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Operations Research

2,338 missions · 1,114 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Graph TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks: With Bundle-Independent Arc Lengths, the Mean-Length Estimate g, Fulkerson's Recursion f and the Expected Critical Path Length e Satisfy g ≤ f ≤ eResearch Paper

Motivation

PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) and the critical path method model a project as a directed acyclic network whose arcs are jobs and whose nodes are events; the duration of the project is the length of a longest path from the origin to the terminal. When job durations are random, the quantity a planner wants is the expected duration. Computing it exactly requires solving one longest-path problem for every joint outcome of the job durations: with mmm jobs each taking two values, 2m2^m2m deterministic problems. Classical PERT practice replaced every random duration by its mean and reported the longest path for the mean durations. That figure is known to be optimistically biased.

D. R. Fulkerson, Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks (RAND Memorandum RM-3075-PR, 1962; Operations Research 10(6):808–817, 1962, doi:10.1287/opre.10.6.808), proposed a second estimate, computed node by node with work exponential only in the size of a single node's bundle of incoming arcs, and proved that it lies between the classical mean-length figure and the true expectation.

Setting

A project network has events 0,1,…,n0,1,\dots,n0,1,…,n with n≥1n\ge1n≥1, origin 000 and terminal nnn. Its arcs are ordered pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) with i<ji<ji<j, at most one per pair, and every event lies on a directed path from the origin to the terminal. Fulkerson numbers his nodes 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n; his node iii is event i−1i-1i−1 here. The bundle BjB_jBj​ of an event jjj is the set of arcs entering jjj, and pred⁡(j)\operatorname{pred}(j)pred(j) the set of their tails; the origin's bundle is empty.

For arc lengths ttt, let ℓi(t)\ell_i(t)ℓi​(t) be the length of a longest (critical) path from the origin to iii; equivalently ℓ0=0\ell_0=0ℓ0​=0 and ℓj=max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(ℓi+tij)\ell_j=\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(\ell_i+t_{ij})ℓj​=maxi∈pred(j)​(ℓi​+tij​).

The lengths of the arcs of each bundle BjB_jBj​ form a random vector with a finite distribution: a finite set SjS_jSj​ of bundle vectors vvv, where viv_ivi​ is the length of arc (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), with probabilities pj(v)≥0p_j(v)\ge 0pj​(v)≥0 summing to 111. Arcs within a bundle may be correlated; distinct bundles are independent, so an assignment ω=(ωj)j\omega=(\omega_j)_jω=(ωj​)j​ of one bundle vector per event has probability p(ω)=∏jpj(ωj)p(\omega)=\prod_j p_j(\omega_j)p(ω)=∏j​pj​(ωj​). Three numbers are attached to each event iii:

  1. the expected critical path length ei=∑ωp(ω) ℓi(t(ω))e_i=\sum_\omega p(\omega)\,\ell_i(t(\omega))ei​=∑ω​p(ω)ℓi​(t(ω));
  2. the mean-length estimate gi=ℓi(tˉ)g_i=\ell_i(\bar t)gi​=ℓi​(tˉ), where tˉij=∑v∈Sjpj(v) vi\bar t_{ij}=\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\,v_itˉij​=∑v∈Sj​​pj​(v)vi​ is the expected length of arc (i,j)(i,j)(i,j);
  3. Fulkerson's numbers f0=0f_0=0f0​=0 and, for j≠0j\neq0j=0,
fj=∑v∈Sjpj(v) max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(fi+vi).f_j=\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\,\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}\bigl(f_i+v_i\bigr).fj​=v∈Sj​∑​pj​(v)i∈pred(j)max​(fi​+vi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: (4.4)

gi  ≤  fi  ≤  eifor every event i.g_i\;\le\;f_i\;\le\;e_i\qquad\text{for every event } i .gi​≤fi​≤ei​for every event i.

Milestones

In the order of Fulkerson's induction (pp. 10–12):

  1. the recursion for ℓ\ellℓ computes the greatest path length (§3, (3.6), and the display on p. 11);
  2. ℓi(t)\ell_i(t)ℓi​(t) depends only on the arcs of the bundles B0,…,BiB_0,\dots,B_iB0​,…,Bi​ (p. 6);
  3. (4.8): max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(fi+tˉij)≤fj\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(f_i+\bar t_{ij})\le f_jmaxi∈pred(j)​(fi​+tˉij​)≤fj​;
  4. (4.5)/(4.9): if gk≤fkg_k\le f_kgk​≤fk​ for all k<jk<jk<j, then gj≤fjg_j\le f_jgj​≤fj​;
  5. (4.13): ∑v∈Sjpj(v)max⁡i∈pred⁡(j)(ei+vi)≤ej\sum_{v\in S_j}p_j(v)\max_{i\in\operatorname{pred}(j)}(e_i+v_i)\le e_j∑v∈Sj​​pj​(v)maxi∈pred(j)​(ei​+vi​)≤ej​;
  6. (4.10)/(4.14): if fk≤ekf_k\le e_kfk​≤ek​ for all k<jk<jk<j, then fj≤ejf_j\le e_jfj​≤ej​.

Companion statements

  • gi≤eig_i\le e_igi​≤ei​ under an arbitrary joint distribution of all arc lengths (remark, p. 12).
  • Fig. 4.2: with correlated bundles, e3=g3=1e_3=g_3=1e3​=g3​=1 but f3=5/4f_3=5/4f3​=5/4, so (4.4) fails without bundle independence.
  • (4.17): an independent example with g3=f3=1<e3=5/4g_3=f_3=1<e_3=5/4g3​=f3​=1<e3​=5/4.
  • Fig. 4.1: explicit values g4=3/2g_4=3/2g4​=3/2, f2=1/2f_2=1/2f2​=1/2, f3=9/8f_3=9/8f3​=9/8, f4=55/32f_4=55/32f4​=55/32, and fi=eif_i=e_ifi​=ei​.

Significance

The chain (4.4) says that the classical PERT estimate ggg never overstates the expected project duration, and that the numbers fff are a lower bound at least as tight. The fff computation visits each node once and sums over the support of that node's bundle only, so its cost grows exponentially with bundle size rather than with network size, while the exact expectation eee requires the whole product space. The Fig. 4.2 example shows that the bundle-independence hypothesis cannot be dropped for the upper inequality, while the lower inequality g≤eg\le eg≤e survives arbitrary dependence.

The result has a complete published proof. This mission seeks a machine-checked proof of (4.4) for finite distributions, with the longest-path characterisation of the earliest-event-time recursion and the locality of critical path lengths as reusable lemmas, and machine-checkable versions of the paper's numerical examples, including the counterexample showing the role of independence.

Difficulty

The left inequality compares an average of maxima with a maximum of averages. The right inequality requires more: fjf_jfj​ averages over the bundle entering jjj, while eje_jej​ averages over assignments to every bundle. Taking expectations in ℓj=max⁡i(ℓi+tij)\ell_j=\max_i(\ell_i+t_{ij})ℓj​=maxi​(ℓi​+tij​) yields ej≥max⁡i(ei+tˉij)e_j\ge\max_i(e_i+\bar t_{ij})ej​≥maxi​(ei​+tˉij​), which gives the weaker bound g≤eg\le eg≤e. Fig. 4.2 shows that f≤ef\le ef≤e can fail when the bundles are dependent. In Lean, eee is a sum over a dependent product of finite supports (Fintype.piFinset); its interaction with the local recurrence for fff is the central technical difficulty.

Formalization scope

  • Network: the published CriticalPath.Events.ProjectNetwork (Kelley–Walker 1959): events Fin (n + 1), arcs a Finset of ordered pairs with strictly increasing labels, origin preceding and terminal following every event. This requires n≥1n\ge1n≥1. Fulkerson's numbering condition "i≤ji\le ji≤j" on p. 3 is read as the strict i<ji<ji<j (arcs join distinct nodes of an acyclic network). There is one arc per ordered pair, Fulkerson's own convention in (3.13).
  • Critical path length: the published CriticalPath.Events.earliest, a recursion with Finset.sup' over the nonempty set of incoming arcs. This is the paper's convention that terms of missing arcs are ignored. Nothing uses a default value of 000 or −∞-\infty−∞.
  • Distributions: finite, given as data (a support Finset and a weight function per bundle) plus a predicate IsProb (nonnegative weights on the support, summing to 111, for every event including the origin). Bundle vectors are functions on all events, and coordinates outside pred⁡(j)\operatorname{pred}(j)pred(j) are never read.
  • Arc lengths are arbitrary reals. §3 assumes nonnegative lengths, but its footnote on p. 4 states that nonnegativity "is not essential in this or the following section"; the statements are given in this more general form.
  • No trivialization: eie_iei​ is the sum over every assignment of bundle vectors, weighted by the product probability (3.5). It is not defined by a recursion, and the goal assumes none of the milestones. fff at node jjj uses only the distribution of the bundle of jjj.

Infrastructure that a full development needs, and that is reusable elsewhere, includes the longest-path characterisation of the earliest-event-time recursion, the locality lemma, and the factorisation of sums over Fintype.piFinset along one coordinate. Proofs of any milestone or companion are welcome. Out of scope here: §5 (computational examples) and the general-network analogues of §6.

Selected references

  • D. R. Fulkerson, Expected Critical Path Lengths in PERT Networks, RAND Memorandum RM-3075-PR, March 1962; published in Operations Research 10(6):808–817, 1962. doi:10.1287/opre.10.6.808
  • J. E. Kelley Jr. and M. R. Walker, Critical-Path Planning and Scheduling, Proceedings of the Eastern Joint Computer Conference, 1959, pp. 160–173. doi:10.1145/1460299.1460318
  • D. G. Malcolm, J. H. Roseboom, C. E. Clark and W. Fazar, Application of a Technique for Research and Development Program Evaluation, Operations Research 7(5):646–669, 1959. doi:10.1287/opre.7.5.646
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🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties 2: For a Fixed Task Order, the Block-Shifting Algorithm Minimizes the Total DiscrepancyResearch Paper

Motivation

A task may have a preferred execution time because a material delivery, external event, or downstream operation is timed to it. Starting early can be as costly as starting late. Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong study this situation on one processor, where tasks cannot overlap but idle time between tasks is permitted. Their total-discrepancy problem is hard when the execution order is free; fixing the order leaves a substantial timing problem because each start can still move and can force changes to earlier starts. The paper gives an explicit scheduling procedure for that case and proves that it minimizes the sum of deviations from preferred starts (Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong, 1988, §§1–2).

This mission targets that procedure and its correctness theorem. It also records the paper's equal-length result: when task lengths are identical, a minimum-cost schedule exists in preferred-start order, so the fixed-order procedure applies after sorting. These are two precise claims about total discrepancy, distinct from the paper's separate maximum-discrepancy problem.

Setting

There are nnn tasks, indexed i=0,…,n−1i=0,\ldots,n-1i=0,…,n−1. Task iii has a nonnegative length lil_ili​, a nonnegative preferred starting time aia_iai​, and an actual starting time sis_isi​. Once started, it occupies the one processor until si+lis_i+l_isi​+li​. Each start must be nonnegative. For the fixed-order problem, task iii must finish before task i+1i+1i+1 starts, so si+li≤si+1s_i+l_i\le s_{i+1}si​+li​≤si+1​. This permits idle time when the inequality is strict. The task's discrepancy is ∣si−ai∣|s_i-a_i|∣si​−ai​∣; because its preferred completion is ai+lia_i+l_iai​+li​, this is also its absolute completion-time discrepancy. The total discrepancy is

cost⁡n(s)=∑i=0n−1∣si−ai∣.\operatorname{cost}_n(s)=\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}|s_i-a_i|.costn​(s)=i=0∑n−1​∣si​−ai​∣.

A block is a maximal consecutive set of tasks with no idle time between neighboring tasks. Within a block, Decrease counts tasks whose actual starts are later than preferred, and Increase counts tasks whose actual starts are no later than preferred. These names describe the effect of moving the entire block earlier: the discrepancy of a Decrease task falls initially, whereas that of an Increase task rises. The algorithm's state is a schedule SnS_nSn​ for the first nnn tasks. It inserts the next task at its preferred start when the previous task has finished, and at that finish time otherwise. In the latter case it may move the final block earlier until one of the paper's stopping events occurs: the block reaches time zero, a late task reaches its preferred start, or the block meets its predecessor (§2.2, p. 337).

For the equal-length result, schedules may execute tasks in any order. Two distinct tasks are feasible together when one completes before the other starts; meeting at endpoints is allowed. The objective remains the same sum of absolute discrepancies.

Formalization targets

Fixed-order optimality

The main target is the paper's Theorem 2. For all nonnegative task data and every nnn, the actual schedule SnS_nSn​ produced by the block-shifting algorithm is feasible and satisfies

cost⁡n(Sn)≤cost⁡n(s)for every feasible fixed-order schedule s.\operatorname{cost}_n(S_n)\le\operatorname{cost}_n(s) \qquad\text{for every feasible fixed-order schedule }s.costn​(Sn​)≤costn​(s)for every feasible fixed-order schedule s.

This includes the empty schedule and schedules with idle time. The milestone list follows the paper's own assertions: a balanced final block can move earlier without changing cost; every block of SnS_nSn​ has more Increase tasks than Decrease tasks or begins at zero (Lemma 7); and the two claims in Case 2 of the proof record the cost of adding a late task and the comparison with schedules that place it earlier (Theorem 2 and Lemma 7, p. 338).

Equal-length schedules

The companion target is Theorem 3. If every task has a common length L≥0L\ge0L≥0 and the preferred starts are indexed so that ai≤ai+1a_i\le a_{i+1}ai​≤ai+1​, then among all feasible schedules, including those with another task order, at least one minimum-cost schedule starts the tasks in index order:

∃s  [cost⁡n(s)≤cost⁡n(t) for every feasible t]with si≤si+1 whenever i+1<n.\exists s\;\bigl[ \operatorname{cost}_n(s)\le\operatorname{cost}_n(t) \text{ for every feasible }t \bigr] \quad\text{with }s_i\le s_{i+1}\text{ whenever }i+1<n.∃s[costn​(s)≤costn​(t) for every feasible t]with si​≤si+1​ whenever i+1<n.

The paper uses this statement to connect free-order equal-length scheduling to its fixed-order procedure (Theorem 3, p. 340).

Significance

Theorem 2 certifies an explicit schedule, not just the existence of an optimum. It fixes the objective value for a prescribed execution order and gives a baseline against which any other legal timing of the same tasks can be compared. Theorem 3 supplies the ordering fact needed to use that result when all lengths agree. Together they explain why a problem that is difficult for unrestricted task lengths still has these structured solvable cases (Garey, Tarjan, and Wilfong, 1988, abstract and §2.5).

The paper proves both theorems on paper. The work here is to formalize its schedule construction, cost, block boundaries, and comparison classes in Lean, then obtain machine-checked proofs of the stated targets. The draft theorem declarations compile with proof placeholders; this proposal does not claim that they are already machine-checked results. A completed development would make the model and the algorithm available for later formal work on scheduling with idle time and symmetric earliness and tardiness penalties.

Difficulty

Moving a task closer to its preferred start can move neighboring tasks farther from theirs. A simple task-by-task choice therefore does not establish global optimality. Nor does a count of late and early tasks in one block, by itself, justify arbitrary earlier movements of individual tasks. The difficult comparison in the paper is between the algorithm's schedule and a competing feasible schedule whose new task starts earlier: the whole final block and its constrained relative movements matter. The proof also has to account for the boundary at time zero and for blocks that merge when shifted. These are the reasons the explicit procedure and its block invariant need careful statements (§§2.2–2.3, pp. 337–338).

Formalization scope

The Lean development represents task data and starts as functions from natural-number indices to real numbers; only indices below nnn count. Task iii in Lean is the paper's Ti+1T_{i+1}Ti+1​. Preferred times, lengths, and legal starting times are nonnegative. The start-time condition is a standing convention used by the paper's algorithm, especially its zero-boundary stopping rule. Fixed-order feasibility requires successive tasks to be separated by at least the earlier task's length; unrestricted feasibility uses pairwise nonoverlap. An empty schedule is legal and has cost zero. The representation allows zero-length tasks, as does the paper's li≥0l_i\ge0li​≥0 model.

The algorithm is defined by its stated insertion and single-block-shift operations. Defining SnS_nSn​ as a chosen minimizer would erase the content of Theorem 2; the goal also explicitly asserts feasibility so that an illegal low-cost function cannot qualify. Theorem 3 compares with every feasible unrestricted-order schedule, not just schedules already in preferred-start order. The core definitions, the block invariant, and the cost comparisons are useful beyond this particular proof. Formalizing the paper's running-time bounds and heap implementation is outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Michael R. Garey, Robert E. Tarjan, and Gordon T. Wilfong, One-Processor Scheduling with Symmetric Earliness and Tardiness Penalties, Mathematics of Operations Research 13(2), 330–348, 1988. DOI: 10.1287/moor.13.2.330.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryFunctional AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Variational Inequality Formulation of the Dynamic Network User Equilibrium Problem I: Route-Departure Equilibria Are Exactly the Solutions of the Path-Integral Variational InequalityResearch Paper

Motivation

Commuters choose not only a route but also a departure time, trading travel delay against the penalty of arriving early or late. Static traffic assignment, in the tradition of Wardrop's user-equilibrium principle, ignores the time dimension; dynamic traffic assignment adds it, and its central modelling question is what "equilibrium" means when flows, delays and costs all vary over a time horizon. Friesz, Bernstein, Smith, Tobin and Wie (Oper. Res. 41(1), 1993) proposed the simultaneous route-departure (SRD) equilibrium of a path-based dynamic model and showed that it is equivalent to an infinite-dimensional variational inequality. That equivalence is the starting point of a large literature on dynamic user equilibrium: existence theory, solution algorithms and differential-variational formulations all take the variational inequality as their definition of the problem.

Timeline, as far as this mission is concerned:

  • 1952: Wardrop states the static user-equilibrium criterion (equal and minimal travel times on used routes).
  • 1979–1980: Smith and Dafermos formulate static user equilibrium as a finite-dimensional variational inequality.
  • 1989: Friesz, Luque, Tobin and Wie treat dynamic route choice with a fixed departure schedule as an optimal-control problem.
  • 1993: Friesz et al. (this paper) formulate simultaneous route and departure-time equilibrium and prove its equivalence with a variational inequality on (L2[0,T])∣P∣(L^2[0,T])^{|P|}(L2[0,T])∣P∣ (Theorem 2, p. 187).

Setting

A traffic network has a finite set PPP of paths. Each path ppp connects exactly one origin–destination (OD) pair klklkl; PklP_{kl}Pkl​ denotes the paths of pair klklkl. Travellers depart during the horizon [0,T][0,T][0,T], T>0T>0T>0, which carries Lebesgue measure ν\nuν; "∀ν(t)\forall_\nu(t)∀ν​(t)" means "for ν\nuν-almost every t∈[0,T]t\in[0,T]t∈[0,T]".

A vector of departure-time densities h=(hp)p∈Ph=(h_p)_{p\in P}h=(hp​)p∈P​ assigns to each path a square-integrable, almost everywhere nonnegative function hph_php​ on [0,T][0,T][0,T]: hp(t)h_p(t)hp​(t) is the rate at which travellers depart at time ttt on path ppp. The set of such vectors is H+H_+H+​. Each OD pair has a fixed travel demand QklQ_{kl}Qkl​, and the feasible set is

Λ={h∈H+:∑p∈Pkl∫0Thp(t) dν(t)=Qkl for every OD pair kl}.(38)\Lambda=\Big\{h\in H_+ : \sum_{p\in P_{kl}}\int_0^T h_p(t)\,d\nu(t)=Q_{kl}\ \text{for every OD pair } kl\Big\}.\qquad(38)Λ={h∈H+​:p∈Pkl​∑​∫0T​hp​(t)dν(t)=Qkl​ for every OD pair kl}.(38)

A cost operator gives the effective delay Cp(t,h)≥0C_p(t,h)\ge 0Cp​(t,h)≥0 of departing at time ttt on path ppp when the densities are hhh: travel time plus a penalty for early or late arrival (13). Because densities are defined only up to null sets, the relevant lowest achievable cost on a path is an essential infimum,

μp(h)=ess inf⁡{Cp(t,h):t∈[0,T]}=sup⁡{x∈R: ν{t:Cp(t,h)<x}=0},\mu_p(h)=\operatorname{ess\,inf}\{C_p(t,h):t\in[0,T]\}=\sup\{x\in\mathbb R:\ \nu\{t: C_p(t,h)<x\}=0\},μp​(h)=essinf{Cp​(t,h):t∈[0,T]}=sup{x∈R: ν{t:Cp​(t,h)<x}=0},

and the lowest achievable cost for pair klklkl is μkl(h)=min⁡p∈Pklμp(h)\mu_{kl}(h)=\min_{p\in P_{kl}}\mu_p(h)μkl​(h)=minp∈Pkl​​μp​(h).

Definition 3. For h∈Λh\in\Lambdah∈Λ and a nonnegative vector μ=(μkl)\mu=(\mu_{kl})μ=(μkl​), the pair (h,μ)(h,\mu)(h,μ) is an SRD equilibrium if for every OD pair klklkl and every p∈Pklp\in P_{kl}p∈Pkl​:

hp(t)>0 ⇒ Cp(t,h)=μkl∀ν(t),Cp(t,h)≥μkl∀ν(t).h_p(t)>0\ \Rightarrow\ C_p(t,h)=\mu_{kl}\quad\forall_\nu(t),\qquad C_p(t,h)\ge\mu_{kl}\quad\forall_\nu(t).hp​(t)>0 ⇒ Cp​(t,h)=μkl​∀ν​(t),Cp​(t,h)≥μkl​∀ν​(t).

No positive-measure set of travellers can lower its cost by switching route or departure time.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (PIE VIP)

For h∗h^*h∗ with nonnegative, square-integrable costs Cp(⋅,h∗)C_p(\cdot,h^*)Cp​(⋅,h∗):

(∃ μ∗: (h∗,μ∗) SRD equilibrium) ⟹ h∗∈Λ and ∑p∈P∫0TCp(t,h∗) [hp(t)−hp∗(t)] dν(t)≥0  ∀h∈Λ,(39)\big(\exists\,\mu^*:\ (h^*,\mu^*)\ \text{SRD equilibrium}\big)\ \Longrightarrow\ h^*\in\Lambda\ \text{and}\ \sum_{p\in P}\int_0^T C_p(t,h^*)\,[h_p(t)-h^*_p(t)]\,d\nu(t)\ge 0\ \ \forall h\in\Lambda,\qquad(39)(∃μ∗: (h∗,μ∗) SRD equilibrium) ⟹ h∗∈Λ and p∈P∑​∫0T​Cp​(t,h∗)[hp​(t)−hp∗​(t)]dν(t)≥0  ∀h∈Λ,(39)

and conversely, if h∗∈Λh^*\in\Lambdah∗∈Λ solves (39), then (h∗,μ(h∗))(h^*,\mu(h^*))(h∗,μ(h∗)) with μkl∗=μkl(h∗)\mu^*_{kl}=\mu_{kl}(h^*)μkl∗​=μkl​(h∗) is an SRD equilibrium. The formal goal states the two directions as two conjuncts; the second names the equilibrium cost vector explicitly, which is stronger than an equivalence with an existential μ∗\mu^*μ∗.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2: a measurable function positive on a set of positive measure exceeds some ε0>0\varepsilon_0>0ε0​>0 on a set of positive measure.
  2. The pointwise inequality (42) at an equilibrium, and the necessity half of Theorem 2.
  3. Condition (17) holds by construction for μ∗=μ(h∗)\mu^*=\mu(h^*)μ∗=μ(h∗).
  4. The positive-measure sets (44)–(46) and (47) produced by a failure of (16).
  5. Feasibility (50) of the mass-shifted vector (48)–(49), the value bound (54), and the sufficiency half of Theorem 2.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 converts an equilibrium defined by almost-everywhere complementarity conditions into a single variational inequality over a convex subset of a Hilbert space. This is what makes dynamic user equilibrium accessible to the general theory of variational inequalities: existence via monotonicity or compactness arguments, and projection-type algorithms in function space or after time discretization. The sufficiency half also identifies the equilibrium cost levels: they are the essential infima μkl(h∗)\mu_{kl}(h^*)μkl​(h∗), so the multiplier μ∗\mu^*μ∗ need not be found separately.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. A formal proof requires essential infima, the shifting of mass between paths on sets of prescribed measure (the paper cites Halmos, Proposition 41.2, for the nonatomicity of Lebesgue measure), and careful integrability bookkeeping. The development is a self-contained template for "complementarity conditions a.e. ⇔ variational inequality in L2L^2L2" arguments, which recur in continuous-time equilibrium models.

Difficulty

Necessity is routine once integrability is in place, though the paper's text asserts the per-path identity ∫0T[hp−hp∗] dν=0\int_0^T[h_p-h^*_p]\,d\nu=0∫0T​[hp​−hp∗​]dν=0, which is false; only the sum over PklP_{kl}Pkl​ vanishes, and that suffices. Sufficiency is the substantive half. The obvious approach, testing (39) against a perturbation that moves flow from an expensive to a cheap route, has to be carried out with sets rather than points: the costs are only defined almost everywhere, the minimal cost is an essential infimum that need not be attained at any time, and the perturbation must keep the demand constraints exact. This forces the choice of sets of exactly equal positive measure inside the positive-measure sets Sp(ε,δ)S_p(\varepsilon,\delta)Sp​(ε,δ) and Tq(ε)T_q(\varepsilon)Tq​(ε), a nonatomicity argument that a pointwise proof would miss.

Formalization scope

Densities are plain functions R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R with a square-integrability condition with respect to ν=\nu=ν= Lebesgue measure restricted to [0,T][0,T][0,T], not L2L^2L2 equivalence classes; every pointwise condition is ν\nuν-almost everywhere, and values outside [0,T][0,T][0,T] are unconstrained. Paths and OD pairs are finite types, with a map sending each path to its OD pair. The essential infimum is the literal formula (12), a real supremum; it is not the pointwise infimum, which changes when CCC is altered on a null set and makes sufficiency false. μkl\mu_{kl}μkl​ is a real infimum over PklP_{kl}Pkl​; for a pair with no paths it is an unused default value.

The cost operator C is abstract, with the paper's measurability assumption strengthened to square-integrability so that every integral in (39) is a genuine Lebesgue integral. The network dynamics (3)–(11) that produce C in the paper are not formalized. Nonnegativity (the codomain R+\mathbb R_+R+​ of (13)) and square-integrability are assumed only at h∗h^*h∗, which makes the formal statements stronger than the paper's. Without integrability, Lean's integral of a non-integrable function is 000, so (39) could hold vacuously; the added hypothesis excludes that trivialization. The goal quantifies over every cost operator satisfying these hypotheses and never fixes one. In the milestones, the reduction from p=qp=qp=q to p≠qp\ne qp=q (p. 188) is taken as the hypothesis p≠qp\ne qp=q.

A complete development needs: properties of the real essential infimum (12) on a finite measure space; Lemma 2 (continuity of measure from below); the existence of measurable subsets of prescribed measure in Lebesgue measure (nonatomicity, available in Mathlib in some form); and integral bookkeeping for products of L2L^2L2 functions on a finite measure. The essential-infimum and mass-shift lemmas are reusable for other continuous-time equilibrium models. Proofs of any milestone, and cleaner restatements of the essential-infimum API, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. L. Friesz, D. Bernstein, T. E. Smith, R. L. Tobin and B. W. Wie, A variational inequality formulation of the dynamic network user equilibrium problem, Operations Research 41(1):179–191, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.179
  • J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers 1(3):325–362, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259
  • M. J. Smith, The existence, uniqueness and stability of traffic equilibria, Transportation Research B 13(4):295–304, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-2615(79)90022-5
  • S. Dafermos, Traffic equilibrium and variational inequalities, Transportation Science 14(1):42–54, 1980. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.14.1.42
  • T. L. Friesz, J. Luque, R. L. Tobin and B. W. Wie, Dynamic network traffic assignment considered as a continuous time optimal control problem, Operations Research 37(6):893–901, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.6.893
  • P. R. Halmos, Measure Theory, Van Nostrand, 1950 (Proposition 41.2, nonatomicity of Lebesgue measure).
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CombinatoricsTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Fibonacci Heaps and Their Uses in Improved Network Optimization Algorithms: O(log n) Amortized Time for Delete Min and Delete, O(1) for Every Other F-Heap OperationResearch Paper

Why priority queues with cheap decrease key matter

Many network optimization algorithms spend most of their time in a heap (priority queue): a set of items with real keys that supports inserting an item, finding and deleting an item of minimum key, melding two heaps, decreasing the key of an item, and deleting an arbitrary item. Dijkstra's shortest-path algorithm performs at most one delete min per vertex and may perform a decrease key for each edge, so on a graph with nnn vertices and mmm edges its running time is governed by how cheap decrease key is. Binomial queues support the heap operations in O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) worst-case time.

Fredman and Tarjan (J. ACM 34 (1987)) introduced Fibonacci heaps (F-heaps), in which delete min and delete take O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) amortized time and every other operation, decrease key included, takes O(1)O(1)O(1) amortized time. This brings Dijkstra's algorithm to O(nlog⁡n+m)O(n \log n + m)O(nlogn+m) and improves the best bounds then known for all-pairs shortest paths, weighted bipartite matching (the assignment problem) and minimum spanning trees. F-heaps descend from the binomial queues of Vuillemin (1978) and use the potential technique of amortized analysis of Sleator and Tarjan. This mission formalizes the paper's §2 analysis, culminating in THEOREM 1 on p. 604.

Setting

An F-heap is a list of heap-ordered rooted trees: every child's key is at least its parent's key. Each node holds an item, the item's real key and a mark bit; the children of a node are kept in the order in which they were linked to it, earliest first. The rank r(x)r(x)r(x) of a node is its number of children. A collection is a list of heaps, named by position; a run starts with no heaps.

Linking two trees with roots xxx and yyy makes yyy the last child of xxx if the key of xxx is smaller, and otherwise makes xxx the last child of yyy; the root that becomes a child is unmarked. The operations act as follows:

  • make heap adds an empty heap; find min acts on a nonempty heap and returns a root of minimum key; insert adds a one-node tree for a new item; meld concatenates two root lists.
  • delete min removes a root xxx of minimum key, adds the children of xxx to the roots, then repeats the linking step, "find any two trees whose roots have the same rank, and link them", in any order, until all root ranks are distinct.
  • decrease key (Δ,i,h)(\Delta, i, h)(Δ,i,h), Δ≥0\Delta \ge 0Δ≥0, lowers the key of iii and, if the node xxx of iii is not a root, cuts xxx from its parent, making its subtree a new tree. delete (i,h)(i, h)(i,h) cuts xxx the same way, destroys it and adds its children to the roots; a minimum root is deleted as in delete min.
  • After every cut of a child of ppp, if ppp is not a root it is marked if unmarked and cut from its own parent if marked: a cascading cut, which may repeat upwards.

The actual time of an operation is one unit, plus one per linking step, plus one per cut, plus for delete min the scan of the rank array (the largest rank involved). The potential Φ\PhiΦ of a collection is the number of trees plus twice the number of marked nonroot nodes, and the amortized time of an operation is its actual time plus the increase of Φ\PhiΦ.

Formalization targets

Goal: THEOREM 1 (p. 604)

There is an absolute constant C>0C > 0C>0 such that for every sequence of TTT operations started from no heaps, with ntn_tnt​ the number of items in the heap that operation ttt acts on, just before it acts,

∑t<Tcostt  ≤  ∑t<Tbt,bt={C(log⁡2nt+1)delete min or delete,Cotherwise.\sum_{t<T} \mathrm{cost}_t \;\le\; \sum_{t<T} b_t, \qquad b_t = \begin{cases} C(\log_2 n_t + 1) & \text{delete min or delete},\\ C & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}t<T∑​costt​≤t<T∑​bt​,bt​={C(log2​nt​+1)C​delete min or delete,otherwise.​

The paper's wording is "the total time is at most the total amortized time, where the amortized time is O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) for each delete min or delete operation and O(1)O(1)O(1) for each of the other operations"; the goal pins the O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) to one constant and does not name the potential.

