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Operations Research

2,232 missions · 1,108 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Personalized Dynamic Pricing with Machine Learning: High-Dimensional Features and Heterogeneous Elasticity 2: Under Unknown Sparsity, Lasso-Based ILQX Pricing Has Regret at Most Cs√T(log d + log T)Research Paper

Motivation

Online sellers of loans, insurance, travel and retail goods observe data about each arriving customer before quoting a price. Using that data to price individually is attractive only if the seller can learn, from its own sales, how demand responds to price for customers with given characteristics. Two features make this hard in practice. The number of recorded characteristics ddd is often large, possibly larger than the selling horizon TTT, while only a few of them matter. And price sensitivity is itself heterogeneous: different customers respond to the same price change differently.

Ban and Keskin (Management Science 67(9), 2021) model both features and ask how fast the revenue lost to learning can grow. Their answer is that a seller who learns with lasso-regularized quasi-likelihood estimation and occasional price experiments loses revenue of order sTs\sqrt TsT​ up to logarithmic factors, where sss is the number of relevant characteristics, and that no policy can do better than order sTs\sqrt TsT​. This mission formalizes the upper bound for the general (nonlinear-link) model with unknown sparsity, Theorem 3 of the paper.

Setting

In each period t=1,2,…,Tt = 1, 2, \dots, Tt=1,2,…,T a customer arrives with a raw feature vector Zt∈RdZ_t \in \mathbb R^dZt​∈Rd. The ZtZ_tZt​ are i.i.d., take values in a compact set Z\mathcal ZZ inside a ball of radius zmax⁡z_{\max}zmax​, have mean zero and positive definite covariance ΣZ\Sigma_ZΣZ​. The seller sees the augmented vector Xt=[1;Zt]∈Rd+1X_t = [1; Z_t] \in \mathbb R^{d+1}Xt​=[1;Zt​]∈Rd+1, charges a price pt∈[ℓ,u]p_t \in [\ell, u]pt​∈[ℓ,u] with 0<ℓ<u0 < \ell < u0<ℓ<u, and observes the demand

Dt=g(α⋅Xt+(β⋅Xt) pt)+εt.D_t = g\big(\alpha \cdot X_t + (\beta \cdot X_t)\, p_t\big) + \varepsilon_t .Dt​=g(α⋅Xt​+(β⋅Xt​)pt​)+εt​.

Here θ=(α,β)\theta = (\alpha, \beta)θ=(α,β) is an unknown parameter in a compact rectangle Θ⊂R2(d+1)\Theta \subset \mathbb R^{2(d+1)}Θ⊂R2(d+1), the link ggg is known, differentiable and increasing with ℓ~≤g′≤u~\tilde\ell \le g' \le \tilde uℓ~≤g′≤u~ on the relevant domain, and the demand shocks εt\varepsilon_tεt​ form a sub-Gaussian martingale difference sequence. The term β⋅Xt\beta \cdot X_tβ⋅Xt​ is the customer's own price sensitivity. With u(p,x)=[1;p]⊗xu(p, x) = [1; p] \otimes xu(p,x)=[1;p]⊗x the argument of ggg is θ⋅u(p,x)\theta \cdot u(p, x)θ⋅u(p,x).

The sparsity of θ\thetaθ is s=∣S∣s = |\mathcal S|s=∣S∣, S={i:αi≠0}∪{i:βi≠0}\mathcal S = \{i : \alpha_i \neq 0\} \cup \{i : \beta_i \neq 0\}S={i:αi​=0}∪{i:βi​=0}. The seller does not know S\mathcal SS.

The expected revenue of price ppp is r(p,θ,x)=p g(θ⋅u(p,x))r(p, \theta, x) = p\, g(\theta \cdot u(p,x))r(p,θ,x)=pg(θ⋅u(p,x)), and the clairvoyant price φ(θ,x)\varphi(\theta, x)φ(θ,x) maximizes it; it is assumed to lie in the interior of [ℓ,u][\ell, u][ℓ,u] for θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ, x∈X={1}×Zx \in \mathcal X = \{1\} \times \mathcal Zx∈X={1}×Z. The regret of a policy over TTT periods is

Δθπ(T)=E[∑t=1Tr∗(θ,Xt)−r(pt,θ,Xt)],r∗(θ,x)=r(φ(θ,x),θ,x).\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = \mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T r^*(\theta, X_t) - r(p_t, \theta, X_t)\Big], \qquad r^*(\theta,x) = r(\varphi(\theta,x),\theta,x).Δθπ​(T)=E[t=1∑T​r∗(θ,Xt​)−r(pt​,θ,Xt​)],r∗(θ,x)=r(φ(θ,x),θ,x).

The policy ILQX(m1,m2,λ)(m_1, m_2, \lambda)(m1​,m2​,λ) charges the experimental price m1m_1m1​ in periods M1={1,4,9,… }M_1 = \{1, 4, 9, \dots\}M1​={1,4,9,…} and m2m_2m2​ in periods M2={2,5,10,… }M_2 = \{2, 5, 10, \dots\}M2​={2,5,10,…}, and otherwise charges φ(PΘθ^t,Xt)\varphi(\mathcal P_\Theta \hat\theta_t, X_t)φ(PΘ​θ^t​,Xt​), where θ^t\hat\theta_tθ^t​ maximizes the lasso-penalized quasi-likelihood

Qt−1(θ~,λt)=∑k=1t−1χk∫Dkg(θ~⋅uk)Dk−yg′(g−1(y)) dy−λt∥θ~∥1Q_{t-1}(\tilde\theta, \lambda_t) = \sum_{k=1}^{t-1} \chi_k \int_{D_k}^{g(\tilde\theta \cdot u_k)} \frac{D_k - y}{g'(g^{-1}(y))}\, dy - \lambda_t \|\tilde\theta\|_1Qt−1​(θ~,λt​)=k=1∑t−1​χk​∫Dk​g(θ~⋅uk​)​g′(g−1(y))Dk​−y​dy−λt​∥θ~∥1​

over the experimental periods (χk=I{k∈M1∪M2}\chi_k = \mathbb I\{k \in M_1 \cup M_2\}χk​=I{k∈M1​∪M2​}), and PΘ\mathcal P_\ThetaPΘ​ is the projection onto Θ\ThetaΘ. The regularization level is λt+1=c~ t1/4log⁡d+log⁡t\lambda_{t+1} = \tilde c\, t^{1/4} \sqrt{\log d + \log t}λt+1​=c~t1/4logd+logt​ for a constant c~>0\tilde c > 0c~>0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

There is a finite constant C~>0\tilde C > 0C~>0 such that

Δθπ(T)≤C~ sT (log⁡d+log⁡T)for all θ∈Θ, T≥2.\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) \le \tilde C\, s \sqrt T\, (\log d + \log T) \qquad \text{for all } \theta \in \Theta,\ T \ge 2 .Δθπ​(T)≤C~sT​(logd+logT)for all θ∈Θ, T≥2.

C~\tilde CC~ is fixed with the model and is uniform over Θ\ThetaΘ; since s=s(θ)s = s(\theta)s=s(θ) varies over Θ\ThetaΘ, the factor sss carries content.

Milestones

  1. The counting property of the schedule (7): for t≥5t \ge 5t≥5 each experimental price is charged at least 14t\tfrac14 \sqrt t41​t​ times in periods 1,…,t1, \dots, t1,…,t.
  2. Lemma 3, the estimation error of the lasso quasi-likelihood estimate:
P{∥θ^t+1(lasso)(λt+1)−θ∥2≤ρ3s(log⁡d+log⁡t)t}≥1−κ3s(log⁡d+log⁡t)t,t≥t1.\mathbb P\Big\{\|\hat\theta^{(\mathrm{lasso})}_{t+1}(\lambda_{t+1}) - \theta\|^2 \le \rho_3 \frac{s(\log d + \log t)}{\sqrt t}\Big\} \ge 1 - \kappa_3 \frac{s(\log d + \log t)}{\sqrt t}, \qquad t \ge t_1 .P{∥θ^t+1(lasso)​(λt+1​)−θ∥2≤ρ3​t​s(logd+logt)​}≥1−κ3​t​s(logd+logt)​,t≥t1​.

Significance

Theorem 3 says that a seller facing many potentially relevant customer characteristics, without knowing which matter and under a nonlinear demand link such as logit, loses revenue at a rate governed by the number sss of relevant characteristics and only logarithmically by the total number ddd. Combined with the paper's sTs\sqrt TsT​ lower bound (Theorem 1, for the linear model), it makes ILQX first-order optimal up to logarithmic factors. An unregularized policy would pay order dTd\sqrt TdT​, which is linear in TTT when ddd exceeds T\sqrt TT​.

The paper's proofs are in its electronic companion, which this mission does not reproduce; no machine-checked version of the result exists. A complete formalization would also produce a reusable high-probability error bound for lasso-regularized quasi-likelihood estimation under adaptively collected data (Lemma 3), and a machine-checked model of feature-based dynamic pricing on which related policies can be stated.

Difficulty

The estimation error must be controlled on data collected by the policy itself. The design vectors uk=[1;mi(k)]⊗Xku_k = [1; m_{i(k)}] \otimes X_kuk​=[1;mi(k)​]⊗Xk​ use only two prices, so the information about the price sensitivity accrues only from the Θ(t)\Theta(\sqrt t)Θ(t​) experimental periods. Standard lasso error bounds assume a fixed or i.i.d. design and a restricted-eigenvalue condition on it; here a restricted-eigenvalue-type property of the random Kronecker design must be derived from ΣZ≻0\Sigma_Z \succ 0ΣZ​≻0 and m1≠m2m_1 \ne m_2m1​=m2​, and the noise enters through a martingale whose conditional law may depend on past prices. The quasi-likelihood is not a least-squares objective, so the curvature comes from the bounds ℓ~≤g′≤u~\tilde\ell \le g' \le \tilde uℓ~≤g′≤u~, which hold only on the bounded domain {θ⋅u(p,x):θ∈Θ}\{\theta \cdot u(p,x) : \theta \in \Theta\}{θ⋅u(p,x):θ∈Θ} and not at an unconstrained estimate. Finally, the regret bound has to turn a squared-error bound holding with probability 1−O(slog⁡(dt)/t)1 - O(s \log(dt)/\sqrt t)1−O(slog(dt)/t​) into an expected revenue loss, which requires the revenue loss to be second order in the parameter error at an interior optimum.

Formalization scope

  • Coordinates. x∈Rd+1x \in \mathbb R^{d+1}x∈Rd+1 is Fin (d+1) → ℝ with the intercept at index 0; θ\thetaθ is Fin 2 × Fin (d+1) → ℝ with θ(0,i)=αi\theta(0,i) = \alpha_iθ(0,i)=αi​, θ(1,i)=βi\theta(1,i) = \beta_iθ(1,i)=βi​. Periods are 1-based. d≥1d \ge 1d≥1.
  • Objective. The integrated form ∑kχk(Dk (θ~⋅uk)−∫0θ~⋅ukg)−λ∥θ~∥1\sum_k \chi_k \big(D_k\,(\tilde\theta \cdot u_k) - \int_0^{\tilde\theta \cdot u_k} g\big) - \lambda \|\tilde\theta\|_1∑k​χk​(Dk​(θ~⋅uk​)−∫0θ~⋅uk​​g)−λ∥θ~∥1​, which differs from the paper's (17) by a term not depending on θ~\tilde\thetaθ~ and therefore has the same maximizers.
  • Estimator. Any measurable selection that is a maximizer whenever one exists; the theorems hold for every such selection. The paper's claim that (17) is strictly concave with a unique maximizer fails when 2(d+1)2(d+1)2(d+1) exceeds the rank of the design.
  • Policy. The price is defined by strong recursion over the realized history; the estimator sees θ\thetaθ only through the realized demands.
  • Regret is a lower Lebesgue integral of nonnegative losses; conditional moments of the shocks use the conditional Lebesgue expectation; probabilities are compared in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞].
  • Standing assumptions formalized: i.i.d. measurable features in a compact Z\mathcal ZZ inside a Euclidean ball, mean zero, positive definite ΣZ\Sigma_ZΣZ​; fresh customers (Zt+1Z_{t+1}Zt+1​ independent of the past); sub-Gaussian martingale-difference shocks; m1≠m2m_1 \ne m_2m1​=m2​ in [ℓ,u][\ell, u][ℓ,u]; ggg differentiable and increasing with derivative bounds on the relevant domain (endnote 2 states them as a consequence, which is false; here they are a hypothesis); φ\varphiφ an unconstrained revenue maximizer in (ℓ,u)(\ell, u)(ℓ,u) whose pricing map after projection and feature augmentation is measurable. The processes are constrained only at the used periods t≥1t\ge1t≥1.
  • Added hypotheses, per θ\thetaθ: s(θ)≥1s(\theta) \ge 1s(θ)≥1 (the paper's s∈{1,…,d+1}s \in \{1, \dots, d+1\}s∈{1,…,d+1}), and almost surely every realized demand lies in the closure of the range of ggg, which guarantees that a maximizer of (17) exists (true for the linear link and for binary demand under a logit link).
  • Not formalized: the paper's support condition on continuous features; Remark 7's independence of C~\tilde CC~ from ddd; dependence of the shock law on θ\thetaθ (the shocks are one fixed process).
  • Ruled-out trivializations. The regret cannot vanish by non-integrability; the estimator cannot be an arbitrary function, since it must maximize the objective; C~\tilde CC~ and κ3,ρ3,t1\kappa_3, \rho_3, t_1κ3​,ρ3​,t1​ are chosen before θ\thetaθ, so they cannot absorb sss; the hypotheses are jointly satisfiable (a linear-link instance with d=1d = 1d=1 is checked).

Contributions welcome: existence of a measurable maximizer of the objective, the counting lemma, and supporting lemmas for Lemma 3 and the regret bound.

Selected references

  • G.-Y. Ban and N. B. Keskin, Personalized Dynamic Pricing with Machine Learning: High-Dimensional Features and Heterogeneous Elasticity, Management Science 67(9):5549–5568, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3680
  • A. V. den Boer and B. Zwart, Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing, Management Science 60(3):770–783, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1788
  • N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • A. Javanmard and H. Nazerzadeh, Dynamic Pricing in High-Dimensions, Journal of Machine Learning Research 20(9):1–49, 2019. https://jmlr.org/papers/v20/17-357.html
6 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Partially Observable Total-Cost Markov Decision Processes with Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities 2: Setwise-Continuous Observations Do Not Make the Belief Transition Weakly ContinuousResearch Paper

Motivation

A partially observable Markov decision process describes a controlled system whose state is hidden but whose observations are available to a decision maker. The distribution of the hidden state conditional on the observations is the belief state. Replacing the hidden state by this distribution turns the model into a fully observed decision process, provided the resulting belief transition has the regularity needed by the usual existence and dynamic programming results. Feinberg, Kasyanov, and Zgurovsky give sufficient conditions for that regularity in their study of total-cost POMDPs, Theorems 3.6 and 3.7.

Their observation-kernel condition is continuity in total variation. Example 4.1 of the same paper tests its sharpness: the authors construct a two-state model with setwise-continuous observations for which the belief transition fails to be weakly continuous. This matters when selecting assumptions for a POMDP theorem. Setwise convergence already requires convergence of the probabilities of every fixed observation event, so it can look adequate for belief updates. The example shows that it is still too weak for the stated conclusion.

Setting

The hidden state space is X={1,2}X=\{1,2\}X={1,2} and the observation space is Y=[0,1]Y=[0,1]Y=[0,1] with Lebesgue probability measure mmm. The action space is A={0}∪{1/n:n=1,2,…}A=\{0\}\cup\{1/n:n=1,2,\ldots\}A={0}∪{1/n:n=1,2,…}, equipped with the topology inherited from R\mathbb RR. The state does not move: its transition law P(⋅∣x,a)P(\cdot\mid x,a)P(⋅∣x,a) is the point mass at xxx for every action. Its continuity in total variation is immediate from this fixed-state behavior.

At hidden state 1 the observation law is always mmm. At hidden state 2, action zero also produces mmm. Under action 1/n1/n1/n, state 2 produces a law m(n)=f(n)mm^{(n)}=f^{(n)}mm(n)=f(n)m. The density f(n)f^{(n)}f(n) equals zero on the open left half of each cell in the 2n2^n2n-part dyadic partition and equals two elsewhere, including the cell endpoints. Equation (4.1) gives the exact intervals. These laws oscillate more rapidly as nnn grows, and the paper establishes m(n)(C)→m(C)m^{(n)}(C)\to m(C)m(n)(C)→m(C) for every fixed Borel set CCC. Thus the observation kernel Q(⋅∣a,x)Q(\cdot\mid a,x)Q(⋅∣a,x) is setwise continuous even at the accumulation action zero. Example 4.1, pp. 13–14.

A belief z∈P(X)z\in\mathcal P(X)z∈P(X) assigns a probability to each hidden state. For a current belief zzz and an action aaa, the joint law R(⋅∣z,a)R(\cdot\mid z,a)R(⋅∣z,a) covers the next state and its observation, and R′(⋅∣z,a)R'(\cdot\mid z,a)R′(⋅∣z,a) is the observation marginal. A filter H(z,a,y)H(z,a,y)H(z,a,y) is a conditional law of the next state given observation yyy: it satisfies the disintegration identity (3.3). The belief transition qH(⋅∣z,a)q_H(\cdot\mid z,a)qH​(⋅∣z,a) is the law of the random posterior H(z,a,y)H(z,a,y)H(z,a,y) when yyy has law R′(⋅∣z,a)R'(\cdot\mid z,a)R′(⋅∣z,a). These objects are defined in (3.1)–(3.5) of the paper. Different versions of HHH agree only almost everywhere for each current belief and action, yet they yield the same belief transition.

Formalization targets

Example 4.1: failure of weak belief continuity

At the uniform belief z=(1/2,1/2)z=(1/2,1/2)z=(1/2,1/2), action zero reveals nothing, while every positive-index action produces the same two-point posterior law:

qH(⋅∣z,0)=δz,qH(⋅∣z,1/n)=34δ(1/3,2/3)+14δ(1,0)(n≥1).q_H(\cdot\mid z,0)=\delta_z,\qquad q_H(\cdot\mid z,1/n)=\tfrac34\delta_{(1/3,2/3)}+\tfrac14\delta_{(1,0)} \quad(n\ge1).qH​(⋅∣z,0)=δz​,qH​(⋅∣z,1/n)=43​δ(1/3,2/3)​+41​δ(1,0)​(n≥1).

The mission's goal asserts that PPP is total-variation continuous, QQQ is a setwise-continuous probability kernel, a valid filter exists, and the positive-index laws fail to converge weakly to the zero-action law as 1/n→01/n\to01/n→0. It states the failure for every filter satisfying (3.3), so it is a property of the POMDP rather than of a selected version of its conditional distribution. The milestone list follows the paper's assertions: setwise convergence of the dyadic laws, setwise continuity of QQQ, the two posterior values almost everywhere, and the explicit laws of qHq_HqH​.

Significance

The example identifies a precise boundary of the sufficient condition in Theorems 3.6 and 3.7. Those theorems use total-variation continuity of the observation law to obtain a weakly continuous belief transition; replacing that premise by setwise continuity makes their continuity conclusion false in this model. The explicit law also shows the size of the discrepancy: the positive-index belief transition has two fixed atoms, while the zero-action transition is concentrated at the original belief. Example 4.1, pp. 13–14.

A machine-checked development would add reusable definitions of sequential kernel continuity, the joint state-observation law, conditional filters, and the belief transition on the Borel space of probability measures. It would also formalize a concrete setwise-convergent sequence of densities whose induced posterior laws do not converge weakly. The paper proves the example; the Lean statements in this proposal are open proof targets, with no completed machine-checked proof claimed here.

Difficulty

Setwise continuity controls Q(C∣a,x)Q(C\mid a,x)Q(C∣a,x) for each fixed Borel set CCC. A posterior is a probability measure determined by the observation, and the belief transition tests the distribution of those posterior measures. The observation regions distinguishing the states change with nnn, so convergence on fixed observation sets does not imply convergence of their posterior distributions. This is the gap in the immediate argument that tries to pass from setwise convergence of QQQ to weak convergence of qHq_HqH​.

The conditional filter adds a second precision issue. Equation (3.3) determines its values only almost surely under the observation marginal, and different versions may disagree on null observations. Any claim about a posterior value at every yyy would exceed the source; the posterior milestone therefore has an almost-everywhere qualifier, while the goal quantifies over every valid version of HHH.

Formalization scope

Lean represents XXX by Fin 2, with 0 for the paper's state 1 and 1 for state 2; YYY by unitInterval; and AAA by the specified subtype of R\mathbb RR. Positive integers are a subtype of N\mathbb NN, so the density and the action 1/n1/n1/n are never evaluated at n=0n=0n=0. The measure mmm is volume on unitInterval, which has total mass one. The density follows (4.1) literally, with open zero intervals and density two at their endpoints. The general transition PPP and observation law QQQ use Mathlib kernels; the example instantiates them directly. The goal includes the probability-kernel property of the concrete QQQ and existence of a valid HHH, guarding the universal filter clause against vacuity.

Weak, setwise, and total-variation convergence are sequential, as on page 4. The weak test class consists of bounded continuous real functions; the setwise test class consists of all Borel sets. The target space of qHq_HqH​ carries the Borel σ-algebra of the weak topology on P(X)\mathcal P(X)P(X), stated explicitly because Mathlib's default measurable structure on that type is the Giry σ-algebra. The filter predicate requires measurability in yyy for fixed (z,a)(z,a)(z,a) in both structures. Joint measurability in (z,a,y)(z,a,y)(z,a,y) is described in the paper but is not encoded in this local predicate; only the fixed-parameter property is used by (3.3) and (3.5). This choice and its quantifier effect are recorded in the moderation notes.

No cost, initial observation kernel, initial prior, or discount factor enters Example 4.1. Contributions on the dyadic law, kernel continuity, conditional posterior values, and the resulting belief-law identity are all within scope. A filter hard-coded to return the prior belief, a discrete topology on AAA, or a claim for only one version of HHH would change the counterexample and is excluded by the definitions and goal.

Selected references

  • E. A. Feinberg, P. O. Kasyanov, and M. Z. Zgurovsky, Partially Observable Total-Cost Markov Decision Processes with Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities, Mathematics of Operations Research 41(2), 2016; arXiv:1401.2168v2. This mission follows the pinned preprint's numbering and pages.
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Partially Observable Total-Cost Markov Decision Processes with Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities 1: The Belief MDP Satisfies Assumption (W*) Under Total-Variation-Continuous ObservationsResearch Paper

Motivation

A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) models a controller that cannot see the state of the system it steers, only noisy observations of it. Inventory control with unrecorded demand, machine maintenance with imperfect inspection, and target tracking from sensor readings all have this form. The standard way to solve a POMDP is to replace it by its belief MDP, also called the completely observable MDP (COMDP): the state becomes the posterior distribution of the hidden state given everything observed so far. The belief MDP is fully observed, so the theory of Markov decision processes applies to it, but only if the belief MDP satisfies that theory's hypotheses. For MDPs with Borel state and action spaces, unbounded costs and possibly noncompact action sets, the hypothesis that yields optimality equations, convergence of value iterations and stationary optimal policies is Assumption (W*) of Feinberg, Kasyanov and Zadoianchuk (Math. Oper. Res. 2012): the cost is K\mathbb KK-inf-compact and the transition probability is weakly continuous.

Before Feinberg, Kasyanov and Zgurovsky (arXiv:1401.2168v2, published in Math. Oper. Res. 41(2), 2016), sufficient conditions for the belief MDP to be weakly continuous required a weakly continuous filter (Hernández-Lerma, 1989, as recalled on p. 11 of arXiv:1401.2168v2), a condition that fails in many natural models. The paper replaces it by a condition on the primitive data of the POMDP.

Setting

Let X\mathbb XX (states), Y\mathbb YY (observations) and A\mathbb AA (actions) be Borel subsets of Polish spaces. Let P(dx′∣x,a)P(dx' \mid x, a)P(dx′∣x,a) be the transition kernel on X\mathbb XX given X×A\mathbb X \times \mathbb AX×A, Q(dy∣a,x)Q(dy \mid a, x)Q(dy∣a,x) the observation kernel on Y\mathbb YY given A×X\mathbb A \times \mathbb XA×X, and c:X×A→R∪{+∞}c : \mathbb X \times \mathbb A \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}c:X×A→R∪{+∞} a Borel one-step cost bounded below. P(X)\mathbb P(\mathbb X)P(X) is the set of probability measures on X\mathbb XX with the topology of weak convergence (∫f dμn→∫f dμ\int f\,d\mu_n \to \int f\,d\mu∫fdμn​→∫fdμ for bounded continuous fff). A sequence μn\mu_nμn​ converges setwise if μn(C)→μ(C)\mu_n(C) \to \mu(C)μn​(C)→μ(C) for every Borel CCC, and in the total variation if sup⁡f∣∫f dμn−∫f dμ∣→0\sup_f |\int f\,d\mu_n - \int f\,d\mu| \to 0supf​∣∫fdμn​−∫fdμ∣→0 over Borel fff with values in [−1,1][-1, 1][−1,1]. A kernel is weakly (setwise, total-variation) continuous if xn→xx_n \to xxn​→x implies the corresponding convergence of the measures.

For a belief z∈P(X)z \in \mathbb P(\mathbb X)z∈P(X) and an action aaa, let R(B×C∣z,a)=∫X∫BQ(C∣a,x′) P(dx′∣x,a) z(dx)R(B \times C \mid z, a) = \int_{\mathbb X} \int_B Q(C \mid a, x')\,P(dx' \mid x, a)\,z(dx)R(B×C∣z,a)=∫X​∫B​Q(C∣a,x′)P(dx′∣x,a)z(dx) be the joint law of the next state and observation (3.1), and R′(C∣z,a)=R(X×C∣z,a)R'(C \mid z, a) = R(\mathbb X \times C \mid z, a)R′(C∣z,a)=R(X×C∣z,a) its observation marginal (3.2). A filter is a kernel H(dx∣z,a,y)H(dx \mid z, a, y)H(dx∣z,a,y) with R(B×C∣z,a)=∫CH(B∣z,a,y) R′(dy∣z,a)R(B \times C \mid z, a) = \int_C H(B \mid z, a, y)\,R'(dy \mid z, a)R(B×C∣z,a)=∫C​H(B∣z,a,y)R′(dy∣z,a) (3.3): H(z,a,y)H(z, a, y)H(z,a,y) is the posterior after observing yyy. The belief MDP has state space P(X)\mathbb P(\mathbb X)P(X), action set A\mathbb AA, cost cˉ(z,a)=∫c(x,a) z(dx)\bar c(z, a) = \int c(x, a)\,z(dx)cˉ(z,a)=∫c(x,a)z(dx) (3.8), and transition q(⋅∣z,a)q(\cdot \mid z, a)q(⋅∣z,a), the law of H(z,a,y)H(z, a, y)H(z,a,y) when y∼R′(⋅∣z,a)y \sim R'(\cdot \mid z, a)y∼R′(⋅∣z,a) (3.5). A cost is K\mathbb KK-inf-compact on S1×S2\mathbb S_1 \times \mathbb S_2S1​×S2​ if its restriction to K×S2K \times \mathbb S_2K×S2​ has compact level sets for every compact K⊆S1K \subseteq \mathbb S_1K⊆S1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.6

If either Assumption (D) (0≤α<10 \le \alpha < 10≤α<1) or Assumption (P) (c≥0c \ge 0c≥0 and 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1) holds, ccc is bounded below and K\mathbb KK-inf-compact on X×A\mathbb X \times \mathbb AX×A, PPP is weakly continuous and QQQ is continuous in the total variation, then the belief MDP satisfies Assumption (W*):

cˉ is bounded below and K-inf-compact on P(X)×A,(zn,an)→(z,a)  ⟹  q(⋅∣zn,an)→q(⋅∣z,a) weakly.\bar c \text{ is bounded below and } \mathbb K\text{-inf-compact on } \mathbb P(\mathbb X) \times \mathbb A, \qquad (z_n, a_n) \to (z, a) \implies q(\cdot \mid z_n, a_n) \to q(\cdot \mid z, a) \text{ weakly}.cˉ is bounded below and K-inf-compact on P(X)×A,(zn​,an​)→(z,a)⟹q(⋅∣zn​,an​)→q(⋅∣z,a) weakly.

The two halves

  • Cost half (Theorem 3.4, through Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 5.1(ii)): cˉ\bar ccˉ is bounded below by the same constant as ccc and K\mathbb KK-inf-compact.
  • Transition half (Theorem 3.7): under the hypotheses on PPP and QQQ, R′R'R′ is setwise continuous and Assumption (H) holds: whenever zn→zz_n \to zzn​→z and an→aa_n \to aan​→a, along a subsequence H(znk,ank,y)→H(z,a,y)H(z_{n_k}, a_{n_k}, y) \to H(z, a, y)H(znk​​,ank​​,y)→H(z,a,y) weakly for R′(⋅∣z,a)R'(\cdot \mid z, a)R′(⋅∣z,a)-almost every yyy. Theorem 3.5 then gives weak continuity of qqq. The route runs through Theorem 5.2, Lemma 5.3, Corollary 5.4, Theorem 5.5 and Lemma 5.6.

Significance

Theorem 3.6 supplies the hypothesis under which the cited general MDP theory gives stationary optimal policies, optimality equations and convergence of value iterations for total-cost POMDPs in terms of PPP, QQQ and ccc alone, without compactness of the action set, boundedness of the cost or continuity of the filter. It covers, for example, observation kernels with densities continuous in (a,x)(a, x)(a,x), and the paper applies it to inventory control with incomplete records and to the Kalman filter. Example 4.1 of the same paper shows that total-variation continuity of QQQ cannot be weakened to setwise continuity.

The result is proved in the paper; this proposal poses its formal statement and the supporting results as proof targets. Completing them would provide a checked bridge from POMDPs to the general MDP theory under weak continuity, together with reusable facts about weak, setwise and total-variation convergence: equicontinuity of integrals against weakly continuous kernels (Theorem 5.2), the convergence-in-probability criterion (Theorem 5.5), and the generalized Fatou lemmas.

Difficulty

The posterior H(z,a,y)H(z, a, y)H(z,a,y) is defined only for R′(⋅∣z,a)R'(\cdot \mid z, a)R′(⋅∣z,a)-almost every yyy and has no continuous version in general, so weak continuity of qqq cannot be read off from continuity of HHH. The tempting argument, that continuous PPP and QQQ make the Bayes posterior move continuously, fails: Y\mathbb YY need not be countable and QQQ need not have densities. What has to be controlled is the joint law RRR on sets (O1∖O2)×C(\mathcal O_1 \setminus \mathcal O_2) \times C(O1​∖O2​)×C uniformly in the observation set CCC; convergence for each fixed CCC is not enough. Turning this uniform control into almost-sure convergence of posteriors along a subsequence requires a diagonal argument over a countable base of X\mathbb XX. On the cost side, the difficulty is that ccc may take the value +∞+\infty+∞ and is not continuous; K\mathbb KK-inf-compactness has to be transported through integration against a weakly converging sequence of measures.

Formalization scope

All definitions live in FeinbergPOMDP.WStar.Model. X,Y,A\mathbb X, \mathbb Y, \mathbb AX,Y,A are separable metrizable spaces with their Borel σ-algebras (PolishSpace is not assumed, since Borel subsets of Polish spaces need not be Polish); X\mathbb XX is additionally nonempty and standard Borel in Theorems 3.6 and 3.7, where a filter must exist. P(X)\mathbb P(\mathbb X)P(X) is Mathlib's ProbabilityMeasure with the weak topology. All continuity notions are the paper's sequential ones; total variation is the supremum over Borel functions with values in [−1,1][-1, 1][−1,1], written in ε\varepsilonε–NNN form, while the set-indexed suprema of (5.15) and (5.17) keep their set form. The cost is written c=ℓ+fc = \ell + fc=ℓ+f with ℓ∈R\ell \in \mathbb Rℓ∈R and fff taking values in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞], so cˉ=ℓ+∫f dz\bar c = \ell + \int f\,dzcˉ=ℓ+∫fdz, exact even when c=+∞c = +\inftyc=+∞ on a set of positive measure. K\mathbb KK-inf-compactness is the published FeinbergLiang.ACOE.KInfCompact. A filter is a map H:P(X)→A→Y→P(X)H : \mathbb P(\mathbb X) \to \mathbb A \to \mathbb Y \to \mathbb P(\mathbb X)H:P(X)→A→Y→P(X) that satisfies (3.3) and is jointly Borel measurable in (z,a,y)(z,a,y)(z,a,y), as the paper's stochastic kernel is; qqq is the image of R′R'R′ under H(z,a,⋅)H(z, a, \cdot)H(z,a,⋅) for the Borel σ-algebra of the weak topology on P(X)\mathbb P(\mathbb X)P(X).

Since qqq does not depend on the choice of filter, every statement about qqq is made for every filter satisfying (3.3). A fixed filter that ignores the observation, such as H(z,a,y)=zH(z, a, y) = zH(z,a,y)=z, would make qqq a point mass and the weak continuity trivial; it satisfies (3.3) only when observations carry no information, and is excluded by quantifying over all filters.

