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Operations Research

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The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Control TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize 2: Under High Follower Turnover the Optimal Policy Is to Stay Authentic ForeverResearch Paper

Motivation

Social-media influencers earn money by endorsing products to their followers. An endorsement of a product that does not fit the audience brings in money today but costs followers, and followers are also what spreads awareness of the influencer to new people. Nistor, Selove and Villas-Boas (Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize, Management Science, 2024) model this trade-off as a deterministic, infinite-horizon, discounted optimal-control problem with a single binary control. In their base model (§3) the optimal policy is to grow first and monetize later: authentic while awareness is small, permanently inauthentic once awareness passes a threshold.

Section 4.2 of the paper asks how this changes when the audience is not permanent: users join and leave the platform, or the influencer covers a topic that interests people only for a while. With follower turnover the influencer never reaches full awareness, and Proposition 3 says that if turnover is fast enough she never monetizes at all. The model gives a testable prediction: influencers on platforms with rapid user turnover, or in product categories with short-lived interest, should stay authentic.

Setting

Time is t∈[0,∞)t \in [0, \infty)t∈[0,∞). There is a unit mass of potential followers, and At∈[0,1]A_t \in [0,1]At​∈[0,1] is the share of them who are aware of the influencer, starting from A0A_0A0​. At each time she is either authentic or inauthentic. Following Table 1 of the paper:

  • authentic: Ft=AtF_t = A_tFt​=At​ followers and instantaneous profit πt=At\pi_t = A_tπt​=At​;
  • inauthentic: Ft=γAtF_t = \gamma A_tFt​=γAt​ followers and profit πt=γφAt\pi_t = \gamma\varphi A_tπt​=γφAt​,

with 0<γ<10 < \gamma < 10<γ<1 and φ>1\varphi > 1φ>1. These are the reduced-form parameters of §3.1: a fraction γ\gammaγ of aware people follow an inauthentic influencer, who earns φ\varphiφ per follower, and authentic profit per follower is normalized to 111. The paper assumes γφ>1\gamma\varphi > 1γφ>1 "for the remainder of the paper", so that being inauthentic pays more today.

Potential followers leave and are replaced at a turnover rate x∈(0,β)x \in (0, \beta)x∈(0,β), and awareness follows equation (6):

dAtdt=βFt(1−At)−xAt,\frac{dA_t}{dt} = \beta F_t (1 - A_t) - x A_t ,dtdAt​​=βFt​(1−At​)−xAt​,

where β>0\beta > 0β>0 is the word-of-mouth rate. Under the always-authentic policy this is the logistic equation dAtdt=At(β−x−βAt)\frac{dA_t}{dt} = A_t(\beta - x - \beta A_t)dtdAt​​=At​(β−x−βAt​), with steady state β−xβ\frac{\beta - x}{\beta}ββ−x​. The influencer maximizes the discounted profit (2), ∫0∞e−rtπt dt\int_0^\infty e^{-rt}\pi_t\,dt∫0∞​e−rtπt​dt, with discount rate r>0r > 0r>0.

In the Lean development (namespace InfluencerAuth.Turnover) a policy is a measurable set S⊆RS \subseteq \mathbb RS⊆R of the times at which she is inauthentic, so S=∅S = \emptysetS=∅ is "always authentic". IsPath β γ x A₀ S A says AAA is an admissible awareness path, discountedProfit γ φ r S A is (2) at time 000, and IsOptimalFrom β γ φ r x A₀ S A says that (S,A)(S, A)(S,A) earns at least as much as every measurable policy with any admissible path from the same A0A_0A0​. authValue β x r is the closed form V‾\overline VV of Lemma 5, and Condition2 γ φ β r x is

(1−γ)xr+β−x>γφ−1.\frac{(1-\gamma)x}{r + \beta - x} > \gamma\varphi - 1 .r+β−x(1−γ)x​>γφ−1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 9)

Under the standing assumptions 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1, φ>1\varphi>1φ>1, γφ>1\gamma\varphi>1γφ>1, β>0\beta>0β>0, r>0r>0r>0, with 0<x<β0 < x < \beta0<x<β and Condition 2,

∀A0∈(0,β−xβ),∃A,  (∅,A) is optimal from A0.\forall A_0 \in \Bigl(0, \tfrac{\beta - x}{\beta}\Bigr),\quad \exists A,\ \ (\emptyset, A) \text{ is optimal from } A_0 .∀A0​∈(0,ββ−x​),∃A,  (∅,A) is optimal from A0​.

The range of A0A_0A0​ is the paper's set of "all feasible levels of awareness". The statement fixes no constant beyond those of Condition 2.

Milestone: Lemma 5 (p. 9)

For 0<A0<10 < A_0 < 10<A0​<1 and every admissible always-authentic path AAA from A0A_0A0​,

∫0∞e−rtAt dt=V‾(A0)=∫0∞e−rsββ−x+1−A0β/(β−x)A0e−(β−x)s ds.\int_0^\infty e^{-rt} A_t\,dt = \overline V(A_0) = \int_0^\infty \frac{e^{-rs}}{\frac{\beta}{\beta - x} + \frac{1 - A_0\beta/(\beta - x)}{A_0} e^{-(\beta - x)s}}\,ds .∫0∞​e−rtAt​dt=V(A0​)=∫0∞​β−xβ​+A0​1−A0​β/(β−x)​e−(β−x)se−rs​ds.

Milestone: display (7) (p. 9)

dV‾(A)dA∣A=β−xβ=∫0∞e−(r+β−x)s ds=1r+β−x.\left.\frac{d\overline V(A)}{dA}\right|_{A = \frac{\beta - x}{\beta}} = \int_0^\infty e^{-(r + \beta - x)s}\,ds = \frac{1}{r + \beta - x}.dAdV(A)​​A=ββ−x​​=∫0∞​e−(r+β−x)sds=r+β−x1​.

Significance

Proposition 3 is the paper's result on when the grow-then-monetize pattern of the base model breaks down. Without turnover the influencer always monetizes once she is large enough (Proposition 1, §3). With turnover there is a whole parameter region, given by Condition 2, where monetizing is never optimal. The condition compares the extra current profit from being inauthentic, γφ−1\gamma\varphi - 1γφ−1, with the awareness lost by being inauthentic, (1−γ)x(1-\gamma)x(1−γ)x, valued at the marginal value of awareness at the steady state, 1/(r+β−x)1/(r+\beta-x)1/(r+β−x) from (7).

The proofs are in an online appendix that is not part of the published article, and this result has no machine-checked proof. The mission provides a precise statement of the control problem: optimality over every measurable switching pattern, with the dynamics in integral form. It also gives the closed-form always-authentic value and its derivative as separate targets. A complete development would be one of the first formal optimality proofs for an infinite-horizon, discounted, continuous-time deterministic control problem.

Difficulty

Optimality is claimed against every measurable policy, not only against constant or threshold policies. The natural argument is a verification theorem: show that V‾\overline VV satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman inequality on the feasible range, then integrate along an arbitrary competitor path. Condition 2 is stated only at the steady state (β−x)/β(\beta-x)/\beta(β−x)/β, where (7) gives the marginal value of awareness. At a lower awareness level the inequality comparing the two actions involves V‾′(A)\overline V'(A)V′(A) at that level, so it does not follow from Condition 2 alone; it needs control of V‾′\overline V'V′ on the whole interval. A competitor path may also switch infinitely often, so its awareness is only absolutely continuous, and the comparison must work almost everywhere. Above the steady state the always-authentic policy is in general not optimal, so any argument must use the restriction A0<(β−x)/βA_0 < (\beta - x)/\betaA0​<(β−x)/β.

Formalization scope

  • Policies and dynamics. A policy is a measurable Set ℝ. An admissible path is continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), starts at A0A_0A0​, stays in [0,1][0,1][0,1], and satisfies At=A0+∫0t(βfS(s)As(1−As)−xAs) dsA_t = A_0 + \int_0^t (\beta f_S(s) A_s(1-A_s) - xA_s)\,dsAt​=A0​+∫0t​(βfS​(s)As​(1−As​)−xAs​)ds for t≥0t \ge 0t≥0, with fS=γf_S = \gammafS​=γ on SSS and 111 off SSS. This is the Carathéodory form of (6). A derivative everywhere is not required, because that would exclude every switching policy. The clause At∈[0,1]A_t\in[0,1]At​∈[0,1] follows from the equation and is stated to make integrability explicit.
  • Objective. discountedProfit is ∫(0,∞)e−rtpS(t)At dt\int_{(0,\infty)} e^{-rt} p_S(t) A_t\,dt∫(0,∞)​e−rtpS​(t)At​dt with pS=γφp_S = \gamma\varphipS​=γφ on SSS and 111 off SSS; the paper's value from time ttt is the same object after the shift s=u−ts = u - ts=u−t. No optimal value is defined as a real supremum; optimality is a comparison with every competitor.
  • Hypotheses. The goal carries every standing assumption of the paper: 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1, φ>1\varphi>1φ>1, γφ>1\gamma\varphi>1γφ>1, β>0\beta>0β>0, 0<x<β0<x<\beta0<x<β. It also assumes r>0r>0r>0, which is how "discount rate rrr" is read and which makes (2) finite. The milestones drop γ\gammaγ, φ\varphiφ and their assumptions, which the always-authentic value does not involve.
  • No trivialization. The goal produces the optimal path existentially, so it cannot hold for lack of an admissible path. The competitor class is nonempty (the logistic solution is admissible), and every competitor's profit is the integral of a bounded measurable function, so no competitor collapses to the junk value 000. Widening A0A_0A0​ to (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) would make the statement false, not stronger.
  • Infrastructure. The development needs the explicit logistic solution with turnover, differentiation under the integral sign for V‾\overline VV, and a comparison or verification argument for scalar ODEs with measurable coefficients. The verification lemma for discounted bang-bang control of a one-dimensional state is reusable for chunk 1 of this series and for similar marketing-diffusion models. Proofs of either milestone, a sanity proof that the logistic path is admissible, and the verification argument are all welcome contributions.

Selected references

  • C. Nistor, M. Selove, J. M. Villas-Boas, Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03479
  • F. M. Bass, A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables, Management Science 15(5), 1969, 215–227. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.5.215
  • W. H. Fleming, R. W. Rishel, Deterministic and Stochastic Optimal Control, Springer, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-6380-7
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AnalysisProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Scores for Multivariate Distributions and Level Sets I: The L² Scoring Rules S and S′ Are Proper, With Divergence the h-Weighted L² Distance Between f_X ∗ w and f_Y ∗ wResearch Paper

Why scoring rules for multivariate distributions

A probabilistic forecast issues a whole distribution PXP_XPX​ for an uncertain quantity Y∈RdY\in\mathbb R^dY∈Rd rather than a single number: wind and wave heights at several sites, demand for several products, the joint returns of several assets. Forecasts of this kind are compared and estimated with a scoring rule S(PX,y)S(P_X,y)S(PX​,y), a number assigned to the forecast once the realization yyy is observed. A scoring rule is proper if a forecaster who knows the true distribution PYP_YPY​ minimizes the expected score by reporting it, and strictly proper if PYP_YPY​ is the only minimizer (Gneiting and Raftery 2007). Properness is what makes a score usable for model ranking and for M-estimation: an improper score rewards systematic misreporting.

For univariate distributions the continuous ranked probability score (CRPS) and the quadratic score are standard. In several dimensions the choices are thinner: the quadratic score needs a density and is sensitive to its spikes, and the energy score and the multivariate CRPS (MCRPS) were treated as separate constructions. Meng, Taylor, Ben Taieb and Li (arXiv:2002.09578v6, Operations Research, 2025) give one family, the L² scoring rules, which contains the quadratic score, the CRPS and the MCRPS as special cases and produces new ones, such as a score based on lower partial moments. Their Theorem 1 says these rules are proper. This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

Work on Rd\mathbb R^dRd with Lebesgue measure Ld\mathcal L^dLd and the componentwise order. A distribution is a probability measure PPP on Rd\mathbb R^dRd; the paper writes it through a generalized density fPf_PfP​ (a PDF, a PMF or a mixture), and every integral ∫g(s)fP(s) ds\int g(s)f_P(s)\,ds∫g(s)fP​(s)ds below is ∫g dP\int g\,dP∫gdP. The forecasts range over a class Vd\mathcal V^dVd of distributions.

Fix a kernel w:Rd→Rw:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb Rw:Rd→R and a weight h≥0h\ge0h≥0 that is integrable. The smoothed density of PPP is the convolution

(fP∗w)(z)=∫Rdw(z−s) dP(s).(f_P*w)(z)=\int_{\mathbb R^d} w(z-s)\,dP(s).(fP​∗w)(z)=∫Rd​w(z−s)dP(s).

For the Heaviside kernel u(z)=1{z≥0}u(z)=\mathbb 1\{z\ge0\}u(z)=1{z≥0} it is the CDF FP(z)=P{s≤z}F_P(z)=P\{s\le z\}FP​(z)=P{s≤z}.

The two L² scoring rules are, for a forecast PXP_XPX​ and a realization yyy,

S(PX,y;w,h)=∫Rd((fX∗w)(z)−w(z−y))2h(z) dz(2)S(P_X,y;w,h)=\int_{\mathbb R^d}\big((f_X*w)(z)-w(z-y)\big)^2h(z)\,dz \qquad (2)S(PX​,y;w,h)=∫Rd​((fX​∗w)(z)−w(z−y))2h(z)dz(2) S′(PX,y;w,h)=∫Rd(fX∗w)2(z)h(z) dz−2∫Rd(fX∗w)(z) w(z−y) h(z) dz.(3)S'(P_X,y;w,h)=\int_{\mathbb R^d}(f_X*w)^2(z)h(z)\,dz-2\int_{\mathbb R^d}(f_X*w)(z)\,w(z-y)\,h(z)\,dz. \qquad (3)S′(PX​,y;w,h)=∫Rd​(fX​∗w)2(z)h(z)dz−2∫Rd​(fX​∗w)(z)w(z−y)h(z)dz.(3)

The realization yyy is treated as a point mass, whose convolution with www is w(⋅−y)w(\cdot-y)w(⋅−y). The divergence of a score is EPY[S(PX,∙)]−EPY[S(PY,∙)]\mathbb E_{P_Y}[S(P_X,\bullet)]-\mathbb E_{P_Y}[S(P_Y,\bullet)]EPY​​[S(PX​,∙)]−EPY​​[S(PY​,∙)], and the paper's candidate is the weighted L² distance between smoothed densities,

∫Rd((fX∗w)(z)−(fY∗w)(z))2h(z) dz.(1)\int_{\mathbb R^d}\big((f_X*w)(z)-(f_Y*w)(z)\big)^2h(z)\,dz. \qquad (1)∫Rd​((fX​∗w)(z)−(fY​∗w)(z))2h(z)dz.(1)

Assumption 1 (p. 32) collects the integrability under which all these integrals are finite.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 8)

Under Assumption 1, for all PX,PY∈VdP_X,P_Y\in\mathcal V^dPX​,PY​∈Vd,

EPY[S(PX,∙)]−EPY[S(PY,∙)]=EPY[S′(PX,∙)]−EPY[S′(PY,∙)]=∫(fX∗w−fY∗w)2h dz ≥0,\mathbb E_{P_Y}[S(P_X,\bullet)]-\mathbb E_{P_Y}[S(P_Y,\bullet)]=\mathbb E_{P_Y}[S'(P_X,\bullet)]-\mathbb E_{P_Y}[S'(P_Y,\bullet)]=\int\big(f_X*w-f_Y*w\big)^2h\,dz\ \ge 0,EPY​​[S(PX​,∙)]−EPY​​[S(PY​,∙)]=EPY​​[S′(PX​,∙)]−EPY​​[S′(PY​,∙)]=∫(fX​∗w−fY​∗w)2hdz ≥0,

so both rules are proper. If in addition h≠0h\ne0h=0 Ld\mathcal L^dLd-a.e. and fY∗wf_Y*wfY​∗w determines PYP_YPY​ within Vd\mathcal V^dVd, both are strictly proper. The goal fixes no kernel and no weight: it holds for every pair (w,h)(w,h)(w,h) meeting the assumption.

Milestones

  1. The relation between (2) and (3): S=S′+∫w2(z−y)h(z) dzS=S'+\int w^2(z-y)h(z)\,dzS=S′+∫w2(z−y)h(z)dz, a term that does not depend on the forecast (p. 8).
  2. The Fubini step of the proof: ∫ ⁣∫g(z)w(z−s)h(z) dz dPY(s)=∫g (fY∗w) h dz\int\!\int g(z)w(z-s)h(z)\,dz\,dP_Y(s)=\int g\,(f_Y*w)\,h\,dz∫∫g(z)w(z−s)h(z)dzdPY​(s)=∫g(fY​∗w)hdz (p. 32).
  3. The divergence display: the divergence of (2) equals (1) and is nonnegative (p. 32).
  4. The strict step: a vanishing divergence with h≠0h\ne0h=0 a.e. forces fX∗w=fY∗wf_X*w=f_Y*wfX​∗w=fY​∗w a.e. (p. 32).
  5. MCRPS (5) and MCRPS′ (6) are strictly proper for all distributions when h≠0h\ne0h=0 a.e. (p. 11).
  6. Lower partial moments of any order kkk determine the distribution (Appendix, p. 34).

Significance

Theorem 1 is the paper's justification for its whole family of scores. With w=uw=uw=u it shows that the MCRPS is proper; with www the kernel of lower partial moments it shows that a new LPM score is proper; and in Section 4 of the paper the same smoothed densities fY∗wf_Y*wfY​∗w define the level sets whose scoring functions are the subject of the companion mission (Mission II of this series). Strict properness reduces to one question about the kernel: whether fY∗wf_Y*wfY​∗w determines PYP_YPY​. Milestones 5 and 6 answer it for the CDF and for lower partial moments.

The result is proved in the paper (appendix, pp. 32 and 34). To our knowledge none of it is formalized: Mathlib has no scoring rules, and the platform has no proper scoring rule for distributions, no multivariate CRPS and no lower partial moment. The formalization adds the integrability bookkeeping the paper leaves implicit, a machine-checked uniqueness theorem for the multivariate CDF (Mathlib's ext_of_Iic covers linear orders only, i.e. d=1d=1d=1), and the same for lower partial moments.

Difficulty

The algebraic core of Theorem 1 is the expansion of a square, and the obvious argument is the paper's. The cost lies elsewhere. Every expectation is an iterated integral of a function of (s,z)(s,z)(s,z), and exchanging the order (Fubini) and splitting an integral of a difference require the integrability that Assumption 1 states only as "then (2) is well-defined and finite". The proof also uses ∫dPY=1\int dP_Y=1∫dPY​=1 when it integrates the yyy-free terms against PYP_YPY​.

For the companions the obstacle is measure-theoretic. An a.e. equality of multivariate CDFs must first be upgraded to equality everywhere, by right-continuity in each coordinate, and then measures that agree on lower orthants must be shown equal, a π-system argument in Rd\mathbb R^dRd. For lower partial moments the paper differentiates kkk times under the integral; a rigorous version has to control the finiteness of the lower-order moments.

Formalization scope

  • Rd\mathbb R^dRd is Fin d → ℝ with its product Lebesgue measure volume and the Pi order, so y≤zy\le zy≤z is componentwise and lower orthants are Set.Iic z. ddd is any natural number; at d=0d=0d=0 the strict clauses are vacuous, as in the paper.
  • Distributions are measures with IsProbabilityMeasure; the class Vd\mathcal V^dVd is a set of such measures. Its convexity (§2) is never used and is not imposed.
  • Standing assumptions. The kernel www is a measurable function. The paper also allows a local Borel measure, so that w=δ0w=\delta_0w=δ0​ gives the quadratic score (4); that case is not covered. hhh is measurable, nonnegative and integrable, not normalized to a density.
  • Assumption 1 made explicit. Its clauses (b) and (c) are formalized as integrability hypotheses, each labelled with its clause: (fY∗w)2h(f_Y*w)^2h(fY​∗w)2h and w(⋅−y)2hw(\cdot-y)^2hw(⋅−y)2h integrable; (s,z)↦w(z−s)2h(z)(s,z)\mapsto w(z-s)^2h(z)(s,z)↦w(z−s)2h(z) integrable for PY⊗LdP_Y\otimes\mathcal L^dPY​⊗Ld; (fX∗w) w(⋅−y) h(f_X*w)\,w(\cdot-y)\,h(fX​∗w)w(⋅−y)h integrable; and (s,z)↦(fX∗w)(z) w(z−s) h(z)(s,z)\mapsto(f_X*w)(z)\,w(z-s)\,h(z)(s,z)↦(fX​∗w)(z)w(z−s)h(z) integrable for PY⊗LdP_Y\otimes\mathcal L^dPY​⊗Ld. Clause (a) adds that fY∗wf_Y*wfY​∗w is well defined.
  • "fX∗w=fY∗wf_X*w=f_Y*wfX​∗w=fY​∗w" is an Ld\mathcal L^dLd-a.e. equality. "fY∗wf_Y*wfY​∗w uniquely characterizes any PY∈VdP_Y\in\mathcal V^dPY​∈Vd" is a property of the whole class Vd\mathcal V^dVd, not of the pair at hand. "hhh nonzero Ld\mathcal L^dLd-a.e." is used with the paper's quantifier. The theorem's printed "fy∗wf_{\mathbf y}*wfy​∗w" is read as fY∗wf_Y*wfY​∗w.
  • Lower partial moments are defined from the explicit kernel printed in (7), ∏j(zj−sj)k1{zj≥sj}/k!\prod_j (z_j-s_j)^k\mathbb 1\{z_j\ge s_j\}/k!∏j​(zj​−sj​)k1{zj​≥sj​}/k!, for k∈Nk\in\mathbb Nk∈N, not as a convolution power of uuu. Milestone 6 states equality of the LPMs implying PX=PYP_X=P_YPX​=PY​, the claim of its opening sentence.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. A Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000 in Lean, so every expectation in every statement carries the integrability that makes it the paper's integral. Without it, properness could hold because both sides are 000. The characterization hypothesis is never assumed for the pair (PX,PY)(P_X,P_Y)(PX​,PY​) alone.
  • Needed infrastructure: product-measure Fubini (integral_integral_swap), integrability of products and squares, and uniqueness of measures from a generating π-system. A general lemma "a multivariate CDF determines its measure" would be reusable well beyond this mission and is welcome as a separate contribution.

Selected references

  • X. Meng, J. W. Taylor, S. Ben Taieb, S. Li, Scores for Multivariate Distributions and Level Sets, Operations Research, 2025; preprint arXiv:2002.09578v6, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09578v6
  • T. Gneiting, A. E. Raftery, Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation, Journal of the American Statistical Association 102(477), 359–378, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1198/016214506000000437
  • T. Gneiting, R. Ranjan, Comparing Density Forecasts Using Threshold- and Quantile-Weighted Scoring Rules, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 29(3), 411–422, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1198/jbes.2010.08110
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Actuarial ScienceProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Lambda Value-at-Risk under Ambiguity and Risk Sharing II: The Inf-Convolution of ΛVaRs under Continuous Capacities Is Induced by a Family of Downsets, and Is Itself a ΛVaR When Every Λ IncreasesResearch Paper

Motivation

Risk sharing asks how a total loss XXX should be split among nnn agents, each of whom evaluates its share with its own risk measure, so that the sum of their assessments is as small as possible. The smallest achievable sum is the inf-convolution of the agents' risk measures, and an allocation that attains it is an optimal allocation. For Value-at-Risk, the risk measure of the Basel framework, this problem was solved by Embrechts, Liu and Wang (2018) and extended to agents with heterogeneous beliefs by Embrechts, Liu, Mao and Wang (2020).

Lambda Value-at-Risk (ΛVaR\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}ΛVaR), introduced by Frittelli, Maggis and Peri (2014), replaces the fixed confidence level of VaR by a function Λ\LambdaΛ of the loss threshold, so that the tolerated exceedance probability may depend on the size of the loss. Liu and Schied (2025) study ΛVaR\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}ΛVaR when probabilities are replaced by capacities, which model ambiguity about the underlying distribution: a capacity can be the upper envelope of a family of probability measures. Their Section 5.1 answers the question of what the inf-convolution of such risk measures is, which earlier work had settled for constant Λ\LambdaΛ under capacities (Choquet quantiles, Liu, Mao and Wang 2024) and for ΛVaR\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}ΛVaR under probability measures (Liu 2025; Liu, Tsanakas and Wei 2025).

Setting

(Ω,F)(\Omega,\mathcal F)(Ω,F) is a measurable space and X\mathcal XX a set of random variables containing every bounded one. A capacity is a map w:F→[0,1]w:\mathcal F\to[0,1]w:F→[0,1] that is increasing for inclusion with w(∅)=0w(\emptyset)=0w(∅)=0 and w(Ω)=1w(\Omega)=1w(Ω)=1; it is continuous if w(An)→0w(A_n)\to0w(An​)→0 whenever An↓∅A_n\downarrow\emptysetAn​↓∅. For a function Λ:R→(0,1)\Lambda:\mathbb R\to(0,1)Λ:R→(0,1) (the class H\mathcal HH; increasing members form HI\mathcal H_IHI​) and a capacity www,

ΛVaRw(X)=inf⁡{x∈R: w(X>x)≤Λ(x)},inf⁡∅=+∞,\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^w(X)=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\ w(X>x)\le\Lambda(x)\},\qquad\inf\emptyset=+\infty,ΛVaRw(X)=inf{x∈R: w(X>x)≤Λ(x)},inf∅=+∞,

a value in [−∞,∞][-\infty,\infty][−∞,∞]. HI∗\mathcal H^*_IHI∗​ (HD∗\mathcal H^*_DHD∗​) denotes the increasing (decreasing) functions R→(0,1]\mathbb R\to(0,1]R→(0,1].

The allocations of XXX are An(X)={(X1,…,Xn)∈Xn:∑iXi=X}\mathbb A_n(X)=\{(X_1,\dots,X_n)\in\mathcal X^n:\sum_iX_i=X\}An​(X)={(X1​,…,Xn​)∈Xn:∑i​Xi​=X}, and the inf-convolution of ρ1,…,ρn\rho_1,\dots,\rho_nρ1​,…,ρn​ is

□i=1nρi(X)=inf⁡{∑i=1nρi(Xi):(X1,…,Xn)∈An(X)}.\mathop{\square}_{i=1}^n\rho_i(X)=\inf\Big\{\sum_{i=1}^n\rho_i(X_i):(X_1,\dots,X_n)\in\mathbb A_n(X)\Big\}.□i=1n​ρi​(X)=inf{i=1∑n​ρi​(Xi​):(X1​,…,Xn​)∈An​(X)}.

A downset is a collection A⊆F\mathcal A\subseteq\mathcal FA⊆F containing ∅\emptyset∅ and closed under taking measurable subsets. A family {Ax}x∈R\{\mathcal A_x\}_{x\in\mathbb R}{Ax​}x∈R​ of downsets induces the risk measure ρ(X)=inf⁡{x:{X>x}∈Ax}\rho(X)=\inf\{x:\{X>x\}\in\mathcal A_x\}ρ(X)=inf{x:{X>x}∈Ax​}. For Λ=(Λ1,…,Λn)\boldsymbol\Lambda=(\Lambda_1,\dots,\Lambda_n)Λ=(Λ1​,…,Λn​) and w=(w1,…,wn)\mathbf w=(w_1,\dots,w_n)w=(w1​,…,wn​) the paper defines

AxΛ,w={⋃i=1nAi: wi(Ai)≤Λi(yi), i∈[n], ∑iyi=x},\mathcal A^{\boldsymbol\Lambda,\mathbf w}_x=\Big\{\bigcup_{i=1}^nA_i:\ w_i(A_i)\le\Lambda_i(y_i),\ i\in[n],\ \textstyle\sum_iy_i=x\Big\},AxΛ,w​={i=1⋃n​Ai​: wi​(Ai​)≤Λi​(yi​), i∈[n], ∑i​yi​=x},

and Πn(Ω)\Pi_n(\Omega)Πn​(Ω) denotes the measurable partitions of Ω\OmegaΩ into nnn (possibly empty) parts.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8

For Λi∈H\Lambda_i\in\mathcal HΛi​∈H with λi−=inf⁡Λi>0\lambda^-_i=\inf\Lambda_i>0λi−​=infΛi​>0 and continuous capacities w1,…,wnw_1,\dots,w_nw1​,…,wn​:

□i=1nΛiVaRwi(X)=inf⁡{x∈R:{X>x}∈AxΛ,w};\mathop{\square}_{i=1}^n\Lambda_i\mathrm{VaR}^{w_i}(X)=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R:\{X>x\}\in\mathcal A^{\boldsymbol\Lambda,\mathbf w}_x\};□i=1n​Λi​VaRwi​(X)=inf{x∈R:{X>x}∈AxΛ,w​};

if this infimum is attained at x∗x^*x∗, then Xi=(X−x∗)1Ai∗+yi∗X_i=(X-x^*)\mathbb 1_{A^*_i}+y^*_iXi​=(X−x∗)1Ai∗​​+yi∗​ is optimal for every (yi∗)(y^*_i)(yi∗​) with ∑iyi∗=x∗\sum_iy^*_i=x^*∑i​yi∗​=x∗ and (Ai∗)∈Πn(Ω)(A^*_i)\in\Pi_n(\Omega)(Ai∗​)∈Πn​(Ω) with wi({X>x∗}∩Ai∗)≤Λi(yi∗)w_i(\{X>x^*\}\cap A^*_i)\le\Lambda_i(y^*_i)wi​({X>x∗}∩Ai∗​)≤Λi​(yi∗​) (and such data exist); and if all Λi\Lambda_iΛi​ are increasing, the inf-convolution equals ΛVaRw\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^wΛVaRw for some Λ∈HI∗\Lambda\in\mathcal H^*_IΛ∈HI∗​ and capacity www.

Milestones

  • Remark 1: under a continuous capacity, ΛVaRw(X)<∞\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^w(X)<\inftyΛVaRw(X)<∞ when inf⁡Λ>0\inf\Lambda>0infΛ>0 or Λ∈HI\Lambda\in\mathcal H_IΛ∈HI​.
  • Theorem 3 (7): for risk measures ρi\rho_iρi​ induced by families of downsets {Ax(i)}\{\mathcal A^{(i)}_x\}{Ax(i)​} with values in [−∞,∞)[-\infty,\infty)[−∞,∞), □ρi(X)=inf⁡{x:{X>x}∈A~x}\mathop{\square}\rho_i(X)=\inf\{x:\{X>x\}\in\widetilde{\mathcal A}_x\}□ρi​(X)=inf{x:{X>x}∈Ax​}, where A~x=⋃y1+⋯+yn=x{⋃iAi:Ai∈Ayi(i)}\widetilde{\mathcal A}_x=\bigcup_{y_1+\dots+y_n=x}\{\bigcup_iA_i:A_i\in\mathcal A^{(i)}_{y_i}\}Ax​=⋃y1​+⋯+yn​=x​{⋃i​Ai​:Ai​∈Ayi​(i)​}.
  • Theorem 3 (8): a minimizer of (7) yields the optimal allocation (X−x∗)1Ai∗+yi∗(X-x^*)\mathbb 1_{A^*_i}+y^*_i(X−x∗)1Ai∗​​+yi∗​.
  • Theorem 3, monotonicity: {A~x}\{\widetilde{\mathcal A}_x\}{Ax​} is increasing (decreasing) when all input families are.
  • Theorem 1 (i): ρ\rhoρ is a ΛVaRw\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^wΛVaRw with Λ∈HI∗\Lambda\in\mathcal H^*_IΛ∈HI∗​ iff it is induced by an increasing family of downsets.
  • Theorem 1 (ii): the decreasing, left-continuous counterpart.

Significance

Proposition 8 shows that risk measures of ΛVaR\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}ΛVaR type, under possibly different capacities for different agents, are closed under inf-convolution when all Λi\Lambda_iΛi​ increase, and it gives explicit optimal allocations: each agent pays a fixed amount yi∗y^*_iyi∗​ and carries the excess X−x∗X-x^*X−x∗ on one cell of a partition. It contains as special cases the inf-convolution of VaR (Embrechts et al. 2018), of VaR with heterogeneous beliefs (Embrechts et al. 2020) and of Choquet quantiles (Liu, Mao and Wang 2024). Via the paper's Corollary 4 it yields risk sharing for robust ΛVaR\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}ΛVaR over sets of probability measures.

The result is proved in the preprint; it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization adds a verified account of the extended-real bookkeeping that the paper leaves implicit, and it pins down which printed claims hold: two claims in the preprint are false (see Formalization scope), which a formal development has to avoid.

Difficulty

The individual risk measures are not real-valued: ΛiVaRwi\Lambda_i\mathrm{VaR}^{w_i}Λi​VaRwi​ can be −∞-\infty−∞, and without the finiteness of Remark 1 it can be +∞+\infty+∞, in which case a sum over agents is meaningless. Every step of (9) therefore has to be carried out in the extended reals, and the identity has to hold in the degenerate cases (an empty or unbounded threshold set) as well as the generic one. Capacities are neither additive nor continuous from above in general, so the familiar quantile arguments for probability measures do not transfer.

The last claim of the goal is not a consequence of (9) alone: it needs the representation Theorem 1 (i), whose converse direction must produce a Λ\LambdaΛ and a capacity from an abstract increasing family of downsets, including degenerate families in which Ω\OmegaΩ itself is eventually admissible or no nonempty event ever is. The natural first idea, that the decreasing case is symmetric, fails: the convolved family of downsets need not be left-continuous, and the decreasing analogue of the claim is false.

Formalization scope

Lean namespace LambdaVaRAmb.InfConv. Random variables are measurable maps Ω→R\Omega\to\mathbb RΩ→R; the domain X\mathcal XX is any set of functions that contains all bounded measurable functions, consists of measurable functions, and is closed under X↦(X−c)1A+dX\mapsto(X-c)\mathbb 1_A+dX↦(X−c)1A​+d and under X↦f(X)X\mapsto f(X)X↦f(X) for increasing 1-Lipschitz fff with f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0. This is the disclosed reading of the paper's "good enough properties"; bounded and all measurable functions both qualify. Capacities are real set functions whose axioms are imposed on measurable sets. ΛVaR\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}ΛVaR, induced risk measures and the inf-convolution are valued in EReal, with inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset=+\inftyinf∅=+∞. Agents are indexed by Fin n with n≥1n\ge1n≥1 (implicit in the paper). "Increasing" is Monotone; left-continuity of Λ\LambdaΛ is continuity within (−∞,x](-\infty,x](−∞,x]; "admits a minimizer" is attainment of the infimum (IsLeast).

Not posed, because false: the claim of Theorem 3 that {A~x}\{\widetilde{\mathcal A}_x\}{Ax​} is left-continuous when all input families decrease, and the decreasing branch of Proposition 8. With w1=w2w_1=w_2w1​=w2​ Lebesgue measure on [0,1][0,1][0,1], Λ1\Lambda_1Λ1​ equal to 0.40.40.4 on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0) and 0.10.10.1 on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and Λ2(y)=0.1+0.4/(1+ey)\Lambda_2(y)=0.1+0.4/(1+e^y)Λ2​(y)=0.1+0.4/(1+ey), the convolved family is not left-continuous and the inf-convolution is not a ΛVaRw\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^wΛVaRw with decreasing Λ\LambdaΛ. The goal states the increasing branch only.

Trivializing encodings are ruled out: infima are taken in EReal (a real sInf would collapse unbounded sets to 000); the finiteness hypothesis of Theorem 3 keeps +∞+\infty+∞ and −∞-\infty−∞ out of the sums; the domain X\mathcal XX is constrained so that the tail allocations lie in it; downsets consist of events; the allocation clause comes with an existence clause so that it cannot hold vacuously; and the representing pair (Λ,w)(\Lambda,w)(Λ,w) is chosen uniformly in XXX. Sanity checks (not part of the mission) confirm that the hypotheses of Proposition 8 are satisfiable and that ΛVaR\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}ΛVaR of a constant is that constant.

Contributions welcome: Remark 1 and the monotonicity milestone are short and independent; Theorem 3 is reusable for any risk measure induced by downsets; Theorem 1 is a general representation result for ΛVaR\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}ΛVaR under capacities.

Selected references

  • P. Liu and A. Schied, Lambda Value-at-Risk under ambiguity and risk sharing, arXiv preprint, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.00717v1
  • M. Frittelli, M. Maggis and I. Peri, Risk measures on P(R)\mathcal P(\mathbb R)P(R) and Value at Risk with probability/loss function, Mathematical Finance 24(3), 442–463, 2014.
  • P. Embrechts, H. Liu and R. Wang, Quantile-based risk sharing, Operations Research 66(4), 936–949, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1716
  • P. Embrechts, H. Liu, T. Mao and R. Wang, Quantile-based risk sharing with heterogeneous beliefs, Mathematical Programming Series B 181(2), 319–347, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-018-1313-1
  • P. Liu, Risk sharing with Lambda value at risk, Mathematics of Operations Research 50(1), 313–333, 2025.
  • P. Liu, T. Mao and R. Wang, Quantiles under ambiguity and risk sharing, arXiv preprint, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.19546v1
  • P. Liu, A. Tsanakas and Y. Wei, Risk sharing with Lambda Value-at-Risk under heterogeneous beliefs, Finance and Stochastics, forthcoming. https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.03147
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Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection 3: The Explore-First Greedy Procedure Is Consistent with a Budget Linear in kResearch Paper

Motivation

Ranking and selection (R&S) asks which of kkk simulated systems has the largest mean performance when every observation is costly. It is a basic tool of simulation optimization: choosing a staffing level, an inventory policy or a network design from a large catalogue of candidates that can only be evaluated by noisy simulation. In the fixed-budget formulation a total of BBB observations is spent sequentially and one alternative is selected at the end; procedures are compared by their probability of correct selection (PCS).

