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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 2: Every Set of Assortments Has a Unique Profile of Thresholds Equal to Expected UtilitiesResearch Paper

Motivation

Online matching platforms for dating, freelancing or ride sharing do not match agents themselves. They decide whom each agent gets to see and how often, and the agents then accept or reject. Immorlica, Lucier, Manshadi and Wei (arXiv:2102.09017, Management Science 2023) model this as directed search. The platform designs assortments, which are rates at which types of agents meet, and the agents play an equilibrium of the induced search game. The platform's design problem only makes sense if every choice of assortments leads to a single, well-defined equilibrium outcome. Otherwise "the welfare of an assortment" is not a function of the assortment. This is not automatic: even for simple asymmetric preferences under random meetings, multiple stationary equilibria can arise (Burdett and Coles 1997).

This mission formalizes that well-posedness result, Proposition 3.1(1) of the paper, together with the fixed-point and iteration lemmas of Appendix A.3 and Appendix B.3 on which its proof rests. It is the companion of the mission on the paper's quarter-approximation theorem (Theorem 4.1), which uses the same model.

The source is the arXiv v2 preprint (18 Aug 2021). The Management Science version may number results differently.

Setting

There are finitely many agent types on each side of the market, a set M\mathcal MM and a set W\mathcal WW, with Θ=M∪W\Theta=\mathcal M\cup\mathcal WΘ=M∪W. Agents of every type leave the market unmatched at a life-event rate δ>0\delta>0δ>0, and type θ\thetaθ arrives at rate αθ>0\alpha_\theta>0αθ​>0. When an agent of type mmm meets an agent of type www, the pair draws one utility u∼Fmwu\sim F_{mw}u∼Fmw​. Valuations are symmetric: both agents receive uuu if they match, and Fwm:=FmwF_{wm}:=F_{mw}Fwm​:=Fmw​. Each FmwF_{mw}Fmw​ is a probability law on R\mathbb RR with no atoms (a "continuous distribution").

An assortment for type θ\thetaθ is a family of rates λθ(θ′)≥0\lambda_\theta(\theta')\ge0λθ​(θ′)≥0 at which type-θ\thetaθ agents meet type-θ′\theta'θ′ agents on the opposite side. Under a threshold strategy with threshold τθ\tau_\thetaτθ​, a type-θ\thetaθ agent accepts a meeting if and only if u≥τθu\ge\tau_\thetau≥τθ​. A meeting turns into a match when both agents accept, i.e. when u≥max⁡(τθ,τθ′)u\ge\max(\tau_\theta,\tau_{\theta'})u≥max(τθ​,τθ′​). If every type plays a threshold strategy, the expected utility of a type-θ\thetaθ agent is (equation (5))

uˉθ(τ)=∑θ′λθ(θ′)∫max⁡(τθ,τθ′)∞u dFθθ′δ+∑θ′λθ(θ′)∫max⁡(τθ,τθ′)∞dFθθ′.\bar u_\theta(\tau)=\frac{\sum_{\theta'}\lambda_\theta(\theta')\int_{\max(\tau_\theta,\tau_{\theta'})}^\infty u\,dF_{\theta\theta'}}{\delta+\sum_{\theta'}\lambda_\theta(\theta')\int_{\max(\tau_\theta,\tau_{\theta'})}^\infty dF_{\theta\theta'}} .uˉθ​(τ)=δ+∑θ′​λθ​(θ′)∫max(τθ​,τθ′​)∞​dFθθ′​∑θ′​λθ​(θ′)∫max(τθ​,τθ′​)∞​udFθθ′​​.

A type's own threshold enters its own utility through max⁡(τθ,τθ′)\max(\tau_\theta,\tau_{\theta'})max(τθ​,τθ′​).

One type's equation. Fix the thresholds τi\tau_iτi​ of the opposite types. Write B(t)B(t)B(t) for the right-hand side of (5) with τθ\tau_\thetaτθ​ replaced by ttt. Lemma A.3 states that t=B(t)t=B(t)t=B(t) has exactly one solution. The best-response map of Appendix A.3 sends a profile τ\tauτ to the profile in which each type's new threshold is that solution, computed against the opposite side's thresholds in τ\tauτ. A best-response sequence starts at the all-zero profile and applies this map repeatedly.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.1, item 1 (fixed-point form)

For any fixed assortments there is exactly one threshold profile τ∈RM×RW\tau\in\mathbb R^{\mathcal M}\times\mathbb R^{\mathcal W}τ∈RM×RW with

τθ=uˉθ(τ)for every θ∈Θ.\tau_\theta=\bar u_\theta(\tau)\qquad\text{for every }\theta\in\Theta .τθ​=uˉθ​(τ)for every θ∈Θ.

Uniqueness ranges over all real profiles.

Milestones

  1. Lemma B.1 (p. 40). With λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0 and τi≥0\tau_i\ge0τi​≥0, ρ=max⁡t≥0B(t)\rho=\max_{t\ge0}B(t)ρ=maxt≥0​B(t) is attained and satisfies B(ρ)=ρB(\rho)=\rhoB(ρ)=ρ. BBB is weakly increasing on (−∞,ρ](-\infty,\rho](−∞,ρ] and weakly decreasing on [ρ,∞)[\rho,\infty)[ρ,∞).
  2. Lemma A.3 (p. 35). With λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0 and arbitrary τi\tau_iτi​, the equation t=B(t)t=B(t)t=B(t) has exactly one real solution.
  3. §A.3, p. 37, first claim. Along a best-response sequence τ(0)≡0,τ(1),…\tau^{(0)}\equiv0,\tau^{(1)},\dotsτ(0)≡0,τ(1),…, the odd iterates are weakly decreasing and the even iterates are weakly increasing, componentwise.
  4. §A.3, p. 37, second claim. Every odd iterate dominates every even iterate: τ(2j)≤τ(2i+1)\tau^{(2j)}\le\tau^{(2i+1)}τ(2j)≤τ(2i+1).
  5. Proposition A.4 (p. 36). There is a universal CCC such that τ(C∣Θ∣)\tau^{(C|\Theta|)}τ(C∣Θ∣) is a fixed point of the best-response map, and the sequence is constant from that index on.

Significance

Proposition 3.1 is what makes the platform's problem OptimalDirectedSearch well defined. Assortments determine a unique threshold profile. That profile determines the matching rates (Lemma 3.2) and, through stationarity, the population masses. Welfare is then a function of the assortments, and the program (6) used for Theorem 4.1 encodes exactly this fixed point as its incentive constraint (6e). The constructive proof also yields an algorithm: iterate best responses from zero, and the iteration stops after O(∣Θ∣)O(|\Theta|)O(∣Θ∣) rounds.

Formalizing it adds three things beyond the paper. First, a checked version of an argument the paper gives informally, including the odd/even sandwich of the iteration, which the paper proves in a few lines. Second, a reusable fixed-point and unimodality lemma for ratios of tail integrals, B(t)=∫t∞u dG / (δ+∫t∞dG)B(t)=\int_t^\infty u\,dG\,/\,(\delta+\int_t^\infty dG)B(t)=∫t∞​udG/(δ+∫t∞​dG), which recurs in reservation-value arguments in search theory. Third, an exact accounting of the hypotheses: integrable utilities and the reading of the best-response map. To our knowledge none of these results has been machine-checked.

Difficulty

The obvious route to uniqueness, a contraction argument for the map τ↦uˉ(τ)\tau\mapsto\bar u(\tau)τ↦uˉ(τ), fails. That map is neither monotone nor contractive in general, since raising a type's own threshold can raise or lower its utility. Existence by Brouwer's fixed-point theorem gives no uniqueness and no algorithm. The best-response iteration does not converge monotonically either: its odd and even iterates move in opposite directions, so convergence in finitely many rounds is a combinatorial statement about the order of the thresholds, not a limit argument. A formal proof also needs continuity and monotonicity of tail integrals of atomless laws, which Mathlib provides only in pieces.

Formalization scope

The two sides are separate finite types M and W. A threshold profile is a pair of functions (M → ℝ) × (W → ℝ), ordered componentwise. A market records δ\deltaδ, α\alphaα and the laws F m w : Measure ℝ. The standing assumptions are:

  • δ>0\delta>0δ>0;
  • αθ>0\alpha_\theta>0αθ​>0, which is implicit in the paper and stated explicitly;
  • each FmwF_{mw}Fmw​ is a probability measure with no atoms (NullSingletonClass);
  • each FmwF_{mw}Fmw​ has an integrable identity. This is implicit in the paper, which uses ∫u dF\int u\,dF∫udF as a real number, and is stated explicitly.

Tails are ∫a∞dF=F([a,∞))\int_a^\infty dF=F([a,\infty))∫a∞​dF=F([a,∞)) and ∫a∞u dF=∫[a,∞)u dF\int_a^\infty u\,dF=\int_{[a,\infty)}u\,dF∫a∞​udF=∫[a,∞)​udF. Capacity (2), flow balance (3) and stationarity (1) are not hypotheses, because Proposition 3.1 holds for any fixed assortments.

The best-response map is encoded as a relation: each new threshold solves its own equation t=B(t)t=B(t)t=B(t) against the opposite side's input thresholds. This is the paper's reading ("This map is a best response by Lemma A.3"). Evaluating (5) at the old profile, own old threshold included, would be a different map. Under that reading finite convergence and the p. 37 claims are false: with one type per side, λ≡1\lambda\equiv1λ≡1, δ=1\delta=1δ=1 and FFF uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1], its iterates are rational and converge only in the limit to 2−32-\sqrt32−3​.

Two formalizations would trivialize the goal, and both are ruled out. Uniqueness is over all real profiles, not only nonnegative ones or those reached by the iteration. The tail integrals are not allowed to vanish by default for non-integrable laws, because integrability is a hypothesis. O(∣Θ∣)O(|\Theta|)O(∣Θ∣) is encoded with a constant chosen before the market.

Not formalized: the agents' Markov decision process of Appendix A.1. Consequently "this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium", item 2 of Proposition 3.1, Lemmas A.1–A.2 and the best-response sentences of Lemma A.3 and Proposition A.4 are out of scope.

Contributions welcome: continuity and monotonicity lemmas for a↦∫[a,∞)u dFa\mapsto\int_{[a,\infty)}u\,dFa↦∫[a,∞)​udF and a↦F([a,∞))a\mapsto F([a,\infty))a↦F([a,∞)) for atomless integrable laws, which are reusable well beyond this mission, and proofs of the milestones in any order.

Selected references

  • N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, V. Manshadi, A. Wei, Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms, Management Science, 2023; preprint arXiv:2102.09017v2, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.09017
  • K. Burdett, M. G. Coles, Marriage and Class, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555127
8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Differential GeometryMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization 1: ZO-RGD Has Average Expected Squared Riemannian Gradient Norm at Most 8(d+4)L(f(x₀) − f(x*))/(N+1) + 8(d+4)L·C(μ)Research Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems in statistics and machine learning constrain the variable to a smooth manifold: orthonormal frames in sparse PCA and dictionary learning (the Stiefel manifold), unit vectors in phase retrieval (the sphere), fixed-rank matrices in matrix completion. Riemannian optimization handles these problems directly on the manifold. A step is taken in the tangent space and mapped back to the manifold by a retraction.

In several applications the objective can be evaluated but not differentiated: black-box adversarial attacks, simulation-based models, and hyperparameter or policy tuning. Zeroth-order (derivative-free) methods replace the gradient by an estimator built from function values. In Euclidean space the standard construction is Gaussian smoothing, analysed by Nesterov and Spokoiny (2017) and Ghadimi and Lan (2013). Li, Balasubramanian and Ma (arXiv:2003.11238; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) carry the construction over to embedded submanifolds. They sample a Gaussian vector, project it onto the tangent space, and use the retraction in place of the straight line x+μux+\mu ux+μu. This mission formalizes their first optimization guarantee: the convergence rate of zeroth-order Riemannian gradient descent (ZO-RGD).

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real inner product space (the ambient Rn\mathbb R^nRn). Let M⊆EM\subseteq EM⊆E be a C1C^1C1 embedded submanifold of dimension ddd. At each x∈Mx\in Mx∈M the tangent space TxMT_xMTx​M is a ddd-dimensional linear subspace of EEE; let PxP_xPx​ denote the orthogonal projection onto it. MMM carries the metric induced by the inner product of EEE.

A retraction is a map (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x,\eta)\mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η) such that, for every x∈Mx\in Mx∈M, RxR_xRx​ is smooth on TxMT_xMTx​M, maps TxMT_xMTx​M into MMM, satisfies Rx(0)=xR_x(0)=xRx​(0)=x, and has the identity as its differential at 000. In this mission RxR_xRx​ is defined on all of TxMT_xMTx​M.

For a differentiable f:E→Rf:E\to\mathbb Rf:E→R the Riemannian gradient is grad⁡f(x)=Px∇f(x)\operatorname{grad} f(x)=P_x\nabla f(x)gradf(x)=Px​∇f(x). Assumption 2.1 (retraction smoothness) asks for a constant L≥0L\ge0L≥0 such that

∣f(Rx(η))−f(x)−⟨grad⁡f(x),η⟩∣≤L2∥η∥2(x∈M, η∈TxM).\big|f(R_x(\eta))-f(x)-\langle \operatorname{grad} f(x),\eta\rangle\big|\le \tfrac L2\|\eta\|^2\qquad(x\in M,\ \eta\in T_xM).​f(Rx​(η))−f(x)−⟨gradf(x),η⟩​≤2L​∥η∥2(x∈M, η∈Tx​M).

Given μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and a standard Gaussian vector u0∼N(0,In)u_0\sim N(0,I_n)u0​∼N(0,In​) of EEE, set u=Pxu0u=P_xu_0u=Px​u0​. The zeroth-order Riemannian gradient estimator is

gμ(x)=f(Rx(μu))−f(x)μ u.g_\mu(x)=\frac{f(R_x(\mu u))-f(x)}{\mu}\,u .gμ​(x)=μf(Rx​(μu))−f(x)​u.

ZO-RGD (Algorithm 1) starts at x0∈Mx_0\in Mx0​∈M, draws independent Gaussian vectors u00,u01,…u_0^0,u_0^1,\dotsu00​,u01​,…, and sets xk+1=Rxk(−η^ gμ(xk))x_{k+1}=R_{x_k}(-\hat\eta\, g_\mu(x_k))xk+1​=Rxk​​(−η^​gμ​(xk​)), where gμ(xk)g_\mu(x_k)gμ​(xk​) uses uk=Pxku0ku_k=P_{x_k}u_0^kuk​=Pxk​​u0k​. The step size is η^=1/(2(d+4)L)\hat\eta=1/(2(d+4)L)η^​=1/(2(d+4)L). Let x∗∈Mx^*\in Mx∗∈M be a minimizer of fff over MMM.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

For every N≥0N\ge0N≥0,

1N+1∑k=0NE ∥grad⁡f(xk)∥2≤4η^(f(x0)−f(x∗)N+1+C(μ)),\frac1{N+1}\sum_{k=0}^{N}\mathbb E\,\|\operatorname{grad} f(x_k)\|^2\le\frac4{\hat\eta}\left(\frac{f(x_0)-f(x^*)}{N+1}+C(\mu)\right),N+11​k=0∑N​E∥gradf(xk​)∥2≤η^​4​(N+1f(x0​)−f(x∗)​+C(μ)),

where 4/η^=8(d+4)L4/\hat\eta=8(d+4)L4/η^​=8(d+4)L and

C(μ)=μ2L16(d+3)3d+4+μ2L16(d+6)3d+4+μ2L16(d+6)3(d+4)2.C(\mu)=\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+3)^3}{d+4}+\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+6)^3}{d+4}+\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+6)^3}{(d+4)^2}.C(μ)=16μ2L​d+4(d+3)3​+16μ2L​d+4(d+6)3​+16μ2L​(d+4)2(d+6)3​.

Milestones

These are the paper's own intermediate results (§2.2, p. 8):

  1. Lemma 2.1. For a subspace X\mathcal XX with projection PPP, u=Pu0u=Pu_0u=Pu0​ and x∈Xx\in\mathcal Xx∈X: E⟨x,u⟩u=x\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle u=xE⟨x,u⟩u=x and E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle^2=\|x\|^2E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2.
  2. Lemma 2.2 (Nesterov–Spokoiny). E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2\mathbb E\|u\|^p\le(n+p)^{p/2}E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2 for p≥2p\ge2p≥2. This result is already on the platform as a proved theorem and is referenced.
  3. Corollary 2.1. If dim⁡X=d\dim\mathcal X=ddimX=d, then E∥Pu0∥p≤(d+p)p/2\mathbb E\|Pu_0\|^p\le(d+p)^{p/2}E∥Pu0​∥p≤(d+p)p/2.
  4. Proposition 2.1(a). ∥Egμ(x)−grad⁡f(x)∥≤μL2(d+3)3/2\|\mathbb E g_\mu(x)-\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|\le\frac{\mu L}{2}(d+3)^{3/2}∥Egμ​(x)−gradf(x)∥≤2μL​(d+3)3/2.
  5. Proposition 2.1(b). ∥grad⁡f(x)∥2≤2∥Egμ(x)∥2+μ22L2(d+6)3\|\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|^2\le2\|\mathbb E g_\mu(x)\|^2+\frac{\mu^2}{2}L^2(d+6)^3∥gradf(x)∥2≤2∥Egμ​(x)∥2+2μ2​L2(d+6)3.
  6. Proposition 2.1(c). E∥gμ(x)∥2≤μ22L2(d+6)3+2(d+4)∥grad⁡f(x)∥2\mathbb E\|g_\mu(x)\|^2\le\frac{\mu^2}{2}L^2(d+6)^3+2(d+4)\|\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|^2E∥gμ​(x)∥2≤2μ2​L2(d+6)3+2(d+4)∥gradf(x)∥2.

Significance

Theorem 3.1 shows that ZO-RGD reaches an ϵ\epsilonϵ-stationary point in expectation using O(d/ϵ2)O(d/\epsilon^2)O(d/ϵ2) function evaluations, provided the smoothing parameter is of order ϵ/d3/2\epsilon/d^{3/2}ϵ/d3/2. The dimension that enters is the intrinsic dimension ddd of the manifold, not the ambient dimension nnn. For the Stiefel manifold of n×pn\times pn×p orthonormal frames this is the difference between np−p(p+1)/2np-p(p+1)/2np−p(p+1)/2 and npnpnp, and for the sphere between n−1n-1n−1 and nnn. More importantly, the estimator never explores normal directions. The three estimates of Proposition 2.1 are the toolkit that the paper reuses for its stochastic (ZO-RSGD), proximal (ZO-ManPG) and second-order variants.

The paper proves these results on paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission adds three things. It gives a precise model of a random iterate sequence on a submanifold, driven by the infinite product of Gaussian draws. It formalizes the projected-Gaussian identities, which are reusable for any method that samples in tangent spaces. And it pins down the constants. In checking the constants, the printed Proposition 2.1(b) turned out to be false for large LLL (its proof yields L2L^2L2, not LLL), and the middle term of the printed C(μ)C(\mu)C(μ) inherits that slip. The statements here carry the constants the proofs actually give.

Difficulty

In Euclidean space, E gμ(x)\mathbb E\,g_\mu(x)Egμ​(x) is exactly the gradient of the Gaussian-smoothed function fμ(x)=Ef(x+μu)f_\mu(x)=\mathbb E f(x+\mu u)fμ​(x)=Ef(x+μu), and the analysis runs on fμf_\mufμ​. Once a retraction replaces x+μux+\mu ux+μu, no smoothed function has Egμ\mathbb E g_\muEgμ​ as its gradient. The bias must be estimated directly from Assumption 2.1, which controls f∘Rxf\circ R_xf∘Rx​ only along the tangent space. The moment bounds must then be taken for a Gaussian projected onto a subspace that changes with xxx.