The goal states the Assumption (W*) conclusion of Theorem 3.6. Its tail, "statements (i)–(vi) of Theorem 3.1 hold", invokes Theorem 2.1 of Feinberg et al. (2012) applied to the belief MDP; it is cited rather than proved in this paper. Generalized Fatou's lemmas 5.1(i) and 5.1(ii) are referenced from the published Schäl (1993) items. A complete development needs weak and setwise convergence on ProbabilityMeasure, portmanteau-type arguments, disintegration (Measure.condKernel) and the identification of the Borel and Giry σ-algebras on P(X)\mathbb P(\mathbb X)P(X); the last is missing from Mathlib and is a welcome contribution in its own right. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for Theorem 3.7, are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. A. Feinberg, P. O. Kasyanov, M. Z. Zgurovsky, Partially Observable Total-Cost Markov Decision Processes with Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities, arXiv:1401.2168v2 (2014); Mathematics of Operations Research 41(2), 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.2168v2
  • E. A. Feinberg, P. O. Kasyanov, N. V. Zadoianchuk, Average-cost Markov decision processes with weakly continuous transition probabilities, Mathematics of Operations Research 37(4), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1120.0555
  • D. P. Bertsekas, S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • M. Schäl, Average optimality in dynamic programming with general state space, Mathematics of Operations Research 18(1), 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.1.163
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Algorithmic Game TheoryFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case 1: If the State Map b Is Bounded and √c_z‖W‖ < 1, the Graphon Game Has at Least One Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

Games with many interacting players appear in economics, epidemiology and network engineering: firms competing in a market, individuals deciding whether to vaccinate, agents in a social network choosing an effort level. When every player interacts with every other player symmetrically, mean field game theory replaces the finite game by a limit with a continuum of players. Real interactions are rarely symmetric: who influences whom is described by a network, and large networks are described in the limit by a graphon (Lovász, Large networks and graph limits, 2012).

Graphon games combine the two ideas. Parise and Ozdaglar (2018) studied deterministic graphon games with continuous strategy sets. Carmona, Cooney, Graves and Laurière (2019) introduced idiosyncratic random shocks, giving a stochastic graphon game in which each player's state is perturbed by independent noise, and proved existence, uniqueness and stability of Nash equilibria as well as convergence of finite network games to the graphon limit. This mission formalizes their existence theorem (Theorem 3.15).

Setting

The players form the interval I=[0,1]I=[0,1]I=[0,1] with Lebesgue measure λI\lambda_IλI​. Each player x∈Ix\in Ix∈I chooses an action αx∈A=R\alpha_x\in A=\mathbb Rαx​∈A=R; a strategy profile is a function α∈L2(I)\alpha\in L^2(I)α∈L2(I), defined up to λI\lambda_IλI​-null sets.

A graphon is a symmetric, Borel-measurable function w:I×I→Rw:I\times I\to\mathbb Rw:I×I→R with ∫I×Iw(x,y)2 dx dy<∞\int_{I\times I}w(x,y)^2\,dx\,dy<\infty∫I×I​w(x,y)2dxdy<∞. It acts on L2(I)L^2(I)L2(I) through the graphon operator

[Wg]x=∫Iw(x,y) g(y) dy,∥W∥=sup⁡∥φ∥L2(I)=1∥Wφ∥L2(I).[\mathbf Wg]_x=\int_I w(x,y)\,g(y)\,dy,\qquad \|\mathbf W\|=\sup_{\|\varphi\|_{L^2(I)}=1}\|\mathbf W\varphi\|_{L^2(I)}.[Wg]x​=∫I​w(x,y)g(y)dy,∥W∥=∥φ∥L2(I)​=1sup​∥Wφ∥L2(I)​.

A state map b:R×R→Rb:\mathbb R\times\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rb:R×R→R and a noise law μ0\mu_0μ0​ on R\mathbb RR define the state Xα,z,ξ=b(α,z)+ξX_{\alpha,z,\xi}=b(\alpha,z)+\xiXα,z,ξ​=b(α,z)+ξ of a player who takes action α\alphaα, feels aggregate zzz, and receives shock ξ∼μ0\xi\sim\mu_0ξ∼μ0​. Assumption 1 asks that ∣b(α,z)−b(α′,z′)∣2≤cα∣α−α′∣2+cz∣z−z′∣2|b(\alpha,z)-b(\alpha',z')|^2\le c_\alpha|\alpha-\alpha'|^2+c_z|z-z'|^2∣b(α,z)−b(α′,z′)∣2≤cα​∣α−α′∣2+cz​∣z−z′∣2 and that μ0\mu_0μ0​ has mean zero and a finite second moment.

The aggregate Zα\mathbf Z\alphaZα felt by the players under a profile α\alphaα is the solution z∈L2(I)z\in L^2(I)z∈L2(I) of

zx=∫Iw(x,y) b(αy,zy) dyfor λI-a.e. x.(6)z_x=\int_I w(x,y)\,b(\alpha_y,z_y)\,dy\qquad\text{for }\lambda_I\text{-a.e. }x.\tag{6}zx​=∫I​w(x,y)b(αy​,zy​)dyfor λI​-a.e. x.(6)

A player choosing α\alphaα against aggregate zzz pays J(α,z)=∫f(b(α,z)+ξ,α,z) μ0(dξ)J(\alpha,z)=\int f(b(\alpha,z)+\xi,\alpha,z)\,\mu_0(d\xi)J(α,z)=∫f(b(α,z)+ξ,α,z)μ0​(dξ). Assumption 4 asks that J(⋅,z)J(\cdot,z)J(⋅,z) be continuously differentiable and ℓc\ell_cℓc​-strongly convex uniformly in zzz, and that ∂αJ\partial_\alpha J∂α​J be ℓJ\ell_JℓJ​-Lipschitz in zzz. Assumption 5 asks that bbb be bounded: ∣b(α,z)∣≤c0|b(\alpha,z)|\le c_0∣b(α,z)∣≤c0​ for some finite c0>0c_0>0c0​>0. The best response [Bz]x[\mathbf Bz]_x[Bz]x​ is the unique minimizer of α↦J(α,zx)\alpha\mapsto J(\alpha,z_x)α↦J(α,zx​).

A Nash equilibrium is a profile α^∈L2(I)\hat\alpha\in L^2(I)α^∈L2(I) such that, for λI\lambda_IλI​-a.e. player xxx and every action β\betaβ,

J(α^x,(Zα^)x)≤J(β,(Zα^)x).J(\hat\alpha_x,(\mathbf Z\hat\alpha)_x)\le J(\beta,(\mathbf Z\hat\alpha)_x).J(α^x​,(Zα^)x​)≤J(β,(Zα^)x​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.15 (existence)

Assumptions 1, 4, 5 and cz ∥W∥<1 ⟹ there is at least one Nash equilibrium.\text{Assumptions 1, 4, 5 and }\sqrt{c_z}\,\|\mathbf W\|<1\ \Longrightarrow\ \text{there is at least one Nash equilibrium.}Assumptions 1, 4, 5 and cz​​∥W∥<1 ⟹ there is at least one Nash equilibrium.

The statement fixes no constants and asserts no uniqueness.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 3.1: under cz∥W∥<1\sqrt{c_z}\|\mathbf W\|<1cz​​∥W∥<1, (6) has a unique solution in L2(I)L^2(I)L2(I) for every α∈L2(I)\alpha\in L^2(I)α∈L2(I).
  2. Lemma 3.7: ∥Bz1−Bz2∥L2≤(ℓJ/ℓc)∥z1−z2∥L2\|\mathbf Bz^1-\mathbf Bz^2\|_{L^2}\le(\ell_J/\ell_c)\|z^1-z^2\|_{L^2}∥Bz1−Bz2∥L2​≤(ℓJ​/ℓc​)∥z1−z2∥L2​.
  3. Lemma 3.16, (15): ∥Zα1−Zα2∥L2≤cα∥W∥1−cz∥W∥∥α1−α2∥L2\|\mathbf Z\alpha^1-\mathbf Z\alpha^2\|_{L^2}\le\dfrac{\sqrt{c_\alpha}\|\mathbf W\|}{1-\sqrt{c_z}\|\mathbf W\|}\|\alpha^1-\alpha^2\|_{L^2}∥Zα1−Zα2∥L2​≤1−cz​​∥W∥cα​​∥W∥​∥α1−α2∥L2​.
  4. Proof of Theorem 3.15, first claim: with χ=c0\chi=c_0χ=c0​ and Bχ={g∈L2(I):∥g∥≤χ}B_\chi=\{g\in L^2(I):\|g\|\le\chi\}Bχ​={g∈L2(I):∥g∥≤χ}, every aggregate lies in W(Bχ)\mathbf W(B_\chi)W(Bχ​).
  5. Proof of Theorem 3.15, second claim: W(Bχ)\mathbf W(B_\chi)W(Bχ​) is relatively compact in L2(I)L^2(I)L2(I).

Significance

The existence theorem holds under mild hypotheses: unlike the uniqueness result of the same paper (Proposition 3.17), it needs no smallness condition linking ℓJ/ℓc\ell_J/\ell_cℓJ​/ℓc​, cαc_\alphacα​ and ∥W∥\|\mathbf W\|∥W∥. Boundedness of the state map takes its place. Existence of a graphon equilibrium is the starting point for the paper's §4, where graphon equilibria are shown to be limits of equilibria of finite network games and to yield ϵ\epsilonϵ-Nash equilibria for them.

The result is proved in the paper; no part of it is machine-checked. A complete formalization yields reusable pieces beyond this mission: square-integrable kernel operators on L2[0,1]L^2[0,1]L2[0,1] with their operator norm, the Hilbert–Schmidt compactness of such operators, Lipschitz dependence of minimizers of uniformly strongly convex functions on a parameter, and Schauder's fixed-point theorem on a Banach space, which is not in Mathlib.

Difficulty

A contraction argument does not apply: the best-response-of-aggregate map BZ\mathbf B\mathbf ZBZ is Lipschitz with constant ℓJℓc⋅cα∥W∥1−cz∥W∥\frac{\ell_J}{\ell_c}\cdot\frac{\sqrt{c_\alpha}\|\mathbf W\|}{1-\sqrt{c_z}\|\mathbf W\|}ℓc​ℓJ​​⋅1−cz​​∥W∥cα​​∥W∥​, which may exceed 111 under the hypotheses of the theorem. Existence therefore rests on a compactness fixed-point theorem in the infinite-dimensional space L2(I)L^2(I)L2(I). That requires compactness of the integral operator W\mathbf WW, which Mathlib does not provide for kernel operators, and Schauder's theorem itself, which Mathlib does not have. A bounded convex set in L2(I)L^2(I)L2(I) is not compact, so Brouwer-type finite-dimensional arguments do not transfer directly.

Formalization scope

All statements live in the namespace GraphonGames.Existence and share one definitions file.

  • III is Mathlib's unitInterval with volume. Profiles and aggregates are functions I→RI\to\mathbb RI→R with MemLp _ 2 volume; equalities between them are almost-everywhere equalities.
  • The action set is R\mathbb RR.
  • ∥W∥\|\mathbf W\|∥W∥ is the supremum, in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], of ∥Wφ∥L2\|\mathbf W\varphi\|_{L^2}∥Wφ∥L2​ over ∥φ∥L2=1\|\varphi\|_{L^2}=1∥φ∥L2​=1; the graphon condition makes it finite, and the hypothesis cz∥W∥<1\sqrt{c_z}\|\mathbf W\|<1cz​​∥W∥<1 uses its real value.
  • The aggregate is a predicate: zzz is an aggregate of α\alphaα when z∈L2(I)z\in L^2(I)z∈L2(I) and (6) holds a.e. Remark 3.3's identity Zα=W[b(α,Zα)]\mathbf Z\alpha=\mathbf W[b(\alpha,\mathbf Z\alpha)]Zα=W[b(α,Zα)] is then the definition itself, the noise having mean zero.
  • The best response is a choice of minimizer, which exists and is unique under Assumption 4.
  • Pinned definition. The paper defines equilibrium (Definition 3.4) as a fixed point of a best response built on a rich Fubini extension, and states in Proposition 3.6 that under Assumption 4 this is equivalent to the a.e. best-response inequality above. The formalization takes that inequality as the definition. Fubini extensions and the exact law of large numbers (Proposition 3.2) are not formalized.
  • Norm inequalities are stated in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so an infinite left-hand side cannot make a bound vacuous.

Trivializing encodings are excluded: the operator norm is not a real supremum that could collapse to 000; an equilibrium must come with its aggregate solving (6), be square-integrable, and beat every action β∈R\beta\in\mathbb Rβ∈R for almost every player; and no norm is converted to a real number where it could be infinite.

The results of §4 (Theorems 4.3, 4.7, 4.9 on finite network games) and the uniqueness and stability results (Proposition 3.17, Theorem 3.20) are not posed in this mission. Contributions welcome include Schauder's fixed-point theorem, the compactness of Hilbert–Schmidt integral operators on L2L^2L2, and the contraction argument behind Proposition 3.1.

Selected references

  • R. Carmona, D. B. Cooney, C. V. Graves, M. Laurière, Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case, arXiv:1911.10664v1, 2019; Mathematics of Operations Research 47(1), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.10664
  • F. Parise, A. Ozdaglar, Graphon games, arXiv:1802.00080, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.00080
  • L. Lovász, Large Networks and Graph Limits, AMS Colloquium Publications 60, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1090/coll/060
  • R. Carmona, F. Delarue, Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I, Springer, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58920-6
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OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization 3: On a Finite Support the Empirical DRO Equals the Burg-Divergence DRO with χ²₁ RadiusResearch Paper

Motivation

Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) evaluates a decision against a collection of probability distributions near an empirical one. In a finite scenario model, the familiar construction puts a divergence ball around the histogram of observed scenarios. Lam's empirical construction instead gives one weight to each observation, even when several observations have the same value. The distinction matters because a sample can contain repeated values and can omit some points of the stated support. The paper uses a Burg-entropy ball on those observation weights to recover statistical guarantees for an expected loss, despite the empirical ball having low probability of containing the true distribution. Lam, §§2.1–2.3, pp. 5–9.

Proposition 1 identifies what this observation-level construction becomes when the random quantity has finite support: its lower and upper DRO values coincide with values from a Burg-divergence ball on the support histogram. This links a method defined on individual data points to the standard finite-scenario formulation. The radius uses a one-degree-of-freedom chi-square quantile because the paper calibrates an expected value at a fixed decision; it does not use the k−1k-1k−1 degrees of freedom associated with estimating a full kkk-point distribution. Lam, Proposition 1, p. 11, and the discussion on pp. 8–9.

Setting

Fix a decision xxx and a real loss h(x;si)h(x;s_i)h(x;si​) at each of kkk support points s1,…,sks_1,\ldots,s_ks1​,…,sk​. A sample of size nnn has an assignment c(j)c(j)c(j) telling which support point produced observation jjj. Write nin_ini​ for the number of assignments to point iii and p^i=ni/n\hat p_i=n_i/np^​i​=ni​/n for the empirical histogram. The support points need not all appear in the sample. The decision and loss only determine a finite vector of loss values; no probability space is needed for this deterministic comparison. Lam, §2.1, p. 6, and Proposition 1, p. 11.

The empirical Burg ball Un(η)\mathcal U_n(\eta)Un​(η) consists of observation weights w1,…,wnw_1,\ldots,w_nw1​,…,wn​ that are nonnegative, sum to one, and obey −n−1∑jlog⁡(nwj)≤η-n^{-1}\sum_j\log(nw_j)\le\eta−n−1∑j​log(nwj​)≤η. The support Burg ball UBurg′(η)\mathcal U'_{\mathrm{Burg}}(\eta)UBurg′​(η) consists of support weights p1,…,pkp_1,\ldots,p_kp1​,…,pk​ that are nonnegative, sum to one, are absolutely continuous with respect to p^\hat pp^​, and obey −∑ip^ilog⁡(pi/p^i)≤η-\sum_i\hat p_i\log(p_i/\hat p_i)\le\eta−∑i​p^​i​log(pi​/p^​i​)≤η. At an observed point, finite Burg divergence requires pi>0p_i>0pi​>0; at an unobserved point, absolute continuity requires pi=0p_i=0pi​=0. Lam, (13)–(15), pp. 5–6; (19), p. 8; (28), p. 11.

For a support weight vector ppp, the expected loss is ∑ipih(x;si)\sum_i p_i h(x;s_i)∑i​pi​h(x;si​). For an observation weight vector www, it is ∑jwjh(x;sc(j))\sum_j w_j h(x;s_{c(j)})∑j​wj​h(x;sc(j)​). The empirical lower and upper values are the minimum and maximum over Un(η)\mathcal U_n(\eta)Un​(η); the support values use UBurg′(η)\mathcal U'_{\mathrm{Burg}}(\eta)UBurg′​(η). The same empirical ball is used for both bounds. Lam, (26)–(28), p. 11.

Formalization targets

The goal is Proposition 1. For every n>0n>0n>0, every assignment of the sample to finite support points, every fixed decision xxx, and every κ≥0\kappa\ge0κ≥0, set η=κ/(2n)\eta=\kappa/(2n)η=κ/(2n). Then

min⁡w∈Un(η)∑j=1nwjh(x;sc(j))=min⁡p∈UBurg′(η)∑i=1kpih(x;si),\min_{w\in\mathcal U_n(\eta)}\sum_{j=1}^n w_jh(x;s_{c(j)}) =\min_{p\in\mathcal U'_{\mathrm{Burg}}(\eta)}\sum_{i=1}^k p_ih(x;s_i),w∈Un​(η)min​j=1∑n​wj​h(x;sc(j)​)=p∈UBurg′​(η)min​i=1∑k​pi​h(x;si​), max⁡w∈Un(η)∑j=1nwjh(x;sc(j))=max⁡p∈UBurg′(η)∑i=1kpih(x;si).\max_{w\in\mathcal U_n(\eta)}\sum_{j=1}^n w_jh(x;s_{c(j)}) =\max_{p\in\mathcal U'_{\mathrm{Burg}}(\eta)}\sum_{i=1}^k p_ih(x;s_i).w∈Un​(η)max​j=1∑n​wj​h(x;sc(j)​)=p∈UBurg′​(η)max​i=1∑k​pi​h(x;si​).

The printed proposition takes κ=χ1,1−α2\kappa=\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}κ=χ1,1−α2​. The deterministic identity holds at every nonnegative κ\kappaκ, including zero. The two milestones record the source proof's statements that a feasible support vector gives a feasible observation vector with the same objective value, and conversely that a feasible observation vector gives a feasible support vector with the same objective value. Lam, Proposition 1, p. 11, proof p. 24.

Significance

The identity lets a finite-support user compute the empirical DRO values with one variable per distinct support point instead of one per observation, without changing either bound. It also shows precisely how Lam's empirical calibration relates to a conventional histogram-based divergence model: the ambiguity sets have different coordinates, but the resulting extrema of any loss constant on each class agree. This is the finite-support interpretation stated immediately after Theorem 2, and it explains the radius comparison on pp. 8–9. Lam, pp. 8–9 and Proposition 1, p. 11.

The result is proved in the paper; the remaining task is a machine-checked proof of the two transformations and the equality of extrema. The published formal library already contains the observation-level ϕ\phiϕ-divergence ball and its robust upper mean, and a shared setting supplies the Burg generator and lower empirical value. This mission adds the support histogram, its Burg ball, and the bridge between the two representations. Those definitions and transformations can also be reused for other finite-support losses. The paper's separate pointwise coverage and consistency results are goals of other missions in this series. Lam, Theorems 2–3 and Proposition 1, pp. 11–12.

Difficulty

Repeated observations make the two weight spaces different: the empirical problem has nnn coordinates and the support problem has kkk. Simply identifying coordinates loses multiplicities in both the normalization and the logarithmic divergence. Empty classes create a second boundary case, since no observation weight can be assigned to an unobserved support point. A statement that silently permits such mass changes the support optimization value. The full reduction must preserve feasible objective values in both directions, for the lower and upper extrema. Lam, proof of Proposition 1, p. 24.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin n for observations and Fin k for support points, with zero-based indices, a class map ccc, real loss values, and the paper's Burg generator valued in EReal. Nonpositive likelihood ratios receive +∞+\infty+∞. The empirical ball reuses the published PhiDivRobust.Counterpart.probUncertaintySet; its upper value is the published GenEmpLik.Expansion.robustMean. The lower value is a real infimum over the same ball. The condition n>0n>0n>0 and the nonnegative radius make both feasible value sets nonempty and bounded, so the real infimum and supremum mean the paper's minimum and maximum. The histogram can have zero entries. Lam, (19), (26)–(28), pp. 8, 11.

Display (28) omits a condition from the preceding definition of a divergence ball: ppp must be absolutely continuous with respect to p^\hat pp^​. Without it, an unobserved support point can receive positive mass and Proposition 1 is false. The formal support ball includes p^i=0⇒pi=0\hat p_i=0\Rightarrow p_i=0p^​i​=0⇒pi​=0 from (13)–(14). It also requires pi>0p_i>0pi​>0 where p^i>0\hat p_i>0p^​i​>0, because Lean's real logarithm returns zero at zero whereas the paper's Burg divergence is infinite there. These conditions, together with n>0n>0n>0, exclude trivial values from empty balls, division by zero, and logarithms at invalid weights. The decision set Θ\ThetaΘ is omitted because the paper fixes one xxx and the result holds for every such xxx. Lam, (13)–(14), pp. 5–6, and (28), p. 11.

The development needs finite-sum identities, elementary properties of the probability simplex, the logarithm's concavity, and bounds on the extrema of bounded nonempty finite-dimensional value sets. Contributions that establish the two direction statements, or reusable facts about aggregation of finite probability weights, directly advance this mission. The paper's uniform calibration theorem, Theorem 4, is outside this scope: it needs a Donsker class, a data-dependent chi-square process, and its supremum quantile, none of which enters Proposition 1. Lam, Theorem 4, pp. 13–14.

Selected references

  • Henry Lam, Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization, arXiv:1605.09349v1, 2016; published in Operations Research 67(4), 2019. arXiv, DOI.
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Bandit AlgorithmsInformation TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Based Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control with Censored Demand and Limited Price Changes 2: Any Policy with at Most m Price Changes Has Regret at Least KT^(1/(m+1)) on a Bernoulli InstanceResearch Paper

Why limited price changes matter

A seller learning a demand curve normally adjusts prices as new observations arrive. A price-change limit prevents that continual adjustment: a price may have to be chosen before the seller knows which demand curve it faces, then held through a block of sales. This matters when repricing is operationally costly, constrained by contracts, or visible to customers. Chen, Chao and Wang study pricing jointly with inventory replenishment under censored demand. Their Theorem 2 asks how much regret is unavoidable when the seller can change price at most mmm times, regardless of the learning policy it uses (SSRN revision, pp. 10–11, 35–42).

The lower bound is paired with their Theorem 1: in the well-separated setting an algorithm attains regret proportional to T1/(m+1)T^{1/(m+1)}T1/(m+1) for large horizons, while Theorem 2 asserts the same exponent cannot be improved uniformly over admissible policies (SSRN revision, p. 10). The paper appeared as an Operations Research technical note in 2020 (DOI 10.1287/opre.2020.1993); this mission cites the authors' SSRN revision dated 2020-02-10, whose page and result numbers are used throughout.

Bernoulli pricing setting

The horizon has TTT periods. At each period the seller posts a price pt∈[1,6]p_t\in[1,6]pt​∈[1,6] and replenishes inventory to one unit. Demand dtd_tdt​ is either zero or one, so all demand can be served and the observed sale equals demand. The unknown scalar parameter zzz belongs to [1/6,5/6][1/6,5/6][1/6,5/6]. Conditional on the posted price, the probability of one unit of demand is

ν(p,z)=max⁡{0,1−pz/2}.\nu(p,z)=\max\{0,1-pz/2\}.ν(p,z)=max{0,1−pz/2}.

Holding and shortage costs are zero. Hence expected one-period revenue is rz(p)=pν(p,z)r_z(p)=p\nu(p,z)rz​(p)=pν(p,z). The clairvoyant benchmark is G∗(z)=1/(2z)G^*(z)=1/(2z)G∗(z)=1/(2z): it is attained by the feasible price p∗=1/zp^*=1/zp∗=1/z. The local Lean sanity check proves this maximum property, so the benchmark does not rely on a default value of a supremum. The model is the explicit Bernoulli construction in the proof of Theorem 2 (SSRN revision, p. 35).

An admissible randomized policy may draw random bits and use past posted prices and observed sales when choosing its next price. Its action cannot depend on future demand or on the unknown parameter. Every realized seed and demand path must satisfy the price-change constraint

∑t=1T−11{pt≠pt+1}≤m,m≥1.\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}\mathbf 1\{p_t\ne p_{t+1}\}\le m,\qquad m\ge1.t=1∑T−1​1{pt​=pt+1​}≤m,m≥1.

The regret Rπ(T,z)R_\pi(T,z)Rπ​(T,z) is the expected sum of G∗(z)−rz(pt)G^*(z)-r_z(p_t)G∗(z)−rz​(pt​) under the policy and the demand law at parameter zzz. The paper's admissibility and change constraint are stated on pp. 5–6; its randomized policy factorization is displayed in (49) on p. 35 (SSRN revision).

Formalization targets

The goal is the minimax reading of Theorem 2. For each fixed m≥1m\ge1m≥1, there is a positive constant K7K_7K7​ and a horizon threshold T0T_0T0​, independent of the policy and the horizon, such that

∀T≥T0  ∀π admissible with at most m changes,∃z∈[1/6,5/6]: Rπ(T,z)≥K7T1/(m+1).\forall T\ge T_0\;\forall\pi\text{ admissible with at most }m\text{ changes},\quad \exists z\in[1/6,5/6]:\ R_\pi(T,z)\ge K_7T^{1/(m+1)}.∀T≥T0​∀π admissible with at most m changes,∃z∈[1/6,5/6]: Rπ​(T,z)≥K7​T1/(m+1).

The parameter is selected after the policy. The proof's objective (56) is a worst-case parameter choice for each policy (SSRN revision, p. 37). The printed theorem sentence can also be read as one fixed instance defeating every algorithm; that order is false because a policy supplied with that instance's zzz can post 1/z1/z1/z in every period.

Five milestones expose the source's quantitative ingredients. The hierarchy (50) constructs parameters zζz_\zetazζ​ from signs ζ∈{±1}m+1\zeta\in\{\pm1\}^{m+1}ζ∈{±1}m+1 and scales εℓ=T−ℓ/[2(m+1)]\varepsilon_\ell=T^{-\ell/[2(m+1)]}εℓ​=T−ℓ/[2(m+1)]. Its parameters lie in [1/6,5/6][1/6,5/6][1/6,5/6] for large TTT. Different signs are separated at scale εℓ/8\varepsilon_\ell/8εℓ​/8. Lemma 1 bounds one-period regret by the squared error in a nearest-instance selection. The pointwise inequality underlying (57) gives a cost of at least 10−4εℓ210^{-4}\varepsilon_\ell^210−4εℓ2​ for a wrong sign. A corrected Lemma 2 supplies a quadratic Bernoulli relative-entropy bound under an explicit interior condition (SSRN revision, pp. 36–37).

What the result establishes

The exponent 1/(m+1)1/(m+1)1/(m+1) quantifies the cost of the change budget: fixing mmm leaves a polynomial regret floor even though the Bernoulli demand law is one-dimensional and observed without censoring. Since the constructed instance fixes inventory at a level that serves every demand, a lower bound here also applies to policies in the joint pricing and inventory setting whenever that instance is admitted. It identifies the information loss caused by limited repricing, independently of lost sales and censoring.

The paper states the lower bound and gives a proof, but its printed Lemma 2 is false at prices where ν(p,z)=0\nu(p,z)=0ν(p,z)=0. The subsequent Lemma 3 applies that unrestricted bound. Therefore the source proof does not, as printed, establish the minimax claim for every admissible price policy. The Lean goal is an open target; the four elementary milestones and corrected information bound are also open Lean statements. Formalizing this mission requires an argument that handles prices at the zero-demand kink, or a different route to the lower bound. No machine-checked proof of this specific result is claimed here.

Where the argument is difficult

The natural comparison of two nearby parameters uses the relative entropy between their observed demand laws. Away from the kink, this information is quadratic in the parameter difference. At a price that makes demand impossible under one parameter but possible under the other, the divergence in the printed direction can be linear in that difference. The unrestricted 108∣z−z′∣2108|z-z'|^2108∣z−z′∣2 bound of Lemma 2 therefore fails at exactly the prices an arbitrary policy may choose. Restricting the policy's prices would change the target. A faithful proof must retain those prices while still controlling the policy's information and regret (SSRN revision, Lemmas 2–3, pp. 36–40).

Formalization scope

Lean represents the horizon by Fin T; its index zero is period one in the paper. Bernoulli demand paths have type Fin T → Bool. A policy's price at a period depends on a random seed and only the earlier demand bits; with inventory level one, these bits are exactly the observed sales. A probability measure on the seed models adaptive randomization, including a pre-sampled stream of random choices. Prices are measurable functions of the seed for each finite history. The budget holds on every seed and path, not only on average.

Path probabilities are finite products of conditional Bernoulli probabilities. Regret is a finite sum of nonnegative gaps integrated over the seed with lintegral, so it cannot become zero through non-integrability of a real-valued expectation. The exponent of TTT and the scales εℓ\varepsilon_\ellεℓ​ use real division. The arg-min in (51) is any genuine nearest-instance selection; a local proof checks that one exists. The hierarchy's validity and separation statements require a large-horizon threshold, which the unqualified printed prose omits. The corrected Lemma 2 adds pz≤11/6pz\le11/6pz≤11/6 to keep the Bernoulli probabilities in the interior. Its verbatim milestone retains the printed statement, and its formal statement and note disclose the correction. Lemma 3 is not stated because its printed proof relies on Lemma 2 outside that interior region.

The named Bernoulli family strengthens the theorem's existential instance wording, while also exposing a limitation: at p≥2/zp\ge2/zp≥2/z it violates the positive-mean and identifiability conditions stated earlier in the paper. That discrepancy is recorded rather than hidden in an assumption. Definitions for randomized adapted policies, finite path laws, the parameter hierarchy, and Bernoulli relative entropy are reusable; contributions that establish the open goal or repair the information comparison are in scope.

Selected references

  • B. Chen, X. Chao, and Y. Wang, Data-Based Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control with Censored Demand and Limited Price Changes, SSRN 2700747, revision of 2020-02-10. Preprint.
  • B. Chen, X. Chao, and Y. Wang, Technical Note—Data-Based Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control with Censored Demand and Limited Price Changes, Operations Research, 2020. DOI 10.1287/opre.2020.1993.
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Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Based Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control with Censored Demand and Limited Price Changes 1: In the Well-Separated Case, Algorithm-I with m Price Changes Has Regret at Most KT^(1/(m+1))Research Paper

Motivation

Retailers set prices and stock levels without knowing how demand responds to price. They must learn the demand curve from their own sales while still earning money, which is the exploration–exploitation trade-off of dynamic pricing with learning (den Boer 2015). Two features of practice make the problem harder than the textbook bandit. First, demand is censored: when the shelf runs empty, the firm sees only its sales min⁡{dt,yt}\min\{d_t,y_t\}min{dt​,yt​}, not the demand dtd_tdt​. Second, firms change prices rarely, because of menu costs and customer reaction, so a policy may change its price at most mmm times over the whole horizon (Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Wang 2017).

Chen, Chao and Wang study a firm facing both features at once, in a parametric model where the demand distribution is known up to a parameter. For the well-separated case they give an algorithm, Algorithm-I, whose regret grows as T1/(m+1)T^{1/(m+1)}T1/(m+1), and they show that no admissible policy does better in general. This mission formalizes the upper bound. A companion mission formalizes the lower bound.

Setting

A firm sells one product over periods t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T. At the start of period ttt it holds inventory xtx_txt​ (with x1=0x_1=0x1​=0). It chooses a price pt∈P=[pl,ph]p_t\in\mathcal P=[p^l,p^h]pt​∈P=[pl,ph] and an order-up-to level yt∈Y={yl,…,yh}y_t\in\mathcal Y=\{y^l,\dots,y^h\}yt​∈Y={yl,…,yh} with yt≥xty_t\ge x_tyt​≥xt​, and the order arrives at once. Demand dtd_tdt​ then has probability mass function f(⋅;pt,z)f(\cdot;p_t,z)f(⋅;pt​,z) on {dl,dl+1,…,dh}\{d^l,d^l+1,\dots,d^h\}{dl,dl+1,…,dh}, where dh≤+∞d^h\le+\inftydh≤+∞ and the parameter zzz lies in Z=[zl,zh]\mathcal Z=[z^l,z^h]Z=[zl,zh], 0≤zl≤zh0\le z^l\le z^h0≤zl≤zh. Unmet demand is lost, and the firm observes only the sales min⁡{dt,yt}\min\{d_t,y_t\}min{dt​,yt​}. Leftover stock carries over, xt+1=(yt−dt)+x_{t+1}=(y_t-d_t)^+xt+1​=(yt​−dt​)+. Each unit left over costs h≥0h\ge0h≥0 and each lost sale costs b≥0b\ge0b≥0. The single-period expected profit is

G(p,y,z)=p E[D(p,z)]−h E[y−D(p,z)]+−(b+p) E[D(p,z)−y]+.G(p,y,z)=p\,\mathbb E[D(p,z)]-h\,\mathbb E[y-D(p,z)]^+-(b+p)\,\mathbb E[D(p,z)-y]^+ .G(p,y,z)=pE[D(p,z)]−hE[y−D(p,z)]+−(b+p)E[D(p,z)−y]+.

For each yyy, py∗(z)p^*_y(z)py∗​(z) is an optimal price, max⁡p∈PG(p,y,z)=G(py∗(z),y,z)\max_{p\in\mathcal P}G(p,y,z)=G(p^*_y(z),y,z)maxp∈P​G(p,y,z)=G(py∗​(z),y,z), and the clairvoyant value is G∗(z)=max⁡(p,y)∈P×YG(p,y,z)G^*(z)=\max_{(p,y)\in\mathcal P\times\mathcal Y}G(p,y,z)G∗(z)=max(p,y)∈P×Y​G(p,y,z).