Cloud and parallel computing have made problems with thousands to millions of alternatives routine, and the relevant question is how the budget must grow with kkk. A procedure is sample optimal if a budget B=ckB = ckB=ck, linear in kkk, keeps its PCS bounded away from zero as k→∞k \to \inftyk→∞; a total budget of order kkk is clearly necessary. Li, Fan and Hong (arXiv:2303.02951) show that the simplest procedure of all, the greedy procedure, which always samples the alternative with the largest current sample mean, is sample optimal. They also show that its PCS limit is strictly below one under the slippage configuration, however large ccc is: the greedy procedure is not consistent. This mission formalizes the remedy: an exploration phase of n0n_0n0​ observations per alternative before the greedy phase makes the procedure consistent.

Setting

There are kkk alternatives. Alternative iii produces independent observations Xi1,Xi2,⋯∼N(μi,σi2)X_{i1}, X_{i2}, \dots \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)Xi1​,Xi2​,⋯∼N(μi​,σi2​), independent across alternatives, and alternative 1 is the unique best. The running average after nnn observations is Xˉi(n)=1n∑j=1nXij\bar X_i(n) = \frac1n\sum_{j=1}^n X_{ij}Xˉi​(n)=n1​∑j=1n​Xij​.

Assumption 1 (p. 12). There are constants γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 and σˉ2>0\bar\sigma^2 > 0σˉ2>0 such that μ1−max⁡i≥2μi≥γ\mu_1 - \max_{i \ge 2}\mu_i \ge \gammaμ1​−maxi≥2​μi​≥γ and max⁡iσi2≤σˉ2\max_i \sigma_i^2 \le \bar\sigma^2maxi​σi2​≤σˉ2, regardless of how large kkk is.

The explore-first greedy (EFG) procedure (Procedure 2, p. 21) with exploration size n0n_0n0​ and budget BBB:

  1. take n0n_0n0​ observations from every alternative, and set ni=n0n_i = n_0ni​=n0​;
  2. while ∑ini<B\sum_i n_i < B∑i​ni​<B, take one more observation from arg⁡max⁡iXˉi(ni)\arg\max_i \bar X_i(n_i)argmaxi​Xˉi​(ni​);
  3. select arg⁡max⁡iXˉi(ni)\arg\max_i \bar X_i(n_i)argmaxi​Xˉi​(ni​).

With B=ckB = ckB=ck the exploration phase uses n0kn_0 kn0​k observations and the greedy phase ngkn_g kng​k, where ng=c−n0n_g = c - n_0ng​=c−n0​. The greedy procedure is the case n0=1n_0 = 1n0​=1.

Crossing times. Let Z1,Z2,…Z_1, Z_2, \dotsZ1​,Z2​,… be iid standard normal, Zˉ(n)=1n∑j=1nZj\bar Z(n) = \frac1n\sum_{j=1}^n Z_jZˉ(n)=n1​∑j=1n​Zj​, and

N~(x;n0)=inf⁡{n≥n0:Zˉ(n)<x},C(x;n0)=E[N~(x;n0)]∈[0,∞],\tilde N(x; n_0) = \inf\{n \ge n_0 : \bar Z(n) < x\}, \qquad C(x; n_0) = \mathrm E\big[\tilde N(x; n_0)\big] \in [0, \infty],N~(x;n0​)=inf{n≥n0​:Zˉ(n)<x},C(x;n0​)=E[N~(x;n0​)]∈[0,∞],

with inf⁡∅=∞\inf \emptyset = \inftyinf∅=∞. C(⋅ ;n0)C(\cdot\,; n_0)C(⋅;n0​) is finite exactly on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞), where it is strictly decreasing and continuous.

Consistency (Definition 2, p. 21): A sample-optimal fixed-budget R&S procedure is consistent if the PCS of the procedure satisfies that, for any α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1), there exists a constant c>0c>0c>0 such that lim inf⁡k→∞PCS≥α\liminf_{k\to\infty} \mathrm{PCS} \ge \alphaliminfk→∞​PCS≥α, for B=ckB = ckB=ck.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 24)

Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) and γ0∈(0,γ)\gamma_0 \in (0, \gamma)γ0​∈(0,γ). Let n0≥1n_0 \ge 1n0​≥1 satisfy

Pr⁡{min⁡n≥n0Xˉ1(n)>μ1−γ0}≥α(5.3)\Pr\Big\{\min_{n \ge n_0} \bar X_1(n) > \mu_1 - \gamma_0\Big\} \ge \alpha \tag{5.3}Pr{n≥n0​min​Xˉ1​(n)>μ1​−γ0​}≥α(5.3)

and let ng≥C(γ−γ0σˉ;n0)−n0n_g \ge C\big(\tfrac{\gamma - \gamma_0}{\bar\sigma}; n_0\big) - n_0ng​≥C(σˉγ−γ0​​;n0​)−n0​. If B=(n0+ng)kB = (n_0 + n_g)kB=(n0​+ng​)k, then the PCS of the EFG procedure satisfies

lim inf⁡k→∞PCS ≥ α.\liminf_{k \to \infty} \mathrm{PCS} \ \ge\ \alpha .k→∞liminf​PCS ≥ α.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 22): Zˉ(n)\bar Z(n)Zˉ(n), n≥n0n \ge n_0n≥n0​, attains its minimum at a finite time almost surely.
  2. (5.1) (p. 22): N~(x)≤N~(x;n0)≤n0inf⁡{m≥1:Zˉ(mn0)<x}\tilde N(x) \le \tilde N(x; n_0) \le n_0 \inf\{m \ge 1 : \bar Z(mn_0) < x\}N~(x)≤N~(x;n0​)≤n0​inf{m≥1:Zˉ(mn0​)<x}, and the last crossing time is distributed as N~(n0 x)\tilde N(\sqrt{n_0}\,x)N~(n0​​x) (scaling corrected, see below).
  3. Lemma 4 (p. 22): N~(x;n0)\tilde N(x;n_0)N~(x;n0​) is a.s. finite with finite mean for x>0x > 0x>0; finite with probability strictly between 0 and 1, with infinite mean, for x<0x < 0x<0; a.s. finite with infinite mean for x=0x = 0x=0.
  4. Lemma 7 (p. ec6): C(x;n0)C(x; n_0)C(x;n0​) is strictly decreasing and continuous on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞).
  5. (5.2) (p. 23): PCS≥Pr⁡{∑i=2kNi(Xˉ1∗(n0);n0)+N1∗(n0)≤B}\mathrm{PCS} \ge \Pr\big\{\sum_{i=2}^k N_i(\bar X_1^*(n_0); n_0) + N_1^*(n_0) \le B\big\}PCS≥Pr{∑i=2k​Ni​(Xˉ1∗​(n0​);n0​)+N1∗​(n0​)≤B}, where Xˉ1∗(n0)\bar X_1^*(n_0)Xˉ1∗​(n0​) and N1∗(n0)N_1^*(n_0)N1∗​(n0​) are the minimum and argmin of Xˉ1(n)\bar X_1(n)Xˉ1​(n) over n≥n0n \ge n_0n≥n0​, and Ni(b;n0)N_i(b; n_0)Ni​(b;n0​) is the first n≥n0n \ge n_0n≥n0​ with Xˉi(n)<b\bar X_i(n) < bXˉi​(n)<b.
  6. Theorem 3 (p. 23, first sentence): if B/k=n0+ngB/k = n_0 + n_gB/k=n0​+ng​ and ng>C(γ/σˉ;n0)−n0n_g > C(\gamma/\bar\sigma; n_0) - n_0ng​>C(γ/σˉ;n0​)−n0​, then lim inf⁡kPCS≥Pr⁡{min⁡n≥n0Xˉ1(n)>μ1−γ0}\liminf_k \mathrm{PCS} \ge \Pr\{\min_{n\ge n_0}\bar X_1(n) > \mu_1 - \gamma_0\}liminfk​PCS≥Pr{minn≥n0​​Xˉ1​(n)>μ1​−γ0​}, where γ0∈(0,γ)\gamma_0 \in (0, \gamma)γ0​∈(0,γ) solves C(γ−γ0σˉ;n0)=ng+n0C\big(\tfrac{\gamma-\gamma_0}{\bar\sigma}; n_0\big) = n_g + n_0C(σˉγ−γ0​​;n0​)=ng​+n0​.
  7. Lemma 5 (p. 24): for every γ0>0\gamma_0 > 0γ0​>0 and α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) some finite n0≥1n_0 \ge 1n0​≥1 satisfies (5.3).

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 shows that a one-line change to the greedy procedure, a fixed number of initial observations per alternative, turns a sample-optimal but inconsistent procedure into one that is both sample optimal and consistent. Any PCS target is reached with a budget that grows only linearly in the number of alternatives, without variance estimates, elimination rules or pairwise comparisons. Together with (5.4) (p. 24) it also gives a recipe for choosing n0n_0n0​ and ngn_gng​ when γ\gammaγ and σˉ2\bar\sigma^2σˉ2 are known, which converts the fixed-budget procedure into a fixed-precision one.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper, but Lemma 4 and Theorem 4 have their proofs omitted ("straightforward"), and Theorem 3's proof refers to "almost the same analysis" as Theorem 1. A machine-checked development makes these steps explicit. It also corrects the scaling in (5.1), which is misprinted in the source. No part of it is formalized on the platform. The boundary-crossing inequality (5.2) and the crossing-time lemmas for the Gaussian running average are reusable in the companion missions of this series and for other greedy procedures.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to bound each inferior alternative's sample size by the number of observations it needs to fall below alternative 1, and to sum. It fails because alternative 1's running average is itself random, may drop below its mean, and can lose the lead at any time before it reaches its minimum. The boundary must be the random minimum Xˉ1∗(n0)\bar X_1^*(n_0)Xˉ1∗​(n0​), and the crossing times of the other alternatives are then dependent through it. The step from (5.2) to Theorem 3 needs crossing times dominated by iid copies of N~(⋅ ;n0)\tilde N(\cdot\,; n_0)N~(⋅;n0​) on the event that the minimum is high, a strong law over the growing array, and the continuity of C(⋅ ;n0)C(\cdot\,; n_0)C(⋅;n0​) (Lemma 7) to pass to the limit in the level. Lemma 4 needs fluctuation facts for the Gaussian random walk (finite expected crossing time for x>0x>0x>0, infinite mean at x=0x=0x=0) that are not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Observations form an array XijX_{ij}Xij​ indexed by N×N\mathbb N \times \mathbb NN×N on a probability space, mutually independent, with Xij∼N(μi,σi2)X_{ij} \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)Xij​∼N(μi​,σi2​) and σi2>0\sigma_i^2 > 0σi2​>0. Problem kkk uses alternatives 0,…,k−10, \dots, k-10,…,k−1; Lean's alternative 000 is the paper's alternative 1. One array serves every kkk, which does not change any PCS.

  • Procedure. The EFG procedure is a deterministic map from the observation array to the selected index. Ties in every arg max go to the smallest index, which is a null event under the model. The greedy loop runs B−n0kB - n_0kB−n0​k times (none if B≤n0kB \le n_0kB≤n0​k).

  • Budget. B=(n0+ng)kB = (n_0 + n_g)kB=(n0​+ng​)k is read as ⌊(n0+ng)k⌋\lfloor (n_0+n_g)k \rfloor⌊(n0​+ng​)k⌋. Conditions involving C(⋅ ;n0)−n0C(\cdot\,; n_0) - n_0C(⋅;n0​)−n0​ are written additively in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞].

  • Crossing times, argmins and CCC. These take values in N∪{∞}\mathbb N \cup \{\infty\}N∪{∞} and [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. A path that never crosses has crossing time ∞\infty∞, and C(0;n0)=∞C(0; n_0) = \inftyC(0;n0​)=∞ is literal. "min⁡n≥n0Xˉ1(n)>a\min_{n \ge n_0} \bar X_1(n) > aminn≥n0​​Xˉ1​(n)>a" means that the path is bounded below from n0n_0n0​ on and its infimum exceeds aaa. The minimum is attained a.s. (Lemma 3).

  • Probabilities and limits. These are extended nonnegative reals. The liminf is taken in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞].

  • (5.1) correction. The paper derives N~(x;n0)≤n0N~(x/n0)\tilde N(x;n_0) \le n_0\tilde N(x/\sqrt{n_0})N~(x;n0​)≤n0​N~(x/n0​​) from "Zˉ(mn0)=n0 Zˉ(m)\bar Z(mn_0) = \sqrt{n_0}\,\bar Z(m)Zˉ(mn0​)=n0​​Zˉ(m) statistically". In fact Zˉ(mn0)=dZˉ(m)/n0\bar Z(mn_0) \overset{d}{=} \bar Z(m)/\sqrt{n_0}Zˉ(mn0​)=dZˉ(m)/n0​​, so the milestone states the bound with N~(n0 x)\tilde N(\sqrt{n_0}\,x)N~(n0​​x). The printed form is false for x<0x < 0x<0 and n0≥2n_0 \ge 2n0​≥2.

  • Theorem 3. The existence of γ0\gamma_0γ0​, implicit in the paper, is a conclusion of the statement, so the lower bound cannot hold vacuously. The slippage-configuration limit in its second sentence is not stated.

  • Ruled out. None of the following can make the statements trivial, because the encodings above exclude them:

    • an N\mathbb NN-valued crossing time with inf⁡∅=0\inf\emptyset = 0inf∅=0;
    • a real infimum of an unbounded path read as 000;
    • an unsolvable equation for γ0\gamma_0γ0​.
  • Infrastructure needed. A complete development needs the following, all reusable beyond this mission:

    • laws of crossing times of the Gaussian random walk;
    • the strong law for iid N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}-valued variables;
    • a coupling of the crossing times with iid copies;
    • a pathwise induction over the run of the procedure for (5.2).

    Contributions to any milestone are welcome.

  • Source. The source is the authors' arXiv preprint, version 3 (11 Dec 2023), and all numbering follows it.

Selected references

  • Z. Li, W. Fan, L. J. Hong, The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection, arXiv:2303.02951v3, 2023; Management Science, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.02951
  • R. E. Bechhofer, A single-sample multiple decision procedure for ranking means of normal populations with known variances, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 25(1):16–39, 1954. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728845
  • S.-H. Kim, B. L. Nelson, A fully sequential procedure for indifference-zone selection in simulation, ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 11(3):251–273, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1145/502109.502111
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Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection 2: Under the Slippage Configuration with a Common Variance the Greedy PCS Lower Bound Is TightResearch Paper

Motivation

Ranking and selection (R&S) asks how to spend a fixed budget of simulation runs on kkk competing system designs so that the design with the largest mean performance is identified with high probability. When kkk runs into the thousands or millions, the relevant question is how the total budget must grow with kkk. Li, Fan and Hong (arXiv:2303.02951v3, published in Management Science, 2025) showed that the simplest adaptive rule, the greedy procedure, is sample optimal: a budget linear in kkk keeps the probability of correct selection (PCS) bounded away from zero (their Theorem 1, p. 15). This mission formalizes their second main result: under the least favorable configuration of means and variances, the PCS lower bound of Theorem 1 is exactly the limit, so it cannot be improved for the greedy procedure.

The result also explains the paper's later design choices. Corollary 1 (p. 18) deduces from it that the greedy procedure is not consistent: however large the constant ccc in B=ckB = ckB=ck, its worst-case PCS stays below a constant less than one. This is why §5 of the paper introduces an explore-first variant.

Setting

There are kkk alternatives. Alternative iii produces independent observations Xi1,Xi2,⋯∼N(μi,σi2)X_{i1}, X_{i2}, \dots \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)Xi1​,Xi2​,⋯∼N(μi​,σi2​), independent across alternatives, and alternative 111 is the unique best. The running average of alternative iii after nnn observations is Xˉi(n)=1n∑j=1nXij\bar X_i(n) = \frac1n \sum_{j=1}^n X_{ij}Xˉi​(n)=n1​∑j=1n​Xij​.

The greedy procedure (Procedure 1, p. 10) takes one observation from each alternative, then repeatedly takes one more observation from the alternative with the largest current running average, until BBB observations have been taken in total; it selects the alternative with the largest final running average. PCS is the probability that it selects alternative 111, and PICS =1−= 1 - =1− PCS.

The slippage configuration with a common variance (SC-CV, §4.3, p. 16) is

μ1−μi=γ>0(i=2,…,k),σi2=σ2>0(i=1,…,k):\mu_1 - \mu_i = \gamma > 0 \quad (i = 2, \dots, k), \qquad \sigma_i^2 = \sigma^2 > 0 \quad (i = 1, \dots, k):μ1​−μi​=γ>0(i=2,…,k),σi2​=σ2>0(i=1,…,k):

the non-best alternatives share one mean and all alternatives share one variance.

The constant governing the analysis is

C(x)=exp⁡(∑n=1∞1nΦ(−n x)),x>0,C(x) = \exp\Big( \sum_{n=1}^\infty \frac1n \Phi(-\sqrt n\, x) \Big), \qquad x > 0,C(x)=exp(n=1∑∞​n1​Φ(−n​x)),x>0,

where Φ\PhiΦ is the standard normal distribution function. By Lemma 2 of the paper, C(x)C(x)C(x) is the expected first time nnn at which the running average of iid N(0,1)N(0,1)N(0,1) variables drops below xxx; it is continuous and strictly decreasing on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞) and tends to ∞\infty∞ as x→0+x \to 0^+x→0+.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 16)

If B=ckB = ckB=ck and c>C(γ/σ)c > C(\gamma/\sigma)c>C(γ/σ), let γ0∈(0,γ)\gamma_0 \in (0, \gamma)γ0​∈(0,γ) solve C((γ−γ0)/σ)=cC((\gamma - \gamma_0)/\sigma) = cC((γ−γ0​)/σ)=c. Under the SC-CV,

lim⁡k→∞PCS=Pr⁡{min⁡n≥1Xˉ1(n)>μ1−γ0}=[C(γ0σ)]−1.\lim_{k\to\infty} \mathrm{PCS} = \Pr\Big\{ \min_{n\ge1} \bar X_1(n) > \mu_1 - \gamma_0 \Big\} = \Big[C\Big(\frac{\gamma_0}{\sigma}\Big)\Big]^{-1}.k→∞lim​PCS=Pr{n≥1min​Xˉ1​(n)>μ1​−γ0​}=[C(σγ0​​)]−1.

The goal asserts both that some such γ0\gamma_0γ0​ exists and that the limit holds for every solution.

Milestones, in the order of the proof (EC.1.4, pp. ec3–ec5)

  1. (EC.1.8), p. ec4: with mϵm_\epsilonmϵ​ the first time Xˉ1\bar X_1Xˉ1​ drops below a level μ1−γϵ+\mu_1 - \gamma_\epsilon^+μ1​−γϵ+​, PICS is at least the probability that the budget suffices to reach mϵm_\epsilonmϵ​ but not to push every other alternative below the new minimum of Xˉ1\bar X_1Xˉ1​.
  2. (EC.1.11), p. ec5, with γϵ±\gamma_\epsilon^\pmγϵ±​ from (EC.1.7): lim inf⁡kPICS≥Pr⁡{mϵ<∞,min⁡1≤n≤mϵ−1Xˉ1(n)≥μ1−γϵ−}\liminf_k \mathrm{PICS} \ge \Pr\{ m_\epsilon < \infty, \min_{1\le n\le m_\epsilon-1} \bar X_1(n) \ge \mu_1 - \gamma_\epsilon^- \}liminfk​PICS≥Pr{mϵ​<∞,min1≤n≤mϵ​−1​Xˉ1​(n)≥μ1​−γϵ−​}.
  3. (EC.1.6), p. ec3: lim inf⁡kPICS≥Pr⁡{∃n≥1 s.t. Xˉ1(n)<μ1−γ0}\liminf_k \mathrm{PICS} \ge \Pr\{\exists n \ge 1 \text{ s.t. } \bar X_1(n) < \mu_1 - \gamma_0\}liminfk​PICS≥Pr{∃n≥1 s.t. Xˉ1​(n)<μ1​−γ0​}.
  4. Theorem 1 under the SC-CV, p. 15: lim inf⁡kPCS≥Pr⁡{min⁡n≥1Xˉ1(n)>μ1−γ0}=[C(γ0/σ)]−1>0\liminf_k \mathrm{PCS} \ge \Pr\{\min_{n\ge1} \bar X_1(n) > \mu_1 - \gamma_0\} = [C(\gamma_0/\sigma)]^{-1} > 0liminfk​PCS≥Pr{minn≥1​Xˉ1​(n)>μ1​−γ0​}=[C(γ0​/σ)]−1>0.

Milestones 3 and 4 bound the PCS from above and below by the same quantity, up to the null event {min⁡nXˉ1(n)=μ1−γ0}\{\min_n \bar X_1(n) = \mu_1 - \gamma_0\}{minn​Xˉ1​(n)=μ1​−γ0​}. Corollary 1 (p. 18, lim⁡PCS≤[C(γ/σ)]−1<1\lim \mathrm{PCS} \le [C(\gamma/\sigma)]^{-1} < 1limPCS≤[C(γ/σ)]−1<1) is included as a separate theorem after the goal; it is not a milestone.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 gives a lower bound on the asymptotic PCS that holds for every configuration satisfying a gap and a variance bound. Theorem 2 shows the bound is attained under the SC-CV, so it is the exact worst-case asymptotic PCS of the greedy procedure on a linear budget. It also identifies the slippage configuration as least favorable for this procedure. Corollary 1, which follows from it, shows that the greedy procedure is sample optimal without being consistent. The paper uses this to motivate the explore-first greedy procedure of §5, which is consistent.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; none of it is formalized. A formal proof requires a precise, total definition of the greedy procedure as a map from an observation array to a selected alternative, a pathwise analysis of that map (milestone 1), the strong law of large numbers for iid crossing times with values in N∪{∞}\mathbb N \cup \{\infty\}N∪{∞}, and a limiting argument in ϵ\epsilonϵ that uses the continuity and strict monotonicity of CCC. The identity Pr⁡{min⁡nXˉ1(n)>μ1−γ0}=[C(γ0/σ)]−1\Pr\{\min_n \bar X_1(n) > \mu_1 - \gamma_0\} = [C(\gamma_0/\sigma)]^{-1}Pr{minn​Xˉ1​(n)>μ1​−γ0​}=[C(γ0​/σ)]−1 is the Gaussian case of Spitzer's identity, which Mathlib does not have.

Difficulty

The lower half is Theorem 1. The upper half needs a different pathwise argument. Showing that the greedy procedure can succeed only requires bounding the budget the inferior alternatives consume. Showing that it must fail requires an event on which alternative 1 has fallen below a level and the remaining budget cannot lift it back. The paper conditions on such an event, BϵB_\epsilonBϵ​. On BϵB_\epsilonBϵ​, two families of crossing times, measured against two different random levels (the running minimum of Xˉ1\bar X_1Xˉ1​ before and at mϵm_\epsilonmϵ​), are compared with deterministic multiples of kkk. Both comparisons need the strong law, and the event BϵB_\epsilonBϵ​ must survive the limit ϵ→0\epsilon \to 0ϵ→0. The obvious first idea is to copy the proof of Theorem 1 with the inequalities reversed. It fails because the inclusion (3.2) behind Theorem 1 is one-sided: a large budget forces a correct selection, but a small budget alone does not force an incorrect one.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Alternatives are indexed from 000 in Lean: Lean's alternative 000 is the paper's alternative 111. Observations form one infinite array XijX_{ij}Xij​ on a probability space, mutually independent over all pairs (i,j)(i, j)(i,j), with Xij∼N(μi,vi)X_{ij} \sim N(\mu_i, v_i)Xij​∼N(μi​,vi​). The problem with kkk alternatives reads rows 0,…,k−10, \dots, k-10,…,k−1. PCS for kkk alternatives depends only on the law of those rows, so this coupling changes no PCS.
  • Procedure. The procedure is a deterministic function of the array. Ties in every arg max go to the smallest index; ties have probability zero under normality. With fewer than kkk observations of budget, no greedy step is taken.
  • Budget. "B=ckB = ckB=ck" is read as B=⌊ck⌋B = \lfloor ck \rfloorB=⌊ck⌋.
  • Values. Probabilities, limits and liminfs are taken in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. Crossing times take values in N∪{∞}\mathbb N \cup \{\infty\}N∪{∞}, with ∞\infty∞ when no crossing occurs. "min⁡n≥1Xˉ1(n)>a\min_{n\ge1} \bar X_1(n) > aminn≥1​Xˉ1​(n)>a" means the running average is bounded below and its infimum exceeds aaa; the minimum is attained almost surely.
  • The constant CCC. It is defined by the series above. Every statement evaluates it only at positive arguments (γ/σ\gamma/\sigmaγ/σ, (γ−γ0)/σ(\gamma - \gamma_0)/\sigma(γ−γ0​)/σ, γ0/σ\gamma_0/\sigmaγ0​/σ), where the series converges.
  • Disclosed generalization. Milestone 1 is stated for an arbitrary level and for arbitrary means with positive variances, since the inclusion uses neither the SC-CV nor the event BϵB_\epsilonBϵ​.

Three trivializations are ruled out. Crossing times typed in N\mathbb NN would be 000 when no crossing occurs. Junk values of tsum or of the infimum on unbounded sets would make the statements meaningless. A γ0\gamma_0γ0​ that no value can satisfy would make the goal vacuous, which is why the goal also asserts that γ0\gamma_0γ0​ exists.

Infrastructure needed: the strong law for iid N∪{∞}\mathbb N \cup \{\infty\}N∪{∞}-valued variables with finite mean, Spitzer's identity for Gaussian random walks, and continuity of CCC. These would be reusable in any boundary-crossing analysis of sequential procedures. Contributions toward any milestone, or toward these general lemmas, are welcome. The source PDF is the arXiv v3 preprint (11 Dec 2023), and all page and equation numbers refer to it.

Selected references

  • Z. Li, W. Fan, L. J. Hong, The (Surprising) Sample Optimality of Greedy Procedures for Large-Scale Ranking and Selection, arXiv:2303.02951v3, 2023; Management Science, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.02951
  • F. Spitzer, A combinatorial lemma and its application to probability theory, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 82 (1956), 323–339. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1956-0079851-X
  • R. E. Bechhofer, A single-sample multiple decision procedure for ranking means of normal populations with known variances, Ann. Math. Statist. 25 (1954), 16–39. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728845
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts 2: The High-Quality Influencer's Defensive Fake-Account Purchase Falls in Antifake Effort If Condition (22) Holds, and Otherwise Rises Then FallsResearch Paper

Motivation

Fake follower accounts are sold openly to social media influencers, who buy them because advertisers and new followers read a large follower count as a sign of quality. Platforms respond with antifake effort: detection, removal and registration hurdles that make fake accounts more expensive to operate, but that also impose a nuisance cost on legitimate users (more CAPTCHAs, more false flags). Huang and Liu (Management Science 71(10), 2025) model this market as a signaling game and ask how fake-account purchases respond to the platform's effort and to contextual factors such as social media literacy and antifake technology.

A finding of the paper that runs against intuition concerns the high-quality influencer. In a costly separating equilibrium the high type buys fake accounts defensively, so that a low-quality influencer cannot afford to mimic its follower count. This contrasts with Chen and Papanastasiou (2021), where only the low type manipulates. Proposition 3 of the paper describes how this defensive purchase moves with every parameter, and in particular that raising the antifake effort can increase it. This mission formalizes Proposition 3 and the steps the paper uses to explain it.

Setting

An influencer is of high type HHH or low type LLL, with content qualities qH>qL>0q_H>q_L>0qH​>qL​>0. A unit mass of consumers has valuation θ∼U[0,1]\theta\sim U[0,1]θ∼U[0,1] and follows when θq≥c\theta q\ge cθq≥c. A fraction l∈(0,1)l\in(0,1)l∈(0,1) of consumers, the social media literacy, know the type; the rest infer it from the early follower count, which the influencer can inflate with fake accounts. Advertising yields revenue μ\muμ per real follower, of which the influencer keeps a share λi\lambda_iλi​.

The platform chooses an antifake effort d≥0d\ge0d≥0. With antifake technology level τ∈[0,1)\tau\in[0,1)τ∈[0,1), base price p0p_0p0​, opportunity cost c0≥0c_0\ge0c0​≥0 and nuisance coefficient c1≥0c_1\ge0c1​≥0, the unit price of fake accounts and the cost of following are

pf=p0+d1−τ,c=c0+c1(1−τ)d.p_f=p_0+\frac{d}{1-\tau},\qquad c=c_0+c_1(1-\tau)d .pf​=p0​+1−τd​,c=c0​+c1​(1−τ)d.

A type of quality qqq has nin=l(1−c/q)n_{in}=l(1-c/q)nin​=l(1−c/q) informed followers, and, when its type is revealed, nun=(1−l)(1−c/q)n_{un}=(1-l)(1-c/q)nun​=(1−l)(1−c/q) uninformed ones. With η2=1lλiμ(1−l2)\eta_2=\frac1l\lambda_i\mu(1-l^2)η2​=l1​λi​μ(1−l2) and d2=(1−τ)(η2−p0)d_2=(1-\tau)(\eta_2-p_0)d2​=(1−τ)(η2​−p0​), Lemma 2 of the paper gives the costly separating equilibrium for d≤d2d\le d_2d≤d2​, in which the H-type's early-follower count is

n2csep=1pfλiμ[(1−l)(ninH−ninL)+(nunH−nunL)]+ninL(17)n_2^{csep}=\frac1{p_f}\lambda_i\mu\big[(1-l)(n_{in}^H-n_{in}^L)+(n_{un}^H-n_{un}^L)\big]+n_{in}^L \quad(17)n2csep​=pf​1​λi​μ[(1−l)(ninH​−ninL​)+(nunH​−nunL​)]+ninL​(17)

and its defensive purchase is xHcsep=n2csep−ninHx_H^{csep}=n_2^{csep}-n_{in}^HxHcsep​=n2csep​−ninH​. In the pooling equilibrium the low type's offensive purchase is xLpool=ninH−ninLx_L^{pool}=n_{in}^H-n_{in}^LxLpool​=ninH​−ninL​. In Lean the parameters are fields mu lamI lamP rho l qH qL c0 c1 tau p0 gamma of a structure Params, and the quantities above are price, cost, nIn, nUnSep, eta2, d2, nCsep2, xCsepH, xPoolL.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3(c)

Assume c0>0c_0>0c0​>0, p0>0p_0>0p0​>0 and Assumption 3 (p0<η2p_0<\eta_2p0​<η2​). Let (22) be the condition

c1(1−τ)2≤λiμ(1−l2)c0p0[λiμ(1−l2)−p0l].c_1(1-\tau)^2\le\frac{\lambda_i\mu(1-l^2)c_0}{p_0[\lambda_i\mu(1-l^2)-p_0l]} .c1​(1−τ)2≤p0​[λi​μ(1−l2)−p0​l]λi​μ(1−l2)c0​​.

If (22) holds, d↦xHcsep(d)d\mapsto x_H^{csep}(d)d↦xHcsep​(d) is strictly decreasing on [0,d2][0,d_2][0,d2​]. Otherwise there is d^∈(0,d2)\hat d\in(0,d_2)d^∈(0,d2​) with xHcsepx_H^{csep}xHcsep​ strictly increasing on [0,d^][0,\hat d][0,d^] and strictly decreasing on [d^,d2][\hat d,d_2][d^,d2​].

Milestones

  1. The closed form (20): xHcsep=1pf[λiμ(1−l2)−pfl](c/qL−c/qH)x_H^{csep}=\frac1{p_f}[\lambda_i\mu(1-l^2)-p_fl](c/q_L-c/q_H)xHcsep​=pf​1​[λi​μ(1−l2)−pf​l](c/qL​−c/qH​).
  2. The marginal effects: dxHcsep/dd=m1+m2dx_H^{csep}/dd=m_1+m_2dxHcsep​/dd=m1​+m2​, with m1m_1m1​ the higher fake-account price effect and m2m_2m2​ the higher nuisance cost effect, as displayed on p. 8875.
  3. m2=0m_2=0m2​=0 at d=d2d=d_2d=d2​, and xHcsepx_H^{csep}xHcsep​ is strictly decreasing on a left neighbourhood of d2d_2d2​.
  4. Proposition 3(a): xHcsepx_H^{csep}xHcsep​ strictly decreases in lll, in p0p_0p0​, in the quality ratio R=qL/qHR=q_L/q_HR=qL​/qH​ and in τ\tauτ (four milestones).
  5. Proposition 3(b): xHcsepx_H^{csep}xHcsep​ strictly increases in λi\lambda_iλi​.

A companion theorem, not a milestone, states Proposition 2(a)–(b) for the offensive purchase xLpoolx_L^{pool}xLpool​.

Significance

Proposition 3(c) says that the platform's main instrument against fake accounts can backfire: below a threshold on the technology level, a moderate increase in antifake effort makes high-quality influencers buy more fake accounts, because the higher nuisance cost widens the follower gap the low type would have to close. Proposition 3(a) identifies the levers that reduce defensive purchases unambiguously: literacy, the base price, and antifake technology. Together with Proposition 2, these results underlie the paper's policy discussion of when an antifake campaign reduces the number of fake accounts at all.

The results are proved in the paper's Online Appendix; none of them is machine-checked. The formalization makes every hypothesis explicit: positivity of c0c_0c0​ and p0p_0p0​, the exact domain on which each monotonicity claim is strict, and the reading of the informal remark "m2→0m_2\to0m2​→0", which is false as d→∞d\to\inftyd→∞ and true at the edge d2d_2d2​ of the costly separating range. It also yields a reusable closed form for the equilibrium purchase that other statements about this model can cite.

Difficulty

The closed form and the derivative are algebra and calculus over rational functions of ddd, with care about pf≠0p_f\ne0pf​=0. The content is the dichotomy in (c). On [0,d2)[0,d_2)[0,d2​) the two marginal effects have opposite signs, m1<0<m2m_1<0<m_2m1​<0<m2​, and both depend on ddd through pfp_fpf​ and through ccc. The paper's informal argument ("m2→0m_2\to0m2​→0, so m1m_1m1​ dominates eventually") settles only the right end of the range. What the goal requires is the sign of m1+m2m_1+m_2m1​+m2​ on the whole interval: that it changes sign at most once, that (22) is exactly the condition for it to be nonpositive at d=0d=0d=0, and that in the other case the change of sign happens strictly inside (0,d2)(0,d_2)(0,d2​). Strictness of the parameter comparative statics also fails at the edges (d=0d=0d=0 for τ\tauτ, d=d2d=d_2d=d2​ for RRR), so each domain has to be chosen exactly.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real-valued closed forms; no probability spaces are introduced, since the paper's expectations over θ\thetaθ are already the closed forms (8)–(9). The parameter bundle carries the standing ranges of §3 and Table 1: μ>0\mu>0μ>0, λi,λp>0\lambda_i,\lambda_p>0λi​,λp​>0, λi+λp<1\lambda_i+\lambda_p<1λi​+λp​<1, 0<ρ<10<\rho<10<ρ<1, 0<l<10<l<10<l<1, 0<qL<qH0<q_L<q_H0<qL​<qH​, c0,c1≥0c_0,c_1\ge0c0​,c1​≥0, 0≤τ<10\le\tau<10≤τ<1, γ>0\gamma>0γ>0. The readings of the paper fixed by the formalization are:

  • Assumptions 1 and 2 (qL>cq_L>cqL​>c, λi>pf/(μ+pf)\lambda_i>p_f/(\mu+p_f)λi​>pf​/(μ+pf​)) depend on ddd and are not imposed; the follower formulas are used untruncated, as in the paper. This strengthens every statement.
  • Added hypotheses c0>0c_0>0c0​>0 (needed for strictness) and p0>0p_0>0p0​>0 ((22) divides by p0p_0p0​; pf>0p_f>0pf​>0 at d=0d=0d=0); Assumption 3 where the paper uses it.
  • The quality ratio RRR is never defined in the paper; it is qL/qHq_L/q_HqL​/qH​ with qHq_HqH​ fixed, as the text after Proposition 3 says.
  • Domains. Proposition 3(c) is stated on [0,d2][0,d_2][0,d2​]; when a pooling range exists, the costly separating range is (d1,d2](d_1,d_2](d1​,d2​] and the peak of the second case may lie below d1d_1d1​. The τ\tauτ claim needs d>0d>0d>0 and pf≤η2p_f\le\eta_2pf​≤η2​; the RRR claim needs d<d2d<d_2d<d2​. The lll, p0p_0p0​ and λi\lambda_iλi​ claims hold for every value in the open range, a strengthening.
  • "m2→0m_2\to0m2​→0" is formalized as m2(d2)=0m_2(d_2)=0m2​(d2​)=0 plus strict decrease near d2d_2d2​.
  • Proposition 2(c) ("unaffected by p0p_0p0​ or λi\lambda_iλi​") is not posed: it holds by definition.

xHcsepx_H^{csep}xHcsep​ is defined as n2csep−ninHn_2^{csep}-n_{in}^Hn2csep​−ninH​ through (17), not by the right side of (20); a definition by (20) would make the closed-form milestone trivial. The goal must be proved about this function on [0,d2][0,d_2][0,d2​], not about a sign condition on an abstract derivative. The proofs are in the paper's Online Appendix, which is not used here; every milestone is a statement or display of the main text. Contributions of proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are lemmas on single-crossing of the derivative.