In the descent argument, the direction uku_kuk​ is sampled in TxkMT_{x_k}MTxk​​M, which depends on all earlier draws. The expectation of step kkk is therefore conditional on the past. Summing the one-step inequality requires conditional expectations on the product space, together with measurability of the iterate map. Finiteness of Ef(xk)\mathbb E f(x_k)Ef(xk​) is not given and must be handled as well.

Formalization scope

  • Space. The ambient space is a finite-dimensional real inner product space EEE. The standard Gaussian is Mathlib's stdGaussian E, so κ−1∫⋯e−∥u0∥2/2du0\kappa^{-1}\int\cdots e^{-\|u_0\|^2/2}du_0κ−1∫⋯e−∥u0​∥2/2du0​ becomes integration against it.
  • Manifold and tangent spaces. The manifold is given by the published coordinate-slice predicate ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.IsSubmanifold 1 d M, which ties ddd to MMM. The tangent space is the published ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.tangentSpace M x, the span of Mathlib's tangent cone. Neither ddd nor the tangent spaces are free parameters.
  • Retraction. The retraction is global: Assumption 2.1 is required for every η∈TxM\eta\in T_xMη∈Tx​M (the paper's "ρx=∞\rho_x=\inftyρx​=∞"). "Smooth" means C∞C^\inftyC∞, not analytic.
  • Regularity of fff. fff is assumed differentiable on EEE, which is what the definition grad⁡f=Px∇f\operatorname{grad} f=P_x\nabla fgradf=Px​∇f needs. This is weaker than the paper's "smooth".
  • Constants. The goal takes L>0L>0L>0, because the step size divides by LLL. The milestones take L≥0L\ge0L≥0 and μ>0\mu>0μ>0.
  • Draws and iterates. The draws live on ENE^{\mathbb N}EN with the infinite product of standard Gaussian measures. The iterates are defined for every kkk: the algorithm runs without a stopping time, so the sum over k=0,…,Nk=0,\dots,Nk=0,…,N is meaningful.
  • Minimizer. x∗x^*x∗ is an attained minimizer over MMM.
  • Measurability. The goal adds two measurability hypotheses that make the iterates random variables: (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x,\eta)\mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η) is measurable and x↦Pxx\mapsto P_xx↦Px​ is measurable. Both hold for closed manifolds such as spheres and Stiefel manifolds.
  • Corrected constants. Proposition 2.1(b) carries L2L^2L2, and the middle term of C(μ)C(\mu)C(μ) carries LLL. The milestone texts keep the printed forms. Proposition 2.1(a) and (c) are as printed.
  • Not formalized. The parameter choices μ=O(ϵ/d3/2)\mu=O(\epsilon/d^{3/2})μ=O(ϵ/d3/2), N=O(d/ϵ2)N=O(d/\epsilon^2)N=O(d/ϵ2) in the theorem's second sentence are an O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) statement.

Several trivializing formalizations are ruled out. A Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000, so every expectation in a conclusion is either a lower Lebesgue integral compared with a finite bound or paired with an integrability conjunct. The dimension ddd comes from the manifold, not from a free natural number. The projection is onto MMM's own tangent space, never onto an arbitrary subspace field.

A complete development needs the following infrastructure:

  • the law of Pu0P u_0Pu0​ (a standard Gaussian on the subspace);
  • Gaussian moment bounds;
  • conditional expectation along the product filtration;
  • measurability of the iterate map.

The projected-Gaussian lemmas and the iterate model are reusable for the stochastic variant (ZO-RSGD) in the companion mission. Contributions of proofs for any milestone, and of general lemmas about Gaussian measures restricted to subspaces, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Li, K. Balasubramanian, S. Ma, Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:2003.11238v3, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11238
  • Y. Nesterov, V. Spokoiny, Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 17 (2017) 527–566. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10208-015-9296-2
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 23 (2013) 2341–2368. https://doi.org/10.1137/120880811
  • P.-A. Absil, R. Mahony, R. Sepulchre, Optimization Algorithms on Matrix Manifolds, Princeton University Press, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830244
13 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information I: ProxyLabel with a Width Estimate ω′ ≥ ω/c Is e^c(ω′+1)/(1−1/k)^{k−1}-CompetitiveResearch Paper

Motivation

In the classical secretary problem, candidates arrive one at a time in uniformly random order, and a decision maker must accept or reject each one irrevocably. The decision maker sees exact scores, or at least a total ranking of the candidates seen so far. In hiring, admissions and procurement the observed scores are often biased: evaluations of candidates from different groups, or produced by different evaluators, cannot be compared reliably, even when comparisons inside a group can. Salem and Gupta (SSRN 3444283; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4926) model this by giving the algorithm only the comparisons it can trust. These form a partial order on the candidates, and the true scores remain hidden.

The question is how much is lost when only partial ordinal information is available. The paper's answer is governed by the width of the partial order, the largest number of mutually incomparable candidates. Width 1 is the classical totally ordered problem. Width NNN means that no comparison is available at all. This mission formalizes the paper's first positive result with explicit constants: an algorithm, ProxyLabel, whose competitive ratio grows linearly in a known estimate of the width.

Setting

A finite set CCC of NNN elements carries a partial order ⪯\preceq⪯. Each element aaa has a hidden true score w(a)≥0w(a) \ge 0w(a)≥0. The scores are pairwise distinct and consistent with the order: a≺ba \prec ba≺b implies w(a)<w(b)w(a) < w(b)w(a)<w(b). The width ω\omegaω of (C,⪯)(C, \preceq)(C,⪯) is the largest size of an antichain, a set of pairwise incomparable elements.

The elements arrive in a uniformly random order. The algorithm knows NNN and a selection capacity k≥1k \ge 1k≥1. At each time it sees the comparisons of ⪯\preceq⪯ among the elements that have arrived. It may select at most kkk elements, and every decision is irrevocable. The offline optimum OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the largest total score of at most kkk elements. An algorithm is ρ\rhoρ-competitive if, on every instance,

E[w(Alg)OPT]≥1ρ,\mathbb E\Big[\frac{w(\mathrm{Alg})}{\mathrm{OPT}}\Big] \ge \frac1\rho,E[OPTw(Alg)​]≥ρ1​,

where w(Alg)w(\mathrm{Alg})w(Alg) is the total score of the selected elements and the expectation is over the arrival order and the algorithm's randomness.

ProxyLabel (Algorithm 1 of the paper) takes a width estimate ω′∈N\omega' \in \mathbb Nω′∈N. It works as follows.

  1. Each element receives a label ℓ(a)∈{1,…,k}\ell(a) \in \{1, \dots, k\}ℓ(a)∈{1,…,k}, uniformly and independently.
  2. It draws m∼Bin(N,ω′/(ω′+1))m \sim \mathrm{Bin}(N, \omega'/(\omega'+1))m∼Bin(N,ω′/(ω′+1)) and lets the sample SSS be the first mmm arrivals. Sampled elements are never selected.
  3. A later element aaa is selected if it is maximal among all previously seen elements with its label, sampled or not, and no element with its label has been selected yet.

Each label class therefore contributes at most one element: the first non-sampled one that beats everything of its label seen before.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.2

If ω′≥ω/c\omega' \ge \omega / cω′≥ω/c for some c≥1c \ge 1c≥1, then ProxyLabel has competitive ratio at most

ρ=ec(ω′+1)(1−1k)k−1 ≤ ec+1(ω′+1),\rho = \frac{e^{c}(\omega'+1)}{\big(1 - \frac1k\big)^{k-1}} \ \le\ e^{c+1}(\omega'+1),ρ=(1−k1​)k−1ec(ω′+1)​ ≤ ec+1(ω′+1),

with the convention 00=10^0 = 100=1. That is, E[w(Alg)]≥OPT/ρ\mathbb E[w(\mathrm{Alg})] \ge \mathrm{OPT}/\rhoE[w(Alg)]≥OPT/ρ.

Milestones, from the proof (pp. 16–17)

  1. Under uniform labels, the jjj-th best element is the maximum of its label class with probability (1−1/k)j−1≥(1−1/k)k−1≥1/e(1 - 1/k)^{j-1} \ge (1 - 1/k)^{k-1} \ge 1/e(1−1/k)j−1≥(1−1/k)k−1≥1/e.
  2. Display (3): conditional on that event, it is selected with probability at least 1ω′+1(1−1ω′+1)ω\frac{1}{\omega'+1}\big(1 - \frac{1}{\omega'+1}\big)^{\omega}ω′+11​(1−ω′+11​)ω.
  3. If ω/c≤ω′\omega/c \le \omega'ω/c≤ω′ with c≥1c \ge 1c≥1, this quantity is at least 1/(ec(ω′+1))1/(e^{c}(\omega'+1))1/(ec(ω′+1)).
  4. Hence each of the top kkk elements is selected with probability at least (1−1/k)k−1/(ec(ω′+1))(1 - 1/k)^{k-1}/(e^{c}(\omega'+1))(1−1/k)k−1/(ec(ω′+1)).
  5. E[w(Alg)]≥∑i=1kP(ai∈Alg) w(ai)\mathbb E[w(\mathrm{Alg})] \ge \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb P(a_i \in \mathrm{Alg})\, w(a_i)E[w(Alg)]≥∑i=1k​P(ai​∈Alg)w(ai​) over the top kkk elements a1,…,aka_1, \dots, a_ka1​,…,ak​.

Companion: Corollary 5.1

With the exact width ω′=ω\omega' = \omegaω′=ω, the ratio is at most e(ω+1)/(1−1/k)k−1≤e2(ω+1)e(\omega+1)/(1 - 1/k)^{k-1} \le e^2(\omega+1)e(ω+1)/(1−1/k)k−1≤e2(ω+1), and it is e(ω+1)e(\omega+1)e(ω+1) for k=1k = 1k=1.

Significance

Proposition 5.2 shows that partial ordinal information costs at most a factor linear in the width, provided a width estimate within a constant factor is available. Proposition 5.1 of the same paper shows that no algorithm beats ratio ω\omegaω, so the bound is order-optimal. ProxyLabel is also the building block of the paper's width-free algorithm PosetLabel (§5.4), which estimates the width from a first sample and then runs ProxyLabel's selection phase.

The result is proved in the paper and has not been machine-checked. A complete development would give a formal model of online selection on a poset under random arrival, with an explicit selection rule and exact finite averages for probabilities. It would also contain a formal use of Dilworth's theorem inside a probabilistic argument, and the elementary inequalities (1−1/k)k−1≥1/e(1 - 1/k)^{k-1} \ge 1/e(1−1/k)k−1≥1/e and (1−1/(ω′+1))ω≥e−c(1 - 1/(\omega'+1))^{\omega} \ge e^{-c}(1−1/(ω′+1))ω≥e−c in the form the proof needs.

Difficulty

The events of the algorithm are tangled. The sample is a prefix of a random order with a random length. Whether an element is selected depends on everything that arrived before it, on the labels, and on whether an earlier element of the same label was already selected. The bound must be proved for every finite poset and every consistent scoring, with exact constants, on the finite probability space of arrival orders, labellings and sample sizes. The width enters only through the structure of a single label class, a subposet whose width is at most ω\omegaω, so the argument has to pass from the global width to an arbitrary random subposet.

A tempting simplification lets every passing unsampled element be selected. That algorithm can select several elements of one label, so its expected score is larger and the bound becomes easier. It is not ProxyLabel.

Formalization scope

  • Elements are a finite type α with a PartialOrder, so NNN is Fintype.card α. The width ω\omegaω is the published definition AppliedComb.Posets.width α, the maximum size of an antichain. Dilworth's theorem is the published, proved theorem AppliedComb.Posets.dilworth.
  • A consistent scoring is w:α→Rw : \alpha \to \mathbb Rw:α→R with w≥0w \ge 0w≥0, www injective, and a<b⇒w(a)<w(b)a < b \Rightarrow w(a) < w(b)a<b⇒w(a)<w(b). These three conditions are the paper's standing assumptions (§3.1, §3.3), not additions.
  • Arrival orders are bijections α ≃ Fin N, and labellings are functions α → Fin k. Labels are independent of the order, which is the same distribution as assigning labels on arrival.
  • Probabilities and expectations are explicit finite averages with weights 1/N!1/N!1/N!, 1/kN1/k^N1/kN and the binomial weights (Nm)pm(1−p)N−m\binom{N}{m}p^m(1-p)^{N-m}(mN​)pm(1−p)N−m with p=ω′/(ω′+1)p = \omega'/(\omega'+1)p=ω′/(ω′+1).
  • The selection rule is encoded exactly. An element is selected iff it is unsampled, no earlier element of its label (sampled or not) is above it, and no earlier unsampled element of its label passed the same test.
  • OPT is the maximum of ∑a∈sw(a)\sum_{a \in s} w(a)∑a∈s​w(a) over sets with ∣s∣≤k|s| \le k∣s∣≤k, so it is the total score when k≥Nk \ge Nk≥N.
  • The competitive ratio is stated as OPT/ρ≤E[w(Alg)]\mathrm{OPT}/\rho \le \mathbb E[w(\mathrm{Alg})]OPT/ρ≤E[w(Alg)]. This agrees with Definition 3.4 when OPT>0\mathrm{OPT} > 0OPT>0; the page's ratio is undefined when OPT=0\mathrm{OPT} = 0OPT=0.
  • (1−1/k)k−1(1 - 1/k)^{k-1}(1−1/k)k−1 has a natural exponent, so k=1k = 1k=1 gives 00=10^0 = 100=1. The width estimate ω′\omega'ω′ is a natural number.
  • The proposition's "interval order" is a slip of the page: the algorithm and the proof concern arbitrary posets, and the goal is stated for every finite poset.
  • The order-optimality clause of Corollary 5.1 refers to Proposition 5.1, the subject of mission II of this series, and is not stated here.
  • The goal is a statement about the full expectation of the selected score over arrival order, labels and sample size. It is not the conditional bound (3). A formalization in which several elements per label can be selected, or in which "previously seen" excludes the sample, proves a statement about a different algorithm.

Contributions are welcome on every milestone. The prefix-of-a-random-order lemma (a binomially sized prefix is an i.i.d. Bernoulli sample) is reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Salem and S. Gupta, Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information, SSRN 3444283 (version of 2022-04-17); Management Science, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3444283, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4926
  • R. P. Dilworth, A Decomposition Theorem for Partially Ordered Sets, Annals of Mathematics 51(1), 1950, 161–166. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969503
  • R. Kleinberg, A Multiple-Choice Secretary Algorithm with Applications to Online Auctions, SODA 2005. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1070432.1070519
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Channels I: The Expected Discounted Cost of a Bidirectional Payment Channel in Closed FormResearch Paper

Payment channels and the cost of locked capital

Blockchains such as Bitcoin settle every transaction on a public ledger. Each on-chain transaction pays a fee and waits for confirmation, so frequent small payments are expensive. The Lightning Network moves such payments off-chain: two parties lock funds in a shared payment channel and pay each other by updating the channel's balance, touching the blockchain only to open, close or re-fund it. A channel is not free either. The locked funds cannot be used elsewhere, and once one side's balance is exhausted the channel has to be reset on-chain.

Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (Lightning Network Economics: Channels, Management Science, 2023) quantify this trade-off in a stochastic model and compare three ways of settling two opposite streams of payments: on-chain transactions, unidirectional channels, and one bidirectional channel. Their comparisons all rest on a single computation, the expected discounted cost of a channel in closed form (Theorem 1). This mission formalizes that computation.

The model

Two nodes exchange unit payments. Node 1 pays node 2 one unit at each jump of a Poisson process Ntλ1N^{\lambda_1}_tNtλ1​​ with rate λ1\lambda_1λ1​; node 2 pays node 1 one unit at each jump of an independent Poisson process Ntλ2N^{\lambda_2}_tNtλ2​​ with rate λ2\lambda_2λ2​. The paper normalizes λ1≤λ2\lambda_1\le\lambda_2λ1​≤λ2​. The net balance of node 1 is

Xt=Ntλ2−Ntλ1,X0=0.X_t=N^{\lambda_2}_t-N^{\lambda_1}_t,\qquad X_0=0 .Xt​=Ntλ2​​−Ntλ1​​,X0​=0.

In a bidirectional channel node 1 commits l1l_1l1​ units and node 2 commits l2l_2l2​ units. The money is the channel's capacity: the channel works as long as −l1<Xt<l2-l_1<X_t<l_2−l1​<Xt​<l2​. Locked capital has an opportunity cost of r(l1+l2)r(l_1+l_2)r(l1​+l2​) per unit of time, where r>0r>0r>0 is the continuously compounded interest rate, and all costs are discounted at rate rrr. When the balance reaches −l1-l_1−l1​ (node 1 is exhausted) or +l2+l_2+l2​ (node 2 is exhausted), the channel is reset at cost BBB and the balance restarts at 000 with the same commitments.

Let J(n)J(n)J(n) be the expected total future cost when the balance equals nnn. Conditioning on the first payment, which arrives after an exponential time with rate λ1+λ2\lambda_1+\lambda_2λ1​+λ2​, gives the first-step equation (15)

J(n)=(l1+l2)rr+λ2+λ1+J(n+1)λ2r+λ2+λ1+J(n−1)λ1r+λ2+λ1,−l1<n<l2,J(n)=(l_1+l_2)\frac{r}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1}+J(n+1)\frac{\lambda_2}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1}+J(n-1)\frac{\lambda_1}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1},\qquad -l_1<n<l_2,J(n)=(l1​+l2​)r+λ2​+λ1​r​+J(n+1)r+λ2​+λ1​λ2​​+J(n−1)r+λ2​+λ1​λ1​​,−l1​<n<l2​,

with the reset conditions J(−l1)=J(0)+BJ(-l_1)=J(0)+BJ(−l1​)=J(0)+B and J(+l2)=J(0)+BJ(+l_2)=J(0)+BJ(+l2​)=J(0)+B. The cost of the channel is cl1,l2(λ1,λ2)=J(0)c^{l_1,l_2}(\lambda_1,\lambda_2)=J(0)cl1​,l2​(λ1​,λ2​)=J(0).

In a unidirectional channel only node 2 pays (rate λ2\lambda_2λ2​) and only node 2 commits capital (l2l_2l2​ units). The cost satisfies J(n)=l2rr+λ2+J(n+1)λ2r+λ2J(n)=l_2\frac{r}{r+\lambda_2}+J(n+1)\frac{\lambda_2}{r+\lambda_2}J(n)=l2​r+λ2​r​+J(n+1)r+λ2​λ2​​ for 0≤n<l20\le n<l_20≤n<l2​ with J(l2)=J(0)+BJ(l_2)=J(0)+BJ(l2​)=J(0)+B, and c0,l2(0,λ2)=J(0)c^{0,l_2}(0,\lambda_2)=J(0)c0,l2​(0,λ2​)=J(0).