A policy's decision in period ttt may depend only on past decisions and past sales. The regret of a policy is

R(T)=T G∗(z)−E[Vϕ(T,z)]=∑t=1TE[G∗(z)−G(pt,yt,z)].R(T)=T\,G^*(z)-\mathbb E[V^\phi(T,z)]=\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E\big[G^*(z)-G(p_t,y_t,z)\big].R(T)=TG∗(z)−E[Vϕ(T,z)]=t=1∑T​E[G∗(z)−G(pt​,yt​,z)].

The family is well-separated (Definition 1) if for every price the pmfs f(⋅;p,z)f(\cdot;p,z)f(⋅;p,z), z∈Zz\in\mathcal Zz∈Z, are pairwise distinct.

Algorithm-I splits the horizon into m+1m+1m+1 stages of lengths Ii=⌈Ti/(m+1)⌉I_i=\lceil T^{i/(m+1)}\rceilIi​=⌈Ti/(m+1)⌉ for i≤mi\le mi≤m, with Im+1=T−∑i≤mIiI_{m+1}=T-\sum_{i\le m}I_iIm+1​=T−∑i≤m​Ii​. Stage iii uses one price p^i\hat p_ip^​i​ and the order-up-to target y~i\tilde y_iy~​i​. The target equals the planned level y^i\hat y_iy^​i​, raised by Δ≥1\Delta\ge1Δ≥1 when y^i=dl\hat y_i=d^ly^​i​=dl so that the sales carry information. At the end of the stage the algorithm computes the censored-data maximum-likelihood estimate z^i\hat z_iz^i​ (5). It then sets the next stage's decisions to a maximizer of G(⋅,⋅,z^i)G(\cdot,\cdot,\hat z_i)G(⋅,⋅,z^i​) (6). It changes its price at most mmm times.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Under Assumption A (regularity of GGG and of py∗p^*_ypy∗​ near the true zzz), Assumption 1 (Fisher-information bounds, a positive lower bound on the pmf, strict monotonicity of f(dl;p,⋅)f(d^l;p,\cdot)f(dl;p,⋅)), Definition 1, and the condition that every optimal order-up-to level exceeds dld^ldl, there is K6>0K_6>0K6​>0 such that for all large TTT

R(T)≤K6 T1m+1.R(T)\le K_6\,T^{\frac1{m+1}} .R(T)≤K6​Tm+11​.

The constant may depend on the model, the true parameter and the algorithm's inputs. The rate T1/(m+1)T^{1/(m+1)}T1/(m+1) is the content.

Milestones

  1. Theorem B1: if an estimator satisfies P{∥z^−z∥≥ϵ}≤K14e−nK15ϵ2+K16/n\mathbb P\{\|\hat z-z\|\ge\epsilon\}\le K_{14}e^{-nK_{15}\epsilon^2}+K_{16}/nP{∥z^−z∥≥ϵ}≤K14​e−nK15​ϵ2+K16​/n, then the plug-in decision has optimality gap G∗(z)−E[G(p^∗,y^∗,z)]≤K17/nG^*(z)-\mathbb E[G(\hat p^*,\hat y^*,z)]\le K_{17}/nG∗(z)−E[G(p^​∗,y^​∗,z)]≤K17​/n.
  2. Proposition 1: the censored MLE satisfies P{∣z−z^i∣≥ϵ}≤K3e−K4Iiϵ2+K5/Ii\mathbb P\{|z-\hat z_i|\ge\epsilon\}\le K_3e^{-K_4I_i\epsilon^2}+K_5/I_iP{∣z−z^i​∣≥ϵ}≤K3​e−K4​Ii​ϵ2+K5​/Ii​.
  3. Per-stage estimation regret (p. 25): E[G∗(z)−G(p^i,y^i,z)]≤K17/Ii−1\mathbb E[G^*(z)-G(\hat p_i,\hat y_i,z)]\le K_{17}/I_{i-1}E[G∗(z)−G(p^​i​,y^​i​,z)]≤K17​/Ii−1​.
  4. (25): the summed estimation regret is at most a constant times mT1/(m+1)mT^{1/(m+1)}mT1/(m+1).
  5. (26): P(y^i≠y~i)≤K/Ii−1\mathbb P(\hat y_i\ne\tilde y_i)\le K/I_{i-1}P(y^​i​=y~​i​)≤K/Ii−1​, so exploration after stage 1 is rare.

Significance

The upper bound shows that a budget of mmm price changes costs only a T1/(m+1)T^{1/(m+1)}T1/(m+1) regret even under censoring. With mmm of order log⁡T\log TlogT the rate drops to logarithmic (Theorem 3 of the paper). Together with the matching lower bound (Theorem 2), it identifies the exact price of limiting price changes in this model. Theorem B1 is a general transfer principle, from a large-deviation bound on an estimate to a 1/n1/n1/n optimality gap of the plug-in decision. It allows continuous and discrete decisions together and needs no unique optimizer. It is reusable for any parametric learning problem with that structure. Proposition 1 is a large-deviation bound for maximum likelihood from censored, dependent, non-identically distributed data. The paper notes that such results were not previously available in the statistics literature.

The results are proved in the paper's appendices. None of them has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would check the regret decomposition (23), the stagewise bookkeeping with ceilings, and the large-deviation argument for the censored MLE. It would also make the reading of several loosely stated steps exact (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The obvious argument plugs a consistent estimator into the optimizer and bounds the regret by the estimation error. It fails twice. The error of z^i\hat z_iz^i​ is of order Ii−1−1/2I_{i-1}^{-1/2}Ii−1−1/2​, so a Lipschitz bound on the profit would give regret of order Ii/Ii−1I_i/\sqrt{I_{i-1}}Ii​/Ii−1​​ per stage, which is too large. The 1/n1/n1/n rate of Theorem B1 needs the first-order condition at an interior optimum and the exact gap δ\deltaδ between optimal and suboptimal discrete levels. Second, the data are censored and dependent. The censoring level yty_tyt​ depends on carried inventory, which depends on past demand and on past prices. The classical large-deviation results for maximum likelihood assume i.i.d. uncensored samples (Borovkov 1998) and do not apply. Proposition 1 needs a separate argument that the inventory target is reached in most periods with high probability.

Formalization scope

The model is encoded with a scalar parameter. P\mathcal PP, Y\mathcal YY and Z\mathcal ZZ are as above. The pmf is positive exactly on {dl,…,dh}\{d^l,\dots,d^h\}{dl,…,dh} and sums to one, and dh=+∞d^h=+\inftydh=+∞ is allowed. The expected profit GGG is built from these sums. G∗(z)G^*(z)G∗(z) is the finite maximum max⁡yG(py∗(z),y,z)\max_{y}G(p^*_y(z),y,z)maxy​G(py∗​(z),y,z) for a price selection p∗p^*p∗, not a real supremum. Periods are 0-based in Lean, while stages keep the paper's indices. Expectations and probabilities are sums over demand paths d∈NTd\in\mathbb N^Td∈NT weighted by ∏tf(dt;pt,z)\prod_tf(d_t;p_t,z)∏t​f(dt​;pt​,z), the law of the path under the algorithm, taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. Every regret summand is nonnegative.

Algorithm-I reads demand only through sales. Step 2's arg max is any maximizer of the censored product likelihood, which exists by compactness. Step 3's arg max is y^\hat yy^​, any maximizer of y↦G(py∗(z^),y,z^)y\mapsto G(p^*_y(\hat z),y,\hat z)y↦G(py∗​(z^),y,z^), together with the price py^∗(z^)p^*_{\hat y}(\hat z)py^​∗​(z^) of Assumption A(iii). This is the decision the proof of Theorem B1 analyses. Proposition 1's "large enough iii" is read as "large enough TTT, uniformly in the stage and in ϵ\epsilonϵ". Theorem B1 is stated for a scalar price and level and a parameter in Rk\mathbb R^kRk.

Three hypotheses are added and disclosed. Differentiability of fff in zzz is presupposed by Assumption 1. Finiteness of the mean demand is needed for (4) when dh=∞d^h=\inftydh=∞. The condition dl≤yld^l\le y^ldl≤yl is needed because Step 1 defines the target only for y^≥dl\hat y\ge d^ly^​≥dl. "The optimal order-up-to level exceeds dld^ldl" is read for every optimal level.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out. Regret and probabilities are path sums of nonnegative terms, not Bochner integrals that vanish on non-integrable inputs. T1/(m+1)T^{1/(m+1)}T1/(m+1) is a real power. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: a Bernoulli instance with Y={1}\mathcal Y=\{1\}Y={1}, P=[1,2]\mathcal P=[1,2]P=[1,2], Z=[2/3,4/5]\mathcal Z=[2/3,4/5]Z=[2/3,4/5], f(0;p,z)=zp/2f(0;p,z)=zp/2f(0;p,z)=zp/2 satisfies all of them, together with explicit selections, and this has been verified in Lean.

A complete development needs the following:

  • Hoeffding-type concentration for dependent bounded sums;
  • a large-deviation bound for the censored log-likelihood;
  • Taylor's theorem with integral remainder on an interval;
  • bookkeeping lemmas for the stage lengths ⌈Ti/(m+1)⌉\lceil T^{i/(m+1)}\rceil⌈Ti/(m+1)⌉.

Theorem B1 and the model definitions are reusable for the paper's later results (Theorems 3, 5, 6), which repeat these arguments. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, including alternative proofs of Proposition 1.

Selected references

  • B. Chen, X. Chao, Y. Wang, Data-Based Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Control with Censored Demand and Limited Price Changes, Operations Research (technical note), 2020; read in the SSRN revision of 2020-02-10. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1993, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2700747
  • W. C. Cheung, D. Simchi-Levi, H. Wang, Dynamic Pricing and Demand Learning with Limited Price Experimentation, Operations Research 65(6), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1629
  • J. Broder, P. Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • A. A. Borovkov, Mathematical Statistics, Gordon and Breach, 1998.
  • A. V. den Boer, Dynamic pricing and learning: Historical origins, current research, and new directions, Surveys in Operations Research and Management Science 20(1), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sorms.2015.03.001
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimization-Based Scenario Reduction for Data-Driven Two-Stage Stochastic Optimization II: Under a Symmetric Uncertainty Law the Mean Solves the Convex Upper-Bound Scenario ProblemResearch Paper

Why reduce scenarios with the cost in view

A two-stage stochastic programme chooses a decision zzz before an uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ is revealed and pays a cost c(z;ξ)c(z;\xi)c(z;ξ). When ξ\xiξ is known only through nnn data points, or through a law with many atoms, the expected cost is expensive to optimize, and practitioners replace the law by a small set of mmm reduced scenarios. Classical scenario reduction chooses these scenarios to be close to the data in a Wasserstein distance, without looking at the cost (Dupačová, Gröwe-Kuska and Römisch, 2003; Rujeerapaiboon, Schindler, Kuhn and Wiesemann, 2022). Bertsimas and Mundru (Operations Research, 2023) propose problem-dependent scenario reduction: the distance between two scenarios measures how much the optimal decision for one costs when evaluated on the other. Their method needs, for each cluster of data, the scenario that minimizes a cost-dependent dissimilarity, which they replace by a convex upper bound, problem (16).

Theorem 3 of the paper is the sanity check for that upper bound. For the simplest cost to which it applies and a single reduced scenario (m=1m=1m=1), under a symmetry assumption on the law, the minimizer of the upper bound is the mean of ξ\xiξ, which is also what Wasserstein scenario reduction returns for m=1m=1m=1. This mission formalizes that statement.

Setting

Decisions and parameters both live in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, with the Euclidean inner product z′ξz'\xiz′ξ. The feasible set is a polytope

Z={z∈R+d:Pz≤q},\mathcal Z = \{ z\in\mathbb R^d_+ : Pz\le q\},Z={z∈R+d​:Pz≤q},

for a matrix P∈Rr×dP\in\mathbb R^{r\times d}P∈Rr×d and a vector q∈Rrq\in\mathbb R^rq∈Rr, assumed nonempty and bounded. The cost is c(z;ξ)=max⁡{z′ξ,0}c(z;\xi)=\max\{z'\xi,0\}c(z;ξ)=max{z′ξ,0}, a special case of the piecewise bilinear costs max⁡1≤t≤kz′Atξ\max_{1\le t\le k} z'A_t\ximax1≤t≤k​z′At​ξ of (15) (take k=2k=2k=2, A1=IA_1=IA1​=I, A2=0A_2=0A2​=0).

An optimal-decision map is any function z∗:Rd→Rdz^*:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb R^dz∗:Rd→Rd with z∗(ξ)∈arg⁡min⁡z∈Zz′ξz^*(\xi)\in\arg\min_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'\xiz∗(ξ)∈argminz∈Z​z′ξ for every ξ\xiξ; for a vector vvv, Z∗(v)=arg⁡min⁡z∈Zz′v\mathcal Z^*(v)=\arg\min_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'vZ∗(v)=argminz∈Z​z′v is the whole set of minimizers. The set of cost-reducing parameters is

U={ξ:min⁡z∈Zz′ξ<0}.\mathcal U=\Big\{\xi : \min_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'\xi<0\Big\}.U={ξ:z∈Zmin​z′ξ<0}.

For a candidate reduced scenario ζ∈Rd\zeta\in\mathbb R^dζ∈Rd, the per-scenario upper-bound loss is

L(ξ,ζ)=max⁡{max⁡z∈Zz′(ξ−2ζ), 0}+2max⁡{z∗(ξ)′ζ, 0}.L(\xi,\zeta)=\max\Big\{\max_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'(\xi-2\zeta),\,0\Big\}+2\max\{z^*(\xi)'\zeta,\,0\}.L(ξ,ζ)=max{z∈Zmax​z′(ξ−2ζ),0}+2max{z∗(ξ)′ζ,0}.

For this cost it is the optimal value, in the auxiliary variables (λ,θ,γ)(\lambda,\theta,\gamma)(λ,θ,γ), of the per-point linear programme in (16). With a random parameter ξ\xiξ of law μ\muμ, the upper-bound objective for m=1m=1m=1 is E[L(ξ,ζ)]\mathbb E[L(\xi,\zeta)]E[L(ξ,ζ)]. The squared cost for Wasserstein reduction to one atom is W(ζ)=∫∥ξ−ζ∥22 dμW(\zeta)=\int\|\xi-\zeta\|_2^2\,d\muW(ζ)=∫∥ξ−ζ∥22​dμ; (4) takes its square root, which preserves minimizers.

Assumption 5 (p. 24) asks:

  • (a) ξ\xiξ has a continuous distribution on U\mathcal UU and density 000 elsewhere;
  • (b) the mean ξˉ=E[ξ]\bar\xi=\mathbb E[\xi]ξˉ​=E[ξ] is finite and z∗(ξˉ)′ξˉ>0z^*(\bar\xi)'\bar\xi>0z∗(ξˉ​)′ξˉ​>0;
  • (c) the law of ξ\xiξ is symmetric about ξˉ\bar\xiξˉ​, that is, ξ\xiξ and 2ξˉ−ξ2\bar\xi-\xi2ξˉ​−ξ are equal in distribution.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 24)

Under Assumption 5, for every measurable optimal-decision map z∗z^*z∗,

E[L(ξ,ξˉ)]  ≤  E[L(ξ,ζ)]andW(ξˉ)≤W(ζ)for all ζ∈Rd.\mathbb E\big[L(\xi,\bar\xi)\big]\;\le\;\mathbb E\big[L(\xi,\zeta)\big]\quad\text{and}\quad W(\bar\xi)\le W(\zeta)\qquad\text{for all }\zeta\in\mathbb R^d.E[L(ξ,ξˉ​)]≤E[L(ξ,ζ)]andW(ξˉ​)≤W(ζ)for all ζ∈Rd.

The page's "the solution … is simply the mean" is read as "the mean is a minimizer", which is what the proof concludes; uniqueness is not claimed.

Milestones (steps of the proof, pp. 24–25)

  1. For each ξ\xiξ, ζ↦L(ξ,ζ)\zeta\mapsto L(\xi,\zeta)ζ↦L(ξ,ζ) is convex.
  2. L(ξ,ζ)≤∣max⁡z∈Zz′(ξ−2ζ)∣+2∣ζ′z∗(ξ)∣≤(∥ξ−2ζ∥1+2∥ζ∥1)max⁡z∈Z∥z∥∞≤(∥ξ∥1+4∥ζ∥1)max⁡z∈Z∥z∥∞L(\xi,\zeta)\le\big|\max_{z\in\mathcal Z} z'(\xi-2\zeta)\big|+2|\zeta'z^*(\xi)|\le(\|\xi-2\zeta\|_1+2\|\zeta\|_1)\max_{z\in\mathcal Z}\|z\|_\infty\le(\|\xi\|_1+4\|\zeta\|_1)\max_{z\in\mathcal Z}\|z\|_\inftyL(ξ,ζ)≤​maxz∈Z​z′(ξ−2ζ)​+2∣ζ′z∗(ξ)∣≤(∥ξ−2ζ∥1​+2∥ζ∥1​)maxz∈Z​∥z∥∞​≤(∥ξ∥1​+4∥ζ∥1​)maxz∈Z​∥z∥∞​.
  3. With probability one, 2ξˉ−ξ∈U2\bar\xi-\xi\in\mathcal U2ξˉ​−ξ∈U and Z∗(2ξˉ−ξ)\mathcal Z^*(2\bar\xi-\xi)Z∗(2ξˉ​−ξ) is a singleton.
  4. Under symmetry, E[z∗(2ξˉ−ξ)]=E[z∗(ξ)]\mathbb E[z^*(2\bar\xi-\xi)]=\mathbb E[z^*(\xi)]E[z∗(2ξˉ​−ξ)]=E[z∗(ξ)].
  5. If z∗(ξˉ)′ξˉ>0z^*(\bar\xi)'\bar\xi>0z∗(ξˉ​)′ξˉ​>0 then z′ξˉ≥z∗(ξˉ)′ξˉ>0z'\bar\xi\ge z^*(\bar\xi)'\bar\xi>0z′ξˉ​≥z∗(ξˉ​)′ξˉ​>0 for every z∈Zz\in\mathcal Zz∈Z.

Significance

The upper bound (16) is the computational core of the paper's Algorithm 1: each alternating-minimization step solves one instance of it per cluster. Theorem 3 is the only result in the paper that identifies its minimizer in closed form, and it shows that, in a symmetric case, the cost-aware reduction agrees with the classical one at m=1m=1m=1. It is the paper's justification that the upper bound is a sensible surrogate and not an arbitrary convex relaxation.

The argument is a variant of the mean-minimizes-the-surrogate result of Elmachtoub and Grigas for the SPO+ loss (Management Science, 2022, Proposition 6(a)), with both terms clipped at zero and with a law living only on U\mathcal UU instead of all of Rd\mathbb R^dRd. Theorem 3 is proved on paper; it has not been formalized, and on Prove2Me the Elmachtoub–Grigas statement is posed but open. The work here is to formalize the known proof, including the measure-theoretic steps the paper treats in one sentence each: integrability of the loss, exchange of the subdifferential and the expectation, and the almost-sure uniqueness of linear minimizers over a polytope.

Difficulty

Convexity of the objective and a vanishing subgradient at ξˉ\bar\xiξˉ​ would settle the theorem, but two steps of that argument are not routine. First, the objective is not differentiable everywhere, and the subdifferential of ζ↦E[L(ξ,ζ)]\zeta\mapsto\mathbb E[L(\xi,\zeta)]ζ↦E[L(ξ,ζ)] is not in general the expectation of the pointwise subdifferentials: the exchange needs the integrable bound of milestone 2 and the almost-sure uniqueness of milestone 3. Second, that uniqueness is a statement about the geometry of polytopes and about the law of the reflected parameter 2ξˉ−ξ2\bar\xi-\xi2ξˉ​−ξ together: neither convexity nor absolute continuity alone gives it. The clipping at zero adds a third point: one has to check that it is inactive at ζ=ξˉ\zeta=\bar\xiζ=ξˉ​ almost surely, which is where Assumption 5a's support condition on U\mathcal UU and Assumption 5b enter. Dropping either half of Assumption 5a breaks the argument: a two-atom symmetric law can put both atoms where Z∗(2ξˉ−ξ)\mathcal Z^*(2\bar\xi-\xi)Z∗(2ξˉ​−ξ) is a whole edge, and a law charging the complement of U\mathcal UU can make the first clipping active at ξˉ\bar\xiξˉ​.

Formalization scope

  • Rd\mathbb R^dRd is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and z′ξz'\xiz′ξ is ⟪z, ξ⟫_ℝ. Decision and parameter spaces coincide (nz=dn_z=dnz​=d), as the cost z′ξz'\xiz′ξ requires.
  • Z\mathcal ZZ is polytope P qv, with the hypotheses that it is nonempty and bounded (§1 of the paper assumes Z\mathcal ZZ nonempty and compact; the polytope is closed).
  • The maximum and minimum of z′vz'vz′v over Z\mathcal ZZ and the argmin set are the published definitions SmartPTO.Fisher.xi, SmartPTO.Fisher.zstar and SmartPTO.Fisher.Wstar; "symmetric about its mean" is the published SmartPTO.Fisher.CentrallySymmetric.
  • z∗z^*z∗ is a function zsel with the hypothesis that zsel ξ is a minimizer for every ξ\xiξ, and it is assumed measurable (needed for E[z∗(ξ)]\mathbb E[z^*(\xi)]E[z∗(ξ)]; not on the page). The theorem holds for every such selection; uniqueness of minimizers is not assumed.
  • The law is a probability measure μ\muμ. Assumption 5a is two hypotheses: μ≪\mu\llμ≪ Lebesgue and μ(Rd∖U)=0\mu(\mathbb R^d\setminus\mathcal U)=0μ(Rd∖U)=0. Full support is not assumed and would contradict the second. Assumption 5b is integrability of ξ\xiξ plus z∗(ξˉ)′ξˉ>0z^*(\bar\xi)'\bar\xi>0z∗(ξˉ​)′ξˉ​>0 with ξˉ=∫ξ dμ\bar\xi=\int\xi\,d\muξˉ​=∫ξdμ.
  • The goal is stated on E[L(ξ,ζ)]\mathbb E[L(\xi,\zeta)]E[L(ξ,ζ)], the first display of the proof, not on the linear programme (16) with its auxiliary variables; for this cost the two coincide by LP duality (Proposition 3's proof), and Theorem 3 is the population, m=1m=1m=1 version.
  • Expectations are Bochner integrals, which return 000 for non-integrable integrands. Under the stated hypotheses ξ↦L(ξ,ζ)\xi\mapsto L(\xi,\zeta)ξ↦L(ξ,ζ) is dominated by (∥ξ∥1+4∥ζ∥1)max⁡z∈Z∥z∥∞(\|\xi\|_1+4\|\zeta\|_1)\max_{z\in\mathcal Z}\|z\|_\infty(∥ξ∥1​+4∥ζ∥1​)maxz∈Z​∥z∥∞​ and is integrable, so the goal is not satisfied by junk values; integrability and measurability hypotheses must not be weakened.
  • The Wasserstein clause uses an extended nonnegative integral for WWW. This expresses the theorem without adding a second-moment hypothesis absent from Assumption 5. With a finite second moment it is the usual squared Wasserstein objective; with an infinite second moment every one-atom value is infinite, so the clause has only the extended-value meaning.

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: support functions of polytopes and their directional derivatives; the fact that a linear function has a unique minimizer over a polytope for Lebesgue-almost every cost vector; differentiation of convex integral functionals under the integral sign. Contributions of any of these as stand-alone lemmas are welcome.

The source is the authors' accepted manuscript (MIT DSpace, "Submitted to Operations Research"), not the published article; all page and theorem numbers refer to the manuscript, whose printed page numbers equal its PDF page numbers.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas and N. Mundru, Optimization-based Scenario Reduction for Data-Driven Two-stage Stochastic Optimization, Operations Research, 2023 (author manuscript, MIT DSpace). https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2265
  • A. N. Elmachtoub and P. Grigas, Smart "Predict, then Optimize", Management Science 68(1), 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3922
  • J. Dupačová, N. Gröwe-Kuska and W. Römisch, Scenario reduction in stochastic programming: an approach using probability metrics, Mathematical Programming 95, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0331-0
  • N. Rujeerapaiboon, K. Schindler, D. Kuhn and W. Wiesemann, Scenario Reduction Revisited: Fundamental Limits and Guarantees, Mathematical Programming 191, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-018-1269-1
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Probability·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers: Over Horizon T the Simple Robust Pricing Policy Earns at Least V*_β(x₀)/(1 + e^{−βT}/(βT))Research Paper

Motivation

A seller with a fixed stock must choose prices before knowing when customers will arrive or what they will be willing to pay. If customers can wait for a later price, the seller must also account for how today's price changes their purchasing decisions. Chen and Farias study this problem with strategic customers and identify a simple inventory-based policy that can be compared with the best attainable revenue. Their Theorem 1 shows that this policy, with discount rate β=1/(1.42T)\beta=1/(1.42T)β=1/(1.42T) for a season of length TTT, earns at least 0.290.290.29 of the optimal expected revenue. The policy posts the price that is optimal in the canonical discounted revenue-management problem with myopic customers (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994; Farias and Van Roy, 2010) at the current inventory level. This mission targets the lower-bound half of its argument, stated as Lemma 9: a comparison between the policy's revenue over a fixed selling season and a discounted, infinite-horizon value. The latter comparison is meaningful independently of the paper's strategic-customer benchmark.

Setting

The seller begins with inventory x0∈Nx_0\in\mathbb Nx0​∈N and sells at most one item to each customer. Customers arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0. Their nonnegative valuations have density fff with total mass one. Write Fˉ(p)=∫p∞f(v) dv\bar F(p)=\int_p^\infty f(v)\,dvFˉ(p)=∫p∞​f(v)dv for the probability that a valuation exceeds price ppp. A customer who behaves myopically buys at a posted price ppp exactly when the valuation is high enough, so sales occur at rate λFˉ(p)\lambda\bar F(p)λFˉ(p) while that price is posted.

The paper's Assumption 1 concerns the virtual value ψ(p)=p−Fˉ(p)/f(p)\psi(p)=p-\bar F(p)/f(p)ψ(p)=p−Fˉ(p)/f(p): it is nondecreasing on nonnegative prices and has a nonnegative root. The simple policy is built from a discount rate β>0\beta>0β>0 and an infinite-horizon Bellman value V:N→RV:\mathbb N\to\mathbb RV:N→R. It has V(0)=0V(0)=0V(0)=0 and, for x≥1x\ge1x≥1, satisfies the sign-corrected recursion

βV(x)=sup⁡p≥0λFˉ(p)(p+V(x−1)−V(x)).\beta V(x)=\sup_{p\ge0}\lambda\bar F(p)\bigl(p+V(x-1)-V(x)\bigr).βV(x)=p≥0sup​λFˉ(p)(p+V(x−1)−V(x)).

At inventory x≥1x\ge1x≥1 the root price π(x)\pi(x)π(x) is the unique nonnegative solution of ψ(π(x))=V(x)−V(x−1)\psi(\pi(x))=V(x)-V(x-1)ψ(π(x))=V(x)−V(x−1). The price posted just before a sale is π(x)\pi(x)π(x), and the inventory then becomes x−1x-1x−1. At zero inventory the posted price is infinity and there are no more sales. The expected sum of prices paid at sales by time TTT is denoted J(x0,T)J(x_0,T)J(x0​,T). These objects come from §§2–3.1 of the paper.

Formalization targets

The goal is Lemma 9, for every λ,β,T>0\lambda,\beta,T>0λ,β,T>0 and every initial inventory x0x_0x0​:

V(x0)≤(1+e−βTβT)J(x0,T).V(x_0)\le\left(1+\frac{e^{-\beta T}}{\beta T}\right)J(x_0,T).V(x0​)≤(1+βTe−βT​)J(x0​,T).

The coefficient is part of the target. No choice of β\betaβ is fixed. The milestones follow the results stated in the paper: inventory monotonicity of VVV, price monotonicity, pathwise monotonicity of the price and its revenue rate (Lemma 7), the expected-rate identity, revenue-per-time monotonicity (Lemma 8), the identification of VVV with discounted policy revenue, and the comparison through an independent exponential horizon. The last milestone evaluates E[max⁡{1,X/T}]\mathbb E[\max\{1,X/T\}]E[max{1,X/T}] exactly for X∼Exp⁡(β)X\sim\operatorname{Exp}(\beta)X∼Exp(β).

Significance

The bound quantifies how much of the discounted value this explicit policy earns within a finite selling season. Its factor depends only on the dimensionless product βT\beta TβT; it does not depend on inventory, arrival rate or valuation density. Together with the paper's separate upper bound on its strategic benchmark, Lemma 9 contributes to the advertised 0.290.290.29 comparison. The full comparison requires definitions and equilibrium arguments beyond this mission, so the goal here is precisely the fixed-horizon lower bound.

Chen and Farias proved these statements in the published paper. The Lean items in this proposal are statements awaiting machine-checked proofs. A completed development would establish the discounted-value verification step and the fixed-horizon comparison for an explicit pure-death sales process. Its constructions of inventory-dependent sale times and finite-horizon revenue could also be reused in other pricing models with Poisson arrivals.

Difficulty

The Bellman value is specified by an optimization equation, while J(x0,T)J(x_0,T)J(x0​,T) is defined from the actual sales process. Their equality at an exponential horizon does not follow by unfolding a definition. The price chosen through the virtual-value equation must be connected to the Bellman optimum, and the inventory-dependent process must be related to the same value. The paper also relies on the fact that the root price falls as inventory rises, citing Lemma 1 of Farias and Van Roy; that fact does not follow merely from monotonicity of ψ\psiψ without control of the marginal values V(x)−V(x−1)V(x)-V(x-1)V(x)−V(x−1). Lemma 8 then concerns expected revenue over two different horizons, including paths that sell out early.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses a nonnegative integrable density on R\mathbb RR, zero on negative valuations and normalized to mass one. It adds f(p)>0f(p)>0f(p)>0 for every p≥0p\ge0p≥0. This disclosed condition excludes bounded-support densities: without it the paper's quotient Fˉ(p)/f(p)\bar F(p)/f(p)Fˉ(p)/f(p) can divide by zero and Lean would assign a spurious value. The paper says the root equation has a unique solution under Assumption 1, but nondecreasing ψ\psiψ alone does not guarantee existence or uniqueness. Accordingly, the root policy is characterized by its equation and an explicit uniqueness condition. The Bellman recursion uses a least-upper-bound predicate rather than a real supremum with a default value on an empty or unbounded set. The corrected sign in the recursion matches the paper's root equation and discounted-revenue equation.

For stock x0x_0x0​, the model uses x0x_0x0​ independent rate-one exponential clocks. At inventory xxx, the next holding time is the next clock divided by λFˉ(π(x))\lambda\bar F(\pi(x))λFˉ(π(x)). Sales are numbered 1,…,x01,\ldots,x_01,…,x0​, and sale kkk earns π(x0−k+1)\pi(x_0-k+1)π(x0​−k+1). The law is the myopic sales process with intensity λFˉ(π(x))\lambda\bar F(\pi(x))λFˉ(π(x)). Expected revenues are lower integrals in the extended nonnegative reals; nonnegative prices make their real-to-extended conversion exact. An independent X∼Exp⁡(β)X\sim\operatorname{Exp}(\beta)X∼Exp(β) is represented by an outer integral over its law. The factor λ\lambdaλ missing from the paper's printed compensator display is restored, and the paper's intermediate 1+e−βT/T1+e^{-\beta T}/T1+e−βT/T is read with the missing β\betaβ restored.

The strategic-customer types, stopping rules, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and the identification of the strategic policy's revenue with myopic-sales revenue are not formalized here. Neither are Theorem 1's OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT and J∗J^*J∗ benchmarks: their specification is not pinned down sufficiently in the paper for this proposal. In particular, JJJ is constructed from sale times and payments, never from VVV, and VVV is specified by the Bellman equation, never as the policy's revenue. Contributions toward the goal include the individual milestones and reusable facts about the clock process, its revenue, and the exponential horizon.

Selected references

  • Y. Chen and V. F. Farias, Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers, Mathematics of Operations Research 43(4):1119–1142, 2018. DOI: 10.1287/moor.2017.0897.
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999.
  • V. F. Farias and B. Van Roy, Dynamic Pricing with a Prior on Market Response, Operations Research 58(1):16–29, 2010. DOI: 10.1287/opre.1090.0729.
  • P. Brémaud, Point Processes and Queues: Martingale Dynamics, Springer, 1981. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4684-9477-8.
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Personalized Dynamic Pricing with Machine Learning: High-Dimensional Features and Heterogeneous Elasticity 1: Under Known Sparsity, ILSX Pricing Has Regret at Most Cs√T log TResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who changes prices while learning demand faces two costs: a price experiment may earn less revenue now, while insufficient experimentation leaves later prices poorly calibrated. Customer features make the balance harder because both willingness to buy and sensitivity to price may vary between customers. Ban and Keskin study this problem when the number of recorded features can be large relative to the selling horizon. Their known-support policy, ILSX, provides the upper bound formalized here Ban and Keskin, 2021, §§2 and 4.1.

The paper's result is a statement about learning a demand model while serving sequential customers, rather than about fitting that model after all observations are available. A price at period ttt must use information then available, including the arriving customer's features but excluding that customer's demand shock. The seller therefore needs a policy whose expected revenue loss can be bounded uniformly over the unknown parameters in a specified model Ban and Keskin, 2021, pp. 5552–5556.

Setting

In each period t=1,2,…t=1,2,\ldotst=1,2,…, a customer arrives with a feature vector Zt∈RdZ_t\in\mathbb R^dZt​∈Rd. The seller observes the augmented vector Xt=[1;Zt]X_t=[1;Z_t]Xt​=[1;Zt​], posts a price pt∈[ℓ,u]p_t\in[\ell,u]pt​∈[ℓ,u] with 0<ℓ<u0<\ell<u0<ℓ<u, and then observes demand. In the linear demand model, demand equals

Dt=α⋅Xt+(β⋅Xt)pt+εt.D_t=\alpha\cdot X_t+(\beta\cdot X_t)p_t+\varepsilon_t.Dt​=α⋅Xt​+(β⋅Xt​)pt​+εt​.

