with increments independent of the past, and let Xt=X0+BtX_t=X_0+B_tXt​=X0​+Bt​ for a spot X0∈RX_0\in\mathbb RX0​∈R. Write Xτ∗=max⁡t≤τXtX^*_\tau=\max_{t\le\tau}X_tXτ∗​=maxt≤τ​Xt​. Let T∞\mathcal T_\inftyT∞​ be the set of stopping times τ\tauτ for which the stopped process (Xt∧τ)t≥0(X_{t\wedge\tau})_{t\ge0}(Xt∧τ​)t≥0​ is a uniformly integrable martingale.

The marginal is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR with finite first moment and mean ∫x μ(dx)=X0\int x\,\mu(dx)=X_0∫xμ(dx)=X0​. Its call prices are c(x)=∫(y−x)+μ(dy)c(x)=\int(y-x)^+\mu(dy)c(x)=∫(y−x)+μ(dy). The payoff is ξ=g(X∗)\xi=g(X^*)ξ=g(X∗) with g:R→R+g:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R_+g:R→R+​ of class C1C^1C1 and nondecreasing.

For a multiplier λ:R→R\lambda:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rλ:R→R and τ∈T∞\tau\in\mathcal T_\inftyτ∈T∞​ set J(λ,τ)=E[g(Xτ∗)−λ(Xτ)]J(\lambda,\tau)=\mathbb E[g(X^*_\tau)-\lambda(X_\tau)]J(λ,τ)=E[g(Xτ∗​)−λ(Xτ​)] and uλ(X0,X0)=sup⁡τ∈T∞J(λ,τ)u^\lambda(X_0,X_0)=\sup_{\tau\in\mathcal T_\infty}J(\lambda,\tau)uλ(X0​,X0​)=supτ∈T∞​​J(λ,τ). The admissible multipliers are

Λ0μ={λ∈L1(μ): sup⁡τ∈T∞E[λ(Xτ)−]<∞},\Lambda^\mu_0=\Big\{\lambda\in\mathbb L^1(\mu):\ \sup_{\tau\in\mathcal T_\infty}\mathbb E[\lambda(X_\tau)^-]<\infty\Big\},Λ0μ​={λ∈L1(μ): τ∈T∞​sup​E[λ(Xτ​)−]<∞},

and the reduced superhedging problem (3.7) is

Uμ(ξ)=inf⁡λ∈Λ0μ{∫λ dμ+uλ(X0,X0)}.U^\mu(\xi)=\inf_{\lambda\in\Lambda^\mu_0}\Big\{\int\lambda\,d\mu+u^\lambda(X_0,X_0)\Big\}.Uμ(ξ)=λ∈Λ0μ​inf​{∫λdμ+uλ(X0​,X0​)}.

The barycenter function is b(x)=∫[x,∞)y μ(dy)/μ([x,∞))b(x)=\int_{[x,\infty)}y\,\mu(dy)/\mu([x,\infty))b(x)=∫[x,∞)​yμ(dy)/μ([x,∞)) for μ((x,∞))>0\mu((x,\infty))>0μ((x,∞))>0 and b(x)=xb(x)=xb(x)=x otherwise. The Hardy–Littlewood transform μHL\mu^{HL}μHL is the probability measure with

μHL([y,∞))=inf⁡ξ<yc(ξ)y−ξ.\mu^{HL}([y,\infty))=\inf_{\xi<y}\frac{c(\xi)}{y-\xi}.μHL([y,∞))=ξ<yinf​y−ξc(ξ)​.

The Azéma–Yor stopping time is τ∗=inf⁡{t>0:Xt∗≥b(Xt)}\tau^*=\inf\{t>0:X^*_t\ge b(X_t)\}τ∗=inf{t>0:Xt∗​≥b(Xt​)}, and the candidate multiplier is

λ∗(x)=∫ℓμx ⁣∫ℓμyg′(b(ξ)) b(dξ)b(ξ)−ξ dy,\lambda^*(x)=\int_{\ell^\mu}^{x}\!\int_{\ell^\mu}^{y}g'(b(\xi))\,\frac{b(d\xi)}{b(\xi)-\xi}\,dy ,λ∗(x)=∫ℓμx​∫ℓμy​g′(b(ξ))b(ξ)−ξb(dξ)​dy,

that is, the convex function vanishing below ℓμ\ell^\muℓμ that solves the weak ODE (3.21) with ψ=b−1\psi=b^{-1}ψ=b−1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

If sup⁡τ∈T∞E[g(Xτ∗)]<∞\sup_{\tau\in\mathcal T_\infty}\mathbb E[g(X^*_\tau)]<\inftysupτ∈T∞​​E[g(Xτ∗​)]<∞ and μHL(g)=∫g dμHL<∞\mu^{HL}(g)=\int g\,d\mu^{HL}<\inftyμHL(g)=∫gdμHL<∞, then

Uμ(ξ)=μ(λ∗)+J(λ∗,τ∗)=μHL(g).U^\mu(\xi)=\mu(\lambda^*)+J(\lambda^*,\tau^*)=\mu^{HL}(g).Uμ(ξ)=μ(λ∗)+J(λ∗,τ∗)=μHL(g).

The goal is the paper's theorem for the reduced problem (3.7), in its full two-equality form: the value, its attainment by (λ∗,τ∗)(\lambda^*,\tau^*)(λ∗,τ∗), and its closed form.

Milestones

  1. The Neumann condition (3.23) for Peskir's candidate vψv^\psivψ.
  2. Lemma 3.1: uλ≤vψu^\lambda\le v^\psiuλ≤vψ for convex λ∈Λ0μ\lambda\in\Lambda^\mu_0λ∈Λ0μ​ and every relaxed free boundary ψ∈Ψλ\psi\in\Psi^\lambdaψ∈Ψλ.
  3. Step (1) of Lemma 3.2: μ(λ)−λ(X0)=∫(c−c0) dλ′′\mu(\lambda)-\lambda(X_0)=\int(c-c_0)\,d\lambda''μ(λ)−λ(X0​)=∫(c−c0​)dλ′′, with c0(x)=(X0−x)+c_0(x)=(X_0-x)^+c0​(x)=(X0​−x)+.
  4. Lemma 3.2: μ(λ)+uλ(X0,X0)≤g(X0)+∫φ(ψ(m),m)g′(m) dm\mu(\lambda)+u^\lambda(X_0,X_0)\le g(X_0)+\int\varphi(\psi(m),m)g'(m)\,dmμ(λ)+uλ(X0​,X0​)≤g(X0​)+∫φ(ψ(m),m)g′(m)dm.
  5. The pointwise minimizations (3.27) and (3.28).
  6. Steps (2) and (3) of Lemma 3.3: properties of λ∗\lambda^*λ∗, and the integration by parts giving μHL(g)\mu^{HL}(g)μHL(g).
  7. Lemma 3.3, the upper bound Uμ(ξ)≤μHL(g)U^\mu(\xi)\le\mu^{HL}(g)Uμ(ξ)≤μHL(g).
  8. The Azéma–Yor facts: τ∗∈T∞\tau^*\in\mathcal T_\inftyτ∗∈T∞​, Xτ∗∼μX_{\tau^*}\sim\muXτ∗​∼μ, Xτ∗∗∼μHLX^*_{\tau^*}\sim\mu^{HL}Xτ∗∗​∼μHL.
  9. The lower bound Uμ(ξ)≥μHL(g)U^\mu(\xi)\ge\mu^{HL}(g)Uμ(ξ)≥μHL(g) of Section 3.4.

Significance

The theorem identifies the model-free price of a lookback payoff as an explicit functional of the call prices, μHL(g)\mu^{HL}(g)μHL(g), and exhibits the extremal model (Brownian motion stopped at τ∗\tau^*τ∗) and the optimal static hedge (λ∗\lambda^*λ∗). It shows that the dual stochastic control formulation is sharp on a nontrivial path-dependent payoff, which is the template for later work on martingale optimal transport with path-dependent costs.

The result has been proved since 2014 (and Hobson's bound since 1998). It has not been formalized. A complete development would provide machine-checked versions of the Azéma–Yor embedding, the law of the maximum at the embedding, a verification theorem for a reflected optimal stopping problem with a nonsmooth obstacle, and the convex-analytic identities linking call prices to second-derivative measures. Each of these is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The upper bound requires a verification argument for an optimal stopping problem of the pair (X,X∗)(X,X^*)(X,X∗) with a reflection at the diagonal, where the candidate vψv^\psivψ is only as regular as the convex multiplier λ\lambdaλ: second derivatives are measures and the free boundary ψ\psiψ solves its ODE only in a relaxed sense. An Itô formula for C2C^2C2 functions does not apply; an Itô–Tanaka (local time) argument for concave functions of XXX, with the reflection term killed by the Neumann condition, is needed, followed by a localisation that uses uniform integrability and the integrability condition in Λ0μ\Lambda^\mu_0Λ0μ​. The lower bound needs the Azéma–Yor embedding and the law of Xτ∗∗X^*_{\tau^*}Xτ∗∗​, neither of which is in Mathlib; the naive appeal to "the embedding exists" does not give the joint law of the stopped value and the maximum.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace LookbackMOT.HL and uses Mathlib's IsBrownianReal, IsStoppingTime, stoppedProcess, stoppedValue, Martingale, UniformIntegrable and HasLaw. Committed conventions:

  • What is formalized. The goal is the reduced problem (3.7), not the superhedging problem (2.6): (2.6) needs stochastic integrals, which Mathlib does not have. The bridge between them (Proposition 2.1, the claim (3.4), Proposition 3.1) is outside this mission. The theorem's hypothesis sup⁡P∈P∞EP[ξ+]<∞\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_\infty}\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}[\xi^+]<\inftysupP∈P∞​​EP[ξ+]<∞ is stated through Proposition 3.1 with λ=0\lambda=0λ=0 as sup⁡τ∈T∞E[g(Xτ∗)]<∞\sup_{\tau\in\mathcal T_\infty}\mathbb E[g(X^*_\tau)]<\inftysupτ∈T∞​​E[g(Xτ∗​)]<∞. The horizon TTT disappears: the stopping problem is over T∞\mathcal T_\inftyT∞​ with time in [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).
  • Standing hypotheses. The Brownian motion lives on an arbitrary filtered probability space with everywhere-continuous paths and B0=0B_0=0B0​=0; the paper's canonical space is one instance. The mean condition and integrability of μ\muμ (p. 7) are assumed throughout. The spot X0X_0X0​ is any real number. μ([0,∞))=1\mu([0,\infty))=1μ([0,∞))=1 is assumed only in (3.27).
  • Added conditions. Every τ∈T∞\tau\in\mathcal T_\inftyτ∈T∞​ is a.s. finite (implied by uniform integrability). Every λ∈Λ0μ\lambda\in\Lambda^\mu_0λ∈Λ0μ​ is measurable.
  • Expectations of payoffs are E[φ+]−E[φ−]\mathbb E[\varphi^+]-\mathbb E[\varphi^-]E[φ+]−E[φ−] in the extended reals, with ∞−∞=−∞\infty-\infty=-\infty∞−∞=−∞; value functions are extended reals.
  • Derivatives. λ′\lambda'λ′ is the right derivative and λ′′\lambda''λ′′ its Stieltjes measure. The weak ODE (3.21) is used both as a change of variables (λ′′\lambda''λ′′ is the image of g′(m)/(m−ψ(m)) dmg'(m)/(m-\psi(m))\,dmg′(m)/(m−ψ(m))dm under ψ\psiψ) and on intervals (λ′(ψ(y2))−λ′(ψ(y1))=∫y1y2g′(m)/(m−ψ(m)) dm\lambda'(\psi(y_2))-\lambda'(\psi(y_1))=\int_{y_1}^{y_2}g'(m)/(m-\psi(m))\,dmλ′(ψ(y2​))−λ′(ψ(y1​))=∫y1​y2​​g′(m)/(m−ψ(m))dm), the two forms the paper's proofs use.
  • The multiplier λ∗\lambda^*λ∗. It is written as λ∗(x)=∫X0<m<rμg′(m)(x−b−1(m))+/(m−b−1(m)) dm\lambda^*(x)=\int_{X_0<m<r^\mu}g'(m)(x-b^{-1}(m))^+/(m-b^{-1}(m))\,dmλ∗(x)=∫X0​<m<rμ​g′(m)(x−b−1(m))+/(m−b−1(m))dm, the change of variables m=b(ξ)m=b(\xi)m=b(ξ) in (3.14) and the solution of (3.21) with ψ=b−1\psi=b^{-1}ψ=b−1 that the proof of Lemma 3.3 uses. It agrees with the b(dξ)b(d\xi)b(dξ) formula when bbb is continuous; at the jumps of bbb (atoms of μ\muμ) the Lebesgue–Stieltjes reading of (3.14) can fail to be μ\muμ-integrable.
  • Measures given by identities. μHL\mu^{HL}μHL and λ′′\lambda''λ′′ enter as measures satisfying their defining identities on intervals; each exists and is unique.
  • Printed slips not copied. (3.12) prints the numerator c(y)c(y)c(y); the formalization uses c(ξ)c(\xi)c(ξ). bbb, μHL\mu^{HL}μHL and λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ are extended from x≥0x\ge0x≥0 to all of R\mathbb RR by the same formulas.

No trivializing reading is available. Payoff expectations are never Bochner integrals (which would be 000 for non-integrable payoffs). τ≡0\tau\equiv0τ≡0 lies in T∞\mathcal T_\inftyT∞​ and λ≡0\lambda\equiv0λ≡0 in Λ0μ\Lambda^\mu_0Λ0μ​, so neither the supremum nor the infimum is over an empty set. The predicates for μHL\mu^{HL}μHL and λ′′\lambda''λ′′ are satisfiable (witnessed for μ=δX0\mu=\delta_{X_0}μ=δX0​​ in a sorry-free check). XτX_\tauXτ​ is only evaluated where τ<∞\tau<\inftyτ<∞ a.s. Every division has a positive denominator on the sets that carry mass.

Contributions welcome: the Azéma–Yor embedding and the law of the maximum; an Itô–Tanaka or local-time calculus sufficient for concave functions of Brownian motion and its maximum; the call-price identities of convex analysis; and the analysis of μHL\mu^{HL}μHL.

Selected references

  • A. Galichon, P. Henry-Labordère, N. Touzi, A stochastic control approach to no-arbitrage bounds given marginals, with an application to lookback options, Ann. Appl. Probab. 24 (2014) 312–336. https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.3921 (v1, the version cited)
  • D. Hobson, Robust hedging of the lookback option, Finance Stoch. 2 (1998) 329–347. https://doi.org/10.1007/s007800050046
  • J. Azéma, M. Yor, Une solution simple au problème de Skorokhod, Séminaire de Probabilités XIII, LNM 721 (1979) 90–115. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0070852
  • G. Peskir, Optimal stopping of the maximum process: the maximality principle, Ann. Probab. 26 (1998) 1614–1640. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1022855875
  • L. Carraro, N. El Karoui, J. Obłój, On Azéma–Yor processes, their optimal properties and the Bachelier–drawdown equation, Ann. Probab. 40 (2012) 372–400. https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.1328
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games on Graphs I: Synchronous Aggregate-Tracking Projected Gradients on Time-Varying Graphs Converge to the Unique EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

In an aggregative game, a player's cost depends on its own decision and on a summary of all players' decisions. An electricity producer, for example, may choose its output while the market price depends on total output. When players communicate only with neighbours, each player must estimate the aggregate before making an update. Koshal, Nedić, and Shanbhag study this setting with communication links that can change over time, and prove convergence of a synchronous algorithm using only local messages Koshal–Nedić–Shanbhag, 2016.

The mission targets Proposition 2 of the pinned preprint. It treats the algorithm itself as a mathematical object: the claim must hold for every sequence satisfying its graph, weight, stepsize, and projected update conditions. The result addresses a concrete information constraint. Players cannot read the true aggregate while the algorithm runs; they have individual estimates constructed from their neighbours' estimates.

Setting

There are N≥1N\ge1N≥1 players. Player iii chooses xi∈Ki⊆Rnx_i\in K_i\subseteq\mathbb R^nxi​∈Ki​⊆Rn, with each KiK_iKi​ nonempty, compact, and convex. Write x=(xi)ix=(x_i)_ix=(xi​)i​, K=∏iKiK=\prod_i K_iK=∏i​Ki​, and xˉ=∑ixi\bar x=\sum_i x_ixˉ=∑i​xi​. The attainable aggregate set is Kˉ={∑ixi:x∈K}\bar K=\{\sum_i x_i:x\in K\}Kˉ={∑i​xi​:x∈K}. A map Fi(xi,u)F_i(x_i,u)Fi​(xi​,u) gives the component of the game's gradient field at player iii's decision and aggregate argument uuu. Its profile field is ϕi(x)=Fi(xi,xˉ)\phi_i(x)=F_i(x_i,\bar x)ϕi​(x)=Fi​(xi​,xˉ).

The target point is a solution of the variational inequality VI⁡(K,ϕ)\operatorname{VI}(K,\phi)VI(K,ϕ): it belongs to KKK and satisfies

∑i=1N(xi−xi∗)⊤ϕi(x∗)≥0for every x∈K.\sum_{i=1}^N (x_i-x_i^*)^\top\phi_i(x^*)\ge0\qquad\text{for every }x\in K.i=1∑N​(xi​−xi∗​)⊤ϕi​(x∗)≥0for every x∈K.

The paper obtains this field from differentiable player costs. The convergence theorem is stated for the field and the VI, while the connection to a Nash equilibrium is established separately in Proposition 1 Koshal–Nedić–Shanbhag, pp. 4–6. Strict monotonicity of ϕ\phiϕ on KKK says that (ϕ(x)−ϕ(x′))⊤(x−x′)>0(\phi(x)-\phi(x'))^\top(x-x')>0(ϕ(x)−ϕ(x′))⊤(x−x′)>0 whenever feasible x≠x′x\ne x'x=x′. Together with compactness and continuity, this yields the unique VI solution used in the target.

At time kkk, player iii keeps a decision xikx_i^kxik​ and an estimate vikv_i^kvik​ of the average decision, initially vi0=xi0v_i^0=x_i^0vi0​=xi0​. A matrix W(k)=(wij(k))W(k)=(w_{ij}(k))W(k)=(wij​(k)) mixes estimates along an undirected communication graph. Each row and column of W(k)W(k)W(k) sums to one; non-neighbours receive zero weight, while every neighbour and the player itself receive at least δ>0\delta>0δ>0. The union of the communication graphs over any Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 consecutive times is connected. The local aligned estimate and the two updates are

v^ik=∑jwij(k)vjk,xik+1=ΠKi[xik−αkFi(xik,Nv^ik)],vik+1=v^ik+xik+1−xik.\hat v_i^k=\sum_j w_{ij}(k)v_j^k,\qquad x_i^{k+1}=\Pi_{K_i}\bigl[x_i^k-\alpha_k F_i(x_i^k,N\hat v_i^k)\bigr],\qquad v_i^{k+1}=\hat v_i^k+x_i^{k+1}-x_i^k.v^ik​=j∑​wij​(k)vjk​,xik+1​=ΠKi​​[xik​−αk​Fi​(xik​,Nv^ik​)],vik+1​=v^ik​+xik+1​−xik​.

Here ΠKi\Pi_{K_i}ΠKi​​ denotes Euclidean nearest-point projection. The stepsizes αk\alpha_kαk​ decrease, their sum diverges to +∞+\infty+∞, and their squares are summable. The paper calls these graph, weight, and stepsize conditions Assumptions 4–6 Koshal–Nedić–Shanbhag, pp. 7–9.

Formalization targets

Unique VI solution

The first milestone makes the existence and uniqueness statement used in the proof explicit:

∃!x∗∈K:(x−x∗)⊤ϕ(x∗)≥0for all x∈K.\exists!x^*\in K:\quad(x-x^*)^\top\phi(x^*)\ge0\quad\text{for all }x\in K.∃!x∗∈K:(x−x∗)⊤ϕ(x∗)≥0for all x∈K.

The other milestones follow the paper's numbered Lemmas 1–4 and 6 and its displayed relations (19)–(20). They state that the mean of the players' estimates is the true mean decision, that the matrix products mix geometrically, that the relevant gradients and estimate errors are controlled, and that the weighted estimate errors have finite total sum Koshal–Nedić–Shanbhag, pp. 9–14.

Proposition 2

For every synchronous run under Assumptions 1–6, the goal asserts both a unique VI solution and convergence of the whole decision sequence:

∃!x∗∈K solving VI⁡(K,ϕ),xk⟶x∗.\exists!x^*\in K\text{ solving }\operatorname{VI}(K,\phi), \qquad x^k\longrightarrow x^*.∃!x∗∈K solving VI(K,ϕ),xk⟶x∗.

The target is a qualitative convergence result. It does not prescribe a convergence rate for xkx^kxk Koshal–Nedić–Shanbhag, Proposition 2, p. 13.

Significance

The theorem says that local estimate mixing is sufficient for every player's projected gradient decision to approach the same equilibrium, even when the communication graph changes, provided connectivity recurs within a fixed window. The result gives a precise condition under which access to the aggregate can be replaced by neighbour messages. Its milestone on the matrix products supplies an explicit estimate for how information spreads; the summability milestones connect that estimate to the optimization error.

The paper contains a mathematical proof, but this mission's Lean declarations are open statements with sorry bodies. A completed formalization would turn the paper's VI existence, mixing, projection, and convergence arguments into individually reusable verified results. The general product-set VI and nearest-point relation are separated from the paper's particular synchronous model so later developments can use them without importing graph-specific definitions.

Difficulty

The obvious single-agent projected-gradient argument assumes each update uses Fi(xik,xˉk)F_i(x_i^k,\bar x^k)Fi​(xik​,xˉk). Here it uses Fi(xik,Nv^ik)F_i(x_i^k,N\hat v_i^k)Fi​(xik​,Nv^ik​) instead, and the estimate errors depend on a changing product of weight matrices. Connectivity of each individual graph is not assumed, so a one-step contraction statement is unavailable. The proof must control time-varying mixing and accumulate its error without losing convergence. Strict monotonicity then identifies the limit, but it does not by itself bound the transient disagreement.

The printed hypotheses also leave a domain issue. The algorithm evaluates FiF_iFi​ at Nv^ikN\hat v_i^kNv^ik​, which need not lie in Kˉ\bar KKˉ; the paper's footnote on p. 10 acknowledges that v^ik\hat v_i^kv^ik​ may leave its apparent feasible aggregate region. The printed Lipschitz condition covers only Kˉ\bar KKˉ, so the target explicitly requires it for all aggregate arguments. The printed Lemma 3 also gives only unit column sums, which allow arbitrarily large negative and positive entries; its mission item carries the graph and positive-weight assumptions needed for the bound. These changes are recorded in the item notes and in the source analysis Koshal–Nedić–Shanbhag, pp. 7–10.

Formalization scope

Decisions live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and players in Fin N; Lean player zero is the paper's player one. A profile is a finite function, and its squared Euclidean norm is the sum of the squared norms of its blocks. The conclusion uses the equivalent finite product topology. The variational inequality's inner product is written as a sum over players, avoiding the sup norm carried by a Lean function space. Graphs are undirected SimpleGraphs; self-neighbours are included explicitly. The product Φ(k,s)\Phi(k,s)Φ(k,s) places the newest matrix on the left. Projection is a relation requiring a genuine nearest point in KiK_iKi​, rather than a total function with an arbitrary value on an empty set.

The target fixes N≥1N\ge1N≥1, δ>0\delta>0δ>0, and nonempty KiK_iKi​. It uses continuity of FiF_iFi​ on Ki×KˉK_i\times\bar KKi​×Kˉ as the field-level part of Assumption 1, and the extended all-Rn\mathbb R^nRn form of Assumption 3 stated above. The stepsize sum is represented by partial sums tending to +∞+\infty+∞, and ∑kαk2<∞\sum_k\alpha_k^2<\infty∑k​αk2​<∞ by summability. Existence and uniqueness are part of the goal conclusion; no bound on the gradients or summability of the estimate error is assumed by the goal. A complete development needs reusable compact-product VI existence, Euclidean projection facts, matrix-product mixing for changing graphs, finite-dimensional norm estimates, and real-series convergence. Contributions proving these milestones and their intermediate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Koshal, A. Nedić, U. V. Shanbhag, Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games on Graphs, Operations Research 64(3):680–704, 2016. arXiv:1605.00267v2; DOI:10.1287/opre.2016.1501. This mission cites the pinned arXiv page indices.
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Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Modern Introduction to Online Learning IX: Cover's Universal Portfolio with Uniform or Dirichlet(1/2) Prior Has Logarithmic Regret Against Constantly Rebalanced PortfoliosTextbook

Why sequential portfolios matter

A portfolio manager chooses fractions of current wealth to place in several stocks before seeing that day’s market gains. The gains need not follow a statistical model: a sequence may be selected adversarially, with some stocks losing all value on a given day. A useful benchmark is the best constantly rebalanced portfolio, which holds the same fractions each day but trades at the end of every round to restore them. Its fixed allocation is an active strategy, and it can grow even when buying and holding each individual stock does not. Chapter 10 of Orabona’s online learning text studies guarantees against this benchmark without imposing a positive lower bound or a finite upper bound on nonzero market gains.

The chapter presents a universal portfolio: an allocation determined by a prior distribution over all fixed portfolios and reweighted according to their wealth so far. The mission focuses on the uniform-prior part of Theorem 10.1. It asks for a worst-case logarithmic regret guarantee against every fixed comparator and every admissible market sequence. This is a deterministic guarantee; no distributional assumption about the market enters its statement.

Market and strategy

There are d≥2d\ge2d≥2 stocks and T≥1T\ge1T≥1 rounds. In round ttt, the market supplies a vector wt∈R≥0d∖{0}w_t\in\mathbb R_{≥0}^d\setminus\{0\}wt​∈R≥0d​∖{0} of nonnegative gains. A portfolio is u∈Δd−1u\in\Delta^{d-1}u∈Δd−1, the simplex of vectors with nonnegative coordinates summing to one. If one unit is invested initially and the allocation stays fixed, its wealth after TTT rounds is

WT(u)=∏t=1T⟨wt,u⟩.W_T(u)=\prod_{t=1}^{T}\langle w_t,u\rangle.WT​(u)=t=1∏T​⟨wt​,u⟩.

A sequential strategy chooses xt∈Δd−1x_t\in\Delta^{d-1}xt​∈Δd−1 before seeing wtw_twt​, and has wealth WT=∏t=1T⟨wt,xt⟩W_T=\prod_{t=1}^{T}\langle w_t,x_t\rangleWT​=∏t=1T​⟨wt​,xt​⟩. The quantity of interest is the difference between the logarithms of benchmark wealth and sequential wealth. A fixed portfolio can have zero wealth when all the stocks it holds have a zero gain on some day; its log wealth is then −∞-\infty−∞ in the mathematical convention of the book.

Algorithm 10.1 begins with a prior FFF on the simplex. Before round ttt, it gives each fixed portfolio uuu weight proportional to its wealth Wt−1(u)W_{t-1}(u)Wt−1​(u), and chooses the resulting mean allocation:

xt(i)=∫Δd−1uiWt−1(u) F(du)∫Δd−1Wt−1(u) F(du).x_t(i)=\frac{\int_{\Delta^{d-1}}u_i W_{t-1}(u)\,F(du)}{\int_{\Delta^{d-1}}W_{t-1}(u)\,F(du)}.xt​(i)=∫Δd−1​Wt−1​(u)F(du)∫Δd−1​ui​Wt−1​(u)F(du)​.

For this mission, FFF is the uniform probability measure on the simplex. It is represented by Lebesgue measure in the first d−1d-1d−1 coordinates, scaled by (d−1)!(d-1)!(d−1)!; the final coordinate is one minus their sum. This explicit density fixes what “uniform” means and prevents the prior from being chosen to suit a particular market sequence.

Formalization targets

The goal is the uniform-prior case of Theorem 10.1. With the notation above, for every fixed portfolio of positive wealth,

log⁡WT(u)−log⁡WT≤log⁡(T+d−1d−1)≤(d−1)[log⁡(Td−1+1)+1].\log W_T(u)-\log W_T \le \log\binom{T+d-1}{d-1} \le (d-1)\left[\log\left(\frac{T}{d-1}+1\right)+1\right].logWT​(u)−logWT​≤log(d−1T+d−1​)≤(d−1)[log(d−1T​+1)+1].

The goal also asserts WT>0W_T>0WT​>0, so the algorithm’s logarithmic wealth is defined. The first inequality gives an exact finite-horizon combinatorial bound; the second displays its logarithmic dependence on TTT for fixed ddd. The book also states a Dirichlet(1/2,…,1/2)(1/2,\ldots,1/2)(1/2,…,1/2) prior bound in the same theorem. That companion branch is not among this proposal’s draft items; its gamma-function normalization and integral identities would require a separate audited definition layer. The fixed series title follows the chapter plan, while the goal and milestone list specify the precise scope delivered here.