Milestones

  1. LEMMA 1: the iiith child of a node, in linking order, has rank at least i−2i - 2i−2.
  2. Fk+2≥φkF_{k+2} \ge \varphi^kFk+2​≥φk, with FkF_kFk​ the Fibonacci numbers and φ=(1+5)/2\varphi = (1+\sqrt5)/2φ=(1+5​)/2.
  3. COROLLARY 1: a node of rank kkk has at least Fk+2≥φkF_{k+2} \ge \varphi^kFk+2​≥φk descendants, itself included.
  4. A node of rank kkk in an nnn-item heap has φk≤n\varphi^k \le nφk≤n, hence k≤log⁡n/log⁡φk \le \log n / \log\varphik≤logn/logφ.
  5. make heap, find min and meld leave Φ\PhiΦ unchanged; insert raises it by one.
  6. delete min raises Φ\PhiΦ by at most log⁡n/log⁡φ\log n / \log \varphilogn/logφ minus the number of linking steps.
  7. decrease key raises Φ\PhiΦ by at most three minus the number of cascading cuts.
  8. From no heaps, the total amortized time bounds the total actual time.

Significance

THEOREM 1 is the data-structure fact behind the paper's algorithmic results: Dijkstra's algorithm in O(nlog⁡n+m)O(n\log n + m)O(nlogn+m), all-pairs shortest paths and the assignment problem in O(n2log⁡n+nm)O(n^2 \log n + nm)O(n2logn+nm), and minimum spanning trees in O(m β(m,n))O(m\,\beta(m,n))O(mβ(m,n)).

The result has been proved since 1987. What the mission adds is a machine-checked version of the paper's own analysis on an operational model with arbitrary linking order, unmarking on link, marking or cascading on every cut, and the paper's unit costs. The proposal states the theorem and its supporting claims; their proofs remain to be formalized.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, that every tree is a binomial tree and so every rank is at most log⁡2n\log_2 nlog2​n, fails as soon as cuts are allowed: decrease key and delete remove subtrees arbitrarily, and the trees of an F-heap need not be binomial. The rank bound has to come from an invariant of the whole history (LEMMA 1), which only holds because a node loses at most one child before it is cut itself; without cascading cuts a node of rank kkk can be left with only k+1k+1k+1 descendants, and no logarithmic rank bound holds. A second difficulty is that the actual cost of one decrease key is unbounded, since a single operation may trigger arbitrarily many cascading cuts; a per-operation worst-case argument cannot give THEOREM 1, and the bound holds only for whole sequences started from no heaps.

Formalization scope

All declarations sit in the namespace FibHeap.Amort. Trees are a nested inductive FTree with item ℕ, key ℝ, a mark bit and a list of children in linking order; a heap is List FTree (its roots) and a collection is List Heap. Operations are a step relation Step s op s' d whose data d records linking steps, cuts, cascading cuts and the scan, so that cost d = 1 + links + cuts + scan is determined by what the operation did. The linking loop allows every order of linking; a link tie makes the first root a child of the second, while delete min may choose any minimum-key root. Runs start from no heaps; reachable collections consist of heap-ordered trees with each item in at most one heap. LEMMA 1, COROLLARY 1 and the delete-min bound are stated for reachable collections only, as the paper's "a node in an F-heap" intends. The paper's standing assumption that an item is in only one heap at a time is enforced by the precondition of insert and is not a hypothesis. The minimum pointer and returned items are not stored in the step relation; find min is a state-preserving step charged one unit. A heap destroyed by meld remains as an empty heap at its index.

Logarithms in the goal are base 2 (footnote 1, p. 600), with a +1+1+1 so that one-item heaps have positive budget. The paper's constant "≤1.4404log⁡n\le 1.4404 \log n≤1.4404logn" on p. 604 is a rounding slip (1/log⁡2φ=1.44042…1/\log_2 \varphi = 1.44042\ldots1/log2​φ=1.44042…); milestones use the exact log⁡φn\log_\varphi nlogφ​n.

The goal is not trivialized: the cost counts every linking step and every cut as fixed by the step relation, CCC is quantified before the run, and a companion theorem (step_exists) shows that every valid operation can be performed, so runs containing delete min, decrease key and cascading cuts exist. A further supporting statement gives an explicit form of the delete potential bound. A complete development needs facts about the nested inductive (sizes, subtree lists, marked counts under list edits), an invariant for LEMMA 1 recording when each child was linked, and the Fibonacci inequality; contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. L. Fredman and R. E. Tarjan, Fibonacci heaps and their uses in improved network optimization algorithms, J. ACM 34(3):596–615, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1145/28869.28874
  • J. Vuillemin, A data structure for manipulating priority queues, Comm. ACM 21(4):309–315, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1145/359460.359478
  • R. E. Tarjan, Amortized computational complexity, SIAM J. Algebraic Discrete Methods 6(2):306–318, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1137/0606031
  • E. W. Dijkstra, A note on two problems in connexion with graphs, Numer. Math. 1:269–271, 1959. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01386390
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Optimal TransportProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations III: Asymptotic Consistency of Wasserstein Robust SolutionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many decisions in operations research and machine learning minimize an expected cost EP[h(x,ξ)]\mathbb E^{P}[h(x,\xi)]EP[h(x,ξ)] whose distribution PPP is unknown and is seen only through NNN independent samples. The sample-average approximation replaces PPP by the empirical distribution and is known to produce decisions with poor out-of-sample performance when NNN is small. Distributionally robust optimization instead minimizes the worst-case expected cost over a set of distributions that are plausible given the data. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116v3, published in Mathematical Programming 171, 2018) take this set to be a ball in the Wasserstein metric around the empirical distribution, and show that such balls deliver both finite-sample certificates and asymptotic consistency. This mission formalizes the statistical half of that paper: Section 3 and Appendix A.

A data-driven method should, at a minimum, be consistent: as the sample grows, its optimal value and decisions should approach those of the true problem. For Wasserstein balls this requires a measure concentration inequality for empirical distributions in the Wasserstein metric, which was supplied by Fournier and Guillin (PTRF 2015). The paper combines that inequality with the Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality and the Borel–Cantelli lemma.

Setting

Let EEE be Rm\mathbb R^mRm with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ and its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra. A decision xxx ranges over a feasible set X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn; the random vector ξ\xiξ has distribution PPP, supported on the uncertainty set Ξ⊆E\Xi\subseteq EΞ⊆E; the loss is h:Rn×E→Rh:\mathbb R^n\times E\to\mathbb Rh:Rn×E→R. The true problem (1) has optimal value

J⋆=inf⁡x∈XEP[h(x,ξ)].J^\star=\inf_{x\in X}\mathbb E^P[h(x,\xi)].J⋆=x∈Xinf​EP[h(x,ξ)].

The Wasserstein distance between distributions Q1,Q2Q_1,Q_2Q1​,Q2​ with finite first moment is

dW(Q1,Q2)=inf⁡{∫∥ξ1−ξ2∥ Π(dξ1,dξ2): Π a coupling of Q1 and Q2}.d_W(Q_1,Q_2)=\inf\Big\{\int\|\xi_1-\xi_2\|\,\Pi(d\xi_1,d\xi_2):\ \Pi\text{ a coupling of }Q_1\text{ and }Q_2\Big\}.dW​(Q1​,Q2​)=inf{∫∥ξ1​−ξ2​∥Π(dξ1​,dξ2​): Π a coupling of Q1​ and Q2​}.

Given samples ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​ drawn independently from PPP (joint law PNP^NPN, and P∞P^\inftyP∞ for the infinite sequence), the empirical distribution is P^N=1N∑i=1Nδξ^i\widehat P_N=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\delta_{\hat\xi_i}PN​=N1​∑i=1N​δξ^​i​​, and the Wasserstein ball Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat P_N)Bε​(PN​) is the set of distributions QQQ on Ξ\XiΞ with dW(P^N,Q)≤εd_W(\widehat P_N,Q)\le\varepsilondW​(PN​,Q)≤ε. The distributionally robust program (5) has optimal value

J^N=inf⁡x∈X sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[h(x,ξ)],\widehat J_N=\inf_{x\in X}\ \sup_{Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat P_N)}\mathbb E^Q[h(x,\xi)],JN​=x∈Xinf​ Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[h(x,ξ)],

and an optimizer of it is written x^N\widehat x_NxN​.

The light-tail condition (Assumption 3.3) asks for an exponent a>1a>1a>1 with A=EP[exp⁡(∥ξ∥a)]<∞A=\mathbb E^P[\exp(\|\xi\|^a)]<\inftyA=EP[exp(∥ξ∥a)]<∞. Under it, and for m≠2m\ne2m=2, Theorem 3.4 (Fournier–Guillin) gives constants c1,c2>0c_1,c_2>0c1​,c2​>0 with

PN{dW(P,P^N)≥ε}≤{c1e−c2Nεmax⁡{m,2},ε≤1,c1e−c2Nεa,ε>1,(7)P^N\{d_W(P,\widehat P_N)\ge\varepsilon\}\le\begin{cases}c_1e^{-c_2N\varepsilon^{\max\{m,2\}}},&\varepsilon\le1,\\ c_1e^{-c_2N\varepsilon^{a}},&\varepsilon>1,\end{cases}\tag{7}PN{dW​(P,PN​)≥ε}≤{c1​e−c2​Nεmax{m,2},c1​e−c2​Nεa,​ε≤1,ε>1,​(7)

for all N≥1N\ge1N≥1, ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0. Solving the right-hand side =β=\beta=β for ε\varepsilonε gives the radius

εN(β)=(log⁡(c1β−1)c2N)1/max⁡{m,2} if N≥log⁡(c1β−1)c2,(log⁡(c1β−1)c2N)1/a otherwise.(8)\varepsilon_N(\beta)=\Big(\frac{\log(c_1\beta^{-1})}{c_2N}\Big)^{1/\max\{m,2\}}\text{ if }N\ge\frac{\log(c_1\beta^{-1})}{c_2},\qquad\Big(\frac{\log(c_1\beta^{-1})}{c_2N}\Big)^{1/a}\text{ otherwise}.\tag{8}εN​(β)=(c2​Nlog(c1​β−1)​)1/max{m,2} if N≥c2​log(c1​β−1)​,(c2​Nlog(c1​β−1)​)1/a otherwise.(8)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.6 (asymptotic consistency)

Let βN∈(0,1)\beta_N\in(0,1)βN​∈(0,1) with ∑NβN<∞\sum_N\beta_N<\infty∑N​βN​<∞ and εN(βN)→0\varepsilon_N(\beta_N)\to0εN​(βN​)→0, and use the radius εN(βN)\varepsilon_N(\beta_N)εN​(βN​) in (5).

(i) If h(x,⋅)h(x,\cdot)h(x,⋅) is upper semicontinuous on Ξ\XiΞ and ∣h(x,ξ)∣≤L(1+∥ξ∥)|h(x,\xi)|\le L(1+\|\xi\|)∣h(x,ξ)∣≤L(1+∥ξ∥) on X×ΞX\times\XiX×Ξ, then P∞P^\inftyP∞-almost surely

J^N≥J⋆ for all large NandJ^N→J⋆.\widehat J_N\ge J^\star\ \text{for all large }N\quad\text{and}\quad\widehat J_N\to J^\star.JN​≥J⋆ for all large NandJN​→J⋆.

(ii) If moreover XXX is closed and h(⋅,ξ)h(\cdot,\xi)h(⋅,ξ) is lower semicontinuous on XXX, then P∞P^\inftyP∞-almost surely every accumulation point of (x^N)(\widehat x_N)(xN​) is an optimal solution of (1).

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.5 (finite sample guarantee). For fixed N≥1N\ge1N≥1 and β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1), with radius εN(β)\varepsilon_N(\beta)εN​(β),
PN{EP[h(x^N,ξ)]>J^N}≤β.P^N\big\{\mathbb E^P[h(\widehat x_N,\xi)]>\widehat J_N\big\}\le\beta.PN{EP[h(xN​,ξ)]>JN​}≤β.
  1. Lemma A.1. An upper semicontinuous hhh on Ξ\XiΞ with h(ξ)≤L(1+∥ξ∥)h(\xi)\le L(1+\|\xi\|)h(ξ)≤L(1+∥ξ∥) is the pointwise limit on Ξ\XiΞ of a non-increasing sequence of Lipschitz functions.
  2. Lemma 3.7 (convergence of distributions). Any data-dependent Q^N∈BεN(βN)(P^N)\widehat Q_N\in\mathbb B_{\varepsilon_N(\beta_N)}(\widehat P_N)Q​N​∈BεN​(βN​)​(PN​) satisfies
P∞{lim⁡N→∞dW(P,Q^N)=0}=1.P^\infty\Big\{\lim_{N\to\infty}d_W(P,\widehat Q_N)=0\Big\}=1.P∞{N→∞lim​dW​(P,Q​N​)=0}=1.

Theorem 3.2 (Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality, dW(Q1,Q2)=sup⁡{∫f dQ1−∫f dQ2: f 1-Lipschitz}d_W(Q_1,Q_2)=\sup\{\int f\,dQ_1-\int f\,dQ_2:\ f\ 1\text{-Lipschitz}\}dW​(Q1​,Q2​)=sup{∫fdQ1​−∫fdQ2​: f 1-Lipschitz}), which the proof of (i) uses, enters as a reference item: the open platform theorem WassersteinDRO.Duality.kantorovich_rubinstein, stated on the whole space for all Borel probability measures. It is not a milestone, because that statement is more general than the paper's version on M(Ξ)\mathcal M(\Xi)M(Ξ) (the two agree for distributions in M(Ξ)\mathcal M(\Xi)M(Ξ) by extending Lipschitz functions from Ξ\XiΞ to the whole space).

A companion item, Example 1 (1), records that upper semicontinuity cannot be dropped in (i): for Ξ=[0,1]\Xi=[0,1]Ξ=[0,1], P=δ0P=\delta_0P=δ0​ and h=1(0,1](ξ)h=\mathbb 1_{(0,1]}(\xi)h=1(0,1]​(ξ) one has J⋆=0J^\star=0J⋆=0 but J^N≥1\widehat J_N\ge1JN​≥1 for every radius ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0.

Significance

Theorem 3.5 makes the robust optimal value an upper confidence bound on the out-of-sample cost of the robust decision. Theorem 3.6 shows that this protection does not cost consistency: with radii shrinking at a rate governed by summable confidence levels, such as βN=e−N\beta_N=e^{-\sqrt N}βN​=e−N​, both the certificate and the decisions converge to their true counterparts. Together they are the statistical justification for the Wasserstein ambiguity sets that the rest of the paper reformulates as finite convex programs, and they are cited as the reference consistency results for Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization.

All results here are proved in the paper. None of them, nor the Fournier–Guillin inequality, is formalized on Prove2Me or in Mathlib to our knowledge. The mission adds machine-checked versions of the finite-sample and consistency statements, a monotone Lipschitz approximation lemma for semicontinuous functions with linear growth (useful wherever Lipschitz duality has to be extended to semicontinuous integrands), and a convergence lemma for measures in shrinking Wasserstein balls.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for (i) bounds the worst-case expectation by the true expectation plus a Lipschitz constant times the radius. That fails, because hhh is only upper semicontinuous in ξ\xiξ, not Lipschitz, and has no Lipschitz constant to multiply. The expectations of a merely semicontinuous loss must be controlled uniformly over every distribution in the ball, including data-dependent worst-case distributions, and the almost-sure convergence of the empirical distribution alone does not give this. Example 1 of the paper shows that each regularity hypothesis is needed. On the formal side, the Wasserstein distance is an infimum over couplings on a Polish space; even its triangle inequality (gluing of couplings) and the Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality are substantial.

Formalization scope

EEE is a finite-dimensional real normed space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra (BorelSpace), and mmm is its dimension; decisions live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The definitions dWd_WdW​ (type p=1p=1p=1), P^N\widehat P_NPN​, Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat P_N)Bε​(PN​), EQ\mathbb E^QEQ and the worst-case expectation are the published WassersteinDRO.Duality definitions. The optimal values J⋆J^\starJ⋆ and J^N\widehat J_NJN​ are extended reals. Standing conventions and pinned hypotheses:

  • "Supported on Ξ\XiΞ" is P(Ξc)=0P(\Xi^c)=0P(Ξc)=0; Ξ\XiΞ is neither closed nor convex in general. The samples lie in Ξ\XiΞ almost surely, and optimizers and ball selections are required only for samples in Ξ\XiΞ.
  • The constants c1,c2>0c_1,c_2>0c1​,c2​>0 enter as any constants for which (7) holds, which is how (8) is defined from Theorem 3.4. The theorem of Fournier and Guillin is not part of this mission, and m≠2m\ne2m=2 is assumed because (7) and (8) are printed only for m≠2m\ne2m=2.
  • The loss is real-valued. In Theorem 3.5 it is assumed PPP-integrable on XXX, because the worst-case expectation counts only distributions under which the loss is integrable. In Theorem 3.6 the linear growth bound makes this automatic.
  • Probabilities "at least 1−β1-\beta1−β" are stated as bounds on the outer measure of the failure event, and "P∞P^\inftyP∞-almost surely" as an almost-everywhere statement for the product measure on sequences.
  • The paper's "J^N↓J⋆\widehat J_N\downarrow J^\starJN​↓J⋆" is stated as eventual domination J^N≥J⋆\widehat J_N\ge J^\starJN​≥J⋆ plus convergence, which is what its proof establishes; monotonicity in NNN is not claimed.

A statement in which (7) could not hold for any constants would make the goal vacuous. The concentration inequality is satisfiable (for instance by a Dirac distribution with any constants), and εN(β)\varepsilon_N(\beta)εN​(β) is defined by the paper's formula, not chosen freely.

Welcome contributions: the triangle inequality and Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality for dWd_WdW​, the Borel–Cantelli step for product measures, Lemma A.1, and the Fatou argument of (ii).

Selected references

  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani and D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric: performance guarantees and tractable reformulations, Mathematical Programming 171 (2018); source version arXiv:1505.05116v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05116v3
  • N. Fournier and A. Guillin, On the rate of convergence in Wasserstein distance of the empirical measure, Probability Theory and Related Fields 162 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00440-014-0583-7
  • L. V. Kantorovich and G. S. Rubinstein, On a space of totally additive functions, Vestnik Leningrad. Univ. 13 (1958).
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta and N. Kallus, Robust sample average approximation, Mathematical Programming 171 (2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.4445
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Convex OptimizationOptimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations II: Worst-Case Distributions from a Finite Convex ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

In data-driven stochastic optimization a decision maker knows the distribution of an uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ only through NNN samples ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​. Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization hedges against this ignorance by evaluating a loss ℓ\ellℓ under the worst distribution in a ball, measured in the Wasserstein metric, around the empirical distribution of the samples. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116v3, published in Mathematical Programming 171, 2018) showed that for piecewise concave losses the worst-case expectation is the optimal value of a finite convex program (their Theorem 4.2), which made the approach computationally practical.

Knowing the worst-case value is often not enough. Stress tests of a candidate decision require the extremal distributions themselves: the distributions inside the ball that (nearly) achieve the worst case. Section 4.2 of the paper answers this question. Its Theorem 4.4 shows that the worst case is approached by discrete distributions with at most NKNKNK atoms, read off from near-optimal solutions of a second finite convex program, and its Example 2 shows that a worst-case distribution need not exist at all. This mission formalizes that section. The source is the arXiv preprint version 3 (13 June 2017); all numbering below refers to it.

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real vector space with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ (the paper's Rm\mathbb R^mRm), equipped with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra. Linear functionals zzz on EEE act by ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩, and the dual norm is ∥z∥∗=sup⁡∥ξ∥≤1⟨z,ξ⟩\|z\|_* = \sup_{\|\xi\|\le 1}\langle z,\xi\rangle∥z∥∗​=sup∥ξ∥≤1​⟨z,ξ⟩. Extended reals R‾=[−∞,+∞]\overline{\mathbb R} = [-\infty,+\infty]R=[−∞,+∞] follow the paper's conventions 0⋅∞=0/0=00\cdot\infty = 0/0 = 00⋅∞=0/0=0 and ∞−∞=∞\infty - \infty = \infty∞−∞=∞.

  • Samples and empirical distribution. ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​ lie in a set Ξ⊆E\Xi\subseteq EΞ⊆E, and P^N=1N∑iδξ^i\widehat{\mathbb P}_N = \frac1N\sum_i\delta_{\hat\xi_i}PN​=N1​∑i​δξ^​i​​.
  • Wasserstein ball. dW(Q1,Q2)d_W(\mathbb Q_1,\mathbb Q_2)dW​(Q1​,Q2​) is the infimum of ∫∥ξ1−ξ2∥ Π(dξ1,dξ2)\int\|\xi_1-\xi_2\|\,\Pi(d\xi_1,d\xi_2)∫∥ξ1​−ξ2​∥Π(dξ1​,dξ2​) over couplings Π\PiΠ of Q1\mathbb Q_1Q1​ and Q2\mathbb Q_2Q2​, and Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) is the set of probability distributions supported on Ξ\XiΞ within distance ε\varepsilonε of P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.
  • Loss. ℓ(ξ)=max⁡k≤Kℓk(ξ)\ell(\xi) = \max_{k\le K}\ell_k(\xi)ℓ(ξ)=maxk≤K​ℓk​(ξ) for measurable pieces ℓk:E→R‾\ell_k : E\to\overline{\mathbb R}ℓk​:E→R, and EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=EQ[max⁡{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min⁡{ℓ,0}]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\max\{\ell,0\}] + \mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\min\{\ell,0\}]EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=EQ[max{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min{ℓ,0}].
  • Worst-case expectation (10). sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)]supQ∈Bε​(PN​)​EQ[ℓ(ξ)].
  • Assumption 4.1. Ξ\XiΞ is convex and closed; every −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ is proper, convex and lower semicontinuous; and no ℓk\ell_kℓk​ is identically −∞-\infty−∞ on Ξ\XiΞ.
  • Program (13). Over weights αik≥0\alpha_{ik}\ge 0αik​≥0 and displacements qik∈Eq_{ik}\in Eqik​∈E,
sup⁡αik,qik 1N∑i=1N∑k=1Kαik ℓk(ξ^i−qikαik)s.t.1N∑i,k∥qik∥≤ε,  ∑kαik=1,  ξ^i−qikαik∈Ξ.\sup_{\alpha_{ik},q_{ik}}\ \frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\sum_{k=1}^K\alpha_{ik}\,\ell_k\Big(\hat\xi_i-\frac{q_{ik}}{\alpha_{ik}}\Big)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\|q_{ik}\|\le\varepsilon,\ \ \sum_k\alpha_{ik}=1,\ \ \hat\xi_i-\frac{q_{ik}}{\alpha_{ik}}\in\Xi .αik​,qik​sup​ N1​i=1∑N​k=1∑K​αik​ℓk​(ξ^​i​−αik​qik​​)s.t.N1​i,k∑​∥qik​∥≤ε,  k∑​αik​=1,  ξ^​i​−αik​qik​​∈Ξ.

When αik=0\alpha_{ik}=0αik​=0 the last constraint forces qik=0q_{ik}=0qik​=0 and the ikikik-th objective term is 000.

  • Candidate distributions. Q=1N∑i,kαik δξik\mathbb Q = \frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\,\delta_{\xi_{ik}}Q=N1​∑i,k​αik​δξik​​ with ξik=ξ^i−qik/αik\xi_{ik} = \hat\xi_i - q_{ik}/\alpha_{ik}ξik​=ξ^​i​−qik​/αik​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4 (worst-case distributions)

Under Assumption 4.1 and for every ε≥0\varepsilon\ge 0ε≥0,

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=optimal value of (13),\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \text{optimal value of (13)},Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=optimal value of (13),

and for every feasible sequence (αik(r),qik(r))r(\alpha_{ik}(r),q_{ik}(r))_r(αik​(r),qik​(r))r​ of (13) whose objective values converge to that optimal value, the distributions Qr\mathbb Q_rQr​ lie in Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) and

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=lim⁡r→∞EQr[ℓ(ξ)]=lim⁡r→∞1N∑i,kαik(r) ℓ(ξik(r)).\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)] = \lim_{r\to\infty}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q_r}[\ell(\xi)] = \lim_{r\to\infty}\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}(r)\,\ell(\xi_{ik}(r)).Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)]=r→∞lim​EQr​[ℓ(ξ)]=r→∞lim​N1​i,k∑​αik​(r)ℓ(ξik​(r)).

The limits may be +∞+\infty+∞; no finiteness is assumed.

Milestones, in the order of the proof

The proof starts from (10) = (12f) (proof of Theorem 4.2, p. 13), which is posed in mission I of this series, Wasserstein Worst-Case Expectations as Finite Convex Programs, and is not restated here; it will be linked as a milestone once that mission is live.

  1. Lemma 4.5: inf⁡z⟨z,q−αξ^⟩+αf∗(z)\inf_z\langle z,q-\alpha\hat\xi\rangle+\alpha f^*(z)infz​⟨z,q−αξ^​⟩+αf∗(z) is the extended perspective of q↦−f(ξ^−q)q\mapsto -f(\hat\xi-q)q↦−f(ξ^​−q) for proper, convex, lower semicontinuous fff.
  2. (14d)–(14f): the ikikik-th dual term equals αℓk(ξ^−q/α)−χΞ(ξ^−q/α)\alpha\ell_k(\hat\xi-q/\alpha)-\chi_\Xi(\hat\xi-q/\alpha)αℓk​(ξ^​−q/α)−χΞ​(ξ^​−q/α) under the extended-arithmetic conventions.
  3. (12f) = (13), the first part of the proof of Theorem 4.4.
  4. Qr∈Bε(P^N)\mathbb Q_r\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Qr​∈Bε​(PN​) for every feasible point of (13).
  5. EQr[ℓ(ξ)]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q_r}[\ell(\xi)]EQr​[ℓ(ξ)] equals 1N∑i,kαikℓ(ξik)\frac1N\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\ell(\xi_{ik})N1​∑i,k​αik​ℓ(ξik​) and is at least the objective of (13) for every feasible point.

Companion results

Corollary 4.6: if Ξ\XiΞ is compact or K=1K=1K=1, the sequence has an accumulation point that defines a worst-case distribution. Example 2: for Ξ=R\Xi=\mathbb RΞ=R, N=1N=1N=1, ξ^1=0\hat\xi_1=0ξ^​1​=0, ℓ=max⁡{0,ξ−1}\ell=\max\{0,\xi-1\}ℓ=max{0,ξ−1}, the worst-case expectation is ε\varepsilonε and, for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, is attained by no distribution in the ball.

Significance

Theorem 4.4 turns the abstract supremum over an infinite-dimensional ball of distributions into a finite-dimensional convex program whose near-optimal solutions are near-worst-case distributions. The atoms ξik\xi_{ik}ξik​ sit within total weighted distance ∑i,kαik∥ξik−ξ^i∥≤Nε\sum_{i,k}\alpha_{ik}\|\xi_{ik}-\hat\xi_i\|\le N\varepsilon∑i,k​αik​∥ξik​−ξ^​i​∥≤Nε of the data, and they may lie off the data, which distinguishes Wasserstein balls from ambiguity sets based on the total variation distance or the Kullback–Leibler divergence. Example 2 marks the boundary: the theorem cannot be upgraded to the existence of a maximizer in general, while Corollary 4.6 names two cases where it can.

The results are proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. The formalization adds a precise account of the extended-arithmetic conventions the paper relies on (0⋅∞=00\cdot\infty=00⋅∞=0, q/0∉Eq/0\notin Eq/0∈/E, ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞), each of which is made explicit in the definitions, and a reusable Lean treatment of extended-valued conjugates and perspective functions on a normed space with an arbitrary norm.

Difficulty

The first claim goes through Lagrangian duality for program (12f), whose constraints involve conjugates that may take the value +∞+\infty+∞; the strong duality and the minimax interchange (14c) must be justified for extended-valued convex functions, not just finite ones. Lemma 4.5 needs the Fenchel–Moreau theorem f∗∗=ff^{**}=ff∗∗=f for proper, convex, lower semicontinuous R‾\overline{\mathbb R}R-valued functions on a finite-dimensional normed space, together with its degenerate case α=0\alpha=0α=0. The second claim is a squeeze argument, but it rests on computing an extended expectation of an R‾\overline{\mathbb R}R-valued function under a discrete measure and on an explicit coupling for the Wasserstein distance. A tempting shortcut, attaining the supremum by a limit distribution, fails: Example 2 shows the maximizing atoms can escape to infinity.

Formalization scope

  • The space is a finite-dimensional real normed space E with [BorelSpace E]; the dual space is StrongDual ℝ E, and the dual norm is the operator norm. All values are in EReal.
  • The Wasserstein distance, the ball (6) and P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​ are the published WassersteinDRO.Duality.wassersteinDistance, ambiguitySet (with p=1p=1p=1) and empiricalDistribution.
  • The extended expectation is the published DupacovaWets.Consistency.expect; it integrates the positive and negative parts separately and returns +∞+\infty+∞ when the positive part is infinite; there is no integrability guard, so a distribution with infinite expected loss pushes (10) to +∞+\infty+∞ as in the paper.
  • Program values are infima or suprema over feasibility predicates, so an empty feasible set gives ±∞\pm\infty±∞, never a junk 000. Program (13) encodes αik=0\alpha_{ik}=0αik​=0 by the clauses "qik=0q_{ik}=0qik​=0" and "objective term =0=0=0" (p. 14).
  • Standing assumptions carried as hypotheses: N≥1N\ge1N≥1, K≥1K\ge1K≥1, ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ (§2), measurability of each ℓk\ell_kℓk​ (p. 11).
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: dropping the clause αik=0⇒qik=0\alpha_{ik}=0\Rightarrow q_{ik}=0αik​=0⇒qik​=0 or the hypothesis ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ would change program (13) or make the ball empty, and both are kept explicitly.
  • The objects shared with mission I (extended expectation, worst-case expectation, conjugate, Assumption 4.1, program (12f)) are restated verbatim in this mission's namespace; they will be merged with mission I's copies. Contributions to the convex-analysis groundwork (extended-valued Fenchel–Moreau, perspective functions) are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani and D. Kuhn, Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations, Mathematical Programming 171, 2018. Version formalized: arXiv:1505.05116v3.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Convex Optimization Theory, Athena Scientific, 2009 (Propositions 1.6.1 and 5.5.4, used in the proofs).
  • R. T. Rockafellar and R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
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CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Matching, Euler Tours and the Chinese Postman II: The Parity Problem Is a Minimum 1-Matching of the Odd Nodes under Shortest-Path LengthsResearch Paper

Motivation

A postal route that must traverse every street and return to its starting point is a Chinese postman tour. In a street network, crossings are nodes, streets are edges, and the cost of a route is the sum of the lengths of the streets it traverses, counted with repetition. The practical question is which streets must be repeated, and how often. Edmonds and Johnson's 1973 paper separates that question from constructing the resulting tour: choose the repeated edges first, then find an Euler tour of the resulting multigraph. This mission concerns their reduction of the first question to a minimum-weight matching of the odd-degree nodes.

The reduction matters because it turns a route problem with arbitrary repeated edge traversals into a finite pairing problem. The graph of odd nodes is complete, with the weight of a pair given by its shortest-path distance in the original network. A matching chooses which odd nodes to pair, and paths realizing those pairs identify edges to repeat. The paper also explains why overlapping paths can be replaced so that no edge needs to be repeated by this construction more than once (§3, pp. 92–93).

Setting

A graph G=(N,E)G=(N,E)G=(N,E) has finite node and edge sets. Each edge has two distinct endpoints. Different edges may join the same pair of nodes, so parallel streets remain distinct. The graph is connected when every pair of nodes is joined by an edge-labelled walk. A walk records both its node sequence and its edge sequence; a tour is a closed walk. An Euler tour uses each edge exactly once, while a postman tour uses each edge at least once. Edge lengths cec_ece​ are real and nonnegative, as in §2, p. 89.

