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Operations Research

2,338 missions · 1,113 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems IV: Greedy Set Cover C1 Has Worst-Case Ratio H(k) on SC(k)Research Paper

Motivation

Set covering asks for the fewest members of a family of sets whose union is everything the family covers. It models crew scheduling, facility siting, test-suite reduction, logic minimization and fault testing; Johnson names the last two as its practical applications. Karp showed in 1972 that the decision version is NP-complete (Karp 1972), so in practice one runs a heuristic and asks how far from optimal it can be.

David S. Johnson's 1974 paper Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems (JCSS 9, 256–278) is one of the founding papers of the worst-case analysis of approximation algorithms. For set covering it analyses the obvious greedy rule, repeatedly take a set that covers the most still-uncovered points, and proves that on families whose sets have at most kkk elements its output is never more than the harmonic number H(k)=∑j=1k1/jH(k) = \sum_{j=1}^k 1/jH(k)=∑j=1k​1/j times the optimum, and that this factor is attained.

Timeline.

  • 1974: Johnson proves the H(k)H(k)H(k) bound for unweighted set cover with sets of size at most kkk, together with a matching family of examples (this mission).
  • 1975: Lovász proves the same bound for the fractional relaxation, giving an integrality-gap statement (Lovász 1975).
  • 1979: Chvátal extends the bound to weighted set cover, with the greedy rule choosing the set of least cost per newly covered point (Chvátal 1979).
  • 1998: Feige shows that no polynomial-time algorithm achieves (1−ε)ln⁡n(1-\varepsilon)\ln n(1−ε)lnn unless NP has slightly superpolynomial deterministic algorithms (Feige 1998), so the greedy guarantee is essentially the best possible.

Setting

An input FFF of SET COVERING I is a finite family {S1,…,Sp}\{S_1, \dots, S_p\}{S1​,…,Sp​} of finite sets. The set to be covered is T=⋃S∈FST = \bigcup_{S \in F} ST=⋃S∈F​S. A subcover is a subfamily F′⊆FF' \subseteq FF′⊆F with ⋃S∈F′S=T\bigcup_{S \in F'} S = T⋃S∈F′​S=T, and its measure is ∣F′∣|F'|∣F′∣. The optimum F∗F^*F∗ is the minimum measure of a subcover; FFF itself is a subcover, so the minimum exists. The subproblem SC(k) restricts the inputs to families no set of which has more than kkk elements.

Algorithm C1 keeps a family SUB of chosen sets, the set UNCOV of uncovered points, and an array SET[i][i][i] holding the still-uncovered part of SiS_iSi​. It starts with SUB =∅= \emptyset=∅, UNCOV =T= T=T, SET[i]=Si[i] = S_i[i]=Si​. While UNCOV is nonempty it chooses an index jjj with ∣SET[j]∣|\mathrm{SET}[j]|∣SET[j]∣ maximal, adds SjS_jSj​ to SUB, and removes SET[j][j][j] from UNCOV and from every SET[i][i][i]. When UNCOV is empty it returns SUB. When several indices tie at Step 3 any of them may be chosen, so one input can have several choosable outputs. Following Section 2 of the paper, the algorithm's value C1(F)C1(F)C1(F) is the worst choosable output, here the largest, and the ratio is r(C1,F)=C1(F)/F∗r(C1, F) = C1(F)/F^*r(C1,F)=C1(F)/F∗.

For the proof the paper introduces configurations K=⟨NK,UNCOVK,⟨SETK[1],…,SETK[NK]⟩⟩K = \langle N_K, \mathrm{UNCOV}_K, \langle \mathrm{SET}_K[1], \dots, \mathrm{SET}_K[N_K]\rangle\rangleK=⟨NK​,UNCOVK​,⟨SETK​[1],…,SETK​[NK​]⟩⟩ with ⋃iSETK[i]=UNCOVK\bigcup_i \mathrm{SET}_K[i] = \mathrm{UNCOV}_K⋃i​SETK​[i]=UNCOVK​, runs from a configuration (sequences of admissible choices ending when UNCOV is empty), Numbers(R)\mathrm{Numbers}(R)Numbers(R), the set of indices chosen in a run RRR, and calls a set MMM selectable from KKK if M=Numbers(R)M = \mathrm{Numbers}(R)M=Numbers(R) for some run RRR from KKK. Write n(K,i)=∣SETK[i]∣n(K, i) = |\mathrm{SET}_K[i]|n(K,i)=∣SETK​[i]∣.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

For every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1:

for every input F∈SC(k) and every choosable F1:∣F1∣≤H(k)⋅F∗,\text{for every input } F \in SC(k) \text{ and every choosable } F_1:\quad |F_1| \le H(k)\cdot F^*,for every input F∈SC(k) and every choosable F1​:∣F1​∣≤H(k)⋅F∗, and some F∈SC(k) with F∗>0 has a choosable F1 with ∣F1∣=H(k)⋅F∗.\text{and some } F \in SC(k) \text{ with } F^* > 0 \text{ has a choosable } F_1 \text{ with } |F_1| = H(k)\cdot F^*.and some F∈SC(k) with F∗>0 has a choosable F1​ with ∣F1​∣=H(k)⋅F∗.

The paper states this as R[C1,SC(k)](n)≤∑j=1k(1/j)R[C1, SC(k)](n) \le \sum_{j=1}^k (1/j)R[C1,SC(k)](n)≤∑j=1k​(1/j) for all n>0n > 0n>0, with equality for all sufficiently large nnn. The two-part form above is the size-free equivalent.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1. For a subcover F1F_1F1​ with index set M1={i:Si∈F1}M1 = \{i : S_i \in F_1\}M1={i:Si​∈F1​} and KKK the configuration after Step 1: F1F_1F1​ is choosable by C1 if and only if M1M1M1 is selectable from KKK.
  2. Lemma 2. For any configuration KKK, any M1M1M1 selectable from KKK and any M0M0M0 with ⋃i∈M0SETK[i]=UNCOVK\bigcup_{i \in M0} \mathrm{SET}_K[i] = \mathrm{UNCOV}_K⋃i∈M0​SETK​[i]=UNCOVK​:
∣M1∣≤∑i∈M0∑j=1n(K,i)1j.|M1| \le \sum_{i \in M0} \sum_{j=1}^{n(K,i)} \frac{1}{j}.∣M1∣≤i∈M0∑​j=1∑n(K,i)​j1​.
  1. Fig. 1. For every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 there is an explicit input of SC(k)SC(k)SC(k) on k⋅k!k \cdot k!k⋅k! points with F∗=k!F^* = k!F∗=k! and a choosable output of k! H(k)k!\,H(k)k!H(k) sets.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 is the first proof that greedy set cover has a worst-case guarantee depending only on the largest set size, and it pins the guarantee down exactly: the constant H(k)H(k)H(k) cannot be lowered for any kkk. Since H(k)≤1+ln⁡kH(k) \le 1 + \ln kH(k)≤1+lnk, it also gives the well-known 1+ln⁡n1 + \ln n1+lnn bound for general inputs. The H(k)H(k)H(k) bound and its later refinements are the standard reference point for analyses of greedy covering, dual fitting and submodular covering.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1974. As far as a search of the platform shows, no machine-checked proof of it exists: the platform holds a Kearns–Vazirani-style statement ComputationalLearning.greedy_set_cover (the opt⋅ln⁡∣U∣\mathrm{opt}\cdot\ln|U|opt⋅ln∣U∣ form for a greedy sequence, still open) and a dual-fitting certificate lemma for weighted set cover, neither of which covers the SC(k)SC(k)SC(k) bound, the tie-breaking semantics or the tightness construction. A complete development provides both halves of Theorem 4, the configuration and run machinery of Lemmas 1–2, and the explicit Fig. 1 family.

Difficulty

The obvious argument charges each chosen set to the points it newly covers and compares the charges with an optimal cover. A statement about the initial input alone, with the original sizes of the optimal sets, does not survive a single greedy step: after a step the optimal sets are only partly uncovered and the remaining run faces a different instance. This is why Lemma 2 is stated for an arbitrary configuration, in terms of the current sizes n(K,i)n(K, i)n(K,i), and for an arbitrary covering subfamily M0M0M0. Because Step 3 breaks ties arbitrarily, the statement must hold for every admissible run, and a formalization that fixes one tie-breaking rule proves a weaker upper bound and cannot express the tightness example, which relies on adversarial ties at every stage.

For the tightness half, the difficulty is bookkeeping: showing that the k!/jk!/jk!/j blocks of each segment are admissible choices at each stage and that no cover uses fewer than k!k!k! sets.

Formalization scope

  • An input is an indexed family S : ι → Finset α over a finite index type ι and a ground type with decidable equality. The indices play the role of 1,…,N1, \dots, N1,…,N; two indices may carry the same set, which only widens the input class. The family, subcovers and F∗F^*F∗ are taken over the set of sets family S, as on the page. F∗F^*F∗ is a Finset.inf' over the nonempty finite set of subcovers; if T=∅T = \emptysetT=∅ then F∗=0F^* = 0F∗=0.
  • C1 is a nondeterministic step relation: a step is allowed for every index maximizing ∣SET[j]∣|\mathrm{SET}[j]|∣SET[j]∣. An output is choosable if a finite chain of steps from the initial state reaches a halting state with that SUB. No tie-breaking rule is fixed.
  • The paper's R[A,P](n)R[A, P](n)R[A,P](n) is a maximum over inputs of size at most nnn in an unspecified notation; it is replaced by the size-free two-part statement above, which is equivalent because RRR is a maximum over finitely many inputs and nondecreasing in nnn.
  • Ratios are stated multiplicatively in Q\mathbb{Q}Q (∣F1∣≤H(k)⋅F∗|F_1| \le H(k)\cdot F^*∣F1​∣≤H(k)⋅F∗), never as a quotient, so an input with F∗=0F^* = 0F∗=0 does not make the bound vacuous, and the attainment part requires F∗>0F^* > 0F∗>0. H(k)H(k)H(k) is Mathlib's harmonic k.
  • Configurations carry the covering condition as a field; runs are an inductive predicate on the list of chosen indices; Selectable K M means MMM is the set of indices of some run.
  • Lemma 1 assumes the family's sets are pairwise distinct (the paper's family is a set of sets); without that the index set {i:Si∈F1}\{i : S_i \in F_1\}{i:Si​∈F1​} may contain a duplicate index C1 never chose.
  • Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: a deterministic tie-break, a ratio written as a division, the original set sizes in place of n(K,i)n(K, i)n(K,i) in Lemma 2, or an attaining input with F∗=0F^* = 0F∗=0 would each change the theorem.

Contributions welcome: proofs of Lemma 2 (the core induction), of Lemma 1, of the Fig. 1 run, and of Theorem 4 from these; the configuration/run layer and the Fig. 1 family are reusable for other greedy covering analyses.

Selected references

  • David S. Johnson, Approximation algorithms for combinatorial problems, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 9 (1974), 256–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0000(74)80044-9
  • Richard M. Karp, Reducibility among combinatorial problems, in Complexity of Computer Computations, Plenum, 1972, 85–103. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2001-2_9
  • László Lovász, On the ratio of optimal integral and fractional covers, Discrete Mathematics 13 (1975), 383–390. https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365X(75)90058-8
  • Vašek Chvátal, A greedy heuristic for the set-covering problem, Mathematics of Operations Research 4 (1979), 233–235. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.3.233
  • Uriel Feige, A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover, Journal of the ACM 45 (1998), 634–652. https://doi.org/10.1145/285055.285059
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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems II: The Greedy Literal Algorithm B1 Has Worst-Case Ratio (k+1)/k on MS(k)Research Paper

Motivation

Maximum satisfiability asks for a truth assignment satisfying as many clauses of a propositional formula as possible. The paper notes that the restriction MS(k)MS(k)MS(k), in which every clause has at least kkk literals, is polynomial complete for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, so exact optimization is out of reach in general and one asks instead how close a fast algorithm is guaranteed to come. David S. Johnson's 1974 paper Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems (J. Comput. System Sci. 9, 256–278) set up a framework for exactly this question — optimization problems, nondeterministic approximation algorithms, and the worst-case ratio between the optimum and the algorithm's output — and applied it to subset-sum, maximum satisfiability, set covering, graph coloring and maximum clique. It is one of the founding papers of the theory of approximation algorithms.

Section 4 of the paper treats maximum satisfiability with two algorithms. This mission covers the first, a greedy literal-selection rule called B1, and its exact worst-case ratio (Theorem 2). A companion mission covers the weighted algorithm B2 (Theorem 3).

Timeline, for orientation:

  • 1971–1972: Cook and Karp establish NP-completeness of satisfiability and of many combinatorial problems.
  • 1974: Johnson proves that B1 has worst-case ratio exactly (k+1)/k(k+1)/k(k+1)/k on MS(k)MS(k)MS(k) and that the weighted algorithm B2 achieves 2k/(2k−1)2^k/(2^k-1)2k/(2k−1) (Theorems 2 and 3).
  • 1990s: semidefinite and LP-based algorithms (Goemans–Williamson, SIAM J. Discrete Math. 1994) improve the constants for general MAX-SAT.

Setting

Let L=⋃i>0{xi,xˉi}L = \bigcup_{i>0}\{x_i, \bar x_i\}L=⋃i>0​{xi​,xˉi​} be the set of literals; the complement of xix_ixi​ is xˉi\bar x_ixˉi​ and conversely. A clause is a finite set C⊆LC \subseteq LC⊆L. A truth assignment is a set T⊆LT \subseteq LT⊆L containing no complementary pair {xi,xˉi}\{x_i, \bar x_i\}{xi​,xˉi​}; it may leave variables unassigned. TTT satisfies CCC if C∩T≠∅C \cap T \ne \emptysetC∩T=∅.

An input is a finite set SSS of clauses. Its feasible solutions are the subsets S′⊆SS' \subseteq SS′⊆S satisfied by a single truth assignment, measured by ∣S′∣|S'|∣S′∣, and the optimum is

S∗=max⁡{∣S′∣:S′⊆S, some truth assignment satisfies every C∈S′}.S^* = \max\{|S'| : S' \subseteq S,\ \text{some truth assignment satisfies every } C \in S'\}.S∗=max{∣S′∣:S′⊆S, some truth assignment satisfies every C∈S′}.

The subproblem MS(k)MS(k)MS(k) admits only inputs whose clauses each contain at least kkk distinct literals.

Algorithm B1 keeps four variables: SUB (clauses already satisfied), LEFT (clauses not yet satisfied), TRUE (literals made true) and LIT (literals still available). It starts with SUB === TRUE =∅= \emptyset=∅, LEFT =S= S=S, LIT =L= L=L. While some literal of LIT occurs in a clause of LEFT, it picks a literal y∈y \iny∈ LIT contained in the most clauses of LEFT, moves those clauses YTYTYT from LEFT to SUB, adds yyy to TRUE, and removes yyy and yˉ\bar yyˉ​ from LIT. When no literal of LIT occurs in LEFT it returns SUB.

The choice of yyy is not determined when several literals tie. Following the paper's framework, every output reachable by some sequence of admissible choices is choosable, and the performance of B1 on SSS is the smallest ∣X∣|X|∣X∣ over choosable outputs XXX. The worst-case ratio on inputs of size at most nnn is

R[B1,MS(k)](n)=max⁡{S∗/B1(S):S∈MS(k), ∣S∣≤n}.R[B1, MS(k)](n) = \max\{S^*/B1(S) : S \in MS(k),\ |S| \le n\}.R[B1,MS(k)](n)=max{S∗/B1(S):S∈MS(k), ∣S∣≤n}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 262)

For all k≥1k \ge 1k≥1,

R[B1,MS(k)](n)≤k+1kfor all n>0,R[B1, MS(k)](n) \le \frac{k+1}{k}\quad\text{for all } n > 0,R[B1,MS(k)](n)≤kk+1​for all n>0,

with equality for all sufficiently large nnn. In the size-free form used here: every choosable output XXX on every S∈MS(k)S \in MS(k)S∈MS(k) satisfies k S∗≤(k+1) ∣X∣k\,S^* \le (k+1)\,|X|kS∗≤(k+1)∣X∣, and for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 some S∈MS(k)S \in MS(k)S∈MS(k) has a choosable XXX with ∣X∣>0|X| > 0∣X∣>0 and k S∗=(k+1) ∣X∣k\,S^* = (k+1)\,|X|kS∗=(k+1)∣X∣.

Milestones (from the proof of Theorem 2, pp. 262–263)

  1. In each iteration, the number of clauses saved (added to SUB) is at least the number of clauses remaining in LEFT that are wounded (lose a literal from LIT without being satisfied).
  2. When B1 halts, every clause left in LEFT is dead: each of its literals has had its complement made true.
  3. When B1 halts on an input of MS(k)MS(k)MS(k), ∣SUB∣≥k ∣LEFT∣|\mathrm{SUB}| \ge k\,|\mathrm{LEFT}|∣SUB∣≥k∣LEFT∣, and SUB and LEFT partition SSS.
  4. On the four-clause input {{x1,x2,x3},{xˉ1,x4,x5},{xˉ2,x6,x7},{xˉ3,x8,x9}}\{\{x_1,x_2,x_3\},\{\bar x_1,x_4,x_5\},\{\bar x_2,x_6,x_7\},\{\bar x_3,x_8,x_9\}\}{{x1​,x2​,x3​},{xˉ1​,x4​,x5​},{xˉ2​,x6​,x7​},{xˉ3​,x8​,x9​}} of MS(3)MS(3)MS(3), S∗=4S^* = 4S∗=4 while B1 may return three clauses.

Significance

The bound is stronger than a ratio: milestone 3 shows that B1 always satisfies at least kk+1∣S∣\tfrac{k}{k+1}|S|k+1k​∣S∣ clauses, whatever the optimum. The tightness half shows that this simple greedy rule cannot be analysed any better, which is what motivated the weighted algorithm B2 of the same section, with ratio 2k/(2k−1)2^k/(2^k-1)2k/(2k−1). The pair of theorems is an early instance of a now standard pattern: a potential-style counting argument for an upper bound, and an adversarial tie-breaking instance for the matching lower bound.

The result is proved in the paper; it has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. This mission produces a formal model of Johnson's framework for a maximization problem with a nondeterministic algorithm, a formal proof of the upper bound through the "saved versus wounded" accounting, and explicit tightness instances for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1. The paper spells out only k=3k = 3k=3 and states that "similar examples can be constructed for any other k>0k > 0k>0"; the formal goal requires them for all kkk.

Difficulty

The upper bound needs an invariant over entire runs, not over a single step: a clause wounded in one iteration may be saved in a later one, so wounds and saves must be tallied globally, and the count of wounds received by a clause that ends in LEFT must be matched with its number of literals. That matching relies on the facts that B1 never makes both a literal and its complement true and that a clause containing a true literal has already left LEFT. Clauses containing both xix_ixi​ and xˉi\bar x_ixˉi​ are allowed and have to be handled.

The lower bound cannot be obtained from a fixed tie-breaking rule: the attaining run chooses negative literals whose count merely ties the maximum. For general kkk the instance has to be built so that every literal occurs in few enough clauses that the adversarial choice is admissible at every step; at k=1k = 1k=1 the paper's pattern degenerates and needs adjusting.

Formalization scope

  • A literal is a pair (variable index in N\mathbb NN, sign); a clause is a Finset of literals; an input is a Finset of clauses, so duplicate clauses are not allowed, as on the page. Tautological clauses are allowed.
  • A truth assignment is a Set of literals without a complementary pair (partial, as in the paper). S∗S^*S∗ is the maximum of ∣S′∣|S'|∣S′∣ over the finite nonempty family of satisfiable subsets, taken with Finset.sup'.
  • B1 is a nondeterministic run relation: a state holds SUB, LEFT, TRUE and the set of decided variables (LIT is its complement, since LLL is infinite); one step chooses any literal of LIT, of either sign, with maximum count; "choosable" is reachability of a halting state with the given SUB. No tie-break is fixed. A formalization that picks a variable and then its better sign, or that resolves ties deterministically, is a different algorithm and would make the tightness half false.
  • The ratio R[B1,MS(k)](n)R[B1, MS(k)](n)R[B1,MS(k)](n), whose problem size is left unspecified in the paper, is replaced by its size-free equivalent, and ratios are written multiplicatively in N\mathbb NN: k S∗≤(k+1)∣X∣k\,S^* \le (k+1)|X|kS∗≤(k+1)∣X∣. The tightness half requires ∣X∣>0|X| > 0∣X∣>0, so the empty input cannot witness it.
  • The running time O(nlog⁡n)O(n \log n)O(nlogn) is not stated.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, the invariants of reachable B1 states (SUB and LEFT partition SSS; TRUE is consistent and exactly covers the decided variables; no clause of LEFT meets TRUE), and the family of tightness instances for general kkk. The run-relation encoding of choosable outputs is reusable for the other algorithms of the paper.

Selected references

  • D. S. Johnson, Approximation algorithms for combinatorial problems, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 9 (1974), 256–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0000(74)80044-9
  • R. M. Karp, Reducibility among combinatorial problems, in Complexity of Computer Computations, Plenum, 1972, 85–103. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2001-2_9
  • M. X. Goemans and D. P. Williamson, New 3/4-approximation algorithms for the maximum satisfiability problem, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 7 (1994), 656–666. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0895480192243516
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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems I: The Subset-Sum Algorithms A_k Have Worst-Case Ratio (k+1)/kResearch Paper

Motivation

David S. Johnson's 1974 paper Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Problems (J. Comput. System Sci. 9 (1974) 256–278) is one of the founding papers of the theory of approximation algorithms. It asks, for optimization problems whose decision versions Karp had just shown to be polynomial complete, how close a fast heuristic can be guaranteed to come to the optimum in the worst case, and it measures this with a worst-case performance ratio that is still the standard yardstick.

Its first example is SUBSET-SUM, the simplest form of the knapsack problem: pack items of given sizes into a knapsack of capacity bbb so as to fill it as much as possible. For this problem the paper gives a family of algorithms AkA_kAk​, one for each k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, whose guaranteed ratio (k+1)/k(k+1)/k(k+1)/k tends to 111. It is one of the first examples of what is now called a polynomial-time approximation scheme: for every ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0 there is a polynomial-time algorithm within a factor 1+ϵ1 + \epsilon1+ϵ of optimal. Sahni (1975) extended the idea to the knapsack problem with utilities, and Ibarra and Kim (1975) later obtained fully polynomial schemes for knapsack and subset-sum.

This mission formalizes Theorem 1 of the paper, the performance guarantee of AkA_kAk​ together with its tightness.

Setting

An input ⟨T,s,b⟩\langle T, s, b\rangle⟨T,s,b⟩ of SUBSET-SUM is a finite set TTT, a positive rational size s(x)s(x)s(x) for every x∈Tx \in Tx∈T, and a positive rational bound bbb. An approximate solution is a subset T′⊆TT' \subseteq TT′⊆T with m(T′)≤bm(T') \le bm(T′)≤b, where the measure is m(T′)=∑x∈T′s(x)m(T') = \sum_{x \in T'} s(x)m(T′)=∑x∈T′​s(x). The problem is a maximization problem with optimal measure

⟨T,s,b⟩∗=max⁡{ m(T′):T′⊆T, m(T′)≤b }.\langle T, s, b\rangle^* = \max\{\, m(T') : T' \subseteq T,\ m(T') \le b \,\}.⟨T,s,b⟩∗=max{m(T′):T′⊆T, m(T′)≤b}.

Fix k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and call xxx big if s(x)>b/(k+1)s(x) > b/(k+1)s(x)>b/(k+1) and small otherwise. Algorithm AkA_kAk​ keeps a set SUB\mathrm{SUB}SUB, its measure SUM\mathrm{SUM}SUM, and the remaining elements LEFT\mathrm{LEFT}LEFT:

  1. SUB\mathrm{SUB}SUB is a subset of the big elements whose measure is as large as possible without exceeding bbb; SUM=m(SUB)\mathrm{SUM} = m(\mathrm{SUB})SUM=m(SUB) and LEFT=T∖SUB\mathrm{LEFT} = T \setminus \mathrm{SUB}LEFT=T∖SUB.
  2. If s(x)+SUM>bs(x) + \mathrm{SUM} > bs(x)+SUM>b for every x∈LEFTx \in \mathrm{LEFT}x∈LEFT, return SUB\mathrm{SUB}SUB.
  3. Otherwise pick y∈LEFTy \in \mathrm{LEFT}y∈LEFT with s(y)+SUMs(y) + \mathrm{SUM}s(y)+SUM as large as possible without exceeding bbb, move it from LEFT\mathrm{LEFT}LEFT to SUB\mathrm{SUB}SUB, add s(y)s(y)s(y) to SUM\mathrm{SUM}SUM, and return to step 2.

Steps 1 and 3 may have ties. Following the paper, a set T1T_1T1​ is choosable by AkA_kAk​ if some resolution of all ties produces it, and the performance Ak(u)A_k(u)Ak​(u) on input uuu is the smallest measure of a choosable output. The ratio is r(Ak,u)=u∗/Ak(u)≥1r(A_k, u) = u^*/A_k(u) \ge 1r(Ak​,u)=u∗/Ak​(u)≥1, and R[Ak](n)R[A_k](n)R[Ak​](n) is its maximum over inputs of size at most nnn.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 260)

For k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and n>0n > 0n>0,

R[Ak](n)≤k+1k,lim⁡n→∞R[Ak](n)=k+1k.R[A_k](n) \le \frac{k+1}{k}, \qquad \lim_{n \to \infty} R[A_k](n) = \frac{k+1}{k}.R[Ak​](n)≤kk+1​,n→∞lim​R[Ak​](n)=kk+1​.

Formally, for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1: every choosable output T1T_1T1​ of every input satisfies k ⟨T,s,b⟩∗≤(k+1) m(T1)k\,\langle T,s,b\rangle^* \le (k+1)\,m(T_1)k⟨T,s,b⟩∗≤(k+1)m(T1​); and for every δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 some input has a choosable output T1T_1T1​ with m(T1)>0m(T_1) > 0m(T1​)>0 and ⟨T,s,b⟩∗>(k+1k−δ) m(T1)\langle T,s,b\rangle^* > \big(\tfrac{k+1}{k} - \delta\big)\,m(T_1)⟨T,s,b⟩∗>(kk+1​−δ)m(T1​).

Milestones

  1. For T1T_1T1​ choosable and T0T_0T0​ any approximate solution, m(T1BIG)≥m(T0BIG)m(T_1^{\mathrm{BIG}}) \ge m(T_0^{\mathrm{BIG}})m(T1BIG​)≥m(T0BIG​) (p. 260).
  2. If a small x∈Tx \in Tx∈T is not in a choosable T1T_1T1​, then s(x)+m(T1)>bs(x) + m(T_1) > bs(x)+m(T1​)>b, hence m(T1)>kb/(k+1)≥kk+1⟨T,s,b⟩∗m(T_1) > kb/(k+1) \ge \tfrac{k}{k+1}\langle T,s,b\rangle^*m(T1​)>kb/(k+1)≥k+1k​⟨T,s,b⟩∗ (p. 261).
  3. The stronger dichotomy: m(T1)=⟨T,s,b⟩∗m(T_1) = \langle T,s,b\rangle^*m(T1​)=⟨T,s,b⟩∗ or m(T1)≥kk+1 bm(T_1) \ge \tfrac{k}{k+1}\,bm(T1​)≥k+1k​b (p. 260).
  4. The lower-bound input T={a1,…,ak+2}T = \{a_1,\dots,a_{k+2}\}T={a1​,…,ak+2​}, s(a1)=1+εs(a_1) = 1+\varepsilons(a1​)=1+ε, s(ai)=1s(a_i) = 1s(ai​)=1 otherwise, b=k+1b = k+1b=k+1: its optimum is k+1k+1k+1, some output is choosable, and every choosable output has measure k+εk + \varepsilonk+ε (p. 261).

Significance

Theorem 1 shows that SUBSET-SUM admits polynomial-time algorithms with any worst-case ratio above 111, in contrast with the other problems of the paper (set covering, graph colouring, maximum clique), whose best known ratios grow with the input. The algorithms AkA_kAk​ are an early instance of the partial-enumeration schemes later used for knapsack-type problems. The tightness half shows that the analysis of AkA_kAk​ itself cannot be sharpened.

The theorem has a short published proof, but no machine-checked version is known; there is no subset-sum or knapsack approximation result on the platform. The mission produces a reusable model of SUBSET-SUM, a model of nondeterministic algorithms through a run relation that captures every tie-break, and a checked proof that the worst case is exactly (k+1)/k(k+1)/k(k+1)/k. The same modelling pattern (choosable outputs, worst-case ratio taken over them) is used in the sibling missions of this series for MAX-SAT, set covering and exact covering.

Difficulty

The arithmetic of the upper bound is short; the difficulty is in reasoning about the algorithm as a nondeterministic process. The natural first attempt, implementing AkA_kAk​ as a function with a fixed tie-breaking rule, proves a weaker statement: the guarantee must hold for every output the algorithm may return, including adversarial ties in step 1 (several maximum-measure sets of big elements) and step 3. Facts that are obvious for a single run, such as SUM\mathrm{SUM}SUM always equalling m(SUB)m(\mathrm{SUB})m(SUB) or which elements can enter SUB\mathrm{SUB}SUB after step 1, have to be established for the run relation as a whole. The lower bound requires tracing the run on the explicit input for general kkk: exactly k−1k-1k−1 unit elements are added after a1a_1a1​, and this must be shown for every choosable run, not only for one.

Formalization scope

  • Numbers. Sizes and the bound are rationals (ℚ), as in the paper; sizes are required to be positive on TTT and b>0b > 0b>0. The index kkk is a natural number with 1≤k1 \le k1≤k as a hypothesis; b/(k+1)b/(k+1)b/(k+1) is rational division, and "big" is the strict inequality s(x)>b/(k+1)s(x) > b/(k+1)s(x)>b/(k+1).
  • Optimum. opt u is Finset.sup' of the measure over the finite set of approximate solutions, which always contains ∅\emptyset∅; it is 000 when no element fits.
  • Run relation. Choosable k u T₁ states that some admissible step 1 choice, followed by a finite chain of admissible iterations (Relation.ReflTransGen), reaches a halting state returning T1T_1T1​. Every "closest to, without exceeding" is an existential choice among all maximizers.
  • Size-free restatement. The paper's input size ∣u∣|u|∣u∣ ("in some standard notation") is never fixed, so the goal quantifies over all inputs instead of over sizes. The upper bound for all choosable outputs is equivalent to R[Ak](n)≤(k+1)/kR[A_k](n) \le (k+1)/kR[Ak​](n)≤(k+1)/k for all nnn; since R[Ak]R[A_k]R[Ak​] is nondecreasing, the limit claim is equivalent to the supremum of the ratio over all inputs being (k+1)/k(k+1)/k(k+1)/k, which is the second part.
  • Multiplicative ratios. No ratio is written as a division, so an output of measure 000 cannot satisfy a bound vacuously; the lower-bound part requires m(T1)>0m(T_1) > 0m(T1​)>0. The value (k+1)/k(k+1)/k(k+1)/k is not claimed to be attained: the paper's family has ratio (k+1)/(k+ε)(k+1)/(k+\varepsilon)(k+1)/(k+ε).
  • Lower-bound input. A def on Fin (k + 2) exactly as on the page, with 0<ε<10 < \varepsilon < 10<ε<1 (the page leaves the range implicit; ε<1\varepsilon < 1ε<1 keeps a1a_1a1​ the only big element that fits when k=1k = 1k=1).
  • Ruled out. A formalization with a deterministic tie-break, with a bound of the form opt/m≤c\mathrm{opt}/m \le copt/m≤c in a field where x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0, or with tightness for a single fixed kkk would be trivial or weaker; none of these is the target.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones and the goal, invariant lemmas for the run relation, and further sanity checks on small inputs. The running-time remark (O(nk)O(n^k)O(nk) for step 1) and Sahni's knapsack extension are not part of the mission.

Selected references

  • D. S. Johnson, Approximation algorithms for combinatorial problems, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 9 (1974) 256–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0000(74)80044-9
  • S. Sahni, Approximate algorithms for the 0/1 knapsack problem, Journal of the ACM 22 (1975) 115–124. https://doi.org/10.1145/321864.321873
  • O. H. Ibarra, C. E. Kim, Fast approximation algorithms for the knapsack and sum of subset problems, Journal of the ACM 22 (1975) 463–468. https://doi.org/10.1145/321906.321909
  • R. M. Karp, Reducibility among combinatorial problems, in Complexity of Computer Computations, Plenum (1972) 85–103. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2001-2_9
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OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs I: Moore's Algorithm Yields a Schedule with the Minimum Number of Late JobsResearch Paper

Motivation

A single machine must process a set of jobs, each with a processing time and a due-date, and a job that finishes after its due-date is late. Counting late jobs is the natural objective when a late order is simply lost, whatever its lateness. In the three-field notation of scheduling theory this is the problem 1 ∥ ∑Uj1\,\|\,\sum U_j1∥∑Uj​, and it is one of the few single-machine problems with a due-date objective that a simple greedy rule solves exactly.

J. Michael Moore gave that rule in 1968 (Management Science 15(1):102–109). The only exact method previously available was the Held–Karp dynamic program, which is exponential in the number of jobs. Moore's algorithm is two sorts plus at most n(n+1)/2n(n+1)/2n(n+1)/2 additions and comparisons. The rule, and the variant from the paper's Author's Supplement (credited to T. J. Hodgson and today called the Moore–Hodgson algorithm), is in every scheduling textbook, for example Brucker, Scheduling Algorithms, Ch. 4, and is the base case of later work on weighted and release-date variants.

Timeline:

  • 1955: J. R. Jackson shows that a job set can be scheduled with no late job if and only if the earliest-due-date order has none (Management Science Research Project report 43, UCLA).
  • 1968: Moore publishes the algorithm and its proof of optimality, with Hodgson's variant stated without proof.
  • 1970s onward: the weighted version 1 ∥ ∑wjUj1\,\|\,\sum w_jU_j1∥∑wj​Uj​ is shown NP-hard (Karp 1972, via knapsack), and 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑Uj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum U_j1∣rj​∣∑Uj​ likewise (Lenstra, Rinnooy Kan and Brucker 1977), so Moore's greedy rule does not extend to them.

Setting

A finite set JJJ of jobs is given. Job jjj has a processing time tj≥0t_j \ge 0tj​≥0 and a due-date DjD_jDj​, and the paper assumes tj≤Djt_j \le D_jtj​≤Dj​ for every job (a job that cannot finish on time even if started at time 000 is removed beforehand). The machine starts at time 000 and processes the jobs one after another, without idle time or preemption.

A schedule SSS of JJJ is an ordering (Ji1,…,Jin)(J_{i_1},\dots,J_{i_n})(Ji1​​,…,Jin​​) of all jobs of JJJ. The job in position kkk completes at Cik=ti1+⋯+tikC_{i_k} = t_{i_1} + \dots + t_{i_k}Cik​​=ti1​​+⋯+tik​​. The late set is L={Ji:Ci>Di}L = \{J_i : C_i > D_i\}L={Ji​:Ci​>Di​} and the early set is E={Ji:Ci≤Di}E = \{J_i : C_i \le D_i\}E={Ji​:Ci​≤Di​}. A schedule is optimal if no schedule of JJJ has fewer late jobs. AAA and RRR denote the early and late jobs of SSS, each kept in their order in SSS.

Moore's algorithm works on a current sequence and a list of rejected jobs.

  • Step 1: order the jobs by non-decreasing processing time (the shortest processing time rule).
  • Step 2: find the first late job JiqJ_{i_q}Jiq​​ of the current sequence. If there is none, stop.
  • Step 3: re-order Ji1,…,JiqJ_{i_1},\dots,J_{i_q}Ji1​​,…,Jiq​​ by non-decreasing due-date. If all of them are then early, keep the re-ordered sequence. Otherwise reject JiqJ_{i_q}Jiq​​ and remove it. Return to Step 2.