The intercept and slope vectors α,β\alpha,\betaα,β are unknown. The seller knows the sparsity structure S\mathcal SS: outside this set of coordinate indices, both parameter vectors vanish. The compressed parameter θS=(αS,βS)\theta_{\mathcal S}=(\alpha_{\mathcal S},\beta_{\mathcal S})θS​=(αS​,βS​) lies in a compact coordinate rectangle ΘS\Theta_{\mathcal S}ΘS​, and s=∣S∣≥1s=|\mathcal S|\ge1s=∣S∣≥1. The compressed customer vector is XS,t=(Xt,i)i∈SX_{\mathcal S,t}=(X_{t,i})_{i\in\mathcal S}XS,t​=(Xt,i​)i∈S​ Ban and Keskin, 2021, pp. 5552–5555.

At price ppp, expected single-period revenue is r(p,θS,x)=p[αS⋅x+(βS⋅x)p]r(p,\theta_{\mathcal S},x)=p[\alpha_{\mathcal S}\cdot x+(\beta_{\mathcal S}\cdot x)p]r(p,θS​,x)=p[αS​⋅x+(βS​⋅x)p]. The clairvoyant price is φ(θS,x)=−(αS⋅x)/(2βS⋅x)\varphi(\theta_{\mathcal S},x)=-(\alpha_{\mathcal S}\cdot x)/(2\beta_{\mathcal S}\cdot x)φ(θS​,x)=−(αS​⋅x)/(2βS​⋅x) when the slope is negative. The paper assumes this price is in (ℓ,u)(\ell,u)(ℓ,u) throughout its model domain. Expected regret ΔθSπ(T)\Delta^{\pi}_{\theta_{\mathcal S}}(T)ΔθS​π​(T) is the expected sum, through period TTT, of the clairvoyant revenue minus the revenue at the policy's price Ban and Keskin, 2021, (2)–(4), p. 5553–5554.

The ILSX policy charges one fixed experimental price m1m_1m1​ at periods 1,4,9,…1,4,9,\ldots1,4,9,… and a distinct price m2m_2m2​ at periods 2,5,10,…2,5,10,\ldots2,5,10,…. At every other period it estimates the compressed demand parameter by least squares using experimental observations, projects the estimate onto ΘS\Theta_{\mathcal S}ΘS​, and applies φ\varphiφ to the projected estimate and the current customer vector. Both prices lie in [ℓ,u][\ell,u][ℓ,u] Ban and Keskin, 2021, (7), (8), (12), pp. 5555–5556.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 2: for the stated model and ILSX policy, a finite positive constant CCC exists such that

ΔθSILSX(m1,m2)(T)≤CsTlog⁡T(θS∈ΘS, T≥2).\Delta^{\mathrm{ILSX}(m_1,m_2)}_{\theta_{\mathcal S}}(T)\le Cs\sqrt T\log T\qquad(\theta_{\mathcal S}\in\Theta_{\mathcal S},\ T\ge2).ΔθS​ILSX(m1​,m2​)​(T)≤CsT​logT(θS​∈ΘS​, T≥2).

The constant is chosen after the model, shock process, experimental prices, and estimator selection are fixed, but before the parameter and horizon. The theorem and Remark 5 are on pp. 5556–5557 of Ban and Keskin, 2021.

The milestones reproduce the paper's route into this claim: the experimental-period count following (7); the growth bound (15) for the price-variation statistic JtJ_tJt​; Lemma 1's minimum-eigenvalue probability bound for the experimental information matrix J~S,t\widetilde{\mathcal J}_{\mathcal S,t}J​S,t​; and Lemma 2's high-probability bound for its noise-driven estimation error. The least-squares error identity (11) is included as a supporting item on invertible samples, not as a milestone. The constants and thresholds in these targets remain existential where the article leaves them existential Ban and Keskin, 2021, pp. 5555–5556.

Significance

The theorem gives a guarantee for a concrete pricing policy under feature-dependent price sensitivity. The bound grows with the horizon at order Tlog⁡T\sqrt T\log TT​logT for a fixed known support, with an explicit factor sss in the published statement. It lets a seller compare the cost of this policy with the revenue of a seller who knew the demand coefficients before pricing. The paper presents its result as matching its lower-bound benchmark up to logarithmic factors, under the paper's respective hypotheses Ban and Keskin, 2021, Theorems 1–2, pp. 5554–5556.

The mathematical result was published in 2021. This mission seeks a machine-checked statement and proof of the known-support guarantee and its stated intermediate results. The checked Prove2Me prior-art catalog contains featureless dynamic-pricing results and separate least-squares results, but no matching formalization of ILSX. A completed development would add reusable definitions for a feature-dependent price regressor, experimental information matrix, nonanticipating estimator selection, and expected regret. The article places its proofs in an electronic companion, which is not included in the held source PDF; this mission does not reproduce those proofs as source material.

Difficulty

The policy learns from a sparse set of deliberately chosen periods, while its regret accumulates at every period. A pointwise least-squares identity alone does not control the regret: the information matrix can be singular at early periods, and the customer features and shocks are random. In particular, the printed inverse identity (11) says “for all t≥2t\ge2t≥2”, although at t=2t=2t=2 the matrix has rank at most two and cannot be invertible when s≥2s\ge2s≥2. The formal statement therefore confines the inverse identity to invertible samples. Lemma 2's event also includes invertibility so a default inverse of a singular matrix cannot make its error bound automatic Ban and Keskin, 2021, (9)–(11), Lemma 2, p. 5556.

Formalization scope

Lean uses one-based periods and a support subtype of the augmented feature coordinates. Coordinate zero is the paper's intercept coordinate one. The parameter has coordinates (j,i)(j,i)(j,i) for demand intercept or price slope j∈{0,1}j\in\{0,1\}j∈{0,1} and support index i∈Si\in\mathcal Si∈S. The regressor [1;p]⊗XS,t[1;p]\otimes X_{\mathcal S,t}[1;p]⊗XS,t​ gives the information matrix in (10). Euclidean squared norms are explicit sums of squares, and the minimum-eigenvalue claim is the equivalent Rayleigh inequality. The parameter rectangle is nonempty, and its Euclidean projection is coordinatewise clamping.

The standing assumptions are d≥1d\ge1d≥1, s≥1s\ge1s≥1, 0<ℓ<u0<\ell<u0<ℓ<u, distinct experimental prices in [ℓ,u][\ell,u][ℓ,u], bounded i.i.d. features with mean zero and positive-definite covariance, and a fixed shock process with conditional mean zero, bounded conditional second moment, and finite conditional exponential moments near zero. The feature process is measurable and integrable. The model additionally states independence of the next customer's features from the past primitives, the reading of the paper's joint probability construction used here. The slope is negative and the clairvoyant price lies in (ℓ,u)(\ell,u)(ℓ,u) for every allowed parameter and realized feature. These conditions ensure that the price formula represents a genuine revenue maximum. The phrase about continuous features having positive measure in the interior of their domains is omitted because the page does not specify the domains or a reference measure Ban and Keskin, 2021, §2, pp. 5552–5554.

The estimator is any measurable minimizer of the experimental least-squares objective for histories with at least two observations. Its type depends only on earlier observations; at nonexperimental periods the recorded pseudo-observations are ignored by the objective. The shock law is fixed while the parameter varies. Expected regret uses a nonnegative integral, and conditional second and exponential moments use nonnegative conditional expectations. The theorem binds CCC before the parameter and horizon, while leaving support size fixed with the model. Consequently, the stronger uniformity in sss suggested by Remark 5 is outside this statement. These choices exclude vacuous integrals, unconstrained estimators, and accidental bounds from a singular matrix inverse. Work on the probability estimates, least-squares identity, and regret bound is welcome under these exact definitions.

Selected references

  • G.-Y. Ban and N. B. Keskin, Personalized Dynamic Pricing with Machine Learning: High-Dimensional Features and Heterogeneous Elasticity, Management Science 67(9):5549–5568, 2021. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3680.
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret in Online Combinatorial Optimization I: For Every Learning Rate the Exponentially Weighted Forecaster EXP2 Has Full-Information Regret at Least 0.01 d^{3/2}√n on Some Action SetResearch Paper

Motivation

Online combinatorial optimization is a repeated game in which a learner selects, round after round, a structured object (a subset of fixed size, a path, a matching, a spanning tree) encoded as a 0/1 vector, and an adversary assigns a cost to every coordinate. It models routing, ranking, scheduling and many other sequential decision problems in operations research and machine learning, and it contains prediction with expert advice as the special case of one-hot vectors.

The most widely used algorithm for this game is the exponentially weighted forecaster, which keeps a weight on every action and multiplies it by exp⁡(−η⋅loss)\exp(-\eta\cdot\text{loss})exp(−η⋅loss) after each round. Applied to a combinatorial action set it is called EXP2 (Audibert, Bubeck and Lugosi), or Expanded Hedge in the full-information case (Koolen, Warmuth and Kivinen, COLT 2010). Its standard analysis gives regret of order m3/2nlog⁡(d/m)m^{3/2}\sqrt{n\log(d/m)}m3/2nlog(d/m)​, while online mirror descent with the negative entropy (Component Hedge) achieves mnlog⁡(d/m)m\sqrt{n\log(d/m)}mnlog(d/m)​, which is optimal. Koolen, Warmuth and Kivinen left open whether a better tuning or a better analysis of EXP2 could close this gap.

Timeline.

  • 1997: Freund and Schapire analyse Hedge for experts.
  • 2010: Koolen, Warmuth and Kivinen introduce Component Hedge, prove the mnlog⁡(d/m)m\sqrt{n\log(d/m)}mnlog(d/m)​ bound, and ask whether Expanded Hedge can match it.
  • 2012–2014: Audibert, Bubeck and Lugosi (arXiv:1204.4710; Math. Oper. Res. 39(1), 2014) answer negatively: Theorem 1 exhibits an action set on which EXP2's full-information regret is at least 0.01 d3/2n0.01\,d^{3/2}\sqrt n0.01d3/2n​ for every learning rate.

Setting

Fix integers ddd (the dimension) and nnn (the number of rounds). An action set is a nonempty finite set A⊆{0,1}d\mathcal A\subseteq\{0,1\}^dA⊆{0,1}d whose elements all have the same number mmm of ones: ∥a∥1=m\|a\|_1=m∥a∥1​=m for every a∈Aa\in\mathcal Aa∈A. At each round t=1,…,nt=1,\dots,nt=1,…,n:

  1. the player chooses a probability distribution ptp_tpt​ on A\mathcal AA and draws at∼pta_t\sim p_tat​∼pt​;
  2. simultaneously, the adversary chooses a loss vector zt∈[0,1]dz_t\in[0,1]^dzt​∈[0,1]d;
  3. the player pays at⊤zta_t^\top z_tat⊤​zt​ and, in the full-information game, observes ztz_tzt​.

The regret after nnn rounds is

Rn=E∑t=1nat⊤zt−min⁡a∈AE∑t=1na⊤zt.R_n=\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n a_t^\top z_t-\min_{a\in\mathcal A}\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n a^\top z_t .Rn​=Et=1∑n​at⊤​zt​−a∈Amin​Et=1∑n​a⊤zt​.

EXP2 with learning rate η\etaη starts from the uniform distribution p1p_1p1​ on A\mathcal AA and updates, for every a∈Aa\in\mathcal Aa∈A,

pt+1(a)=exp⁡(−η a⊤zt) pt(a)∑b∈Aexp⁡(−η b⊤zt) pt(b).p_{t+1}(a)=\frac{\exp(-\eta\,a^\top z_t)\,p_t(a)}{\sum_{b\in\mathcal A}\exp(-\eta\,b^\top z_t)\,p_t(b)} .pt+1​(a)=∑b∈A​exp(−ηb⊤zt​)pt​(b)exp(−ηa⊤zt​)pt​(a)​.

In the Lean development IsBinaryActionSet A m is the action-set condition, exp2Weights A η z t is pt+1p_{t+1}pt+1​, and exp2Regret A η z n is RnR_nRn​ against a fixed loss sequence zzz. thmOneSet d, adv1 d and adv2 d ε are the action set and the two adversaries of the paper's proof.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 6)

For n≥dn\ge dn≥d with ddd a multiple of 444, there is an action set A⊆{0,1}d\mathcal A\subseteq\{0,1\}^dA⊆{0,1}d with constant ∥a∥1\|a\|_1∥a∥1​ such that for every η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0 some adversary with losses in [0,1]d[0,1]^d[0,1]d makes EXP2 pay

Rn ≥ 0.01 d3/2n.R_n\ \ge\ 0.01\,d^{3/2}\sqrt n .Rn​ ≥ 0.01d3/2n​.

The action set is chosen before the learning rate, and the adversary after it.

Milestones (App. A and App. C)

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 19): for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and 1≤c≤21\le c\le 21≤c≤2,
∑i=0k(1−i/k)(ki)2ci∑i=0k(ki)2ci ≥ 13.\frac{\sum_{i=0}^k(1-i/k)\binom ki^2c^i}{\sum_{i=0}^k\binom ki^2c^i}\ \ge\ \frac13 .∑i=0k​(ik​)2ci∑i=0k​(1−i/k)(ik​)2ci​ ≥ 31​.
  1. First adversary (p. 15): on the action set of App. A, against the alternating adversary, Rn=nd16tanh⁡ηd8R_n=\frac{nd}{16}\tanh\frac{\eta d}{8}Rn​=16nd​tanh8ηd​ for nnn even.
  2. Second adversary (p. 16): against the constant adversary with ε=min⁡(log⁡2/(ηn),1)\varepsilon=\min(\log2/(\eta n),1)ε=min(log2/(ηn),1), Rn≥min⁡(dlog⁡212η,nd12)R_n\ge\min\bigl(\frac{d\log2}{12\eta},\frac{nd}{12}\bigr)Rn​≥min(12ηdlog2​,12nd​) for η>0\eta>0η>0.
  3. Optimization over η\etaη (pp. 14–15): for every η>0\eta>0η>0,
max⁡(nd16tanh⁡ηd8, min⁡(dlog⁡212η,nd12)) ≥ min⁡(0.04 nd, 0.01 d3/2n).\max\Bigl(\tfrac{nd}{16}\tanh\tfrac{\eta d}{8},\ \min\bigl(\tfrac{d\log2}{12\eta},\tfrac{nd}{12}\bigr)\Bigr)\ \ge\ \min\bigl(0.04\,nd,\ 0.01\,d^{3/2}\sqrt n\bigr).max(16nd​tanh8ηd​, min(12ηdlog2​,12nd​)) ≥ min(0.04nd, 0.01d3/2n​).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 shows that the gap between EXP2 and mirror descent with the negative entropy is not an artefact of the analysis: on an action set with m=d/2m=d/2m=d/2, where the optimal rate is of order dnd\sqrt ndn​, no learning rate brings EXP2 below 0.01 d3/2n0.01\,d^{3/2}\sqrt n0.01d3/2n​. Exponential weights over the actions are therefore provably suboptimal in online combinatorial optimization, which motivates working with the convex hull of A\mathcal AA (mirror descent) rather than with the actions themselves. The construction is also a template for algorithm-specific lower bounds: two adversaries, one punishing large and one punishing small learning rates.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper (App. A, with Lemma 3 in App. C); to our knowledge none of it is machine-checked. A formalization yields a checked algorithm-specific lower bound for exponential weights, an exact closed-form regret computation for EXP2 on a structured action set, and a rigorous proof of Lemma 3, whose printed proof checks k≤106k\le10^6k≤106 numerically before an asymptotic argument with Stirling's formula.

Difficulty

The statements are elementary, but each step hides a real computation. The first adversary requires the exact distribution of EXP2 on a set of 2(d/2d/4)2\binom{d/2}{d/4}2(d/4d/2​) actions over alternating rounds, and a regret identity rather than a bound. The second requires controlling EXP2's expected loss over all nnn rounds against a constant adversary on the same exponentially large set. Lemma 3 is the hardest piece: at c=2c=2c=2 it is tight at k=1k=1k=1, while the ratio tends to 1−2/(1+2)≈0.4141-\sqrt2/(1+\sqrt2)\approx0.4141−2​/(1+2​)≈0.414 as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞; the printed proof verifies k≤106k\le10^6k≤106 numerically, so a formal proof needs an argument valid for every kkk. A naive attempt to prove the goal with a single adversary fails: one adversary only defeats either large or small learning rates.

Formalization scope

  • Actions are real vectors Fin d → ℝ with entries in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}, so a⊤za^\top za⊤z is the dot product. Coordinates and rounds are 0-based: the paper's odd rounds are the even indices.
  • EXP2 is defined by the recursion of Figure 2 with z~t=zt\tilde z_t=z_tz~t​=zt​, starting uniform on A\mathcal AA; its closed form pt(a)∝exp⁡(−η∑s<ta⊤zs)p_t(a)\propto\exp(-\eta\sum_{s<t}a^\top z_s)pt​(a)∝exp(−η∑s<t​a⊤zs​) is a consequence, not the definition.
  • The regret is defined against a deterministic, oblivious loss sequence, for which the expectation is a finite sum. Exhibiting such an adversary proves the paper's sup⁡adversary\sup_{\text{adversary}}supadversary​, since it is a special case of the paper's adaptive adversaries.
  • The minimum over A\mathcal AA is a Finset.inf'; every statement requires A\mathcal AA nonempty, so no junk value enters.
  • Added hypotheses: 4∣d4\mid d4∣d in the goal (the proof's own simplifying assumption; the printed statement fails at d=1d=1d=1, where any constant-norm A\mathcal AA is a singleton); η>0\eta>0η>0 and n≥1n\ge1n≥1 wherever 1/η1/\eta1/η or 1/(ηn)1/(\eta n)1/(ηn) appears. The goal does not assume nnn even, although App. A does; the second-adversary milestone does not need it either.
  • The action set of App. A is printed with "or"; it is formalized with exactly one of the two intervals filled, as the prose and the constant norm ∥a∥1=d/2\|a\|_1=d/2∥a∥1​=d/2 require.
  • Ruled out: an existential over η\etaη, an adversary chosen before η\etaη, an action set depending on η\etaη, unbounded losses, and an empty action set with a junk minimum would each make the goal trivial or different; the statement quantifies as above.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a proof of Lemma 3 by any method, and reusable lemmas on exponential weights (normalization, closed form, monotonicity of weights along a constant adversary). The paper's proofs are in its App. A and App. C.

Selected references

  • J.-Y. Audibert, S. Bubeck, G. Lugosi, Regret in Online Combinatorial Optimization, Math. Oper. Res. 39(1), 2014; arXiv:1204.4710v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4710
  • W. M. Koolen, M. K. Warmuth, J. Kivinen, Hedging Structured Concepts, Proceedings of COLT 2010 (reference [26] of the paper above).
  • Y. Freund, R. E. Schapire, A Decision-Theoretic Generalization of On-Line Learning and an Application to Boosting, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 55(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcss.1997.1504
  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Found. Trends Mach. Learn. 5(1), 2012; arXiv:1204.5721. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5721
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Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs I: Expected (α, β)-Balanced Prices Scaled by α/(1 + αβ) Earn 1/(1 + αβ) of the Expected Welfare of ALGResearch Paper

Motivation

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random values one at a time and must decide irrevocably, with a "prophet" who sees all values in advance. The classic result of Krengel, Sucheston and Garling (1977) and Samuel-Cahn (1984) says that for a single item and independent values a single threshold earns at least half of the expected maximum. In mechanism design the same inequalities describe posted-price mechanisms: a seller approaches buyers in sequence and offers each a menu of prices; each buyer takes the outcome it likes best. Such mechanisms are truthful, simple and online, so a prophet inequality for a feasibility constraint is a welfare guarantee for a practical selling procedure.

Before this paper, prophet inequalities were proved one constraint at a time (matroids, matroid intersections, polymatroids, unit-demand and combinatorial auctions), each with its own probabilistic argument. Dütting, Feldman, Kesselheim and Lucier (SIAM J. Comput. 49(3), 2020; conference version FOCS 2017) showed that a single extension theorem reduces all of them to a deterministic question about full-information instances.

Setting

There are nnn agents N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Agent iii has an outcome space XiX_iXi​ containing a null outcome ∅\varnothing∅. An outcome profile is x=(x1,…,xn)\mathbf x=(x_1,\dots,x_n)x=(x1​,…,xn​); x[i−1]\mathbf x_{[i-1]}x[i−1]​ is x\mathbf xx with the outcomes of agents i,…,ni,\dots,ni,…,n replaced by ∅\varnothing∅. The feasible profiles form a downward-closed set F\mathcal FF: removing outcomes keeps a profile feasible.

Agent iii's valuation vi:Xi→[0,1]v_i:X_i\to[0,1]vi​:Xi​→[0,1] is drawn independently from a known distribution Di\mathcal D_iDi​; D=∏iDi\mathcal D=\prod_i\mathcal D_iD=∏i​Di​. The welfare of x\mathbf xx is v(x)=∑ivi(xi)\mathbf v(\mathbf x)=\sum_iv_i(x_i)v(x)=∑i​vi​(xi​), and v(OPT(v,S))\mathbf v(\mathrm{OPT}(\mathbf v,S))v(OPT(v,S)) is the largest welfare over a set SSS of profiles. An outcome rule ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG maps each valuation profile to a feasible profile.

A pricing rule assigns a price pi(xi∣y)∈[0,∞]p_i(x_i\mid\mathbf y)\in[0,\infty]pi​(xi​∣y)∈[0,∞] to outcome xix_ixi​ offered to agent iii when the partial allocation is y\mathbf yy, with price ∞\infty∞ when xix_ixi​ cannot be feasibly added to y\mathbf yy. In the posted-price mechanism the agents are approached in index order; agent iii sees the prices given the allocation so far and takes an outcome maximizing its utility vi(xi)−pi(xi∣y)v_i(x_i)-p_i(x_i\mid\mathbf y)vi​(xi​)−pi​(xi​∣y).

A set H\mathcal HH of profiles is exchange compatible with x\mathbf xx if (yi,x−i)∈F(y_i,\mathbf x_{-i})\in\mathcal F(yi​,x−i​)∈F for every y∈H\mathbf y\in\mathcal Hy∈H and every iii. For a fixed valuation profile v\mathbf vv, a pricing rule pvp^{\mathbf v}pv is (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-balanced (Definition 3.1) with respect to ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG and an exchange-compatible family (Fx)x(\mathcal F_{\mathbf x})_{\mathbf x}(Fx​)x​ if for every x∈F\mathbf x\in\mathcal Fx∈F

(a)∑ipiv(xi∣x[i−1]) ≥ 1α(v(ALG(v))−v(OPT(v,Fx))),\text{(a)}\quad\sum_{i}p^{\mathbf v}_i(x_i\mid\mathbf x_{[i-1]})\ \ge\ \tfrac1\alpha\bigl(\mathbf v(\mathrm{ALG}(\mathbf v))-\mathbf v(\mathrm{OPT}(\mathbf v,\mathcal F_{\mathbf x}))\bigr),(a)i∑​piv​(xi​∣x[i−1]​) ≥ α1​(v(ALG(v))−v(OPT(v,Fx​))), (b)∑ipiv(xi′∣x[i−1]) ≤ β⋅v(OPT(v,Fx))for all x′∈Fx.\text{(b)}\quad\sum_{i}p^{\mathbf v}_i(x'_i\mid\mathbf x_{[i-1]})\ \le\ \beta\cdot\mathbf v(\mathrm{OPT}(\mathbf v,\mathcal F_{\mathbf x}))\quad\text{for all }\mathbf x'\in\mathcal F_{\mathbf x}.(b)i∑​piv​(xi′​∣x[i−1]​) ≤ β⋅v(OPT(v,Fx​))for all x′∈Fx​.

Property (a) says the prices paid by x\mathbf xx cover the welfare x\mathbf xx blocks; (b) says that what remains available is not overpriced.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (p. 549)

If every pv~p^{\tilde{\mathbf v}}pv~ is (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-balanced with respect to one exchange-compatible family, post δp\delta pδp with pi(xi∣y)=Ev~[piv~(xi∣y)]p_i(x_i\mid\mathbf y)=\mathbb E_{\tilde{\mathbf v}}[p^{\tilde{\mathbf v}}_i(x_i\mid\mathbf y)]pi​(xi​∣y)=Ev~​[piv~​(xi​∣y)] and δ=α/(1+αβ)\delta=\alpha/(1+\alpha\beta)δ=α/(1+αβ). Then the welfare x(v)\mathbf x(\mathbf v)x(v) of the mechanism satisfies

Ev[v(x(v))] ≥ 11+αβ Ev[v(ALG(v))].\mathbb E_{\mathbf v}\bigl[\mathbf v(\mathbf x(\mathbf v))\bigr]\ \ge\ \frac1{1+\alpha\beta}\,\mathbb E_{\mathbf v}\bigl[\mathbf v(\mathrm{ALG}(\mathbf v))\bigr].Ev​[v(x(v))] ≥ 1+αβ1​Ev​[v(ALG(v))].

Milestones

The steps of the paper's proof (pp. 549–550), in order: the prefix x[i−1](v)\mathbf x_{[i-1]}(\mathbf v)x[i−1]​(v) does not depend on viv_ivi​; the per-agent utility bound against a deviation drawn from an independent sample v′\mathbf v'v′; (3.1); the bound (3.2) from property (b); (3.3); the pointwise revenue bound from property (a); (3.4); and welfare = utilities + revenue. Two applications complete the list: Claim 3.3 (the single-item price max⁡ℓvℓ\max_\ell v_\ellmaxℓ​vℓ​ is (1,1)(1,1)(1,1)-balanced, which with the goal gives the classic factor 2) and the balancedness half of Theorem 4.2 for knapsack.

Significance

The theorem turns prophet inequalities into a deterministic design problem: to obtain a 1/(1+αβ)1/(1+\alpha\beta)1/(1+αβ) guarantee against any benchmark ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG, it suffices to exhibit balanced prices for each fixed valuation profile. The paper uses it to rederive the single-item factor 2, to obtain O(d)O(d)O(d) guarantees for combinatorial auctions with bundles of size ddd, a constant for knapsack, and bounds for MPH-kkk valuations, sparse packing problems and multidimensional matroids. Because ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG can be any (for example polynomial-time) algorithm, the guarantee is relative to what can be computed, not only to the optimum.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known, no part of it has a machine-checked proof; the platform holds no posted-price framework of this generality. A formal proof would provide a reusable model of sequential posted-price mechanisms over arbitrary outcome spaces and a checked reduction that later formalizations of the applications can invoke instead of repeating a probabilistic argument.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fixes the realized valuations and charges each agent's purchase against the welfare it blocks. That fails because the prices are averages over a hypothetical profile v~\tilde{\mathbf v}v~, not the prices of the realized instance, and the set of outcomes still available depends on everyone's random values. The proof needs an independent copy v′\mathbf v'v′ of the valuations and the fact that the allocation before agent iii does not depend on viv_ivi​, so that viv_ivi​ and vi′v'_ivi′​ can be exchanged without changing the distribution. Formally, the run of the mechanism is a recursion over agents, the exchange is a measure-preserving swap of coordinates of a product measure, the optimal value v(OPT(v,Fx))\mathbf v(\mathrm{OPT}(\mathbf v,\mathcal F_{\mathbf x}))v(OPT(v,Fx​)) is a supremum that need not be attained, and the family Fx\mathcal F_{\mathbf x}Fx​ may be empty.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n, 0-based; the index order is the order of Fin n. Outcomes are (X : Fin n → Type*) with a null profile nul. Valuation types V i are countable with the discrete σ-algebra (a disclosed restriction: the paper allows any distribution); this makes every function measurable and every bounded one integrable. A type w : V i values outcomes through val i w : X i → ℝ, with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1] as on p. 547. The distribution is Measure.pi μ with every μ i a probability measure.

Prices are ℝ≥0∞-valued, ⊤ standing for ∞\infty∞; the expected price is a Lebesgue integral in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. Property (a) passes its real right side through ENNReal.ofReal, and no price sum is ever converted to a real number, so an infinite price is never read as 000. v(OPT(v,S))\mathbf v(\mathrm{OPT}(\mathbf v,S))v(OPT(v,S)) is the real supremum sSup of the welfare over SSS, equal to 000 on S=∅S=\varnothingS=∅ as in the proof of Claim 3.3. Exchange compatibility of the family is required at every profile, not only feasible ones. The pricing-rule condition "∞\infty∞ when infeasible" is imposed at feasible partial allocations, which is where the paper defines prices.

Two standing assumptions are disclosed. First, the null outcome is free: piv~(∅∣y)=0p^{\tilde{\mathbf v}}_i(\varnothing\mid\mathbf y)=0piv~​(∅∣y)=0 for feasible y\mathbf yy. Every pricing rule of the paper satisfies it, and without it the proof's deviation does not exist when Fx(v)=∅\mathcal F_{\mathbf x(\mathbf v)}=\varnothingFx(v)​=∅. Second, the agents' behaviour is a choice rule that sees only the agent's own type and the allocation so far, assumed utility-maximizing (finite price, best utility among finitely priced outcomes) at every feasible partial allocation. The constant δ=α/(1+αβ)\delta=\alpha/(1+\alpha\beta)δ=α/(1+αβ) is written into the posted prices, not passed as a parameter.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal mentions only the run of the mechanism, the expected prices scaled by δ\deltaδ, balancedness and the two expectations. It does not assume the utility or revenue bounds, it does not let an agent's choice see other agents' types, and a supplementary check confirms that its hypotheses are jointly satisfiable. Milestones that involve the proof's deviation OPT(v′,Fx(v))\mathrm{OPT}(\mathbf v',\mathcal F_{\mathbf x(\mathbf v)})OPT(v′,Fx(v)​) are stated for an arbitrary selector from Fx\mathcal F_{\mathbf x}Fx​, a generalization that avoids assuming that the supremum is attained. Theorem 4.2 is stated as (2,1)(2,1)(2,1)-balanced, which is what its proof establishes; the printed "(1,2)(1,2)(1,2)" is false.

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: measure-preserving coordinate swaps for Measure.pi and products of product measures, ε-maximizer selection for bounded suprema, and induction principles for the sequential run. Contributions of proofs of individual milestones are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Dütting, M. Feldman, T. Kesselheim, B. Lucier, Prophet inequalities made easy: Stochastic optimization by pricing nonstochastic inputs, SIAM J. Comput. 49(3):540–582, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1137/20M1323850
  • U. Krengel, L. Sucheston, Semiamarts and finite values, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 83(4):745–747, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1977-14378-4
  • E. Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables, Ann. Probab. 12(4):1213–1216, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993150
  • R. Kleinberg, S. M. Weinberg, Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design, Games Econom. Behav. 113:97–115, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.002
  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing, STOC 2010, 311–320. https://doi.org/10.1145/1806689.1806733
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Harmonic AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Sum-of-Squares Hierarchy on the Sphere, and Applications in Quantum Information Theory I: If 0 ⪯ F ⪯ I on S^{d−1} for a Degree-2n Matrix Polynomial F, Then F + C′ₙ(d/ℓ)²·I Is ℓ-SOS for ℓ ≥ CₙdResearch Paper

Motivation

Maximizing a homogeneous polynomial ppp over the unit sphere, pmax⁡=max⁡x∈Sd−1p(x)p_{\max}=\max_{x\in S^{d-1}}p(x)pmax​=maxx∈Sd−1​p(x), covers the largest stable set of a graph (degree three), the 2→42\to42→4 norm of a matrix (degree four) and the best separable state problem of quantum information. For quadratic ppp it is an eigenvalue problem; for degree at least three it is NP-hard. The sum-of-squares hierarchy of Parrilo and Lasserre replaces "γ−p≥0\gamma-p\ge0γ−p≥0 on the sphere" by "γ−p\gamma-pγ−p is a sum of squares of polynomials of degree at most ℓ\ellℓ on the sphere", giving upper bounds pℓ≥pmax⁡p_\ell\ge p_{\max}pℓ​≥pmax​ that are computable by a semidefinite program of size dO(ℓ)d^{O(\ell)}dO(ℓ) and decrease to pmax⁡p_{\max}pmax​. How fast they converge decides how large ℓ\ellℓ has to be for a given accuracy. Fang–Fawzi, §1–1.1

Timeline:

  • 1995. Reznick shows, for pmin⁡=0p_{\min}=0pmin​=0, that pℓ/pmax⁡→1p_\ell/p_{\max}\to1pℓ​/pmax​→1 at rate d/ℓd/\elld/ℓ for ℓ\ellℓ large enough. Rez95
  • 2012. Doherty and Wehner study the same hierarchy on the hypersphere and obtain the same rate. DW12
  • 2019. De Klerk and Laurent prove a rate O(1/ℓ2)O(1/\ell^2)O(1/ℓ2) for a hierarchy of lower bounds on pmax⁡p_{\max}pmax​, and ask whether the upper bounds pℓp_\ellpℓ​ converge at the same rate. dKL19
  • 2019. Fang and Fawzi answer this: for ℓ≥Cnd\ell\ge C_ndℓ≥Cn​d the error is O((d/ℓ)2)O((d/\ell)^2)O((d/ℓ)2), and the statement holds for symmetric matrix-valued polynomials with constants that do not depend on the matrix size. Fang–Fawzi, Theorems 1–2

Setting

Write x=(x1,…,xd)x=(x_1,\dots,x_d)x=(x1​,…,xd​), ∥x∥2=∑ixi2\|x\|^2=\sum_ix_i^2∥x∥2=∑i​xi2​, and Sd−1={x∈Rd:∥x∥2=1}S^{d-1}=\{x\in\mathbb R^d:\|x\|^2=1\}Sd−1={x∈Rd:∥x∥2=1}. A k×kk\times kk×k matrix polynomial FFF has a real polynomial in each entry, and F(x)F(x)F(x) is the real matrix of values. A⪰0A\succeq0A⪰0 means that the symmetric matrix AAA is positive semidefinite. A matrix polynomial GGG is ℓ\ellℓ-sos on Sd−1S^{d-1}Sd−1 if there are finitely many k×kk\times kk×k matrix polynomials UjU_jUj​, each entry of total degree at most ℓ\ellℓ, with

G(x)=∑jUj(x)Uj(x)Tfor all x∈Sd−1.G(x)=\sum_jU_j(x)U_j(x)^{\mathsf T}\qquad\text{for all }x\in S^{d-1}.G(x)=j∑​Uj​(x)Uj​(x)Tfor all x∈Sd−1.