The degree of vvv is the number of named edges meeting it. Let TTT be the set of nodes of odd degree. For every edge eee, let xe∈Nx_e\in\mathbb Nxe​∈N be the number of additional traversals. The parity equations require a nonnegative integer wvw_vwv​ at each node such that

∑e∋vxe=2wv+bv,bv={1v∈T,0v∉T.\sum_{e\ni v}x_e=2w_v+b_v,\qquad b_v=\begin{cases}1&v\in T,\\0&v\notin T.\end{cases}e∋v∑​xe​=2wv​+bv​,bv​={10​v∈T,v∈/T.​

Their objective is z(x)=∑e∈Ecexez(x)=\sum_{e\in E}c_ex_ez(x)=∑e∈E​ce​xe​. These are the paper's (3.1)–(3.4), with natural-number values encoding integrality and nonnegativity (§3, pp. 90–91). The equations express the even-degree condition after adding xex_exe​ copies of each original edge.

For nodes u,vu,vu,v, write d(u,v)d(u,v)d(u,v) for the length of a shortest path in GGG. This distance is backed by an attaining edge-simple path and is a lower bound on the length of every walk from uuu to vvv. Connectivity and nonnegative edge lengths make that specification meaningful. Let GpG_pGp​ be the complete graph on TTT, with edge {u,v}\{u,v\}{u,v} of weight d(u,v)d(u,v)d(u,v). A 1-matching MMM pairs every node of TTT with exactly one distinct node. Its length is L(M)=∑{u,v}∈Md(u,v)L(M)=\sum_{\{u,v\}\in M}d(u,v)L(M)=∑{u,v}∈M​d(u,v), equivalently half the sum of d(v,f(v))d(v,f(v))d(v,f(v)) over v∈Tv\in Tv∈T for the pairing involution fff (§3, p. 92).

Formalization targets

Odd-node matching reduction

The goal asserts the existence of a 1-matching of the odd nodes and both directions of the cost comparison:

∀M  ∃x satisfying the parity equations:xe∈{0,1}, z(x)≤L(M),\forall M\;\exists x\text{ satisfying the parity equations}:\quad x_e\in\{0,1\},\ z(x)\le L(M),∀M∃x satisfying the parity equations:xe​∈{0,1}, z(x)≤L(M), ∀x satisfying the parity equations  ∃M:L(M)≤z(x).\forall x\text{ satisfying the parity equations}\;\exists M:\quad L(M)\le z(x).∀x satisfying the parity equations∃M:L(M)≤z(x).

The existence conclusion and these comparisons identify the two attained minimum values. The goal does not prescribe a particular matching algorithm. Its supporting targets are the paper's uncrossing of overlapping shortest paths, parity of their union, reduction of multiplicities to zero or one, and decomposition of a parity solution into paths between odd nodes (§3, pp. 92–93).

Postman-tour reduction

The companion target relates a tour's edge counts to the parity equations. A postman tour traverses edge eee exactly 1+xe1+x_e1+xe​ times, and its length is

∑e∈Ece(1+xe)=∑e∈Ece+z(x).\sum_{e\in E}c_e(1+x_e) =\sum_{e\in E}c_e+z(x).e∈E∑​ce​(1+xe​)=e∈E∑​ce​+z(x).

Conversely, positive integer edge counts with even incidence at every node can be ordered into a postman tour of a connected graph. The supporting Euler theorem handles a connected even multigraph (§2, p. 89).

Significance

The matching result characterizes the optimal additional cost of an undirected postman route. It says that the parity correction can be chosen from paths pairing odd nodes, and that no feasible choice of repeated traversals can beat the best such pairing. The companion identifies how that correction becomes an actual tour. The distinction is useful when one wants to change the matching method while retaining the mathematical guarantee on route length.

A formal development would provide a reusable account of finite multigraph walks whose edge names distinguish parallel edges, of shortest-path distances with explicit attainment, and of parity subgraphs decomposed into odd-to-odd paths and even-degree residual tours. These pieces support later formal work on route inspection, TTT-joins, and matching-based graph algorithms. The paper proves the mathematical result. The exact multigraph and cost statements drafted here are open formalization targets; the local prior-art search found related results for simple graphs and metric traveling-salesman models, but no published statement with this paper's objects and conclusion.

Difficulty

A direct shortest-path construction can assign the same original edge to two matching pairs. Simply setting xe=1x_e=1xe​=1 for the union then loses the additivity of path lengths, and setting xe=2x_e=2xe​=2 loses the promised zero-or-one form. The uncrossing claim must control both the matching cost and the number of times each original edge appears. In the converse direction, an arbitrary feasible xxx may contain repeated edges and cycles; the argument must account for these without assuming that every supported edge belongs to a path between odd nodes (§3, pp. 92–93).

Formalization scope

Lean uses the published EdmondsMatching65.Polyhedron.Graph for GGG: finite node and edge types and an endpoint map into unordered node pairs. A proof field excludes loops; distinct edge names may have identical endpoints. Walks use lists of nodes and named edges with zero-based indices, and the one-node, zero-edge walk is allowed. Edge multiplicities and parity witnesses are natural numbers. Costs and shortest-path lengths are real. The distance relation requires both an attaining edge-simple path and a bound against all walks; no real infimum over a possibly empty family is used. The matching is a fixed-point-free involution on the odd nodes, extended by the identity elsewhere, and each pair contributes half of its two directed distance terms.

The goal assumes a connected graph and nonnegative edge lengths, exactly as the section does. The tour-only results require a nonempty node type because a list-based tour must have a starting node; without it an edgeless graph on no nodes would satisfy connectivity and even degree vacuously. The path-decomposition statement permits unused even-degree cycles. No independent set of “odd nodes” is accepted as input: it is computed from the degree of GGG.

The development needs finite multigraph incidence, edge-labelled walks, shortest paths, finite matchings, parity arithmetic, path uncrossing, and Euler tours. Proofs or useful intermediate results for these objects are welcome, including results applicable to multigraphs beyond the postman setting.

Selected references

  • Jack Edmonds and Ellis L. Johnson, Matching, Euler tours and the Chinese postman, Mathematical Programming 5 (1973), 88–124. DOI: 10.1007/BF01580113.
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Convex OptimizationOptimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Distributionally Robust Optimization Using the Wasserstein Metric: Performance Guarantees and Tractable Reformulations I: Wasserstein Worst-Case Expectations as Finite Convex ProgramsResearch Paper

Motivation

A decision maker who must minimize an expected cost EP[h(x,ξ)]\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}[h(x,\xi)]EP[h(x,ξ)] rarely knows the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertain parameter ξ\xiξ; usually only NNN samples ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_Nξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​ are available. Replacing P\mathbb PP by the empirical distribution (sample average approximation) tends to produce decisions that perform poorly out of sample when NNN is small. Distributionally robust optimization instead minimizes the worst expected cost over a set of distributions that are plausible given the data. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (arXiv:1505.05116v3, published in Mathematical Programming 171, 2018) take that set to be a ball in the Wasserstein metric around the empirical distribution. Such balls give finite-sample and asymptotic guarantees, but each evaluation of the robust objective is an optimization over infinitely many probability distributions. Section 4.1 of the paper shows that, for a large class of losses, this inner problem is a finite convex program. That result, Theorem 4.2, is the subject of this mission.

Timeline. Wasserstein ambiguity sets for portfolio selection were proposed by Pflug and Wozabal (2007); before this paper, robust problems over such sets were solved with global optimization algorithms (Pflug and Pichler 2014). Strong duality for conic linear and moment problems (Shapiro 2001) underlies the reduction. Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn (preprint 2015, journal 2018) proved the convex reduction for piecewise concave losses; Gao and Kleywegt (arXiv:1604.02199) and Blanchet and Murthy (arXiv:1604.01446) proved strong duality for general transport costs in 2016.

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real vector space with an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ (the paper's Rm\mathbb R^mRm) and its Borel σ-algebra. Its dual norm is ∥z∥∗=sup⁡∥ξ∥≤1⟨z,ξ⟩\|z\|_* = \sup_{\|\xi\|\le 1}\langle z,\xi\rangle∥z∥∗​=sup∥ξ∥≤1​⟨z,ξ⟩, where ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩ is the value of the linear functional zzz at ξ\xiξ. Let Ξ⊆E\Xi\subseteq EΞ⊆E be the support set and ξ^1,…,ξ^N∈Ξ\hat\xi_1,\dots,\hat\xi_N\in\Xiξ^​1​,…,ξ^​N​∈Ξ the samples, with empirical distribution P^N=1N∑i=1Nδξ^i\widehat{\mathbb P}_N=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\delta_{\hat\xi_i}PN​=N1​∑i=1N​δξ^​i​​.

The 1-Wasserstein distance between two distributions is the least transport cost ∫∥ξ−ξ′∥ Π(dξ,dξ′)\int\|\xi-\xi'\|\,\Pi(d\xi,d\xi')∫∥ξ−ξ′∥Π(dξ,dξ′) over all couplings Π\PiΠ with the given marginals. The Wasserstein ball Bε(P^N)\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)Bε​(PN​) is the set of probability distributions on Ξ\XiΞ within distance ε≥0\varepsilon\ge 0ε≥0 of P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.

The loss is a pointwise maximum ℓ(ξ)=max⁡k≤Kℓk(ξ)\ell(\xi)=\max_{k\le K}\ell_k(\xi)ℓ(ξ)=maxk≤K​ℓk​(ξ) of measurable functions ℓk:E→R‾=R∪{±∞}\ell_k:E\to\overline{\mathbb R}=\mathbb R\cup\{\pm\infty\}ℓk​:E→R=R∪{±∞}. Its expectation is EQ[ℓ]=EQ[max⁡{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min⁡{ℓ,0}]\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell]=\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\max\{\ell,0\}]+\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\min\{\ell,0\}]EQ[ℓ]=EQ[max{ℓ,0}]+EQ[min{ℓ,0}] with ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞. The worst-case expectation is

sup⁡Q∈Bε(P^N)EQ[ℓ(ξ)].(10)\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\varepsilon(\widehat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\ell(\xi)].\tag{10}Q∈Bε​(PN​)sup​EQ[ℓ(ξ)].(10)

The conjugate of f:E→R‾f:E\to\overline{\mathbb R}f:E→R is f∗(z)=sup⁡ξ⟨z,ξ⟩−f(ξ)f^*(z)=\sup_\xi\langle z,\xi\rangle-f(\xi)f∗(z)=supξ​⟨z,ξ⟩−f(ξ), the characteristic function χΞ\chi_\XiχΞ​ is 000 on Ξ\XiΞ and +∞+\infty+∞ off it, and the support function is σΞ(z)=sup⁡ξ∈Ξ⟨z,ξ⟩\sigma_\Xi(z)=\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}\langle z,\xi\rangleσΞ​(z)=supξ∈Ξ​⟨z,ξ⟩. Assumption 4.1 requires Ξ\XiΞ to be convex and closed, each −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ to be proper, convex and lower semicontinuous, and no ℓk\ell_kℓk​ to be identically −∞-\infty−∞ on Ξ\XiΞ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2 (convex reduction)

Under Assumption 4.1, for every ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0, (10) equals

inf⁡λ,si,zik,νik λε+1N∑i=1Nsis.t.[−ℓk]∗(zik−νik)+σΞ(νik)−⟨zik,ξ^i⟩≤si,  ∥zik∥∗≤λ∀i,k.(11)\inf_{\lambda,s_i,z_{ik},\nu_{ik}}\ \lambda\varepsilon+\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N s_i\quad\text{s.t.}\quad [-\ell_k]^*(z_{ik}-\nu_{ik})+\sigma_\Xi(\nu_{ik})-\langle z_{ik},\hat\xi_i\rangle\le s_i,\ \ \|z_{ik}\|_*\le\lambda\quad\forall i,k.\tag{11}λ,si​,zik​,νik​inf​ λε+N1​i=1∑N​si​s.t.[−ℓk​]∗(zik​−νik​)+σΞ​(νik​)−⟨zik​,ξ^​i​⟩≤si​,  ∥zik​∥∗​≤λ∀i,k.(11)

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. (12a)–(12c). Without any convexity, (10) is at most the value of (12c): inf⁡{λε+1N∑isi: sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓ(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^i∥)≤si, λ≥0}\inf\{\lambda\varepsilon+\frac1N\sum_i s_i:\ \sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell(\xi)-\lambda\|\xi-\hat\xi_i\|)\le s_i,\ \lambda\ge0\}inf{λε+N1​∑i​si​: supξ∈Ξ​(ℓ(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^​i​∥)≤si​, λ≥0}.
  2. Corollary 4.3. Without Assumption 4.1, (10) is at most the value of (12f), the program with constraints [−ℓk+χΞ]∗(zik)−⟨zik,ξ^i⟩≤si[-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi]^*(z_{ik})-\langle z_{ik},\hat\xi_i\rangle\le s_i[−ℓk​+χΞ​]∗(zik​)−⟨zik​,ξ^​i​⟩≤si​ and ∥zik∥∗≤λ\|z_{ik}\|_*\le\lambda∥zik​∥∗​≤λ.
  3. (12a) is an equality for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 under Assumption 4.1.
  4. The case ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0. (10) is the sample average 1N∑iℓ(ξ^i)\frac1N\sum_i\ell(\hat\xi_i)N1​∑i​ℓ(ξ^​i​), the objective of (12b) converges to it as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞, and (12a) is again an equality.
  5. (12e) is an equality. For each constraint, sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓk(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^i∥)=min⁡∥z∥∗≤λsup⁡ξ∈Ξ(ℓk(ξ)−⟨z,ξ−ξ^i⟩)\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell_k(\xi)-\lambda\|\xi-\hat\xi_i\|)=\min_{\|z\|_*\le\lambda}\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\ell_k(\xi)-\langle z,\xi-\hat\xi_i\rangle)supξ∈Ξ​(ℓk​(ξ)−λ∥ξ−ξ^​i​∥)=min∥z∥∗​≤λ​supξ∈Ξ​(ℓk​(ξ)−⟨z,ξ−ξ^​i​⟩).
  6. (10) equals (12f) under Assumption 4.1.
  7. (12f) equals (11) under Assumption 4.1, as optimal values.

Significance

Theorem 4.2 is what makes Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization computable. Once the worst-case expectation is a convex program in (λ,s,z,ν)(\lambda,s,z,\nu)(λ,s,z,ν), minimizing over the decision xxx becomes one larger convex program. Section 5 of the paper derives linear and conic programs from it for piecewise affine losses, uncertainty quantification and two-stage problems. Theorem 4.4 of the same paper (mission II of this series) builds worst-case distributions from the same program. Corollary 4.3 gives a conservative convex bound for losses that are not piecewise concave.

The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of it is known. A formal development needs a working theory of extended-valued conjugates, support functions and inf-convolution in a normed space, Kantorovich-type couplings of an empirical measure, and a minimax theorem over a compact dual ball. Each of these is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The weak inequality, (10) ≤\le≤ (12f), is the elementary direction: integrate a pointwise bound against a near-optimal coupling. The difficulty lies in the two equalities. Equality in (12a) is strong duality for an infinite-dimensional moment problem whose loss may take the values ±∞\pm\infty±∞ and may be unbounded on an unbounded Ξ\XiΞ. A Slater point exists only for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, so ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0 needs a separate limit argument. The equality (12f) === (11) is subtle as well. The conjugate of −ℓk+χΞ-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi−ℓk​+χΞ​ is only the closure of the inf-convolution of [−ℓk]∗[-\ell_k]^*[−ℓk​]∗ and σΞ\sigma_\XiσΞ​, so the two constraint sets differ and only the optimal values agree. The paper's sentence "cl[f]≤0[f]\le 0[f]≤0 iff f≤0f\le0f≤0" is false pointwise and cannot be formalized as written.

Formalization scope

  • Space. EEE is a finite-dimensional real normed space with its Borel σ-algebra. The pairing ⟨z,ξ⟩\langle z,\xi\rangle⟨z,ξ⟩ is application of a continuous linear functional zzz, and ∥z∥∗\|z\|_*∥z∥∗​ is the operator norm. These choices keep the paper's arbitrary norm; §5 of the paper uses the 1- and ∞-norms.
  • Extended reals. Values are in EReal. Mathlib's EReal has ⊤+⊥=⊥\top+\bot=\bot⊤+⊥=⊥, whereas the paper has ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞, so the expectation treats an infinite positive part separately, and [−ℓk+χΞ]∗(z)[-\ell_k+\chi_\Xi]^*(z)[−ℓk​+χΞ​]∗(z) is written as sup⁡ξ∈Ξ(⟨z,ξ⟩+ℓk(ξ))\sup_{\xi\in\Xi}(\langle z,\xi\rangle+\ell_k(\xi))supξ∈Ξ​(⟨z,ξ⟩+ℓk​(ξ)), with no addition at all. The one EReal sum, [−ℓk]∗+σΞ[-\ell_k]^*+\sigma_\Xi[−ℓk​]∗+σΞ​ in (11), never meets ⊤+⊥\top+\bot⊤+⊥ under Assumption 4.1.
  • Programs. Each optimal value is an infimum over a feasibility predicate with real epigraph variables, so an infeasible program has value +∞+\infty+∞.
  • Ball. The ball is the published WassersteinDRO.Duality.ambiguitySet with p=1p=1p=1 around empiricalDistribution. Its condition Q(Ξc)=0\mathbb Q(\Xi^{\mathrm c})=0Q(Ξc)=0 encodes Q∈M(Ξ)\mathbb Q\in\mathcal M(\Xi)Q∈M(Ξ). The finite first moment is automatic at finite distance from P^N\widehat{\mathbb P}_NPN​.
  • Standing assumptions. Every statement carries N≥1N\ge1N≥1, K≥1K\ge1K≥1, ξ^i∈Ξ\hat\xi_i\in\Xiξ^​i​∈Ξ (§2, p. 5) and measurability of each ℓk\ell_kℓk​ (p. 11). The radius condition is ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0, or ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 in milestone 3.
  • Assumption 4.1. Convexity of −ℓk-\ell_k−ℓk​ is stated through its real epigraph, because ConvexOn cannot take an EReal codomain.
  • Not trivializable. The statements cannot be made vacuous by an empty ball, because the samples lie in Ξ\XiΞ. They cannot be trivialized by a junk expectation either: the expectation is not guarded by integrability, so a distribution with infinite expected loss makes (10) infinite, exactly as in the paper.

Welcome contributions are reusable lemmas on EReal-valued conjugates and support functions, the decomposition of a coupling with an empirical marginal into conditional distributions, the dual-norm identity max⁡∥z∥∗≤λ⟨z,v⟩=λ∥v∥\max_{\|z\|_*\le\lambda}\langle z,v\rangle=\lambda\|v\|max∥z∥∗​≤λ​⟨z,v⟩=λ∥v∥, and a Sion-type minimax theorem.

Selected references

  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric: performance guarantees and tractable reformulations, arXiv:1505.05116v3, 2017; Math. Program. 171 (2018) 115–166. https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05116v3
  • A. Shapiro, On duality theory of conic linear problems, in M. A. Goberna, M. A. López (eds.), Semi-Infinite Programming, Kluwer, 2001.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 2010 (Theorem 11.23(a), p. 493).
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Convex Optimization Theory, Athena Scientific, 2009 (Proposition 5.5.4).
  • G. Ch. Pflug, A. Pichler, Multistage Stochastic Optimization, Springer, 2014.
  • G. Ch. Pflug, D. Wozabal, Ambiguity in portfolio selection, Quantitative Finance 7 (2007) 435–442.
  • R. Gao, A. J. Kleywegt, Distributionally robust stochastic optimization with Wasserstein distance, arXiv:1604.02199, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying distributional model risk via optimal transport, arXiv:1604.01446, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01446
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Dynamic ProgrammingLinear OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Convergence of Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming and Related Methods: DOASA Reaches an Optimal Policy in Finitely Many Iterations Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

Stochastic dual dynamic programming (SDDP), introduced by Pereira and Pinto in 1991, is the standard method for multistage stochastic linear programs with many stages, such as hydro-thermal scheduling and long-term energy planning. It approximates each stage's expected future cost from below by the maximum of finitely many linear functions (cuts), built from LP dual solutions at sampled states, and alternates a forward simulation pass with a backward cut-generation pass. Practitioners stop the method when a simulated upper bound is close to the lower bound C1kC^k_1C1k​. Whether this procedure converges at all is the question of this mission.

Timeline:

  • 1991: Pereira and Pinto publish SDDP, with no convergence proof.
  • 1999: Chen and Powell prove almost-sure convergence for CUPPS; Linowsky and Philpott (2005) extend the argument to SDDP, AND and ReSa. Both proofs rely on an unstated independence assumption between sampled outcomes and convergent subsequences of iterates.
  • 2008: Philpott and Guan (Oper. Res. Lett. 36(4), 450–455) give a proof based on the finiteness of the set of distinct cut coefficients, for a class they call DOASA (Dynamic Outer Approximation Sampling Algorithms).
  • Later work (Shapiro 2011; Girardeau, Leclère and Philpott 2015) extends convergence to convex nonlinear and continuous settings.

Setting

There are T≥2T\ge2T≥2 stages. Stage ttt has a decision xt≥0x_t\ge0xt​≥0 in Rnt\mathbb R^{n_t}Rnt​, costs ctc_tct​, a matrix AtA_tAt​ and, for t≤T−1t\le T-1t≤T−1, a matrix BtB_tBt​ coupling xtx_txt​ to the next stage. At stage 111 the constraint is A1x1=b1A_1x_1=b_1A1​x1​=b1​. For 2≤t≤T2\le t\le T2≤t≤T the right-hand side is random: Atxt=ωt−Bt−1xt−1A_tx_t=\omega_t-B_{t-1}x_{t-1}At​xt​=ωt​−Bt−1​xt−1​, where ωt\omega_tωt​ takes values ωt1,…,ωtqt\omega_{t1},\dots,\omega_{tq_t}ωt1​,…,ωtqt​​ with probabilities pti>0p_{ti}>0pti​>0, independently across stages. The expected cost-to-go is defined backwards from QT+1≡0\mathcal Q_{T+1}\equiv0QT+1​≡0:

Qt(xt−1,ωti)=min⁡{ct⊤xt+Qt+1(xt):Atxt=ωti−Bt−1xt−1, xt≥0},Qt=∑iptiQt(⋅,ωti),Q_t(x_{t-1},\omega_{ti})=\min\{c_t^\top x_t+\mathcal Q_{t+1}(x_t):A_tx_t=\omega_{ti}-B_{t-1}x_{t-1},\ x_t\ge0\},\qquad \mathcal Q_t=\sum_i p_{ti}Q_t(\cdot,\omega_{ti}),Qt​(xt−1​,ωti​)=min{ct⊤​xt​+Qt+1​(xt​):At​xt​=ωti​−Bt−1​xt−1​, xt​≥0},Qt​=i∑​pti​Qt​(⋅,ωti​),

and Q1=min⁡{c1⊤x1+Q2(x1):A1x1=b1,x1≥0}Q_1=\min\{c_1^\top x_1+\mathcal Q_2(x_1):A_1x_1=b_1,x_1\ge0\}Q1​=min{c1⊤​x1​+Q2​(x1​):A1​x1​=b1​,x1​≥0} is the problem [LP1]. Assumption (A4) says every stage problem met along the way has a nonempty, bounded feasible region.

The approximate problem [APtk_t^ktk​] replaces Qt+1\mathcal Q_{t+1}Qt+1​ by max⁡j{αt+1,j−(βt+1j)⊤xt}\max_j\{\alpha_{t+1,j}-(\beta^j_{t+1})^\top x_t\}maxj​{αt+1,j​−(βt+1j​)⊤xt​} over the cuts generated before iteration kkk; its value is CtkC^k_tCtk​. A scenario fixes one outcome per stage 2,…,T−12,\dots,T-12,…,T−1. Each DOASA iteration (i) samples one forward scenario ωk\omega^kωk and solves [APtk_t^ktk​] along it, giving states xtkx^k_txtk​; (ii) for t=T,…,2t=T,\dots,2t=T,…,2 runs the Cut Calculation Algorithm (CCA): it solves [APtk_t^ktk​] at xt−1kx^k_{t-1}xt−1k​ for the outcomes in a backward sample Ωtk\Omega^k_tΩtk​, stores optimal extreme-point dual solutions (π,ρ)(\pi,\rho)(π,ρ) in a collection Dt\mathcal D_tDt​, picks for every outcome the best stored dual, and averages them into a new cut on θt\theta_tθt​. DOASA-N instead traverses a fixed list of NNN scenarios in every iteration.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 under the joint sampling property J

If, with probability 1, every scenario prefix is followed by the forward pass jointly with each outcome being in the backward sample infinitely often (property J), then with probability 1 every DOASA run has an iteration KKK after which the cuts no longer change, the policy xˉ\bar xxˉ they induce is optimal for [LP1], and

C1K=Q1.C^K_1=Q_1 .C1K​=Q1​.

Milestones

  • Monotonicity (p. 4): Ctk+1≥CtkC^{k+1}_t\ge C^k_tCtk+1​≥Ctk​ and C1k+1≥C1kC^{k+1}_1\ge C^k_1C1k+1​≥C1k​.
  • Lower bound (p. 4): every cut is valid, so Ctk≤QtC^k_t\le Q_tCtk​≤Qt​ and C1k≤Q1C^k_1\le Q_1C1k​≤Q1​.
  • Lemma 1 (p. 6): the set Gtk\mathcal G^k_tGtk​ of distinct generated cuts is bounded in size and eventually constant.
  • Lemma 2 (p. 10): DOASA-N stops changing after finitely many iterations, with lim⁡kC1k≤Q1\lim_kC^k_1\le Q_1limk​C1k​≤Q1​.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 10): DOASA-N over all scenarios, with backward sampling infinitely often per scenario, converges almost surely to an optimal policy.

Significance

The theorem justifies SDDP, AND, ReSa and CUPPS as exact methods: on a finite scenario tree, sampling-based cutting-plane schemes reach an optimal policy and a tight lower bound after finitely many iterations, almost surely. The finiteness argument (Lemma 1) is the template for later finite-convergence proofs of SDDP variants.

The paper's proofs are informal. No part of this development is machine-checked, and the printed statement of Theorem 4 is false (see below), so a formal proof also settles exactly which sampling hypothesis is enough. The finite-cut lemma and the cut-validity milestone are reusable for any Benders-type multistage method.

Difficulty

The obvious argument goes: cut sets stabilize (Lemma 1), and every scenario and every outcome is sampled infinitely often, so the limiting cuts must be exact. The last step fails. A cut at a state is exact only if, for every outcome, a dual that is optimal at that state has been collected. Sampling the forward scenario and the backward outcomes infinitely often, but separately, does not ensure this. Lemma 1 itself is also delicate: the dual vectors ρ\rhoρ grow in dimension with kkk, so the collection of extreme-point duals can be infinite even though the cut coefficients take finitely many values. The algorithm's choices (extreme-point duals, ties among best duals) must be handled for every run, not for a convenient one.

Formalization scope

Stages are numbered 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T with variable dimensions per stage. B t is the paper's BtB_tBt​, the matrix multiplying xtx_txt​ in stage t+1t+1t+1. Value functions are real infima, used only on reachable states. Iterations are numbered from 000 in Lean. Explicit choices, each recorded in the item statements:

  • The J correction. The paper states Theorem 4 under FPSP and BPSP. These do not suffice. In a three-stage instance whose last-stage backward sample is {c}\{c\}{c} after forward outcome aaa and {d}\{d\}{d} after bbb, alternating, both properties hold but the cuts stabilize at a suboptimal policy with C1kC^k_1C1k​ below Q1Q_1Q1​. The goal is stated under J, which implies FPSP and BPSP and holds for the schemes the paper names. Lemma 3's BPSP is read per scenario of DOASA-N.
  • Initial cut. The paper's trivial cut θt+1≥−∞\theta_{t+1}\ge-\inftyθt+1​≥−∞ makes [APt1_t^1t1​] unbounded; it is replaced by a finite cut θt+1≥Lt\theta_{t+1}\ge L_tθt+1​≥Lt​ assumed valid on reachable states. Stage TTT uses the exact cut θT+1≥0\theta_{T+1}\ge0θT+1​≥0.
  • (A4) is required on reachable states only.
  • The LP solver is a deterministic oracle on cut sets returning optimal solutions of [APt_tt​], so repeated cuts do not change forward solutions.
  • Duals. Collected duals are optimal extreme points of the dual region; best duals are chosen with arbitrary tie-breaks. No cut is added while the dual collection is empty. Dual multipliers ρ\rhoρ are sequences padded with zeros.
  • Runs are relations covering DOASA and DOASA-N (batched forward scenarios). The conclusions hold for every run consistent with the samples, inside the almost-sure quantifier.

A trivializing encoding, in which cuts are arbitrary valid hyperplanes, duals are taken for all outcomes, or the sampling hypotheses directly assume exactness of the cuts, is ruled out: the run relation transcribes CCA steps 1–3 as printed.

A complete development needs LP weak and strong duality (published on the platform as LinearOptimization.lp_weak_duality and LinearOptimization.lp_strong_duality, in their own encoding), finiteness of the set of extreme points of a polyhedron, and the almost-sure intersection of finitely many events (Mathlib). Contributions to any milestone, to the proof that J holds for independent sampling, and to the counterexample showing FPSP and BPSP are insufficient are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. B. Philpott, Z. Guan, On the convergence of stochastic dual dynamic programming and related methods, Oper. Res. Lett. 36(4) (2008) 450–455. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2008.01.013 (cited from the authors' manuscript v24, 2008-02-25)
  • M. V. F. Pereira, L. M. V. G. Pinto, Multi-stage stochastic optimization applied to energy planning, Math. Program. 52 (1991) 359–375. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582895
  • Z.-L. Chen, W. B. Powell, Convergent cutting-plane and partial-sampling algorithm for multistage stochastic linear programs with recourse, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 102 (1999) 497–524. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022641805263
  • A. Shapiro, Analysis of stochastic dual dynamic programming method, European J. Oper. Res. 209 (2011) 63–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.007
  • P. Girardeau, V. Leclère, A. B. Philpott, On the convergence of decomposition methods for multistage stochastic convex programs, Math. Oper. Res. 40(1) (2015) 130–145. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0664
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Efficient Monte Carlo Procedures for Generating Points Uniformly Distributed over Bounded Regions 2: Geometric Convergence Rate of the Random Directions Algorithm to UniformResearch Paper

Motivation

Generating points uniformly distributed over a bounded region S⊆RnS\subseteq\mathbb R^nS⊆Rn is a basic subroutine in Monte Carlo integration, in estimating the volume of a region, in randomized search for optimization, and in identifying redundant constraints of mathematical programs. When SSS is given only implicitly, for instance by a system of inequalities, the classical methods break down in high dimension: transformation methods need a tractable description of SSS, and rejection from an enclosing box or ball accepts a fraction of proposals that decays exponentially with nnn.

Smith (Oper. Res. 32(6), 1984) studied a family of Markov chain methods, mixing algorithms, that avoid rejection altogether. The best known member is the Random Directions Algorithm, now called hit-and-run: from the current point, pick a direction uniformly at random and move to a uniformly random point of SSS on the line through the current point in that direction. Boneh and Golan (1979) proposed it for constraint identification and conjectured, without proof, that it generates uniform points; Smith (1980, 1984) proved asymptotic uniformity, and Section 3 of the 1984 paper gives an explicit geometric convergence rate. This mission targets that rate, Theorem 3.

Later work, in particular Lovász (Math. Program. 86, 1999) and Lovász and Vempala (SIAM J. Comput. 35, 2006), proved polynomial mixing bounds for hit-and-run on convex bodies. Smith's bound is exponential in nnn, but it holds for every open bounded region, convex or not, and from every starting point.

Setting

Write VVV for nnn-dimensional Lebesgue measure (content) on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ for the Euclidean norm. Let S⊆RnS\subseteq\mathbb R^nS⊆Rn be open, bounded and nonempty.