Selected references

  • Z. Huang and D. Liu, Economics of Social Media Fake Accounts, Management Science 71(10):8865–8883, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02616
  • L. Chen and Y. Papanastasiou, Seeding the Herd: Pricing and Welfare Effects of Social Learning Manipulation, Management Science 67(11):6734–6750, 2021.
  • X. Guo, G. Xiao and F. Zhang, Effect of Consumer Awareness on Corporate Social Responsibility under Asymmetric Information, SSRN preprint, 2017. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3039862
  • G. J. Mailath, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and A. Postlewaite, Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games, Journal of Economic Theory 60(2):241–276, 1993.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryBandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions 1: With IID Private Values a Bidding Policy Achieves Expected Regret at Most C√T log^2.5 TResearch Paper

Motivation

Most display advertising is sold in first-price auctions: the highest bidder wins and pays its own bid. Since the industry's move away from second-price formats around 2019, a bidder can no longer bid its value and must instead learn how much to shade its bid, from data about how the other bidders behave. A demand-side platform faces this problem millions of times a day with very little information. When it wins it pays its bid and learns nothing about the competition beyond the fact that it won; when it loses it sees only the winning price.

Han, Zhou and Weissman (arXiv:2003.09795v7, Operations Research 2025) cast this as an online learning problem and gave the first bidding policies with O~(T)\tilde O(\sqrt T)O~(T​) regret against an arbitrary unknown distribution of competing bids. This mission is the first of a series of six on that paper. It covers the case of stochastic private values, and the route to it through a general class of contextual bandits.

Setting

A single bidder takes part in TTT rounds. In round ttt she observes a private value vt∈[0,1]v_t\in[0,1]vt​∈[0,1], bids bt∈[0,1]b_t\in[0,1]bt​∈[0,1], and the highest other bid (HOB) is mt∈[0,1]m_t\in[0,1]mt​∈[0,1]. She wins iff bt≥mtb_t\ge m_tbt​≥mt​, so her payoff is r(vt,bt;mt)=(vt−bt)1(bt≥mt)r(v_t,b_t;m_t)=(v_t-b_t)\mathbb 1(b_t\ge m_t)r(vt​,bt​;mt​)=(vt​−bt​)1(bt​≥mt​). The HOBs are iid with an unknown CDF GGG on [0,1][0,1][0,1]; no continuity or shape assumption is made, and atoms are allowed. The values v1,…,vTv_1,\dots,v_Tv1​,…,vT​ are iid with an unknown distribution FFF on [0,1][0,1][0,1], independent of the HOBs.

Feedback is censored: at the end of round ttt only the winning bid yt=max⁡{bt,mt}y_t=\max\{b_t,m_t\}yt​=max{bt​,mt​} is revealed. A policy π\piπ chooses btb_tbt​ from its own internal randomness, v1,…,vtv_1,\dots,v_tv1​,…,vt​ and y1,…,yt−1y_1,\dots,y_{t-1}y1​,…,yt−1​. With the expected reward R(v,b)=(v−b)G(b)R(v,b)=(v-b)G(b)R(v,b)=(v−b)G(b), the regret is

RT(π;v)=∑t=1T(max⁡b∈[0,1]R(vt,b)−R(vt,bt)),R_T(\pi;v)=\sum_{t=1}^T\Big(\max_{b\in[0,1]}R(v_t,b)-R(v_t,b_t)\Big),RT​(π;v)=t=1∑T​(b∈[0,1]max​R(vt​,b)−R(vt​,bt​)),

the gap to an oracle that knows GGG.

The paper reaches its bound through partially ordered contextual bandits. These are contextual bandits with MMM contexts and KKK actions, rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], and a feedback graph GGG on the actions. Playing aaa reveals the rewards of aaa and its out-neighbours under every context (cross learning). The graph is a transitively closed DAG, so it induces a partial order ⪯G\preceq_G⪯G​ on actions. There is also a partial order ⪯C\preceq_{\mathcal C}⪯C​ on contexts along which some choice of optimal action is monotone (Definitions 2 and 3). Algorithm 3 is an arm-elimination algorithm for this class. The auction becomes such a bandit when values are clipped to the grid C={1/M,…,1}\mathcal C=\{1/M,\dots,1\}C={1/M,…,1} and bids are restricted to A={1/K,…,1}\mathcal A=\{1/K,\dots,1\}A={1/K,…,1}: a bid bbb reveals 1(mt≤b′)\mathbb 1(m_t\le b')1(mt​≤b′) for every b′≥bb'\ge bb′≥b.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

∃ C>0  ∀ T≥2  ∃ π  ∀ F,G:E[RT(π;v)]≤CT log⁡2.5T.\exists\,C>0\ \ \forall\,T\ge2\ \ \exists\,\pi\ \ \forall\,F,G:\qquad \mathbb E\big[R_T(\pi;v)\big]\le C\sqrt T\,\log^{2.5}T .∃C>0  ∀T≥2  ∃π  ∀F,G:E[RT​(π;v)]≤CT​log2.5T.

The policy may depend on TTT but not on FFF or GGG, and CCC is absolute. The goal leaves the policy unspecified. That makes it the weakest stable form of the paper's result: any later policy with a better logarithmic factor still proves it.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma 5 (p. 20): the largest maximiser b⋆(v)b^\star(v)b⋆(v) of R(v,⋅)R(v,\cdot)R(v,⋅) over the grid A\mathcal AA is non-decreasing in vvv.
  2. Lemma 4 (p. 20): pathwise, quantization costs at most (2/M+1/K)T(2/M+1/K)T(2/M+1/K)T regret.
  3. Lemma 3.1 (p. 19): for iid X1,…,XTX_1,\dots,X_TX1​,…,XT​ in a finite poset of width β\betaβ, E∑t(1+∑s<t1(Xs⪯Xt))−1≤β(1+log⁡T)2\mathbb E\sum_t(1+\sum_{s<t}\mathbb 1(X_s\preceq X_t))^{-1}\le\beta(1+\log T)^2E∑t​(1+∑s<t​1(Xs​⪯Xt​))−1≤β(1+logT)2.
  4. Lemma 2 (p. 18): with probability 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, Algorithm 3's minimum counts satisfy Nctt−1≥∑s<t1(cs⪯Cct)/(αlog⁡(MKT2/δ))−1N^{t-1}_{c_t}\ge\sum_{s<t}\mathbb 1(c_s\preceq_{\mathcal C}c_t)/(\alpha\log(MKT^2/\delta))-1Nct​t−1​≥∑s<t​1(cs​⪯C​ct​)/(αlog(MKT2/δ))−1.
  5. Theorem 5, iid contexts (p. 18): E[RT]≤1+24αβTlog⁡(2T)log⁡(2MKT2)log⁡(2MKT3)(1+log⁡T)\mathbb E[R_T]\le1+24\sqrt{\alpha\beta T\log(2T)\log(2MKT^2)\log(2MKT^3)}(1+\log T)E[RT​]≤1+24αβTlog(2T)log(2MKT2)log(2MKT3)​(1+logT).
  6. Corollary 1, iid values (p. 20): Algorithm 3 on the quantized auction with M=K=⌈T⌉M=K=\lceil\sqrt T\rceilM=K=⌈T​⌉, δ=1/(2T)\delta=1/(2T)δ=1/(2T) has expected regret O(Tlog⁡2.5T)O(\sqrt T\log^{2.5}T)O(T​log2.5T). This is the explicit policy behind the goal.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 shows that a bidder facing an arbitrary unknown competition distribution can learn to bid as well as the oracle up to O~(T)\tilde O(\sqrt T)O~(T​). That rate is optimal up to logarithms: mission 3 of the series formalizes the Ω(T)\Omega(\sqrt T)Ω(T​) lower bound. Theorem 5 is of independent interest. For partially ordered contextual bandits with iid contexts, the regret depends on the widths α,β\alpha,\betaα,β of the two orders and not on the numbers M,KM,KM,K of contexts and actions. Mission 5 of the series shows that this fails for adversarial contexts.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper, with full proofs in its Appendix C; none of them has a machine-checked proof. Beyond the theorems, the mission produces a reusable model of repeated auctions with censored feedback, with policies that are non-anticipating by construction. It also produces a definition of contextual bandits with graph feedback and cross learning, and an executable definition of an elimination algorithm with randomized exploration. Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 are self-contained and need no bandit machinery.

Difficulty

The obvious approach discretizes and runs one bandit algorithm per context. That gives regret O~(MT)\tilde O(\sqrt{MT})O~(MT​) and, after balancing against the quantization error of Lemma 4, only O~(T2/3)\tilde O(T^{2/3})O~(T2/3). Reaching T\sqrt TT​ requires information to flow across contexts. Lemma 2 says that a round with a small context feeds the minimum counts of every larger context. Lemma 3 turns this into a bound on the sum of confidence widths that depends on the width β\betaβ of the context order and not on MMM. Lemma 2 is a statement about a randomized algorithm whose active sets depend on the whole past, and its proof uses the uniform choice among the sources of the active set together with the extra elimination rule (⋆⋆\star\star⋆⋆). The step from a high-probability bound to an expectation over iid contexts must keep the contexts independent of the rewards and of the algorithm's randomness.

Formalization scope

  • Time and grids. Rounds are Fin T: paper round ttt is index t−1t-1t−1. The grids (6) are finite sets of reals. Context iii and action jjj of Fin M, Fin K stand for (i+1)/M(i+1)/M(i+1)/M and (j+1)/K(j+1)/K(j+1)/K. The paper's M=K=T1/2M=K=T^{1/2}M=K=T1/2 are ⌈T⌉\lceil\sqrt T\rceil⌈T​⌉.
  • HOB law. GGG is a probability measure on R\mathbb RR carried by [0,1][0,1][0,1], with G(x)=μG((−∞,x])G(x)=\mu_G((-\infty,x])G(x)=μG​((−∞,x]). Atoms are allowed.
  • Policies. A policy has an internal probability space. Its round-ttt bid takes the values as Fin (t+1) → ℝ and the feedback max⁡{bs,ms}\max\{b_s,m_s\}max{bs​,ms​} as Fin t → ℝ. It never sees mmm, GGG or FFF. The expectation is an integral against μU⊗F⊗T⊗G⊗T\mu_U\otimes F^{\otimes T}\otimes G^{\otimes T}μU​⊗F⊗T⊗G⊗T.
  • Integrability. Every expected-regret bound also asserts that the regret is integrable. This rules out the trivializing reading in which a non-measurable policy has expected regret 000 (Lean's value of a non-integrable integral).
  • Horizon. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 start at T≥2T\ge2T≥2: at T=1T=1T=1 the printed bound is 000, but an uninformed first bid has positive regret.
  • Algorithm 3. The algorithm is a deterministic function of the contexts, the reward vectors and one uniform ut∈[0,1]u_t\in[0,1]ut​∈[0,1] per round. The uniform choice in (⋆\star⋆) is the ⌊utn⌋\lfloor u_tn\rfloor⌊ut​n⌋-th of the nnn candidates. The topological ordering of the contexts is an argument, and every theorem quantifies over all such orderings. An active set emptied off the good event has minimum count +∞+\infty+∞, and the algorithm then plays action 000.
  • Definition 3. "a⋆(c)=arg⁡max⁡aRc,aa^\star(c)=\arg\max_aR_{c,a}a⋆(c)=argmaxa​Rc,a​" is read as some selection of maximisers that is monotone. The independence numbers enter as upper bounds.
  • Probabilities. "With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ" means the failure set has measure at most δ\deltaδ. Lemma 2 is stated for every fixed context sequence.
  • Rewards in Corollary 1. The quantized auction rewards lie in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1], and Algorithm 3 runs on them as printed. The formalization does not claim that they are a Definition 2 instance.

Not stated here: the adversarial parts of Theorem 5 and Corollary 1, Lemma 3.2, and the contextual form of Lemma 1. Proof contributions are welcome at every level. Useful infrastructure includes an anytime concentration bound for running means under adaptive sampling (the contextual Lemma 1) and Dilworth's theorem for finite posets (the step from β=1\beta=1β=1 to general β\betaβ in Lemma 3). Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 can be attacked first and independently.

Selected references

  • Y. Han, Z. Zhou, T. Weissman, Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions, Operations Research, 2025; preprint arXiv:2003.09795v7, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.09795
  • N. Alon, N. Cesa-Bianchi, O. Dekel, T. Koren, Online Learning with Feedback Graphs: Beyond Bandits, COLT 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.07617
  • S. Balseiro, N. Golrezaei, M. Mahdian, V. Mirrokni, J. Schneider, Contextual Bandits with Cross-Learning, NeurIPS 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.09582
  • R. P. Dilworth, A Decomposition Theorem for Partially Ordered Sets, Annals of Mathematics 51(1), 1950. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969503
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EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Retailer-Led Marketplaces 3: An Ad Valorem Fee Dominates a Per-Unit Fee, So the Monopolist Charges No Per-Unit FeeResearch Paper

Why platform fee design matters

Large online retailers such as Amazon, Walmart and JD.com run a retailer-led marketplace: they sell products on their own account and, on the same storefront, host independent third-party sellers whose sales they tax. How the platform charges those sellers is a live question for competition authorities and for the platforms themselves. Real marketplaces mostly use ad valorem fees (a percentage of the seller's revenue, the "referral fee"), sometimes together with per-item charges. Hervas-Drane and Shelegia (Management Science, 2025) build a model of such a marketplace in which the platform chooses its fee, steers part of the demand, and decides which products to sell itself under a capacity constraint. In their Appendix B.3 they ask whether a per-unit fee would serve the platform better than the ad valorem fee, and answer that it would not: provided the per-unit fee is not a subsidy, the platform sets it to zero (Lemma B.1). The comparison echoes the classical public-finance question of ad valorem versus specific taxation under imperfect competition (Suits and Musgrave, 1953).

Setting

There is a unit mass of products, indexed by their value vvv to consumers, distributed by a probability measure μ\muμ (the CDF GGG of the paper) on [c,∞)[c,\infty)[c,∞), where c>0c>0c>0 is the common marginal cost of supplying a unit. Each product is its own market, with a unit mass of unit-demand consumers and one potential third-party seller TTT. The monopolist MMM:

  • charges an ad valorem fee f∈[0,1]f\in[0,1]f∈[0,1] on TTT's revenue and a per-unit fee t≥0t\ge0t≥0 on each unit TTT sells;
  • steers a share λ∈[1/2,1]\lambda\in[1/2,1]λ∈[1/2,1] of the consumers of each product to the seller of his choice (Assumption 1 of the paper); the other 1−λ1-\lambda1−λ buy from the cheapest seller;
  • can sell himself at most a fraction k∈[0,1]k\in[0,1]k∈[0,1] of all products (assortment capacity).

The game has three stages: MMM announces (f,t)(f,t)(f,t); each TTT decides whether to enter, then MMM chooses which products to sell; then prices are set. In a product sold by TTT alone (SBT) she charges vvv and MMM earns fv+tfv+tfv+t. In a product sold by both (SBMT), MMM serves the steered consumers at vvv and TTT charges

pˉT=λv+(1−λ)(c+t)1−f(1−λ)(B.1),\bar p_T=\frac{\lambda v+(1-\lambda)(c+t)}{1-f(1-\lambda)}\qquad\text{(B.1)},pˉ​T​=1−f(1−λ)λv+(1−λ)(c+t)​(B.1),

so MMM earns πMSBMT=λ(v−c)+(1−λ)(fpˉT+t)\pi_M^{SBMT}=\lambda(v-c)+(1-\lambda)(f\bar p_T+t)πMSBMT​=λ(v−c)+(1−λ)(fpˉ​T​+t). A product sold by MMM alone (SBM) earns him v−cv-cv−c. Sellers enter the products of the marketplace set mp(c,f,t)={v:v(1−f)≥c+t}\mathrm{mp}(c,f,t)=\{v: v(1-f)\ge c+t\}mp(c,f,t)={v:v(1−f)≥c+t}, that is v≥vT=(c+t)/(1−f)v\ge v_T=(c+t)/(1-f)v≥vT​=(c+t)/(1−f) when f<1f<1f<1.

An allocation is a measurable set AAA of products with μ(A)≤k\mu(A)\le kμ(A)≤k. MMM's profit profitM(A)\mathrm{profit}_M(A)profitM​(A) adds v−cv-cv−c over A∖mpA\setminus\mathrm{mp}A∖mp, πMSBMT\pi_M^{SBMT}πMSBMT​ over A∩mpA\cap\mathrm{mp}A∩mp and fv+tfv+tfv+t over mp∖A\mathrm{mp}\setminus Amp∖A, and his profit at fees (f,t)(f,t)(f,t) is

ΠM(k,f,t)=sup⁡{profitM(A):A measurable, μ(A)≤k}.\Pi_M(k,f,t)=\sup\{\mathrm{profit}_M(A): A\ \text{measurable},\ \mu(A)\le k\}.ΠM​(k,f,t)=sup{profitM​(A):A measurable, μ(A)≤k}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma B.1

For every maximiser (f∗,t∗)(f^*,t^*)(f∗,t∗) of ΠM(k,⋅,⋅)\Pi_M(k,\cdot,\cdot)ΠM​(k,⋅,⋅) over [0,1]×[0,∞)[0,1]\times[0,\infty)[0,1]×[0,∞) with f∗<1f^*<1f∗<1,

t∗=0.t^*=0.t∗=0.

The goal asserts nothing about existence of a maximiser or about the value of f∗f^*f∗; it constrains every maximiser.

Milestones

  1. Entry threshold with a unit fee (App. B.3). For f<1f<1f<1: (1−f)v−c−t>0  ⟺  v>vT(1-f)v-c-t>0\iff v>v_T(1−f)v−c−t>0⟺v>vT​,  pˉT(1−f)−c−t>0  ⟺  v>vT\ \bar p_T(1-f)-c-t>0\iff v>v_T pˉ​T​(1−f)−c−t>0⟺v>vT​, and v∈mp  ⟺  v≥vTv\in\mathrm{mp}\iff v\ge v_Tv∈mp⟺v≥vT​, with vT=(c+t)/(1−f)v_T=(c+t)/(1-f)vT​=(c+t)/(1−f).
  2. The fee switch (proof of Lemma B.1). For 0<ε<t∗0<\varepsilon<t^*0<ε<t∗ and f∗<1f^*<1f∗<1, the fees t′=t∗−εt'=t^*-\varepsilont′=t∗−ε, f′=ε+f∗(c+t∗−ε)c+t∗f'=\dfrac{\varepsilon+f^*(c+t^*-\varepsilon)}{c+t^*}f′=c+t∗ε+f∗(c+t∗−ε)​ satisfy t′>0t'>0t′>0, f∗<f′<1f^*<f'<1f∗<f′<1 and vT(f′,t′)=vT(f∗,t∗)v_T(f',t')=v_T(f^*,t^*)vT​(f′,t′)=vT​(f∗,t∗).
  3. SBT step. vf′+t′>vf∗+t∗  ⟺  v>vT(f∗,t∗)vf'+t'>vf^*+t^*\iff v>v_T(f^*,t^*)vf′+t′>vf∗+t∗⟺v>vT​(f∗,t∗).
  4. SBMT step. pˉT(f′,t′)f′+t′>pˉT(f∗,t∗)f∗+t∗  ⟺  v>vT(f∗,t∗)\bar p_T(f',t')f'+t'>\bar p_T(f^*,t^*)f^*+t^*\iff v>v_T(f^*,t^*)pˉ​T​(f′,t′)f′+t′>pˉ​T​(f∗,t∗)f∗+t∗⟺v>vT​(f∗,t∗).

Significance

The result. Lemma B.1 justifies restricting the platform's instrument to an ad valorem fee, which is how the paper's main analysis (entry modes, the positive optimal fee, fee regulation) proceeds. It also isolates a mechanism: a per-unit fee raises the seller's effective marginal cost and so the price she must charge, while an ad valorem fee with the same entry threshold extracts more from high-value products. The paper notes on p. 19 that once subsidies t<0t<0t<0 are allowed the conclusion reverses; that is a different optimisation and not part of this mission.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper in a short argument; it has no machine-checked proof. A formal proof must make precise what the paper leaves implicit: that ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ is a supremum over all allocations, re-optimised after a fee change, that the profit gain from the fee switch is strictly positive and survives the supremum, and which degenerate corners (a foreclosed marketplace, full capacity with full steering) must be excluded. The model file is shared in form with the series' two other missions, which formalize the paper's entry-mode theorem (Proposition 2) and the positivity of the optimal ad valorem fee (Lemma 2).

Difficulty

The milestone algebra is elementary. The difficulty is in passing from a pointwise gain to the value function. The fee switch raises MMM's revenue on every marketplace product above vTv_TvT​ for a fixed allocation; ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ is a supremum over allocations, so a pointwise strict gain does not by itself give a strict gain of the supremum. When λ<1\lambda<1λ<1 the gain is bounded below uniformly over allocations, through the positive mass of [vT,∞)[v_T,\infty)[vT​,∞). When λ=1\lambda=1λ=1 the SBMT gain vanishes, and an allocation that covers almost all marketplace products gains nothing; ruling out that the supremum is approached by such allocations requires comparing with a different fee pair, and uses that μ\muμ has a density and full support. The naive reading, "keep MMM's allocation fixed and compare", only gives a lower bound on the new value and is not itself a proof of optimality failure.

Formalization scope

Lean conventions, all in the namespace RetailerMarketplace.UnitFee:

  • GGG is a measure μ : Measure ℝ with IsProbabilityMeasure μ, μ (Set.Iio c) = 0, μ ≪ volume (a density), Integrable (fun v => v) μ (finite mean, never stated in the paper but needed for profits to be finite), and full support on [c,∞)[c,\infty)[c,∞), ∀ a b, c ≤ a → a < b → 0 < μ (Set.Ioo a b) (the reading of G−1G^{-1}G−1 in the paper's display (3)).
  • 0 < c is a standing hypothesis (the paper's v∈[c,∞)v\in[c,\infty)v∈[c,∞) and "f=1f=1f=1 such that vT→∞v_T\to\inftyvT​→∞" presuppose it); λ∈[1/2,1]\lambda\in[1/2,1]λ∈[1/2,1] is Assumption 1; k∈[0,1]k\in[0,1]k∈[0,1].
  • The marketplace set is {v:c+t≤v(1−f)}\{v: c+t\le v(1-f)\}{v:c+t≤v(1−f)} (entry at zero profit, as in the paper's Lemma 1), never {v:(c+t)/(1−f)≤v}\{v: (c+t)/(1-f)\le v\}{v:(c+t)/(1−f)≤v}, which Lean's division by zero would make wrong at f=1f=1f=1. vT and the switched fee f′f'f′ appear only under f<1f<1f<1 and c+t>0c+t>0c+t>0.
  • (B.1) and the unit-fee payoffs are definitions: the paper states them without proof as the Stage-3 outcome, and this mission does not formalize a unit-fee pricing game.
  • PiM is sSup of the profits of all measurable allocations of mass at most kkk; under integrability the set is nonempty and bounded above, so this is a genuine supremum.
  • The goal adds two disclosed restrictions: f∗<1f^*<1f∗<1 (at f=1f=1f=1 no seller enters, ttt is payoff-irrelevant, and (1,t)(1,t)(1,t) with t>0t>0t>0 can be optimal) and (k,λ)≠(1,1)(k,\lambda)\ne(1,1)(k,λ)=(1,1) (every fee pair is then optimal).

A formalization that fixes MMM's allocation in the definition of ΠM\Pi_MΠM​, restricts allocations to intervals, takes the supremum over a set that may be unbounded, or replaces "every maximiser has t∗=0t^*=0t∗=0" by "some pair beats (f∗,t∗)(f^*,t^*)(f∗,t∗)" would trivialize or change the statement, and is ruled out.

A complete development needs set integrals over the marketplace set, the bathtub-type comparison of allocations, and order properties of sSup on ℝ. The model file and the milestone lemmas are reusable for any fee-design question in the same model. Proofs of the milestones, of the goal, and of intermediate lemmas about PiM (monotonicity in the fees, strict improvement under the fee switch) are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Hervas-Drane and S. Shelegia, Retailer-Led Marketplaces, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00315 (App. B.3, p. 18).
  • D. B. Suits and R. A. Musgrave, Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes Compared, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 67(4):598–604, 1953. https://doi.org/10.2307/1883604
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions 4: Arm Elimination with Graph Feedback and Cross Learning Has Regret Õ(T ∧ √(αMT) ∧ √(KT)) with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

In many sequential decision problems, playing one action reveals the outcome of other actions too. A bidder in a first-price auction who bids bbb and sees the winning price learns whether every bid at or above that price would have won. A recommender that shows one item learns something about related items. Two kinds of side information recur. Graph feedback across actions: playing action aaa also reveals the rewards of the out-neighbours of aaa in a directed graph GGG (Mannor and Shamir 2011; Alon, Cesa-Bianchi, Dekel and Koren 2015). Cross learning across contexts: the reward of the chosen action is revealed under every context, not only the current one (Balseiro, Golrezaei, Mahdian, Mirrokni and Schneider 2019).

Han, Zhou and Weissman (arXiv:2003.09795v7) reduce learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions to a contextual bandit with both structures. Their §3 starts from a simple arm-elimination algorithm that exploits graph feedback (Algorithm 1) and extends it to contexts with cross learning (Algorithm 2). This mission formalizes that layer: the algorithms, their concentration lemma, and their high-probability regret bounds (Theorems 3 and 4).

Timeline:

  • 2011: Mannor and Shamir introduce bandits with side observations given by a graph.
  • 2015: Alon, Cesa-Bianchi, Dekel and Koren show that for adversarial bandits with a directed feedback graph the minimax regret is Θ~(αT)\tilde\Theta(\sqrt{\alpha T})Θ~(αT​), with α\alphaα the independence number; their Lemma 8 bounds the weak domination number by 50αlog⁡n50\alpha\log n50αlogn.
  • 2016–2020: Cohen, Hazan and Koren, and Lykouris, Tardos and Wali, give elimination-type algorithms for stochastic bandits with graph feedback.
  • 2019: Balseiro et al. introduce cross learning and obtain O~(KT)\tilde O(\sqrt{KT})O~(KT​) regret.
  • 2020–2024: Han, Zhou and Weissman obtain O~(min⁡{αM,K}T)\tilde O(\sqrt{\min\{\alpha M, K\}T})O~(min{αM,K}T​) for both structures together (this mission) and use it for first-price auctions.

Setting

A stochastic contextual bandit with graph feedback and cross learning (Definition 2) has a horizon TTT, contexts C=[M]\mathcal C = [M]C=[M], actions A=[K]\mathcal A = [K]A=[K], a joint reward law PPP supported on [0,1]M×K[0,1]^{M\times K}[0,1]M×K with mean rewards Rc,aR_{c,a}Rc,a​, and a directed graph G=(A,E)G = (\mathcal A, E)G=(A,E) without self-loops. In round ttt a context ctc_tct​ is revealed, the learner picks ata_tat​, nature draws rt=(rt,c,a)c,ar_t = (r_{t,c,a})_{c,a}rt​=(rt,c,a​)c,a​ iid from PPP, and the learner observes rt,c,ar_{t,c,a}rt,c,a​ for every c∈Cc \in \mathcal Cc∈C and every a∈It={at}∪{a:(at,a)∈E}a \in I_t = \{a_t\}\cup\{a : (a_t,a)\in E\}a∈It​={at​}∪{a:(at​,a)∈E}. The regret (5) is

RT(π)=∑t=1T(max⁡a∈ARct,a−Rct,at).R_T(\pi) = \sum_{t=1}^T\Big(\max_{a\in\mathcal A}R_{c_t,a} - R_{c_t,a_t}\Big).RT​(π)=t=1∑T​(a∈Amax​Rct​,a​−Rct​,at​​).

Definition 1 is the case M=1M = 1M=1, with regret (4). The independence number α\alphaα of GGG is the largest size of a set of actions with no edge between any two of them.

Algorithm 2 keeps for each context ccc an active set Aact,c\mathcal A_{\mathrm{act},c}Aact,c​ and a minimum count NcN_cNc​, and for each action aaa a count nan_ana​ shared by all contexts. In each round it plays an action of A0,ct={a∈Aact,ct:na=Nct}\mathcal A_{0,c_t} = \{a\in\mathcal A_{\mathrm{act},c_t} : n_a = N_{c_t}\}A0,ct​​={a∈Aact,ct​​:na​=Nct​​}, either of largest out-degree in the graph restricted to A0,ct\mathcal A_{0,c_t}A0,ct​​ (Option I) or of in-degree zero there (Option II, for DAGs). When every active action of context ccc has been observed more than NcN_cNc​ times, the active set drops the actions whose empirical reward falls below the best by more than 6log⁡(2T)log⁡(MKT/δ)/Nc6\sqrt{\log(2T)\log(MKT/\delta)/N_c}6log(2T)log(MKT/δ)/Nc​​. Algorithm 1 is the case M=1M = 1M=1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, writing L=log⁡(2T)log⁡(MKT/δ)L = \log(2T)\log(MKT/\delta)L=log(2T)log(MKT/δ),

RT(π)≤T∧(K+24KTL)∧{50αM(log⁡K)2+24log⁡K50αMTLOption I,αM+24αMTLOption II, G a DAG,R_T(\pi)\le T\wedge\big(K+24\sqrt{KTL}\big)\wedge\begin{cases}50\alpha M(\log K)^2+24\log K\sqrt{50\alpha MTL} & \text{Option I},\\ \alpha M+24\sqrt{\alpha MTL} & \text{Option II, }G\text{ a DAG,}\end{cases}RT​(π)≤T∧(K+24KTL​)∧{50αM(logK)2+24logK50αMTL​αM+24αMTL​​Option I,Option II, G a DAG,​

for every context sequence and every tie-breaking rule.

Milestones

  • Lemma 1 (p. 13): with probability 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, ∣rˉat−Ra∣≤3log⁡(2T)log⁡(KT/δ)/nat|\bar r^t_a - R_a|\le 3\sqrt{\log(2T)\log(KT/\delta)/n^t_a}∣rˉat​−Ra​∣≤3log(2T)log(KT/δ)/nat​​ for all rounds and all observed actions of Algorithm 1.
  • Lemma 10 (p. 35): a directed graph on n≥2n\ge2n≥2 vertices with independence number α\alphaα has a weakly dominating set of size at most 50αlog⁡n50\alpha\log n50αlogn.
  • Theorem 3 (p. 13): the one-context bound T∧(50α(log⁡K)2+24log⁡K50αTlog⁡(2T)log⁡(KT/δ))T\wedge(50\alpha(\log K)^2+24\log K\sqrt{50\alpha T\log(2T)\log(KT/\delta)})T∧(50α(logK)2+24logK50αTlog(2T)log(KT/δ)​) (Option I), resp. T∧(α+24αTlog⁡(2T)log⁡(KT/δ))T\wedge(\alpha+24\sqrt{\alpha T\log(2T)\log(KT/\delta)})T∧(α+24αTlog(2T)log(KT/δ)​) (Option II).
  • Lemma 1, contextual form (p. 16): the same concentration for Algorithm 2, uniformly over contexts, with log⁡(MKT/δ)\log(MKT/\delta)log(MKT/δ).

Significance

Theorem 4 shows that one algorithm attains, up to logarithmic factors, the better of two regret rates: KT\sqrt{KT}KT​, available from cross learning alone, and αMT\sqrt{\alpha MT}αMT​, available from graph feedback alone. The paper then shows (Theorem 6) that with adversarial contexts nothing better than min⁡{αMT,KT,T2/3}\min\{\sqrt{\alpha MT},\sqrt{KT},T^{2/3}\}min{αMT​,KT​,T2/3} is possible, while with stochastic contexts and a partial order a variant reaches O~(T)\tilde O(\sqrt T)O~(T​) for first-price auctions. Algorithm 2 is the building block of that variant.

The results are proved in the paper; none is formalized. A formal development produces machine-checked versions of a concentration inequality with a random number of observations, of a domination bound for directed graphs, and of an elimination analysis with shared counts across contexts. Four printed statements need correction, and the formal statements record the corrected forms: the constant 333 in Theorem 4's second bound (the printed proof gives 242424); Lemma 10, which is false for n=1n = 1n=1 and for edgeless graphs as worded; Lemma 1, which fails for K=T=1K = T = 1K=T=1 and δ\deltaδ close to 111 (excluded by KT≥2KT \ge 2KT≥2); and the pseudocode of Algorithms 1–2, whose update Nc←Nc+1N_c \leftarrow N_c + 1Nc​←Nc​+1 can leave A0,c\mathcal A_{0,c}A0,c​ empty after an elimination (the formalization keeps the text's invariant Nc=min⁡a∈Aact,cnaN_c = \min_{a \in \mathcal A_{\mathrm{act},c}} n_aNc​=mina∈Aact,c​​na​, and coincides with the printed algorithm wherever the latter is defined).

Difficulty

The observations of an action are not a fixed sample: how often and when action aaa is revealed depends on earlier rewards through the algorithm's choices. A union bound with Hoeffding's inequality at a fixed sample size does not apply directly, and Lemma 1 needs a self-normalized martingale inequality.

For Option I, the obvious bound on how long it takes to observe every least-pulled action once more is ∣A0∣|\mathcal A_0|∣A0​∣ rounds, which gives only KT\sqrt{KT}KT​. Getting α\alphaα instead of KKK requires that a vertex of largest out-degree covers a 1/(50αlog⁡K)1/(50\alpha\log K)1/(50αlogK) fraction of the remaining vertices; this is the content of Lemma 10, a probabilistic-method bound that is not in Mathlib. For contexts, the per-context analyses must be combined while counts are shared, and the bound in KKK needs a per-action rather than a per-context accounting.

Formalization scope

  • Actions Fin K, contexts Fin M, rounds Fin T; paper round ttt is Lean index t−1t-1t−1. The feedback graph is a relation E with no self-loops; "independence number α\alphaα" is the hypothesis that every independent set has at most α\alphaα elements (all bounds increase in α\alphaα).
  • The reward law is a probability measure on Fin M → Fin K → ℝ carried by [0,1]M×K[0,1]^{M\times K}[0,1]M×K; rewards are iid across rounds (Measure.pi). The regret is the pseudo-regret with means Rc,a=∫rc,a dPR_{c,a}=\int r_{c,a}\,dPRc,a​=∫rc,a​dP.
  • "With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ" is: the outer measure of the bad event under P⊗TP^{\otimes T}P⊗T is at most δ\deltaδ. The context sequence is fixed in advance (oblivious adversary); stochastic contexts independent of the rewards follow by conditioning.
  • "Break ties arbitrarily" is a tie-breaking rule that sees the round, the algorithm's state (including the learner's whole observation history) and the context; the theorems hold for every rule that picks a member of every nonempty set.
  • The minimum count NcN_cNc​ follows the text's definition Nc=min⁡a∈Aact,cnaN_c = \min_{a\in\mathcal A_{\mathrm{act},c}}n_aNc​=mina∈Aact,c​​na​. The printed update Nc←Nc+1N_c\leftarrow N_c+1Nc​←Nc​+1 can leave A0,c\mathcal A_{0,c}A0,c​ empty after an elimination (for example with edges a→ba\to ba→b and c→bc\to bc→b, when aaa and ccc are eliminated), where the printed algorithm is undefined. The formal algorithm agrees with the printed one wherever the latter is defined.
  • Lemma 1 quantifies over nat≥1n^t_a\ge1nat​≥1 and excludes K=T=1K = T = 1K=T=1, where it is false for δ\deltaδ close to 111.
  • Ruled out: replacing the three-way minimum by a single bound, restricting to a fixed tie-breaking rule, or to stochastic contexts.

Welcome contributions: the self-normalized inequality of de la Peña, Klass and Lai (Lemma 11), Lemma 10, invariants of Algorithm 2 (the active sets stay nonempty and contain an optimal action on the good event), and the deterministic regret accounting given the concentration event.

Selected references

  • Y. Han, Z. Zhou, T. Weissman, Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions, arXiv:2003.09795v7, 2024; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.09795
  • N. Alon, N. Cesa-Bianchi, O. Dekel, T. Koren, Online Learning with Feedback Graphs: Beyond Bandits, COLT 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.07617
  • S. Mannor, O. Shamir, From Bandits to Experts: On the Value of Side-Observations, NeurIPS 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.2436
  • S. Balseiro, N. Golrezaei, M. Mahdian, V. Mirrokni, J. Schneider, Contextual Bandits with Cross-Learning, NeurIPS 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.09582
  • V. H. de la Peña, M. J. Klass, T. L. Lai, Self-normalized processes: exponential inequalities, moment bounds and iterated logarithm laws, Annals of Probability 32(3A), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1214/009117904000000397
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EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Retailer-Led Marketplaces 2: The Monopolist Always Charges a Strictly Positive Ad Valorem Marketplace FeeResearch Paper

Motivation

Large online retailers such as Amazon sell their own products and, on the same storefront, host third-party sellers who pay a commission on their sales. The owner of such a retailer-led marketplace sets the commission, competes with the sellers it hosts, and can direct inattentive consumers to the offer of its choice. How these levers interact is a central question in the economics of digital platforms and in the current policy debate on platform fees and self-preferencing.

Hervas-Drane and Shelegia (2025) build a model of a monopoly retailer with a marketplace and an assortment capacity constraint, and derive the platform's entry pattern, its fee and the effect of policy interventions. A basic question about the fee is whether a retailer that can sell products itself would ever choose to run its marketplace for free, collecting nothing from the sellers it hosts. This mission formalizes the paper's answer, Lemma 2: it never does.

Setting

There is a unit mass of products, indexed by their consumer valuation vvv. Valuations are distributed according to a probability measure μ\muμ (the CDF GGG of the paper) on [c,∞)[c,\infty)[c,∞), where c>0c>0c>0 is the marginal cost every firm incurs per unit. Each product is an independent market with a unit mass of consumers who each buy one unit at any price p≤vp\le vp≤v.