The output is the final current sequence sorted by due-dates, followed by the rejected jobs in any order.

In Lean, a schedule is IsSchedule J l, the late set is lateSet t D l, optimality is IsOptimal t D J l, AAA and RRR are earlyPart/latePart, and one pass of Steps 2–3 is the relation MooreStep t D, all in the namespace MooreLateJobs.NumLate.

Formalization targets

Goal: Moore's algorithm is optimal (The Algorithm, Step 2, p. 103)

Let l0l_0l0​ be a shortest-processing-time schedule of JJJ, and let a run of MooreStep from (l0,[ ])(l_0,[\,])(l0​,[]) reach a state (cur,rej)(\mathrm{cur},\mathrm{rej})(cur,rej) in which cur\mathrm{cur}cur has no late job. Then for every due-date ordering ADA_DAD​ of cur\mathrm{cur}cur and every ordering PPP of rej\mathrm{rej}rej,

(AD, P) is an optimal schedule for J.(A_D,\,P)\ \text{is an optimal schedule for } J.(AD​,P) is an optimal schedule for J.

All tie-breaks in both sorts are covered.

Milestones

In attack order:

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 105): every optimal schedule has the same number of late jobs as (A,R)(A,R)(A,R) and as every (A,P)(A,P)(A,P).
  2. Jackson's lemma (p. 105).
  3. Lemma 2 (p. 105): re-ordering AAA by due-dates keeps an optimal (A,R)(A,R)(A,R) schedule optimal.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 105): a job that is late in some optimal schedule can be removed and appended.
  5. The repeated-elimination claim (p. 106): after removing jobs late in successive optimal schedules until the rest is feasible, (AD,P)(A_D,P)(AD​,P) is optimal.
  6. Cases 2) and 3) of the Selection Algorithm (p. 107): in either case the job JqJ_qJq​ is late in some optimal schedule.
  7. Progress and termination of the algorithm (p. 108).

A companion item states the p. 104 remark that the final current sequence need not be re-sorted: (cur,P)(\mathrm{cur},P)(cur,P) is already optimal.

Significance

The theorem shows that the minimum number of late jobs on one machine can be found in O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) time, by a rule that also produces an optimal schedule of a very particular shape: due-date ordered early jobs first, then the late jobs in any order. Lemma 3's decomposition, that jobs late in some optimal schedule may be discarded one at a time, is the template reused for many related greedy results in scheduling.

The result is classical and fully proved on paper. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of Moore's algorithm, of the Moore–Hodgson variant, or of Jackson's rule exists in Mathlib. This mission produces a checked proof of the algorithm as stated in the paper, with every tie-break allowed, together with reusable single-machine objects (schedules as lists, completion times, late sets) and Jackson's earliest-due-date feasibility lemma.

Difficulty

Neither ordering rule works alone. Sorting by due-dates alone gives a schedule with no late job whenever one exists, but it can make many jobs late once any must be. Keeping the shortest jobs first does not respect the due-dates at all. The step that fails in a direct greedy argument is the claim that the specific job JiqJ_{i_q}Jiq​​, the one just found late, belongs to the late set of some optimal schedule. That job is not in general the longest job of the prefix, and the paper has to treat separately the two cases in which it is rejected. On top of this, the algorithm re-sorts prefixes on the fly, so the claim has to be tied to the invariants of the run: the prefix is early and due-date sorted, and the jobs after it are at least as long as JiqJ_{i_q}Jiq​​.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs and times. Jobs form a type ι with decidable equality; JJJ is a Finset ι; t,D:ι→Rt, D : ι \to \mathbb{R}t,D:ι→R.
  • Standing hypotheses. Every statement that involves schedules assumes tj≥0t_j \ge 0tj​≥0 and tj≤Djt_j \le D_jtj​≤Dj​ on JJJ. The first is added: processing times are durations, and Jackson's lemma fails for negative times. The second is the paper's assumption on p. 102.
  • Schedules and completion times. A schedule is a duplicate-free list with exactly the jobs of JJJ. Positions are 0-based, and the job in position kkk completes at the sum of the first k+1k+1k+1 processing times. Lateness is strict (Cj>DjC_j > D_jCj​>Dj​).
  • Optimality compares against every schedule of the same job set.
  • Ties. Orderings "by due-dates" and "by processing times" are List.Pairwise with ≤. Ties are arbitrary, and every statement quantifies over all such orderings.
  • The algorithm. Steps 2–3 are the relation MooreStep. The re-ordered prefix is any due-date sorted permutation of the first q+1q+1q+1 jobs, and case 2) rejects the first late job JiqJ_{i_q}Jiq​​ itself, not the longest job of the prefix (that is Hodgson's variant). A run is Relation.ReflTransGen.

The goal must concern runs of this step relation from a shortest-processing-time schedule of JJJ. Replacing the run by an arbitrary set of rejected jobs satisfying invariants would state a different theorem. The goal is not vacuous: the progress and termination milestones show that a terminal state is always reached.

Contributions are welcome at every level. Useful ones include general lemmas on completion times under permutation and filtering of lists, a proof of Jackson's lemma, proofs of the Selection Algorithm cases, and a proof of Hodgson's variant.

Selected references

  • J. M. Moore, An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs, Management Science 15(1):102–109, 1968. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.1.102
  • J. R. Jackson, Scheduling a Production Line to Minimize Maximum Tardiness, Research Report 43, Management Science Research Project, UCLA, 1955.
  • M. Held and R. M. Karp, A Dynamic Programming Approach to Sequencing Problems, J. SIAM 10(1):196–210, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1137/0110015
  • R. M. Karp, Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems, in Complexity of Computer Computations, 1972. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2001-2_9
  • J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan and P. Brucker, Complexity of Machine Scheduling Problems, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1:343–362, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70743-X
  • P. Brucker, Scheduling Algorithms, 5th ed., Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69516-5
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling with Deadlines and Loss Functions: On One Processor, Decreasing Penalty-to-Length Order Is Optimal When No Task Finishes Before Its DeadlineResearch Paper

Motivation

A processor, a machine shop or a single server must work through a set of jobs one at a time, and each job is costly when it is late. Deciding the order is the single-machine sequencing problem, the simplest and most studied model of scheduling theory. Robert McNaughton's 1959 article Scheduling with Deadlines and Loss Functions (Management Science 6(1):1–12) treats it for a computer that must run several tasks, each with a deadline and a loss that grows linearly with the lateness. Its §2 gives the first sufficient condition under which a simple ratio rule is optimal in the presence of deadlines, and shows that interrupting and resuming tasks ("splitting", now called preemption) never helps on one processor.

Timeline.

  • 1956: W. E. Smith, Various optimizers for single-stage production (Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3), proves that sequencing jobs by non-increasing weight-to-processing-time ratio minimizes the total weighted completion time over non-preemptive sequences.
  • 1959: McNaughton, §2 of the present paper, proves independently that the same ratio order is optimal against all schedules, split or not and with idle time (Theorem 2.3), and extends it to deadlines when no task finishes early in that order (Theorem 2.4). §3 of the same paper gives the "wrap-around" rule for preemptive makespan on identical processors, and §4 the non-preemptive optimality for weighted completion time on several processors.
  • 1977: J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan and P. Brucker show that minimizing total weighted tardiness on one machine, the general problem of §2, is strongly NP-hard (Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1); this is why §2 gives a sufficient condition and not an algorithm.

Setting

There are mmm tasks (1),…,(m)(1),\dots,(m)(1),…,(m) for a single processor, and the present is time 000. Task (i)(i)(i) takes ai>0a_i > 0ai​>0 units of processing time, has a deadline did_idi​ and a penalty rate pi≥0p_i \ge 0pi​≥0. If (i)(i)(i) is finished at time Ci≤diC_i \le d_iCi​≤di​ there is no loss; otherwise the loss on (i)(i)(i) is pixp_i xpi​x, where x=Ci−dix = C_i - d_ix=Ci​−di​ is the time from the deadline to the completion. Thus the loss on a task completed at time ttt is

ℓi(t)=pimax⁡(0, t−di).\ell_i(t) = p_i \max(0,\ t - d_i).ℓi​(t)=pi​max(0, t−di​).

The ratio of task (i)(i)(i) is ri=pi/air_i = p_i / a_iri​=pi​/ai​.

A task may be split: part of it may run between times 4 and 6 and the remainder between times 8 and 11, and similarly in any finite number of parts. A schedule SSS is therefore a finite list of pieces, each a task together with a start and a stop time. It is feasible when every piece lies in [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with start ≤\le≤ stop, no two pieces overlap in time, and the pieces of each task (i)(i)(i) have total length exactly aia_iai​. The completion time Ci(S)C_i(S)Ci​(S) is the latest stop time of a piece of (i)(i)(i), and the total loss is

c(S)=∑i=1mℓi(Ci(S)).c(S) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \ell_i\bigl(C_i(S)\bigr).c(S)=i=1∑m​ℓi​(Ci​(S)).

For an order σ\sigmaσ of the tasks (σ(k)\sigma(k)σ(k) in position kkk), the sequenced schedule SσS_\sigmaSσ​ runs the tasks without splits and without unused time: σ(k)\sigma(k)σ(k) occupies [∑l<kaσ(l), ∑l≤kaσ(l)]\bigl[\sum_{l<k} a_{\sigma(l)},\ \sum_{l\le k} a_{\sigma(l)}\bigr][∑l<k​aσ(l)​, ∑l≤k​aσ(l)​]. The order is in decreasing rir_iri​ when k≤lk \le lk≤l implies rσ(l)≤rσ(k)r_{\sigma(l)} \le r_{\sigma(k)}rσ(l)​≤rσ(k)​. Finally c∗(S)c^*(S)c∗(S) denotes the total loss of SSS computed as if d1=⋯=dm=0d_1 = \dots = d_m = 0d1​=⋯=dm​=0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.4 (p. 5)

If σ\sigmaσ is in decreasing rir_iri​ and no task finishes before its deadline in SσS_\sigmaSσ​, i.e. di≤Ci(Sσ)d_i \le C_i(S_\sigma)di​≤Ci​(Sσ​) for every iii, then SσS_\sigmaSσ​ is feasible and

c(Sσ)≤c(S′)for every feasible schedule S′.c(S_\sigma) \le c(S') \qquad \text{for every feasible schedule } S'.c(Sσ​)≤c(S′)for every feasible schedule S′.

The competitors S′S'S′ may split tasks and leave the processor idle. The condition is sufficient but not necessary.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Theorem 2.1 (p. 4): if both (i)(i)(i) and (j)(j)(j) run in the ai+aja_i + a_jai​+aj​ consecutive units of time after a time ttt past both deadlines and ri>rjr_i > r_jri​>rj​, their joint loss is strictly smaller when (i)(i)(i) goes first:
ℓi(t+ai)+ℓj(t+ai+aj)<ℓj(t+aj)+ℓi(t+aj+ai).\ell_i(t+a_i) + \ell_j(t+a_i+a_j) < \ell_j(t+a_j) + \ell_i(t+a_j+a_i).ℓi​(t+ai​)+ℓj​(t+ai​+aj​)<ℓj​(t+aj​)+ℓi​(t+aj​+ai​).
  1. The reduction in the proof of Theorem 2.2 (pp. 4–5): a feasible schedule with more than mmm pieces can be replaced by a feasible one with fewer pieces and no greater loss.
  2. Theorem 2.2 (p. 4): some optimal schedule, optimal among all feasible schedules, splits no task.
  3. Theorem 2.3 (p. 5): if d1=⋯=dm=0d_1 = \dots = d_m = 0d1​=⋯=dm​=0, the sequenced schedule in decreasing rir_iri​ minimizes the total loss over all feasible schedules.
  4. The display of the proof of Theorem 2.4 (p. 6): if no task finishes early in S=SσS = S_\sigmaS=Sσ​, then for every feasible S′S'S′,
c(S′)−c(S)≥c∗(S′)−c∗(S).c(S') - c(S) \ge c^*(S') - c^*(S).c(S′)−c(S)≥c∗(S′)−c∗(S).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.3 is the ratio rule for total weighted completion time, in its strongest single-machine form: it holds against preemptive schedules and schedules with idle time, not only against permutations. Theorem 2.4 carries the rule over to deadlines and linear tardiness penalties under a checkable condition on one schedule. Since weighted tardiness is strongly NP-hard in general, a condition of this kind is what one can hope for, and the paper's two-step heuristic for general deadlines (p. 6) is built on it. Theorem 2.2, as the paper remarks (p. 6), "does not depend on the linear loss function": it makes non-preemptive scheduling without loss of generality for single-machine objectives of this kind.

Formalizing it. All results of §2 are proved in the paper and are textbook material; none has a machine-checked proof on the platform. The platform's Scheduling Algorithms V mission formalizes the multi-processor results of §§3–4 (via Brucker's textbook), and nothing there states a single-processor ratio rule with deadlines. This mission supplies a single-processor schedule model with splitting, the interchange lemma, the non-preemption theorem and the ratio rule, each over all feasible schedules.

Difficulty

The interchange argument of Theorem 2.1 compares only two schedules that differ in the order of two adjacent tasks. Turning it into optimality against every feasible schedule requires two further steps, and each fails if done naively. First, a competitor may split tasks and leave gaps; the interchange argument does not apply to such schedules, so a separate argument must remove splits without raising any completion time. Second, with deadlines the loss max⁡(0,t−di)\max(0, t - d_i)max(0,t−di​) is not linear in the completion time, so the ratio order is in general not optimal; the obvious attempt to repeat the interchange argument fails as soon as a task can finish before its deadline, since moving such a task later costs nothing. This is why Theorem 2.4 needs its hypothesis that no task finishes early, and why the paper leaves the general case to a heuristic.

Formalization scope

Tasks and positions are the zero-based indices of Fin m; times, lengths, deadlines and penalties are real numbers. A schedule is a List of pieces (task, start, stop), mirroring the public definition SchedulingAlgorithms_ParallelMachines with one processor. Feasibility requires 0≤0 \le0≤ start ≤\le≤ stop, pairwise disjoint pieces, and exact total length aia_iai​ per task; zero-length pieces and unsorted lists are allowed. The completion time is the maximum stop time of the task's pieces (000 for a task with no pieces, which feasibility excludes). "No split" means exactly one piece per task, so two abutting pieces count as a split. "Decreasing rir_iri​" is non-increasing, with ties in any order. "Minimal" and "optimal" are stated as ≤\le≤ against every feasible schedule, never as an infimum.

Standing assumptions, stated in every item: ai>0a_i > 0ai​>0 (tasks take time, and ri=pi/air_i = p_i/a_iri​=pi​/ai​ needs ai≠0a_i \ne 0ai​=0), and pi≥0p_i \ge 0pi​≥0 for Theorems 2.2–2.4 and the proof steps (penalties are non-negative; with a negative penalty and idle time allowed the loss is unbounded below). Theorem 2.1 carries no sign condition. No condition is placed on the deadlines.

A formalization that restricts the competitors of Theorems 2.2–2.4 to unsplit schedules, or to sequenced schedules of other orders, states a weaker theorem and is ruled out: every statement quantifies over all feasible schedules.

A complete development needs: sums over sublists of pieces, rearrangements of pieces of a schedule and their effect on completion times, and optimality over permutations of a finite set of tasks. The schedule model and the non-preemption argument are reusable for any single-machine regular objective. Contributions of intermediate lemmas on these points are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. McNaughton, Scheduling with Deadlines and Loss Functions, Management Science 6(1):1–12, 1959. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1
  • W. E. Smith, Various optimizers for single-stage production, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3(1–2):59–66, 1956. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800030106
  • J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, P. Brucker, Complexity of machine scheduling problems, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1:343–362, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70743-X
  • P. Brucker, Scheduling Algorithms, 5th ed., Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69516-5
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Control TheoryConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Solutions to Uncertain Semidefinite Programs II: An SDP Inner Approximation of the Robust Feasible Set under Structured PerturbationsResearch Paper

Motivation

A semidefinite program (SDP) minimizes a linear objective cTxc^TxcTx subject to a linear matrix inequality F(x)=F0+∑i=1mxiFi⪰0F(x) = F_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m x_i F_i \succeq 0F(x)=F0​+∑i=1m​xi​Fi​⪰0. In engineering applications the coefficient matrices are rarely known exactly: they come from measurements, from a model of a physical plant, or from a finite-precision implementation. El Ghaoui, Oustry and Lebret (SIAM J. Optim. 9(1), 1998) asked for solutions that remain feasible for every admissible value of the uncertain data, and showed how to compute such robust solutions by semidefinite programming. The paper appeared alongside Ben-Tal and Nemirovski's robust convex programming (Math. Oper. Res. 23(4), 1998) and is one of the two founding treatments of robust SDP.

When the uncertainty has structure (a block-diagonal perturbation, repeated scalar parameters, a symmetric matrix), the exact robust problem is NP-hard (El Ghaoui and Lebret, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 18, 1997). This is the same obstacle that robust control meets in computing the structured singular value, and the remedy the paper uses, scaling matrices that commute with the perturbation structure, goes back to that literature (Doyle, IEE Proc. D 129, 1982; Fan, Tits and Doyle, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 36, 1991). This mission formalizes the resulting tractable conservative approximation, Theorem 3.2 of the paper, together with the lemma it rests on and an application to integer feasibility problems.

Setting

Fix natural numbers m,n,p,qm, n, p, qm,n,p,q. The decision variable is x∈Rmx \in \mathbb{R}^mx∈Rm. The nominal data are affine maps

F(x)=F0+∑i=1mxiFi∈Rn×n,R(x)=R0+∑i=1mxiRi∈Rq×n,F(x) = F_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m x_i F_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times n}, \qquad R(x) = R_0 + \sum_{i=1}^m x_i R_i \in \mathbb{R}^{q\times n},F(x)=F0​+i=1∑m​xi​Fi​∈Rn×n,R(x)=R0​+i=1∑m​xi​Ri​∈Rq×n,

with every FiF_iFi​ symmetric, and fixed matrices L∈Rn×pL \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times p}L∈Rn×p, D∈Rq×pD \in \mathbb{R}^{q\times p}D∈Rq×p. A perturbation is a matrix Δ∈Rp×q\Delta \in \mathbb{R}^{p\times q}Δ∈Rp×q, and the perturbed constraint matrix is the linear-fractional representation (LFR)

F(x,Δ)=F(x)+LΔ(I−DΔ)−1R(x)+R(x)T(I−ΔTDT)−1ΔTLT,\mathbf{F}(x,\Delta) = F(x) + L\Delta(I - D\Delta)^{-1}R(x) + R(x)^T(I - \Delta^TD^T)^{-1}\Delta^TL^T,F(x,Δ)=F(x)+LΔ(I−DΔ)−1R(x)+R(x)T(I−ΔTDT)−1ΔTLT,

which is defined when det⁡(I−DΔ)≠0\det(I - D\Delta) \neq 0det(I−DΔ)=0. The perturbation ranges over a linear subspace D⊆Rp×q\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{p\times q}D⊆Rp×q, which encodes the structure, and is bounded by a level ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0 in the spectral norm ∥Δ∥\|\Delta\|∥Δ∥ (the largest singular value). The robust feasible set is

Xρ={x:for every Δ∈D with ∥Δ∥≤ρ, det⁡(I−DΔ)≠0 and F(x,Δ)⪰0},\mathcal{X}_\rho = \{x : \text{for every } \Delta \in \mathcal{D} \text{ with } \|\Delta\| \le \rho,\ \det(I - D\Delta) \neq 0 \text{ and } \mathbf{F}(x,\Delta) \succeq 0\},Xρ​={x:for every Δ∈D with ∥Δ∥≤ρ, det(I−DΔ)=0 and F(x,Δ)⪰0},

and the robust SDP (RSDP) is to minimize cTxc^TxcTx over Xρ\mathcal{X}_\rhoXρ​.

The scaling set of D\mathcal{D}D is the linear subspace

B={(S,T,G)∈Rp×p×Rq×q×Rp×q:SΔ=ΔT, GΔT=−ΔGT for every Δ∈D}.\mathcal{B} = \{(S,T,G) \in \mathbb{R}^{p\times p}\times\mathbb{R}^{q\times q}\times\mathbb{R}^{p\times q} : S\Delta = \Delta T,\ G\Delta^T = -\Delta G^T \text{ for every } \Delta \in \mathcal{D}\}.B={(S,T,G)∈Rp×p×Rq×q×Rp×q:SΔ=ΔT, GΔT=−ΔGT for every Δ∈D}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (p. 37), as an inclusion of feasible sets

For every xxx: if some (S,T,G)∈B(S,T,G) \in \mathcal{B}(S,T,G)∈B has S≻0S \succ 0S≻0, T≻0T \succ 0T≻0 and

[F(x)−LSLTR(x)T−LSDT+LGR(x)−DSLT+GTLTρ−2T−DSDT+DG+GTDT]≻0,\begin{bmatrix} F(x) - LSL^T & R(x)^T - LSD^T + LG \\ R(x) - DSL^T + G^TL^T & \rho^{-2}T - DSD^T + DG + G^TD^T\end{bmatrix} \succ 0,[F(x)−LSLTR(x)−DSLT+GTLT​R(x)T−LSDT+LGρ−2T−DSDT+DG+GTDT​]≻0,

then x∈Xρx \in \mathcal{X}_\rhox∈Xρ​, and in fact F(x,Δ)≻0\mathbf{F}(x,\Delta) \succ 0F(x,Δ)≻0 for every Δ∈D\Delta \in \mathcal{D}Δ∈D with ∥Δ∥≤ρ\|\Delta\| \le \rho∥Δ∥≤ρ. A companion item states the consequence for optimal values: the SDP value is an upper bound on the RSDP value, with both infima taken in the extended reals.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.2 (p. 37): the same implication for constant FFF, RRR and ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1, with the matrix (13).
  2. The full-perturbation case (p. 37): for D=Rp×q\mathcal{D} = \mathbb{R}^{p\times q}D=Rp×q and p,q≥1p, q \ge 1p,q≥1, B\mathcal{B}B consists exactly of the triples (τIp,τIq,0)(\tau I_p, \tau I_q, 0)(τIp​,τIq​,0), with τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0 when S⪰0S \succeq 0S⪰0.
  3. Theorem 5.6 (p. 48): if Fi=2LiRiF_i = 2L_iR_iFi​=2Li​Ri​ with ri=rank⁡Fir_i = \operatorname{rank} F_iri​=rankFi​, and xfeasx_{\mathrm{feas}}xfeas​ satisfies, for some λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0 and block-diagonal S=STS = S^TS=ST, G=−GTG = -G^TG=−GT,
[F(xfeas)−λI−LSLT12RT+LG12R−GLTS]≻0,\begin{bmatrix} F(x_{\mathrm{feas}}) - \lambda I - LSL^T & \tfrac12R^T + LG \\ \tfrac12R - GL^T & S\end{bmatrix} \succ 0,[F(xfeas​)−λI−LSLT21​R−GLT​21​RT+LGS​]≻0,

then every integer vector closest to xfeasx_{\mathrm{feas}}xfeas​ in the maximum norm satisfies F(z)⪰0F(z) \succeq 0F(z)⪰0.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.2 replaces an NP-hard semi-infinite constraint, one matrix inequality for each admissible perturbation, by a single linear matrix inequality in the enlarged variable (x,S,T,G)(x, S, T, G)(x,S,T,G). Every point it certifies is robustly feasible, so its optimal value is a certified upper bound on the robust optimum and its optimizer is a usable robust solution. In the full case the scalings collapse to one multiplier τ\tauτ (milestone 2), which connects the bound to the exact reformulation of Section 3.1 of the paper. Theorem 5.6 shows the same machinery at work on a combinatorial problem: robustness against perturbations of size 1/21/21/2 in each coordinate of xxx turns an SDP-feasible point into an integer solution by rounding.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper (Lemma 3.2 with the proof deferred to [16]); none of them has a machine-checked proof that this mission is aware of, and the platform has no linear-fractional or structured-perturbation results. The formalization also settles the exact form of the certificate: as printed, the matrix (13) and the LMI of Theorem 3.2 contain products that are dimensionally undefined, and this mission states the condition the proof actually yields (see the scope section).

Difficulty

The inequality to be proved is a statement about infinitely many perturbations, and F(x,Δ)\mathbf{F}(x,\Delta)F(x,Δ) depends on Δ\DeltaΔ through a matrix inverse. The natural first step, eliminating Δ\DeltaΔ by an exact S-procedure as in the full case, is not available: with a structured D\mathcal{D}D the set of pairs of vectors linked by some Δ∈D\Delta \in \mathcal{D}Δ∈D is not described by one quadratic inequality, and losslessness fails. The scalings in B\mathcal{B}B give several valid quadratic inequalities instead, and one must show that their combination controls every Δ\DeltaΔ in the norm ball, including the well-posedness claim det⁡(I−DΔ)≠0\det(I - D\Delta) \neq 0det(I−DΔ)=0, which is part of the conclusion rather than an assumption. The commutation condition SΔ=ΔTS\Delta = \Delta TSΔ=ΔT must be turned into an inequality for ∥Δ∥≤1\|\Delta\| \le 1∥Δ∥≤1, which requires more than the definition of the spectral norm. For Theorem 5.6 the block-diagonal perturbation family and the rescaling between ρ=1/2\rho = 1/2ρ=1/2 and the stated matrix must be matched to the general lemma.

Formalization scope

Matrices are Matrix (Fin a) (Fin b) ℝ; ≻0\succ 0≻0 and ⪰0\succeq 0⪰0 are Matrix.PosDef and Matrix.PosSemidef (both include symmetry); block matrices are Matrix.fromBlocks on Fin n ⊕ Fin q. The norm of a perturbation is the ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 operator norm (open scoped Matrix.Norms.L2Operator), i.e. the largest singular value; the maximum norm in Theorem 5.6 is Mathlib's sup norm on Fin m → ℝ. D\mathcal{D}D is a Submodule. Affine maps are given by coefficient families indexed by Fin (m+1). Mathlib's matrix inverse is 000 at a singular matrix, so every statement pairs the LFR with det⁡(I−DΔ)≠0\det(I - D\Delta) \neq 0det(I−DΔ)=0. The standing assumption ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0 of Section 3 is a hypothesis.

Readings and corrections of the printed statements:

  • (13) as printed is dimensionally inconsistent; we state the condition the proof yields, which coincides with the printed one when GGG is square and skew-symmetric and D\mathcal{D}D consists of symmetric matrices. Concretely, (11) prints G∈Rq×pG \in \mathbb{R}^{q\times p}G∈Rq×p with GΔ=−ΔTGTG\Delta = -\Delta^TG^TGΔ=−ΔTGT and (13) prints the blocks R−DSL−GLTR - DSL - GL^TR−DSL−GLT and T−GDT+DG−DSDTT - GD^T + DG - DSD^TT−GDT+DG−DSDT; the mission uses G∈Rp×qG \in \mathbb{R}^{p\times q}G∈Rp×q with GΔT=−ΔGTG\Delta^T = -\Delta G^TGΔT=−ΔGT and the blocks R−DSLT+GTLTR - DSL^T + G^TL^TR−DSLT+GTLT and T−DSDT+DG+GTDTT - DSD^T + DG + G^TD^TT−DSDT+DG+GTDT. The same correction applies to the LMI of Theorem 3.2 (with ρ−2T\rho^{-2}Tρ−2T). Theorem 5.6 is stated as printed.
  • "An upper bound on the RSDP (4) and a corresponding solution xxx can be computed by solving the SDP" is read as the inclusion of the SDP's feasible projection in Xρ\mathcal{X}_\rhoXρ​, for every xxx; the goal states it with the strict conclusion F(x,Δ)≻0\mathbf{F}(x,\Delta) \succ 0F(x,Δ)≻0 as well. The value form is a separate item.
  • In the full-perturbation remark, "for some τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0" is stated under S⪰0S \succeq 0S⪰0, and "We then recover the exact results of section 3.1" is not formalized.
  • In Theorem 5.6, S\mathcal{S}S's index range "i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n" is read as i=1,…,mi = 1,\dots,mi=1,…,m; the hypothesis ri=rank⁡Fir_i = \operatorname{rank}F_iri​=rankFi​ is kept.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: (0,0,0)∈B(0,0,0) \in \mathcal{B}(0,0,0)∈B always, so the hypotheses S≻0S \succ 0S≻0 and T≻0T \succ 0T≻0 are kept outside B\mathcal{B}B; D\mathcal{D}D is a subspace, not an arbitrary set; and the norm is the spectral norm, not Mathlib's default entrywise norm.

A complete development needs the square root of a positive definite matrix and its commutation with SSS and TTT, the spectral-norm characterization ΔΔT⪯∥Δ∥2I\Delta\Delta^T \preceq \|\Delta\|^2 IΔΔT⪯∥Δ∥2I, Schur-complement and congruence facts for block matrices, and a linear-fractional identity relating (I−DΔ)−1(I - D\Delta)^{-1}(I−DΔ)−1 to an auxiliary vector. These are reusable well beyond this mission; contributions of any of them, and of the value and rounding corollaries, are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. El Ghaoui, F. Oustry, H. Lebret, Robust Solutions to Uncertain Semidefinite Programs, SIAM J. Optim. 9(1):33–52, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623496305717
  • L. El Ghaoui, H. Lebret, Robust solutions to least-squares problems with uncertain data, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 18:1035–1064, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0895479896298130
  • M. K. H. Fan, A. L. Tits, J. C. Doyle, Robustness in the presence of mixed parametric uncertainty and unmodeled dynamics, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 36:25–38, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1109/9.62265
  • J. C. Doyle, Analysis of feedback systems with structured uncertainties, IEE Proc. D 129(6):242–250, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1049/ip-d.1982.0053
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust convex optimization, Math. Oper. Res. 23(4):769–805, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.4.769
  • S. Boyd, L. El Ghaoui, E. Feron, V. Balakrishnan, Linear Matrix Inequalities in System and Control Theory, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970777
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information II: With Zero Set-up Cost the Myopic Base-Stock Policy Is Optimal When Myopic Levels Are NondecreasingResearch Paper

Motivation

Many firms learn about demand before it has to be served: customers place orders days or weeks ahead of the date they want delivery. Gallego and Özer (Management Science 47(10), 2001) model this advance demand information in a periodic-review inventory system and ask how the optimal replenishment policy should use it. Classical inventory theory (Arrow, Harris and Marschak 1951; Scarf 1959; Veinott 1965, 1966; Iglehart 1963) assumes that nothing about future demand is known when an order is placed. With advance orders the state of the system is no longer a single number, and it is not a priori clear whether the familiar policy structures survive.

This mission covers the paper's zero set-up cost case (Section 5). The companion mission Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information I covers the positive set-up cost case and its (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies.

Setting

Time is divided into periods t=1,…,Tt = 1, \dots, Tt=1,…,T. The supply lead time is an integer L≥0L \ge 0L≥0, and the information horizon is NNN. In period ttt customers place orders Dt=(Dt,t,…,Dt,t+N)D_t = (D_{t,t}, \dots, D_{t,t+N})Dt​=(Dt,t​,…,Dt,t+N​), where Dt,s≥0D_{t,s} \ge 0Dt,s​≥0 is demand placed in period ttt for delivery in period sss. Throughout, N>L+1N > L + 1N>L+1; write M=N−L−1≥1M = N - L - 1 \ge 1M=N−L−1≥1.

At the start of period ttt the decision maker knows two things. The first is the modified inventory position xtx_txt​: on-hand stock plus outstanding orders minus backorders, net of the demand already observed for the protection period t,…,t+Lt, \dots, t+Lt,…,t+L. The second is the vector

ot=(ot,t+L+1,…,ot,t+N−1)∈RMo_t = (o_{t,t+L+1}, \dots, o_{t,t+N-1}) \in \mathbb{R}^Mot​=(ot,t+L+1​,…,ot,t+N−1​)∈RM

of demands already observed for periods beyond the protection period. The decision maker raises the position to y≥xty \ge x_ty≥xt​ at zero fixed cost, the demand vector DtD_tDt​ is realised, and the state moves to

xt+1=y−∑k=0L+1Dt,t+k−ot,t+L+1,ot+1,s=ot,s+Dt,s (s=t+L+2,…,t+N),x_{t+1} = y - \sum_{k=0}^{L+1} D_{t,t+k} - o_{t,t+L+1}, \qquad o_{t+1,s} = o_{t,s} + D_{t,s}\ (s = t+L+2, \dots, t+N),xt+1​=y−k=0∑L+1​Dt,t+k​−ot,t+L+1​,ot+1,s​=ot,s​+Dt,s​ (s=t+L+2,…,t+N),

with ot,t+N=0o_{t,t+N} = 0ot,t+N​=0.

Costs enter through a single-period cost Gt:R→RG_t : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}Gt​:R→R (holding, backorder and linear ordering cost, charged against the demand over the protection period) and one-period discount factors αt+1>0\alpha_{t+1} > 0αt+1​>0. The optimal cost-to-go JtJ_tJt​ and the cost VtV_tVt​ of ordering up to yyy satisfy

Jt(x,o)=min⁡y≥xVt(y,o),Vt(y,o)=Gt(y)+αt+1 E Jt+1(xt+1,ot+1),JT+1≡0,J_t(x, o) = \min_{y \ge x} V_t(y, o), \qquad V_t(y, o) = G_t(y) + \alpha_{t+1}\,\mathbb{E}\,J_{t+1}(x_{t+1}, o_{t+1}), \qquad J_{T+1} \equiv 0,Jt​(x,o)=y≥xmin​Vt​(y,o),Vt​(y,o)=Gt​(y)+αt+1​EJt+1​(xt+1​,ot+1​),JT+1​≡0,

where the expectation is over DtD_tDt​. The base-stock level in period ttt is the smallest minimizer

yt(o)=min⁡{y:Vt(y,o)=min⁡xVt(x,o)},y_t(o) = \min\{y : V_t(y, o) = \min_x V_t(x, o)\},yt​(o)=min{y:Vt​(y,o)=xmin​Vt​(x,o)},

and the myopic level is the smallest minimizer of the single-period cost,

ytm=min⁡{y:Gt(y)=min⁡xGt(x)}.y^m_t = \min\{y : G_t(y) = \min_x G_t(x)\}.ytm​=min{y:Gt​(y)=xmin​Gt​(x)}.

A function f(x,θ)f(x, \theta)f(x,θ) has decreasing differences if f(x1,θ)−f(x2,θ)≤f(x1,θ′)−f(x2,θ′)f(x_1, \theta) - f(x_2, \theta) \le f(x_1, \theta') - f(x_2, \theta')f(x1​,θ)−f(x2​,θ)≤f(x1​,θ′)−f(x2​,θ′) whenever x1≥x2x_1 \ge x_2x1​≥x2​ and θ≥θ′\theta \ge \theta'θ≥θ′ componentwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 1352)

If t↦ytmt \mapsto y^m_tt↦ytm​ is nondecreasing on {1,…,T}\{1, \dots, T\}{1,…,T}, then for every period ttt and every observed-demand vector o≥0o \ge 0o≥0,

yt(o)=ytm.y_t(o) = y^m_t .yt​(o)=ytm​.

The optimal order-up-to level then ignores all advance information beyond the protection period. A second item states the paper's stationary special case: if Gt=GG_t = GGt​=G for all ttt, the smallest minimizer ymy^mym of GGG is the optimal base-stock level in every period.

Milestones: Theorem 4 (p. 1351)

For every period ttt and every fixed oto_tot​:

  1. Vt(⋅,ot)V_t(\cdot, o_t)Vt​(⋅,ot​) is convex and Vt(x,ot)→∞V_t(x, o_t) \to \inftyVt​(x,ot​)→∞ as ∣x∣→∞|x| \to \infty∣x∣→∞;
  2. yt(ot)y_t(o_t)yt​(ot​) exists and Jt(x,ot)=Vt(max⁡(yt(ot),x),ot)J_t(x, o_t) = V_t(\max(y_t(o_t), x), o_t)Jt​(x,ot​)=Vt​(max(yt​(ot​),x),ot​): a state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal;
  3. Jt(⋅,ot)J_t(\cdot, o_t)Jt​(⋅,ot​) is nondecreasing and convex;
  4. Vt(x,o)V_t(x, o)Vt​(x,o) has decreasing differences in (x,o)(x, o)(x,o);
  5. Jt(x,o)J_t(x, o)Jt​(x,o) has decreasing differences in (x,o)(x, o)(x,o);
  6. yt(o)y_t(o)yt​(o) is nondecreasing in ooo.