The roots of the characteristic equation λ2α2−(λ1+λ2+r)α+λ1=0\lambda_2\alpha^2-(\lambda_1+\lambda_2+r)\alpha+\lambda_1=0λ2​α2−(λ1​+λ2​+r)α+λ1​=0 are

α±=λ1+λ2+r±(λ2−λ1)2+r2+2r(λ2+λ1)2λ2.(4)\alpha_\pm=\frac{\lambda_1+\lambda_2+r\pm\sqrt{(\lambda_2-\lambda_1)^2+r^2+2r(\lambda_2+\lambda_1)}}{2\lambda_2}. \tag{4}α±​=2λ2​λ1​+λ2​+r±(λ2​−λ1​)2+r2+2r(λ2​+λ1​)​​.(4)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (ii)

For 0<λ1≤λ20<\lambda_1\le\lambda_20<λ1​≤λ2​, r>0r>0r>0, any BBB and natural commitments l1,l2≥1l_1,l_2\ge1l1​,l2​≥1, the bidirectional cost system has a solution, and every solution satisfies

cl1,l2(λ1,λ2)=l1+l2−B α−l1(1−α+l1+l2)−α+l1(1−α−l1+l2)α−l1(1−α+l1+l2)−α+l1(1−α−l1+l2)+α+l1+l2−α−l1+l2.(3)c^{l_1,l_2}(\lambda_1,\lambda_2)=l_1+l_2-B\,\frac{\alpha_-^{l_1}(1-\alpha_+^{l_1+l_2})-\alpha_+^{l_1}(1-\alpha_-^{l_1+l_2})}{\alpha_-^{l_1}(1-\alpha_+^{l_1+l_2})-\alpha_+^{l_1}(1-\alpha_-^{l_1+l_2})+\alpha_+^{l_1+l_2}-\alpha_-^{l_1+l_2}}. \tag{3}cl1​,l2​(λ1​,λ2​)=l1​+l2​−Bα−l1​​(1−α+l1​+l2​​)−α+l1​​(1−α−l1​+l2​​)+α+l1​+l2​​−α−l1​+l2​​α−l1​​(1−α+l1​+l2​​)−α+l1​​(1−α−l1​+l2​​)​.(3)

Milestones

  1. Competing exponential clocks (proof of Theorem 1, p. 10): the minimum τ\tauτ of independent exponential times with rates λ2,λ1\lambda_2,\lambda_1λ2​,λ1​ is exponential with rate λ2+λ1\lambda_2+\lambda_1λ2​+λ1​, and τλ2\tau^{\lambda_2}τλ2​ rings first with probability λ2/(λ2+λ1)\lambda_2/(\lambda_2+\lambda_1)λ2​/(λ2​+λ1​). This is a published, proved platform theorem, reused as is.
  2. The first term (p. 10): E[e−rτ]=(λ2+λ1)/(λ2+λ1+r)E[e^{-r\tau}]=(\lambda_2+\lambda_1)/(\lambda_2+\lambda_1+r)E[e−rτ]=(λ2​+λ1​)/(λ2​+λ1​+r) and E[∫0τe−rsr(l1+l2) ds]=(l1+l2) r/(r+λ2+λ1)E[\int_0^\tau e^{-rs}r(l_1+l_2)\,ds]=(l_1+l_2)\,r/(r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1)E[∫0τ​e−rsr(l1​+l2​)ds]=(l1​+l2​)r/(r+λ2​+λ1​).
  3. The last term (p. 10): E[e−rτJ(Xt+τ)∣Xt=n]=J(n+1)λ2r+λ2+λ1+J(n−1)λ1r+λ2+λ1E[e^{-r\tau}J(X_{t+\tau})\mid X_t=n]=J(n+1)\frac{\lambda_2}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1}+J(n-1)\frac{\lambda_1}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1}E[e−rτJ(Xt+τ​)∣Xt​=n]=J(n+1)r+λ2​+λ1​λ2​​+J(n−1)r+λ2​+λ1​λ1​​.
  4. General solution of (15) (§5.1): on the lattice −l1≤n≤l2-l_1\le n\le l_2−l1​≤n≤l2​, (15) holds at the interior points if and only if J(n)=l1+l2+k1α−n+k2α+nJ(n)=l_1+l_2+k_1\alpha_-^n+k_2\alpha_+^nJ(n)=l1​+l2​+k1​α−n​+k2​α+n​ for constants k1,k2k_1,k_2k1​,k2​.
  5. The cost function (§5.1): the closed form of J(n)J(n)J(n) at every balance nnn, which gives (3) at n=0n=0n=0.
  6. Theorem 1 (i), (1): c0,l2(0,λ2)=l2+B(((r+λ2)/λ2)l2−1)−1c^{0,l_2}(0,\lambda_2)=l_2+B\big(((r+\lambda_2)/\lambda_2)^{l_2}-1\big)^{-1}c0,l2​(0,λ2​)=l2​+B(((r+λ2​)/λ2​)l2​−1)−1.
  7. Theorem 1 (i), (2): with k=Blog⁡(1+r/λ2)k=B\log(1+r/\lambda_2)k=Blog(1+r/λ2​) and B>0B>0B>0, the minimum of (1) over real sizes is B2k(−k+k(k+4)+2log⁡(12(k+k(k+4)+2)))\frac{B}{2k}\big(-k+\sqrt{k(k+4)}+2\log(\tfrac12(k+\sqrt{k(k+4)}+2))\big)2kB​(−k+k(k+4)​+2log(21​(k+k(k+4)​+2))), attained at l2=Bklog⁡(12(k+k(k+4)+2))l_2=\frac Bk\log(\tfrac12(k+\sqrt{k(k+4)}+2))l2​=kB​log(21​(k+k(k+4)​+2)).

What the closed form gives

Formula (3) is what the rest of the paper works with. Lemma 1 prices on-chain settlement of a stream of rate λ\lambdaλ at Cλ/rC\lambda/rCλ/r. Comparing that price with (1) and (3) yields the paper's thresholds on the on-chain fee below which no channel pays off (Theorem 2), the small-interest-rate asymptotics of the optimal symmetric channel, whose minimal cost scales like 3(2Bλ/r)1/33(2B\lambda/r)^{1/3}3(2Bλ/r)1/3 (Theorem 3), and the long-run number of channel payments per on-chain transaction (Proposition 2). Without an exact expression for the cost these comparisons would rest on simulation.

The paper proves Theorem 1 by a first-step argument and the solution of a linear difference equation. No part of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof would supply what the published argument passes over: that the first-step equation (15) and the reset conditions together have a unique solution on the lattice, that the denominator of (3) does not vanish, and the measure-theoretic computation of the coefficients of (15) from the exponential clocks. The later missions of this series (rate bounds, small-rate asymptotics, the balance walk) build on the same model.

Where the difficulty lies

The algebra of solving a second-order linear recurrence is routine. Two points are not. First, the solution has to be shown to exist and to be unique for every admissible set of parameters. This requires α−≠α+\alpha_-\ne\alpha_+α−​=α+​ and a non-singular 2×22\times 22×2 system for k1,k2k_1,k_2k1​,k2​, whose determinant is the denominator of (3), and the paper does not discuss when that determinant vanishes. Second, the coefficients of (15) come from expectations over exponential times: the joint expectation of the discount factor e−rτe^{-r\tau}e−rτ and the indicator of which clock rang first. The paper factors it as E[e−rτ] P(τ=τλ2)E[e^{-r\tau}]\,P(\tau=\tau^{\lambda_2})E[e−rτ]P(τ=τλ2​), which uses that the minimum is independent of the identity of the first clock, a fact it does not state.

Formalization scope

  • The rates are written lam₁, lam₂; the sizes l1,l2l_1,l_2l1​,l2​ are natural numbers with l1,l2≥1l_1,l_2\ge1l1​,l2​≥1, because payments are of one unit and the balance lives on the lattice {−l1,…,l2}\{-l_1,\dots,l_2\}{−l1​,…,l2​}. The cost function is a map J:Z→RJ:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RJ:Z→R whose values off the lattice are unconstrained.
  • The cost is defined by its equations, (15) with the reset conditions (IsBiCostFn) and the §5.2 system (IsUniCostFn), never by (3) or (1). Every statement about "the cost" asserts both that a solution exists and that every solution takes the stated value, so it is neither vacuous nor dependent on a choice of solution.
  • The unidirectional system is a separate definition: the bidirectional one at l1=0l_1=0l1​=0 would force B=0B=0B=0. For the same reason the Remark after Theorem 1 ("(1) follows from (3) by substituting λ1=l1=0\lambda_1=l_1=0λ1​=l1​=0") is not posed: with α−=0\alpha_-=0α−​=0 and l1=0l_1=0l1​=0 the denominator of (3) vanishes.
  • Powers are natural powers in (1) and (3), integer powers (zpow) in the general solution and in J(n)J(n)J(n), and real powers (Real.rpow) in the minimization (2), which is over real sizes m>0m>0m>0 as in the paper's proof.
  • The paper prints the exponent in the numerator of the J(n)J(n)J(n) display as l+nl+nl+n; the statement uses l1+nl_1+nl1​+n, which is what the derivation gives and what reduces to (3) at n=0n=0n=0.
  • The probabilistic milestones use Mathlib's expMeasure for the laws (through push-forward measures of measurable random variables) and IndepFun. Integrability is part of what is to be proved.
  • The hypothesis λ1≤λ2\lambda_1\le\lambda_2λ1​≤λ2​ is kept in the goal as printed. No sign of BBB is assumed except B>0B>0B>0 in (2), without which the infimum is not attained.
  • Ruled out as trivializing: defining the cost as its closed form (which turns the goal into a definitional equality), fixing numerical parameters, restricting to λ1=λ2\lambda_1=\lambda_2λ1​=λ2​, and treating the sizes as real numbers in the cost system.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order, and reusable lemmas on linear difference equations with constant coefficients and on Laplace transforms of exponential laws, neither of which Mathlib currently has in this form.

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01664
  • J. Poon, T. Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments, technical report, 2015 (as cited by Guasoni et al.). https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Quantum InformationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Direct Fidelity Estimation from Few Pauli Measurements 2: A Unit Vector Nearly Orthogonal to 2^{cd} Given States With Every Non-Identity Pauli Expectation ≤ √(72π³)·√(log d)/√dResearch Paper

Motivation

Quantum state tomography reconstructs an unknown ddd-dimensional quantum state from measurements on many copies of it. For nnn qubits, d=2nd = 2^nd=2n, so the number of copies a tomography procedure needs grows exponentially in nnn, and lower bounds on that number decide how far experiments can scale. In many experiments the only measurements available are Pauli measurements: each qubit is measured in the eigenbasis of one of σx,σy,σz\sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_zσx​,σy​,σz​.

Flammia and Liu, Direct fidelity estimation from few Pauli measurements (arXiv:1104.4695, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 230501, 2011), show that the fidelity of an experimental state with a target pure state can be estimated with far fewer copies than full tomography needs. To make the comparison meaningful they also prove that full tomography of a pure state with Pauli measurements requires Ω(d2/log⁡d)\Omega(d^2/\log d)Ω(d2/logd) copies. That lower bound has two steps. The first builds a large family of nearly orthogonal pure states whose Pauli expectation values are all small, so that Pauli measurements extract little information about which state is present. Its engine is Lemma 1 of the paper (p. 7), the subject of this mission. The second step, an information-theoretic argument over a noisy classical channel, is not in scope.

Setting

Fix n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 qubits and put d=2nd = 2^nd=2n. States are unit vectors ψ∈Cd\psi \in \mathbb C^dψ∈Cd, ∥ψ∥2=1\|\psi\|_2 = 1∥ψ∥2​=1; the overlap ⟨φ∣ψ⟩=∑xφx‾ψx\langle\varphi|\psi\rangle = \sum_x \overline{\varphi_x}\psi_x⟨φ∣ψ⟩=∑x​φx​​ψx​ is conjugate-linear in φ\varphiφ.

The single-qubit Pauli matrices are III, σx\sigma_xσx​, σy\sigma_yσy​, σz\sigma_zσz​. A Pauli label k∈{0,1,2,3}nk \in \{0,1,2,3\}^nk∈{0,1,2,3}n determines the nnn-qubit Pauli operator Wk=σk1⊗⋯⊗σknW_k = \sigma_{k_1}\otimes\cdots\otimes\sigma_{k_n}Wk​=σk1​​⊗⋯⊗σkn​​ (with σ0=I\sigma_0 = Iσ0​=I). There are d2d^2d2 labels; the all-zero label gives Wk=IW_k = IWk​=I. Every WkW_kWk​ is Hermitian and unitary, so the Pauli expectation ⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩ is a real number in [−1,1][-1, 1][−1,1].

A Haar-random state is a vector ψ\psiψ drawn from the uniform (rotation-invariant) probability measure on the unit sphere of Cd\mathbb C^dCd, a real sphere of dimension 2d−12d - 12d−1. The constants of the lemma are

ε=9π3(log⁡2) c,τ=72π3,C1=29π3,\varepsilon = \sqrt{9\pi^3(\log 2)\,c},\qquad \tau = \sqrt{72\pi^3},\qquad C_1 = \frac{2}{9\pi^3},ε=9π3(log2)c​,τ=72π3​,C1​=9π32​,

with log⁡\loglog the natural logarithm and c>0c > 0c>0 a parameter.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 1

Let φ1,…,φs∈Cd\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_s \in \mathbb C^dφ1​,…,φs​∈Cd be states with s≤2cds \le 2^{cd}s≤2cd. Then there is a state ψ∈Cd\psi \in \mathbb C^dψ∈Cd with

∣⟨φi∣ψ⟩∣≤ε(1≤i≤s),∣⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩∣≤τlog⁡d/d(Wk≠I).|\langle\varphi_i|\psi\rangle| \le \varepsilon \quad (1 \le i \le s), \qquad |\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle| \le \tau\sqrt{\log d}/\sqrt d \quad (W_k \ne I).∣⟨φi​∣ψ⟩∣≤ε(1≤i≤s),∣⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩∣≤τlogd​/d​(Wk​=I).

These are (31) and (32) of the paper. The goal is an existence statement with no measure in it.

Milestones (all p. 7)

  1. (33): for a state φ\varphiφ, ∣⟨φ∣ψ⟩−⟨φ∣ψ′⟩∣≤∥ψ−ψ′∥2|\langle\varphi|\psi\rangle - \langle\varphi|\psi'\rangle| \le \|\psi - \psi'\|_2∣⟨φ∣ψ⟩−⟨φ∣ψ′⟩∣≤∥ψ−ψ′∥2​.
  2. E⟨φ∣ψ⟩=0\mathbb E\langle\varphi|\psi\rangle = 0E⟨φ∣ψ⟩=0 for Haar-random ψ\psiψ.
  3. (34): Pr⁡[∣⟨φ∣ψ⟩∣≥ε]≤4exp⁡(−C1dε2/η2)\Pr[|\langle\varphi|\psi\rangle| \ge \varepsilon] \le 4\exp(-C_1 d\varepsilon^2/\eta^2)Pr[∣⟨φ∣ψ⟩∣≥ε]≤4exp(−C1​dε2/η2) with η=1\eta = 1η=1.
  4. (35): Pr⁡[(31) fails for some i]≤4exp⁡(cdlog⁡2−C1dε2)=4⋅2−cd\Pr[(31)\text{ fails for some } i] \le 4\exp(cd\log 2 - C_1 d\varepsilon^2) = 4\cdot 2^{-cd}Pr[(31) fails for some i]≤4exp(cdlog2−C1​dε2)=4⋅2−cd.
  5. (36): on unit vectors, ∣⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩−⟨ψ′∣Wk∣ψ′⟩∣≤2∥ψ−ψ′∥2|\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle - \langle\psi'|W_k|\psi'\rangle| \le 2\|\psi - \psi'\|_2∣⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩−⟨ψ′∣Wk​∣ψ′⟩∣≤2∥ψ−ψ′∥2​.
  6. E⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩=0\mathbb E\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle = 0E⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩=0 for Wk≠IW_k \ne IWk​=I.
  7. (37): Pr⁡[∣⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩∣≥τlog⁡d/d]≤4exp⁡(−C1τ2(log⁡d)/η2)\Pr[|\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle| \ge \tau\sqrt{\log d}/\sqrt d] \le 4\exp(-C_1\tau^2(\log d)/\eta^2)Pr[∣⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩∣≥τlogd​/d​]≤4exp(−C1​τ2(logd)/η2) with η=2\eta = 2η=2.
  8. (38): Pr⁡[(32) fails for some k]≤4exp⁡(2log⁡d−C1τ2(log⁡d)/4)=4/d2\Pr[(32)\text{ fails for some } k] \le 4\exp(2\log d - C_1\tau^2(\log d)/4) = 4/d^2Pr[(32) fails for some k]≤4exp(2logd−C1​τ2(logd)/4)=4/d2.

Every constant is the paper's; none is replaced by an unspecified absolute constant.

Significance

The result. Lemma 1 is a packing statement: applied repeatedly, it yields 2Ω(d)2^{\Omega(d)}2Ω(d) states that are pairwise almost orthogonal and whose non-identity Pauli expectations are all O(log⁡d/d)O(\sqrt{\log d/d})O(logd/d​). Such states are hard to tell apart with Pauli measurements, since each measurement outcome is nearly unbiased. The paper converts this into the Ω(d2/log⁡d)\Omega(d^2/\log d)Ω(d2/logd) copy lower bound for full tomography with Pauli measurements (pp. 3, 7–8). Since direct fidelity estimation of an arbitrary pure state uses O(d)O(d)O(d) copies (for fixed accuracy and failure probability), the lower bound is what shows that the scheme beats tomography followed by a fidelity computation by a factor of about ddd.

Formalizing it. The lemma and its proof are published, but none of it is machine-checked: Mathlib has no Pauli operators, no concentration of measure on spheres with explicit constants, and no Levy lemma. A formal proof needs a concentration inequality on the complex unit sphere with the explicit constant C1=2/(9π3)C_1 = 2/(9\pi^3)C1​=2/(9π3) (or any sharper one), the vanishing of the means by symmetry, and the union bounds. Each milestone is a reusable fact about Haar-random states.

Difficulty

The two union bounds (35) and (38) and the Lipschitz estimates (33) and (36) are elementary. The central difficulty is the tail bounds (34) and (37). The paper obtains them from Levy's lemma, which it cites (P. Lévy, 1951) and does not prove; Levy's lemma rests on the isoperimetric inequality on the sphere, which Mathlib does not have, and (37) concerns a quadratic form of ψ\psiψ rather than a linear one. Both tail bounds also need a working theory of the uniform measure on the complex unit sphere (rotation invariance, the distribution of a coordinate), little of which exists in Lean today.

A second difficulty is that the printed proof does not cover every parameter. The union bound produces a good ψ\psiψ only when 4⋅2−cd+4/d2<14\cdot 2^{-cd} + 4/d^2 < 14⋅2−cd+4/d2<1. For small ddd, or small ccc with few given states, the goal is still true, but a complete proof must handle those cases separately; they are not in the paper.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Basis labels are Q n = Fin n → Fin 2, Pauli labels P n = Fin n → Fin 4, states live in EuclideanSpace ℂ (Q n), and WkW_kWk​ is the entrywise product of single-qubit Pauli matrices (the Kronecker product). ddd is the real number 2n2^n2n; log⁡\loglog is Real.log; ⟨φ|ψ⟩ is Mathlib's inner ℂ φ ψ.
  • Measure. The uniform measure on the sphere is Mathlib's Measure.toSphere of an additive Haar measure on Cd\mathbb C^dCd (as a real vector space), normalised to total mass one. The paper's "Haar-random vector in Sd−1S^{d-1}Sd−1" is read as this measure on the unit sphere of Cd\mathbb C^dCd.
  • Added hypotheses, all disclosed. The goal assumes n≥1n \ge 1n≥1: at n=0n = 0n=0 (d=1d = 1d=1) and small ccc the lemma is false, since every unit vector of C1\mathbb C^1C1 has overlap 111 with φ1\varphi_1φ1​. It assumes c>0c > 0c>0, under which ε\varepsilonε is defined. "States" means unit vectors, for the given φi\varphi_iφi​ and for the produced ψ\psiψ. The mean-zero statement for Pauli operators assumes Wk≠IW_k \ne IWk​=I (for Wk=IW_k = IWk​=I the mean is 111); the paper's "for each kkk" refers to the non-identity labels of (32). "Wk≠IW_k \ne IWk​=I" is formalized as "the label kkk is not all zeros".
  • Non-trivialization. The produced ψ\psiψ must be a unit vector, so ψ=0\psi = 0ψ=0 does not satisfy the goal; the given states are unit vectors, so (31) is not trivially false; and the mean-zero milestones assert integrability together with the value of the integral, so they cannot hold merely because a non-integrable integral is 000.
  • Infrastructure needed. Facts about nnn-qubit Pauli operators (Hermitian, unitary, traceless for Wk≠IW_k \ne IWk​=I); rotation invariance of the normalised sphere measure; a concentration inequality for Lipschitz functions on the complex unit sphere with an explicit constant. The concentration inequality and the sphere-measure facts are reusable well beyond this mission and are welcome as separate contributions.