The monopolist MMM owns the storefront. For each product there is one third-party seller TTT who can sell only through the marketplace. The game has three stages.

  1. MMM announces an ad valorem fee f∈[0,1]f\in[0,1]f∈[0,1], the share of TTT's revenue he collects.
  2. Each TTT decides whether to enter; then MMM chooses which products to sell himself, subject to his capacity k∈[0,1]k\in[0,1]k∈[0,1]: the set AAA of products he enters must have μ(A)≤k\mu(A)\le kμ(A)≤k.
  3. Prices are set. MMM can steer a share λ\lambdaλ of consumers to the seller of his choice; the remaining 1−λ1-\lambda1−λ buy from the cheapest seller.

The pricing stage (Proposition 1 of the paper) gives per-market payoffs. If MMM sells alone (SBM) he earns v−cv-cv−c. If TTT sells alone (SBT) she charges vvv and MMM collects fvfvfv. If both sell (SBMT), TTT charges

pˉT=λv+c(1−λ)1−f(1−λ),\bar p_T=\frac{\lambda v+c(1-\lambda)}{1-f(1-\lambda)},pˉ​T​=1−f(1−λ)λv+c(1−λ)​,

and MMM earns πMSBMT=λ(v−c)+(1−λ)fpˉT\pi_M^{SBMT}=\lambda(v-c)+(1-\lambda)f\bar p_TπMSBMT​=λ(v−c)+(1−λ)fpˉ​T​. Seller TTT enters exactly the marketplace products mp(c,f)={v:v(1−f)≥c}\mathrm{mp}(c,f)=\{v: v(1-f)\ge c\}mp(c,f)={v:v(1−f)≥c} (Lemma 1). Given an allocation AAA, MMM's profit is

profitM(A)=∫A∖mp(v−c) dμ+∫A∩mpπMSBMT dμ+∫mp∖Afv dμ,\mathrm{profit}_M(A)=\int_{A\setminus\mathrm{mp}}(v-c)\,d\mu+\int_{A\cap\mathrm{mp}}\pi_M^{SBMT}\,d\mu+\int_{\mathrm{mp}\setminus A}fv\,d\mu,profitM​(A)=∫A∖mp​(v−c)dμ+∫A∩mp​πMSBMT​dμ+∫mp∖A​fvdμ,

and his profit as a function of the fee is the value of his allocation problem,

ΠM(k,f)=sup⁡{profitM(A):A measurable, μ(A)≤k}.\Pi_M(k,f)=\sup\{\mathrm{profit}_M(A): A\ \text{measurable},\ \mu(A)\le k\}.ΠM​(k,f)=sup{profitM​(A):A measurable, μ(A)≤k}.

The paper maintains Assumption 1, λ≥12\lambda\ge\tfrac12λ≥21​: the monopolist steers over half of the consumers.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 2 (p. 7)

For every f∗∈[0,1]f^*\in[0,1]f∗∈[0,1] with ΠM(k,f)≤ΠM(k,f∗)\Pi_M(k,f)\le\Pi_M(k,f^*)ΠM​(k,f)≤ΠM​(k,f∗) for all f∈[0,1]f\in[0,1]f∈[0,1],

f∗>0.f^*>0 .f∗>0.

The statement is about every maximising fee. It does not assert that a maximiser exists, which the paper does not claim in Lemma 2.

Milestone: the derivative in the proof of Lemma 2 (p. 8)

The map f↦ΠM(k,f)f\mapsto\Pi_M(k,f)f↦ΠM​(k,f) has a right derivative at f=0f=0f=0, and it is strictly positive:

∃ d>0:∂ΠM∂f(k,0+)=d.\exists\, d>0:\quad \frac{\partial\Pi_M}{\partial f}(k,0^+)=d .∃d>0:∂f∂ΠM​​(k,0+)=d.

Significance

Lemma 2 is the first result of the paper's fee analysis. It says that the fee is an active instrument in every configuration of capacity and steering: even a monopolist who can sell every product himself extracts revenue from the sellers he hosts, because at a zero fee the first-order effect of raising it is positive. The paper's subsequent characterisation of the optimal fee (Proposition 3) and its policy results on fee caps and on banning the retailer from its own marketplace (Propositions 4–6) all take place in the region f∗>0f^*>0f∗>0 that this lemma secures.

The paper proves Lemma 2 in two sentences, by "inspection of ΠM\Pi_MΠM​". None of the results is formalized elsewhere. The formal development has to make the inspection precise: ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ is the value of an infinite-dimensional allocation problem whose optimal allocation changes with fff, so its one-sided differentiability at 000 is an envelope-type statement rather than a calculus exercise. The model layer (the marketplace set, the Proposition 1 payoffs, the allocation problem and its value) is shared, in identical form, with the two companion missions of this series.

Difficulty

ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ is a supremum over measurable sets, not a closed-form function of fff, so its derivative cannot be read off a formula. Two effects change as fff grows from zero: fee revenue rises on every marketplace product, while the products with c≤v<c/(1−f)c\le v<c/(1-f)c≤v<c/(1−f) leave the marketplace and their sellers stop paying fees. At f=0f=0f=0 these products pay no fee, so their loss is of second order. Making this precise requires control of the optimal allocation uniformly near f=0f=0f=0 and of the mass of the exiting products, using only that GGG has a density.

The naive argument "keep the allocation optimal at f=0f=0f=0 and raise the fee slightly" shows that some positive fee beats f=0f=0f=0, but it does not compute the derivative. The claim also fails in one corner: with k=1k=1k=1 and λ=1\lambda=1λ=1 the SBMT payoff equals the SBM payoff, the monopolist supplies every product at every fee, and ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ does not depend on fff.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace RetailerMarketplace.PositiveFee. Valuations are a measure μ : Measure ℝ with IsProbabilityMeasure μ, μ (Set.Iio c) = 0 (support in [c,∞)[c,\infty)[c,∞)) and μ ≪ volume (the density ggg). Allocations are arbitrary measurable sets of mass at most kkk, never intervals. ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ is defined as the supremum of profitM over them (PiM); by the paper's Proposition 2 it coincides with the closed form (4), which this mission cannot use because its thresholds vL,vHv_L,v_HvL​,vH​ are the conclusion of Proposition 2. The marketplace set is {v | c ≤ v * (1 - f)}, correct also at f=1f=1f=1, where it is empty.

Standing and added hypotheses, all disclosed in the item statements:

  • c>0c>0c>0, implicit in the paper's "v∈[c,∞)v\in[c,\infty)v∈[c,∞)" and "f=1f=1f=1 such that vT→∞v_T\to\inftyvT​→∞";
  • λ∈[12,1]\lambda\in[\tfrac12,1]λ∈[21​,1] (Assumption 1), k∈[0,1]k\in[0,1]k∈[0,1], fees in [0,1][0,1][0,1];
  • ∫∣v∣ dμ<∞\int|v|\,d\mu<\infty∫∣v∣dμ<∞, needed for the profits to be finite and not stated in the paper;
  • ¬(k=1∧λ=1)\neg(k=1\wedge\lambda=1)¬(k=1∧λ=1), the corner where the printed claim is false.

No full-support hypothesis and no existence of an optimal fee are assumed.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the supremum is over a nonempty family that is bounded above under integrability, so PiM is not a junk sSup; and the goal quantifies over every maximiser rather than asserting that some positive fee beats f=0f=0f=0.

A complete development needs set integrals over μ\muμ, a bathtub-type comparison of allocations, and one-sided derivatives of a value function. The value-function and allocation lemmas are reusable for the companion missions on entry modes and on per-unit fees. Contributions of intermediate lemmas, such as attainment of ΠM(k,0)\Pi_M(k,0)ΠM​(k,0) by a top-kkk allocation, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Hervas-Drane and S. Shelegia, Retailer-Led Marketplaces, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00315
  • A. Hervas-Drane and S. Shelegia, Price competition with a stake in your rival, International Journal of Industrial Organization 84, 102862, 2022 (the paper's source for the simultaneous pricing game). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102862
  • F. Zhu and Q. Liu, Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com, Strategic Management Journal 39, 2618–2642, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2932
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Graph TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Topology I: A Cost-Minimizing Lightning Network Is Bipartite, with All Net Flows from One Side to the OtherResearch Paper

Why the topology of payment-channel networks matters

The Lightning Network (LN) is a second-layer payment system for Bitcoin. Instead of recording every payment on the blockchain, two parties lock funds in a payment channel and settle many payments off-chain; payments between parties without a common channel are routed along paths of channels. Locking funds is costly, and the amount a channel needs grows with the net flow it carries. Which channel topology supports a given pattern of payments at least total cost is therefore an economic design question for the network's participants.

Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (SSRN 4439190, 2023; published in Management Science, 2024) study this question for a general cost function, assuming only a few qualitative properties derived in their earlier work on channel economics ([GHS22], Lightning Network Economics: Channels). This mission covers §3.1 of the paper, local channel reconfiguration: a relaying node can be bypassed at lower cost, odd cycles are never optimal, and a cost-minimizing network is bipartite with every net flow going from one side to the other. Three companion missions (II–IV of this series) cover hermetization by a routing hub (§3.2) and bounds on the global minimal cost (§3.3).

Setting

Let VVV be a finite set of nodes. A payment flow is a vector F=(fi)i∈VF=(f_i)_{i\in V}F=(fi​)i∈V​ of net flows with ∑ifi=0\sum_i f_i=0∑i​fi​=0. A Lightning Network on VVV is an anti-symmetric real matrix Λ=(λu,v)u,v∈V\Lambda=(\lambda_{u,v})_{u,v\in V}Λ=(λu,v​)u,v∈V​, λu,v=−λv,u\lambda_{u,v}=-\lambda_{v,u}λu,v​=−λv,u​, where λu,v\lambda_{u,v}λu,v​ is the net flow from uuu to vvv in the channel between them and λu,v=0\lambda_{u,v}=0λu,v​=0 means there is no channel. The network supports FFF if

∑j∈Vλi,j=fifor every i∈V.\sum_{j\in V}\lambda_{i,j}=f_i\qquad\text{for every } i\in V .j∈V∑​λi,j​=fi​for every i∈V.

A channel cost function is c:R→R≥0c:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}c:R→R≥0​ with

  • (MO) c(x)>c(y)c(x)>c(y)c(x)>c(y) for x>y≥0x>y\ge 0x>y≥0;
  • (SY) c(−x)=c(x)c(-x)=c(x)c(−x)=c(x);
  • (CI) c(0)=0c(0)=0c(0)=0;
  • (SA) c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y) for x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0.

The cost of a network is c(Λ)=12∑i,jc(λi,j)c(\Lambda)=\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}c(\lambda_{i,j})c(Λ)=21​∑i,j​c(λi,j​), the sum of ccc over its channels. A network is cost-minimizing for FFF if it supports FFF and no Lightning Network on the same node set VVV that supports FFF has smaller cost.

The paper's channel notation: uv→λ\overrightarrow{uv}^{\lambda}uvλ is a channel with net flow λ\lambdaλ from uuu to vvv, and axy↔b{}^{a}\overleftrightarrow{xy}^{b}axy​b is a channel in which yyy sends aaa and xxx sends bbb, so the net flow from xxx to yyy is b−ab-ab−a.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 3.3

If Λ\LambdaΛ is cost-minimizing for FFF, there is a set A⊆VA\subseteq VA⊆V with B=V∖AB=V\setminus AB=V∖A such that the channel graph (i∼ji\sim ji∼j iff λi,j≠0\lambda_{i,j}\ne0λi,j​=0) is bipartite with parts A,BA,BA,B, and

λi,j>0 ⟹ i∈A, j∈B.\lambda_{i,j}>0\ \Longrightarrow\ i\in A,\ j\in B .λi,j​>0 ⟹ i∈A, j∈B.

The statement is conditional and does not assert that a minimizer exists.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.1. For distinct u,v,wu,v,wu,v,w and λ1,λ2>0\lambda_1,\lambda_2>0λ1​,λ2​>0, the structure uv→λ1,vw→λ2\overrightarrow{uv}^{\lambda_1},\overrightarrow{vw}^{\lambda_2}uvλ1​,vwλ2​ is not cost-minimizing; if λ1≤λ2\lambda_1\le\lambda_2λ1​≤λ2​ the structure uw→λ1,λ1vw↔λ2\overrightarrow{uw}^{\lambda_1},{}^{\lambda_1}\overleftrightarrow{vw}^{\lambda_2}uwλ1​,λ1​vwλ2​ supports the same flow at strictly lower cost, and if λ1≥λ2\lambda_1\ge\lambda_2λ1​≥λ2​ so does λ2uv↔λ1,uw→λ2{}^{\lambda_2}\overleftrightarrow{uv}^{\lambda_1},\overrightarrow{uw}^{\lambda_2}λ2​uvλ1​,uwλ2​.
  2. The in-and-out claim (proof of Corollary 3.2). In an arbitrary network supporting FFF, if λu,v>0\lambda_{u,v}>0λu,v​>0 and λv,w>0\lambda_{v,w}>0λv,w​>0 for some u,v,wu,v,wu,v,w, the network is not cost-minimizing.
  3. Corollary 3.2. A network containing a cycle of odd length is not cost-minimizing.
  4. Corollary 3.11 (a sibling corollary of Theorem 3.1, not on the path to the goal). If fi1,fi2>0>fj1,fj2f_{i_1},f_{i_2}>0>f_{j_1},f_{j_2}fi1​​,fi2​​>0>fj1​​,fj2​​ for distinct i1≠i2i_1\ne i_2i1​=i2​, j1≠j2j_1\ne j_2j1​=j2​, no star network is cost-minimizing.

Significance

Corollary 3.3 says that in an optimal Lightning Network every node is a pure sender or a pure receiver, and that no node relays payments. This sits in tension with the observed LN, which is organized around large routing hubs; the paper reconciles the two in §3.2 by allowing new nodes. Corollary 3.11 shows that the star, the intuitive candidate for a cheapest topology, is optimal only with a single net payer or a single net payee.

The results are proved in the paper, with short arguments in its Appendix A, and they have no machine-checked proof. This mission adds a precise version of the model, in which the meaning of "cost-minimizing", the sign conventions and the corrected cost axioms are fixed, and a formal proof of the chain Theorem 3.1 → odd cycles → bipartite structure for an arbitrary cost function satisfying the axioms.

Difficulty

Theorem 3.1 on its own is a two-line computation. The difficulty is in applying it inside an arbitrary network. When uuu and www already share a channel, adding λ1\lambda_1λ1​ or λ2\lambda_2λ2​ to it requires c(a+b)≤c(a)+c(b)c(a+b)\le c(a)+c(b)c(a+b)≤c(a)+c(b) for reals of either sign. That inequality is not among the axioms and has to be derived from them. The odd-cycle step needs a pigeonhole argument on channel orientations around a cycle. The bipartite step needs either König's characterization of bipartite graphs or a direct construction of the parts from the flow directions. The naive formalization that re-states Theorem 3.1 only for a network with exactly two channels does not reach the corollaries.

Formalization scope

  • The node set is an arbitrary finite type V, not {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n}. The matrix is Λ : V → V → ℝ, because λ is a Lean keyword.
  • Sign convention. Support is the row-sum display ∑jλi,j=fi\sum_j\lambda_{i,j}=f_i∑j​λi,j​=fi​ of §2.1, under which a net payer has fi>0f_i>0fi​>0. The paper's examples (§2, Figure 1, proof of Theorem 3.1) use the opposite sign. Every statement here is invariant under F↦−FF\mapsto-FF↦−F, and Theorem 3.1 is stated with "the same flow" given by Supports, which is independent of the sign.
  • Cost is the form 12∑i,jc(λi,j)\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}c(\lambda_{i,j})21​∑i,j​c(λi,j​), which needs no order on VVV.
  • Cost-minimizing compares with networks on the same node set VVV; a network with an added hub (§3.2) is not an alternative.
  • Axiom correction (SA). The paper prints (SA) as "c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y)c(x+y)<c(x)+c(y) for x>y≥0x>y\ge0x>y≥0", which fails at y=0y=0y=0, so every theorem would hold vacuously. The formalization uses x,y>0x,y>0x,y>0, the form verified in Appendix D. The stronger axiom (SA+) is not used in this mission.
  • Cycles are injective maps Fin k → V, k≥3k\ge3k≥3 odd, with cyclic successor finRotate k. A channel is a nonzero entry in either direction.
  • Bipartite is Mathlib's SimpleGraph.IsBipartiteWith A Aᶜ on the channel graph, with the flow-direction clause stated separately as the stronger content.
  • The star is the network whose only channels join each i≠hi\ne hi=h to the hub hhh with net flow fif_ifi​; Corollary 3.11 assumes ∑ifi=0\sum_i f_i=0∑i​fi​=0.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the cost function is arbitrary subject to the axioms (no ∣x∣\sqrt{|x|}∣x∣​ or linear cost); cost-minimization ranges over all networks on VVV, not over a fixed edge set; VVV is not fixed to three nodes; the in-and-out claim is stated for arbitrary networks; and AAA and BBB are complementary, so they cannot overlap.

König's theorem is in Mathlib (SimpleGraph.two_colorable_iff_forall_loop_even) and proved on the platform (FamousTheorems.two_colorable_iff_no_odd_cycle_6b), so it is not posed here. The derived two-sided subadditivity of ccc, and a lemma rerouting a relayed flow inside an arbitrary network, are reusable in the other missions of the series. Contributions of such auxiliary lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Topology, SSRN working paper 4439190, version of February 3, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4439190 (published in Management Science, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03872).
  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, working paper, 2022 ([GHS22] in the paper; the source of the cost axioms).
  • D. Kőnig, Theorie der endlichen und unendlichen Graphen, Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, Leipzig, 1936.
  • J. Poon, T. Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments, 2015 (as cited in the paper). https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
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Graph TheoryMarkov ChainProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Opinion Dynamics on Directed Complex Networks 1: On Graph Sequences Admitting a Strong Coupling, the Typical Stationary Opinion Converges to the Root Opinion R* of the Local Weak LimitResearch Paper

Opinions on large directed social networks

Linear models of opinion formation go back to DeGroot (DeGroot 1974), in which every individual repeatedly replaces their opinion by a weighted average of the opinions of the people they listen to, and to Friedkin and Johnsen (Friedkin–Johnsen 1990), who added a persistent internal opinion. Fraiman, Lin and Olvera-Cravioto (arXiv:2209.00969v2, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) add a random external (media) signal whose law may depend on the individual's attributes, which models selective exposure, and ask what the opinions look like on a large random social network. The answer is the behaviour of a typical individual, a uniformly chosen vertex: its stationary opinion converges in law to the opinion of the root of the network's local weak limit, and the empirical distribution of all stationary opinions converges to the same law. Questions such as consensus or polarization are then questions about one limiting random variable, independent of the particular realization of the network.

This mission formalizes that main result (Theorem 2) together with the fixed-graph stationarity theorem it rests on (Theorem 1).

Setting

A vertex-weighted directed graph on a vertex set VVV gives each vertex iii an in-degree di−d_i^-di−​, an ordered list of inbound neighbours ℓ(i,1),…,ℓ(i,di−)\ell(i,1),\dots,\ell(i,d_i^-)ℓ(i,1),…,ℓ(i,di−​) and weights c(i,r)∈[0,1]c(i,r)\in[0,1]c(i,r)∈[0,1] with ∑rc(i,r)=c\sum_r c(i,r)=c∑r​c(i,r)=c whenever di−>0d_i^->0di−​>0. The parameters satisfy c∈[0,1)c\in[0,1)c∈[0,1), d∈(0,1]d\in(0,1]d∈(0,1], c+d≤1c+d\le1c+d≤1. The opinions Ri(k)∈[−1,1]R_i^{(k)}\in[-1,1]Ri(k)​∈[−1,1] evolve by recursion (1),

Ri(k+1)=∑r=1di−c(i,r) Rℓ(i,r)(k)+Wi(k)+(1−c−d)Ri(k),k≥0,R_i^{(k+1)}=\sum_{r=1}^{d_i^-}c(i,r)\,R^{(k)}_{\ell(i,r)}+W_i^{(k)}+(1-c-d)R_i^{(k)},\qquad k\ge0,Ri(k+1)​=r=1∑di−​​c(i,r)Rℓ(i,r)(k)​+Wi(k)​+(1−c−d)Ri(k)​,k≥0,

where the external signals Wi(k)W_i^{(k)}Wi(k)​ are independent, i.i.d. in time given the vertex mark, and bounded by ∣Wi(k)∣≤d+c−∑rc(i,r)|W_i^{(k)}|\le d+c-\sum_rc(i,r)∣Wi(k)​∣≤d+c−∑r​c(i,r). With the operator Δf(i)=∑rc(i,r)f(ℓ(i,r))+(1−c−d)f(i)\Delta f(i)=\sum_rc(i,r)f(\ell(i,r))+(1-c-d)f(i)Δf(i)=∑r​c(i,r)f(ℓ(i,r))+(1−c−d)f(i) this reads R(k+1)=ΔR(k)+W(k)R^{(k+1)}=\Delta R^{(k)}+W^{(k)}R(k+1)=ΔR(k)+W(k). The stationary vector is R=∑r≥0ΔrW(r)R=\sum_{r\ge0}\Delta^rW^{(r)}R=∑r≥0​ΔrW(r).

The full mark of a vertex is Xi=(Ai,Qi,Si,Di−,C(i,1),C(i,2),… )\mathbf X_i=(\mathbf A_i,Q_i,S_i,D_i^-,C(i,1),C(i,2),\dots)Xi​=(Ai​,Qi​,Si​,Di−​,C(i,1),C(i,2),…): a generic attribute, an internal opinion, a stubbornness label, the in-degree and the weights. Marks are compared by the metric

ρ(x,x~)=ρ′(a,a~)+∣q−q~∣+∣s−s~∣+∣d−−d~−∣+∑j∣cj1(d−≥j)−c~j1(d~−≥j)∣.\rho(\mathbf x,\tilde{\mathbf x})=\rho'(\mathbf a,\tilde{\mathbf a})+|q-\tilde q|+|s-\tilde s|+|d^--\tilde d^-|+\sum_j|c_j\mathbb 1(d^-\ge j)-\tilde c_j\mathbb 1(\tilde d^-\ge j)|.ρ(x,x~)=ρ′(a,a~)+∣q−q~​∣+∣s−s~∣+∣d−−d~−∣+j∑​∣cj​1(d−≥j)−c~j​1(d~−≥j)∣.

A random graph sequence G(Vn,En;An)G(V_n,E_n;\mathscr A_n)G(Vn​,En​;An​) has vertex set Vn={1,…,n}V_n=\{1,\dots,n\}Vn​={1,…,n} and attributes An={Yi=(Ai,Qi,Si)}\mathscr A_n=\{\mathbf Y_i=(\mathbf A_i,Q_i,S_i)\}An​={Yi​=(Ai​,Qi​,Si​)}; edges and weights are random given the attributes. The conditional expectation En[⋅]=E[⋅∣An]E_n[\cdot]=E[\cdot\mid\mathscr A_n]En​[⋅]=E[⋅∣An​] conditions on the attributes only. The in-component of depth kkk of a vertex vvv is the set of vertices with a directed path of length at most kkk to vvv. The sequence admits a strong coupling (Definition 4) with a rooted marked graph G(X)\mathcal G(\boldsymbol{\mathcal X})G(X) if, for two independent uniform vertices In,JnI_n,J_nIn​,Jn​, every depth k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and every ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, there are two independent copies of G(X)\mathcal G(\boldsymbol{\mathcal X})G(X) whose depth-kkk root in-components are, with conditional probability tending to one in probability, isomorphic to those of InI_nIn​ and JnJ_nJn​, with all marks ϵ\epsilonϵ-close in ρ\rhoρ and the two in-components of InI_nIn​ and JnJ_nJn​ disjoint. The Wasserstein distance is d1(μ,ν)=inf⁡{E∣X−Y∣:X∼μ,Y∼ν}d_1(\mu,\nu)=\inf\{E|X-Y|:X\sim\mu,Y\sim\nu\}d1​(μ,ν)=inf{E∣X−Y∣:X∼μ,Y∼ν}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

Assume a strong coupling, d>0d>0d>0, and a signal kernel ν(x)\nu(\mathbf x)ν(x) with d1(ν(x),ν(x~))≤Kρ(x,x~)d_1(\nu(\mathbf x),\nu(\tilde{\mathbf x}))\le K\rho(\mathbf x,\tilde{\mathbf x})d1​(ν(x),ν(x~))≤Kρ(x,x~). Then there are laws LkL_kLk​ of (R(0),…,R(k))(\mathcal R^{(0)},\dots,\mathcal R^{(k)})(R(0),…,R(k)) and L∗L^*L∗ of R∗\mathcal R^*R∗, not depending on nnn, with

max⁡0≤r≤kE[∣RIn(r)−R(r)∣∣An]→P0,1n∑i=1nf(Ri(k))→PEf(R(k)),\max_{0\le r\le k}E\bigl[|R^{(r)}_{I_n}-\mathcal R^{(r)}|\bigm|\mathscr A_n\bigr]\xrightarrow{P}0,\qquad \frac1n\sum_{i=1}^nf(R_i^{(k)})\xrightarrow{P}E f(\mathcal R^{(k)}),0≤r≤kmax​E[∣RIn​(r)​−R(r)∣​An​]P​0,n1​i=1∑n​f(Ri(k)​)P​Ef(R(k)), E[∣RIn−R∗∣∣An]→P0,1n∑i=1nf(Ri)→PEf(R∗),E\bigl[|R_{I_n}-\mathcal R^*|\bigm|\mathscr A_n\bigr]\xrightarrow{P}0,\qquad \frac1n\sum_{i=1}^nf(R_i)\xrightarrow{P}E f(\mathcal R^*),E[∣RIn​​−R∗∣​An​]P​0,n1​i=1∑n​f(Ri​)P​Ef(R∗),

for every continuous fff on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1], and R(k)⇒R∗\mathcal R^{(k)}\Rightarrow\mathcal R^*R(k)⇒R∗ geometrically fast:

d1(law R(k),law R∗)≤(1−d)k(2d+2).d_1\bigl(\mathrm{law}\,\mathcal R^{(k)},\mathrm{law}\,\mathcal R^*\bigr)\le(1-d)^k\Bigl(\frac2d+2\Bigr).d1​(lawR(k),lawR∗)≤(1−d)k(d2​+2).

Milestones

  1. ∥Δ∥∞≤1−d\|\Delta\|_\infty\le1-d∥Δ∥∞​≤1−d (proof of Theorem 1, p. 22).
  2. Theorem 1 (p. 5): on a fixed locally finite graph, R(k)⇒RR^{(k)}\Rightarrow RR(k)⇒R at a geometric rate, with a limit that does not depend on R(0)R^{(0)}R(0).
  3. Theorem 2(1) (p. 8): the fixed-time statement.

A supporting statement of the proposal, not a milestone, is the tail bound ∥R−B(k)∥∞≤2∑r>k(1−d)r\|R-B^{(k)}\|_\infty\le2\sum_{r>k}(1-d)^r∥R−B(k)∥∞​≤2∑r>k​(1−d)r for B(k)=∑r≤kΔrW(r)B^{(k)}=\sum_{r\le k}\Delta^rW^{(r)}B(k)=∑r≤k​ΔrW(r) (proof of Theorem 2, p. 28).

Significance

Theorem 2 reduces the stationary opinion distribution of a large network to a single random variable R∗\mathcal R^*R∗ attached to the local limit. When the limit is a marked Galton–Watson tree, R∗\mathcal R^*R∗ has an explicit series representation whose mean and variance are computed in closed form later in the paper (the other two missions of this series), and these formulas are what explain consensus and polarization. Strong couplings exist ([Olvera-Cravioto 2022], cited on p. 8 of the paper) for Erdős–Rényi graphs, the Chung–Lu and Norros–Reittu models, the configuration model, stochastic block models and preferential attachment graphs, so the theorem applies to most random graph models used for social networks.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in it has been formalized. On Prove2Me this is the first statement of a strong coupling, a form of local weak convergence for directed marked graphs, and of a stochastic recursion on a random graph. The definitions of in-components, the coupling event and the strong coupling are reusable for any local-limit statement about directed random graphs, and the contraction and time-reversal milestones are reusable for linear stochastic recursions.

Difficulty

The fixed-graph part is a contraction argument, but the coupled object is not the opinion process itself: R(k)R^{(k)}R(k) does not converge almost surely, and only its time reversal B(k)B^{(k)}B(k) does. The main difficulty is Theorem 2. A local limit controls one neighbourhood at a time, while the empirical averages need two uniformly chosen vertices to be asymptotically independent, which a one-vertex limit statement does not give. The errors in weights, signals and initial opinions enter at every vertex of a depth-kkk neighbourhood, and the statements condition only on the attributes, with edges and weights integrated out. The stationary statement then requires an interchange of n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞ and k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞ that is uniform in nnn.

Formalization scope

All random objects of the mmm-th model live on one probability space, and the mmm-th graph has m+1m+1m+1 vertices (the paper's Gm+1G_{m+1}Gm+1​), so a uniform vertex always exists. Signals are written Wi(k)=ζ(Xi,Ui(k))W_i^{(k)}=\zeta(\mathbf X_i,U_i^{(k)})Wi(k)​=ζ(Xi​,Ui(k)​) and initial opinions Ri(0)=φ(Xi,Vi)R_i^{(0)}=\varphi(\mathbf X_i,V_i)Ri(0)​=φ(Xi​,Vi​) with i.i.d. uniforms independent of the graph: this quantile representation is equivalent in law to the paper's conditionally i.i.d. signals. Neighbour indices are 0-based. The conditional quantities given An\mathscr A_nAn​ are regular conditional distributions given the attribute vector, and "random variables whose distribution does not depend on An\mathscr A_nAn​" are encoded by fixed limit laws, with the paper's E[∣⋅∣∣An]→0E[|\cdot|\mid\mathscr A_n]\to0E[∣⋅∣∣An​]→0 read as d1d_1d1​ convergence in probability of the conditional laws, which is equivalent. Theorem 1 is stated on countably many vertices, with its geometric rate given as an explicit bound for 1-Lipschitz test functions of finitely many coordinates.

Disclosed choices: the strong coupling is stated on the given space with measurable events inside the coupling events (the event "an isomorphism exists" need not be measurable), with isomorphisms that preserve the order of inbound neighbours (which the proof uses), and through its second bullet, which implies the first. The paper's conditional independence of weight vectors given An\mathscr A_nAn​ is not imposed. The strong coupling also requires the depth-kkk in-components of InI_nIn​ and JnJ_nJn​ to be disjoint on the coupling event: the proof of Theorem 7 uses this, and without it Definition 4 admits a graph whose vertices all listen to a single hub, whose shared signals keep 1n∑if(Ri(k))\frac1n\sum_if(R_i^{(k)})n1​∑i​f(Ri(k)​) random. The page puts no condition on R(0)R^{(0)}R(0) beyond conditional independence of the signals, but Theorem 2(1) at time 000 is false then (take R(0)≡(−1)nR^{(0)}\equiv(-1)^nR(0)≡(−1)n); the statement assumes a d1d_1d1​-Lipschitz initial kernel with the same KKK, which covers the paper's own simulations. The geometric rate uses the constant of the proof.

Trivializing readings are excluded: every tsum is absolutely summable under the hypotheses, conditional laws are regular conditional distributions of measurable random variables, the averages have no division by zero, and the limit laws are forced onto [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1] by the convergence, so no integral defaults to 000. Theorem 7 of the paper (the two-vertex coupling) is not a milestone. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of general lemmas on regular conditional distributions and Wasserstein couplings, are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Fraiman, T.-C. Lin and M. Olvera-Cravioto, Opinion dynamics on directed complex networks, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; preprint arXiv:2209.00969v2, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.00969v2
  • M. H. DeGroot, Reaching a consensus, Journal of the American Statistical Association 69 (1974), 118–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1974.10480137
  • N. E. Friedkin and E. C. Johnsen, Social influence and opinions, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 15 (1990), 193–206. https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.1990.9990069
  • M. Olvera-Cravioto, Strong couplings for static locally tree-like random graphs, Journal of Applied Probability 59(4) (2022), 1261–1285 (reference [33] of the paper, where the random graph models admitting strong couplings are listed).
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Control TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Stationary Mean-Field Equilibrium Model of Irreversible Investment in a Two-Regime Economy: A Unique Stationary Mean-Field Equilibrium Exists and Invests at Regime-Dependent BarriersResearch Paper

Motivation

Industries in which capacity can be built but not sold back (energy generation, manufacturing, mining) are studied through irreversible investment models: a firm controls a nondecreasing investment process and trades the cost of capacity against uncertain future revenues. When many small firms compete, each firm's revenue depends on aggregate production through the market price, and the natural equilibrium notion is a mean-field equilibrium: every firm optimizes against a given aggregate, and the aggregate generated by the optimal behaviour is the one that was assumed.

Aïd, Basei and Ferrari (arXiv:2305.00541; Operations Research, 2025) add a macroeconomic regime to this picture. The economy switches between two states according to a continuous-time Markov chain, and volatilities and prices depend on the state. They prove that a stationary mean-field equilibrium exists and is unique, and that the equilibrium firm invests at regime-dependent barriers. Related stationary mean-field games with singular controls include Cao and Guo (Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 2022) and Cao, Dianetti and Ferrari (doi:10.1287/moor.2022.1323); the stability of the reflected regime-switching diffusions that appear in the equilibrium is due to Budhiraja and Liu (Mathematics of Operations Research, 2012).

Setting

A real Brownian motion BBB and an independent two-state Markov chain ε\varepsilonε with generator

P=(−p1p1p2−p2),π=(p2p1+p2,p1p1+p2),p1,p2∈(0,1),P=\begin{pmatrix}-p_1&p_1\\p_2&-p_2\end{pmatrix},\qquad \pi=\Big(\frac{p_2}{p_1+p_2},\frac{p_1}{p_1+p_2}\Big),\qquad p_1,p_2\in(0,1),P=(−p1​p2​​p1​−p2​​),π=(p1​+p2​p2​​,p1​+p2​p1​​),p1​,p2​∈(0,1),

live on a complete probability space; F\mathbb FF is their augmented natural filtration. A control III is an adapted, nonnegative, nondecreasing càdlàg process with I0−=0I_{0-}=0I0−​=0. The production capacity is

XtI=xexp⁡(−(δt+12∫0tσεs2ds)+∫0tσεsdBs+It),x>0,X^I_t=x\exp\Big(-\Big(\delta t+\tfrac12\int_0^t\sigma^2_{\varepsilon_s}ds\Big)+\int_0^t\sigma_{\varepsilon_s}dB_s+I_t\Big),\qquad x>0,XtI​=xexp(−(δt+21​∫0t​σεs​2​ds)+∫0t​σεs​​dBs​+It​),x>0,

and investment costs κ XtI∘dIt\kappa\,X^I_t\circ dI_tκXtI​∘dIt​, the integral (2.3) that charges a jump ΔIt\Delta I_tΔIt​ the amount Xt−I(eΔIt−1)X^I_{t-}(e^{\Delta I_t}-1)Xt−I​(eΔIt​−1). Given aggregate productions Q=(Q1,Q2)∈(0,∞)2Q=(Q_1,Q_2)\in(0,\infty)^2Q=(Q1​,Q2​)∈(0,∞)2, the price in regime iii is ηi=φi+ζiQi−α\eta_i=\varphi_i+\zeta_iQ_i^{-\alpha}ηi​=φi​+ζi​Qi−α​, and a firm starting from (x,i)(x,i)(x,i) maximizes, over the admissible set A\mathcal AA of (2.5),

J(x,i)(I,Q)=E(x,i)[∫0∞e−ρt(ηεtXtIdt−c(XtI)2dt−κXtI∘dIt)].J_{(x,i)}(I,Q)=\mathbb E_{(x,i)}\Big[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t}\big(\eta_{\varepsilon_t}X^I_tdt-c(X^I_t)^2dt-\kappa X^I_t\circ dI_t\big)\Big].J(x,i)​(I,Q)=E(x,i)​[∫0∞​e−ρt(ηεt​​XtI​dt−c(XtI​)2dt−κXtI​∘dIt​)].

A stationary mean-field equilibrium (Definition 2.2) is a pair (I⋆,Q⋆)(I^\star,Q^\star)(I⋆,Q⋆) such that I⋆I^\starI⋆ maximizes J(x,i)(⋅,Q⋆)J_{(x,i)}(\cdot,Q^\star)J(x,i)​(⋅,Q⋆) over A\mathcal AA, and the controlled pair (XtI⋆,εt)(X^{I^\star}_t,\varepsilon_t)(XtI⋆​,εt​) has a stationary distribution p∞p_\inftyp∞​ with

Qj⋆=1πj∫0∞x p∞(dx,j),j=1,2.Q^\star_j=\frac1{\pi_j}\int_0^\infty x\,p_\infty(dx,j),\qquad j=1,2.Qj⋆​=πj​1​∫0∞​xp∞​(dx,j),j=1,2.