For a scalar polynomial ppp, pℓp_\ellpℓ​ is the least γ\gammaγ such that γ−p\gamma-pγ−p (a 1×11\times11×1 matrix) is ℓ\ellℓ-sos on Sd−1S^{d-1}Sd−1, and pmin⁡p_{\min}pmin​ is the minimum of ppp on Sd−1S^{d-1}Sd−1. The level value is +∞+\infty+∞ when no such γ\gammaγ exists.

The milestones use three further objects. A harmonic decomposition of a homogeneous fff of degree 2n2n2n is f=∑k=0n∥x∥2(n−k)f2kf=\sum_{k=0}^n\|x\|^{2(n-k)}f_{2k}f=∑k=0n​∥x∥2(n−k)f2k​ with f2kf_{2k}f2k​ homogeneous of degree 2k2k2k and Δf2k=0\Delta f_{2k}=0Δf2k​=0. B2nB_{2n}B2n​ is the least constant with max⁡Sd−1∣f2k∣≤B2nmax⁡Sd−1∣f∣\max_{S^{d-1}}|f_{2k}|\le B_{2n}\max_{S^{d-1}}|f|maxSd−1​∣f2k​∣≤B2n​maxSd−1​∣f∣ for all such fff in all dimensions. The Gegenbauer coefficients λi(ϕ)\lambda_i(\phi)λi​(ϕ) of a univariate polynomial ϕ\phiϕ are its coefficients against the orthogonal polynomials CiC_iCi​ for the weight (1−t2)(d−3)/2(1-t^2)^{(d-3)/2}(1−t2)(d−3)/2 on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1], equation (9). For qqq of degree at most ℓ\ellℓ, the kernel error is

ρ2n(d,ℓ)=min⁡deg⁡q≤ℓ, λ0(q2)=1 ∑k=1n∣λ2k(q2)−1−1∣.\rho_{2n}(d,\ell)=\min_{\deg q\le\ell,\ \lambda_0(q^2)=1}\ \sum_{k=1}^n\big|\lambda_{2k}(q^2)^{-1}-1\big|.ρ2n​(d,ℓ)=degq≤ℓ, λ0​(q2)=1min​ k=1∑n​​λ2k​(q2)−1−1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 3)

For every nnn there are constants Cn,Cn′C_n,C'_nCn​,Cn′​ depending only on nnn such that, for all d,k,ℓd,k,\elld,k,ℓ and every k×kk\times kk×k matrix polynomial FFF, homogeneous of degree 2n2n2n with n≤dn\le dn≤d, symmetric at every xxx, with 0⪯F(x)⪯I0\preceq F(x)\preceq I0⪯F(x)⪯I on Sd−1S^{d-1}Sd−1:

ℓ≥Cnd ⟹ F+Cn′(dℓ)2I is ℓ-sos on Sd−1.\ell\ge C_nd\ \Longrightarrow\ F+C'_n\Big(\frac d\ell\Big)^2I\ \text{is }\ell\text{-sos on }S^{d-1}.ℓ≥Cn​d ⟹ F+Cn′​(ℓd​)2I is ℓ-sos on Sd−1.

The goal fixes only the shape (d/ℓ)2(d/\ell)^2(d/ℓ)2 and the regime ℓ≥Cnd\ell\ge C_ndℓ≥Cn​d, and leaves the constants open.

Milestones

They follow the paper's proof, in attack order:

  1. Harmonic projection: Lemma 16 (Reznick's bound on Δkf\Delta^kfΔkf), Proposition 5 (B2nB_{2n}B2n​ is independent of ddd, with B2≤2B_2\le2B2​≤2, B4≤9B_4\le9B4​≤9), the explicit value (34), and Proposition 17 (matrices, spectral norm).
  2. Kernels: the Funk–Hecke formula (8), Remark 1, and the first part of Theorem 6: F+B2n2∑k∣λ2k−1−1∣ IF+\frac{B_{2n}}2\sum_k|\lambda_{2k}^{-1}-1|\,IF+2B2n​​∑k​∣λ2k−1​−1∣I is ℓ\ellℓ-sos for every admissible qqq.
  3. The kernel error: Ci′(1)/Ci(1)=i(i+d−2)/(d−1)C_i'(1)/C_i(1)=i(i+d-2)/(d-1)Ci′​(1)/Ci​(1)=i(i+d−2)/(d−1), Proposition 18 (tangent line at 111), Proposition 8 (spectra of Toeplitz matrices of linear functions), the value of h′(1)h'(1)h′(1) and the eigenvalue comparison from the proof of Proposition 7, Proposition 9 (ρ≤ρ~/(1−ρ~)\rho\le\tilde\rho/(1-\tilde\rho)ρ≤ρ~​/(1−ρ~​)), and the second part of Theorem 6:
ρ2n(d,ℓ)≤Cn(dℓ)2(ℓ≥Cn′d).\rho_{2n}(d,\ell)\le C_n\Big(\frac d\ell\Big)^2\qquad(\ell\ge C'_nd).ρ2n​(d,ℓ)≤Cn​(ℓd​)2(ℓ≥Cn′​d).
  1. Corollary: Theorem 1, 1≤pℓ−pmin⁡pmax⁡−pmin⁡≤1+(Cnd/ℓ)21\le\frac{p_\ell-p_{\min}}{p_{\max}-p_{\min}}\le1+(C_nd/\ell)^21≤pmax​−pmin​pℓ​−pmin​​≤1+(Cn​d/ℓ)2 for ℓ≥Cnd\ell\ge C_ndℓ≥Cn​d.

Significance

Theorem 2 says how the level must grow with the dimension: ℓ=Θ(d/ε)\ell=\Theta(d/\sqrt\varepsilon)ℓ=Θ(d/ε​) suffices for relative error ε\varepsilonε, where Reznick's analysis needs ℓ=Θ(d/ε)\ell=\Theta(d/\varepsilon)ℓ=Θ(d/ε). Theorem 10 of the paper shows that, for n=1n=1n=1, the kernel error of this technique really is of order (d/ℓ)2(d/\ell)^2(d/ℓ)2. Independence of the matrix size gives certificates for polynomials that are bihomogeneous of degree (2n,2)(2n,2)(2n,2) on Sk−1×Sd−1S^{k-1}\times S^{d-1}Sk−1×Sd−1. The paper's Theorem 15 uses this, together with the DPS duality of the companion mission, to bound the convergence of the DPS hierarchy for separability. Fang–Fawzi, pp. 3, 10, 14

The theorem is proved in the 2019 preprint and was published in Mathematical Programming in 2021. No machine-checked proof of it or of its ingredients is known. Proving it formally takes reusable infrastructure: degree-bounded matrix SOS on the sphere, harmonic decomposition of homogeneous polynomials, Gegenbauer polynomials with their coefficients and the Funk–Hecke formula, and spectra of Jacobi matrices of orthogonal polynomials. The milestones also correct the printed text, as listed under Formalization scope.

Difficulty

Positive semidefiniteness of F+δIF+\delta IF+δI at each point of the sphere does not give a factorization with factors of prescribed degree, and Reznick's kernel ⟨x,y⟩2ℓ\langle x,y\rangle^{2\ell}⟨x,y⟩2ℓ only reaches error d/ℓd/\elld/ℓ. Two estimates must be uniform at once. First, harmonic projection of a degree-2n2n2n form must be bounded in sup norm independently of ddd; the L2L^2L2 bound is easy, and the sup-norm bound is the content of Proposition 5. Second, the kernel error ρ2n(d,ℓ)\rho_{2n}(d,\ell)ρ2n​(d,ℓ) must be bounded throughout the regime ℓ≥Cnd\ell\ge C_ndℓ≥Cn​d, which comes down to the location of the largest zero of a Gegenbauer polynomial. The printed bounds on that zero and on λmax⁡\lambda_{\max}λmax​ in Proposition 7 are false in small dimensions, so the paper's explicit constants cannot be relied on.

Formalization scope

  • Objects. Rd\mathbb R^dRd is Fin d → ℝ (0-based coordinates), and Sd−1S^{d-1}Sd−1 is the equation ∑ixi2=1\sum_ix_i^2=1∑i​xi2​=1, not the sup-norm sphere. Matrix polynomials are matrices over MvPolynomial (Fin d) ℝ, evaluated entrywise, and homogeneity is entrywise.
  • ℓ\ellℓ-sos. A finite family of k×kk\times kk×k factors, every entry of total degree at most ℓ\ellℓ, with equality on the sphere only. Without the degree bound the level disappears; with equality on all of Rd\mathbb R^dRd Theorem 2 becomes false. Neither change is a faithful reading.
  • Constants. In the goal the constants are chosen before ddd, kkk, ℓ\ellℓ and FFF. No assumption d≥2d\ge2d≥2 is added: the cases d=0,1d=0,1d=0,1 are true and elementary.
  • Standing assumption d≥2d\ge2d≥2. Every milestone that uses the Gegenbauer objects assumes it, as §2–3 do: the weight (1−t2)(d−3)/2(1-t^2)^{(d-3)/2}(1−t2)(d−3)/2, ωd−1/ωd\omega_{d-1}/\omega_dωd−1​/ωd​ and the divisions by d−1d-1d−1 need it. Gegenbauer polynomials are normalized by Ci(1)C_i(1)Ci​(1) and defined by their three-term recurrence. σ\sigmaσ is the normalized surface measure built from Mathlib's Measure.toSphere.
  • B2nB_{2n}B2n​. It is not defined (it would be a real infimum). Statements quantify over every constant BBB with the defining property, and B2nB_{2n}B2n​ is one of them.
  • ρ2n\rho_{2n}ρ2n​. It takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], with ∣λ−1−1∣=∞|\lambda^{-1}-1|=\infty∣λ−1−1∣=∞ at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0 and ∞\infty∞ on an empty feasible set. Its sum runs over k=1,…,nk=1,\dots,nk=1,…,n, following (12), (13) and (16); (10) prints 2n2n2n, a slip. Its minimum is over deg⁡q≤ℓ\deg q\le\elldegq≤ℓ, as in (13). The first part of Theorem 6 is posed per polynomial qqq, which is what (12) proves and implies the printed form.
  • Other conventions. Proposition 17's spectral norm is written as max⁡∥y∥=1∣yTAy∣\max_{\|y\|=1}|y^{\mathsf T}Ay|max∥y∥=1​∣yTAy∣, and homogeneity of FFF is explicit there. Theorem 1 is stated cross-multiplied, so that it is meaningful when ppp is constant on the sphere. Its level value is extended real to record infeasibility; the theorem asserts a finite attained value and a degree-bounded SOS certificate.
  • Not posed. Proposition 7 (λmax⁡(T[h])≥1−7n12d2ℓ2\lambda_{\max}(\mathcal T[h])\ge1-\frac{7n}{12}\frac{d^2}{\ell^2}λmax​(T[h])≥1−127n​ℓ2d2​) fails, for example, at d=2d=2d=2, n=1n=1n=1, ℓ=10\ell=10ℓ=10. The zero bound it quotes and the explicit constants at the end of p. 9 are not posed either; the true first inequality of its proof is.

Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are reusable developments of Gegenbauer polynomials, spherical harmonics, the Funk–Hecke formula, Jacobi matrices, and Carathéodory-type finite quadratures that turn an integral of squares into a finite sum of squares.

Selected references

  • K. Fang, H. Fawzi, The sum-of-squares hierarchy on the sphere, and applications in quantum information theory, arXiv preprint, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.05155v1
  • B. Reznick, Uniform denominators in Hilbert's seventeenth problem, Mathematische Zeitschrift 220(1), 75–97, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02572604
  • A. C. Doherty, S. Wehner, Convergence of SDP hierarchies for polynomial optimization on the hypersphere, arXiv preprint, 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.5048
  • E. de Klerk, M. Laurent, Convergence analysis of a Lasserre hierarchy of upper bounds for polynomial minimization on the sphere, arXiv preprint, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.08828
  • J. B. Lasserre, Global optimization with polynomials and the problem of moments, SIAM Journal on Optimization 11(3), 796–817, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400366802
23 thms1 active userReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Sample Average Approximation 1: A Data-Driven DRO Converges in Objective, Optimal Value and Optimal Solutions for Every Admissible Cost If and Only If Its Test Is Uniformly ConsistentResearch Paper

Motivation

A decision maker who must choose xxx to minimize an expected cost EF[c(x;ξ)]\mathbb E_F[c(x;\xi)]EF​[c(x;ξ)] rarely knows the distribution FFF of the uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ; what is available is a sample ξ1,…,ξN\xi^1,\dots,\xi^Nξ1,…,ξN. Sample average approximation (SAA) replaces FFF by the empirical distribution. Data-driven distributionally robust optimization (DRO) instead minimizes the worst case of the expected cost over a set FN\mathcal F_NFN​ of distributions built from the data, which protects against the error of the empirical distribution at small NNN. Many such sets have been proposed: moment sets (Delage and Ye, 2010), ϕ\phiϕ-divergence balls (Ben-Tal et al., 2013), Wasserstein balls (Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn, 2018).

Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus (arXiv:1408.4445v3; Mathematical Programming, 2018, doi:10.1007/s10107-017-1174-z) observe that each such set can be read as the confidence region of a statistical goodness-of-fit (GoF) test, and call the resulting method Robust SAA. A basic question for any such method is whether, as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞, its objective, optimal value and optimal solutions converge to those of the full-information problem. The paper answers it for all data-driven DROs at once, with a single property of the test.

Setting

The support Ξ⊆Rd\Xi\subseteq\mathbb R^dΞ⊆Rd of ξ\xiξ is closed, and P(Ξ)\mathcal P(\Xi)P(Ξ) is the set of Borel probability distributions on Ξ\XiΞ with the topology of weak convergence. The data ξ1,ξ2,…\xi^1,\xi^2,\dotsξ1,ξ2,… are i.i.d. from an unknown F∈P(Ξ)F\in\mathcal P(\Xi)F∈P(Ξ). A data-driven uncertainty set (DUS) map assigns to each sample (ξ1,…,ξN)(\xi^1,\dots,\xi^N)(ξ1,…,ξN) a set FN⊆P(Ξ)\mathcal F_N\subseteq\mathcal P(\Xi)FN​⊆P(Ξ); it is the confidence region of the test that rejects a hypothesis F0F_0F0​ exactly when F0∉FNF_0\notin\mathcal F_NF0​∈/FN​. Decisions lie in a closed set X⊆RdxX\subseteq\mathbb R^{d_x}X⊆Rdx​, the cost is c(x;ξ)c(x;\xi)c(x;ξ), and the robust objective is the worst-case expectation

C(x;FN)=sup⁡F0∈FNEF0[c(x;ξ)].\mathcal C(x;\mathcal F_N)=\sup_{F_0\in\mathcal F_N}\mathbb E_{F_0}[c(x;\xi)] .C(x;FN​)=F0​∈FN​sup​EF0​​[c(x;ξ)].

A test is uniformly consistent (Definition 3) if, for every data-generating FFF, almost surely every sequence FNF_NFN​ that does not converge weakly to FFF lies outside FN\mathcal F_NFN​ for infinitely many NNN. The admissible instances are those satisfying three assumptions: (1) c(⋅;ξ)c(\cdot;\xi)c(⋅;ξ) is equicontinuous in xxx uniformly over ξ\xiξ; (2) XXX is bounded, or ccc is coercive in xxx uniformly over a set DDD of positive FFF-probability and bounded below off DDD; (3) Ξ\XiΞ is bounded, or there is a growth function ϕ≥0\phi\ge0ϕ≥0 with c(x;ξ)=O(ϕ(ξ))c(x;\xi)=O(\phi(\xi))c(x;ξ)=O(ϕ(ξ)) whose expectation the DUS tracks: sup⁡F0∈FN∣EF0ϕ−1N∑iϕ(ξi)∣→0\sup_{F_0\in\mathcal F_N}|\mathbb E_{F_0}\phi-\frac1N\sum_i\phi(\xi^i)|\to0supF0​∈FN​​∣EF0​​ϕ−N1​∑i​ϕ(ξi)∣→0 almost surely. The convergence conditions are (18) C(x;FN)→EF[c(x;ξ)]\mathcal C(x;\mathcal F_N)\to\mathbb E_F[c(x;\xi)]C(x;FN​)→EF​[c(x;ξ)] uniformly on compact subsets of XXX; (19) convergence of optimal values; and (20) every sequence of robust minimizers has a limit point, and all its limit points are true minimizers.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For a DUS map with nonempty sets,

FN is uniformly consistent  ⟺  [∀F,X,c satisfying Assumptions 1–3: (18),(19),(20) hold a.s.].\mathcal F_N\ \text{is uniformly consistent}\iff\Big[\forall F,X,c\ \text{satisfying Assumptions 1–3}:\ (18),(19),(20)\ \text{hold a.s.}\Big].FN​ is uniformly consistent⟺[∀F,X,c satisfying Assumptions 1–3: (18),(19),(20) hold a.s.].

The statement carries no rates and no constants; it is a characterization, so it does not depend on any particular test.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 8: under uniform consistency and Assumptions 1 and 3, almost surely EFN[c(x;ξ)]→EF[c(x;ξ)]\mathbb E_{F_N}[c(x;\xi)]\to\mathbb E_F[c(x;\xi)]EFN​​[c(x;ξ)]→EF​[c(x;ξ)] for every x∈Xx\in Xx∈X and every sequence FN∈FNF_N\in\mathcal F_NFN​∈FN​.
  2. Proposition 9: deterministically, convergence of C(xN;FN)\mathcal C(x_N;\mathcal F_N)C(xN​;FN​) along every convergent xN→xx_N\to xxN​→x implies (18).
  3. Theorem 2, "only if" side: uniform consistency implies (18)–(20) a.s. for every admissible instance.
  4. Theorem 2, "if" side: if the test is not uniformly consistent, some admissible instance fails (18)–(20) with positive probability.
  5. Theorem 3: if FN\mathcal F_NFN​ always contains the empirical distribution and the test is ccc-consistent (Definition 5, consistency with respect to the expected costs only), then (18)–(20) hold a.s.
  6. Proposition 4 (first sentence): a uniformly consistent test is consistent in the classical sense, P(F0∉FN)→1\mathbb P(F_0\notin\mathcal F_N)\to1P(F0​∈/FN​)→1 for each F0≠FF_0\neq FF0​=F.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 reduces the asymptotic analysis of a data-driven DRO to a property of a statistical test, which can be checked once per test rather than once per optimization model. The paper uses it to classify DUSs: the χ2\chi^2χ2 and G-tests on a finite support and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov, Kuiper, Cramér–von Mises, Watson and Anderson–Darling tests on the line are uniformly consistent (Theorems 4–5, separate missions of this series), while the test of marginals is not even consistent and so cannot give convergence for every cost. The necessity direction makes the property sharp: a weaker test always admits a well-behaved cost on which the DRO fails to converge. Theorem 3 explains the remaining cases where a DRO converges for one given cost.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper (§10.5), but its proof leans on several standard facts used without detail: the portmanteau theorem, uniform integrability arguments from Billingsley's Convergence of Probability Measures, the Lévy continuity theorem with the Cramér–Wold device, and coercivity arguments carried over from the paper's Theorem 1. A machine-checked version would fix exactly which regularity of the cost these steps need; three such conditions are stated explicitly here (see the scope section). No part of the result is formalized elsewhere to our knowledge; the platform has no notion of a data-driven uncertainty set or of uniform consistency.

Difficulty

Uniform consistency is a statement about weak convergence, while (18)–(20) are statements about expectations of an unbounded, xxx-dependent cost under the members of FN\mathcal F_NFN​. Weak convergence controls expectations only of bounded continuous functions, so the "only if" side must recover convergence of EFN[c(x;ξ)]\mathbb E_{F_N}[c(x;\xi)]EFN​​[c(x;ξ)] from Assumption 3, which requires uniform integrability, and then upgrade pointwise convergence to uniform convergence on compacts and to convergence of minimizers when XXX is unbounded. The tempting route through a single limiting minimization problem fails: the sets FN\mathcal F_NFN​ change with the sample, the worst case is a supremum over infinitely many distributions, and the minimizers of C(⋅;FN)\mathcal C(\cdot;\mathcal F_N)C(⋅;FN​) could escape to infinity unless coercivity on DDD transfers to every member of FN\mathcal F_NFN​. The "if" side needs, from the mere failure of uniform consistency, a single admissible cost whose worst-case objective detects every failure of weak convergence.

Formalization scope

Points are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), distributions are ProbabilityMeasure ↥Ξ (whose topology is weak convergence), and the data live on the canonical product space ΞN\Xi^{\mathbb N}ΞN with the product law, 0-indexed. "Almost surely" is ∀ᵐ, and in Definition 3 one null set serves every sequence FNF_NFN​. An expectation over a member of FN\mathcal F_NFN​ is +∞+\infty+∞ when the integrand is not integrable, never Lean's default 000. Minima in (19)–(20) are infima in the extended reals, so the empty and unattained cases need no special treatment; (20) applies to sequences that are minimizers for all large NNN.

Four hypotheses are added to the page, each used by the paper's own proof: every FN\mathcal F_NFN​ is nonempty (otherwise the worst case is −∞-\infty−∞ and uniform consistency is vacuous); c(x;⋅)c(x;\cdot)c(x;⋅) is continuous on Ξ\XiΞ; the set DDD of Assumption 2b is open; the growth function ϕ\phiϕ of Assumption 3b is continuous, with EFϕ<∞\mathbb E_F\phi<\inftyEF​ϕ<∞ as fixed on p. 10 of the paper. Theorem 3 additionally assumes Assumption 2, which its proof uses. Proposition 4 assumes the rejection events are measurable. A formalization in which the worst case uses the raw Bochner integral, the supremum ranges over a possibly empty set, or (20) requires minimizers at N=0N=0N=0 would make the statements false or vacuous, and is ruled out.

A full development needs weak convergence and the portmanteau theorem (in Mathlib), uniform integrability and its relation to convergence of means under weak convergence, the strong law of large numbers for the growth function and the empirical measure, the Lévy continuity theorem in several dimensions (in Mathlib, via characteristic functions), and a countable convergence-determining class of bounded continuous functions. The uniform-integrability step and the path characterization of local uniform convergence (Proposition 9) are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome; Proposition 9 is self-contained and deterministic.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, N. Kallus, Robust Sample Average Approximation, arXiv:1408.4445v3, 2016; Mathematical Programming 171 (2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.4445v3, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-017-1174-z
  • P. Billingsley, Convergence of Probability Measures, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316962
  • E. Delage, Y. Ye, Distributionally Robust Optimization Under Moment Uncertainty with Application to Data-Driven Problems, Operations Research 58(3), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0741
  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, A. De Waegenaere, B. Melenberg, G. Rennen, Robust Solutions of Optimization Problems Affected by Uncertain Probabilities, Management Science 59(2), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1641
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric, Mathematical Programming 171, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-017-1172-1
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Heavy-Tail Behavior of the Distributionally Robust Newsvendor 2: Below the Critical Ratio η₀ = 1 − (m₁^α/m_α)^{1/(α−1)} the Robust Newsvendor Orders Nothing; Above It Orders at Least q₀Research Paper

Motivation

The newsvendor problem is the basic single-period inventory decision: a retailer orders q≥0q\ge0q≥0 units at unit cost ccc before a random demand d~\tilde dd~ is observed, sells at unit price p>cp>cp>c, and loses unsold units. When the demand law is known, the optimal order is a quantile of that law. In practice the law is rarely known, and a distributionally robust newsvendor instead hedges against the worst law in an ambiguity set of laws consistent with partial information.

Scarf (1958; reference [42] of arXiv:1806.05379) solved the case where only the mean and the variance of demand are known, and observed that for a range of small profit margins the robust newsvendor orders nothing. Demand data in retail and spare-parts settings are often heavy tailed: Pareto fits with exponent close to 111 have been reported, so a finite mean is plausible while a finite variance is not. Das, Dhara and Natarajan (arXiv:1806.05379) therefore replace the variance by an α\alphaα-th moment for an arbitrary real α>1\alpha>1α>1. This mission formalizes their result that the zero-order phenomenon survives for every such α\alphaα.

Setting

Write the critical ratio as η=1−c/p∈[0,1)\eta=1-c/p\in[0,1)η=1−c/p∈[0,1). A demand law is a probability measure FFF on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Fix a real α>1\alpha>1α>1 and two moments m1,mαm_1,m_\alpham1​,mα​ with

mα>m1α>0.m_\alpha>m_1^\alpha>0 .mα​>m1α​>0.

The ambiguity set is

F1,α={F: ∫0∞w dF(w)=m1, ∫0∞wα dF(w)=mα},\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}=\Big\{F:\ \int_0^\infty w\,dF(w)=m_1,\ \int_0^\infty w^\alpha\,dF(w)=m_\alpha\Big\},F1,α​={F: ∫0∞​wdF(w)=m1​, ∫0∞​wαdF(w)=mα​},

the laws on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with mean m1m_1m1​ and α\alphaα-th moment mαm_\alphamα​. The worst-case expected shortage is

Π1,α(q)=sup⁡F∈F1,αEF[d~−q]+,\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)=\sup_{F\in\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}}\mathbb E_F[\tilde d-q]^+ ,Π1,α​(q)=F∈F1,α​sup​EF​[d~−q]+,

and the robust newsvendor problem (3.2) is

min⁡q≥0 ((1−η)q+Π1,α(q)).\min_{q\ge0}\ \big((1-\eta)q+\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)\big).q≥0min​ ((1−η)q+Π1,α​(q)).

An optimal order quantity is a minimizer q∗≥0q^*\ge0q∗≥0 of this objective. Two thresholds appear:

η0=1−(m1αmα)1/(α−1),q0=α−1α(mαm1)1/(α−1).\eta_0=1-\Big(\frac{m_1^\alpha}{m_\alpha}\Big)^{1/(\alpha-1)},\qquad q_0=\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}\Big(\frac{m_\alpha}{m_1}\Big)^{1/(\alpha-1)} .η0​=1−(mα​m1α​​)1/(α−1),q0​=αα−1​(m1​mα​​)1/(α−1).

In Lean these are ambiguitySet, worstCase, robustCost, eta0, q0 and IsOptimalOrder in the namespace HeavyTailNV.ZeroOrder.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.2 (p. 13)

η0∈(0,1)\eta_0\in(0,1)η0​∈(0,1), and

  • for every η∈[0,η0)\eta\in[0,\eta_0)η∈[0,η0​) the set of optimal order quantities is exactly {0}\{0\}{0};
  • for every η∈(η0,1)\eta\in(\eta_0,1)η∈(η0​,1) an optimal order quantity exists, and every optimal order quantity q∗q^*q∗ satisfies q∗>0q^*>0q∗>0 and
q∗≥q0;q^*\ge q_0 ;q∗≥q0​;
  • for η=η0\eta=\eta_0η=η0​ every q∈[0,q0]q\in[0,q_0]q∈[0,q0​] is optimal.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 3.1 (p. 12): for 0≤q≤q00\le q\le q_00≤q≤q0​,
Π1,α(q)=m1−q(m1αmα)1/(α−1),\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)=m_1-q\Big(\frac{m_1^\alpha}{m_\alpha}\Big)^{1/(\alpha-1)},Π1,α​(q)=m1​−q(mα​m1α​​)1/(α−1),

and the two-point law with mass (m1α/mα)1/(α−1)(m_1^\alpha/m_\alpha)^{1/(\alpha-1)}(m1α​/mα​)1/(α−1) at (mα/m1)1/(α−1)(m_\alpha/m_1)^{1/(\alpha-1)}(mα​/m1​)1/(α−1) and the rest at 000 lies in F1,α\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}F1,α​ and attains the supremum. 2. Properties of Π\PiΠ (§2.1, p. 6): Π1,α\Pi_{1,\alpha}Π1,α​ is non-increasing and convex, Π1,α(q)+q=m1\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)+q=m_1Π1,α​(q)+q=m1​ for q≤0q\le0q≤0, and Π1,α(q)→0\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)\to0Π1,α​(q)→0 as q→∞q\to\inftyq→∞. 3. Display (3.10) (p. 14): for η∈[0,1)\eta\in[0,1)η∈[0,1) and 0≤q≤q00\le q\le q_00≤q≤q0​,

(1−η)q+Π1,α(q)=m1−q(η−η0).(1-\eta)q+\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)=m_1-q(\eta-\eta_0).(1−η)q+Π1,α​(q)=m1​−q(η−η0​).

Significance

Proposition 3.2 shows that for every finite moment order α>1\alpha>1α>1, however high, there is a nonempty interval [0,η0)[0,\eta_0)[0,η0​) of critical ratios in which the robust newsvendor orders nothing, and it gives the threshold η0\eta_0η0​ and the minimum positive order q0q_0q0​ in closed form. For α=2\alpha=2α=2 it recovers Scarf's zero-order region. The worst-case law associated with Π1,α\Pi_{1,\alpha}Π1,α​ therefore carries a positive mass at zero demand, which is the low-service-level counterpart of the paper's heavy-tail result for high critical ratios (the companion mission of this series).

The results are proved in the paper: the proof of Proposition 3.1 follows the statement on pp. 12–13 and the proof of Proposition 3.2 is on p. 14. None of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires a usable treatment of moment-constrained suprema over probability measures on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), of the stop-loss transform q↦E[d~−q]+q\mapsto\mathbb E[\tilde d-q]^+q↦E[d~−q]+, and of minimizers of convex functions on a half-line. These pieces recur across robust inventory and pricing models.

Difficulty

The closed form of Proposition 3.1 is the central step. The lower bound is a computation with a two-point law. The matching upper bound has to hold against every law in F1,α\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}F1,α​, including laws with unbounded support and non-integer α\alphaα. The paper obtains it from a dual certificate for the moment problem (3.3)–(3.4), and weak duality for this semi-infinite problem is not available off the shelf. The closed form also holds only on [0,q0][0,q_0][0,q0​]. To conclude anything about minimizers on all of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), where no closed form is known for general α\alphaα (the dual leads to equations awα+bw+c=0aw^\alpha+bw+c=0awα+bw+c=0, p. 11), one needs convexity of Π1,α\Pi_{1,\alpha}Π1,α​ on the whole line. Inspecting the objective on [0,q0][0,q_0][0,q0​] alone does not determine the global minimizers.

Formalization scope

  • Demand laws are Measure ℝ with IsProbabilityMeasure F and F (Set.Iio 0) = 0. Moments are Bochner integrals, and the set requires Integrable (fun w => w) F and Integrable (fun w => w ^ α) F (real rpow), so that the moment equalities are genuine.
  • Π1,α\Pi_{1,\alpha}Π1,α​ is a real sSup. Under the standing hypotheses α>1\alpha>1α>1, m1>0m_1>0m1​>0, mα>m1αm_\alpha>m_1^\alphamα​>m1α​ the set is nonempty (it contains the two-point law of Proposition 3.1) and the expectations are bounded above by m1+∣q∣m_1+|q|m1​+∣q∣, so the value is not Lean's default for an empty or unbounded set. Every statement carries these standing hypotheses of (3.1); no other hypothesis is added except the range η∈[0,1)\eta\in[0,1)η∈[0,1) in (3.10), which is the paper's standing range of the critical ratio.
  • Optimality is minimization over q∈[0,∞)q\in[0,\infty)q∈[0,∞), as in (3.2), not over R\mathbb RR. Over R\mathbb RR the objective equals m1−ηqm_1-\eta qm1​−ηq for q≤0q\le0q≤0, and part (a) would fail at η=0\eta=0η=0.
  • Trivializing readings are ruled out. Part (a) asserts that {0}\{0\}{0} is the whole set of minimizers, not only that 000 is a minimizer. Part (b) asserts that a minimizer exists, so its lower bound is not vacuous. Dropping the support constraint, the normalization, or the integrability clauses would change the problem or let junk integrals satisfy the moment constraints.
  • The unit cost and price never appear; everything is stated in η\etaη.
  • The ambiguity set, worst-case value and objective come from the shared HeavyTailNV.Tail.Model. This mission defines the thresholds, optimality predicate and two-point law in HeavyTailNV.ZeroOrder.Model. Contributions to the general moment-problem duality used by Proposition 3.1 are welcome and reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • B. Das, A. Dhara and K. Natarajan, On the heavy-tail behavior of the distributionally robust newsvendor, Operations Research 69(4), 2021; preprint arXiv:1806.05379v2, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.05379
  • H. Scarf, A min–max solution of an inventory problem, in K. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, pp. 201–209, Stanford University Press, 1958 (no DOI; reference [42] of https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.05379).
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ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Sample Average Approximation 3: The Kolmogorov–Smirnov, Kuiper, Cramér–von Mises, Watson and Anderson–Darling Tests with O(N^(−1/2)) Thresholds Are Uniformly ConsistentResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust Sample Average Approximation (Robust SAA) is a data-driven approach to stochastic optimization proposed by Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus (arXiv:1408.4445; Mathematical Programming (2018), doi:10.1007/s10107-017-1174-z). Instead of minimizing the empirical average of a cost, a decision maker minimizes the worst-case expected cost over a distributional uncertainty set: the set of distributions that a statistical goodness-of-fit (GoF) test does not reject at a chosen significance level, given the observed data. Each classical GoF test therefore produces its own robust optimization model.