Selected references

  • S. T. Flammia and Y.-K. Liu, Direct fidelity estimation from few Pauli measurements, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 230501 (2011); arXiv:1104.4695v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.4695
  • P. Lévy, Problèmes concrets d'analyse fonctionnelle, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1951 (reference [10] of the paper; no stable online link).
  • M. Ledoux, The Concentration of Measure Phenomenon, Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 89, AMS, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1090/surv/089
  • P. Hayden, D. W. Leung and A. Winter, Aspects of generic entanglement, Comm. Math. Phys. 265, 95–117 (2006); arXiv:quant-ph/0407049. https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0407049
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Quantum InformationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Direct Fidelity Estimation from Few Pauli Measurements 1: ⌈1/(ε²δ)⌉ Importance-Sampled Pauli Measurements Estimate tr(ρσ) Within 2ε With Probability ≥ 1 − 2δResearch Paper

Certifying a prepared quantum state

Experiments that prepare many-body entangled states (GHZ, W, stabilizer, cluster and matrix product states) need a way to check that the device produced the intended state. Full quantum state tomography answers the question but its cost grows with the dimension d=2nd = 2^nd=2n of an nnn-qubit system: a reconstruction needs on the order of d2d^2d2 measurement settings. Entanglement witnesses are cheap but exist only for special states.

Direct fidelity estimation (S. T. Flammia and Y.-K. Liu, arXiv:1104.4695, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 230501, 2011; the same idea appears in M. P. da Silva, O. Landon-Cardinal and D. Poulin, arXiv:1104.3835) estimates only the one number the experimentalist needs, the fidelity of the prepared state σ\sigmaσ to the target pure state ρ\rhoρ. It measures a constant number of randomly chosen Pauli observables, independent of nnn, and needs only single-qubit measurements. The method has since become a standard benchmarking tool in experimental quantum information.

Setting

Consider nnn qubits, d=2nd = 2^nd=2n. Let WkW_kWk​, kkk ranging over the d2=4nd^2 = 4^nd2=4n labels in {0,1,2,3}n\{0,1,2,3\}^n{0,1,2,3}n, be the nnn-fold tensor products of the single-qubit matrices I,σx,σy,σzI, \sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_zI,σx​,σy​,σz​. The characteristic function of a d×dd\times dd×d matrix ρ\rhoρ is

χρ(k)=tr(ρWk/d).\chi_\rho(k) = \mathrm{tr}(\rho W_k/\sqrt d).χρ​(k)=tr(ρWk​/d​).

The target ρ\rhoρ is a pure state, ρ=∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣\rho = |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|ρ=∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣ with ∥ψ∥=1\|\psi\| = 1∥ψ∥=1; the prepared σ\sigmaσ is an arbitrary state (positive semidefinite, trace one). For pure ρ\rhoρ the fidelity is F(ρ,σ)=tr(ρσ)F(\rho,\sigma) = \mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)F(ρ,σ)=tr(ρσ), and tr(ρσ)=∑kχρ(k)χσ(k)\mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma) = \sum_k\chi_\rho(k)\chi_\sigma(k)tr(ρσ)=∑k​χρ​(k)χσ​(k).

Given an additive error ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and a failure probability δ>0\delta>0δ>0, the protocol runs in two stages.

  1. Importance sampling. Draw ℓ=⌈1/(ε2δ)⌉\ell = \lceil 1/(\varepsilon^2\delta)\rceilℓ=⌈1/(ε2δ)⌉ labels k1,…,kℓk_1,\dots,k_\ellk1​,…,kℓ​ independently with probability Pr⁡(k)=χρ(k)2\Pr(k) = \chi_\rho(k)^2Pr(k)=χρ​(k)2. The ideal estimator is Y=1ℓ∑iXiY = \frac1\ell\sum_i X_iY=ℓ1​∑i​Xi​, Xi=χσ(ki)/χρ(ki)X_i = \chi_\sigma(k_i)/\chi_\rho(k_i)Xi​=χσ​(ki​)/χρ​(ki​).
  2. Finite precision. For each iii, measure the observable WkiW_{k_i}Wki​​ on
mi=⌈2d χρ(ki)2 ℓ ε2log⁡(2/δ)⌉m_i = \Big\lceil\frac{2}{d\,\chi_\rho(k_i)^2\,\ell\,\varepsilon^2}\log(2/\delta)\Big\rceilmi​=⌈dχρ​(ki​)2ℓε22​log(2/δ)⌉

copies of σ\sigmaσ. Each measurement gives an outcome Aij∈{1,−1}A_{ij}\in\{1,-1\}Aij​∈{1,−1} with mean tr(σWki)=d χσ(ki)\mathrm{tr}(\sigma W_{k_i}) = \sqrt d\,\chi_\sigma(k_i)tr(σWki​​)=d​χσ​(ki​), independently. The output is

Y~=1ℓ∑i=1ℓX~i,X~i=1mid χρ(ki)∑j=1miAij.\tilde Y = \frac1\ell\sum_{i=1}^\ell\tilde X_i,\qquad \tilde X_i = \frac{1}{m_i\sqrt d\,\chi_\rho(k_i)}\sum_{j=1}^{m_i}A_{ij}.Y~=ℓ1​i=1∑ℓ​X~i​,X~i​=mi​d​χρ​(ki​)1​j=1∑mi​​Aij​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the direct-fidelity-estimation guarantee (p. 2)

For every nnn, every pure ρ\rhoρ, every state σ\sigmaσ and every ε,δ>0\varepsilon,\delta>0ε,δ>0,

Pr⁡[ tr(ρσ)∈[Y~−2ε, Y~+2ε] ] ≥ 1−2δ,\Pr\Big[\,\mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)\in[\tilde Y-2\varepsilon,\ \tilde Y+2\varepsilon]\,\Big]\ \ge\ 1-2\delta ,Pr[tr(ρσ)∈[Y~−2ε, Y~+2ε]] ≥ 1−2δ,

the probability being over both stages of the protocol.

Milestones

  • the fidelity formula (1) and the Pauli expansion (2) (p. 1), and the normalization of (3) (footnote [6], p. 4);
  • unbiasedness EX=tr(ρσ)\mathbb E X = \mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)EX=tr(ρσ) and the variance bound Var(X)≤tr(σ2)−[tr(ρσ)]2≤1\mathrm{Var}(X)\le\mathrm{tr}(\sigma^2)-[\mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)]^2\le1Var(X)≤tr(σ2)−[tr(ρσ)]2≤1 ((12)–(14), p. 6);
  • the ideal-estimator bound (5), Pr⁡[∣Y−tr(ρσ)∣≥ε]≤δ\Pr[|Y-\mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)|\ge\varepsilon]\le\deltaPr[∣Y−tr(ρσ)∣≥ε]≤δ;
  • Hoeffding's bound (16)–(17), Pr⁡[∣Y~−Y∣≥t]≤2exp⁡(−2t2/C)\Pr[|\tilde Y - Y|\ge t]\le 2\exp(-2t^2/C)Pr[∣Y~−Y∣≥t]≤2exp(−2t2/C), the computation (18), C≤2ε2/log⁡(2/δ)C\le2\varepsilon^2/\log(2/\delta)C≤2ε2/log(2/δ), and the finite-precision bound (8), Pr⁡[∣Y~−Y∣≥ε]≤δ\Pr[|\tilde Y - Y|\ge\varepsilon]\le\deltaPr[∣Y~−Y∣≥ε]≤δ for every fixed k1,…,kℓk_1,\dots,k_\ellk1​,…,kℓ​;
  • the resource bounds (9)–(10) on the expected number of copies and the deterministic bound mi≤1+2log⁡(2/δ)/(α2ℓε2)m_i\le1+2\log(2/\delta)/(\alpha^2\ell\varepsilon^2)mi​≤1+2log(2/δ)/(α2ℓε2) for well-conditioned states.

Significance

The guarantee says that ℓ=⌈1/(ε2δ)⌉\ell = \lceil1/(\varepsilon^2\delta)\rceilℓ=⌈1/(ε2δ)⌉ Pauli settings suffice to estimate the fidelity of any nnn-qubit state to any pure target, whatever nnn. The number of copies of σ\sigmaσ is O(d)O(d)O(d) in expectation in the worst case and constant for stabilizer states, while the paper's lower bounds show that full tomography with Pauli measurements needs a number of copies polynomial in ddd. The same scheme, applied to the Choi state, certifies unitary channels and Clifford circuits.

The result is proved on paper but has not been machine-checked. A formal proof requires the Pauli-basis machinery (orthogonality and completeness of the nnn-qubit Pauli operators), the Born-rule model of repeated Pauli measurements, and the combination of a second-moment bound with a sub-Gaussian bound through a two-stage union bound. The formalization also corrects a printed slip: the paper's equality (13) holds only as an inequality (see the milestone's note), which does not affect the result.

Difficulty

Each individual step is classical: Chebyshev's inequality for the first stage, Hoeffding's inequality for the second. The difficulty lies in the bookkeeping that the informal proof leaves implicit. The first-stage estimator involves 1/χρ(k)1/\chi_\rho(k)1/χρ​(k), which is undefined at labels the sampling never produces, so every probability must be weighted by Pr⁡(k)\Pr(k)Pr(k). The second-stage bound holds conditionally on the labels, and its sample sizes mim_imi​ depend on them, so the two stages cannot be treated as one product of independent variables. The constant in Hoeffding's bound must be tracked through the d\sqrt dd​ factors of χ\chiχ and of EAij\mathbb E A_{ij}EAij​, and through the ceiling in mim_imi​. Finally, the Pauli expansion (2) requires the trace orthogonality tr(WkWk′)=d δkk′\mathrm{tr}(W_kW_{k'}) = d\,\delta_{kk'}tr(Wk​Wk′​)=dδkk′​ of nnn-fold tensor products, which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

  • Basis labels are Q n := Fin n → Fin 2, Pauli labels P n := Fin n → Fin 4; matrices are Matrix (Q n) (Q n) ℂ, and WkW_kWk​ is the entrywise product ∏i(Pki)xiyi\prod_i(P_{k_i})_{x_iy_i}∏i​(Pki​​)xi​yi​​. ddd is the real number 2n2^n2n.
  • Traces are real parts of complex traces (real on Hermitian matrices); χρ(k)\chi_\rho(k)χρ​(k) is real-valued.
  • States are WildeQIT.IsDensityOperator (positive semidefinite, trace one), referenced from the platform; purity is ρ=ψψ†\rho = \psi\psi^\daggerρ=ψψ† with ψ†ψ=1\psi^\dagger\psi = 1ψ†ψ=1.
  • ⌈⋅⌉\lceil\cdot\rceil⌈⋅⌉ is Nat.ceil, log⁡\loglog the natural logarithm.
  • The first stage is a finite sum over label tuples weighted by ∏iχρ(ki)2\prod_i\chi_\rho(k_i)^2∏i​χρ​(ki​)2. The second stage is an explicit product measure: each AijA_{ij}Aij​ is +1+1+1 with probability (1+tr(σWki))/2(1+\mathrm{tr}(\sigma W_{k_i}))/2(1+tr(σWki​​))/2 and −1-1−1 otherwise. This Born-rule law is the unique ±1\pm1±1 law with the page's mean d χσ(ki)\sqrt d\,\chi_\sigma(k_i)d​χσ​(ki​). The outcomes are not arbitrary random variables with hypothesised means, which would make the goal vacuous or false.
  • Statements that divide by χρ(ki)\chi_\rho(k_i)χρ​(ki​) either weight by Pr⁡(ki)\Pr(k_i)Pr(ki​) or assume χρ(ki)≠0\chi_\rho(k_i)\neq0χρ​(ki​)=0; none quantifies over all labels without weights.
  • (9), (10), (18) and the well-conditioned bound assume δ<1\delta<1δ<1, so that log⁡(2/δ)>0\log(2/\delta)>0log(2/δ)>0; the goal, (5) and (8) carry no such hypothesis.
  • The goal does not mention variances, Chebyshev, Hoeffding's constant or (15), and it quantifies over every nnn, pure ρ\rhoρ, state σ\sigmaσ and ε,δ>0\varepsilon,\delta>0ε,δ>0. It cannot be discharged by a special case or a degenerate measure.

A complete development needs the Pauli-basis lemmas (Hermiticity, Wk2=IW_k^2 = IWk2​=I, trace orthogonality and the expansion of a matrix in the Pauli basis), a Born-rule lemma for ±1\pm1±1 observables, and Hoeffding and Chebyshev bounds specialised to finite product measures. The Pauli-basis lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission (stabilizer formalism, shadow tomography, randomized benchmarking). Proofs of any milestone, and of auxiliary Pauli-basis facts, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. T. Flammia and Y.-K. Liu, Direct fidelity estimation from few Pauli measurements, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 230501 (2011); arXiv:1104.4695v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.4695
  • M. P. da Silva, O. Landon-Cardinal and D. Poulin, Practical characterization of quantum devices without tomography, Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 210404 (2011). https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.3835
  • R. Jozsa, Fidelity for mixed quantum states, J. Mod. Opt. 41, 2315 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1080/09500349414552171
  • W. Hoeffding, Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 58, 13–30 (1963). https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830
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Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretaries with Advice 5: With Binary-Classifier Advice of Recall p and Specificity p′, the Optimal Success Probability Tends to ((1−p′)/p)^((1−p′)/p′)·e^((p−1)/p′)Research Paper

Motivation

A secretary problem asks a decision maker to choose one candidate from a sequence, without being able to recall a rejected candidate. Each arrival reveals how the candidate compares with those seen earlier, but the decision maker does not know the candidate's final rank. A classifier can provide an additional Yes or No signal about whether the current candidate is the best overall. The natural performance question is how much this signal improves the chance of selecting the best candidate when the number of arrivals grows. Dütting, Lattanzi, Paes Leme and Vassilvitskii give an exact finite linear program for this setting and an explicit asymptotic value. This mission makes the limit and its finite prerequisites precise.

The classifier's quality has two parameters with different meanings. Recall ppp is the probability of a Yes signal for the top candidate. Specificity p′p'p′ is the probability of a No signal for any other candidate. Both lie in [1/2,1][1/2,1][1/2,1], as in Example 5 of the paper. At p=p′=1/2p=p'=1/2p=p′=1/2 the signal conveys no information, while p=p′=1p=p'=1p=p′=1 is perfect advice. These endpoints matter to the statement rather than being omitted as special cases. Example 5, pp. 7–8.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 arrivals, indexed by i=1,…,ni=1,\ldots,ni=1,…,n. Their ranks form a uniformly random permutation; the maximum rank is the candidate to select. At each arrival, the observer sees the relative ranking of candidates already seen and a signal s∈{Y,N}s\in\{Y,N\}s∈{Y,N} from the classifier. An admissible decision can depend on this observed history and may use a stopping probability. It cannot inspect a candidate's hidden final rank. The paper shows that, for this signal model, the optimal stopping probability is characterized by a finite primal linear program. Sections 2 and 6.

For each round and signal, zis∈[0,1]z_i^s\in[0,1]zis​∈[0,1] is a primal variable. Put zˉj=(1−p′)zjY+p′zjN\bar z_j=(1-p')z_j^Y+p'z_j^Nzˉj​=(1−p′)zjY​+p′zjN​. The program has constraints zis≤1−∑j<izˉj/jz_i^s\le1-\sum_{j<i}\bar z_j/jzis​≤1−∑j<i​zˉj​/j, and its objective is ∑i=1n[pziY+(1−p)ziN]/n\sum_{i=1}^n[pz_i^Y+(1-p)z_i^N]/n∑i=1n​[pziY​+(1−p)ziN​]/n. Write Opt⁡(n,p,p′)\operatorname{Opt}(n,p,p')Opt(n,p,p′) for its optimal value. The constraints account for the chance that an earlier candidate has already been selected; the objective weights winning selections by the signal probabilities of the top candidate. This is the Opt⁡\operatorname{Opt}Opt of Section 6, rather than a value defined by an asymptotic formula. Section 6, p. 20.

The paper also considers a rescaled dual with variables wiY,wiNw_i^Y,w_i^NwiY​,wiN​ and an associated pair of thresholds tY,tNt_Y,t_NtY​,tN​. The thresholds are the first rounds at which the corresponding greedy dual coordinate is positive. In the finite formalization, n+1n+1n+1 records a signal whose coordinate is never positive. Proof of Theorem 20, p. 21.

Formalization targets

The main target is the limiting primal optimum for every p,p′∈[1/2,1]p,p'\in[1/2,1]p,p′∈[1/2,1]:

lim⁡n→∞Opt⁡(n,p,p′)=(1−p′p)(1−p′)/p′exp⁡(p−1p′).\lim_{n\to\infty}\operatorname{Opt}(n,p,p') =\left(\frac{1-p'}p\right)^{(1-p')/p'} \exp\left(\frac{p-1}{p'}\right).n→∞lim​Opt(n,p,p′)=(p1−p′​)(1−p′)/p′exp(p′p−1​).

The finite milestones identify the primal optimum with the greedy dual objective, give the exact late dual coordinates and the exact range of the early YYY recursion, and establish tY≤tNt_Y\le t_NtY​≤tN​. The asymptotic milestones state

tNn⟶exp⁡(p−1p′),tYn⟶(1−p′p)1/p′exp⁡(p−1p′).\frac{t_N}{n}\longrightarrow \exp\left(\frac{p-1}{p'}\right),\qquad \frac{t_Y}{n}\longrightarrow \left(\frac{1-p'}p\right)^{1/p'}\exp\left(\frac{p-1}{p'}\right).ntN​​⟶exp(p′p−1​),ntY​​⟶(p1−p′​)1/p′exp(p′p−1​).

A separate companion target gives the finite lower bound Opt⁡(n,p,p′)≥L(p,p′)\operatorname{Opt}(n,p,p')\ge L(p,p')Opt(n,p,p′)≥L(p,p′), where LLL denotes the displayed limit. Theorem 20 states the corresponding infimum inequality but does not separately prove it. Theorem 20 and its proof, pp. 20–22.

Significance

The limit quantifies the benefit of advice across the whole parameter square, including asymmetric classifiers. It recovers the classical value e−1e^{-1}e−1 when p=p′=1/2p=p'=1/2p=p′=1/2, and gives value 111 for perfect advice. The two threshold limits say when each signal begins to justify stopping as the horizon grows. Thus the result specifies both the achievable success probability and the scale of the optimal decisions. Theorem 20, p. 20.

The paper already proves threshold optimality through its linear program and presents the limit calculation. The formalization work here is to establish a full Lean limit theorem from an exact finite LP, including the two endpoint regimes and a finite dual characterization. The nearby classical secretary threshold limit on Prove2Me uses a different rank-based model; it does not state this classifier result. Definitions of the primal feasible set and the backward dual sequence can support later results about other advice distributions.

Difficulty

The source uses approximations throughout its asymptotic argument and explicitly omits terms that vanish as nnn grows. Those omissions cannot be carried into an exact finite statement: the YYY recursion, for example, fails at the round immediately before the NNN threshold because the next NNN dual coordinate is then present. A complete argument has to keep the discrete threshold boundaries and the harmonic sums under control while passing to a limit. The source's displayed theorem also contains an exponent inconsistent with the last equation of its proof; the corrected expression must be checked uniformly, including zero base at p′=1p'=1p′=1. Proof of Theorem 20, pp. 21–22.