The barrier control at levels a1,a2>0a_1,a_2>0a1​,a2​>0 is

It⋆=0∨sup⁡0≤s≤t(ln⁡(aεs/x)+∫0s(δ+12σεu2)du−∫0sσεudBu),I^\star_t=0\vee\sup_{0\le s\le t}\Big(\ln(a_{\varepsilon_s}/x)+\int_0^s\big(\delta+\tfrac12\sigma^2_{\varepsilon_u}\big)du-\int_0^s\sigma_{\varepsilon_u}dB_u\Big),It⋆​=0∨0≤s≤tsup​(ln(aεs​​/x)+∫0s​(δ+21​σεu​2​)du−∫0s​σεu​​dBu​),

the minimal investment keeping XtI⋆≥aεtX^{I^\star}_t\ge a_{\varepsilon_t}XtI⋆​≥aεt​​. Finally ϕi(θ)=12σi2θ2+(δ+12σi2)θ−pi\phi_i(\theta)=\frac12\sigma_i^2\theta^2+(\delta+\frac12\sigma_i^2)\theta-p_iϕi​(θ)=21​σi2​θ2+(δ+21​σi2​)θ−pi​ and ϕˉ=ϕ1ϕ2−p1p2\bar\phi=\phi_1\phi_2-p_1p_2ϕˉ​=ϕ1​ϕ2​−p1​p2​, whose negative roots are θ1<θ2<0\theta_1<\theta_2<0θ1​<θ2​<0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

Under Assumption 2.1, ρ>2max⁡{σ12,σ22}\rho>2\max\{\sigma_1^2,\sigma_2^2\}ρ>2max{σ12​,σ22​}, and 1+θ2<01+\theta_2<01+θ2​<0: for every (x,i)(x,i)(x,i) there are barriers a⋆∈(0,∞)2a^\star\in(0,\infty)^2a⋆∈(0,∞)2 and Q⋆∈(0,∞)2Q^\star\in(0,\infty)^2Q⋆∈(0,∞)2 with

(I⋆(a⋆),Q⋆) a stationary MFE, and every stationary MFE (I,Q) has Q=Q⋆, I=I⋆ a.s.(I^\star(a^\star),Q^\star)\ \text{a stationary MFE, and every stationary MFE } (I,Q)\text{ has } Q=Q^\star,\ I=I^\star\ \text{a.s.}(I⋆(a⋆),Q⋆) a stationary MFE, and every stationary MFE (I,Q) has Q=Q⋆, I=I⋆ a.s.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Proposition 4.1: a C2C^2C2 solution of the free-boundary problem (4.10) is the value function, and the barrier control is optimal.
  2. Proposition 4.2 (corrected): the stopping problem (4.13) has threshold regions, a C1C^1C1 value satisfying (4.17), and an optimal hitting time.
  3. Proposition 4.3 ((4.18) corrected): V(x,i)=ki+∫aixv(y,i)dyV(x,i)=k_i+\int_{a_i}^xv(y,i)dyV(x,i)=ki​+∫ai​x​v(y,i)dy.
  4. The root structure of (4.29): θ1<θ2<0<θ4\theta_1<\theta_2<0<\theta_4θ1​<θ2​<0<θ4​ are the nonzero roots of ϕˉ\bar\phiϕˉ​.
  5. Proposition 4.6: the stationary distribution function of the capacity reflected at 0<a1<a20<a_1<a_20<a1​<a2​ is the explicit Π(ln⁡x,i)\Pi(\ln x,i)Π(lnx,i) of (4.32).
  6. Corollary 4.7: the regime-wise stationary means (4.35)–(4.36).
  7. Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 4.1: the stopping value and the barriers decrease in QQQ.
  8. Theorem 2.4(ii): P(X∞≥x)/xθ2→C>0\mathbb P(X_\infty\ge x)/x^{\theta_2}\to C>0P(X∞​≥x)/xθ2​→C>0.

Significance

The theorem gives a fully explicit equilibrium in a model with common noise in the form of regime switching: the barriers solve a finite system of algebraic equations, and the stationary distribution of capacities is known in closed form, with a Pareto tail of exponent θ2\theta_2θ2​. This makes comparative statics of market concentration and of the industry's response to regime persistence computable, which is what Section 3 of the paper does numerically.

The result is proved on paper; none of it is formalized. A complete development would yield a machine-checked verification theorem for regime-switching singular control, a checked link between singular control and optimal stopping, and a checked stationary law for a reflected regime-switching geometric Brownian motion. The printed text contains slips the formalization corrects in the open: the continuation and stopping regions of Proposition 4.2 are printed swapped, a term of (4.18) carries a spurious factor aia_iai​, and an integration by parts in the proof drops κ\kappaκ.

Difficulty

The obvious route, solving the variational inequality (4.8) by guessing a smooth-fit solution, fails here: the two regimes couple the ordinary differential equations, and the smooth-fit and smooth-pasting equations become nonlinear in both barriers at once, so existence and uniqueness of their solution cannot be read off. The regularity a verification argument needs (C2C^2C2 value, a threshold structure of the investment region) is therefore the hard part, and with regime switching it is not covered by the one-dimensional theory. The stationary law requires positive recurrence of a reflected diffusion with switching and the identification of its limit law. The fixed point Q=RQQ=\mathcal RQQ=RQ, where (RQ)j=πj−1∫0∞x p∞Q(dx,j)(\mathcal RQ)_j=\pi_j^{-1}\int_0^\infty x\,p^Q_\infty(dx,j)(RQ)j​=πj−1​∫0∞​xp∞Q​(dx,j) is built from the stationary law under the barrier control optimal for QQQ, needs continuity and a priori bounds of R\mathcal RR for existence, and a monotonicity argument for uniqueness; the printed uniqueness argument treats ordered pairs of fixed points explicitly, and uniqueness of the optimal control itself is not argued on the page but is part of the goal.

Formalization scope

Lean represents regimes as Fin 2 (index 0 is regime 1) and time as R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​. The model consists of: the chain, pinned by its closed-form transition function etPe^{tP}etP; Mathlib's IsBrownianReal for BBB; independence of BBB and ε\varepsilonε; the augmented filtration; M=∫σεdBM=\int\sigma_\varepsilon dBM=∫σε​dB through the platform relation EthierKurtz.HasBrownianItoIntegral, with continuous paths; the state (2.4); the integral (2.3), computed as ∫e−ρtYt d(eI)t\int e^{-\rho t}Y_t\,d(e^{I})_t∫e−ρtYt​d(eI)t​; the admissible set (2.5) with [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued expectations; JJJ of (2.6); Definition 2.2; and the barrier control (4.11). E(x,i)\mathbb E_{(x,i)}E(x,i)​ is the expectation conditioned on ε0=i\varepsilon_0=iε0​=i.

Standing constants: δ,σi,ρ,c,κ,φi,ζi>0\delta,\sigma_i,\rho,c,\kappa,\varphi_i,\zeta_i>0δ,σi​,ρ,c,κ,φi​,ζi​>0, pi∈(0,1)p_i\in(0,1)pi​∈(0,1), 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1, min⁡iφi>ρ+δ\min_i\varphi_i>\rho+\deltamini​φi​>ρ+δ, and Assumption 2.1. The root condition 1+θ2<01+\theta_2<01+θ2​<0 is stated as "ϕˉ\bar\phiϕˉ​ has no root in [−1,0)[-1,0)[−1,0)". Pinned hypotheses, each disclosed in the item that carries it: the stationary distribution is the weak limit of the time-ttt laws; Qi>0Q_i>0Qi​>0; ai>0a_i>0ai​>0 wherever (4.11) is used; 0<a1<a20<a_1<a_20<a1​<a2​ for the §4.2 statements; (ρ+δ)κ<φi(\rho+\delta)\kappa<\varphi_i(ρ+δ)κ<φi​ on the goal; and "∼\sim∼" in Theorem 2.4(ii) as a ratio tending to a positive constant.

The equilibrium is defined from the model: optimality against every admissible control, including those with an initial jump, and the limit law of the actually controlled process. It is never defined through the paper's closed forms (4.23) or (4.32), which would make the goal a statement about formulas. The barrier control is the printed formula, not an arbitrary control keeping X≥aX\ge aX≥a.

Not formalized: Section 3 (numerics), Proposition 4.4 and Corollary 4.5 (semi-explicit value functions), the continuity part of Step 1, and Steps 2–4 of the proof as separate items. Contributions toward a general verification theorem for regime-switching singular control, regularity of regime-switching stopping problems, and stationary laws of reflected switching diffusions are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • R. Aïd, M. Basei, G. Ferrari, A Stationary Mean-Field Equilibrium Model of Irreversible Investment in a Two-Regime Economy, arXiv:2305.00541v1, 2023; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.00541
  • A. Budhiraja, X. Liu, Stability of constrained Markov-modulated diffusions, Mathematics of Operations Research 37(4):626–653, 2012.
  • H. Cao, X. Guo, MFGs for partially reversible investment, Stochastic Processes and their Applications 150:995–1014, 2022.
  • H. Cao, J. Dianetti, G. Ferrari, Stationary discounted and ergodic mean-field games of singular controls, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1323
  • G. Ferrari, N. Rodosthenous, Optimal control of debt-to-GDP ratio in an N-state regime switching economy, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 58(2):755–786, 2020.
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Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning 1: The Circumcenter Policy Has Offline Worst-Case Regret at Most sin α(C(D)), or 1 When α(C(D)) ≥ π/2, and No Policy Does BetterResearch Paper

Motivation

Inverse optimization asks for the objective of an optimization problem when only its optimal decisions are observed. It was formalized for linear programs by Ahuja and Orlin (Operations Research 2001) and has since been used to infer costs, preferences and utilities from observed choices, for instance in routing, pricing and the imitation of expert planners (see the survey discussion in Chan, Lee and Terekhov, Management Science 2019, and the noisy-data setting of Aswani, Shen and Siddiq, Operations Research 2018).

Besbes, Fonseca and Lobel (arXiv:2106.14015; Operations Research, 2025) study a contextual version: the problems a decision-maker faces change from instance to instance, and the observed expert decisions constrain a fixed but unknown cost vector. Their question is not how to estimate the cost, but which decisions to take so that the loss against the expert is as small as possible in the worst case. This mission formalizes the answer in the offline setting, where a finite data set is given in advance. The text used is the arXiv preprint v3 (1 July 2023); all theorem numbers refer to it.

Setting

Actions live in Rn\mathbb R^nRn and costs in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, both with the Euclidean norm, and d≥2d\ge2d≥2. The unknown cost c⋆c^\starc⋆ lies on the unit sphere Sd={c:∥c∥=1}S^d=\{c:\|c\|=1\}Sd={c:∥c∥=1}.

An instance is a pair (X,f)(\mathcal X,f)(X,f): a feasible set X∈B\mathcal X\in\mathcal BX∈B, i.e. a nonempty compact subset of Rn\mathbb R^nRn with diameter at most 111, and a context function f∈Ff\in\mathcal Ff∈F, i.e. a 111-Lipschitz map Rn→Rd\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^dRn→Rd. Given a cost ccc, the forward problem is

ψ(c,X,f)=arg min⁡x∈Xf(x)′c,\psi(c,\mathcal X,f)=\operatorname*{arg\,min}_{x\in\mathcal X} f(x)'c,ψ(c,X,f)=x∈Xargmin​f(x)′c,

a set of minimizers.

The offline data are D={(Xi,fi,xi⋆)}i=1N\mathcal D=\{(\mathcal X_i,f_i,x^\star_i)\}_{i=1}^ND={(Xi​,fi​,xi⋆​)}i=1N​ with xi⋆∈ψ(c⋆,Xi,fi)x^\star_i\in\psi(c^\star,\mathcal X_i,f_i)xi⋆​∈ψ(c⋆,Xi​,fi​). The costs compatible with them form the knowledge set

C(D)={c∈Sd: c′fi(xi⋆)≤c′fi(x)  ∀x∈Xi, i=1,…,N}.C(\mathcal D)=\{c\in S^d:\ c'f_i(x^\star_i)\le c'f_i(x)\ \ \forall x\in\mathcal X_i,\ i=1,\dots,N\}.C(D)={c∈Sd: c′fi​(xi⋆​)≤c′fi​(x)  ∀x∈Xi​, i=1,…,N}.

A policy maps the data and a new instance (X,f)(\mathcal X,f)(X,f) to an action xπ∈Xx^\pi\in\mathcal Xxπ∈X, and its regret on the instance is (f(xπ)−f(x⋆))′c⋆(f(x^\pi)-f(x^\star))'c^\star(f(xπ)−f(x⋆))′c⋆ with x⋆∈ψ(c⋆,X,f)x^\star\in\psi(c^\star,\mathcal X,f)x⋆∈ψ(c⋆,X,f). The worst-case regret WCRπ(D)\mathcal{WCR}^\pi(\mathcal D)WCRπ(D) is the supremum of the regret over c⋆∈C(D)c^\star\in C(\mathcal D)c⋆∈C(D), X∈B\mathcal X\in\mathcal BX∈B and f∈Ff\in\mathcal Ff∈F.

The angle between two vectors is θ(c,c^)=arccos⁡(c′c^/(∥c∥∥c^∥))\theta(c,\hat c)=\arccos\big(c'\hat c/(\|c\|\|\hat c\|)\big)θ(c,c^)=arccos(c′c^/(∥c∥∥c^∥)), with θ(c,0)=θ(0,c^)=0\theta(c,0)=\theta(0,\hat c)=0θ(c,0)=θ(0,c^)=0. The uncertainty angle of a set CCC is

α(C)=inf⁡c^∈Sd sup⁡c∈C θ(c,c^),\alpha(C)=\inf_{\hat c\in S^d}\ \sup_{c\in C}\ \theta(c,\hat c),α(C)=c^∈Sdinf​ c∈Csup​ θ(c,c^),

and a circumcenter c^(C)\hat c(C)c^(C) is a point of SdS^dSd attaining the infimum. Geometrically, α(C)\alpha(C)α(C) is the aperture of the narrowest revolution cone containing CCC and c^(C)\hat c(C)c^(C) is its axis. The circumcenter policy answers an instance with any xπ∈ψ(c^(C(D)),X,f)x^\pi\in\psi(\hat c(C(\mathcal D)),\mathcal X,f)xπ∈ψ(c^(C(D)),X,f). Write g(a)=1{a<π/2}sin⁡a+1{a≥π/2}g(a)=\mathbf 1\{a<\pi/2\}\sin a+\mathbf 1\{a\ge\pi/2\}g(a)=1{a<π/2}sina+1{a≥π/2}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (offline minimax regret), p. 12

For every realizable data set,

WCRπ(D) ≤ g(α(C(D)))\mathcal{WCR}^{\pi}(\mathcal D)\ \le\ g\big(\alpha(C(\mathcal D))\big)WCRπ(D) ≤ g(α(C(D)))

for the circumcenter policy π\piπ, whatever circumcenter and whatever minimizer it picks. Conversely, for every αˉ∈[0,π]\bar\alpha\in[0,\pi]αˉ∈[0,π] there is an information set C⊆SdC\subseteq S^dC⊆Sd with α(C)=αˉ\alpha(C)=\bar\alphaα(C)=αˉ on which every policy suffers regret at least g(αˉ)g(\bar\alpha)g(αˉ) on some instance. The upper bound and the lower bound are one statement.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 11). For a proxy cost cπ∈Sdc^\pi\in S^dcπ∈Sd and a true cost c⋆∈Sdc^\star\in S^dc⋆∈Sd, the worst-case regret over instances and over minimizers xπ∈ψ(cπ,X,f)x^\pi\in\psi(c^\pi,\mathcal X,f)xπ∈ψ(cπ,X,f) is attained and equals g(θ(c⋆,cπ))g(\theta(c^\star,c^\pi))g(θ(c⋆,cπ)):
L(cπ,c⋆)={sin⁡θ(c⋆,cπ)θ(c⋆,cπ)<π/2,1otherwise.\mathcal L(c^\pi,c^\star)=\begin{cases}\sin\theta(c^\star,c^\pi)&\theta(c^\star,c^\pi)<\pi/2,\\1&\text{otherwise.}\end{cases}L(cπ,c⋆)={sinθ(c⋆,cπ)1​θ(c⋆,cπ)<π/2,otherwise.​
  1. Lemma 2 (p. 12). Every nonempty C⊆RdC\subseteq\mathbb R^dC⊆Rd has a circumcenter; it is unique when C∖{0}≠∅C\setminus\{0\}\neq\emptysetC∖{0}=∅ and α(C)<π/2\alpha(C)<\pi/2α(C)<π/2.

Significance

Theorem 1 identifies the minimax offline regret of contextual inverse optimization with a single geometric number of the knowledge set, sin⁡α(C(D))\sin\alpha(C(\mathcal D))sinα(C(D)) (or 111), and shows that one explicit policy, acting as if the cost were the circumcenter, attains it uniformly over all instances. It reduces the design of offline policies to computing a circumcenter, and it is the benchmark that the paper's online analysis (§4–§5) compares against: the online policies are judged by how fast they shrink the uncertainty angle.

The results are proved in the paper (App-3–App-9). To our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them yields a verified statement of the minimax value, a reusable notion of uncertainty angle and circumcenter for arbitrary subsets of Rd\mathbb R^dRd, and the exact tightness of the bound, including the regime α≥π/2\alpha\ge\pi/2α≥π/2 where nature can force the maximal regret.

Difficulty

The upper bound is not a direct consequence of the definitions: the regret involves an arbitrary compact action set and an arbitrary 111-Lipschitz context, and the only link between the circumcenter's choice and c⋆c^\starc⋆ is that xπx^\pixπ is optimal for the wrong cost. Lemma 1 is where this link is turned into an angle, and its value must be matched exactly, not up to constants. Lemma 2 requires care because the objective c^↦sup⁡c∈Cθ(c,c^)\hat c\mapsto\sup_{c\in C}\theta(c,\hat c)c^↦supc∈C​θ(c,c^) is a supremum over an arbitrary, possibly non-closed, set and the angle convention at 000 breaks continuity. The lower bound must hold for every policy, including ones that exploit tie-breaking, so the hard instance must be chosen after the policy.

Formalization scope

Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d). The angle vecAngle is defined directly with value 000 when either argument is 000; Mathlib's InnerProductGeometry.angle (which is π/2\pi/2π/2 there) is not used. α\alphaα is a real infimum over the sphere of a real supremum over CCC; the angles lie in [0,π][0,\pi][0,π], so both are genuine when CCC is nonempty. Action sets are nonempty compact sets of diameter at most 111 (nonemptiness is added: an empty feasible set has no action), contexts are 111-Lipschitz, and data are indexed by Fin N.

Committed conventions and pins:

  • d≥2d\ge2d≥2 is the paper's standing assumption (p. 7). n≥1n\ge1n≥1 is added on Lemma 1 and on Theorem 1: in R0\mathbb R^0R0 every regret is 000 and the lower bounds would be false.
  • Theorem 1's upper bound assumes realizable data (some c0∈Sdc_0\in S^dc0​∈Sd explains every observation), as the paper's data model does; this makes C(D)C(\mathcal D)C(D) nonempty.
  • Worst-case regrets are never written as real suprema. The upper bound quantifies over every c⋆∈C(D)c^\star\in C(\mathcal D)c⋆∈C(D), instance, circumcenter, policy minimizer and expert minimizer. Lemma 1 is stated with IsGreatest, and the lower bound of Theorem 1 in attained form, which implies the paper's statement about the supremum.
  • In the lower bound the quantifiers are ordered as in the paper: the set CCC, then the policy (any map from instances to feasible actions), then nature's instance.

A formalization that bounds the regret only for one selected minimizer of the forward problem, or that chooses the hard instance before the policy, proves a different and weaker theorem and is excluded.

The development needs: compactness and lower semicontinuity on the sphere (existence of a circumcenter), elementary spherical geometry for the uniqueness and for sin⁡θ\sin\thetasinθ as the value of a two-point instance, and monotonicity of ggg on [0,π][0,\pi][0,π]. The angle, uncertainty angle and circumcenter definitions are reusable for the online missions of this series. Proofs of the two lemmas are the natural first contributions.

Selected references

  • O. Besbes, Y. Fonseca, I. Lobel, Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning, arXiv preprint v3, 2023; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14015v3
  • R. K. Ahuja, J. B. Orlin, Inverse optimization, Operations Research 49(5):771–783, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.5.771.10607
  • T. C. Y. Chan, T. Lee, D. Terekhov, Inverse optimization: closed-form solutions, geometry, and goodness of fit, Management Science 65(3):1115–1135, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2992
  • A. Aswani, Z.-J. Shen, A. Siddiq, Inverse optimization with noisy data, Operations Research 66(3):870–892, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1705
  • R. Henrion, A. Seeger, Inradius and circumradius of various convex cones arising in applications, Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 18(3–4):483–511, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11228-010-0150-z
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions IV: No Deterministic Posted-Price Mechanism Beats a √n/2-Approximation for Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Motivation

In budget-feasible procurement an auctioneer with a budget BBB wants to buy services from nnn strategic sellers. Each seller iii has a private cost ci≥0c_i\ge0ci​≥0, the auctioneer has a public valuation vvv over sets of sellers, and the mechanism must choose whom to pay and how much, so that sellers have no reason to misreport and the total payment never exceeds BBB. The model was introduced by Singer (FOCS 2010) and is used for crowdsourcing, influence maximization and data acquisition, where a buyer with a fixed budget faces sellers whose costs it cannot observe.

Balkanski, Garimidi, Gkatzelis, Schoepflin and Tan (arXiv:2107.09239v2, Operations Research 2025) show that deterministic clock auctions, which repeatedly lower personalized prices and let sellers drop out, achieve constant approximations for monotone submodular valuations. Their Appendix B asks whether an even simpler family suffices: posted-price mechanisms, which approach each seller once with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. This mission formalizes their answer for additive valuations, Theorem 13 (p. 25): no deterministic posted-price mechanism achieves an approximation better than n/2\sqrt n/2n​/2.

Setting

There are nnn sellers N={0,…,n−1}N=\{0,\dots,n-1\}N={0,…,n−1}, a budget B>0B>0B>0, private costs ci≥0c_i\ge0ci​≥0, and a valuation v:2N→R≥0v:2^N\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}v:2N→R≥0​. The valuation is additive if there are values vi≥0v_i\ge0vi​≥0 with v(S)=∑i∈Sviv(S)=\sum_{i\in S}v_iv(S)=∑i∈S​vi​ for every S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N.

A deterministic posted-price mechanism knows nnn, BBB and vvv, but not ccc. It approaches sellers one at a time. At each step it looks at the history of earlier offers (the seller, the price, and whether the seller accepted) and either stops or names a seller not yet approached and a price pip_ipi​. The seller accepts if pi≥cip_i\ge c_ipi​≥ci​ and rejects otherwise, and is never approached again. The output M(v,c)M(v,c)M(v,c) is the set of sellers who accepted; each of them is paid its price. The mechanism is budget feasible if for every additive vvv and every cost profile c≥0c\ge0c≥0 the accepted prices sum to at most BBB.

For an instance, OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the largest value v(O)v(O)v(O) of a set OOO with ∑i∈Oci≤B\sum_{i\in O}c_i\le B∑i∈O​ci​≤B. A mechanism is a ρ\rhoρ-approximation on a class if OPT≤ρ v(M(v,c))\mathrm{OPT}\le\rho\,v(M(v,c))OPT≤ρv(M(v,c)) on every instance of the class.

In Lean the sellers are Fin n, a mechanism is M : (Finset (Fin n) → ℝ) → PostedPrice n with PostedPrice n a rule next : List (Fin n × ℝ × Bool) → Option (Fin n × ℝ) on histories, run (M v) c is its history on the costs c, and accepted and payment read off the output and the total payment.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 13 (p. 25)

For every n≥1n\ge1n≥1, every B>0B>0B>0 and every budget-feasible deterministic posted-price mechanism MMM, there are an additive vvv, costs c≥0c\ge0c≥0 and a set OOO with

∑i∈Oci≤B,v(O)>0,n2 v(M(v,c))≤v(O).\sum_{i\in O}c_i\le B,\qquad v(O)>0,\qquad \frac{\sqrt n}{2}\,v\big(M(v,c)\big)\le v(O).i∈O∑​ci​≤B,v(O)>0,2n​​v(M(v,c))≤v(O).

This is OPT/v(M)≥n/2\mathrm{OPT}/v(M)\ge\sqrt n/2OPT/v(M)≥n​/2 on some instance, written without division.

Milestones: the three cases of the proof (p. 25)

All three concern one valuation v0v_0v0​: a high-value seller bhb_hbh​ worth n\sqrt nn​ and n−1n-1n−1 small sellers worth 111 each, with cbh=Bc_{b_h}=Bcbh​​=B.

  1. Case 1. If the first positive offer goes to a small seller iii, before bhb_hbh​ is approached, then on the costs ci=pic_i=p_ici​=pi​, cj=Bc_j=Bcj​=B otherwise, v0(M)≤1v_0(M)\le1v0​(M)≤1 and n2v0(M)<n=v0({bh})\frac{\sqrt n}2 v_0(M)<\sqrt n=v_0(\{b_h\})2n​​v0​(M)<n​=v0​({bh​}).
  2. Case 2. If every earlier offer is 000 and bhb_hbh​ is offered BBB, then on small costs B/(n−1)B/(n-1)B/(n−1), v0(M)=nv_0(M)=\sqrt nv0​(M)=n​ and n2v0(M)<n−1\frac{\sqrt n}2 v_0(M)<n-12n​​v0​(M)<n−1 for n≥3n\ge3n≥3, the value of the budget-feasible set of small sellers.
  3. Case 3. If every earlier offer is 000 and bhb_hbh​ is offered ph<Bp_h<Bph​<B, then on all costs BBB, v0(M)≤1v_0(M)\le1v0​(M)≤1 and n2v0(M)<n\frac{\sqrt n}2 v_0(M)<\sqrt n2n​​v0​(M)<n​.

Significance

The theorem separates two families of simple mechanisms. Deterministic clock auctions achieve a constant approximation for monotone submodular valuations (Theorem 1 of the same paper, a 4.754.754.75-approximation), while deterministic posted prices cannot achieve better than n/2\sqrt n/2n​/2 even for additive valuations, the simplest class. Clock auctions are therefore not merely sufficient but needed among these simple formats: the ability to lower a price after a refusal is what the constant approximation rests on. The bound also explains why the paper's positive result for posted prices (Theorem 15, symmetric submodular valuations) must give up a logarithmic factor.

The result is proved in the paper; it has not been formalized. A formal version fixes what "deterministic posted-price mechanism" means, an adaptive rule on histories that never sees costs, and makes the adversary argument checkable: the hard instance depends on the mechanism, and the case analysis must be exhaustive over all such rules. The mission also provides a reusable model of sequential take-it-or-leave-it mechanisms with budget constraints.

Difficulty

The statement is a lower bound over all mechanisms, so the instance must be chosen after the mechanism. The mechanism is adaptive: which seller it approaches next and at what price can depend on every earlier answer. The proof handles this by noting that, on the hard family, every seller rejects a non-positive offer, so all instances share the run up to the first positive offer or the offer to bhb_hbh​. Making that "common prefix" precise for an arbitrary history-dependent rule, and covering the mechanisms that fall outside the three printed cases (those that never approach bhb_hbh​, or offer bhb_hbh​ more than BBB), is the work of the formal proof. A naive attempt that fixes one instance for all mechanisms fails: a mechanism tailored to that instance is optimal on it.

Formalization scope

  • Sellers are Fin n; valuations are functions Finset (Fin n) → ℝ, and additivity carries nonnegative weights. Costs are real and nonnegative.
  • The budget satisfies B>0B>0B>0, an addition to §2's "a budget BBB"; with B=0B=0B=0 nothing can be bought.
  • A mechanism may depend on the valuation (and on nnn and BBB, which are fixed outside it) but not on costs. Prices are arbitrary reals. The run asks the rule for at most nnn offers; a proposal of an already approached seller ends the run.
  • Budget feasibility is a property of the mechanism on every additive instance, as defined on p. 24, not of a single run.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is never a supremum: the goal exhibits a budget-feasible set OOO with v(O)>0v(O)>0v(O)>0. The condition v(O)>0v(O)>0v(O)>0 rules out the trivial instance with OPT=0\mathrm{OPT}=0OPT=0, where every bound holds.
  • The Case 2 cost is B/(n−1)B/(n-1)B/(n−1); the page prints 1/(n−1)1/(n-1)1/(n−1), which is budget feasible for the small sellers only when B≥1B\ge1B≥1.
  • The cases' hypotheses ("before bhb_hbh​", "price 000") are read off the run on the profile with all costs BBB; "price 000" is rendered as "price at most 000".
  • Out of scope: running time, truthfulness (posted-price mechanisms are truthful by construction), and randomized mechanisms.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the three cases, the "common prefix" lemma for runs on cost profiles that agree on every seller approached, and the assembly of the goal.

Selected references

  • E. Balkanski, P. Garimidi, V. Gkatzelis, D. Schoepflin, X. Tan, Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions, arXiv:2107.09239v2, 2021; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.09239v2
  • Y. Singer, Budget Feasible Mechanisms, FOCS 2010. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2010.78
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions V: A Posted-Price Mechanism Achieves an O(log n)-Approximation for Symmetric Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

Budget-feasible procurement with posted prices

In budget-feasible procurement an auctioneer with a fixed budget BBB wants to buy services from strategic sellers whose costs are private. The auctioneer values sets of services through a valuation function vvv, and wants a mechanism that pays the sellers at most BBB in total while acquiring a set of nearly maximal value. The model was introduced by Singer (FOCS 2010) and is used for crowdsourcing, influence maximization and data acquisition, where a platform recruits workers or data owners under a fixed spending cap.

Balkanski, Garimidi, Gkatzelis, Schoepflin and Tan (arXiv:2107.09239, Operations Research 2025) study deterministic clock auctions for this problem: mechanisms that offer each seller a sequence of non-increasing prices, where a seller who rejects an offer leaves for good. Clock auctions are obviously strategyproof and robust to collusion, which makes them attractive in practice. A posted-price mechanism is the most restrictive kind: every seller receives a single take-it-or-leave-it offer.

Appendix B of the paper asks how much is lost by restricting to posted prices. For additive valuations no deterministic posted-price mechanism beats n/2\sqrt{n}/2n​/2 (Theorem 13). For symmetric submodular valuations, where the value of a set depends only on how many sellers it contains, no such mechanism achieves a factor better than log⁡n/4\log n/4logn/4 (Theorem 14), and Theorem 15, the subject of this mission, shows that a simple posted-price mechanism achieves a logarithmic factor.

Setting

There are nnn sellers (bidders) N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n}. Seller iii has a private cost ci≥0c_i \ge 0ci​≥0 and accepts an offered price ppp exactly when ci≤pc_i \le pci​≤p. The auctioneer has a budget B>0B > 0B>0, and throughout this mission every cost satisfies ci≤Bc_i \le Bci​≤B, as the paper assumes for Mechanism 5.

A valuation v:2N→R≥0v : 2^N \to \mathbb{R}_{\ge 0}v:2N→R≥0​ is symmetric submodular if there are numbers r1≥r2≥⋯≥rn≥0r_1 \ge r_2 \ge \cdots \ge r_n \ge 0r1​≥r2​≥⋯≥rn​≥0 such that

v(S)=∑i=1∣S∣rifor all S⊆N.v(S) = \sum_{i=1}^{|S|} r_i \qquad \text{for all } S \subseteq N.v(S)=i=1∑∣S∣​ri​for all S⊆N.

The case ri≡1r_i \equiv 1ri​≡1 counts the sellers bought.

A set O⊆NO \subseteq NO⊆N is budget feasible at true costs if ∑i∈Oci≤B\sum_{i \in O} c_i \le B∑i∈O​ci​≤B; the optimum OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the largest value v(O)v(O)v(O) over such sets.

Mechanism 5 (p. 27) sets aside an arbitrary seller jjj and keeps a counter aaa of accepted offers, initially 000, and a winning set WWW, initially empty. It visits every other seller once, offering

pi=B2ln⁡n if a=0,pi=Ba⋅2ln⁡n if a≥1;p_i = \frac{B}{2\ln n} \text{ if } a = 0, \qquad p_i = \frac{B}{a\cdot 2\ln n} \text{ if } a \ge 1;pi​=2lnnB​ if a=0,pi​=a⋅2lnnB​ if a≥1;

a seller who accepts joins WWW and increments aaa. If nobody accepted, jjj is offered the whole budget BBB. Winners are paid their offered price. In Lean the mechanism is BudgetClock.PostedSym.mech5 n B c j, the loop is scan n B c j, and the valuation class is IsSymmetricSubmodular n v.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15

There is an absolute constant C>0C > 0C>0 such that for every n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, every symmetric submodular vvv, every budget B>0B > 0B>0, every cost vector with 0≤ci≤B0 \le c_i \le B0≤ci​≤B and every choice of the set-aside seller jjj, the winning set WWW of Mechanism 5 and its prices ppp satisfy

∑i∈Wpi≤Bandv(O)≤C ln⁡n⋅v(W)  for every budget-feasible O.\sum_{i \in W} p_i \le B \qquad\text{and}\qquad v(O) \le C\,\ln n \cdot v(W) \ \text{ for every budget-feasible } O.i∈W∑​pi​≤Bandv(O)≤Clnn⋅v(W)  for every budget-feasible O.

The constant is left unspecified, as in the paper's O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn); the goal survives any improvement of it.

Milestones

  1. Budget feasibility (proof of Theorem 15, p. 27): the payments made during the scan stay strictly below BBB, and the payments of the final output are at most BBB.
  2. Case 1 (p. 28): if no scanned seller accepts, then W={j}W = \{j\}W={j} and v(O)≤(2ln⁡n+1) v(W)v(O) \le (2\ln n + 1)\,v(W)v(O)≤(2lnn+1)v(W) for every budget-feasible OOO.
  3. Case 2 (p. 28, corrected): if at least one scanned seller accepts, then v(O)≤(2ln⁡n+2) v(W)v(O) \le (2\ln n + 2)\,v(W)v(O)≤(2lnn+2)v(W) for every budget-feasible OOO.

Significance

Theorem 15 locates the price of posting prices for symmetric submodular valuations: together with Theorem 14 (no deterministic posted-price mechanism beats log⁡n/4\log n/4logn/4) it shows that the best such mechanism loses a factor of order exactly log⁡n\log nlogn, while the clock auctions of the main body of the paper achieve constant factors for all monotone submodular valuations. The gap between one-shot offers and descending clocks is therefore a genuine separation, not an artefact of the analysis.

The result is proved in the paper. Its formal value lies in pinning down the mechanism and the constants. Checking the printed argument against a precise model exposes three slips: the pseudocode never adds the set-aside seller to WWW, the printed payment bound fails for 2≤n≤62 \le n \le 62≤n≤6, and the constant 2ln⁡n+12\ln n + 12lnn+1 of Case 2 ignores the set-aside seller and is false (see the milestone notes). None of them affects the O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) claim, and the formal statements record the corrected forms. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of any result of this paper exists.

Difficulty

The mechanism decides each offer without knowing the remaining costs, and the optimum is defined at the true costs, which the mechanism never learns for rejected sellers. The only information available is a lower bound on each rejected seller's cost, and these lower bounds shrink as the counter aaa grows. The difficulty is to convert the history of offers into an upper bound on how many sellers any budget-feasible set can hold, uniformly in the order of the scan and the choice of jjj, while keeping the total payment, a harmonic-type sum, below the budget for every n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. The set-aside seller is the subtle point: it receives no offer when a≥1a \ge 1a≥1, so nothing is known about its cost, and a count that forgets it is wrong.

Formalization scope

  • Sellers are Fin n; costs are a real vector with 0≤ci≤B0 \le c_i \le B0≤ci​≤B; the budget is a real B>0B > 0B>0 (the paper says only "a budget BBB"; B>0B > 0B>0 is an added hypothesis, since a zero budget makes every offer zero).
  • The scan visits [n]∖{j}[n]\setminus\{j\}[n]∖{j} in increasing index order. The paper's "arbitrarily ordered" sellers and "arbitrary agent jjj" are covered because every statement quantifies over all cost vectors and all jjj; relabelling sellers changes only the costs.
  • A seller accepts iff ci≤pic_i \le p_ici​≤pi​. The mechanism returns the winning set and the price offered to each seller (zero for a seller who was never offered anything).
  • The set-aside seller jjj joins WWW when it accepts the offer BBB. The printed pseudocode omits this step, but the proof relies on it, and without it the goal is false when every scanned seller rejects.
  • The symmetric submodular sequence is indexed from 000 in Lean (r 0 is r1r_1r1​).
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is never a supremum: the approximation is stated as v(O)≤Cln⁡n⋅v(W)v(O) \le C\ln n\cdot v(W)v(O)≤Clnn⋅v(W) for every budget-feasible OOO at true costs, which avoids dividing by v(W)v(W)v(W).
  • The constant CCC is quantified before nnn and all instance data, so it is uniform. The threshold n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 is required: ln⁡1=0\ln 1 = 0ln1=0, and at n=1n = 1n=1 the price B/(2ln⁡n)B/(2\ln n)B/(2lnn) is a division by zero, which Lean evaluates to 000.
  • Out of scope: running time, determinism (every Lean function is deterministic) and the posted-price property (built into the definition: each seller receives at most one offer).
  • A formalization in which CCC depends on nnn or on the instance, or in which OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is taken over a set that excludes jjj, would make the goal trivial or different; both are ruled out by the statement's quantifier order and by quantifying over all budget-feasible O⊆NO \subseteq NO⊆N.

A complete development needs elementary facts about finite sums, the harmonic numbers (Hm≤1+ln⁡mH_m \le 1 + \ln mHm​≤1+lnm, available in Mathlib) and a reasoning principle for the left fold that defines the scan; the latter is reusable for any sequential posted-price mechanism. Proofs of the three milestones, and of the goal from them, are all welcome.