  • The uniform distribution over SSS is λ(A)=V(A∩S)/V(S)\lambda(A)=V(A\cap S)/V(S)λ(A)=V(A∩S)/V(S).
  • For x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and a unit vector ddd, the line set is L=S∩{x+td:t∈R}L=S\cap\{x+td:t\in\mathbb R\}L=S∩{x+td:t∈R}, and its length is ℓ(x,d)=Leb1{t:x+td∈S}\ell(x,d)=\mathrm{Leb}_1\{t: x+td\in S\}ℓ(x,d)=Leb1​{t:x+td∈S}. For convex SSS this is the chord length; in general LLL may consist of many segments.
  • One step of the Random Directions Algorithm from x∈Sx\in Sx∈S: draw ddd uniformly on the unit sphere {d:∥d∥=1}\{d:\|d\|=1\}{d:∥d∥=1}, then draw Xi+1X_{i+1}Xi+1​ uniformly on LLL. The transition kernel is
P(A∣x)=∫Leb1{t:x+td∈S∩A}ℓ(x,d) σ(dd),P(A\mid x)=\int \frac{\mathrm{Leb}_1\{t:x+td\in S\cap A\}}{\ell(x,d)}\,\sigma(\mathrm dd),P(A∣x)=∫ℓ(x,d)Leb1​{t:x+td∈S∩A}​σ(dd),

with σ\sigmaσ the normalized surface measure of the sphere, and Pm(A∣x)=P(Xm∈A∣X0=x)P^m(A\mid x)=P(X_m\in A\mid X_0=x)Pm(A∣x)=P(Xm​∈A∣X0​=x) is its mmm-step iterate.

  • R⋆R^\starR⋆ is the radius of the smallest ball containing SSS, Vn(r)V_n(r)Vn​(r) the volume of a ball of radius rrr, and
γ=V(S)Vn(R⋆)∈(0,1]\gamma=\frac{V(S)}{V_n(R^\star)}\in(0,1]γ=Vn​(R⋆)V(S)​∈(0,1]

the fraction of its smallest enclosing ball that SSS fills.

  • Sn(r)=nVn(1)rn−1S_n(r)=nV_n(1)r^{n-1}Sn​(r)=nVn​(1)rn−1 is the surface area of a sphere of radius rrr, and d=diam⁡Sd=\operatorname{diam}Sd=diamS.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 1304)

For n≥2n\ge2n≥2, every x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, every measurable A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S and every m≥1m\ge1m≥1,

∣P(Xm∈A∣X0=x)−λ(A)∣<(1−γn 2n−1)m−1.\bigl|P(X_m\in A\mid X_0=x)-\lambda(A)\bigr|<\Bigl(1-\frac{\gamma}{n\,2^{n-1}}\Bigr)^{m-1}.​P(Xm​∈A∣X0​=x)−λ(A)​<(1−n2n−1γ​)m−1.

The constant is the paper's. The bound is uniform in the starting point and in AAA, and it depends on SSS only through nnn and γ\gammaγ.

Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof, in order)

  1. Lemma 1 for this algorithm: λ\lambdaλ is stationary, λ(A)=∫SP(A∣x) λ(dx)\lambda(A)=\int_S P(A\mid x)\,\lambda(\mathrm dx)λ(A)=∫S​P(A∣x)λ(dx).
  2. Doob's Case (b) bound: for a chain with stationary law π\piπ and a minorization P(A∣x)≥δ φ(A∩C)P(A\mid x)\ge\delta\,\varphi(A\cap C)P(A∣x)≥δφ(A∩C) on a closed set CCC that carries π\piπ, ∣Pm(A∣x)−π(A)∣≤(1−δφ(C))m−1|P^m(A\mid x)-\pi(A)|\le(1-\delta\varphi(C))^{m-1}∣Pm(A∣x)−π(A)∣≤(1−δφ(C))m−1.
  3. Density formula: P(A∣x)=∫Af(y∣x) dyP(A\mid x)=\int_A f(y\mid x)\,\mathrm dyP(A∣x)=∫A​f(y∣x)dy with f(y∣x)=2/(Sn(∥y−x∥) ℓ(x,y))f(y\mid x)=2/\bigl(S_n(\|y-x\|)\,\ell(x,y)\bigr)f(y∣x)=2/(Sn​(∥y−x∥)ℓ(x,y)).
  4. Density lower bound: f(y∣x)>δ=2/(d Sn(d))f(y\mid x)>\delta=2/(d\,S_n(d))f(y∣x)>δ=2/(dSn​(d)) for all distinct x,y∈Sx,y\in Sx,y∈S when n≥2n\ge2n≥2.
  5. Constant comparison: δ V(S)≥γ/(n2n−1)\delta\,V(S)\ge\gamma/(n2^{n-1})δV(S)≥γ/(n2n−1).

Significance

The result. Theorems 1 and 2 of the paper (the companion mission) establish only that the chain converges to λ\lambdaλ. Theorem 3 makes this quantitative: the deviation from uniformity decays geometrically, at a rate computable from the dimension and the shape ratio γ\gammaγ alone. It shows which features of a region govern convergence, it gives a stopping rule with a guarantee, and it holds for non-convex regions, which the later polynomial-time analyses of hit-and-run do not cover. The paper notes the bound is of practical use only in low dimension; its value lies in being explicit and fully general.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, but parts of the proof are heuristic: the density is derived by a limit over small cubes, and the step from δ\deltaδ to γ\gammaγ uses a claim about circumscribed spheres that is false as stated (see below). A machine-checked proof would produce, as reusable components, a general-state-space Doeblin bound (no such theorem currently exists on the platform; the existing Doeblin results are finite-state), a measure-theoretic definition of hit-and-run as a Markov kernel, and the polar-coordinates computation of its density. None of these has, to our knowledge, been formalized.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is: the density is bounded below on SSS, so Doeblin's condition holds, so the chain converges geometrically. Each step hides work. The density is not given by the algorithm but must be derived: the algorithm draws a direction and a scalar, and the change of variables from (direction, signed distance) to the endpoint is two-to-one and carries the Jacobian ∥y−x∥n−1\|y-x\|^{n-1}∥y−x∥n−1, which is where SnS_nSn​ and the factor 2 come from. The Doeblin step needs a stationary law and the fact that the chain started in SSS never leaves SSS. For non-convex SSS, the paper's "diameter along the ray" must be replaced by the measure of the line set, and the maximal chord does not bound the distance ∥y−x∥\|y-x\|∥y−x∥; the diameter of SSS is needed instead. Finally, the paper's assertion that the ball of radius d/2d/2d/2 circumscribes SSS fails already for an equilateral triangle, so the final comparison must go through the smallest enclosing ball's radius R⋆≥d/2R^\star\ge d/2R⋆≥d/2.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with Lebesgue measure. The region is a set S with IsOpen S and Bornology.IsBounded S; boundedness is the paper's standing assumption ("bounded regions").
  • The transition law is a Mathlib ProbabilityTheory.Kernel built operationally from the algorithm: the uniform law on the line set, integrated against the normalized surface measure of the unit sphere (Mathlib's Measure.toSphere, divided by its total mass nVn(1)nV_n(1)nVn​(1)). Off SSS the kernel is the identity, which the chain started in SSS never uses. The mmm-step law is the published MarkovChainCLT.iterKernel.
  • λ\lambdaλ is Lebesgue measure restricted to SSS divided by V(S)V(S)V(S). γ\gammaγ uses the infimum of radii of closed balls containing SSS; the ball is not a free parameter. δ=2/(d Sn(d))\delta=2/(d\,S_n(d))δ=2/(dSn​(d)) is defined from d=diam⁡Sd=\operatorname{diam}Sd=diamS, not assumed.
  • Deviations from the printed statement. (i) The goal assumes n≥2n\ge2n≥2: for n=1n=1n=1 the strict inequality is false (on an interval X1X_1X1​ is already uniform and γ=1\gamma=1γ=1, so both sides vanish for m≥2m\ge2m≥2). (ii) The density uses the line-set length ℓ(x,y)\ell(x,y)ℓ(x,y) instead of "the diameter of SSS along the ray", which coincides for convex SSS. (iii) The paper's d=max⁡x,yd(x,y)d=\max_{x,y}d(x,y)d=maxx,y​d(x,y) is taken as diam⁡S\operatorname{diam}SdiamS. (iv) The Doob step is stated with a kernel-form minorization rather than a lower bound on the density of the absolutely continuous part, which it is implied by, and with CCC a closed set carrying the stationary law, which is what C=SC=SC=S means inside Rn\mathbb R^nRn. (v) The final comparison is stated as δV(S)≥γ/(n2n−1)\delta V(S)\ge\gamma/(n2^{n-1})δV(S)≥γ/(n2n−1), the true inequality behind the paper's false circumscribed-sphere claim. No statement weakens the paper's constant.
  • Ruled out. The kernel is not defined through the density formula (which would make milestone 3 definitional and remove the algorithm from the goal), and neither stationarity nor a minorization is a hypothesis of the goal: Theorem 3 assumes only conditions on nnn, SSS, xxx, AAA and mmm.
  • Contributions welcome: the general Doeblin bound, the polar-coordinates density computation (useful for any line-sampling algorithm), and proofs that the kernel is Markov on SSS and reversible with respect to λ\lambdaλ.

Selected references

  • R. L. Smith, Efficient Monte Carlo Procedures for Generating Points Uniformly Distributed over Bounded Regions, Operations Research 32(6):1296–1308, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.6.1296
  • A. Boneh and A. Golan, Constraints' redundancy and feasible region boundedness by random feasible point generator (RFPG), Third European Congress on Operations Research (EURO III), Amsterdam, 1979.
  • J. L. Doob, Stochastic Processes, Wiley, 1953 (Case (b), p. 197).
  • L. Lovász, Hit-and-run mixes fast, Mathematical Programming 86:443–461, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/s101070050099
  • L. Lovász and S. Vempala, Hit-and-run from a corner, SIAM Journal on Computing 35(4):985–1005, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1137/S009753970544727X
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Efficient Monte Carlo Procedures for Generating Points Uniformly Distributed over Bounded Regions 1: Symmetric Mixing Algorithms Converge to the Uniform Distribution from Every Starting PointResearch Paper

Motivation

Sampling uniformly from a bounded region can be difficult when direct transformation of a familiar random variable is unavailable and rejection sampling spends most of its trials outside the region. Robert L. Smith studied procedures that move within the region: from the current point, choose a direction, form the line set through that point inside the region, and choose the next point uniformly on that line set. The resulting sequence is a homogeneous Markov chain. The Random Directions Algorithm, later commonly called hit-and-run, is a central instance of this construction. Smith's 1984 paper establishes conditions under which the chain approaches the uniform distribution even when its initial point is fixed rather than sampled uniformly (Smith 1984, pp. 1298–1301).

For simulation, the initial point is usually chosen because it is known to be feasible. The question is therefore whether the distribution after many moves forgets that particular choice. A stationary distribution alone does not answer this: stationarity describes what happens if the chain already starts with that distribution. Smith's Theorem 2 gives the stronger, pointwise starting-state statement for the class of symmetric mixing algorithms satisfying his two regularity assumptions (Smith 1984, p. 1301).

Setting

Let SSS be the state region and VVV its finite, nonzero content measure. In Smith's geometric setting, SSS is a bounded kkk-dimensional measurable region in Rn\mathbb R^nRn, and VVV is kkk-dimensional content; at k=0k=0k=0, content is counting measure. A Markov transition kernel PPP assigns to every current point x∈Sx\in Sx∈S a probability P(x,A)P(x,A)P(x,A) of entering a measurable set A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S on the next move. For the associated chain (X0,X1,…)(X_0,X_1,\ldots)(X0​,X1​,…), the mmm-step transition probability is Pm(x,A)=P(Xm∈A∣X0=x)P^m(x,A)=\mathbb P(X_m\in A\mid X_0=x)Pm(x,A)=P(Xm​∈A∣X0​=x).

The uniform law is λ(A)=V(A)/V(S)\lambda(A)=V(A)/V(S)λ(A)=V(A)/V(S). Smith's Assumption (a) gives a measurable transition density f(y∣x)f(y\mid x)f(y∣x) relative to VVV:

P(x,A)=∫Af(y∣x) V(dy).P(x,A)=\int_A f(y\mid x)\,V(dy).P(x,A)=∫A​f(y∣x)V(dy).

For a symmetric mixing algorithm, the paper states that this density satisfies f(y∣x)=f(x∣y)f(y\mid x)=f(x\mid y)f(y∣x)=f(x∣y) for all x,y∈Sx,y\in Sx,y∈S. Assumption (b) says f(y∣x)>0f(y\mid x)>0f(y∣x)>0 for all such pairs. These are pointwise conditions, including states of zero VVV-measure. A nonempty measurable set AAA is closed if P(x,A)=1P(x,A)=1P(x,A)=1 for every x∈Ax\in Ax∈A. The chain is indecomposable in the paper's sense when it has no two disjoint closed sets (Smith 1984, pp. 1299–1300).

Formalization targets

Stationarity and indecomposability

Lemma 1 asserts that λ\lambdaλ is stationary: λ(A)=∫SP(x,A) λ(dx)\lambda(A)=\int_S P(x,A)\,\lambda(dx)λ(A)=∫S​P(x,A)λ(dx) for every measurable AAA. Lemma 2 excludes two disjoint closed sets. Both are direct prerequisites of the goal. Smith's Theorem 1 also establishes uniqueness of the stationary distribution and almost-sure convergence of empirical visit frequencies under a stationary start; it is described in the source, but its trajectory-level formalization is outside this proposal (Smith 1984, p. 1300).

Convergence from every starting point

The mission goal is Smith's Theorem 2. For every x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and every measurable A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S,

lim⁡m→∞Pm(x,A)=λ(A).\lim_{m\to\infty}P^m(x,A)=\lambda(A).m→∞lim​Pm(x,A)=λ(A).

This is the paper's explicit meaning of strongly mixing. The milestone list also records the proof's stated nonperiodicity condition: for every n≥2n\ge2n≥2, the nnn-step transition law has no two disjoint closed sets. It is a target in its own right because it concerns all higher-step kernels, not only the one-step chain (Smith 1984, p. 1301).

Significance

Theorem 2 makes the uniform law the limiting distribution of the sample at time mmm, for any fixed feasible initial point. The paper's Theorem 1 supplies a different guarantee about long-run empirical frequencies under a stationary start, although it is not a target of this proposal. Smith later specializes the framework to the Random Directions Algorithm and gives a quantitative rate under additional geometric conditions; that rate is the subject of the companion mission (Smith 1984, pp. 1303–1304).

These results are proved in the paper but the declarations in this proposal are theorem statements with sorry, not machine-checked proofs. A completed formalization would turn the paper's measure-theoretic claims into reusable statements about general measurable state spaces and kernels. The normalized content law, the density interface, and closed-set predicate can be reused when studying other Monte Carlo kernels with the same hypotheses.

Difficulty

The main obstacle is the jump from stationary behavior to convergence from every starting point. Symmetry identifies the candidate stationary law, and strict positivity limits how the chain can split into closed parts, but neither sentence by itself establishes the claimed limit of Pm(x,A)P^m(x,A)Pm(x,A). The distinction matters especially at starting points in VVV-null sets: an almost-everywhere starting-state result would leave out precisely the universal claim in Theorem 2. The paper appeals to a general-state Markov-chain convergence result for this step (Smith 1984, p. 1301).

Formalization scope

Lean uses a measurable type α\alphaα as the whole region SSS, a finite measure VVV with V(S)≠0V(S)\ne0V(S)=0, a Markov kernel PPP, and an extended-nonnegative density f:α→α→R≥0∞f:\alpha\to\alpha\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}^{\infty}f:α→α→R≥0∞​. The density is jointly measurable and is linked to PPP by the integral identity above; symmetry is pointwise, and positivity is added only for Lemma 2 and Theorems 1–2. This abstract representation retains the hypotheses those results use without fixing a particular Euclidean dimension. It covers the counting-content case as well as continuous content, although it does not construct the geometric direction-and-chord algorithm. The Random Directions kernel belongs to the companion mission.

The uniform law is normalized by V(S)V(S)V(S). Finiteness and nonzero total content prevent a meaningless inverse or an empty probability space. The mmm-step law is the published MarkovChainCLT.iterKernel. Theorem 2 quantifies over every xxx, rather than λ\lambdaλ-almost every xxx, and uses setwise convergence on each measurable AAA. No invariance, uniqueness, minorization, or convergence premise is added to the goal. Detaching fff from PPP would empty out the substantive assertion. Formal contributions can target the density-to-invariance argument, the closed-set conditions, and the general-state convergence theorem needed for the goal. The paper's separate pathwise Theorem 1 remains an appropriate later extension.

Selected references

  • Robert L. Smith, Efficient Monte Carlo Procedures for Generating Points Uniformly Distributed over Bounded Regions, Operations Research 32(6), 1296–1308, 1984. DOI: 10.1287/opre.32.6.1296.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Auction Design: Giving the Object to a Bidder with the Highest Priority Level c̄ᵢ(tᵢ) ≥ t₀ and Charging (6.8) Is an Optimal Auction MechanismResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller with one indivisible object must decide whether to keep it or transfer it to one of several bidders whose values she does not observe. The allocation and the payment rule affect what bidders choose to report. Myerson's 1981 paper identifies a revenue-maximizing rule when bidders' private value estimates are independent, their densities are positive, and their valuations may be revised after learning other bidders' information. It covers value distributions for which the usual virtual-value rule is not monotone, by replacing each bidder's virtual value with an ironed priority level.

The question matters to auction design because a pointwise revenue-maximizing assignment can reward a bidder for understating a value. The seller must maximize expected utility subject to both incentive compatibility and each bidder's ability to decline participation. The paper's main theorem gives a specific allocation and payment pair that meets those constraints and attains the maximum. The result is proved in the source; this mission asks for a machine-checked formalization of it.

Setting

There is a finite nonempty set NNN of bidders and one seller. Bidder iii has a value estimate tit_iti​ in a finite interval [ai,bi][a_i,b_i][ai​,bi​], where ai<bia_i<b_iai​<bi​; endpoints may be negative and may differ between bidders. The continuous density fif_ifi​ is strictly positive on that interval and has total integral one. The bidders' estimates are independent, so a profile t=(ti)i∈Nt=(t_i)_{i\in N}t=(ti​)i∈N​ has density f(t)=∏ifi(ti)f(t)=\prod_i f_i(t_i)f(t)=∏i​fi​(ti​) on T=∏i[ai,bi]T=\prod_i[a_i,b_i]T=∏i​[ai​,bi​]. Write Fi(s)=∫aisfi(u) duF_i(s)=\int_{a_i}^{s}f_i(u)\,duFi​(s)=∫ai​s​fi​(u)du for the distribution function. The seller's known value for keeping the object is t0t_0t0​.

A revision effect ej(tj)e_j(t_j)ej​(tj​) describes the change in everyone else's valuation after bidder jjj's estimate becomes known. Bidder iii's revised value is vi(t)=ti+∑j≠iej(tj)v_i(t)=t_i+\sum_{j\ne i}e_j(t_j)vi​(t)=ti​+∑j=i​ej​(tj​), while the seller's is v0(t)=t0+∑jej(tj)v_0(t)=t_0+\sum_j e_j(t_j)v0​(t)=t0​+∑j​ej​(tj​). A direct mechanism assigns each profile an allocation probability pi(t)p_i(t)pi​(t) and expected payment xi(t)x_i(t)xi​(t) for each bidder. Payments may be negative and need not vanish when a bidder loses. Its feasibility conditions say that allocation probabilities are nonnegative and sum to at most one, each bidder's interim expected utility is nonnegative at every possible value, and truthful reporting yields at least as much interim utility as any other report. The seller maximizes her expected utility over all feasible mechanisms.

The virtual value is ci(s)=s−ei(s)−(1−Fi(s))/fi(s)c_i(s)=s-e_i(s)-(1-F_i(s))/f_i(s)ci​(s)=s−ei​(s)−(1−Fi​(s))/fi​(s). In the general case it need not increase with sss. Myerson transforms cic_ici​ through the quantile q=Fi(s)q=F_i(s)q=Fi​(s): hi(q)=ci(Fi−1(q))h_i(q)=c_i(F_i^{-1}(q))hi​(q)=ci​(Fi−1​(q)), Hi(q)=∫0qhi(r) drH_i(q)=\int_0^q h_i(r)\,drHi​(q)=∫0q​hi​(r)dr, and GiG_iGi​ is the convex envelope of HiH_iHi​ on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The slope gig_igi​ of GiG_iGi​, extended across kinks, gives the ironed priority cˉi(s)=gi(Fi(s))\bar c_i(s)=g_i(F_i(s))cˉi​(s)=gi​(Fi​(s)). At profile ttt, the winning set M(t)M(t)M(t) contains exactly those bidders whose priority is maximal and at least t0t_0t0​.

Formalization targets

The goal is Myerson's §6 theorem. The proposed rule shares the object equally among bidders in M(t)M(t)M(t), or keeps it when M(t)M(t)M(t) is empty, and charges each bidder the envelope payment:

pˉi(t)={∣M(t)∣−1,i∈M(t),0,i∉M(t),xˉi(t)=pˉi(t)vi(t)−∫aitipˉi(t−i,s) ds.\bar p_i(t)=\begin{cases}|M(t)|^{-1},&i\in M(t),\\0,&i\notin M(t),\end{cases} \qquad \bar x_i(t)=\bar p_i(t)v_i(t)-\int_{a_i}^{t_i}\bar p_i(t_{-i},s)\,ds.pˉ​i​(t)={∣M(t)∣−1,0,​i∈M(t),i∈/M(t),​xˉi​(t)=pˉ​i​(t)vi​(t)−∫ai​ti​​pˉ​i​(t−i​,s)ds.

The target asserts that (pˉ,xˉ)(\bar p,\bar x)(pˉ​,xˉ) is feasible and that every feasible (p,x)(p,x)(p,x) has seller utility no greater than that of (pˉ,xˉ)(\bar p,\bar x)(pˉ​,xˉ). The milestone list follows the paper's reduction: Lemma 2 characterizes feasible direct mechanisms by a monotone interim allocation rule and an envelope identity; equation (4.12) rewrites seller utility using virtual values; Lemma 3 turns maximization of virtual surplus into optimality. Equations (6.9)–(6.13) compare virtual and ironed priorities and establish the optimality and monotonicity of the proposed allocation.

Significance

The theorem specifies both who receives the object and how payments are computed, including irregular distributions and bidder-specific supports. The ironed priorities preserve incentives while retaining the seller's maximal expected utility. Equation (4.12) also gives the revenue-equivalence consequence: once the allocation rule and each lowest-type interim utility are fixed, expected seller utility is fixed.

A formal proof would connect several reusable results: product distributions with bidder-specific densities, interim incentive constraints, an envelope characterization, virtual-surplus accounting, and one-dimensional convex ironing. The source theorem and milestones are currently statements to be proved in this development, not existing machine-checked results. Related Börgers auction statements on Prove2Me use a common nonnegative support, at least two bidders, zero revision effects, and zero seller value; they do not provide this general theorem.

Difficulty

Maximizing virtual surplus at each profile is straightforward only if each bidder's virtual value rises with her report. When it falls, the resulting win probability can also fall, violating the incentive constraint. Replacing virtual values by slopes of a convex envelope restores monotonicity, but then the proof must account exactly for the difference between the original and ironed objectives, including flat portions of the envelope. Payments must satisfy the interim envelope identity for every type, while the seller's objective includes both transfers and her value for retaining the object.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses a finite nonempty bidder type, real-valued reports and payments, one object, independent continuous positive densities normalized on each finite support, and continuous revision effects. The latter regularity is implicit in the paper's assertion that cic_ici​ is continuous. No mean-zero condition on revision effects is imposed: the paper explicitly says its equation (2.9) is unnecessary. One bidder, negative support endpoints, unequal supports, and arbitrary seller value remain allowed.

The profile law is Lebesgue measure restricted to TTT and weighted by the product density. Integrating a function after replacing coordinate iii represents the T−iT_{-i}T−i​ integral, because bidder iii's marginal density has mass one. Mechanisms are total functions, but allocation and incentive conditions quantify over supported profiles and reports. Feasibility explicitly requires integrability of allocations, payments, and their report sections so no undefined Bochner expectation can acquire Lean's default value zero. The convex envelope is the two-point infimum of equation (6.3); its defining set is nonempty and bounded below on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The slope uses the right derivative below quantile one and the left derivative at one. The theorem requires feasibility of the proposed pair as well as its utility bound, ruling out an empty or unconstrained maximization claim.

The Stieltjes expressions in (6.9), (6.12), and (6.13) are combined into equivalent ordinary-integral comparisons over the profile law. A complete proof needs the one-dimensional envelope theorem, product-measure integration and Fubini results, differentiation of the convex envelope, and a careful endpoint treatment. The definitions of interim utilities and ironing can be reused for related auction models; contributions that establish these analytic components or the listed source lemmas are in scope.

Selected references

  • Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58–73, 1981. DOI: 10.1287/moor.6.1.58.
13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes I: A Boolean Circuit Is True Iff Its Finite-Horizon Markov Decision Process Has Optimal Expected Cost ZeroResearch Paper

Motivation

Markov decision processes are the standard model of sequential decision making under uncertainty in operations research, control and artificial intelligence. Their finite-horizon, discounted and average-cost versions are all solvable in polynomial time, by dynamic programming or linear programming. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Math. Oper. Res. 12(3), 1987) asked the next question: can these problems be solved fast in parallel, in polylogarithmic time on polynomially many processors (the class NC)? Their Theorem 1 answers no, unless every polynomial-time problem parallelizes: all three versions are P-complete. The proof is a short reduction from the circuit value problem (CVP), the canonical P-complete problem (Ladner, 1975). This mission formalizes the mathematical heart of that reduction: the constructed process has optimal expected cost zero exactly when the circuit evaluates to true.

The result is the first of a series of five missions on the same paper; the others treat the deterministic special cases (which are in NC) and the partially observed case (which is PSPACE-hard).

Setting

A circuit is a finite sequence of triples C=((ai,bi,ci), i=1,…,k)C=((a_i,b_i,c_i),\ i=1,\dots,k)C=((ai​,bi​,ci​), i=1,…,k) with k≥1k\ge1k≥1. Each aia_iai​ is one of the operations false, true, and, or. A triple with ai∈{false,true}a_i\in\{\text{false},\text{true}\}ai​∈{false,true} is an input; a triple with ai∈{and,or}a_i\in\{\text{and},\text{or}\}ai​∈{and,or} is a gate, and a gate reads two earlier triples, 1≤bi,ci<i1\le b_i,c_i<i1≤bi​,ci​<i. The value of an input is its constant; the value of a gate is the Boolean operation aia_iai​ applied to the values of triples bib_ibi​ and cic_ici​. The value of CCC is the value of triple kkk.

A finite Markov decision process has a finite state set SSS, an initial state s0s_0s0​, and at each state sss a nonempty finite set DsD_sDs​ of decisions. Taking decision iii at state sss at time ttt costs c(s,i,t)c(s,i,t)c(s,i,t) and moves to s′s's′ with probability p(s,s′,i,t)p(s,s',i,t)p(s,s′,i,t). A policy δ\deltaδ chooses a decision δ(s,t)∈Ds\delta(s,t)\in D_sδ(s,t)∈Ds​ for every state and time. For a horizon TTT the expected cost of δ\deltaδ is

JT(δ)=Eδ[∑t=0Tc(st,δ(st,t),t)],J_T(\delta)=\mathbb E_\delta\Bigl[\sum_{t=0}^{T}c\bigl(s_t,\delta(s_t,t),t\bigr)\Bigr],JT​(δ)=Eδ​[t=0∑T​c(st​,δ(st​,t),t)],

and the optimal expected cost is JT∗=inf⁡δJT(δ)J_T^\ast=\inf_\delta J_T(\delta)JT∗​=infδ​JT​(δ) over all policies.

From a circuit CCC the proof of Theorem 1 builds a stationary process MCM_CMC​: one state per triple plus an absorbing state qqq. An input state has one decision, moving to qqq, at cost 111 if the input is false and 000 if it is true. An or gate has two free decisions, 000 moving to bib_ibi​ and 111 moving to cic_ici​. An and gate has one decision, moving to bib_ibi​ or cic_ici​ with probability 1/21/21/2 each. All other costs are zero. The initial state is triple kkk and the horizon is T=kT=kT=k.

In the Lean development these are MDPComplexity.CircuitValue.MDP (with Policy, trajProb, expCost, optCost), Circuit (with val, value, lastIdx) and Circuit.toMDP.

Formalization targets

Goal: correctness of the reduction

Jk∗(MC)≤0⟺the value of C is true,J_k^\ast(M_C)\le 0\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \text{the value of } C \text{ is true},Jk∗​(MC​)≤0⟺the value of C is true,

for every circuit CCC with k≥1k\ge1k≥1 triples (theorem1_reduction). This is the claim "the optimum expected cost is 0 or less iff the value of CCC was true" on p. 445.

Milestones

  1. Every policy has Jk(δ)≥0J_k(\delta)\ge0Jk​(δ)≥0 ("it cannot be less").
  2. For any finite process with nonnegative costs, JT(δ)=0J_T(\delta)=0JT​(δ)=0 iff no positive cost is incurred on any trajectory of positive probability ("the states with positive costs are impossible to reach").
  3. If some policy has Jk(δ)=0J_k(\delta)=0Jk​(δ)=0, then CCC is true.
  4. If CCC is true, some policy has Jk(δ)=0J_k(\delta)=0Jk​(δ)=0.

Further statement

The discounted analogue, which the paper asserts in one sentence: for β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1), the optimal expected discounted cost inf⁡δ∑t≥0βt Eδ[c(st,δ(st,t))]\inf_\delta\sum_{t\ge0}\beta^t\,\mathbb E_\delta[c(s_t,\delta(s_t,t))]infδ​∑t≥0​βtEδ​[c(st​,δ(st​,t))] of MCM_CMC​ is at most 000 iff CCC is true (discounted_reduction).

Significance

Combined with the log-space computability of MCM_CMC​ from CCC, the goal shows that the finite-horizon Markov decision problem is P-hard, hence not in NC unless P = NC. This is the reason dynamic programming for general Markov decision processes is believed to be inherently sequential, and it frames the contrast drawn in the rest of the paper: deterministic processes are in NC, and partially observed ones are PSPACE-hard. The construction is also stationary, so it shows that even the stationary finite-horizon problem is P-hard, as the paper remarks.

The theorem is proved in the paper, in one paragraph; it is not open. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of it exists. Formalizing it produces a precise statement of what the reduction proves, a reusable finite-trajectory model of finite-horizon Markov decision processes with time-dependent policies, and a reusable encoding of Boolean circuits and their value.

Difficulty

The informal argument is short, but two points need care. First, the optimum ranges over all time-dependent policies, which form an infinite type; the infimum is attained only because the expected cost depends on finitely many decisions, and this must be established rather than assumed. Second, the passage from "the expected cost is zero" to "the circuit is true" turns a statement about trajectory probabilities into a statement about the recursive value of the circuit, and the and gates (where both successors are reached with positive probability) behave differently from the or gates (where only the chosen successor is reached). Reasoning only along a single path, as for a deterministic process, does not suffice at and gates.

Formalization scope

Theorem 1 is a complexity statement: "The Markov Decision Process problem is P-complete in all three cases." Membership in P, the log-space computability of the construction, the notion of P-completeness, and the average-cost case are not part of this mission; Mathlib has no log-space reductions or class P. The mission states the correctness of the reduction, for the exact process of the proof.