Formalization scope

Lean represents time by natural numbers 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n, matching the paper's displayed LP, and signals by Bool, with true meaning YYY. The primal optimum is the real supremum of objective values over exactly the feasible LP variables. For n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and p,p′∈[1/2,1]p,p'\in[1/2,1]p,p′∈[1/2,1], the zero assignment is feasible and the objective is bounded, so this supremum has its ordinary optimization meaning. Values of a variable array outside 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n are ignored. The greedy dual is a backward finite recursion, not the definition of Opt⁡\operatorname{Opt}Opt; otherwise the central LP-to-dual milestone would disappear.

The formal thresholds are first positive greedy dual coordinates. If there is no positive NNN coordinate, tN=n+1t_N=n+1tN​=n+1; this occurs when p=1p=1p=1 and has the same normalized limit as the paper's informal tN=nt_N=ntN​=n convention at perfect advice. Real powers use Lean's 00=10^0=100=1, yielding the correct p′=1p'=1p′=1 endpoint. All theorems quantify explicitly over n≥1n\ge1n≥1 where finite rounds are used, and over p,p′∈[1/2,1]p,p'\in[1/2,1]p,p′∈[1/2,1]. The limit uses Filter.Tendsto at infinity. The chapter does not formalize the algorithmic running time, Figures 3 and 7, or the policy-level threshold optimality addressed by the series' preceding mission. Contributions to finite LP duality, harmonic asymptotics, and endpoint analysis are within scope. Sections 6 and Appendix C.

Selected references

  • Paul Dütting, Silvio Lattanzi, Renato Paes Leme and Sergei Vassilvitskii, Secretaries with Advice, arXiv:2011.06726v1, 2020; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. Preprint.
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimistic Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning: Worst-Case Regret Bounds I: An Extended MDP with δ-Optimistic Samples for Hitting Times Has Diameter at Most D/(1−δ)Research Paper

Motivation

Regret bounds for reinforcement learning in a single, non-episodic Markov decision process (MDP) are stated in terms of the diameter DDD of the MDP: the worst expected time needed to travel between two states when the travel policy is chosen well. UCRL2 (Jaksch, Ortner and Auer, 2010) achieves regret O~(DSAT)\tilde O(DS\sqrt{AT})O~(DSAT​), against a lower bound of Ω(DSAT)\Omega(\sqrt{DSAT})Ω(DSAT​), by planning in an extended MDP, whose action set lets the planner also pick a transition law from a confidence set. Posterior-sampling methods replace the confidence set with random samples from a posterior. Agrawal and Jia (arXiv:1705.07041v3, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) show that such a method attains a high-probability worst-case regret bound of O~(DSAT)\tilde O(DS\sqrt{AT})O~(DSAT​) for every communicating MDP (their Theorem 1).

Their analysis plans in an extended MDP built from finitely many sampled transition vectors. Optimal-gain policies of that MDP are only useful if it is itself communicating with a diameter comparable to DDD, so the paper needs a deterministic statement: if every state-action pair has a sample that is optimistic about travel times, the diameter of the extended MDP is at most D/(1−δ)D/(1-\delta)D/(1−δ). This mission formalizes that statement, Lemma 5.6 of the paper (p. 12), together with three claims from its proof.

Setting

A finite MDP M\mathcal MM has a finite state set S\mathcal SS of size SSS, a finite action set A\mathcal AA of size AAA, a probability vector Ps,a∈ΔSP_{s,a}\in\Delta^{S}Ps,a​∈ΔS for each state sss and action aaa, and rewards rs,a∈[0,1]r_{s,a}\in[0,1]rs,a​∈[0,1]. A deterministic policy is a map π:S→A\pi:\mathcal S\to\mathcal Aπ:S→A; under π\piπ the state process is the Markov chain with transition rows Ps,π(s)P_{s,\pi(s)}Ps,π(s)​.

For states s′s's′ and sss, Ts′→sπ∈[0,∞]T^{\pi}_{s'\to s}\in[0,\infty]Ts′→sπ​∈[0,∞] is the expected number of steps to reach sss when starting at s′s's′ and following π\piπ. It is 000 when s′=ss'=ss′=s. The diameter is

D(M)=max⁡s≠s′ min⁡π:S→ATs→s′π,D(\mathcal M)=\max_{s\neq s'}\ \min_{\pi:\mathcal S\to\mathcal A} T^{\pi}_{s\to s'},D(M)=s=s′max​ π:S→Amin​Ts→s′π​,

and M\mathcal MM is communicating when D(M)<∞D(\mathcal M)<\inftyD(M)<∞ (Definitions 1–3, p. 3). For a target sss, the vector EsE^{s}Es collects the minimum expected times, Es′s=min⁡πTs′→sπE^{s}_{s'}=\min_{\pi}T^{\pi}_{s'\to s}Es′s​=minπ​Ts′→sπ​, so Ess=0E^{s}_{s}=0Ess​=0.

The extended MDP (§3, p. 5) starts from ψ\psiψ probability vectors Qs,a1,…,Qs,aψQ^{1}_{s,a},\dots,Q^{\psi}_{s,a}Qs,a1​,…,Qs,aψ​ for every pair (s,a)(s,a)(s,a). In the algorithm these are posterior samples, but here they are arbitrary. The extended MDP M~\tilde{\mathcal M}M~ has the same states and, for every action aaa, the actions a1,…,aψa^{1},\dots,a^{\psi}a1,…,aψ. Taking aja^{j}aj in sss gives reward rs,ar_{s,a}rs,a​, and the next state is drawn from Qs,ajQ^{j}_{s,a}Qs,aj​. Its diameter D(M~)D(\tilde{\mathcal M})D(M~) is defined as above, minimizing over policies π~:S→{aj}\tilde\pi:\mathcal S\to\{a^{j}\}π~:S→{aj}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 5.6

Let δ∈[0,1)\delta\in[0,1)δ∈[0,1). Suppose that for every target state sss, every state s′s's′ and every action aaa there is a sample index jjj with

Qs′,aj⋅Es ≤ Ps′,a⋅Es+δ.(16)Q^{j}_{s',a}\cdot E^{s}\ \le\ P_{s',a}\cdot E^{s}+\delta. \tag{16}Qs′,aj​⋅Es ≤ Ps′,a​⋅Es+δ.(16)

Then

D(M~) ≤ D(M)1−δ.D(\tilde{\mathcal M})\ \le\ \frac{D(\mathcal M)}{1-\delta}.D(M~) ≤ 1−δD(M)​.

Milestones (claims of the proof, p. 13)

  1. In a communicating MDP with at least one action, for every target s2s_2s2​ there is one deterministic policy π\piπ with Ts′→s2π=Es′s2T^{\pi}_{s'\to s_2}=E^{s_2}_{s'}Ts′→s2​π​=Es′s2​​ for every s′s's′.
  2. First-step analysis: for every policy π\piπ and s≠s2s\neq s_2s=s2​,
Ts→s2π=1+∑s′≠s2Ps,π(s)(s′) Ts′→s2π.T^{\pi}_{s\to s_2}=1+\sum_{s'\neq s_2}P_{s,\pi(s)}(s')\,T^{\pi}_{s'\to s_2}.Ts→s2​π​=1+s′=s2​∑​Ps,π(s)​(s′)Ts′→s2​π​.
  1. Comparison (display (17)): if E∈[0,∞]SE\in[0,\infty]^{\mathcal S}E∈[0,∞]S satisfies 1+∑s′≠s2Qs,π~(s)(s′)Es′≤Es+δ1+\sum_{s'\neq s_2}Q_{s,\tilde\pi(s)}(s')E_{s'}\le E_s+\delta1+∑s′=s2​​Qs,π~(s)​(s′)Es′​≤Es​+δ for all s≠s2s\neq s_2s=s2​, then (1−δ) Ts→s2π~≤Es(1-\delta)\,T^{\tilde\pi}_{s\to s_2}\le E_s(1−δ)Ts→s2​π~​≤Es​ for all s≠s2s\neq s_2s=s2​.

Significance

The result. Lemma 5.6 turns a per-pair, one-sided condition on samples into a global bound on the diameter. Agrawal and Jia combine it with their Lemma 5.7, which shows that (16) holds with δ≤1/2\delta\le 1/2δ≤1/2 with high probability for their posterior samples. Together these give D(M~k)≤2DD(\tilde{\mathcal M}^{k})\le 2DD(M~k)≤2D in every epoch, which is what lets the bias span of the sampled MDP enter their regret analysis. The lemma is deterministic and makes no use of how the samples were drawn, so it applies to any optimistic-sampling or perturbation scheme that produces vectors satisfying (16).

Formalizing it. The lemma is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. The paper's proof assumes that every sampled entry is strictly positive ("drawn from Dirichlet distribution") so that the absorbing chain and its fundamental matrix are well defined. That assumption fails for the simple optimistic samples of the same algorithm, which can have zero entries. The statements here drop it, so a formal proof also settles the general case. Milestones 1 and 2 are standard facts about minimum expected hitting times (stochastic shortest paths) that the platform's finite-MDP library does not yet contain. They are reusable for any diameter-based regret analysis.

The main regret bound (Theorem 1) is not posed. Its constants are hidden in O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅), and the algorithm's parameters are given only up to Θ(⋅)\Theta(\cdot)Θ(⋅).

Difficulty

The paper's argument inverts I−Qπ~†I-Q^{\dagger}_{\tilde\pi}I−Qπ~†​ and uses the nonnegativity of the fundamental matrix of an absorbing chain. Without positive entries the policy π~\tilde\piπ~ can have closed classes that avoid the target, so I−Qπ~†I-Q^{\dagger}_{\tilde\pi}I−Qπ~†​ can be singular and the matrix argument does not apply as written. The comparison has to be made with expected travel times that may be infinite.

A second obstacle is that (16) constrains only the minimizing vectors EsE^{s}Es of the true MDP. The bound therefore needs a policy of M\mathcal MM whose travel times equal Es2E^{s_2}Es2​ from every state at once, not merely from the starting state s1s_1s1​. The existence of such a uniformly optimal deterministic policy is not immediate from the definition of the diameter, which minimizes separately for each pair of states.

Finally, the platform's expected travel time is defined through finite-horizon trajectory laws, so first-step analysis is a Markov-property computation on those measures. It does not follow from the definition by unfolding alone.

Formalization scope

  • Library. The mission reuses the published definitions FiniteMDPLearning (namespace BanditAlgorithm): FiniteMDP S A, mdpTravelTime M f src tgt (the expected hitting time minus one, valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], equal to Tsrc→tgtfT^{f}_{src\to tgt}Tsrc→tgtf​), and mdpDiameterENN M (Definition 2 verbatim, valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]). The mission's own definitions file adds extendedMDP, extendedAction and minTravel (the vector EsE^{s}Es).
  • Indexing. States, actions and samples are 0-based (Fin S, Fin A, Fin ψ). The action aja^{j}aj of the extended MDP is finProdFinEquiv (a, j) : Fin (A * ψ). The epoch index kkk plays no role and is dropped.
  • Extended values. Travel times, diameters, the vectors EsE^{s}Es and the inner products Q⋅EsQ\cdot E^{s}Q⋅Es are computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with 0⋅∞=00\cdot\infty=00⋅∞=0. The bound D/(1−δ)D/(1-\delta)D/(1−δ) is division in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] by the positive real 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, with δ∈[0,1)\delta\in[0,1)δ∈[0,1) as δ : ℝ≥0, δ < 1.
  • Quantifiers of (16). The printed (16) uses the letter sss both for the target of EsE^{s}Es and for the state in Ps,aP_{s,a}Ps,a​. The proof applies it at the current state with a different target, so the goal quantifies the target separately: for every target, state and action there is a sample.
  • Pinned hypotheses. Milestone 1 assumes D(M)<∞D(\mathcal M)<\inftyD(M)<∞ (the paper's "M\mathcal MM has diameter DDD") and A≥1A\ge1A≥1. The goal assumes neither: if D(M)=∞D(\mathcal M)=\inftyD(M)=∞ its bound is trivially true, so it generalizes the paper's statement. No statement assumes positivity of the sampled entries or any distribution of the samples.
  • Ruled-out trivializations. An extended MDP whose transitions ignore jjj or QQQ, an EsE^{s}Es that is not the infimum over policies, a hypothesis comparing QQQ and PPP against different vectors, and a real-valued conclusion through a truncation with junk value 000 for non-communicating MDPs would each make the goal vacuous or different. None is used.
  • Useful existing result. The platform has the proved drift criterion BanditAlgorithm.mdp_travel_time_le_of_lyapunov_drift (a real-valued nonnegative VVV with ∑s′Ps,f(s)(s′)V(s′)+1≤V(s)\sum_{s'}P_{s,f(s)}(s')V(s')+1\le V(s)∑s′​Ps,f(s)​(s′)V(s′)+1≤V(s) off the target bounds the travel time by VVV), which covers the case δ=0\delta=0δ=0 of milestone 3 for finite EEE.
  • Welcome contributions. Proofs of the three milestones and of the goal; a general first-step (Markov property) lemma for mdpMeasure; an existence theorem for uniformly optimal deterministic policies of minimum expected hitting time.

Selected references

  • S. Agrawal and R. Jia, Posterior sampling for reinforcement learning: worst-case regret bounds, arXiv:1705.07041v3, 2020; published as Optimistic posterior sampling for reinforcement learning: worst-case regret bounds, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07041
  • T. Jaksch, R. Ortner and P. Auer, Near-optimal regret bounds for reinforcement learning, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v11/jaksch10a.html
  • D. P. Bertsekas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, An analysis of stochastic shortest path problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 16(3), 1991. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.16.3.580
  • C. M. Grinstead and J. L. Snell, Introduction to Probability, American Mathematical Society, 2nd revised edition, 1997 (Chapter 11, absorbing Markov chains). https://math.dartmouth.edu/~prob/prob/prob.pdf
  • T. Lattimore and C. Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020 (Chapter 38, MDPs and the diameter). https://tor-lattimore.com/downloads/book/book.pdf
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption I: Blockchain Adoption Raises Total Welfare for Large Horizontal Differentiation Yet Is Not an EquilibriumResearch Paper

Why blockchain adoption in supply chains is an economic question

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger that only invited parties may write to. In supply chains it is promoted as a way to make the provenance and quality of goods verifiable by the end consumer: a manufacturer who joins records how a good was produced, and consumers can read that record. Joining is costly, and the parties who pay the cost are not the parties who benefit most from the information. Whether such a technology is adopted at all is therefore a question about incentives, not engineering.

G. Iyengar, F. Saleh, J. Sethuraman and W. Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption (SSRN 3602376; Management Science, 2023, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532), build a stylised supply chain with vendors, price-competing manufacturers and consumers with an outside option, and show that welfare-improving adoption can fail to arise in equilibrium. This mission formalizes the first of the paper's two main results, Proposition 4.8, together with the welfare comparisons it rests on. A companion mission formalizes the second, the self-financing transfers of Proposition 4.9.

The supply chain

There are two vendors, of high and low quality h>l≥0h > l \ge 0h>l≥0, and a set MMM of 4m4m4m manufacturers, m≥2m \ge 2m≥2 of each type (qi,ξi)∈{A,B}×{h,l}(q_i,\xi_i) \in \{A,B\}\times\{h,l\}(qi​,ξi​)∈{A,B}×{h,l}. A consumer of horizontal type tkt_ktk​ obtains utility HHH from a good with qi=tkq_i = t_kqi​=tk​ and LLL otherwise, plus the vertical utility ξi\xi_iξi​; here 0≤L<H0 \le L < H0≤L<H, and Δ:=H−L>0\Delta := H - L > 0Δ:=H−L>0 measures horizontal differentiation. Consumers can always take an outside option φk\varphi_kφk​, drawn from a continuous distribution GGG supported on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The high type vendor produces at cost ch(x)=γxc_h(x) = \gamma xch​(x)=γx, γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0; the low type vendor at a strictly increasing convex cost clc_lcl​ with cl(0)=0c_l(0)=0cl​(0)=0 and strictly increasing derivative cl′c_l'cl′​ (Assumption 1, items 1–2).

Manufacturer iii may join the blockchain at cost χi>0\chi_i > 0χi​>0 (ai=1a_i = 1ai​=1) or not (ai=0a_i = 0ai​=0). Three scenarios are compared: full adoption FFF (all adopt), partial adoption PPP (exactly the high type manufacturers adopt) and non-adoption NNN. The paper's Proposition A.1 gives each scenario's equilibrium in closed form: every consumer's best manufacturer offers utility

uF=uP=H+h−γ,uN=H+L+h+l2−γ,u^F = u^P = H + h - \gamma,\qquad u^N = \tfrac{H+L+h+l}{2} - \gamma,uF=uP=H+h−γ,uN=2H+L+h+l​−γ,

the low type vendor price is ΨlF=max⁡{γ−(h−l),0}\Psi^F_l = \max\{\gamma-(h-l),0\}ΨlF​=max{γ−(h−l),0}, ΨlP=max⁡{γ−(h−l)−H−L2,0}\Psi^P_l = \max\{\gamma-(h-l)-\frac{H-L}{2},0\}ΨlP​=max{γ−(h−l)−2H−L​,0}, ΨlN=γ\Psi^N_l = \gammaΨlN​=γ (the high type price is always γ\gammaγ), the low type market shares are slF=(cl′)−1(γ−(h−l))s^F_l = (c_l')^{-1}(\gamma-(h-l))slF​=(cl′​)−1(γ−(h−l)), slP=(cl′)−1(γ−(h−l)−H−L2)s^P_l = (c_l')^{-1}(\gamma-(h-l)-\frac{H-L}{2})slP​=(cl′​)−1(γ−(h−l)−2H−L​), slN=(cl′)−1(γ)s^N_l = (c_l')^{-1}(\gamma)slN​=(cl′​)−1(γ), and shX=G(uX)−slXs^X_h = G(u^X) - s^X_lshX​=G(uX)−slX​. Manufacturers earn zero gross profit Π\PiΠ in every scenario because of price competition.

Welfare in scenario XXX is the sum WX=WVX+WMX+WCXW^X = W^X_V + W^X_M + W^X_CWX=WVX​+WMX​+WCX​ of vendor welfare WVXW^X_VWVX​ (revenue minus production cost of both vendors, (10)), manufacturer welfare WMX=∑i(Π−χiaiX)W^X_M = \sum_{i}(\Pi - \chi_i a^X_i)WMX​=∑i​(Π−χi​aiX​) and consumer welfare WCX=E[max⁡{uX,φ}]W^X_C = \mathbb E[\max\{u^X,\varphi\}]WCX​=E[max{uX,φ}] ((12)). The adoption game (8) lets each manufacturer choose aia_iai​ to maximise Π(ai,a−i)−χiai\Pi(a_i,a_{-i}) - \chi_i a_iΠ(ai​,a−i​)−χi​ai​. An adoption failure is a situation in which full adoption raises total welfare, WF>WNW^F > W^NWF>WN, but is not an equilibrium of the adoption game.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.8 (p. 19)

With LLL fixed and H=L+ΔH = L + \DeltaH=L+Δ,

∃ Δ‾  ∀ Δ>Δ‾:WF(Δ)>WN(Δ)  and full adoption is not an equilibrium,\exists\,\underline\Delta\ \ \forall\,\Delta > \underline\Delta:\quad W^F(\Delta) > W^N(\Delta)\ \text{ and full adoption is not an equilibrium},∃Δ​  ∀Δ>Δ​:WF(Δ)>WN(Δ)  and full adoption is not an equilibrium,

at every such Δ\DeltaΔ at which Assumption 1 holds. The threshold Δ‾\underline\DeltaΔ​ is left unspecified, as in the paper.