Selected references

  • E. Balkanski, P. Garimidi, V. Gkatzelis, D. Schoepflin, X. Tan, Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions, arXiv:2107.09239v2, 2021; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.09239
  • Y. Singer, Budget Feasible Mechanisms, FOCS 2010. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2010.78
  • A. Badanidiyuru, R. Kleinberg, Y. Singer, Learning on a Budget: Posted Price Mechanisms for Online Procurement, EC 2012. https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229026
  • W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance 16(1), 1961. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
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Functional AnalysisOptimizationPartial Differential Equations·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality Conditions in Control Problems with Random State Constraints in Probabilistic or Almost Sure Form IV: Radon-Measure Optimality Conditions for Robust State ConstraintsResearch Paper

Motivation

Optimal control problems governed by partial differential equations (PDEs) often carry uncertainty in their data, for example a random source term. When the state must stay below a threshold, there are several ways to impose the constraint: with high probability (chance constraints), almost surely, or for every value in a fixed uncertainty set (robust constraints). C. Geiersbach and R. Henrion (arXiv:2306.03965v2, Math. Oper. Res. 2025) derive first-order optimality conditions for all three models for the same elliptic model problem. This mission covers the robust model of §3.2 (pp. 23–25). Its Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) system has a Radon measure as multiplier, and it is related to the semi-infinite programming view of the same problem.

Robust state constraints are also the limiting case of the almost-sure model: by Lemma 3.4 of the paper (p. 19), an almost-sure constraint and the constraint for every parameter in the support of the distribution coincide when the constraint function is lower semicontinuous in the parameter. The robust multipliers live in C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗C(\bar D\times\Xi)^*C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗, which is a space of measures, whereas the almost-sure multipliers of §3.1 contain singular functionals with no such representation.

Setting

Let D⊆RdD\subseteq\mathbb R^dD⊆Rd, d∈{1,2,3}d\in\{1,2,3\}d∈{1,2,3}, be open, bounded and of class S: there are γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and r0>0r_0>0r0​>0 such that meas⁡(Br(x)∖D)≥γmeas⁡(Br(x))\operatorname{meas}(B_r(x)\setminus D)\ge\gamma\operatorname{meas}(B_r(x))meas(Br​(x)∖D)≥γmeas(Br​(x)) for all x∈∂Dx\in\partial Dx∈∂D and 0<r<r00<r<r_00<r<r0​. Let Ξ⊂Rm\Xi\subset\mathbb R^mΞ⊂Rm be compact, let f0,φ1,…,φm∈L2(D)f_0,\varphi_1,\dots,\varphi_m\in L^2(D)f0​,φ1​,…,φm​∈L2(D), and set f(x,z)=f0(x)+∑i=1mziφi(x)f(x,z)=f_0(x)+\sum_{i=1}^m z_i\varphi_i(x)f(x,z)=f0​(x)+∑i=1m​zi​φi​(x) (Assumption 1.1, eq. (3)). The solution operator A−1:L2(D)→C(Dˉ)A^{-1}:L^2(D)\to C(\bar D)A−1:L2(D)→C(Dˉ) maps FFF to the unique weak solution y∈H01(D)∩C(Dˉ)y\in H^1_0(D)\cap C(\bar D)y∈H01​(D)∩C(Dˉ) of −Δy=F-\Delta y=F−Δy=F in DDD, y=0y=0y=0 on ∂D\partial D∂D.

For a control u∈L2(D)u\in L^2(D)u∈L2(D), a cost F:L2(D)→RF:L^2(D)\to\mathbb RF:L2(D)→R and a threshold α∈R\alpha\in\mathbb Rα∈R, the robust problem (63) is

min⁡u∈L2(D)F(u)s.t.−Δy^(⋅,z)=u+f(⋅,z) in D,y^(⋅,z)=0 on ∂D,y^(x,z)≤α  ∀(x,z)∈D×Ξ.\min_{u\in L^2(D)}F(u)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad -\Delta\hat y(\cdot,z)=u+f(\cdot,z)\ \text{in }D,\quad \hat y(\cdot,z)=0\ \text{on }\partial D,\quad \hat y(x,z)\le\alpha\ \ \forall (x,z)\in D\times\Xi.u∈L2(D)min​F(u)s.t.−Δy^​(⋅,z)=u+f(⋅,z) in D,y^​(⋅,z)=0 on ∂D,y^​(x,z)≤α  ∀(x,z)∈D×Ξ.

The state is S^(u)∈C(Dˉ×Ξ)\hat{\mathcal S}(u)\in C(\bar D\times\Xi)S^(u)∈C(Dˉ×Ξ), [S^(u)](x,z)=[A−1(u+f(⋅,z))](x)[\hat{\mathcal S}(u)](x,z)=[A^{-1}(u+f(\cdot,z))](x)[S^(u)](x,z)=[A−1(u+f(⋅,z))](x), and G^(u)=S^(u)−α\hat{\mathcal G}(u)=\hat{\mathcal S}(u)-\alphaG^​(u)=S^(u)−α. The cone is K^={y∈C(Dˉ×Ξ):y≤0}\hat{\mathcal K}=\{y\in C(\bar D\times\Xi):y\le0\}K^={y∈C(Dˉ×Ξ):y≤0} and its polar cone is K^−={y∗∈C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗:⟨y∗,y⟩≤0 ∀y∈K^}\hat{\mathcal K}^-=\{y^*\in C(\bar D\times\Xi)^*:\langle y^*,y\rangle\le0\ \forall y\in\hat{\mathcal K}\}K^−={y∗∈C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗:⟨y∗,y⟩≤0 ∀y∈K^}. The linear part of the state is [A^−1B^h](x,z)=[A−1h](x)[\hat{\mathcal A}^{-1}\hat{\mathcal B}h](x,z)=[A^{-1}h](x)[A^−1B^h](x,z)=[A−1h](x). The active set is M(u)={(x,z)∈Dˉ×Ξ:[S^(u)](x,z)=max⁡Dˉ×ΞS^(u)}M(u)=\{(x,z)\in\bar D\times\Xi:[\hat{\mathcal S}(u)](x,z)=\max_{\bar D\times\Xi}\hat{\mathcal S}(u)\}M(u)={(x,z)∈Dˉ×Ξ:[S^(u)](x,z)=maxDˉ×Ξ​S^(u)}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 3.14 refined to (66), pp. 23–24

Let FFF be convex and continuously Fréchet differentiable, and assume the constraint qualification 0∈int⁡{G^(L2(D))−K^}0\in\operatorname{int}\{\hat{\mathcal G}(L^2(D))-\hat{\mathcal K}\}0∈int{G^​(L2(D))−K^}. Then u∗u^*u∗ is a solution of (63) if and only if there is a nonnegative finite Borel measure μ∗\mu^*μ∗ on Dˉ×Ξ\bar D\times\XiDˉ×Ξ with, for y∗=S^(u∗)y^*=\hat{\mathcal S}(u^*)y∗=S^(u∗),

⟨DF(u∗),h⟩+∫Dˉ×Ξ[A−1h](x) dμ∗(x,z)=0∀h∈L2(D),\langle DF(u^*),h\rangle+\int_{\bar D\times\Xi}[A^{-1}h](x)\,d\mu^*(x,z)=0\quad\forall h\in L^2(D),⟨DF(u∗),h⟩+∫Dˉ×Ξ​[A−1h](x)dμ∗(x,z)=0∀h∈L2(D), y∗≤α on Dˉ×Ξ,∫Dˉ×Ξ(y∗−α) dμ∗=0.y^*\le\alpha\ \text{on }\bar D\times\Xi,\qquad\int_{\bar D\times\Xi}(y^*-\alpha)\,d\mu^*=0.y∗≤α on Dˉ×Ξ,∫Dˉ×Ξ​(y∗−α)dμ∗=0.

The page derives (66) from the abstract system (65) of Lemma 3.14 (necessity). Sufficiency is the converse direction of Lemma 3.14, since a nonnegative measure defines a multiplier in K^−\hat{\mathcal K}^-K^− by integration. Both directions are part of the goal.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.13: unique solvability of (63b)–(63c) in C(Dˉ×Ξ)C(\bar D\times\Xi)C(Dˉ×Ξ) with the bound (64).
  2. Lemma 3.14: the abstract KKT system (65) with λ∗∈C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗\lambda^*\in C(\bar D\times\Xi)^*λ∗∈C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗.
  3. The identification C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗≅M(Dˉ×Ξ)C(\bar D\times\Xi)^*\cong\mathcal M(\bar D\times\Xi)C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗≅M(Dˉ×Ξ) (p. 23): every λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ is integration against a signed measure.
  4. Nonnegativity (p. 24): λ∗∈K^−\lambda^*\in\hat{\mathcal K}^-λ∗∈K^− gives a nonnegative μ∗\mu^*μ∗.
  5. Lemma 3.15: (66) is equivalent to the scalar-multiplier form (67): λ∗≥0\lambda^*\ge0λ∗≥0 and a probability measure μ~\tilde\muμ~​ on M(u∗)M(u^*)M(u∗) with ⟨DF(u∗),h⟩+λ∗∫[A−1h](x) dμ~=0\langle DF(u^*),h\rangle+\lambda^*\int[A^{-1}h](x)\,d\tilde\mu=0⟨DF(u∗),h⟩+λ∗∫[A−1h](x)dμ~​=0, max⁡y∗≤α\max y^*\le\alphamaxy∗≤α, λ∗(max⁡y∗−α)=0\lambda^*(\max y^*-\alpha)=0λ∗(maxy∗−α)=0.
  6. Lemma 3.16: the convex-hull condition (68) is equivalent to the existence of such a μ~\tilde\muμ~​.
  7. Lemma 3.4: for lower semicontinuous hhh, h(ξ)≤0h(\xi)\le0h(ξ)≤0 almost surely if and only if h≤0h\le0h≤0 on the support of the law of ξ\xiξ.

Significance

The goal gives the robust problem a KKT system whose multiplier is a nonnegative measure on Dˉ×Ξ\bar D\times\XiDˉ×Ξ that is carried by the points where the constraint is active. Lemmas 3.15 and 3.16 turn this into a scalar multiplier times a probability measure on the active set, and into a convex-hull condition. These are the forms used by semi-infinite programming algorithms and by discretizations that approximate the measure by finitely many atoms. Together with Lemma 3.4, they say when the KKT system of the almost-sure model (§3.1, with its singular multipliers) can be replaced by the measure-valued system of the robust model.

All statements of the mission are proved in the paper, some by reference: Lemma 3.14's proof refers to the argument of Lemma 3.7, and Lemma 3.16 relies on Phelps's barycenter theorem. None of them is formalized. A formal development would also check two points that the page leaves implicit. Lemma 3.15's proof divides by the total mass of μ∗\mu^*μ∗ and does not treat μ∗=0\mu^*=0μ∗=0. Condition (68) is printed per direction hhh, while (67a) needs one measure for all hhh.

Difficulty

The necessity direction of the goal needs a Lagrange multiplier theorem in a Banach space whose constraint cone K^\hat{\mathcal K}K^ has nonempty interior. The multiplier is a priori only an element of C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗C(\bar D\times\Xi)^*C(Dˉ×Ξ)∗, and the Riesz–Markov–Kakutani theorem on the compact space Dˉ×Ξ\bar D\times\XiDˉ×Ξ turns it into a measure. The state S^(u)\hat{\mathcal S}(u)S^(u) must also be shown to lie in C(Dˉ×Ξ)C(\bar D\times\Xi)C(Dˉ×Ξ). Continuity of each slice in xxx is the regularity of Lemma 1.2 (continuity of H01H^1_0H01​ solutions up to the boundary for class-S domains, from Kinderlehrer–Stampacchia), and joint continuity needs the bound (64), uniform in zzz. Working pointwise in zzz does not give these: a family of continuous slices need not be jointly continuous without an estimate that is uniform in the parameter.

Formalization scope

Dˉ\bar DDˉ and Ξ\XiΞ are subtypes of Euclidean spaces with CompactSpace instances, so C(Dˉ×Ξ)C(\bar D\times\Xi)C(Dˉ×Ξ) carries its sup norm. Measures on Dˉ×Ξ\bar D\times\XiDˉ×Ξ are Borel measures; on this compact metric space every finite Borel measure is regular, so "regular Borel (Radon) measure" is IsFiniteMeasure, and nonnegativity (66c) is built into Lean's Measure type. The solution operator is a hypothesis: a bounded linear map L2(D)→C(Dˉ)L^2(D)\to C(\bar D)L2(D)→C(Dˉ) such that A−1FA^{-1}FA−1F is, for every FFF, the weak solution in H01(D)∩C(Dˉ)H^1_0(D)\cap C(\bar D)H01​(D)∩C(Dˉ), encoded with the published weak-derivative definitions HunterPDE.Shared.WeakDeriv. The page's "≤0\le0≤0 in D×ΞD\times\XiD×Ξ" is encoded on Dˉ×Ξ\bar D\times\XiDˉ×Ξ, the same condition for continuous functions. "Solution" means global minimizer over the feasible set. L2(D)∗L^2(D)^*L2(D)∗ is identified with L2(D)L^2(D)L2(D) through the Riesz map. In Lemma 3.16 the clco of (68) is the norm closure of the convex hull, which equals the weak closure.

Added hypotheses: DDD and Ξ\XiΞ nonempty in Lemmas 3.15 and 3.16 (no probability measure exists on an empty set). Pinned reading: (68) is posed as one inclusion 0∈DF(u∗)+λ∗ co⁡‾{ux:(x,z)∈M(u∗)}0\in DF(u^*)+\lambda^*\,\overline{\operatorname{co}}\{u_x:(x,z)\in M(u^*)\}0∈DF(u∗)+λ∗co{ux​:(x,z)∈M(u∗)} in L2(D)L^2(D)L2(D), where uxu_xux​ represents h↦[A−1h](x)h\mapsto[A^{-1}h](x)h↦[A−1h](x). The page derives (68) from exactly this inclusion. The closed hull is kept because the page's remark that "co" suffices is not proved in infinite dimension.

Several trivializing formalizations are ruled out. The state operator is tied to the PDE and is never an arbitrary map into C(Dˉ×Ξ)C(\bar D\times\Xi)C(Dˉ×Ξ). The multiplier carries its sign (a nonnegative measure, or λ∗∈K^−\lambda^*\in\hat{\mathcal K}^-λ∗∈K^−) together with complementarity. Optimality is global minimality, not a stationarity condition. All integrands are continuous functions on a compact space against finite measures, so no integral takes a junk value.

A complete development needs elliptic regularity in C(Dˉ)C(\bar D)C(Dˉ) for class-S domains, a Banach-space Lagrange multiplier theorem under a Robinson-type constraint qualification, the Riesz–Markov–Kakutani theorem for C(K)∗C(K)^*C(K)∗ with signed measures (the platform's FamousTheorems.riesz_markov_kakutani covers positive functionals on CcC_cCc​), and barycenters of probability measures on compact convex sets. The last three are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of proofs for any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Geiersbach, R. Henrion, Optimality conditions in control problems with random state constraints in probabilistic or almost-sure form, arXiv:2306.03965v2, 2024; Math. Oper. Res., 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.03965
  • F. Clarke, Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis, Wiley, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971309
  • D. Kinderlehrer, G. Stampacchia, An Introduction to Variational Inequalities and Their Applications, Academic Press, 1980 (SIAM reprint 2000). https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898719451
  • R. R. Phelps, Lectures on Choquet's Theorem, 2nd ed., Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1757, Springer, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/b76887
  • H. W. Alt, Lineare Funktionalanalysis, Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-08386-4
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EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Auditing with a Chance of Whistleblowing: Increasing Whistleblowing Intensity Lowers Equilibrium Audit Quality If and Only If the Enforcer's Incentive Exceeds r* and the Auditor's Is Below d*Research Paper

Motivation

Many accounting frauds have come to light through whistleblowers rather than through audits, and regulators now run programs to encourage tips: since the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission pays awards for original information that leads to a successful enforcement action. Empirically, whistleblower involvement is associated with better enforcement outcomes (Call, Martin, Sharp & Wilde, 2018), and employees are a leading source of fraud detection (Dyck, Morse & Zingales, 2010). A natural conjecture is that more whistleblowing raises the chance that an audit failure is caught, and so pushes auditors to work harder.

Nan, Tang & Ye (Management Science, 2025) show in a small game that this conjecture can fail. Their main result, Proposition 2, characterizes exactly when increasing whistleblowing intensity lowers equilibrium audit quality. This mission formalizes that result together with the equilibrium it is about.

Setting

A firm is good (GGG) with probability p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1) and bad (BBB) otherwise.

  1. Auditor. She chooses an audit quality a∈(0,1)a\in(0,1)a∈(0,1) at cost 12ka2\tfrac12ka^221​ka2. She always issues a clean opinion ggg on a good firm and detects a bad firm with probability aaa.
  2. Whistleblower. After a clean opinion he receives a signal with Pr⁡(sl∣B)=Pr⁡(sh∣G)=β∈(12,1)\Pr(s_l\mid B)=\Pr(s_h\mid G)=\beta\in(\tfrac12,1)Pr(sl​∣B)=Pr(sh​∣G)=β∈(21​,1). On the signal sls_lsl​ he blows the whistle (event W1W_1W1​) with probability τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1), the whistleblowing intensity; otherwise the enforcer sees silence (W0W_0W0​).
  3. Enforcer. Having seen W∈{W1,W0}W\in\{W_1,W_0\}W∈{W1​,W0​}, he chooses an investigative effort eW∈[0,1]e_W\in[0,1]eW​∈[0,1] at cost 12γeW2\tfrac12\gamma e_W^221​γeW2​ and catches a bad firm with probability eWe_WeW​. He maximizes
Pr⁡(B∣g,W) e R−12γe2,(3)\Pr(B\mid g,W)\,e\,R-\tfrac12\gamma e^2,\tag{3}Pr(B∣g,W)eR−21​γe2,(3)

where the posterior is computed by Bayes' rule from the probabilities above. 4. Auditor's program. She pays damages DDD when an audit failure is caught, and minimizes

(1−p)(1−a)Pr⁡(rb∣B,g) D+12ka2,Pr⁡(rb∣B,g)=βτe1+(1−βτ)e0.(4, 6)(1-p)(1-a)\Pr(r_b\mid B,g)\,D+\tfrac12ka^2,\qquad \Pr(r_b\mid B,g)=\beta\tau e_1+(1-\beta\tau)e_0.\tag{4, 6}(1−p)(1−a)Pr(rb​∣B,g)D+21​ka2,Pr(rb​∣B,g)=βτe1​+(1−βτ)e0​.(4, 6)

An equilibrium at intensity τ\tauτ is a triple (a∗,e1∗,e0∗)(a^*,e_1^*,e_0^*)(a∗,e1∗​,e0∗​) of mutual best responses in which the enforcer's posteriors are computed at the actual a∗a^*a∗. The paper assumes R/γ<1/(1−p)R/\gamma<1/(1-p)R/γ<1/(1−p) and D/k<1/(1−p)D/k<1/(1-p)D/k<1/(1−p). Write r=R/γr=R/\gammar=R/γ for the enforcer's incentive and d=D/kd=D/kd=D/k for the auditor's incentive.

In Lean, a Model carries p,β,R,γ,D,kp,\beta,R,\gamma,D,kp,β,R,γ,D,k with these restrictions. The posteriors are postW1, postW0; the best-response predicates are IsEnforcerBR and IsAuditorBR; the equilibrium is IsEquilibrium M τ a e1 e0. An equilibrium path A (IsEquilibriumPath M A) assigns to every τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1) an equilibrium audit quality A(τ)A(\tau)A(τ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

Fix p,β,rp,\beta,rp,β,r and τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1), and let

r∗=β [τ(β−2βp+p)−1]2(p−1)(βτ−1) [β−β2τ+(2β−1)p(βτ+1)].r^*=\frac{\beta\,[\tau(\beta-2\beta p+p)-1]^2}{(p-1)(\beta\tau-1)\,[\beta-\beta^2\tau+(2\beta-1)p(\beta\tau+1)]}.r∗=(p−1)(βτ−1)[β−β2τ+(2β−1)p(βτ+1)]β[τ(β−2βp+p)−1]2​.

There is a threshold d∗d^*d∗, depending only on (p,β,r,τ)(p,\beta,r,\tau)(p,β,r,τ) and positive when r>r∗r>r^*r>r∗, such that for every model with these p,βp,\betap,β and R/γ=rR/\gamma=rR/γ=r, and every equilibrium path AAA,

A is differentiable at τ with A′(τ)<0  ⟺  Rγ>r∗ and Dk<d∗.A\ \text{is differentiable at}\ \tau\ \text{with}\ A'(\tau)<0\iff \frac R\gamma>r^*\ \text{and}\ \frac Dk<d^*.A is differentiable at τ with A′(τ)<0⟺γR​>r∗ and kD​<d∗.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's equilibrium analysis and its proof of Proposition 2:

  • the enforcer's best responses e1,e0e_1,e_0e1​,e0​, with e1>e0e_1>e_0e1​>e0​ and e0<1e_0<1e0​<1 (p. 12);
  • the auditor's best response a=(D/k)(1−p)Pr⁡(rb∣B,g)a=(D/k)(1-p)\Pr(r_b\mid B,g)a=(D/k)(1−p)Pr(rb​∣B,g) (pp. 12–13);
  • Proposition 1: existence, uniqueness and the characterization (7)–(9) (p. 13);
  • the silence effect: e0∗e_0^*e0∗​ decreases in τ\tauτ (p. 32);
  • the gap function VVV (28) is strictly increasing and its root is the equilibrium (pp. 32–33);
  • on the branch e1∗=1e_1^*=1e1∗​=1: lim⁡a→0∂V/∂τ>0  ⟺  r>r∗\lim_{a\to0}\partial V/\partial\tau>0\iff r>r^*lima→0​∂V/∂τ>0⟺r>r∗; ∂V/∂τ\partial V/\partial\tau∂V/∂τ decreases in aaa, giving a threshold a1a_1a1​ that does not depend on ddd; and a∗a^*a∗ increases in ddd, giving d∗d^*d∗ (p. 33);
  • the region e1∗=1e_1^*=1e1∗​=1 is r>r2r>r_2r>r2​, a∗<a2a^*<a_2a∗<a2​, with r2<r∗r_2<r^*r2​<r∗ and a1<a2a_1<a_2a1​<a2​ (p. 33);
  • the closed form of ∂V/∂τ<0\partial V/\partial\tau<0∂V/∂τ<0 when e1∗<1e_1^*<1e1∗​<1 (p. 34).

Significance

Proposition 2 separates two effects of intensity. The direct effect is that a tip triggers high investigative effort more often, which raises detection and audit quality. The indirect effect, the silence effect, is that with more intense whistleblowing silence becomes reassuring, so the enforcer investigates less without a tip. The result says the indirect effect dominates exactly when the enforcer's incentive is above an explicit threshold and the auditor's incentive is below a threshold. The paper builds its welfare analysis on it: the planner's optimal intensity (Lemma 2, Proposition 3) and the reward-design extension of §4.

The theorem is proved in the paper (Appendix, pp. 31–34), and Proposition 1 is stated without a printed proof. As far as is known, none of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof would check the computer-algebra steps the paper summarizes as "it is simple to verify" or "after some algebra manipulation". It would also make precise two points the printed proof leaves loose. First, the derivative of a∗a^*a∗ in τ\tauτ fails to exist where the equilibrium crosses the kink of e1=min⁡{1,⋅}e_1=\min\{1,\cdot\}e1​=min{1,⋅}. Second, the printed comparison "r2>r∗r_2>r^*r2​>r∗" is reversed: r2<r∗r_2<r^*r2​<r∗ is what holds and what the argument needs.

Difficulty

The equilibrium audit quality has no closed form; it is the root of the gap function VVV, which involves a min⁡\minmin and rational functions of (a,τ)(a,\tau)(a,τ). The obvious attempt, differentiating the closed-form equations (7)–(9) in τ\tauτ, gives an expression whose sign is not visible. Its sign depends on rrr, ddd and on which branch of the min⁡\minmin the equilibrium lies.

The paper splits by branch. On e1∗=1e_1^*=1e1∗​=1, the sign of ∂V/∂τ\partial V/\partial\tau∂V/∂τ is controlled by a single-crossing property in aaa and by the limit at a=0a=0a=0, which yields r∗r^*r∗. Turning this into a threshold on ddd requires the comparative static of a∗a^*a∗ in ddd. Each of these steps is a polynomial inequality in four or five variables over a box. They are routine to check numerically, but proving them requires explicit sign certificates.

Formalization scope

  • Model. All parameters are real. The restrictions 0<p<10<p<10<p<1, 12<β<1\tfrac12<\beta<121​<β<1, R,γ,D,k>0R,\gamma,D,k>0R,γ,D,k>0, R/γ<1/(1−p)R/\gamma<1/(1-p)R/γ<1/(1−p), D/k<1/(1−p)D/k<1/(1-p)D/k<1/(1−p) are fields of Model. The intensity τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1) is a hypothesis of each statement, not a field.
  • Efforts. The enforcer's effort lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1], which is where the min⁡{1,⋅}\min\{1,\cdot\}min{1,⋅} comes from. The auditor's effort lies in the open interval (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), as on p. 6.
  • Posteriors. They are defined from the joint probabilities by Bayes' rule, not as the simplified fractions. The best-response formulas are therefore theorems.
  • Omitted. The firm's cash flow XXX, the investment III, the fee FFF, the investors and Lemma 1, and the restrictions R<IR<IR<I, D≤I−RD\le I-RD≤I−R of p. 9 are omitted, because none of them enters (3)–(9). The social planner (§3.4), the reward micro-foundation (§4.1) and the Online Appendix extensions are out of scope.
  • "Impairs". It means that the equilibrium path has a derivative at τ\tauτ and that the derivative is negative. Mathlib's deriv is not used for this, because it returns 000 at a kink. By Proposition 1 the path is unique on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).
  • Quantifier order. r∗r^*r∗ is the explicit formula. The threshold d∗d^*d∗ is existential but is chosen before the model, so it may depend on (p,β,r,τ)(p,\beta,r,\tau)(p,β,r,τ) and not on DDD or kkk. Choosing d∗d^*d∗ after the model would make the equivalence a tautology (d∗=D/k±1d^*=D/k\pm1d∗=D/k±1 according to the sign). The threshold a1a_1a1​ is likewise chosen before the model, which encodes "a1a_1a1​ does not depend on ddd".
  • Derivatives in the proof. Derivative claims of the proof that fail at the kink (de0∗/dτ<0de_0^*/d\tau<0de0∗​/dτ<0, ∂V/∂a∗>0\partial V/\partial a^*>0∂V/∂a∗>0) are stated as strict monotonicity. The two printed slips, "≥1  ⟺  \ge1\iff≥1⟺" and "r2>r∗r_2>r^*r2​>r∗", are stated in corrected form, and the milestone quotes keep the printed text.

Contributions that are welcome include sign certificates for the polynomial inequalities of p. 33, an implicit-function argument for the derivative of the equilibrium path off the kink and a proof of Proposition 1, for which the paper prints none.

Selected references

  • L. Nan, C. Tang, M. Ye, Auditing with a Chance of Whistleblowing, Management Science, 2025 (author manuscript dated December 30, 2024). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04808
  • A. C. Call, G. S. Martin, N. Y. Sharp, J. H. Wilde, Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions, Journal of Accounting Research 56(1), 123–171, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12192
  • A. Dyck, A. Morse, L. Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, Journal of Finance 65(6), 2213–2253, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x
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Optimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robustifying Conditional Portfolio Decisions via Optimal Transport 3: For a Fiber of Radius γ > 0 and a Budget ρ > ρ_max, the Worst-Case Conditional Expected Loss Collapses to sup_y ℓ(y)Research Paper

Motivation

A portfolio manager who observes a covariate today, say a vector of macroeconomic indicators x0x_0x0​, wants an allocation that performs well on the returns YYY that follow such a covariate. With finitely many historical pairs (x^i,y^i)(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)(x^i​,y^​i​) the conditional law of YYY given X=x0X=x_0X=x0​ is poorly estimated: usually no sample has covariate exactly x0x_0x0​, and few have covariates near it. Distributionally robust optimization hedges against this estimation error by optimizing against the worst distribution in a ball around the empirical one. Nguyen, Zhang, Wang, Blanchet, Delage and Ye (arXiv:2103.16451, Operations Research, 2025) study this problem with an optimal transport ball and a conditional objective. Before giving tractable reformulations they identify the regimes in which the robust problem is degenerate. This mission covers one of those regimes, a transport budget large enough to empty a fiber of positive radius.

Setting

Let X\mathcal XX and Y\mathcal YY be Polish spaces (covariates and returns) and let (x^i,y^i)∈X×Y(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)\in\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y(x^i​,y^​i​)∈X×Y, i∈[N]i\in[N]i∈[N], be the data, with empirical distribution P^=N−1∑iδ(x^i,y^i)\hat{\mathbb P}=N^{-1}\sum_i\delta_{(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)}P^=N−1∑i​δ(x^i​,y^​i​)​. Ground costs DX\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}DX​ and DY\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}DY​ combine into the separable cost D((x,y),(x′,y′))=DX(x,x′)+DY(y,y′)\mathbb D((x,y),(x',y'))=\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,x')+\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(y,y')D((x,y),(x′,y′))=DX​(x,x′)+DY​(y,y′). The optimal transport cost W(Q,P^)\mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\hat{\mathbb P})W(Q,P^) is the least expected cost Eπ[D]\mathbb E_\pi[\mathbb D]Eπ​[D] over couplings π\piπ of Q\mathbb QQ and P^\hat{\mathbb P}P^, and the ambiguity set is the ball

Bρ={Q∈M(X×Y):W(Q,P^)≤ρ}.\mathbb B_\rho=\{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal M(\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y):\mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\hat{\mathbb P})\le\rho\}.Bρ​={Q∈M(X×Y):W(Q,P^)≤ρ}.

The conditioning event is the fiber Nγ(x0)×Y\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\times\mathcal YNγ​(x0​)×Y, with Nγ(x0)={x:DX(x,x0)≤γ}\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)=\{x:\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(x,x_0)\le\gamma\}Nγ​(x0​)={x:DX​(x,x0​)≤γ} and fiber radius γ>0\gamma>0γ>0. For a loss ℓ(y)\ell(y)ℓ(y) (the loss of a fixed portfolio at return yyy) the worst-case conditional expected loss is

sup⁡Q∈Bρ, Q(X∈Nγ(x0))>0 EQ[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ(x0)],\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho,\ \mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))>0}\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}\big[\ell(Y)\mid X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\big],Q∈Bρ​, Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))>0sup​ EQ​[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ​(x0​)],

problem (12) of the paper, where the strict inequality avoids conditioning on null sets. The threshold

ρmax⁡(x0,γ)=inf⁡{W(Q,P^):Q(X∈Nγ(x0))=0}\rho_{\max}(x_0,\gamma)=\inf\{\mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\hat{\mathbb P}):\mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))=0\}ρmax​(x0​,γ)=inf{W(Q,P^):Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))=0}

is the least budget that empties the fiber. With I1={i:x^i∈Nγ(x0)}\mathcal I_1=\{i:\hat x_i\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\}I1​={i:x^i​∈Nγ​(x0​)} and did_idi​ the cost from x^i\hat x_ix^i​ to the boundary ∂Nγ(x0)\partial\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)∂Nγ​(x0​), the paper computes it in closed form. Throughout, the paper's Assumption 2.4 holds: the costs are symmetric, nonnegative and continuous, and D\mathbb DD vanishes exactly on the diagonal; projections onto Nγ(x0)\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)Nγ​(x0​) are unique; and every boundary point of Nγ(x0)\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)Nγ​(x0​) has points outside it at arbitrarily small cost.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.2

For γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 and ρ>ρmax⁡(x0,γ)\rho>\rho_{\max}(x_0,\gamma)ρ>ρmax​(x0​,γ), and every loss ℓ\ellℓ,

sup⁡Q∈Bρ, Q(X∈Nγ(x0))>0EQ[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ(x0)]=sup⁡y∈Yℓ(y).\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho,\ \mathbb Q(X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0))>0}\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}\big[\ell(Y)\mid X\in\mathcal N_\gamma(x_0)\big]=\sup_{y\in\mathcal Y}\ell(y).Q∈Bρ​, Q(X∈Nγ​(x0​))>0sup​EQ​[ℓ(Y)∣X∈Nγ​(x0​)]=y∈Ysup​ℓ(y).

Milestones

  1. The decomposition (24): Q∈Bρ\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rhoQ∈Bρ​ iff Q=N−1∑iπi\mathbb Q=N^{-1}\sum_i\pi_iQ=N−1∑i​πi​ with N−1∑iEπi[DX(X,x^i)+DY(Y,y^i)]≤ρN^{-1}\sum_i\mathbb E_{\pi_i}[\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}(X,\hat x_i)+\mathbb D_{\mathcal Y}(Y,\hat y_i)]\le\rhoN−1∑i​Eπi​​[DX​(X,x^i​)+DY​(Y,y^​i​)]≤ρ.
  2. Proposition 4.1: ρmax⁡(x0,γ)=N−1∑i∈I1di\rho_{\max}(x_0,\gamma)=N^{-1}\sum_{i\in\mathcal I_1}d_iρmax​(x0​,γ)=N−1∑i∈I1​​di​.
  3. A conditional expectation of ℓ(Y)\ell(Y)ℓ(Y) never exceeds sup⁡yℓ(y)\sup_y\ell(y)supy​ℓ(y).
  4. For every y0y_0y0​, some Q′∈Bρ\mathbb Q'\in\mathbb B_\rhoQ′∈Bρ​ with positive fiber mass has conditional expected loss ℓ(y0)\ell(y_0)ℓ(y0​).

Significance

Proposition 4.2 is a negative result with a practical consequence: when the budget ρ\rhoρ exceeds ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​, the robust conditional loss equals the worst loss over the whole return space and ignores the data. The modeler must therefore keep ρ<ρmax⁡\rho<\rho_{\max}ρ<ρmax​, and Proposition 4.1 makes that threshold computable from the samples. In that regime the paper replaces the strict constraint by a positive mass requirement (Proposition 4.3) and derives a finite-dimensional dual (Theorem 4.4); those results are separate missions of this series.

The results are proved in the paper; none is formalized. The mission formalizes them in Lean 4 on top of Mathlib, using a published optimal transport cost and a published extended-real integral. The decomposition (24) is reusable for every argument about empirical optimal transport balls with finitely many atoms. The formal statement of Proposition 4.1 makes explicit a regularity condition on the boundary that the paper's proof uses but does not state.

Difficulty

The upper bound is elementary. The lower bound needs, for each y0y_0y0​, a feasible distribution whose conditional law on the fiber is concentrated at y0y_0y0​. The construction printed on p. 46 keeps a positive mass of a sample inside the fiber, so its conditional expectation mixes ℓ(y0)\ell(y_0)ℓ(y0​) with a sample loss; that construction has to be corrected. Proposition 4.1 needs a matching lower bound on the cost of every fiber-emptying coupling, and an exit cost from the fiber that equals the boundary distance did_idi​. For a general continuous DX\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}DX​ this fails. The decomposition (24) needs an optimal coupling to exist, which on Polish spaces with a lower semicontinuous cost is Villani's existence theorem. Mathlib does not have that theorem.

Formalization scope

  • X,Y\mathcal X,\mathcal YX,Y are Polish Borel spaces; [N][N][N] is Fin N with N>0N>0N>0; repeated samples are allowed.
  • W\mathbb WW is RWPI.SqrtLasso.transportCost, an infimum over couplings with a [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued cost; the paper's "min" is not built into the definition.
  • Expectations are ∫ℓ+−∫ℓ−\int\ell^+-\int\ell^-∫ℓ+−∫ℓ− in EReal (ModelRiskOT.Duality.extIntegral), never a Bochner integral, which would assign 000 to a non-integrable loss. Both sides of the goal are extended reals; sup⁡yℓ(y)\sup_y\ell(y)supy​ℓ(y) may be +∞+\infty+∞.
  • The loss at a fixed portfolio (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β) is an arbitrary function L:Y→RL:\mathcal Y\to\mathbb RL:Y→R, with no measurability or boundedness assumed.
  • The conditional expectation is Q(S)−1⋅EQ[ℓ 1S]\mathbb Q(S)^{-1}\cdot\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[\ell\,\mathbb 1_S]Q(S)−1⋅EQ​[ℓ1S​] and is evaluated only at measures with Q(S)>0\mathbb Q(S)>0Q(S)>0. The supremum ranges exactly over probability measures in the ball with positive fiber mass.
  • The radius enters as ENNReal.ofReal ρ; the hypothesis ρmax⁡<ρ\rho_{\max}<\rhoρmax​<ρ forces ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, and (24) carries 0≤ρ0\le\rho0≤ρ.
  • κi\kappa_iκi​ and did_idi​ are real infima; ∂\partial∂ is the topological frontier in X\mathcal XX.
  • Assumption 2.4 is a structure hypothesis on every theorem. Proposition 4.1 additionally carries BoundaryRegular, which is not in the paper: the boundary is nonempty, the exit cost of a sample inside the fiber equals did_idi​, and di=κid_i=\kappa_idi​=κi​ for samples outside. It mentions only DX\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}DX​ and the samples and holds when DX\mathbb D_{\mathcal X}DX​ is a norm distance. The goal does not carry it.
  • The goal's hypothesis is ρ>ρmax⁡\rho>\rho_{\max}ρ>ρmax​ with ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​ as defined (an infimum over measures), not its closed form, so Proposition 4.1 is not built into the goal.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: no conditional expectation is evaluated at fiber mass zero, the expectation is not a Bochner integral, ρ<0\rho<0ρ<0 cannot enter through ofReal, and the supremum is over the ball with positive fiber mass, not over all measures.