Parts 1–3 are what the goal's proof uses. Parts 4–6 are the paper's second zero set-up result, monotonicity of the base-stock level in observed demand.

Significance

The theorem identifies when advance demand information beyond the protection period can be ignored. When the myopic levels do not decrease over time, which includes stationary costs and ramping-up demand, the (1+M)(1 + M)(1+M)-dimensional dynamic program collapses to a sequence of one-dimensional newsvendor-type problems. That is both a computational simplification and a managerial statement: information about demand after the protection period does not change the order. Theorem 4, Part 5 gives the complementary monotone comparative statics. When the myopic condition fails, more observed demand never lowers the order-up-to level.

The results are proved in the paper, with the proofs in Appendix B. No machine-checked version exists. This mission produces a formal account of the finite-horizon recursion with a multi-dimensional information state, and checks the base-stock and myopic-optimality arguments against it.

Difficulty

The obvious induction carries convexity of Jt+1J_{t+1}Jt+1​ backward, but here the future cost is evaluated at a random next state (xt+1,ot+1)(x_{t+1}, o_{t+1})(xt+1​,ot+1​) whose first coordinate depends on the current observed demand ot,t+L+1o_{t,t+L+1}ot,t+L+1​. Showing that the base-stock level does not depend on oto_tot​ therefore needs more than convexity. It needs to know where Jt+1(⋅,ot+1)J_{t+1}(\cdot, o_{t+1})Jt+1​(⋅,ot+1​) is flat, uniformly in the random ot+1o_{t+1}ot+1​, and that the next position cannot exceed the current order-up-to level. The latter holds only on the reachable states, where observed demands are nonnegative. For a sufficiently negative ot,t+L+1o_{t,t+L+1}ot,t+L+1​ the next period starts above its myopic level whatever is ordered now, and the conclusion fails. On the analytic side, every infimum and expectation in the recursion must be shown to be finite and attained before the order-theoretic argument can start.

Formalization scope

The model is parametrised by LLL and M≥1M \ge 1M≥1, with N=L+M+1N = L + M + 1N=L+M+1. The demand vector is a function on {0,…,N}\{0, \dots, N\}{0,…,N} and ooo a function on {0,…,M−1}\{0, \dots, M-1\}{0,…,M−1}, ordered componentwise. JtJ_tJt​ is defined by backward recursion with Jt≡0J_t \equiv 0Jt​≡0 for t>Tt > Tt>T. The minimum over y≥xy \ge xy≥x is a real infimum and the expectation a Bochner integral against the law μt\mu_tμt​ of DtD_tDt​. Attainment and finiteness are consequences proved in the theorems, not assumptions. Base-stock and myopic levels are characterised as smallest minimizers (IsLeast), never through sInf.

The single-period cost GtG_tGt​ is a primitive rather than being assembled from ctc_tct​, gtg_tgt​ and the lead-time demand; the paper's GtG_tGt​ has the assumed properties, so the theorems cover the paper's model. Hypotheses the paper uses without stating, all placed on primitives and labelled in the statements:

  • nonnegative demands, Dt,s≥0D_{t,s} \ge 0Dt,s​≥0 almost surely;
  • coercivity of GtG_tGt​ (the paper states it for G~t\tilde G_tG~t​ only);
  • αt+1>0\alpha_{t+1} > 0αt+1​>0;
  • finiteness of the expectation in (9), guaranteed by linear growth of GtG_tGt​ and finite first moments of DtD_tDt​. This covers piecewise-linear holding and backorder costs with any finite-mean demand (including the paper's Poisson example), but excludes superlinear costs;
  • in the goal, o≥0o \ge 0o≥0, the set of reachable states.

The goal cannot be trivialised: the hypotheses are satisfied by concrete instances (for example Gt(y)=∣y∣G_t(y) = |y|Gt​(y)=∣y∣ with any finite-mean nonnegative demand), and the conclusion identifies the base-stock level exactly rather than asserting that some minimizer exists.

Out of scope: the reduction of the control problem to the functional equation (Appendix A, Özer 2000), the infinite-horizon Theorem 6, and Lemma 5, whose proof argues on the integers and whose real-valued form with a unit forward difference is unverified. Contributions of general lemmas are welcome: convexity and attainment for inf⁡y≥x\inf_{y \ge x}infy≥x​ of a convex coercive function, and preservation of convexity and decreasing differences under expectation. All of them are reusable in other inventory models.

Selected references

  • G. Gallego, Ö. Özer, Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information, Management Science 47(10):1344–1360, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.10.1344.10261
  • A. F. Veinott, Optimal Policy for a Multi-Product, Dynamic, Nonstationary Inventory Problem, Management Science 12(3):206–222, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2):259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Validation of Subgradient Optimization I: The Core Problem Built from the Subgradient Iterates Solves the Dual Linear ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

Subgradient optimization maximizes a concave function that is not differentiable by stepping along an arbitrary subgradient with a prescribed sequence of step sizes. It became a standard tool of integer programming after Held and Karp used it to compute the Lagrangian 1-tree bound for the traveling-salesman problem (Held & Karp 1971). Held, Wolfe and Crowder then tested it on the assignment problem, a traveling-salesman relaxation and a multicommodity flow problem (Held, Wolfe & Crowder 1974).

The method has one practical defect that the paper names at the start of its Section 6: it contains no test of optimality. The value w(πj)w(\pi^j)w(πj) approaches the maximum, but at no finite step does the method say that the maximum has been reached, or what the maximum is. Section 6 of the paper supplies such a test for the case where www is a minimum of finitely many affine functions. The finitely many subgradients produced by the iterates define a small linear program, the core problem, and from some iteration on this linear program already solves the full dual linear program. Its optimal value is therefore the exact maximum of www, obtained from quantities the method computes anyway. This is how the authors certified the optimal values reported in their experiments.

Timeline:

  • 1967–1969: Poljak proves that the subgradient iterates satisfy w(πj)→max⁡ww(\pi^j)\to\max ww(πj)→maxw when the step sizes tend to zero and have divergent sum (Poljak 1967; Poljak 1969).
  • 1971: Held and Karp apply the method to the 1-tree bound (Held & Karp 1971).
  • 1974: Held, Wolfe and Crowder prove that the core problem P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) solves the dual linear program (Theorem 6.3) and give a sufficient condition for bounded iterates (Theorem 6.1).
  • 1996–1999: primal recovery from subgradient iterates is developed further, by convex combinations of the subgradients with weights derived from the step sizes (Sherali & Choi 1996; Larsson, Patriksson & Strömberg 1999).

Setting

Fix n≥0n\ge0n≥0 and write En=RnE^n=\mathbb R^nEn=Rn with the Euclidean inner product π⋅v\pi\cdot vπ⋅v. The data are K≥1K\ge1K≥1 scalars ckc_kck​ and vectors vk∈Env_k\in E^nvk​∈En, and

w(π)=min⁡{ck+π⋅vk:k=1,…,K}.(2.2)w(\pi)=\min\{c_k+\pi\cdot v_k : k=1,\dots,K\}.\qquad(2.2)w(π)=min{ck​+π⋅vk​:k=1,…,K}.(2.2)

The function www is assumed bounded above, the paper's standing assumption. An index kkk attains the minimum at π\piπ if ck+π⋅vk=w(π)c_k+\pi\cdot v_k=w(\pi)ck​+π⋅vk​=w(π).

A run of the subgradient algorithm consists of a starting point π0∈En\pi^0\in E^nπ0∈En, step sizes tj>0t_j>0tj​>0 and indices k(j)k(j)k(j) such that k(j)k(j)k(j) attains the minimum at πj\pi^jπj, and

πj+1=πj+tj vk(j)(j=0,1,… ).(2.6)\pi^{j+1}=\pi^j+t_j\,v_{k(j)}\qquad(j=0,1,\dots).\qquad(2.6)πj+1=πj+tj​vk(j)​(j=0,1,…).(2.6)

No rule for choosing among several minimizing indices is imposed. Write vj=vk(j)v^j=v_{k(j)}vj=vk(j)​ and cj=ck(j)c^j=c_{k(j)}cj=ck(j)​. The step-size conditions are

tj→0,∑j=0∞tj=∞.(2.7)t_j\to0,\qquad \sum_{j=0}^\infty t_j=\infty.\qquad(2.7)tj​→0,j=0∑∞​tj​=∞.(2.7)

The dual linear program of max⁡w\max wmaxw is

min⁡{∑kckyk:yk≥0, ∑kyk=1, ∑kykvk=0}.(6.1)\min\Big\{\sum_k c_ky_k : y_k\ge0,\ \sum_ky_k=1,\ \sum_ky_kv_k=0\Big\}.\qquad(6.1)min{k∑​ck​yk​:yk​≥0, k∑​yk​=1, k∑​yk​vk​=0}.(6.1)

For integers J<J∗J<J^*J<J∗ the core problem P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) has one variable yjy_jyj​ for each iteration j∈[J,J∗]j\in[J,J^*]j∈[J,J∗]:

min⁡{∑j=JJ∗cjyj:yj≥0, ∑j=JJ∗yj=1, ∑j=JJ∗yjvj=0}.\min\Big\{\sum_{j=J}^{J^*}c^jy_j : y_j\ge0,\ \sum_{j=J}^{J^*}y_j=1,\ \sum_{j=J}^{J^*}y_jv^j=0\Big\}.min{j=J∑J∗​cjyj​:yj​≥0, j=J∑J∗​yj​=1, j=J∑J∗​yj​vj=0}.

An index chosen at several iterations contributes several identical columns. A point yyy of P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) is sent to the point yˉk=∑{yj:J≤j≤J∗, k(j)=k}\bar y_k=\sum\{y_j : J\le j\le J^*,\ k(j)=k\}yˉ​k​=∑{yj​:J≤j≤J∗, k(j)=k} of (6.1). This aggregation preserves feasibility and objective value.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.3 (p. 82)

Assume www is bounded above, (tj,πj,k(j))(t_j,\pi^j,k(j))(tj​,πj,k(j)) is a run satisfying (2.7), and {πj}\{\pi^j\}{πj} is bounded. Then

∀J ∃J∗>J:P(J,J∗) has a solution, and every solution of P(J,J∗) aggregates to a solution of (6.1).\forall J\ \exists J^*>J:\quad P(J,J^*)\text{ has a solution, and every solution of }P(J,J^*)\text{ aggregates to a solution of (6.1)}.∀J ∃J∗>J:P(J,J∗) has a solution, and every solution of P(J,J∗) aggregates to a solution of (6.1).

The goal states existence of J∗J^*J∗, which is what the paper claims. The paper's argument in fact gives the conclusion for every sufficiently large J∗J^*J∗. That stronger form is not the goal. Feasibility of P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) (Lemma 6.2) or the inequality Value[P(J,J∗)]≥Value[(6.1)]\mathrm{Value}[P(J,J^*)]\ge\mathrm{Value}[(6.1)]Value[P(J,J∗)]≥Value[(6.1)], which holds for every feasible P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗), is not a formalization of the goal. The content is optimality in (6.1).

Milestones

  1. Eq. (2.10): if π∗\pi^*π∗ maximizes www and kkk attains the minimum at π\piπ, then w∗−w(π)≤vk⋅(π∗−π)w^*-w(\pi)\le v_k\cdot(\pi^*-\pi)w∗−w(π)≤vk​⋅(π∗−π).
  2. §6, p. 80 (display): under (2.6), (2.7) and www bounded above, lim⁡jw(πj)=max⁡w=w(π∗)\lim_j w(\pi^j)=\max w=w(\pi^*)limj​w(πj)=maxw=w(π∗) for some π∗\pi^*π∗. The iterates are not assumed bounded.
  3. Theorem 6.1: if every π≠0\pi\ne0π=0 has some π⋅vk<0\pi\cdot v_k<0π⋅vk​<0, every run satisfying (2.7) is bounded.
  4. Eq. (6.1): (6.1) has a solution, and its optimal value equals max⁡w\max wmaxw.
  5. Lemma 6.2: for any JJJ there is J∗>JJ^*>JJ∗>J with P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) feasible, for bounded runs.

Significance

Theorem 6.3 turns an asymptotic method into one that returns an exact answer. Solving P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) for growing J∗J^*J∗ produces a linear program of bounded size whose optimum is eventually the optimum of (6.1), and hence max⁡w\max wmaxw. In the Lagrangian applications, where (6.1) is the linear relaxation of a combinatorial problem, this yields both the bound and a primal solution of the relaxation. The theorem is the ancestor of the primal-recovery results listed in the timeline.

The mission produces a machine-checked version of the paper's Section 6, together with the input the paper takes on citation: Poljak's convergence theorem for divergent-series step sizes, specialized to piecewise-linear concave functions. Neither Poljak's theorem nor Theorem 6.3 is in Mathlib. The pieces are reusable: the convergence theorem applies to every Lagrangian dual solved by subgradient steps, and the duality between max⁡w\max wmaxw and (6.1) is linear-programming duality for a minimum of affine functions.

Difficulty

The inequality Value⁡P(J,J∗)≥Value⁡(6.1)\operatorname{Value}P(J,J^*)\ge\operatorname{Value}(6.1)ValueP(J,J∗)≥Value(6.1) is immediate, since aggregation maps feasible points to feasible points with the same objective. All of the content lies in the reverse inequality. That inequality ties a finite linear program to the limit of an infinite sequence, and it must hold for an arbitrary choice among tied minimizing indices. The iterates themselves need not converge, and under (2.7) the values w(πj)w(\pi^j)w(πj) are not monotone. So an argument that inspects a single iterate, or assumes that the method settles on one face of www, fails. The convergence statement of milestone 2 is not proved in the paper and is the heaviest single step. Feasibility of P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) also needs its own argument, and it fails without the boundedness hypothesis.

Formalization scope

EnE^nEn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), the index set is a finite nonempty type ι, and www is the finite minimum Finset.univ.inf'. A run is the predicate IsSubgradientRun c v t π k: positive steps, a minimizing index at every step, and update (2.6). It is not a function of π0\pi^0π0, so every tie-breaking rule is covered. (2.7) is StepSizeCond t: t → 0, and the partial sums tend to +∞+\infty+∞. Iterates are indexed from j=0j=0j=0. Boundedness is Bornology.IsBounded (Set.range π). The variables of P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) are a function on N\mathbb NN of which only the values at J≤j≤J∗J\le j\le J^*J≤j≤J∗ enter. Optimality of yyy in either linear program means feasibility plus an objective no larger than that of every feasible point. Suprema are never taken over unbounded sets: every maximum of www is stated as attained at an explicit π∗\pi^*π∗.

A statement that only asserts feasibility of P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗), or only Value⁡P≥Value⁡(6.1)\operatorname{Value}P\ge\operatorname{Value}(6.1)ValueP≥Value(6.1), is not the theorem. The goal requires that the solutions of P(J,J∗)P(J,J^*)P(J,J∗) be optimal for (6.1).

Theorem 6.1 is printed for the step rule (2.8), but its proof uses w(πj)→w∗w(\pi^j)\to w^*w(πj)→w∗, the consequence of (2.7). The mission states it for (2.7), and its milestone title says so.

A complete development needs:

  • linear-programming duality for (6.1), including attainment;
  • the convergence theorem for divergent-series step sizes;
  • existence of a maximizer of a bounded-above minimum of finitely many affine functions;
  • basic facts on convex hulls of finitely many vectors in EnE^nEn.

The first three are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions of any of them, as standalone theorems, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Held, P. Wolfe, H. P. Crowder, Validation of subgradient optimization, Mathematical Programming 6 (1974) 62–88. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580223
  • M. Held, R. M. Karp, The traveling-salesman problem and minimum spanning trees: Part II, Mathematical Programming 1 (1971) 6–25. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01584070
  • B. T. Poljak, A general method of solving extremum problems, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 8 (1967) 593–597.
  • B. T. Poljak, Minimization of unsmooth functionals, USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics 9 (1969) 14–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/0041-5553(69)90061-5
  • H. D. Sherali, G. Choi, Recovery of primal solutions when using subgradient optimization methods to solve Lagrangian duals of linear programs, Operations Research Letters 19 (1996) 105–113. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(96)00019-3
  • T. Larsson, M. Patriksson, A.-B. Strömberg, Ergodic, primal convergence in dual subgradient schemes for convex programming, Mathematical Programming 86 (1999) 283–312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s101070050090
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Convex OptimizationLinear algebraNumerical Analysis+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Solutions to Least-Squares Problems with Uncertain Data II: Robust Least Squares as Tikhonov RegularizationResearch Paper

Motivation

Least squares fits a linear model Ax≃bAx \simeq bAx≃b by minimizing ∥Ax−b∥\|Ax - b\|∥Ax−b∥, and its solution can be extremely sensitive to errors in the data (A,b)(A, b)(A,b) when AAA is ill-conditioned. The standard remedy is Tikhonov regularization (ridge regression): minimize ∥Ax−b∥2+μ∥x∥2\|Ax - b\|^2 + \mu\|x\|^2∥Ax−b∥2+μ∥x∥2, whose solution x=(A⊤A+μI)−1A⊤bx = (A^\top A + \mu I)^{-1}A^\top bx=(A⊤A+μI)−1A⊤b is stable but depends on a parameter μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 that must be chosen by some external rule.

El Ghaoui and Lebret (SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 18(4), 1997) proposed instead to take the uncertainty in (A,b)(A, b)(A,b) seriously: the robust least-squares (RLS) solution minimizes the worst-case residual over all perturbations [ΔA Δb][\Delta A\ \Delta b][ΔA Δb] of Frobenius norm at most ρ\rhoρ. Their Theorem 3.1 shows that for ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 this worst-case residual equals ∥Ax−b∥+∥x∥2+1\|Ax - b\| + \sqrt{\|x\|^2 + 1}∥Ax−b∥+∥x∥2+1​ and that its minimization is the second-order cone program (15). Theorem 3.2, the subject of this mission, reads off the optimal solution: it is a Tikhonov-regularized solution, and the regularization parameter is not a free choice but is fixed by the data. This gives a principled answer to the question of how to choose μ\muμ, and it is the reason the paper describes RLS as "a Tikhonov regularization procedure" with "a rigorous way to compute the regularization parameter" (abstract, p. 1035).

A closely related model for least squares with bounded data uncertainty was developed at the same time by Chandrasekaran, Golub, Gu and Sayed; the paper notes that their preliminary draft (its reference [5]) gives a solution to the unstructured RLS problem similar to that of §3.2 (pp. 1036–1037).

Setting

Throughout, A∈Rn×mA \in \mathbb R^{n\times m}A∈Rn×m, b∈Rnb \in \mathbb R^nb∈Rn, x∈Rmx \in \mathbb R^mx∈Rm, and every vector norm is Euclidean, ∥v∥=∑ivi2\|v\| = \sqrt{\sum_i v_i^2}∥v∥=∑i​vi2​​. For x∈Rmx \in \mathbb R^mx∈Rm, [x;1]∈Rm+1[x; 1] \in \mathbb R^{m+1}[x;1]∈Rm+1 is xxx with a coordinate 111 appended, so ∥[x;1]∥=∥x∥2+1\|[x;1]\| = \sqrt{\|x\|^2 + 1}∥[x;1]∥=∥x∥2+1​.

The SOCP (15) is the problem, in the variables x∈Rmx \in \mathbb R^mx∈Rm and λ,τ∈R\lambda, \tau \in \mathbb Rλ,τ∈R,

minimize λsubject to∥Ax−b∥≤λ−τ,∥[x;1]∥≤τ.\text{minimize } \lambda \quad\text{subject to}\quad \|Ax - b\| \le \lambda - \tau,\qquad \|[x;1]\| \le \tau.minimize λsubject to∥Ax−b∥≤λ−τ,∥[x;1]∥≤τ.

A triple (x,λ,τ)(x, \lambda, \tau)(x,λ,τ) is optimal for (15) if it is feasible and λ≤λ′\lambda \le \lambda'λ≤λ′ for every feasible (x′,λ′,τ′)(x', \lambda', \tau')(x′,λ′,τ′). Its dual, derived in the paper from the general second-order cone duality of §2.1, is the problem in z∈Rnz \in \mathbb R^nz∈Rn, u∈Rmu \in \mathbb R^mu∈Rm, v∈Rv \in \mathbb Rv∈R

maximize b⊤z−vsubject toA⊤z+u=0,∥z∥≤1,∥[u;v]∥≤1.\text{maximize } b^\top z - v \quad\text{subject to}\quad A^\top z + u = 0,\quad \|z\| \le 1,\quad \|[u; v]\| \le 1.maximize b⊤z−vsubject toA⊤z+u=0,∥z∥≤1,∥[u;v]∥≤1.

The minimum-norm solution of Ax=bAx = bAx=b is a solution xxx with ∥x∥≤∥y∥\|x\| \le \|y\|∥x∥≤∥y∥ for every other solution yyy; when Ax=bAx = bAx=b is consistent it is A†bA^\dagger bA†b, with A†A^\daggerA† the Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse.

In the Lean development these objects are IsSOCPFeasible, IsSOCPOptimal, IsDualFeasible, dualObjective, IsDualOptimal and IsMinNormSolution, in the namespace RobustLS.Tikhonov, with the Euclidean norm eucNorm.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 with the identity for μ\muμ

Let (x,λ,τ)(x, \lambda, \tau)(x,λ,τ) be optimal for (15) and set μ=(λ−τ)/τ\mu = (\lambda - \tau)/\tauμ=(λ−τ)/τ. Then

x={(μI+A⊤A)−1A⊤bif μ>0,A†belse,andμ=∥Ax−b∥∥x∥2+1.x = \begin{cases} (\mu I + A^\top A)^{-1}A^\top b & \text{if } \mu > 0,\\ A^\dagger b & \text{else,}\end{cases}\qquad\text{and}\qquad \mu = \frac{\|Ax - b\|}{\sqrt{\|x\|^2 + 1}}.x={(μI+A⊤A)−1A⊤bA†b​if μ>0,else,​andμ=∥x∥2+1​∥Ax−b∥​.

By Theorem 3.1 (the subject of the companion mission I of this series), the xxx-part of an optimal point of (15) is the RLS solution for ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1, so this is formula (17) of the paper. The identity for μ\muμ is the final display of the paper's proof and is the claim in the mission's title.

Milestones (in the order of the paper's proof, p. 1041)

  1. Both (15) and its dual have optimal points.
  2. If λ=τ\lambda = \tauλ=τ at the optimum, then Ax=bAx = bAx=b and λ=τ=∥x∥2+1\lambda = \tau = \sqrt{\|x\|^2 + 1}λ=τ=∥x∥2+1​.
  3. In that case xxx is the minimum-norm solution of Ax=bAx = bAx=b, x=A†bx = A^\dagger bx=A†b.
  4. Eq. (18): for λ>τ\lambda > \tauλ>τ, primal and dual optimal values coincide,
∥Ax−b∥+∥[x;1]∥=λ=b⊤z−v=−(Ax−b)⊤z−[x⊤ 1][−A⊤zv].\|Ax - b\| + \|[x;1]\| = \lambda = b^\top z - v = -(Ax-b)^\top z - [x^\top\ 1]\begin{bmatrix} -A^\top z\\ v\end{bmatrix}.∥Ax−b∥+∥[x;1]∥=λ=b⊤z−v=−(Ax−b)⊤z−[x⊤ 1][−A⊤zv​].
  1. The dual optimal point is z=−(Ax−b)/∥Ax−b∥z = -(Ax - b)/\|Ax - b\|z=−(Ax−b)/∥Ax−b∥, [u;v]=−[x;1]/∥x∥2+1[u; v] = -[x; 1]/\sqrt{\|x\|^2 + 1}[u;v]=−[x;1]/∥x∥2+1​.
  2. Substituting into A⊤z+u=0A^\top z + u = 0A⊤z+u=0: x=(A⊤A+μI)−1A⊤bx = (A^\top A + \mu I)^{-1}A^\top bx=(A⊤A+μI)−1A⊤b with μ=(λ−τ)/τ=∥Ax−b∥/∥x∥2+1\mu = (\lambda - \tau)/\tau = \|Ax - b\|/\sqrt{\|x\|^2 + 1}μ=(λ−τ)/τ=∥Ax−b∥/∥x∥2+1​.

A further item states Remark 3.1: for λ>τ\lambda > \tauλ>τ, xxx is the unique minimizer of the weighted residual ∥[A;I;0]y−[b;0;1]∥Θ\big\|[A; I; 0]y - [b; 0; 1]\big\|_\Theta​[A;I;0]y−[b;0;1]​Θ​ with Θ=diag((λ−τ)I,τI,τ)\Theta = \mathbf{diag}((\lambda-\tau)I, \tau I, \tau)Θ=diag((λ−τ)I,τI,τ) and ∥r∥Θ=∥Θ−1/2r∥\|r\|_\Theta = \|\Theta^{-1/2} r\|∥r∥Θ​=∥Θ−1/2r∥.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.2 turns a robust optimization problem into a familiar linear-algebra object. It says that the robust solution always lies on the Tikhonov path {(A⊤A+μI)−1A⊤b:μ>0}\{(A^\top A + \mu I)^{-1}A^\top b : \mu > 0\}{(A⊤A+μI)−1A⊤b:μ>0} or at its endpoint A†bA^\dagger bA†b, and it identifies the point on the path through a fixed-point equation relating μ\muμ to the residual and the size of the solution. The paper builds on this in §3.3 (a one-dimensional search for μ\muμ via the SVD) and in §6 (continuity of the RLS solution in the data), and Remark 3.1 is the template for the weighted least-squares interpretation of the structured and linear-fractional problems in §5.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal account of second-order cone duality for a concrete program, the characterization of the optimal dual point by equality in the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, and the minimum-norm characterization of A†bA^\dagger bA†b, all in terms of explicit Euclidean norms on Fin k → ℝ.

Difficulty

The paper's proof rests on strong duality for (15) ("both primal and dual problems are strictly feasible"), which it cites from the SOCP literature rather than proving; Mathlib has no second-order cone duality, so this step is the main gap. The degenerate case λ=τ\lambda = \tauλ=τ also needs care: there ∥Ax−b∥=0\|Ax - b\| = 0∥Ax−b∥=0, the residual term is not differentiable at the optimum, and the conclusion changes from a regularized inverse to a pseudoinverse. A statement that only handles the case Ax≠bAx \ne bAx=b, or that assumes the matrix A⊤A+μIA^\top A + \mu IA⊤A+μI invertible without deriving it from μ>0\mu > 0μ>0, misses part of the theorem.

Formalization scope

  • Normalization. The paper states Theorem 3.2 for ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 ("we take ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 in what follows", p. 1039) and obtains general ρ\rhoρ by the scaling φ(A,b,ρ)=ρ φ(A/ρ,b/ρ,1)\varphi(A, b, \rho) = \rho\,\varphi(A/\rho, b/\rho, 1)φ(A,b,ρ)=ρφ(A/ρ,b/ρ,1). Only the ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 statement is formalized.
  • The RLS solution. The perturbation model is not used here: all statements are about optimal points of (15). That the xxx-part of such a point is the RLS solution is Theorem 3.1 (mission I), and it is recalled in prose only.
  • Norms. Vectors are Fin k → ℝ; the Euclidean norm is the explicit eucNorm v = √(∑ vᵢ²) (Mathlib's ‖·‖ on Fin k → ℝ is the sup norm). Stacked vectors [x;1][x;1][x;1] and [u;v][u;v][u;v] are indexed by Fin m ⊕ Unit.
  • Optimality. "Optimal point" means feasible with objective no worse than every feasible point; the minimum and maximum are therefore attained by definition, and milestone 1 guarantees they exist.
  • Pseudoinverse. Mathlib has no matrix pseudoinverse, so A†bA^\dagger bA†b is stated as the minimum-norm solution of Ax=bAx = bAx=b, which is how the proof uses it. The branch "else" is ¬(μ>0)\neg(\mu > 0)¬(μ>0).
  • Inverse. (μI+A⊤A)−1(\mu I + A^\top A)^{-1}(μI+A⊤A)−1 is Mathlib's Matrix.inv; it is used only where μ>0\mu > 0μ>0, where the matrix is positive definite. τ≥1\tau \ge 1τ≥1 at every feasible point, so μ\muμ is well defined without an extra hypothesis.
  • No trivialization. The goal quantifies over optimal points of (15) over the whole feasible set, not over feasible points, and milestone 1 shows the hypothesis is satisfiable for every (A,b)(A, b)(A,b), including n=0n = 0n=0 or m=0m = 0m=0.
  • Weighted norm. For Remark 3.1, ∥r∥Θ\|r\|_\Theta∥r∥Θ​ for the diagonal Θ\ThetaΘ is written as ∑iri2/θi\sqrt{\sum_i r_i^2/\theta_i}∑i​ri2​/θi​​, which equals ∥Θ−1/2r∥\|\Theta^{-1/2}r\|∥Θ−1/2r∥ for positive weights.

Contributions welcome: second-order cone (or general conic) weak and strong duality for finite-dimensional programs, the equality case of Cauchy–Schwarz in the explicit-norm form used here, and a Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse for real matrices with its minimum-norm property. The platform's ConvexOptimization.conic_slater_strong_duality may help with the duality step.

Selected references

  • L. El Ghaoui and H. Lebret, Robust Solutions to Least-Squares Problems with Uncertain Data, SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. 18(4):1035–1064, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0895479896298130
  • S. Chandrasekaran, G. H. Golub, M. Gu and A. H. Sayed, A new linear least-squares type model for parameter estimation in the presence of data uncertainties, cited as submitted to SIAM J. Matrix Anal. Appl. (reference [5] of the paper).
  • A. N. Tikhonov and V. Y. Arsenin, Solutions of Ill-Posed Problems, Wiley, New York, 1977 (reference [43] of the paper).
  • Y. Nesterov and A. Nemirovskii, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
  • M. S. Lobo, L. Vandenberghe, S. Boyd and H. Lebret, Applications of Second-Order Cone Programming, Linear Algebra Appl. 284:193–228, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0024-3795(98)10032-0
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems 1: The Augmentation Bound for Shortest Augmenting PathsResearch Paper

Why the number of augmentations matters

The maximum flow problem asks how much of a commodity can be sent from a source to a sink through a network whose arcs have capacities. It is a basic model in operations research, underlies bipartite matching, transportation and scheduling problems, and is a standard subroutine inside larger combinatorial algorithms.

The classical method for it is the labeling method of Ford and Fulkerson: starting from some flow, repeatedly find an augmenting path from source to sink along which flow can be increased, push as much as the path allows, and stop when no such path exists. When all capacities are integers, each augmentation raises the flow value by at least one, so the method terminates, but the number of augmentations can be as large as the final flow value, which is exponential in the size of the input. Edmonds and Karp give a four-node example in which the method alternates between two paths and needs 2M2M2M augmentations for capacities MMM (Edmonds–Karp 1972, p. 250). With irrational capacities, Ford and Fulkerson showed that the method need not terminate at all and may converge to a non-maximum flow.

Timeline.

  • 1956 — Ford and Fulkerson introduce the labeling method and the max-flow min-cut theorem (Ford–Fulkerson 1956).
  • 1962 — Flows in Networks records the non-termination example for incommensurable capacities.
  • 1970 — Dinic independently obtains a polynomial bound using layered (shortest-path) networks (Dinic 1970).
  • 1972 — Edmonds and Karp prove that choosing each augmenting path with fewest arcs bounds the number of augmentations by 14(n3−n)\tfrac14(n^3-n)41​(n3−n), for arbitrary real capacities (Edmonds–Karp 1972, Theorem 1).

Setting

A network NNN consists of a finite set of nnn nodes, a source sss and a sink t≠st \ne st=s, and a set of arcs, which are ordered pairs (u,v)(u,v)(u,v) with u≠vu \ne vu=v; there is at most one arc from a node to another. One arc is the special return arc (t,s)(t,s)(t,s), and AAA denotes the set of all other arcs. Each (u,v)∈A(u,v) \in A(u,v)∈A has a real capacity c(u,v)>0c(u,v) > 0c(u,v)>0.

A flow is a nonnegative function fff on the arcs of NNN with f(u,v)≤c(u,v)f(u,v) \le c(u,v)f(u,v)≤c(u,v) on AAA and with inflow equal to outflow at every node, the return arc included. The value f(t,s)f(t,s)f(t,s) is the amount sent from sss to ttt; a maximum flow maximizes it.

Given a flow fff, the residual network NfN^fNf has the same nodes, and (u,v)(u,v)(u,v) is an arc of NfN^fNf when (u,v)∈A(u,v) \in A(u,v)∈A with c(u,v)−f(u,v)>0c(u,v) - f(u,v) > 0c(u,v)−f(u,v)>0, or (v,u)∈A(v,u) \in A(v,u)∈A with f(v,u)>0f(v,u) > 0f(v,u)>0. An augmenting path is a sequence of distinct nodes s=u1,…,up=ts = u_1, \dots, u_p = ts=u1​,…,up​=t whose consecutive pairs are arcs of NfN^fNf. Each step carries a number εi>0\varepsilon_i > 0εi​>0 (residual capacity forward, flow backward, or their sum when both (ui,ui+1)(u_i,u_{i+1})(ui​,ui+1​) and (ui+1,ui)(u_{i+1},u_i)(ui+1​,ui​) lie in AAA); ε=min⁡iεi\varepsilon = \min_i \varepsilon_iε=mini​εi​, and a step with εi=ε\varepsilon_i = \varepsilonεi​=ε is a bottleneck arc. Augmenting raises f(t,s)f(t,s)f(t,s) by ε\varepsilonε and shifts the flow on the path's arcs accordingly, using the paper's own rule for opposite arcs, which never exceeds a capacity.

A run with fewest-arc augmentations is a sequence f0,…,fKf^0, \dots, f^Kf0,…,fK where f0f^0f0 is a flow and each fk+1f^{k+1}fk+1 arises from fkf^kfk by augmenting along a path PkP^kPk with fewest arcs. The distance δk(u,v)\delta^k(u,v)δk(u,v) is the least number of arcs of a directed path from uuu to vvv in Nk=NfkN^k = N^{f^k}Nk=Nfk, or ∞\infty∞.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 1

For every network on nnn nodes and every run of length KKK with fewest-arc augmentations,

K≤14 (n3−n),K \le \tfrac14\,(n^3 - n),K≤41​(n3−n),

and if no augmenting path exists relative to fKf^KfK, then fKf^KfK is a maximum flow. The capacities are arbitrary positive reals, and the initial flow is arbitrary.

Milestones

  1. §1.1: augmentation yields a flow with value f(t,s)+εf(t,s) + \varepsilonf(t,s)+ε, ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0.
  2. §1.1: a flow is maximum if and only if it admits no augmenting path.
  3. Proposition 1: a bottleneck arc of PkP^kPk is not an arc of Nk+1N^{k+1}Nk+1.
  4. Proposition 2: (u,v)∈Nk+1(u,v) \in N^{k+1}(u,v)∈Nk+1 implies (u,v)∈Nk(u,v) \in N^k(u,v)∈Nk or (v,u)∈Pk(v,u) \in P^k(v,u)∈Pk.
  5. Lemma 1: if (u,v)(u,v)(u,v) is a bottleneck arc at steps k<mk < mk<m, then (v,u)∈Pl(v,u) \in P^l(v,u)∈Pl for some k<l<mk < l < mk<l<m.
  6. Proposition 3: δk(s,u)≤δk+1(s,u)\delta^k(s,u) \le \delta^{k+1}(s,u)δk(s,u)≤δk+1(s,u) and δk(u,t)≤δk+1(u,t)\delta^k(u,t) \le \delta^{k+1}(u,t)δk(u,t)≤δk+1(u,t).
  7. Lemma 2: if k<lk < lk<l, (u,v)∈Pk(u,v) \in P^k(u,v)∈Pk and (v,u)∈Pl(v,u) \in P^l(v,u)∈Pl, then δl(s,t)≥δk(s,t)+2\delta^l(s,t) \ge \delta^k(s,t) + 2δl(s,t)≥δk(s,t)+2.
  8. Proof of Theorem 1: each pair {u,v}\{u,v\}{u,v} occurs as a bottleneck at most 12(n+1)\tfrac12(n+1)21​(n+1) times.