Milestones

  • Proposition 4.1 (pp. 15–16): WCF≥WCP>WCNW^F_C \ge W^P_C > W^N_CWCF​≥WCP​>WCN​.
  • Proposition 4.3 (p. 17): WMF<WMP<WMNW^F_M < W^P_M < W^N_MWMF​<WMP​<WMN​.
  • Proposition 4.4 (p. 17): WVF, WVP<WVNW^F_V,\ W^P_V < W^N_VWVF​, WVP​<WVN​.
  • Proposition 4.6 (p. 18): WF,WP>WNW^F, W^P > W^NWF,WP>WN for all sufficiently large Δ\DeltaΔ; at fixed Δ\DeltaΔ, WF<WNW^F < W^NWF<WN once ∑i∈Mχi\sum_{i\in M}\chi_i∑i∈M​χi​ is large and WP<WNW^P < W^NWP<WN once ∑i:ξi=hχi\sum_{i:\xi_i=h}\chi_i∑i:ξi​=h​χi​ is large.
  • Proposition 4.7 (p. 19): neither full nor partial adoption is an equilibrium.

What the result gives

The proposition isolates a mechanism: blockchain information raises consumer surplus, which grows without bound in Δ\DeltaΔ, while Bertrand competition prevents the manufacturers who pay for adoption from capturing any of it. The conclusion is a market failure that persists however valuable the information is, and it motivates the paper's transfer scheme (Proposition 4.9), in which a consumer access fee finances the adopters. The welfare comparisons of Propositions 4.1–4.6 are reusable on their own: they quantify who gains and who loses from information disclosure in a vertically and horizontally differentiated market.

The results are proved in the paper (App. A.2, pp. 33–36). None is machine-checked. This mission produces a checked version of the welfare comparisons and of the failure result in the reduced form described below; the proofs as printed use a density for GGG and a second derivative of clc_lcl​, neither of which the model assumes, so a formal proof has to avoid both.

Where the difficulty lies

The equilibrium part is light once the gross profit is zero. The substance is in the welfare comparisons. Consumer welfare is an expectation E[max⁡{u,φ}]\mathbb E[\max\{u,\varphi\}]E[max{u,φ}] of an outside option with an arbitrary continuous law: strict monotonicity in uuu needs positive mass of φ\varphiφ below uNu^NuN, which is a consequence of Assumption 1 rather than an assumption, and the growth in Δ\DeltaΔ of WF−WNW^F - W^NWF−WN has to be bounded below without a density. Vendor welfare involves the generalised inverse (cl′)−1(c_l')^{-1}(cl′​)−1, which is 000 below cl′(0)c_l'(0)cl′​(0): the comparison WVF<WVNW^F_V < W^N_VWVF​<WVN​ must handle the regime where the low type vendor's share collapses to zero and the regime where it is interior, and must obtain continuity of cl′c_l'cl′​ from convexity rather than from a second derivative.

Formalization scope

The paper describes a signalling and pricing game but does not define its equilibrium concept precisely; Proposition A.1 states the outcomes and every proof in App. A.2 uses only those closed forms. The mission adopts the same reduced form, disclosed in every item: welfare is evaluated at Proposition A.1's prices, shares and utilities; the manufacturers' gross profit Π\PiΠ is the constant 000 for every adoption profile (the paper's statement in the proof of Proposition 4.3, p. 34); an equilibrium of the adoption stage is a pure Nash equilibrium of (8) with that payoff, expressed with AGT.IsPureNash from the published agt_games vocabulary. The signal accuracy is fixed at α=1/2\alpha = 1/2α=1/2, as in the paper's main text.

Conventions: manufacturers are Fin 2 × Bool × Fin m (the Boolean records ξi=h\xi_i = hξi​=h), adoption profiles are Boolean functions, GGG is ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ for a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR, Δ\DeltaΔ is an argument of every statement with H=L+ΔH = L + \DeltaH=L+Δ, and (cl′)−1(x)=sup⁡{s≥0:cl′(s)≤x}(c_l')^{-1}(x) = \sup\{s \ge 0 : c_l'(s) \le x\}(cl′​)−1(x)=sup{s≥0:cl′​(s)≤x}. The standing assumptions are bundled in Model.Standing: m≥2m \ge 2m≥2, 0≤L0 \le L0≤L, 0≤l<h0 \le l < h0≤l<h, γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0, χi>0\chi_i > 0χi​>0, μ\muμ an atomless probability measure with μ((−∞,0))=0\mu((-\infty,0)) = 0μ((−∞,0))=0 and positive mass on every interval (a,b)⊆[0,∞)(a,b) \subseteq [0,\infty)(a,b)⊆[0,∞), clc_lcl​ strictly increasing and convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with cl(0)=0c_l(0) = 0cl​(0)=0 and a strictly increasing derivative there. One hypothesis is added to the paper's: φ\varphiφ has a finite mean, which the paper uses (its proof of Proposition 4.1 integrates v p(v)v\,p(v)vp(v)) without stating it. Assumption 1, item 3, depends on Δ\DeltaΔ through HHH and is a hypothesis at each Δ\DeltaΔ; it is satisfiable (for instance with cl(x)=x2c_l(x) = x^2cl​(x)=x2, φ∼Exp(1)\varphi \sim \mathrm{Exp}(1)φ∼Exp(1), γ=1/2\gamma = 1/2γ=1/2, h=1h=1h=1, L=l=0L=l=0L=l=0, Δ=4\Delta = 4Δ=4) and monotone in Δ\DeltaΔ.

The formalization rules out the trivializing readings: the equilibrium predicate is concrete, not an abstract hypothesis; the integrals are of integrable functions, so no junk value 000 enters; the inverse of cl′c_l'cl′​ is the explicit supremum, not Function.invFun; and LLL, not HHH, is held fixed as Δ\DeltaΔ grows.

Needed infrastructure: expectations of max⁡{c,φ}\max\{c,\varphi\}max{c,φ} as a function of ccc (monotonicity, growth), and the generalised inverse of a strictly increasing derivative of a convex function. Both are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are alternative arguments that avoid the density and the second derivative of the printed proofs.

Selected references

  • G. Iyengar, F. Saleh, J. Sethuraman, W. Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, SSRN 3602376, version of 2022-08-19. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3602376
  • G. Iyengar, F. Saleh, J. Sethuraman, W. Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, Management Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532
  • N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007, Ch. 1 (pure Nash equilibrium). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481
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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Gathering Information before Negotiation I: The Buyer's Optimal Information Acquisition Increases with Its Bargaining Power and First Increases, Then Decreases with the Seller's CostResearch Paper

Motivation

Many transactions are priced by negotiation rather than posted prices: business-to-business procurement, used cars, real estate, the purchase of a company. Before negotiating, a buyer can often spend effort finding out how much the object is actually worth to it, through inspections, trials, consultants or market research. That information serves two purposes. It improves the joint decision of whether to trade at all, and it changes how the surplus of trade is split. Liang Guo's Gathering Information before Negotiation (SSRN 3930651; Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4360) studies how a buyer's endogenous information acquisition interacts with the two primitives of bargaining: the parties' bargaining powers and the seller's cost.

The first finding of the paper, Proposition 1, concerns how much information the buyer gathers. Its comparative statics in the seller's cost are non-monotone, and this non-monotonicity drives the later results of the paper, in which a seller can be worse off with more bargaining power or a lower cost. This mission formalizes Proposition 1 in its general form, for an arbitrary prior. A companion mission (Gathering Information before Negotiation II) formalizes the payoff reversals under a uniform prior and a linear information cost.

Setting

A seller can supply one unit of a product at cost ccc. A buyer's true value uuu of the unit is unknown to both parties; the common prior law of uuu is FFF, with a finite mean u^>0\hat u>0u^>0.

Before negotiating, the buyer acquires a truth-or-noise signal www: with probability α\alphaα the signal equals uuu, and with probability 1−α1-\alpha1−α it is an independent draw from FFF. Because the parties are risk neutral, only the buyer's posterior mean

v≡αw+(1−α)u^v\equiv\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat uv≡αw+(1−α)u^

matters. Ex ante, vvv has the distribution function

G(v,α)≡F ⁣(v−(1−α)u^α).G(v,\alpha)\equiv F\!\left(\frac{v-(1-\alpha)\hat u}{\alpha}\right).G(v,α)≡F(αv−(1−α)u^​).

The buyer chooses the informativeness α\alphaα in an interval [α‾,αˉ]⊆(0,1)[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]\subseteq(0,1)[α​,αˉ]⊆(0,1) at a cost k(α)k(\alpha)k(α) that is increasing, with k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0 and k(αˉ)>0k(\bar\alpha)>0k(αˉ)>0.

After observing vvv, the parties trade exactly when v>cv>cv>c and split the net surplus v−cv-cv−c according to their bargaining powers θs,θb∈(0,1)\theta_s,\theta_b\in(0,1)θs​,θb​∈(0,1), θs+θb=1\theta_s+\theta_b=1θs​+θb​=1. Anticipating this, the buyer chooses α\alphaα to solve

max⁡α∈[α‾,αˉ] Ub(α)=θb A(α,c)−k(α),A(α,c)=∫cvˉ(v−c) dG(v,α),(6)\max_{\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]}\ U_b(\alpha)=\theta_b\,A(\alpha,c)-k(\alpha),\qquad A(\alpha,c)=\int_c^{\bar v}(v-c)\,dG(v,\alpha),\tag{6}α∈[α​,αˉ]max​ Ub​(α)=θb​A(α,c)−k(α),A(α,c)=∫cvˉ​(v−c)dG(v,α),(6)

where A(α,c)A(\alpha,c)A(α,c) is the total ex ante surplus (7). A solution of (6) is written α∗\alpha^*α∗; in general there may be several, and A∗(θb,c)\mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c)A∗(θb​,c) denotes the set of all of them.

Two sets S,T⊆RS,T\subseteq\mathbb RS,T⊆R are compared in the induced set order S⊑TS\sqsubseteq TS⊑T when min⁡(s,t)∈S\min(s,t)\in Smin(s,t)∈S and max⁡(s,t)∈T\max(s,t)\in Tmax(s,t)∈T for all s∈Ss\in Ss∈S, t∈Tt\in Tt∈T.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 10)

Whenever the optimal sets compared are nonempty,

θb≤θb′ ⟹ A∗(θb,c)⊑A∗(θb′,c),\theta_b\le\theta_b'\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c)\sqsubseteq\mathcal A^*(\theta_b',c),θb​≤θb′​ ⟹ A∗(θb​,c)⊑A∗(θb′​,c), c≤c′≤u^ ⟹ A∗(θb,c)⊑A∗(θb,c′),u^≤c≤c′ ⟹ A∗(θb,c′)⊑A∗(θb,c).c\le c'\le\hat u\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c)\sqsubseteq\mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c'),\qquad \hat u\le c\le c'\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c')\sqsubseteq\mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c).c≤c′≤u^ ⟹ A∗(θb​,c)⊑A∗(θb​,c′),u^≤c≤c′ ⟹ A∗(θb​,c′)⊑A∗(θb​,c).

The buyer's optimal information acquisition increases with its bargaining power, and first increases and then decreases with the seller's cost, turning at the prior mean u^\hat uu^.

Milestones

  1. Display (1), p. 7. G(v,α)G(v,\alpha)G(v,α) is nondecreasing in α\alphaα for v<u^v<\hat uv<u^ and nonincreasing for v>u^v>\hat uv>u^: the family rotates about u^\hat uu^.
  2. Display (2) and footnote 7, p. 8. The mean of vvv is u^\hat uu^ for every α\alphaα, and α↦A(α,c)\alpha\mapsto A(\alpha,c)α↦A(α,c) is nondecreasing.
  3. Proof of Proposition 1, p. 30. Integration by parts: Ub(α)=θb∫c∞[1−G(v,α)] dv−k(α)U_b(\alpha)=\theta_b\int_c^{\infty}[1-G(v,\alpha)]\,dv-k(\alpha)Ub​(α)=θb​∫c∞​[1−G(v,α)]dv−k(α).
  4. Proof of Proposition 1, p. 30. UbU_bUb​ has increasing differences in (α,θb)(\alpha,\theta_b)(α,θb​).
  5. Proof of Proposition 1, p. 30. UbU_bUb​ has increasing differences in (α,c)(\alpha,c)(α,c) for c≤u^c\le\hat uc≤u^ and decreasing differences for c≥u^c\ge\hat uc≥u^.
  6. Topkis's theorem (Topkis 1998, Theorem 2.8.1), already proved on the platform and referenced.

Significance

The result. The first part of Proposition 1 says that a buyer with more bargaining power gathers more information, because it captures a larger share of the surplus that information creates. The second part is the less expected one: a higher seller cost shrinks the gains from trade, yet it raises the buyer's incentive to become informed as long as the cost is below the prior mean u^\hat uu^, and lowers it only beyond. Information is most valuable when trade is a close call. The paper's later results (Corollary 1, Propositions 2 and 3) build on this: since information acquisition responds to θb\theta_bθb​ and ccc, the seller's equilibrium payoff need not increase in its own bargaining power or decrease in its cost. The paper also notes (p. 11) that the monotonicity in θb\theta_bθb​ needs only that a higher α\alphaα is a mean-preserving spread, which is why the statement is posed here for every prior with finite mean.

Formalizing it. The proposition is proved in the paper, in a short appendix argument that differentiates under the integral and appeals to Topkis's theorem. To our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a density-free formalization: the rotation property and the mean-preserving-spread property of the truth-or-noise family, the integration-by-parts identity for the expected positive part, and the two increasing-differences statements, which together with the already formalized Topkis theorem give the goal.

Difficulty

The paper's argument is first-order: it computes cross-partial derivatives such as ∂2Ub/∂c ∂α=θb ∂G(c,α)/∂α\partial^2U_b/\partial c\,\partial\alpha=\theta_b\,\partial G(c,\alpha)/\partial\alpha∂2Ub​/∂c∂α=θb​∂G(c,α)/∂α and reads off their signs. Without a density these derivatives need not exist, and the information cost kkk is assumed only increasing, so UbU_bUb​ need not be differentiable, concave or even continuous in α\alphaα. The statements here are therefore in difference form, and the cross effects must be established as inequalities between integrals over different distributions of vvv.

The second obstacle is the shape of the comparative statics. Topkis's theorem gives a monotone optimal set in the induced set order on a parameter range where increasing differences hold, but the cost ccc has increasing differences only on (−∞,u^](-\infty,\hat u](−∞,u^] and decreasing differences on [u^,∞)[\hat u,\infty)[u^,∞). The referenced platform theorem, by contrast, asks for increasing differences on the whole product of the decision and parameter spaces, so it does not apply to UbU_bUb​ as it stands.

The obvious shortcut of picking a selection from the optimal set and proving it monotone does not work: the cross differences are only weakly positive (they vanish when ccc lies outside the support of vvv), so the strict version of Topkis's theorem does not apply, and two different maximizers need not be ordered.

Formalization scope

The prior is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR with integrable identity and positive mean u^=∫w dμ\hat u=\int w\,d\muu^=∫wdμ. The paper's additional assumptions on FFF (continuous and differentiable, strictly positive density on a bounded support [u‾,uˉ][\underline u,\bar u][u​,uˉ]) and c∈(u‾,uˉ)c\in(\underline u,\bar u)c∈(u​,uˉ) are dropped: every statement is posed for all priors with finite mean and all real ccc, which implies the paper's case. FFF is ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ, and GGG is defined from it by the page's formula. The interval [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ] satisfies 0<α‾<αˉ<10<\underline\alpha<\bar\alpha<10<α​<αˉ<1; kkk is monotone on it with k(α‾)=0<k(αˉ)k(\underline\alpha)=0<k(\bar\alpha)k(α​)=0<k(αˉ); θb∈(0,1)\theta_b\in(0,1)θb​∈(0,1) in every statement.

The total ex ante surplus is defined as A(α,c)=∫max⁡(αw+(1−α)u^−c,0) dμ(w)A(\alpha,c)=\int\max(\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat u-c,0)\,d\mu(w)A(α,c)=∫max(αw+(1−α)u^−c,0)dμ(w), which is (7) after the change of variables v=αw+(1−α)u^v=\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat uv=αw+(1−α)u^. The bargaining stage is not modelled; the paper's reduction to (6) is built into UbU_bUb​. The optimal level α∗\alpha^*α∗ is the set of maximizers of UbU_bUb​ over [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ] (optSet), never a chosen element. "Increases" is the induced set order, and every comparison assumes both optimal sets nonempty, which is the paper's presumption that (6) has a solution.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: AAA is never given by a closed form or by the integration-by-parts expression (that identity is a milestone), α∗\alpha^*α∗ is never defined by a formula or a threshold rule, and the nonemptiness hypotheses prevent the induced set order from holding vacuously on an empty optimal set.

The development reuses the platform definitions Supermodularity.Lattices.InducedSetOrder and Supermodularity.Monotonicity.IncreasingDifferencesOn and the proved theorem Supermodularity.Monotonicity.argmax_increasing_of_increasing_differences. The rotation and mean-preserving-spread lemmas for truth-or-noise signals, and the tail-integral identity E[(X−c)+]=∫c∞P(X>x) dx\mathbb E[(X-c)^+]=\int_c^\infty P(X>x)\,dxE[(X−c)+]=∫c∞​P(X>x)dx for integrable XXX, are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of any of the milestones, of alternative proofs that avoid the integration by parts, and of the strict versions under the paper's density assumption are welcome.

Not posed in this mission: the benchmark (3)–(5), Corollary 1, Propositions 2–7, and the extensions of §4–§5.

Selected references

  • L. Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, author's manuscript of 15 Feb 2022, SSRN 3930651. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3930651 ; published in Management Science (2022), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4360
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • J. P. Johnson and D. P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design, American Economic Review 96(3), 756–784, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.756
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Stall Economy: The Value of Mobility in Retail on Wheels I: The Magnet Rule Makes the Rendezvous Chain Doubly Stochastic, and Its Stationary Distribution Is Uniform on the Inner DiamondResearch Paper

Motivation

A mobile retail stall can travel toward its next customer while that customer walks toward the stall. The customer's walking allowance changes where the stall stops, so it also changes the location from which the next trip begins. A useful trip-length calculation therefore needs a distribution for successive meeting points, not just a rule for one meeting. Cao and Qi study this question in a service zone assigned to one stall and give a particular magnet rule whose rendezvous chain has a simple stationary law Cao and Qi, §3.3. The result supplies the location model used in their analysis of repositioning distances.

The rule matters because different choices of a meeting point can produce different chains even when each choice lets the customer walk the same maximum distance. The paper's Theorem 1 establishes a distributional property of the specified rule, for every admissible finite grid. Its proof is in Appendix B, pp. 46–49 of the cited SSRN manuscript.

Setting

The service zone is a square drawn as a diamond in ordinary horizontal and vertical coordinates. Its edge length is RRR in Euclidean distance, while stall and customer travel is measured in Manhattan distance. For the chain, use the paper's two edge coordinates, aligned with the lower edges of the zone. The full customer grid is Gk={0,…,k}2G_k=\{0,\ldots,k\}^2Gk​={0,…,k}2, so it contains (k+1)2(k+1)^2(k+1)2 points. A customer is uniform on this full grid.

Write h=ϕkh=\phi kh=ϕk, where ϕ=r/(2R)\phi=r/(\sqrt2R)ϕ=r/(2​R) and rrr is the customer's maximum walking distance. The paper chooses kkk so that hhh is an integer and assumes 2h≤k2h\le k2h≤k. The stall docks only at points of the inner diamond

I0=[h,k−h]2∩Z2.\mathcal I_0=[h,k-h]^2\cap\mathbb Z^2.I0​=[h,k−h]2∩Z2.

The name “diamond” refers to its appearance in ordinary coordinates; in edge coordinates it is an axis-aligned square. A type-1 origin lies in I1=[2h,k−2h]2∩Z2\mathcal I_1=[2h,k-2h]^2\cap\mathbb Z^2I1​=[2h,k−2h]2∩Z2. The other origins in I0\mathcal I_0I0​ are type 2. The closed small diamond around an origin zo=(xo,yo)z_o=(x_o,y_o)zo​=(xo​,yo​) is I(zo)=[xo−h,xo+h]×[yo−h,yo+h]∩Z2\mathcal I(z_o)=[x_o-h,x_o+h]\times[y_o-h,y_o+h]\cap\mathbb Z^2I(zo​)=[xo​−h,xo​+h]×[yo​−h,yo​+h]∩Z2.