Conventions committed to:

  • Triples are indexed by Fin k (paper index iii is Lean index i−1i-1i−1); k≥1k\ge1k≥1 via [NeZero k]. The fields bi,cib_i,c_ibi​,ci​ of an input are unused (the paper sets them to 000, not a triple index). Triple kkk need not be a gate.
  • States of MCM_CMC​ are Option (Fin k), with none the state qqq; decisions are Fin 2 at or gates and Fin 1 elsewhere.
  • The and-gate row is 121[s′=bi]+121[s′=ci]\tfrac12\mathbf 1[s'=b_i]+\tfrac12\mathbf 1[s'=c_i]21​1[s′=bi​]+21​1[s′=ci​], so that bi=cib_i=c_ibi​=ci​ (allowed by the paper) gives a probability vector.
  • Rows of the transition kernel are probability vectors and every DsD_sDs​ is nonempty (implicit in the paper, explicit here).
  • The expected cost is a finite sum over trajectories, with the §2 horizon convention ∑t=0T\sum_{t=0}^{T}∑t=0T​ and T=kT=kT=k. The optimum is a real infimum over all policies δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t), not over stationary ones.
  • The discounted cost is ∑tβt\sum_t\beta^t∑t​βt times the expected time-ttt cost, which equals the expectation of the discounted series for bounded nonnegative costs.

A formalization that defines the optimal cost directly as "the cost of the best choice at the or gates", or optimizes only over stationary policies, would make the goal a restatement of the circuit's value; the mission's optimum is over all time-dependent policies of the general model.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones and the goal; lemmas on the trajectory model (marginalization of trajProb, attainment of the infimum for policies that matter only up to time TTT) that are reusable for any finite-horizon process.

Selected references

  • C. H. Papadimitriou and J. N. Tsitsiklis, The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3) (1987) 441–450. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.441
  • R. E. Ladner, The Circuit Value Problem is Log Space Complete for P, SIGACT News 7(1) (1975) 18–20. https://doi.org/10.1145/990518.990519
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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CombinatoricsTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling Unrelated Parallel Machines 3: On the 3-Dimensional Matching Instances, a Schedule within ρ < 3/2 of Optimal Has Makespan ≤ 2 Iff a Matching ExistsResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum makespan scheduling on unrelated parallel machines, written R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​, is one of the basic models of scheduling theory: nnn jobs must each be run on one of mmm machines, and the time a job takes depends arbitrarily on the machine. Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos (CWI Report OS-R8714, 1987; journal version Math. Programming 46, 1990) gave a polynomial 2-approximation algorithm for this problem and, in the same paper, a matching limit from below: no polynomial algorithm can guarantee a factor smaller than 3/23/23/2 unless P=NPP = NPP=NP (their Corollary 2).

The two bounds have stood for more than three decades. Closing the gap between 3/23/23/2 and 222 for R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​ is listed among the central open problems of approximation algorithms (Williamson and Shmoys, The Design of Approximation Algorithms, 2011, open problem on unrelated machines; Schuurman and Woeginger, Polynomial time approximation algorithms for machine scheduling: ten open problems, J. Scheduling 1999). The lower bound of 3/23/23/2 is the subject of this mission.

Timeline:

  • 1979: Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan introduce the classification R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​.
  • 1987/1990: Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos prove NP-completeness of deciding makespan at most 3 (Theorem 4, giving the bound 4/34/34/3) and at most 2 (Theorem 5, giving 3/23/23/2), both by reduction from 3-dimensional matching.
  • Since then: the 3/23/23/2 hardness bound has not been improved for general R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​; progress has concentrated on special cases such as the restricted-assignment problem.

Setting

3-dimensional matching. There are three disjoint sets A={a1,…,an}A = \{a_1,\dots,a_n\}A={a1​,…,an​}, B={b1,…,bn}B = \{b_1,\dots,b_n\}B={b1​,…,bn​}, C={c1,…,cn}C = \{c_1,\dots,c_n\}C={c1​,…,cn​} and a family F={T1,…,Tm}F = \{T_1,\dots,T_m\}F={T1​,…,Tm​} of triples, each with one element of AAA, one of BBB and one of CCC. A matching is a subfamily F′F'F′ with ∣F′∣=n|F'| = n∣F′∣=n whose union is A∪B∪CA \cup B \cup CA∪B∪C. In Lean an instance is a map T:Fin m→Fin n×Fin n×Fin nT : \mathrm{Fin}\,m \to \mathrm{Fin}\,n \times \mathrm{Fin}\,n \times \mathrm{Fin}\,nT:Finm→Finn×Finn×Finn, and HasMatching T says that a matching exists.

The scheduling model. Machines are Fin m\mathrm{Fin}\,mFinm, jobs are Fin N\mathrm{Fin}\,NFinN, and pijp_{ij}pij​ is the positive integer processing time of job jjj on machine iii. A schedule σ\sigmaσ assigns each job to one machine; the load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=ipij\sum_{j:\sigma(j)=i} p_{ij}∑j:σ(j)=i​pij​ and the makespan Cmax⁡(σ)C_{\max}(\sigma)Cmax​(σ) is the largest load. These are the published definitions MatousekLP.Scheduling.load and makespan.

The instance of Theorem 5. The triples containing aja_jaj​ are the triples of type jjj; let tjt_jtj​ be their number. From TTT the paper builds a scheduling instance with mmm machines, machine iii corresponding to TiT_iTi​, and with

  1. 2n2n2n element jobs, one for each bkb_kbk​ and each clc_lcl​;
  2. tj−1t_j - 1tj​−1 dummy jobs of type jjj, for each jjj.

If Ti=(aj,bk,cl)T_i = (a_j, b_k, c_l)Ti​=(aj​,bk​,cl​), machine iii processes the element jobs of bkb_kbk​ and clc_lcl​ in time 111, each dummy job of type jjj in time 222, and every other job in time 333. In Lean the processing-time matrix is P T.

A ρ\rhoρ-approximate schedule of an instance is a schedule σ\sigmaσ with Cmax⁡(σ)≤ρ Cmax⁡(τ)C_{\max}(\sigma) \le \rho\, C_{\max}(\tau)Cmax​(σ)≤ρCmax​(τ) for every schedule τ\tauτ of the same instance.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2 (p. 8)

For every instance TTT, every ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2, and every ρ\rhoρ-approximate schedule σ\sigmaσ of the instance of Theorem 5 built from TTT,

Cmax⁡(σ)≤2  ⟺  T has a matching.C_{\max}(\sigma) \le 2 \iff T \text{ has a matching}.Cmax​(σ)≤2⟺T has a matching.

This is the mathematical content of "for every ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2 there is no polynomial ρ\rhoρ-approximation algorithm unless P=NPP = NPP=NP": a ρ\rhoρ-approximate answer on the reduced instance decides 3-dimensional matching.

Theorem 5 (p. 7)

For every instance TTT,

∃ σ: Cmax⁡(σ)≤2  ⟺  T has a matching.\exists\,\sigma:\ C_{\max}(\sigma) \le 2 \iff T \text{ has a matching}.∃σ: Cmax​(σ)≤2⟺T has a matching.

Milestones from the proof of Theorem 5 (pp. 7–8)

  1. If every tj≥1t_j \ge 1tj​≥1, then ∑j(tj−1)+n=m\sum_j (t_j - 1) + n = m∑j​(tj​−1)+n=m: there are m−nm - nm−n dummy jobs.
  2. A matching yields a schedule with makespan at most 222.
  3. A schedule with makespan at most 222 yields a matching.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5 shows that R ∣∣ Cmax⁡R\,||\,C_{\max}R∣∣Cmax​ is NP-hard already when every processing time lies in {1,2,3}\{1,2,3\}{1,2,3} and the target makespan is 222. Corollary 2 turns this into the best known inapproximability bound for the problem, 3/23/23/2, which sits opposite the paper's own factor-2 algorithm. The same reduction pattern (machines as triples, dummy jobs that pin machines down) is reused in many later hardness proofs for scheduling and assignment problems.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked version is known to exist. A formal proof requires the full combinatorial argument behind the reduction, including the counting of machines per type and the case where some element of AAA lies in no triple, which the paper does not discuss. Together with mission 1 of this series (the factor-2 algorithm), it fixes both ends of the [3/2,2][3/2, 2][3/2,2] gap in one formal library.

Difficulty

The construction is short, but the converse direction carries the weight: from an arbitrary schedule with makespan at most 222 one must recover a matching, although nothing in the schedule singles out the triples that form it. The obvious first idea, to read the matching off the machines that receive unit-time jobs, fails as it stands: a machine may receive one unit-time job or none, and the argument must exclude this for every schedule, including the degenerate instances in which some aja_jaj​ lies in no triple or triples repeat. For Corollary 2, the passage from the real-valued approximation guarantee to the threshold 222 depends on the strict inequality ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2; at ρ=3/2\rho = 3/2ρ=3/2 the statement is no longer implied by Theorem 5.

Formalization scope

  • Machines are Fin m; 3DM elements are Fin n; a 3DM instance is T : Fin m → Fin n × Fin n × Fin n, so a triple may repeat. A matching is a set of nnn triple indices covering every aja_jaj​, bkb_kbk​, clc_lcl​ (the covering form of the paper's definition, which forces disjointness).
  • The jobs of the reduced instance are the sum type Fin n⊕Fin n⊕Σj Fin(tj−1)\mathrm{Fin}\,n \oplus \mathrm{Fin}\,n \oplus \Sigma_j\,\mathrm{Fin}(t_j - 1)Finn⊕Finn⊕Σj​Fin(tj​−1). They are enumerated by a fixed bijection with Fin N\mathrm{Fin}\,NFinN so that the published MatousekLP.Scheduling.makespan applies. All statements quantify over every schedule, so the choice of bijection is irrelevant.
  • tj−1t_j - 1tj​−1 is natural-number subtraction. When some tj=0t_j = 0tj​=0 (a case the paper leaves aside), type jjj has no dummy job; the reduced instance then has neither a matching nor a schedule of makespan at most 222, so Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 hold as stated, with no hypothesis tj≥1t_j \ge 1tj​≥1. Only the dummy-count milestone assumes tj≥1t_j \ge 1tj​≥1.
  • Processing times are natural numbers cast to R\mathbb RR; makespans are real.
  • Not formalized: "polynomial" (running time of an algorithm and of the reduction), membership in NP, "NP-complete" and "unless P=NPP = NPP=NP". Theorem 5 is stated as the reduction's equivalence; Corollary 2 is stated as the fact that any ρ\rhoρ-approximate schedule of the reduced instance, ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2, decides 3-dimensional matching. The reduction is evidently polynomial, but this is not stated.
  • The approximation hypothesis compares σ\sigmaσ with every schedule τ\tauτ of the same reduced instance; a goal in which σ\sigmaσ is an arbitrary schedule, or is bounded against an unrelated quantity, would be a different statement. The strict inequality ρ<3/2\rho < 3/2ρ<3/2 is essential and kept.
  • Contributions welcome: proofs of the three milestones, of Theorem 5 from them, and of Corollary 2; reusable lemmas about integer-valued makespans and about sum-type job sets.

Selected references

  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, CWI Report OS-R8714, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam, 1987 (FOCS 1987); the version cited for every theorem number in this mission.
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46 (1990) 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, Freeman, 1979 (3-dimensional matching, problem [SP1]).
  • P. Schuurman, G. J. Woeginger, Polynomial time approximation algorithms for machine scheduling: ten open problems, Journal of Scheduling 2 (1999) 203–213. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1425(199909/10)2:5<203::AID-JOS26>3.0.CO;2-5
  • D. P. Williamson, D. B. Shmoys, The Design of Approximation Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921735
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimization under Variants of the Nested Logit Model 6: For δ > 1, the Powers-of-δ LP Optimum Scaled by (δ^(2γ̄+1), δ^(γ̄+1)) Is Feasible for the Full LPResearch Paper

Motivation

Assortment optimization asks which products a retailer should offer when customers choose among the offered products according to a probabilistic choice model, so as to maximize expected revenue. Under the nested logit model the products are grouped into nests: a customer first picks a nest, then a product inside it. The model is the standard relaxation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives property of the multinomial logit, and it is used throughout revenue management and transportation demand modelling.

Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 62(2), 2014) classify the complexity of the assortment problem under four variants of the nested logit model, according to whether the dissimilarity parameters are at most one and whether a customer who picks a nest always buys there. The problem is NP-hard as soon as some dissimilarity parameter exceeds one (their Theorem 5), and also when the nests have positive no-purchase weights (Theorem 8), so for the general variant approximation is the realistic aim. §6.2 of the paper gives an approximation scheme for the most general variant: for any δ>1\delta > 1δ>1 it restricts each nest to a short list of candidate assortments indexed by the powers of δ\deltaδ, solves a small linear program, and loses at most a factor δ2γˉ+1\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δ2γˉ​+1 of the optimal revenue. This mission formalizes the guarantee behind that scheme, Theorem 12.

Setting

There are nests MMM and products N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} in each nest. Product jjj of nest iii has revenue rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and preference weight vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0; the products are ordered so that ri1≥⋯≥rinr_{i1} \ge \dots \ge r_{in}ri1​≥⋯≥rin​. Nest iii has a no-purchase weight vi0≥0v_{i0} \ge 0vi0​≥0 and a dissimilarity parameter γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0, and v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0 is the weight of leaving without choosing a nest. Offering Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N in nest iii gives

Vi(Si)=vi0+∑j∈Sivij,Ri(Si)=∑j∈SirijvijVi(Si),Π(S1,…,Sm)=∑iVi(Si)γiRi(Si)v0+∑iVi(Si)γi.V_i(S_i) = v_{i0} + \sum_{j \in S_i} v_{ij}, \qquad R_i(S_i) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S_i} r_{ij} v_{ij}}{V_i(S_i)}, \qquad \Pi(S_1, \dots, S_m) = \frac{\sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i} R_i(S_i)}{v_0 + \sum_i V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}}.Vi​(Si​)=vi0​+j∈Si​∑​vij​,Ri​(Si​)=Vi​(Si​)∑j∈Si​​rij​vij​​,Π(S1​,…,Sm​)=v0​+∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​∑i​Vi​(Si​)γi​Ri​(Si​)​.

The optimal expected revenue Z∗=max⁡ΠZ^* = \max \PiZ∗=maxΠ is the optimal value of the linear program (3): minimize xxx subject to v0x≥∑iyiv_0 x \ge \sum_i y_iv0​x≥∑i​yi​ and yi≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−x)y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - x)yi​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−x) for every nest iii and every Si⊆NS_i \subseteq NSi​⊆N. Problem (4) keeps the second family of constraints only for a candidate collection of assortments in each nest.

Let γˉ=max⁡iγi\bar\gamma = \max_i \gamma_iγˉ​=maxi​γi​, assumed >1> 1>1 throughout §6, and fix δ>1\delta > 1δ>1. Put viL=vi0+min⁡jvijv^L_i = v_{i0} + \min_j v_{ij}viL​=vi0​+minj​vij​, viU=vi0+∑jvijv^U_i = v_{i0} + \sum_j v_{ij}viU​=vi0​+∑j​vij​, and let liLl^L_iliL​, liUl^U_iliU​ be the least integers with δl≥viL\delta^{l} \ge v^L_iδl≥viL​, δl≥viU\delta^l \ge v^U_iδl≥viU​. For each level l=liL,…,liUl = l^L_i, \dots, l^U_il=liL​,…,liU​, problem (15) maximizes ∑j∈Srijvij\sum_{j \in S} r_{ij} v_{ij}∑j∈S​rij​vij​ over the assortments with δl−1≤Vi(S)≤δl\delta^{l-1} \le V_i(S) \le \delta^lδl−1≤Vi​(S)≤δl; its value is G^il\hat G_{il}G^il​. An assortment S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ is feasible for (15) and satisfies δ∑j∈S^ilrijvij≥G^il\delta \sum_{j \in \hat S_{il}} r_{ij} v_{ij} \ge \hat G_{il}δ∑j∈S^il​​rij​vij​≥G^il​. The candidate collection of nest iii is {S^il:l=liL,…,liU}∪{∅}\{\hat S_{il} : l = l^L_i, \dots, l^U_i\} \cup \{\emptyset\}{S^il​:l=liL​,…,liU​}∪{∅}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 12 (p. 28)

If (x^,y^)(\hat x, \hat y)(x^,y^​) is an optimal solution of problem (4) over the candidate collections {S^il}∪{∅}\{\hat S_{il}\} \cup \{\emptyset\}{S^il​}∪{∅}, then

(δ2γˉ+1x^, δγˉ+1y^) is feasible for problem (3).\big(\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}\hat x,\ \delta^{\bar\gamma+1}\hat y\big) \text{ is feasible for problem (3).}(δ2γˉ​+1x^, δγˉ​+1y^​) is feasible for problem (3).

Milestones (Appendix A.6, pp. 53–54)

  1. x^≥0\hat x \ge 0x^≥0.
  2. Every nonempty assortment of nest iii lies in some level liL≤l≤liUl^L_i \le l \le l^U_iliL​≤l≤liU​.
  3. If δl−1≤a≤δl\delta^{l-1} \le a \le \delta^lδl−1≤a≤δl, then aγ−1≥(δl)γ−1δ−[γ−1]+a^{\gamma-1} \ge (\delta^l)^{\gamma-1}\delta^{-[\gamma-1]^+}aγ−1≥(δl)γ−1δ−[γ−1]+.
  4. Under the same hypothesis, (δl)γ−1≥δ−[1−γ]+aγ−1(\delta^l)^{\gamma-1} \ge \delta^{-[1-\gamma]^+} a^{\gamma-1}(δl)γ−1≥δ−[1−γ]+aγ−1.
  5. δγˉδ−[γi−1]+δ−[1−γi]+≥1\delta^{\bar\gamma}\delta^{-[\gamma_i-1]^+}\delta^{-[1-\gamma_i]^+} \ge 1δγˉ​δ−[γi​−1]+δ−[1−γi​]+≥1 and δγˉ+γi+1≤δ2γˉ+1\delta^{\bar\gamma+\gamma_i+1} \le \delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δγˉ​+γi​+1≤δ2γˉ​+1.
  6. The scaled pair satisfies δγˉ+1y^i≥Vi(Si)γi(Ri(Si)−δ2γˉ+1x^)\delta^{\bar\gamma+1}\hat y_i \ge V_i(S_i)^{\gamma_i}(R_i(S_i) - \delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}\hat x)δγˉ​+1y^​i​≥Vi​(Si​)γi​(Ri​(Si​)−δ2γˉ​+1x^) for every nonempty SiS_iSi​.
  7. The same inequality for Si=∅S_i = \emptysetSi​=∅.

Companions

  • The guarantee stated after Theorem 12: with v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, the assortment assembled from the candidates solving problem (5) earns at least Z∗/δ2γˉ+1Z^*/\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}Z∗/δ2γˉ​+1.
  • Proposition 15 (p. 51): when (15) is feasible, one of the explicit assortments S^(JL,JS)\hat S(J_L, J_S)S^(JL​,JS​), built from at most q=⌈δ/(δ−1)⌉q = \lceil \delta/(\delta-1)\rceilq=⌈δ/(δ−1)⌉ large and at most qqq small products by a greedy continuous knapsack, is feasible for (15) and within a factor δ\deltaδ of G^il\hat G_{il}G^il​.
  • The count liU−liL≤1+log⁡δ(viU/viL)l^U_i - l^L_i \le 1 + \log_\delta(v^U_i/v^L_i)liU​−liL​≤1+logδ​(viU​/viL​) (p. 28).

Significance

Theorem 12 is the analytical half of the approximation scheme. Together with the paper's Theorem 1 it shows that a linear program with 1+m1 + m1+m variables and at most 1+m(2+log⁡δ(viU/viL))1 + m(2 + \log_\delta(v^U_i/v^L_i))1+m(2+logδ​(viU​/viL​)) constraints yields an assortment within a factor δ2γˉ+1\delta^{2\bar\gamma+1}δ2γˉ​+1 of the optimum, for the most general variant, which is NP-hard, and Proposition 15 makes the candidate assortments computable. Letting δ↓1\delta \downarrow 1δ↓1 trades accuracy for running time, so the result is the paper's answer to how well the general problem can be approximated by this LP approach.

The result is proved in the paper; the work here is to formalize the known proof. To the best of a search of the Prove2Me library (local index and platform mirror, October 2026), no nested logit approximation result, and no knapsack lemma matching Proposition 15, has a machine-checked statement or proof. The definitions of the shared model (the instance, ViV_iVi​, RiR_iRi​, Π\PiΠ, the linear programs (3) and (4)) are common to the six missions of this series.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares an arbitrary assortment SiS_iSi​ with the candidate of its level and uses the candidate's constraint in (4). This fails as a direct comparison because the nest weight Vi(⋅)γiV_i(\cdot)^{\gamma_i}Vi​(⋅)γi​ enters twice with different exponents, γi−1\gamma_i - 1γi​−1 in front of the revenue and γi\gamma_iγi​ in front of x^\hat xx^, and within one level ViV_iVi​ may vary by a factor δ\deltaδ. When γi>1\gamma_i > 1γi​>1 and when γi≤1\gamma_i \le 1γi​≤1 the monotonicity of t↦tγi−1t \mapsto t^{\gamma_i - 1}t↦tγi​−1 goes in opposite directions, so the losses must be tracked separately by [γi−1]+[\gamma_i - 1]^+[γi​−1]+ and [1−γi]+[1 - \gamma_i]^+[1−γi​]+, and they are absorbed by the common factor δγˉ\delta^{\bar\gamma}δγˉ​ only because γˉ>1\bar\gamma > 1γˉ​>1. The other half, Proposition 15, concerns a knapsack with both a lower and an upper bound on the total weight, where a feasible solution must be produced as well as a good objective value.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n (0,…,n−10, \dots, n-10,…,n−1 for 1,…,n1, \dots, n1,…,n), nests a finite type, powers VγV^{\gamma}Vγ real powers, and x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0, which gives Ri(∅)=0R_i(\emptyset) = 0Ri​(∅)=0. The shared model carries the standing assumptions of §1 with the disclosed pins vij>0v_{ij} > 0vij​>0, rij≥0r_{ij} \ge 0rij​≥0 and γi>0\gamma_i > 0γi​>0 (the page allows γi=0\gamma_i = 0γi​=0 and zero-weight padding products, under which its convention 0γi=00^{\gamma_i} = 00γi​=0 and its proofs fail). Every statement of the mission also assumes n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 (for viLv^L_iviL​), γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ is the greatest of the γi\gamma_iγi​ (so at least one nest exists) with γˉ>1\bar\gamma > 1γˉ​>1, and δ>1\delta > 1δ>1. Integer powers δl\delta^lδl are zpow, and liLl^L_iliL​, liUl^U_iliU​ are written ⌈log⁡δviL⌉\lceil \log_\delta v^L_i\rceil⌈logδ​viL​⌉, ⌈log⁡δviU⌉\lceil \log_\delta v^U_i\rceil⌈logδ​viU​⌉, which equal the minima of the paper. An optimal solution of (4) is a feasible pair whose xxx is minimal among feasible pairs. The companion guarantee adds v0>0v_0 > 0v0​>0, the pin of Theorem 1. In Proposition 15 the capacity row of (33) includes v0v_0v0​, correcting a printed slip, and the running-time claim is not stated.

The assortments S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ enter Theorem 12 as an arbitrary family with the two properties of p. 28; the theorem is stated for every such family. A level at which (15) has no feasible assortment imposes nothing on S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​, as on the page. Requiring S^il\hat S_{il}S^il​ to lie in its level unconditionally would make the hypothesis unsatisfiable for most instances and the goal vacuous; that encoding, and any goal that assumes displays (34)–(36) or the exponent bounds, is ruled out.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the real-power milestones (3)–(5), which are self-contained, of the two cases (6)–(7), and of Proposition 15, whose fractional knapsack lemma (the greedy solution of a continuous knapsack sorted by ratio is optimal) is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment optimization under variants of the nested logit model, Operations Research 62(2), 2014; cited from the revised manuscript of June 18, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256
  • A. M. Frieze, M. R. B. Clarke, Approximation algorithms for the m-dimensional 0–1 knapsack problem: worst-case and probabilistic analyses, European Journal of Operational Research 15(1), 1984. (cited on p. 50 of the paper for the continuous knapsack (33); link not verified here)
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
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Linear OptimizationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Estimation of Executive Compensation by Linear Programming I: Least Absolute Deviations under Ranking Constraints Equal a Linear ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm may know salary bounds and the ranking of positions without having a reliable sample of individual salaries suitable for least-squares estimation. Charnes, Cooper and Ferguson used that kind of partial information to estimate a salary formula from ratings assigned to job factors. Their 1955 paper gives a model in which weights respect the job hierarchy while the implied salaries approach specified salary levels as closely as possible. It then turns the sum of absolute deviations into a linear program that can be handled by the methods available for constrained optimization. The setting and transformation are in §§4–6 of the published paper.

The question here is a precise one: does the transformed program have the same optimal value and the same optimal salary weights as the original absolute-deviation problem? This matters because a linear-program solution should answer the compensation-estimation problem stated before the transformation, even though the transformed program has additional variables and a different feasible set. The mission also records the paper's seven-position numerical example, where the reported salary formula can be checked directly against the table of factor ratings.

Setting

There are nnn rated factors and L≥1L\ge1L≥1 job levels ordered from highest to lowest. The rating xikx_{ik}xik​ is the amount of factor iii required at level kkk, and aia_iai​ is the nonnegative weight assigned to that factor. The estimated salary at level kkk is

Sk(a)=∑i=1naixik.S_k(a)=\sum_{i=1}^{n}a_i x_{ik}.Sk​(a)=i=1∑n​ai​xik​.

The salary formula applied to a person's factor amounts yiy_iyi​ is s=∑iaiyis=\sum_i a_i y_is=∑i​ai​yi​. For the ranked positions, feasible weights satisfy the four parts of the paper's system (2): each ai≥0a_i\ge0ai​≥0; the top-level salary is at most the ceiling sMs_MsM​; successive salaries descend, Sk+1(a)≤Sk(a)S_{k+1}(a)\le S_k(a)Sk+1​(a)≤Sk​(a); and the bottom-level salary is at least the floor sms_msm​. These are one-sided ceiling and floor bounds. They do not force the fitted salaries to equal the bounds.

The firm specifies target salaries sks_ksk​ at a finite set KKK of levels, which includes the ceiling and floor levels in the examples and may include intermediate levels. The absolute-deviation objective of (3) is

D(a)=∑k∈K∣Sk(a)−sk∣.D(a)=\sum_{k\in K}|S_k(a)-s_k|.D(a)=k∈K∑​∣Sk​(a)−sk​∣.

The original problem minimizes DDD over the feasible weights. At a specified level, let wk=Sk(a)−skw_k=S_k(a)-s_kwk​=Sk​(a)−sk​. The split-variable program of (4)–(5) introduces uk,vk≥0u_k,v_k\ge0uk​,vk​≥0 with wk=uk−vkw_k=u_k-v_kwk​=uk​−vk​ and minimizes P(u,v)=∑k∈K(uk+vk)P(u,v)=\sum_{k\in K}(u_k+v_k)P(u,v)=∑k∈K​(uk​+vk​). The split variables are constrained only for levels in KKK. The salary constraints (2) continue to apply to aaa. This is the paper's transformed linear program, with a feasible set that contains many choices of (u,v)(u,v)(u,v) above the same weight vector Charnes, Cooper and Ferguson, §§4–5.

Formalization targets

Equivalence of the two programs

The main target is the paper's claim that the two problems have equal minimal values and that minimizers correspond §6, p. 143. In the formal statement, equal values are expressed by equality of attainable objective thresholds:

∀t∈R,[∃a feasible:D(a)≤t]⟺[∃(a,u,v) LP-feasible:P(u,v)≤t].\forall t\in\mathbb R,\qquad [\exists a\text{ feasible}:D(a)\le t] \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad [\exists(a,u,v)\text{ LP-feasible}:P(u,v)\le t].∀t∈R,[∃a feasible:D(a)≤t]⟺[∃(a,u,v) LP-feasible:P(u,v)≤t].

The goal also says that aaa minimizes DDD exactly when the triple formed from aaa and the positive and negative parts of www minimizes PPP. Every LP minimizer projects to a minimizer of DDD. These clauses give the value and solution correspondence the authors use when they call the two problems equivalent.

Supporting claims and numerical result

Three milestones follow the paper's exposition. First, every feasible weight vector has a split-variable lift with the same objective. Second, every transformed feasible point projects to an original feasible weight vector with no larger original objective. Third, the minimal values agree §§5–6, pp. 141–143. Each is recorded under the unnumbered sentence from which it was extracted; the paper has no numbered lemmas.

Two companion statements record other claims: opposite coefficient columns cannot both occur among selected independent simplex columns, and the Table I data have the reported optimum. For the latter, targets are 16 at R1R_1R1​, 10 at R5R_5R5​, and 4 at R7R_7R7​, measured in thousands of dollars. Equation (7) assigns weights (4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11(4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11(4,0,0,16,0,4,0,28,0)/11, yielding the minimum deviation 14/1114/1114/11 §7, pp. 145–148. A further companion checks the redundant R2≤R1R_2\le R_1R2​≤R1​ ranking row.

Significance

The equivalence justifies using a linear-program output as an estimate for the earlier salary problem: the transformed objective reaches the same value, and its optimal weight vectors solve the original problem. The numerical claim supplies a fully specified instance with seven job levels and nine factors, including the exact fitted salaries. Without the correspondence, optimizing the enlarged variable set could give no assurance that its weights minimize the deviations the firm intended to measure.

The mathematical result was argued in the 1955 paper; this mission asks for a machine-checked formulation and proof of that known result. The statements compile as open Lean theorems, so compilation alone does not establish their truth. Closing them would add a reusable treatment of absolute-deviation objectives under finite linear inequalities and an exact certificate for the paper's worked example. The consistency claim in the appendix is a separate mission because it concerns perturbations of another linear program, not this transformation.

Difficulty

The split-variable program permits uku_kuk​ and vkv_kvk​ to be simultaneously positive even when their difference is fixed. Consequently, simply identifying the two feasible sets would misstate the transformation: one has extra degrees of freedom. A proof must relate their objective values and then account for optimal solutions on both sides. The numerical example has a separate difficulty. Substituting the reported weights verifies a feasible objective of 14/1114/1114/11, but does not by itself rule out another feasible weight vector with a smaller deviation. The global lower bound is part of the companion theorem.

Formalization scope

The Lean development represents factor and level vectors by functions on Fin n and Fin L, and sums explicitly over finite indices. Paper level 1 is Lean index 0; paper level LLL is the final Fin L index. The assumption L≥1L\ge1L≥1 is explicit because both the top and bottom level are named. No sign, monotonicity, or boundedness assumptions are imposed on the ratings beyond what the paper states. The weights are componentwise nonnegative. Intermediate target salaries enter the objectives through KKK but add no constraints to (2), matching the paper's treatment of R5R_5R5​.

A minimizer is a feasible point whose objective is no larger than that of every feasible point. The equality of minimal values uses the threshold formula above, so an empty feasible set cannot inherit a spurious real infimum. The transformed feasible set is exactly the split-variable system of (4)–(5); defining it as only the image of a chosen lift would make the principal comparison empty of content. The Table I constants are exact rational values in units of 1,0001{,}0001,000. The paper rounds some displayed salaries, while Lean records their exact fractions. The generic column-independence companion is stated for an arbitrary finite matrix, with the basis and zero nonbasic coordinates explicit.

The shared definition module provides the salary map, feasibility predicates, objectives, minimizers, and example data. A full development can contribute proofs of the three milestones, the main equivalence, the column claim, the numerical lower bound, and the redundant-row fact. The finite absolute-deviation and split-variable statements can also serve later formalizations with other linear constraints.

Selected references

  • A. Charnes, W. W. Cooper, and R. O. Ferguson, Optimal Estimation of Executive Compensation by Linear Programming, Management Science 1(2), 138–151, 1955. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1.2.138.
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CombinatoricsTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling Unrelated Parallel Machines 4: With Times in {p, q} and gcd(p, q) = 1, a q-Dimensional Matching Exists Iff a Schedule Has Makespan ≤ pqResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimum makespan scheduling on unrelated parallel machines asks for an assignment of nnn jobs to mmm machines, where job jjj takes pijp_{ij}pij​ time units on machine iii, so that the largest machine load is as small as possible. In the three-field notation of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (1979) it is R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​. It models load balancing across heterogeneous processors, workers or production lines, and it is a standard test case for linear-programming rounding.

Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos (FOCS 1987; CWI Report OS-R8714; Mathematical Programming 46, 1990) gave a polynomial 2-approximation algorithm for R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​ and showed that no polynomial algorithm achieves a ratio below 3/23/23/2 unless P = NP. They also asked which restrictions on the processing times keep the problem hard. Their Section 5 answers this when only two distinct processing times occur:

  • all pij=1p_{ij}=1pij​=1: trivial;
  • all pij∈{1,∞}p_{ij}\in\{1,\infty\}pij​∈{1,∞}: bipartite cardinality matching;
  • all pij∈{1,2}p_{ij}\in\{1,2\}pij​∈{1,2}: polynomial by matching techniques (Theorem 6);
  • all pij∈{p,q}p_{ij}\in\{p,q\}pij​∈{p,q} with p<qp<qp<q, 2p≠q2p\ne q2p=q: NP-hard (Theorem 7).

Theorem 7 is the paper's last result and closes this classification. Its proof generalizes the reduction of Theorem 4, which handles the case {1,3}\{1,3\}{1,3}, from 3-dimensional matching to qqq-dimensional matching.

Setting

Machines are indexed by i∈{1,…,m}i\in\{1,\dots,m\}i∈{1,…,m} and jobs by jjj. A schedule σ\sigmaσ assigns every job to exactly one machine. The load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=ipij\sum_{j:\sigma(j)=i}p_{ij}∑j:σ(j)=i​pij​, and the makespan Cmax⁡(σ)C_{\max}(\sigma)Cmax​(σ) is the largest load.

qqq-dimensional matching. An instance is a ground set UUU of qnqnqn elements and a family S1,…,SmS_1,\dots,S_mS1​,…,Sm​ of qqq-element subsets of UUU. A matching is a subfamily F′⊆{1,…,m}F'\subseteq\{1,\dots,m\}F′⊆{1,…,m} with ∣F′∣=n|F'|=n∣F′∣=n and ⋃i∈F′Si=U\bigcup_{i\in F'}S_i=U⋃i∈F′​Si​=U; its members are then pairwise disjoint.

The instance of Theorem 7. Fix natural numbers 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q that are relatively prime. Build a scheduling instance with mmm machines, machine iii corresponding to SiS_iSi​, and two kinds of jobs:

  • qnqnqn element jobs, one per u∈Uu\in Uu∈U, with piu=pp_{iu}=ppiu​=p if u∈Siu\in S_iu∈Si​ and piu=qp_{iu}=qpiu​=q otherwise;
  • p(m−n)p(m-n)p(m−n) dummy jobs, each taking qqq time units on every machine.

Every processing time lies in {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q}.

The instance of Theorem 4. For disjoint sets A={a1,…,an}A=\{a_1,\dots,a_n\}A={a1​,…,an​}, BBB, CCC of the same size and triples Ti=(aj,bk,cl)T_i=(a_j,b_k,c_l)Ti​=(aj​,bk​,cl​), i=1,…,mi=1,\dots,mi=1,…,m, there are 3n3n3n element jobs, one per element of A∪B∪CA\cup B\cup CA∪B∪C, and m−nm-nm−n dummy jobs. Machine iii processes the element jobs of aja_jaj​, bkb_kbk​, clc_lcl​ in one time unit and every other job in three time units. A 3-dimensional matching is a subfamily of nnn triples covering A∪B∪CA\cup B\cup CA∪B∪C.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 8; proof pp. 8–9)

For relatively prime 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q and a family of qqq-subsets S1,…,SmS_1,\dots,S_mS1​,…,Sm​ of a qnqnqn-element set, the instance above has all processing times in {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q}, and

∃ σ: Cmax⁡(σ)≤pq⟺∃ F′⊆{1,…,m}: ∣F′∣=n, ⋃i∈F′Si=U.\exists\,\sigma:\ C_{\max}(\sigma)\le pq \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \exists\,F'\subseteq\{1,\dots,m\}:\ |F'|=n,\ \bigcup_{i\in F'}S_i=U .∃σ: Cmax​(σ)≤pq⟺∃F′⊆{1,…,m}: ∣F′∣=n, i∈F′⋃​Si​=U.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 4 (p. 7): on the 3-dimensional matching instance with times in {1,3}\{1,3\}{1,3}, a schedule with makespan at most 333 exists iff a matching exists.
  2. Matching gives a schedule (pp. 8–9): if SSS has a matching, some schedule has Cmax⁡≤pqC_{\max}\le pqCmax​≤pq.
  3. No idle time, two kinds of machine (p. 9): in every schedule with Cmax⁡≤pqC_{\max}\le pqCmax​≤pq, three things hold. Every load equals pqpqpq. Every element job runs at length ppp, on a machine whose tuple contains it. Each machine processes either exactly qqq element jobs and no dummy job, or exactly ppp dummy jobs and no element job.

Significance

The result. Theorems 6 and 7 together say exactly which two-valued restrictions of R ∥ Cmax⁡R\,\|\,C_{\max}R∥Cmax​ are tractable. Up to scaling, the polynomial case is {1,2}\{1,2\}{1,2}, and every other pair {p,q}\{p,q\}{p,q} with p<qp<qp<q is NP-hard. Theorem 4 is the base case. It also yields Corollary 1 of the paper: no polynomial ρ\rhoρ-approximation with ρ<4/3\rho<4/3ρ<4/3 exists unless P = NP. Reductions of this "no idle time" kind are a standard template for hardness of restricted-assignment and two-value scheduling, a line still active in the study of the restricted assignment problem and of the "graph balancing" special case.

Formalizing it. The result is proved, in two short paragraphs. The proof leaves to the reader the construction of the schedule from a matching and the "easy number theoretic argument" behind the converse, and both become explicit here. The development also produces reusable pieces: a qqq-dimensional matching definition over an arbitrary family of qqq-sets, and two reduction instances built on the published load and makespan of MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of these reductions exists.

Difficulty

The forward direction is a direct construction. The converse is where care is needed. A schedule with makespan at most pqpqpq may a priori place an element job on a machine whose tuple does not contain it, at length qqq, and may mix element and dummy jobs on one machine. Looking at one machine at a time does not exclude either: a single machine can carry such a mixed load below pqpqpq. What excludes them is a property of the whole schedule together with the arithmetic of ppp and qqq. The hypotheses are sharp for this step: for p>qp>qp>q element jobs are cheaper on foreign machines, and for gcd⁡(p,q)>1\gcd(p,q)>1gcd(p,q)>1 a load ap+bq=pqap+bq=pqap+bq=pq with a,b>0a,b>0a,b>0 becomes possible.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Machines are Fin m. Schedules are maps from jobs to machines. Load and makespan are those of the published MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule, with natural-number processing times cast to R\mathbb RR. The jobs are enumerated as Fin (q * n + p * (m - n)) (Theorem 7) and Fin (3 * n + (m - n)) (Theorem 4), element jobs first, through finSumFinEquiv.
  • Ground set and family. The ground set is Fin (q * n) and the family is indexed by machines, so repeated tuples are allowed. The qqq-partite structure of qqq-dimensional matching is not imposed: the reduction does not use it, and statements over all families of qqq-sets contain the qqq-partite case. Theorem 4 keeps the tripartite structure, with triples of indices in Fin n × Fin n × Fin n.
  • Threshold. The thresholds are exactly pqpqpq and 333, with "makespan at most".
  • Complexity wording not formalized. "NP-hard" (Theorem 7) and "NP-complete" (Theorem 4) are not formalized: membership in NP, polynomial size of the reductions, and the hardness of the matching problems are not stated. What is stated is the equivalence each reduction establishes.
  • Hypotheses. Theorem 7's goal assumes 0<p<q0<p<q0<p<q, gcd⁡(p,q)=1\gcd(p,q)=1gcd(p,q)=1 and ∣Si∣=q|S_i|=q∣Si​∣=q. The paper's general case gcd⁡(p,q)=g>1\gcd(p,q)=g>1gcd(p,q)=g>1 is its stated "without loss of generality": divide all times by ggg, which divides every makespan by ggg. It is not part of the formal statement. The paper's hypothesis 2p≠q2p\ne q2p=q is dropped because the reduction does not use it. With coprime p<qp<qp<q it excludes only (p,q)=(1,2)(p,q)=(1,2)(p,q)=(1,2), where the equivalence still holds but the source problem is bipartite matching. The formal goal is therefore stronger than the paper's.
  • Edge cases. For m<nm<nm<n, natural-number subtraction gives no dummy jobs; both sides of each equivalence are false when n≥1n\ge1n≥1. This stands in for the paper's "trivial 'no' instance". For n=0n=0n=0 the empty family is a matching and the dummy jobs fill the machines exactly.
  • No trivialization. The goal is an equivalence about a constructed instance whose processing times are given by explicit definitions. Neither side is assumed, the schedule is quantified over all maps from jobs to machines, and the instance is not a free parameter pinned by hypotheses.
  • Welcome contributions. Besides the milestones: counting lemmas relating a machine's load to the numbers of jobs of each length on it, and lemmas on the makespan of MatousekLP.Scheduling.Schedule (it bounds every load; it is attained when m≥1m\ge1m≥1), which are reusable across scheduling reductions.

Selected references

  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, CWI Report OS-R8714, Amsterdam, 1987 (the version formalized here); journal version in Mathematical Programming 46 (1990) 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, Freeman, 1979 (3-dimensional matching, problem SP1).
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and approximation in deterministic sequencing and scheduling: a survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5 (1979) 287–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer, 2007, §8.3 (the schedule, load and makespan definitions reused here). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
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CombinatoricsProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

An Optimal Algorithm for On-line Bipartite Matching 2: No Randomized On-line Algorithm Guarantees an Expected Matching Larger Than n(1 − 1/e) + o(n)Research Paper

Motivation

An online matching algorithm must commit to each assignment when a request arrives, before it sees later requests. This limitation arises whenever waiting for the full instance is impossible: an available resource can be assigned to a current request or saved for an unknown future request. The quality of the assignment is measured by how many requests can be matched. The central question is how much the lack of future information costs, even when an algorithm uses randomness. Karp, U. Vazirani, and V. Vazirani studied this question for bipartite graphs and proved an asymptotic ceiling of 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e for the expected fraction matched by any randomized online rule on graphs with a perfect matching (Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani, 1990).

The paper also analyzes RANKING and gives a matching asymptotic guarantee from below. This mission concerns the separate upper-bound result: the existence of hard instances for every algorithm. The upper bound matters independently of any particular proposed rule. It says that improving an algorithm's decisions cannot remove the worst-case loss due to decisions made before all columns are revealed. Its quantifiers make the adversarial model precise: the graph is selected with knowledge of the algorithm, before that algorithm's random choices are made.

Setting

There are nnn boys, represented by rows, and nnn girls, represented by columns. A bipartite graph G⊆[n]×[n]G\subseteq[n]\times[n]G⊆[n]×[n] records which boy and girl pairs may be matched. The graph is assumed to contain a perfect matching: some bijection between the two sides uses only edges of GGG. This assumption supplies an offline benchmark of nnn matches. Without it, a graph with no edges would make every upper bound on matching size empty of content.

Girls arrive one at a time. On arrival, the algorithm learns the edges incident to that girl, chooses an as-yet-unmatched adjacent boy, or declines to match her. A choice cannot later be changed. The paper labels columns so that they arrive in the order n,n−1,…,1n,n-1,\ldots,1n,n−1,…,1. A deterministic algorithm can base its action on the neighborhoods revealed so far. A randomized algorithm can additionally use internal random choices. Its performance p(A)p(A)p(A) is the minimum, over a graph with a perfect matching and a preselected arrival order, of its expected number of matches; the expectation is over its own randomness (Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani, 1990, p. 352).

The paper's hard family begins with the complete upper-triangular graph TnT_nTn​, where row iii is adjacent to column jjj exactly when i≤ji\le ji≤j. Its columns arrive from largest to smallest. Relabeling the rows by a permutation π\piπ gives an instance TπT_\piTπ​ that still contains a perfect matching. The algorithm RANDOM takes an eligible boy uniformly whenever at least one is available. Write VTn(n,∅)V_{T_n}(n,\varnothing)VTn​​(n,∅) for RANDOM's expected number of matches on TnT_nTn​, beginning with no matched rows (Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani, 1990, p. 357).

Formalization targets

Main theorem

For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, there is one threshold NNN such that, for every n≥Nn\ge Nn≥N and every randomized online algorithm AAA on nnn rows and columns, a graph GGG with a perfect matching satisfies

EA[∣M(G)∣]≤(1−e−1+ε)n.\mathbb E_A[|M(G)|]\le (1-e^{-1}+\varepsilon)n.EA​[∣M(G)∣]≤(1−e−1+ε)n.

The threshold is uniform over algorithms. The graph may depend on AAA. This is the quantified upper-bound reading of Theorem 2's p(A)≤n(1−1/e)+o(n)p(A)\le n(1-1/e)+o(n)p(A)≤n(1−1/e)+o(n) (Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani, 1990, Theorem 2).

Milestone statements

Lemma 13 identifies the average size produced by any deterministic greedy algorithm on a uniformly permuted TnT_nTn​ with RANDOM's expected size on TnT_nTn​. Lemma 14 bounds the worst-case performance of every randomized algorithm, including non-greedy algorithms, by that value. Lemma 16 identifies the value itself by the two-sided limit

lim⁡n→∞VTn(n,∅)n=1−e−1.\lim_{n\to\infty}\frac{V_{T_n}(n,\varnothing)}{n}=1-e^{-1}.n→∞lim​nVTn​​(n,∅)​=1−e−1.

Together these statements give the finite-instance comparison and the asymptotic value named in the goal (Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani, 1990, Lemmas 13, 14, 16).

Significance

Theorem 2 limits what any randomized online matching rule can guarantee under the paper's oblivious-adversary performance measure. Since the hard graph always admits a perfect matching, the gap from nnn is caused by the order of information and the required irrevocable decisions. The statement applies to the entire algorithm class, rather than comparing two selected procedures. It therefore provides the ceiling against which the paper's lower guarantee for RANKING is measured.

Formalizing the result requires a reusable description of finite online algorithms, their visible histories, and expected matching size. It also requires a definition of uniform random choice from currently eligible rows with an explicit empty-choice case. The 1990 result is proved in the paper; the statements in this mission are targets for machine-checked proofs, not claims of an existing formal proof. The model can support later statements about other matching rules and hard-input distributions without changing the meaning of an online decision.

Difficulty

For a fixed graph, an algorithm can be designed around the graph's particular perfect matching, so one hard graph cannot simply be announced in advance for all deterministic algorithms. The theorem instead has to bound each randomized algorithm against a graph selected for that algorithm. Even then, checking the triangular graph against one rule does not establish a universal bound: different rules can respond differently to the same revealed neighborhoods. The crucial mathematical obstacle is a comparison across all such rules while preserving the restriction that future columns remain unseen. A further asymptotic step is needed to determine RANDOM's value on the triangular family, including both sides of the o(n)o(n)o(n) claim in Lemma 16.

Formalization scope

Both sides are Fin n. An edge set is a subset of row-column pairs. The published perfect-matching predicate is reused: it asks for a bijection whose every selected pair is an edge. The paper's one-based column order n,…,1n,\ldots,1n,…,1 is represented by zero-based order n−1,…,0n-1,\ldots,0n−1,…,0; arrival number zero is the largest column. A deterministic rule receives only the neighborhoods of columns that have arrived, including the current column. A randomized rule is a probability mass function on the finite set of deterministic rules, allowing arbitrary correlations among its choices. The expected size is a finite sum over that mass function.

RANDOM is represented by the conditional-expectation recursion for uniform choice among eligible rows. If none is eligible, the column remains unmatched and there is no division by zero. For n=0n=0n=0, the matching and RANDOM value are zero; the main theorem is eventual in nnn and Lemma 16's value at zero does not affect the limit. Lemma 16 uses a two-sided limit. The paper's o(n)o(n)o(n) in Theorem 2 is stated as ∀ε>0,∃N,∀n≥N\forall\varepsilon>0,\exists N,\forall n\ge N∀ε>0,∃N,∀n≥N with NNN before the algorithm, so the error is uniform across algorithms. A hard graph must contain a perfect matching; dropping this condition would let the empty graph satisfy the inequality trivially.

Useful contributions include finite probabilistic averaging, the greedy comparison, analysis of the recursive RANDOM value, and a proof joining Lemmas 14 and 16 into the uniform goal. The history and matching-run definitions are reusable for other finite online bipartite matching statements. The two numbered claims inside the paper's proof of Lemma 13 and its later remarks are outside the mission's curated milestone list.

Selected references

  • Richard M. Karp, Umesh V. Vazirani, and Vijay V. Vazirani, An Optimal Algorithm for On-line Bipartite Matching, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 352–358, 1990. DOI: 10.1145/100216.100262.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts X: Under Forced Compliance, Options Contracts with Shares λ_l and min{λ_h, λ̂_h} Separate the Two Demand Types and Coordinate CapacityTextbook

Motivation

A manufacturer launching a new product often depends on a single supplier for a critical component, and the supplier must build capacity before demand is known. The manufacturer usually knows more about demand than the supplier does: her sales force, market research and order history give her a forecast the supplier cannot verify, and she has a reason to inflate it, since more capacity costs her nothing if the supplier pays for it. Whether contracts can make forecast sharing credible, and at what cost to the supply chain, is the subject of Cachon and Lariviere, "Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain" (Management Science 47(5), 2001, doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486). Section 6.10 of G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents a simplified version of that model, and this mission formalizes it from the author's January 2003 draft.

The section separates two regimes. Under forced compliance the supplier must build exactly the capacity the contract specifies; under voluntary compliance he may build less. The section's conclusion is that forced compliance allows both coordination and credible forecast sharing, while voluntary compliance allows forecast sharing only at the price of under-investment in capacity.

Setting

Demand DθD_\thetaDθ​ has one of two types θ∈{h,l}\theta \in \{h, l\}θ∈{h,l} with distribution function Fθ(x)=F(x∣θ)F_\theta(x) = F(x\mid\theta)Fθ​(x)=F(x∣θ). The page assumes Fθ(x)=0F_\theta(x) = 0Fθ​(x)=0 for x<0x < 0x<0, Fθ(x)>0F_\theta(x) > 0Fθ​(x)>0 for x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 (so demand has an atom at 000), FθF_\thetaFθ​ increasing and differentiable, and stochastic dominance Fh(x)<Fl(x)F_h(x) < F_l(x)Fh​(x)<Fl​(x) for all x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The supplier SSS builds capacity kkk at cost ck>0c_k > 0ck​>0 per unit; after demand is observed he produces min⁡{Dθ,k}\min\{D_\theta, k\}min{Dθ​,k} at cost cp>0c_p > 0cp​>0 per unit; the manufacturer MMM earns r>cp+ckr > c_p + c_kr>cp​+ck​ per unit of demand satisfied; unused capacity is worth nothing.

Expected sales with xxx units of capacity are Sθ(x)=x−E[(x−Dθ)+]S_\theta(x) = x - E[(x - D_\theta)^+]Sθ​(x)=x−E[(x−Dθ​)+], and the supply chain's expected profit is

Ωθ(k)=(r−cp)Sθ(k)−ckk.\Omega_\theta(k) = (r - c_p)S_\theta(k) - c_k k .Ωθ​(k)=(r−cp​)Sθ​(k)−ck​k.

An optimal capacity kθok_\theta^okθo​ maximizes Ωθ\Omega_\thetaΩθ​ over k≥0k \ge 0k≥0, and Ωθo=Ωθ(kθo)\Omega_\theta^o = \Omega_\theta(k_\theta^o)Ωθo​=Ωθ​(kθo​).

In an options contract MMM buys qiq_iqi​ options at wow_owo​ each and pays wew_ewe​ for each option exercised. With k=qik = q_ik=qi​ her profit is Πθ(qi)=(r−we)Sθ(qi)−woqi\Pi_\theta(q_i) = (r - w_e)S_\theta(q_i) - w_o q_iΠθ​(qi​)=(r−we​)Sθ​(qi​)−wo​qi​ and the supplier's is (we−cp)Sθ(qi)+woqi−ckqi(w_e - c_p)S_\theta(q_i) + w_o q_i - c_k q_i(we​−cp​)Sθ​(qi​)+wo​qi​−ck​qi​. The contract with share λ\lambdaλ sets r−we=λ(r−cp)r - w_e = \lambda(r - c_p)r−we​=λ(r−cp​) and wo=λckw_o = \lambda c_kwo​=λck​. Under a wholesale price contract with price www the supplier earns πθ(k)=(w−cp)Sθ(k)−ckk\pi_\theta(k) = (w - c_p)S_\theta(k) - c_k kπθ​(k)=(w−cp​)Sθ​(k)−ck​k; the price inducing capacity kkk is wθ(k)=ck/Fˉθ(k)+cpw_\theta(k) = c_k/\bar F_\theta(k) + c_pwθ​(k)=ck​/Fˉθ​(k)+cp​ with Fˉθ=1−Fθ\bar F_\theta = 1 - F_\thetaFˉθ​=1−Fθ​, and the manufacturer then earns Πθ(k)=(r−wθ(k))Sθ(k)\Pi_\theta(k) = (r - w_\theta(k))S_\theta(k)Πθ​(k)=(r−wθ​(k))Sθ​(k).

With asymmetric information only MMM observes θ\thetaθ. Let π^\hat\piπ^ be the supplier's minimum acceptable profit, and define the shares

λl=1−π^Ωlo,λh=1−π^Ωho,λ^h=Ωlo−π^Ωl(kho),λH=min⁡{λh,λ^h}.\lambda_l = 1 - \frac{\hat\pi}{\Omega_l^o},\qquad \lambda_h = 1 - \frac{\hat\pi}{\Omega_h^o},\qquad \hat\lambda_h = \frac{\Omega_l^o - \hat\pi}{\Omega_l(k_h^o)},\qquad \lambda_H = \min\{\lambda_h, \hat\lambda_h\}.λl​=1−Ωlo​π^​,λh​=1−Ωho​π^​,λ^h​=Ωl​(kho​)Ωlo​−π^​,λH​=min{λh​,λ^h​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: forced-compliance separating contracts (§6.10.3, pp. 103–104)

The low type offers the options contract with share λl\lambda_lλl​ and initial order klok_l^oklo​, the high type the one with share λH\lambda_HλH​ and initial order khok_h^okho​. Assuming 0<π^<Ωlo0 < \hat\pi < \Omega_l^o0<π^<Ωlo​ and Ωl(kho)>0\Omega_l(k_h^o) > 0Ωl​(kho​)>0:

0<λl<λH<1,λl Ωh(klo)<λH Ωho,λH Ωl(kho)≤Ωlo−π^,0 < \lambda_l < \lambda_H < 1,\qquad \lambda_l\,\Omega_h(k_l^o) < \lambda_H\,\Omega_h^o,\qquad \lambda_H\,\Omega_l(k_h^o) \le \Omega_l^o - \hat\pi,0<λl​<λH​<1,λl​Ωh​(klo​)<λH​Ωho​,λH​Ωl​(kho​)≤Ωlo​−π^,

the supplier earns π^\hat\piπ^ from the low type and at least π^\hat\piπ^ from the high type, and each initial order kθok_\theta^okθo​ maximizes both firms' profits. The profit comparisons are stated between the contract profit functions, not between shares.

Milestones

  1. Sθ(x)=x−∫0xFθS_\theta(x) = x - \int_0^x F_\thetaSθ​(x)=x−∫0x​Fθ​ (p. 98).
  2. Ωθ\Omega_\thetaΩθ​ is concave, and k>0k > 0k>0 is optimal iff Fˉθ(k)=ck/(r−cp)\bar F_\theta(k) = c_k/(r - c_p)Fˉθ​(k)=ck​/(r−cp​) (p. 99).
  3. Ωl(k)<Ωh(k)\Omega_l(k) < \Omega_h(k)Ωl​(k)<Ωh​(k) for k>0k > 0k>0, hence Ωlo<Ωho\Omega_l^o < \Omega_h^oΩlo​<Ωho​ (implicit on p. 104).
  4. The options contract with share λ∈[0,1]\lambda \in [0,1]λ∈[0,1] gives Πθ=λΩθ\Pi_\theta = \lambda\Omega_\thetaΠθ​=λΩθ​ and the supplier (1−λ)Ωθ(1-\lambda)\Omega_\theta(1−λ)Ωθ​, so it coordinates (pp. 99–100).
  5. Under voluntary compliance, ∂π(kθo,kθo,θ)/∂k<0\partial\pi(k_\theta^o, k_\theta^o, \theta)/\partial k < 0∂π(kθo​,kθo​,θ)/∂k<0 (p. 100).
  6. A capacity k>0k > 0k>0 is optimal for the supplier under a wholesale price www iff w=wθ(k)w = w_\theta(k)w=wθ​(k) (p. 101).
  7. A stationary point k∗k^*k∗ of Πθ\Pi_\thetaΠθ​ satisfies Fˉθ(k∗)=Fˉθ(kθo)(1+fθ(k∗)Sθ(k∗)/Fˉθ(k∗)2)\bar F_\theta(k^*) = \bar F_\theta(k_\theta^o)\bigl(1 + f_\theta(k^*)S_\theta(k^*)/\bar F_\theta(k^*)^2\bigr)Fˉθ​(k∗)=Fˉθ​(kθo​)(1+fθ​(k∗)Sθ​(k∗)/Fˉθ​(k∗)2), so k∗<kθok^* < k_\theta^ok∗<kθo​ (p. 102).

Significance

The goal shows that with forced compliance a high-demand manufacturer can share her forecast credibly through the terms of a coordinating contract rather than its form: both types use the same contract family, the supply chain is coordinated in every state, and the only cost of asymmetric information is that the high type may be unable to push the supplier down to his reservation profit. The voluntary-compliance milestones show the other side: once the supplier may under-build, only the wholesale price affects his capacity, and the resulting capacity is strictly below the integrated optimum. Together they explain why compliance regimes matter in capacity contracting.

The results are established on the page with short arguments; none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires the derivative of expected sales for a distribution with an atom, the first-order characterization of a concave maximizer on a half-line, and careful bookkeeping of the incentive constraints. The demand and profit definitions are reusable for other capacity-procurement and newsvendor-type models.

Difficulty

The incentive constraints look like arithmetic on shares, but the strict inequality λl<λ^h\lambda_l < \hat\lambda_hλl​<λ^h​ needs Ωl(kho)<Ωlo\Omega_l(k_h^o) < \Omega_l^oΩl​(kho​)<Ωlo​: the low type's chain profit at the high type's capacity must be strictly below its optimum. The obvious argument via uniqueness of the maximizer is not available, because the page does not assume FθF_\thetaFθ​ strictly increasing, so Ωl\Omega_lΩl​ need not be strictly concave and may have a whole interval of maximizers. Likewise Ωlo<Ωho\Omega_l^o < \Omega_h^oΩlo​<Ωho​ needs a strict comparison of integrals of distribution functions. In the voluntary-compliance part, the derivative of wθ(k)w_\theta(k)wθ​(k) needs the density at k∗k^*k∗, and k∗<kθok^* < k_\theta^ok∗<kθo​ fails when that density is 000.

Formalization scope

Each demand law is a probability measure on R\mathbb RR and FθF_\thetaFθ​ is Mathlib's cdf. FθF_\thetaFθ​ is required to be differentiable only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), because the page's Fθ(0)>0F_\theta(0) > 0Fθ​(0)>0 makes it jump at 000. SθS_\thetaSθ​ is defined by the expectation x−E[(x−Dθ)+]x - E[(x - D_\theta)^+]x−E[(x−Dθ​)+], whose integrand is integrable because Dθ≥0D_\theta \ge 0Dθ​≥0 almost surely. Optimal capacities are passed as arguments characterized as maximizers over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), never chosen; kθo>0k_\theta^o > 0kθo​>0 is footnote 46's assumption. Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements.

Hypotheses added relative to the page, all disclosed in the items: 0<π^<Ωlo0 < \hat\pi < \Omega_l^o0<π^<Ωlo​ and Ωl(kho)>0\Omega_l(k_h^o) > 0Ωl​(kho​)>0 in the goal (the page divides by Ωl(kho)\Omega_l(k_h^o)Ωl​(kho​) and needs λl∈(0,1)\lambda_l \in (0,1)λl​∈(0,1)); λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 for the voluntary-compliance derivative (at λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 it vanishes); Fˉθ(k∗)>0\bar F_\theta(k^*) > 0Fˉθ​(k∗)>0 and fθ(k∗)>0f_\theta(k^*) > 0fθ​(k∗)>0 for the non-coordination result. The page's assumption wθ′′>0w''_\theta > 0wθ′′​>0 is not needed and not imposed; its strict-concavity claim on p. 101 is not stated, because it would need FθF_\thetaFθ​ strictly increasing. The prior Pr⁡(θ=h)=ρ\Pr(\theta = h) = \rhoPr(θ=h)=ρ does not enter any statement. The page's "separating equilibrium" is formalized by its defining incentive and participation conditions, not by a general signalling-game solution concept; a predicate that holds by construction of λ^h\hat\lambda_hλ^h​ (for example λH≤λ^h\lambda_H \le \hat\lambda_hλH​≤λ^h​) is not an acceptable substitute for the profit inequalities. The fixed-fee condition of p. 105 is pure algebra on four numbers and is not included.

All definitions are local to the namespace CachonCoord.CapacityForecast. No platform theorem formalizes this model; the Snyder–Shen newsvendor definitions (SupplyChainTheory_contracts) and the revenue-sharing model of Cachon–Lariviere 2005 (RevShareCoord.*) concern different games and are not reused. Proofs of any milestone, and a sanity instance showing the model's hypotheses are satisfiable (for example demand with an atom pθp_\thetapθ​ at 000 and an exponential tail, ph<plp_h < p_lph​<pl​), are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6. doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain, Management Science 47(5), 629–646, 2001. doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486
  • R. E. Barlow and F. Proschan, Mathematical Theory of Reliability, Wiley, 1965 (increasing failure rate distributions, cited on p. 102).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts IX: An Internal Market at the Shadow Price w(α, Q) Allocates Output Optimally, and Paying Its Expectation per Unit Induces the Optimal Effort e°Textbook

Motivation

In most contracts of the supply chain coordination literature the transfer payments are fixed when the contract is signed: a wholesale price www, a buy-back rate bbb, a revenue share ϕ\phiϕ. Some settings need payments that respond to information arriving after signing, such as realized demand at several retailers and realized production output. Fixing the per-unit price in advance then fails twice: for some output realizations the retailers do not buy everything that was produced, and for others they want more than exists, so the supplier must ration, which invites strategic ordering and misallocation (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999).

Section 6.9 of Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003) studies an alternative after Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000): the supplier commits to hold an internal market for output after demand is observed, and pays her own production manager a fixed amount per unit of realized output. The model is a variant of Porteus and Whang (1991), who studied incentives between manufacturing and marketing managers in a firm. The section shows that this pair of mechanisms coordinates both the production decision and the allocation decision without the supplier observing either the demand shocks or the manager's effort.

This mission is part IX of a series formalizing the capstone results of that chapter.

Setting

One supplier employs a production manager and sells to two independent retailers. The constant demand elasticity is η>1\eta>1η>1.

  1. The manager chooses a production input level e≥0e\ge0e≥0. The output is Q=YeQ=YeQ=Ye, where Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1] is a random variable. The manager incurs the cost c(e)c(e)c(e), strictly convex and increasing, with derivative c′c'c′.
  2. Retailer i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} observes the realization αi\alpha_iαi​ of a random variable Ai>0A_i>0Ai​>0.
  3. The supplier allocates qiq_iqi​ units to retailer iii with q1+q2≤Qq_1+q_2\le Qq1​+q2​≤Q. Retailer iii earns revenue qipi(qi)q_ip_i(q_i)qi​pi​(qi​) with the inverse demand pi(qi)=αiqi−1/ηp_i(q_i)=\alpha_iq_i^{-1/\eta}pi​(qi​)=αi​qi−1/η​, that is, αiqi(η−1)/η\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}αi​qi(η−1)/η​.