Significance

The theorem shows that one simple rule for choosing augmenting paths, which a breadth-first labeling process implements, makes the number of augmentations depend on the number of nodes alone, independent of the capacities and of their arithmetic nature. It removes both pathologies of the unrestricted labeling method at once: exponential running time for integer capacities, and non-termination for irrational ones. Together with Dinic's work it is the starting point of the theory of strongly polynomial network-flow algorithms, and the distance-monotonicity argument (Proposition 3, Lemma 2) reappears in blocking-flow and push-relabel analyses.

The result is classical and fully proved in the paper. What this mission adds is a machine-checked version of the complete argument in the paper's own model: return arc, arbitrary real capacities, and the paper's augmentation rule for pairs of opposite arcs, which differs from Ford and Fulkerson's (footnote 1, p. 249). The platform has a max-flow min-cut theorem and an integer termination theorem for the Ford–Fulkerson method in the Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis model (Introduction to Linear Optimization, missions IX–X), but no bound on the number of augmentations. No machine-checked proof of Theorem 1 in Lean is known to exist.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "each augmentation saturates a bottleneck arc, which then disappears", fails because a saturated arc can reappear after later augmentations push flow back along its reverse. Counting augmentations therefore requires control over how often the same pair of nodes can supply a bottleneck again, and no property of a single augmentation provides it; the bound has to come from an invariant of the whole run that holds for real capacities, where no integrality argument is available. A second trap is that the converse direction of milestone 2 (no augmenting path implies maximality) is a max-flow min-cut statement that the paper cites without proof; it must be proved in the paper's model with the return arc.

Formalization scope

Nodes form a finite type V with decidable equality and nnn = Fintype.card V counts all nodes, sss and ttt included. The arc set A is a Finset (V × V) with no loops and without (t,s)(t,s)(t,s); capacities are real and positive on A. A flow is a function V → V → ℝ whose values off the arcs are ignored. A maximum flow is the predicate "f(t,s)≥g(t,s)f(t,s) \ge g(t,s)f(t,s)≥g(t,s) for every flow ggg", never a real supremum. Paths are lists of distinct nodes with every consecutive pair a residual arc, so the return arc is never on a path. Distances take values in ℕ∞. A run is a pair of ℕ-indexed sequences constrained on indices up to KKK. The explicit constants are stated as printed: 4K≤n3−n4K \le n^3 - n4K≤n3−n in ℕ (the truncated subtraction is harmless since n≤n3n \le n^3n≤n3) and 2 b(u,v)≤n+12\,b(u,v) \le n + 12b(u,v)≤n+1 for the per-pair count.

Case (b) of the paper's definition of augmenting paths is misprinted (its hypothesis repeats that of Case (c)); the formalization uses the reading (ui,ui+1)∉A(u_i,u_{i+1}) \notin A(ui​,ui+1​)∈/A, (ui+1,ui)∈A(u_{i+1},u_i) \in A(ui+1​,ui​)∈A, which the paper's own description of NfN^fNf on p. 251 confirms.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: a run predicate that no sequence satisfies (for instance, one that requires paths through the return arc, or computes ε=0\varepsilon = 0ε=0) would make the bound vacuous; the step predicate here is satisfiable, and a concrete four-node run has been checked. Replacing the paper's augmentation rule by "increase the forward arc by ε\varepsilonε" would also change the theorem, because that rule can violate capacities.

A complete development needs basic facts on simple paths in finite digraphs, shortest paths and their subpaths, and a max-flow min-cut theorem in the paper's model. These are reusable well beyond this mission, as are the network, residual-network and augmentation definitions. Contributions proving any milestone independently are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds, R. M. Karp, Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems, Journal of the ACM 19(2):248–264, 1972. https://doi.org/10.1145/321694.321699
  • L. R. Ford, D. R. Fulkerson, Maximal Flow Through a Network, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 8:399–404, 1956. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5
  • L. R. Ford, D. R. Fulkerson, Flows in Networks, Princeton University Press, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400875184
  • E. A. Dinic, Algorithm for Solution of a Problem of Maximum Flow in a Network with Power Estimation, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 11:1277–1280, 1970. https://www.cs.bgu.ac.il/~dinitz/D70.pdf
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, Chapter 7 (network flow problems; formalized on the platform in missions IX–X).
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Convex OptimizationFunctional AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Three-Operator Splitting Scheme and its Optimization Applications 2: The Objective Rate of the Weighted Ergodic IterateResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in signal processing, statistics and machine learning minimise a sum of three convex terms: a smooth data-fit term and two nonsmooth regularisers or constraints, each of which is easy to handle on its own (through its proximal map) but not in combination. Examples are constrained sparse regression, matrix completion with a nuclear-norm penalty and box constraints, and support-vector machines with a norm penalty. Davis and Yin (Set-Valued Var. Anal. 25 (2017)) introduced a three-operator splitting scheme that evaluates each proximal map and the gradient of the smooth term once per iteration and reduces to Douglas–Rachford splitting (Lions and Mercier 1979) and forward–backward splitting as special cases. Section 3 of that paper gives the objective-error rates of the scheme on convex problems. This mission formalizes those rates for general convex problems.

Setting

Let HHH be a real Hilbert space. The problem is

min⁡x∈H  f(x)+g(x)+h(x),(3.1)\min_{x \in H}\; f(x) + g(x) + h(x), \tag{3.1}x∈Hmin​f(x)+g(x)+h(x),(3.1)

where f,g:H→(−∞,+∞]f, g : H \to (-\infty, +\infty]f,g:H→(−∞,+∞] are closed, proper, convex functions (lower semicontinuous, never −∞-\infty−∞, finite somewhere, with convex epigraph) and h:H→Rh : H \to \mathbb Rh:H→R is convex and differentiable with β−1\beta^{-1}β−1-Lipschitz gradient ∇h\nabla h∇h, β>0\beta > 0β>0.

For γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 the proximal map prox⁡γf(x)\operatorname{prox}_{\gamma f}(x)proxγf​(x) is the unique minimiser of y↦f(y)+12γ∥y−x∥2y \mapsto f(y) + \frac{1}{2\gamma}\|y - x\|^2y↦f(y)+2γ1​∥y−x∥2. Algorithm 2 of the paper picks z0∈Hz^0 \in Hz0∈H and γ∈(0,2β)\gamma \in (0, 2\beta)γ∈(0,2β) and iterates, with relaxation λk≡1\lambda_k \equiv 1λk​≡1,

xgk=prox⁡γg(zk),xfk=prox⁡γf(2xgk−zk−γ∇h(xgk)),zk+1=zk+xfk−xgk.x^k_g = \operatorname{prox}_{\gamma g}(z^k),\qquad x^k_f = \operatorname{prox}_{\gamma f}\big(2x^k_g - z^k - \gamma\nabla h(x^k_g)\big),\qquad z^{k+1} = z^k + x^k_f - x^k_g .xgk​=proxγg​(zk),xfk​=proxγf​(2xgk​−zk−γ∇h(xgk​)),zk+1=zk+xfk​−xgk​.

Equivalently zk+1=Tzkz^{k+1} = T z^kzk+1=Tzk for the three-operator map

Tz=prox⁡γf(2prox⁡γg(z)−z−γ∇h(prox⁡γg(z)))+z−prox⁡γg(z).T z = \operatorname{prox}_{\gamma f}\big(2\operatorname{prox}_{\gamma g}(z) - z - \gamma\nabla h(\operatorname{prox}_{\gamma g}(z))\big) + z - \operatorname{prox}_{\gamma g}(z).Tz=proxγf​(2proxγg​(z)−z−γ∇h(proxγg​(z)))+z−proxγg​(z).

If z∗z^*z∗ is a fixed point of TTT, then x∗=prox⁡γg(z∗)x^* = \operatorname{prox}_{\gamma g}(z^*)x∗=proxγg​(z∗) minimises (3.1). The weighted ergodic iterate is

xˉgk=2(k+1)(k+2)∑i=0k(i+1) xgi,\bar x^k_g = \frac{2}{(k+1)(k+2)}\sum_{i=0}^{k} (i+1)\,x^i_g ,xˉgk​=(k+1)(k+2)2​i=0∑k​(i+1)xgi​,

and xˉfk\bar x^k_fxˉfk​ is defined the same way from (xfi)(x^i_f)(xfi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (p. 840)

Let z∗z^*z∗ be a fixed point of TTT, x∗=prox⁡γg(z∗)x^* = \operatorname{prox}_{\gamma g}(z^*)x∗=proxγg​(z∗), and suppose fff is LLL-Lipschitz continuous on the closed ball B(x∗,(1+γ/β)∥z0−z∗∥)B\big(x^*, (1+\gamma/\beta)\|z^0 - z^*\|\big)B(x∗,(1+γ/β)∥z0−z∗∥). Then there is a constant CCC, independent of kkk, with

(f+g+h)(xˉgk)−(f+g+h)(x∗)≤Ck+1(k≥0).(f+g+h)(\bar x^k_g) - (f+g+h)(x^*) \le \frac{C}{k+1}\qquad (k \ge 0).(f+g+h)(xˉgk​)−(f+g+h)(x∗)≤k+1C​(k≥0).

The goal asserts the order O(1/(k+1))O(1/(k+1))O(1/(k+1)) and leaves the constant free, so it is not invalidated by a sharper constant.

Milestones

  1. Corollary 2.1, Part 1 (p. 834): ∥zj−z∗∥\|z^j - z^*\|∥zj−z∗∥ is nonincreasing.
  2. Lemma 3.1 (p. 838): xfj,xgj∈B(x∗,(1+γ/β)∥z0−z∗∥)x^j_f, x^j_g \in B\big(x^*, (1+\gamma/\beta)\|z^0 - z^*\|\big)xfj​,xgj​∈B(x∗,(1+γ/β)∥z0−z∗∥) for all jjj.
  3. Eq. (3.2) (p. 839): for all k≥0k \ge 0k≥0,
2γ(f(xfk)+g(xgk)+h(xgk)−(f+g+h)(x∗))≤∥zk−x∗∥2−∥zk+1−x∗∥2−∥zk−zk+1∥2+2γ⟨zk−zk+1,∇h(xgk)⟩.2\gamma\big(f(x^k_f) + g(x^k_g) + h(x^k_g) - (f+g+h)(x^*)\big) \le \|z^k - x^*\|^2 - \|z^{k+1} - x^*\|^2 - \|z^k - z^{k+1}\|^2 + 2\gamma\langle z^k - z^{k+1}, \nabla h(x^k_g)\rangle .2γ(f(xfk​)+g(xgk​)+h(xgk​)−(f+g+h)(x∗))≤∥zk−x∗∥2−∥zk+1−x∗∥2−∥zk−zk+1∥2+2γ⟨zk−zk+1,∇h(xgk​)⟩.
  1. Theorem 3.1 (p. 838): the last-iterate rate (f+g+h)(xgk)−(f+g+h)(x∗)=o(1/k+1)(f+g+h)(x^k_g) - (f+g+h)(x^*) = o\big(1/\sqrt{k+1}\big)(f+g+h)(xgk​)−(f+g+h)(x∗)=o(1/k+1​).
  2. Eq. (2.7) (p. 836), with λk≡1\lambda_k \equiv 1λk​≡1: for γ/(2β)<ε<1\gamma/(2\beta) < \varepsilon < 1γ/(2β)<ε<1,
∑i=k∞∥∇h(xgi)−∇h(x∗)∥2≤∥zk−z∗∥2γ(2β−γ/ε).\sum_{i=k}^\infty \|\nabla h(x^i_g) - \nabla h(x^*)\|^2 \le \frac{\|z^k - z^*\|^2}{\gamma(2\beta - \gamma/\varepsilon)} .i=k∑∞​∥∇h(xgi​)−∇h(x∗)∥2≤γ(2β−γ/ε)∥zk−z∗∥2​.
  1. Eq. (3.4) (p. 840): ∥xˉfk−xˉgk∥≤5∥z0−z∗∥/(k+1)\|\bar x^k_f - \bar x^k_g\| \le 5\|z^0 - z^*\|/(k+1)∥xˉfk​−xˉgk​∥≤5∥z0−z∗∥/(k+1).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.1 gives the last iterate an objective error of o(1/k+1)o(1/\sqrt{k+1})o(1/k+1​). Theorem 3.2 shows that averaging with linearly increasing weights improves this to O(1/(k+1))O(1/(k+1))O(1/(k+1)), the rate of the standard uniform ergodic average, while putting more weight on recent iterates. The paper notes that this matters when the iterates xgkx^k_gxgk​ are sparse vectors or low-rank matrices and the average should stay close to them. The rates hold under a local Lipschitz condition on one of the two nonsmooth terms only, so ggg may be the indicator function of a constraint set. They therefore cover the constrained applications of Section 4 of the paper.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper. No machine-checked version of this scheme or its rates exists on the platform or, as far as is known, in Mathlib. A formalization produces a checked proof in an arbitrary real Hilbert space with extended-valued f,gf, gf,g. It also produces infrastructure that Mathlib lacks: proximal maps characterised by minimisation, the prox-subgradient inclusion, Fejér monotonicity of an averaged-operator iteration, and a weighted Jensen inequality for extended-valued convex functions. All of these can be reused by other splitting and proximal-gradient missions. The formalization also checks the constants: the last display of the published proof of Theorem 3.2 drops a factor 2γ2\gamma2γ in front of the Lipschitz term, and the printed ball in both theorems is centred at 000 where the proof needs x∗x^*x∗.

Difficulty

The obvious argument sums the one-step inequality (3.2). That controls the objective at the two different points xfkx^k_fxfk​ and xgkx^k_gxgk​, and only f(xfk)f(x^k_f)f(xfk​) appears, never f(xgk)f(x^k_g)f(xgk​). Moving from one point to the other needs the Lipschitz hypothesis on fff, and so it needs every iterate, and every weighted average, to stay in the ball on which that hypothesis holds. For the weighted average there is a further obstacle: the cross term 2γ⟨zk−zk+1,∇h(xgk)⟩2\gamma\langle z^k - z^{k+1}, \nabla h(x^k_g)\rangle2γ⟨zk−zk+1,∇h(xgk​)⟩ does not telescope under the weights (i+1)(i+1)(i+1). Controlling it requires the summability of the gradient differences (2.7), which is inherited from the averagedness analysis of Section 2 and not from convexity alone. Uniform averaging with the same argument does not give the weighted statement, and the weights must not be replaced.

Formalization scope

  • HHH is an arbitrary real Hilbert space (InnerProductSpace ℝ H, CompleteSpace H), not Rn\mathbb R^nRn.
  • f,g:H→f, g : H \tof,g:H→ EReal. They are proper (never ⊥\bot⊥, somewhere ≠⊤\ne \top=⊤), lower semicontinuous, and have a convex epigraph in H×RH \times \mathbb RH×R. h:H→Rh : H \to \mathbb Rh:H→R is convex and differentiable, and Mathlib's gradient h is β−1\beta^{-1}β−1-Lipschitz.
  • Proximal maps are not constructed. A map PPP is assumed to minimise f(y)+∥y−x∥2/(2γ)f(y) + \|y - x\|^2/(2\gamma)f(y)+∥y−x∥2/(2γ) for every xxx. Such a map exists and is unique for closed proper convex fff, so nothing is lost.
  • Algorithm 2 is fixed with λk≡1\lambda_k \equiv 1λk​≡1, the only case of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. Iterates are indexed from 000. The fixed point z∗z^*z∗ is a hypothesis, Tz∗=z∗T z^* = z^*Tz∗=z∗, and x∗:=prox⁡γg(z∗)x^* := \operatorname{prox}_{\gamma g}(z^*)x∗:=proxγg​(z∗). Assumption 1 of the paper follows from this and is not assumed separately.
  • Ball centre. The theorems print B(0,(1+γ/β)∥z0−z∗∥)B(0, (1+\gamma/\beta)\|z^0 - z^*\|)B(0,(1+γ/β)∥z0−z∗∥). The proofs use Lemma 3.1, whose ball is centred at x∗x^*x∗, so the ball here is centred at x∗x^*x∗. "fff is LLL-Lipschitz on the ball" is stated as: fff is finite on the ball, and its real-valued restriction is LLL-Lipschitz there.
  • O(·) and o(·). O(1/(k+1))O(1/(k+1))O(1/(k+1)) is ∃C∈R, ∀k, (f+g+h)(xˉgk)≤(f+g+h)(x∗)+C/(k+1)\exists C \in \mathbb R,\ \forall k,\ (f+g+h)(\bar x^k_g) \le (f+g+h)(x^*) + C/(k+1)∃C∈R, ∀k, (f+g+h)(xˉgk​)≤(f+g+h)(x∗)+C/(k+1), with CCC chosen after all data. o(1/k+1)o(1/\sqrt{k+1})o(1/k+1​) is k+1 ((f+g+h)(xgk)−(f+g+h)(x∗))→0\sqrt{k+1}\,\big((f+g+h)(x^k_g) - (f+g+h)(x^*)\big) \to 0k+1​((f+g+h)(xgk​)−(f+g+h)(x∗))→0, together with finiteness of the objective values as part of the conclusion. No explicit constant from the proof is stated, because the published constant drops a factor.
  • Corollary 2.1 Part 1 and Eq. (2.7) are stated for Algorithm 2 with λk≡1\lambda_k \equiv 1λk​≡1, γ∈(0,2β)\gamma \in (0, 2\beta)γ∈(0,2β) and ε∈(γ/(2β),1)\varepsilon \in (\gamma/(2\beta), 1)ε∈(γ/(2β),1). As printed, Corollary 2.1's condition on τk\tau_kτk​ excludes λk≡1\lambda_k \equiv 1λk​≡1, but Section 3 uses Part 1 in exactly this case. Summability in (2.7) is part of the conclusion.
  • Trivialization ruled out. Objective values are extended reals, and the goal compares them without subtraction. The value (f+g+h)(x∗)(f+g+h)(x^*)(f+g+h)(x∗) is proved finite as part of the conclusion. So the goal cannot hold through ∞−∞\infty - \infty∞−∞ or through an infinite right-hand side.

Welcome contributions: the prox–subgradient inclusion for EReal-valued convex functions, averagedness and Fejér monotonicity of TTT (the companion mission on Section 2 treats the general operator case), a weighted Jensen inequality in EReal, and proofs of the milestones in the listed order.

Selected references

  • D. Davis and W. Yin, A Three-Operator Splitting Scheme and its Optimization Applications, Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 25 (2017) 829–858. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11228-017-0421-z
  • H. H. Bauschke and P. L. Combettes, Convex Analysis and Monotone Operator Theory in Hilbert Spaces, 2nd ed., Springer, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48311-5
  • P.-L. Lions and B. Mercier, Splitting Algorithms for the Sum of Two Nonlinear Operators, SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 16 (1979) 964–979. https://doi.org/10.1137/0716071
  • D. Davis and W. Yin, Convergence Rate Analysis of Several Splitting Schemes, in Splitting Methods in Communication, Imaging, Science, and Engineering, Springer, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41589-5_4
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Convex OptimizationFunctional AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Three-Operator Splitting Scheme and its Optimization Applications 1: Weak and Strong Convergence of the Three-Operator Splitting IterationResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in convex optimization, variational inequalities and signal processing reduce to a monotone inclusion: find a point xxx at which the sum of several monotone operators contains 000. When the sum has two terms, the classical operator-splitting methods (Douglas–Rachford, forward–backward, forward–backward–forward) solve it by iterating a fixed-point map that uses each operator separately, through its resolvent or through a forward (explicit) step. Problems with three terms, for instance a smooth loss plus two nonsmooth regularizers or constraints, are common in practice, and before 2015 no fixed-point map was known that handled three operators one at a time without a product-space reformulation.

Davis and Yin (Set-Valued Var. Anal. 25 (2017) 829–858; preprint arXiv:1504.01032) introduced such a map, now called Davis–Yin three-operator splitting. It contains Douglas–Rachford splitting (C=0C = 0C=0) and forward–backward splitting (B=0B = 0B=0) as special cases, and it has become a standard building block of first-order methods for composite optimization. This mission formalizes Section 2 of the paper: the fixed-point encoding, the averagedness of the map, and the weak and strong convergence of the resulting iteration.

Setting

Let HHH be a real Hilbert space. A set-valued operator A:H→2HA : H \to 2^HA:H→2H is monotone if ⟨x−y,u−v⟩≥0\langle x - y, u - v\rangle \ge 0⟨x−y,u−v⟩≥0 for all u∈Axu \in Axu∈Ax, v∈Ayv \in Ayv∈Ay, and maximal monotone if its graph is not properly contained in the graph of another monotone operator. Its domain is dom⁡(A)={x:Ax≠∅}\operatorname{dom}(A) = \{x : Ax \ne \emptyset\}dom(A)={x:Ax=∅} and the zero set of an operator MMM is zer⁡(M)={x:0∈Mx}\operatorname{zer}(M) = \{x : 0 \in Mx\}zer(M)={x:0∈Mx}. A single-valued C:H→HC : H \to HC:H→H is β\betaβ-cocoercive (β>0\beta > 0β>0) if β∥Cx−Cy∥2≤⟨Cx−Cy,x−y⟩\beta\|Cx - Cy\|^2 \le \langle Cx - Cy, x - y\rangleβ∥Cx−Cy∥2≤⟨Cx−Cy,x−y⟩ for all x,yx, yx,y.

Problem (1.1) is: given maximal monotone A,BA, BA,B and β\betaβ-cocoercive CCC, find

x∈Hwith0∈Ax+Bx+Cx.x \in H \quad\text{with}\quad 0 \in Ax + Bx + Cx .x∈Hwith0∈Ax+Bx+Cx.

For γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 the resolvent JγA=(I+γA)−1J_{\gamma A} = (I + \gamma A)^{-1}JγA​=(I+γA)−1 is the map with x∈JγAx+γA(JγAx)x \in J_{\gamma A}x + \gamma A(J_{\gamma A}x)x∈JγA​x+γA(JγA​x). The Davis–Yin operator (Eq. (1.2)) is

T:=JγA∘(2JγB−I−γC∘JγB)+I−JγB.T := J_{\gamma A} \circ (2J_{\gamma B} - I - \gamma C \circ J_{\gamma B}) + I - J_{\gamma B}.T:=JγA​∘(2JγB​−I−γC∘JγB​)+I−JγB​.

Algorithm 1 starts from z0∈Hz^0 \in Hz0∈H and, for relaxation parameters λk>0\lambda_k > 0λk​>0, iterates

xBk=JγB(zk),xAk=JγA(2xBk−zk−γCxBk),zk+1=zk+λk(xAk−xBk),x_B^k = J_{\gamma B}(z^k),\qquad x_A^k = J_{\gamma A}(2x_B^k - z^k - \gamma Cx_B^k),\qquad z^{k+1} = z^k + \lambda_k(x_A^k - x_B^k),xBk​=JγB​(zk),xAk​=JγA​(2xBk​−zk−γCxBk​),zk+1=zk+λk​(xAk​−xBk​),

so that zk+1=(1−λk)zk+λkTzkz^{k+1} = (1 - \lambda_k)z^k + \lambda_k Tz^kzk+1=(1−λk​)zk+λk​Tzk. A sequence converges weakly, uk⇀uu_k \rightharpoonup uuk​⇀u, if ⟨uk,y⟩→⟨u,y⟩\langle u_k, y\rangle \to \langle u, y\rangle⟨uk​,y⟩→⟨u,y⟩ for every y∈Hy \in Hy∈H.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (Main convergence theorem)

Fix ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon \in (0,1)ε∈(0,1), γ∈(0,2βε)\gamma \in (0, 2\beta\varepsilon)γ∈(0,2βε), α=1/(2−ε)\alpha = 1/(2-\varepsilon)α=1/(2−ε) and λk∈(0,1/α)\lambda_k \in (0, 1/\alpha)λk​∈(0,1/α) with ∑kτk=∞\sum_k \tau_k = \infty∑k​τk​=∞, where τk=λk(1−λk)+λk(1−α)/α\tau_k = \lambda_k(1-\lambda_k) + \lambda_k(1-\alpha)/\alphaτk​=λk​(1−λk​)+λk​(1−α)/α, and inf⁡kλk>0\inf_k \lambda_k > 0infk​λk​>0. If Fix⁡T≠∅\operatorname{Fix} T \ne \emptysetFixT=∅, there is z∗∈Fix⁡Tz^* \in \operatorname{Fix} Tz∗∈FixT with zk⇀z∗z^k \rightharpoonup z^*zk⇀z∗ and

CxBk→Cx∗  (∀x∗∈zer⁡(A+B+C)),xBk⇀JγB(z∗)∈zer⁡(A+B+C),xAk⇀JγB(z∗),Cx_B^k \to Cx^* \ \ (\forall x^* \in \operatorname{zer}(A+B+C)),\qquad x_B^k \rightharpoonup J_{\gamma B}(z^*) \in \operatorname{zer}(A+B+C),\qquad x_A^k \rightharpoonup J_{\gamma B}(z^*),CxBk​→Cx∗  (∀x∗∈zer(A+B+C)),xBk​⇀JγB​(z∗)∈zer(A+B+C),xAk​⇀JγB​(z∗),

and if AAA or BBB is uniformly monotone on every nonempty bounded subset of its domain, or CCC is demiregular at every zero of A+B+CA + B + CA+B+C, then xBkx_B^kxBk​ and xAkx_A^kxAk​ converge strongly to a common point of zer⁡(A+B+C)\operatorname{zer}(A + B + C)zer(A+B+C).

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them: Lemma 2.1 (the identities for one application of TTT), Lemma 2.2 (zer⁡(A+B+C)=JγB(Fix⁡T)\operatorname{zer}(A+B+C) = J_{\gamma B}(\operatorname{Fix} T)zer(A+B+C)=JγB​(FixT)), Lemma 2.3 (inequality (2.1)), Proposition 2.1 (TTT is 2β/(4β−γ)2\beta/(4\beta-\gamma)2β/(4β−γ)-averaged, inequality (2.2)), Remark 2.1 (the strengthened inequality (2.4)), Corollary 2.1 Parts 1–3 (Fejér monotonicity, vanishing residual, weak convergence of zkz^kzk), Corollary 2.1 Part 4 (the residual rates ∥Tzk−zk∥2≤∥z0−z∗∥2/(τ‾(k+1))\|Tz^k - z^k\|^2 \le \|z^0 - z^*\|^2/(\underline\tau(k+1))∥Tzk−zk∥2≤∥z0−z∗∥2/(τ​(k+1)) and o(1/(k+1))o(1/(k+1))o(1/(k+1))), and Eqs. (2.6)–(2.7) (the per-step descent inequality and its summed form).

Significance

Theorem 2.1 is the basic convergence guarantee for three-operator splitting: it certifies that the computable sequences xBkx_B^kxBk​, xAkx_A^kxAk​, not only the auxiliary sequence zkz^kzk, approach a solution of (1.1). In infinite dimensions this is the delicate part: for Douglas–Rachford splitting (C=0C = 0C=0) weak convergence of the shadow sequence JγB(zk)J_{\gamma B}(z^k)JγB​(zk) was only established by Svaiter in 2011. The result underlies the convergence of the many algorithms obtained from it by specialization (Douglas–Rachford, forward–backward, and the three-block methods of Section 4 of the paper), and the averagedness coefficient of Proposition 2.1 reduces, for B=0B = 0B=0, to the best known one for forward–backward splitting.

All statements of this mission are proved in the paper, partly by appeal to Bauschke and Combettes' monograph (Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann convergence, the demiclosedness of maximal monotone graphs). None of them has a machine-checked proof: Mathlib has no maximal monotone operators, resolvents, averaged maps or Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann theorem. The mission therefore produces both a formal proof of the Davis–Yin theorem and a first body of monotone-operator theory in Lean.

Difficulty

The fixed-point part is standard once TTT is known to be averaged: Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann theory and Opial's argument give zk⇀z∗z^k \rightharpoonup z^*zk⇀z∗. The obstacle is transferring this to xBk=JγB(zk)x_B^k = J_{\gamma B}(z^k)xBk​=JγB​(zk). Resolvents are nonexpansive but not weakly continuous, so zk⇀z∗z^k \rightharpoonup z^*zk⇀z∗ does not imply JγB(zk)⇀JγB(z∗)J_{\gamma B}(z^k) \rightharpoonup J_{\gamma B}(z^*)JγB​(zk)⇀JγB​(z∗); the naive argument fails at exactly this step. Identifying the weak cluster points of xBkx_B^kxBk​ requires a closedness property of sums of maximal monotone operators under mixed weak and strong convergence, fed by the strong convergence of CxBkCx_B^kCxBk​, which in turn needs the extra term of (2.4) that (2.2) discards. Strong convergence in Part 2 needs yet another argument for each of the three alternative hypotheses.

Formalization scope

  • HHH is an arbitrary real Hilbert space (NormedAddCommGroup, InnerProductSpace ℝ, CompleteSpace); a finite-dimensional space would identify weak and strong convergence and change the theorems.
  • Operators A,BA, BA,B are H → Set H; CCC is single-valued H → H. The resolvents are not constructed: JA,JBJ_A, J_BJA​,JB​ are maps satisfying the resolvent inclusion γ−1(x−Jx)∈A(Jx)\gamma^{-1}(x - Jx) \in A(Jx)γ−1(x−Jx)∈A(Jx), which for maximal monotone operators determines them uniquely and exists by Minty's theorem.
  • Weak convergence is ⟨uk,y⟩→⟨u,y⟩\langle u_k, y\rangle \to \langle u, y\rangle⟨uk​,y⟩→⟨u,y⟩ for every yyy; strong convergence is norm convergence. Iterates are indexed from 000.
  • The printed hypothesis α=1/(2−ε)<2β/(4β−γ)\alpha = 1/(2-\varepsilon) < 2\beta/(4\beta-\gamma)α=1/(2−ε)<2β/(4β−γ) of Corollary 2.1 and Theorem 2.1 contradicts γ<2βε\gamma < 2\beta\varepsilonγ<2βε (it is a typo for >>>) and is not assumed. The printed τk=(1−λk/α)λk/α\tau_k = (1-\lambda_k/\alpha)\lambda_k/\alphaτk​=(1−λk​/α)λk​/α is replaced by the τk\tau_kτk​ of the proof (p. 836), a weaker hypothesis.
  • Uniform monotonicity uses a nondecreasing φ:[0,∞)→[0,+∞]\varphi : [0,\infty) \to [0,+\infty]φ:[0,∞)→[0,+∞] with φ(0)=0\varphi(0) = 0φ(0)=0 that vanishes only at 000, as the proof requires; with φ≡0\varphi \equiv 0φ≡0 allowed, Part 2(a) would be false.
  • The O-constant of Corollary 2.1 Part 4 is explicit, ∥z0−z∗∥2/τ‾\|z^0 - z^*\|^2/\underline\tau∥z0−z∗∥2/τ​, and the little-ooo is stated as (k+1)∥Tzk−zk∥2→0(k+1)\|Tz^k - z^k\|^2 \to 0(k+1)∥Tzk−zk∥2→0. Eq. (2.7) is stated with a uniform lower bound λ‾≤λi\underline\lambda \le \lambda_iλ​≤λi​ in place of the printed λk\lambda_kλk​, with summability part of the conclusion.
  • A formalization with TTT an arbitrary averaged map, with resolvents replaced by arbitrary nonexpansive maps, or with the contradictory comparison of α\alphaα kept as a hypothesis would make the theorem vacuous or different; all three are ruled out.

A complete development needs the basic theory of monotone operators (monotonicity of resolvents' graphs, firm nonexpansiveness of resolvents, weak-to-strong closedness of maximal monotone graphs), Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann iteration with Opial's lemma, and weak sequential compactness of bounded sets in Hilbert space. All of this is reusable far beyond this mission, and contributions of any of these pieces as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Davis and W. Yin, A Three-Operator Splitting Scheme and its Optimization Applications, Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 25 (2017) 829–858. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11228-017-0421-z
  • H. H. Bauschke and P. L. Combettes, Convex Analysis and Monotone Operator Theory in Hilbert Spaces, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9467-7
  • B. F. Svaiter, On weak convergence of the Douglas–Rachford method, SIAM J. Control Optim. 49 (2011) 280–287. https://doi.org/10.1137/100788100
  • D. Davis and W. Yin, Convergence rate analysis of several splitting schemes, in: Splitting Methods in Communication, Imaging, Science, and Engineering, Springer, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.4834
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities II: Optimality Conditions for the Sum of the Largest Linear FormsResearch Paper

Motivation

In 1955 E. M. L. Beale showed how Dantzig's simplex method, which was built for linear objectives, can be carried over to certain nonlinear convex objectives that are minimized subject to linear inequalities (Beale 1955). Section 4 of that paper treats one such objective: the sum of the ttt largest of a set of ggg linear forms. Beale's motivation comes from the theory of games: "if the enemy has to choose ttt out of a set of ggg possible actions, and LfL_fLf​ represents his average gain through using the fffth", then the defender wants to minimize the sum of the ttt largest LfL_fLf​.

The same objective can be written as a linear program. One introduces a bound uuu and requires every sum of ttt forms to be at most uuu. That formulation has (gt)\binom{g}{t}(tg​) constraints, which is unwieldy once t>1t>1t>1 and ggg is large. Beale's alternative works with the nonlinear objective directly, and he needs a test that tells him when the current basic solution is already optimal. This mission formalizes that test, Theorem 1 of the paper.

The objective reappears in later work under other names: the sum of the kkk largest components of a vector, the "top-kkk sum", and kkk times the conditional value-at-risk of an empirical distribution. Beale's paper is an early source for its optimality conditions.

Setting

There are real variables zlz_lzl​, indexed by lll in a finite set (possibly empty), and u1,…,usu_1,\dots,u_su1​,…,us​. Two linear forms in these variables are given,

A=A0+∑lAlzl+∑f=1sφfuf,L0=c00+∑lc0lzl+∑f=1sθfuf,A=A_0+\sum_l A_l z_l+\sum_{f=1}^{s}\varphi_f u_f,\qquad L_0=c_{00}+\sum_l c_{0l} z_l+\sum_{f=1}^{s}\theta_f u_f,A=A0​+l∑​Al​zl​+f=1∑s​φf​uf​,L0​=c00​+l∑​c0l​zl​+f=1∑s​θf​uf​,

together with sss further forms

Lf=L0−uf(f=1,…,s).L_f=L_0-u_f\qquad(f=1,\dots,s).Lf​=L0​−uf​(f=1,…,s).

For an integer τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0 the objective is

C=A+(sum of the τ largest of L0,L1,…,Ls).C=A+\bigl(\text{sum of the }\tau\text{ largest of }L_0,L_1,\dots,L_s\bigr).C=A+(sum of the τ largest of L0​,L1​,…,Ls​).

The sum of the τ\tauτ largest of s+1s+1s+1 numbers is the largest total of any τ\tauτ of them. Ties do not make it ambiguous.

The feasible region is fixed by a set FFF of indices. The variables zlz_lzl​ with l∈Fl\in Fl∈F and all the ufu_fuf​ are free, and every other zlz_lzl​ is restricted to zl≥0z_l\ge0zl​≥0. At the origin z=0z=0z=0, u=0u=0u=0 all s+1s+1s+1 forms are equal to c00c_{00}c00​, so the origin is where CCC fails to be differentiable. In Beale's algorithm the origin is the current basic solution: the ufu_fuf​ measure how far the "borderline" forms sit from a chosen critical form, and AAA collects the forms that are certainly among the largest.

