Personalized Dynamic Pricing with Machine Learning: High-Dimensional Features and Heterogeneous Elasticity 2: Under Unknown Sparsity, Lasso-Based ILQX Pricing Has Regret at Most Cs√T(log d + log T)Research Paper
Motivation
Online sellers of loans, insurance, travel and retail goods observe data about each arriving customer before quoting a price. Using that data to price individually is attractive only if the seller can learn, from its own sales, how demand responds to price for customers with given characteristics. Two features make this hard in practice. The number of recorded characteristics is often large, possibly larger than the selling horizon , while only a few of them matter. And price sensitivity is itself heterogeneous: different customers respond to the same price change differently.
Ban and Keskin (Management Science 67(9), 2021) model both features and ask how fast the revenue lost to learning can grow. Their answer is that a seller who learns with lasso-regularized quasi-likelihood estimation and occasional price experiments loses revenue of order up to logarithmic factors, where is the number of relevant characteristics, and that no policy can do better than order . This mission formalizes the upper bound for the general (nonlinear-link) model with unknown sparsity, Theorem 3 of the paper.
Setting
In each period a customer arrives with a raw feature vector . The are i.i.d., take values in a compact set inside a ball of radius , have mean zero and positive definite covariance . The seller sees the augmented vector , charges a price with , and observes the demand
Here is an unknown parameter in a compact rectangle , the link is known, differentiable and increasing with on the relevant domain, and the demand shocks form a sub-Gaussian martingale difference sequence. The term is the customer's own price sensitivity. With the argument of is .
The sparsity of is , . The seller does not know .
The expected revenue of price is , and the clairvoyant price maximizes it; it is assumed to lie in the interior of for , . The regret of a policy over periods is
The policy ILQX charges the experimental price in periods and in periods , and otherwise charges , where maximizes the lasso-penalized quasi-likelihood
over the experimental periods (), and is the projection onto . The regularization level is for a constant .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 3
There is a finite constant such that
is fixed with the model and is uniform over ; since varies over , the factor carries content.
Milestones
- The counting property of the schedule (7): for each experimental price is charged at least times in periods .
- Lemma 3, the estimation error of the lasso quasi-likelihood estimate:
Significance
Theorem 3 says that a seller facing many potentially relevant customer characteristics, without knowing which matter and under a nonlinear demand link such as logit, loses revenue at a rate governed by the number of relevant characteristics and only logarithmically by the total number . Combined with the paper's lower bound (Theorem 1, for the linear model), it makes ILQX first-order optimal up to logarithmic factors. An unregularized policy would pay order , which is linear in when exceeds .
The paper's proofs are in its electronic companion, which this mission does not reproduce; no machine-checked version of the result exists. A complete formalization would also produce a reusable high-probability error bound for lasso-regularized quasi-likelihood estimation under adaptively collected data (Lemma 3), and a machine-checked model of feature-based dynamic pricing on which related policies can be stated.
Difficulty
The estimation error must be controlled on data collected by the policy itself. The design vectors use only two prices, so the information about the price sensitivity accrues only from the experimental periods. Standard lasso error bounds assume a fixed or i.i.d. design and a restricted-eigenvalue condition on it; here a restricted-eigenvalue-type property of the random Kronecker design must be derived from and , and the noise enters through a martingale whose conditional law may depend on past prices. The quasi-likelihood is not a least-squares objective, so the curvature comes from the bounds , which hold only on the bounded domain and not at an unconstrained estimate. Finally, the regret bound has to turn a squared-error bound holding with probability into an expected revenue loss, which requires the revenue loss to be second order in the parameter error at an interior optimum.
Formalization scope
- Coordinates. is
Fin (d+1) → ℝwith the intercept at index0; isFin 2 × Fin (d+1) → ℝwith , . Periods are 1-based. . - Objective. The integrated form , which differs from the paper's (17) by a term not depending on and therefore has the same maximizers.
- Estimator. Any measurable selection that is a maximizer whenever one exists; the theorems hold for every such selection. The paper's claim that (17) is strictly concave with a unique maximizer fails when exceeds the rank of the design.
- Policy. The price is defined by strong recursion over the realized history; the estimator sees only through the realized demands.
- Regret is a lower Lebesgue integral of nonnegative losses; conditional moments of the shocks use the conditional Lebesgue expectation; probabilities are compared in .
- Standing assumptions formalized: i.i.d. measurable features in a compact inside a Euclidean ball, mean zero, positive definite ; fresh customers ( independent of the past); sub-Gaussian martingale-difference shocks; in ; differentiable and increasing with derivative bounds on the relevant domain (endnote 2 states them as a consequence, which is false; here they are a hypothesis); an unconstrained revenue maximizer in whose pricing map after projection and feature augmentation is measurable. The processes are constrained only at the used periods .
- Added hypotheses, per : (the paper's ), and almost surely every realized demand lies in the closure of the range of , which guarantees that a maximizer of (17) exists (true for the linear link and for binary demand under a logit link).
- Not formalized: the paper's support condition on continuous features; Remark 7's independence of from ; dependence of the shock law on (the shocks are one fixed process).
- Ruled-out trivializations. The regret cannot vanish by non-integrability; the estimator cannot be an arbitrary function, since it must maximize the objective; and are chosen before , so they cannot absorb ; the hypotheses are jointly satisfiable (a linear-link instance with is checked).
Contributions welcome: existence of a measurable maximizer of the objective, the counting lemma, and supporting lemmas for Lemma 3 and the regret bound.
Selected references
- G.-Y. Ban and N. B. Keskin, Personalized Dynamic Pricing with Machine Learning: High-Dimensional Features and Heterogeneous Elasticity, Management Science 67(9):5549–5568, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3680
- A. V. den Boer and B. Zwart, Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing, Management Science 60(3):770–783, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1788
- N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
- A. Javanmard and H. Nazerzadeh, Dynamic Pricing in High-Dimensions, Journal of Machine Learning Research 20(9):1–49, 2019. https://jmlr.org/papers/v20/17-357.html