Needed infrastructure: finitely supported measures and their couplings, convexity of W(⋅,P^)\mathbb W(\cdot,\hat{\mathbb P})W(⋅,P^), and for (24) the existence of optimal couplings on Polish spaces. These are reusable well beyond this paper, and contributions toward them are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. A. Nguyen, F. Zhang, S. Wang, J. Blanchet, E. Delage, Y. Ye, Robustifying conditional portfolio decisions via optimal transport, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2103.16451v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.16451
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009 (Theorem 4.1, existence of optimal couplings). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying distributional model risk via optimal transport, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0936
9 thms1 active userReviewed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing II: With Store-Wise Homogeneous Discounts, Some Optimal Sequential Assortments Are Nested and Revenue-OrderedResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that operates several physical stores can show a customer who finds nothing she likes in her store the products that other stores carry, for example on an in-store screen or a magic mirror, and ship the chosen product from the other store. The customer then buys at a utility discount: shipping takes time and the product cannot be tried on. Liu, Chen, Liu and Wan (2025) compare two ways of making such recommendations. Under simultaneous recommendation (SMR) all products of all stores are shown at once; under sequential recommendation (SQR) the customer first sees the products of her own store and is shown the other stores' products only if she buys nothing. The SQR choice model is the impatient-customer multinomial logit (MNL) model of Gao et al. (2021) applied store by store.

Under SMR the seller can do no better than letting every store offer the single-store optimal assortment (Theorem 1 of the paper, the subject of mission I of this series). Under SQR the seller can do better: the assortment of one store becomes a second-chance offer to the customers of every other store. The SQR problem with general discounts is NP-hard (Proposition 3 of the paper). This mission formalizes the structural result that makes the problem tractable when the discounts depend only on the store a customer visits.

Setting

A seller runs m≥2m\ge2m≥2 stores and sells nnn products. A fraction λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0 of the customers visits store iii, with ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1. Product kkk has revenue rkr_krk​, with r1>r2>⋯>rn>0r_1>r_2>\dots>r_n>0r1​>r2​>⋯>rn​>0, and attraction value vk>0v_k>0vk​>0; not buying has attraction 111. A profile S=(S1,…,Sm)\mathbf S=(S_1,\dots,S_m)S=(S1​,…,Sm​) lists the assortment of each store, and Sˉ=S1∪⋯∪Sm\bar S=S_1\cup\dots\cup S_mSˉ=S1​∪⋯∪Sm​. A customer of store iii who buys product kkk from store jjj pays a utility discount cijk≥0c_{ij}^k\ge0cijk​≥0, with ciik=0c_{ii}^k=0ciik​=0, and cik(S)c_i^k(\mathbf S)cik​(S) is the smallest such discount over the stores that offer kkk. Under SQR the probability that a customer of store iii buys product kkk is

pikQ(S)=vk1+V(Si)  (k∈Si),pikQ(S)=vke−cik(S)(1+V(Si))(1+V(Si)+∑l∈Sˉ∖Sivle−cil(S))  (k∈Sˉ∖Si),p^Q_{ik}(\mathbf S)=\frac{v_k}{1+V(S_i)}\ \ (k\in S_i),\qquad p^Q_{ik}(\mathbf S)=\frac{v_k e^{-c_i^k(\mathbf S)}}{\big(1+V(S_i)\big)\big(1+V(S_i)+\sum_{l\in\bar S\setminus S_i}v_le^{-c_i^l(\mathbf S)}\big)}\ \ (k\in\bar S\setminus S_i),pikQ​(S)=1+V(Si​)vk​​  (k∈Si​),pikQ​(S)=(1+V(Si​))(1+V(Si​)+∑l∈Sˉ∖Si​​vl​e−cil​(S))vk​e−cik​(S)​  (k∈Sˉ∖Si​),

and 000 otherwise, where V(S)=∑k∈SvkV(S)=\sum_{k\in S}v_kV(S)=∑k∈S​vk​ and W(S)=∑k∈SrkvkW(S)=\sum_{k\in S}r_kv_kW(S)=∑k∈S​rk​vk​. The seller maximizes the expected revenue

R(S)=∑i=1mλi∑k=1nrk pikQ(S)(SQR).R(\mathbf S)=\sum_{i=1}^m\lambda_i\sum_{k=1}^n r_k\,p^Q_{ik}(\mathbf S)\qquad\text{(SQR)}.R(S)=i=1∑m​λi​k=1∑n​rk​pikQ​(S)(SQR).

The discounts are universally homogeneous if cijk=c>0c_{ij}^k=c>0cijk​=c>0 for all i≠ji\ne ji=j, and store-wise homogeneous if cijk=ci>0c_{ij}^k=c_i>0cijk​=ci​>0 for all i≠ji\ne ji=j: the discount depends only on the store the customer visits. The single-store problem is R∗=max⁡SW(S)/(1+V(S))R^*=\max_S W(S)/(1+V(S))R∗=maxS​W(S)/(1+V(S)) (3). An assortment is revenue-ordered if it equals {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k} for some k∈[n]k\in[n]k∈[n], and S~\tilde SS~ denotes the smallest revenue-ordered optimal solution of (3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 17)

If the discounts are store-wise homogeneous, λm=min⁡{λ1,…,λm}\lambda_m=\min\{\lambda_1,\dots,\lambda_m\}λm​=min{λ1​,…,λm​} and c1≤c2≤⋯≤cmc_1\le c_2\le\dots\le c_mc1​≤c2​≤⋯≤cm​, then some optimal solution of (SQR) satisfies

S1∗⊆S2∗⊆⋯⊆Sm−1∗⊆S~⊆Sm∗,S_1^*\subseteq S_2^*\subseteq\dots\subseteq S_{m-1}^*\subseteq\tilde S\subseteq S_m^*,S1∗​⊆S2∗​⊆⋯⊆Sm−1∗​⊆S~⊆Sm∗​,

with every Si∗S_i^*Si∗​ revenue-ordered.

Milestones

  1. Existence of S~\tilde SS~ (p. 11): a smallest revenue-ordered optimal solution of (3) exists.
  2. Lemma B.3 (p. 36): a three-store, four-product comparison of three explicit profiles.
  3. Proposition B.1 (p. 35): if λm\lambda_mλm​ is minimal and cmc_mcm​ maximal, some optimal solution has Si∗⊆Sm∗S_i^*\subseteq S_m^*Si∗​⊆Sm∗​ for all iii.
  4. Lemma B.2 (p. 35): the one-store problem (8) with a fixed second-step set has an optimum that is revenue-ordered within that set.
  5. Claim in the proof of Lemma B.1 (p. 38): a unique optimum of (8) shrinks as the discount factor grows.
  6. Lemma B.1 (p. 35): under the hypotheses of Theorem 4, some optimal solution is nested, S1∗⊆⋯⊆Sm∗S_1^*\subseteq\dots\subseteq S_m^*S1∗​⊆⋯⊆Sm∗​.
  7. Lemma B.4 (p. 39): f(x)=∑i(ai+bix)/(di+x)f(x)=\sum_i(a_i+b_ix)/(d_i+x)f(x)=∑i​(ai​+bi​x)/(di​+x) is quasi-convex on x≥0x\ge0x≥0 when ai/bia_i/b_iai​/bi​ decreases and did_idi​ increases.
  8. (B.4) and (B.5) (pp. 40–41): for a nested profile whose last store misses product kkk, adding kkk or truncating the last store does not lose revenue.
  9. Proposition B.2 (p. 35): some optimal solution is nested and all revenue-ordered.
  10. Step 3, Cases 1 and 2 (p. 43): moving stores k+1,…,m−1k+1,\dots,m-1k+1,…,m−1 to S~\tilde SS~, or growing store mmm towards S~\tilde SS~, does not lose revenue.
  11. Theorem 3 (p. 16) and Theorem 2 (p. 15): the universally homogeneous mmm-store and two-store versions.

Significance

Theorem 4 reduces the SQR problem with store-wise homogeneous discounts from a search over 2mn2^{mn}2mn profiles to a search over nested chains of prefixes, of which there are polynomially many for fixed mmm. It also gives an operational rule: the store with the lowest demand and the largest discount for its customers carries the widest assortment, wider than the single-store optimum S~\tilde SS~, and every other store carries a prefix that fits inside S~\tilde SS~. Example 2 of the paper (p. 18) shows that when the two orderings point in opposite directions an optimal solution need not be revenue-ordered, so both hypotheses carry weight.

The result is proved in the paper's Online and Additional Supplements. None of it is machine-checked. A formal development would also settle two places where the printed proof is incomplete: the proof of Proposition B.2 ends with "If we continue the analysis, one can show…", and it applies Lemma B.4 with some coefficients ai=0a_i=0ai​=0 and a reordered index, outside the lemma's stated hypotheses.

Difficulty

The revenue of one store depends on the assortments of all others through Sˉ∖Si\bar S\setminus S_iSˉ∖Si​, and the objective is a sum of ratios of ratios. The classical argument for MNL assortment problems, that a product with revenue above the current optimum should be added, does not transfer: adding a product to store iii raises store iii's first-step revenue but also changes the second-step offer to every other store's customers, and removing it from store iii moves it into the second step. A local exchange that improves one store can hurt another, so revenue-ordering has to be established jointly with the nesting, and the order of the stores (by λi\lambda_iλi​ and by cic_ici​) determines which exchanges are safe.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n and the paper's product kkk is index k−1k-1k−1; stores are Fin (M + 2), so m≥2m\ge2m≥2 and stores m−1m-1m−1, mmm are the last two indices. Assortments are Finset (Fin n). The attraction values vkv_kvk​ are the primitive data. The factor e−cik(S)e^{-c_i^k(\mathbf S)}e−cik​(S) is the largest e−cijke^{-c_{ij}^k}e−cijk​ over the stores offering kkk, and 000 when none does. The choice probabilities (2) and the objective (SQR) are the model; the Gumbel derivation of (2) (Proposition 1, from Gao et al. 2021) is not formalized. Store-wise homogeneity is a predicate on a general discount array, not a separate model.

The standing assumptions of §3 are explicit hypotheses everywhere: λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1, r1>⋯>rnr_1>\dots>r_nr1​>⋯>rn​, vk>0v_k>0vk​>0, ciik=0c_{ii}^k=0ciik​=0. Two hypotheses are pinned and disclosed: rk>0r_k>0rk​>0 (revenues are prices; Lemma B.3 is false with a negative revenue), and n≥1n\ge1n≥1 wherever revenue-ordered sets appear, since {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k} with k∈[n]k\in[n]k∈[n] is nonempty. Lemma B.3 takes nonnegative revenues and attraction values, because the proof of Proposition B.1 applies it to proxy products that may be empty.

"Optimal" means a global maximizer of (SQR) over all profiles, ties allowed. S~\tilde SS~ enters as the hypothesis that a given set is the smallest revenue-ordered optimum of (3); the first milestone shows the hypothesis can be met, so the goal is not vacuous. A formalization in which S~\tilde SS~ is an arbitrary optimum, the discount factor ignores which store offers a product, or mmm is fixed to 222 would be a different theorem and is ruled out. The inequalities (B.4), (B.5) and those of Step 3 are stated for every profile of the stated shape rather than only for an optimal one, since for an optimal profile they would hold trivially.

A complete development needs finite-sum manipulations of MNL ratios, a reusable lemma that the single-store MNL problem has a revenue-ordered optimum, and quasi-convexity of sums of linear-fractional functions (Lemma B.4, a pure real-analysis statement of independent use). Contributions of any milestone, of alternative proofs of Theorem 4, and of proofs of the companion Theorems 2 and 3 are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Liu, X. A. Chen, Y. Liu, Z. Wan, Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0761 (formalized from the authors' manuscript of 2024-09-17 with its Online and Additional Supplements).
  • P. Gao, Y. Ma, N. Chen, G. Gallego, A. Li, P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, Assortment optimization and pricing under the multinomial logit model with impatient customers: Sequential recommendation and selection, Operations Research 69(5):1509–1532, 2021. https://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/opre
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
17 thms1 active userReviewed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing IV: Full Assortments at Constant Adjusted Markups Solve Joint Pricing Under Simultaneous RecommendationResearch Paper

Motivation

Retail chains increasingly let a customer who visits one store buy a product that only another store carries, delivered from that store or picked up later. Liu, Chen, Liu and Wan (MSOM 2025, DOI 10.1287/msom.2024.0761) study how a seller operating several stores should choose assortments when customers can substitute across stores at a utility cost, and compare two ways of presenting the other stores' products: simultaneous recommendation (SMR), where they are shown together with the visited store's assortment, and sequential recommendation (SQR), where they are shown only after the customer declines everything in the visited store.

For fixed prices, the paper shows that under SMR the best a chain can do is to offer the single-store optimal assortment everywhere (its Theorem 1). Section 8 asks whether this survives when the seller also sets prices, store by store. This mission formalizes the answer, Theorem 6: under SMR with joint pricing, offering every product in every store at the classical single-store constant adjusted markup prices is optimal. It also formalizes the paper's Proposition 9, which transfers this solution to SQR with a factor-½ revenue guarantee.

The single-store ingredient is older. For the multinomial logit (MNL) model with product-specific price sensitivities, the optimal prices share a common markup adjusted by the reciprocal sensitivity; this goes back to work on MNL multi-product pricing such as Li and Huh (2011) and is stated in this form by Wang (2012), whom the paper cites.

Setting

There are mmm stores i∈[m]i\in[m]i∈[m] and nnn products k∈N=[n]k\in\mathcal N=[n]k∈N=[n]. A fraction λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0 of customers visits store iii, with ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1. The seller chooses an assortment profile S=(S1,…,Sm)\mathbf S=(S_1,\dots,S_m)S=(S1​,…,Sm​) with Si⊆NS_i\subseteq\mathcal NSi​⊆N, writes Sˉ=S1∪⋯∪Sm\bar S=S_1\cup\dots\cup S_mSˉ=S1​∪⋯∪Sm​, and chooses real prices P=(pik)\mathbf P=(p_{ik})P=(pik​), the price of product kkk in store iii; production costs are zero.

A customer visiting store iii who buys product kkk in store jjj at that store's price has utility αik−βikpjk−cijk\alpha_{ik}-\beta_{ik}p_{jk}-c^k_{ij}αik​−βik​pjk​−cijk​ plus an independent standard Gumbel term, where αik>0\alpha_{ik}>0αik​>0 is the intrinsic utility, βik>0\beta_{ik}>0βik​>0 the price sensitivity, and cijk≥0c^k_{ij}\ge0cijk​≥0 the utility discount for buying from another store, with ciik=0c^k_{ii}=0ciik​=0. Write vik=exp⁡(αik−βikpik)v_{ik}=\exp(\alpha_{ik}-\beta_{ik}p_{ik})vik​=exp(αik​−βik​pik​). For k∈Sˉ∖Sik\in\bar S\setminus S_ik∈Sˉ∖Si​, the customer buys from a store l=l(i,k)l=l(i,k)l=l(i,k) that offers kkk and maximizes αik−βikpjk−cijk\alpha_{ik}-\beta_{ik}p_{jk}-c^k_{ij}αik​−βik​pjk​−cijk​ over the stores jjj offering kkk; then v~ik(S)=exp⁡(αik−βikplk−cilk)\tilde v_{ik}(\mathbf S)=\exp(\alpha_{ik}-\beta_{ik}p_{lk}-c^k_{il})v~ik​(S)=exp(αik​−βik​plk​−cilk​) and p~ik(S)=plk\tilde p_{ik}(\mathbf S)=p_{lk}p~​ik​(S)=plk​. The no-purchase option has weight 111.

The SMR joint problem (13) maximizes

RM(S,P)=∑i=1mλi⋅∑k∈Sipikvik+∑k∈Sˉ∖Sip~ik(S)v~ik(S)1+∑k∈Sivik+∑k∈Sˉ∖Siv~ik(S),R^M(\mathbf S,\mathbf P)=\sum_{i=1}^m\lambda_i\cdot\frac{\sum_{k\in S_i}p_{ik}v_{ik}+\sum_{k\in\bar S\setminus S_i}\tilde p_{ik}(\mathbf S)\tilde v_{ik}(\mathbf S)}{1+\sum_{k\in S_i}v_{ik}+\sum_{k\in\bar S\setminus S_i}\tilde v_{ik}(\mathbf S)},RM(S,P)=i=1∑m​λi​⋅1+∑k∈Si​​vik​+∑k∈Sˉ∖Si​​v~ik​(S)∑k∈Si​​pik​vik​+∑k∈Sˉ∖Si​​p~​ik​(S)v~ik​(S)​,

and the SQR joint problem (15) maximizes

RQ(S,P)=∑i=1mλi(∑k∈Sipikvik1+∑k∈Sivik+∑k∈Sˉ∖Sip~ikv~ik(1+∑k∈Sivik)(1+∑k∈Sivik+∑k∈Sˉ∖Siv~ik)).R^Q(\mathbf S,\mathbf P)=\sum_{i=1}^m\lambda_i\left(\frac{\sum_{k\in S_i}p_{ik}v_{ik}}{1+\sum_{k\in S_i}v_{ik}}+\frac{\sum_{k\in\bar S\setminus S_i}\tilde p_{ik}\tilde v_{ik}}{(1+\sum_{k\in S_i}v_{ik})(1+\sum_{k\in S_i}v_{ik}+\sum_{k\in\bar S\setminus S_i}\tilde v_{ik})}\right).RQ(S,P)=i=1∑m​λi​(1+∑k∈Si​​vik​∑k∈Si​​pik​vik​​+(1+∑k∈Si​​vik​)(1+∑k∈Si​​vik​+∑k∈Sˉ∖Si​​v~ik​)∑k∈Sˉ∖Si​​p~​ik​v~ik​​).

The single-store problem (14) maximizes ∑k∈Spkeαk−βkpk/(1+∑k∈Seαk−βkpk)\sum_{k\in S}p_k e^{\alpha_k-\beta_kp_k}/(1+\sum_{k\in S}e^{\alpha_k-\beta_kp_k})∑k∈S​pk​eαk​−βk​pk​/(1+∑k∈S​eαk​−βk​pk​) over S⊆NS\subseteq\mathcal NS⊆N and real (pk)(p_k)(pk​). Finally θi∗\theta^*_iθi∗​ is the unique solution of

θi=∑k∈Neα^ik−βikθi,α^ik=αik−log⁡βik−1.\theta_i=\sum_{k\in\mathcal N}e^{\hat\alpha_{ik}-\beta_{ik}\theta_i},\qquad\hat\alpha_{ik}=\alpha_{ik}-\log\beta_{ik}-1.θi​=k∈N∑​eα^ik​−βik​θi​,α^ik​=αik​−logβik​−1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

RM(S,P) ≤ RM((N,…,N), (θi∗+1/βik)i,k)for all S, P∈Rm×n and every best-store rule l.R^M(\mathbf S,\mathbf P)\ \le\ R^M\bigl((\mathcal N,\dots,\mathcal N),\ (\theta^*_i+1/\beta_{ik})_{i,k}\bigr)\quad\text{for all }\mathbf S,\ \mathbf P\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}\text{ and every best-store rule }l.RM(S,P) ≤ RM((N,…,N), (θi∗​+1/βik​)i,k​)for all S, P∈Rm×n and every best-store rule l.

No uniqueness is claimed.

Milestones

  1. The markup equation has a unique solution θi∗\theta^*_iθi∗​ (p. 28).
  2. The single-store problem (14) has optimal value θ∗\theta^*θ∗, attained by the full set at prices θ∗+1/βk\theta^*+1/\beta_kθ∗+1/βk​ (p. 28, citing Wang 2012).
  3. In the proof of Theorem 6 (Online Supplement, p. 47): store iii's revenue in (13) is at most the objective of (14) at S=SˉS=\bar SS=Sˉ, pk=pikp_k=p_{ik}pk​=pik​ on SiS_iSi​ and pk=(αik−log⁡v~ik)/βikp_k=(\alpha_{ik}-\log\tilde v_{ik})/\beta_{ik}pk​=(αik​−logv~ik​)/βik​ off SiS_iSi​, and these prices dominate p~ik\tilde p_{ik}p~​ik​.
  4. Hence store iii's revenue in (13) is at most θi∗\theta^*_iθi∗​.
  5. Proposition 9 (p. 29): RQ(S,P)≤2RQ(S∗,P∗)R^Q(\mathbf S,\mathbf P)\le 2R^Q(\mathbf S^*,\mathbf P^*)RQ(S,P)≤2RQ(S∗,P∗) for the solution of Theorem 6.

Significance

Theorem 6 says that, under simultaneous recommendation, cross-store substitution creates no value that a coordinated price-and-assortment policy can extract: the multistore problem decouples into independent single-store pricing problems, each solved by offering everything at a constant adjusted markup. Together with Theorem 1 it places SMR as a clean benchmark against which SQR is compared, and Proposition 9 turns the benchmark into a guaranteed policy for SQR, where the joint problem has no known closed-form solution.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The mission's main new formal content is the single-store MNL pricing theorem with heterogeneous price sensitivities (milestone 2), which is cited, not proved, in the paper and is not on the platform; it is reusable for any MNL pricing model. Formalizing the store-wise reduction also makes explicit what the printed argument leaves implicit: the bound holds for every tie-breaking in the best-store rule, and for arbitrary real prices.

Difficulty

The multistore objective (13) is not a sum of independent store problems: store jjj's prices enter store iii's revenue through p~ik\tilde p_{ik}p~​ik​ and v~ik\tilde v_{ik}v~ik​, and the selection lll is itself an arg⁡max⁡\arg\maxargmax that changes with the prices, so the objective is discontinuous in P\mathbf PP. Direct first-order analysis of (13) is therefore not available. The single-store problem (14) is not concave in the prices either, so its optimum cannot be read off from a stationarity condition alone: one needs a global bound valid for every real price vector and every assortment, including negative prices and empty assortments.

Formalization scope

Stores are Fin m, products Fin n (the paper's product kkk is index k−1k-1k−1), assortments Finset (Fin n), prices real-valued functions. Sˉ\bar SSˉ is the finite union of the SiS_iSi​. The best-store rule lll is a function Fin m → Fin n → Fin m constrained by a predicate (it must offer kkk and maximize the customer's utility among the stores offering kkk); every statement holds for every such lll, and the right-hand side at the full profile, where Sˉ∖Si=∅\bar S\setminus S_i=\emptysetSˉ∖Si​=∅, does not depend on its rule. θi∗\theta^*_iθi∗​ enters as a hypothesis "θ solves the markup equation", never as a chosen term; its existence and uniqueness is milestone 1.

Standing assumptions carried as explicit hypotheses: λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1, αik>0\alpha_{ik}>0αik​>0 and βik>0\beta_{ik}>0βik​>0 (the page's R+\mathbb R^+R+), cijk≥0c^k_{ij}\ge0cijk​≥0, ciik=0c^k_{ii}=0ciik​=0. Prices range over all of R\mathbb RR. Optimality is a universal upper bound over all profiles, prices and tie-breaking rules, never a supremum or an arg⁡max⁡\arg\maxargmax. Proposition 9's "optimal solution to problem (13)" is the solution constructed in Theorem 6.

The choice model (13)–(15) is taken as given; the derivation of the MNL probabilities from Gumbel utilities is not formalized. A formalization in which the selection lll is unconstrained, in which v~ik\tilde v_{ik}v~ik​ uses store lll's price sensitivity instead of the customer's, or in which the optimum is a supremum of a possibly unbounded set would change the theorem and is ruled out by the definitions.

A complete development needs only Mathlib's real analysis (exponential, logarithm, finite sums); no new library is required. The single-store pricing optimum (milestone 2) is reusable for any MNL pricing model, and contributions of a general MNL pricing library are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Liu, X. A. Chen, Y. Liu, Z. Wan, Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0761
  • R. Wang, Capacitated assortment and price optimization under the multinomial logit model, Operations Research Letters 40(6), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2012.08.003
  • H. Li, W. T. Huh, Pricing multiple products with the multinomial logit and nested logit models: concavity and implications, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 13(4), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1110.0344
  • P. Gao, Y. Ma, N. Chen, G. Gallego, A. Li, P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, Assortment optimization and pricing under the multinomial logit model with impatient customers: Sequential recommendation and selection, Operations Research 69(5), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2127
8 thms1 active userReviewed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing III: Offering Each Store Its Single-Store Optimal Assortment Earns at Least Half the Optimal Sequential RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer with several physical stores often carries a different selection in each one. A customer who walks into a store and finds nothing she likes may still buy a product stocked elsewhere in the chain, paying in delivery cost or waiting time for it. Liu, Chen, Liu and Wan (MSOM 2025, DOI 10.1287/msom.2024.0761) compare two ways of showing those other products. Under simultaneous recommendation (SMR) the customer sees the store's own assortment and the rest of the chain's products at once. Under sequential recommendation (SQR) she first sees only the store's assortment and is shown the other stores' products only after declining all of them.

The paper shows that sequential recommendation earns more than simultaneous recommendation, but that choosing the best SQR assortments is NP-hard. A natural first heuristic ignores the cross-store interaction: each store simply carries the assortment that would be optimal if it were alone. This mission formalizes the paper's guarantee for that heuristic: it earns at least half the optimal sequential revenue, and half is the best possible constant. The guarantee is proved in the heterogeneous case of the paper's §7.1, where a product may be valued differently in different stores (a flagship store downtown and an outlet store, for example).

Setting

There are mmm stores and nnn products. A fraction λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0 of the customers first visits store iii, with ∑i=1mλi=1\sum_{i=1}^m\lambda_i=1∑i=1m​λi​=1. Product kkk earns revenue rkr_krk​, and the products are numbered so that r1>r2>⋯>rn>0r_1>r_2>\dots>r_n>0r1​>r2​>⋯>rn​>0. In store iii, product kkk has attraction value vik=exp⁡(uik)>0v_{ik}=\exp(u_{ik})>0vik​=exp(uik​)>0, where uiku_{ik}uik​ is its mean utility; not buying has attraction value 111. A customer who first visits store iii but buys product kkk from store jjj suffers a utility discount cijk≥0c^k_{ij}\ge0cijk​≥0, with ciik=0c^k_{ii}=0ciik​=0.

A decision is a profile S=(S1,…,Sm)\boldsymbol S=(S_1,\dots,S_m)S=(S1​,…,Sm​) of assortments Si⊆{1,…,n}S_i\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}Si​⊆{1,…,n}; write Sˉ=S1∪⋯∪Sm\bar S=S_1\cup\dots\cup S_mSˉ=S1​∪⋯∪Sm​. A product k∈Sˉ∖Sik\in\bar S\setminus S_ik∈Sˉ∖Si​ reaches a store-iii customer through the cheapest store that offers it, with discount cik(S)=min⁡j: k∈Sjcijkc^k_i(\boldsymbol S)=\min_{j:\,k\in S_j}c^k_{ij}cik​(S)=minj:k∈Sj​​cijk​. Under the multinomial logit model with sequential recommendation, a customer who first visits store iii buys product kkk with probability

pikQ(S)={vik1+∑l∈Sivilk∈Si,vike−cik(S)(1+∑l∈Sivil)(1+∑l∈Sivil+∑l∈Sˉ∖Sivile−cil(S))k∈Sˉ∖Si,0otherwise,p^Q_{ik}(\boldsymbol S)=\begin{cases}\dfrac{v_{ik}}{1+\sum_{l\in S_i}v_{il}} & k\in S_i,\\[3mm]\dfrac{v_{ik}e^{-c^k_i(\boldsymbol S)}}{\bigl(1+\sum_{l\in S_i}v_{il}\bigr)\bigl(1+\sum_{l\in S_i}v_{il}+\sum_{l\in\bar S\setminus S_i}v_{il}e^{-c^l_i(\boldsymbol S)}\bigr)} & k\in\bar S\setminus S_i,\\[3mm]0&\text{otherwise,}\end{cases}pikQ​(S)=⎩⎨⎧​1+∑l∈Si​​vil​vik​​(1+∑l∈Si​​vil​)(1+∑l∈Si​​vil​+∑l∈Sˉ∖Si​​vil​e−cil​(S))vik​e−cik​(S)​0​k∈Si​,k∈Sˉ∖Si​,otherwise,​

and the seller's expected revenue is

R(S)=∑i=1mλi∑k=1nrk pikQ(S).(SQR-heter)R(\boldsymbol S)=\sum_{i=1}^m\lambda_i\sum_{k=1}^nr_k\,p^Q_{ik}(\boldsymbol S).\qquad\text{(SQR-heter)}R(S)=i=1∑m​λi​k=1∑n​rk​pikQ​(S).(SQR-heter)

Its maximum over all profiles is RQ∗R^*_QRQ∗​.

The single-store problem of store iii is

Ri∗=max⁡S∑k∈Srkvik1+∑k∈Svik.R^*_i=\max_{S}\frac{\sum_{k\in S}r_kv_{ik}}{1+\sum_{k\in S}v_{ik}}.Ri∗​=Smax​1+∑k∈S​vik​∑k∈S​rk​vik​​.

An assortment is revenue-ordered if it is {1,2,…,k}\{1,2,\dots,k\}{1,2,…,k} for some k∈{1,…,n}k\in\{1,\dots,n\}k∈{1,…,n}. Some revenue-ordered assortment is optimal for the single-store problem; S~i\tilde S_iS~i​ denotes the smallest such one. The heuristic offers S~i\tilde S_iS~i​ in store iii for every iii, and its revenue is RQH=R(S~1,…,S~m)R^H_Q=R(\tilde S_1,\dots,\tilde S_m)RQH​=R(S~1​,…,S~m​), cross-selling between stores included.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7

RQH ≥ 12RQ∗,R^H_Q\ \ge\ \tfrac12R^*_Q,RQH​ ≥ 21​RQ∗​,

and the factor 12\tfrac1221​ is tight: for every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there is an instance with two stores and two products on which RQH<(12+δ)RQ∗R^H_Q<(\tfrac12+\delta)R^*_QRQH​<(21​+δ)RQ∗​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma D.1. Scaling every attraction value by a factor ϵi∈(0,1)\epsilon_i\in(0,1)ϵi​∈(0,1) does not increase the optimal MNL revenue.
  2. First inequality. For every profile, R(T)≥∑iλi∑k∈Tirkvik1+∑k∈TivikR(\boldsymbol T)\ge\sum_i\lambda_i\frac{\sum_{k\in T_i}r_kv_{ik}}{1+\sum_{k\in T_i}v_{ik}}R(T)≥∑i​λi​1+∑k∈Ti​​vik​∑k∈Ti​​rk​vik​​; at the heuristic profile this is RQH≥∑iλiRi∗R^H_Q\ge\sum_i\lambda_iR^*_iRQH​≥∑i​λi​Ri∗​.
  3. Second and third inequalities. For every profile S\boldsymbol SS, R(S)≤2∑iλiRi∗R(\boldsymbol S)\le2\sum_i\lambda_iR^*_iR(S)≤2∑i​λi​Ri∗​.
  4. Tightness instance. With λ=(1,0)\lambda=(1,0)λ=(1,0), r=(1+1ϵ,1)r=(1+\frac1\epsilon,1)r=(1+ϵ1​,1), vi⋅=(ϵ,1ϵ)v_{i\cdot}=(\epsilon,\frac1\epsilon)vi⋅​=(ϵ,ϵ1​) and no discounts, S~i={1}\tilde S_i=\{1\}S~i​={1}, the heuristic earns exactly 111 and the profile ({1},{2})(\{1\},\{2\})({1},{2}) earns 1+1(1+ϵ)(1+ϵ+ϵ2)1+\frac1{(1+\epsilon)(1+\epsilon+\epsilon^2)}1+(1+ϵ)(1+ϵ+ϵ2)1​.

Significance

The guarantee says that the simplest decentralized policy, in which every store optimizes as if alone, cannot lose more than half of what the best sequential recommendation earns, whatever the store-specific valuations and the cross-store discounts. Read from the other side, the same bound with its tight instance says that sequential cross-selling can at most double the revenue of operating the stores separately, and that a doubling is approached. Since the exact SQR problem is NP-hard (the paper's Proposition 3), a constant-factor guarantee for a policy computable store by store is the kind of statement a practitioner can act on; the paper's numerical study (its Appendix G) finds the heuristic much closer to optimal on synthetic data than the worst case.

Proposition 7 is proved in the paper; nothing in it has been machine-checked. The mission formalizes the model, the proposition with both parts, and the three steps of its proof. Lemma D.1, the monotonicity of the optimal MNL revenue in the attraction values, is a standard fact of assortment optimization that is stated here for a single MNL model and is reusable beyond this mission.

Difficulty

The heuristic profile and the optimal profile are unrelated: the optimal one may stock in store iii products that store iii's own optimum omits, precisely to sell them to other stores' customers in the second stage. A comparison store by store therefore fails, because the optimum's revenue in store iii depends on every other store's assortment through Sˉ\bar SSˉ and the discounts cik(S)c^k_i(\boldsymbol S)cik​(S). The second-stage revenue is a product of two MNL fractions over different assortments with discounted attraction values, and it has to be bounded by the single-store optimum with undiscounted values; this is where Lemma D.1 is needed, and the lemma itself does not follow from comparing a fixed assortment, since the optimal assortment changes with the attraction values. For the tightness part, the answer depends on the tie rule that defines S~i\tilde S_iS~i​: in the instance, store 2 has two optimal single-store assortments, and only the smallest one makes the bound tight.

Formalization scope

Lean 4 with Mathlib. Products are Fin n (the paper's product kkk is index k−1k-1k−1) and stores are Fin m; assortments are Finset (Fin n) and profiles are Fin m → Finset (Fin n). Attraction values vikv_{ik}vik​ are the primitive data, not utilities. The discount factor e−cik(S)e^{-c^k_i(\boldsymbol S)}e−cik​(S) is the largest e−cijke^{-c^k_{ij}}e−cijk​ over the offering stores, and 000 when no store offers kkk (the paper's c=∞c=\inftyc=∞). The single-store revenue is the published ChoiceCDLP.MNL.mnlObjective v r 1 S. The model is the choice probabilities (10) and the objective (SQR-heter), taken as given; the paper's derivation of (10) from Gumbel utilities is not formalized.

The standing assumptions λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1, r1>⋯>rnr_1>\dots>r_nr1​>⋯>rn​, vik>0v_{ik}>0vik​>0, cijk≥0c^k_{ij}\ge0cijk​≥0 and ciik=0c^k_{ii}=0ciik​=0 are explicit hypotheses of every theorem. One hypothesis is pinned beyond the page: rk>0r_k>0rk​>0. The paper's revenues are prices and its proof drops a second-stage revenue term that is nonnegative only for nonnegative revenues, but the sign is never stated. The paper's tightness claim ("an instance where the equality holds") is realized only in the limit ϵ→0\epsilon\to0ϵ→0, so the goal states it in the form "for every δ>0\delta>0δ>0, some instance has RQH<(12+δ)RQ∗R^H_Q<(\frac12+\delta)R^*_QRQH​<(21​+δ)RQ∗​".

"Optimal" means a maximizer over all assortments or profiles, ties allowed, and RQ∗R^*_QRQ∗​ is never formed as a term: the bound is stated as 12R(S)≤RQH\frac12R(\boldsymbol S)\le R^H_Q21​R(S)≤RQH​ for every profile S\boldsymbol SS. S~i\tilde S_iS~i​ is a predicate (revenue-ordered, optimal, and of least cardinality among the revenue-ordered optima). An encoding in which S~i\tilde S_iS~i​ can never exist would make the bound vacuous, so the tightness part asserts that S~i\tilde S_iS~i​ exists on its instance. The tightness part also must use the paper's tie rule, not an arbitrary single-store optimum, since with the other optimum the instance is not tight.

Welcome contributions: proofs of Lemma D.1 and of the two halves of the bound, the exact evaluation of the tightness instance, and a general Lean library for single-store MNL assortment optimization (existence of revenue-ordered optima, monotonicity in attraction values) that the other missions of this series can reuse.

Selected references

  • Y. Liu, X. A. Chen, Y. Liu, Z. Wan, Simultaneous vs. Sequential: Optimal Assortment Recommendation in Multistore Retailing, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0761 (formalized from the authors' manuscript of 2024-09-17 with its Online Supplement).
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • P. Gao, Y. Ma, N. Chen, G. Gallego, A. Li, P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization and Pricing Under the Multinomial Logit Model with Impatient Customers: Sequential Recommendation and Selection, Operations Research 69(5):1509–1532, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2127
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Actuarial ScienceProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Lambda Value-at-Risk under Ambiguity and Risk Sharing I: For Increasing Λ, the Worst-Case ΛVaR over a φ-Divergence Ball Is the ΛVaR under the Distorted Capacity g∘ℙ, and Tends to ΛVaR⁺ as δ ↓ 0Research Paper

Motivation

Lambda Value-at-Risk (Λ\LambdaΛVaR), introduced by Frittelli, Maggis and Peri (Mathematical Finance 24(3), 2014), generalizes the Value-at-Risk used in banking and insurance regulation: instead of one fixed confidence level, the level Λ(x)\Lambda(x)Λ(x) may depend on the size xxx of the loss. It has since been studied for its properties, representation and characterization (Bellini and Peri, SIAM J. Financial Math. 13(1), 2022; Han et al. 2025; see the references of arXiv:2511.00717v1).