Write al=Al+τc0la_l=A_l+\tau c_{0l}al​=Al​+τc0l​ and wf=φf+τθfw_f=\varphi_f+\tau\theta_fwf​=φf​+τθf​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (a), p. 179

For τ≤s\tau\le sτ≤s, CCC is minimized over the feasible region when all the zlz_lzl​ and ufu_fuf​ vanish if and only if

al≥0 for all l,al=0 for all l∈F,0≤wf≤1 for all f,τ−1≤∑f=1swf≤τ.(4.5)\begin{aligned} &a_l\ge0\ \text{for all } l, \qquad a_l=0\ \text{for all } l\in F,\\ &0\le w_f\le1\ \text{for all } f,\qquad \tau-1\le\sum_{f=1}^{s}w_f\le\tau . \end{aligned}\tag{4.5}​al​≥0 for all l,al​=0 for all l∈F,0≤wf​≤1 for all f,τ−1≤f=1∑s​wf​≤τ.​(4.5)

"Minimized" means a global minimum: C(0,0)≤C(z,u)C(0,0)\le C(z,u)C(0,0)≤C(z,u) at every feasible point.

Milestones

  1. Convexity (p. 179). CCC is a convex function of (z,u)(z,u)(z,u) for τ≤s+1\tau\le s+1τ≤s+1.
  2. Descent rules (second half of Theorem 1 (a), p. 179). When a condition of (4.5) fails, a stated move of one variable, or of all ufu_fuf​ together, lowers CCC below C(0,0)C(0,0)C(0,0) for every small enough step. There are six moves: zl↑z_l\uparrowzl​↑ if al<0a_l<0al​<0; zl↓z_l\downarrowzl​↓ if al>0a_l>0al​>0 and l∈Fl\in Fl∈F; uf↑u_f\uparrowuf​↑ if wf<0w_f<0wf​<0; uf↓u_f\downarrowuf​↓ if wf>1w_f>1wf​>1; all uf↑u_f\uparrowuf​↑ if ∑wf<τ−1\sum w_f<\tau-1∑wf​<τ−1; all uf↓u_f\downarrowuf​↓ if ∑wf>τ\sum w_f>\tau∑wf​>τ.
  3. The rearrangement identity (proof of Theorem 1 (a), p. 180). If 1≤τ≤s1\le\tau\le s1≤τ≤s, u1′≤⋯≤us′u'_1\le\dots\le u'_su1′​≤⋯≤us′​ and uτ′≤0u'_\tau\le0uτ′​≤0, then
C=A0+τc00+∑lalzl′+∑f=1τ(wf−1)(uf′−uτ′)+∑f=τ+1swf(uf′−uτ′)+{∑f=1swf−τ}uτ′.C=A_0+\tau c_{00}+\sum_l a_l z'_l+\sum_{f=1}^{\tau}(w_f-1)(u'_f-u'_\tau)+\sum_{f=\tau+1}^{s}w_f(u'_f-u'_\tau)+\Bigl\{\sum_{f=1}^{s}w_f-\tau\Bigr\}u'_\tau .C=A0​+τc00​+l∑​al​zl′​+f=1∑τ​(wf​−1)(uf′​−uτ′​)+f=τ+1∑s​wf​(uf′​−uτ′​)+{f=1∑s​wf​−τ}uτ′​.
  1. Theorem 1 (b) (p. 180). For τ=s+1\tau=s+1τ=s+1, the origin is a minimum if and only if (4.5) holds and wf=1w_f=1wf​=1 for every fff. Otherwise some value of ufu_fuf​ with the sign opposite to wf−1w_f-1wf​−1 lowers CCC.

Significance

Theorem 1 is the optimality test of Beale's simplex method for the sum-of-largest objective. The algorithm on pp. 178–179 changes nonbasic variables one at a time. When no single change is profitable it applies Theorem 1: either (4.5) holds and the current solution is optimal, or one of the six descent rules names the variable to change next. The test is exact even though the objective is not differentiable at the current point. It is a closed-form description of the subdifferential of a top-τ\tauτ sum at a point where all the forms tie. The theorem is also the base case of the multi-group generalization that Beale mentions on p. 181.

The paper proves Theorem 1 by hand. To our knowledge neither the theorem nor the rearrangement identity behind it has been formalized in any proof assistant. The mission produces:

  • a checked statement and proof of the test, including the degenerate cases τ=0\tau=0τ=0 and s=0s=0s=0, which the paper does not discuss separately;
  • the boundary case τ=s+1\tau=s+1τ=s+1;
  • a reusable Lean definition of the sum of the τ\tauτ largest entries of a finite real family, with its convexity.

Difficulty

Necessity, the "only if" direction, is the part the paper calls obvious: each descent rule changes CCC linearly for small steps. Two features still have to be handled explicitly. The step must be small only in rule-dependent ways, and the ordering of the forms changes along the moves of rules 4 and 6.

Sufficiency is where the work lies. The naive argument, "the directional derivative in every coordinate direction is non-negative, so the origin is a minimum", fails because CCC is not differentiable at the origin. Nonnegative derivatives along the coordinate axes do not control mixed directions in which several ufu_fuf​ move by different amounts, which reorders the forms. Which τ\tauτ forms are the largest then depends on the point, and the paper settles the configurations in which L0L_0L0​ is among the τ\tauτ largest by an informal appeal to the "essential symmetry" between L0L_0L0​ and the other forms. A formal proof cannot leave that appeal informal: the forms are parametrised relative to L0L_0L0​ (each LfL_fLf​ is L0−ufL_0-u_fL0​−uf​), so the symmetry is a change of variables that has to be written down and shown to preserve (4.5).

Formalization scope

  • Data. The variables are z : Fin r → ℝ (any r, including 000) and u : Fin s → ℝ. The paper's ufu_fuf​ for f=1,…,sf=1,\dots,sf=1,…,s is Lean's u f for f=0,…,s−1f=0,\dots,s-1f=0,…,s−1. The coefficients (A0,Al,φf,c00,c0l,θf)(A_0,A_l,\varphi_f,c_{00},c_{0l},\theta_f)(A0​,Al​,φf​,c00​,c0l​,θf​) form a structure Forms r s.
  • Forms. The family L0,…,LsL_0,\dots,L_sL0​,…,Ls​ is Fin (s+1) → ℝ, with index 000 for L0L_0L0​ and index f.succ for L0−ufL_0-u_fL0​−uf​. The free set FFF is a Finset (Fin r), and τ\tauτ is a natural number cast to R\mathbb RR wherever it multiplies a coefficient.
  • Sum of the largest. sumLargest τ v is the maximum over τ\tauτ-element subsets SSS of ∑i∈Svi\sum_{i\in S}v_i∑i∈S​vi​ (Finset.sup' over powersetCard). It is the junk 000 for τ\tauτ larger than the number of entries, a case no statement uses.
  • Minimality. "Minimized when all variables vanish" is the global statement C(0,0)≤C(z,u)C(0,0)\le C(z,u)C(0,0)≤C(z,u) for all (z,u)(z,u)(z,u) with zl≥0z_l\ge0zl​≥0 for l∉Fl\notin Fl∈/F. It is not a local minimum, and the sign constraints on restricted zlz_lzl​ are kept: they are why the first condition of (4.5) is an inequality.
  • Descent. "CCC can be decreased by moving xxx from zero" is a strict decrease for all step sizes in some interval (0,ε)(0,\varepsilon)(0,ε), with every other variable at zero.
  • No trivialization. The goal is an equivalence with no hypothesis beyond τ≤s\tau\le sτ≤s. Neither direction can be satisfied vacuously, and the cases τ=0\tau=0τ=0 and s=0s=0s=0 are included, as on the page.
  • Added hypotheses. The rearrangement milestone assumes τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1, because the paper's uτ′u'_\tauuτ′​ does not exist at τ=0\tau=0τ=0. Its second line uses c0lc_{0l}c0l​ where the page misprints clc_lcl​.

Needed infrastructure:

  • basic lemmas on sumLargest: its value at a constant family, at a family sorted by a monotone shift, and under adding a common constant;
  • the change of variables behind the paper's symmetry between L0L_0L0​ and the other forms.

These lemmas are reusable for any top-kkk-sum or empirical-CVaR objective. Contributions are welcome at any level: lemmas about sumLargest, any of the milestones, or an alternative sufficiency proof through convexity and one-sided directional derivatives.

Not in scope: the pivoting rules (4.2)–(4.4), the degeneracy discussion on pp. 180–181, and the multi-group generalization, which the paper says is "cumbersome to state" and does not state.

Selected references

  • E. M. L. Beale, On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 17(2), 173–184, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1955.tb00191.x
  • G. B. Dantzig, A. Orden and P. Wolfe, The generalized simplex method for minimizing a linear form under linear inequality restraints, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 5(2), 183–195, 1955. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1955.5.183
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Optimization of conditional value-at-risk, Journal of Risk 2(3), 21–41, 2000. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
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Partial Differential EquationsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management of a Make-to-Stock Queue: Exponential Stationary Density under Normal Reflection (Proposition 2)Research Paper

Motivation

A make-to-stock manufacturer who also sells on a spot market must decide, at every moment, whether to keep producing and whether to accept or reject incoming orders at the prevailing price. Caldentey and Wein (Revenue Management of a Make-to-Stock Queue, Operations Research 54(5), 2006) study this problem in heavy traffic. The limit is a two-dimensional singular control problem for a diffusion: the inventory level and the logarithm of the price move jointly as a correlated Brownian motion, and the controls push the inventory only when it reaches one of two free boundaries. The optimal boundaries are characterized by an elliptic free-boundary problem that the authors could not solve in closed form.

The paper's way forward is an approximation: change the direction of reflection on the boundary so that the stationary distribution of the controlled process becomes an explicit exponential. Proposition 2 states that exponential form, and it turns the free-boundary problem into a calculus-of-variations problem for the two boundary curves. Explicit stationary densities of reflected diffusions in two dimensions are rare; the classical condition for an exponential stationary density of a reflected Brownian motion, and the characterization of the stationary law by a basic adjoint relation, are due to Harrison and Williams, Multidimensional reflected Brownian motions having exponential stationary distributions, Annals of Probability 15, 1987, the reference the paper cites. This mission formalizes the analytic core of Proposition 2: the exponential density satisfies that relation for the reflection field the proposition singles out.

Setting

Points of the plane are (x,y)(x,y)(x,y), with xxx the inventory level and yyy the logarithm of the price. The limiting process (X,Y)(\mathcal X,\mathcal Y)(X,Y) has drift (θ,0)(\theta,0)(θ,0) and covariance matrix

Σ=(σ2σδϱσδϱδ2),σ>0, δ>0, −1<ϱ<1,\Sigma=\begin{pmatrix}\sigma^2&\sigma\delta\varrho\\ \sigma\delta\varrho&\delta^2\end{pmatrix},\qquad \sigma>0,\ \delta>0,\ -1<\varrho<1,Σ=(σ2σδϱ​σδϱδ2​),σ>0, δ>0, −1<ϱ<1,

so its generator is

Γ=θ∂∂x+σ22∂2∂x2+σδϱ∂2∂x ∂y+δ22∂2∂y2.\Gamma=\theta\frac{\partial}{\partial x}+\frac{\sigma^2}{2}\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2}+\sigma\delta\varrho\frac{\partial^2}{\partial x\,\partial y}+\frac{\delta^2}{2}\frac{\partial^2}{\partial y^2}.Γ=θ∂x∂​+2σ2​∂x2∂2​+σδϱ∂x∂y∂2​+2δ2​∂y2∂2​.

Two curves bound the region where the process lives: the rejection boundary x=η(y)x=\eta(y)x=η(y) (below it, orders are rejected) and the idleness boundary x=ξ(y)x=\xi(y)x=ξ(y) (above it, production stops). For ymin⁡<ymax⁡y_{\min}<y_{\max}ymin​<ymax​ the region is

Ω={(x,y): ymin⁡<y<ymax⁡, η(y)<x<ξ(y)},\Omega=\{(x,y):\ y_{\min}<y<y_{\max},\ \eta(y)<x<\xi(y)\},Ω={(x,y): ymin​<y<ymax​, η(y)<x<ξ(y)},

and its boundary splits into four pieces: x=η(y)x=\eta(y)x=η(y), x=ξ(y)x=\xi(y)x=ξ(y), y=ymin⁡y=y_{\min}y=ymin​, y=ymax⁡y=y_{\max}y=ymax​. Write n⃗\vec nn for the inward unit normal on ∂Ω\partial\Omega∂Ω and dldldl for arc length. A reflection field v⃗\vec vv on ∂Ω\partial\Omega∂Ω gives the direction in which the process is pushed back into Ω\OmegaΩ. The basic adjoint relation (BAR) of the paper, equation (43), is

∫ΩΓf πΩ ds+12∫∂Ωv⃗⋅∇f πΩ dl=0for all test functions f,\int_\Omega \Gamma f\,\pi_\Omega\,ds+\frac12\int_{\partial\Omega}\vec v\cdot\nabla f\,\pi_\Omega\,dl=0\quad\text{for all test functions } f,∫Ω​ΓfπΩ​ds+21​∫∂Ω​v⋅∇fπΩ​dl=0for all test functions f,

and the paper cites Harrison and Williams for the fact that the stationary distribution πΩ\pi_\OmegaπΩ​ of the reflected process satisfies it. Proposition 2 introduces the eigen-decomposition Σ=V′EV\Sigma=V'EVΣ=V′EV (VVV a rotation whose rows are eigenvectors, EEE diagonal), the whitening map T=E−1/2VT=E^{-1/2}VT=E−1/2V and Ω∗=T(Ω)\Omega^*=T(\Omega)Ω∗=T(Ω), and assumes that Tv⃗T\vec vTv is normal to ∂Ω∗\partial\Omega^*∂Ω∗. The exponents are

mx=2θσ2(1−ϱ2),my=−2ϱθσδ(1−ϱ2).(47)m_x=\frac{2\theta}{\sigma^2(1-\varrho^2)},\qquad m_y=\frac{-2\varrho\theta}{\sigma\delta(1-\varrho^2)}.\tag{47}mx​=σ2(1−ϱ2)2θ​,my​=σδ(1−ϱ2)−2ϱθ​.(47)

Formalization targets

Goal: the exponential density satisfies the BAR under conormal reflection

For η,ξ\eta,\xiη,ξ continuously differentiable with η<ξ\eta<\xiη<ξ on [ymin⁡,ymax⁡][y_{\min},y_{\max}][ymin​,ymax​], π(x,y)=emxx+myy\pi(x,y)=e^{m_xx+m_yy}π(x,y)=emx​x+my​y, and every C2C^2C2 function fff on R2\mathbb R^2R2,

∫ΩΓf  π ds+12∫∂Ω(Σn⃗)⋅∇f  π dl=0.\int_\Omega \Gamma f\;\pi\,ds+\frac12\int_{\partial\Omega}(\Sigma\vec n)\cdot\nabla f\;\pi\,dl=0 .∫Ω​Γfπds+21​∫∂Ω​(Σn)⋅∇fπdl=0.

The boundary integral is written out on the four pieces, with n⃗ dl\vec n\,dlndl equal to (1,−η′(y)) dy(1,-\eta'(y))\,dy(1,−η′(y))dy, (−1,ξ′(y)) dy(-1,\xi'(y))\,dy(−1,ξ′(y))dy, (0,1) dx(0,1)\,dx(0,1)dx and (0,−1) dx(0,-1)\,dx(0,−1)dx respectively. The normalizing constant is left out because the relation is linear in π\piπ.

Milestones

  1. The interior equation: Γ∗π=−θπx+σ22πxx+σδϱ πxy+δ22πyy=0\Gamma^*\pi=-\theta\pi_x+\frac{\sigma^2}{2}\pi_{xx}+\sigma\delta\varrho\,\pi_{xy}+\frac{\delta^2}{2}\pi_{yy}=0Γ∗π=−θπx​+2σ2​πxx​+σδϱπxy​+2δ2​πyy​=0 everywhere.
  2. The zero-flux identity: 12Σ∇π=(θ,0) π\frac12\Sigma\nabla\pi=(\theta,0)\,\pi21​Σ∇π=(θ,0)π everywhere.
  3. The meaning of the hypothesis: with T=E−1/2VT=E^{-1/2}VT=E−1/2V, (Tv)⋅(Tw)=v⋅Σ−1w(Tv)\cdot(Tw)=v\cdot\Sigma^{-1}w(Tv)⋅(Tw)=v⋅Σ−1w, and for n≠0n\neq0n=0, TvTvTv is orthogonal to TTT of every vector orthogonal to nnn exactly when vvv is a multiple of Σn\Sigma nΣn.
  4. The normalizing constant: π\piπ is integrable on Ω\OmegaΩ and a unique KΩ>0K_\Omega>0KΩ​>0 makes KΩπK_\Omega\piKΩ​π integrate to one.

Significance

For the operations model, Proposition 2 is what makes the problem computable. Once the stationary density is explicit, the long-run average cost of any pair of boundary curves is an explicit integral, and optimizing over (η,ξ)(\eta,\xi)(η,ξ) becomes a variational problem with Euler–Lagrange equations; the paper's proposed policy and its numerical comparisons all rest on it.

For formalization, the mission produces a machine-checked version of a statement whose proof the paper does not contain (it is in an online companion) and whose hypothesis is stated only in words. The formal statements fix exactly which reflection field makes the claim true, which the prose leaves ambiguous. None of the statements has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof anywhere; the result itself is classical in spirit (an integration by parts on a planar region), but no divergence theorem on a region between two graphs with an anisotropic operator is currently available as a ready-made statement.

Difficulty

The interior equation and the zero-flux identity are finite computations with the exponential. The difficulty is the goal: it is an integration-by-parts identity on a curved planar region with an anisotropic second-order operator. The obvious first step, "apply Green's identity", presupposes a divergence theorem on a region bounded by two graphs x=η(y)x=\eta(y)x=η(y), x=ξ(y)x=\xi(y)x=ξ(y) and two horizontal segments, with the boundary integral written in the parametrization of each piece and the orientation of every normal tracked. Mathlib has the divergence theorem on rectangular boxes, not on such regions, and the moving limits η(y)\eta(y)η(y), ξ(y)\xi(y)ξ(y) are exactly where the terms in η′\eta'η′ and ξ′\xi'ξ′ of the boundary integral come from.

The second trap is the reflection field. The page describes the modification as substituting the inward unit normal n⃗\vec nn for v⃗\vec vv; with v⃗=n⃗\vec v=\vec nv=n the identity is false as soon as Σ\SigmaΣ is not a multiple of the identity (on a random instance the residual is of order one). Only the conormal field Σn⃗\Sigma\vec nΣn, which is what the hypothesis of Proposition 2 selects, gives a true statement.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace MakeToStockRM.ExpDensity. The plane is ℝ × ℝ with the inventory first; partial derivatives are Fréchet derivatives applied to (1, 0) and (0, 1), and the mixed partial is ∂x(∂yf)\partial_x(\partial_y f)∂x​(∂y​f). Parameters satisfy σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, δ>0\delta>0δ>0, ∣ϱ∣<1|\varrho|<1∣ϱ∣<1; θ\thetaθ is any real number, and θ=0\theta=0θ=0 (then π≡1\pi\equiv1π≡1) is allowed.

This is the analytic, pinned-down content of Proposition 2. The identification "the BAR characterizes the stationary law of the reflected diffusion" (Harrison–Williams 1987) is out of scope: Mathlib has no reflected Brownian motion. Relative to the page, the formalization commits to the following:

  • The reflection field is v⃗=Σn⃗\vec v=\Sigma\vec nv=Σn with n⃗\vec nn the inward unit normal and dldldl arc length. The hypothesis "Tv⃗T\vec vTv is normal to ∂Ω∗\partial\Omega^*∂Ω∗" fixes only the direction of v⃗\vec vv (milestone 3); the length Σn⃗\Sigma\vec nΣn is the one for which the BAR holds. The page's phrase "substituting the inward unit normal n⃗\vec nn for v⃗\vec vv" is inconsistent with the proposition's own hypothesis and is not followed.
  • The boundary curves are C1C^1C1 on R\mathbb RR with η<ξ\eta<\xiη<ξ on [ymin⁡,ymax⁡][y_{\min},y_{\max}][ymin​,ymax​], and ymin⁡<ymax⁡y_{\min}<y_{\max}ymin​<ymax​, so Ω\OmegaΩ is a nonempty bounded region; the paper assumes this implicitly.
  • Test functions are all C2C^2C2 functions on R2\mathbb R^2R2, which are bounded with bounded derivatives on the closure of Ω\OmegaΩ (the paper's "twice continuous and bounded").
  • The constant KΩK_\OmegaKΩ​ is dropped from the goal and treated in milestone 4.

The goal quantifies over every C2C^2C2 test function; restricting to functions supported inside Ω\OmegaΩ would delete the boundary term and reduce the goal to milestone 1, and that trivialization is ruled out. The second half of Proposition 2 ("(45)–(46) is equivalent to (48)–(49)"), Proposition 1, the heavy-traffic limit, the HJB equation and the proposed policy are not formalized: their normalizations or proofs are only in the online companion.

A complete development needs a divergence theorem on regions between two C1C^1C1 graphs, which is reusable for any planar PDE statement on such regions. Contributions of that lemma, and of the four milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Caldentey, L. M. Wein, Revenue Management of a Make-to-Stock Queue, Operations Research 54(5):859–875, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0289
  • J. M. Harrison, R. J. Williams, Multidimensional reflected Brownian motions having exponential stationary distributions, Annals of Probability 15(1):115–137, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176992259
  • F. John, Partial Differential Equations, 4th ed., Springer, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9333-7
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 3: Optimal Contingent-Pricing Revenue with Myopic Customers and Exponential ValuationsResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of seasonal goods (fashion, electronics, holiday items) sell a fixed stock over a short season and routinely cut prices toward its end. A markdown of this kind segments the market over time: customers with high valuations buy early at a premium price, and customers with lower valuations are served later at a discount price. Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 2008) study how much such two-price schemes are worth when customers arrive over time, differ in their valuations, and may or may not anticipate the discount.

To measure the value of price segmentation, the paper compares every two-price scheme with the best fixed-price policy, a single price held for the whole season. Its benchmark is the case of myopic customers, who never delay a purchase strategically. Proposition 3 of the paper computes this benchmark in closed form in the simplest nontrivial setting: exponentially distributed valuations that do not decline over the season, and unlimited inventory. The resulting formula explains the pattern of the paper's Table 1, where the benefit of segmentation grows with the heterogeneity of valuations and with a late discount time.

Setting

A seller offers a product during the season [0,H][0, H][0,H]; throughout this mission H=1H = 1H=1, so time is measured as a fraction of the season. Customers arrive as a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Customer jjj has a base valuation VjV_jVj​ drawn independently from a distribution FFF with tail Fˉ(x)=1−F(x)\bar F(x) = 1 - F(x)Fˉ(x)=1−F(x), and values the product at Vje−αtV_j e^{-\alpha t}Vj​e−αt at time ttt, where α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 is the decline factor. The paper reparametrizes it as ρ=e−αH\rho = e^{-\alpha H}ρ=e−αH, the fraction of the base valuation left at the end of the season.

In the numerical study, FFF is a Gamma law with mean μ\muμ and coefficient of variation ccc (standard deviation over mean): shape 1/c21/c^21/c2 and rate 1/(μc2)1/(\mu c^2)1/(μc2). The paper sets μ=1\mu = 1μ=1. For c=1c = 1c=1 this is the exponential law with mean one, Fˉ(x)=e−x\bar F(x) = e^{-x}Fˉ(x)=e−x for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0.

A contingent two-price policy posts the premium price p1p_1p1​ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T), where 0<T≤10 < T \le 10<T≤1 is fixed, and a discount price p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​ from time TTT on. A myopic customer arriving at t<Tt < Tt<T buys at p1p_1p1​ if his valuation is at least p1p_1p1​; otherwise he waits and buys at TTT if his valuation is then at least p2p_2p2​. Customers arriving at or after TTT buy if their valuation is at least p2p_2p2​. The numbers of customers in these groups are Poisson with means

ΛI(p1)=λ∫0TFˉ(p1eαt) dt,ΛW(p1,p2)=λ∫0T[Fˉ(min⁡{p1eαt,p2eαT})−Fˉ(p1eαt)]dt,ΛL(p2)=λ∫THFˉ(p2eαt) dt.\Lambda_I(p_1) = \lambda\int_0^T \bar F(p_1 e^{\alpha t})\,dt, \quad \Lambda_W(p_1,p_2) = \lambda\int_0^T \big[\bar F(\min\{p_1e^{\alpha t}, p_2e^{\alpha T}\}) - \bar F(p_1e^{\alpha t})\big]dt, \quad \Lambda_L(p_2) = \lambda\int_T^H \bar F(p_2e^{\alpha t})\,dt .ΛI​(p1​)=λ∫0T​Fˉ(p1​eαt)dt,ΛW​(p1​,p2​)=λ∫0T​[Fˉ(min{p1​eαt,p2​eαT})−Fˉ(p1​eαt)]dt,ΛL​(p2​)=λ∫TH​Fˉ(p2​eαt)dt.

With unlimited inventory, the expected revenue of the policy is

RC/N(p1,p2)=p1ΛI(p1)+p2(ΛW(p1,p2)+ΛL(p2)),R_{C/N}(p_1, p_2) = p_1\Lambda_I(p_1) + p_2\big(\Lambda_W(p_1,p_2) + \Lambda_L(p_2)\big),RC/N​(p1​,p2​)=p1​ΛI​(p1​)+p2​(ΛW​(p1​,p2​)+ΛL​(p2​)),

and the expected revenue of a single price ppp is RF(p)=p λ∫0HFˉ(peαt) dtR_F(p) = p\,\lambda\int_0^H \bar F(p e^{\alpha t})\,dtRF​(p)=pλ∫0H​Fˉ(peαt)dt (Eq. (9) of the paper). The optimal values are πC/N∗=max⁡p2≤p1RC/N(p1,p2)\pi^*_{C/N} = \max_{p_2 \le p_1} R_{C/N}(p_1,p_2)πC/N∗​=maxp2​≤p1​​RC/N​(p1​,p2​) and πF∗=max⁡pRF(p)\pi^*_F = \max_p R_F(p)πF∗​=maxp​RF​(p).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

Suppose c=1c = 1c=1, ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 and Q/λ→∞Q/\lambda \to \inftyQ/λ→∞ (unlimited inventory), with μ=1\mu = 1μ=1 and H=1H = 1H=1. Then

πC/N∗=(λe−1)⋅eT/e=πF∗⋅eT/e.\pi^*_{C/N} = (\lambda e^{-1})\cdot e^{T/e} = \pi^*_F \cdot e^{T/e}.πC/N∗​=(λe−1)⋅eT/e=πF∗​⋅eT/e.

Both maxima are attained. The goal states the two optimal values; it does not fix the optimal prices.

Milestones from the paper's proof

  1. The reduced problem: for 0≤p2≤p10 \le p_2 \le p_10≤p2​≤p1​, RC/N(p1,p2)=p2⋅λe−p2+(p1−p2)⋅λTe−p1R_{C/N}(p_1,p_2) = p_2\cdot\lambda e^{-p_2} + (p_1-p_2)\cdot\lambda T e^{-p_1}RC/N​(p1​,p2​)=p2​⋅λe−p2​+(p1​−p2​)⋅λTe−p1​.
  2. Its solution: over p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​ the maximum is λe−1+T/e\lambda e^{-1+T/e}λe−1+T/e, attained exactly at p1∗=2−T/e≥1p_1^* = 2 - T/e \ge 1p1∗​=2−T/e≥1, p2∗=p1∗−1≤1p_2^* = p_1^* - 1 \le 1p2∗​=p1∗​−1≤1.
  3. The fixed-price optimum (a supporting item of the goal, stated in the proof on pp. 358–359): p∗=μ=1p^* = \mu = 1p∗=μ=1 is the unique optimal single price and πF∗=λe−1\pi^*_F = \lambda e^{-1}πF∗​=λe−1.

Significance

Proposition 3 gives the relative benefit of contingent pricing over a single price, eT/e−1e^{T/e} - 1eT/e−1, as a function of the discount time alone. It increases in TTT and is largest at T=1T = 1T=1, where it equals e1/e−1≈44.46%e^{1/e} - 1 \approx 44.46\%e1/e−1≈44.46%. This is the paper's analytic anchor for its numerical findings: segmentation is most valuable when valuations are heterogeneous and customers are carried to the discount at little cost, and a late discount exposes more customers to the premium price. Under strategic customers the same quantity serves as an upper bound on the benefit of segmentation (§6.1 of the paper).

The result is proved in the paper, in a short appendix argument that states the reduced problem and its solution without the calculus. No machine-checked version exists. Formalizing it produces a reusable Lean encoding of the paper's segment rates ΛI,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛW​,ΛL​ as integrals of a valuation tail, a Gamma valuation law through Mathlib's gammaMeasure, and a complete verification that the integral model reduces to the two-variable problem and that the stated prices are its unique maximizer.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to write the revenue in closed form and set the gradient to zero. Two steps of that route are not automatic. First, the reduction requires evaluating the three integrals with the piecewise tail of the exponential law, including the min⁡\minmin inside ΛW\Lambda_WΛW​, and the reduced formula is valid only for nonnegative prices; negative prices must be handled separately in the model itself, where the tail equals one. Second, the reduced objective p2λe−p2+(p1−p2)λTe−p1p_2\lambda e^{-p_2} + (p_1-p_2)\lambda T e^{-p_1}p2​λe−p2​+(p1​−p2​)λTe−p1​ is not concave on the region p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​, so a stationary point is not automatically a global maximizer, and the boundary p2=p1p_2 = p_1p2​=p1​ and unbounded directions have to be ruled out. Uniqueness of the maximizer, which the paper asserts, fails at T=0T = 0T=0 and needs T>0T > 0T>0.

Formalization scope

All declarations sit in the namespace SeasonalPricing.MyopicExp. Time, prices and rates are real numbers. The season is [0,1][0, 1][0,1] with 0<T≤10 < T \le 10<T≤1 and λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. Integrals are interval integrals. The valuation tail is gammaValuationTail μ c x = 1 - cdf (gammaMeasure (1/c^2) (1/(μ c^2))) x, used at μ=c=1\mu = c = 1μ=c=1. The hypothesis ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 is decayRatio α 1 = 1 with α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

Readings of the paper's informal words:

  • "Q/λ→∞Q/\lambda \to \inftyQ/λ→∞" is read as unlimited inventory: the truncated Poisson mean N(q,Λ)N(q,\Lambda)N(q,Λ) of §4.2 is replaced by Λ\LambdaΛ and stock-outs never occur. This is what the proof computes, what p. 348 writes as Q=∞Q = \inftyQ=∞, and what §7.1 calls inventory that is "practically unlimited". A limit of finite-inventory optimal revenues is not stated.
  • "max" is an attained maximum (IsGreatest), not a supremum.
  • The optimum is taken over all real prices with p2≤p1p_2 \le p_1p2​≤p1​, as printed; the paper never restricts signs, and negative prices are never optimal in the model.
  • The seller's discount at TTT is a best response to p1p_1p1​ in the paper (R(q∣p1)R(q \mid p_1)R(q∣p1​), p. 349). With unlimited inventory it does not depend on the realized sales, and the nested maximum equals the joint maximum over (p1,p2)(p_1, p_2)(p1​,p2​), which is what the goal states.
  • "The solution … is" (milestone 2) and "the optimal single price is given by p∗=μ=1p^* = \mu = 1p∗=μ=1" (the fixed-price item) are read as unique maximizers.

The Gamma density printed on p. 349 has the exponent 1/(sc2−1)1/(sc^2-1)1/(sc2−1), a misprint for 1/c2−11/c^2 - 11/c2−1; at c=1c = 1c=1 the exponent is 000 either way.

A trivializing formalization would state the goal on the reduced two-variable function, dropping the model: the goal here is about RC/NR_{C/N}RC/N​ built from ΛI,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛW​,ΛL​ and the Gamma tail, and about RFR_FRF​ built from Eq. (9). The platform's BuyingToBundle.monopolyRevenue (definition monopoly_pricing) is a related object, sup⁡pp ν([p,∞))\sup_p p\,\nu([p,\infty))supp​pν([p,∞)); with ρ=1\rho = 1ρ=1 and H=1H = 1H=1, πF∗\pi^*_FπF∗​ equals λ\lambdaλ times it for the exponential law, but it is a supremum without arrivals or time and is not reused.

Contributions welcome: closed forms of the segment rates for the exponential tail, a general lemma that negative prices are dominated, and the two-variable maximization.

Selected references

  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • D. Besanko and W. L. Winston, Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers, Management Science 36(5):555–567, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers 1: Threshold Purchasing Policies under Contingent PricingResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers of fashion and seasonal goods sell at a premium price early in the season and mark the remaining stock down later. When customers anticipate the markdown, some of them who would buy at the premium price instead wait, trading a lower price against the risk that the item sells out and against the decline of their own valuation over the season. How forward-looking ("strategic") customers respond to a markdown policy is the first question any model of such pricing has to answer, because the seller's optimal prices depend on it.

Aviv and Pazgal (MSOM 2008) model a seller with a fixed inventory, Poisson arrivals of customers with heterogeneous, exponentially declining valuations, and two pricing regimes: contingent pricing, where the discount depends on the inventory left at the markdown time, and announced fixed discounts. The first step of their analysis of contingent pricing is Theorem 1: whatever the other customers do, a customer's best response is a threshold rule on his current valuation, with a threshold that rises as the markdown approaches. Their numerical study of equilibria and of the value of price commitment (§§4.2–7) is built on this reduction.

Setting

A seller holds QQQ units over a season [0,H][0, H][0,H] split at a fixed time TTT with 0<T≤H0 < T \le H0<T≤H. On [0,T)[0, T)[0,T) the premium price p1p_1p1​ applies. At time TTT the seller observes the remaining inventory QT∈{0,1,…,Q}Q_T \in \{0, 1, \dots, Q\}QT​∈{0,1,…,Q} and charges the discount menu price p2(QT)p_2(Q_T)p2​(QT​), where p2(q)≤p1p_2(q) \le p_1p2​(q)≤p1​ for q=1,…,Qq = 1, \dots, Qq=1,…,Q. Customer jjj has a base valuation VjV_jVj​ and valuation Vj(t)=Vje−αtV_j(t) = V_j e^{-\alpha t}Vj​(t)=Vj​e−αt at time ttt, with a common decline factor α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0.

A customer arriving at t<Tt < Tt<T either buys immediately at p1p_1p1​ or waits until TTT, when he requests a unit if the discounted price leaves him a nonnegative surplus. Waiting is uncertain in two ways: the remaining inventory QTQ_TQT​ is random, and when fewer units remain than customers request them, units are rationed at random. A belief is a probability mass function π\piπ of QTQ_TQT​ on {0,…,Q}\{0, \dots, Q\}{0,…,Q} together with allocation probabilities a(q)=Pr⁡{A∣QT=q}∈[0,1]a(q) = \Pr\{\mathcal A \mid Q_T = q\} \in [0,1]a(q)=Pr{A∣QT​=q}∈[0,1], a(0)=0a(0) = 0a(0)=0, where A\mathcal AA is the event that the customer is allocated a unit. It is determined by the other customers' strategies, which are arbitrary.