The attack path records four source statements. Lemma 10.5 bounds a ratio of nonnegative sums by the largest component ratio. Lemma 10.6 reduces a universal portfolio’s wealth ratio to a maximum over sequences of single-stock choices. Theorem 10.4 bounds the size of a type class, the set of sequences with the same empirical fractions of symbols. Equation (10.5) computes the monomial integral under the uniform simplex prior. These statements are from the chapter’s proof of Theorem 10.1; the equation is referred to as an exercise in Problem 10.3.

What the result provides

The theorem ensures that the uniform-prior strategy keeps its log wealth within O(dlog⁡(1+T/d))O(d\log(1+T/d))O(dlog(1+T/d)) of the best constantly rebalanced portfolio, while making no bounded-gain assumption. In particular, a stock may have gain zero on one day or a very large gain on another. The guarantee is pathwise: it applies to the realized market vectors, regardless of how they were chosen. For a fixed number of stocks, dividing regret by TTT therefore gives a vanishing average shortfall in log wealth.

The mathematical result is already proved in the cited text. This mission’s work is to give its exact algorithm, prior measure, combinatorial objects, and finite-horizon constants machine-checked statements and then proofs. The density-based prior, finite type classes, and simplex monomial integrals can also be reused in online aggregation and universal coding developments. The draft statements currently have Lean placeholders for proofs; a successful submission will still require solvers to close them.

Main difficulty

Applying a generic online convex optimization bound to the loss −log⁡⟨wt,x⟩-\log\langle w_t,x\rangle−log⟨wt​,x⟩ runs into unbounded gradients when a chosen portfolio has small gain. A bound based on one global Lipschitz constant cannot cover the market sequences allowed here. The integral strategy creates a different obstacle: its denominator must be positive at every round, including histories with zero gains for many fixed portfolios. Its uniform prior is a measure on a (d−1)(d-1)(d−1)-dimensional simplex embedded in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, so ambient ddd-dimensional volume would give it mass zero. A proof must work with the intrinsic coordinate measure and its normalization. The exact binomial coefficient also depends on counting all sequences of one type without losing the boundary cases where some symbol occurs zero times.

Formalization scope

Lean represents a portfolio as a function Fin d → ℝ in Mathlib’s stdSimplex; a market is a one-based sequence of vectors of the same type. The coordinate chart maps Rd−1\mathbb R^{d-1}Rd−1 into the simplex, and a scaled restricted Lebesgue measure is pushed forward to define the uniform prior. The chart’s measurability is proved in the definition file. Algorithm 10.1 is a componentwise ratio of real integrals, and the main theorem asserts positive realized wealth. All market vectors on rounds 1,…,T1,\ldots,T1,…,T are nonnegative and nonzero. The parameter restrictions d≥2d\ge2d≥2 and T≥1T\ge1T≥1 make the dimension and printed denominators meaningful.

For Lemma 10.5, quotients use extended nonnegative reals, with a/0=+∞a/0=+\inftya/0=+∞ when a>0a>0a>0 and 0/0=00/0=00/0=0 as printed. Lemma 10.6 is stated for a generic prior concentrated on the simplex, with its ratios in extended nonnegative reals under the same conventions, and with the hypothesis that the normalizing integral of Algorithm 10.1 is positive in every round, which is what makes the algorithm's prediction defined. A comparator with zero wealth is omitted only from the real-log statement, corresponding to log wealth −∞-\infty−∞ in the source. The prior cannot be replaced by an arbitrary point mass: the theorem names the chart-based uniform measure, and the prediction is the exact integral ratio. Contributions proving normalization, support, the integral identity, and the final regret bound are all within scope.

Selected references

  • Francesco Orabona, Online Learning: A Modern Introduction Using Convex Optimization, arXiv:1912.13213v10, 2026, Chapter 10 and Appendix A.2.2. arXiv
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Constant-Factor Approximation Algorithm for the Asymmetric Traveling Salesman Problem: The Asymmetric Held–Karp Relaxation Has Integrality Gap at Most 319Research Paper

Motivation

The asymmetric traveling salesman problem (ATSP) asks for a shortest closed walk through every vertex of a directed graph whose edge weights need not be symmetric. It models routing with one-way streets, scheduling with sequence-dependent setup times, and many other problems in which the cost of going from uuu to vvv differs from the cost of going back. Its standard linear relaxation, the asymmetric Held–Karp relaxation, is the lower bound used both by exact branch-and-cut codes and by approximation algorithms, and the central question about it is how far it can be from the integer optimum.

Timeline of the approximation ratio and of the integrality gap for ATSP:

  • 1982: Frieze, Galbiati and Maffioli give a log⁡2n\log_2 nlog2​n-approximation by repeated cycle covers.
  • 2010: Asadpour, Goemans, Mądry, Oveis Gharan and Saberi reach O(log⁡n/log⁡log⁡n)O(\log n/\log\log n)O(logn/loglogn) via thin trees (SODA 2010).
  • 2015: Anari and Oveis Gharan bound the integrality gap by poly(log⁡log⁡n)\mathrm{poly}(\log\log n)poly(loglogn), non-constructively; Svensson obtains a constant factor for node-weighted digraphs.
  • 2018: Svensson, Tarnawski and Végh obtain the first constant-factor approximation for general ATSP (STOC 2018); the journal version (J. ACM 2020) states the ratio 506506506 and the integrality gap bound 319319319.
  • 2020: Traub and Vygen improve the ratio to 22+ε22+\varepsilon22+ε and the gap to 222222 (STOC 2020).

The lower bound on the integrality gap remains 222 (Charikar, Goemans and Karloff, 2006).

Setting

A digraph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) has finite vertex and edge sets; each edge has a tail and a head, and parallel edges and loops are allowed. For S⊆VS\subseteq VS⊆V, δ+(S)\delta^+(S)δ+(S) and δ−(S)\delta^-(S)δ−(S) are the edges leaving and entering SSS, and δ(S)=δ+(S)∪δ−(S)\delta(S)=\delta^+(S)\cup\delta^-(S)δ(S)=δ+(S)∪δ−(S). An ATSP input is a strongly connected digraph GGG with a weight function w:E→R≥0w:E\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}w:E→R≥0​.

An edge multiset FFF gives each edge a multiplicity F(e)∈NF(e)\in\mathbb NF(e)∈N; V(F)V(F)V(F) is the set of vertices it touches. FFF is Eulerian if every vertex has as many outgoing as incoming edges of FFF, a subtour if moreover (V(F),F)(V(F),F)(V(F),F) is connected, and a tour if it is a subtour with V(F)=VV(F)=VV(F)=V. Tours are exactly the closed walks visiting every vertex. The weight of FFF is ∑eF(e)w(e)\sum_e F(e)w(e)∑e​F(e)w(e).

The asymmetric Held–Karp relaxation LP(G,w)(G,w)(G,w) is

min⁡∑e∈Ew(e)x(e)s.t.x(δ+(v))=x(δ−(v)) (v∈V),x(δ(S))≥2 (∅≠S⊊V),x≥0,\min\sum_{e\in E}w(e)x(e)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x(\delta^+(v))=x(\delta^-(v))\ (v\in V),\qquad x(\delta(S))\ge2\ (\emptyset\ne S\subsetneq V),\qquad x\ge0,mine∈E∑​w(e)x(e)s.t.x(δ+(v))=x(δ−(v)) (v∈V),x(δ(S))≥2 (∅=S⊊V),x≥0,

and its optimum is the Held–Karp lower bound.

The mission also uses the paper's intermediate objects: laminarly-weighted instances I=(G,L,x,y)I=(G,\mathcal L,x,y)I=(G,L,x,y), in which L\mathcal LL is a laminar family of sets that are tight for a strictly positive feasible xxx, y≥0y\ge0y≥0 on L\mathcal LL, and the weight of an edge is wI(e)=∑S∈L: e∈δ(S)ySw_I(e)=\sum_{S\in\mathcal L:\,e\in\delta(S)}y_SwI​(e)=∑S∈L:e∈δ(S)​yS​; the value value(I)=2∑S∈LyS\mathrm{value}(I)=2\sum_{S\in\mathcal L}y_Svalue(I)=2∑S∈L​yS​ and the lower bound lbI(U)=∑v∈U2y{v}\mathrm{lb}_I(U)=\sum_{v\in U}2y_{\{v\}}lbI​(U)=∑v∈U​2y{v}​; Subtour Partition Cover and (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-lightness; irreducible instances; vertebrate pairs; and quasi-backbones. Each is defined, with the paper's page reference, in the two definition files of the mission.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 11.1

For every strongly connected digraph GGG with ∣V∣≥2|V|\ge2∣V∣≥2, every w≥0w\ge0w≥0 and every feasible solution xxx of LP(G,w)(G,w)(G,w), there is a tour FFF with

∑e∈EF(e) w(e) ≤ 319∑e∈Ew(e) x(e).\sum_{e\in E}F(e)\,w(e)\ \le\ 319\sum_{e\in E}w(e)\,x(e).e∈E∑​F(e)w(e) ≤ 319e∈E∑​w(e)x(e).

This is the statement that the integrality gap of the asymmetric Held–Karp relaxation is at most 319319319.

Milestones

The milestones are the results the paper's §11 combines, in the order it combines them:

  1. Theorem 4.1: Subtour Partition Cover is (2,0)(2,0)(2,0)-light on singleton instances with B=∅B=\emptysetB=∅.
  2. Theorem 5.1: an (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-light pair (I,B)(I,B)(I,B) has a tour of weight at most 5α lbI(Bˉ)+β+wI(B)5\alpha\,\mathrm{lb}_I(\bar B)+\beta+w_I(B)5αlbI​(Bˉ)+β+wI​(B).
  3. §11: every singleton instance has a tour of weight at most 10 value(I)10\,\mathrm{value}(I)10value(I) (αS′=10\alpha'_S=10αS′​=10).
  4. Theorem 10.1: vertebrate pairs are (4, 2 value(I)+lbI(Bˉ))(4,\,2\,\mathrm{value}(I)+\mathrm{lb}_I(\bar B))(4,2value(I)+lbI​(Bˉ))-light.
  5. §11: a vertebrate pair has a tour of weight at most 2 value(I)+21 lbI(Bˉ)+wI(B)2\,\mathrm{value}(I)+21\,\mathrm{lb}_I(\bar B)+w_I(B)2value(I)+21lbI​(Bˉ)+wI​(B) (η′=1+5⋅4\eta'=1+5\cdot4η′=1+5⋅4).
  6. Lemma 9.3: an irreducible instance has a quasi-backbone of weight at most (αS+3) value(I)(\alpha_S+3)\,\mathrm{value}(I)(αS​+3)value(I).
  7. Theorem 9.4: tours on vertebrate pairs give a ρ\rhoρ-bound on irreducible instances, ρ=κ+η(1−δ)+αS+32δ−1\rho=\frac{\kappa+\eta(1-\delta)+\alpha_S+3}{2\delta-1}ρ=2δ−1κ+η(1−δ)+αS​+3​.
  8. Theorem 8.3: a ρ\rhoρ-bound on irreducible instances gives a 2ρ1−δ\frac{2\rho}{1-\delta}1−δ2ρ​-bound on all laminarly-weighted instances.
  9. Lemma 2.2: DUAL(G,w)(G,w)(G,w) has an optimal solution with laminar support.
  10. Theorem 2.4: a bound α value(I)\alpha\,\mathrm{value}(I)αvalue(I) on all laminarly-weighted instances gives α\alphaα times the Held–Karp bound on all ATSP inputs.

Significance

The result shows that the asymmetric Held–Karp relaxation approximates ATSP within a constant factor, which settled a question open since the 1980s and made the relaxation a certified lower bound with bounded loss. The structural steps (reduction to laminarly-weighted instances, Subtour Partition Cover, irreducibility and vertebrate pairs) are the framework on which the later improvement to 222222 by Traub and Vygen is built.

The theorem is proved; to the best of available knowledge none of it has been formalized in a proof assistant. A complete development would give a machine-checked bound on the integrality gap of a central relaxation in combinatorial optimization, and its intermediate statements are reusable for the improved bounds that follow the same framework.

Difficulty

The obvious approaches do not give a constant. Repeated cycle covers lose a factor at each of logarithmically many rounds. Rounding the LP solution through thin trees needs a spanning tree that is thin in every cut, and only polylogarithmic thinness is known. The paper's route is long: the reduction to laminarly-weighted instances needs an uncrossed dual; the reduction from irreducible to general instances and the one from vertebrate pairs to irreducible instances are recursive, applying the assumed algorithm to instances built by contracting or inducing tight sets, so their hypotheses must hold on all instances and not only on the given one; and the lightness bound for vertebrate pairs (Theorem 10.1) rests on a flow-based construction with careful accounting against the laminar family.

Formalization scope

Vertices and edges are finite types; edges carry tail and head maps, so parallel edges (created by contraction) are distinct edges, and loops are allowed and lie in no cut. Edge multisets are functions E→NE\to\mathbb NE→N. Connectivity of a multiset and its components are defined by the reflexive–transitive closure of undirected adjacency along its edges.

Running times are not formalized. Every algorithmic statement is posed in its existential form, as §11 of the paper itself uses it to derive Theorem 11.1: "there is an algorithm returning a tour within ccc" becomes "every instance has a tour within ccc", and an assumed algorithm becomes a hypothesis quantified over instances on all finite vertex and edge types. The algorithmic constants 9(1+ε)9(1+\varepsilon)9(1+ε), 18+ε18+\varepsilon18+ε, 37+36ε37+36\varepsilon37+36ε and 506506506 are therefore not stated; the non-constructive constants 555, 101010 and 212121 of §11 are.

The Held–Karp lower bound is never defined as an infimum: comparisons with it are stated for every feasible xxx, equivalently because the LP optimum is attained. Likewise dSd_SdS​ and DSD_SDS​ in the definition of irreducibility are expressed through walks, without an infimum.

Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • ∣V∣≥2|V|\ge2∣V∣≥2 in the goal, Theorem 2.4 and every laminarly-weighted instance: on one vertex without a loop no tour exists while LP(G,w)(G,w)(G,w) has value 000.
  • Partition parts in Subtour Partition Cover are nonempty and different from VVV; for B=∅B=\emptysetB=∅ the one-part partition (V)(V)(V) admits no solution.
  • α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0 in Theorem 5.1, which is false without it.
  • αS\alpha_SαS​ in Lemma 9.3 and Theorem 9.4 is a parameter with the hypothesis that singleton instances have tours within αS value\alpha_S\,\mathrm{value}αS​value, instead of the fixed 18+ε18+\varepsilon18+ε.

These choices rule out trivializing formalizations: no instance class in a hypothesis is empty (a two-vertex singleton instance is valid, irreducible and vertebrate), admissible partitions exist for every instance, and LP(G,w)(G,w)(G,w) is feasible for every strongly connected input. The goal assumes none of the milestones.

Out of scope: the polynomial running times, §5's merge-procedure lemmas, the constructions of §7, and Corollaries 11.2–11.4 on the path version, which rest on external reductions. Contributions are welcome on every milestone, and on infrastructure that a complete development needs: LP duality and uncrossing for cut LPs, Eulerian multigraphs and their decomposition into closed walks, and circulations with lower bounds (Hoffman's theorem). The platform's proved LP strong duality (SmaleNinth.lp_strong_duality) is a natural starting point for Lemma 2.2.

Selected references

  • O. Svensson, J. Tarnawski, L. A. Végh, A constant-factor approximation algorithm for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem, J. ACM 67(6), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1145/3424306 (accepted manuscript: LSE Research Online 106582, https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/106582/)
  • O. Svensson, J. Tarnawski, L. A. Végh, A constant-factor approximation algorithm for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem, STOC 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3188745.3188824
  • V. Traub, J. Vygen, An improved approximation algorithm for ATSP, STOC 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.00670
  • A. Asadpour, M. X. Goemans, A. Mądry, S. Oveis Gharan, A. Saberi, An O(log n/log log n)-approximation algorithm for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem, SODA 2010. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973075.32
  • A. M. Frieze, G. Galbiati, F. Maffioli, On the worst-case performance of some algorithms for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem, Networks 12(1), 1982. https://doi.org/10.1002/net.3230120103
  • M. Charikar, M. X. Goemans, H. Karloff, On the integrality ratio for the asymmetric traveling salesman problem, Math. Oper. Res. 31(2), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1050.0172
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Type Matching: Under the Modified Monge Condition There Is an Optimal Matching Policy That Respects the Priority Relation ≻MsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many platforms match two sides of a market over time: ride-hailing platforms match riders with drivers, blood banks match donated units with patients, organ allocation matches donors with recipients, and retailers pool inventory across fulfilment centres to serve orders from several regions. Demand and supply arrive in several types (locations, blood groups, quality grades), the reward of a match depends on both types, and whatever is not matched today partly waits for tomorrow. A central operational question is which pairs to match first. Static versions of this question go back to the transportation problem and to Monge sequences: Hoffman (1963) characterized the cost matrices for which a fixed greedy order of the arcs solves a transportation problem.

Hu and Zhou (arXiv:1811.07048, published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 24(1), 2022) extend this to a stochastic, multi-period setting. They identify conditions on the rewards, the (weak) modified Monge conditions, under which an optimal dynamic policy matches a dominant pair before the neighbouring pairs it dominates. This mission formalizes their main structural result, Theorem 1, and the chain of results it rests on.

Setting

There are mmm demand types D={1,…,m}\mathcal D=\{1,\dots,m\}D={1,…,m}, nnn supply types S={1,…,n}\mathcal S=\{1,\dots,n\}S={1,…,n}, and TTT periods t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T. In period ttt the state is a pair of vectors (x,y)∈R+m×R+n(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)\in\mathbb R^m_+\times\mathbb R^n_+(x,y)∈R+m​×R+n​ of available demand and supply. The firm chooses a matching decision Q=(qij)∈Rm×n\mathbf Q=(q_{ij})\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}Q=(qij​)∈Rm×n, collecting the reward

Rt∘Q=∑i=1m∑j=1nrijtqij,\mathbf R^t\circ\mathbf Q=\sum_{i=1}^m\sum_{j=1}^n r^t_{ij}q_{ij},Rt∘Q=i=1∑m​j=1∑n​rijt​qij​,

where the rewards rijtr^t_{ij}rijt​ are arbitrary real numbers. The post-matching levels are ui=xi−∑jqiju_i=x_i-\sum_j q_{ij}ui​=xi​−∑j​qij​ and vj=yj−∑iqijv_j=y_j-\sum_i q_{ij}vj​=yj​−∑i​qij​, and Q\mathbf QQ is feasible if Q≥0\mathbf Q\ge0Q≥0, u≥0\mathbf u\ge0u≥0 and v≥0\mathbf v\ge0v≥0. A fraction α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] of unmatched demand and β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] of unmatched supply carries over, and new random quantities (Dt+1,St+1)≥0(\mathbf D^{t+1},\mathbf S^{t+1})\ge0(Dt+1,St+1)≥0 arrive. The value function VtV_tVt​ is defined by the dynamic program

Vt(x,y)=max⁡Q feasibleHt(Q,x,y),Ht(Q,x,y)=Rt∘Q+E Vt+1(αu+Dt+1,βv+St+1),V_t(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)=\max_{\mathbf Q\ \text{feasible}}H_t(\mathbf Q,\mathbf x,\mathbf y),\qquad H_t(\mathbf Q,\mathbf x,\mathbf y)=\mathbf R^t\circ\mathbf Q+\mathbb E\,V_{t+1}(\alpha\mathbf u+\mathbf D^{t+1},\beta\mathbf v+\mathbf S^{t+1}),Vt​(x,y)=Q feasiblemax​Ht​(Q,x,y),Ht​(Q,x,y)=Rt∘Q+EVt+1​(αu+Dt+1,βv+St+1),

with VT+1≡0V_{T+1}\equiv0VT+1​≡0. A matching policy assigns a feasible decision Qt(x,y)\mathbf Q^t(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)Qt(x,y) to every period and state; it is optimal if each of these decisions maximizes HtH_tHt​.

Two neighbouring pairs are compared by the relation ≻M\succ_{\mathcal M}≻M​. For i′≠ii'\ne ii′=i, (i,j)≻M(i′,j)(i,j)\succ_{\mathcal M}(i',j)(i,j)≻M​(i′,j) means rijt>ri′jtr^t_{ij}>r^t_{i'j}rijt​>ri′jt​ for all ttt, and rijt−ri′jt≥α(rij′′t+1−ri′j′′t+1)r^t_{ij}-r^t_{i'j}\ge\alpha(r^{t+1}_{ij''}-r^{t+1}_{i'j''})rijt​−ri′jt​≥α(rij′′t+1​−ri′j′′t+1​) for all t≤T−1t\le T-1t≤T−1 and all j′′j''j′′; the relation (i,j)≻M(i,j′)(i,j)\succ_{\mathcal M}(i,j')(i,j)≻M​(i,j′) is defined symmetrically with β\betaβ. The modified Monge condition requires rijt+ri′j′t≥rij′t+ri′jtr^t_{ij}+r^t_{i'j'}\ge r^t_{ij'}+r^t_{i'j}rijt​+ri′j′t​≥rij′t​+ri′jt​ whenever (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) dominates both (i′,j)(i',j)(i′,j) and (i,j′)(i,j')(i,j′); the paper then writes ≻Ms\succ_{\mathcal M_s}≻Ms​​. For a pair (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), let aia_iai​ be the type-iii demand left after matching iii through all pairs that (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) does not dominate, and bjb_jbj​ the analogous supply residual. A decision respects ≻Ms\succ_{\mathcal M_s}≻Ms​​ if (i,j)≻(i′,j)(i,j)\succ(i',j)(i,j)≻(i′,j) implies qi′j=0q_{i'j}=0qi′j​=0 or ai=0a_i=0ai​=0, and (i,j)≻(i,j′)(i,j)\succ(i,j')(i,j)≻(i,j′) implies qij′=0q_{ij'}=0qij′​=0 or bj=0b_j=0bj​=0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 12)

Under the modified Monge condition there is a single policy PPP such that, for all 1≤t≤T1\le t\le T1≤t≤T and all x,y≥0\mathbf x,\mathbf y\ge0x,y≥0,

Pt(x,y) is optimalandPt(x,y) respects ≻Ms.P_t(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)\ \text{is optimal}\quad\text{and}\quad P_t(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)\ \text{respects}\ \succ_{\mathcal M_s}.Pt​(x,y) is optimalandPt​(x,y) respects ≻Ms​​.

Milestones

  • Proposition 1 (p. 10): VtV_tVt​ and HtH_tHt​ are continuous and concave, and an optimal policy exists.
  • Lemma A.1 (Online Appendix A, p. 1): shifting ε\varepsilonε units of demand from type iii to type i′i'i′ (or of supply from jjj to j′j'j′) changes VtV_tVt​ by at least −∑τ∑j′λj′τ(rij′τ−ri′j′τ)-\sum_\tau\sum_{j'}\lambda^\tau_{j'}(r^\tau_{ij'}-r^\tau_{i'j'})−∑τ​∑j′​λj′τ​(rij′τ​−ri′j′τ​) for some nonnegative multipliers with ∑τα−(τ−t)∑j′λj′τ≤ε\sum_\tau\alpha^{-(\tau-t)}\sum_{j'}\lambda^\tau_{j'}\le\varepsilon∑τ​α−(τ−t)∑j′​λj′τ​≤ε.
  • Lemma A.2 (p. 3): transferring matching quantity from a dominated pair to a dominant one weakly increases HtH_tHt​.
  • Theorem 2 (p. 28): without the Monge condition, some optimal policy weakly respects ≻M\succ_{\mathcal M}≻M​: qi′j=0q_{i'j}=0qi′j​=0 or ui=0u_i=0ui​=0, and qij′=0q_{ij'}=0qij′​=0 or vj=0v_j=0vj​=0.
  • Monge exchange (proof of Theorem 1, p. 4): the transfer Q+ε(eij+ei′j′−ei′j−eij′)\mathbf Q+\varepsilon(\mathbf e_{ij}+\mathbf e_{i'j'}-\mathbf e_{i'j}-\mathbf e_{ij'})Q+ε(eij​+ei′j′​−ei′j​−eij′​) stays feasible and weakly increases HtH_tHt​.
  • Properties (i)–(iii) imply compatibility (proof of Theorem 1, p. 5).

Significance

Theorem 1 replaces the search over all optimal policies, which are state-dependent and generally complex, by a priority structure: whenever (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) dominates a neighbour, the neighbour is matched only once the residual capacity of (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) is exhausted. The paper derives from it the optimality of greedy matching for "perfect" pairs (Proposition 2), the priority order for horizontal (distance-based) and vertical (quality-based) reward structures, and the match-down-to threshold structure of the optimal policy in those models. These results generalize inventory rationing and capacity allocation with upgrading.

The result is proved in the paper, but not completely: the limit argument in the printed proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 ("the quantity transferred converges to zero") is not justified, and Proposition 1 has no printed proof in this version. A machine-checked development would close these gaps and would provide a reusable finite-horizon model with continuous states, concave value functions and an exchange-argument toolkit. No part of this mission is known to be formalized.

Difficulty

The obvious argument starts from an optimal decision and repeatedly applies the transfers of Lemma A.2 and the Monge exchange. Each transfer preserves optimality, but nothing in the printed argument guarantees that the procedure terminates or that its limit has the required property: transfers of different kinds can undo each other's progress, and with equal rewards they can cycle forever. A complete proof has to select the right optimal decision without relying on such an iteration. Before that, the dynamic program itself needs care: the value function is a supremum of an expectation of the next value function, so continuity, concavity, measurability and integrability have to be established together by backward induction, and attainment of the maximum is needed for any optimal policy to exist. Lemma A.1 is a further backward induction in which the multipliers become random and must be averaged.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace DynTypeMatching.Priority. Types are Fin m and Fin n; states are Fin m → ℝ, Fin n → ℝ; decisions are Fin m → Fin n → ℝ. Periods are natural numbers with the paper's 1-based indexing, and Vt=0V_t=0Vt​=0 for t>Tt>Tt>T. A model Model m n carries TTT, the rewards, α\alphaα, β\betaβ and one arrival law per period on Rm×Rn\mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R^nRm×Rn. The paper permits exogenous correlation between periods; its recursion (1) uses per-period laws and does not specify a joint arrival process. The expectation in HtH_tHt​ is over the law of the arrivals entering period t+1t+1t+1.

Every result assumes Model.WellPosed: each arrival law is a probability measure, supported on the nonnegative orthant and integrable, and 0≤α,β≤10\le\alpha,\beta\le10≤α,β≤1. Integrability is not stated in the paper, but without it the expectation in (1) is undefined. The value function is a real supremum and the expectation a Bochner integral, so outside the nonnegative orthant, or for non-integrable integrands, Lean returns the junk value 0. All statements therefore quantify over nonnegative states and feasible decisions.

The following hypotheses are added relative to the page, and each is disclosed in the item where it occurs:

  • Definition 1(i) is strict, rijt>ri′jtr^t_{ij}>r^t_{i'j}rijt​>ri′jt​, and the neighbours are distinct. With the printed weak inequality, Theorems 1 and 2 are false. Take m=3m=3m=3, n=1n=1n=1, T=1T=1T=1, all rewards equal to 2, x=(0,1,1)\mathbf x=(0,1,1)x=(0,1,1), y=(1)\mathbf y=(1)y=(1). Then types 2 and 3 dominate each other, every optimal decision matches one unit, and no such decision respects the relation.
  • Definition 1(ii) is required only for t+1≤Tt+1\le Tt+1≤T, because rT+1r^{T+1}rT+1 is not part of the model.
  • Lemma A.1 assumes α>0\alpha>0α>0 in part (i) and β>0\beta>0β>0 in part (ii), because α−(τ−t)\alpha^{-(\tau-t)}α−(τ−t) is undefined at α=0\alpha=0α=0.
  • Lemma A.2 assumes that Q\mathbf QQ itself is feasible.

Several printed index slips are corrected: the doubled εeij\varepsilon\mathbf e_{ij}εeij​ in the Monge exchange, the index ranges in Lemma A.1, and "and" for "or" in the compatibility step.

An optimal decision is defined as a feasible maximizer of HtH_tHt​ over feasible decisions, not through the equation Vt=HtV_t=H_tVt​=Ht​. This rules out a trivializing reading of the goal: a decision that respects the relation but is not optimal (for instance Q=0\mathbf Q=0Q=0) does not satisfy it. The goal asserts one policy that is optimal and compatible at the same time.

A complete development needs measurable-function and Bochner-integral calculus on finite-dimensional spaces, concavity and continuity of parametric suprema over polytopes, and compactness arguments for attainment. The model and the exchange lemmas are reusable for later missions on this paper (greedy matching, horizontal and vertical models). Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so are alternative proofs of the goal.