The magnet rule maps the origin zoz_ozo​ and next customer location zcz_czc​ to a rendezvous zdz_dzd​. The stall stays at zoz_ozo​ when zc∈I(zo)z_c\in\mathcal I(z_o)zc​∈I(zo​). Otherwise, the location of zcz_czc​ in one of eight surrounding regions selects one of eight customer movement arrows. At a type-1 origin the head of that arrow is the rendezvous. At a type-2 origin the rule changes an arrow whose head would leave I0\mathcal I_0I0​, keeping the rendezvous inside it while preserving the customer's allowed walking distance. These are Definitions 1 and 2 of the paper pp. 14–16.

For zo,zd∈I0z_o,z_d\in\mathcal I_0zo​,zd​∈I0​, let A(zo,zd)\mathcal A(z_o,z_d)A(zo​,zd​) be the customer grid locations sent from zoz_ozo​ to zdz_dzd​. The transition probability is

P(zo,zd)=∣A(zo,zd)∣(k+1)2.\mathbb P(z_o,z_d)=\frac{|\mathcal A(z_o,z_d)|}{(k+1)^2}.P(zo​,zd​)=(k+1)2∣A(zo​,zd​)∣​.

Thus the denominator is the number of possible customers, not the number of stall locations. Repeated independent customer locations produce a finite Markov chain on I0\mathcal I_0I0​.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 1 p. 17. For every k,h∈Nk,h\in\mathbb Nk,h∈N with 2h≤k2h\le k2h≤k, its first part says that P\mathbb PP is doubly stochastic:

∑zd∈I0P(zo,zd)=1and∑zo∈I0P(zo,zd)=1.\sum_{z_d\in\mathcal I_0}\mathbb P(z_o,z_d)=1 \quad\text{and}\quad \sum_{z_o\in\mathcal I_0}\mathbb P(z_o,z_d)=1.zd​∈I0​∑​P(zo​,zd​)=1andzo​∈I0​∑​P(zo​,zd​)=1.

Its second part says that the stationary distribution is uniform on I0\mathcal I_0I0​. The formal target states existence and uniqueness: a probability vector π\piπ is stationary for P\mathbb PP if and only if π(z)=1/∣I0∣\pi(z)=1/|\mathcal I_0|π(z)=1/∣I0​∣ for every state zzz.

The milestones follow the source's intermediate assertions: the rule keeps the rendezvous in I0\mathcal I_0I0​ at the prescribed customer distance; each row counts (k+1)2(k+1)^2(k+1)2 customers; the type-1 self-transition counts (2h+1)2(2h+1)^2(2h+1)2 customers; type-1 and type-2 columns each count (k+1)2(k+1)^2(k+1)2 incoming customer events; and every transition entry is positive. The last assertion supports the uniqueness clause.

Significance

A uniform stationary law replaces an unknown, history-dependent location distribution with one specified directly by the inner diamond. In the paper, that distribution is the location input for later within-radius repositioning calculations Cao and Qi, §§3.2–3.3. The result is specific to the magnet rule. It does not say that every reasonable meeting rule has a uniform stationary law.

The paper proves the finite-grid theorem in Appendix B. This mission asks for a machine-checked account of its exact finite combinatorial statement. The development will provide reusable definitions of the grid rule and its transition counts, while using an existing formal library interface for finite Markov chains. The theorem statements are open proof targets; a successful local compilation of their statements alone is not a proof.

Difficulty

Unit row sums follow from assigning each customer location to one next rendezvous. Unit column sums are subtler: fixing a destination and varying the origin gives overlapping sets of customer locations. Interior destinations and boundary destinations have different counts because a type-2 origin can redirect an arrow that would otherwise leave the allowed stall region. The source treats these as Case I and Case II on pp. 46–49. An interior-only count cannot establish the theorem for all of I0\mathcal I_0I0​, and positivity of every transition is a separate requirement for identifying the unique stationary law.

Formalization scope

Lean uses integer coordinate pairs for grid points and finite sets for GkG_kGk​, I0\mathcal I_0I0​, I1\mathcal I_1I1​, and I(zo)\mathcal I(z_o)I(zo​). The region boundaries use the paper's strict or inclusive inequalities exactly. The permitted parameters are all natural numbers k,hk,hk,h satisfying 2h≤k2h\le k2h≤k, including h=0h=0h=0, k=0k=0k=0, and 2h=k2h=k2h=k. In physical units h=ϕkh=\phi kh=ϕk; no division by kkk occurs in the formal statements. When k=0k=0k=0, there is one customer point and one state.

The matrix is computed from the paper's two-part magnet rule and uniform demand on the full grid. Defining it as a uniform matrix, using a nearest-point rule, dropping the type-2 correction, fixing one grid size, or proving only column sums would miss the target. The definition of A\mathcal AA counts customer locations that induce a transition. This includes customers already inside I(zo)\mathcal I(z_o)I(zo​) in a self-transition, as required by the paper's Case I(IX) and row-count formula. The paper's separate Proposition 2 is not a claim of this mission because it is false as printed; none of these targets assumes it. The finite-grid theorem does not formalize the subsequent informal k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞ statement.

The complete development needs finite-set counting, integer interval bounds, real-valued stochastic matrices, and the stationary-distribution interface of the published MarkovChain definition. Contributions proving any of the stated counting milestones or strengthening the finite-chain consequences are welcome. The paper's own proof is in Appendix B, pp. 46–49.

Selected references

  • J. Cao and W. Qi, Stall Economy: The Value of Mobility in Retail on Wheels, SSRN manuscript 3711896, 2022, §§3.2–3.3 and Appendix B, pp. 46–49. Manuscript.
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 1: For Generic Score Distributions No Nonintersectional Policy Yields a Representative Outcome but an Intersectional One DoesResearch Paper

Motivation

Affirmative action policies are usually designed reductively: one adjustment for women, another for a racial minority, a third for applicants from low-income families. An applicant who belongs to several categories gets the combined adjustments. A long literature in sociology and law, beginning with Crenshaw's account of intersectionality (1989), argues that people at the intersection of several disadvantaged categories (for instance Black women) can stay underrepresented even when every single category is proportionally represented. Carvalho, Pradelski and Williams, Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities (Management Science, 2025), give this debate a decision-theoretic model. They ask whether any policy that treats identity dimensions independently can achieve proportional representation of every intersectional group.

Their first main result answers that question for a general class of score adjustments and for generic score distributions. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 1, together with the lemmas its proof uses.

Setting

A decision maker admits a share α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) of a unit-mass pool of applicants. Each applicant has a score xxx in an interval X⊂RX \subset \mathbb{R}X⊂R and an identity g=(g1,…,gn)∈G={0,1}ng = (g_1,\dots,g_n) \in G = \{0,1\}^ng=(g1​,…,gn​)∈G={0,1}n, with n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. Category iii is the set of identities with gi=1g_i = 1gi​=1. Write 0\mathbf 00 and 1\mathbf 11 for the vectors of zeros and ones and eie_iei​ for the iii-th basis vector. The identity ggg equals g′+g′′g' + g''g′+g′′ when the sum is computed coordinatewise in the integers.

The population is a probability measure ppp on X×GX \times GX×G, with marginal masses p(g)=p(X×{g})p(g) = p(X \times \{g\})p(g)=p(X×{g}). The space PPP consists of those ppp whose conditional score laws Fg=p(⋅∣g)F_g = p(\cdot \mid g)Fg​=p(⋅∣g) are continuous (atomless) and have full support on XXX. PPP carries the relative weak∗^*∗ topology, the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.

A policy family QQQ is a set of strictly increasing bijections X→XX \to XX→X that is rich (for all x,y∈Xx, y \in Xx,y∈X some q∈Qq \in Qq∈Q has q(x)=yq(x) = yq(x)=y) and commutative (q∘q′=q′∘qq \circ q' = q' \circ qq∘q′=q′∘q). Additive shifts x↦x+δx \mapsto x + \deltax↦x+δ on X=RX = \mathbb{R}X=R are an example. A policy assigns to each identity a map qg∈Qq_g \in Qqg​∈Q. Given a threshold x∗∈Xx^* \in Xx∗∈X, an applicant of group ggg is accepted when qg(x)≥x∗q_g(x) \ge x^*qg​(x)≥x∗, subject to the capacity constraint

∑g∈GPr⁡(qg(x)≥x∗∣g) p(g)=α.\sum_{g \in G} \Pr(q_g(x) \ge x^* \mid g)\, p(g) = \alpha .g∈G∑​Pr(qg​(x)≥x∗∣g)p(g)=α.

The accepted share of ggg is p^(g)\hat p(g)p^​(g), the fraction of the accepted who belong to ggg. The outcome is representative if p^(g)=p(g)\hat p(g) = p(g)p^​(g)=p(g) for every ggg (Definition 2). A policy is nonintersectional if g=g′+g′′g = g' + g''g=g′+g′′ implies qg=qg′∘qg′′q_g = q_{g'} \circ q_{g''}qg​=qg′​∘qg′′​, and intersectional otherwise (Definition 1). Nonintersectional policies are the reductive ones: qgq_gqg​ is the composition of the maps qeiq_{e_i}qei​​ over the categories iii that ggg belongs to.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

A property is generic in PPP if it holds on a dense open subset of PPP. Theorem 1 states: there is a dense open U⊆PU \subseteq PU⊆P such that for every p∈Up \in Up∈U,

(a) no nonintersectional policy in Q∣G∣ yields a representative outcome at p,\text{(a) no nonintersectional policy in } Q^{|G|} \text{ yields a representative outcome at } p,(a) no nonintersectional policy in Q∣G∣ yields a representative outcome at p, (b) some intersectional policy in Q∣G∣ yields a representative outcome at p.\text{(b) some intersectional policy in } Q^{|G|} \text{ yields a representative outcome at } p.(b) some intersectional policy in Q∣G∣ yields a representative outcome at p.

"Yields a representative outcome" means that some threshold x∗∈Xx^* \in Xx∗∈X satisfies the capacity constraint at level α\alphaα and gives p^(g)=p(g)\hat p(g) = p(g)p^​(g)=p(g) for every ggg. Nothing about QQQ is fixed beyond richness and commutativity, and nothing about ppp beyond membership in PPP.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1(a)–(e) (p. 22). Every q∈Qq \in Qq∈Q is continuous. For each pair x,yx, yx,y exactly one element of QQQ maps xxx to yyy. QQQ contains the identity, is closed under composition, and contains inverses.
  2. Displays (1)–(2) (p. 10). When every p(g)>0p(g) > 0p(g)>0, (q,x∗)(q, x^*)(q,x∗) is representative if and only if qg(βg)=x∗q_g(\beta_g) = x^*qg​(βg​)=x∗ for all ggg, where βg=Fg−1(1−α)\beta_g = F_g^{-1}(1-\alpha)βg​=Fg−1​(1−α).
  3. The β1\beta_{\mathbf 1}β1​ identity (p. 10). A representative nonintersectional policy forces x∗=β0x^* = \beta_{\mathbf 0}x∗=β0​ and qei(βei)=β0q_{e_i}(\beta_{e_i}) = \beta_{\mathbf 0}qei​​(βei​​)=β0​. It also forces β1=(qen−1∘⋯∘qe1−1)(β0)\beta_{\mathbf 1} = (q_{e_n}^{-1} \circ \cdots \circ q_{e_1}^{-1})(\beta_{\mathbf 0})β1​=(qen​−1​∘⋯∘qe1​−1​)(β0​).
  4. Lemma 2 (p. 23). For n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, the set of p∈Pp \in Pp∈P with every p(g)>0p(g) > 0p(g)>0 on which that identity fails is open and dense in PPP.
  5. Part (b) construction (p. 10). For every p∈Pp \in Pp∈P and every threshold there is a policy in Q∣G∣Q^{|G|}Q∣G∣ satisfying (2) whose outcome is representative.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 separates two classes of policy. The reductive class, which covers the way most affirmative action programmes are written, cannot generically deliver proportional representation of intersectional groups, however its category-wise adjustments are tuned. A policy that adjusts each intersectional group separately can. The negative part holds for every rich commutative family, not only for additive or multiplicative adjustments, so the impossibility does not come from a particular functional form. The later results of the paper build on this one. They measure how badly reductive policies fail, give the nongeneric conditions under which they succeed (Proposition 3, which is the subject of the companion mission), and treat imperfectly intersectional policies.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. A formalization has to make several things precise:

  • the weak∗^*∗ topology on the constrained space PPP;
  • the passage from representativeness to quantile conditions;
  • the continuity of quantiles under weak convergence;
  • the group structure that commutativity and richness impose on QQQ.

The paper's proof of Lemma 2 also concludes with a formula valid only for the additive family (p. 23), so a complete formal proof would supply the missing argument for a general QQQ.

Difficulty

Part (b) and the necessary conditions behind part (a) follow from the definitions. The hard step is genericity (Lemma 2). Openness requires the quantiles βg\beta_gβg​ to depend continuously on ppp in the weak∗^*∗ topology. It also requires the map (βg)g↦(qen−1∘⋯∘qe1−1)(β0)(\beta_g)_g \mapsto (q_{e_n}^{-1} \circ \cdots \circ q_{e_1}^{-1})(\beta_{\mathbf 0})(βg​)g​↦(qen​−1​∘⋯∘qe1​−1​)(β0​) to be continuous, where each qeiq_{e_i}qei​​ is itself determined by βei\beta_{e_i}βei​​ and β0\beta_{\mathbf 0}β0​. The obvious argument writes this map as an explicit formula, ∑iβei−(n−1)β0\sum_i \beta_{e_i} - (n-1)\beta_{\mathbf 0}∑i​βei​​−(n−1)β0​, and that formula holds only for additive shifts. For a general rich commutative family, continuity of the transport map (x,y)↦qx→y(x, y) \mapsto q_{x \to y}(x,y)↦qx→y​ must come from the structure of QQQ as a group of homeomorphisms of an interval acting freely and transitively. Density requires perturbing the law of group 1\mathbf 11 while keeping the perturbation inside PPP. This is where n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 enters: for n=1n = 1n=1, 1=e1\mathbf 1 = e_11=e1​ and there is nothing to perturb independently.

Formalization scope

The Lean development fixes the following conventions.

  • Scores. Scores live in the subtype ↑X\uparrow X↑X of an order-connected, nonempty set X⊆RX \subseteq \mathbb{R}X⊆R.
  • Identities. Identities are Boolean vectors Fin n → Bool, and g=g′+g′′g = g' + g''g=g′+g′′ is checked coordinatewise on Bool.toNat.
  • Distributions. Distributions are ProbabilityMeasures on ↑X×G\uparrow X \times G↑X×G, whose Mathlib topology is that of weak convergence. PPP is the subtype of measures for which every group of positive mass has no atoms and positive mass on every nonempty open subinterval of XXX.
  • Convention C1. Groups with p(g)=0p(g) = 0p(g)=0 are unconstrained. The page is silent on them, and the paper's proofs need such ppp in PPP.
  • Policy maps. "Increasing" is strict monotonicity.
  • Representativeness. Representativeness always includes the capacity constraint at the given α\alphaα. Acceptance probabilities appear as the joint masses Pr⁡(qg(x)≥x∗∣g) p(g)\Pr(q_g(x) \ge x^* \mid g)\,p(g)Pr(qg​(x)≥x∗∣g)p(g).
  • Genericity. "Generic" is existence of a set that is open and dense in the subtype PPP, with both parts (a) and (b) holding on that one set.
  • Milestone-only objects. Quantiles βg\beta_gβg​ and the transport maps appear only in milestones, which carry p(g)>0p(g) > 0p(g)>0 wherever a quantile is used.

Several trivializing formalizations are ruled out:

  • PPP is nonempty and rich commutative families exist (both checked in a sorry-free sanity file), so the goal is not vacuous;
  • representation is not weakened to "every group accepted at a common rate", because the capacity constraint fixes the rate to α\alphaα;
  • openness and density are not taken in the ambient space of probability measures;
  • policies are required to take values in QQQ.

A complete development needs:

  • the structure theory of rich commutative families (Lemma 1, in effect Hölder's theorem for free transitive actions on an interval);
  • continuity of quantiles of conditional laws under weak convergence;
  • a perturbation argument inside PPP.

The first two are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, and proofs of the quantile-continuity facts as standalone lemmas are especially useful.

Selected references

  • J.-P. Carvalho, B. S. R. Pradelski and C. Williams, Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities, Management Science 71(5), 2025; author manuscript hal-04788142v1. https://hal.science/hal-04788142v1
  • K. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8
  • C. D. Aliprantis and K. C. Border, Infinite Dimensional Analysis, 3rd ed., Springer, 2006 (topologies on spaces of measures, Chapters 2 and 15). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-29587-9
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On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design IV: The Fixed-Reserve Second-Price Auction Has Worst-Case Regret (n/(n+1))ⁿ at Its Best Reserve 1/(n+1)Research Paper

Motivation

A seller who must auction one item without knowing how buyers value it needs a mechanism that performs acceptably against every plausible value distribution. Anunrojwong, Balseiro and Besbes (arXiv:2204.10478, Operations Research 2025) measure performance by regret: the expected revenue lost relative to a seller who knows the realized valuations and extracts the highest one. Their main result (Theorem 1, the subject of mission I of this series) shows that against independent and identically distributed valuations the minimax-regret mechanism is a second-price auction whose reserve price is random, drawn from an explicit distribution.

Practitioners rarely randomize reserves. The natural benchmark is the familiar second-price auction with a fixed deterministic reserve rrr, and the question this mission addresses is how much is lost by insisting on a deterministic reserve: what is the worst-case regret of that auction, and which reserve minimizes it? The paper answers this exactly in Proposition 5 (§5.2.1, p. 24, proof in Appendix D, pp. App-10–11). For a single buyer, regret-optimal posted pricing was studied by Bergemann and Schlag (2008), where a deterministic price 1/21/21/2 has worst-case regret 1/21/21/2; Proposition 5 is the nnn-buyer version of that benchmark.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 buyers with valuations v=(v1,…,vn)v=(v_1,\dots,v_n)v=(v1​,…,vn​) in the type cube [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n, drawn from a joint distribution F\mathbf FF unknown to the seller. Write v(1)=max⁡iviv^{(1)}=\max_i v_iv(1)=maxi​vi​ and v(2)v^{(2)}v(2) for the second-highest valuation. A direct mechanism charges buyer iii a payment pi(v)p_i(v)pi​(v), and its regret under F\mathbf FF is

Rn(m,F)=Ev∼F[v(1)−∑i=1npi(v)].R_n(m,\mathbf F)=\mathbb E_{v\sim\mathbf F}\Big[v^{(1)}-\sum_{i=1}^n p_i(v)\Big].Rn​(m,F)=Ev∼F​[v(1)−i=1∑n​pi​(v)].

The second-price auction with reserve rrr, SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r), gives the item to the highest bidder if the highest bid is at least rrr, at price max⁡(v(2),r)\max(v^{(2)},r)max(v(2),r), and otherwise does not sell. Its revenue is max⁡(v(2),r) 1(v(1)≥r)\max(v^{(2)},r)\,\mathbf 1(v^{(1)}\ge r)max(v(2),r)1(v(1)≥r).