With δ=e−α(T−t)\delta = e^{-\alpha(T-t)}δ=e−α(T−t), the expected surplus of waiting of a customer with current valuation ψ\psiψ is

Wt(ψ)=EQT ⁣[max⁡{ψδ−p2(QT),0}⋅1{A∣QT}]=∑q=0Qπ(q) a(q) max⁡{ψδ−p2(q),0}.W_t(\psi) = \mathrm E_{Q_T}\!\left[\max\{\psi\delta - p_2(Q_T), 0\}\cdot \mathbf 1\{\mathcal A \mid Q_T\}\right] = \sum_{q=0}^{Q}\pi(q)\,a(q)\,\max\{\psi\delta - p_2(q), 0\}.Wt​(ψ)=EQT​​[max{ψδ−p2​(QT​),0}⋅1{A∣QT​}]=q=0∑Q​π(q)a(q)max{ψδ−p2​(q),0}.

The paper's purchase rule (p. 344): buy immediately iff the current surplus V(t)−p1V(t) - p_1V(t)−p1​ is nonnegative and at least Wt(V(t))W_t(V(t))Wt​(V(t)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 and Corollary 1

Assume p1≥0p_1 \ge 0p1​≥0, and α>0\alpha > 0α>0 or ∑qπ(q)a(q)<1\sum_q \pi(q)a(q) < 1∑q​π(q)a(q)<1. For every t∈[0,T)t \in [0,T)t∈[0,T) the equation

ψ−p1=Wt(ψ)(2)\psi - p_1 = W_t(\psi) \tag{2}ψ−p1​=Wt​(ψ)(2)

has a unique solution ψ(t)≥p1\psi(t) \ge p_1ψ(t)≥p1​; a customer arriving at ttt buys immediately under the purchase rule if and only if V(t)≥ψ(t)V(t) \ge \psi(t)V(t)≥ψ(t); and the threshold function ψ:[0,T)→[p1,∞)\psi : [0, T) \to [p_1, \infty)ψ:[0,T)→[p1​,∞) is nondecreasing in ttt.

Milestones

  1. The right-hand side of (2) is nonnegative and nondecreasing in ψ\psiψ, with increments bracketed by δ Pr⁡{ψδ≥p2(QT),A}\delta\,\Pr\{\psi\delta \ge p_2(Q_T), \mathcal A\}δPr{ψδ≥p2​(QT​),A} at the two endpoints, and this slope is below one.
  2. Equation (2) has a unique solution ψ≥p1\psi \ge p_1ψ≥p1​.

Significance

Theorem 1 reduces a customer's strategy, a function of arrival time and valuation, to one threshold function ψ\psiψ on [0,T)[0, T)[0,T). The segment sizes ΛI,ΛS,ΛW,ΛL\Lambda_I, \Lambda_S, \Lambda_W, \Lambda_LΛI​,ΛS​,ΛW​,ΛL​ of §4.2, the seller's menu problem (3), the equilibrium iteration (4) and the closed form of Proposition 2 are all written in terms of ψ\psiψ; without Theorem 1 none of them is defined. Corollary 1, that the threshold rises toward the markdown, is what the paper calls "useful in our analyses below"; the customer segments of Figure 1 are drawn with it.

The result is proved in the paper, with a short appendix argument. No machine-checked version exists. The mission produces a formal statement and proof of the reduction for an arbitrary belief, which fixes the exact hypotheses under which it holds: the paper's slope bound needs either valuation decline (α>0\alpha > 0α>0) or imperfect availability, and the monotonicity of the threshold needs a nonnegative premium price. A formal WtW_tWt​ and threshold are the starting point for formalizing the equilibrium and pricing results of the paper.

Difficulty

The mathematics is one-dimensional. The difficulty is in stating it exactly. WtW_tWt​ is piecewise linear with a kink wherever ψδ\psi\deltaψδ crosses a menu price, so the paper's derivative is only a one-sided derivative, and the uniqueness argument has to use increments. The paper's bound "slope <1< 1<1" is false when α=0\alpha = 0α=0 and a unit is allocated with certainty; then (2) has either no finite solution or a half-line of them. The threshold's monotonicity in ttt rests on Wt(ψ)W_t(\psi)Wt​(ψ) increasing in ttt for fixed ψ\psiψ, which needs ψ≥0\psi \ge 0ψ≥0; with a negative premium price the threshold can decrease. The naive reading of "optimal to use a threshold" as an abstract fixed-point fact about any monotone function with slope below one discards the model and is not the goal.

Formalization scope

Lean namespace SeasonalPricing.Contingent. Time, prices and valuations are real numbers. The belief is a pair pmf alloc : ℕ → ℝ restricted to {0, …, Q} (IsInventoryBelief), not a random variable on a probability space; only the law of (QT,1{A})(Q_T, \mathbf 1\{\mathcal A\})(QT​,1{A}) enters (2). The menu is p2 : ℕ → ℝ with p2(q)≤p1p_2(q) \le p_1p2​(q)≤p1​ required on {1,…,Q}\{1, \dots, Q\}{1,…,Q} only; p2(0)p_2(0)p2​(0) never matters because a(0)=0a(0) = 0a(0)=0. The belief does not depend on the arrival time, as in Eq. (4) of the paper. waitingSurplus is WtW_tWt​ with e−α(T−t)e^{-\alpha(T-t)}e−α(T−t) written Real.exp (-(α * (T - t))); buysNow is the purchase rule, stated on the current valuation V(t)V(t)V(t).

Readings of the paper's words:

  • "the unique solution" of (2): existence and uniqueness of a real ψ≥p1\psi \ge p_1ψ≥p1​ (∃!). The paper's "ψ∈[p1,∞]\psi \in [p_1, \infty]ψ∈[p1​,∞]" includes ∞\infty∞ only in the case excluded by the added hypothesis.
  • "it is optimal to base purchasing decisions on a threshold function": the purchase rule of p. 344 holds exactly when V(t)≥ψ(t)V(t) \ge \psi(t)V(t)≥ψ(t).
  • "derivative … <1< 1<1": a two-sided bracket on increments of WtW_tWt​, with right slope δPr⁡{ψδ≥p2(QT),A}\delta\Pr\{\psi\delta \ge p_2(Q_T), \mathcal A\}δPr{ψδ≥p2​(QT​),A}, below one.
  • "increasing" (Corollary 1): nondecreasing (MonotoneOn), since ψ\psiψ is constant on an initial interval whenever no menu price is reachable (p. 347).

Added hypotheses, both named in the statements: α>0\alpha > 0α>0 or ∑qπ(q)a(q)<1\sum_q \pi(q)a(q) < 1∑q​π(q)a(q)<1, the one hypothesis the paper's proof uses without stating it; and p1≥0p_1 \ge 0p1​≥0, the model's convention that prices are nonnegative. Only the branch 0≤t<T0 \le t < T0≤t<T of the threshold θ\thetaθ is stated: for t≥Tt \ge Tt≥T the paper's θ(t)=p2\theta(t) = p_2θ(t)=p2​ is the model's rule for late customers. The belief enters through the explicit sum; a formalization with an unspecified monotone WWW, or with ψ(t)\psi(t)ψ(t) defined by choice inside a definition, is not the target.

No new library is needed beyond finite sums, max and Real.exp. A lemma on unique roots of ψ↦ψ−c−f(ψ)\psi \mapsto \psi - c - f(\psi)ψ↦ψ−c−f(ψ) for fff with increments bounded by k(ψ′−ψ)k(\psi' - \psi)k(ψ′−ψ), k<1k < 1k<1, is reusable. Proofs of the milestones and the goal, in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Aviv and A. Pazgal, Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of Forward-Looking Consumers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3):339–359, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0183
  • X. Su, Intertemporal Pricing with Strategic Customer Behavior, Management Science 53(5):726–741, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0667
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
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Dynamic ProgrammingProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Theory of Dynamic Programming: The Index Rule for Bellman's Stochastic Gold-Mining ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

Richard Bellman's survey The theory of dynamic programming (Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 60 (1954), 503–515, DOI 10.1090/s0002-9904-1954-09848-8) introduced dynamic programming to a general mathematical audience. It states the principle of optimality (§2, p. 504): "An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decisions are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decisions", and derives from it the functional equations of finite and infinite stochastic decision processes, (4.2) and (5.1) (p. 506).

The survey illustrates the method on a small number of worked examples. The second of them, §8 "Stochastic gold mining" (pp. 508–509), is the one with a sharp answer: a two-armed sequential allocation problem with an absorbing failure state, whose optimal policy is a simple index rule. It is an early instance of the allocation-index phenomenon later made general by Gittins and Jones (1974) and Gittins (1979), and the paper itself notes (p. 509) that the rule "is not valid generally in more complicated decision processes", citing a counterexample of Karlin and Shapiro. The full treatment is in Bellman's RAND report R-245 and his 1957 book Dynamic Programming.

Setting

Two gold mines, Anaconda (AAA) and Bonanza (BBB), hold amounts x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and y≥0y \ge 0y≥0 of gold. A single machine can be used in either mine. A use in Anaconda succeeds with probability ppp: it then mines a fraction rrr of the gold currently in Anaconda and the machine stays undamaged. With probability 1−p1-p1−p it mines nothing and the machine is destroyed. Bonanza behaves the same way with probability qqq and fraction sss. While the machine works, the operator chooses the next mine; the aim is to maximize the expected amount mined before the machine is destroyed.

The only information the operator ever receives is that the machine still works. A policy is therefore a choice sequence σ=(σ0,σ1,… )∈{A,B}N\sigma = (\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \dots) \in \{A, B\}^{\mathbb N}σ=(σ0​,σ1​,…)∈{A,B}N: the mine for use number nnn, applied if uses 0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1 succeeded. With ana_nan​, bnb_nbn​ the numbers of AAA- and BBB-uses among the first nnn, use nnn collects gn=rx(1−r)ang_n = r x (1-r)^{a_n}gn​=rx(1−r)an​ if σn=A\sigma_n = Aσn​=A and gn=sy(1−s)bng_n = s y (1-s)^{b_n}gn​=sy(1−s)bn​ if σn=B\sigma_n = Bσn​=B, and does so with probability ∏k=0nπσk\prod_{k=0}^{n} \pi_{\sigma_k}∏k=0n​πσk​​ (πA=p\pi_A = pπA​=p, πB=q\pi_B = qπB​=q). The expected return is

J(σ;x,y)=∑n≥0(∏k=0nπσk)gn,J(\sigma; x, y) = \sum_{n \ge 0} \Big(\prod_{k=0}^{n} \pi_{\sigma_k}\Big) g_n ,J(σ;x,y)=n≥0∑​(k=0∏n​πσk​​)gn​,

and Bellman's (8.1) defines the optimal return

f(x,y)=sup⁡σJ(σ;x,y).f(x, y) = \sup_\sigma J(\sigma; x, y).f(x,y)=σsup​J(σ;x,y).

In Lean these are expectedReturn p q r s σ x y and optimalReturn p q r s x y in the namespace BellmanTheoryDP.GoldMining.

Formalization targets

Milestone: the functional equation (8.2), p. 508

f(x,y)=max⁡{p [rx+f((1−r)x,y)], q [sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]}.f(x, y) = \max\Big\{ p\,[r x + f((1-r)x, y)],\ q\,[s y + f(x, (1-s)y)] \Big\}.f(x,y)=max{p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)], q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]}.

Goal: the decision rule (8.3), p. 509, corrected

Write VA=p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)]V_A = p[rx + f((1-r)x, y)]VA​=p[rx+f((1−r)x,y)] and VB=q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)]V_B = q[sy + f(x, (1-s)y)]VB​=q[sy+f(x,(1−s)y)] for the two branches of (8.2). For 0<p,q,r,s<10 < p, q, r, s < 10<p,q,r,s<1 and x,y≥0x, y \ge 0x,y≥0:

prx1−p>qsy1−q⇒VA>VB,prx1−p<qsy1−q⇒VA<VB,prx1−p=qsy1−q⇒VA=VB.\frac{prx}{1-p} > \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A > V_B, \qquad \frac{prx}{1-p} < \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A < V_B, \qquad \frac{prx}{1-p} = \frac{qsy}{1-q} \Rightarrow V_A = V_B .1−pprx​>1−qqsy​⇒VA​>VB​,1−pprx​<1−qqsy​⇒VA​<VB​,1−pprx​=1−qqsy​⇒VA​=VB​.

The paper prints the rule with (1−r)(1-r)(1−r) and (1−s)(1-s)(1−s) in the denominators:

a. For prx/(1−r)>qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) > qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)>qsy/(1−s), choose A, b. For prx/(1−r)<qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) < qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)<qsy/(1−s), choose B, c. For prx/(1−r)=qsy/(1−s)prx/(1 - r) = qsy/(1 - s)prx/(1−r)=qsy/(1−s), choose either.

and glosses it as "the locus of points where immediate expected gain over immediate expected loss is the same for both choices". The immediate expected loss is the probability of destroying the machine, 1−p1-p1−p (resp. 1−q1-q1−q), not 1−r1 - r1−r. As printed the rule is false: with p=1/2p = 1/2p=1/2, r=0.9r = 0.9r=0.9, q=0.9q = 0.9q=0.9, s=0.1s = 0.1s=0.1, x=1x = 1x=1, y=2y = 2y=2 the printed indices are 4.5>0.24.5 > 0.24.5>0.2, but VA≈0.924<VB≈1.055V_A \approx 0.924 < V_B \approx 1.055VA​≈0.924<VB​≈1.055. The mission's goal is the corrected rule, the one the paper describes in words.

Companion: the index policy is optimal, p. 509

"Using this prescription, f(x,y)f(x, y)f(x,y) may be computed recurrently": the choice sequence σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ generated by applying the corrected rule to the current amounts at every use satisfies J(σ∗;x,y)=f(x,y)J(\sigma^*; x, y) = f(x, y)J(σ∗;x,y)=f(x,y).

Significance

The decision rule reduces an optimization over infinite sequences to comparing two explicit numbers, one per mine, each depending only on that mine's own data. This is the defining property of an index policy, and gold mining is one of the earliest problems where it was observed. The functional equation (8.2) is the concrete form, for this process, of the infinite-horizon equation (5.1) that the paper states formally.

Formalizing the example yields a complete machine-checked instance of the principle of optimality for an infinite-horizon stochastic process whose state space (the amounts left in the two mines) is infinite, where the supremum over policies is not attained trivially and the finite-horizon recursion does not apply directly. It also records, with a checked statement, the correction of the misprint in (8.3). No machine-checked proof of (8.2) or (8.3) is known to exist.

Difficulty

The equation (8.2) looks immediate, and the paper calls it "easily seen". The informal argument treats fff as the value of an optimal policy, but fff is a supremum over infinite sequences that need not be attained a priori, and the return of a sequence is an infinite series. The finite-horizon recursion (4.2) does not apply as it stands, because the process has no last stage and its state space, the amounts left in the two mines, is infinite.

The rule (8.3) compares the two optimal continuations f((1−r)x,y)f((1-r)x, y)f((1−r)x,y) and f(x,(1−s)y)f(x, (1-s)y)f(x,(1−s)y), which are themselves unknown. A comparison of the one-step gains alone does not decide it, as the misprinted rule shows. Parts a and b are strict preferences, so it is not enough to show that one choice is at least as good as the other.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. The mines are a two-element inductive type Mine; a policy is a function ℕ → Mine (ChoiceSeq). All quantities are real numbers. Randomized policies are mixtures of choice sequences and give no larger return, so they are not modelled. No restriction to stationary or Markov policies is made: fff is the supremum over all sequences.
  • Parameter ranges. The paper does not state them. The theorems assume 0<p,q,r,s<10 < p, q, r, s < 10<p,q,r,s<1 and x,y≥0x, y \ge 0x,y≥0 (zero amounts allowed). p,q<1p, q < 1p,q<1 keeps the indices prx/(1−p)prx/(1-p)prx/(1−p), qsy/(1−q)qsy/(1-q)qsy/(1−q) well defined.
  • Series and supremum. JJJ is a real tsum and fff a real iSup. For the parameter ranges above the terms are nonnegative, the partial sums are bounded by x+yx + yx+y, and the family is bounded above, so neither Lean default value (0 for a divergent series or an unbounded supremum) arises; this is stated as the auxiliary theorem expectedReturn_le_add.
  • Survival indexing. The gold of use nnn is counted only if use nnn itself succeeds, so the survival product runs over k≤nk \le nk≤n.
  • The misprint. The goal and the index policy use (1−p)(1-p)(1−p), (1−q)(1-q)(1−q) in place of the printed (1−r)(1-r)(1−r), (1−s)(1-s)(1−s). The printed rule appears only as the quotation above.
  • No trivializing encoding. fff is defined as the supremum of expected returns over all choice sequences, per (8.1); it is not defined as a solution of (8.2), as the value of the index policy, or as a limit of value iteration, any of which would make the milestone or the goal true by definition.
  • Auxiliary theorems (not from the paper). The bound 0≤J≤x+y0 \le J \le x + y0≤J≤x+y with summability, the one-step unrolling J(σ)=p[rx+J(σ′;(1−r)x,y)]J(\sigma) = p[rx + J(\sigma'; (1-r)x, y)]J(σ)=p[rx+J(σ′;(1−r)x,y)] when σ0=A\sigma_0 = Aσ0​=A (and symmetrically), and the single-mine values f(x,0)=prx/(1−p(1−r))f(x, 0) = prx/(1 - p(1-r))f(x,0)=prx/(1−p(1−r)), f(0,y)=qsy/(1−q(1−s))f(0, y) = qsy/(1-q(1-s))f(0,y)=qsy/(1−q(1−s)) are included as footholds. They are not milestones.
  • Related platform content. AllocationIndices.two_discount_index_policy_optimal (Gittins et al., Theorem 3.4) concerns Markov bandits whose rewards are discounted by ata^tat at global time ttt; gold mining multiplies by the success probability of each use of the mine used, so it is a different model and is not reused. BertsekasDP.dp_algorithm_optimality is finite-horizon and does not give (8.2).

Contributions welcome: proofs of the auxiliary theorems, of (8.2), of the decision rule, and of the optimality of the index policy.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, The theory of dynamic programming, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 60 (1954), no. 6, 503–515. https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1954-09848-8
  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957.
  • J. C. Gittins, Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 41 (1979), 148–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.x
  • J. C. Gittins, K. D. Glazebrook, R. Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470980033
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 2: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism with Type-Specific Quotas Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Motivation

Many US school districts assign children to public schools centrally. Each family ranks the schools. Each school ranks the children by priority, which is set by state or local law (siblings, walking distance, a lottery). A procedure then turns these rankings into an assignment. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics Discussion Paper 0203-18, 2003; published in the American Economic Review 93(3), 2003) cast this as a mechanism design problem. They showed that the mechanisms then in use in Boston, Columbus and Minneapolis gave families reasons to misreport their preferences. They proposed two alternatives: the student-optimal stable mechanism of Gale and Shapley, and a school-choice version of Shapley and Scarf's top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism.

Many districts also operate under controlled choice: court-ordered or voluntary rules that keep the racial or ethnic composition of each school within bounds. In Minneapolis, for instance, a 100-seat school could admit at most 75 majority and at most 55 minority students (paper, Section III). Such rules are implemented as type-specific quotas. Section III.B of the paper modifies TTC to respect these quotas. It proves that the modified mechanism keeps both properties that recommend TTC: it wastes nothing beyond what the quotas force (constrained efficiency, Proposition 6), and truth-telling is a dominant strategy (strategy-proofness, Proposition 7). This mission formalizes those two results.

Setting

There is a finite set III of students and a finite set SSS of schools. School sss has a capacity qsq_sqs​, and the total number of seats suffices: ∣I∣≤∑sqs|I|\le\sum_s q_s∣I∣≤∑s​qs​. Each student iii has a strict preference over all schools, encoded as a ranking Pi:S→{0,…,∣S∣−1}P_i : S\to\{0,\dots,|S|-1\}Pi​:S→{0,…,∣S∣−1} with rank 000 the favourite. Each school sss has a strict priority ranking over all students, with rank 000 the highest priority. Each student belongs to exactly one type τ(i)\tau(i)τ(i), and school sss has a type quota qstq_s^tqst​ for each type ttt.

An assignment ν\nuν gives each student a school or nothing (∅\varnothing∅, worse than every school). It satisfies the controlled choice constraints if every school sss receives at most qsq_sqs​ students, and at most qstq_s^tqst​ students of each type ttt. An assignment μ\muμ is constrained efficient if no assignment satisfying the constraints makes every student weakly better off and some student strictly better off.

The top trading cycles mechanism with type-specific quotas, TTCq\mathrm{TTC}^qTTCq, runs in steps. Each school keeps a counter csc_scs​ (initially qsq_sqs​) and one type counter cstc_s^tcst​ for each type (initially qstq_s^tqst​). A school is removed when csc_scs​ reaches zero. At each step:

  • every remaining student points to her favourite remaining school with room for her type, that is, with cs>0c_s>0cs​>0 and csτ(i)>0c_s^{\tau(i)}>0csτ(i)​>0;
  • every remaining school points to its highest-priority remaining student, whatever her type;
  • every student on a cycle of this graph is assigned the school she points to and leaves;
  • that school's counter and its counter for her type each drop by one.

A direct mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can ever gain by misreporting her preference, whatever the others report.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7 (p. 23)

For every student iii, every profile PPP of announced preferences and every alternative report QiQ_iQi​,

TTCq(Qi,P−i)(i)=s′  ⟹  TTCq(P)(i)=s with Pi(s)≤Pi(s′).\mathrm{TTC}^q(Q_i,P_{-i})(i)=s' \implies \mathrm{TTC}^q(P)(i)=s \text{ with } P_i(s)\le P_i(s').TTCq(Qi​,P−i​)(i)=s′⟹TTCq(P)(i)=s with Pi​(s)≤Pi​(s′).

This holds for all capacities without shortage, all quotas, all types and all priorities. The priorities are fixed data, not reported.

Milestones

  1. Section III.B, Step 1 (p. 22). At every step there is at least one cycle, after the convention below has removed the students who cannot point.
  2. The Lemma (Appendix, pp. 28–29; declared valid for the modified mechanism on p. 30). Fix the other students' reports, and suppose student iii is still present at the beginning of a step under two different reports of hers. Then the two runs have the same remaining students and the same counters at that point.
  3. Proposition 6 (p. 23). TTCq(P)\mathrm{TTC}^q(P)TTCq(P) satisfies the controlled choice constraints and is constrained efficient with respect to PPP.

Significance

Strategy-proofness is what lets a district publish a simple instruction: rank the schools in your true order. A strategy-proof mechanism does not reward families who can afford to gather information and game the system. Proposition 7 shows that this guarantee survives the addition of flexible diversity quotas, which many districts are legally bound to impose. Proposition 6 shows that the quotas cost nothing beyond the losses they themselves cause. Both results were proved in 2003 by pen and paper. The published proof of Proposition 7 is a short adaptation of the proof of Proposition 4 (strategy-proofness of plain TTC). It rests on a lemma about how the algorithm's intermediate states depend on one student's report.

To our knowledge neither result has a machine-checked proof. The related platform theorem AGT.ttc_strategyproof concerns the Shapley–Scarf housing market, where every agent owns one house and the mechanism selects the core. It does not cover capacities, priorities or quotas. A formal proof here would check the adaptation that the paper leaves to the reader, and would give a reusable formal model of cycle-clearing allocation algorithms with multiple counters.

Difficulty

The algorithm clears all cycles of a step at once, and a student's report changes the graph at every step she is present. The paper's argument compares two whole runs of the algorithm, under the true report and under a misreport, step by step. That comparison needs precise control of which parts of the state a single student's report can influence, and when. A local argument about one step does not suffice. The student's outcome can depend on cycles that form several steps after the two runs could first have diverged.

With quotas, the pointing graph also depends on the type counters. A school can be present but closed to one type, and a school points to its best remaining student even when it has no room for her type. The comparison must therefore track the type counters as well as the set of remaining schools. Efficiency cannot be read off step by step against unrestricted matchings either: every competing assignment must satisfy both the capacity and the quota constraints.

Formalization scope

Students, schools and types are finite types; no nonemptiness is assumed. Preferences and priorities are bijective rankings onto Fin, so strictness is built in. Rank 000 is the favourite or the highest priority. The no-shortage condition ∣I∣≤∑sqs|I|\le\sum_s q_s∣I∣≤∑s​qs​ appears in every theorem, as the standing assumption of Section I. No relation between qsq_sqs​ and qstq_s^tqst​ is imposed, which generalises the paper.

The algorithm is a concrete, total definition: a state with remaining students, counters, type counters and partial assignments, a step map that clears all cycles simultaneously, and ∣I∣|I|∣I∣ iterations. run … t is the state at the beginning of the paper's Step t+1t+1t+1.

The paper's step is undefined when a remaining student has no remaining school with room for her type. She cannot point, and the promised cycle may not exist. The formalization adopts one convention: at the beginning of each step, such a stuck student is removed unassigned, and her outcome is ∅\varnothing∅, ranked below every school. Counters only decrease, so a stuck student stays stuck. Whenever nobody gets stuck, the algorithm is exactly the paper's, and when every quota is at least the capacity it is plain TTC. The goal and Proposition 6 are stated for assignments that may leave students unassigned. When everyone is assigned, they coincide with the paper's statements over matchings.

The formalization does not add a hypothesis that the run never gets stuck. Such a hypothesis would restrict the algorithm's own behaviour and could make the theorems vacuous. Nor may strategy-proofness be weakened to comparisons at the truthful profile only: the others' reports and the misreport are arbitrary.

Contributions welcome: invariants of the step map (counters bounded by the initial values, assigned students leave for good), the cycle-existence lemma for functional graphs on finite sets, and the comparison lemma. These pieces are shared with the plain-TTC mission of this series.

Selected references

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0203-18, 2003. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8057T27
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, American Economic Review 93(3), 729–747, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061
  • Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf, On Cores and Indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(1), 23–37, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 1: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Motivation

Public school districts in many US cities let families rank schools and then assign seats by a centralized procedure. Each school has a limited number of seats, and state or local law gives some students priority at some schools, for example for a sibling already enrolled or for living within walking distance. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics Discussion Paper 0203-18, 2003; published in the American Economic Review 93(3), 2003) framed this as a mechanism design problem and showed that the mechanism then used in Boston rewards families who misreport their preferences. They proposed two replacements with written proofs of their properties. This mission covers the second one, the top trading cycles mechanism, and its two properties: every outcome is Pareto efficient, and no student can gain by misreporting.

The paper drew on earlier results for simpler allocation problems:

  • 1974: Shapley and Scarf introduce housing markets and Gale's top trading cycles algorithm, in which each agent owns one house.
  • 1977: Roth and Postlewaite show the algorithm finds the unique core allocation of a housing market.
  • 1982: Roth proves the core mechanism for housing markets is strategy-proof.
  • 1999: Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez adapt the algorithm to house allocation with existing tenants and prove strategy-proofness.
  • 2000: Pápai introduces hierarchical exchange rules, a wider class that includes these mechanisms.
  • 2003: the paper formalized here extends the algorithm to schools with capacities and school-specific priorities (Propositions 3 and 4).

Setting

A school choice problem consists of a finite set III of students, a finite set SSS of schools, a capacity qs∈Nq_s \in \mathbb Nqs​∈N for each school, a strict preference PiP_iPi​ of each student over all schools, and a strict priority ordering ≻s\succ_s≻s​ of each school over all students. The standing assumption is that there is no shortage of seats:

∣I∣≤∑s∈Sqs.|I| \le \sum_{s\in S} q_s .∣I∣≤s∈S∑​qs​.

Preferences are rankings: Pi(s)∈{0,…,∣S∣−1}P_i(s)\in\{0,\dots,|S|-1\}Pi​(s)∈{0,…,∣S∣−1} is the rank of sss for student iii, with rank 000 the favourite. Priorities are rankings of students in the same way, with rank 000 the highest priority. A matching is a map μ:I→S\mu : I\to Sμ:I→S with #{i:μ(i)=s}≤qs\#\{i:\mu(i)=s\}\le q_s#{i:μ(i)=s}≤qs​ for every school sss. A matching μ\muμ is Pareto efficient if no other matching ν\nuν gives every student a weakly better school (Pi(ν(i))≤Pi(μ(i))P_i(\nu(i))\le P_i(\mu(i))Pi​(ν(i))≤Pi​(μ(i))) and some student a strictly better one.

A direct mechanism maps the reported preference profile, together with the fixed priorities and capacities, to a matching. It is strategy-proof if no student can ever obtain a school she strictly prefers by changing her own report while the others keep theirs.

The top trading cycles algorithm keeps a counter csc_scs​ of free seats at each school, starting at qsq_sqs​. A school is remaining while cs>0c_s>0cs​>0. At each step every remaining student points to her favourite remaining school, and every remaining school points to the remaining student with the highest priority for it. A cycle is a list (s1,i1,…,sk,ik)(s_1,i_1,\dots,s_k,i_k)(s1​,i1​,…,sk​,ik​) of distinct schools and students in which s1s_1s1​ points to i1i_1i1​, i1i_1i1​ points to s2s_2s2​, and so on, and iki_kik​ points to s1s_1s1​. Every student on a cycle is assigned the school she points to and is removed. Each school on a cycle loses one seat. All cycles present at a step are cleared at that same step. The top trading cycles mechanism TTC(q,≻,P)\mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,P)TTC(q,≻,P) returns the resulting assignment.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4 (strategy-proofness)

For all capacities with no shortage, all priorities, every profile PPP, every student iii and every alternative report QiQ_iQi​, student iii is assigned schools s=TTC(q,≻,P)(i)s = \mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,P)(i)s=TTC(q,≻,P)(i) and s′=TTC(q,≻,(Qi,P−i))(i)s' = \mathrm{TTC}(q,\succ,(Q_i,P_{-i}))(i)s′=TTC(q,≻,(Qi​,P−i​))(i), and

Pi(s)≤Pi(s′).P_i(s) \le P_i(s') .Pi​(s)≤Pi​(s′).

Milestones

  1. At every step at which some student remains, there is a cycle (Section II.B, p. 15).
  2. After ∣I∣|I|∣I∣ steps no student remains, and the outcome is a matching (Section II.B, p. 16).
  3. Lemma (Appendix, pp. 28–29): if student iii is still remaining at the beginning of a step under two different reports of her own, the remaining students and the remaining schools at that point are the same under both reports.
  4. Proposition 3 (p. 17): the outcome is a Pareto efficient matching with respect to the reported profile.
  5. When all schools share one priority ordering π\piπ, the mechanism equals the serial dictatorship induced by π\piπ (Section II.B, p. 16).

Significance

Strategy-proofness means truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for every student. Families need no information about other families' reports. Under the Boston mechanism, ranking a popular school first can cost a student her priority at her second choice. Proposition 3 separates the top trading cycles mechanism from the Gale–Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism, which is also strategy-proof but can select Pareto dominated matchings.

The results are proved in the paper, in short prose arguments in its Appendix. To the best of our knowledge they have no machine-checked proof. The platform already has the housing-market version, AGT.ttc_strategyproof, but that statement covers one house per agent with the mechanism characterised as the core. Capacities, school priorities and the step-by-step algorithm are absent from it. This mission produces a checked account of the algorithm with capacities and counters, together with its termination and invariance properties.

Difficulty

The paper's argument moves from the step at which student iii leaves under one report to the step at which she leaves under another. It relies on the claim that the cycles formed before either step are unaffected by iii's report. Informally, iii is not on a cycle yet, so what she points to does not matter. Formally, "the same cycles form" requires comparing two runs of a simultaneous-clearing procedure step by step. At each step one has to show that the set of cycles, and hence the counters and the remaining schools, agree, even though iii points to different schools in the two runs. Reasoning about a single cycle at a time does not work, because the algorithm clears all cycles of a step at once. Termination is also not immediate: without the no-shortage condition the algorithm can leave students unassigned. Seats are counted with multiplicity, so a school can stay in the market for several steps.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace SchoolChoice.TTC. Students and schools are arbitrary finite types with decidable equality; the set of students may be empty. Capacities are q : S → ℕ, and a school of capacity zero is never remaining. A preference is a bijection S ≃ Fin (card S) and a priority is a bijection I ≃ Fin (card I), in both cases with rank 0 the best. Strictness and completeness of both therefore hold by construction, and every school is acceptable. A state of the algorithm consists of the remaining students, the counters and the assignments made so far. run q pri P t is the state after t completed steps, which is the beginning of the paper's Step t + 1. The mechanism ttc q pri P : I → Option S reads off the assignment after card I steps. Every theorem assumes card I ≤ ∑ s, q s.

The algorithm is a concrete, deterministic definition that clears all cycles at every step. The mechanism is not defined as "some Pareto efficient matching" or characterised by properties, since that would make Proposition 3 trivial. The goal asserts that both outcomes exist, so an unassigned outcome cannot satisfy it vacuously. The misreport, the other students' reports and the priorities are all universally quantified.

A complete development needs termination of the algorithm, a combinatorial account of the pointing graph (cycles in a finite functional graph), and the step-by-step invariance argument of the Lemma. The last two are reusable for the type-specific quota variant and for other trading-cycle mechanisms. Contributions of intermediate lemmas are welcome: counter invariants such as "the sum of the counters is at least the number of remaining students", monotonicity of the remaining sets, and the fact that a student on a cycle receives her favourite remaining school.

Selected references

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0203-18, 2003. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8057T27
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach, American Economic Review 93(3), 729–747, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061
  • Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf, On Cores and Indivisibility, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1(1), 23–37, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0
  • Alvin E. Roth and Andrew Postlewaite, Weak versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics 4(2), 131–137, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0
  • Alvin E. Roth, Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods, Economics Letters 9(2), 127–132, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tayfun Sönmez, House Allocation with Existing Tenants, Journal of Economic Theory 88(2), 233–260, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553
  • Szilvia Pápai, Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange, Econometrica 68(6), 1403–1433, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166
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Discrete GeometryLinear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Elementare Theorie der konvexen Polyeder I: A Point on All Extreme Supports of a Finite Cone Is a Nonnegative Combination of at Most n GeneratorsResearch Paper

Motivation

A polyhedral cone can be described in two ways: as the set of nonnegative combinations of finitely many vectors (a finitely generated cone), or as the intersection of finitely many closed half-spaces through the origin. That the two descriptions give the same class of sets is the Minkowski–Weyl theorem. It is the structural basis of linear programming: the simplex method, LP duality, Farkas' lemma, and the vertex/facet description of polytopes used throughout combinatorial optimization all rest on it.

Hermann Weyl's 1935 paper Elementare Theorie der konvexen Polyeder (Comment. Math. Helv. 7, 290–306) gives an elementary, self-contained proof of both directions. Its first result, which Weyl calls the Hauptsatz (main theorem, Satz 1), is the direction "finitely generated ⇒ finite intersection of half-spaces", in a sharp form: the half-spaces needed are exactly the extreme supports of the generating set, i.e. its facets. Its sharpening, Satz 2, bounds the number of generators needed to represent a point by the dimension nnn. This mission formalizes §§1–2 of the paper (pp. 290–295): the Hauptsatz, its sharpening, and the steps of Weyl's inductive proof.

Timeline:

  • 1896, H. Minkowski, Geometrie der Zahlen: polytopes as bounded intersections of half-spaces and as convex hulls of finitely many points.
  • 1911, C. Carathéodory: a point in the convex hull of a set in Rd\mathbb{R}^dRd is a convex combination of at most d+1d+1d+1 of its points (Rend. Circ. Mat. Palermo 32).
  • 1935, H. Weyl: the present paper; Satz 1 and Satz 2 for cones, with the dual statements in §3 and the polytope theorem in §4.

Setting

Points of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn are nnn-tuples x=(x1,…,xn)x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)x=(x1​,…,xn​), and ⟨α,x⟩=α1x1+⋯+αnxn\langle \alpha, x \rangle = \alpha_1 x_1 + \cdots + \alpha_n x_n⟨α,x⟩=α1​x1​+⋯+αn​xn​. A vector α≠0\alpha \ne 0α=0 determines the half-space {x:⟨α,x⟩≥0}\{x : \langle\alpha,x\rangle \ge 0\}{x:⟨α,x⟩≥0}; positive multiples of α\alphaα give the same half-space.