Selected references

  • Ming Hu, Yun Zhou, Dynamic Type Matching, arXiv:1811.07048v1, 2018; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 24(1), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.07048 · https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0952
  • Alan J. Hoffman, On simple linear programming problems, Convexity, Proc. Symposia in Pure Mathematics 7, AMS, 1963, 317–327. https://doi.org/10.1090/pspum/007/0157783
  • Rainer E. Burkard, Bettina Klinz, Rüdiger Rudolf, Perspectives of Monge properties in optimization, Discrete Applied Mathematics 70(2), 1996, 95–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(95)00103-X
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Linear OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Greed Works – Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling 2: Greedy Assignment With Nominal Start Times Is (7.216 + 3.608Δ)h(Δ)-Competitive in the Online-Time ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

Scheduling jobs on parallel machines to minimize the total weighted completion time ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_jC_j∑j​wj​Cj​ is a basic model of service and computing systems. Two features of practice are hard to combine with performance guarantees: jobs are not known in advance but arrive over time, and their processing times are random, with only their distributions known when they arrive. Machines are moreover often unrelated: a job's processing time distribution depends arbitrarily on the machine, and some jobs cannot run on some machines at all.

Gupta, Moseley, Uetz and Xie (arXiv:1703.01634, Math. Oper. Res. 2020) give the first performance guarantee for this combination: a simple greedy policy whose expected cost is within a factor depending only on the variability of the processing times of the best nonanticipatory policy, which knows all jobs in advance.

Timeline. For deterministic jobs arriving over time, Hall, Schulz, Shmoys and Wein (1997) gave an 8-competitive algorithm on unrelated machines. Megow, Uetz and Vredeveld (2006) introduced the stochastic online model and analysed greedy policies on identical machines with modified release dates. Skutella, Sviridenko and Uetz (2016) gave LP-based approximation algorithms for offline stochastic scheduling on unrelated machines, with guarantees linear in the squared coefficient of variation. The present paper (conference version IPCO 2017) treats the online, stochastic, unrelated case with release dates.

Setting

There is a finite set MMM of machines and jobs j=1,…,nj=1,\dots,nj=1,…,n. Job jjj is released at an integer time rj≥0r_j\ge0rj​≥0, jobs are indexed so that r1≤⋯≤rnr_1\le\dots\le r_nr1​≤⋯≤rn​, and job jjj has weight wj≥0w_j\ge0wj​≥0. If job jjj runs on machine iii its processing time is a random variable PijP_{ij}Pij​ with values in {0,1,2,… }\{0,1,2,\dots\}{0,1,2,…}; on forbidden pairs the page writes E[Pij]=∞\mathbb E[P_{ij}]=\inftyE[Pij​]=∞, and every job has an allowed machine. On allowed pairs E[Pij]≥1\mathbb E[P_{ij}]\ge1E[Pij​]≥1 and the variance is finite. Different jobs are independent; one job's times on different machines need not be. The squared coefficient of variation is CV[Pij]2=Var⁡[Pij]/E[Pij]2\mathbb{CV}[P_{ij}]^2=\operatorname{Var}[P_{ij}]/\mathbb E[P_{ij}]^2CV[Pij​]2=Var[Pij​]/E[Pij​]2, and Δ\DeltaΔ bounds it on every allowed pair.

A policy decides, for each job, a machine and a start time; jobs are nonpreemptive and a machine runs one job at a time. It is nonanticipatory if its decisions up to time ttt use only what is known at ttt: the processing time of a job is learned when the job completes. OPT\mathsf{OPT}OPT is the least expected cost E[∑jwjCj]\mathbb E[\sum_jw_jC_j]E[∑j​wj​Cj​] of a nonanticipatory policy that knows all jobs, release dates and distributions in advance.

The greedy algorithm (§6.1) is first defined for deterministic times pijp_{ij}pij​. On machine iii job jjj gets the modified release date rij=max⁡{rj,c pij}r_{ij}=\max\{r_j,c\,p_{ij}\}rij​=max{rj​,cpij​}. On arrival, job jjj is assigned to a machine m(j)m(j)m(j) minimizing an explicit upper bound cost⁡(j→i)\operatorname{cost}(j\to i)cost(j→i) on the increase of the objective (Definition 4), and each machine runs WSPT (largest wk/pikw_k/p_{ik}wk​/pik​ first) among its jobs whose modified release dates have passed. Run on pij=E[Pij]p_{ij}=\mathbb E[P_{ij}]pij​=E[Pij​] with c=23c=\frac23c=32​ it yields the nominal schedule (m,s)(m,s)(m,s). The stochastic greedy policy (§6.3) keeps mmm and the nominal order on each machine, and starts the ℓ\ellℓth job on machine iii at Si,ℓ=max⁡{si,ℓ,Si,ℓ−1+Pi,ℓ−1}S_{i,\ell}=\max\{s_{i,\ell},S_{i,\ell-1}+P_{i,\ell-1}\}Si,ℓ​=max{si,ℓ​,Si,ℓ−1​+Pi,ℓ−1​}, never before its nominal start. Its expected cost is ALG\mathsf{ALG}ALG, and

h(Δ)=1+Δ2 (Δ≤1),h(Δ)=1+ΔΔ+1 (Δ≥1).h(\Delta)=1+\tfrac{\sqrt\Delta}2\ (\Delta\le1),\qquad h(\Delta)=1+\tfrac{\Delta}{\Delta+1}\ (\Delta\ge1).h(Δ)=1+2Δ​​ (Δ≤1),h(Δ)=1+Δ+1Δ​ (Δ≥1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

ALG  ≤  (7.216+3.608 Δ) h(Δ) OPT.\mathsf{ALG}\;\le\;(7.216+3.608\,\Delta)\,h(\Delta)\,\mathsf{OPT}.ALG≤(7.216+3.608Δ)h(Δ)OPT.

The goal is stated against every admissible nonanticipatory policy, for every tie-breaking of the greedy algorithm.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 6: the deterministic greedy schedule has ALG≤∑jcost⁡(j→m(j))\mathsf{ALG}\le\sum_j\operatorname{cost}(j\to m(j))ALG≤∑j​cost(j→m(j)).
  2. Lemma 7, feasibility: with αj=cost⁡(j→m(j))\alpha_j=\operatorname{cost}(j\to m(j))αj​=cost(j→m(j)), βi,t\beta_{i,t}βi,t​ the weight of jobs on machine iii released by ttt and unfinished at ttt, and the speed-scaled values (12), (αf/a,βf/b)(\alpha^f/a,\beta^f/b)(αf/a,βf/b) is feasible for the dual (Dr)(\mathrm D_r)(Dr​) when af≥2(2+c)af\ge2(2+c)af≥2(2+c), 1/c≤f(a−1)1/c\le f(a-1)1/c≤f(a−1), af≥baf\ge baf≥b.
  3. (13): zPr≤(1+Δ2)zSr≤(1+Δ2)OPTz^{P_r}\le(1+\frac\Delta2)z^{S_r}\le(1+\frac\Delta2)\mathsf{OPT}zPr​≤(1+2Δ​)zSr​≤(1+2Δ​)OPT for the time-indexed relaxations with release dates.
  4. Lemma 10: E[(X−μ)+]≤μΔ/2\mathbb E[(X-\mu)^+]\le\mu\sqrt\Delta/2E[(X−μ)+]≤μΔ​/2 for Δ≤1\Delta\le1Δ≤1 and ≤μΔ/(Δ+1)\le\mu\Delta/(\Delta+1)≤μΔ/(Δ+1) for Δ≥1\Delta\ge1Δ≥1.
  5. Lemma 8: E[Sj]≤h(Δ) sj\mathbb E[S_j]\le h(\Delta)\,s_jE[Sj​]≤h(Δ)sj​ for every job.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 is the first constant-factor guarantee, for fixed Δ\DeltaΔ, for stochastic online scheduling on unrelated machines with release dates, and it is achieved by a combinatorial policy that needs no LP solution. For deterministic jobs (Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0, h=1h=1h=1) it gives a deterministic 7.216-competitive algorithm (Theorem 3), improving the ratio 8 of Hall et al.; for exponential processing times (Δ=1\Delta=1Δ=1) the factor is (7.216+3.608)⋅32(7.216+3.608)\cdot\frac32(7.216+3.608)⋅23​. The order O(Δ)O(\Delta)O(Δ) matches earlier offline results on unrelated machines and online results on identical machines.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper and has no machine-checked proof. A formalization needs nonanticipatory policies with machine choice, a time-indexed LP relaxation with countably many variables and its weak duality, and a dual-fitting argument. It also exposes a gap: the second sentence of Lemma 7, the bound zDr(αf/a,βf/b)≥ALG/(7+1151)z^{D_r}(\alpha^f/a,\beta^f/b)\ge\mathsf{ALG}/(7+\frac{11}{51})zDr​(αf/a,βf/b)≥ALG/(7+5111​), fails as printed. On one machine with jobs r=(0,0,0,5)r=(0,0,0,5)r=(0,0,0,5), p=(54,54,1,3)p=(\frac54,\frac54,1,3)p=(45​,45​,1,3), w=(2,1,11000,1100)w=(2,1,\frac1{1000},\frac1{100})w=(2,1,10001​,1001​) the greedy schedule has ALG=6049600\mathsf{ALG}=\frac{6049}{600}ALG=6006049​ while zDr=88796400<ALG/(7+1151)=44713200z^{D_r}=\frac{8879}{6400}<\mathsf{ALG}/(7+\frac{11}{51})=\frac{4471}{3200}zDr​=64008879​<ALG/(7+5111​)=32004471​. The step ∑i,sβisf=ALG/f\sum_{i,s}\beta^f_{is}=\mathsf{ALG}/f∑i,s​βisf​=ALG/f counts a job at ⌊Ck/f⌋−⌈rk/f⌉+1\lfloor C_k/f\rfloor-\lceil r_k/f\rceil+1⌊Ck​/f⌋−⌈rk​/f⌉+1 integer slots, up to one more than Ck/fC_k/fCk​/f. A complete proof of the goal has to close this gap.

Difficulty

Three parts are hard. First, the comparison is with an optimal adaptive policy, so the lower bound has to come from a relaxation that every nonanticipatory policy satisfies in expectation. Writing the time-indexed LP for policies that choose machines at start time, idle deliberately and start at real times, and showing it is a relaxation, requires nonanticipation and job independence to decouple a job's machine from its own processing time. Second, the dual fitting runs through a speed-scaled instance with a non-integer speed f=236f=\frac{23}6f=623​, so the dual's integer slots and the schedule's real times do not align; this is where the printed objective bound breaks. Third, the obvious stochastic policy, WSEPT list scheduling without forced idleness, fails: Remark 2 of the paper gives an instance where it has E[C]=Ω(n)\mathbb E[C]=\Omega(n)E[C]=Ω(n) against O(1)O(1)O(1). The analysis therefore has to work with deliberately delayed starts.

Formalization scope

Machines are a Fintype, Nonempty type; jobs are Fin n in release order. Processing times are ℕ-valued measurable functions on a probability space, with finite second moment and mean at least one on eligible pairs, and with jobs independent (iIndepFun over jobs of the machine-indexed vectors). Forbidden pairs are an eligibility relation, never a zero or junk mean. Release dates are natural numbers: the relaxation of §6.2 has integer slots s≥rjs\ge r_js≥rj​, and (13) is false for a fractional release date. Weights are nonnegative; Δ\DeltaΔ is any upper bound on the squared coefficients of variation, which is at least as strong as the page's maximum.

OPT\mathsf{OPT}OPT is never written as an infimum. The goal and (13) quantify over every admissible policy: a map from realizations to machines and real start times that is feasible (eligible machine, start at or after release, disjoint half-open processing intervals per machine), nonanticipatory, and has integrable completion times. A non-integrable comparator would have Bochner integral 000 and would make the bound trivial or false; the integrability requirement rules this out. The greedy algorithm is a predicate on an outcome (assignment and start times): cost-minimal assignment, no start before the modified release date, no unnecessary idleness, and the WSPT priority. Every tie-breaking is covered, and the goal fixes c=23c=\frac23c=32​. The stochastic policy is the recursion Si,ℓ=max⁡{si,ℓ,Si,ℓ−1+Pi,ℓ−1}S_{i,\ell}=\max\{s_{i,\ell},S_{i,\ell-1}+P_{i,\ell-1}\}Si,ℓ​=max{si,ℓ​,Si,ℓ−1​+Pi,ℓ−1​} itself. LP feasibility includes summability of every series, and LP optima appear only through "for every feasible point there is a feasible point" statements.

A complete development needs: weak duality for (Pr)(\mathrm P_r)(Pr​)/(Dr)(\mathrm D_r)(Dr​) with countably many variables; the identity E[Cj]=CjS\mathbb E[C_j]=C^S_jE[Cj​]=CjS​ for the expected occupation variables of a nonanticipatory policy (reusable for any time-indexed stochastic scheduling relaxation); Lemma 10, a self-contained probability inequality; and the dual fitting. Contributions are welcome on each milestone and on a repaired objective bound for Lemma 7.

Selected references

  • V. Gupta, B. Moseley, M. Uetz, Q. Xie, Greed Works – Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020; arXiv:1703.01634v4. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.01634, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.0999
  • L. A. Hall, A. S. Schulz, D. B. Shmoys, J. Wein, Scheduling to minimize average completion time: off-line and on-line approximation algorithms, Mathematics of Operations Research 22:513–544, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.3.513
  • N. Megow, M. Uetz, T. Vredeveld, Models and algorithms for stochastic online scheduling, Mathematics of Operations Research 31(3):513–525, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0201
  • M. Skutella, M. Sviridenko, M. Uetz, Unrelated machine scheduling with stochastic processing times, Mathematics of Operations Research 41(3):851–864, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0757
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Closing the Gap for Makespan Scheduling via Sparsification Techniques: A Feasible Configuration IP Has a Thin Solution, Support at Most 4(d+1)log(4(d+1)T), Complex Configurations Used at Most OnceResearch Paper

Motivation

Makespan minimization on identical parallel machines, P∥Cmax⁡P\|C_{\max}P∥Cmax​, asks to assign nnn jobs with processing times to mmm machines so that the largest machine load is as small as possible. It is strongly NP-hard, and the question has long been how fast a (1+ε)(1+\varepsilon)(1+ε)-approximate schedule can be found. After rounding and scaling, a guess TTT of the optimal makespan becomes a constant, the job sizes take only d=O((1/ε)log⁡(1/ε))d = O((1/\varepsilon)\log(1/\varepsilon))d=O((1/ε)log(1/ε)) distinct values, and the problem becomes an integer program over machine packings: the configuration IP.

A short history of the running times for this problem:

  • Hochbaum and Shmoys (1987) gave the first PTAS, with running time (n/ε)O(1/ε2)(n/\varepsilon)^{O(1/\varepsilon^2)}(n/ε)O(1/ε2).
  • Alon, Azar, Woeginger and Yadid (1997/1998), and Hochbaum and Shmoys, obtained an EPTAS with running time 2(1/ε)poly(1/ε)+O(nlog⁡n)2^{(1/\varepsilon)^{\mathrm{poly}(1/\varepsilon)}} + O(n\log n)2(1/ε)poly(1/ε)+O(nlogn).
  • Jansen (2010) used the support bound of Eisenbrand and Shmonin (2006) to reach 2O((1/ε)2log⁡3(1/ε))+O(nlog⁡n)2^{O((1/\varepsilon)^2\log^3(1/\varepsilon))} + O(n\log n)2O((1/ε)2log3(1/ε))+O(nlogn).
  • Chen, Jansen and Zhang (2014) showed that, under the Exponential Time Hypothesis, no PTAS runs in time 2(1/ε)1−δpoly(n)2^{(1/\varepsilon)^{1-\delta}}\mathrm{poly}(n)2(1/ε)1−δpoly(n).
  • Jansen, Klein and Verschae (arXiv 2016; Mathematics of Operations Research 2020) reached 2O((1/ε)log⁡4(1/ε))+O(nlog⁡n)2^{O((1/\varepsilon)\log^4(1/\varepsilon))} + O(n\log n)2O((1/ε)log4(1/ε))+O(nlogn), matching that lower bound up to polylogarithmic factors in the exponent. Their key ingredient is a structural theorem on the configuration IP, which this mission formalizes.

Setting

Fix d∈Nd \in \mathbb{N}d∈N, a vector of job sizes π∈Z>0d\pi \in \mathbb{Z}^d_{>0}π∈Z>0d​ and a capacity T∈Z>0T \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}T∈Z>0​. The knapsack polytope is P={c∈R≥0d:π⋅c≤T}\mathcal{P} = \{c \in \mathbb{R}^d_{\ge 0} : \pi\cdot c \le T\}P={c∈R≥0d​:π⋅c≤T}, and a configuration is an integral point of it:

Q=Zd∩P,c∈Q  ⟺  c∈Z≥0d,  ∑kπkck≤T.Q = \mathbb{Z}^d \cap \mathcal{P}, \qquad c \in Q \iff c \in \mathbb{Z}^d_{\ge 0},\ \ \sum_{k} \pi_k c_k \le T.Q=Zd∩P,c∈Q⟺c∈Z≥0d​,  k∑​πk​ck​≤T.

A configuration describes one machine: ckc_kck​ jobs of size πk\pi_kπk​, of total load at most TTT. The support of a vector is the set of its nonzero coordinates, supp⁡(c)={k:ck≠0}\operatorname{supp}(c) = \{k : c_k \ne 0\}supp(c)={k:ck​=0}. Throughout, log⁡=log⁡2\log = \log_2log=log2​. A configuration is simple if ∣supp⁡(c)∣≤log⁡(T+1)|\operatorname{supp}(c)| \le \log(T+1)∣supp(c)∣≤log(T+1) and complex otherwise; QcQ_cQc​ is the set of complex configurations.

Given the number bkb_kbk​ of jobs of each size and the number mmm of machines, the configuration IP [conf-IP] asks for multiplicities xc∈Z≥0x_c \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ge 0}xc​∈Z≥0​, one per configuration, with

∑c∈Qc xc=b,∑c∈Qxc=m.\sum_{c\in Q} c\, x_c = b, \qquad \sum_{c \in Q} x_c = m.c∈Q∑​cxc​=b,c∈Q∑​xc​=m.

Its LP relaxation [conf-LP] replaces xc∈Z≥0x_c \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ge 0}xc​∈Z≥0​ by xc≥0x_c \ge 0xc​≥0. The support of a solution is supp⁡(x)={c∈Q:xc≠0}\operatorname{supp}(x) = \{c \in Q : x_c \neq 0\}supp(x)={c∈Q:xc​=0}.

Formalization targets

Goal: thin solutions (Theorem 1)

If [conf-IP] is feasible, it has a feasible solution xxx with

xc>1⇒c simple,∣supp⁡(x)∣≤4(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T),∑c∈Qcxc≤2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T).x_c > 1 \Rightarrow c \text{ simple}, \qquad |\operatorname{supp}(x)| \le 4(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T), \qquad \sum_{c\in Q_c} x_c \le 2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T).xc​>1⇒c simple,∣supp(x)∣≤4(d+1)log(4(d+1)T),c∈Qc​∑​xc​≤2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T).

A solution with these three properties is called thin.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (Eisenbrand–Shmonin): if ∣supp⁡(x)∣>2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T)|\operatorname{supp}(x)| > 2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T)∣supp(x)∣>2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T) for a nonnegative integer vector xxx on QQQ, there are disjoint nonempty A,B⊆supp⁡(x)A, B \subseteq \operatorname{supp}(x)A,B⊆supp(x) with ∑c∈Ac=∑c∈Bc\sum_{c \in A} c = \sum_{c\in B} c∑c∈A​c=∑c∈B​c and ∣A∣=∣B∣|A| = |B|∣A∣=∣B∣.
  2. Lemma 3 (Eisenbrand–Shmonin): a feasible [conf-IP] has a solution with ∣supp⁡(x)∣≤2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T)|\operatorname{supp}(x)| \le 2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T)∣supp(x)∣≤2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T).
  3. Lemma 4 (Sparsification Lemma): every complex c∈Qc \in Qc∈Q satisfies 2c=c1+c22c = c_1 + c_22c=c1​+c2​ for configurations c1,c2c_1, c_2c1​,c2​ with π⋅c1=π⋅c2=π⋅c\pi\cdot c_1 = \pi\cdot c_2 = \pi\cdot cπ⋅c1​=π⋅c2​=π⋅c and supp⁡(ci)⊊supp⁡(c)\operatorname{supp}(c_i) \subsetneq \operatorname{supp}(c)supp(ci​)⊊supp(c).
  4. P1: a feasible solution minimizing the potential Φ(x)=∑c complexxc∣supp⁡(c)∣\Phi(x) = \sum_{c \text{ complex}} x_c|\operatorname{supp}(c)|Φ(x)=∑c complex​xc​∣supp(c)∣ uses each complex configuration at most once.
  5. P2: such a solution has at most 2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T)2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T)2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T) complex configurations in its support.

Companion results

  • Corollary 5: every vertex of conv.hull⁡(Q)\operatorname{conv.hull}(Q)conv.hull(Q) is a simple configuration; and, from its proof, the number of simple configurations is at most (L+1)dL(T+1)L(L+1)d^{L}(T+1)^{L}(L+1)dL(T+1)L with L=log⁡(T+1)L = \log(T+1)L=log(T+1), for d≥1d \ge 1d≥1.
  • Corollary 6: a feasible [conf-LP] has a solution supported on simple configurations only.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 says that, up to O(dlog⁡(dT))O(d\log(dT))O(dlog(dT)) machines, every feasible configuration IP can be solved using simple configurations only. There are 2O(log⁡2d+log⁡2T)2^{O(\log^2 d + \log^2 T)}2O(log2d+log2T) simple configurations, far fewer than configurations in general, so an algorithm can guess the support of a solution among a much smaller family. This is what yields the 2O((1/ε)log⁡4(1/ε))+O(nlog⁡n)2^{O((1/\varepsilon)\log^4(1/\varepsilon))} + O(n\log n)2O((1/ε)log4(1/ε))+O(nlogn) EPTAS for P∥Cmax⁡P\|C_{\max}P∥Cmax​, and through the same structure PTASs for Q∥Cmax⁡Q\|C_{\max}Q∥Cmax​ and for LpL_pLp​-norm and max–min objectives. Corollaries 5 and 6 are structural facts about knapsack polytopes in their own right: the integer hull has only simple vertices, and the configuration LP can be restricted to simple configurations.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof that this mission knows of. The development produces a reusable formal model of configurations and of the configuration IP and LP, a formal Eisenbrand–Shmonin support bound for this IP (a Carathéodory-type statement for integer cones that recurs across integer programming), and the sparsification lemma with its potential-function argument. The constants 4(d+1)4(d+1)4(d+1) and 2(d+1)2(d+1)2(d+1) are the paper's and are stated exactly.

Difficulty

The obvious argument applies the sparsification lemma repeatedly, replacing any complex configuration used twice by two configurations of smaller support, and then shrinks the support with the Eisenbrand–Shmonin exchange. The second step can undo the first: the exchange moves weight between configurations and may raise the multiplicity of a complex configuration above one again, so alternating the two steps has no evident termination measure. A proof has to control both properties at once. The counting behind the support bound needs the explicit inequality (sT+1)d+1<2s(sT+1)^{d+1} < 2^s(sT+1)d+1<2s for every s>2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T)s > 2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T)s>2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T), which must be carried out with the exact constants rather than up to O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅).

Formalization scope

  • Configurations are functions Fin d → ℕ with ∑kπkck≤T\sum_k \pi_k c_k \le T∑k​πk​ck​≤T; solutions of [conf-IP] are finitely supported functions (Fin d → ℕ) →₀ ℕ vanishing outside QQQ, and solutions of [conf-LP] are finitely supported real-valued functions, nonnegative and vanishing outside QQQ.
  • The standing assumptions of §2 are binders of every statement: πk>0\pi_k > 0πk​>0 for all kkk and T>0T > 0T>0. Lemma 4 does not need T>0T > 0T>0 and omits it.
  • The paper writes b∈Rdb \in \mathbb{R}^db∈Rd for [conf-IP]; feasibility forces b∈Ndb \in \mathbb{N}^db∈Nd, so bbb and mmm are natural numbers. For [conf-LP] they are real.
  • log⁡\loglog is Real.logb 2 and every bound is a real inequality; no floor is taken.
  • In Lemma 2, MxA=MxBMx^A = Mx^BMxA=MxB is stated row by row: the sum of the configurations in AAA equals that in BBB, and ∣A∣=∣B∣|A| = |B|∣A∣=∣B∣.
  • "Minimum potential" in P1 and P2 means Φ(x)≤Φ(y)\Phi(x) \le \Phi(y)Φ(x)≤Φ(y) for every feasible solution yyy of the same instance.
  • A vertex of conv.hull⁡(Q)\operatorname{conv.hull}(Q)conv.hull(Q) is an extreme point (Mathlib's Set.extremePoints). The asymptotic count of Corollary 5 is replaced by the explicit bound of its proof, with the added hypothesis d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 (at d=0d = 0d=0 the explicit bound is 000 while Q={0}Q = \{0\}Q={0}).

The goal theorem refers only to [conf-IP], its solutions, supports and the simple/complex split; it does not mention the potential, the matrix MMM or a minimality assumption, so it cannot be discharged by choosing a special solution in the hypotheses.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over Finsupp, the pigeonhole principle on finsets, elementary bounds on Real.logb, and, for Corollaries 5 and 6, convex hulls and extreme points of finite sets in Rd\mathbb{R}^dRd. The definitions of configurations and of the configuration IP/LP are reusable for other configuration-IP papers (bin packing, cutting stock, scheduling). Contributions of auxiliary lemmas on supports of integer conic combinations are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Jansen, K.-M. Klein, J. Verschae, Closing the Gap for Makespan Scheduling via Sparsification Techniques, ICALP 2016; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.07153 (version v1, the basis of every citation in this mission)
  • F. Eisenbrand, G. Shmonin, Carathéodory bounds for integer cones, Operations Research Letters 34, 564–568, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2005.09.008
  • K. Jansen, An EPTAS for scheduling jobs on uniform processors: using an MILP relaxation with a constant number of integral variables, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 24, 457–485, 2010.
  • N. Alon, Y. Azar, G. J. Woeginger, T. Yadid, Approximation schemes for scheduling on parallel machines, Journal of Scheduling 1, 55–66, 1998.
  • D. S. Hochbaum, D. B. Shmoys, Using dual approximation algorithms for scheduling problems: theoretical and practical results, Journal of the ACM 34, 144–162, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1145/7531.7535
  • L. Chen, K. Jansen, G. Zhang, On the optimality of approximation schemes for the classical scheduling problem, Proceedings of the 25th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 657–668, 2014.
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Linear OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Greed Works – Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling 1: Greedy Assignment With WSEPT Sequencing Is (4 + 2Δ)-Competitive in the Online-List ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

Online scheduling asks for decisions before the full job set is known. In the online-list model, jobs are revealed one at a time and each must be assigned to a machine before the next job is revealed; the scheduler may choose the processing order after the list is complete. When processing durations are random and machines are unrelated, the same job may have different duration distributions on different machines. An assignment decision therefore affects both its own completion time and the waiting time of other jobs. Gupta, Moseley, Uetz and Xie study a greedy assignment rule for this setting and prove a bound against a scheduler that knows all distributions and all jobs in advance but cannot see future processing-time realizations (arXiv:1703.01634v4, §§2–5). This comparison is relevant to systems that must commit work to heterogeneous servers as requests arrive, while service times remain uncertain.

Setting

Let MMM be a nonempty finite set of machines and J={0,…,n−1}J=\{0,\ldots,n-1\}J={0,…,n−1} a finite set of jobs indexed by their presentation order. Job jjj has a nonnegative weight wjw_jwj​. An eligibility relation E⊆M×JE\subseteq M\times JE⊆M×J records which machines can process each job; every job has at least one eligible machine. For an eligible pair (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), PijP_{ij}Pij​ is a nonnegative integer-valued random processing time with mean μij=E[Pij]≥1\mu_{ij}=\mathbb E[P_{ij}]\ge1μij​=E[Pij​]≥1 and a finite second moment. The vector (Pij)i∈M(P_{ij})_{i\in M}(Pij​)i∈M​ for one job may have dependence across machines, but the vectors for different jobs are independent. A parameter Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0 bounds Var⁡(Pij)/μij2\operatorname{Var}(P_{ij})/\mu_{ij}^{2}Var(Pij​)/μij2​ for all eligible pairs. These conventions follow the standing model and coefficient-of-variation bound in the paper (§2, pp. 4–6 and Definition 3, p. 7).

The greedy assignment sends each newly presented job to an eligible machine that minimizes the instantaneous increase in expected total weighted completion time. For a fixed machine, jobs are sequenced by decreasing ratio wj/μijw_j/\mu_{ij}wj​/μij​, with job index breaking equal-ratio ties. This is the weighted shortest expected processing time, or WSEPT, order. The algorithm runs each machine continuously from time zero in that order. Its expected objective, ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG, is the expectation of ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_j C_j∑j​wj​Cj​ for the resulting realized completion times, not a value assigned by a closed formula (§4, pp. 8–9).