Regulators and risk managers rarely know the loss distribution exactly. A standard way to account for this ambiguity is to evaluate the risk measure under every model in a neighbourhood of a reference model P\mathbb PP and report the worst case. Neighbourhoods defined by a ϕ\phiϕ-divergence (Kullback–Leibler, chi-squared, α\alphaα-divergences) are the most common choice in distributionally robust optimization (Ben-Tal et al. 2013). P. Liu and A. Schied, Lambda Value-at-Risk under ambiguity and risk sharing, arXiv:2511.00717v1 (2025), define Λ\LambdaΛVaR with respect to a capacity. They show that for increasing Λ\LambdaΛ the worst case over a ϕ\phiϕ-divergence ball is again a Λ\LambdaΛVaR, under an explicitly distorted reference probability. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Let (Ω,F)(\Omega,\mathcal F)(Ω,F) be a measurable space. A capacity is a set function w:F→[0,1]w:\mathcal F\to[0,1]w:F→[0,1] that is increasing (A⊆B⇒w(A)≤w(B)A\subseteq B\Rightarrow w(A)\le w(B)A⊆B⇒w(A)≤w(B)) with w(∅)=0w(\emptyset)=0w(∅)=0 and w(Ω)=1w(\Omega)=1w(Ω)=1; every probability measure is one. Let HI\mathcal H_IHI​ be the set of increasing functions Λ:R→(0,1)\Lambda:\mathbb R\to(0,1)Λ:R→(0,1). For a capacity www and a random variable XXX,

ΛVaRw(X)=inf⁡{x∈R:w(X>x)≤Λ(x)},ΛVaR+,w(X)=sup⁡{x∈R:w(X>x)≥Λ(x)},\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^w(X)=\inf\{x\in\mathbb R: w(X>x)\le\Lambda(x)\},\qquad \Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{+,w}(X)=\sup\{x\in\mathbb R: w(X>x)\ge\Lambda(x)\},ΛVaRw(X)=inf{x∈R:w(X>x)≤Λ(x)},ΛVaR+,w(X)=sup{x∈R:w(X>x)≥Λ(x)},

with inf⁡∅=∞\inf\emptyset=\inftyinf∅=∞ and sup⁡∅=−∞\sup\emptyset=-\inftysup∅=−∞. A constant Λ≡α\Lambda\equiv\alphaΛ≡α gives the Choquet quantile VaRαw\mathrm{VaR}^w_\alphaVaRαw​. For a class WWW of capacities, w‾=sup⁡w∈Ww\overline w=\sup_{w\in W}ww=supw∈W​w and w‾=inf⁡w∈Ww\underline w=\inf_{w\in W}ww​=infw∈W​w are its setwise envelopes; for a class P\mathcal PP of probability measures they are written Q‾\overline{\mathbb Q}Q​ and Q‾\underline{\mathbb Q}Q​.

Fix a probability measure P\mathbb PP and a convex ϕ:[0,∞)→R∪{∞}\phi:[0,\infty)\to\mathbb R\cup\{\infty\}ϕ:[0,∞)→R∪{∞} with ϕ(1)=0\phi(1)=0ϕ(1)=0 and ϕ(0)=lim⁡x↓0ϕ(x)\phi(0)=\lim_{x\downarrow0}\phi(x)ϕ(0)=limx↓0​ϕ(x). For a probability measure Q≪P\mathbb Q\ll\mathbb PQ≪P, Dϕ(Q∥P)=EP[ϕ(dQ/dP)]D_\phi(\mathbb Q\|\mathbb P)=\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}[\phi(\mathrm d\mathbb Q/\mathrm d\mathbb P)]Dϕ​(Q∥P)=EP[ϕ(dQ/dP)], and for δ>0\delta>0δ>0 the ϕ\phiϕ-divergence ball is Pϕ(P,δ)={Q≪P:Dϕ(Q∥P)≤δ}\mathcal P_\phi(\mathbb P,\delta)=\{\mathbb Q\ll\mathbb P: D_\phi(\mathbb Q\|\mathbb P)\le\delta\}Pϕ​(P,δ)={Q≪P:Dϕ​(Q∥P)≤δ}. The distortion gϕ,δ:[0,1]→[0,1]g_{\phi,\delta}:[0,1]\to[0,1]gϕ,δ​:[0,1]→[0,1] is gϕ,δ(0)=0g_{\phi,\delta}(0)=0gϕ,δ​(0)=0, gϕ,δ(1)=1g_{\phi,\delta}(1)=1gϕ,δ​(1)=1 and

gϕ,δ(x)=sup⁡{t∈[x,1]:xϕ(t/x)+(1−x)ϕ((1−t)/(1−x))≤δ},x∈(0,1).g_{\phi,\delta}(x)=\sup\{t\in[x,1]: x\phi(t/x)+(1-x)\phi((1-t)/(1-x))\le\delta\},\qquad x\in(0,1).gϕ,δ​(x)=sup{t∈[x,1]:xϕ(t/x)+(1−x)ϕ((1−t)/(1−x))≤δ},x∈(0,1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 12)

For δ>0\delta>0δ>0, Λ∈HI\Lambda\in\mathcal H_IΛ∈HI​, α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1) and every random variable XXX,

sup⁡Q∈Pϕ(P,δ)ΛVaRQ(X)=ΛVaRgϕ,δ∘P(X),sup⁡Q∈Pϕ(P,δ)VaRαQ(X)=VaRαgϕ,δ∘P(X).\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P_\phi(\mathbb P,\delta)}\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb Q}(X)=\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{g_{\phi,\delta}\circ\mathbb P}(X),\qquad \sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P_\phi(\mathbb P,\delta)}\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb Q}_\alpha(X)=\mathrm{VaR}^{g_{\phi,\delta}\circ\mathbb P}_\alpha(X).Q∈Pϕ​(P,δ)sup​ΛVaRQ(X)=ΛVaRgϕ,δ​∘P(X),Q∈Pϕ​(P,δ)sup​VaRαQ​(X)=VaRαgϕ,δ​∘P​(X).

If moreover ϕ\phiϕ is finite, strictly convex and ϕ(x)/x→∞\phi(x)/x\to\inftyϕ(x)/x→∞, then

sup⁡Q∈Pϕ(P,δ)ΛVaRQ=(gϕ,δ−1∘Λ)VaRP,sup⁡Q∈Pϕ(P,δ)VaRαQ=VaRgϕ,δ−1(α)P,\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P_\phi(\mathbb P,\delta)}\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb Q}=(g^{-1}_{\phi,\delta}\circ\Lambda)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P},\qquad \sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P_\phi(\mathbb P,\delta)}\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb Q}_\alpha=\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_{g^{-1}_{\phi,\delta}(\alpha)},Q∈Pϕ​(P,δ)sup​ΛVaRQ=(gϕ,δ−1​∘Λ)VaRP,Q∈Pϕ​(P,δ)sup​VaRαQ​=VaRgϕ,δ−1​(α)P​, lim⁡δ↓0sup⁡Q∈Pϕ(P,δ)ΛVaRQ(X)=lim⁡δ↓0(gϕ,δ−1∘Λ)VaRP(X)=ΛVaR+,P(X).\lim_{\delta\downarrow0}\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P_\phi(\mathbb P,\delta)}\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb Q}(X)=\lim_{\delta\downarrow0}(g^{-1}_{\phi,\delta}\circ\Lambda)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}(X)=\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{+,\mathbb P}(X).δ↓0lim​Q∈Pϕ​(P,δ)sup​ΛVaRQ(X)=δ↓0lim​(gϕ,δ−1​∘Λ)VaRP(X)=ΛVaR+,P(X).

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2 (p. 8): for a nonempty class WWW of capacities and Λ∈HI\Lambda\in\mathcal H_IΛ∈HI​, sup⁡w∈WΛVaRw=ΛVaRw‾\sup_{w\in W}\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^w=\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{\overline w}supw∈W​ΛVaRw=ΛVaRw and inf⁡w∈WΛVaR+,w=ΛVaR+,w‾\inf_{w\in W}\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{+,w}=\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{+,\underline w}infw∈W​ΛVaR+,w=ΛVaR+,w​.
  2. Corollary 1 (p. 8): the same for a class of probability measures, together with the fact that Q‾\overline{\mathbb Q}Q​ and Q‾\underline{\mathbb Q}Q​ are capacities.
  3. Proposition 5, formula (p. 11): sup⁡Q∈Pϕ(P,δ)Q(A)=gϕ,δ(P(A))\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P_\phi(\mathbb P,\delta)}\mathbb Q(A)=g_{\phi,\delta}(\mathbb P(A))supQ∈Pϕ​(P,δ)​Q(A)=gϕ,δ​(P(A)) for every A∈FA\in\mathcal FA∈F.
  4. Proposition 5, properties (pp. 11–12): under the extra hypotheses on ϕ\phiϕ, xϕ(1/x)+(1−x)ϕ(0)=δx\phi(1/x)+(1-x)\phi(0)=\deltaxϕ(1/x)+(1−x)ϕ(0)=δ has a unique root xδ∈(0,1)x_\delta\in(0,1)xδ​∈(0,1), gϕ,δg_{\phi,\delta}gϕ,δ​ is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,xδ][0,x_\delta][0,xδ​] and equal to 111 on [xδ,1][x_\delta,1][xδ​,1], and gϕ,δ(x)>xg_{\phi,\delta}(x)>xgϕ,δ​(x)>x with gϕ,δ(x)↓xg_{\phi,\delta}(x)\downarrow xgϕ,δ​(x)↓x as δ↓0\delta\downarrow0δ↓0.

Significance

The theorem reduces a supremum over an infinite-dimensional set of models to a single Λ\LambdaΛVaR under the reference model with a transformed level function gϕ,δ−1∘Λg^{-1}_{\phi,\delta}\circ\Lambdagϕ,δ−1​∘Λ. Robust Λ\LambdaΛVaR therefore inherits the computational and statistical tools available for Λ\LambdaΛVaR, and the worst-case VaR at level α\alphaα is the ordinary VaR at the explicit level gϕ,δ−1(α)g^{-1}_{\phi,\delta}(\alpha)gϕ,δ−1​(α). The limit statement shows an asymmetry: as the ambiguity vanishes, the robust value converges to the upper version ΛVaR+,P\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{+,\mathbb P}ΛVaR+,P, not to ΛVaRP\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}ΛVaRP; the two differ when the distribution function of XXX has a flat piece where it meets Λ\LambdaΛ.

The result is proved in the paper (2025) and, to our knowledge, nothing of it is machine-checked. The platform has no capacity, no Choquet quantile, no Λ\LambdaΛVaR, and no ϕ\phiϕ-divergence over general (non-discrete) probability spaces; the mission supplies all of these, and the formula for the upper probability of a ϕ\phiϕ-divergence ball (Proposition 5) is a reusable fact about divergence balls in its own right.

Difficulty

Proposition 2 is an order-theoretic exchange of a supremum with an infimum; it fails for decreasing Λ\LambdaΛ (Example 1 of the paper), so monotonicity of Λ\LambdaΛ must be used at the right place, and the values ±∞\pm\infty±∞ have to be handled. Proposition 5 asks for the exact value of a supremum over an infinite-dimensional ball of measures, for a ϕ\phiϕ that may take the value +∞+\infty+∞ and may be negative; the upper bound must hold for every density in the ball, not only for the simple ones, and the integrability conventions of DϕD_\phiDϕ​ matter. The second part of Proposition 5 is real analysis of the perspective function xϕ(t/x)x\phi(t/x)xϕ(t/x), and continuity of gϕ,δg_{\phi,\delta}gϕ,δ​ at the endpoints 000 and xδx_\deltaxδ​ does not follow from continuity of ϕ\phiϕ alone. In the limit δ↓0\delta\downarrow0δ↓0 the natural guess ΛVaRP\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}ΛVaRP is wrong: the limit is ΛVaR+,P\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{+,\mathbb P}ΛVaR+,P, so any argument that treats the robust value as a perturbation of ΛVaRP\Lambda\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}ΛVaRP fails at flat pieces of the distribution function.

Formalization scope

All definitions live in the namespace LambdaVaRAmb.Robust. A random variable is a measurable function Ω→R\Omega\to\mathbb RΩ→R; statements quantify over all of them, which covers every domain X\mathcal XX the paper allows. Set functions are Set Ω → ℝ and the capacity axioms are imposed on measurable sets. Λ\LambdaΛVaR, Λ\LambdaΛVaR+^++, the suprema over the ball and the limits as δ→0+\delta\to0^+δ→0+ are taken in EReal, so ±∞\pm\infty±∞ are genuine values. ϕ\phiϕ is ℝ → EReal (only its values on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) matter); convexity uses 0⋅∞=00\cdot\infty=00⋅∞=0. DϕD_\phiDϕ​ is the integral of the positive part of ϕ(dQ/dP)\phi(\mathrm d\mathbb Q/\mathrm d\mathbb P)ϕ(dQ/dP) minus that of the negative part; members of the ball are probability measures. gϕ,δ−1(t)g^{-1}_{\phi,\delta}(t)gϕ,δ−1​(t) is defined as sup⁡{x∈[0,1]:gϕ,δ(x)≤t}\sup\{x\in[0,1]: g_{\phi,\delta}(x)\le t\}sup{x∈[0,1]:gϕ,δ​(x)≤t}, which is the inverse of gϕ,δg_{\phi,\delta}gϕ,δ​ on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) under the hypotheses where the paper uses it.

Implicit hypotheses made explicit: the classes WWW and P\mathcal PP in Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 are nonempty; "ϕ:[0,∞)→R\phi:[0,\infty)\to\mathbb Rϕ:[0,∞)→R" in the second parts is the hypothesis that ϕ\phiϕ is finite on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); "xδx_\deltaxδ​ being the solution" is posed as existence and uniqueness.

The trivializing readings are ruled out: suprema over the ball and Λ\LambdaΛVaR values are never real sSup/sInf (which would collapse to 000 on empty or unbounded sets); the envelopes are real suprema only over nonempty classes of values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the ball always contains P\mathbb PP, so it is not empty; gϕ,δg_{\phi,\delta}gϕ,δ​ is the paper's supremum, not a closed form for a particular ϕ\phiϕ.

Needed infrastructure, all reusable beyond this mission: capacities and Choquet-type quantiles; ϕ\phiϕ-divergences for general measures via Radon–Nikodym derivatives; conditional Jensen for extended-valued convex functions; perspective functions. Contributions of any of these, and proofs of the milestones in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Liu and A. Schied, Lambda Value-at-Risk under ambiguity and risk sharing, arXiv preprint, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.00717v1
  • M. Frittelli, M. Maggis and I. Peri, Risk measures on 𝒫(ℝ) and Value at Risk with probability/loss function, Mathematical Finance 24(3), 442–463, 2014.
  • F. Bellini and I. Peri, An axiomatization of Λ-quantiles, SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics 13(1), 26–38, 2022.
  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, A. De Waegenaere, B. Melenberg and G. Rennen, Robust solutions of optimization problems affected by uncertain probabilities, Management Science 59(2), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1641
  • C. P. Chambers, Ordinal aggregation and quantiles, Journal of Economic Theory 137(1), 416–431, 2007 (Choquet quantiles).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers I: The Seller's Interest-Rate Threshold Never Exceeds the Supplier's, So Platform Loans Are Win-Win, Lose-Win or Lose-LoseResearch Paper

Motivation

Small third-party sellers on e-commerce marketplaces (Amazon, JD.com, Alibaba) typically have little capital and limited credit history, so they finance procurement through short-term credit. The traditional source is trade credit: the supplier ships the goods and is paid after the sales. Since about 2011 the platforms themselves lend to their sellers (the Amazon Lending Program, Ant Group's micro-loans, JD Small Loan), a form of finance called platform financing. The usual argument for platform loans is that platforms have cheap capital and rich data. Huang, Lai, Wang and Xiao (SSRN 4014045; published in Management Science, 2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.00201) remove both advantages: supplier and platform have the same capital cost and the same information. They ask whether a platform loan can still help the seller and the supplier, and at which interest rates.

The paper builds on the literature comparing supply-chain finance with bank finance, for example Buzacott and Zhang (2004) on asset-based financing and Kouvelis and Zhao (2012) on supplier versus bank financing of a newsvendor. The new feature is a third lender, the platform, which also collects a share of the revenue.

Setting

A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c>0c>0. A seller with no capital procures q≥0q\ge 0q≥0 units and sells all of them on a platform at the market-clearing price p=a~−qp=\tilde a-qp=a~−q. The market size a~\tilde aa~ is uniform on [a−δ,a+δ][a-\delta,a+\delta][a−δ,a+δ], where δ>0\delta>0δ>0 measures uncertainty. The platform keeps the share φ∈[0,1)\varphi\in[0,1)φ∈[0,1) of revenue, and the seller receives (1−φ)pq(1-\varphi)pq(1−φ)pq. Supplier and platform both have capital cost equal to the risk-free rate rf≥0r_f\ge 0rf​≥0. The paper assumes (1−φ)a>c(1+rf)(1-\varphi)a>c(1+r_f)(1−φ)a>c(1+rf​), so selling is profitable in expectation, and that the smallest market size a−δa-\deltaa−δ keeps the price positive.

The seller has limited liability: if her revenue falls short of what she owes, she hands over all of it. If she owes WWW per unit, her expected profit is

Πs(W,q)=E[((1−φ)(a~−q)q−Wq)+].\Pi_s(W,q)=\mathbb E\big[((1-\varphi)(\tilde a-q)q-Wq)^+\big].Πs​(W,q)=E[((1−φ)(a~−q)q−Wq)+].
  • Trade credit. The supplier sets a deferred wholesale price www, so W=wW=wW=w. He collects min⁡{(1−φ)(a~−q)q, wq}\min\{(1-\varphi)(\tilde a-q)q,\,wq\}min{(1−φ)(a~−q)q,wq} and pays production cost cq(1+rf)cq(1+r_f)cq(1+rf​).
  • Platform financing at rate rrr. The supplier sets an upfront price www and earns (w−c)q(1+rf)(w-c)q(1+r_f)(w−c)q(1+rf​). The seller borrows wqwqwq from the platform and owes W=w(1+r)W=w(1+r)W=w(1+r) per unit.

Each scheme is a two-stage Stackelberg game: the supplier chooses www, then the seller, having observed www, chooses qqq. Its subgame-perfect equilibrium gives the profits ΠsT,ΠmT\Pi^T_s,\Pi^T_mΠsT​,ΠmT​ (seller and supplier under trade credit) and ΠsP,ΠmP\Pi^P_s,\Pi^P_mΠsP​,ΠmP​ (under platform financing).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6 (p. 18)

The paper defines two piecewise threshold functions of δ\deltaδ. They are built from the thresholds δ1,δ2,δ3\delta_1,\delta_2,\delta_3δ1​,δ2​,δ3​ and the rates r1,…,r4r_1,\dots,r_4r1​,…,r4​, all explicit in a,δ,φ,c,rfa,\delta,\varphi,c,r_fa,δ,φ,c,rf​:

r^1(δ)={rfδ≤δ2r1δ2<δ≤δ3r2δ>δ3r^2(δ)={rfδ≤δ2r3δ2<δ≤δ1r4δ>δ1.\hat r_1(\delta)=\begin{cases}r_f&\delta\le\delta_2\\ r_1&\delta_2<\delta\le\delta_3\\ r_2&\delta>\delta_3\end{cases}\qquad \hat r_2(\delta)=\begin{cases}r_f&\delta\le\delta_2\\ r_3&\delta_2<\delta\le\delta_1\\ r_4&\delta>\delta_1.\end{cases}r^1​(δ)=⎩⎨⎧​rf​r1​r2​​δ≤δ2​δ2​<δ≤δ3​δ>δ3​​r^2​(δ)=⎩⎨⎧​rf​r3​r4​​δ≤δ2​δ2​<δ≤δ1​δ>δ1​.​

The goal states that r^1(δ)≤r^2(δ)\hat r_1(\delta)\le\hat r_2(\delta)r^1​(δ)≤r^2​(δ) and that, for every pair of equilibria of the two games,

r<r^1⇒ΠsP>ΠsT, ΠmP>ΠmT;r^1<r<r^2⇒ΠsP≤ΠsT, ΠmP>ΠmT;r>r^2⇒ΠsP≤ΠsT, ΠmP≤ΠmT.r<\hat r_1\Rightarrow \Pi^P_s>\Pi^T_s,\ \Pi^P_m>\Pi^T_m;\qquad \hat r_1<r<\hat r_2\Rightarrow \Pi^P_s\le\Pi^T_s,\ \Pi^P_m>\Pi^T_m;\qquad r>\hat r_2\Rightarrow \Pi^P_s\le\Pi^T_s,\ \Pi^P_m\le\Pi^T_m .r<r^1​⇒ΠsP​>ΠsT​, ΠmP​>ΠmT​;r^1​<r<r^2​⇒ΠsP​≤ΠsT​, ΠmP​>ΠmT​;r>r^2​⇒ΠsP​≤ΠsT​, ΠmP​≤ΠmT​.

Milestones

  1. Lemmas 1–2: the seller's unique best response.
  2. Propositions 1–2: existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in each game, with explicit prices and quantities.
  3. The equilibrium profits displayed in the proofs (pp. 32–33, 35).
  4. Proposition 3: the comparison of unit costs and order quantities.
  5. Propositions 4 and 5: the seller's and the supplier's profit comparisons.

Significance

The theorem says that a platform loan never benefits the seller while hurting the supplier. The outcome "win for the seller, loss for the supplier" does not occur. Whenever the platform's rate is low enough to help the seller, it also helps the supplier. Combined with Proposition 3, it identifies the mechanisms that make a platform loan attractive even without a cost-of-capital or information advantage: an interest subsidy at low uncertainty, risk mitigation at moderate uncertainty, and risk isolation at high uncertainty, where r^1\hat r_1r^1​ exceeds rfr_frf​. The thresholds are explicit, so the result tells a platform the range of rates at which its lending creates value for both supply-chain parties.

The paper's proofs are long case analyses on closed-form radicals. Several displayed formulas in the manuscript contain printing errors (listed below), and some comparisons are justified as "it can be verified". A machine-checked development would certify the closed forms and the threshold algebra and settle the boundary cases. None of these results is formalized in Mathlib or in the Prove2Me library as of October 2026.

Difficulty

The equilibrium is not given by first-order conditions alone. Under limited liability the seller's objective is not concave in qqq: it has a no-default regime and a default regime, and the maximizer jumps between them at w=(1−φ)(a−2δ)w=(1-\varphi)(a-2\delta)w=(1−φ)(a−2δ). The supplier's problem under trade credit is therefore a comparison of two local optima: one quadratic, one a cubic in www with a radical maximizer. The winner switches at δ1\delta_1δ1​, which involves 510−145\sqrt{10}-14510​−14. The comparisons of Propositions 3–6 then require sign analyses of differences of nested radicals across up to five regimes, ordered by δ1,δ2,δ3,δr\delta_1,\delta_2,\delta_3,\delta_rδ1​,δ2​,δ3​,δr​ and (1−φ)a−c(1+rf)(1-\varphi)a-c(1+r_f)(1−φ)a−c(1+rf​) over 1−φ1-\varphi1−φ.

Equating first-order conditions is not enough: equilibrium uniqueness requires excluding the off-path behaviour of the seller and handling the supplier's indifference at δ=δ1\delta=\delta_1δ=δ1​ and δ=δr\delta=\delta_rδ=δr​.

Formalization scope

  • Expectation. E\mathbb EE over a~\tilde aa~ is the normalized interval integral 12δ∫a−δa+δ\frac1{2\delta}\int_{a-\delta}^{a+\delta}2δ1​∫a−δa+δ​. All integrands are continuous.

  • Equilibrium. A strategy profile is a price www together with an order rule q(⋅)q(\cdot)q(⋅) defined at every price. A subgame-perfect equilibrium requires two things:

    • for every www, q(w)≥0q(w)\ge 0q(w)≥0 maximizes Πs\Pi_sΠs​ over q≥0q\ge0q≥0;
    • the supplier's price maximizes his payoff over all real prices.

    Two tie-breaks are part of the definition, both the paper's own conventions:

    • the seller orders 000 when no order is profitable (proofs of Propositions 1–2);
    • the supplier's price is the least maximizer, which assigns δ=δ1\delta=\delta_1δ=δ1​ and δ=δr\delta=\delta_rδ=δr​ to the low-price branch as the paper does.
  • Goals quantify over equilibria. The closed forms enter only through the milestones. A statement taking the closed forms as hypotheses, or proving only r^1≤r^2\hat r_1\le\hat r_2r^1​≤r^2​, is not this theorem.

  • Standing assumptions.

    • 0<δ<a0<\delta<a0<δ<a. The pin δ<a\delta<aδ<a formalizes "the smallest market size keeps the price positive". It is load-bearing: r^1≤r^2\hat r_1\le\hat r_2r^1​≤r^2​ fails for some δ>a\delta>aδ>a.
    • 0≤φ<10\le\varphi<10≤φ<1 and c>0c>0c>0.
    • rf≥0r_f\ge0rf​≥0 and (1−φ)a>c(1+rf)(1-\varphi)a>c(1+r_f)(1−φ)a>c(1+rf​).
    • For platform financing, r>−1r>-1r>−1 and c(1+r)<(a+δ)(1−φ)c(1+r)<(a+\delta)(1-\varphi)c(1+r)<(a+δ)(1−φ) (the paper's conditions (ii)–(iii), p. 36).
  • Corrected slips, each disclosed in its item:

    • r3r_3r3​ uses (2ac+8cδ)(2ac+8c\delta)(2ac+8cδ) under the root, not the printed (2ac+8δ)(2ac+8\delta)(2ac+8δ);
    • Proposition 1's δ>δ1\delta>\delta_1δ>δ1​ branch uses the proof's form wT=(1−φ)(a−δ(S−2))w^T=(1-\varphi)(a-\delta(S-2))wT=(1−φ)(a−δ(S−2)), qT=δ(S−1)/3q^T=\delta(S-1)/3qT=δ(S−1)/3;
    • the supplier's trade-credit profit for δ>δ1\delta>\delta_1δ>δ1​ is δK/27\delta K/27δK/27, where the printed display has flipped signs;
    • Proposition 3(c) uses the strict endpoint.
  • Boundary. Propositions 3–4 exclude the rate r=r^1(δ)r=\hat r_1(\delta)r=r^1​(δ) from their "otherwise" clause only for δ2<δ≤δ3\delta_2<\delta\le\delta_3δ2​<δ≤δ3​, where r=r1r=r_1r=r1​ makes δ=δr\delta=\delta_rδ=δr​ and the paper's statement and proof disagree; for other δ\deltaδ the boundary rate is kept, as on the page.

A complete development needs the following:

  • calculus of the uniform expectation of piecewise polynomials;
  • the seller's best response;
  • the two supplier optimizations;
  • the algebra of the thresholds.

The best-response analysis under limited liability is reusable for other newsvendor-type financing models. Contributions of any milestone, of lemmas on the threshold order, and of alternative proofs are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Huang, G. Lai, X. Wang, W. Xiao, Lending to Third-party Sellers with Platform Loan, SSRN manuscript 4014045 (the source of every page and label cited here). https://ssrn.com/abstract=4014045 — published as Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers, Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00201
  • J. A. Buzacott, R. Q. Zhang, Inventory management with asset-based financing, Management Science 50(9), 1274–1292, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0278
  • P. Kouvelis, W. Zhao, Financing the newsvendor: supplier vs. bank, and the structure of optimal trade credit contracts, Operations Research 60(3), 566–580, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1040
  • B. Jing, X. Chen, G. Cai, Equilibrium financing in a distribution channel with capital constraint, Production and Operations Management 21(6), 1090–1101, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01328.x
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand 2: The Myopic Policy Loses at Most β(1−α)ωp_H/((1−αβ)(1−β)) Against the Optimal Discounted RevenueResearch Paper

Why reference effects make pricing dynamic

Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal benchmark formed from the prices they have seen before. A price below the reference is perceived as a gain and raises demand; a price above it is perceived as a loss and lowers demand. Because today's price moves tomorrow's reference price, a seller who maximises the revenue of each period separately ignores how it erodes or builds future demand. This makes pricing a dynamic program, studied for a single product with linear demand by Popescu and Wu (Operations Research 2007) and Chen, Hu and Hu (Management Science 2017), among others.

Guo, Jiang and Shen (SSRN 4189049, published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025) treat several substitutable products under multinomial-logit (MNL) demand. The dynamic program then has a continuous state of dimension nnn, and computing the optimal policy is impractical even for moderate nnn. The myopic policy, which maximises the current period's revenue only, is easy to compute. This mission formalizes the paper's bound on how much revenue the myopic policy can lose (Proposition 2).

Setting

There are nnn products N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Product iii has intrinsic utility aia_iai​, price sensitivity bi>0b_i>0bi​>0, and reference-price sensitivities ci+≥0c_i^+\ge0ci+​≥0 (to gains) and ci−≥0c_i^-\ge0ci−​≥0 (to losses). At price vector p\mathbf pp and reference vector r\mathbf rr, the utility of product iii is

ui(p,r)=ai−bipi+ci+(ri−pi)+−ci−(pi−ri)+,u_i(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)=a_i-b_ip_i+c_i^+(r_i-p_i)_+-c_i^-(p_i-r_i)_+,ui​(p,r)=ai​−bi​pi​+ci+​(ri​−pi​)+​−ci−​(pi​−ri​)+​,

the market share is qi(p,r)=eui/(1+∑k∈Neuk)q_i(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)=e^{u_i}/(1+\sum_{k\in N}e^{u_k})qi​(p,r)=eui​/(1+∑k∈N​euk​), and the single-period revenue is Π(p,r)=∑i∈Npiqi(p,r)\Pi(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)=\sum_{i\in N}p_iq_i(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)Π(p,r)=∑i∈N​pi​qi​(p,r).

Prices and reference prices lie in the admissible box Pn=[0,pH]n\mathcal P^n=[0,p_H]^nPn=[0,pH​]n with a price ceiling pH>0p_H>0pH​>0. The reference price follows exponential smoothing with memory α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1]: rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt\mathbf r^{t+1}=\alpha\mathbf r^t+(1-\alpha)\mathbf p^trt+1=αrt+(1−α)pt. Revenue is discounted by β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1).

  • The optimal value V⋆(r0)V^\star(\mathbf r^0)V⋆(r0) is the supremum of ∑t≥0βtΠ(pt,rt)\sum_{t\ge0}\beta^t\Pi(\mathbf p^t,\mathbf r^t)∑t≥0​βtΠ(pt,rt) over all price sequences in Pn\mathcal P^nPn.
  • A myopic policy pm\mathbf p^mpm picks, for each r∈Pn\mathbf r\in\mathcal P^nr∈Pn, a maximiser of Π(⋅,r)\Pi(\cdot,\mathbf r)Π(⋅,r) over Pn\mathcal P^nPn. Its value Vm(r0)=∑t≥0βtΠ(pm(rt),rt)V^m(\mathbf r^0)=\sum_{t\ge0}\beta^t\Pi(\mathbf p^m(\mathbf r^t),\mathbf r^t)Vm(r0)=∑t≥0​βtΠ(pm(rt),rt) is taken along rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pm(rt)\mathbf r^{t+1}=\alpha\mathbf r^t+(1-\alpha)\mathbf p^m(\mathbf r^t)rt+1=αrt+(1−α)pm(rt).
  • The ceiling condition: pH≥p^Hp_H\ge\hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​, where p^H\hat p_Hp^​H​ is the root of the scalar equation (9) of the paper, p=χ+∑i1bi+ci+exp⁡(ai−bip+(bi+ci+)χ−1)p=\chi+\sum_i\frac{1}{b_i+c_i^+}\exp(a_i-b_ip+(b_i+c_i^+)\chi-1)p=χ+∑i​bi​+ci+​1​exp(ai​−bi​p+(bi​+ci+​)χ−1) with χ=max⁡i1/(bi+min⁡{ci+,ci−})\chi=\max_i 1/(b_i+\min\{c_i^+,c_i^-\})χ=maxi​1/(bi​+min{ci+​,ci−​}). It makes the ceiling non-binding for the single-period problem, and the paper assumes it throughout §3–§4.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (optimality gap)

With ω=max⁡i∈N{ci+/(bi+ci+), ci−/(bi+ci−)}\omega=\max_{i\in N}\{c_i^+/(b_i+c_i^+),\ c_i^-/(b_i+c_i^-)\}ω=maxi∈N​{ci+​/(bi​+ci+​), ci−​/(bi​+ci−​)}, for every r0∈Pn\mathbf r^0\in\mathcal P^nr0∈Pn and every myopic policy,

0≤V⋆(r0)−Vm(r0)≤β(1−α)(1−αβ)(1−β)⋅ω pH.0\le V^\star(\mathbf r^0)-V^m(\mathbf r^0)\le\frac{\beta(1-\alpha)}{(1-\alpha\beta)(1-\beta)}\cdot\omega\,p_H .0≤V⋆(r0)−Vm(r0)≤(1−αβ)(1−β)β(1−α)​⋅ωpH​.

Milestones

  1. The Bellman equation (6), p. 9: V⋆(r0)=max⁡p∈Pn{Π(p,r0)+βV⋆(αr0+(1−α)p)}V^\star(\mathbf r^0)=\max_{\mathbf p\in\mathcal P^n}\{\Pi(\mathbf p,\mathbf r^0)+\beta V^\star(\alpha\mathbf r^0+(1-\alpha)\mathbf p)\}V⋆(r0)=maxp∈Pn​{Π(p,r0)+βV⋆(αr0+(1−α)p)}, with the maximum attained.
  2. The left inequality Vm(r0)≤V⋆(r0)V^m(\mathbf r^0)\le V^\star(\mathbf r^0)Vm(r0)≤V⋆(r0), stated in §4.1, p. 17.
  3. Proposition 1.1, p. 10: if α<1\alpha<1α<1, β>0\beta>0β>0 and max⁡ici+>0\max_ic_i^+>0maxi​ci+​>0, then V⋆(r0)V^\star(\mathbf r^0)V⋆(r0) is non-decreasing in pHp_HpH​ and lim⁡pH→∞V⋆(r0)=∞\lim_{p_H\to\infty}V^\star(\mathbf r^0)=\inftylimpH​→∞​V⋆(r0)=∞. It explains why the gap is linear in pHp_HpH​ and why a ceiling is needed at all.

Significance

The bound is uniform in the initial reference price and has an explicit constant. It vanishes in three regimes: α=1\alpha=1α=1 (the reference price never moves), β=0\beta=0β=0 (only the present counts) and ω=0\omega=0ω=0 (no reference effect). It quantifies how much the intertemporal structure costs a seller who ignores it. The myopic policy is computable by a one-dimensional root search (Theorem 1 of the paper), while the optimal policy suffers from the curse of dimensionality, so the bound is what makes the myopic policy a usable benchmark.

The paper proves Proposition 2 in its online supplement (Appendix C.1), which is not part of the source file used for this mission. To our knowledge, none of these results has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them yields a verified Bellman equation for a deterministic dynamic program with a continuous multidimensional state and a nonsmooth, nonconcave reward.

Difficulty

The left inequality only uses the fact that the myopic price sequence is admissible. The right inequality is the content. Comparing the two value functions period by period fails: in a given period the optimal policy may earn less than the myopic one, and its later advantage comes from having moved the reference price. The two policies also generate different reference paths, so their revenues are evaluated at different states, and the sensitivity of the revenue to the reference price enters only through the constant ω\omegaω. The revenue is not concave in prices or in reference prices, and the kinks at pi=rip_i=r_ipi​=ri​ make it nonsmooth. The Bellman equation itself needs the optimal value to be well behaved enough in r\mathbf rr for the one-step maximum to be attained.

Formalization scope

Products are indexed by Fin n (product iii is Lean index i−1i-1i−1), and vectors are Fin n → ℝ. The shares are defined directly by the logit formula; the Gumbel random-utility derivation is motivation only. The standing assumptions b>0b>0b>0, c±≥0c^\pm\ge0c±≥0, α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1) and pH>0p_H>0pH​>0 are hypotheses of every theorem. The goal also assumes the ceiling condition pH≥p^Hp_H\ge\hat p_HpH​≥p^​H​, as a standing assumption of §2.4. That condition is stated as the existence of a root of (9) at most pHp_HpH​. The Bellman equation omits the ceiling condition (it holds without it). Proposition 1.1 varies pHp_HpH​, so it does not take the condition.

  • V⋆V^\starV⋆ is optValue, the supremum over all admissible price sequences, built as an instance of the published deterministic dynamic program KarlinDP.Deterministic.optimalReturn (Karlin 1955). The paper writes V⋆V^\starV⋆ as a maximum over stationary policies and uses it through (6); milestone 1 is the theorem that connects the two.
  • The bound holds for every myopic selection, because single-period maximisers can tie.
  • ω\omegaω and χ\chiχ are maxima over NNN, written ⨆ i, which is 000 when n=0n=0n=0 (then V⋆=Vm=0V^\star=V^m=0V⋆=Vm=0).

Lean's real supremum is 000 on an unbounded family and its tsum is 000 on a non-summable series. Neither default is reached here: with β<1\beta<1β<1 and pH>0p_H>0pH​>0 the family is nonempty and bounded by pH/(1−β)p_H/(1-\beta)pH​/(1−β), and every series is summable. So the goal cannot hold vacuously through a junk value. In particular, V⋆V^\starV⋆ may not be replaced by an arbitrary solution of (6), and the constant may not be weakened, for example by replacing ω\omegaω with 111.

Needed infrastructure: continuity of the MNL revenue, the Bellman equation for a discounted deterministic program on a compact action set, and bounds on the myopic value Πm(r)=max⁡p∈PnΠ(p,r)\Pi^m(\mathbf r)=\max_{\mathbf p\in\mathcal P^n}\Pi(\mathbf p,\mathbf r)Πm(r)=maxp∈Pn​Π(p,r) as a function of r\mathbf rr. The first two are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions toward any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. A. Guo, H. Jiang, Z.-J. M. Shen, Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand, SSRN 4189049 (version of 2024-05-25); Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189049, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0801
  • I. Popescu, Y. Wu, Dynamic pricing strategies with reference effects, Operations Research 55(3):413–429, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
  • X. Chen, P. Hu, Z. Hu, Efficient algorithms for the dynamic pricing problem with reference price effect, Management Science 63(12):4389–4408, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2554
  • S. Karlin, The structure of dynamic programming models, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 2(4):285–294, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020408
  • D. McFadden, Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior, in Frontiers in Econometrics, 105–142, 1974.
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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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