A point system SSS is a finite set of points of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn. It is non-degenerate if its points do not all satisfy one equation ⟨α,x⟩=0\langle\alpha,x\rangle = 0⟨α,x⟩=0 with α≠0\alpha \neq 0α=0, i.e. the only α\alphaα orthogonal to every point of SSS is 000.

A half-space ⟨α,x⟩≥0\langle\alpha,x\rangle\ge 0⟨α,x⟩≥0 (α≠0\alpha\ne 0α=0) is a support of SSS if every point of SSS lies in it. It is an extreme support if, in addition, equality ⟨α,x⟩=0\langle\alpha,x\rangle = 0⟨α,x⟩=0 holds at n−1n-1n−1 linearly independent points xxx of SSS.

A point xxx is representable by SSS if it is a nonnegative combination of the points of SSS:

x=∑s∈Scs s,cs≥0.x = \sum_{s\in S} c_s\, s, \qquad c_s \ge 0 .x=s∈S∑​cs​s,cs​≥0.

The set of points lying in all extreme supports of SSS is Weyl's konvexe Pyramide. In the Lean development these objects are Representable, NonDegenerate, IsSupport and IsExtremeSupport in the namespace WeylPolyhedra.Pyramid, with points of type Fin n → ℝ and ⟨α,x⟩\langle\alpha,x\rangle⟨α,x⟩ written α ⬝ᵥ x.

Formalization targets

Goal: Satz 2 (Verschärfung des Hauptsatzes), p. 295

For a finite non-degenerate S⊂RnS \subset \mathbb{R}^nS⊂Rn and a point xxx with ⟨α,x⟩≥0\langle\alpha,x\rangle\ge 0⟨α,x⟩≥0 for every extreme support α\alphaα of SSS,

∃ T⊆S,∣T∣≤n,x=∑t∈Tct t,  ct≥0.\exists\, T \subseteq S,\quad |T| \le n,\quad x = \sum_{t\in T} c_t\, t,\ \ c_t \ge 0 .∃T⊆S,∣T∣≤n,x=t∈T∑​ct​t,  ct​≥0.

Satz 1 (Hauptsatz), p. 291

Under the same hypotheses, xxx is representable by SSS. Satz 2 contains Satz 1.

Steps of the proof (§1–§2)

  1. A finite non-degenerate SSS has only finitely many extreme supports, up to positive scaling (p. 291).
  2. The reduction step of case a) (p. 292): if SSS has an extreme support β\betaβ and ppp satisfies all extreme supports, there are e∈Se \in Se∈S with ⟨β,e⟩>0\langle\beta,e\rangle>0⟨β,e⟩>0 and λ≥0\lambda\ge 0λ≥0 such that q=p−λeq = p-\lambda eq=p−λe still satisfies all extreme supports and lies on the plane of one of them.
  3. The lifting step (p. 293): with xn≥0x_n \ge 0xn​≥0 an extreme support of SSS and S0S_0S0​ the points on xn=0x_n = 0xn​=0, every extreme support β\betaβ of S0S_0S0​ in Rn−1\mathbb{R}^{n-1}Rn−1 lifts to the extreme support β1x1+⋯+βn−1xn−1−μxn≥0\beta_1x_1+\cdots+\beta_{n-1}x_{n-1} - \mu x_n \ge 0β1​x1​+⋯+βn−1​xn−1​−μxn​≥0 of SSS (inequality (6)).
  4. Case b) (p. 291, proved pp. 293–294): if SSS has no extreme support, every point of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is representable by SSS.

Significance

Satz 1 together with its trivial converse identifies the cone generated by SSS with the intersection of its extreme-support half-spaces. This is one half of the Minkowski–Weyl theorem for cones, and it names the half-spaces: they are the facets of the cone. Satz 2 adds the conic form of Carathéodory's theorem: every point of a cone generated by a finite spanning set in Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is a nonnegative combination of at most nnn generators. In linear programming this is the statement that a feasible system has a basic feasible solution. The second mission in this series, on §§3–4 of the paper, uses Satz 1 to prove that a bounded region cut out by finitely many inequalities is the convex hull of finitely many points, and conversely.

On formalization status: Mathlib defines finitely generated and dually finitely generated pointed cones (PointedCone, PointedCone.DualFG) and proves Carathéodory's theorem for convex hulls (convexHull_eq_union), but, at the pinned revision, it does not prove the Minkowski–Weyl theorem or the facet description of a finitely generated cone. The results are classical and proved in the paper; this mission produces machine-checked proofs of them, in Weyl's formulation with extreme supports, together with the intermediate steps of his induction.

Difficulty

The hypothesis only controls xxx against the extreme supports, not against every support. Showing that xxx lies in the cone generated by SSS whenever ⟨α,x⟩≥0\langle\alpha,x\rangle\ge 0⟨α,x⟩≥0 holds for every support is the conic Farkas lemma, which follows from a separating hyperplane argument. Here that argument is not enough: a separating hyperplane is a support, but in general not an extreme one, and the statement is about the finitely many extreme ones. The proof has to produce, for a point outside the cone, a violated extreme support, which requires control over the facet structure of the cone.

The dimension count of Satz 2 is a second difficulty. An induction on the dimension naturally gives nnn generators in one case and n+1n+1n+1 in another (a point of a half-space needs one generator on each side), and Weyl notes that he could not avoid a detour to recover the bound nnn. The case where SSS has no extreme support at all must also be handled separately; it is not vacuous, since SSS can then generate all of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is Fin n → ℝ; points and normals share this type (the dual space is identified with Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, as in the paper). The pairing is dotProduct, written α ⬝ᵥ x.
  • A point system is a Finset (Fin n → ℝ). The zero vector is not excluded.
  • A support normal satisfies α ≠ 0. Extreme supports require a subset T ⊆ S with T.card = n - 1 whose elements are linearly independent in the vector space Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn.
  • "All extreme support equations are satisfied" in Satz 1 is read as the inequalities ⟨α,x⟩≥0\langle\alpha,x\rangle\ge0⟨α,x⟩≥0 for every extreme normal α\alphaα, as the proof and Satz 2 make explicit. The hypothesis quantifies over all extreme normals, so no representatives are chosen.
  • "Positive-linear" combinations have nonnegative coefficients (display (3)). In Satz 2 the subset TTT is not required to be linearly independent.
  • Finiteness of extreme supports is stated up to positive scaling.
  • The lifting step is stated in the coordinates Weyl fixes on p. 293: Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is Fin (m+1) → ℝ, the extreme support is xn≥0x_n \ge 0xn​≥0 (Fin.last m), S0S_0S0​ is projected by Fin.init, and μ\muμ is given together with hypotheses that it is the attained minimum. The hypothesis n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 is made explicit.

Replacing extreme supports by all supports in the hypothesis of Satz 1 or Satz 2 would turn the goal into a much weaker theorem (the conic Farkas lemma plus Carathéodory) and is not an admissible formalization. Dropping non-degeneracy makes Satz 1 false: for S={e1}⊂R2S = \{e_1\} \subset \mathbb{R}^2S={e1​}⊂R2 the extreme supports are ±x2≥0\pm x_2 \ge 0±x2​≥0, and x=(−1,0)x = (-1, 0)x=(−1,0) satisfies both without being a nonnegative multiple of e1e_1e1​.

A complete development needs basic linear algebra over Fin n → ℝ (hyperplanes through n−1n-1n−1 independent points, projection to a coordinate hyperplane) and finite minimisation. The facet description of finitely generated cones, conic Carathéodory and the finiteness of facets are reusable beyond this mission, including for the second mission of the series. Contributions of lemmas on PointedCone that connect Representable with PointedCone.span are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Weyl, Elementare Theorie der konvexen Polyeder, Commentarii Mathematici Helvetici 7 (1935), 290–306. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01292722
  • C. Carathéodory, Über den Variabilitätsbereich der Fourier'schen Konstanten von positiven harmonischen Funktionen, Rendiconti del Circolo Matematico di Palermo 32 (1911), 193–217. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03014795
  • A. Schrijver, Theory of Linear and Integer Programming, Wiley, 1986, §7.2 (the Farkas–Minkowski–Weyl theorem). ISBN 978-0-471-98232-6
  • G. M. Ziegler, Lectures on Polytopes, Springer GTM 152, 1995, Lecture 1. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-8431-1
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Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear, Concave Utilities II: An Exact 3-Cover Exists iff the Constructed Market Has an EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

Market equilibrium is the central solution concept of general equilibrium theory: prices at which every agent buys a utility-maximizing bundle and supply meets demand. Arrow and Debreu (1954) proved that equilibria exist under mild conditions on endowments and utilities, and a line of work in algorithmic game theory asks how hard it is to compute them. For linear utilities an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, and there is an efficiently checkable condition for its existence. The next natural class, additively separable piecewise-linear concave utilities, models diminishing marginal utility and is the class most used in applications.

Vazirani and Yannakakis (J. ACM 58(3), 2011) settle the complexity of this class. They show that equilibria are rational whenever they exist (Theorems 4.1 and 5.1), that computing an equilibrium under the standard sufficient conditions is PPAD-complete (Theorems 6.1 and 7.1, building on Chen, Dai, Du and Teng 2009), and — the subject of this mission — that deciding whether an equilibrium exists at all is NP-complete (Theorem 8.1). The hardness half rests on an explicit construction: from an instance of Exact Cover by 3-Sets, a market whose equilibria encode exact covers.

Setting

An Arrow–Debreu market has a finite set BBB of agents and a finite set GGG of divisible goods. Agent iii owns an endowment wij≥0w_{ij}\ge 0wij​≥0 of each good jjj and has utility ui(y)=∑jfji(yj)u_i(y)=\sum_{j} f^i_j(y_j)ui​(y)=∑j​fji​(yj​), where each fjif^i_jfji​ is a piecewise-linear concave utility function: slopes c1≥c2≥⋯≥cm>0c_1\ge c_2\ge\dots\ge c_m>0c1​≥c2​≥⋯≥cm​>0 on consecutive pieces of lengths a1,…,ama_1,\dots,a_ma1​,…,am​, followed by a last piece of slope t∈[0,cm]t\in[0,c_m]t∈[0,cm​] until infinity (t=0t=0t=0 means the function goes flat).

At prices ppp, agent iii's income is ∑jpjwij\sum_j p_j w_{ij}∑j​pj​wij​. An optimal bundle is an affordable y≥0y\ge 0y≥0 maximizing uiu_iui​ among affordable bundles, bought only along the pieces of fjif^i_jfji​ that carry utility. A price equilibrium is a price vector ppp in the unit simplex (p≥0p\ge 0p≥0, ∑jpj=1\sum_j p_j=1∑j​pj​=1) together with an allocation of optimal bundles such that ∑ixij=∑iwij\sum_i x_{ij}=\sum_i w_{ij}∑i​xij​=∑i​wij​ for every good jjj. It is an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate equilibrium if instead ∣∑ixij−∑iwij∣≤ϵ∑iwij|\sum_i x_{ij}-\sum_i w_{ij}|\le\epsilon\sum_i w_{ij}∣∑i​xij​−∑i​wij​∣≤ϵ∑i​wij​ for every jjj.

An X3C instance is a family C=(C1,…,Cn)\mathcal C=(C_1,\dots,C_n)C=(C1​,…,Cn​) of 333-element subsets of X={x1,…,xn}X=\{x_1,\dots,x_n\}X={x1​,…,xn​}; an exact cover is a subfamily in which every element of XXX lies in exactly one set. Following the paper, nnn is a multiple of 333, n>35n>35n>35, and ⋃iCi=X\bigcup_i C_i=X⋃i​Ci​=X.

The market D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C) has 2n+12n+12n+1 goods (good 000, goods CiC_iCi​, goods xjx_jxj​) and 2n+22n+22n+2 agents, with e0=n3e_0=n^3e0​=n3:

  1. agent 000 owns e0e_0e0​ units of every good; his utility for every good has slope 222 up to e0e_0e0​ units and slope 111 beyond;
  2. agent CiC_iCi​ owns one unit of good CiC_iCi​; segments of slope 111, length 1/21/21/2 for good 000, slope 1/31/31/3, length 1/61/61/6 for each good xj∈Cix_j\in C_ixj​∈Ci​, slope 1/91/91/9, length 1/41/41/4 for good CiC_iCi​;
  3. agent xjx_jxj​ owns 1/61/61/6 unit of good xjx_jxj​; one segment of slope 111, length 1/121/121/12 for good 000;
  4. the extra agent owns n/2n/2n/2 units of good 000; one segment of slope 111, length 3/43/43/4 for each good CiC_iCi​.

All other utility functions are flat.

Formalization targets

Goal: the reduction statement

C has an exact cover  ⟺  D(C) has an equilibrium  ⟺  D(C) has an n−5-approximate equilibrium.\mathcal C\ \text{has an exact cover}\iff D(\mathcal C)\ \text{has an equilibrium}\iff D(\mathcal C)\ \text{has an } n^{-5}\text{-approximate equilibrium}.C has an exact cover⟺D(C) has an equilibrium⟺D(C) has an n−5-approximate equilibrium.

This is the mathematical content of the NP-hardness half of Theorem 8.1, assembled by the paper from Lemmas 8.2 and 8.3.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 8.2: an exact cover yields an equilibrium of D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C).
  2. Lemma 7.2, as applied in Lemma 8.3: in an n−5n^{-5}n−5-approximate equilibrium of D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C) all prices are positive and within a factor 222 of each other.
  3. Claims 8.4–8.7: in such an equilibrium, with pmp_mpm​ the minimum price, p(0)=2pmp(0)=2p_mp(0)=2pm​; p(xj)<2pmp(x_j)<2p_mp(xj​)<2pm​; with S={i:p(Ci)≥pm+16∑xj∈Cip(xj)}S=\{i: p(C_i)\ge p_m+\tfrac16\sum_{x_j\in C_i}p(x_j)\}S={i:p(Ci​)≥pm​+61​∑xj​∈Ci​​p(xj​)}, every i∉Si\notin Si∈/S has p(Ci)=pmp(C_i)=p_mp(Ci​)=pm​; and the sets indexed by SSS are pairwise disjoint.
  4. Lemma 8.3: an equilibrium, or an n−5n^{-5}n−5-approximate equilibrium, of D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C) yields an exact cover.

Significance

Theorem 8.1 shows that there is no efficiently checkable necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium in piecewise-linear concave markets unless P = NP, in contrast with the linear case. Together with the PPAD results of the same paper it separates two questions: under the classical sufficient conditions an equilibrium exists and finding one is PPAD-complete; without them, even deciding existence is NP-hard, and remains so for n−5n^{-5}n−5-approximate equilibria. The construction illustrates the technique the paper uses for both of its negative results: well-chosen piecewise-linear pieces make an agent buy a segment wholly or not at all, depending on how prices compare, which gives the equilibrium problem a discrete character.

The result is proved in the paper. To our knowledge no part of it has been machine-checked. This mission formalizes the reduction's correctness at full strength, including the approximate version, which requires quantitative control of clearing errors that the exact version does not.

Difficulty

The direction "exact cover ⇒ equilibrium" is an explicit verification: prescribed prices and an allocation, and a check that every bundle is optimal, which for separable piecewise-linear utilities is a bang-per-buck comparison. The converse is the substantial part. An arbitrary approximate equilibrium must be shown to have the rigid price structure — every price in [pm,2pm][p_m,2p_m][pm​,2pm​], good 000 at 2pm2p_m2pm​, unused sets at pmp_mpm​ — before a counting argument on agent 000's savings forces ∣S∣=n/3|S|=n/3∣S∣=n/3. Each step is an excess-demand argument in which the error ϵ\epsilonϵ times the supply must be compared with quantities of order 1/n1/n1/n; this is where n>35n>35n>35 and the exponent 555 enter, and why the approximate statement does not follow from the exact one. Optimality of bundles is a statement about all affordable bundles, so each claim needs the structure of optimal bundles under piecewise-linear concave utility, which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Lean namespace PLCMarkets.ExactCover. Market data (endowments, slopes, lengths) are rationals; prices and allocations are reals. Goods and agents of D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C) are small inductive types named as in the paper; indices are 0-based. Supplies are not normalized to 111, so clearing is ∑ixij=∑iwij\sum_i x_{ij}=\sum_i w_{ij}∑i​xij​=∑i​wij​; prices are normalized to the simplex in both equilibrium notions, as in the proof of Lemma 8.3. The family C\mathcal CC is indexed and may repeat a set; exact cover and the disjointness of SSS count indices.

Standing hypotheses of every theorem: each CiC_iCi​ has three elements, 3∣n3\mid n3∣n, n>35n>35n>35, ⋃iCi=X\bigcup_i C_i=X⋃i​Ci​=X — the paper's own "without loss of generality" assumptions (p. 10:19). Two conventions depart from the printed page, both necessary and both disclosed on the items:

  • Optimal bundles buy only utility-bearing pieces. If a utility function is flat beyond its segments, the agent does not buy beyond them. The paper uses this throughout (an agent "can only spend pm/6p_m/6pm​/6 on the single segment", Claim 8.5). Without it, agents can spend leftover income on goods worth nothing to them; then setting p(0)=2pmp(0)=2p_mp(0)=2pm​ and every other price to pmp_mpm​ gives an exact equilibrium of every D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C), and the goal is false.
  • The extra agent's segments have length 3/43/43/4. The page prints 3n/43n/43n/4; every computation in the paper (Lemma 8.2, Claim 8.6, the end of Lemma 8.3) uses 3/43/43/4 per good, and with 3n/43n/43n/4 the prices of Lemma 8.2 are not an equilibrium.

Trivializing encodings are excluded: optimality of bundles is part of both equilibrium notions (without it the endowment itself clears every market), clearing is relative and per good, and the goal quantifies only over nnn and C\mathcal CC, with D(C)D(\mathcal C)D(C) an explicit function of C\mathcal CC.

Out of scope: the complexity-class statement "NP-complete" and NP membership (which comes from the rationality theorems of the companion mission); polynomial-time computability of the construction and string encodings of markets; and the Fisher market FFF of §8, whose half of Lemmas 8.2 and 8.3 is a natural follow-up. Reusable infrastructure: piecewise-linear concave utilities, Arrow–Debreu markets with exact and approximate equilibria, and bang-per-buck characterizations of optimal bundles. Contributions proving that characterization as a standalone lemma are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. V. Vazirani and M. Yannakakis, Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear, Concave Utilities, Journal of the ACM 58(3), Article 10, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1145/1970392.1970394
  • X. Chen, D. Dai, Y. Du and S.-H. Teng, Settling the Complexity of Arrow–Debreu Equilibria in Markets with Additively Separable Utilities, Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2009 (reference [Chen et al. 2009a] of the paper).
  • M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
  • K. J. Arrow and G. Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, Econometrica 22(3), 1954. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907353
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analysis of Several Heuristics for the Traveling Salesman Problem II: Every Insertion Method Is Within ⌈lg n⌉ + 1 of the Optimal TourResearch Paper

Motivation

The traveling salesman problem asks for a shortest closed route visiting every node of a weighted complete graph exactly once. It is NP-hard, so practitioners use fast heuristics, and the basic question about a heuristic is how far from optimal its tour can be. Rosenkrantz, Stearns and Lewis (SIAM J. Comput. 6(3), 1977) gave the first systematic worst-case analysis of the simple constructive heuristics under the triangle inequality: nearest neighbor, the family of insertion methods, and several variants.

Insertion methods build a tour by growing it one node at a time. They are among the most widely used construction heuristics in practice and in textbooks, and they differ only in the rule that chooses which node to insert next: the nearest one, the cheapest one, the farthest one, a random one, or any other. This mission formalizes the paper's result that holds for the whole family at once, regardless of that rule: every insertion method produces a tour at most ⌈lg⁡n⌉+1\lceil \lg n\rceil + 1⌈lgn⌉+1 times longer than an optimal one (Theorem 3, p. 571).

Timeline. 1977: Rosenkrantz, Stearns and Lewis prove ⌈lg⁡n⌉+1\lceil\lg n\rceil+1⌈lgn⌉+1 for every insertion method (Theorem 3), 12(⌈lg⁡n⌉+1)\tfrac12(\lceil\lg n\rceil+1)21​(⌈lgn⌉+1) for nearest neighbor (Theorem 1), both from a shared counting lemma (Lemma 1), and the constant 222 for nearest and cheapest insertion (Theorem 4). 1994: Bafna, Kalyanasundaram and Pruhs (Theoretical Computer Science 125, 1994) give instances on which some insertion methods reach ratio Ω(log⁡n/log⁡log⁡n)\Omega(\log n/\log\log n)Ω(logn/loglogn), so the logarithmic growth cannot be replaced by a constant for the family as a whole.

Setting

A traveling salesman graph with nnn nodes consists of a finite node set NNN with ∣N∣=n|N|=n∣N∣=n and a distance d:N×N→Rd:N\times N\to\mathbb Rd:N×N→R with d(i,j)=d(j,i)d(i,j)=d(j,i)d(i,j)=d(j,i), d(i,j)≥0d(i,j)\ge 0d(i,j)≥0 and d(i,j)+d(j,k)≥d(i,k)d(i,j)+d(j,k)\ge d(i,k)d(i,j)+d(j,k)≥d(i,k) for all nodes (the triangle inequality). A tour visits every node once and returns to its start; its length is the sum of its edge lengths, and OPTIMAL is the least length of a tour.

A subtour is a tour on a subset of the nodes; a single node is a tour without edges. Given a subtour TTT and a node k∉Tk\notin Tk∈/T, TOUR(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is obtained by choosing an edge (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) of TTT minimizing

d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)-d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y)

and replacing it by the edges (x,k)(x,k)(x,k) and (k,y)(k,y)(k,y); if TTT is a single node iii, TOUR(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is the two-node tour (i,k),(k,i)(i,k),(k,i)(i,k),(k,i). COST(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is the length of TOUR(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) minus the length of TTT.

An insertion method constructs subtours T1,…,TnT_1,\dots,T_nT1​,…,Tn​ with T1={a0}T_1=\{a_0\}T1​={a0​} a single node and Ti+1=TOUR(Ti,ai)T_{i+1}=\mathrm{TOUR}(T_i,a_i)Ti+1​=TOUR(Ti​,ai​) for some node ai∉Tia_i\notin T_iai​∈/Ti​, 1≤i<n1\le i<n1≤i<n. The final tour TnT_nTn​ is the approximation, and INSERT denotes its length. No rule for choosing the aia_iai​ is fixed, and ties between minimizing edges are broken arbitrarily.

Write lg⁡\lglg for the logarithm to base 2 and ⌈x⌉\lceil x\rceil⌈x⌉ for the least integer ≥x\ge x≥x.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For every traveling salesman graph with n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 nodes and every run of every insertion method,

INSERT ≤ (⌈lg⁡n⌉+1)⋅OPTIMAL.\mathrm{INSERT}\ \le\ \bigl(\lceil\lg n\rceil+1\bigr)\cdot\mathrm{OPTIMAL}.INSERT ≤ (⌈lgn⌉+1)⋅OPTIMAL.

Milestones

  1. (2.2), shortcutting: visiting a subset of the nodes in the order of a tour gives a tour of the subset that is no longer.
  2. (2.1): if the numbers l1≥⋯≥lnl_1\ge\dots\ge l_nl1​≥⋯≥ln​ satisfy d(p,q)≥min⁡(lp,lq)d(p,q)\ge\min(l_p,l_q)d(p,q)≥min(lp​,lq​) for distinct p,qp,qp,q, then OPTIMAL≥2∑i=k+1min⁡(2k,n)li\mathrm{OPTIMAL}\ge 2\sum_{i=k+1}^{\min(2k,n)} l_iOPTIMAL≥2∑i=k+1min(2k,n)​li​ for 1≤k≤n1\le k\le n1≤k≤n.
  3. Lemma 1: if d(p,q)≥min⁡(lp,lq)d(p,q)\ge\min(l_p,l_q)d(p,q)≥min(lp​,lq​) for distinct nodes and lp≤12OPTIMALl_p\le\frac12\mathrm{OPTIMAL}lp​≤21​OPTIMAL for all ppp, then
∑plp≤12(⌈lg⁡n⌉+1)OPTIMAL.\sum_p l_p\le\tfrac12\bigl(\lceil\lg n\rceil+1\bigr)\mathrm{OPTIMAL}.p∑​lp​≤21​(⌈lgn⌉+1)OPTIMAL.
  1. Lemma 2: COST(T,k)≤2 d(k,j)\mathrm{COST}(T,k)\le 2\,d(k,j)COST(T,k)≤2d(k,j) for every node jjj of TTT.
  2. (3.7): INSERT=∑i=1n−1COST(Ti,ai)\mathrm{INSERT}=\sum_{i=1}^{n-1}\mathrm{COST}(T_i,a_i)INSERT=∑i=1n−1​COST(Ti​,ai​).
  3. (3.10): COST(Ti,ai)≤2 d(ai,aj)\mathrm{COST}(T_i,a_i)\le 2\,d(a_i,a_j)COST(Ti​,ai​)≤2d(ai​,aj​) whenever j<ij<ij<i.
  4. (3.12): COST(Ti,ai)≤OPTIMAL\mathrm{COST}(T_i,a_i)\le\mathrm{OPTIMAL}COST(Ti​,ai​)≤OPTIMAL for 1≤i<n1\le i<n1≤i<n.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 is a guarantee for an entire class of algorithms rather than for one. Any rule for choosing the next node, including rules designed for speed or for empirical quality, inherits a worst-case ratio of ⌈lg⁡n⌉+1\lceil\lg n\rceil+1⌈lgn⌉+1 from the insertion step alone. The rule matters only for improving on that: nearest and cheapest insertion achieve the constant 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) (Theorem 4 and its corollary, the subject of the third mission of this series), while the logarithmic bound remains the best general statement for other rules, such as farthest or arbitrary insertion. Lemma 1 is reusable on its own: it converts "every node carries a charge bounded by half the optimum and by its distance to other nodes" into a logarithmic bound, and the same lemma yields the nearest neighbor bound of Theorem 1.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1977; the work here is a machine-checked proof of the known argument together with a reusable library for subtours, insertion and insertion costs. The companion nearest neighbor bound (Theorem 1) is already on the platform as SupplyChainTheory.nearest_neighbor_bound (proved), and nearest insertion with constant 2 as SupplyChainTheory.nearest_insertion_bound; neither covers arbitrary insertion methods or states Lemma 1 separately.

Difficulty

The per-step facts are local: each insertion is cheap relative to a node already present (Lemma 2) and relative to OPTIMAL (3.12). The obvious way to combine them, adding up n−1n-1n−1 costs each at most OPTIMAL, gives only the ratio n−1n-1n−1. The logarithm comes from a global counting argument over all nodes simultaneously (Lemma 1), in which OPTIMAL is compared with tours on nested subsets of nodes of doubling size, and the per-node charges must be matched against the edges of those tours. Formally, the delicate parts are the bookkeeping of subtours as they grow (that every earlier node lies on the current subtour, and that the insertion cost equals the length increase), the shortcutting of a tour to an arbitrary subset, and the ceiling-of-logarithm arithmetic.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n; a tour of all nodes is a permutation τ : Equiv.Perm (Fin n), and OPTIMAL is the minimum of the tour length over the finite, nonempty set of permutations. Subtours are duplicate-free lists of nodes, with closed length d(x0,x1)+⋯+d(xm−1,x0)d(x_0,x_1)+\dots+d(x_{m-1},x_0)d(x0​,x1​)+⋯+d(xm−1​,x0​). TOUR(T,k)(T,k)(T,k) is encoded as inserting kkk at a list position whose resulting length is minimal among all positions; inserting at a position removes exactly one edge of TTT and raises the length by exactly d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)-d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y), so this is the paper's rule, with every tie-breaking allowed. COST is the minimum length increase over positions. The paper's 1-based subtour index is kept (T1=[a0]T_1=[a_0]T1​=[a0​], TnT_nTn​ final). ⌈lg⁡n⌉\lceil\lg n\rceil⌈lgn⌉ is Nat.clog 2 n. All quantities are real.

Conventions and deviations, each disclosed in the item statements:

  • The distance satisfies d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0, a normalization not in the paper; a loop never enters any length.
  • Ratios are multiplied out (INSERT≤c⋅OPTIMAL\mathrm{INSERT}\le c\cdot\mathrm{OPTIMAL}INSERT≤c⋅OPTIMAL), so the paper's exclusion of the identically zero distance (1.1) is not needed.
  • Condition a) of Lemma 1 is required for distinct nodes only. The page says "for all nodes ppp and qqq", which for p=qp=qp=q would force every lp≤0l_p\le 0lp​≤0 and make the lemma inapplicable in the proof of Theorem 3; the proof uses the condition only on edges of a tour.
  • (2.2) is stated for every subset of the nodes and every tour, which is what the shortcut argument shows; the paper applies it to one specific subset and an optimal tour.
  • (2.1) uses 0-based node labels, so its range k+1,…,min⁡(2k,n)k+1,\dots,\min(2k,n)k+1,…,min(2k,n) becomes k,…,min⁡(2k,n)−1k,\dots,\min(2k,n)-1k,…,min(2k,n)−1.

The goal quantifies over every run: any choice of the inserted nodes aia_iai​ and any minimizing insertion position. Adding a selection rule (nearest, cheapest) or fixing a tie-breaking would state a weaker, different theorem; restricting to instances with OPTIMAL =0=0=0 or to a fixed small nnn would trivialize it.

Reusable beyond this mission: the subtour and insertion library (closed length of a list, TOUR, COST, insertion runs) and Lemma 1, which also yields Theorem 1. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, general lemmas about the closed length of List.insertIdx and of filtered lists, and a proof of Theorem 1 from this mission's Lemma 1.

Selected references

  • D. J. Rosenkrantz, R. E. Stearns, P. M. Lewis II, An Analysis of Several Heuristics for the Traveling Salesman Problem, SIAM Journal on Computing 6(3):563–581, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206041
  • V. Bafna, B. Kalyanasundaram, K. Pruhs, Not all insertion methods yield constant approximate tours in the Euclidean plane, Theoretical Computer Science 125(2):345–353, 1994.
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Mean-Covariance Solutions for Stochastic Optimization I: The General Projection Property of Mean-Covariance Distribution ClassesResearch Paper

Motivation

In robust stochastic optimization a decision maker chooses a decision xxx whose outcome depends on a random vector R\mathbf RR, but knows only the first two moments of R\mathbf RR: its mean vector μ\muμ and its covariance matrix Σ\SigmaΣ. The decision is evaluated by its worst-case expected utility over every distribution consistent with those moments. This model is standard in portfolio selection, where estimated means and covariances are the usual inputs, and in pricing and inventory problems with mean-variance information. It goes back to Scarf's min-max newsvendor (1958) and the Chebyshev-type moment bounds of Bertsimas and Popescu (2005).

For a linear outcome x′Rx'\mathbf Rx′R, such as the return of a portfolio with weights xxx, the robust objective is

U(x)=min⁡R∼(μ,Σ)E[u(x′R)],U(x) = \min_{\mathbf R \sim (\mu,\Sigma)} E[u(x'\mathbf R)],U(x)=R∼(μ,Σ)min​E[u(x′R)],

an optimization over an infinite-dimensional set of nnn-variate distributions. Popescu (2007) showed that this problem depends on μ\muμ and Σ\SigmaΣ only through the scalar mean μx=x′μ\mu_x = x'\muμx​=x′μ and variance σx2=x′Σx\sigma_x^2 = x'\Sigma xσx2​=x′Σx. The multivariate robust problem then reduces to a univariate moment problem, and for many utilities to a parametric quadratic program. The reduction rests on one structural fact, the general projection property, which this mission formalizes.

Setting

Fix a dimension nnn. A law on Rn\mathbb R^nRn is a Borel probability measure on Rn\mathbb R^nRn. For a vector μ∈Rn\mu \in \mathbb R^nμ∈Rn and a real n×nn\times nn×n matrix Σ\SigmaΣ, the mean-covariance class M(μ,Σ)n\mathbb M^n_{(\mu,\Sigma)}M(μ,Σ)n​ is the set of laws PPP under which every coordinate RiR_iRi​ has a finite second moment and

∫Ri dP(R)=μi,∫(Ri−μi)(Rj−μj) dP(R)=Σij(1≤i,j≤n).\int R_i\,dP(R) = \mu_i, \qquad \int (R_i-\mu_i)(R_j-\mu_j)\,dP(R) = \Sigma_{ij} \qquad (1\le i,j\le n).∫Ri​dP(R)=μi​,∫(Ri​−μi​)(Rj​−μj​)dP(R)=Σij​(1≤i,j≤n).

Writing R∼(μ,Σ)\mathbf R \sim (\mu,\Sigma)R∼(μ,Σ) means that the law of R\mathbf RR lies in M(μ,Σ)n\mathbb M^n_{(\mu,\Sigma)}M(μ,Σ)n​. For n=1n=1n=1 the superscript is dropped: for real mmm and vvv, M(m,v)\mathbb M_{(m,v)}M(m,v)​ is the set of laws on R\mathbb RR with finite second moment, mean mmm and variance vvv.

For a vector x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn, the xxx-projection sends the law PPP of R\mathbf RR to the law of the scalar r=x′R\mathbf r = x'\mathbf Rr=x′R, that is, to the pushforward of PPP under R↦x′RR \mapsto x'RR↦x′R. Write μx=x′μ\mu_x = x'\muμx​=x′μ and σx2=x′Σx\sigma_x^2 = x'\Sigma xσx2​=x′Σx. The matrix Σ\SigmaΣ is positive semidefinite, Σ⪰0\Sigma \succeq 0Σ⪰0, when x′Σx≥0x'\Sigma x \ge 0x′Σx≥0 for all xxx (and Σ\SigmaΣ is symmetric); Σ1/2\Sigma^{1/2}Σ1/2 denotes its positive semidefinite square root.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (General Projection Property)

For every μ∈Rn\mu \in \mathbb R^nμ∈Rn, every Σ⪰0\Sigma \succeq 0Σ⪰0 and every nonzero x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn, the xxx-projection maps M(μ,Σ)n\mathbb M^n_{(\mu,\Sigma)}M(μ,Σ)n​ into and onto M(μx,σx2)\mathbb M_{(\mu_x,\sigma_x^2)}M(μx​,σx2​)​:

{ law of x′R  :  R∼(μ,Σ)}  =  M(x′μ,  x′Σx).\bigl\{\, \text{law of } x'\mathbf R \;:\; \mathbf R \sim (\mu,\Sigma) \bigr\} \;=\; \mathbb M_{(x'\mu,\; x'\Sigma x)}.{law of x′R:R∼(μ,Σ)}=M(x′μ,x′Σx)​.

The "into" half says every projected law has the right mean and variance. The "onto" half says that every univariate law with mean μx\mu_xμx​ and variance σx2\sigma_x^2σx2​, however heavy-tailed or irregular, is the law of x′Rx'\mathbf Rx′R for some R∼(μ,Σ)\mathbf R \sim (\mu,\Sigma)R∼(μ,Σ). The degenerate case x′Σx=0x'\Sigma x = 0x′Σx=0 is included.