A comparator policy can choose machines and start times as earlier jobs finish. It must schedule nonpreemptively, use only information available when a decision is made, and have integrable completion times. It may know the full job set and every processing-time distribution before time zero, but not the future realizations. Write CjΠC_j^\PiCjΠ​ for its realized completion time and OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT for the least expected weighted completion cost among such policies when an optimum exists (§2.1, pp. 5–6).

Formalization targets

The goal is the paper's Theorem 1 (p. 11). It compares every eligible-minimum greedy assignment, including every tie choice, with every admissible nonanticipatory comparator Π\PiΠ:

ALG≤(4+2Δ) E ⁣[∑j∈JwjCjΠ].\mathrm{ALG}\le(4+2\Delta)\,\mathbb E\!\left[\sum_{j\in J}w_j C_j^\Pi\right].ALG≤(4+2Δ)E​j∈J∑​wj​CjΠ​​.

This universal comparison expresses ALG≤(4+2Δ)OPT\mathrm{ALG}\le(4+2\Delta)\mathrm{OPT}ALG≤(4+2Δ)OPT without requiring an optimizer to exist. The milestone list contains the paper's integer tail identities (Lemma 1), the completion-time expression for one job (Lemma 9), the comparison of two time-indexed relaxations and its policy consequence (Lemma 2 and Corollary 1), and the three dual-variable claims used around the greedy algorithm (Lemmas 3–5). Their printed indices and formulas are attached to the proposal in proof order.

Significance

The result supplies a performance guarantee for a combinatorial online algorithm on heterogeneous machines with random durations. The factor varies explicitly with the processing-time variability: for deterministic eligible processing times, Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0 and the bound is 444; greater permitted variability increases it linearly. Forbidden machine-job pairs are included, so the claim applies when some jobs have a restricted set of possible servers. The comparator may postpone machine selection until processing begins and adapt to completed work, so the bound is not limited to fixed-assignment schedules (Theorem 1 and §2.1).

The theorem is proved in the cited paper. In this proposal, the Lean statements and definitions have compiled, while the theorem modules still contain sorry; the remaining formalization work is to supply machine-checked proofs. A completed development would contribute reusable definitions for nonanticipatory unrelated-machine policies, time-indexed stochastic scheduling relaxations, and comparisons with countably many LP variables. Those interfaces can support later scheduling results that use the same information structure.

Difficulty

The most immediate comparison treats the greedy assignment costs as dual variables. For this paper's linear program, the direct halved dual point is feasible, but the resulting dual objective is zero, so feasibility alone gives no useful upper bound on ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG (Lemmas 3–4 and the beginning of §5). The random processing times also require care when translating occupancy probabilities into completion costs: the time-indexed expression uses both first and second moments, and a policy's start decision must not depend on the job's unobserved duration. The proof must reconcile the greedy order, those probability identities, and a comparison with policies that may change machines and start times adaptively.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses Fin n in arrival order and permits n=0n=0n=0; the empty instance gives a trivial inequality. The machine type is finite and nonempty. Processing times are natural-valued random variables, while policy start times are real. Processing intervals are half-open, so a zero-duration job occupies no machine time. An ineligible pair is represented by the eligibility relation, never by a zero mean. Each eligible processing time has finite second moment and mean at least one; Δ\DeltaΔ is any nonnegative upper bound on squared coefficients of variation. The paper leaves wj≥0w_j\ge0wj​≥0 implicit; it is included because negative weights invalidate the comparison. Dependence across machines for the same job is allowed, and the entire time vector is independent across jobs.

Nonanticipation is stated by comparing two realizations that agree on the durations observed by time ttt and on the fact that running jobs have not yet completed. Admissible comparator policies must work for every realization and have integrable completion times, preventing a default zero value for a nonintegrable integral. The goal quantifies over all such policies, so it cannot be made true by choosing a restricted benchmark. The greedy predicate reads only earlier assignments and admits every eligible minimizing machine; it does not fix a favorable tie choice.

The LP variables yijsy_{ijs}yijs​ are real and nonnegative, supported on eligible pairs, and their countable sums and time-weighted sums must converge. LP comparisons use feasible witnesses instead of a real infimum, whose value would be misleading for an empty feasible set. A source-level discretization issue is isolated in Lemma 4: ∑sβis\sum_s\beta_{is}∑s​βis​ counts whole slots up to a nominal completion time, so the printed second equality requires integer means. Its first equality and the goal do not take that condition. A complete proof needs measurable-policy reasoning, tail-sum identities, summability arguments, WSEPT order properties and dual weak duality. Definitions and lemmas that isolate those components are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Gupta, B. Moseley, M. Uetz and Q. Xie, Greed Works – Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling, accepted version of Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020. arXiv:1703.01634v4; DOI:10.1287/moor.2019.0999.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 4: Bundling k ≥ 2 I.I.D. Goods Guarantees a Fraction c/log k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller with several goods and a single buyer is the smallest setting in which multi-dimensional mechanism design differs from the one-good theory. For one good, Myerson's theorem (Myerson 1981) says the optimal mechanism posts a price. For two or more goods the optimal mechanism may use lotteries, may be non-monotone in the buyer's values, and is in general not known in closed form. Practitioners nevertheless use simple mechanisms, and the question that Hart and Nisan (arXiv:1204.1846v3) ask is quantitative: what fraction of the optimal revenue does a simple mechanism guarantee?

This mission concerns the simplest mechanism of all, bundling: one posted price for the set of all goods. When the goods are independent and identically distributed, bundling is known to become nearly optimal as the number of goods grows for a fixed distribution (Armstrong 1999; Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999). That limit is not uniform over distributions. Theorem D of Hart and Nisan gives the uniform guarantee: for every k≥2k\ge2k≥2 and every distribution, bundling kkk i.i.d. goods earns at least c/log⁡kc/\log kc/logk of the optimal revenue.

Timeline. Armstrong (1999) and Bakos–Brynjolfsson (1999) proved the asymptotic optimality of bundling for a fixed distribution. Hart and Nisan circulated the first version of this paper in 2012 (EC 2012), proving Theorems A–D; the version formalized here is arXiv:1204.1846v3 (2017), published in J. Econ. Theory 172 (2017). Li and Yao (2013) later improved separate selling for i.i.d. goods to Θ(1/log⁡k)\Theta(1/\log k)Θ(1/logk), and Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier and Weinberg (2014) showed that the better of separate selling and bundling is a constant-factor approximation for independent goods.

Setting

There are kkk goods and one buyer with additive valuation x=(x1,…,xk)∈R+kx=(x_1,\dots,x_k)\in\mathbb R_+^kx=(x1​,…,xk​)∈R+k​, drawn from a known distribution. A mechanism μ=(q,s)\mu=(q,s)μ=(q,s) assigns to every reported valuation xxx an allocation vector q(x)∈[0,1]kq(x)\in[0,1]^kq(x)∈[0,1]k (the probabilities of receiving each good) and a payment s(x)∈Rs(x)\in\mathbb Rs(x)∈R. The buyer's payoff is b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x)b(x)=q(x)\cdot x-s(x)b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x). The mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if b(x)≥q(x~)⋅x−s(x~)b(x)\ge q(\tilde x)\cdot x-s(\tilde x)b(x)≥q(x~)⋅x−s(x~) for all x,x~x,\tilde xx,x~, and individually rational (IR) if b(x)≥0b(x)\ge0b(x)≥0 for all xxx. For a random valuation XXX, the expected revenue is R(μ;X)=E[s(X)]R(\mu;X)=\mathbb E[s(X)]R(μ;X)=E[s(X)] and the optimal revenue is

Rev(X)=sup⁡{R(μ;X): μ IC and IR}∈[0,∞].\mathrm{Rev}(X)=\sup\{R(\mu;X):\ \mu\text{ IC and IR}\}\in[0,\infty].Rev(X)=sup{R(μ;X): μ IC and IR}∈[0,∞].

For one good, Rev(X)=sup⁡p≥0p⋅P[X≥p]\mathrm{Rev}(X)=\sup_{p\ge0}p\cdot\mathbb P[X\ge p]Rev(X)=supp≥0​p⋅P[X≥p]. The bundled revenue is the one-good revenue of the total value, BRev(X)=Rev(X1+⋯+Xk)\mathrm{BRev}(X)=\mathrm{Rev}(X_1+\dots+X_k)BRev(X)=Rev(X1​+⋯+Xk​), and the separate revenue is SRev(X)=∑iRev(Xi)\mathrm{SRev}(X)=\sum_i\mathrm{Rev}(X_i)SRev(X)=∑i​Rev(Xi​).

"kkk i.i.d. goods" means that X1,…,XkX_1,\dots,X_kX1​,…,Xk​ are independent with a common law ν\nuν on R+\mathbb R_+R+​. Write Rk=Rev(X1,…,Xk)R_k=\mathrm{Rev}(X_1,\dots,X_k)Rk​=Rev(X1​,…,Xk​) and Bk=BRev(X1,…,Xk)B_k=\mathrm{BRev}(X_1,\dots,X_k)Bk​=BRev(X1​,…,Xk​).

Two auxiliary objects appear in the milestones. A real random variable XXX is stochastically dominated by YYY if P[X≥p]≤P[Y≥p]\mathbb P[X\ge p]\le\mathbb P[Y\ge p]P[X≥p]≤P[Y≥p] for every ppp. The equal-revenue (ER) law is that of V≥1V\ge1V≥1 with P[V≥p]=1/p\mathbb P[V\ge p]=1/pP[V≥p]=1/p for p≥1p\ge1p≥1. The constant w≈0.278w\approx0.278w≈0.278 is the unique real solution of w ew+1=1w\,e^{w+1}=1wew+1=1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem D (p. 7)

∃ c>0  ∀k≥2  ∀ν:clog⁡k Rk≤Bk.\exists\,c>0\ \ \forall k\ge2\ \ \forall\nu:\qquad \frac{c}{\log k}\,R_k\le B_k .∃c>0  ∀k≥2  ∀ν:logkc​Rk​≤Bk​.

The constant is absolute: it is chosen before kkk and before the distribution. This is the statement as printed; it fixes neither the constant nor the base of the logarithm.

Explicit form (proof of Theorem D, p. 27)

Rk≤8(w+1)(log⁡2k+2) Bk(k≥2).R_k\le 8(w+1)(\log_2k+2)\,B_k\qquad(k\ge2).Rk​≤8(w+1)(log2​k+2)Bk​(k≥2).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof: Myerson's formula (1); monotonicity of one-good revenue under domination (Proposition 11); the ER characterization (Lemma 20) and the tail of a weighted sum of two ER goods (Lemma 21); BRev(V1,V2)=2(w+1)\mathrm{BRev}(V_1,V_2)=2(w+1)BRev(V1​,V2​)=2(w+1) (Proposition 24); SRev≥BRev/(w+1)\mathrm{SRev}\ge\mathrm{BRev}/(w+1)SRev≥BRev/(w+1) for two independent goods (Proposition 13 (i)); BRev≥SRev/4\mathrm{BRev}\ge\mathrm{SRev}/4BRev≥SRev/4 for i.i.d. goods (Proposition 14 (ii)); the decomposition Theorem 7; the power-of-two bound Rk≤4(log⁡2k+1)BkR_k\le4(\log_2k+1)B_kRk​≤4(log2​k+1)Bk​; monotonicity of RkR_kRk​ and BkB_kBk​ in kkk; and the explicit bound above.

Significance

Theorem D says that for identically distributed goods the gap between the simplest mechanism and the optimal one grows at most logarithmically in the number of goods, uniformly over all distributions, including heavy-tailed ones with infinite mean. The i.i.d. hypothesis is essential: for independent goods with different distributions bundling can recover only a 1/k1/k1/k fraction (Example 27 of the paper). Together with Theorem C (separate selling, c/log⁡2kc/\log^2kc/log2k) it places the two simple mechanisms on a common scale, and the decomposition Theorem 7 it rests on is a general tool for independent groups of goods.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known to exist. A formalization adds: a Lean model of multi-good mechanisms with IC, IR and expected revenue in the extended reals; a checked version of Myerson's one-good formula for arbitrary laws on R+\mathbb R_+R+​; the equal-revenue law and its two-good convolution; and a checked reduction from the decomposition theorem to the logarithmic bundling guarantee. Shorter arguments or a better constant are also welcome.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the first step: revenue is not monotone in the valuation for two or more goods (Hart and Reny 2015), so one cannot bound RkR_kRk​ by replacing each good by a dominating ER good. Every comparison therefore has to pass through one-dimensional quantities, and the multi-good step (Theorem 7) is a statement about expectations of a mechanism's payments conditioned on an independent block of goods. Proposition 14 (ii) must handle distributions where no optimal one-good price exists and Rev(Xi)\mathrm{Rev}(X_i)Rev(Xi​) may be infinite (the paper's proof speaks of "an optimal price"). Proposition 24 is an exact evaluation whose answer is defined only implicitly, through w ew+1=1w\,e^{w+1}=1wew+1=1. The induction itself must track how block sums of i.i.d. goods are again i.i.d.

Formalization scope

Valuations are laws: a kkk-good random valuation is a probability measure on Fin k → ℝ≥0, and kkk i.i.d. goods with law ν\nuν form Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin k => ν). Two independent groups Y,ZY,ZY,Z have the product law on the disjoint union of their index types (jointLaw); the two-good statement Proposition 13 (i) uses this encoding on Unit ⊕ Unit. A mechanism is a pair of functions; the admissible class requires q∈[0,1]kq\in[0,1]^kq∈[0,1]k, IC, IR, and a measurable payment rule, the last being the without-loss-of-generality pin of the paper's footnote 12. The expected revenue of one mechanism is an EReal difference of two lower integrals, never a Bochner integral (which would be 000 for non-integrable payments). Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev is a supremum in ℝ≥0∞, so infinite revenues are represented. www is a real parameter with the hypothesis w ew+1=1w\,e^{w+1}=1wew+1=1, not a Lambert-WWW value. Logarithms are natural in Theorem D and base 2 (Real.logb 2) in the proof's explicit bounds, as printed; every statement with a logarithm keeps k≥2k\ge2k≥2.

The paper states Theorem D as a lower bound on an infimum of ratios BRev/Rev\mathrm{BRev}/\mathrm{Rev}BRev/Rev; the formal goal is the multiplicative inequality, which agrees with it wherever the ratio is defined and requires BRev=∞\mathrm{BRev}=\inftyBRev=∞ when Rev=∞\mathrm{Rev}=\inftyRev=∞. A formalization in which ccc may depend on kkk or on the distribution, or in which Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev is computed with a Bochner integral, would trivialize the statement and is ruled out by the binder order and the definitions above.

The definitions are a mission-local copy of the model shared by this series (missions 1–5), so they can be merged later. Not posed here: Theorem C, Proposition 25, Corollary 23, Lemma 22, Example 32, the GFOR notation, and the asymptotic optimality of bundling (Appendix A.5). Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are reusable lemmas on posted prices, stochastic domination of sums of independent variables, and binomial medians.

Selected references

  • S. Hart and N. Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, J. Econ. Theory 172 (2017); preprint arXiv:1204.1846v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.1846
  • R. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • M. Armstrong, Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 151–168. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00083
  • Y. Bakos and E. Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency, Management Sci. 45 (1999) 1613–1630. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.12.1613
  • S. Hart and P. Reny, Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations, Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 893–922. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1517
  • X. Li and A. C.-C. Yao, On Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Independently Distributed Items, PNAS 110 (2013) 11232–11237. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1309533110
  • M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier and S. M. Weinberg, A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer, FOCS 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.6146
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 6: With n Buyers and Dominant-Strategy Implementation, Selling Two Independent Goods Separately Earns at Least Half the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who owns several goods and faces buyers with private values must decide how to sell them. The revenue-maximizing mechanism is known in closed form only for one good: for a single buyer it is a posted price, and for several buyers it is Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981). With two or more goods the optimal mechanism may use lotteries, may be impossible to describe compactly, and may behave non-monotonically in the value distribution. This makes simple mechanisms with provable revenue guarantees the practical question: how much of the optimal revenue does a seller lose by selling each good separately with its own optimal one-good mechanism?

Hart and Nisan (arXiv:1204.1846v3) answer this for one buyer and two independent goods (their Theorem A): selling separately earns at least half of the optimal revenue. Their Theorem 18 (p. 29), proved in Appendix A.7 as Theorems 33 and 34, extends the factor 12\tfrac1221​ to any number nnn of buyers. This mission formalizes the dominant-strategy half, Theorem 33, in which the buyers may be arbitrarily correlated with one another, as long as the two goods are independent.

Setting

One seller sells kkk goods to n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 buyers. Buyer jjj's value for good iii is a number xij≥0x^j_i \ge 0xij​≥0; a valuation profile is x=(xij)∈R+knx = (x^j_i) \in \mathbb R^{kn}_+x=(xij​)∈R+kn​, and xj=(xij)ix^j = (x^j_i)_ixj=(xij​)i​ is buyer jjj's valuation vector. The profile is random, XXX, with a commonly known joint law.

A mechanism μ=(qj,sj)j=1,…,n\mu = (q^j, s^j)_{j=1,\dots,n}μ=(qj,sj)j=1,…,n​ gives each buyer jjj an allocation qj(x)∈[0,1]kq^j(x) \in [0,1]^kqj(x)∈[0,1]k (the probability that jjj receives each good) and a payment sj(x)∈Rs^j(x) \in \mathbb Rsj(x)∈R, as functions of the reported profile, subject to feasibility: ∑jqij(x)≤1\sum_j q^j_i(x) \le 1∑j​qij​(x)≤1 for every good iii. Buyer jjj's payoff is bj(x)=qj(x)⋅xj−sj(x)b^j(x) = q^j(x)\cdot x^j - s^j(x)bj(x)=qj(x)⋅xj−sj(x), and the seller's revenue is S(x)=∑jsj(x)S(x) = \sum_j s^j(x)S(x)=∑j​sj(x).

  • IC-DS (dominant-strategy incentive compatibility): bj(x)≥qj(x~j,x−j)⋅xj−sj(x~j,x−j)b^j(x) \ge q^j(\tilde x^j, x^{-j})\cdot x^j - s^j(\tilde x^j, x^{-j})bj(x)≥qj(x~j,x−j)⋅xj−sj(x~j,x−j) for every buyer jjj, every profile xxx and every report x~j\tilde x^jx~j, where (x~j,x−j)(\tilde x^j, x^{-j})(x~j,x−j) replaces jjj's vector in xxx by x~j\tilde x^jx~j.
  • IR-DS: bj(x)≥0b^j(x) \ge 0bj(x)≥0 for every jjj and xxx.
  • NPT (no positive transfer): sj≥0s^j \ge 0sj≥0.

The expected revenue is R(μ;X)=E[S(X)]R(\mu; X) = \mathbb E[S(X)]R(μ;X)=E[S(X)], and

RevDS(X)=sup⁡{R(μ;X):μ feasible, IC-DS and IR-DS}∈[0,∞].\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X) = \sup\{R(\mu;X) : \mu \text{ feasible, IC-DS and IR-DS}\} \in [0, \infty].RevDS(X)=sup{R(μ;X):μ feasible, IC-DS and IR-DS}∈[0,∞].

For two goods write Y=X1=(X1j)jY = X_1 = (X^j_1)_jY=X1​=(X1j​)j​ and Z=X2=(X2j)jZ = X_2 = (X^j_2)_jZ=X2​=(X2j​)j​ for the vectors of the buyers' values for good 1 and good 2, so X=(Y,Z)X = (Y, Z)X=(Y,Z). RevDS(Y)\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(Y)RevDS(Y) is the optimal dominant-strategy revenue from good 1 alone, sold to the same nnn buyers. Finally a(1)=max⁡jaja^{(1)} = \max_j a^ja(1)=maxj​aj.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 33 (p. 49)

If YYY and ZZZ are independent, then

RevDS(X1)+RevDS(X2)≥12 RevDS(X1,X2).\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X_1) + \mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X_2) \ge \tfrac12\,\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X_1, X_2).RevDS(X1​)+RevDS(X2​)≥21​RevDS(X1​,X2​).

No independence among buyers is assumed: the values Xi1,…,XinX^1_i, \dots, X^n_iXi1​,…,Xin​ for the same good may have any joint law.

Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof)

  1. Remark (b) of A.7 (p. 48): an IC-DS, IR-DS mechanism is NPT iff sj(0,x−j)=0s^j(0, x^{-j}) = 0sj(0,x−j)=0 for all jjj, x−jx^{-j}x−j, and NPT is without loss of generality for RevDS\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}RevDS.
  2. Remark (b), subdomain property (p. 48): E[∑jsj(X)1X∈A]≤RevDS(X1X∈A)≤RevDS(X)\mathbb E[\sum_j s^j(X)\mathbf 1_{X\in A}] \le \mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X\mathbf 1_{X\in A}) \le \mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X)E[∑j​sj(X)1X∈A​]≤RevDS(X1X∈A​)≤RevDS(X).
  3. Display (21) (p. 50): z(1) P[Y(1)≥z(1)]≤RevDS(Y)z^{(1)}\,\mathbb P[Y^{(1)} \ge z^{(1)}] \le \mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(Y)z(1)P[Y(1)≥z(1)]≤RevDS(Y).
  4. The marginal mechanism (p. 50): for fixed second-good values zzz, q^j(y)=q1j(y,z)\hat q^j(y) = q^j_1(y,z)q^​j(y)=q1j​(y,z), s^j(y)=sj(y,z)−q2j(y,z)zj\hat s^j(y) = s^j(y,z) - q^j_2(y,z)z^js^j(y)=sj(y,z)−q2j​(y,z)zj is feasible, IC-DS and IR-DS.
  5. Display (19) (p. 49): E[S(Y,Z)1Y(1)≥Z(1)]≤2 RevDS(Y)\mathbb E[S(Y,Z)\mathbf 1_{Y^{(1)} \ge Z^{(1)}}] \le 2\,\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(Y)E[S(Y,Z)1Y(1)≥Z(1)​]≤2RevDS(Y) for an NPT, IC-DS, IR-DS mechanism.

Companion: Theorem 34 (p. 49)

With nnn independent buyers and two independent goods, so that all 2n2n2n values are independent (footnote 27), the same inequality holds for Bayesian Nash implementation: RevBN(X1)+RevBN(X2)≥12RevBN(X1,X2)\mathrm{Rev}^{BN}(X_1) + \mathrm{Rev}^{BN}(X_2) \ge \tfrac12\mathrm{Rev}^{BN}(X_1, X_2)RevBN(X1​)+RevBN(X2​)≥21​RevBN(X1​,X2​).

Significance

The result. Theorem 33 shows that the factor-12\tfrac1221​ guarantee of separate selling does not depend on there being a single buyer, nor on the buyers being independent, provided incentive compatibility is required in dominant strategies. It reduces a two-good, nnn-buyer design problem, whose optimum is not characterized, to two one-good problems, each of which can be handled by known single-good auction theory. Remark (a) on p. 29 records that the dominant-strategy statement holds for correlated buyers, while Remark (b) there explains, via Crémer and McLean (1988), why the Bayesian Nash analogue cannot be extended to correlated buyers.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof requires multi-agent mechanisms on R+kn\mathbb R^{kn}_+R+kn​, the Lebesgue integral of a possibly non-integrable revenue, conditioning on an independent coordinate of a product law, and the subdomain property of Remark (b). The definitions here (feasible multi-buyer mechanisms, IC-DS, IR-DS, RevDS\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}RevDS, and the Bayesian Nash counterparts) are reusable for any multi-buyer revenue-maximization result.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea is to apply the one-buyer Theorem A buyer by buyer. It fails: the feasibility constraint ∑jqij≤1\sum_j q^j_i \le 1∑j​qij​≤1 couples the buyers, so a multi-buyer mechanism does not decompose into single-buyer mechanisms, and the revenue extracted from one buyer depends on the reports of all the others. Any reduction to one-good problems must produce, from a two-good mechanism, one-good mechanisms that remain feasible and dominant-strategy incentive compatible for every buyer at once. On the measure-theoretic side, payments of an incentive compatible mechanism may be negative and non-integrable, so expectations must be handled in the extended reals, and the passage from bounds that hold for each fixed value of one good to a bound in expectation needs the product structure of the law of (Y,Z)(Y, Z)(Y,Z).

Formalization scope

  • A profile is x : Fin n → ι → ℝ≥0 (x j i =xij= x^j_i=xij​); a random profile is given by its law, a probability measure on that space. One good is ι = Unit, two goods are ι = Fin 2 (good 1 is index 0). The law of two independent goods is twoGoodsN μY μZ, the image of the product law μY⊗μZ\mu_Y\otimes\mu_ZμY​⊗μZ​; μY and μZ are arbitrary probability laws on R+n\mathbb R^n_+R+n​, so correlation among buyers is allowed.
  • (x~j,x−j)(\tilde x^j, x^{-j})(x~j,x−j) is Function.update x j x'. Feasibility ∑jqij≤1\sum_j q^j_i \le 1∑j​qij​≤1 is part of admissibility; without it a mechanism could sell each good to every buyer.
  • Payments are required measurable (the paper's footnote 12). R(μ;X)R(\mu;X)R(μ;X) is the EReal difference of the integrals of S+S^+S+ and S−S^-S−, never a Bochner integral, which would vanish on non-integrable revenues. RevDS\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}RevDS takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • The subdomain property requires the set AAA to be measurable, so that the law of X1X∈AX\mathbf 1_{X\in A}X1X∈A​ is defined. It also requires the signed expectation on AAA to be defined: at least one of its positive and negative part integrals must be finite. The hypothesis n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 is the paper's.
  • For Theorem 34, buyers are independent with laws ρj\rho_jρj​; interim payoffs integrate over the others' product law, and allocations as well as payments are required measurable.
  • The constant 12\tfrac1221​ is stated exactly as printed. A statement over an arbitrary joint law with given marginals, or with the feasibility constraint dropped, would be a different (and false, or trivial) theorem.

Contributions of every kind are welcome: proofs of the milestones, of Theorem 34, and general lemmas on multi-buyer mechanisms.

Selected references

  • S. Hart and N. Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, arXiv:1204.1846v3, 2017; J. Economic Theory 172 (2017). https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.1846
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981), 58–73. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • J. Crémer and R. P. McLean, Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1247–1257. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913096
  • S. Hart and P. J. Reny, Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations, Theoretical Economics 10 (2015), 893–922. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1517
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 2: Generalized Weighted Shapley Value Rules Yield Generalized Weighted Potential GamesResearch Paper

Motivation

In a welfare sharing game, several players choose resources and receive shares of each resource's welfare. A rule for splitting welfare is useful only if the resulting players' incentives admit stable choices. The paper by Gopalakrishnan, Marden, and Wierman characterizes the distribution rules that guarantee a pure Nash equilibrium for every game formed from a specified class of local welfare functions. Its Appendix C supplies a complementary structural result: generalized weighted Shapley rules give the game a vector-valued potential. That structure provides a way to analyze equilibrium existence and dynamics without enumerating all possible unilateral deviations individually.

The scalar weighted-potential case was known for weighted Shapley values in the work of Hart and Mas-Colell, as Appendix C recounts. The 2014 paper extends the setting to an ordered system of priority blocks. A single scalar component cannot generally express the priority structure, so Appendix C uses a finite vector whose components are compared in order. This mission isolates that explicit potential theorem from the paper's separate characterization theorem.

Setting

Let N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\ldots,n\}N={1,…,n} be the players and R={r1,…,rm}R=\{r_1,\ldots,r_m\}R={r1​,…,rm​} the resources, with n,m>1n,m>1n,m>1. Player iii chooses an action ai∈Ai⊆2Ra_i\in\mathcal A_i\subseteq 2^Rai​∈Ai​⊆2R, possibly containing several resources. For a profile aaa, let {a}r={i∈N:r∈ai}\{a\}_r=\{i\in N:r\in a_i\}{a}r​={i∈N:r∈ai​} be the users of resource rrr. Each resource has a local welfare function Wr:2N→RW_r:2^N\to\mathbb RWr​:2N→R and a distribution rule fr(i,S)f^r(i,S)fr(i,S), giving player iii's share when the resource is used by coalition SSS. The game's utilities are separable:

Ui(a)=∑r∈aifr(i,{a}r).U_i(a)=\sum_{r\in a_i}f^r(i,\{a\}_r).Ui​(a)=r∈ai​∑​fr(i,{a}r​).