If retailer one receives the share γ\gammaγ of QQQ, total retailer revenue is

π(γ,α,Q)=(α1γ(η−1)/η+α2(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)=\big(\alpha_1\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}+\alpha_2(1-\gamma)^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big)Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}.π(γ,α,Q)=(α1​γ(η−1)/η+α2​(1−γ)(η−1)/η)Q(η−1)/η.

The optimal share is γo(α)=α1η/(α1η+α2η)\gamma^o(\alpha)=\alpha_1^\eta/(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)γo(α)=α1η​/(α1η​+α2η​) (Eq. (44)), and π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)=\pi(\gamma^o(\alpha),\alpha,Q)π(α,Q)=π(γo(α),α,Q) is revenue under it. The expected supply chain profit is Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e)\Pi(e)=E[\pi(A,Ye)]-c(e)Π(e)=E[π(A,Ye)]−c(e), and the optimal effort eoe^oeo solves the first-order condition (45).

In the decentralized system, if the per-unit price is www, retailer iii's profit is πi(qi,w)=αiqi(η−1)/η−wqi\pi_i(q_i,w)=\alpha_iq_i^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-wq_iπi​(qi​,w)=αi​qi(η−1)/η​−wqi​. The contingent price is

w(α,Q)=(η−1η)(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ−1/η.w(\alpha,Q)=\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{-1/\eta}.w(α,Q)=(ηη−1​)(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ−1/η.

The manager is paid a fixed amount per unit of realized output. With K=E[(A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η]K=E\big[(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}\big]K=E[(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η], the payment is

(η−1η)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),\Big(\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}\Big)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K/E[Y]\qquad(46),(ηη−1​)(eo)−1/ηK/E[Y](46),

and his expected utility is u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e)u(e)=(\text{payment})\cdot E[Ye]-c(e)u(e)=(payment)⋅E[Ye]−c(e).

Formalization targets

Goal

The goal has two parts.

  1. For every realization α1,α2>0\alpha_1,\alpha_2>0α1​,α2​>0 and output Q>0Q>0Q>0, at the price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) retailer one's unique optimal order is γo(α)Q\gamma^o(\alpha)Qγo(α)Q and retailer two's is (1−γo(α))Q(1-\gamma^o(\alpha))Q(1−γo(α))Q. So the retailers order exactly QQQ, the allocation maximizes revenue over all feasible allocations, and
∂π(α,Q)∂Q=w(α,Q).\frac{\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)}{\partial Q}=w(\alpha,Q).∂Q∂π(α,Q)​=w(α,Q).
  1. If eo>0e^o>0eo>0 satisfies (45), then under the payment (46) the manager's unique optimal effort is eoe^oeo. The payment equals E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo]E[Qw(A,Q)\mid e^o]/E[Q\mid e^o]E[Qw(A,Q)∣eo]/E[Q∣eo], and the supplier's expected profit from the market is zero.

Milestones

  • (44): revenue is strictly concave in γ\gammaγ, and γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) is the unique optimal share.
  • The closed form π(α,Q)=(α1η+α2η)1/ηQ(η−1)/η\pi(\alpha,Q)=(\alpha_1^\eta+\alpha_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Q^{(\eta-1)/\eta}π(α,Q)=(α1η​+α2η​)1/ηQ(η−1)/η.
  • (45): Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e)\Pi(e)=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}-c(e)Π(e)=Ke(η−1)/η−c(e) is strictly concave, and an interior eoe^oeo is optimal if and only if ((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0((\eta-1)/\eta)(e^o)^{-1/\eta}K-c'(e^o)=0((η−1)/η)(eo)−1/ηK−c′(eo)=0.
  • The retailers' first-order condition, and the market allocation at w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q).
  • ∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q)\partial\pi(\alpha,Q)/\partial Q=w(\alpha,Q)∂π(α,Q)/∂Q=w(α,Q).
  • The identity (46).
  • The manager's optimal effort and the supplier's zero expected profit.

Significance

The result shows that one mechanism handles two separate information problems. The market price w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the shadow price of output. Charging it makes the retailers' independent orders add up to exactly the output and split it as the integrated firm would, and the supplier never needs to observe AAA. Paying the manager the output-weighted expectation of that shadow price, a single number fixed in advance, aligns his marginal incentive with the supply chain's, and the supplier does not need to observe eee. The supplier breaks even on the market. Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) show that in more general settings she breaks even or loses money, so any profit must come from fixed fees. The section therefore illustrates a general design principle: market-based transfer prices inside a firm, combined with linear output-based pay.

The derivations are short calculus on the page. Formalizing them pins down what the page leaves implicit: the range of efforts and allocations; the role of E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0 and of the integrability of the shock; the fact that each retailer's problem has a unique interior optimum only at a positive price; and how the realized output Q=0Q=0Q=0 enters the expectation E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]E[Qw(A,Q)]. To our knowledge none of these statements has been machine-checked before.

Difficulty

The deterministic part requires real-power calculus with a non-integer exponent (η−1)/η∈(0,1)(\eta-1)/\eta\in(0,1)(η−1)/η∈(0,1). Strict concavity of γ↦γ(η−1)/η\gamma\mapsto\gamma^{(\eta-1)/\eta}γ↦γ(η−1)/η has to be used on the closed interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], where the derivative blows up at the endpoints. The retailer's optimum has to be shown to be interior even though the profit at q=0q=0q=0 is defined.

The stochastic part requires pulling the effort out of the expectation, E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/ηE[\pi(A,Ye)]=Ke^{(\eta-1)/\eta}E[π(A,Ye)]=Ke(η−1)/η, pointwise in the shock, including at realizations with Y=0Y=0Y=0. The natural first idea, to differentiate under the expectation sign, is unnecessary but tempting. The obstacle it hides is that w(α,Ye)w(\alpha,Ye)w(α,Ye) is undefined where Y=0Y=0Y=0, so the identity (46) only holds once Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q)Qw(A,Q) is read as its limit 000 at Q=0Q=0Q=0. Uniqueness of the manager's optimum depends on strict convexity of ccc alone, since his payment is linear in eee.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CachonCoord.InternalMarket. The deterministic file Revenue defines π(γ,α,Q)\pi(\gamma,\alpha,Q)π(γ,α,Q), γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) (as the printed formula, not as an argmax), π(α,Q)\pi(\alpha,Q)π(α,Q), πi(qi,w)\pi_i(q_i,w)πi​(qi​,w) and w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) with real powers (Real.rpow). The file Model bundles a probability space with measurable A1,A2>0A_1,A_2>0A1​,A2​>0 and Y∈[0,1]Y\in[0,1]Y∈[0,1], the elasticity η>1\eta>1η>1, and the cost ccc. The cost is strictly convex and increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and has derivative c′c'c′ at every e>0e>0e>0. On top of these, Model defines Π\PiΠ, KKK, the payment (46) (by its printed left side, not as the ratio it is claimed to equal), expected output and market revenue, and the manager's utility (from the payment scheme, not by the printed formula). Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements and optima are IsMaxOn over [0,1][0,1][0,1] or [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The standing assumptions are those of the model paragraph on p. 92: risk neutrality and the distributional assumptions above. Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • E[Y]>0E[Y]>0E[Y]>0, because (46) divides by it.
  • Integrability of (A1η+A2η)1/ηY(η−1)/η(A_1^\eta+A_2^\eta)^{1/\eta}Y^{(\eta-1)/\eta}(A1η​+A2η​)1/ηY(η−1)/η.
  • A positive price in the retailer's first-order condition.
  • Differentiability of ccc only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).

The existence of an effort satisfying (45) is a hypothesis, as on the page. Clauses 1 of the goal are stated for fixed realizations, not as random variables.

A trivializing formalization would define γo(α)\gamma^o(\alpha)γo(α) as an argmax, or define the payment (46) as E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]E[Qw]/E[Q]; neither is done here. Outside γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] and Q>0Q>0Q>0, Lean's real power returns junk values, and every statement restricts to that range. The companion claim that w(α,Q)w(\alpha,Q)w(α,Q) is the unique market-clearing price is not posed.

The formalization needs no infrastructure beyond Mathlib's real powers, convexity and Bochner integral. The concavity and first-order-condition lemmas for x↦axr−bxx\mapsto ax^{r}-bxx↦axr−bx with 0<r<10<r<10<r<1 may be reused for other constant-elasticity models. Contributions are welcome at any milestone; each is independent of the others except through the closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, Ch. 6, §6.9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7 (formalized from the author's 3rd draft, January 2003).
  • P. Kouvelis and M. A. Lariviere, Decentralizing cross-functional decisions: Coordination through internal markets, Management Science 46(8), 2000, 1049–1058. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1049.12025
  • E. L. Porteus and S. Whang, On manufacturing/marketing incentives, Management Science 37(9), 1991, 1166–1181. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.9.1166
  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Capacity choice and allocation: strategic behavior and supply chain performance, Management Science 45(8), 1999, 1091–1108. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.8.1091
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Wait-and-Judge Scenario Optimization 1: For Convex Programs, Seeing s_N Support Constraints Gives P^N{V(x_N) > ε(s_N)} ≤ γ, the Value of the Variational Problem (10)Research Paper

Motivation

Many decision problems in control, finance and engineering must hold against an uncertain parameter δ\deltaδ whose distribution is unknown, while samples of δ\deltaδ (measurements, historical records, simulations) are available. The scenario approach replaces the uncertain constraint by the constraints of the NNN observed samples and solves the resulting convex program. The open question is then how robust its solution is: with what probability does a new, unseen δ\deltaδ violate it?

The classical answer, due to Calafiore and Campi (doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0499-y, 2005; doi:10.1109/TAC.2006.875041, 2006) and sharpened by Campi and Garatti (doi:10.1137/07069821X, 2008), is an a-priori bound: it depends only on NNN and the dimension ddd, and it is tight for the worst problems. It is conservative for the many problems whose solution is determined by far fewer than ddd samples. Campi and Garatti's wait-and-judge theorem (doi:10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9, Math. Program. 2018) replaces it by an a-posteriori certificate: after solving, count the samples that actually determine the solution and certify the solution at a level that depends on that count.

Timeline:

  • 2005–2006, Calafiore and Campi: a convex scenario program in Rd\mathbb R^dRd has at most ddd support constraints; first sample-size bounds.
  • 2008, Campi and Garatti: the exact bound PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ}≤∑i=0d−1(Ni)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon\}\le\sum_{i=0}^{d-1}\binom Ni\epsilon^i(1-\epsilon)^{N-i}PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ}≤∑i=0d−1​(iN​)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i, with equality for fully-supported problems.
  • 2018, Campi and Garatti: the wait-and-judge bound, Theorem 1 below, with the 2008 bound as a corollary.

Setting

The decision variable is x∈Rdx\in\mathbb R^dx∈Rd. A problem consists of a cost vector c∈Rdc\in\mathbb R^dc∈Rd, a convex domain X⊆Rd\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb R^dX⊆Rd, convex constraint sets Xδ⊆Rd\mathcal X_\delta\subseteq\mathbb R^dXδ​⊆Rd indexed by δ\deltaδ in a probability space (Δ,F,P)(\Delta,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Δ,F,P), and convex tie-break functions t1,…,tpt_1,\dots,t_pt1​,…,tp​. Given an i.i.d. sample δ(1),…,δ(N)\delta^{(1)},\dots,\delta^{(N)}δ(1),…,δ(N) with N>dN>dN>d, the scenario program is

min⁡x∈X cTxsubject tox∈⋂i=1NXδ(i).\min_{x\in\mathcal X}\ c^{\mathsf T}x\quad\text{subject to}\quad x\in\bigcap_{i=1}^N\mathcal X_{\delta^{(i)}}.x∈Xmin​ cTxsubject tox∈i=1⋂N​Xδ(i)​.

Ties are broken by minimising t1t_1t1​ among the minimisers, then t2t_2t2​, and so on; the resulting solution is xN∗x^*_NxN∗​.

  • The violation of a point is V(x)=P{δ∈Δ:x∉Xδ}V(x)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta: x\notin\mathcal X_\delta\}V(x)=P{δ∈Δ:x∈/Xδ​}.
  • A constraint is a support constraint if removing it changes the solution; sN∗s^*_NsN∗​ is their number.
  • Assumption 1: for every mmm and every sample of size mmm, the program with those mmm constraints has a unique tie-broken solution.
  • Assumption 2 (non-degeneracy): for every mmm, with probability one, keeping only the support constraints does not change the solution.

The variational problem (10) is: for a function ϵ:{0,…,d}→[0,1]\epsilon:\{0,\dots,d\}\to[0,1]ϵ:{0,…,d}→[0,1],

γ∗=inf⁡ξ∈Cd[0,1]ξ(1)s.t.1k!dkdtkξ(t)≥(Nk)tN−k 1[0,1−ϵ(k))(t),  t∈[0,1], k=0,…,d.\gamma^*=\inf_{\xi\in C^d[0,1]}\xi(1)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\frac1{k!}\frac{\mathrm d^k}{\mathrm dt^k}\xi(t)\ge\binom Nk t^{N-k}\,\mathbf 1_{[0,1-\epsilon(k))}(t),\ \ t\in[0,1],\ k=0,\dots,d.γ∗=ξ∈Cd[0,1]inf​ξ(1)s.t.k!1​dtkdk​ξ(t)≥(kN​)tN−k1[0,1−ϵ(k))​(t),  t∈[0,1], k=0,…,d.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 10)

For every [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k), under Assumptions 1 and 2,

PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(sN∗)} ≤ γ∗.\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(s^*_N)\}\ \le\ \gamma^*.PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(sN∗​)} ≤ γ∗.

The level ϵ\epsilonϵ is evaluated at the observed number of support constraints. The goal fixes no particular ϵ\epsilonϵ, which keeps it stable under any later choice of levels.

Milestones (the proof of Theorem 1, Sect. 5.1)

  1. sm∗≤ds^*_m\le dsm∗​≤d for every sample (quoted from [7]).
  2. (14): PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(k)∧sN∗=k}=(Nk) PN{A}\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(k)\wedge s^*_N=k\}=\binom Nk\,\mathbb P^N\{A\}PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(k)∧sN∗​=k}=(kN​)PN{A}, where AAA adds "the first kkk constraints are of support".
  3. A=BA=BA=B up to a null set, where BBB concerns the program on the first kkk samples.
  4. (16): PN{A}=∫(ϵ(k),1](1−v)N−k dFk(v)\mathbb P^N\{A\}=\int_{(\epsilon(k),1]}(1-v)^{N-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)PN{A}=∫(ϵ(k),1]​(1−v)N−kdFk​(v), with Fk(v)=Pk{V(xk∗)≤v∧sk∗=k}F_k(v)=\mathbb P^k\{V(x^*_k)\le v\wedge s^*_k=k\}Fk​(v)=Pk{V(xk∗​)≤v∧sk∗​=k}.
  5. (17): PN{V(xN∗)>ϵ(sN∗)}=∑k=0d(Nk)∫(ϵ(k),1](1−v)N−k dFk(v)\mathbb P^N\{V(x^*_N)>\epsilon(s^*_N)\}=\sum_{k=0}^d\binom Nk\int_{(\epsilon(k),1]}(1-v)^{N-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)PN{V(xN∗​)>ϵ(sN∗​)}=∑k=0d​(kN​)∫(ϵ(k),1]​(1−v)N−kdFk​(v).
  6. (18): ∑k=0min⁡{m,d}(mk)∫[0,1](1−v)m−k dFk(v)=1\sum_{k=0}^{\min\{m,d\}}\binom mk\int_{[0,1]}(1-v)^{m-k}\,\mathrm dF_k(v)=1∑k=0min{m,d}​(km​)∫[0,1]​(1−v)m−kdFk​(v)=1 for every mmm.
  7. Weak duality between the truncated moment problem (20) and its dual (21), giving (22).
  8. (23): 1k!dkdtktm=(mk)tm−k\frac1{k!}\frac{\mathrm d^k}{\mathrm dt^k}t^m=\binom mk t^{m-k}k!1​dtkdk​tm=(km​)tm−k for m≥km\ge km≥k, and 000 otherwise.
  9. (24): the infimum of p(1)p(1)p(1) over polynomials feasible for (10) equals γ∗\gamma^*γ∗.

Companions

  • Theorem 2 (p. 11): for β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1) and ϵ(k)=1−t(k)\epsilon(k)=1-t(k)ϵ(k)=1−t(k), with t(k)t(k)t(k) the unique root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) of βN+1∑m=kN(mk)tm−k−(Nk)tN−k=0\frac{\beta}{N+1}\sum_{m=k}^N\binom mk t^{m-k}-\binom Nk t^{N-k}=0N+1β​∑m=kN​(km​)tm−k−(kN​)tN−k=0, the probability is at most β\betaβ.
  • The root lemma of Sect. 5.3, including its sign and divergence claims.
  • γ∗≤∑i<d(Ni)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i\gamma^*\le\sum_{i<d}\binom Ni\epsilon^i(1-\epsilon)^{N-i}γ∗≤∑i<d​(iN​)ϵi(1−ϵ)N−i for constant ϵ\epsilonϵ (Sect. 5.2).
  • Corollary 1, the 2008 bound.

Significance

Theorem 1 turns the number of support constraints, which is observed after solving, into a confidence statement that holds uniformly over all convex problems and all distributions. With Theorem 2's choice of ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k), a user who finds k≪dk\ll dk≪d support constraints obtains a level ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k) comparable to that of a kkk-dimensional problem, which is far below the a-priori level for dimension ddd. The classical bound (2) is recovered as Corollary 1, so Theorem 1 contains the earlier theory.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known, it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization produces:

  • a formal account of scenario programs with lexicographic tie-break and of support constraints in the "changes the solution" sense;
  • the exchangeability argument (14) on product measures;
  • the representation (17) of a tail probability through generalized distribution functions;
  • a weak-duality argument for a generalized moment problem. The 2008 bound itself is posed on the platform as an open problem under other hypotheses; Corollary 1 states it under this paper's assumptions.

Difficulty

The obvious approach bounds the probability for each value of sN∗s^*_NsN∗​ separately by a binomial tail, then sums. This fails: the event sN∗=ks^*_N=ksN∗​=k is not known in advance, and summing the individual bounds over kkk loses the uniformity that makes the result useful. The paper instead characterises every convex problem by the (d+1)(d+1)(d+1)-tuple (F0,…,Fd)(F_0,\dots,F_d)(F0​,…,Fd​). It then maximises (17) over all tuples satisfying the infinitely many moment conditions (18), which is a generalized moment problem in d+1d+1d+1 measures, and solves it by duality.

Two steps carry most of the work. One is the almost-sure identity A=BA=BA=B, which depends on the precise interplay of Assumptions 1 and 2 with the tie-break. The other is passing from the polynomial dual problems to the variational problem (10), which needs a density argument in Cd[0,1]C^d[0,1]Cd[0,1]. The bound sN∗≤ds^*_N\le dsN∗​≤d itself is quoted from the earlier literature; it needs a Helly-type argument adapted to the lexicographic tie-break.

Formalization scope

  • Spaces. The decision space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with its Borel σ-algebra, and samples are Fin N → Δ, indexed from 000. P\mathbb PP is a probability measure and PN\mathbb P^NPN is the product measure.
  • Tie-break. The tie-broken solution is the lexicographic minimiser of (cTx,t1(x),…,tp(x))(c^{\mathsf T}x,t_1(x),\dots,t_p(x))(cTx,t1​(x),…,tp​(x)) and depends only on the feasible set, which is what makes the exchangeability step valid. A support constraint is one whose removal changes this solution; this is not the platform's earlier "removal lowers the cost" notion.
  • Assumptions. Assumption 1 is required for every sample, Assumption 2 almost surely.
  • Measurability. The paper takes measurability for granted (footnote 1). Here it is two explicit hypotheses: the relation {(x,δ):x∈Xδ}\{(x,\delta):x\in\mathcal X_\delta\}{(x,δ):x∈Xδ​} is measurable, and every solution map ω↦xm∗(ω)\omega\mapsto x^*_m(\omega)ω↦xm∗​(ω) is measurable. No event is assumed measurable directly.
  • FkF_kFk​. FkF_kFk​ is the finite measure on R\mathbb RR given by the law of V(xk∗)V(x^*_k)V(xk∗​) on the event {sk∗=k}\{s^*_k=k\}{sk∗​=k}; it is not normalised.
  • Problem (10). Cd[0,1]C^d[0,1]Cd[0,1] is ContDiffOn ℝ d on [0,1][0,1][0,1], with derivatives taken within [0,1][0,1][0,1]. γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ is a real infimum over a set that is nonempty (ξ(t)=tN\xi(t)=t^Nξ(t)=tN) and bounded below by 000.
  • Probabilities are compared with real quantities through ENNReal.ofReal.
  • Theorem 2 is stated for every ϵ\epsilonϵ whose values 1−ϵ(k)1-\epsilon(k)1−ϵ(k) are roots of (11) in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), which by its first part is the paper's ϵ\epsilonϵ.
  • Added hypothesis. The constant-ϵ\epsilonϵ companion assumes d≥1d\ge1d≥1: at d=0d=0d=0, ϵ=0\epsilon=0ϵ=0 its inequality is false.

Ruled-out trivializations:

  • The solution is never a free function of the sample.
  • The goal does not mention FkF_kFk​, moments or polynomials.
  • Assumption 1 is not weakened to almost surely.
  • N>dN>dN>d is kept on Theorems 1, 2 and Corollary 1.
  • The indicators keep the paper's open and closed ends: [0,1−ϵ(k))[0,1-\epsilon(k))[0,1−ϵ(k)) in (10), (ϵ(k),1](\epsilon(k),1](ϵ(k),1] in (16)–(21).

Contributions welcome:

  • the support-constraint bound under lexicographic tie-break, which is reusable for any convex scenario result;
  • the exchangeability lemma on Measure.pi;
  • the duality and density lemmas, which are pure analysis.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming 167 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, Uncertain convex programs: randomized solutions and confidence levels, Mathematical Programming 102 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-003-0499-y
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 51 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization 19 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
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Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts VIII: In the Two-Location Base-Stock Model the Linear Transfers (39)–(41) Make the Optimal Base Stocks the Unique Nash EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

In a supply chain with stock at two locations, a supplier holds inventory that replenishes a retailer, and the retailer serves customers. Each firm sets its own inventory level to minimize its own cost. The retailer bears only part of the cost of customer backorders, and the supplier bears none of the retailer's holding cost, so their incentives differ. The resulting equilibrium generally differs from the policy that minimizes total cost. Cachon and Zipkin (Management Science 45(7), 1999) studied this game and proposed linear transfer payments that align the firms' incentives. In the chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, vol. 11, 2003, doi:10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7), Cachon re-derives that analysis, adds a parameter λ\lambdaλ that divides the retail-level costs between the firms, and answers two questions the original paper left open: whether the contracts allow an arbitrary division of cost, and whether the optimal policy is the unique equilibrium under the contracts. This mission formalizes the second answer, together with the analysis of the decentralized game and of the optimal policy that it rests on (§6.8 of the 2003 chapter, read in the author's January 2003 draft).

Setting

Two firms, a retailer rrr and a supplier sss, each use a base stock policy: firm iii keeps its inventory position equal to its base stock level si∈Rs_i \in \mathbb Rsi​∈R. A negative supplier base stock means planned backorders. Let DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​ be the demands during the retailer's and the supplier's lead times. They are nonnegative with finite means μr\mu_rμr​, μs\mu_sμs​, and their distribution functions FrF_rFr​, FsF_sFs​ are continuous, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Holding costs are hrh_rhr​ and hsh_shs​, with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​. Each backorder at the retailer costs the retailer βr>0\beta_r > 0βr​>0 and the supplier βs>0\beta_s > 0βs​>0 per unit time. Write β=βr+βs\beta = \beta_r + \beta_sβ=βr​+βs​.

At retailer inventory level yyy the expected on-hand stock is Ir(y)=E[(y−Dr)+]I_r(y) = E[(y-D_r)^+]Ir​(y)=E[(y−Dr​)+] and the expected backorders are Br(y)=E[(Dr−y)+]B_r(y) = E[(D_r-y)^+]Br​(y)=E[(Dr​−y)+]. The retail-level cost rates are cr(y)=hrIr(y)+βrBr(y)c_r(y) = h_rI_r(y) + \beta_rB_r(y)cr​(y)=hr​Ir​(y)+βr​Br​(y), cs(y)=βsBr(y)c_s(y) = \beta_sB_r(y)cs​(y)=βs​Br​(y) and c(y)=cr(y)+cs(y)c(y) = c_r(y) + c_s(y)c(y)=cr​(y)+cs​(y). Because the supplier may stock out, the retailer's actual inventory level is sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, and every retail-level quantity is averaged accordingly:

g(sr,ss)=E[g(sr−(Ds−ss)+)]=Fs(ss)g(sr)+∫ss∞g(sr+ss−x)fs(x) dx.g(s_r,s_s) = E\big[g(s_r - (D_s-s_s)^+)\big] = F_s(s_s)g(s_r) + \int_{s_s}^\infty g(s_r+s_s-x)f_s(x)\,dx .g(sr​,ss​)=E[g(sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+)]=Fs​(ss​)g(sr​)+∫ss​∞​g(sr​+ss​−x)fs​(x)dx.

With the supplier's inventory Is(y)=E[(y−Ds)+]I_s(y) = E[(y-D_s)^+]Is​(y)=E[(y−Ds​)+] and backorders Bs(y)=μs−y+Is(y)B_s(y) = \mu_s - y + I_s(y)Bs​(y)=μs​−y+Is​(y), the firms' costs and the chain's cost are

πr(sr,ss)=cr(sr,ss),πs(sr,ss)=hsIs(ss)+cs(sr,ss),Π=πr+πs.\pi_r(s_r,s_s) = c_r(s_r,s_s), \qquad \pi_s(s_r,s_s) = h_sI_s(s_s) + c_s(s_r,s_s), \qquad \Pi = \pi_r + \pi_s .πr​(sr​,ss​)=cr​(sr​,ss​),πs​(sr​,ss​)=hs​Is​(ss​)+cs​(sr​,ss​),Π=πr​+πs​.

A pair {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} minimizing Π\PiΠ is an optimal policy. A Nash equilibrium is a pair from which neither firm can lower its own cost by a unilateral change of its base stock.

Under a linear transfer the supplier pays the retailer tIIr(sr,ss)+tBrBr(sr,ss)+tBsBs(ss)t_II_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^rB_r(s_r,s_s) + t_B^sB_s(s_s)tI​Ir​(sr​,ss​)+tBr​Br​(sr​,ss​)+tBs​Bs​(ss​) (a negative amount is a payment the other way). The Cachon–Zipkin contracts with parameter λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1] are

tI=(1−λ)hr,tBr=βr−λβ,tBs=λhsFs(sso)1−Fs(sso).t_I = (1-\lambda)h_r, \qquad t_B^r = \beta_r - \lambda\beta, \qquad t_B^s = \lambda h_s\frac{F_s(s_s^o)}{1-F_s(s_s^o)} .tI​=(1−λ)hr​,tBr​=βr​−λβ,tBs​=λhs​1−Fs​(sso​)Fs​(sso​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the contracts coordinate, uniquely

If {sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is optimal with sso>0s_s^o > 0sso​>0 and λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1], then under the contracts

πr=λc(sr,ss)−tBsBs(ss),πs=(hs+tBs)Is(ss)+(1−λ)c(sr,ss)+tBs(μs−ss),\pi_r = \lambda c(s_r,s_s) - t_B^sB_s(s_s), \qquad \pi_s = (h_s+t_B^s)I_s(s_s) + (1-\lambda)c(s_r,s_s) + t_B^s(\mu_s - s_s),πr​=λc(sr​,ss​)−tBs​Bs​(ss​),πs​=(hs​+tBs​)Is​(ss​)+(1−λ)c(sr​,ss​)+tBs​(μs​−ss​),

{sro,sso}\{s_r^o, s_s^o\}{sro​,sso​} is a Nash equilibrium, and it is the only one. The goal contains no numerical constants. It holds for every demand distribution in the class and every λ\lambdaλ in the range.

Milestones

  1. In the uncontracted game, every retailer best response exceeds s^r>0\hat s_r > 0s^r​>0, where Fr(s^r)=βr/(hr+βr)F_r(\hat s_r) = \beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)Fr​(s^r​)=βr​/(hr​+βr​), and every supplier best response is positive (pp. 79–80).
  2. In the uncontracted game, for every sss_sss​ the retailer's optimal base stock is below the chain's; consequently the competition penalty (Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so)(\Pi(s^*) - \Pi(s^o))/\Pi(s^o)(Π(s∗)−Π(so))/Π(so) is positive at every equilibrium s∗s^*s∗ (pp. 80–81).
  3. The partial derivatives (35)–(36) of Π\PiΠ, and every optimum with ss>0s_s > 0ss​>0 satisfies c′(sr)=hsc'(s_r) = h_sc′(sr​)=hs​, i.e. Fr(sr)=(hs+β)/(hr+β)F_r(s_r) = (h_s+\beta)/(h_r+\beta)Fr​(sr​)=(hs​+β)/(hr​+β) (37) (p. 83).
  4. Optima with ss≤0s_s \le 0ss​≤0 have sr+ss=sˉs_r + s_s = \bar ssr​+ss​=sˉ, where Pr⁡(Dr+Ds≤sˉ)=β/(hr+β)\Pr(D_r + D_s \le \bar s) = \beta/(h_r+\beta)Pr(Dr​+Ds​≤sˉ)=β/(hr​+β) (38) (p. 83).
  5. The cost identities (42)–(43) under the contracts (p. 84).
  6. Under the contracts the retailer's best response decreases in sss_sss​, and the supplier's marginal cost along it has the closed form printed on p. 84.

Significance

The goal says that a contract built from quantities both firms can measure, namely the retailer's inventory and backorders and the supplier's backorders, makes the system-optimal policy the only equilibrium. The firms therefore reach the optimum without coordinating on an equilibrium. The parameter λ\lambdaλ splits the retail-level costs between the firms in any proportion up to λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1. Milestone 2 shows the contract is needed: without transfers, decentralization is always strictly suboptimal when the supplier is charged for retail backorders. The transfers tIt_ItI​ and tBrt_B^rtBr​ are those of the single-location model (§6.7), even though the retailer's target fractile changes from β/(β+hr)\beta/(\beta+h_r)β/(β+hr​) to (β+hs)/(β+hr)(\beta+h_s)/(\beta+h_r)(β+hs​)/(β+hr​).

The results are proved in the source and in Cachon and Zipkin (1999), with informal derivative arguments. No machine-checked version is known. Formalizing them requires differentiating expectations of piecewise-linear convex functions of a random lead-time shortfall. The page's argument also assumes densities, which the formal statements avoid, and contains several printing slips (see below). These would be settled by a complete development.

Difficulty

The firms' costs are compositions: a convex single-location cost evaluated at the random level sr−(Ds−ss)+s_r - (D_s - s_s)^+sr​−(Ds​−ss​)+, which is concave in sss_sss​. The supplier's cost is therefore not obviously convex in sss_sss​; its convexity at sr=sros_r = s_r^osr​=sro​ depends on the value of tBst_B^stBs​ and on c′(sro)=hsc'(s_r^o) = h_sc′(sro​)=hs​. Uniqueness is the hard part. Under the contracts the retailer's best response sr(ss)s_r(s_s)sr​(ss​) decreases, but the supplier's marginal cost along that best response, Fs(ss)(hs−(1−λ)c′(sr(ss))+tBs)−tBsF_s(s_s)(h_s - (1-\lambda)c'(s_r(s_s)) + t_B^s) - t_B^sFs​(ss​)(hs​−(1−λ)c′(sr​(ss​))+tBs​)−tBs​, is not monotone in general when λ\lambdaλ is small, contrary to a literal reading of p. 84. A uniqueness argument has to show that it has at most one zero, not that it increases.