Whether such a model behaves well as data accumulate depends on a property of the test. Theorem 2 of the paper shows that Robust SAA converges, in objective, optimal value and optimal solutions, for every admissible cost if and only if the underlying test is uniformly consistent. This mission concerns the univariate case: it asks for a proof that the five standard tests on the real line, those of Kolmogorov–Smirnov, Kuiper, Cramér–von Mises, Watson and Anderson–Darling, are uniformly consistent (Theorem 5, p. 14). The companion missions of the series treat the characterization (Theorem 2) and the discrete χ² and G-tests (Theorem 4).

Setting

Let FFF be a probability distribution on R\mathbb RR, and let ξ1,ξ2,…\xi^1,\xi^2,\dotsξ1,ξ2,… be independent draws from FFF. As in §3.2 of the paper, ξ\xiξ is a continuous random variable: FFF has no atoms. For a candidate distribution F0F_0F0​ write F0(t)=F0((−∞,t])F_0(t)=F_0((-\infty,t])F0​(t)=F0​((−∞,t]) for its cdf, and write ξ(1)≤⋯≤ξ(N)\xi^{(1)}\le\dots\le\xi^{(N)}ξ(1)≤⋯≤ξ(N) for the sorted sample of size NNN. With ui=F0(ξ(i))u_i=F_0(\xi^{(i)})ui​=F0​(ξ(i)), the five statistics (8) are

DN=max⁡1≤i≤Nmax⁡{iN−ui, ui−i−1N},VN=max⁡i(ui−i−1N)+max⁡i(iN−ui),WN=(112N2+1N∑i=1N(2i−12N−ui)2)1/2,UN=(WN2−(1N∑i=1Nui−12)2)1/2,\begin{aligned} D_N&=\max_{1\le i\le N}\max\Big\{\tfrac iN-u_i,\ u_i-\tfrac{i-1}N\Big\},& V_N&=\max_i\Big(u_i-\tfrac{i-1}N\Big)+\max_i\Big(\tfrac iN-u_i\Big),\\ W_N&=\Big(\tfrac1{12N^2}+\tfrac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\Big(\tfrac{2i-1}{2N}-u_i\Big)^2\Big)^{1/2},& U_N&=\Big(W_N^2-\Big(\tfrac1N\sum_{i=1}^Nu_i-\tfrac12\Big)^2\Big)^{1/2}, \end{aligned}DN​WN​​=1≤i≤Nmax​max{Ni​−ui​, ui​−Ni−1​},=(12N21​+N1​i=1∑N​(2N2i−1​−ui​)2)1/2,​VN​UN​​=imax​(ui​−Ni−1​)+imax​(Ni​−ui​),=(WN2​−(N1​i=1∑N​ui​−21​)2)1/2,​ AN=(−1−∑i=1N2i−1N2(log⁡ui+log⁡(1−uN+1−i)))1/2.A_N=\Big(-1-\sum_{i=1}^N\tfrac{2i-1}{N^2}\big(\log u_i+\log(1-u_{N+1-i})\big)\Big)^{1/2}.AN​=(−1−i=1∑N​N22i−1​(logui​+log(1−uN+1−i​)))1/2.

For a statistic SNS_NSN​ and a threshold QSN(α)Q_{S_N}(\alpha)QSN​​(α), the confidence region (7) is FSNα={F0:SN(F0;ξ1,…,ξN)≤QSN(α)}\mathcal F^\alpha_{S_N}=\{F_0: S_N(F_0;\xi^1,\dots,\xi^N)\le Q_{S_N}(\alpha)\}FSN​α​={F0​:SN​(F0​;ξ1,…,ξN)≤QSN​​(α)}: the distributions the test does not reject. A test is uniformly consistent (Definition 3, p. 13) if, for every data-generating FFF, almost surely every sequence FNF_NFN​ that does not converge weakly to FFF is rejected infinitely often, i.e. FN∉FNF_N\notin\mathcal F_NFN​∈/FN​ for infinitely many NNN. The Lévy metric between cdfs is dLeˊvy(G,G′)=inf⁡{ϵ>0:G(ξ−ϵ)−ϵ≤G′(ξ)≤G(ξ+ϵ)+ϵ ∀ξ}d_{\text{Lévy}}(G,G')=\inf\{\epsilon>0: G(\xi-\epsilon)-\epsilon\le G'(\xi)\le G(\xi+\epsilon)+\epsilon\ \forall\xi\}dLeˊvy​(G,G′)=inf{ϵ>0:G(ξ−ϵ)−ϵ≤G′(ξ)≤G(ξ+ϵ)+ϵ ∀ξ}, and F^N\hat F_NF^N​ denotes the empirical cdf.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

For thresholds τN\tau_NτN​ with τN≤q/N\tau_N\le q/\sqrt NτN​≤q/N​ for some constant qqq and all N≥1N\ge1N≥1,

the regions {F0:SN(F0)≤τN},SN∈{DN,VN,WN,UN,AN}, are uniformly consistent.\text{the regions }\{F_0: S_N(F_0)\le\tau_N\},\quad S_N\in\{D_N,V_N,W_N,U_N,A_N\},\ \text{are uniformly consistent.}the regions {F0​:SN​(F0​)≤τN​},SN​∈{DN​,VN​,WN​,UN​,AN​}, are uniformly consistent.

The statement fixes only the rate O(N−1/2)O(N^{-1/2})O(N−1/2) of the thresholds, which is all the paper's argument uses; it holds for any sequence with that rate, in particular for the tabulated quantiles QSN(α)Q_{S_N}(\alpha)QSN​​(α).

Milestones (§10.7, pp. 38–39)

  1. dLeˊvyd_{\text{Lévy}}dLeˊvy​ metrizes weak convergence on R\mathbb RR; almost surely dLeˊvy(F^N,F)→0d_{\text{Lévy}}(\hat F_N,F)\to0dLeˊvy​(F^N​,F)→0.
  2. dLeˊvy(F^N,F0)≤DN(F0)d_{\text{Lévy}}(\hat F_N,F_0)\le D_N(F_0)dLeˊvy​(F^N​,F0​)≤DN​(F0​), and DN≤VND_N\le V_NDN​≤VN​.
  3. DN2(F0)≤max⁡{1/N+3/(2N), N WN2(F0)+2/N}D_N^2(F_0)\le\max\{1/\sqrt N+3/(2N),\ \sqrt N\,W_N^2(F_0)+2/\sqrt N\}DN2​(F0​)≤max{1/N​+3/(2N), N​WN2​(F0​)+2/N​}, and the same with WN2W_N^2WN2​ replaced by AN2A_N^2AN2​.
  4. WN2−UN2=(1N∑iF0(ξ(i))−12)2≤max⁡{… }W_N^2-U_N^2=(\tfrac1N\sum_iF_0(\xi^{(i)})-\tfrac12)^2\le\max\{\dots\}WN2​−UN2​=(N1​∑i​F0​(ξ(i))−21​)2≤max{…}, a bound in terms of DN′(F0)=max⁡i∣F0(ξ(i))−2i−12N∣D'_N(F_0)=\max_i|F_0(\xi^{(i)})-\tfrac{2i-1}{2N}|DN′​(F0​)=maxi​∣F0​(ξ(i))−2N2i−1​∣.

Significance

The result. Together with Theorem 2 of the paper, Theorem 5 guarantees that Robust SAA built on any of these five univariate tests converges for every cost that is equicontinuous in the decision and satisfies the paper's growth conditions. It also feeds Proposition 5, which extends the guarantee to multivariate problems with separable costs by testing marginals. Without it, the univariate tests would carry only the finite-sample guarantee of Proposition 1 and no asymptotic one.

The formalization. The theorem is proved in the paper, but the published argument for the Watson test has a gap. Its last step asserts that (1N∑imin⁡{1,2i−12N+DN′}−12)2=O(1/N)(\tfrac1N\sum_i\min\{1,\tfrac{2i-1}{2N}+D'_N\}-\tfrac12)^2=O(1/N)(N1​∑i​min{1,2N2i−1​+DN′​}−21​)2=O(1/N) whenever DN′≥1/N+1/ND'_N\ge1/\sqrt N+1/NDN′​≥1/N​+1/N, which fails when DN′D'_NDN′​ stays bounded away from 000 (at DN′=1/2D'_N=1/2DN′​=1/2 the expression tends to 9/649/649/64). The Watson clause is believed true, but a complete proof needs a different argument. The Anderson–Darling step relies on a cited integral representation rather than an argument on the page. A machine-checked proof would close both points. No part of the theorem is formalized elsewhere, as far as a search of the platform shows.

Difficulty

The Kolmogorov–Smirnov case reduces to deterministic inequalities once the Lévy-metric picture is in place, but each of the other statistics controls DND_NDN​ only indirectly. The Cramér–von Mises statistic is an L2L^2L2 quantity, and an L2L^2L2 bound does not by itself control a supremum. What closes the gap is monotonicity of F0F_0F0​ together with the rate of the threshold, so a threshold that merely tends to 000 is not enough. The Watson statistic is invariant under cyclic rotation of the transformed sample u1,…,uNu_1,\dots,u_Nu1​,…,uN​ on the circle [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), so a small UNU_NUN​ leaves the centring term 1N∑iF0(ξ(i))−12\tfrac1N\sum_iF_0(\xi^{(i)})-\tfrac12N1​∑i​F0​(ξ(i))−21​ uncontrolled until the boundary constraints 0≤F0≤10\le F_0\le10≤F0​≤1 are used. The obvious attempt, bounding the centring term by DN′D'_NDN′​ alone, is the step that fails on p. 39.

Formalization scope

Distributions are MeasureTheory.ProbabilityMeasure ℝ, with weak convergence as their topology. The cdf is Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.cdf. The data are the coordinates of the canonical product space ℕ → ℝ under Measure.infinitePi, so the sample of size NNN is (ω0,…,ωN−1)(\omega_0,\dots,\omega_{N-1})(ω0​,…,ωN−1​). Order statistics are the sorted sample s ∘ Tuple.sort s, and every formula of (8) is written with the paper's 1-based index (iii in Lean is the paper's i+1i+1i+1; ξ(N+1−i)\xi^{(N+1-i)}ξ(N+1−i) is Fin.rev i).

Committed conventions:

  • distributions range over all of R\mathbb RR; a support [ξ‾,ξ‾][\underline\xi,\overline\xi][ξ​,ξ​] with infinite endpoints is this case;
  • the data law has no atoms (§3.2's standing assumption, expressed by the predicate IsContinuousLaw), although the paper's proof does not use it;
  • ANA_NAN​ takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and is +∞+\infty+∞ when some F0(ξ(i))∈{0,1}F_0(\xi^{(i)})\in\{0,1\}F0​(ξ(i))∈{0,1}, so Lean's log⁡0=0\log0=0log0=0 never makes a distribution look close;
  • the threshold hypothesis is an explicit constant, τN≤q/N\tau_N\le q/\sqrt NτN​≤q/N​ for N≥1N\ge1N≥1;
  • maxima over an empty index set are 000, and every fixed-NNN milestone assumes N≥1N\ge1N≥1.

Uniform consistency is quantified over all sequences FNF_NFN​ inside the almost-sure event, as in Definition 3. A pointwise consistency statement for a fixed F0F_0F0​ is a different and weaker theorem and does not count.

A full development needs the Lévy metric and its metrization of weak convergence on R\mathbb RR, the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem in Lévy form, and elementary order-statistic inequalities. The first two are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions of independent value include a corrected proof of the Watson step, and a proof of the goal without the atomless hypothesis.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, N. Kallus, Robust Sample Average Approximation, arXiv:1408.4445v3 (2016); Mathematical Programming (2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.4445, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-017-1174-z
  • R. M. Dudley, Real Analysis and Probability, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Theorem 11.4.1. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755347
  • R. B. D'Agostino, M. A. Stephens (eds.), Goodness-of-Fit Techniques, Marcel Dekker, New York, 1986 (reference [14] of the paper; the source of the formulas (8)).
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ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Sample Average Approximation 2: Pearson's χ² Test and the G-Test on a Known Finite Support, with Thresholds √(Q/N), Are Uniformly ConsistentResearch Paper

Motivation

A decision made from sampled data can be sensitive to the distribution chosen to represent future uncertainty. Robust sample average approximation addresses this by optimizing against every distribution that passes a goodness of fit test, rather than against one fitted distribution. The resulting set of plausible laws is a data driven uncertainty set. Its finite sample coverage and its behavior as the sample grows serve different purposes: coverage protects against sampling error at a chosen sample size, while convergence asks whether the uncertainty set eventually stops admitting laws far from the true one. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus distinguish these properties in their Robust Sample Average Approximation paper.

This mission concerns the two tests the paper assigns to a known finite support: Pearson's χ2\chi^2χ2 test and the G test. Both compare the empirical frequencies of the observed support points with the probabilities under a proposed law. Their confidence regions give concrete uncertainty sets for discrete data. The paper's Theorem 4 states that both tests have the stronger convergence property it calls uniform consistency. That property is used in its general characterization of when robust sample average approximation converges for every admissible cost function (Theorem 2 and Table 1, pp. 13–14).

Setting

Fix a known set of nnn possible observations, labelled j=1,…,nj=1,\ldots,nj=1,…,n. A probability law FFF on this support is specified by probabilities pF(j)p_F(j)pF​(j), each nonnegative and summing to one. A sample of size NNN consists of independent observations ξ1,…,ξN\xi^1,\ldots,\xi^Nξ1,…,ξN from an unknown true law FFF. Its empirical frequency at label jjj is

p^N(j)=1N∑i=1N1{ξi=j}.\widehat p_N(j)=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\mathbf 1\{\xi^i=j\}.p​N​(j)=N1​i=1∑N​1{ξi=j}.

To assess a hypothetical law F0F_0F0​ with probabilities p0(j)p_0(j)p0​(j), Pearson's statistic and the G statistic are, in the paper's normalization,

XN(F0)=(∑j=1n(p0(j)−p^N(j))2p0(j))1/2,GN(F0)=(2∑j=1np^N(j)log⁡p^N(j)p0(j))1/2.X_N(F_0)=\left(\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{(p_0(j)-\widehat p_N(j))^2}{p_0(j)}\right)^{1/2},\qquad G_N(F_0)=\left(2\sum_{j=1}^n\widehat p_N(j)\log\frac{\widehat p_N(j)}{p_0(j)}\right)^{1/2}.XN​(F0​)=(j=1∑n​p0​(j)(p0​(j)−p​N​(j))2​)1/2,GN​(F0​)=(2j=1∑n​p​N​(j)logp0​(j)p​N​(j)​)1/2.

The confidence region for each test is the set of hypothetical laws whose statistic is at most Q/N\sqrt{Q/N}Q/N​, where Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 is fixed across sample sizes. An observed point to which F0F_0F0​ assigns zero probability makes either statistic infinite. A term with zero empirical frequency contributes zero to the G sum, including when its hypothetical probability is zero. These conventions make the regions describe the same tests at the boundary of the probability simplex as they do in its interior (§3.1, p. 8; §10.6, p. 38).

A sequence of laws FNF_NFN​ is weakly convergent to FFF when expectations of every bounded continuous function converge. On this finite support, weak convergence can be measured by the total variation distance

dTV(q,q′)=12∑j=1n∣q(j)−q′(j)∣.d_{\mathrm{TV}}(q,q')=\frac12\sum_{j=1}^n|q(j)-q'(j)|.dTV​(q,q′)=21​j=1∑n​∣q(j)−q′(j)∣.

The paper's Definition 3 calls a test uniformly consistent when, for every true law FFF, almost surely every sequence FNF_NFN​ that fails to converge weakly to FFF lies outside the confidence region infinitely often (Definition 3, p. 13). The almost sure event applies to all such sequences at once; this is stronger than a statement about one fixed false hypothesis.

Formalization targets

Goal: both tests are uniformly consistent

For the Pearson and G confidence regions FNχ2\mathcal F_N^{\chi^2}FNχ2​ and FNG\mathcal F_N^GFNG​ with fixed Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0, the target is

UC⁡(FNχ2)andUC⁡(FNG).\operatorname{UC}(\mathcal F_N^{\chi^2})\quad\text{and}\quad\operatorname{UC}(\mathcal F_N^G).UC(FNχ2​)andUC(FNG​).

Here UC⁡\operatorname{UC}UC has the quantifier order of Definition 3: every generating FFF, almost every infinite sample, and every nonconvergent sequence FNF_NFN​. This is Theorem 4, p. 14. Its four milestone claims are the finite support description of weak convergence, almost sure convergence of empirical frequencies, and the paper's total variation bounds for XNX_NXN​ and GNG_NGN​ (§10.6, p. 38).

Significance

The result says that distributions retained by either test cannot remain persistently separated from the data generating law as the sample grows. In the paper's framework, that is the statistical condition needed for its general theorem to turn test based confidence regions into convergent robust optimization values and decisions under its separate assumptions on the cost and feasible set (Theorem 2, p. 13). Theorem 4 itself concerns the tests; it does not assume a cost function or assert optimization convergence directly.

The paper proves Theorem 4, so the open work here is its Lean formalization. A complete development would also leave reusable statements for finite probability vectors, their empirical frequencies under an infinite product law, total variation, and the boundary aware Pearson and G divergences. These pieces can support other discrete goodness of fit and distributionally robust optimization results. The mission does not claim that Theorem 4 already has a machine checked proof.

Difficulty

Pointwise convergence of empirical frequencies does not by itself state uniform consistency. The latter quantifies over all moving hypothetical laws FNF_NFN​ on one almost sure sample event, including laws chosen differently at every NNN. A direct argument about one fixed F0≠FF_0\ne FF0​=F therefore does not address the target. The finite support makes weak convergence concrete, but the formal statement must still relate that topology to a finite total variation sum and keep the quantifiers in the order required by Definition 3.

The boundary of the probability simplex is another source of difficulty. Lean's real division and logarithm have default values at zero. Using those defaults in the test statistics would accept some laws that assign zero probability to an actually observed category. Both statistics must instead retain the paper's infinite penalty there. The G expression also contains individual logarithmic terms that may be negative before summation, so its extended value cannot be built by coercing each term directly to a nonnegative extended real.

Formalization scope

The known support is represented by Fin n. Its members are labels for the paper's distinct points ξ^1,…,ξ^n\hat\xi^1,\ldots,\hat\xi^nξ^​1,…,ξ^​n; coordinates in Euclidean space are irrelevant to these tests. Laws use Mathlib's ProbabilityMeasure (Fin n) and its weak topology. The data are coordinates of the canonical infinite product law, with Lean index zero corresponding to the paper's first observation. The empty support has no probability law; all substantive instances have n≥1n\ge1n≥1. The empty sample N=0N=0N=0 is defined by total operations but has no bearing on an eventual or infinitely often assertion.

Pearson's statistic lives in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞]. The squared G statistic uses extended real arithmetic so finite negative summands can be combined with an infinite boundary term. Its region compares GN2G_N^2GN2​ with Q/NQ/NQ/N, equivalent to the paper's GN≤Q/NG_N\le\sqrt{Q/N}GN​≤Q/N​ at positive NNN. The free Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0 stands for a fixed threshold constant, including the paper's chi square quantile; no particular quantile value is built into the theorem. This makes explicit the only property of that threshold used in §10.6: independence from NNN.

Contributions may prove the four milestone statements, connect Mathlib's finite probability and strong law interfaces to the empirical frequencies, or establish finite support versions of Cauchy–Schwarz and Pinsker with the correct infinite boundary cases. A proof of the goal must use the stated regions and preserve simultaneous quantification over every moving sequence of laws; replacing uniform consistency by convergence of p^N\widehat p_Np​N​ would remove its main claim.

Selected references

  • Dimitris Bertsimas, Vishal Gupta, Nathan Kallus, Robust Sample Average Approximation, arXiv:1408.4445v3, 2016; published in Mathematical Programming (2018). Preprint · Publication DOI.
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AnalysisOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Heavy-Tail Behavior of the Distributionally Robust Newsvendor 1: Worst-Case Expected Shortage under Known First and αth Moments Equals That of a Regularly Varying Demand of Tail Index αResearch Paper

Motivation

A newsvendor chooses an order quantity before seeing demand. Unsold units have no salvage value, while demand above the order quantity cannot be filled. If the demand law is unknown but a few moments are known, the decision maker may minimize cost against the worst distribution consistent with those moments. Das, Dhara and Natarajan study this distributionally robust problem when the known moments are the first and an arbitrary real moment of order α>1\alpha>1α>1 Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019. The high-demand tail matters especially when the cost ratio favors large orders. The mission asks what tail behavior is implicitly selected by the robust objective, even though each admissible distribution has a finite α\alphaαth moment.

The two-moment case α=2\alpha=2α=2 goes back to Scarf's newsvendor bound. The paper extends the model to noninteger α\alphaα and gives lower and upper shortage bounds before proving its tail result. Its preprint is the pinned source for every statement here; the proof of each numbered result follows that result in the paper Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, §§1, 3–4.

Setting

Let q≥0q\ge0q≥0 be the order quantity and let d~≥0\tilde d\ge0d~≥0 be random demand. The expected shortage under a demand law FFF is EF[(d~−q)+]\mathbb E_F[(\tilde d-q)^+]EF​[(d~−q)+], where x+=max⁡(x,0)x^+=\max(x,0)x+=max(x,0). Fix α>1\alpha>1α>1, a positive mean m1m_1m1​, and a moment mα>m1αm_\alpha>m_1^\alphamα​>m1α​. The moment ambiguity set F1,α\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}F1,α​ contains all probability laws supported on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) whose first moment is m1m_1m1​ and whose finite α\alphaαth moment is mαm_\alphamα​. Its worst-case expected shortage is

Π1,α(q)=sup⁡F∈F1,αEF[(d~−q)+].\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)=\sup_{F\in\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}}\mathbb E_F[(\tilde d-q)^+].Π1,α​(q)=F∈F1,α​sup​EF​[(d~−q)+].

For a critical ratio η∈[0,1)\eta\in[0,1)η∈[0,1), the robust newsvendor minimizes (1−η)q+Π1,α(q)(1-\eta)q+\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)(1−η)q+Π1,α​(q) over q≥0q\ge0q≥0. This mission centers on Π1,α\Pi_{1,\alpha}Π1,α​; the optimal-order threshold is treated in the companion mission. The ambiguity set and objective are the paper's (3.1)–(3.3) Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, pp. 10–11.

A positive function uuu is regularly varying with index ρ\rhoρ if u(tx)/u(x)→tρu(tx)/u(x)\to t^\rhou(tx)/u(x)→tρ as x→∞x\to\inftyx→∞ for every t>0t>0t>0. The notation is u∈RVρu\in RV_\rhou∈RVρ​. For a probability law FFF, its survival tail is Fˉ(x)=PF(d~>x)\bar F(x)=P_F(\tilde d>x)Fˉ(x)=PF​(d~>x); Fˉ∈RV−α\bar F\in RV_{-\alpha}Fˉ∈RV−α​ means a tail parameter α\alphaα Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, §4.1, p. 26.

Formalization targets

Worst-case shortage

The first target is Theorem 4.3(a):

Π1,α∈RV−(α−1).\Pi_{1,\alpha}\in RV_{-(\alpha-1)}.Π1,α​∈RV−(α−1)​.

It covers every α>1\alpha>1α>1, including α=2\alpha=2α=2. Scarf's piecewise formula (1.3), Proposition 3.3, and both parts of Proposition 3.4 supply the paper's cited bounds. Each upper bound retains its strict quantity threshold and its printed denominator Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, pp. 3, 15, 19, 28.

One representative demand law

The full goal, Theorem 4.3, also states that a nonnegative probability law F∗F^*F∗ exists outside F1,α\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}F1,α​ with

EF∗[(d~∗−q)+]=Π1,α(q)(q≥0),Fˉ∗∈RV−α.\mathbb E_{F^*}[(\tilde d^*-q)^+]=\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)\quad(q\ge0), \qquad \bar F^*\in RV_{-\alpha}.EF∗​[(d~∗−q)+]=Π1,α​(q)(q≥0),Fˉ∗∈RV−α​.

Every moment of F∗F^*F∗ of order 0≤a<α0\le a<\alpha0≤a<α is finite, while every moment of order a≥αa\ge\alphaa≥α is infinite. The milestone list includes the properties of Π1,α\Pi_{1,\alpha}Π1,α​ stated in §2.1 (non-increasing, convex, Π1,α(q)+q=m1\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)+q=m_1Π1,α​(q)+q=m1​ for q≤0q\le0q≤0, Π1,α(q)→0\Pi_{1,\alpha}(q)\to0Π1,α​(q)→0), the single-law representation (2.1) and the two stated Karamata results used to characterize the tail Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, pp. 6, 27–30.

High critical ratios

A companion milestone is Proposition 4.1. For η∈(0,1)\eta\in(0,1)η∈(0,1) let qη∗q^*_\etaqη∗​ be a robust optimal order quantity and Cη∗C^*_\etaCη∗​ the optimal robust cost. Then qη∗q^*_\etaqη∗​ is optimal for the standard newsvendor with demand law F∗F^*F∗, and

qη∗∼α−1α 11−η Cη∗,η→1q^*_\eta\sim\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}\,\frac{1}{1-\eta}\,C^*_\eta,\qquad \eta\to1qη∗​∼αα−1​1−η1​Cη∗​,η→1

Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, p. 30, (4.9). It is a consequence of the goal, not a step toward it.

Significance

The theorem connects a decision made against an entire moment class to a single effective law. That law matches the robust expected shortage for every admissible order quantity but has an infinite α\alphaαth moment, so it does not belong to the class being optimized over. This distinction explains why large robust orders behave as though demand were heavy tailed. The paper also uses the result to relate the robust optimal order quantity to the optimal cost at high service levels in Proposition 4.1 Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, pp. 30–31.

The mathematical theorem was proved in the cited paper. This mission asks for a Lean proof of its exact statement and reusable formal results for moment-constrained probability laws, stop-loss transforms, and regular variation. No machine-checked proof of these particular statements is part of the present draft. The cited bounds and analytic results are posed as separate milestones so their hypotheses and constants remain inspectable.

Difficulty

Pointwise optimization over demand laws does not automatically give one law that attains the worst-case shortage for every qqq. For a fixed qqq, an extremal law may depend on qqq, as Scarf's formula illustrates Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, p. 3. The theorem asks for a single F∗F^*F∗ and then a precise tail index and a sharp moment cutoff. A generic upper bound on shortages would establish neither the representative law nor its infinite α\alphaαth moment. The regimes 1<α<21<\alpha<21<α<2, α=2\alpha=2α=2, and α>2\alpha>2α>2 have different cited upper-bound statements, yet the final theorem has no regime restriction.

Formalization scope

Lean represents a demand law by a Borel measure on R\mathbb RR with probability mass one and zero mass below zero. Membership in F1,α\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}F1,α​ requires both real moments to be integrable; this makes the moment equalities genuine rather than default values of a nonintegrable Bochner integral. Under m1>0m_1>0m1​>0 and mα>m1αm_\alpha>m_1^\alphamα​>m1α​, the paper's two-point law (3.6) makes the ambiguity set nonempty. Its shortage values are bounded above by m1+∣q∣m_1+|q|m1​+∣q∣, so the real supremum defining Π1,α\Pi_{1,\alpha}Π1,α​ is finite and meaningful. The strict thresholds in Propositions 3.3–3.4 keep their power denominators positive Das, Dhara and Natarajan, 2019, pp. 12, 15, 19.

Regular variation includes eventual positivity, excluding a zero-over-zero ratio from passing as a tail law. Infinite moments of F∗F^*F∗ are lower Lebesgue integrals in extended nonnegative reals. The existence of F∗F^*F∗ is asserted rather than built into a definition. Theorem 4.2(b)'s displayed limit has a negative sign in the preprint, although its nonnegative numerator and denominator require the positive value α\alphaα; the formal statement uses the corrected sign. Its regularly varying tail integral is eventually positive, which ensures genuine finite tail integrals for large lower limits. Theorem 4.1 explicitly requires local integrability. Two encodings would trivialize the goal and are excluded: defining F∗F^*F∗ inside the statement (it is existential), and a regular-variation predicate satisfied by the zero function. The properties of Π\PiΠ and the representation (2.1) are stated for F1,α\mathcal F_{1,\alpha}F1,α​, the instance the paper uses, rather than for a general finite-mean ambiguity set. In Proposition 4.1 the optimal cost is the cost at the chosen optimizer, the statement holds for every selection of optimizers, and ∼\sim∼ means that the ratio of the two sides tends to 111 as η↑1\eta\uparrow1η↑1. These analytic conventions and the probability and measure infrastructure can be reused beyond this mission. Contributions to any of the ten source milestones, including the difficult root assertion in Proposition 3.4(b), are welcome.

Selected references

  • B. Das, A. Dhara, and K. Natarajan, On the Heavy-Tail Behavior of the Distributionally Robust Newsvendor, Operations Research 69(4), 2021; preprint arXiv:1806.05379v2, 2019. Preprint, DOI.
  • H. Scarf, A min-max solution of an inventory problem, in K. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958, pp. 201–209.
  • A. Shapiro and A. Kleywegt, Minimax analysis of stochastic problems, Optimization Methods and Software 17, 2002, pp. 523–542. DOI.
  • N. H. Bingham, C. M. Goldie and J. L. Teugels, Regular Variation, Cambridge University Press, 1987. DOI.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals III: Even for I.I.D. Variables, No Nonadaptive Threshold Rule Beats the Factor 1 − 1/eResearch Paper

Motivation

In a prophet inequality, a decision maker observes random rewards one at a time and must choose without seeing future realizations. The benchmark is a prophet who sees all rewards and selects their maximum. A nonadaptive threshold rule chooses a threshold for each reward before observations begin, then accepts the first arriving reward that crosses its threshold. This model captures a simple class of stopping rules and, through the prophet inequality connection, informs posted price mechanisms in which prices are set before buyers arrive. Correa et al. (2021) prove that under uniformly random arrival order some such rule earns at least a 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e fraction of the prophet's expected reward. The question here is whether that guarantee improves when the reward distributions are identical.

Setting

Fix an integer n≥2n\ge 2n≥2 and draw n2n^2n2 independent rewards X1,…,Xn2X_1,\ldots,X_{n^2}X1​,…,Xn2​ from the same three point law. A reward is Hn=n/(e−2)H_n=n/(e-2)Hn​=n/(e−2) with probability 1/n31/n^31/n3, is 111 with probability 1/n1/n1/n, and is 000 otherwise. The three probabilities are nonnegative and sum to one for n≥2n\ge2n≥2. Thus a typical sample contains roughly nnn unit rewards, while a high reward is rare enough that its presence among all n2n^2n2 draws has probability on the order of 1/n1/n1/n. Its magnitude is on the order of nnn, so it still makes a nonvanishing contribution to the prophet's expected reward.

Give each coordinate iii a predetermined threshold τi∈[0,∞]\tau_i\in[0,\infty]τi​∈[0,∞]. A uniformly random order reveals the sampled rewards, and the rule accepts the first Xi>τiX_i>\tau_iXi​>τi​. Conditional on a sample, let A(x,τ)={i:xi>τi}A(x,\tau)=\{i:x_i>\tau_i\}A(x,τ)={i:xi​>τi​}. Each accepted coordinate is equally likely to arrive first among A(x,τ)A(x,\tau)A(x,τ), so the conditional expected reward is

Rn(x,τ)=∑i∈A(x,τ)xi∣A(x,τ)∣,Rn(x,τ)=0 if A(x,τ)=∅.R_n(x,\tau)=\frac{\sum_{i\in A(x,\tau)}x_i}{|A(x,\tau)|},\qquad R_n(x,\tau)=0\text{ if }A(x,\tau)=\varnothing.Rn​(x,τ)=∣A(x,τ)∣∑i∈A(x,τ)​xi​​,Rn​(x,τ)=0 if A(x,τ)=∅.

Write Vn(τ)=E[Rn(X,τ)]V_n(\tau)=\mathbb E[R_n(X,\tau)]Vn​(τ)=E[Rn​(X,τ)] for the rule's reward and Pn=E[max⁡iXi]P_n=\mathbb E[\max_i X_i]Pn​=E[maxi​Xi​] for the prophet's reward. These are expectations of nonnegative random variables. The thresholds may be infinite, allowing a coordinate to be discarded in advance.

Formalization targets

The goal is the paper's i.i.d. tightness claim: for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, sufficiently large members of this explicit family satisfy

∀τ∈[0,∞]n2,Vn(τ)<(1+ε)(1−1/e)Pn.\forall\tau\in[0,\infty]^{n^2},\qquad V_n(\tau)<(1+\varepsilon)(1-1/e)P_n.∀τ∈[0,∞]n2,Vn​(τ)<(1+ε)(1−1/e)Pn​.

The universal quantifier includes every nonadaptive threshold vector, including asymmetric thresholds and coordinates that are never accepted. The proof in Appendix B supports the displayed statement for every sufficiently large nnn, which strengthens the existence of one hard instance stated in Section 3.1. Together with the paper's 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e lower bound, this shows that the factor cannot be raised for this rule class even under identical distributions.

The milestones cover the prophet limit Pn→(e−1)/(e−2)P_n\to(e-1)/(e-2)Pn​→(e−1)/(e−2), reduction of arbitrary thresholds to two-level rules, the three contributions to a two-level rule's expected reward according to the number of high observations, Proposition A.3's scalar maximization, and the resulting uniform asymptotic bound on all two-level rules. The first kkk coordinates of a two-level rule accept both 111 and HnH_nHn​; the remaining coordinates accept only HnH_nHn​. These targets correspond to Section 3.1, Proposition A.3, and Appendix B of Correa et al..