A weight system ω=(λ,Σ)\omega=(\lambda,\Sigma)ω=(λ,Σ) specifies positive weights λi\lambda_iλi​ and an ordered partition Σ=(S1,…,SK)\Sigma=(S_1,\ldots,S_K)Σ=(S1​,…,SK​) of the players. For a nonempty coalition TTT, let Tˉ\bar TTˉ be its members in the earliest block meeting TTT. The Möbius coefficient of a welfare function is

qTW=∑B⊆T(−1)∣T∣−∣B∣W(B).q_T^W=\sum_{B\subseteq T}(-1)^{|T|-|B|}W(B).qTW​=B⊆T∑​(−1)∣T∣−∣B∣W(B).

The generalized weighted Shapley value distributes the contribution of TTT among players in Tˉ\bar TTˉ in proportion to their weights. The generalized weighted marginal contribution rule instead evaluates the difference in a welfare function when a player is removed from the part of a coalition in that player's block and later blocks. These are the two formulas in Tables 1–2 of the source paper. The ground welfare functions used by the two rules, Wr′W'_rWr′​ and Wr′′W''_rWr′′​, may differ. Their coefficients are related by (12): qTWr′=(∑j∈Tˉλj)qTWr′′q_T^{W'_r}=(\sum_{j\in\bar T}\lambda_j)q_T^{W''_r}qTWr′​​=(∑j∈Tˉ​λj​)qTWr′′​​ for every nonempty TTT.

A generalized weighted potential is a vector Φ(a)∈RK\Phi(a)\in\mathbb R^KΦ(a)∈RK with a fixed component assigned to each player. For any unilateral change by that player, all earlier components stay equal, and the player's utility change equals a positive multiple of the change in the assigned component. This is the precise potential identity used in this mission.

Formalization targets

The local target is equation (83): local resource potentials whose changes agree with each player's utility share combine into a game-level potential. The coefficient target is the equality between the Table 1 marginal-contribution rule and its Table 2 Möbius-basis expansion. The closed-form target identifies exactly which vector component each player can change.

The goal is Theorem 3, using its closed form (85). Write Sˉb=S∖⋃ℓ<bSℓ\bar S_b=S\setminus\bigcup_{\ell<b}S_\ellSˉb​=S∖⋃ℓ<b​Sℓ​. If each frf^rfr is simultaneously the generalized weighted Shapley rule for Wr′W'_rWr′​ and the generalized weighted marginal contribution rule for Wr′′W''_rWr′′​, with their coefficients related by (12), then

Φ(a)=∑r∈Rϕr({a}r),(ϕr(S))k=Wr′′(SˉK−k+1)(1≤k≤K)\Phi(a)=\sum_{r\in R}\phi_r(\{a\}_r),\qquad (\phi_r(S))_k=W''_r(\bar S_{K-k+1})\quad(1\le k\le K)Φ(a)=r∈R∑​ϕr​({a}r​),(ϕr​(S))k​=Wr′′​(SˉK−k+1​)(1≤k≤K)

is a generalized weighted potential with player weights λ\lambdaλ. The goal specifies this potential itself, rather than merely asserting that some potential exists.

Significance

The theorem gives an explicit structural certificate for all games built from these sharing rules. A maximum of a vector potential in lexicographic order is stable against improving deviations, so the identity supports the equilibrium guarantee in the main characterization result. Its formula also gives a concrete object for studying changes in allocations or comparing priority systems; these are uses of the result, not additional claims of this mission. The closed form is particularly useful because each component is an evaluation of a ground welfare function on a specified suffix of the priority partition, as the paper explains on p. 11.

The mathematical result was proved in 2014. The remaining formalization work is to construct a machine-checked proof of the exact vector identity, including the coalition basis calculation and the passage from local resource changes to whole-game utility changes. The local platform index contains related scalar and ordinal potential theorems, but no declaration with this paper's priority-block model and closed-form vector potential.

Difficulty

The obvious scalar-potential analogy does not by itself track ordered priority classes. Adding a player in one class can leave some vector components unchanged while affecting a later component. The proof obligation therefore includes the exact component order and a player-specific change identity, uniformly over coalitions and actions. A second difficulty is reconciling two descriptions of the same distribution rule: Table 1 uses a welfare difference, while Table 2 expands welfare in Möbius coefficients over coalitions. The equality must hold even when the welfare at the empty coalition is arbitrary.

There is also a printed inconsistency. Definition 1 and (83) call the assigned component the “first nonzero” component, but the proof only establishes that earlier components are unchanged. The assigned component can also be unchanged on a particular deviation, while a later one changes. Formula (84) disagrees with the closed form (85) in a two-block example. The mission follows the fixed per-player component supported by the proof and states (85); the precise counterexample is in the moderation notes.

Formalization scope

Players and resources are represented by Fin n and Fin m, coalitions and actions by Finset, and real-valued welfare and utility functions by functions into R\mathbb RR. The standing model has n,m>1n,m>1n,m>1 and strictly positive player weights. The potential predicate requires K>0K>0K>0, matching Definition 1's positive vector dimension. The ordered partition is a map from players into KKK blocks; empty blocks are allowed, and Fin K provides zero-based indices. A vector component is indexed in reverse block order, so component 1 sees only the final block and component KKK sees the whole coalition. For a nonempty TTT, Tˉ\bar TTˉ is its earliest occupied block; its empty-case value is empty and is never used in (12).

Rules are compared only for players belonging to the coalition in which they are evaluated. The named Shapley and marginal rules return zero off that coalition; arbitrary input rules may have other unused values there. No budget-balance or W(∅)=0W(\varnothing)=0W(∅)=0 hypothesis is added; the empty-coalition value cancels in marginal differences. Action sets may be empty because this mission proves a potential identity for feasible deviations, without asserting that a feasible profile or equilibrium exists. The formalization does not replace the goal by a vacuous existence claim: it fixes the potential to the explicit closed form (85) and requires the full change identity at every feasible unilateral deviation.

The development needs finite-set sums, powersets, ordered finite indices, real arithmetic, and the paper-specific welfare rules. The local-to-global separability statement and finite coalition-basis calculation can be reused in related sharing games. Contributions proving the stated milestones, or strengthening the result under correctly stated extra assumptions, are in scope.

Selected references

  • R. Gopalakrishnan, J. R. Marden, and A. Wierman, Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games, arXiv:1402.3610v1, 2014; published in Mathematics of Operations Research 39(4), 2014. Preprint; DOI.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 3: Selling k ≥ 2 Independent Goods Separately Guarantees a Fraction c/log² k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who knows the distributions of a buyer's values for several goods can, in principle, design a mechanism that offers lotteries and prices conditional on the buyer's reported values. Finding the best such mechanism can be difficult even with two goods. Separate selling is much simpler: choose a one-good price for each item and let the buyer decide item by item. The question is how much revenue this simplicity can cost when the goods' values are independent. Hart and Nisan establish a guarantee that declines only with the square of the logarithm of the number of goods, even though the distributions need not be identical or bounded. Their result is Theorem C of Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, stated on p. 7 and proved on p. 26.

The paper grew from the problem of comparing easy selling formats with fully optimal mechanisms. For one good, a posted price characterizes optimal revenue. With multiple goods, the choice of a mechanism becomes genuinely multidimensional: its allocation rule can correlate the disposition of the goods and use lotteries. The guarantee in this mission applies uniformly over all independent distributions on nonnegative valuations, so a seller does not need a regularity, density, or finite-moment assumption to use it.

Setting

There is one seller, one risk-neutral buyer, and k≥2k\ge2k≥2 goods. The buyer's valuation vector is x=(xi)i=1k∈R+kx=(x_i)_{i=1}^k\in\mathbb R_+^kx=(xi​)i=1k​∈R+k​; receiving a set of goods gives the sum of the values of its members. The seller knows the joint law of the random vector XXX, but not its realization. In this mission the coordinates XiX_iXi​ are independent, with possibly different probability laws νi\nu_iνi​.

A direct mechanism consists of an allocation rule qi(x)∈[0,1]q_i(x)\in[0,1]qi​(x)∈[0,1] for each good and a real payment s(x)s(x)s(x). At a truthful report xxx, the buyer's payoff is b(x)=∑iqi(x)xi−s(x)b(x)=\sum_i q_i(x)x_i-s(x)b(x)=∑i​qi​(x)xi​−s(x). The mechanism is incentive compatible if truthful reporting is at least as good as every alternative report, and individually rational if b(x)≥0b(x)\ge0b(x)≥0 for every xxx. The seller's expected payment is its revenue. The optimal revenue Rev⁡(X)\operatorname{Rev}(X)Rev(X) is the supremum of revenue over such mechanisms. Payments are taken to be measurable, following footnote 12 on p. 12 of Hart and Nisan.

For one good, Rev⁡(Xi)\operatorname{Rev}(X_i)Rev(Xi​) equals the supremum of pPr⁡[Xi≥p]p\Pr[X_i\ge p]pPr[Xi​≥p] over prices p≥0p\ge0p≥0, as in display (1) on p. 12. The separate revenue is SRev⁡(X)=∑iRev⁡(Xi)\operatorname{SRev}(X)=\sum_i\operatorname{Rev}(X_i)SRev(X)=∑i​Rev(Xi​). The bundled revenue is BRev⁡(X)=Rev⁡(∑iXi)\operatorname{BRev}(X)=\operatorname{Rev}(\sum_i X_i)BRev(X)=Rev(∑i​Xi​), where the sum is treated as one good. Both formats are defined through one-good revenue, even when the full optimum can use multidimensional allocations.

Formalization targets

Theorem C: a uniform guarantee for separate selling

The goal is the inequality form of Theorem C, with one constant that works for every number and every family of independent goods:

∃c>0  ∀k≥2  ∀(νi)i=1k,SRev⁡(X1,…,Xk)≥c(log⁡k)2Rev⁡(X1,…,Xk).\exists c>0\;\forall k\ge2\;\forall (\nu_i)_{i=1}^k,\qquad \operatorname{SRev}(X_1,\ldots,X_k) \ge \frac{c}{(\log k)^2}\operatorname{Rev}(X_1,\ldots,X_k).∃c>0∀k≥2∀(νi​)i=1k​,SRev(X1​,…,Xk​)≥(logk)2c​Rev(X1​,…,Xk​).

Here XiX_iXi​ has law νi\nu_iνi​, and the joint law is their product. The paper phrases the headline as a guarantee for an approximation ratio; the displayed inequality is the form used in its proof on p. 26. It handles zero and infinite optimal revenues without introducing a ratio with an undefined denominator.

Supporting targets

The milestone list records the one-good posted-price formula, monotonicity under first-order stochastic domination, the equal-revenue comparison of Lemma 20, Proposition 13(ii)'s comparison of separate and bundled revenue, the two inequalities of Theorem 7, and the two-good base case of Theorem A. It also records the power-of-two estimate and the zero-padding assertion stated in the proof of Theorem C. Each milestone is attached to its source page in the pinned preprint.

Significance

The theorem gives a distribution-independent performance floor for a mechanism that can be run using one price per good. It applies to unequal and unbounded independent distributions, for which expected values can be infinite while one-good optimal revenues remain finite. The comparison is with the best incentive-compatible and individually rational multi-good mechanism, including randomized allocations, rather than with another simple selling format. The result is proved in the 2017 preprint; the open work here is a machine-checked formalization of that known result and its selected supporting statements.

The formal development also supplies reusable objects: a law-based direct-mechanism model, extended-real expected revenue, product laws for independent groups of goods, and first-order stochastic domination of one-good laws. These are useful for other comparisons among separate selling, bundling, and optimal mechanisms in the same paper. The mission does not pose the paper's distinct i.i.d. bundling theorem, multi-buyer results, or tightness examples.

Difficulty

The main obstacle is that optimal multi-good revenue is not monotone in the values of the goods. Increasing each coordinate of a valuation vector does not, by itself, give a valid comparison between the optimal revenues of the two vectors' laws; Hart and Nisan, p. 23 explicitly warn against that inference. One-good revenue does have the needed monotonicity, but the full optimum can depend on how the goods interact in an incentive-compatible mechanism. Theorem 7 is a substantive bridge between these two regimes. Infinite expected values also make a real-valued integral or an ordinary ratio unsuitable for the general statement.

Formalization scope

Goods are indexed by finite types, and valuations lie in R≥0k\mathbb R_{\ge0}^kR≥0k​. Each good's law is a probability measure; independence means the product law, while Theorem 7 allows dependence among coordinates within each of its two independent groups. A one-good law is represented by a singleton coordinate type. Revenue takes values in R≥0∪{∞}\mathbb R_{\ge0}\cup\{\infty\}R≥0​∪{∞}, and the expectation of a mechanism's possibly negative payment is represented in extended reals. The supremum defining optimal revenue ranges only over feasible, incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanisms with measurable payments. Theorem C quantifies ccc before kkk and the laws, and the restriction k≥2k\ge2k≥2 keeps the logarithmic coefficient in its stated domain.

The equal-revenue law is represented by the density x−2x^{-2}x−2 on [1,∞)[1,\infty)[1,∞), mapped to nonnegative reals. First-order stochastic domination compares the upper-tail probabilities at nonnegative thresholds, which is equivalent to testing every real threshold for nonnegative valuations. A complete proof will need measure-theoretic facts about that law, the posted-price characterization, product measures, and operations on extended nonnegative revenue. Contributions to those reusable facts and to the selected milestone theorems are within scope.

Selected references

  • Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, arXiv:1204.1846v3, 2017. Preprint.
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 1: Every Game Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium Iff the Distribution Rules Are Generalized Weighted Shapley ValuesResearch Paper

Motivation

In a cost sharing game (or, symmetrically, a revenue sharing game) self-interested players each pick a set of resources, every resource generates a welfare that depends on who uses it, and a distribution rule splits that welfare among the users. Network formation, atomic routing, coverage and distributed-control problems all fit this model (Anshelevich et al. 2004; Marden and Wierman, Distributed welfare games, 2013; see §2 of the paper). The designer controls only the distribution rule, and the first requirement on a rule is that the games it induces have a pure Nash equilibrium; without one, equilibrium-based efficiency guarantees say nothing.

Which rules guarantee equilibria? The Shapley value and its weighted and generalized-weighted versions do, because they induce potential games (Hart and Mas-Colell 1989). Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant (2010) and Marden and Wierman (Overcoming the limitations of utility design for multiagent systems, 2013) showed that, among budget-balanced rules, these are the only ones that work for every welfare function, by exhibiting one worst-case welfare function (Proposition 1 of the paper, p. 9). Marden and Wierman (Distributed welfare games) also showed that when players may choose only one resource, other budget-balanced rules can work. That left open what happens when the designer knows the welfare functions in advance, and whether dropping budget-balance enlarges the set of good rules. Gopalakrishnan, Marden and Wierman 2014 answered both questions: for any fixed set of welfare functions, with or without budget-balance, the equilibrium-guaranteeing rules are exactly generalized weighted Shapley values on suitable ground welfare functions.

Setting

Players are N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} with n>1n>1n>1; resources are R={r1,…,rm}R=\{r_1,\dots,r_m\}R={r1​,…,rm​} with m>1m>1m>1. A local welfare function is W:2N→RW:2^N\to\mathbb RW:2N→R and a distribution rule is f:N×2N→Rf:N\times2^N\to\mathbb Rf:N×2N→R, where f(i,S)f(i,S)f(i,S) is the share of player iii when sharing with the coalition SSS (and f(i,S)=0f(i,S)=0f(i,S)=0 for i∉Si\notin Si∈/S). Each player iii has a nonempty action set Ai⊆2R\mathcal A_i\subseteq 2^RAi​⊆2R. In an allocation aaa, the users of rrr are {a}r={i:r∈ai}\{a\}_r=\{i:r\in a_i\}{a}r​={i:r∈ai​} and player iii receives

Ui(a)=∑r∈aifWr(i,{a}r).U_i(a)=\sum_{r\in a_i}f^{W_r}\bigl(i,\{a\}_r\bigr).Ui​(a)=r∈ai​∑​fWr​(i,{a}r​).

Resources with equal welfare functions use the same rule. For a nonempty set W\mathbb WW of welfare functions, G(N,fW,W)\mathcal G(N,f^{\mathbb W},\mathbb W)G(N,fW,W) is the class of all such games with every Wr∈WW_r\in\mathbb WWr​∈W, any number of resources and any action sets. A rule is budget-balanced for WWW if ∑i∈Sf(i,S)=W(S)\sum_{i\in S}f(i,S)=W(S)∑i∈S​f(i,S)=W(S).

A weight system ω=(λ,Σ)\omega=(\lambda,\Sigma)ω=(λ,Σ) consists of positive weights λi\lambda_iλi​ and an ordered partition Σ=(S1,…,SK)\Sigma=(S_1,\dots,S_K)Σ=(S1​,…,SK​) of NNN into priority classes. For nonempty TTT, T‾=T∩Sk\overline T=T\cap S_kT=T∩Sk​ with kkk the first class meeting TTT. With the basis coefficients qTW=∑R⊆T(−1)∣T∣−∣R∣W(R)q^W_T=\sum_{R\subseteq T}(-1)^{|T|-|R|}W(R)qTW​=∑R⊆T​(−1)∣T∣−∣R∣W(R), the generalized weighted Shapley value is

fGWSVW[ω](i,S)=∑T⊆S: i∈T‾λi∑j∈T‾λj qTW.f^W_{GWSV}[\omega](i,S)=\sum_{T\subseteq S:\,i\in\overline T}\frac{\lambda_i}{\sum_{j\in\overline T}\lambda_j}\,q^W_T .fGWSVW​[ω](i,S)=T⊆S:i∈T∑​∑j∈T​λj​λi​​qTW​.

The distributed welfare of a rule is W′(S)=∑i∈SfW(i,S)W'(S)=\sum_{i\in S}f^W(i,S)W′(S)=∑i∈S​fW(i,S), display (10).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

all games in G(N,fW,W) have a pure Nash equilibrium  ⟺  ∃ ω ∀W∈W: fW=fGWSVW′[ω] on {(i,S):i∈S},\text{all games in }\mathcal G(N,f^{\mathbb W},\mathbb W)\text{ have a pure Nash equilibrium}\iff\exists\,\omega\ \forall W\in\mathbb W:\ f^W=f^{W'}_{GWSV}[\omega]\text{ on }\{(i,S):i\in S\},all games in G(N,fW,W) have a pure Nash equilibrium⟺∃ω ∀W∈W: fW=fGWSVW′​[ω] on {(i,S):i∈S},

with W′W'W′ the distributed welfare of fWf^WfW. One weight system serves all of W\mathbb WW.

Milestones

The "if" direction (Appendix A, p. 16). For a single WWW and a budget-balanced fff guaranteeing equilibria: f(i,S)=0f(i,S)=0f(i,S)=0 when SSS contains no contributing coalition (Lemma 1) and for non-contributing iii (Lemma 2); f(i,S)=f(i,N(S))f(i,S)=f(i,N(S))f(i,S)=f(i,N(S)) (Lemma 3). The basis rules fTf^TfT of the recursion (27) are budget-balanced for the inclusion functions (Lemma 5), recover f=∑TqTfTf=\sum_Tq_Tf^Tf=∑T​qT​fT (Lemma 7), obey an inclusion–exclusion principle (Corollary 1), and are generalized weighted Shapley basis rules fGWSVT[ωT]f^T_{GWSV}[\omega^T]fGWSVT​[ωT] (Lemma 8). Across welfare functions the basis shares are consistent pairwise (Lemma 9) and around cycles (Lemma 10); the induced relation on players is a partial order modulo equivalence (Lemma 11), and one universal weight system replaces all ωW,T\omega^{W,T}ωW,T (Lemma 13).

Companions

Proposition 2: for welfare functions normalized by W′(∅)=W′′(∅)=0W'(\emptyset)=W''(\emptyset)=0W′(∅)=W′′(∅)=0, fGWSVW′[ω]=fGWMCW′′[ω]f^{W'}_{GWSV}[\omega]=f^{W''}_{GWMC}[\omega]fGWSVW′​[ω]=fGWMCW′′​[ω] iff T′=T′′\mathcal T'=\mathcal T''T′=T′′ and qT′=(∑j∈T‾λj)qT′′q'_T=(\sum_{j\in\overline T}\lambda_j)q''_TqT′​=(∑j∈T​λj​)qT′′​. Theorem 2: the same characterization with generalized weighted marginal contributions on W′′=h(W′)W''=h(W')W′′=h(W′).

Significance

The theorem settles the design space completely: a designer who wants equilibria in every game over known welfare functions must use a generalized weighted Shapley value, and the only freedom is the weight system and the ground welfare functions, which control budget-balance. Since these rules induce (generalized weighted) potential games, potential games are necessary for guaranteed equilibrium existence in this model, and computing shares inherits the exponential cost of Shapley values. Theorem 2 gives the marginal-contribution form, which needs one marginal contribution per share.

The paper proves Theorem 1 with a full appendix of counterexample constructions; none of it has a published machine-checked proof. The mission asks for a Lean proof of the characterization, of the reusable structure behind it (necessary conditions, basis decomposition, inclusion–exclusion for basis rules, consistency of weight systems), and of the Shapley–marginal-contribution correspondence.

Difficulty

The "if" direction is a potential argument. The "only if" direction is not: every necessary condition is proved by building, from a hypothetical violation, a specific game with no equilibrium, and the games grow more elaborate as the conditions do. Lemma 8 needs the inclusion–exclusion principle to isolate a single basis share, using many weighted copies of resources; Lemma 10's proof combines best-response cycles over kkk welfare functions and is partly omitted on the page ("We omit the proof for brevity", p. 51), so it is the hardest milestone. A tempting shortcut, applying the worst-case result of Chen et al. and Marden–Wierman (Proposition 1, p. 9), fails: it uses one worst-case welfare function, while here W\mathbb WW is arbitrary and may not contain it.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n, resources Fin m, an action is a Finset (Fin m) (the empty action is allowed). The family of rules is one function f : Welfare n → Rule n, which encodes that equal welfare functions get equal rules. GuaranteesPNE 𝕎 f quantifies over every m > 1, every assignment Fin m → 𝕎 (repetitions allowed: the counterexamples rely on many copies of one welfare function) and every family of nonempty action sets. A weight system stores a block index Fin K per player (empty blocks allowed) and positive weights. Rules are compared only at i∈Si\in Si∈S. Contributing coalitions exclude ∅\emptyset∅ (Appendix A's normalization W(∅)=0W(\emptyset)=0W(∅)=0). The recursion (27) divides by qTq_TqT​ and is used only for contributing TTT; where it reads f(i,T)f(i,T)f(i,T) with i∉Ti\notin Ti∈/T, the paper's convention f(i,S)=0f(i,S)=0f(i,S)=0 off SSS is a hypothesis.

The ground welfare in Theorem 1 is the distributed welfare (10), written out, never an arbitrary function: an existentially quantified ground welfare would make the right side easier and the theorem a different one. The weight system is quantified before the welfare functions, and empty action sets are excluded; with them no game would have an equilibrium and the theorem would claim that no rule is a Shapley value.

Disclosed readings: Lemma 11's "partial order" is antisymmetry modulo the equivalence =Ω+=^+_\Omega=Ω+​, as the proof states; in (74) the first block S1W,TS_1^{W,T}S1W,T​ is read on TTT as its positive-share block T‾\overline TT. Proposition 2 carries W′(∅)=W′′(∅)=0W'(\emptyset)=W''(\emptyset)=0W′(∅)=W′′(∅)=0 so that the paper's basis support, which ranges over all coalitions, agrees with the local support of nonempty coalitions.

A complete development needs: finite games and pure equilibria on resource-selection models, Möbius inversion on Finset lattices, the potential argument for generalized weighted Shapley values (shared with the companion mission on generalized weighted potential games), and counterexample games built from copies of resources. The game model and the basis-rule recursion are reusable for other cost-sharing results. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for the necessary conditions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Gopalakrishnan, J. R. Marden, A. Wierman, Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games, Math. Oper. Res. 39(4), 2014; preprint arXiv:1402.3610v1, 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.3610v1
  • S. Hart, A. Mas-Colell, Potential, Value, and Consistency, Econometrica 57(3), 589–614, 1989. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911054
  • H.-L. Chen, T. Roughgarden, G. Valiant, Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria, SIAM J. Comput. 39(5), 1799–1832, 2010 (reference [8] of arXiv:1402.3610v1).
  • J. R. Marden, A. Wierman, Overcoming the Limitations of Utility Design for Multiagent Systems, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control, 2013 (reference [30] of arXiv:1402.3610v1).
  • J. R. Marden, A. Wierman, Distributed Welfare Games, Oper. Res., 2013 (reference [29] of arXiv:1402.3610v1).
  • E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, FOCS 2004, 295–304 (reference [3] of arXiv:1402.3610v1).
  • L. S. Shapley, A Value for n-Person Games, Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Princeton University Press, 1953 (reference [43] of arXiv:1402.3610v1).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction: Under Cournot Competition Both Chains Share Below k_N, Both or Neither Between k_N and k_S, and Neither Above k_SResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers observe demand signals (point-of-sale data, local forecasts) that their suppliers do not. Whether a retailer should pass such a signal upstream is a central question of the supply chain information-sharing literature. In a single chain, sharing helps the manufacturer plan, but the retailer may lose from it. Competition between chains adds a second effect: sharing in one chain changes how the rival chain responds to its own signal.

Ha, Tian and Tong (MSOM 2017) study this question when the manufacturer's planning decision is production cost reduction: a manufacturer that knows more about demand can invest in lowering its unit cost more efficiently. They find that the equilibrium of the information-sharing game between two competing chains depends on a single efficiency parameter kkk in a three-regime pattern. This mission formalizes that pattern for quantity (Cournot) competition.

Earlier work on information sharing in competing chains (for example Ha, Tong and Zhang, Management Science 2011, on production diseconomies of scale) found related threshold structures under different upstream technologies. The present paper replaces the production cost with a cost-reduction investment.

Setting

There are two identical supply chains i=1,2i=1,2i=1,2, each with one manufacturer and one retailer. Retailer iii faces the inverse demand

pi=a+θ−qi−γCqj,p_i=a+\theta-q_i-\gamma_C q_j,pi​=a+θ−qi​−γC​qj​,

where θ\thetaθ is a demand shock with mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2, and γC∈(0,1)\gamma_C\in(0,1)γC​∈(0,1) is the competition intensity. Manufacturer iii has unit production cost ccc and lowers it by xix_ixi​ at effort cost 12kxi2\tfrac12 kx_i^221​kxi2​; a small kkk means efficient cost reduction. Retailer iii observes a signal YiY_iYi​ with accuracy ttt; under the linear information structure, E[θ∣Yi]=E[Yj∣Yi]=tσ21+tσ2YiE[\theta\mid Y_i]=E[Y_j\mid Y_i]=\tfrac{t\sigma^2}{1+t\sigma^2}Y_iE[θ∣Yi​]=E[Yj​∣Yi​]=1+tσ2tσ2​Yi​.

In stage one, each chain fixes its arrangement Xi∈{S,N}X_i\in\{S,N\}Xi​∈{S,N}: the retailer shares its signal with the manufacturer (SSS) or not (NNN). Then the manufacturer sets a wholesale price and a cost reduction, and the retailer a quantity. For each arrangement profile (Xi,Xj)(X_i,X_j)(Xi​,Xj​) the quantity stage has a linear equilibrium qi=qˉ+CXiXjYiq_i=\bar q+C^{X_iX_j}Y_iqi​=qˉ​+CXi​Xj​Yi​ with explicit response coefficients CXiXj(k,γC,t,σ2)C^{X_iX_j}(k,\gamma_C,t,\sigma^2)CXi​Xj​(k,γC​,t,σ2) (Lemma 2(a)). These give closed-form ex-ante profits ΠRi,CXiXj\Pi^{X_iX_j}_{R_i,C}ΠRi​,CXi​Xj​​, ΠMi,CXiXj\Pi^{X_iX_j}_{M_i,C}ΠMi​,CXi​Xj​​ and Πi,CXiXj\Pi^{X_iX_j}_{i,C}Πi,CXi​Xj​​ for the retailer, the manufacturer and the chain.

The value of information sharing to chain iii is Vi,CXj=Πi,CSXj−Πi,CNXjV^{X_j}_{i,C}=\Pi^{SX_j}_{i,C}-\Pi^{NX_j}_{i,C}Vi,CXj​​=Πi,CSXj​​−Πi,CNXj​​. In stage one, manufacturer iii offers retailer iii the smallest side payment m^Xj\hat m^{X_j}m^Xj​ that makes sharing acceptable to the retailer, and chooses SSS or NNN. The result is a symmetric 2×22\times22×2 game between the two manufacturers (Table 1). Manufacturer iii's payoff is ΠMi,CSXj−m^Xj\Pi^{SX_j}_{M_i,C}-\hat m^{X_j}ΠMi​,CSXj​​−m^Xj​ for SSS and ΠMi,CNXj\Pi^{NX_j}_{M_i,C}ΠMi​,CNXj​​ for NNN. The standing assumptions are k>a/(4c)k>a/(4c)k>a/(4c), k>1/3k>1/3k>1/3 and a>ca>ca>c.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7(a)

For fixed γC∈(0,1)\gamma_C\in(0,1)γC​∈(0,1), t>0t>0t>0 and σ2>0\sigma^2>0σ2>0 there are thresholds

12<kCN<kCS<3+54\tfrac12<k^N_C<k^S_C<\tfrac{3+\sqrt5}{4}21​<kCN​<kCS​<43+5​​

such that the set E\mathcal EE of pure-strategy equilibria of the stage-one game is

E={(S,S)} (k<kCN),E={(S,S),(N,N)} (kCN<k<kCS),E={(N,N)} (k>kCS).\mathcal E=\{(S,S)\}\ (k<k^N_C),\qquad \mathcal E=\{(S,S),(N,N)\}\ (k^N_C<k<k^S_C),\qquad \mathcal E=\{(N,N)\}\ (k>k^S_C).E={(S,S)} (k<kCN​),E={(S,S),(N,N)} (kCN​<k<kCS​),E={(N,N)} (k>kCS​).