Formalization scope

Demand laws are probability measures on R\mathbb RR with no mass below 000, finite means, and continuous distribution functions, zero at 000, strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). These are the section's standing assumptions, together with 0<hs<hr0 < h_s < h_r0<hs​<hr​ and βr,βs>0\beta_r, \beta_s > 0βr​,βs​>0 (footnote 34 excludes the zero cases). Expectations are Lebesgue integrals: IrI_rIr​, BrB_rBr​, IsI_sIs​ and the two-location averages are defined by expectation, and the page's integral forms are consequences. Integrals against fs(x) dxf_s(x)\,dxfs​(x)dx are written against the law of DsD_sDs​, so no density hypothesis is made. Base stocks range over all of R\mathbb RR, and "optimal" means minimizing Π\PiΠ over R2\mathbb R^2R2; the existence of an optimum is a hypothesis, as on p. 77. Derivatives are stated with HasDerivAt. Independence of DrD_rDr​ and DsD_sDs​, implicit on the page, enters only through the convolution of their laws in (38).

The contracted costs are defined from the firms' original costs and the transfer payment. Defining them by the closed forms (42)–(43) would make the identities trivial and is ruled out.

Corrected slips: (42) is stated with λc(sr,ss)\lambda c(s_r,s_s)λc(sr​,ss​) where the page prints λΠ(sr,ss)\lambda\Pi(s_r,s_s)λΠ(sr​,ss​) (the difference λhsIs(ss)\lambda h_sI_s(s_s)λhs​Is​(ss​) does not depend on srs_rsr​). The retailer's single-location fractile on p. 79 is stated as βr/(hr+βr)\beta_r/(h_r+\beta_r)βr​/(hr​+βr​), not the printed β/(hr+β)\beta/(h_r+\beta)β/(hr​+β). The garbled display after (43) and the fsf_sfs​/FsF_sFs​ slip in the best-response derivative are not reproduced. Not included: the contraction condition (34), the case split for the optimal policy (p. 84), the case sso≤0s_s^o \le 0sso​≤0, and the alternative schemes of §6.8.5 (Lee–Whang, Chen). Contributions of those, or of a reusable library for derivatives of E[g(s−(D−t)+)]E[g(s - (D-t)^+)]E[g(s−(D−t)+)], are welcome. The platform's Clark–Scarf items (InventoryControl_clarkScarf, ClarkScarf.Serial.*) concern periodic-review echelon policies and are not reused.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves and T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 11, North-Holland, 2003, §6.8. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • G. P. Cachon and P. H. Zipkin, Competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two-stage supply chain, Management Science 45(7), 936–953, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.7.936
  • F. Chen and Y.-S. Zheng, Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 40(11), 1426–1443, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational issues in an infinite-horizon, multiechelon inventory model, Operations Research 32(4), 818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
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Discrete GeometryLinear OptimizationNumber Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables 1: If B(p,r) ⊂ τK ⊂ B(p,R) with R/r ≤ c₁ and τK Misses the Lattice, Fewer Than 1 + c₁c₂√n Lattice Hyperplanes H + kbₙ Meet B(p,R)Research Paper

Motivation

The integer linear programming feasibility problem asks, for an integer m×nm\times nm×n matrix AAA and b∈Zmb\in\mathbb Z^mb∈Zm, whether some x∈Znx\in\mathbb Z^nx∈Zn satisfies Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b. It is NP-complete, so no algorithm polynomial in the length of the data is expected. H. W. Lenstra, Jr. (Math. Oper. Res. 8 (1983) 538–548) showed that the picture changes when the number of variables nnn is fixed: the problem is then solvable in polynomial time. The proof is a short argument from the geometry of numbers, and it became the starting point of lattice methods in integer programming, including Kannan's improved algorithm and the later flatness-based branching schemes.

Lenstra's introduction (p. 538) describes the idea as transforming the problem into an equivalent one in which "either the existence of a vector x∈Znx \in \mathbb Z^nx∈Zn satisfying Ax≤bAx \le bAx≤b is obvious; or it is known that the last coordinate of any such xxx belongs to an interval whose length is bounded by a constant only depending on nnn." This mission formalizes the geometric statement behind that dichotomy, §1 of the paper.

Timeline. For n=2n = 2n=2, Hirschberg and Wong and Kannan gave polynomial algorithms in special cases, and Scarf treated the case n=2n=2n=2 completely; the case of general fixed nnn was conjectured by Hirschberg–Wong and Scarf (as recounted on p. 538). Lenstra's paper (received 1981, published 1983) settled the conjecture. Its lattice reduction step uses the algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász (1982). Kannan (1987) later reduced the dependence on nnn to nO(n)n^{O(n)}nO(n).

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean length ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣, and write B(p,z)={x∈Rn:∣x−p∣≤z}B(p,z)=\{x\in\mathbb R^n : |x-p|\le z\}B(p,z)={x∈Rn:∣x−p∣≤z} for the closed ball with centre ppp and radius z>0z>0z>0.

A lattice is L=∑i=1nZbiL=\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb Z b_iL=∑i=1n​Zbi​ for a basis b1,…,bnb_1,\dots,b_nb1​,…,bn​ of Rn\mathbb R^nRn. Its determinant d(L)=∣det⁡(b1,…,bn)∣d(L)=|\det(b_1,\dots,b_n)|d(L)=∣det(b1​,…,bn​)∣ (the bib_ibi​ as columns) is the volume of the parallelepiped ∑i[0,1) bi\sum_i[0,1)\,b_i∑i​[0,1)bi​ and does not depend on the basis. Hadamard's inequality (6) says d(L)≤∏i∣bi∣d(L)\le\prod_i|b_i|d(L)≤∏i​∣bi​∣. A basis is reduced in Lenstra's sense if, for a constant c2c_2c2​ depending only on nnn,

∏i=1n∣bi∣≤c2⋅d(L).(7)\prod_{i=1}^n |b_i| \le c_2\cdot d(L). \tag{7}i=1∏n​∣bi​∣≤c2​⋅d(L).(7)

Singling out bnb_nbn​, let H=∑i=1n−1RbiH=\sum_{i=1}^{n-1}\mathbb R b_iH=∑i=1n−1​Rbi​ be the hyperplane spanned by the other vectors, L′=∑i=1n−1ZbiL'=\sum_{i=1}^{n-1}\mathbb Z b_iL′=∑i=1n−1​Zbi​ the lattice inside it, and hhh the distance of bnb_nbn​ to HHH. Then L⊂⋃k∈Z(H+kbn)L\subset\bigcup_{k\in\mathbb Z}(H+kb_n)L⊂⋃k∈Z​(H+kbn​): the lattice lies on a family of parallel hyperplanes H+kbnH + kb_nH+kbn​ at successive distance hhh.

In the paper, K={x:Ax≤b}K=\{x : Ax\le b\}K={x:Ax≤b} is bounded with positive volume, and a linear map τ\tauτ makes it "round":

B(p,r)⊂τK⊂B(p,R)(3),R/r≤c1(4),B(p,r)\subset\tau K\subset B(p,R)\quad(3),\qquad R/r\le c_1\quad(4),B(p,r)⊂τK⊂B(p,R)(3),R/r≤c1​(4),

with c1c_1c1​ depending only on nnn. Then K∩Zn=∅K\cap\mathbb Z^n=\emptysetK∩Zn=∅ if and only if τK∩L=∅\tau K\cap L=\emptysetτK∩L=∅ for L=τZnL=\tau\mathbb Z^nL=τZn, a lattice with basis bi=τ(ei)b_i=\tau(e_i)bi​=τ(ei​).

Formalization targets

Goal (§1, p. 541)

Let b1,…,bnb_1,\dots,b_nb1​,…,bn​ be a basis with (7), numbered so that ∣bn∣=max⁡i∣bi∣|b_n|=\max_i|b_i|∣bn​∣=maxi​∣bi​∣, and let τK\tau KτK satisfy (3) and (4). Then

τK∩L≠∅ort−1<c1c2n,\tau K\cap L\neq\emptyset\quad\text{or}\quad t-1<c_1c_2\sqrt n,τK∩L=∅ort−1<c1​c2​n​,

where ttt is the number of hyperplanes H+kbnH+kb_nH+kbn​, k∈Zk\in\mathbb Zk∈Z, that meet B(p,R)B(p,R)B(p,R) (finiteness included).

Milestones, in the order the paper uses them

  1. LEMMA (8), p. 540: every xxx has y∈Ly\in Ly∈L with ∣x−y∣2≤14(∣b1∣2+⋯+∣bn∣2)|x-y|^2\le\frac14(|b_1|^2+\cdots+|b_n|^2)∣x−y∣2≤41​(∣b1​∣2+⋯+∣bn​∣2).
  2. (10), p. 540: if ∣bn∣|b_n|∣bn​∣ is maximal, ∣x−y∣≤12n ∣bn∣|x-y|\le\frac12\sqrt n\,|b_n|∣x−y∣≤21​n​∣bn​∣.
  3. (11), p. 540: d(L)=h⋅d(L′)d(L)=h\cdot d(L')d(L)=h⋅d(L′).
  4. (12), pp. 540–541: under (7), c2−1∣bn∣≤h≤∣bn∣c_2^{-1}|b_n|\le h\le|b_n|c2−1​∣bn​∣≤h≤∣bn​∣.
  5. p. 541: if B(p,r)⊂τKB(p,r)\subset\tau KB(p,r)⊂τK and τK∩L=∅\tau K\cap L=\emptysetτK∩L=∅, then r<12n ∣bn∣r<\frac12\sqrt n\,|b_n|r<21​n​∣bn​∣.
  6. p. 541: if precisely ttt hyperplanes H+kbnH+kb_nH+kbn​ meet B(p,R)B(p,R)B(p,R), then t−1≤2R/ht-1\le 2R/ht−1≤2R/h.

The goal leaves c1c_1c1​ and c2c_2c2​ free, so it remains valid for any reduction algorithm and any rounding procedure; the companion mission (Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables 2) supplies c1=2n3/2c_1 = 2n^{3/2}c1​=2n3/2, and the LLL algorithm supplies c2=2n(n−1)/4c_2=2^{n(n-1)/4}c2​=2n(n−1)/4.

Significance

The result. The goal is the branching step of Lenstra's algorithm. It says that a lattice-point-free convex body that is well rounded is "flat" in the lattice direction dual to HHH: only boundedly many lattice hyperplanes meet it. The search for a lattice point in dimension nnn therefore reduces to fewer than 1+c1c2n1+c_1c_2\sqrt n1+c1​c2​n​ searches in dimension n−1n-1n−1, which with nnn fixed gives polynomial running time. Sharper forms of the same dichotomy, such as Kannan's bounds, are the basis of later lattice-based integer programming algorithms.

Formalizing it. The results are classical and proved on paper; to our knowledge none of the statements of §1 is machine-checked. Hadamard's inequality (6) is in Mathlib (Orientation.abs_volumeForm_apply_le). The published platform theorem KannanLattice.Core.exists_lattice_point_near_projection (Kannan 1987, Proposition 4.2) proves a stronger form of (8) and (10), with Gram–Schmidt lengths in place of ∣bi∣|b_i|∣bi​∣; for L=ZnL=\mathbb Z^nL=Zn, (10) is the published QFS.exists_lattice_mem_closedBall. What remains is the "base times height" identity (11) relating a full-rank determinant to the distance of a vector from a hyperplane, the spacing bound (12), the count of hyperplanes meeting a ball, and their assembly. This is one of the two geometric ingredients of Lenstra's polynomial algorithm; the algorithm itself and its running time are not formalized.

Difficulty

The argument is short on paper, and each step is "clear" there. The work lies in connecting three descriptions of the same geometry that Mathlib keeps apart: the determinant of a coordinate matrix (d(L)d(L)d(L)), the metric distance of a point to a subspace (hhh), and the (n−1)(n-1)(n−1)-dimensional volume of L′L'L′. Identity (11) needs exactly this bridge, and (12) needs Hadamard's inequality for the lower-dimensional lattice L′L'L′ inside a hyperplane of Rn\mathbb R^nRn, not for a full-rank matrix. Bounding the number of hyperplanes meeting a ball needs the normal direction of HHH and the fact that the hyperplanes are hhh apart along it. A tempting shortcut is to define hhh as the length of the last Gram–Schmidt vector and d(L)d(L)d(L) as the product of Gram–Schmidt lengths: that turns (11) into a tautology and is ruled out below.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so norms are Euclidean and balls round; B(p,z)B(p,z)B(p,z) is Metric.closedBall p z with z>0z>0z>0 as a hypothesis where the paper writes a ball.
  • Where bnb_nbn​ is singled out, n=k+1n=k+1n=k+1, the basis is b : Fin (k+1) → ℝⁿ, bnb_nbn​ = b (Fin.last k) and b1,…,bn−1b_1,\dots,b_{n-1}b1​,…,bn−1​ = b ∘ Fin.castSucc. "Basis for LLL" is linear independence of the nnn vectors over R\mathbb RR, and LLL is the published KannanLattice.Core.lattice b, the Z\mathbb ZZ-span.
  • d(L)d(L)d(L) is the paper's definition, ∣det⁡∣|\det|∣det∣ of the column matrix (latDet). hhh is Metric.infDist from bnb_nbn​ to the span HHH. d(L′)d(L')d(L′), for which the paper writes no formula, is the published KannanLattice.Core.latticeDet (the product of Gram–Schmidt lengths of b1,…,bn−1b_1,\dots,b_{n-1}b1​,…,bn−1​, the (n−1)(n-1)(n−1)-volume of their parallelepiped).
  • The hyperplanes H+kbnH+kb_nH+kbn​ meeting B(p,R)B(p,R)B(p,R) are indexed by the set of integers hitIndices b p R; ttt is its cardinality, its finiteness is part of every conclusion (the cardinality of an infinite set is 000 in Lean), and t−1t-1t−1 is computed in R\mathbb RR.
  • The constants "only depending on nnn", c1c_1c1​ and c2c_2c2​, are arbitrary real numbers. The reducedness (7) is a hypothesis, and so is the maximality ∣bi∣≤∣bn∣|b_i|\le|b_n|∣bi​∣≤∣bn​∣, which enters (10), the radius bound and the goal only.
  • τK\tau KτK is an arbitrary set X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn satisfying (3); §1 never uses that KKK is a polyhedron or the map τ\tauτ, and every lattice is τZn\tau\mathbb Z^nτZn for τ(ei)=bi\tau(e_i)=b_iτ(ei​)=bi​. The paper's "for some p∈τKp\in\tau Kp∈τK" follows from (3).
  • The identity (11) is stated without (7), which the paper assumes in the surrounding sentence but does not use.
  • Ruled out: defining d(L)d(L)d(L) or hhh through Gram–Schmidt lengths (which makes (11) bookkeeping), dropping finiteness of the hyperplane count, and replacing the dichotomy "some lattice point lies in τK\tau KτK" by a statement about one computed lattice point.

Welcome contributions: the bridge between Matrix.det of a basis and products of Gram–Schmidt lengths (reusable for any lattice development), Hadamard's inequality for a family of fewer than nnn vectors, and the count of lattice hyperplanes meeting a ball.

Selected references

  • H. W. Lenstra, Jr., Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(4) (1983) 538–548. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.538
  • A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, Jr., L. Lovász, Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients, Mathematische Annalen 261 (1982) 515–534. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01457454
  • R. Kannan, Minkowski's convex body theorem and integer programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3) (1987) 415–440. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.415
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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts V: With Market-Clearing Prices the Best Wholesale Price Earns θ/(2(1 + θ)) or θ/8, Below the (1 + θ)/8 a Full-Refund Buy-Back AttainsTextbook

Motivation

A supplier that sells through many competing retailers usually worries that competition among them pushes orders too high, because each retailer ignores the demand it takes from the others. Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997) identified the opposite failure. When the retail price is set by the market after demand is realized, retailers who hold too much stock in a weak market bid the price down, and anticipating this, perfectly competitive retailers order too little. The supplier then needs a contract that raises orders, and the classical justification for resale price maintenance (a price floor imposed on retailers) comes out of this model. G. P. Cachon's survey chapter Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (Handbooks in OR & MS, Vol. 11, 2003) presents the model in §6.5.2 as a closed-form example. In it the supplier's best wholesale price contract is computed explicitly and compared with two contracts that recover the monopoly profit: resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back.

This mission is volume V of a series that formalizes the section capstones of that chapter, read in the author's 3rd draft (January 2003), pp. 53–58.

Setting

Fix θ>1\theta>1θ>1. Industry demand is low or high, each with probability 1/21/21/2. If the retailers hold a total stock qqq, the market clearing price is

pl(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph(q)=(1−qθ)+ (high state).p_l(q)=(1-q)^+\ \text{(low state)},\qquad p_h(q)=\Big(1-\frac q\theta\Big)^+\ \text{(high state)}.pl​(q)=(1−q)+ (low state),ph​(q)=(1−θq​)+ (high state).

Leftover inventory has no salvage value, and the supplier's production cost is zero.

  • Monopolist benchmark. A single firm orders a stock QQQ, observes the state, and sells xl≤Qx_l\le Qxl​≤Q (low) or xh≤Qx_h\le Qxh​≤Q (high) at the market clearing price. Its expected profit is 12pl(xl)xl+12ph(xh)xh\tfrac12p_l(x_l)x_l+\tfrac12p_h(x_h)x_h21​pl​(xl​)xl​+21​ph​(xh​)xh​, and Πo\Pi^oΠo is the maximum of this.
  • Wholesale price contract. The supplier charges www per unit. A continuum of retailers orders before demand is known and sells everything at the market clearing price. Their aggregate expected profit is
π(q)=12pl(q)q+12ph(q)q−wq.\pi(q)=\tfrac12p_l(q)q+\tfrac12p_h(q)q-wq .π(q)=21​pl​(q)q+21​ph​(q)q−wq.

Perfect competition means the retailers keep ordering until expected profit is zero. The competitive order is the q>0q>0q>0 with π(q)=0\pi(q)=0π(q)=0 and π>0\pi>0π>0 on (0,q)(0,q)(0,q). The supplier earns wqwqwq.

  • Resale price maintenance (pˉ,w)(\bar p,w)(pˉ​,w): retailers may not sell below pˉ\bar ppˉ​. When the clearing price would fall below pˉ\bar ppˉ​, only the demand at pˉ\bar ppˉ​ is sold, allocated in proportion to stock.
  • Buy-back (w,b)(w,b)(w,b): the supplier pays bbb per unsold unit. The market price then cannot fall below bbb, and retailers sell at most 1−b1-b1−b units (low) and θ(1−b)\theta(1-b)θ(1−b) units (high).

The page's notation q1(w)=2θ1+θ(1−w)q_1(w)=\frac{2\theta}{1+\theta}(1-w)q1​(w)=1+θ2θ​(1−w), q2(w)=θ(1−2w)q_2(w)=\theta(1-2w)q2​(w)=θ(1−2w), πs(w)\pi_s(w)πs​(w) and w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is kept in Lean under the names q1, q2, supplierProfit, wStar.

Formalization targets

Goal (pp. 55, 57)

With

πs∗={θ2(1+θ)θ≤3,θ8θ>3,\pi_s^*=\begin{cases}\dfrac{\theta}{2(1+\theta)}&\theta\le3,\\[4pt]\dfrac\theta8&\theta>3,\end{cases}πs∗​=⎩⎨⎧​2(1+θ)θ​8θ​​θ≤3,θ>3,​

the goal states four things:

  1. πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ is the greatest supplier profit wqwqwq over all wholesale prices and their competitive orders.
  2. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) attains it.
  3. The monopolist's maximum is Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8, and πs∗<Πo\pi_s^*<\Pi^oπs∗​<Πo.
  4. Under the buy-back b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2 the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns exactly Πo\Pi^oΠo.

Milestones

  1. Πo=(1+θ)/8\Pi^o=(1+\theta)/8Πo=(1+θ)/8 (p. 54).
  2. The competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w) if w≥12−12θw\ge\tfrac12-\tfrac1{2\theta}w≥21​−2θ1​ and q2(w)q_2(w)q2​(w) otherwise, for 0≤w<10\le w<10≤w<1 (p. 55).
  3. w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), with the value πs∗\pi_s^*πs∗​ (p. 55).
  4. The orders and market clearing prices at w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) (p. 55).
  5. Under resale price maintenance with pˉ=1/2\bar p=1/2pˉ​=1/2 and total stock θ/2\theta/2θ/2, πr(t)=q(t)(1+θ4θ−w)\pi_r(t)=q(t)\big(\frac{1+\theta}{4\theta}-w\big)πr​(t)=q(t)(4θ1+θ​−w) (p. 56).
  6. Under (pˉ,wˉ)(\bar p,\bar w)(pˉ​,wˉ) the competitive order is θ/2\theta/2θ/2 and the supplier earns Πo\Pi^oΠo (p. 57).
  7. Under the buy-back b=1/2b=1/2b=1/2 the retailers' profit is q(34−w−q2θ)q\big(\frac34-w-\frac q{2\theta}\big)q(43​−w−2θq​) for 1/2<q<θ/21/2<q<\theta/21/2<q<θ/2 (p. 57).
  8. 1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ)1/2>(1+\theta)/(4\theta)1/2>(1+θ)/(4θ) (p. 57).

Significance

The goal shows that in this model a wholesale price contract always falls short of the integrated profit, whatever θ\thetaθ. It also shows where the shortfall comes from: at the optimal wholesale price the low-state market price falls below the monopoly price 1/21/21/2 (milestone 4). Restoring the monopoly profit therefore requires a mechanism that holds the low-state price at 1/21/21/2. Resale price maintenance and a full-refund buy-back both do this, so the section gives a closed-form efficiency argument for vertical restraints that are often treated as anticompetitive. The section also contrasts the buy-back with revenue sharing, which coordinates the single newsvendor (§6.2) but not this model.

The results are proved on the printed pages by elementary algebra. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and nothing on Prove2Me covers this model. The mission produces checked versions of the case analysis, including the θ=3\theta=3θ=3 tie and the two regimes of the competitive order. It also adds a reusable encoding of "perfect competition" as the first zero of aggregate expected profit.

Difficulty

Every statement reduces to one-variable inequalities, but the case structure is easy to get wrong.

  • The retailers' profit is piecewise (prices hit zero at q=1q=1q=1 in the low state and at q=θq=\thetaq=θ in the high state). The competitive order lies on either side of q=1q=1q=1 depending on www.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is piecewise in www, and its second branch peaks at w=1/4w=1/4w=1/4 only when θ>2\theta>2θ>2.
  • The global optimum switches at θ=3\theta=3θ=3, where both prices are optimal.
  • A statement "the competitive order is q1(w)q_1(w)q1​(w)" needs the order to exist, to be unique, and to have positive profit everywhere below it. Exhibiting a root is not enough.
  • The buy-back profit is identically zero for q≥θ/2q\ge\theta/2q≥θ/2 when b=w=1/2b=w=1/2b=w=1/2. Only the "first zero" reading of perfect competition pins the order at θ/2\theta/2θ/2.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers and θ>1\theta>1θ>1 throughout. The continuum of retailers enters only through the total order. No measure space of retailers is formalized, and footnote 26's multiplicity of individual equilibria is not stated. The sales rules under resale price maintenance (proportional allocation) and under the buy-back (price floor bbb) are written into the contract definitions, as the page describes them in words. The theorems use only pˉ=b=1/2\bar p=b=1/2pˉ​=b=1/2.

The formulas q1q_1q1​, q2q_2q2​, πs\pi_sπs​ and w∗w^*w∗ are definitions transcribed from the page. That they are the competitive order and the optimum is the content of the theorems. Defining Πo\Pi^oΠo or the competitive order by its closed form would trivialize the mission, so the competitive order is defined only by the zero-profit property and Πo\Pi^oΠo as a greatest element of the monopolist's feasible profits. The goal is stated over all real wholesale prices, so it also rules out profitable prices outside [0,1)[0,1)[0,1). Uniqueness of w∗(θ)w^*(\theta)w∗(θ) is not asserted at θ=3\theta=3θ=3.

The chapter's standing assumptions used here are risk neutrality and full information, together with the model paragraph of pp. 53–54 (two equally likely states, zero salvage value, zero production cost). No platform definition is referenced: no published item formalizes this model.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in S. Graves, T. de Kok (eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 11: Supply Chain Management, North-Holland, 2003, §6.5.2 (3rd draft, January 2003, pp. 53–58). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition, American Economic Review 87(4), 619–641, 1997. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2951366
  • R. Deneckere, H. P. Marvel, J. Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(3), 885–913, 1996. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
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Discrete GeometryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Linear Characterizations of Combinatorial Optimization Problems III: Zero-One and Integer-Programming-Type Problems Have Small Facial DescriptionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many discrete optimization problems can be described by linear inequalities, even when their feasible solutions are integer vectors. A linear description lets one study the geometry of the feasible set and connect combinatorial methods with linear programming. The number of inequalities may be large, so a more basic question is whether each inequality needs coefficients of manageable size. Karp and Papadimitriou separated this coefficient-size issue from the number and computational recognizability of the inequalities in their study of facial descriptions Karp and Papadimitriou, MIT/LCS/TM-154, pp. 3–7.

Their Lemma 1 identifies two common families for which small coefficients suffice: zero-one problems and problems given by an integer linear system. This result establishes a geometric premise used by the paper's later complexity discussion. It says nothing by itself about finding the inequalities efficiently or recognizing whether a proposed inequality belongs to a description. Those computational conditions belong to the paper's subsequent theorems Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 5–8.

Setting

A combinatorial optimization problem here consists of a set LLL of binary strings, a dimension n(z)n(z)n(z) for each z∈Lz\in Lz∈L, and a set S(z)S(z)S(z) of feasible nonnegative integer vectors of that dimension. The geometric object is the rational convex hull CH(S(z))⊆Qn(z)\mathrm{CH}(S(z))\subseteq\mathbb Q^{n(z)}CH(S(z))⊆Qn(z). The paper calls the rationals RRR in its notation. The values of nnn and SSS outside LLL carry no meaning. A feasible set may be empty; its convex hull is then empty as well Karp and Papadimitriou, Definition 1 and footnote, p. 3.

A facial description FFF is a collection of triples ⟨z,f,g⟩\langle z,f,g\rangle⟨z,f,g⟩, where z∈Lz\in Lz∈L, f∈Zn(z)f\in\mathbb Z^{n(z)}f∈Zn(z), and g∈Zg\in\mathbb Zg∈Z. For every rational vector xxx and every z∈Lz\in Lz∈L, membership in CH(S(z))\mathrm{CH}(S(z))CH(S(z)) must be equivalent to satisfying all inequalities f⋅x≤gf\cdot x\le gf⋅x≤g indexed by triples of FFF with first component zzz. A facial description is small when one polynomial in ∣z∣+n(z)|z|+n(z)∣z∣+n(z) bounds the binary size of every coefficient of every triple in the collection. The collection itself need not be small Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 4–5.

A zero-one problem has only vectors with entries zero or one in each S(z)S(z)S(z). An integer-programming-type problem gives an integral matrix A(z)A(z)A(z) and right-hand side b(z)b(z)b(z) and takes S(z)S(z)S(z) to be all nonnegative integer vectors satisfying A(z)x≤b(z)A(z)x\le b(z)A(z)x≤b(z). The dimensions of these data depend on zzz. Their total binary coefficient size is controlled by the length of the encoded input Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 5–6.

Formalization targets

Lemma 1

The mission goal is the complete statement for both classes:

∀C,(ZeroOne⁡(C)∨IPType⁡(C))⟹∃F,FacialDescription⁡(C,F)∧Small⁡(C,F).\forall C,\quad \bigl(\operatorname{ZeroOne}(C)\lor\operatorname{IPType}(C)\bigr) \Longrightarrow \exists F,\quad \operatorname{FacialDescription}(C,F)\land\operatorname{Small}(C,F).∀C,(ZeroOne(C)∨IPType(C))⟹∃F,FacialDescription(C,F)∧Small(C,F).

The milestone list records three claims used in the paper's proof. In a zero-one hull, every vertex is a zero-one vector and there are no nonzero rays. For integer hulls, the cited vertex-size result gives a uniform polynomial bound on the coordinates of vertices. Finally, the Cramer's-rule calculation bounds an integral normal fff and intercept ggg by (2nx)n(2nx)^n(2nx)n when the geometric data have coordinates bounded by xxx Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 5–7.

Significance

Lemma 1 permits descriptions of the whole hull, including lower-dimensional hulls that require equations and unbounded integer hulls that have recession directions. It gives a coefficient bound for every input with one polynomial, rather than a polynomial chosen separately for each instance. This is the premise needed when the paper treats a facial description as a language of short encodable inequalities. The later assertion that an NP-recognizable small facial description places the decision problem in co-NP has a distinct hypothesis and is handled by the first mission of this series Karp and Papadimitriou, Theorem 1, pp. 7–8.

The mathematical result is known; the mission asks for a Lean proof of its precise rational, input-indexed version. The local declarations are proof obligations and do not yet carry verified proofs. Existing platform work includes a rational integer-hull definition reused here, a related open theorem of Cook–Gerards–Schrijver–Tardos that bounds normal coefficients under different hypotheses, and proved real-carrier versions of Meyer's polyhedrality and finite-generation results. The related open theorem does not supply Lemma 1: it has neither this zero-one case nor the bound on the intercept ggg. The real-carrier theorems supply neither the input-size bound nor the paper's rational convention.

Difficulty

The zero-one case has bounded coordinates, but a complete description must also handle an empty hull and a hull contained in a proper affine subspace. Bounding only the facet inequalities of a full-dimensional nonempty polytope does not describe those cases. The integer-programming case adds unbounded directions, and the paper's printed identification of extreme rays with rows of AAA is false. A faithful treatment must bound suitable recession directions and then obtain a uniform coefficient bound for the inequalities describing the hull Karp and Papadimitriou, pp. 5–7.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses List Bool for inputs, Fin (n z) → ℤ for feasible vectors, and Fin (n z) → ℚ for the convex hull. The published CookSensitivity.ChvatalRank.polyhedron and integerHull definitions provide the general rational integer-programming substrate. This mission adds only the paper's input-indexed problem, facial description, smallness condition, and two named problem classes. The three language-recognition requirements in the paper's Definition 1 are omitted because Lemma 1 never uses them; the resulting theorem applies to every such geometric problem, including every c.o.p. in the paper's narrower definition.

The polynomial bound is represented by (∣z∣+n(z))k+k(|z|+n(z))^k+k(∣z∣+n(z))k+k with a single natural exponent kkk chosen before every input and inequality. For an integer-programming-type input, the sum s(A,b)=∑a⌈log⁡2(1+∣a∣)⌉s(A,b)=\sum_a\lceil\log_2(1+|a|)\rceils(A,b)=∑a​⌈log2​(1+∣a∣)⌉ over all entries of AAA and bbb must be at most ∣z∣|z|∣z∣. This makes the paper's phrase “zzz specifies AAA and bbb” an explicit binary-size condition. The cited vertex milestone bounds coordinates in terms of sss alone, as the page states: a zero column gives a line direction rather than a vertex. Its statement follows the paper's unrestricted Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b formulation; the IP-type goal additionally imposes x≥0x\ge0x≥0. The paper calls bbb an nnn-vector, but it has one entry per row of AAA and is an mmm-vector here. The Cramer's-rule milestone allows rows of size 2x2x2x, as vertex differences can reach that size.

Empty feasible sets, dimension zero, lower-dimensional hulls, and unbounded IP hulls remain in the goal. A description restricted to full-dimensional facets, or a smallness exponent chosen separately for each input, would not meet it. A complete development needs rational convex hulls, integer-hull geometry, finite descriptions of rational polyhedra, bounds on vertices and recession generators, and finite-dimensional determinant estimates. The rational integer-hull definitions and the coefficient estimates are reusable beyond this mission; contributions that establish the three listed milestones or the remaining geometric steps are in scope.

Selected references

  • Richard M. Karp and Christos H. Papadimitriou, On Linear Characterizations of Combinatorial Optimization Problems, MIT/LCS/TM-154, February 1980, pp. 3–7. Report scan. Later published in SIAM Journal on Computing 11 (1982), 620–632, DOI.
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