Milestones

  1. The into half (§2.1, justification of (4)): x′Rx'\mathbf Rx′R has mean x′μx'\mux′μ and variance x′Σxx'\Sigma xx′Σx.
  2. The degenerate case: if x′Σx=0x'\Sigma x = 0x′Σx=0 then x′R=x′μx'\mathbf R = x'\mux′R=x′μ almost surely.
  3. Standardization: if r∼(m,v)\mathbf r \sim (m, v)r∼(m,v) with v>0v > 0v>0, then v−1/2(r−m)∼(0,1)v^{-1/2}(\mathbf r - m) \sim (0,1)v−1/2(r−m)∼(0,1).
  4. Normalization: for x′Σx>0x'\Sigma x > 0x′Σx>0, the vector y=(x′Σx)−1/2Σ1/2xy = (x'\Sigma x)^{-1/2}\Sigma^{1/2}xy=(x′Σx)−1/2Σ1/2x satisfies y′y=1y'y = 1y′y=1.
  5. Isotropic lift: if y′y=1y'y = 1y′y=1 and z∼(0,1)\mathbf z \sim (0,1)z∼(0,1), there is Z∼(0,In)\mathbf Z \sim (0, I_n)Z∼(0,In​) with y′Zy'\mathbf Zy′Z distributed as z\mathbf zz.
  6. Affine image: if Z∼(0,In)\mathbf Z \sim (0,I_n)Z∼(0,In​) then μ+Σ1/2Z∼(μ,Σ)\mu + \Sigma^{1/2}\mathbf Z \sim (\mu,\Sigma)μ+Σ1/2Z∼(μ,Σ), and x′(μ+Σ1/2Z)=x′μ+(x′Σx)1/2 y′Zx'(\mu + \Sigma^{1/2}Z) = x'\mu + (x'\Sigma x)^{1/2}\,y'Zx′(μ+Σ1/2Z)=x′μ+(x′Σx)1/2y′Z for every ZZZ.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 immediately yields Proposition 1 of the paper: for every objective uuu,

min⁡R∼(μ,Σ)E[u(x′R)]=min⁡r∼(μx,σx2)E[u(r)],\min_{\mathbf R\sim(\mu,\Sigma)} E[u(x'\mathbf R)] = \min_{\mathbf r\sim(\mu_x,\sigma_x^2)} E[u(\mathbf r)],R∼(μ,Σ)min​E[u(x′R)]=r∼(μx​,σx2​)min​E[u(r)],

with minima in the wide sense of infima. The robust objective is therefore a function of (μx,σx)(\mu_x, \sigma_x)(μx​,σx​) alone, which makes every robust mean-covariance problem with a linear outcome a bicriteria mean-variance problem. The paper's later results use this: the two-point and one-point support properties, the parametric quadratic programming solution, and the portfolio applications (bonus schemes, value at risk). The projection property holds with no assumption on uuu, so it serves non-concave, discontinuous and quantile-based objectives alike.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. The mission produces a formal definition of mean-covariance classes that treats integrability honestly, a proof of the projection property, and through it a formally verified reduction of multivariate moment-robust problems to univariate ones. The paper's own construction of the lifted vector has a gap (see Difficulty), so a formal proof also records a corrected argument.

Difficulty

The into half is a computation with linearity of expectation. The difficulty is entirely in the onto half. Given an arbitrary univariate law with prescribed mean and variance, one must build an nnn-variate law with a prescribed full covariance matrix whose one-dimensional marginal in direction xxx is exactly the given law. This is a coupling problem: the obvious approach, taking independent coordinates, fixes the marginal in direction xxx as a convolution and cannot reproduce an arbitrary target. Taking R\mathbf RR supported on the line through μ\muμ in a single direction reproduces the target law but has a rank-one covariance and fails whenever Σ\SigmaΣ has rank above one.

The paper's appendix constructs the lift through conditional distributions of the remaining coordinates given the projected one. As printed, the conditional second-moment requirement it imposes cannot hold for unbounded targets, so that argument does not go through verbatim. The milestone for the lift states only the claim, not the printed construction.

The integrability bookkeeping is real work: every intermediate law must be shown to have finite second moments before its moments can be computed.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with its Borel σ-algebra; x′Rx'Rx′R is the inner product ⟨x,R⟩\langle x, R\rangle⟨x,R⟩; x′Σxx'\Sigma xx′Σx is x.ofLp ⬝ᵥ S *ᵥ x.ofLp, where the matrix Σ\SigmaΣ is named S (the symbol Σ is reserved in Lean).
  • Laws are probability measures. Both classes require finite second moments (MemLp … 2), so that means and covariances are genuine integrals, not the default value 000 that Lean assigns to non-integrable functions. The univariate class is parametrized by the variance v=σ2v = \sigma^2v=σ2, not by σ\sigmaσ.
  • The projection is the pushforward P.map (fun R => ⟪x, R⟫) under a continuous map. "Pathwise" identities in the paper become equalities of pushforward laws, or pointwise algebraic identities.
  • Σ1/2\Sigma^{1/2}Σ1/2 is CFC.sqrt S, acting through Matrix.toEuclideanCLM, as in Mathlib's multivariateGaussian.
  • The goal is stated as Set.MapsTo ∧ Set.SurjOn with both classes explicit. Its only hypotheses are Σ⪰0\Sigma \succeq 0Σ⪰0 and x≠0x \ne 0x=0, as in the paper. No bound on nnn, no invertibility of Σ\SigmaΣ and no positivity of x′Σxx'\Sigma xx′Σx is assumed. Restricting the target to Gaussian, bounded or finitely supported laws, or dropping the finite-second-moment clause (which would admit Cauchy laws as "mean 0, variance 0"), would trivialize or change the theorem and is ruled out.
  • Milestones 3, 4 and 6 assume x′Σx>0x'\Sigma x > 0x′Σx>0 (or v>0v > 0v>0), the case the proof treats after its first sentence; milestone 2 covers the complementary case.

Needed infrastructure: moments of pushforwards under linear and affine maps, a covariance calculus for coordinates of random vectors, and a coupling that realizes the isotropic lift. Mathlib's multivariateGaussian, stdGaussian and CFC.sqrt are available. A reusable lemma "the covariance of AZ+bA\mathbf Z + bAZ+b is A Cov(Z)A′A\,\mathrm{Cov}(\mathbf Z)A'ACov(Z)A′" would serve beyond this mission. Related platform work on moment-based ambiguity sets: Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization II. Contributions of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the lift, are welcome.

Selected references

  • I. Popescu, Robust Mean-Covariance Solutions for Stochastic Optimization, Operations Research 55(1):98–112, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0353
  • D. Bertsimas, I. Popescu, Optimal Inequalities in Probability Theory: A Convex Optimization Approach, SIAM Journal on Optimization 15(3):780–804, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623401399903
  • H. Scarf, A Min-Max Solution of an Inventory Problem, in Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958.
  • W. W. Rogosinski, Moments of Non-Negative Mass, Proceedings of the Royal Society A 245:1–27, 1958. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1958.0062
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Convex OptimizationLinear algebraLinear Optimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Path-Finding Methods for Linear Programming II: Properties of the Regularized D-Optimal-Design Weight FunctionResearch Paper

Motivation

Interior point methods for a linear program min⁡{c⊤x:Ax≥b}\min\{c^\top x : Ax\ge b\}min{c⊤x:Ax≥b} with A∈Rm×nA\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n follow the central path of the logarithmic barrier −∑ilog⁡si-\sum_i\log s_i−∑i​logsi​, where s=Ax−bs=Ax-bs=Ax−b is the slack vector. Renegar's path-following analysis (1988) gives O(m L)O(\sqrt m\,L)O(m​L) iterations, and for decades this was the best bound for methods whose iterations cost a linear system solve. Vaidya's volumetric barrier −log⁡det⁡(A⊤S−2A)-\log\det(A^\top S^{-2}A)−logdet(A⊤S−2A) and the hybrid volumetric barriers of Vaidya and of Anstreicher (references [45] and [2] of the paper) reached O((m rank(A))1/4L)O((m\,\mathrm{rank}(A))^{1/4}L)O((mrank(A))1/4L) iterations at the price of more expensive linear algebra. Nesterov and Nemirovski showed that a universal barrier gives O(n L)O(\sqrt n\,L)O(n​L) iterations, but that barrier cannot be evaluated efficiently.

Lee and Sidford (FOCS 2014; full version arXiv:1312.6677) obtained O~(rank(A) L)\tilde O(\sqrt{\mathrm{rank}(A)}\,L)O~(rank(A)​L) iterations, each costing O~(1)\tilde O(1)O~(1) linear system solves, by following a weighted central path whose weights are recomputed from the slacks. The weights come from a weight function ggg, defined as the minimizer of a regularized D-optimal-design problem. This mission is about that weight function and the theorem (Theorem 1 of the paper) certifying its properties. The companion mission, Path-Finding Methods for Linear Programming I, formalizes the path-following framework (Theorem 5 of §IV.C) that consumes these properties.

Setting

Fix A∈Rm×nA\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n with full column rank, rank(A)=n\mathrm{rank}(A)=nrank(A)=n, and 1≤n<m1\le n<m1≤n<m. For vectors s,w∈R>0ms,w\in\mathbb R^m_{>0}s,w∈R>0m​ write S=diag(s)S=\mathrm{diag}(s)S=diag(s), W=diag(w)W=\mathrm{diag}(w)W=diag(w), Wα=diag(wiα)W^\alpha=\mathrm{diag}(w_i^\alpha)Wα=diag(wiα​), and As=S−1AA_s=S^{-1}AAs​=S−1A. For a matrix MMM let ∥v∥M=v⊤Mv\|v\|_M=\sqrt{v^\top Mv}∥v∥M​=v⊤Mv​.

Projection matrix and slack sensitivity (Definition 2, p. 428). The projection matrix is PS−1A(w)=W1/2S−1A (A⊤S−1WS−1A)−1A⊤S−1W1/2P_{S^{-1}A}(w)=W^{1/2}S^{-1}A\,(A^\top S^{-1}WS^{-1}A)^{-1}A^\top S^{-1}W^{1/2}PS−1A​(w)=W1/2S−1A(A⊤S−1WS−1A)−1A⊤S−1W1/2, and the slack sensitivity is

γ(s,w)=max⁡i∈[m]∥W−1/21i∥PS−1A(w).\gamma(s,w)=\max_{i\in[m]}\big\|W^{-1/2}\mathbb 1_i\big\|_{P_{S^{-1}A}(w)} .γ(s,w)=i∈[m]max​​W−1/21i​​PS−1A​(w)​.

Weight function (Definition 4, p. 428). A map g:R>0m→R>0mg:\mathbb R^m_{>0}\to\mathbb R^m_{>0}g:R>0m​→R>0m​ is a weight function with constants c1,cγ,crc_1,c_\gamma,c_rc1​,cγ​,cr​ if it is differentiable and, for every s>0s>0s>0, with G(s)=diag(g(s))G(s)=\mathrm{diag}(g(s))G(s)=diag(g(s)), G′(s)G'(s)G′(s) the Jacobian of ggg at sss, and ∥y∥G(s)=∑igi(s)yi2\|y\|_{G(s)}=\sqrt{\sum_ig_i(s)y_i^2}∥y∥G(s)​=∑i​gi​(s)yi2​​:

  1. Size: ∥g(s)∥1≤c1\|g(s)\|_1\le c_1∥g(s)∥1​≤c1​;
  2. Slack sensitivity: cγ≥1c_\gamma\ge1cγ​≥1 and γ(s,g(s))≤cγ\gamma(s,g(s))\le c_\gammaγ(s,g(s))≤cγ​;
  3. Step consistency: cr≥1c_r\ge1cr​≥1 and for all r≥crr\ge c_rr≥cr​, y∈Rmy\in\mathbb R^my∈Rm: ∥(I+r−1G−1G′S)y∥G(s)≤∥y∥G(s)\|(I+r^{-1}G^{-1}G'S)y\|_{G(s)}\le\|y\|_{G(s)}∥(I+r−1G−1G′S)y∥G(s)​≤∥y∥G(s)​ and ∥y+r−1G−1G′Sy∥∞≤∥y∥∞+cr∥y∥G(s)\|y+r^{-1}G^{-1}G'Sy\|_\infty\le\|y\|_\infty+c_r\|y\|_{G(s)}∥y+r−1G−1G′Sy∥∞​≤∥y∥∞​+cr​∥y∥G(s)​;
  4. Uniformity: ∥g(s)∥∞≤2\|g(s)\|_\infty\le2∥g(s)∥∞​≤2.

The regularized objective (6), p. 429. For α,β∈R\alpha,\beta\in\mathbb Rα,β∈R,

f^(s,w)=1⊤w−1αlog⁡det⁡(As⊤WαAs)−β∑i∈[m]log⁡wi,g(s)=arg⁡min⁡w∈R>0mf^(s,w).\hat f(s,w)=\mathbb 1^\top w-\frac1\alpha\log\det\big(A_s^\top W^\alpha A_s\big)-\beta\sum_{i\in[m]}\log w_i ,\qquad g(s)=\arg\min_{w\in\mathbb R^m_{>0}}\hat f(s,w).f^​(s,w)=1⊤w−α1​logdet(As⊤​WαAs​)−βi∈[m]∑​logwi​,g(s)=argw∈R>0m​min​f^​(s,w).

At α=1,β=0\alpha=1,\beta=0α=1,β=0 this is the D-optimal design problem, dual to computing the John ellipsoid of the polytope {y:∣[A(y−x)]i∣≤si}\{y:|[A(y-x)]_i|\le s_i\}{y:∣[A(y−x)]i​∣≤si​} (§V.B).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (Properties of Weight Function), §V.A, p. 429

With

α=1−(log⁡22mrank(A))−1,β=rank(A)2m,\alpha=1-\Big(\log_2\frac{2m}{\mathrm{rank}(A)}\Big)^{-1},\qquad \beta=\frac{\mathrm{rank}(A)}{2m},α=1−(log2​rank(A)2m​)−1,β=2mrank(A)​,

the objective f^(s,⋅)\hat f(s,\cdot)f^​(s,⋅) has a unique minimizer over R>0m\mathbb R^m_{>0}R>0m​ for every s>0s>0s>0, and the resulting ggg is a weight function with

c1(g)=2 rank(A),cγ(g)=2,cr(g)=2log⁡22mrank(A).c_1(g)=2\,\mathrm{rank}(A),\qquad c_\gamma(g)=2,\qquad c_r(g)=2\log_2\frac{2m}{\mathrm{rank}(A)} .c1​(g)=2rank(A),cγ​(g)=2,cr​(g)=2log2​rank(A)2m​.

Milestones: the three bullets of Theorem 1

  • Size: every minimizer www of f^(s,⋅)\hat f(s,\cdot)f^​(s,⋅) satisfies ∥w∥1≤2 rank(A)\|w\|_1\le2\,\mathrm{rank}(A)∥w∥1​≤2rank(A).
  • Slack sensitivity: every minimizer www satisfies γ(s,w)≤2\gamma(s,w)\le2γ(s,w)≤2.
  • Step consistency: any map ggg selecting a minimizer at every s>0s>0s>0 is differentiable on R>0m\mathbb R^m_{>0}R>0m​ and satisfies the two step-consistency inequalities for every r≥2log⁡22mrank(A)r\ge2\log_2\frac{2m}{\mathrm{rank}(A)}r≥2log2​rank(A)2m​.

A supporting (non-milestone) item states the existence and uniqueness of the minimizer on its own.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 is the input that turns the weighted path-following framework into an O~(rank(A) L)\tilde O(\sqrt{\mathrm{rank}(A)}\,L)O~(rank(A)​L)-iteration method: the framework needs O(cγ−1cr−3c1−1/2)O(c_\gamma^{-1}c_r^{-3}c_1^{-1/2})O(cγ−1​cr−3​c1−1/2​)-sized steps in ttt (p. 428), and Theorem 1 makes that Ω~(1/rank(A))\tilde\Omega(1/\sqrt{\mathrm{rank}(A)})Ω~(1/rank(A)​). The step consistency bound is what allows the weights to be recomputed after each Newton step without losing centrality. The same construction underlies later work on Lewis-weight barriers and on fast approximate John ellipsoids and maximum flow (§VIII of the paper).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the full version of the paper (arXiv:1312.6677); the FOCS extended abstract contains no proofs. No part of it has a machine-checked proof. A complete formalization would give a verified account of leverage-score calculus (sums of leverage scores equal the rank; derivatives of projection matrices), of the convexity of w↦−log⁡det⁡(A⊤WαA)w\mapsto-\log\det(A^\top W^\alpha A)w↦−logdet(A⊤WαA) for α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1), and of differentiability of an argmin via the implicit function theorem, none of which is currently packaged in Mathlib in this form.

Difficulty

Size and slack sensitivity are statements about the minimizer, which is only characterized implicitly; they require precise matrix calculus for log⁡det⁡(As⊤WαAs)\log\det(A_s^\top W^\alpha A_s)logdet(As⊤​WαAs​) and a comparison between the matrices A⊤WAA^\top WAA⊤WA (which defines γ\gammaγ) and A⊤WαAA^\top W^\alpha AA⊤WαA (which defines ggg). The specific values of α\alphaα and β\betaβ matter here: the unregularized choice α=1\alpha=1α=1, β=0\beta=0β=0 makes the problem degenerate (p. 429).

The hard part is step consistency. The Jacobian G′G'G′ of an argmin is available only implicitly, as the solution of a linear system obtained by differentiating the optimality condition. A bound on ∥G′∥\|G'\|∥G′∥ that depends on mmm is easy to get and useless: the theorem needs the operator norm of I+r−1G−1G′SI+r^{-1}G^{-1}G'SI+r−1G−1G′S in the G(s)G(s)G(s)-norm to be at most 111 as soon as rrr exceeds 2log⁡2(2m/rank(A))2\log_2(2m/\mathrm{rank}(A))2log2​(2m/rank(A)), and an ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ bound with only an additive cr∥y∥G(s)c_r\|y\|_{G(s)}cr​∥y∥G(s)​ loss.

Existence and differentiability of the minimizer are conclusions, not hypotheses. The minimization is over an open orthant on which the objective is not obviously coercive or strictly convex for α<1\alpha<1α<1, and differentiability of ggg requires the Hessian of f^\hat ff^​ at the minimizer to be invertible.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin m → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ; inverses are Matrix.inv, log⁡det⁡\log\detlogdet is Real.log (Matrix.det …), wiαw_i^\alphawiα​ is Real.rpow, log⁡2\log_2log2​ is Real.logb 2, the Jacobian is fderiv ℝ g s, and ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​ is Mathlib's sup norm on Fin m → ℝ.

Conventions and pinned hypotheses:

  • Full column rank A.rank = n is assumed in every theorem. The paper never states it, but without it As⊤WαAsA_s^\top W^\alpha A_sAs⊤​WαAs​ is singular and every formula is undefined (in Lean, Matrix.inv and Real.log would return junk 000).
  • 1≤n<m1\le n<m1≤n<m. β=rank(A)/(2m)\beta=\mathrm{rank}(A)/(2m)β=rank(A)/(2m) and log⁡2(2m/rank(A))\log_2(2m/\mathrm{rank}(A))log2​(2m/rank(A)) need rank(A)≥1\mathrm{rank}(A)\ge1rank(A)≥1; at m=rank(A)m=\mathrm{rank}(A)m=rank(A) the page's α\alphaα is 000 and 1/α1/\alpha1/α in (6) is undefined.
  • Reading of α\alphaα: the exponent −1-1−1 is the reciprocal of log⁡22mrank(A)\log_2\frac{2m}{\mathrm{rank}(A)}log2​rank(A)2m​, giving α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1).
  • Size is an upper bound ∥g(s)∥1≤c1\|g(s)\|_1\le c_1∥g(s)∥1​≤c1​ (the paper's weight function has ∥g(s)∥1=32rank(A)\|g(s)\|_1=\tfrac32\mathrm{rank}(A)∥g(s)∥1​=23​rank(A), while Theorem 1 reports c1=2 rank(A)c_1=2\,\mathrm{rank}(A)c1​=2rank(A)).
  • The first step-consistency bullet (an operator-norm bound) is stated for every vector yyy.
  • ggg is any map Rm→Rm\mathbb R^m\to\mathbb R^mRm→Rm whose value at each positive sss minimizes f^(s,⋅)\hat f(s,\cdot)f^​(s,⋅) over R>0m\mathbb R^m_{>0}R>0m​. Only its values on the open orthant matter. The goal also asserts that such minimizers exist and are unique, so it is not vacuous.

Ruling out trivializations: the goal does not assume ggg to be a weight function or to be differentiable, and it does not replace ggg by an arbitrary weight function; differentiability is a conclusion (a predicate using fderiv without it would make step consistency hold vacuously wherever ggg fails to be differentiable).

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: leverage scores and their sum; derivatives of w↦log⁡det⁡(A⊤WA)w\mapsto\log\det(A^\top WA)w↦logdet(A⊤WA) and of projection matrices; convexity of −log⁡det⁡(A⊤WαA)-\log\det(A^\top W^\alpha A)−logdet(A⊤WαA) in www (related to the published ConvexOptimization.log_det_concaveOn); differentiability of the argmin of a strictly convex smooth function. Contributions of these as separate theorems are welcome, as is a proof of any single bullet of Theorem 1.

Selected references

  • Y. T. Lee, A. Sidford, Path Finding Methods for Linear Programming: Solving Linear Programs in Õ(√rank) Iterations and Faster Algorithms for Maximum Flow, FOCS 2014, pp. 424–433. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2014.52
  • Y. T. Lee, A. Sidford, Path Finding I: Solving Linear Programs with Õ(√rank) Linear System Solves, arXiv, 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6677
  • J. Renegar, A polynomial-time algorithm, based on Newton's method, for linear programming, Mathematical Programming 40 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580724
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Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Path-Finding Methods for Linear Programming I: Centering with Weights on the Weighted Central PathResearch Paper

Motivation

Interior point methods solve a linear program by following a central path: a curve of minimizers of a penalized objective that trades off cost against distance from the boundary of the feasible region. The classical analysis of path following with the logarithmic barrier needs O(m L)O(\sqrt{m}\,L)O(m​L) iterations for a program with mmm constraints, where LLL is the bit complexity of the input (Renegar 1988). For programs with many more constraints than variables, mmm can be far larger than the dimension nnn or the rank of the constraint matrix, and the m\sqrt mm​ factor is then the bottleneck.

Lee and Sidford (FOCS 2014) reduce the iteration count to O~(rank(A) L)\tilde O(\sqrt{\mathrm{rank}(A)}\,L)O~(rank(A)​L) by following a weighted central path in which each constraint carries its own positive weight, and the weights are re-computed as the algorithm moves. Their improved maximum-flow algorithm is an application of the same method.

Timeline. Karmarkar (1984) gave the first polynomial-time interior point method for linear programming. Renegar (1988) showed that path following with the logarithmic barrier needs O(mL)O(\sqrt m L)O(m​L) iterations. Nesterov and Nemirovskii (1994) showed that a universal self-concordant barrier yields O(nL)O(\sqrt n L)O(n​L) iterations, but that barrier is not known to be efficiently computable. Lee and Sidford (2014) achieved O~(rank(A)L)\tilde O(\sqrt{\mathrm{rank}(A)}L)O~(rank(A)​L) iterations, each reducible to O~(1)\tilde O(1)O~(1) linear-system solves.

This mission covers the first half of that framework (§IV of the paper): the weighted central path, the weighted Newton step, and the centering theorem that shows a single step followed by re-weighting makes constant-factor progress.

Setting

Let A∈Rm×nA\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n, b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm, c∈Rnc\in\mathbb R^nc∈Rn, and consider the linear program

min⁡x∈Rn: Ax≥bcTx.\min_{x\in\mathbb R^n:\ Ax\ge b} c^Tx .x∈Rn: Ax≥bmin​cTx.

The slack of a point xxx is s(x)=Ax−bs(x)=Ax-bs(x)=Ax−b, and the interior is S0={x:Ax>b}S^0=\{x : Ax>b\}S0={x:Ax>b}, the points with all slacks strictly positive. For a path parameter ttt and a vector of positive weights w∈R>0mw\in\mathbb R^m_{>0}w∈R>0m​, the weighted penalized objective is

ft(x,w)=t cTx−∑i=1mwilog⁡s(x)i.f_t(x,w)=t\,c^Tx-\sum_{i=1}^m w_i\log s(x)_i .ft​(x,w)=tcTx−i=1∑m​wi​logs(x)i​.

A pair (x,w)(x,w)(x,w) is feasible if x∈S0x\in S^0x∈S0 and w>0w>0w>0.

Write Sx=diag(s(x))S_x=\mathrm{diag}(s(x))Sx​=diag(s(x)), W=diag(w)W=\mathrm{diag}(w)W=diag(w) and ∥v∥M=vTMv\|v\|_M=\sqrt{v^TMv}∥v∥M​=vTMv​. The Newton step and the centrality are

h⃗t(x,w)=(ATSx−1WSx−1A)−1(tc−ATSx−1w),δt(x,w)=∥h⃗t(x,w)∥ATSx−1WSx−1A.\vec h_t(x,w)=\big(A^TS_x^{-1}WS_x^{-1}A\big)^{-1}\big(tc-A^TS_x^{-1}w\big),\qquad \delta_t(x,w)=\big\|\vec h_t(x,w)\big\|_{A^TS_x^{-1}WS_x^{-1}A}.ht​(x,w)=(ATSx−1​WSx−1​A)−1(tc−ATSx−1​w),δt​(x,w)=​ht​(x,w)​ATSx−1​WSx−1​A​.

The matrix ATSx−1WSx−1AA^TS_x^{-1}WS_x^{-1}AATSx−1​WSx−1​A is the Hessian of ftf_tft​ in xxx, and tc−ATSx−1wtc-A^TS_x^{-1}wtc−ATSx−1​w is its gradient; δt(x,w)=0\delta_t(x,w)=0δt​(x,w)=0 exactly when xxx minimizes ft(⋅,w)f_t(\cdot,w)ft​(⋅,w).

For slacks sss and weights www the projection matrix is PS−1A(w)=W1/2S−1A(ATS−1WS−1A)−1ATS−1W1/2P_{S^{-1}A}(w)=W^{1/2}S^{-1}A(A^TS^{-1}WS^{-1}A)^{-1}A^TS^{-1}W^{1/2}PS−1A​(w)=W1/2S−1A(ATS−1WS−1A)−1ATS−1W1/2 and the slack sensitivity is

γ(s,w)=max⁡i∈[m]∥W−1/21⃗i∥PS−1A(w).\gamma(s,w)=\max_{i\in[m]}\big\|W^{-1/2}\vec 1_i\big\|_{P_{S^{-1}A}(w)} .γ(s,w)=i∈[m]max​​W−1/21i​​PS−1A​(w)​.

A weight function (Definition 4) is a differentiable map g⃗:R>0m→R>0m\vec g:\mathbb R^m_{>0}\to\mathbb R^m_{>0}g​:R>0m​→R>0m​ from slacks to weights with constants c1c_1c1​ (size, a bound on ∥g⃗(s)∥1\|\vec g(s)\|_1∥g​(s)∥1​), cγ≥1c_\gamma\ge1cγ​≥1 (slack sensitivity, γ(s,g⃗(s))≤cγ\gamma(s,\vec g(s))\le c_\gammaγ(s,g​(s))≤cγ​), cr≥1c_r\ge1cr​≥1 (step consistency, two inequalities on the Jacobian G′(s)G'(s)G′(s) of g⃗\vec gg​ that hold for every r≥crr\ge c_rr≥cr​), and uniformity ∥g⃗(s)∥∞≤2\|\vec g(s)\|_\infty\le2∥g​(s)∥∞​≤2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (Centering with Weights), §IV.C

Let g⃗\vec gg​ be a weight function for AAA with constants c1,cγ,crc_1,c_\gamma,c_rc1​,cγ​,cr​, let x(old)∈S0x^{(old)}\in S^0x(old)∈S0, s(old)=s(x(old))s^{(old)}=s(x^{(old)})s(old)=s(x(old)), and

x(new)=x(old)−11+cr h⃗t(x(old),g⃗(s(old))).x^{(new)}=x^{(old)}-\frac{1}{1+c_r}\,\vec h_t\big(x^{(old)},\vec g(s^{(old)})\big).x(new)=x(old)−1+cr​1​ht​(x(old),g​(s(old))).

If δt(x(old),g⃗(s(old)))≤1100cγcr2\delta_t(x^{(old)},\vec g(s^{(old)}))\le\frac{1}{100c_\gamma c_r^2}δt​(x(old),g​(s(old)))≤100cγ​cr2​1​, then x(new)∈S0x^{(new)}\in S^0x(new)∈S0 and

δt(x(new),g⃗(s(new)))≤(1−14cr)δt(x(old),g⃗(s(old))).\delta_t\big(x^{(new)},\vec g(s^{(new)})\big)\le\Big(1-\frac{1}{4c_r}\Big)\delta_t\big(x^{(old)},\vec g(s^{(old)})\big).δt​(x(new),g​(s(new)))≤(1−4cr​1​)δt​(x(old),g​(s(old))).

The theorem is stated for every weight function, not for the specific one constructed in §V of the paper; that construction is the subject of a separate mission.

Milestone: Lemma 3 (Split Newton Step), §IV.B

For feasible (x(old),w(old))(x^{(old)},w^{(old)})(x(old),w(old)) and r≥0r\ge0r≥0, the split step x(new)=x(old)−11+rh⃗tx^{(new)}=x^{(old)}-\frac1{1+r}\vec h_tx(new)=x(old)−1+r1​ht​, w(new)=w(old)+r1+rW(old)S(old)−1Ah⃗tw^{(new)}=w^{(old)}+\frac r{1+r}W_{(old)}S_{(old)}^{-1}A\vec h_tw(new)=w(old)+1+rr​W(old)​S(old)−1​Aht​ satisfies, whenever δt≤18γ\delta_t\le\frac1{8\gamma}δt​≤8γ1​,

δt(x(new),w(new))≤21+r γ δt2,\delta_t\big(x^{(new)},w^{(new)}\big)\le\frac{2}{1+r}\,\gamma\,\delta_t^2,δt​(x(new),w(new))≤1+r2​γδt2​,

with γ=γ(s(x(old)),w(old))\gamma=\gamma(s(x^{(old)}),w^{(old)})γ=γ(s(x(old)),w(old)), and the new pair is feasible.

Milestone: Lemma 1, §IV.B

For feasible (x,w)(x,w)(x,w) and α,t≥0\alpha,t\ge0α,t≥0:

δ(1+α)t(x,w)≤(1+α)δt(x,w)+α∥w∥1.\delta_{(1+\alpha)t}(x,w)\le(1+\alpha)\delta_t(x,w)+\alpha\sqrt{\|w\|_1}.δ(1+α)t​(x,w)≤(1+α)δt​(x,w)+α∥w∥1​​.

Significance

Theorem 5 is the centering half of the weighted path-following method. Combined with Lemma 1, it shows that the path parameter can be doubled, while staying close to the weighted central path, in a number of steps of the form (5) controlled by cγc_\gammacγ​, crc_rcr​ and c1\sqrt{c_1}c1​​. The paper then constructs (§V, Theorem 1) a weight function with c1=2 rank(A)c_1=2\,\mathrm{rank}(A)c1​=2rank(A), cγ=2c_\gamma=2cγ​=2 and crc_rcr​ logarithmic in m/rank(A)m/\mathrm{rank}(A)m/rank(A), which yields the O~(rank(A))\tilde O(\sqrt{\mathrm{rank}(A)})O~(rank(A)​) iteration bound. The theorem isolates exactly which properties of a weighting scheme are needed, so it applies to any weight function satisfying Definition 4.

The FOCS extended abstract states these results without proofs; the proofs are in the arXiv full version (arXiv:1312.6677). The results are proved on paper. No machine-checked formalization of weighted path following, or of the Lee–Sidford framework, is known. A formal proof would check the constants 1100\frac1{100}1001​, 14\frac1{4}41​, 18\frac1881​ and 21+r\frac2{1+r}1+r2​ as stated in the extended abstract, and would produce reusable Lean infrastructure for Newton steps of barrier functions with explicit matrix formulas.

Difficulty

The standard analysis of Newton's method on a self-concordant barrier gives quadratic convergence of centrality for a fixed barrier. Here the barrier changes during the step: the weights are reset to g⃗(s(x(new)))\vec g(s(x^{(new)}))g​(s(x(new))), so the new centrality is measured with respect to a different Hessian and a different gradient. The obvious argument, analysing the step at fixed weights and then treating the re-weighting as a small perturbation, does not give a contraction factor independent of mmm: without control of how g⃗\vec gg​ reacts to changes in the slacks, the re-weighting can undo the progress of the step. The step-consistency conditions of Definition 4 are the only hypotheses that control this reaction, and they are pointwise bounds on the Jacobian of g⃗\vec gg​, while the step moves the slacks by a finite amount.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ and Fin m → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, and products are Matrix.mulVec and dotProduct. S−1S^{-1}S−1 is the diagonal matrix of reciprocals, W±1/2W^{\pm1/2}W±1/2 the diagonal matrices of wi±1\sqrt{w_i}^{\pm1}wi​​±1, and ∥v∥M=vTMv\|v\|_M=\sqrt{v^TMv}∥v∥M​=vTMv​. The Newton step and centrality are defined by the explicit formulas (3) and (4), not by derivatives of ftf_tft​; the centrality uses the Hessian-norm form of (4). The Jacobian G′(s)G'(s)G′(s) is the Fréchet derivative fderiv ℝ g s, and ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​ is Mathlib's sup norm.

Conventions fixed where the paper is silent:

  1. Full column rank. Every theorem assumes A.rank = n. The paper uses (ATSx−1WSx−1A)−1(A^TS_x^{-1}WS_x^{-1}A)^{-1}(ATSx−1​WSx−1​A)−1 without comment; the inverse exists for positive slacks and weights exactly when AAA has full column rank. Lean's matrix inverse is 000 on singular matrices, which would make h⃗t\vec h_tht​, δt\delta_tδt​ and γ\gammaγ vanish and every statement trivially true; the rank hypothesis rules this trivializing reading out.
  2. Size as an upper bound. Definition 4's "c1(g⃗)=∥g⃗(s)∥1c_1(\vec g)=\|\vec g(s)\|_1c1​(g​)=∥g​(s)∥1​" is read as ∥g⃗(s)∥1≤c1\|\vec g(s)\|_1\le c_1∥g​(s)∥1​≤c1​ for all s>0s>0s>0 (the paper's own weight function reports a c1c_1c1​ above its ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ norm). c1c_1c1​ does not enter Theorem 5.
  3. Operator norm. Step consistency's first bullet is written as ∥(I+r−1G−1G′S)y∥G(s)≤∥y∥G(s)\|(I+r^{-1}G^{-1}G'S)y\|_{G(s)}\le\|y\|_{G(s)}∥(I+r−1G−1G′S)y∥G(s)​≤∥y∥G(s)​ for all yyy.
  4. Lemma 3's rrr ranges over r≥0r\ge0r≥0, and γ(x,w)\gamma(x,w)γ(x,w) means γ(s(x),w)\gamma(s(x),w)γ(s(x),w).
  5. Feasibility of the new point is part of the conclusion of Lemma 3 and Theorem 5, since the page's conclusion evaluates quantities defined only on the interior.
  6. Maximum over [m][m][m] is a supremum over Fin m (attained for m≥1m\ge1m≥1, equal to 000 for m=0m=0m=0).
  7. The path parameter ttt is unrestricted in Theorem 5 and Lemma 3, as on the page; Lemma 1 assumes t≥0t\ge0t≥0 as the page does.

A complete development needs basic facts about weighted norms and the projection matrix PS−1A(w)P_{S^{-1}A}(w)PS−1A​(w), spectral comparison of the matrices ATS−1WS−1AA^TS^{-1}WS^{-1}AATS−1WS−1A for nearby slacks and weights, and calculus for vector-valued maps on the positive orthant. The weighted-norm and projection-matrix material is reusable for any interior point analysis. Proofs of the milestones, alternative arguments, and sharper constants are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. T. Lee, A. Sidford, Path Finding Methods for Linear Programming: Solving Linear Programs in Õ(√rank) Iterations and Faster Algorithms for Maximum Flow, FOCS 2014, pp. 424–433. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2014.52
  • Y. T. Lee, A. Sidford, Path Finding I: Solving Linear Programs with Õ(√rank) Linear System Solves, arXiv:1312.6677, 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6677
  • J. Renegar, A polynomial-time algorithm, based on Newton's method, for linear programming, Mathematical Programming 40, 1988, pp. 59–93. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580724
  • N. Karmarkar, A new polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming, Combinatorica 4, 1984, pp. 373–395. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579150
  • Y. Nesterov, A. Nemirovskii, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
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