In the middle regime, both manufacturers are strictly better off at (S,S)(S,S)(S,S) than at (N,N)(N,N)(N,N).

Milestones

  • the linear strategies solve the best responses (proof of Lemma 2(a));
  • CjXjXi<1C^{X_jX_i}_j<1CjXj​Xi​​<1 and the four coefficient differences in closed form with their signs (proof of Lemma 3);
  • the retailer gains from sharing if and only if k≤1/2k\le1/2k≤1/2, and for k≤1/2k\le1/2k≤1/2 free information strictly raises the manufacturer's profit (§5.3);
  • Vi,CS>0  ⟺  g>0V^S_{i,C}>0\iff g>0Vi,CS​>0⟺g>0 and Vi,CN>0  ⟺  h>0V^N_{i,C}>0\iff h>0Vi,CN​>0⟺h>0 for two explicit polynomials g,hg,hg,h (proof of Proposition 6(a));
  • Proposition 6(a): Vi,CS>0  ⟺  k<kCSV^S_{i,C}>0\iff k<k^S_CVi,CS​>0⟺k<kCS​, Vi,CN>0  ⟺  k<kCNV^N_{i,C}>0\iff k<k^N_CVi,CN​>0⟺k<kCN​, the bounds above, and both thresholds strictly decreasing in ttt and in γC\gamma_CγC​.

A companion item states the Cournot half of Proposition 7(c): for k<1/2k<1/2k<1/2 no side payment is needed and (S,S)(S,S)(S,S) is the unique equilibrium.

Significance

Proposition 7(a) separates three regimes of cost-reduction efficiency. When cost reduction is efficient (k<kCNk<k^N_Ck<kCN​), sharing is dominant. At intermediate efficiency the stage-one game is a coordination game: both chains sharing is Pareto-better for the manufacturers, but both not sharing is also an equilibrium. When cost reduction is inefficient, no chain shares. Competition matters through the gap kCN<kCSk^N_C<k^S_CkCN​<kCS​: a chain whose rival shares tolerates a less efficient cost reduction before it stops sharing, and the thresholds fall as signals become more accurate or competition more intense.

The paper proves these facts by hand-checked algebra, often stated as "we can verify". The formalization turns each such step into a checked statement: the fixed-point identities behind Lemma 2(a), the closed forms of Lemma 3, the reduction of the sign of VVV to the polynomials ggg and hhh, and the monotonicity and location of their roots. None of these results has a machine-checked proof yet. The definitions (response coefficients, profits, side payment, stage-one game) are reusable for the Bertrand half of the paper and for other two-chain information-sharing models.

Difficulty

The obvious approach expands VSV^SVS and VNV^NVN as rational functions of (k,γC,t,σ2)(k,\gamma_C,t,\sigma^2)(k,γC​,t,σ2) and tries to read off their signs. That does not finish by itself. After cancelling positive factors, the signs are those of ggg and hhh, which are quadratics in ξ=t2σ4γC2/(tσ2+1)2∈(0,1)\xi=t^2\sigma^4\gamma_C^2/(t\sigma^2+1)^2\in(0,1)ξ=t2σ4γC2​/(tσ2+1)2∈(0,1) with coefficients polynomial in kkk. The thresholds are defined implicitly by a root of each quadratic crossing ξ\xiξ. Showing that {g>0}\{g>0\}{g>0} and {h>0}\{h>0\}{h>0} are initial intervals of (1/3,∞)(1/3,\infty)(1/3,∞) needs the relevant root to be strictly decreasing in kkk, to exceed 111 below k=1/2k=1/2k=1/2 and to change sign at (3+5)/4(3+\sqrt5)/4(3+5​)/4. The strict ordering kCN<kCSk^N_C<k^S_CkCN​<kCS​ needs a comparison of two roots involving k3(6k−1)\sqrt{k^3(6k-1)}k3(6k−1)​ and k(6k−1)\sqrt{k(6k-1)}k(6k−1)​ on (1/2,(3+5)/4)(1/2,(3+\sqrt5)/4)(1/2,(3+5​)/4). The equilibrium analysis then needs the retailer comparison, to know when the side payment is positive. Table 1's payoff entries are valid only in that case.

Formalization scope

Everything is over R\mathbb RR, in the namespace CompetingChains.Cournot. A general definition TwoPlayerGame gives pure-strategy Nash equilibria of a two-player normal-form game. The definition Setting records the paper's reduced form: the standing assumptions, the response coefficients CXiXjC^{X_iX_j}CXi​Xj​ of Lemma 2(a), the best responses (7) and (9), the ex-ante profit functions of p. 17, the equilibrium profits ΠXiXj=πXi(CjXjXi)\Pi^{X_iX_j}=\pi^{X_i}(C_j^{X_jX_i})ΠXi​Xj​=πXi​(CjXj​Xi​​), VVV, m^\hat mm^, the stage-one payoff and its set of pure equilibria. The Bayesian stages enter only through these closed forms. The arrangements are an inductive type {S, N}. Manufacturer 2's payoff at (X1,X2)(X_1,X_2)(X1​,X2​) is manufacturer 1's payoff at (X2,X1)(X_2,X_1)(X2​,X1​). The chain profit is defined as retailer plus manufacturer profit. The stage-one payoff uses m^\hat mm^ as printed on p. 21, and agrees with Table 1 whenever the side payment is positive.

Conventions and added hypotheses, each disclosed in the items:

  • γC>0\gamma_C>0γC​>0 wherever the result needs it; at γC=0\gamma_C=0γC​=0 the chains do not interact and the middle regime is empty. Positivity of ccc, ttt and σ2\sigma^2σ2 is part of the standing assumptions.
  • The goal's "otherwise" is read as k>kCSk>k^S_Ck>kCS​, because both profiles are equilibria at k=kCNk=k^N_Ck=kCN​ and k=kCSk=k^S_Ck=kCS​.
  • Only pure-strategy equilibria are counted. "Unique equilibrium" is equality of the equilibrium set with a singleton, not membership.
  • The thresholds depend on (γC,t,σ2)(\gamma_C,t,\sigma^2)(γC​,t,σ2) only and are chosen before a,c,ka,c,ka,c,k.
  • "Decreasing" means strictly decreasing.
  • Every division is real division by a quantity positive under k>1/3k>1/3k>1/3, γC≥0\gamma_C\ge0γC​≥0, tσ2>0t\sigma^2>0tσ2>0. These hypotheses are carried in every theorem, so no statement is about Lean's value x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0.

The coefficients, profits, VVV and payoffs are definitions, never free parameters. A statement with free coefficients, a goal whose thresholds lack kCN<kCSk^N_C<k^S_CkCN​<kCS​, or one that only asserts membership of (S,S)(S,S)(S,S) would be trivial or weaker, and is not what is posed. No published platform definition states this model, so none is referenced.

Not in scope: Lemma 2's uniqueness (delegated by the paper to earlier work), the wholesale-price and cost-reduction lines of Lemma 2(a), the Bertrand half (Propositions 6(b), 7(b)), the single-chain analysis of §4, Proposition 8 and the numerical study. Proofs of any item are welcome. The polynomial root analysis behind Proposition 6(a) is the main open piece of work.

Selected references

  • A. Y. Ha, Q. Tian and S. Tong, Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 19(2), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2016.0607
  • A. Y. Ha, S. Tong and H. Zhang, Sharing Imperfect Demand Information in Competing Supply Chains with Production Diseconomies, Management Science 57(3), 566–581, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1295
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Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 5: Bundling Is Optimal for Two I.I.D. Goods Whose Density on [a, ∞) Satisfies x f′(x) + (3/2) f(x) ≤ 0Research Paper

Motivation

A seller with several goods and a single buyer of unknown, additive valuation faces the multi-dimensional revenue maximization problem. For one good the answer is classical: by Myerson's theorem (Myerson 1981) a single posted price is optimal. For two or more goods no such simplification exists in general: optimal mechanisms may randomize, may offer menus of lotteries, and are rarely known in closed form. Selling the grand bundle at one price is the simplest multi-good mechanism, and it is used widely in practice.

Hart and Nisan (arXiv:1204.1846, J. Econ. Theory 2017) quantify how much revenue simple mechanisms lose. Most of their results are approximation bounds. Section 7.2 of the paper also contains an exact result: for two independent and identically distributed goods whose density decays fast enough, in the sense of a differential inequality, bundling is exactly optimal. This mission formalizes that theorem, Theorem 16, and the steps of its proof in Appendix A.6.

Timeline. Manelli and Vincent (2006) gave conditions under which a bundled mechanism is optimal for a multiple-good monopolist. Hart and Nisan's preprint (2012, revised 2017) proved Theorem 16 with the condition xf′(x)+32f(x)≤0x f'(x) + \tfrac32 f(x) \le 0xf′(x)+23​f(x)≤0. Daskalakis, Deckelbaum and Tzamos (2017) later gave a strong duality theory for the multiple-good monopolist, based on optimal transport.

Setting

There are two goods and one buyer. A valuation is a vector x=(y,z)∈R+2x = (y, z) \in \mathbb{R}^2_+x=(y,z)∈R+2​. The buyer's values Y,ZY, ZY,Z are i.i.d. with a one-good law FFF on R+\mathbb{R}_+R+​.

A mechanism μ=(q,s)\mu = (q, s)μ=(q,s) assigns to each reported valuation xxx an allocation vector q(x)∈[0,1]2q(x) \in [0,1]^2q(x)∈[0,1]2 (qi(x)q_i(x)qi​(x) is the probability that good iii is sold) and a payment s(x)∈Rs(x) \in \mathbb{R}s(x)∈R. The buyer's payoff is b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x)b(x) = q(x)\cdot x - s(x)b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x). The mechanism is

  • incentive compatible (IC) if b(x)≥q(x~)⋅x−s(x~)b(x) \ge q(\tilde x)\cdot x - s(\tilde x)b(x)≥q(x~)⋅x−s(x~) for all x,x~∈R+2x, \tilde x \in \mathbb{R}^2_+x,x~∈R+2​;
  • individually rational (IR) if b(x)≥0b(x) \ge 0b(x)≥0 for all xxx;
  • NPT (no positive transfer) if s≥0s \ge 0s≥0.

The revenue of μ\muμ is R(μ;X)=E[s(X)]R(\mu; X) = \mathbb{E}[s(X)]R(μ;X)=E[s(X)], and the optimal revenue is Rev(X)=sup⁡R(μ;X)\mathrm{Rev}(X) = \sup R(\mu; X)Rev(X)=supR(μ;X) over all IC and IR mechanisms. The bundled revenue is BRev(X)=Rev(Y+Z)\mathrm{BRev}(X) = \mathrm{Rev}(Y + Z)BRev(X)=Rev(Y+Z), the optimal revenue from selling the bundle as a single good.

A two-good mechanism is symmetric if q1(y,z)=q2(z,y)q_1(y,z) = q_2(z,y)q1​(y,z)=q2​(z,y) and s(y,z)=s(z,y)s(y,z) = s(z,y)s(y,z)=s(z,y). For a level a≥0a \ge 0a≥0, the bundled majorant μ^=(q^,s^)\hat\mu = (\hat q, \hat s)μ^​=(q^​,s^) of μ\muμ is

q^(y,z)=(q1(y+z−a,a), q1(y+z−a,a)),s^(y,z)=q^(y,z)⋅(y,z)−b(y+z−a,a).\hat q(y,z) = \bigl(q_1(y+z-a, a),\ q_1(y+z-a, a)\bigr), \qquad \hat s(y,z) = \hat q(y,z)\cdot(y,z) - b(y+z-a, a).q^​(y,z)=(q1​(y+z−a,a), q1​(y+z−a,a)),s^(y,z)=q^​(y,z)⋅(y,z)−b(y+z−a,a).

It depends on (y,z)(y,z)(y,z) only through y+zy + zy+z, so it is a bundled mechanism.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 16

Let a>0a > 0a>0 and let FFF have a density fff supported in [a,∞)[a, \infty)[a,∞), differentiable on (a,∞)(a,\infty)(a,∞), with

xf′(x)+32f(x)≤0(x>a).(9)x f'(x) + \tfrac32 f(x) \le 0 \qquad (x > a). \tag{9}xf′(x)+23​f(x)≤0(x>a).(9)

Then for two i.i.d.-FFF goods,

Rev(X1,X2)=BRev(X1,X2)=Rev(X1+X2).\mathrm{Rev}(X_1, X_2) = \mathrm{BRev}(X_1, X_2) = \mathrm{Rev}(X_1 + X_2).Rev(X1​,X2​)=BRev(X1​,X2​)=Rev(X1​+X2​).

The substance is Rev≤BRev\mathrm{Rev} \le \mathrm{BRev}Rev≤BRev. The reverse inequality holds for every law, and the second equality is the definition of BRev\mathrm{BRev}BRev.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 5 (at least one good): IC holds if and only if bbb is convex and q(x)q(x)q(x) is a subgradient of bbb at every xxx.
  2. Proposition 6 (iii) (at least one good): the supremum defining Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev may be restricted to NPT mechanisms.
  3. Symmetrization (p. 32): for i.i.d. goods, the symmetrization μˉ\bar\muμˉ​ is IC, IR, NPT and symmetric, and it has the same revenue.
  4. Display (18): for symmetric IC μ\muμ and y,z≥ay, z \ge ay,z≥a, b(y,z)≤b(y+z−a,a)b(y,z) \le b(y+z-a, a)b(y,z)≤b(y+z−a,a).
  5. μ^\hat\muμ^​ is feasible, IC and IR on the quadrant [a,∞)2[a,\infty)^2[a,∞)2, and bundled.
  6. Under (9), R(μ;X)≤R(μ^;X)R(\mu; X) \le R(\hat\mu; X)R(μ;X)≤R(μ^​;X) for symmetric IC, IR and NPT μ\muμ.

Companion: Corollary 17

For two i.i.d. goods with the equal-revenue law P[V≥p]=1/p\mathbb{P}[V \ge p] = 1/pP[V≥p]=1/p (p≥1p \ge 1p≥1),

Rev(V1,V2)=BRev(V1,V2)=2(w+1)≈2.56,\mathrm{Rev}(V_1,V_2) = \mathrm{BRev}(V_1,V_2) = 2(w+1) \approx 2.56,Rev(V1​,V2​)=BRev(V1​,V2​)=2(w+1)≈2.56,

where wew+1=1w e^{w+1} = 1wew+1=1.

Significance

Theorem 16 is one of the few closed-form optimality results for multi-good monopoly. It gives an explicit, checkable condition: x3/2f(x)x^{3/2} f(x)x3/2f(x) is nonincreasing. The condition covers the equal-revenue distribution and Pareto distributions with index α≥1/2\alpha \ge 1/2α≥1/2. On these distributions the optimal revenue reduces to a one-dimensional pricing problem for Y+ZY + ZY+Z. Corollary 17 is the resulting exact value for two equal-revenue goods. Elsewhere in the paper, Theorems C and D use the equal-revenue law as the extremal example for the approximation ratios.

The theorem is proved in the paper. As far as is known it has not been machine-checked. The mission formalizes the model and every step of the proof as a separate milestone. These steps are Rochet's characterization (Proposition 5), the NPT reduction, symmetrization, the convexity majorization (18), and the revenue comparison under (9). Propositions 5 and 6 (iii) and symmetrization are shared with other missions of this series, so they are reusable beyond Theorem 16.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to show that the optimal mechanism is bundled by exhibiting it. This fails because nothing is known about the optimal mechanism, and it need not exist. The proof instead compares an arbitrary symmetric mechanism with its bundled majorant μ^\hat\muμ^​. A pointwise comparison fails: b^≥b\hat b \ge bb^≥b does not imply s^≥s\hat s \ge ss^≥s. The comparison holds only in expectation and only for densities satisfying (9); without (9) bundling is not optimal in general.

Making this rigorous requires several things:

  • the a.e. differentiability of the convex function bbb, together with q1=∂b/∂yq_1 = \partial b/\partial yq1​=∂b/∂y a.e.;
  • integration by parts on truncated squares [a,M]2[a, M]^2[a,M]2 with possibly infinite total revenue;
  • control of the boundary term at y=ay = ay=a, where fff need not be bounded or continuous;
  • the extension of μ^\hat\muμ^​, defined on [a,∞)2[a,\infty)^2[a,∞)2, to an IC and IR mechanism on all of R+2\mathbb{R}^2_+R+2​.

Formalization scope

Valuations are functions Fin 2→R≥0\mathrm{Fin}\ 2 \to \mathbb{R}_{\ge 0}Fin 2→R≥0​, and random valuations are given by their laws. "Two i.i.d. goods" is the product measure ν⊗ν\nu \otimes \nuν⊗ν. The law ν\nuν is the image on R≥0\mathbb{R}_{\ge0}R≥0​ of f(x) dxf(x)\,dxf(x)dx, so no mass is lost because f=0f = 0f=0 below a>0a > 0a>0. "Density function" means: fff measurable, f≥0f \ge 0f≥0, ∫f=1\int f = 1∫f=1, and f=0f = 0f=0 on (−∞,a)(-\infty, a)(−∞,a). Continuity of FFF is then automatic. Differentiability of fff is required at every x>ax > ax>a, the range of (9). Nothing is assumed about fff at aaa; in particular fff may blow up there.

Admissible mechanisms are feasible, IC, IR and have a measurable payment function. The paper allows measurability without loss of generality (footnote 12). Revenue R(μ;X)R(\mu;X)R(μ;X) is an extended real, so a non-integrable payment never collapses to 000. Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and may be infinite under (9), for instance for f(x)=c x−3/2f(x) = c\,x^{-3/2}f(x)=cx−3/2 on [a,∞)[a,\infty)[a,∞). Milestone 5 states IC and IR of μ^\hat\muμ^​ on the quadrant only, as the paper defines μ^\hat\muμ^​ there. Off the quadrant, y+z−ay + z - ay+z−a is truncated at 000.

The goal must not be stated as the second equality alone, which is definitional. Nor may it assume the law is bounded or that f(a)f(a)f(a) is finite: these would replace the theorem with a special case. The display (17) and the limit formula (16) are not posed, because their boundary term 2af(a)∫b(a,z)f(z) dz2a f(a)\int b(a,z) f(z)\,dz2af(a)∫b(a,z)f(z)dz refers to the value of fff at aaa, which the hypotheses do not control.

A complete development needs Rochet's characterization, a.e. gradients of convex functions on R+2\mathbb{R}^2_+R+2​, Fubini–Tonelli on the product law, one-dimensional integration by parts with an absolutely continuous weight, and Myerson's one-good formula for Corollary 17. Contributions of any of these as standalone lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Hart and N. Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, J. Econ. Theory 172 (2017); arXiv:1204.1846v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.1846
  • R. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • J.-C. Rochet, The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton–Jacobi equations, J. Math. Econ. 14 (1985) 113–128. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(85)90015-1
  • A. Manelli and D. Vincent, Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist, J. Econ. Theory 127 (2006) 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007
  • S. Hart and P. Reny, Maximal revenue with multiple goods: nonmonotonicity and other observations, Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 893–922. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1517
  • C. Daskalakis, A. Deckelbaum and C. Tzamos, Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist, Econometrica 85 (2017) 735–767. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12618
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Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 1: For Independent Groups of Goods Y and Z, Rev(Y, Z) ≤ Rev(Y) + Rev(Z) + BRev(Y) + BRev(Z)Research Paper

Motivation

A seller who offers several goods to a buyer with private values has to choose a selling mechanism. For one good the optimal mechanism is known: post the best take-it-or-leave-it price (Myerson 1981). For two or more goods the optimal mechanism can be complicated: it may use lotteries, its menu may be infinite, and it may not be computable in closed form even for simple value distributions. Sellers therefore use simple mechanisms, such as selling each good separately or selling all goods as one bundle, and the question is how much revenue this costs.

Hart and Nisan (arXiv:1204.1846v3, J. Econ. Theory 2017) answer this with guaranteed fractions of the optimal revenue. Their basic tool is a decomposition theorem: when the goods split into two groups whose values are independent, the optimal revenue from all goods together is bounded by revenues computed from each group separately. This mission formalizes that theorem (Theorem 7) and the paper's first headline result, Theorem A, which is its two-good case.

Setting

There are k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 goods and one buyer with additive values. A valuation is a vector x∈R+kx \in \mathbb{R}^k_+x∈R+k​, and a kkk-good random valuation XXX is a random vector in R+k\mathbb{R}^k_+R+k​ whose law the seller knows.

A mechanism μ=(q,s)\mu = (q, s)μ=(q,s) consists of an allocation q:R+k→[0,1]kq : \mathbb{R}^k_+ \to [0,1]^kq:R+k​→[0,1]k, where qi(x)q_i(x)qi​(x) is the probability that the buyer receives good iii when reporting xxx, and a payment s:R+k→Rs : \mathbb{R}^k_+ \to \mathbb{R}s:R+k​→R. The buyer's payoff from truthful reporting is b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x)b(x) = q(x)\cdot x - s(x)b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x). The mechanism is

  • incentive compatible (IC) if b(x)≥q(x~)⋅x−s(x~)b(x) \ge q(\tilde x)\cdot x - s(\tilde x)b(x)≥q(x~)⋅x−s(x~) for all x,x~∈R+kx, \tilde x \in \mathbb{R}^k_+x,x~∈R+k​;
  • individually rational (IR) if b(x)≥0b(x) \ge 0b(x)≥0 for all xxx;
  • no positive transfer (NPT) if s(x)≥0s(x) \ge 0s(x)≥0 for all xxx.

Let M\mathcal MM be the class of IC and IR mechanisms. The expected revenue of μ∈M\mu \in \mathcal Mμ∈M is R(μ;X)=E[s(X)]R(\mu; X) = \mathbb{E}[s(X)]R(μ;X)=E[s(X)], which lies in (−∞,+∞](-\infty, +\infty](−∞,+∞], and the optimal revenue is

Rev(X)=sup⁡μ∈MR(μ;X)∈[0,∞].\mathrm{Rev}(X) = \sup_{\mu \in \mathcal M} R(\mu; X) \in [0, \infty].Rev(X)=μ∈Msup​R(μ;X)∈[0,∞].

Two benchmarks reduce to one-good problems: the separate revenue SRev(X)=Rev(X1)+⋯+Rev(Xk)\mathrm{SRev}(X) = \mathrm{Rev}(X_1) + \dots + \mathrm{Rev}(X_k)SRev(X)=Rev(X1​)+⋯+Rev(Xk​) and the bundled revenue BRev(X)=Rev(X1+⋯+Xk)\mathrm{BRev}(X) = \mathrm{Rev}(X_1 + \dots + X_k)BRev(X)=Rev(X1​+⋯+Xk​). Finally Val(X)=E[∑iXi]\mathrm{Val}(X) = \mathbb{E}[\sum_i X_i]Val(X)=E[∑i​Xi​] is the expected total value.

For the decomposition, YYY is a random valuation for k1≥1k_1 \ge 1k1​≥1 goods and ZZZ one for k2≥1k_2 \ge 1k2​≥1 goods. The coordinates of YYY may be arbitrarily dependent, and so may those of ZZZ, but the vectors YYY and ZZZ are independent. Rev(Y,Z)\mathrm{Rev}(Y, Z)Rev(Y,Z) is the optimal revenue from selling all k1+k2k_1 + k_2k1​+k2​ goods together, and X1X∈AX\mathbf 1_{X \in A}X1X∈A​ is the random valuation equal to XXX on the event X∈AX \in AX∈A and to 000 otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 18)

If YYY and ZZZ are independent, then

Rev(Y,Z)≤Rev(Y)+Rev(Z)+BRev(Y)+BRev(Z)≤2(Rev(Y)+Rev(Z)).\mathrm{Rev}(Y, Z) \le \mathrm{Rev}(Y) + \mathrm{Rev}(Z) + \mathrm{BRev}(Y) + \mathrm{BRev}(Z) \le 2\big(\mathrm{Rev}(Y) + \mathrm{Rev}(Z)\big).Rev(Y,Z)≤Rev(Y)+Rev(Z)+BRev(Y)+BRev(Z)≤2(Rev(Y)+Rev(Z)).

Both inequalities are part of the goal, with the same middle term.

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. Proposition 6 (iii), p. 14: Rev(X)\mathrm{Rev}(X)Rev(X) is the supremum of R(μ;X)R(\mu; X)R(μ;X) over IC, IR and NPT mechanisms.
  2. The NPT split, p. 20: Rev(Y,Z)≤Rev((Y,Z)1∑iYi≥∑jZj)+Rev((Y,Z)1∑jZj≥∑iYi)\mathrm{Rev}(Y,Z) \le \mathrm{Rev}\big((Y,Z)\mathbf 1_{\sum_i Y_i \ge \sum_j Z_j}\big) + \mathrm{Rev}\big((Y,Z)\mathbf 1_{\sum_j Z_j \ge \sum_i Y_i}\big)Rev(Y,Z)≤Rev((Y,Z)1∑i​Yi​≥∑j​Zj​​)+Rev((Y,Z)1∑j​Zj​≥∑i​Yi​​).
  3. Proposition 6 (iv), p. 14: for μ∈M\mu \in \mathcal Mμ∈M and a set AAA of values, E[s(X)1X∈A]≤Rev(X1X∈A)≤Rev(X)\mathbb{E}[s(X)\mathbf 1_{X\in A}] \le \mathrm{Rev}(X\mathbf 1_{X\in A}) \le \mathrm{Rev}(X)E[s(X)1X∈A​]≤Rev(X1X∈A​)≤Rev(X).
  4. Lemma 8, p. 19: Rev((Y,Z)1(Y,Z)∈A)≤Rev(Y)+Val(Z1(Y,Z)∈A)\mathrm{Rev}\big((Y,Z)\mathbf 1_{(Y,Z)\in A}\big) \le \mathrm{Rev}(Y) + \mathrm{Val}\big(Z\mathbf 1_{(Y,Z)\in A}\big)Rev((Y,Z)1(Y,Z)∈A​)≤Rev(Y)+Val(Z1(Y,Z)∈A​).
  5. Lemma 9, p. 20: for one-dimensional independent Y,ZY, ZY,Z, Val(Z1Y≥Z)≤Rev(Y)\mathrm{Val}(Z\mathbf 1_{Y \ge Z}) \le \mathrm{Rev}(Y)Val(Z1Y≥Z​)≤Rev(Y).
  6. Lemma 10, p. 20: Val(Z1∑iYi≥∑jZj)≤BRev(Y)\mathrm{Val}\big(Z\mathbf 1_{\sum_i Y_i \ge \sum_j Z_j}\big) \le \mathrm{BRev}(Y)Val(Z1∑i​Yi​≥∑j​Zj​​)≤BRev(Y).
  7. BRev ≤ Rev, p. 18.

Companions

Theorem A in the form (2), p. 16: for two independent goods Y,ZY, ZY,Z, Rev(Y,Z)≤2(Rev(Y)+Rev(Z))\mathrm{Rev}(Y, Z) \le 2(\mathrm{Rev}(Y) + \mathrm{Rev}(Z))Rev(Y,Z)≤2(Rev(Y)+Rev(Z)). Also posed is display (5), p. 17: z⋅P[Y≥z]≤Rev(Y)z\cdot\mathbb{P}[Y \ge z] \le \mathrm{Rev}(Y)z⋅P[Y≥z]≤Rev(Y) for one good and every z≥0z \ge 0z≥0.

Significance

Theorem A says that for two independent goods, selling them separately guarantees half of the optimal revenue, whatever the distributions. Theorem 7 extends this to two independent groups of goods. It is the induction step behind the paper's bounds for many goods: separate selling guarantees a fraction c/log⁡2kc/\log^2 kc/log2k of the optimal revenue for kkk independent goods (Theorem C), and bundling guarantees c/log⁡kc/\log kc/logk for kkk i.i.d. goods (Theorem D). These are other missions of this series, and both use Theorem 7 as a black box. The same approach underlies later work on simple versus optimal mechanisms, for example Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier and Weinberg (FOCS 2014) and Li and Yao (PNAS 2013).