Significance

The explicit i.i.d. family locates a limit of nonadaptive thresholds under random arrivals. Identical distributions remove heterogeneity as an explanation for the loss against a prophet: the obstruction remains even when every reward has the same law. Consequently, an improved guarantee requires a richer rule class or additional assumptions on the distribution. The paper studies an adaptive threshold rule separately and obtains a stronger i.i.d. guarantee; this mission isolates the upper bound for the nonadaptive class.

Formalizing this result supplies a reusable model for random-order threshold selection on a finite i.i.d. product space, including its conditional reward formula and extended nonnegative expectations. The paper proves the tightness result; the Lean declarations in this proposal state it and its supporting results as proof obligations. The published i.i.d. product-measure model from the Samuel-Cahn development already has machine-checked definitions and is reused here. The proposed upper-bound theorems have not yet been proved in Lean.

Difficulty

Bounding each coordinate's expected contribution in isolation loses the interaction between unit rewards and the rare high reward. When a high reward occurs, accepting many unit rewards can dilute its share of the random-order reward; rejecting unit rewards sacrifices ordinary samples. The reduction to two-level rules must apply to every threshold vector before the count of unit-accepting coordinates can be optimized. Appendix B then controls the cases of zero, one, and at least two high observations uniformly in that count. The one-high-value case contains a printed final inequality that drops a positive 1/n1/n1/n term; the formal target uses the preceding, valid bound, whose extra term vanishes in the limit.

Formalization scope

Lean represents a sample as Fin (n ^ 2) → ℝ and its law as a finite product measure. The index set is 0-based: the paper's X1,…,XkX_1,\ldots,X_kX1​,…,Xk​ are coordinates 0,…,k−10,\ldots,k-10,…,k−1. The law is used only for n≥2n\ge2n≥2, where it is a probability measure. Thresholds have type R≥0∪{∞}\mathbb R_{\ge0}\cup\{\infty\}R≥0​∪{∞}, and crossing is strict, matching Theorem 1's indicator Yi=1{Xi>τi}Y_i=\mathbf1\{X_i>\tau_i\}Yi​=1{Xi​>τi​}. The page describes its two-level rule with weak threshold language; under strict crossing the same acceptance sets use thresholds 000 and 111. The reward uses the paper's 0/0=00/0=00/0=0 convention. Expectations are lintegrals with values in $[0,\infty]`, avoiding a zero default for nonintegrable real integrals. The goal quantifies over all threshold vectors and uses the actual prophet expectation of the same law; no restricted rule class or surrogate benchmark can replace either one.

The general i.i.d. law, sample maximum, and expected maximum come from SamuelCahnProphet.IID.Setting. The paper's three point law, random-order reward, canonical two-level rule, and high-value count are local definitions. Useful contributions include exact finite-law calculations, dominance of two-level rules, uniform estimates in kkk, and the scalar exponential inequality of Proposition A.3. These parts can also support formal work on other finite-support prophet inequalities.

Selected references

  • Correa, Foncea, Hoeksma, Oosterwijk, and Vredeveld, Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(4):1452–1478, 2021. DOI 10.1287/moor.2020.1105.
  • Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables, Annals of Probability 12(4):1213–1216, 1984. DOI 10.1214/aop/1176993150.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals II: For I.I.D. Variables, Adaptive Thresholds Achieve E[max Xᵢ] ≤ β*·E[X_t] with β* ≈ 1.341Research Paper

Motivation

A prophet inequality compares a gambler who sees nonnegative random rewards X1,…,XnX_1,\ldots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ one at a time, and must accept or reject each on arrival, with a prophet who knows all values in advance and simply takes max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​. For independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) rewards the question is the best constant β\betaβ such that some online rule always earns at least E(max⁡iXi)/βE(\max_i X_i)/\betaE(maxi​Xi​)/β. The question matters in operations research and mechanism design because a seller who posts take-it-or-leave-it prices to arriving customers faces exactly this stopping problem on the customers' virtual values; prophet inequalities translate into revenue guarantees for posted price mechanisms relative to Myerson's optimal auction (Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan 2010).

Timeline (as recounted in §1 of the paper):

  • Hill and Kertz (1982) characterized, through a recursion, the smallest constants ana_nan​ with E(max⁡iXi)≤ansup⁡tE(Xt)E(\max_iX_i)\le a_n\sup_tE(X_t)E(maxi​Xi​)≤an​supt​E(Xt​) for nnn i.i.d. nonnegative variables, showed 1.1<an<1.61.1<a_n<1.61.1<an​<1.6, gave instances where ana_nan​ cannot be beaten, and conjectured that (an)(a_n)(an​) is monotone; the computation of its limit was left open.
  • Kertz (1986) proved an→β∗≈1.341a_n\to\beta^*\approx1.341an​→β∗≈1.341, the solution of the integral equation (2) below, and conjectured that β∗\beta^*β∗ bounds every ana_nan​; the best uniform bound then known was an≤e/(e−1)≈1.582a_n\le e/(e-1)\approx1.582an​≤e/(e−1)≈1.582.
  • Abolhassani et al. (2017) improved the uniform bound to 1/0.738≈1.3551/0.738\approx1.3551/0.738≈1.355.
  • Correa, Foncea, Hoeksma, Oosterwijk and Vredeveld (EC 2017; Math. Oper. Res. 2021) proved E(max⁡iXi)≤β∗E(Xt)E(\max_iX_i)\le\beta^*E(X_t)E(maxi​Xi​)≤β∗E(Xt​) for a threshold rule ttt, so an≤β∗a_n\le\beta^*an​≤β∗ for all nnn and 1/β∗≈0.7451/\beta^*\approx0.7451/β∗≈0.745 is the tight i.i.d. guarantee.

Setting

Let X1,…,XnX_1,\ldots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ be i.i.d. nonnegative random variables with distribution function FFF. A threshold rule fixes real numbers τ1,…,τn\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_nτ1​,…,τn​ and stops at

t=min⁡{i∈{1,…,n}:Xi≥τi},t=\min\{i\in\{1,\ldots,n\}: X_i\ge\tau_i\},t=min{i∈{1,…,n}:Xi​≥τi​},

receiving XtX_tXt​. Because the thresholds may change with the step iii, the rule is adaptive; for i.i.d. variables the number of variables already seen is all the history the rule needs.

The analysis works with quantiles. The generalized inverse is F−1(q)=inf⁡{x≥0:F(x)≥q}F^{-1}(q)=\inf\{x\ge0: F(x)\ge q\}F−1(q)=inf{x≥0:F(x)≥q}, and τ(q)=F−1(1−q)\tau(q)=F^{-1}(1-q)τ(q)=F−1(1−q) is the threshold that accepts with probability qqq (with a coin toss to break ties at an atom). The function

R(q)=∫0qF−1(1−θ) dθR(q)=\int_0^qF^{-1}(1-\theta)\,d\thetaR(q)=∫0q​F−1(1−θ)dθ

is the expected reward from a variable accepted with probability qqq. The quantile stopping rule of Algorithm 2 partitions [0,1][0,1][0,1] into intervals Ai=[εi−1,εi]A_i=[\varepsilon_{i-1},\varepsilon_i]Ai​=[εi−1​,εi​], draws an acceptance probability qi∈Aiq_i\in A_iqi​∈Ai​ with density proportional to ψ(q)=(n−1)(1−q)n−2\psi(q)=(n-1)(1-q)^{n-2}ψ(q)=(n−1)(1−q)n−2, and stops at step iii with probability qiq_iqi​; its value is E(Xr)E(X_r)E(Xr​). The analysis then passes through the normalizations γi=∫Aiψ\gamma_i=\int_{A_i}\psiγi​=∫Ai​​ψ and ρi\rho_iρi​, the recursion (8)–(9) on xi=1−εix_i=1-\varepsilon_ixi​=1−εi​, and the differential equation

y′(t)=y(t)(ln⁡y(t)−1)−(β−1),y(0)=1.(ODE)y'(t)=y(t)\big(\ln y(t)-1\big)-(\beta-1),\qquad y(0)=1.\qquad\text{(ODE)}y′(t)=y(t)(lny(t)−1)−(β−1),y(0)=1.(ODE)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

Let β∗>1\beta^*>1β∗>1 be the unique solution of

∫01dyy(1−ln⁡y)+(β−1)=1.(2)\int_0^1\frac{dy}{y(1-\ln y)+(\beta-1)}=1.\qquad(2)∫01​y(1−lny)+(β−1)dy​=1.(2)

For every n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and every law of nonnegative i.i.d. X1,…,XnX_1,\ldots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ there are thresholds τ1,…,τn\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_nτ1​,…,τn​ with

E(max⁡{X1,…,Xn})≤β∗E(Xt).E(\max\{X_1,\ldots,X_n\})\le\beta^*E(X_t).E(max{X1​,…,Xn​})≤β∗E(Xt​).

Milestones

In order: the quantile sandwich P(X≥τ(q))≥q≥P(X>τ(q))P(X\ge\tau(q))\ge q\ge P(X>\tau(q))P(X≥τ(q))≥q≥P(X>τ(q)); the representation (7) E(max⁡iXi)=n∫01ψ(q)R(q) dqE(\max_iX_i)=n\int_0^1\psi(q)R(q)\,dqE(maxi​Xi​)=n∫01​ψ(q)R(q)dq; the identity "expected reward of the quantile rule at qqq equals R(q)R(q)R(q)"; Lemma 4 (E(Xr)=∑iρi∫AiψRE(X_r)=\sum_i\rho_i\int_{A_i}\psi RE(Xr​)=∑i​ρi​∫Ai​​ψR); Lemma 5 (E(max⁡iXi)=nγ1E(Xr)E(\max_iX_i)=n\gamma_1E(X_r)E(maxi​Xi​)=nγ1​E(Xr​) when all ρi\rho_iρi​ agree); the equivalence of equal ρi\rho_iρi​ with the recursion (8) and γ1=1−x1n−1\gamma_1=1-x_1^{n-1}γ1​=1−x1n−1​; the closed form (9)–(10); Lemma 6 on (ODE); Proposition D.1; Lemma 7 (xin−1<y(i/n)x_i^{n-1}<y(i/n)xin−1​<y(i/n)); uniqueness of β∗\beta^*β∗ in (2); optimality of the dynamic-programming thresholds; domination of the randomized rule by them; and n(1−x1n−1)≤β∗n(1-x_1^{n-1})\le\beta^*n(1−x1n−1​)≤β∗.

A companion statement records the numerical guarantee 1/β∗>0.7451/\beta^*>0.7451/β∗>0.745.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 gives the optimal constant of the i.i.d. prophet inequality and, through an=n(1−x1n−1)a_n=n(1-x_1^{n-1})an​=n(1−x1n−1​), shows an≤β∗a_n\le\beta^*an​≤β∗ for every nnn, which settles the problem posed by Hill and Kertz in 1982. Since an→β∗a_n\to\beta^*an​→β∗ (Kertz 1986), no rule of any kind achieves a better constant uniformly in nnn. Through the virtual-value connection it implies that, for customers with i.i.d. valuations, an adaptive posted price mechanism earns at least a 1/β∗>0.7451/\beta^*>0.7451/β∗>0.745 fraction of the optimal auction's revenue (Corollary 2 of the paper).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of it or of any of its lemmas is known. The proof combines a measure-theoretic part (quantile functions, randomized tie-breaking at atoms, Tonelli and integration by parts), a combinatorial recursion, and real analysis of an autonomous ODE with a third-derivative Taylor argument. Formal versions of these parts are reusable: the quantile representation of E(max⁡iXi)E(\max_iX_i)E(maxi​Xi​), the expected reward of a quantile rule, and the optimality of dynamic-programming thresholds are standard tools across prophet inequalities and optimal stopping.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt, computing the optimal dynamic-programming thresholds and bounding their value against E(max⁡iXi)E(\max_iX_i)E(maxi​Xi​), does not lead to a closed-form constant: the optimal values satisfy a nonlinear recursion that depends on the whole distribution. The paper avoids it by analysing a randomized rule whose value is exactly a ψ\psiψ-weighted average of RRR, which reduces the problem to a distribution-free recursion. Two steps then carry the weight. First, randomizing correctly at atoms of FFF so that every step accepts with probability exactly qqq; without this, R(q)R(q)R(q) is not the step reward. Second, comparing the discrete recursion (9) with the continuous (ODE): the comparison needs strict convexity and y′′′>0y'''>0y′′′>0, and the latter holds only because β>1.25\beta>1.25β>1.25, a standing assumption validated at β∗\beta^*β∗ at the end. The existence of the partition with all ρi\rho_iρi​ equal (a solution of (8) with x0=1x_0=1x0​=1, xn=0x_n=0xn​=0, xi∈(0,1)x_i\in(0,1)xi​∈(0,1)) is taken from Hill and Kertz and is not proved in the paper.

Formalization scope

Lean conventions:

  • The common law is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR with μ((−∞,0))=0\mu((-\infty,0))=0μ((−∞,0))=0; the sample is the coordinate vector of SamuelCahnProphet.IID.iidLaw μ n (the published i.i.d. setting), and E(max⁡iXi)E(\max_iX_i)E(maxi​Xi​) is its Emax. Coordinates are 0-based; the partition εi\varepsilon_iεi​, γi\gamma_iγi​, ρi\rho_iρi​ and the recursion keep the paper's 1-based index.
  • All expectations of the random variables, R(q)R(q)R(q) and E(Xr)E(X_r)E(Xr​) are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; no integrability is assumed in the goal, so infinite means are covered. Only bounded deterministic integrals (γi\gamma_iγi​, ρi\rho_iρi​, (2)) are interval integrals.
  • XtX_tXt​ is 000 when no XiX_iXi​ reaches its threshold (the page leaves it undefined; 000 is the least favourable choice).
  • The quantile rule's coin at an atom is an independent uniform variable on [0,1][0,1][0,1]; acceptance probabilities are drawn independently with density ψ/γi\psi/\gamma_iψ/γi​ on AiA_iAi​.
  • β∗\beta^*β∗ enters through (2) and β∗>1\beta^*>1β∗>1, not through a choice function; uniqueness is a milestone.
  • Statements involving ψ\psiψ, γi\gamma_iγi​, ρi\rho_iρi​ or the recursion assume n≥2n\ge2n≥2 (for n=1n=1n=1, ψ≡0\psi\equiv0ψ≡0). Lemmas 6 and 7 carry §4's standing assumption β>1.25\beta>1.25β>1.25; Proposition D.1 carries β>1.25\beta>1.25β>1.25. Lemma 6 does not assert existence of a solution of (ODE) on [0,1][0,1][0,1], which fails for β>β∗\beta>\beta^*β>β∗.
  • The dynamic-programming milestones assume EX<∞E X<\inftyEX<∞ and use the optimal-stopping recurrence Vi=E[max⁡(X,Vi+1)]V_i=E[\max(X,V_{i+1})]Vi​=E[max(X,Vi+1​)]; the page prints Vi=E(X∣X≥τi)V_i=E(X\mid X\ge\tau_i)Vi​=E(X∣X≥τi​), which is a slip.
  • The page's "β∗≈1.341>1/0.745\beta^*\approx1.341>1/0.745β∗≈1.341>1/0.745" has its inequality reversed and is not formalized.

A degenerate β\betaβ cannot trivialize the goal: β\betaβ is pinned by (2) and β>1\beta>1β>1, and the goal is stated for every n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and every nonnegative law, including laws with infinite mean.

A complete development needs the quantile function of a law on R\mathbb RR, Tonelli's theorem on product measures, uniqueness for ODEs with locally Lipschitz right-hand side (ODE_solution_unique), and Taylor's theorem; the existence of the Hill–Kertz partition is a further proof obligation. Contributions to any milestone, and reusable lemmas on quantile functions and finite-horizon optimal stopping, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Correa, P. Foncea, R. Hoeksma, T. Oosterwijk, T. Vredeveld, Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(4):1452–1478, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1105
  • T. P. Hill, R. P. Kertz, Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables, Annals of Probability 10(2):336–345, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993861
  • R. P. Kertz, Stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables: a complete comparison by conjugate duality, Journal of Multivariate Analysis 19(1):88–112, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-259X(86)90095-3
  • M. Abolhassani, S. Ehsani, H. Esfandiari, M. T. HajiAghayi, R. Kleinberg, B. Lucier, Beating 1−1/e for ordered prophets, Proc. 49th ACM STOC, 61–71, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3055399.3055479
  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. L. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing, Proc. 42nd ACM STOC, 311–320, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1145/1806689.1806733
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Mechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers 3: Every Incentive-Compatible Two-Sided Dynamic Mechanism Earns at Most the Expected Virtual-Surplus Assignment ValueResearch Paper

Motivation

Ride-hailing, freelancing and delivery platforms are intermediaries that post a price to buyers and a price to sellers and then match the two sides. Both sides are forward-looking: an agent who arrives can wait before requesting, and an agent who requests waits until she is matched, at a cost per unit of time. Chen and Hu, Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers (SSRN 2859864; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 22(4), 2020, doi:10.1287/msom.2018.0769), measure simple pricing and matching policies against an upper bound that holds for every policy. This mission formalizes that upper bound in its mechanism-design form: no incentive-compatible two-sided dynamic mechanism earns more than the expected value of a clairvoyant assignment problem in virtual values.

The bound extends the virtual-value approach of Myerson (1981) and its bilateral-trade version by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) from a single static trade to a market with random arrivals on both sides, waiting costs and a timing constraint that matched units change hands at the same instant.

Setting

Over a horizon [0,T][0,T][0,T], buyers arrive as a Poisson process of rate λd>0\lambda^d>0λd>0. A buyer has type ϕ=(tϕ,vϕ)\phi=(t_\phi,v_\phi)ϕ=(tϕ​,vϕ​): arrival time tϕt_\phitϕ​ and valuation vϕ∈[v‾,vˉ]v_\phi\in[\underline v,\bar v]vϕ​∈[v​,vˉ], drawn with continuous positive density fdf^dfd and c.d.f. FdF^dFd, independently of the arrival time. Sellers arrive as an independent Poisson process of rate λs>0\lambda^s>0λs>0, with types ψ=(tψ,cψ)\psi=(t_\psi,c_\psi)ψ=(tψ​,cψ​) and costs cψ∈[c‾,cˉ]c_\psi\in[\underline c,\bar c]cψ​∈[c​,cˉ] of continuous positive density fsf^sfs and c.d.f. FsF^sFs. The paper assumes c‾≤vˉ\underline c\le\bar vc​≤vˉ and that the virtual value Vd(v)=v−(1−Fd(v))/fd(v)V^d(v)=v-(1-F^d(v))/f^d(v)Vd(v)=v−(1−Fd(v))/fd(v) and the virtual cost Vs(c)=c+Fs(c)/fs(c)V^s(c)=c+F^s(c)/f^s(c)Vs(c)=c+Fs(c)/fs(c) are increasing (Assumptions 1–2). Write HTH^THT for the realized arrivals.

A direct mechanism yTy^TyT assigns to every buyer an outcome (sϕ,mϕ,pϕ)(s_\phi,m_\phi,p_\phi)(sϕ​,mϕ​,pϕ​): the time sϕ∈[tϕ,T]s_\phi\in[t_\phi,T]sϕ​∈[tϕ​,T] at which she leaves, the indicator mϕ∈{0,1}m_\phi\in\{0,1\}mϕ​∈{0,1} that she receives a unit, and her payment pϕp_\phipϕ​. Every seller receives (sψ,mψ,pψ)(s_\psi,m_\psi,p_\psi)(sψ​,mψ​,pψ​) likewise, pψp_\psipψ​ now paid to her. The balancing condition requires that at every t∈[0,T]t\in[0,T]t∈[0,T] the number of buyers who receive a unit at ttt equals the number of sellers who deliver one at ttt. The buyer's utility is Ud=vϕmϕ−pϕ−b(sϕ−tϕ)U^d=v_\phi m_\phi-p_\phi-b(s_\phi-t_\phi)Ud=vϕ​mϕ​−pϕ​−b(sϕ​−tϕ​) and the seller's is Us=pψ−cψmψ−h(sψ−tψ)U^s=p_\psi-c_\psi m_\psi-h(s_\psi-t_\psi)Us=pψ​−cψ​mψ​−h(sψ​−tψ​), with waiting costs b,h≥0b,h\ge0b,h≥0. The intermediary's profit is

Π(yT)=∑ϕ∈HTpϕ−∑ψ∈HTpψ.\Pi(y^T)=\sum_{\phi\in H^T}p_\phi-\sum_{\psi\in H^T}p_\psi .Π(yT)=ϕ∈HT∑​pϕ​−ψ∈HT∑​pψ​.

Incentive compatibility (ICd) asks that no buyer gain, in the interim expectation E−ϕE_{-\phi}E−ϕ​ over all other agents, by reporting another valuation or a later arrival time tϕ^∈[tϕ,T]t_{\hat\phi}\in[t_\phi,T]tϕ^​​∈[tϕ​,T]; individual rationality (IRd) asks that her interim utility be nonnegative. (ICs) and (IRs) are the seller counterparts. Problem (B′) maximizes E[Π(yT)]E[\Pi(y^T)]E[Π(yT)] over feasible mechanisms subject to these constraints; its value is J∗J^*J∗.

The comparison object is the clairvoyant assignment problem (B): knowing HTH^THT in advance, choose a partial matching xxx of buyers to sellers maximizing

∑ϕ,ψ(Vd(vϕ)−Vs(cψ)−b (tψ−tϕ)+−h (tϕ−tψ)+)xϕψ;\sum_{\phi,\psi}\Big(V^d(v_\phi)-V^s(c_\psi)-b\,(t_\psi-t_\phi)^+-h\,(t_\phi-t_\psi)^+\Big)x_{\phi\psi};ϕ,ψ∑​(Vd(vϕ​)−Vs(cψ​)−b(tψ​−tϕ​)+−h(tϕ​−tψ​)+)xϕψ​;

its optimal value is Jˉ(HT)≥0\bar J(H^T)\ge0Jˉ(HT)≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: the mechanism-design bound

For every feasible, well-defined mechanism satisfying (ICd), (IRd), (ICs) and (IRs),

E[Π(yT)]≤E[Jˉ(HT)],E\big[\Pi(y^T)\big]\le E\big[\bar J(H^T)\big],E[Π(yT)]≤E[Jˉ(HT)],

with Jˉ(HT)\bar J(H^T)Jˉ(HT) integrable. This is the last display of the proof of Lemma 1 (Online Appendix p. 4), J∗≤Jˉ1≤Jˉ2≤E[Jˉ(HT)]J^*\le\bar J^1\le\bar J^2\le E[\bar J(H^T)]J∗≤Jˉ1≤Jˉ2≤E[Jˉ(HT)].

Milestones

  1. Lemma S.1 (Supplemental Note p. 1): E−ϕ[pϕ]≤vϕE−ϕ[mϕ]−∫v‾vϕE−ϕ[mϕv′] dv′−bE−ϕ[sϕ−tϕ]E_{-\phi}[p_\phi]\le v_\phi E_{-\phi}[m_\phi]-\int_{\underline v}^{v_\phi}E_{-\phi}[m_{\phi_{v'}}]\,dv'-bE_{-\phi}[s_\phi-t_\phi]E−ϕ​[pϕ​]≤vϕ​E−ϕ​[mϕ​]−∫v​vϕ​​E−ϕ​[mϕv′​​]dv′−bE−ϕ​[sϕ​−tϕ​] under (ICd′) and (IRd).
  2. Lemma S.2: E[∑ϕpϕ]≤E[∑ϕVd(vϕ)mϕ−b(sϕ−tϕ)]E[\sum_\phi p_\phi]\le E[\sum_\phi V^d(v_\phi)m_\phi-b(s_\phi-t_\phi)]E[∑ϕ​pϕ​]≤E[∑ϕ​Vd(vϕ​)mϕ​−b(sϕ​−tϕ​)].
  3. Lemma S.4: E[∑ψpψ]≥E[∑ψVs(cψ)mψ+h(sψ−tψ)]E[\sum_\psi p_\psi]\ge E[\sum_\psi V^s(c_\psi)m_\psi+h(s_\psi-t_\psi)]E[∑ψ​pψ​]≥E[∑ψ​Vs(cψ​)mψ​+h(sψ​−tψ​)].
  4. The pathwise step Jˉ2≤E[Jˉ(HT)]\bar J^2\le E[\bar J(H^T)]Jˉ2≤E[Jˉ(HT)]: for every profile and every balanced assignment of outcomes, buyer virtual surplus net of waiting, less seller virtual cost plus waiting, is at most the value of (B).

Lemma S.3 (Supplemental Note p. 3), the seller envelope bound with information rent ∫cψcˉE−ψ[mψc′] dc′\int_{c_\psi}^{\bar c}E_{-\psi}[m_{\psi_{c'}}]\,dc'∫cψ​cˉ​E−ψ​[mψc′​​]dc′, is posed as a further theorem of the mission, the mirror image of Lemma S.1; it is not listed as a milestone.

Here (ICd′) and (ICs′) are the one-dimensional constraints in which the reported arrival time is the true one; Lemmas S.1–S.4 are stated under these weaker hypotheses, as in the paper.

Significance

Lemma 1 of the paper, Jπ,M≤E[Jˉ(HT)]J^{\pi,M}\le E[\bar J(H^T)]Jπ,M≤E[Jˉ(HT)] for every pricing policy π\piπ and matching policy MMM, is the benchmark against which the paper's main theorem measures its waiting-adjusted fixed-price policy, and E[Jˉ(HT)]E[\bar J(H^T)]E[Jˉ(HT)] is in turn bounded by a deterministic fluid value (Lemma 2). Lemma 1 is the composition of two facts: the revelation principle Jπ,M≤J∗J^{\pi,M}\le J^*Jπ,M≤J∗ (Lemma 3) and the mechanism-design bound J∗≤E[Jˉ(HT)]J^*\le E[\bar J(H^T)]J∗≤E[Jˉ(HT)] posed here. The second carries the analytic content: it is where the envelope theorem, the exchange of integrals that turns payments into virtual values, and the timing argument appear.

The result is proved in the paper; its proofs are in the Online Appendix (Section A.2) and the Supplemental Note (Section A). No machine-checked proof of it, or of a dynamic two-sided Myerson bound of this kind, is known. A formal proof would also yield a reusable two-sided, Poisson-arrival version of the interim envelope and revenue-equivalence identities.

Difficulty

Each agent's type is two-dimensional, an arrival time and a valuation or cost, and arrival can only be misreported later. The relaxation to (ICd′)/(ICs′) makes the screening problem one-dimensional, but the interim expectation E−ϕE_{-\phi}E−ϕ​ ranges over a random population whose size is itself random. Turning E[∑ϕ∈HTpϕ]E[\sum_{\phi\in H^T}p_\phi]E[∑ϕ∈HT​pϕ​] into an integral of interim payments requires the Mecke formula for the Poisson process, and the envelope argument must be carried out for interim utilities that are only known to be suprema of affine functions, using no differentiability of the mechanism. The pathwise step is combinatorial: the balancing condition at each instant pairs buyers with sellers discharged together, and those pairs must be compared with an optimal matching of (B), with duplicate types and unmatched agents handled.

A frequent first idea, bounding payments by valuations directly, gives only the first-best surplus E[∑(vϕ−cψ)]E[\sum (v_\phi-c_\psi)]E[∑(vϕ​−cψ​)], which is not the target; the information rents must be extracted.

Formalization scope

The primitives are the published bilateral-trade environment MechanismDesign.BilateralTrade.Environment (densities on intervals, cdfB, cdfS, psiB =Vd=V^d=Vd, psiS =Vs=V^s=Vs, Regular === Assumptions 1–2), and (B) is AssignmentGame.CoreLP.worth of the published assignment game, with sellers as rows and buyers as columns. The conventions committed to are:

  1. Arrivals. Each side is a Poisson(λT\lambda TλT) number of agents with i.i.d. types, arrival time uniform on [0,T][0,T][0,T] and independent of the mark; this is equal in law to the Poisson process restricted to [0,T][0,T][0,T]. Profiles are multisets of types: agents are named by their types, as in the paper, and coincide only with probability zero.
  2. Mechanisms map the reported buyer and seller profiles to an outcome for each type, (s,m,p)(s,m,p)(s,m,p) with t≤s≤Tt\le s\le Tt≤s≤T and m∈{0,1}m\in\{0,1\}m∈{0,1} for listed agents and the balancing condition at every t∈[0,T]t\in[0,T]t∈[0,T]. The causality conditions of the paper (stopping times with respect to the filtration Ht\mathcal H_tHt​) and the timing variables τ,a\tau,aτ,a are dropped. This enlarges the class of mechanisms; it is the clairvoyant class through which the paper's own proof passes (Jˉ1≤Jˉ2\bar J^1\le\bar J^2Jˉ1≤Jˉ2), and the bound for the larger class implies the paper's.
  3. Interim expectations. E−ϕ[g(yϕ^)]E_{-\phi}[g(y_{\hat\phi})]E−ϕ​[g(yϕ^​​)] is the expectation, over an independent copy of HTH^THT, of ggg at the outcome of the report ϕ^\hat\phiϕ^​ inserted among the buyers (the Slivnyak–Mecke reading of "expectation taken with respect to HT∖{ϕ}H^T\setminus\{\phi\}HT∖{ϕ}").
  4. Incentive constraints are quantified over every type and every report in the type spaces, not almost everywhere, with reported arrivals tϕ^∈[tϕ,T]t_{\hat\phi}\in[t_\phi,T]tϕ^​​∈[tϕ​,T].
  5. Added hypotheses. Continuity of fdf^dfd, fsf^sfs on their supports, without which Vd,VsV^d,V^sVd,Vs are defined only almost everywhere; and WellDefined: outcomes are Borel in the listed types, interim payments are integrable, and total absolute payments are integrable. Integrability of Jˉ(HT)\bar J(H^T)Jˉ(HT) and of the virtual-surplus sums is part of each conclusion.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the mechanism class is not restricted beyond the paper's feasibility, the constraints are not vacuous (the null mechanism satisfies them, so J∗≥0J^*\ge0J∗≥0), and expectations are of integrable functions. The goal quantifies over mechanisms rather than taking a supremum, which is equivalent because the class is nonempty.

A complete development needs the Mecke formula for the Poisson-count representation, an envelope theorem for suprema of affine functions on an interval, Fubini on the type space, and an exchange argument for matchings. All of these are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of any of them, of the milestones in any order, or of alternative proofs are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Chen and M. Hu, Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 22(4):717–734, 2020; submitted manuscript SSRN 2859864. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2859864, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0769
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58–73, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, Journal of Economic Theory 29(2):265–281, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
  • P. Milgrom and I. Segal, Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets, Econometrica 70(2):583–601, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00296
  • G. Last and M. Penrose, Lectures on the Poisson Process, Cambridge University Press, 2017 (Mecke equation, Theorem 4.1). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316104477
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness III: With Additive Valuations, Donating the Pool to an Unenvied Agent Yields a 4/7-Groupwise-Maximin-Share AllocationResearch Paper

Motivation

When indivisible goods are shared among people, comparing each person's bundle with another person's bundle is only one way to judge fairness. A second test asks whether a group could repartition the goods it collectively received so that one of its members would reliably obtain more. Groupwise maximin share (GMMS) makes this test for every subgroup. It strengthens the ordinary maximin-share benchmark, which tests only the grand coalition and all goods. Chaudhury, Kavitha, Mehlhorn and Sgouritsa use this distinction to study a complete allocation obtained from their almost envy-free allocation: goods initially left unassigned are given to one unenvied agent. Their Theorem 16 proves that the resulting allocation gives every agent at least four sevenths of her groupwise maximin share under additive valuations. Chaudhury et al., pp. 4–5, 15–16.

The paper first constructs a partial EFX allocation whose unallocated goods have bounded value to every agent. Its Section 3 then assumes additive valuations and derives maximin-share and GMMS guarantees. This mission addresses the GMMS consequence of that construction. The existence of the starting allocation is the subject of the first mission in this series; the present theorem specifies what happens when its pool is donated. Chaudhury et al., Theorems 8 and 16.

Setting

Let NNN be a finite set of agents and MMM a finite set of indivisible goods. Each agent iii has a valuation vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) for a bundle S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M. Here valuations are nonnegative and additive: vi(S)v_i(S)vi​(S) is the sum of the values of the individual goods in SSS. A partial allocation X=(Xi)i∈NX=(X_i)_{i\in N}X=(Xi​)i∈N​ gives pairwise disjoint bundles to the agents. The remaining goods form its pool, P=M∖⋃i∈NXiP=M\setminus\bigcup_{i\in N}X_iP=M∖⋃i∈N​Xi​. An allocation is complete when its pool is empty. These are the paper's allocation conventions. Chaudhury et al., pp. 3–4.

An allocation is envy-free up to any good (EFX) if, after any single good ggg is removed from agent jjj's bundle, agent iii values that remainder no more than her own bundle: vi(Xj∖{g})≤vi(Xi)v_i(X_j\setminus\{g\})\le v_i(X_i)vi​(Xj​∖{g})≤vi​(Xi​) for all i,ji,ji,j and g∈Xjg\in X_jg∈Xj​. The envy graph has a directed edge i→ji\to ji→j when iii values jjj's bundle more than her own. A source is a vertex with no incoming edge, so nobody envies that agent. Chaudhury et al., pp. 3, 8.

For a set SSS and a positive number kkk of parts, MMS⁡i(k,S)\operatorname{MMS}_i(k,S)MMSi​(k,S) is the largest worst-part value agent iii can secure by partitioning SSS into kkk bundles. A complete allocation YYY is α\alphaα-GMMS when each agent meets an α\alphaα fraction of this benchmark for every subgroup containing her:

vi(Yi)≥αMMS⁡i ⁣(∣N′∣,⋃j∈N′Yj)(N′⊆N, i∈N′).v_i(Y_i)\ge\alpha\operatorname{MMS}_i\!\left(|N'|,\bigcup_{j\in N'}Y_j\right) \qquad(N'\subseteq N,\ i\in N').vi​(Yi​)≥αMMSi​​∣N′∣,j∈N′⋃​Yj​​(N′⊆N, i∈N′).