All results posed here are proved in the paper. As far as we know, none has a machine-checked proof. A formal proof would give a reusable development of mechanism design with multi-dimensional types: IC and IR mechanisms on R+k\mathbb{R}^k_+R+k​, revenue as an extended-real expectation, restriction of mechanisms to subdomains, and marginal mechanisms obtained by fixing some coordinates of an independent product.

Difficulty

The proofs are short on paper but rest on measure theory the prose passes over. Lemma 8 conditions on Z=zZ = zZ=z and applies Proposition 6 (iv) to a one-group mechanism for each fixed zzz. Formally this is a Tonelli argument on a product measure, with an integrand that may be negative on part of the space and +∞+\infty+∞ in expectation. The induced mechanism sz(y)=s(y,z)−∑jqj(y,z)zjs^z(y) = s(y, z) - \sum_j q_j(y,z) z_jsz(y)=s(y,z)−∑j​qj​(y,z)zj​ involves the allocation qqq, which is not assumed measurable. Proposition 6 (iv) bounds a mechanism with possibly negative payments by the optimal revenue on a modified valuation X1X∈AX\mathbf 1_{X \in A}X1X∈A​, and this requires shifting the mechanism to make it NPT. Finally, every revenue may be infinite, so the inequalities must be handled in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and in the extended reals, without cancelling.

A natural first idea is to apply Theorem A coordinate by coordinate. This fails, because the coordinates inside YYY may be dependent. Only the independence of YYY from ZZZ is available, and the bound must go through the bundled revenue BRev\mathrm{BRev}BRev.

Formalization scope

  • Valuations as laws. A random valuation is represented by its law, a probability measure on ι → ℝ≥0 for a finite type ι of goods. Every quantity of the paper depends only on the law. One good is ι = Unit.
  • Independence as a product law. The law of (Y,Z)(Y,Z)(Y,Z) is the product of the laws of YYY and ZZZ, transported to ι₁ ⊕ ι₂ → ℝ≥0. Theorems that need independence are never stated over an arbitrary joint law with given marginals, since they are false for correlated groups. The NPT split in the proof of Theorem 7 is stated for independent groups, as on the page. Proposition 6 applies to an arbitrary law.
  • The class M\mathcal MM. M\mathcal MM requires q∈[0,1]kq \in [0,1]^kq∈[0,1]k, IC, IR and a measurable payment sss, the last as allowed by the paper's footnote 12. qqq is not required to be measurable.
  • Revenue. R(μ;X)R(\mu;X)R(μ;X) is ∫s+−∫s−\int s^+ - \int s^-∫s+−∫s− in the extended reals, so that E[s(X)]=+∞\mathbb{E}[s(X)] = +\inftyE[s(X)]=+∞ is kept. Since s≥s(0)s \ge s(0)s≥s(0) under IC, the negative part is finite. The Bochner integral is not used, because it would assign 000 to a non-integrable payment. Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev, SRev\mathrm{SRev}SRev, BRev\mathrm{BRev}BRev and Val\mathrm{Val}Val take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • Subdomains. X1X∈AX\mathbf 1_{X\in A}X1X∈A​ is the image law under x↦x1A(x)x \mapsto x\mathbf 1_A(x)x↦x1A​(x), and AAA is assumed measurable. The regions of the proof of Theorem 7 are both closed, so the diagonal is counted twice, as in the paper.
  • Not trivializable. A formalization in which Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev is computed with a Bochner integral, the expected revenue is clipped before comparing a single mechanism with Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev, or independence is dropped does not state the paper's theorem, and none of these is used.
  • Not posed. The ratio form of Theorem A (GFOR≥1/2\mathrm{GFOR} \ge 1/2GFOR≥1/2) is not posed, because of its conventions 0/0=10/0 = 10/0=1 and ∞/∞\infty/\infty∞/∞. Theorems B, C, D, 16 and 33 are separate missions of this series.

Contributions are welcome at every level: Proposition 6 (the NPT shift and subdomain restriction), the marginal-mechanism construction behind Lemma 8, and the one-good facts (5) and Lemma 9 are all reusable in the sibling missions on Theorems C and D.

Selected references

  • S. Hart and N. Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, Journal of Economic Theory 172 (2017); preprint arXiv:1204.1846v3, 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.1846
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981) 58–73. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • S. Hart and P. J. Reny, Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations, Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 893–922. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1517
  • M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier and S. M. Weinberg, A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer, FOCS 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.6146
  • X. Li and A. C.-C. Yao, On Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Independently Distributed Items, PNAS 110 (2013) 11232–11237. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1309533110
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Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 5: A (b, c)-Selectable Greedy OCRS Rounds x ∈ bP to E[f(S)] ≥ c·F(x) for Monotone Submodular fResearch Paper

Motivation

Many online selection problems ask an algorithm to accept or reject items one at a time, irrevocably, while keeping the accepted set feasible: independent in a matroid, a matching in a graph, or within a knapsack budget. In Bayesian versions, such as prophet inequalities and posted-price mechanisms, a fractional point xxx of a relaxation of the feasible sets is available in advance, and each item is active independently with probability xex_exe​. An online contention resolution scheme (OCRS), introduced by Feldman, Svensson and Zenklusen, turns this random active set into a feasible selection as items arrive.

The quality of an OCRS is measured by its selectability: the probability that every element is accepted when it is active, whatever the arrival order. Applications, however, care about the value of the selected set, often a submodular function such as a coverage or a utility with diminishing returns. Theorem 1.10 of the paper is the bridge between the two: a selectability guarantee ccc yields an approximation guarantee ccc for every monotone submodular objective, and c/4c/4c/4 for non-monotone ones, even against an adversary who sees every random outcome before fixing the order. The other four missions of this series construct selectable OCRSs for matroids, matchings and knapsacks and combine them; this mission formalizes what such a guarantee is worth.

The offline counterpart is the theory of contention resolution schemes (CRSs) of Chekuri, Vondrák and Zenklusen (SIAM J. Comput. 2014), whose Theorem 1.3 shows that a monotone balanced CRS rounds the multilinear extension of a submodular function with the balancedness factor. The proof of Theorem 1.10 reduces the online statement to that offline result.

Setting

Let NNN be a finite ground set and F⊆2N\mathcal F\subseteq 2^NF⊆2N a down-closed family of feasible sets. A polytope P⊆[0,1]NP\subseteq[0,1]^NP⊆[0,1]N is a relaxation of F\mathcal FF if it contains exactly the characteristic vectors 1I\mathbf 1_I1I​ with I∈FI\in\mathcal FI∈F among the {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}-points. For x∈[0,1]Nx\in[0,1]^Nx∈[0,1]N, the random set R(x)R(x)R(x) contains every eee independently with probability xex_exe​.

A greedy OCRS fixes, for each input xxx, a down-closed family Fx⊆F\mathcal F_x\subseteq\mathcal FFx​⊆F containing ∅\emptyset∅ (deterministically, or drawn from a distribution independent of R(x)R(x)R(x)). The elements then arrive one by one; an arriving active element is selected if, together with the elements already selected, it forms a set in Fx\mathcal F_xFx​. An element eee is selectable for the active set AAA if I∪{e}∈FxI\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal F_xI∪{e}∈Fx​ for every I⊆AI\subseteq AI⊆A with I∈FxI\in\mathcal F_xI∈Fx​. For b,c∈[0,1]b,c\in[0,1]b,c∈[0,1] the OCRS is (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-selectable if for every x∈bPx\in bPx∈bP and every e∈Ne\in Ne∈N

Pr⁡[I∪{e}∈Fx  ∀I⊆R(x), I∈Fx]≥c.\Pr\big[I\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal F_x\ \ \forall I\subseteq R(x),\ I\in\mathcal F_x\big]\ge c .Pr[I∪{e}∈Fx​  ∀I⊆R(x), I∈Fx​]≥c.

The arrival order is chosen by the almighty adversary, which knows R(x)R(x)R(x), the realized family Fx\mathcal F_xFx​ and every random bit of the algorithm before choosing it.

For f:2N→Rf:2^N\to\mathbb Rf:2N→R, the multilinear extension is F(x)=E[f(R(x))]F(x)=\mathbb E[f(R(x))]F(x)=E[f(R(x))]. The function fff is submodular if f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)≤f(A)+f(B)f(A\cup B)+f(A\cap B)\le f(A)+f(B)f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)≤f(A)+f(B) for all A,BA,BA,B, and monotone if A⊆BA\subseteq BA⊆B implies f(A)≤f(B)f(A)\le f(B)f(A)≤f(B). For a set SSS, S(1/2)S(1/2)S(1/2) keeps every element of SSS independently with probability 1/21/21/2.

An (offline) CRS π\piπ for PPP maps each S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, possibly at random, to a subset π(S)⊆S\pi(S)\subseteq Sπ(S)⊆S with 1π(S)∈P\mathbf 1_{\pi(S)}\in P1π(S)​∈P. It is (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-balanced if Pr⁡[e∈π(R(x))∣e∈R(x)]≥c\Pr[e\in\pi(R(x))\mid e\in R(x)]\ge cPr[e∈π(R(x))∣e∈R(x)]≥c for x∈bPx\in bPx∈bP and xe>0x_e>0xe​>0, and monotone if Pr⁡[e∈π(S1)]≥Pr⁡[e∈π(S2)]\Pr[e\in\pi(S_1)]\ge\Pr[e\in\pi(S_2)]Pr[e∈π(S1​)]≥Pr[e∈π(S2​)] whenever e∈S1⊆S2e\in S_1\subseteq S_2e∈S1​⊆S2​. The characteristic CRS of a greedy OCRS is πˉ(A)={e∈A:e selectable for A}\bar\pi(A)=\{e\in A : e \text{ selectable for } A\}πˉ(A)={e∈A:e selectable for A}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.10

Let PPP be a relaxation of F\mathcal FF, let π\piπ be a (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-selectable greedy OCRS for PPP, let x∈bPx\in bPx∈bP, and let f≥0f\ge0f≥0 be submodular. Against every almighty adversary, the selected set SSS satisfies

E[f(S)]≥c⋅F(x)if f is monotone,E[f(S(1/2))]≥c4⋅F(x)in general,\mathbb E[f(S)]\ge c\cdot F(x)\quad\text{if } f \text{ is monotone},\qquad \mathbb E[f(S(1/2))]\ge \frac c4\cdot F(x)\quad\text{in general},E[f(S)]≥c⋅F(x)if f is monotone,E[f(S(1/2))]≥4c​⋅F(x)in general,

where in the second case the coins defining S(1/2)S(1/2)S(1/2) are known to the adversary. The constants are the paper's and are not parameters to be improved here.

Milestones

  1. Observation 3.3: for every greedy family, active set and order, πˉ(A)\bar\pi(A)πˉ(A) is contained in the selected set.
  2. The remark after Definition 3.2: πˉ\bar\piπˉ is a CRS for PPP.
  3. Lemma 3.4: the characteristic CRS of a (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-selectable greedy OCRS is (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-balanced and monotone.
  4. Lemma 3.5 (from Chekuri–Vondrák–Zenklusen): for every non-negative submodular fff there is a pruning map ηf\eta_fηf​, with ηf(S)⊆S\eta_f(S)\subseteq Sηf​(S)⊆S, such that E[f(ηf(π(R(x))))]≥c⋅F(x)\mathbb E[f(\eta_f(\pi(R(x))))]\ge c\cdot F(x)E[f(ηf​(π(R(x))))]≥c⋅F(x) for every monotone (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-balanced CRS π\piπ and every x∈bPx\in bPx∈bP.
  5. Lemma 3.6 (Feige–Mirrokni–Vondrák, Lemma 2.2): if Tp⊆TT_p\subseteq TTp​⊆T contains every element of TTT with probability ppp, not necessarily independently, then E[g(Tp)]≥(1−p)g(∅)+p g(T)\mathbb E[g(T_p)]\ge(1-p)g(\emptyset)+p\,g(T)E[g(Tp​)]≥(1−p)g(∅)+pg(T) for submodular ggg.
  6. Lemma 3.7 (Buchbinder–Feldman–Naor–Schwartz, Lemma 2.2): if NpN_pNp​ contains every element with probability at most ppp, then E[g(Np)]≥(1−p)g(∅)\mathbb E[g(N_p)]\ge(1-p)g(\emptyset)E[g(Np​)]≥(1−p)g(∅) for non-negative submodular ggg.

Significance

Theorem 1.10 is what makes selectability useful. Combined with the paper's OCRSs for matroids, matchings and knapsacks (Theorem 1.8) and the combination rule (Theorem 1.9), it gives constant-factor online algorithms for submodular objectives under intersections of these constraints, and through them the paper's applications to prophet inequalities, posted-price mechanisms and stochastic probing. The guarantee holds against the strongest adversary considered, so it applies whatever arrival order the application imposes.

The theorem and its proof are published; none of the statements of this mission has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing it produces a reusable interface between online and offline contention resolution, and machine-checked versions of two standard lemmas on correlated random subsets of submodular functions (Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7) used throughout submodular maximization. Lemma 3.5 is the substantial imported ingredient: its formal proof amounts to formalizing the rounding theorem of Chekuri, Vondrák and Zenklusen for non-monotone objectives.

Difficulty

The first idea is to compare the online selection directly with F(x)F(x)F(x) element by element: each element is selected with probability at least c xec\,x_ecxe​. For a linear objective this suffices. For a submodular objective it does not, because the marginal value of an element depends on which other elements are selected, and the adversary controls this through the order. The reduction to the characteristic CRS removes the order, but the offline rounding result (Lemma 3.5) then needs the full CRS machinery, including a pruning step that depends on fff alone.

For non-monotone fff, selecting extra elements can lose value, and the adversary decides which elements beyond πˉ(A)\bar\pi(A)πˉ(A) are selected, after seeing the coins. Controlling this requires the correlated-sampling bounds of Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 rather than independence.

Formalization scope

The ground set is a finite type α : Type with decidable equality; sets are Finset α; vectors are α → ℝ. All probabilities and expectations are exact finite sums of product weights, without measure theory. bPbPbP is the pointwise scaling b • P, which handles b=0b=0b=0. The multilinear extension and submodularity are the published definitions NonmonotoneSubmod.Shared.F and NonmonotoneSubmod.Shared.Submodular.

A randomized greedy OCRS is a weight function on families Finset (Finset α), a CRS a weight function on maps Finset α → Finset α; a deterministic OCRS is a point mass. The almighty adversary is any function from the realized family and active set (and, in part 2, the coin set CCC, with S(1/2)=S∩CS(1/2)=S\cap CS(1/2)=S∩C and CCC uniform and independent of everything else) to an order listing every element once. The standing assumptions of Definition 1.3 are explicit hypotheses: F\mathcal FF down-closed, PPP a polytope contained in [0,1]N[0,1]^N[0,1]N and a relaxation of F\mathcal FF, and b,c∈[0,1]b,c\in[0,1]b,c∈[0,1]. A polytope is encoded as the convex hull of finitely many vectors. Every greedy family contains ∅\emptyset∅, so the empty family cannot make every element vacuously selectable, and the inputs x∈bPx\in bPx∈bP lie in [0,1]N[0,1]^N[0,1]N, so the product weights are probabilities.

Definition 3.1 is printed with "≥c⋅xe\ge c\cdot x_e≥c⋅xe​"; the formalization uses "≥c\ge c≥c", as the proof of Lemma 3.4 and Definition 4.5 do. Lemma 3.5 keeps the paper's quantifier order: ηf\eta_fηf​ is fixed before PPP, bbb, ccc, π\piπ and xxx.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones in any order; Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 are self-contained and reusable; Lemma 3.5 may be split further along the proof of Chekuri–Vondrák–Zenklusen.

Selected references

  • M. Feldman, O. Svensson, R. Zenklusen, Online Contention Resolution Schemes, arXiv:1508.00142v2, 2015; Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems, SIAM J. Comput. 50(2), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.00142v2
  • C. Chekuri, J. Vondrák, R. Zenklusen, Submodular Function Maximization via the Multilinear Relaxation and Contention Resolution Schemes, SIAM J. Comput. 43(6), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/110839655
  • U. Feige, V. Mirrokni, J. Vondrák, Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions, SIAM J. Comput. 40(4), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1137/090779346
  • N. Buchbinder, M. Feldman, J. Naor, R. Schwartz, Submodular Maximization with Cardinality Constraints, SODA 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973402.106
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Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 4: Intersecting the Families of (b, c₁)- and (b, c₂)-Selectable Greedy OCRSs Is (b, c₁c₂)-SelectableResearch Paper

Motivation

Online selection problems ask an algorithm to accept or reject elements as they arrive, while keeping the accepted set feasible. The decisions are irrevocable, and the arrival order can be chosen after the random activity of the elements is known. A guarantee for one constraint is therefore useful only if it remains meaningful when several constraints apply at once. In Feldman, Svensson and Zenklusen's paper, the constraints include matroid independence, matching, and knapsack capacity. A set satisfying two such requirements lies in the intersection of their feasible families. Theorem 1.9 establishes how their online guarantees combine: the two selectability factors multiply.

The result belongs to a sequence of statements in the paper. The authors first define greedy online contention resolution schemes and their selectability guarantee in Definitions 1.3–1.5. They then state the combination theorem in the introduction and identify the intersection construction in Definition 2.10. Lemma 2.11 supplies the precise selectability assertion for that construction. This mission isolates those claims so that later formalizations of specific constraints can reuse them without repeating the probability argument.

Setting

Let NNN be a finite ground set and F⊆2N\mathcal F\subseteq 2^NF⊆2N a family of feasible sets. A fractional point x∈[0,1]Nx\in[0,1]^Nx∈[0,1]N determines a random active set R(x)R(x)R(x): each e∈Ne\in Ne∈N belongs to R(x)R(x)R(x) independently with probability xex_exe​. Thus a particular set A⊆NA\subseteq NA⊆N has weight

Pr⁡[R(x)=A]=∏e∈Axe∏e∉A(1−xe).\Pr[R(x)=A]=\prod_{e\in A}x_e\prod_{e\notin A}(1-x_e).Pr[R(x)=A]=e∈A∏​xe​e∈/A∏​(1−xe​).

A greedy online contention resolution scheme, or greedy OCRS, chooses a down-closed family Gx⊆F\mathcal G_x\subseteq\mathcal FGx​⊆F. As active elements arrive, it accepts an element when adding that element to those already accepted remains in Gx\mathcal G_xGx​. In a randomized scheme, the choice of Gx\mathcal G_xGx​ is random and independent of R(x)R(x)R(x). The family contains the empty set, as the procedure begins with no accepted elements.

An element eee is selectable for a realized active set AAA and family Gx\mathcal G_xGx​ if every I⊆AI\subseteq AI⊆A with I∈GxI\in\mathcal G_xI∈Gx​ still permits eee: I∪{e}∈GxI\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal G_xI∪{e}∈Gx​. This condition covers every possible set that might have been accepted before eee arrives. A greedy OCRS is (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-selectable for a relaxation PPP when the probability of this event is at least ccc for every x∈bPx\in bPx∈bP and every e∈Ne\in Ne∈N. The probability includes both draws when the family is randomized. Here b,c∈[0,1]b,c\in[0,1]b,c∈[0,1] and bP={by:y∈P}bP=\{by:y\in P\}bP={by:y∈P}.

For two feasible families F1,F2\mathcal F_1,\mathcal F_2F1​,F2​, the combination of their greedy OCRSs independently draws G1,x\mathcal G_{1,x}G1,x​ and G2,x\mathcal G_{2,x}G2,x​, then uses Gx=G1,x∩G2,x\mathcal G_x=\mathcal G_{1,x}\cap\mathcal G_{2,x}Gx​=G1,x​∩G2,x​. This is a family of sets satisfying both constraints. The proof also uses χe(A,F,F′)\chi_e(A,F,F')χe​(A,F,F′), the indicator that I∪{e}∈FI\cup\{e\}\in FI∪{e}∈F for every I⊆AI\subseteq AI⊆A lying in F′F'F′. For selectability itself, F′=FF'=FF′=F.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.9

For P1,P2⊆[0,1]NP_1,P_2\subseteq[0,1]^NP1​,P2​⊆[0,1]N, let the first scheme be (b,c1)(b,c_1)(b,c1​)-selectable and the second (b,c2)(b,c_2)(b,c2​)-selectable. The mission asks for a greedy OCRS on the intersection with

Pr⁡[e selectable at x]≥c1c2for all x∈b(P1∩P2), e∈N.\Pr[e\text{ selectable at }x]\ge c_1c_2 \quad\text{for all }x\in b(P_1\cap P_2),\ e\in N.Pr[e selectable at x]≥c1​c2​for all x∈b(P1​∩P2​), e∈N.

The target records existence of the combined scheme, independent of a particular proof of its selectability. The paper also claims preservation of polynomial-time efficiency; the finite mathematical model here does not assign a complexity measure to a family sampler or membership oracle, so that clause is outside this target.

Construction: Lemma 2.11

The lemma names the combined scheme: independently draw both greedy families and use their intersection. It asserts the same (b,c1c2)(b,c_1c_2)(b,c1​c2​) bound for that specific scheme. The earlier milestones record the two order properties of χe\chi_eχe​ and the finite product-measure correlation inequality appearing in the lemma's proof. Their statements keep the original quantifiers over active sets and families visible.

Significance

The theorem turns guarantees for individual constraints into a guarantee for simultaneous constraints. If a matroid scheme and a matching scheme meet the same scale parameter bbb, their intersection is governed by the product of their selectability factors. The factor loss is explicit, which lets subsequent algorithmic results track it without redefining the combined scheme. The lemma additionally fixes the actual distribution over intersected families, avoiding ambiguity about how two randomized procedures are coupled.

Mathlib already provides a general finite FKG inequality, but it does not state the paper's OCRS objects, the selectable event, or the intersection theorem. This mission adds those interfaces and the specialized correlation statement. The source results are proved in the cited paper; the local theorem files in this proposal are statements for later machine-checked proofs. A complete formalization would connect the finite active-set weights to Mathlib's lattice correlation theorem and then establish the randomized family bookkeeping. The finite probability definitions can also serve other OCRS results in the same paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument would multiply the two probabilities that eee is selectable for the separate families. Both events depend on the same active set R(x)R(x)R(x), so they are not independent even when the families are drawn independently. Moreover, selectability for the intersection checks only sets belonging to both families, whereas the original bounds check each family separately. The formal statements must keep these two dependencies distinct. The paper's two monotonicity claims and its FKG display identify the needed intermediate assertions, but their use with an arbitrary random choice of families still requires careful finite-sum reasoning.

Formalization scope

The ground set is a finite Lean type and subsets are Finsets. Feasibility is a predicate on those finite sets. Fractional points are real-valued functions, and each input relaxation is represented as a set of such functions with an explicit coordinate bound 0≤ye≤10\le y_e\le10≤ye​≤1. The scale and selectability parameters belong to [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The point xxx ranges over b(P1∩P2)b(P_1\cap P_2)b(P1​∩P2​), not over an independently chosen intersection of scaled sets, so the case b=0b=0b=0 retains the paper's meaning. The finite products define the law of R(x)R(x)R(x); no measure-theoretic integral is used.

A randomized scheme is a probability weight on possible greedy families for every input point. The combined weight is the product of the two original weights summed over pairs with the required intersection, expressing independent draws. The family distribution is independent of the active-set draw. This sampling convention is necessary for the stated product guarantee and is made explicit here although Definition 2.10 does not spell it out. Each greedy family contains ∅\varnothing∅ and lies in its own feasible family. These requirements exclude the empty-family and unconstrained-family encodings that would make selectability trivial. The unit-cube bounds prevent negative active-set weights.

The Lean declarations focus on the finite selectability guarantee. They abstract a polytope by its set of fractional points and use the paper's unit-cube condition; they do not formalize a polyhedral representation or test that its binary points equal the feasible sets. A full development of the paper's algorithmic setting would additionally represent online arrival orders, family sampling algorithms, membership oracles, and polynomial running time. Contributions establishing the finite probability lemmas, the specialized FKG statement, and Lemma 2.11 are directly useful here. The general active-set and selectability definitions are reusable across the paper's other missions.

Selected references

  • Moran Feldman, Ola Svensson and Rico Zenklusen, Online Contention Resolution Schemes, arXiv preprint, 2015, arXiv:1508.00142v2. Definitions 1.3–1.5, Theorem 1.9, Definition 2.10 and Lemma 2.11.
  • Moran Feldman, Ola Svensson and Rico Zenklusen, Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems, SIAM Journal on Computing 50(2), 2021, DOI:10.1137/18M1226130. The mission's statement indices follow the arXiv version above.
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CombinatoricsOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 3: A Knapsack Polytope Has a (b, (1−2b)/(2−2b))-Selectable Randomized Greedy OCRS for b ≤ 1/2Research Paper

Motivation

In online selection, useful items arrive one at a time and must be accepted or rejected before the next arrival. A knapsack constraint limits the total size of accepted items to one unit. When the order may depend on all of the random outcomes, an algorithm needs a guarantee that survives every such order. Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen introduced online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs) to provide this guarantee for fractional relaxations of selection problems. Their knapsack theorem gives an explicit guarantee for a randomized greedy scheme and contrasts with a size-dependent obstruction for deterministic greedy schemes (Feldman–Svensson–Zenklusen, §2.3).

The knapsack result is one of the three concrete existence results summarized in Theorem 1.8 of the paper. The surrounding framework is designed to convert fractional solutions into feasible online selections under an almighty adversary, who knows the active items and the scheme's random choices before choosing their arrival order. This makes the selectability requirement stronger than a performance claim for one fixed order (Feldman–Svensson–Zenklusen, Definitions 1.3–1.5).

Setting

Let NNN be a finite ground set. Each element e∈Ne\in Ne∈N has a size se∈[0,1]s_e\in[0,1]se​∈[0,1]. A subset I⊆NI\subseteq NI⊆N is feasible when its total size is at most one. The natural fractional polytope is

P={x∈[0,1]N:∑e∈Nsexe≤1}.P=\left\{x\in[0,1]^N:\sum_{e\in N}s_ex_e\le1\right\}.P={x∈[0,1]N:e∈N∑​se​xe​≤1}.

For a vector x∈[0,1]Nx\in[0,1]^Nx∈[0,1]N, the random active set R(x)R(x)R(x) includes each element eee independently with probability xex_exe​. A greedy family FxF_xFx​ is a downward-closed family of feasible subsets. The online rule accepts an active arriving element when adding it to the accepted set keeps that set inside FxF_xFx​. A randomized greedy OCRS chooses the family at random, independently of R(x)R(x)R(x). The paper studies the probability that an element eee is selectable: for every possible accepted set I⊆R(x)I\subseteq R(x)I⊆R(x) with I∈FxI\in F_xI∈Fx​, the enlarged set I∪{e}I\cup\{e\}I∪{e} still belongs to FxF_xFx​. Such an event makes eee acceptable regardless of the arrival order (Feldman–Svensson–Zenklusen, §1.1).

Write bP={bp:p∈P}bP=\{bp:p\in P\}bP={bp:p∈P}. An OCRS is (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-selectable when, for every x∈bPx\in bPx∈bP and every e∈Ne\in Ne∈N, the probability that eee is selectable is at least ccc. The paper divides elements at size 1/21/21/2: Nbig={e:se>1/2}N_{\mathrm{big}}=\{e:s_e>1/2\}Nbig​={e:se​>1/2}, while equality belongs to the small elements. Its construction randomly chooses between the feasible subsets using only big elements and those using only small elements (Feldman–Svensson–Zenklusen, proof of Theorem 2.9).

Formalization targets

Main theorem

Theorem 2.9 asserts that for every b∈[0,1/2]b\in[0,1/2]b∈[0,1/2] and every such knapsack polytope, a randomized greedy OCRS exists with

c=1−2b2−2b.c=\frac{1-2b}{2-2b}.c=2−2b1−2b​.

The goal quantifies over every finite ground set and every allowed size vector. At the endpoint b=1/2b=1/2b=1/2, the claimed lower bound is zero; at b=0b=0b=0, it is 1/21/21/2. The denominator remains positive throughout the stated interval. The goal is an existence statement; its witnesses are arbitrary randomized greedy families meeting the definition, so the paper's particular construction is named separately in the supporting definitions (Feldman–Svensson–Zenklusen, Theorem 2.9, p. 14).

Supporting targets

The milestones include the paper's bound 0≤bbig≤b0\le b_{\mathrm{big}}\le b0≤bbig​≤b for bbig=∑e∈Nbigsexeb_{\mathrm{big}}=\sum_{e\in N_{\mathrm{big}}}s_ex_ebbig​=∑e∈Nbig​​se​xe​, the big and small element selectability bounds for the paper's construction, and Proposition 2.8. That proposition says that, for every ground-set size n≥1n\ge1n≥1, some knapsack constraint defeats every deterministic greedy OCRS whenever c>(1−b)n−1c>(1-b)^{n-1}c>(1−b)n−1 for b∈[0,1]b\in[0,1]b∈[0,1] (Feldman–Svensson–Zenklusen, §2.3, pp. 14–15).

Significance

The theorem supplies a concrete selectable OCRS for the natural fractional knapsack relaxation. Its guarantee applies to every element and every fractional point in bPbPbP, under the paper's strongest arrival-order adversary. Proposition 2.8 explains why randomization matters here: a deterministic greedy scheme cannot retain an analogous positive constant independent of the number of elements on every knapsack instance. These results serve as the knapsack component in the paper's broader OCRS framework and can be combined with schemes for other constraints in the paper's later combination result (Feldman–Svensson–Zenklusen, Theorem 1.9).

The mathematical theorem and proposition have proofs in the cited paper. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of their formal statements and of the stated intermediate bounds. The current draft declarations contain proof placeholders; compilation establishes only that their statements and definitions are well formed. A completed development would also leave reusable finite active-set probabilities, greedy-family predicates, and explicit knapsack constructions for later online-rounding work.

Difficulty

A family that contains every feasible subset is not automatically useful for online selection: one active set may contain several subsets whose accepted elements block the tested element. The requirement quantifies over every feasible accepted subset of the realized active set, reflecting the almighty adversary rather than a fixed order. In a knapsack, elements larger than one half behave differently from smaller ones, and a single deterministic family cannot give a ground-set-independent selectability guarantee on all instances. The randomized construction must assign valid probabilities to its two families and obtain the same lower bound in both size regimes (Feldman–Svensson–Zenklusen, Proposition 2.8 and Theorem 2.9).

Formalization scope

The Lean ground set is a finite type, and subsets are Finsets. The polytope is the set of real vectors satisfying both the box inequalities and the unit-capacity inequality. The feasible family uses the same sizes and unit capacity. Active-set and family-choice probabilities are finite sums, with independent Bernoulli factors for R(x)R(x)R(x). The scaling bPbPbP is pointwise set scalar multiplication, so the case b=0b=0b=0 retains its intended meaning. The size assumptions se∈[0,1]s_e\in[0,1]se​∈[0,1] and the ranges of bbb are explicit theorem hypotheses. No nonemptiness assumption is added to the ground set; the statements include the empty case.

The greedy-family definition requires the empty set, making it impossible to satisfy selectability by using an empty family. Every family chosen with positive probability is downward closed and consists of feasible sets. The polytope's box constraints keep every active-set weight a probability. The construction's mixing probability is used exactly on x∈bPx\in bPx∈bP; on other vectors its totalized value chooses the small family, where the paper makes no performance claim. The two branch weights are added if their families coincide, as they can on an empty ground set.

One display on page 15 includes the tested element in a load sum, while the next displayed equality treats that element as excluded. The pointwise supporting item uses the excluded-element form needed for the stated argument; the printed display is preserved in the milestone quotation and the discrepancy is detailed in MODERATION_NOTES.md. Contributions toward either size regime, the finite probability bounds, or the deterministic obstruction are welcome. The finite probability and greedy-family definitions are the parts most directly reusable beyond knapsack.

Selected references

  • Moran Feldman, Ola Svensson, and Rico Zenklusen, Online Contention Resolution Schemes, arXiv:1508.00142v2, 2015, §1.1 and §2.3, pp. 2–4 and 14–15. arXiv.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 1: Every Loopless Matroid Polytope Has a (b, 1−b)-Selectable Deterministic Greedy OCRSResearch Paper

Motivation

In online selection, items reveal information one at a time, and each decision to accept an item is irrevocable. A matroid constraint permits some subsets and excludes others; it covers choices such as selecting linearly independent vectors or acyclic edges. A fractional solution can assign an acceptance probability to each item, but independent activations can produce a set that violates the constraint. An online contention resolution scheme (OCRS) turns these activations into a feasible selection while respecting the order in which items arrive. The matroid result of Feldman, Svensson and Zenklusen gives a guarantee that survives even when an adversary knows all random outcomes before choosing the arrival order.

This mission concerns the paper's matroid theorem, Theorem 2.1. The same paper develops schemes for matching and knapsack constraints and a rule for combining schemes for intersecting constraints. Those results are separate missions in this series. Here the central question is how much of a fractional matroid point can be retained by a deterministic greedy rule as each active item is revealed.

Setting

Let NNN be a finite ground set and let MMM be a matroid on NNN. Its independent subsets form a down-closed family F\mathcal FF: if III is independent, every subset of III is independent. The rank r(S)r(S)r(S) of S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N is the maximum size of an independent subset of SSS. The matroid independence polytope is

PF={x∈R≥0N:x(S):=∑e∈Sxe≤r(S) for all S⊆N}.P_{\mathcal F}=\left\{x\in\mathbb R^N_{\ge0}:x(S):=\sum_{e\in S}x_e\le r(S)\text{ for all }S\subseteq N\right\}.PF​={x∈R≥0N​:x(S):=e∈S∑​xe​≤r(S) for all S⊆N}.

Its points have 0≤xe≤10\le x_e\le10≤xe​≤1. For a point xxx, the active set R(x)R(x)R(x) contains each eee independently with probability xex_exe​. A deterministic greedy OCRS assigns a down-closed family Fx⊆F\mathcal F_x\subseteq\mathcal FFx​⊆F to xxx and accepts an active element when adding it to the already accepted set stays in Fx\mathcal F_xFx​. The empty set belongs to every Fx\mathcal F_xFx​. The rule depends on xxx before the active set and arrival order are revealed.

An element eee is selectable for an active set AAA if I∪{e}∈FxI\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal F_xI∪{e}∈Fx​ for every I⊆AI\subseteq AI⊆A with I∈FxI\in\mathcal F_xI∈Fx​. A greedy OCRS is (b,c)(b,c)(b,c)-selectable if this event has probability at least ccc for every x∈bPFx\in bP_{\mathcal F}x∈bPF​ and every e∈Ne\in Ne∈N. The event implies that eee can be added regardless of which eligible active elements arrived first. These definitions are from §1.1 of the paper.

Formalization targets

Matroid OCRS

For every b∈[0,1]b\in[0,1]b∈[0,1] and every finite loopless matroid MMM, the target is a deterministic greedy OCRS with

Pr⁡[I∪{e}∈Fx for all I⊆R(x), I∈Fx]≥1−bfor every x∈bPF, e∈N.\Pr\left[I\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal F_x\text{ for all }I\subseteq R(x),\ I\in\mathcal F_x\right]\ge 1-b \quad\text{for every }x\in bP_{\mathcal F},\ e\in N.Pr[I∪{e}∈Fx​ for all I⊆R(x), I∈Fx​]≥1−bfor every x∈bPF​, e∈N.

The loopless condition is a disclosed correction to the printed Theorem 2.1: a loop cannot belong to any independent singleton, so its selectability is zero. The printed bound would demand positive selectability for that loop whenever b<1b<1b<1. The theorem keeps the paper's constant 1−b1-b1−b exactly.

Supporting targets

The milestones reproduce six statements from §2.1–2.1.1, in attack order: validity of a family defined by a chain ∅=Nℓ⊊⋯⊊N0=N\varnothing=N_\ell\subsetneq\cdots\subsetneq N_0=N∅=Nℓ​⊊⋯⊊N0​=N of matroid minors (independence of the union of layer-wise independent sets is Soto, Theorem 5.1); a characterization of selectability through span in one layer; monotonicity of the first chain set as coordinates of xxx increase; the description of the base polytope PB={x∈PF:x(N)=r(N)}P_{\mathcal B}=\{x\in P_{\mathcal F}:x(N)=r(N)\}PB​={x∈PF​:x(N)=r(N)} as the set of maximal vectors of PFP_{\mathcal F}PF​; the weighted span bound of Lemma 2.4,

∑e∈NxePr⁡[e∈span⁡(R(x)∪S)]≤b⋅(x(N)+(1−b) r(S)),\sum_{e\in N}x_e\Pr[e\in\operatorname{span}(R(x)\cup S)]\le b\cdot\bigl(x(N)+(1-b)\,r(S)\bigr),e∈N∑​xe​Pr[e∈span(R(x)∪S)]≤b⋅(x(N)+(1−b)r(S)),

strict when S≠∅S\neq\varnothingS=∅; and the proper-inclusion conclusion S⊊NS\subsetneq NS⊊N of Corollary 2.5. They expose the distinct matroid and probability claims on which the main theorem rests.

Significance

The theorem gives a fixed greedy family for each fractional point, with a per-element probability guarantee that is independent of the arrival order. Offline contention resolution schemes for matroids were introduced by Chekuri, Vondrák and Zenklusen; the online, almighty-adversary version here is stronger. A solver can use that guarantee as the matroid component in larger online selection problems. In the source paper it feeds the intersection and application results; those applications require further models and statements beyond this mission. The factor 1−b1-b1−b makes the tradeoff explicit: using a more heavily scaled fractional point raises the risk of contention.

The result is proved in the cited paper. This mission asks for a machine-checked Lean proof of its corrected statement and the source's supporting claims. A successful development would add reusable finite representations of independent activation, matroid polytope inequalities, span probabilities, and chain families. It would also make the loop boundary explicit, preventing a formally false version of the printed theorem from being published as a target.

Difficulty

Independent activation does not itself respect matroid independence. A greedy family that simply contains every independent set can make an element unavailable after earlier active elements are accepted, and the arrival order can expose the worst such history. The central issue is therefore a uniform selectability event: the same element must remain addable after every feasible subset of the active set. The paper measures that obstruction through spans in successive matroid minors. The first chain set must be proper so that the construction can continue, which is why the strict part of the weighted span inequality matters.

Formalization scope

The ground set is a finite Lean type, subsets are Finsets, and Mathlib's Matroid supplies independence, closure, contraction and restriction. Matroid rank is converted from Mathlib's extended natural rank to a real number; finiteness makes this conversion finite on every subset. The independence and base polytopes are defined by the paper's inequalities. The scalar multiple bPbPbP is pointwise set scalar multiplication, including b=0b=0b=0.

Probabilities are finite sums of product weights over all active sets. In particular, the event in Lemma 2.4 uses span⁡(R(x)∪S)\operatorname{span}(R(x)\cup S)span(R(x)∪S), whereas the recurrence defining SSS uses span⁡((R(x)∪Si)∖{e})\operatorname{span}((R(x)\cup S_i)\setminus\{e\})span((R(x)∪Si​)∖{e}). These are separate definitions. Every point used for activation lies in [0,1]N[0,1]^N[0,1]N, as enforced by the polytope and b∈[0,1]b\in[0,1]b∈[0,1]. The base-polytope condition on Corollary 2.5 is the standing assumption stated before the lemma in the source.

The loopless condition applies to the goal, to Corollary 2.5, and to the strict clause of Lemma 2.4 only; its non-strict clause, the chain statements and the monotonicity statement hold for every matroid and are stated without it. Three trivializing formalizations are ruled out: every greedy family must contain the empty set, so an empty family cannot satisfy selectability vacuously; every member of a greedy family must be independent in MMM, so Fx=2N\mathcal F_x=2^NFx​=2N is not admissible; and every point used for activation lies in [0,1]N[0,1]^N[0,1]N, so Pr⁡[R(x)=A]\Pr[R(x)=A]Pr[R(x)=A] is a genuine probability. The quantified scheme depends only on xxx, and its success condition ranges over every feasible subset of the realized active set. Contributions that establish the chain family's independence, finite probability identities, and rank or closure facts are within scope. Polynomial-time implementation and the Monte Carlo estimates of Lemma 2.6 are outside this mission's mathematical target.

Selected references

  • Moran Feldman, Ola Svensson and Rico Zenklusen, Online Contention Resolution Schemes, arXiv:1508.00142v2, 2015; published as Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2021. Preprint.
  • Chandra Chekuri, Jan Vondrák and Rico Zenklusen, Submodular Function Maximization via the Multilinear Relaxation and Contention Resolution Schemes, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2014. arXiv:1105.4593.
  • José A. Soto, Matroid Secretary Problem in the Random-Assignment Model, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2013. arXiv:1007.2140.
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Cost Flows in Graphs with Unit Capacities: When the Second Phase of a Cost Scale Starts, at Most 3λ Excess Is Left for λ = √m and 36λ for λ = n^(2/3)Research Paper

Motivation

Minimum-cost flow is a standard model for routing a quantity through a network while paying a cost on each arc. Unit capacities arise when each input arc can carry at most one unit; they include flow formulations of several matching and assignment problems. Goldberg, Kaplan, Hed and Tarjan analyze a cost-scaling algorithm for this setting. Their second-phase argument depends on a bound on the excess left in a pseudoflow when every excess vertex has undergone enough potential increases. This mission formalizes that bound, Lemma 5 of their STACS 2015 paper. The published paper gives an O(min⁡{m1/2,n2/3} mlog⁡(nC))O(\min\{m^{1/2},n^{2/3}\}\,m\log(nC))O(min{m1/2,n2/3}mlog(nC)) running-time bound for its unit-capacity algorithm; the running-time statement itself is outside this mission.

Setting

A network has a finite vertex set VVV and an arc set EEE that contains both orientations of each input arc. Write n=∣V∣n=|V|n=∣V∣. Every input arc has capacity one; its reverse has capacity zero and opposite cost. Write mmm for the number of input arcs, so ∣E∣=2m|E|=2m∣E∣=2m. The paper assumes no parallel or antiparallel input arcs, allowing an arc to be identified by its ordered endpoints. Costs are antisymmetric between orientations.

A pseudoflow fff assigns an antisymmetric quantity to each arc and respects its capacity. Its excess at vvv is the sum ef(v)e_f(v)ef​(v) of incoming flow. Positive excess means that vvv has flow to discharge; negative excess is a deficit. A circulation is a pseudoflow with zero excess at every vertex. An arc is residual for fff when its residual capacity uf(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w)u_f(v,w)=u(v,w)-f(v,w)uf​(v,w)=u(v,w)−f(v,w) is positive. For vertex prices ppp, its reduced cost is cp(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w)c_p(v,w)=c(v,w)-p(v)+p(w)cp​(v,w)=c(v,w)−p(v)+p(w). A pseudoflow is ε\varepsilonε-optimal at ppp when every residual arc has reduced cost at least −ε-\varepsilon−ε. These are the paper's conventions on p. 408.

At the start of a cost scale, let f′f'f′ be a circulation that is 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimal at prices p′p'p′. During the scale, fff is a pseudoflow that is ε\varepsilonε-optimal at prices ppp. The potential increase in scale units is d(v)=(p(v)−p′(v))/εd(v)=(p(v)-p'(v))/\varepsilond(v)=(p(v)−p′(v))/ε. Put λ=min⁡{m,n2/3}\lambda=\min\{\sqrt m,n^{2/3}\}λ=min{m​,n2/3}. The second phase begins when every excess vertex has d(v)≥λd(v)\ge\lambdad(v)≥λ; the paper also states that every deficit then has d(v)=0d(v)=0d(v)=0 and that the levels d(v)d(v)d(v) are integral. The remaining excess is X(f)=∑v:ef(v)>0ef(v)X(f)=\sum_{v:e_f(v)>0}e_f(v)X(f)=∑v:ef​(v)>0​ef​(v).

The comparison graph has arcs E+={(v,w)∈E:f′(v,w)>f(v,w)}E^+=\{(v,w)\in E:f'(v,w)>f(v,w)\}E+={(v,w)∈E:f′(v,w)>f(v,w)} and vertices VVV. An excess–deficit cut Y⊆E+Y\subseteq E^+Y⊆E+ meets every path in this graph from an excess vertex to a deficit vertex. Thus a cut is measured among comparison arcs, not among arbitrary arcs of the original network. Lemmas 3 and 4 of the paper establish the level and cut bounds on which the excess estimate rests.

Formalization targets

The goal is Lemma 5 on p. 410, stated with both constants obtained in its proof. Under the cost-scale conditions above, and the divisibility conventions in footnotes 5–6, its two cases are

λ=m⟹X(f)≤3λ,\lambda=\sqrt m\quad\Longrightarrow\quad X(f)\le 3\lambda,λ=m​⟹X(f)≤3λ, λ=n2/3⟹X(f)≤36λ.\lambda=n^{2/3}\quad\Longrightarrow\quad X(f)\le36\lambda.λ=n2/3⟹X(f)≤36λ.

The second case also assumes that six divides the integer λ\lambdaλ; the first uses divisibility by three. The goal keeps the two conclusions separate so that the stronger 3λ3\lambda3λ bound is retained when m\sqrt mm​ determines the scale. Its milestone list follows the paper: Lemma 3 bounds d(v)−d(w)d(v)-d(w)d(v)−d(w) by three on an arc of E+E^+E+; Lemma 4 bounds total excess by a cut; and the proof of Lemma 5 supplies the cut bands and the two size estimates. The bands use the exact three-level and six-level ranges printed on p. 410.

Significance

The result connects a condition on price increases to a numerical bound on the amount of flow still needing discharge. Combined with the paper's time per unit of remaining excess, this is the bound needed for its second-phase running-time estimate. The two regimes show how the same cost-scale state can be controlled by either the number of input arcs or the number of vertices. Without the excess bound, the paper's argument gives no comparable limit on the remaining work at the phase transition.

The paper proves Lemma 5, but this particular unit-capacity excess argument has no matching theorem in the platform catalog checked for this mission. The network, circulation and pseudoflow interfaces are already published as reusable definitions from earlier cost-scaling work. A completed machine-checked development would add the cut argument and band counts to those interfaces. Those facts can also support other analyses that compare an entry circulation with an intermediate pseudoflow; this mission does not claim to formalize the algorithm's entire execution or its running-time model.

Difficulty

The main obstacle is linking local price inequalities to a global bound on excess. A reduced-cost inequality controls a single residual arc, while excess may move through a path and is measured over many vertices. The comparison graph G+G^+G+ is essential: on a residual arc outside E+E^+E+, the level difference used by Lemma 3 is not available. Counting all residual arcs as if they were comparison arcs would therefore not justify the cut bound. There is a separate counting issue: the represented network has both directions of each input arc, so using ∣E∣|E|∣E∣ for mmm changes the constant in the square-root case.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the network by a finite symmetric arc set with real capacities and antisymmetric real costs. A local unit-capacity predicate marks each reverse pair as capacities (1,0)(1,0)(1,0) or (0,1)(0,1)(0,1); mmm counts the capacity-one orientations. Flows are real valued as on p. 408. Integer costs on that page are generalized to real costs because Lemmas 3–5 use only antisymmetry and reduced-cost inequalities. No result here depends on cost integrality.

The formalization takes the cost-scale state as hypotheses: ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, entry circulation and 2ε2\varepsilon2ε-optimality, current ε\varepsilonε-optimality, integral levels, level at least λ\lambdaλ at excess vertices, and zero level at deficits. It takes λ\lambdaλ as a natural number equal to min⁡{m,n2/3}\min\{\sqrt m,n^{2/3}\}min{m​,n2/3} and records the paper's divisibility simplifications. The indexed pigeonhole milestones also require λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 so their index ranges are nonempty; the goal includes the zero-arc boundary without requiring an index. Cuts use reachability after deleting a subset of E+E^+E+, equivalent to meeting every excess-to-deficit path. The proof of Lemma 5 prints “cut in GfG_fGf​”; the formalized claim uses G+G^+G+, the graph for which Lemma 3 gives the required level control and Lemma 4 states its bound.

The definition layer, path-cut lemma and finite counting arguments are the reusable infrastructure. Contributions that establish these exact statements, their necessary elementary flow identities, or a machine-checked goal proof are in scope. Counting mmm with reverse arcs, allowing cuts outside E+E^+E+, using arbitrary real levels in place of integral ones, or replacing both cases by the weaker 36λ36\lambda36λ bound does not express this target.

Selected references

  • A. V. Goldberg, H. Kaplan, S. Hed and R. E. Tarjan, Minimum Cost Flows in Graphs with Unit Capacities, 32nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LIPIcs 30, pp. 406–419, 2015. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2015.406.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case 2: Under Condition (17) the Unique Nash Equilibrium of a Graphon Game Moves by at Most κ‖W − W′‖ When the Graphon ChangesResearch Paper

Motivation

Large network games can be described by a graphon, a measurable kernel that assigns an interaction weight to each pair of players in a continuum. This representation is useful when a finite network is viewed as an approximation to a limiting network. A basic question is whether a small change in interaction weights can cause a large change in equilibrium behavior. Carmona, Cooney, Graves, and Laurière answer this question for a static game with real actions, noisy player states, and costs coupled through an aggregate state. Their static graphon games paper establishes existence and uniqueness under different hypotheses, and Theorem 3.20 gives an explicit stability estimate under its contraction condition.

The mission isolates that stability estimate and the results on which it depends. It belongs to the same development as the paper's existence theorem, but has a narrower question: how sensitively does the equilibrium respond when one graphon is replaced by another? The paper later studies finite-player approximations, for which understanding the limiting graphon game's equilibrium is useful. Those later approximation theorems are outside this mission.

Setting

The player set is I=[0,1]I=[0,1]I=[0,1] with Lebesgue probability measure. Every player chooses a real action. A strategy profile α\alphaα assigns an action α(x)\alpha(x)α(x) to almost every player and belongs to L2(I)L^2(I)L2(I). Profiles that differ only on a null set represent the same strategy.

A graphon is a symmetric, real-valued, measurable, square-integrable function www on I×II\times II×I. It defines an integral operator WWW on L2(I)L^2(I)L2(I) by

[Wg](x)=∫Iw(x,y)g(y) dy.[Wg](x)=\int_I w(x,y)g(y)\,dy.[Wg](x)=∫I​w(x,y)g(y)dy.

Its norm ∥W∥\|W\|∥W∥ is the L2L^2L2-to-L2L^2L2 operator norm. In particular, interaction weights are allowed to be negative and are not restricted to [0,1][0,1][0,1]. A second graphon w′w'w′ has operator W′W'W′, and ∥W−W′∥\|W-W'\|∥W−W′∥ is the operator norm of their difference.

A player's state is Xa,z,ξ=b(a,z)+ξX_{a,z,\xi}=b(a,z)+\xiXa,z,ξ​=b(a,z)+ξ, where aaa is the player's action, zzz is an aggregate state, and ξ\xiξ has a common centered probability law μ0\mu_0μ0​ with finite second moment. Assumption 1 bounds squared changes in bbb by cαc_\alphacα​ times the squared action change plus czc_zcz​ times the squared aggregate change. For a profile α\alphaα, its aggregate ZαZ\alphaZα is the L2L^2L2 solution of

[Zα](x)=∫Iw(x,y)b(α(y),[Zα](y)) dyfor almost every x∈I.[Z\alpha](x)=\int_I w(x,y)b(\alpha(y),[Z\alpha](y))\,dy \quad\text{for almost every }x\in I.[Zα](x)=∫I​w(x,y)b(α(y),[Zα](y))dyfor almost every x∈I.

Proposition 3.1 states that this aggregate exists and is unique when cz∥W∥<1\sqrt{c_z}\|W\|<1cz​​∥W∥<1. This equation is the deterministic aggregate obtained from the paper's continuum model.

The expected cost of action aaa at aggregate zzz is J(a,z)=∫f(b(a,z)+ξ,a,z) μ0(dξ)J(a,z)=\int f(b(a,z)+\xi,a,z)\,\mu_0(d\xi)J(a,z)=∫f(b(a,z)+ξ,a,z)μ0​(dξ). Assumption 4 says that J(⋅,z)J(\cdot,z)J(⋅,z) is continuously differentiable and uniformly ℓc\ell_cℓc​-strongly convex, and its action derivative changes at most ℓJ∣z−z′∣\ell_J|z-z'|ℓJ​∣z−z′∣ when the aggregate changes. The best response BzBzBz minimizes this cost pointwise. A Nash equilibrium is an L2L^2L2 profile α\alphaα whose action minimizes J(⋅,[Zα](x))J(\cdot,[Z\alpha](x))J(⋅,[Zα](x)) for almost every player. Assumption 5 adds the uniform bound ∣b(a,z)∣≤c0|b(a,z)|\leq c_0∣b(a,z)∣≤c0​.

Formalization targets

The first targets are the unique aggregate of Proposition 3.1, the best-response bound of Lemma 3.7, and the L2L^2L2 aggregate bound (15) of Lemma 3.16. Together these support the uniqueness condition in Proposition 3.17:

ℓJℓccα∥W∥1−cz∥W∥<1.(17)\frac{\ell_J}{\ell_c} \frac{\sqrt{c_\alpha}\|W\|}{1-\sqrt{c_z}\|W\|}<1. \tag{17}ℓc​ℓJ​​1−cz​​∥W∥cα​​∥W∥​<1.(17)

Lemma 3.19 then bounds the change of aggregate when the same profile is placed in two graphons. The goal, Theorem 3.20, concerns an equilibrium α\alphaα for www and any equilibrium α′\alpha'α′ for w′w'w′:

∥α−α′∥L2(I)≤κ∥W−W′∥,κ=c0ℓJ(1−cz∥W∥)(1−cz∥W∥)[ℓc(1−cz∥W∥)−ℓJcα∥W∥].\|\alpha-\alpha'\|_{L^2(I)}\leq\kappa\|W-W'\|, \qquad \kappa=\frac{c_0\ell_J(1-\sqrt{c_z}\|W\|)} {(1-\sqrt{c_z}\|W\|) [\ell_c(1-\sqrt{c_z}\|W\|)-\ell_J\sqrt{c_\alpha}\|W\|]}.∥α−α′∥L2(I)​≤κ∥W−W′∥,κ=(1−cz​​∥W∥)[ℓc​(1−cz​​∥W∥)−ℓJ​cα​​∥W∥]c0​ℓJ​(1−cz​​∥W∥)​.

Here www satisfies both cz∥W∥<1\sqrt{c_z}\|W\|<1cz​​∥W∥<1 and (17), while w′w'w′ is required only to satisfy cz∥W′∥<1\sqrt{c_z}\|W'\|<1cz​​∥W′∥<1. The displayed coefficient is the paper's expression, including its common factor.

Significance

The theorem gives a quantitative guarantee: as long as the original game's contraction condition holds, the distance between equilibria is controlled by the operator distance between graphons. The bound identifies how state sensitivity cα,czc_\alpha,c_zcα​,cz​, cost sensitivity ℓJ\ell_JℓJ​, strong convexity ℓc\ell_cℓc​, and the state bound c0c_0c0​ enter that guarantee. The result also separates two questions: whether an equilibrium exists for a changed graphon, and how far any such equilibrium can lie from the original one.

The mathematical theorem is proved in the paper; the Lean goal is open. A complete formal development would establish the L2L^2L2 integral-operator estimates, the aggregate and best-response regularity results, the unique equilibrium under (17), and finally the stability inequality. The definitions of real-valued graphons, aggregates, and their extended-valued operator norm can support later work on graphon games beyond this particular estimate. The paper's §4 finite-player results, including Theorems 4.3, 4.7, and 4.9, are not posed here.

Difficulty

An equilibrium is a fixed point of a response to an aggregate, so changing the graphon changes both the aggregate and the equilibrium profile. A direct comparison of costs at two equilibria does not by itself separate these effects or yield the printed constant. The aggregate is defined only as an L2L^2L2 equivalence class, while its equation and pointwise best responses use representatives. The formalization must keep those almost-everywhere statements aligned with the operator norm estimate. It must also retain the paper's asymmetric hypotheses: (17) is assumed for the original graphon, while the second graphon is allowed to have any Nash equilibrium under its own aggregate condition.

Formalization scope

Lean uses unitInterval with its volume measure for III, real actions, functions with MemLp for L2L^2L2 profiles, and almost-everywhere equality for profiles and aggregates. IsGraphon includes measurability, symmetry, and square integrability. IsAggregate records equation (6) and membership in L2L^2L2. The integral cost is computed from bbb, fff, and μ0\mu_0μ0​ rather than supplied as an unrelated function. Assumptions 1, 4, and 5 are explicit; the centered noise law is part of the standing model. Lemma 3.7 is stated for an arbitrary cost satisfying Assumption 4, as on the page.

The paper defines equilibrium through a best-response map on a rich Fubini extension. Proposition 3.6 identifies that with the almost-everywhere pointwise minimization condition under Assumption 4. The mission uses that equivalent condition as its equilibrium predicate. This is a disclosed model choice because the Fubini extension itself is not formalized. A best response is selected by classical choice; Assumption 4 gives the minimizer that makes the selection meaningful.

Norm inequalities use extended nonnegative reals. For a square-integrable graphon, its operator norm is finite, and real hypotheses use that finite value. The operator norm is never a real supremum with a default value for unbounded inputs; an equilibrium always includes an aggregate; and an infinite left-side norm is never converted to zero. These choices prevent the stability claim from becoming empty at a bad input. Contributions to the integral-operator infrastructure, the existence and uniqueness of aggregates, and the five named milestones are all within scope.

Selected references

  • René Carmona, Daniel B. Cooney, Christy V. Graves, and Mathieu Laurière, Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case, arXiv:1911.10664v1, 2019; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. arXiv
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