The benchmark uses only goods allocated to that subgroup. The paper states it both as a complete-allocation property in its introduction and in Definition 15. Chaudhury et al., pp. 5, 15.

Formalization targets

The donated allocation

Assume XXX is partial and EFX, every agent satisfies vi(P)≤vi(Xi)v_i(P)\le v_i(X_i)vi​(P)≤vi​(Xi​), and sss is a source of its envy graph. Define Ys=Xs∪PY_s=X_s\cup PYs​=Xs​∪P and Yj=XjY_j=X_jYj​=Xj​ for j≠sj\ne sj=s. The goal states that YYY is complete, that donation does not lower any agent's own value, and that

vi(Yi)≥47MMS⁡i ⁣(∣N′∣,⋃j∈N′Yj)(N′⊆N, i∈N′).v_i(Y_i)\ge\frac47\operatorname{MMS}_i\!\left(|N'|,\bigcup_{j\in N'}Y_j\right) \qquad(N'\subseteq N,\ i\in N').vi​(Yi​)≥74​MMSi​​∣N′∣,j∈N′⋃​Yj​​(N′⊆N, i∈N′).

This is the GMMS bullet of Theorem 16 applied to the particular allocation the authors define immediately before it. The paper obtains a suitable XXX from Lemma 12, which has the relevant properties of Theorem 8. Chaudhury et al., pp. 11–12, 14–16.

Intermediate results

The milestones are Proposition 13, the reduction step in Theorem 16's proof, and all three parts of Lemma 17. Proposition 13 compares maximin shares after deleting agents and at most as many goods. Lemma 17 bounds the value of each bad good, the donated bundle, and the other good bundles. They retain the constants 222 and 3/23/23/2 used in the paper. Chaudhury et al., pp. 14, 16–17.

Significance

The result turns an almost envy-free partial allocation into a complete allocation with a guarantee for every coalition. A plain maximin-share statement would only compare each agent with a partition of all goods among all agents; here every subgroup and its allocated goods count. The distinction matters even when an ordinary maximin-share bound is easy to meet because there are fewer goods than agents. Chaudhury et al., p. 5.

The paper proves Theorem 16 mathematically. The remaining work for this mission is a machine-checked proof of its stated GMMS consequence and its supporting results. Its definitions of partial allocation, pool, finite maximin share and groupwise guarantee can also serve later formalizations of fair division. The Nash-social-welfare half-guarantee in the printed theorem depends on the starting allocation from Lemma 12; this mission records only the value preservation under donation. Chaudhury et al., pp. 14, 16.

Difficulty

Giving all leftover goods to one agent makes the allocation complete, but it can change how another agent values that enlarged bundle and how a subgroup's benchmark is calculated. EFX alone compares bundles after deleting one good; GMMS compares an agent with every repartition of a subgroup's goods. The difficulty is to control those repartitions while keeping the exact 4/74/74/7 constant. Merely applying an ordinary maximin-share bound to the grand coalition does not establish the required subgroup inequalities. Chaudhury et al., pp. 15–17.

Formalization scope

Agents and goods are represented by Fin n and Fin m; Lean numbers agents from zero, and the paper's “agent 1” is an explicit source sss. Bundles are finite sets. Valuations are real-valued but include nonnegativity alongside additivity, representing the paper's codomain R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​. The pool is computed from XXX, and the donated allocation is a function of XXX and sss. No independent pool or arbitrary completed allocation is allowed. Completeness is a conclusion. The maximin share is a finite maximum of finite minima over labelled partitions, which may have empty parts. Every use has a positive part count; in the GMMS definition this follows from i∈N′i\in N'i∈N′. Cardinality is converted to real numbers before fractions are formed. These choices exclude zero-part maximin shares and integer division. Chaudhury et al., pp. 3–5, 15–16.

The theorem is conditional on the EFX and pool-value properties of the source allocation, rather than repeating its existence proof. It states the conclusion for every such allocation and every source. The paper's half-optimal-Nash-social-welfare bullet is outside this mission because it invokes the separate black-box starting allocation of Lemma 12. Contributions toward finite-partition comparisons, EFX value bounds, and the groupwise estimate are welcome. Chaudhury et al., pp. 14–17.

Selected references

  • B. R. Chaudhury, T. Kavitha, K. Mehlhorn and A. Sgouritsa, A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness, SIAM Journal on Computing, 2021. Formalization source: arXiv:1907.04596v3.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness II: With Additive Valuations Such an Allocation Gives Every Agent Her Maximin Share Divided by 2 − |P|/nResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods

A set of nnn agents must share a set MMM of mmm indivisible goods, each agent valuing bundles of goods by her own valuation. Two fairness notions dominate the literature. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), introduced by Caragiannis, Kurokawa, Moulin, Procaccia, Shah and Wang (EC 2016), asks that no agent prefer another's bundle once any single good is removed from it. The maximin share (MMS), proposed by Budish (JPE 2011), asks that every agent receive at least what she could secure by splitting the goods into nnn bundles herself and taking the worst one.

Neither notion is known to be achievable in full. Whether complete EFX allocations always exist is open in general. Complete MMS allocations need not exist: Procaccia and Wang (EC 2014) gave a counterexample with three agents, and the best known approximation factors for additive valuations are 3/4−ε3/4-\varepsilon3/4−ε (Ghodsi et al., EC 2018) and 3/43/43/4 (Garg and Taki, arXiv:1903.00029). Amanatidis, Birmpas and Markakis (IJCAI 2018) showed that every complete EFX allocation is a 4/74/74/7-MMS allocation.

Caragiannis, Gravin and Huang (EC 2019) showed that EFX can be achieved if some goods are left unallocated, with no bound on how many. Chaudhury, Kavitha, Mehlhorn and Sgouritsa (arXiv:1907.04596, SODA 2020, SIAM J. Comput. 2021) relax completeness instead: some goods may be "donated to charity". Their Theorem 8 produces an EFX partial allocation in which nobody envies the donated set and the donated set has fewer goods than there are unenvied agents. This mission formalizes their Theorem 14: such an allocation also gives every agent a maximin-share guarantee that improves as more goods are donated.

Setting

Agents are N=[n]N=[n]N=[n] and goods are MMM, ∣M∣=m|M|=m∣M∣=m. Agent iii has a valuation vi:2M→R≥0v_i:2^M\to\mathbb{R}_{\ge 0}vi​:2M→R≥0​, assumed additive: vi(S)=∑g∈Svi({g})v_i(S)=\sum_{g\in S}v_i(\{g\})vi​(S)=∑g∈S​vi​({g}) for every S⊆MS\subseteq MS⊆M.

A (partial) allocation X=⟨X1,…,Xn⟩X=\langle X_1,\dots,X_n\rangleX=⟨X1​,…,Xn​⟩ gives agent iii the bundle Xi⊆MX_i\subseteq MXi​⊆M, the bundles being pairwise disjoint. The pool of unallocated goods is P=M∖⋃iXiP=M\setminus\bigcup_i X_iP=M∖⋃i​Xi​, and k=∣P∣k=|P|k=∣P∣.

  • XXX is EFX if vi(Xi)≥vi(Xj∖{g})v_i(X_i)\ge v_i(X_j\setminus\{g\})vi​(Xi​)≥vi​(Xj​∖{g}) for all agents i,ji,ji,j and every g∈Xjg\in X_jg∈Xj​.
  • The envy graph GXG_XGX​ has the agents as vertices and an edge i→ji\to ji→j exactly when vi(Xi)<vi(Xj)v_i(X_i)<v_i(X_j)vi​(Xi​)<vi​(Xj​). A source is a vertex of indegree zero: an agent nobody envies.
  • The maximin share of agent iii over k′≥1k'\ge1k′≥1 bundles of a set SSS of goods is
MMSi(k′,S)=max⁡(S1,…,Sk′) min⁡1≤j≤k′vi(Sj),\mathrm{MMS}_i(k',S)=\max_{(S_1,\dots,S_{k'})}\ \min_{1\le j\le k'} v_i(S_j),MMSi​(k′,S)=(S1​,…,Sk′​)max​ 1≤j≤k′min​vi​(Sj​),

the maximum over partitions of SSS into k′k'k′ possibly empty bundles. Agent iii's maximin share in the instance is MMSi(n,M)\mathrm{MMS}_i(n,M)MMSi​(n,M).

The three conditions of Theorem 8 on (X,P)(X,P)(X,P) are:

  1. XXX is EFX;
  2. vi(Xi)≥vi(P)v_i(X_i)\ge v_i(P)vi​(Xi​)≥vi​(P) for every agent iii;
  3. ∣P∣|P|∣P∣ is less than the number of sources of GXG_XGX​; in particular ∣P∣<n|P|<n∣P∣<n.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14 (MMS bullet)

For every allocation XXX with pool PPP satisfying conditions 1–3, and every agent iii,

vi(Xi) ≥ MMSi(n,M)2−kn,k=∣P∣.v_i(X_i)\ \ge\ \frac{\mathrm{MMS}_i(n,M)}{2-\frac{k}{n}},\qquad k=|P|.vi​(Xi​) ≥ 2−nk​MMSi​(n,M)​,k=∣P∣.

The factor ranges from 12\tfrac1221​ when P=∅P=\emptysetP=∅ to (1+1n)−1(1+\tfrac1n)^{-1}(1+n1​)−1 when ∣P∣=n−1|P|=n-1∣P∣=n−1.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 13 (quoted by the paper from Garg, McGlaughlin and Taki, SOSA 2019): for N′⊆NN'\subseteq NN′⊆N and M′⊆MM'\subseteq MM′⊆M with ∣N∖N′∣≥∣M∖M′∣|N\setminus N'|\ge|M\setminus M'|∣N∖N′∣≥∣M∖M′∣ and i∈N′i\in N'i∈N′,
MMSi(∣N′∣,M′) ≥ MMSi(∣N∣,M).\mathrm{MMS}_i(|N'|,M')\ \ge\ \mathrm{MMS}_i(|N|,M).MMSi​(∣N′∣,M′) ≥ MMSi​(∣N∣,M).
  1. MMS is at most the proportional share: MMSi(k′,S)≤vi(S)/k′\mathrm{MMS}_i(k',S)\le v_i(S)/k'MMSi​(k′,S)≤vi​(S)/k′ for additive valuations and k′≥1k'\ge1k′≥1.
  2. The EFX half-bound: if XXX is EFX and ∣Xj∣≥2|X_j|\ge2∣Xj​∣≥2, then vi(Xi)≥(1−1/∣Xj∣) vi(Xj)≥12vi(Xj)v_i(X_i)\ge(1-1/|X_j|)\,v_i(X_j)\ge\tfrac12 v_i(X_j)vi​(Xi​)≥(1−1/∣Xj​∣)vi​(Xj​)≥21​vi​(Xj​).
  3. The counting step (summing inequalities (1)–(3) of the proof): with N′N'N′ the sources of GXG_XGX​, agent iii and all agents holding at least two goods, n′=∣N′∣n'=|N'|n′=∣N′∣ and M′=⋃j∈N′XjM'=\bigcup_{j\in N'}X_jM′=⋃j∈N′​Xj​,
(2n′−k) vi(Xi) ≥ vi(M′∪P).(2n'-k)\,v_i(X_i)\ \ge\ v_i(M'\cup P).(2n′−k)vi​(Xi​) ≥ vi​(M′∪P).

Significance

Theorem 14 shows that leaving goods unallocated is not merely a cost: under conditions 1–3, each donated good buys a quantitative improvement of every agent's maximin-share guarantee, interpolating between the factor 12\tfrac1221​ the bound gives when the pool is empty and a factor tending to 111 when nearly nnn goods are donated. Together with Theorem 8 it shows that a single allocation can be simultaneously EFX, envy-free towards the charity, small in its charity, and approximately MMS. The same reduction (Proposition 13 applied to a carefully chosen sub-instance) is the template for the paper's 4/74/74/7-groupwise-maximin-share result, Theorem 16, formalized in mission III of this series.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it, of Proposition 13, or of the existence of EFX allocations with bounded charity is known to exist. The mission produces a formal maximin-share definition on arbitrary subsets of goods with an arbitrary number of bundles, a formal proof of the monotonicity of the maximin share under removal of agents and goods (Proposition 13, which the paper quotes without proof), and the guarantee itself. Combined with mission I of this series (Theorem 8), it yields the printed existence statement.

Difficulty

The guarantee compares an agent's own bundle with a benchmark defined over all partitions of all goods, while EFX and the source condition speak only about the allocation at hand. The obvious attempt, summing vi(Xi)≥12vi(Xj)v_i(X_i)\ge\tfrac12 v_i(X_j)vi​(Xi​)≥21​vi​(Xj​) over all agents and adding the pool, gives only a factor near 12\tfrac1221​ and ignores the pool's size. Agents holding a single good are the obstruction: EFX gives no bound on the value of their bundles relative to vi(Xi)v_i(X_i)vi​(Xi​), and the benchmark MMSi(n,M)\mathrm{MMS}_i(n,M)MMSi​(n,M) is defined on the full instance, which contains them. Proposition 13, the comparison of maximin shares across instances, is a combinatorial statement about all partitions of the original instance and requires nonnegativity of the valuations: with a good of negative value it fails.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n (0-based) and goods Fin m; the set MMM is the whole of Fin m. Valuations are functions Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ; additivity is the sum formula together with nonnegativity, which is the paper's codomain R≥0\mathbb{R}_{\ge0}R≥0​. An allocation is a family of pairwise disjoint finsets and the pool is always computed as the complement of their union, never taken as a free parameter. Sources are agents of indegree zero in the envy graph (nobody envies them), not agents who envy nobody. The maximin share MMS(k′,S)\mathrm{MMS}(k',S)MMS(k′,S) is a supremum over labellings Fin m → Fin k' restricted to SSS of the minimum bundle value; it is used only with k′≥1k'\ge1k′≥1, which every statement has in its hypotheses or derives from them (in the goal, condition 3 forces n≥1n\ge1n≥1). Every cardinality is cast to R\mathbb{R}R before division or subtraction, and 2−k/n>12-k/n>12−k/n>1 under condition 3, so no division by zero occurs.

The goal is posed as an implication for every allocation satisfying conditions 1–3, rather than as the paper's "there exists an allocation"; the paper's proof of the MMS bullet uses only those three conditions, and existence is Theorem 8. The Nash-social-welfare bullet of Theorem 14 is not posed: it depends on Lemma 12, which takes the allocation of an earlier paper as a black box. The goal cannot be trivialized by a free pool, by overlapping bundles, by zero agents (condition 3 excludes them), by a junk maximin share over zero bundles, or by natural-number division; the statement keeps all three conditions, each of which is needed.

Contributions welcome: a library-quality maximin-share API for additive valuations (attainment of the maximum, monotonicity, the proportional bound), which is reusable for other MMS results; proofs of the milestones; and the final assembly.

Selected references

  • B. R. Chaudhury, T. Kavitha, K. Mehlhorn, A. Sgouritsa, A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness, SIAM J. Comput. 50(4), 2021; cited from arXiv:1907.04596v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04596
  • E. Budish, The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes, J. Political Economy 119(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1086/664613
  • I. Caragiannis, D. Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. D. Procaccia, N. Shah, J. Wang, The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare, EC 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940726
  • A. D. Procaccia, J. Wang, Fair Enough: Guaranteeing Approximate Maximin Shares, EC 2014. https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602835
  • M. Ghodsi, M. HajiAghayi, M. Seddighin, S. Seddighin, H. Yami, Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvements and Generalizations, EC 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219238
  • J. Garg, S. Taki, An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Maximin Shares, CoRR abs/1903.00029, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.00029
  • J. Garg, P. McGlaughlin, S. Taki, Approximating Maximin Share Allocations, SOSA 2019. https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.SOSA.2019.20
  • I. Caragiannis, N. Gravin, X. Huang, Envy-Freeness up to Any Item with High Nash Welfare: The Virtue of Donating Items, EC 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329574
  • G. Amanatidis, G. Birmpas, E. Markakis, Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness, IJCAI 2018. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/7
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers 2: Both Fixed Prices Rise with the Buyer Arrival Rate and Fall with the Seller Arrival Rate; Matches and Fluid Profit Rise with BothResearch Paper

Why market size changes prices

Two-sided intermediaries charge buyers and pay sellers while trying to match the two groups. A larger arrival stream on one side changes both the number of possible matches and the prices that clear the market. Chen and Hu study this in a model of buyers and sellers who arrive over time and may wait before requesting a match. Their market-size theorem concerns the deterministic fluid benchmark used to choose fixed prices for the dynamic system. This mission formalizes that theorem from the submitted manuscript, main text §6, rather than the performance of the waiting-adjusted policy itself.

The fluid benchmark matters because it supplies an interpretable price and quantity for each pair of arrival rates. When buyers become more numerous, the model predicts that both the buyer price and the seller payment rise. When sellers become more numerous, both prices fall. In either direction, more arrivals raise the maximum matching quantity and the fluid profit. These claims concern the same valuation and cost distributions as the rates vary, so they isolate the effect of market size.

The two-sided fluid market

Buyer valuations lie in [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ], with density fdf^dfd and distribution function FdF^dFd. Seller costs lie in [c‾,cˉ][\underline c,\bar c][c​,cˉ], with density fsf^sfs and distribution function FsF^sFs. Write Fˉd=1−Fd\bar F^d=1-F^dFˉd=1−Fd. Buyer and seller arrival rates are λd>0\lambda^d>0λd>0 and λs>0\lambda^s>0λs>0, and the horizon has length T>0T>0T>0. A buyer accepts a fixed ask price ppp when the valuation is at least ppp; a seller accepts a fixed bid price www when the cost is at most www. Thus λdFˉd(p)\lambda^d\bar F^d(p)λdFˉd(p) and λsFs(w)\lambda^s F^s(w)λsFs(w) are the corresponding acceptance rates.

The buyer virtual value is Vd(v)=v−Fˉd(v)/fd(v)V^d(v)=v-\bar F^d(v)/f^d(v)Vd(v)=v−Fˉd(v)/fd(v), and the seller virtual cost is Vs(c)=c+Fs(c)/fs(c)V^s(c)=c+F^s(c)/f^s(c)Vs(c)=c+Fs(c)/fs(c). Assumptions 1 and 2 of the manuscript say these functions are weakly increasing on their respective supports. The supports overlap in the sense c‾≤vˉ\underline c\le\bar vc​≤vˉ. The density assumptions ensure that the survival and cost distribution functions have inverse quantiles on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. For a candidate volume μ\muμ, the virtual surplus is

V(μ)=Vd ⁣(Fˉd,−1 ⁣(μλdT))−Vs ⁣(Fs,−1 ⁣(μλsT)).V(\mu)=V^d\!\left(\bar F^{d,-1}\!\left(\frac{\mu}{\lambda^dT}\right)\right)-V^s\!\left(F^{s,-1}\!\left(\frac{\mu}{\lambda^sT}\right)\right).V(μ)=Vd(Fˉd,−1(λdTμ​))−Vs(Fs,−1(λsTμ​)).

The optimal fluid matching quantity μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is the largest μ\muμ in [0,min⁡{λdT,λsT}][0,\min\{\lambda^dT,\lambda^sT\}][0,min{λdT,λsT}] for which V(μ)≥0V(\mu)\ge0V(μ)≥0. The corresponding fixed prices are p∗=Fˉd,−1(μ∗/(λdT))p^*=\bar F^{d,-1}(\mu^*/(\lambda^dT))p∗=Fˉd,−1(μ∗/(λdT)) and w∗=Fs,−1(μ∗/(λsT))w^*=F^{s,-1}(\mu^*/(\lambda^sT))w∗=Fs,−1(μ∗/(λsT)).

The fluid program (D) permits any measurable nonnegative ask and bid price path (π^td,π^ts)(\hat\pi^d_t,\hat\pi^s_t)(π^td​,π^ts​) on [0,T][0,T][0,T] that clears the market at every time: λdFˉd(π^td)=λsFs(π^ts)\lambda^d\bar F^d(\hat\pi^d_t)=\lambda^sF^s(\hat\pi^s_t)λdFˉd(π^td​)=λsFs(π^ts​). Its value Jˉ∗\bar J^*Jˉ∗ is the supremum of buyer revenue minus seller payments, integrated over the horizon. Proposition 1 states that the constant path (p∗,w∗)(p^*,w^*)(p∗,w∗) attains this value and that Jˉ∗=(p∗−w∗)μ∗\bar J^*=(p^*-w^*)\mu^*Jˉ∗=(p∗−w∗)μ∗.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 3, the eight weak comparisons of prices, volume, and fluid profit. For 0<λ1d≤λ2d0<\lambda^d_1\le\lambda^d_20<λ1d​≤λ2d​ with λs\lambda^sλs fixed, it asserts

p1∗≤p2∗,w1∗≤w2∗,μ1∗≤μ2∗,Jˉ1∗≤Jˉ2∗.p^*_1\le p^*_2,\quad w^*_1\le w^*_2,\quad \mu^*_1\le\mu^*_2,\quad \bar J^*_1\le\bar J^*_2.p1∗​≤p2∗​,w1∗​≤w2∗​,μ1∗​≤μ2∗​,Jˉ1∗​≤Jˉ2∗​.

For 0<λ1s≤λ2s0<\lambda^s_1\le\lambda^s_20<λ1s​≤λ2s​ with λd\lambda^dλd fixed, the two price inequalities reverse while the volume and profit inequalities retain their directions. The goal leaves the rates and the two distributions as variables, so it states the market-size result across all systems meeting the paper's assumptions.

The milestones follow the source's dependency structure: Proposition 1 identifies the fluid optimizer; the proof of Lemma S.5 notes that V(μ)V(\mu)V(μ) decreases in μ\muμ; Lemma S.5 establishes the volume and profit comparisons; and the two parts of the proof of Theorem 3 compare the fractions μ∗/(λdT)\mu^*/(\lambda^dT)μ∗/(λdT) and μ∗/(λsT)\mu^*/(\lambda^sT)μ∗/(λsT) served on the growing side. The paper's proofs are in the Supplemental Note, with related proofs in the Online Appendix.

What the result provides

The theorem gives directional predictions without differentiating optimal prices with respect to arrival rates. A platform comparing two otherwise identical markets can infer which way its fluid ask and bid prices move, whether it matches more units, and whether the benchmark profit increases. Proposition 1 also connects the optimization over time-varying paths to a fixed price pair, so the static claims apply to the entire feasible fluid program.

The result is proved in the manuscript; this mission asks for a machine-checked proof of the same statement. The formal development would make the inverse-quantile construction, attainment of the optimal volume, and the nonempty bounded fluid optimization problem explicit. Those objects can be reused in other two-sided pricing or matching models. This mission does not claim that the corresponding stochastic system has identical comparative statics; the manuscript itself focuses on the fluid regime in §6.

Where the proof is difficult

Increasing one arrival rate expands the feasible number of matches, but the two optimal prices do not follow from that fact alone. The buyer price depends on the fraction of buyers served, and the seller price depends on the fraction of sellers served. A growing side can have a larger matched volume yet a smaller matched fraction. The proof must control both quantities under the appropriate inverse distribution function. Profit also needs a comparison of two separate fluid optimization problems, rather than only a comparison of their candidate fixed-price formulas.

Formalization scope

The Lean model reuses the published bilateral-trade environment for the two positive densities, interval supports, cumulative distributions, and virtual values. The new definitions clamp both cumulative distributions to their supports so a price outside the support still has the correct acceptance probability. Inverse quantiles are supported level-set infima, used only at arguments in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. All rates and the horizon are positive; both densities are continuous on their supports; the virtual functions satisfy the paper's regularity assumptions; and c‾≤vˉ\underline c\le\bar vc​≤vˉ. Density continuity is a disclosed addition needed for the asserted inverse-quantile and maximum properties.

The claims involving the value of (D) assume a nonnegative seller cost support. This disclosed domain correction puts the fixed seller price in (D), whose price paths take values in R+2\mathbb R_+^2R+2​; the imported bilateral-trade environment itself permits negative supports. The virtual-surplus and served-fraction inequalities hold without this condition. Every feasible path is measurable, nonnegative on [0,T][0,T][0,T], clears the market at every point of that interval, and has integrable buyer and seller revenue terms. The fluid value is defined as the supremum over those paths. It is never defined by Proposition 1's fixed-price identity, which would erase the optimization claim. The volume set is restricted to [0,min⁡{λdT,λsT}][0,\min\{\lambda^dT,\lambda^sT\}][0,min{λdT,λsT}], so its supremum has the source's intended domain. The source uses “increasing” and “decreasing” in the weak sense.

Useful contributions include lemmas showing the clamped distributions are monotone, their supported inverses have the stated identities, the candidate volume set has a greatest member, the fluid feasible set is nonempty and bounded above, and the two fraction comparisons. These are substantive mathematical obligations: no arbitrary inverse, empty feasible set, non-integrable path, or preassigned fluid value should satisfy the goal by a default value.

Selected references

  • Y. Chen and M. Hu, Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers, submitted manuscript, SSRN 2859864, 2020; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 22(4), 717–734. SSRN manuscript.
  • T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, §3.4.1. Publisher.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A game-theoretic approach to computation offloading in mobile cloud computing III: Variational Solutions Are the Nash Equilibria of the Extended Cloudlet-Pricing GameResearch Paper

Why a cloudlet price matters

Mobile devices can divide work between local execution, a nearby shared cloudlet, and a remote cloud. A cloudlet has limited capacity, so one user's choice changes the delay faced by the others. Cardellini and coauthors model this as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem, in which each user's feasible choices depend on the aggregate cloudlet load. The shared utilization cap makes a direct distributed solution awkward: a user must know how much capacity all other users consume before choosing a feasible deviation. The paper therefore introduces an additional player who sets a cloudlet price. This mission formalizes the relationship between the original coupled game and that extended, ordinary Nash game Cardellini et al., accepted manuscript, pp. 10–16.

The offloading game

There are NNN users and nnn cloudlet servers. User uuu chooses fractions xu,mx_{u,m}xu,m​, xu,cletx_{u,\mathrm{clet}}xu,clet​, and xu,cloudx_{u,\mathrm{cloud}}xu,cloud​ for local, cloudlet, and remote-cloud execution. These fractions are nonnegative and sum to one. At most a fraction χ\chiχ can be offloaded, and a user-specific linear power constraint applies. The set K~u\widetilde K_uKu​ contains these private feasible choices. The cloudlet load and the shared feasible set are

L(x)=1n∑u=1Nδuxu,clet,Ω={x:L(x)≤Umax⁡},K=(∏u=1NK~u)∩Ω.L(x)=\frac1n\sum_{u=1}^{N}\delta_u x_{u,\mathrm{clet}},\qquad \Omega=\{x:L(x)\le U_{\max}\},\qquad K=\left(\prod_{u=1}^{N}\widetilde K_u\right)\cap\Omega.L(x)=n1​u=1∑N​δu​xu,clet​,Ω={x:L(x)≤Umax​},K=(u=1∏N​Ku​)∩Ω.

Each user's cost λuRu\lambda_u R_uλu​Ru​ is the response-time expression on p. 10, with coefficients αu,βu,γu,δu\alpha_u,\beta_u,\gamma_u,\delta_uαu​,βu​,γu​,δu​. The VI map FFF is the stack of the user's partial gradients, written in closed form on p. 11. A variational solution xˉ\bar xxˉ belongs to KKK and satisfies ⟨F(xˉ),x−xˉ⟩≥0\langle F(\bar x),x-\bar x\rangle\ge0⟨F(xˉ),x−xˉ⟩≥0 for every x∈Kx\in Kx∈K. The pairing sums all three coordinates for each user. Section 5 assumes 0<Umax⁡<10<U_{\max}<10<Umax​<1 and 0<αu,δu<10<\alpha_u,\delta_u<10<αu​,δu​<1 for every user; the model also has n>0n>0n>0 and 0<χ≤10<\chi\le10<χ≤1 Cardellini et al., pp. 7, 9–11.

The extended game replaces the joint cap in each user's feasible set by a price. User uuu minimizes λuRu(x)+ρ(δu/n)xu,clet\lambda_uR_u(x)+\rho(\delta_u/n)x_{u,\mathrm{clet}}λu​Ru​(x)+ρ(δu​/n)xu,clet​ over K~u\widetilde K_uKu​. A cloudlet manager chooses ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0 to maximize ρ(L(x)−Umax⁡)\rho(L(x)-U_{\max})ρ(L(x)−Umax​). The manager's choice is part of the Nash equilibrium condition, not a preimposed complementary-slackness equation. The extended game's VI set is Ke=(∏uK~u)×R+K_e=(\prod_u\widetilde K_u)\times\mathbb R_+Ke​=(∏u​Ku​)×R+​ and its map is Fe(x,ρ)=(F(x)+price⁡(ρ),Umax⁡−L(x))F_e(x,\rho)=(F(x)+\operatorname{price}(\rho),U_{\max}-L(x))Fe​(x,ρ)=(F(x)+price(ρ),Umax​−L(x)) Cardellini et al., p. 15.

Formalization targets

The goal is the two-part assertion of Theorem 2. Under the standing assumptions and a strict load bound on the full product of private feasible sets, its equilibrium characterization is

xˉ∈SOL⁡(K,F)⟺∃ρˉ,  (xˉ,ρˉ)∈NE⁡ext.\bar x\in\operatorname{SOL}(K,F) \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \exists\bar\rho,\; (\bar x,\bar\rho)\in\operatorname{NE}_{\mathrm{ext}}.xˉ∈SOL(K,F)⟺∃ρˉ​,(xˉ,ρˉ​)∈NEext​.

The same goal states that monotonicity of FFF on ∏uK~u\prod_u\widetilde K_u∏u​Ku​ implies monotonicity of FeF_eFe​ on KeK_eKe​. The three milestones follow the paper's path: the extended Nash game is equivalent to its VI; the shared affine constraint has a scalar multiplier at a VI solution; and the price-load coupling cancels in the monotonicity pairing. The source states the first as a classical result and gives the last two in its proof Cardellini et al., pp. 15–16.

What the result provides

The characterization lets a variational solution of a game with coupled feasible sets be found as an equilibrium of a game whose NNN users have separate feasible sets. The additional scalar has a concrete interpretation: it is the multiplier of the shared cloudlet-utilization cap. The monotonicity assertion connects the paper's analysis of the original VI to methods for the extended one. The paper uses this relationship as the entry point for its distributed algorithms in the next section Cardellini et al., pp. 16–17.

The result is proved in the paper but is not yet machine checked in this mission. A complete development would give reusable Lean interfaces for a finite-dimensional VI on an intersection of a product polytope and one affine half-space, a multiplier characterization for that intersection, and an equilibrium-to-VI conversion for separable player constraints. Those components could support other capacity-sharing games. The theorem drafts remain proof obligations; the definitions compile locally.

Where the proof is delicate

A Nash equilibrium requires each user to be optimal against every privately feasible deviation, including deviations that violate the original shared cap. Consequently, the user's cloudlet cost must remain well defined throughout K~u\widetilde K_uKu​ for the equivalence to hold. A load bound only on KKK does not cover those deviations. The multiplier comparison must also account for the manager's maximization condition and the sign of the load term in FeF_eFe​. For monotonicity, FeF_eFe​ evaluates FFF on the whole product ∏uK~u\prod_u\widetilde K_u∏u​Ku​, a larger domain than KKK. These domain distinctions explain why the statement needs two explicit repairs to the printed theorem Cardellini et al., pp. 15–16.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the users as Fin N and the three processing locations as a finite tier type. Indices therefore start at zero. The costs, the map FFF, the private sets, Ω\OmegaΩ, and KKK are separate definitions. The Euclidean pairing is written as a finite sum; no Pi-type sup norm is used. The extended Nash predicate quantifies over user deviations in K~u\widetilde K_uKu​ and over every nonnegative manager price. The VI predicates are in their own module so the game is not built into their meaning. The theorem's statement remains meaningful at N=0N=0N=0; no positive-user hypothesis is added to Section 5's assumptions.

The first repair requires L(x)<1L(x)<1L(x)<1 at every x∈∏uK~ux\in\prod_u\widetilde K_ux∈∏u​Ku​. The paper's Theorem 1 condition (18) implies this bound, but is stronger than needed. Without the bound, a private deviation can cross the pole of δuxu,clet/(1−L(x))\delta_u x_{u,\mathrm{clet}}/(1-L(x))δu​xu,clet​/(1−L(x)); Lean's total division then assigns a value at a zero denominator even though the paper's cost has none. In a two-user instance with n=1n=1n=1, δu=0.9\delta_u=0.9δu​=0.9 and Umax⁡=0.5U_{\max}=0.5Umax​=0.5, the pole can lie within one user's private feasible interval. The second repair reads “the original game is monotone” on ∏uK~u\prod_u\widetilde K_u∏u​Ku​, because that is precisely the xxx-domain of KeK_eKe​. Monotonicity on KKK alone is insufficient. Both repairs are disclosed in the item notes, and the source wording remains visible in the milestone quotations.

An empty KKK would make a solution statement vacuous; the formal development should retain concrete feasible parameter instances. The map FFF is the paper's displayed formula, rather than a derivative chosen to make a milestone tautological. The VI uses all user coordinates, and the extended game does not silently reinstate the shared constraint in user deviations. Contributions toward the stated multiplier theorem, Nash-to-VI equivalence, and the cancellation identity are welcome, along with reusable finite-dimensional convex-analysis lemmas.

Selected references

  • V. Cardellini, V. De Nitto Personé, V. Di Valerio, F. Facchinei, V. Grassi, F. Lo Presti, and V. Piccialli, A game-theoretic approach to computation offloading in mobile cloud computing, accepted manuscript for Mathematical Programming, 2015, DOI 10.1007/s10107-015-0881-6.
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