Three classes of distributions on [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n are considered:

  • Fiid\mathcal F_{\mathrm{iid}}Fiid​: product laws G⊗nG^{\otimes n}G⊗n, with GGG a law on [0,1][0,1][0,1];
  • Faff\mathcal F_{\mathrm{aff}}Faff​: exchangeable laws (invariant under permuting buyers) that are affiliated, meaning Pr⁡(A∩B∣S)≥Pr⁡(A∣S)Pr⁡(B∣S)\Pr(A\cap B\mid S)\ge\Pr(A\mid S)\Pr(B\mid S)Pr(A∩B∣S)≥Pr(A∣S)Pr(B∣S) for all increasing sets A,BA,BA,B and every sublattice SSS (a set closed under coordinatewise minimum and maximum);
  • Fmix\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}Fmix​: mixtures of i.i.d. laws, whose joint CDF is F(v)=∫∏iG(vi) dμ(G)\mathbf F(v)=\int\prod_i G(v_i)\,d\mu(G)F(v)=∫∏i​G(vi​)dμ(G) for a probability measure μ\muμ on distributions.

The worst-case regret of SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r) over a class F\mathcal FF is sup⁡F∈FRn(SPA(r),F)\sup_{\mathbf F\in\mathcal F}R_n(\mathrm{SPA}(r),\mathbf F)supF∈F​Rn​(SPA(r),F). The closed form found by the paper is

Wn(r)={max⁡(1−r, r),n=1,(1−r)n(n−1)n−1((1−r)n−r)n−1,n≥2, r≤12,r,n≥2, r>12,W_n(r)=\begin{cases}\max(1-r,\,r), & n=1,\\[2pt] \dfrac{(1-r)^n(n-1)^{n-1}}{((1-r)n-r)^{n-1}}, & n\ge 2,\ r\le\tfrac12,\\[4pt] r, & n\ge2,\ r>\tfrac12,\end{cases}Wn​(r)=⎩⎨⎧​max(1−r,r),((1−r)n−r)n−1(1−r)n(n−1)n−1​,r,​n=1,n≥2, r≤21​,n≥2, r>21​,​

called wcFixed n r in the Lean development.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5

For every n≥1n\ge1n≥1, every class F∈{Fiid,Faff,Fmix}\mathcal F\in\{\mathcal F_{\mathrm{iid}},\mathcal F_{\mathrm{aff}},\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}\}F∈{Fiid​,Faff​,Fmix​} and every r∈[0,1]r\in[0,1]r∈[0,1],

sup⁡F∈FRn(SPA(r),F)=Wn(r),\sup_{\mathbf F\in\mathcal F}R_n(\mathrm{SPA}(r),\mathbf F)=W_n(r),F∈Fsup​Rn​(SPA(r),F)=Wn​(r),

the no-reserve auction has Wn(0)=1W_n(0)=1Wn​(0)=1 for n=1n=1n=1 and (n−1n)n−1\big(\frac{n-1}{n}\big)^{n-1}(nn−1​)n−1 for n≥2n\ge2n≥2, and

min⁡r∈[0,1]Wn(r)=Wn(1n+1)=(nn+1)n,\min_{r\in[0,1]}W_n(r)=W_n\Big(\frac1{n+1}\Big)=\Big(\frac n{n+1}\Big)^n,r∈[0,1]min​Wn​(r)=Wn​(n+11​)=(n+1n​)n,

with r∗=1/(n+1)r^*=1/(n+1)r∗=1/(n+1) the unique minimizer.

Milestones

  1. The regret of SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r) under an i.i.d. law with marginal CDF FFF: rF−(r)n−∫0rFn+∫r1(nFn−1−nFn)rF_-(r)^n-\int_0^rF^n+\int_r^1(nF^{n-1}-nF^n)rF−​(r)n−∫0r​Fn+∫r1​(nFn−1−nFn).
  2. For n≥2n\ge2n≥2, the maximum of rcn+(1−r)(ncn−1−ncn)rc^n+(1-r)(nc^{n-1}-nc^n)rcn+(1−r)(ncn−1−ncn) over c∈[n−1n,1]c\in[\frac{n-1}{n},1]c∈[nn−1​,1] equals Wn(r)W_n(r)Wn​(r).
  3. For n=1n=1n=1, the maximum of rc+(1−r)(1−c)rc+(1-r)(1-c)rc+(1−r)(1−c) over c∈[0,1]c\in[0,1]c∈[0,1] is max⁡(1−r,r)\max(1-r,r)max(1−r,r).
  4. WnW_nWn​ is minimized on [0,1][0,1][0,1] exactly at 1/(n+1)1/(n+1)1/(n+1), with value (n/(n+1))n(n/(n+1))^n(n/(n+1))n.
  5. For n≥2n\ge2n≥2, every exchangeable affiliated law gives SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r) regret at most Wn(r)W_n(r)Wn​(r).

Significance

The result. Proposition 5 gives the exact price of determinism. The optimal fixed reserve 1/(n+1)1/(n+1)1/(n+1) has worst-case regret (n/(n+1))n(n/(n+1))^n(n/(n+1))n: 1/21/21/2 for one buyer, 4/94/94/9 for two. The minimax regret of the optimal randomized auction is about 0.3680.3680.368 and 0.3240.3240.324 for the same cases, so the benchmark shows how much of the paper's improvement comes from randomizing the reserve. Both values converge to 1/e1/e1/e as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. Proposition 5 also shows that the worst case does not change when valuations are positively dependent (affiliated, or mixtures of i.i.d.), the same robustness the paper establishes for its optimal mechanism.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper in the paper's Appendix D, and no machine-checked version is known. A formal proof needs an expression of the expected revenue of a second-price auction through the order-statistic CDFs, a careful treatment of atoms at the reserve, two elementary but fiddly one-variable optimizations, and, for Faff\mathcal F_{\mathrm{aff}}Faff​ and Fmix\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}Fmix​, the reduction to the i.i.d. case.

Difficulty

The supremum over Fiid\mathcal F_{\mathrm{iid}}Fiid​ is not attained. The auction's revenue jumps at the reserve: a buyer valued exactly at rrr buys, while one valued just below does not. Nature exploits this with two-point laws placing mass just below rrr and the rest at 111, and the regret approaches Wn(r)W_n(r)Wn​(r) only in the limit. So the first idea, exhibiting a maximizing distribution, fails, and any formalization must treat the worst case as a least upper bound. The upper bound over Faff\mathcal F_{\mathrm{aff}}Faff​ is the real difficulty: it rests on an order-statistic identity and on an inequality between the CDFs of the maxima of n−1n-1n−1 and nnn affiliated valuations, which in turn needs properties of affiliation that are quoted from Milgrom and Weber (1982) rather than proved in the paper. For Fmix\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}Fmix​ the bound needs the regret to be linear in the mixing measure, i.e. a disintegration of the mixture law through its joint CDF.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Buyers are Fin n; valuations are vectors Fin n → ℝ; a distribution is a probability measure on Fin n → ℝ whose complement of the cube [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n is null. Fiid\mathcal F_{\mathrm{iid}}Fiid​ is the set of products Measure.pi (fun _ => G) of a probability law G on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Fmix\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}Fmix​ uses a probability measure on Measure ℝ with the Giry σ-algebra and states the CDF identity of Definition 6 for every vvv.
  • The auction. SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r) is the random-reserve auction SPA ρ at ρ = Measure.dirac r; the winner pays max⁡(v(2),r)\max(v^{(2)},r)max(v(2),r) when its bid is at least rrr. Ties go to the lowest index (the paper breaks them arbitrarily; revenue does not depend on the rule).
  • Affiliation is stated cross-multiplied, μ(A∩S)μ(B∩S)≤μ(A∩B∩S)μ(S)\mu(A\cap S)\mu(B\cap S)\le\mu(A\cap B\cap S)\mu(S)μ(A∩S)μ(B∩S)≤μ(A∩B∩S)μ(S), for measurable increasing A,BA,BA,B and measurable sublattices SSS.
  • Conventions committed to. The reserve ranges over [0,1][0,1][0,1] (the page leaves this implicit; for r>1r>1r>1 the closed form is false). Worst-case regret is IsLUB of the set of regrets, not a maximum and not sSup. "The optimal reserve" is IsLeast of WnW_nWn​ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], its value at 1/(n+1)1/(n+1)1/(n+1), and uniqueness of the minimizer.
  • Ruled out. A statement with IsGreatest would be false (the supremum is not attained); sSup of the regret image would be a junk value if the image were unbounded; classes without the [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n support condition, or rrr unconstrained, change the theorem.
  • Infrastructure. Expected revenue of a second-price auction via order statistics, the CDF of the maximum and second maximum of i.i.d. variables, and the reduction of mixtures to their components are reusable for the rest of this series and for auction theory generally. Contributions to the affiliation inequalities (Milgrom–Weber) are particularly welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Anunrojwong, S. R. Balseiro, O. Besbes, On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design, arXiv:2204.10478v5, 2024; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.10478
  • D. Bergemann, K. Schlag, Pricing without Priors, Journal of the European Economic Association 6(2–3), 560–569, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.560
  • P. R. Milgrom, R. J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, Econometrica 50(5), 1089–1122, 1982. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability I: Banks' Risk-Exposure Choices Are Strategic Complements in Every Financial NetworkResearch Paper

Motivation

Banks lend to each other. When one bank's investments fail, it may be unable to repay its interbank debt, and its creditors then receive less. Since Eisenberg and Noe (2001), the standard way to compute who pays whom after such losses has been a clearing vector: a fixed point of a system in which every bank pays the smaller of what it owes and what it has. Much of the later literature on systemic risk takes the banks' assets as given and asks how losses spread through this fixed point, for example Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015).

Chong Shu's paper Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01519) reverses the question: when banks know they are connected, how much risk do they choose? A successful bank pays its interbank debt in full while its failed counterparties do not, so success is partly taxed by the network. This cross-subsidy shrinks the reward for choosing a safe project. The paper's first main result, Proposition 1, says that in every network the banks' risk choices are strategic complements: when one bank takes more risk, every other bank wants to take more risk too. This mission formalizes Proposition 1.

Setting

A finite set of banks is given. For banks i,ji,ji,j, dˉij≥0\bar d_{ij}\ge 0dˉij​≥0 is the face value of the debt that bank jjj owes bank iii. Bank jjj's total interbank liability is dˉj=∑idˉij\bar d_j=\sum_i\bar d_{ij}dˉj​=∑i​dˉij​, assumed positive, and θij=dˉij/dˉj\theta_{ij}=\bar d_{ij}/\bar d_jθij​=dˉij​/dˉj​ is bank iii's share of it. Bank iii also owes a deposit vi>0v_i>0vi​>0, which must be paid before its interbank debt.

Every bank iii picks a project ZiZ_iZi​ from an interval [Z‾,Z‾][\underline Z,\overline Z][Z​,Z]. The project pays ZiZ_iZi​ with probability P(Zi)P(Z_i)P(Zi​) and 000 otherwise, independently across banks. Assumption 1: P(z)∈(0,1)P(z)\in(0,1)P(z)∈(0,1), PPP is decreasing, and P(z) zP(z)\,zP(z)z is concave. A standing assumption rules out systemic default: Z‾≥vi+dˉi\underline Z\ge v_i+\bar d_iZ​≥vi​+dˉi​ for every iii, so a bank whose project succeeds can always pay in full.

A state ω∈{s,f}N\omega\in\{s,f\}^Nω∈{s,f}N records which projects succeeded; bank iii's cash flow is ei=Zie_i=Z_iei​=Zi​ if ωi=s\omega_i=sωi​=s and 000 otherwise. A payment equilibrium d∗(ω;Z)d^*(\omega;Z)d∗(ω;Z) solves

di∗={min⁡[∑jθijdj∗+ei−vi, dˉi]}+for all i.d_i^*=\Big\{\min\Big[\sum_j\theta_{ij}d_j^*+e_i-v_i,\ \bar d_i\Big]\Big\}^+\quad\text{for all } i .di∗​={min[j∑​θij​dj∗​+ei​−vi​, dˉi​]}+for all i.

Bank iii's profit is Πi=(∑jθijdj∗+ei−vi−di∗)+\Pi_i=(\sum_j\theta_{ij}d_j^*+e_i-v_i-d_i^*)^+Πi​=(∑j​θij​dj∗​+ei​−vi​−di∗​)+, and its expected profit E[Πi(ω;Z)]\mathbb E[\Pi_i(\omega;Z)]E[Πi​(ω;Z)] is the sum over states weighted by Pr⁡(ω)=∏jPr⁡(ωj)\Pr(\omega)=\prod_j\Pr(\omega_j)Pr(ω)=∏j​Pr(ωj​). The best-response set Z^i(Z−i)\hat Z_i(Z_{-i})Z^i​(Z−i​) is the set of maximizers of E[Πi]\mathbb E[\Pi_i]E[Πi​] over Zi∈[Z‾,Z‾]Z_i\in[\underline Z,\overline Z]Zi​∈[Z​,Z], with the other banks' choices Z−iZ_{-i}Z−i​ held fixed. The cross-subsidy is

Di(Z−i)=∑ω−i(dˉi−∑jθijdj∗(ωi=s))Pr⁡(ω−i),\mathcal D_i(Z_{-i})=\sum_{\omega_{-i}}\Big(\bar d_i-\sum_j\theta_{ij}d^*_j(\omega^{i=s})\Big)\Pr(\omega_{-i}),Di​(Z−i​)=ω−i​∑​(dˉi​−j∑​θij​dj∗​(ωi=s))Pr(ω−i​),

bank iii's expected net payment to the network when its own project succeeds.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 10)

For banks i≠mi\ne mi=m, profiles Z∈[Z‾,Z‾]NZ\in[\underline Z,\overline Z]^NZ∈[Z​,Z]N, and Z′Z'Z′ equal to ZZZ except that Zm≤Zm′Z_m\le Z'_mZm​≤Zm′​:

z^∈Z^i(Z−i), z^′∈Z^i(Z−i′) ⟹ max⁡(z^,z^′)∈Z^i(Z−i′)  and  min⁡(z^,z^′)∈Z^i(Z−i).\hat z\in\hat Z_i(Z_{-i}),\ \hat z'\in\hat Z_i(Z'_{-i})\ \Longrightarrow\ \max(\hat z,\hat z')\in\hat Z_i(Z'_{-i})\ \text{ and }\ \min(\hat z,\hat z')\in\hat Z_i(Z_{-i}).z^∈Z^i​(Z−i​), z^′∈Z^i​(Z−i′​) ⟹ max(z^,z^′)∈Z^i​(Z−i′​)  and  min(z^,z^′)∈Z^i​(Z−i​).

This is the strong-set-order form of "Z^i\hat Z_iZ^i​ is nondecreasing in ZmZ_mZm​". It does not require the network to be regular or path-connected.

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 8): d∗(ω;Z)d^*(\omega;Z)d∗(ω;Z) does not depend on ZZZ.
  2. Auxiliary Lemma (IA p. 7): d∗(ωj=f)≤d∗(ωj=s)d^*(\omega^{j=f})\le d^*(\omega^{j=s})d∗(ωj=f)≤d∗(ωj=s) componentwise.
  3. (7) (p. 9): E[Πi]=P(Zi)(Zi−vi)−P(Zi)Di(Z−i)+(1−P(Zi))⋅(expected payoff after failure)\mathbb E[\Pi_i]=P(Z_i)(Z_i-v_i)-P(Z_i)\mathcal D_i(Z_{-i})+(1-P(Z_i))\cdot(\text{expected payoff after failure})E[Πi​]=P(Zi​)(Zi​−vi​)−P(Zi​)Di​(Z−i​)+(1−P(Zi​))⋅(expected payoff after failure).
  4. (I.4) (IA p. 8): Di(Z−i)≤Di(Z−i′)\mathcal D_i(Z_{-i})\le\mathcal D_i(Z'_{-i})Di​(Z−i​)≤Di​(Z−i′​).
  5. The Ω−if+\Omega^{f+}_{-i}Ω−if+​ claims (IA p. 9): a bank that survives its own failure pays dˉi\bar d_idˉi​ in full, and its own state does not change what it receives.
  6. Di∗\mathcal D^*_iDi∗​ is increasing in ZmZ_mZm​ (IA p. 10).
  7. Supermodularity (IA p. 10): E[Πi]\mathbb E[\Pi_i]E[Πi​] has increasing differences in (Zi,Zm)(Z_i,Z_m)(Zi​,Zm​).

The regular-network step (I.3) (IA p. 7), that the maximizer of P(z)(z−v)−P(z)DP(z)(z-v)-P(z)DP(z)(z−v)−P(z)D is increasing in DDD, is also posed, as a theorem outside the milestone list.

Significance

Proposition 1 makes the risk-taking game supermodular. That property is what the rest of the paper relies on. It gives existence of equilibrium (Proposition 2) through Tarski's fixed-point theorem, it identifies least and greatest equilibria, and it lets the later comparative statics compare networks: complete against ring, size, central clearing, bailouts. Each of these results argues "the cross-subsidy rises, so equilibrium risk rises", and that step is Proposition 1 applied through Topkis's monotonicity theorem.

On the formal side, no clearing model is currently on the platform. This mission supplies one: the Eisenberg–Noe clearing system with a stochastic state, the greatest clearing vector, expected profits, and best responses. It also checks the paper's proof in the non-regular case. That proof splits on the states in which a bank survives its own failure, and one inequality in it is asserted without proof. The result is proved on paper; none of it has been machine-checked.

Difficulty

In a regular network a failed bank always defaults, and the argument reduces to two monotonicity facts: (I.3) and (I.4). In a non-regular network a failed bank can still earn a profit when enough of its debtors succeed. A riskier counterparty then has two opposite effects. It raises the cross-subsidy, which pushes toward risk, and it lowers the chance of being bailed out after one's own failure, which pushes away from risk. The proof must show that the first effect dominates in every network. It does so by partitioning the states according to whether bank iii survives its own failure, Ω−if+\Omega^{f+}_{-i}Ω−if+​, and by showing that the states in that set contribute nothing to the cross-partial. This requires the clearing vector to be monotone in every bank's success and stable when a surviving bank's own state flips. It also needs an inequality, vi+dˉi≥∑jθijdj∗(ωm=f,i=s)v_i+\bar d_i\ge\sum_j\theta_{ij}d^*_j(\omega^{m=f,i=s})vi​+dˉi​≥∑j​θij​dj∗​(ωm=f,i=s) whenever ω−im=f∉Ω−if+\omega^{m=f}_{-i}\notin\Omega^{f+}_{-i}ω−im=f​∈/Ω−if+​, which the paper asserts without proof.

The naive route is to differentiate the first-order condition, as the paper does in (I.3). That route is not available: Assumption 1 gives neither differentiability of PPP nor a unique maximizer.

Formalization scope

Banks form a finite type, and states are Boolean vectors (true = success). All probabilities are finite products and all expectations are finite sums: no measure theory is involved. Sums over ω−i\omega_{-i}ω−i​ are written as sums over full states with ωi\omega_iωi​ fixed, weighted by the product over j≠ij\ne ij=i.

Conventions the Lean statements commit to:

  • dˉij≥0\bar d_{ij}\ge0dˉij​≥0 rather than the page's dˉij>0\bar d_{ij}>0dˉij​>0. This is the reading forced by the paper's own ring network (Definition 3), and every total dˉj>0\bar d_j>0dˉj​>0 is assumed. Self-loops are allowed.
  • d∗d^*d∗ is the greatest solution of the clearing system, the componentwise supremum of all solutions in [0,dˉ][0,\bar d][0,dˉ]. Lemma 1 asserts only generic uniqueness, so a selection is required. The greatest solution is the one Eisenberg–Noe's algorithm returns, and it equals the solution whenever that is unique.
  • "Decreasing" in Assumption 1 is read weakly (AntitoneOn), which is the more general hypothesis.
  • Every bank's choice, including the varied Zm′Z'_mZm′​, lies in [Z‾,Z‾][\underline Z,\overline Z][Z​,Z], and the no-default assumption Z‾≥vi+dˉi\underline Z\ge v_i+\bar d_iZ​≥vi​+dˉi​ is an explicit hypothesis. Without either, Lemma 2 fails.
  • Derivative statements are replaced by order-theoretic ones: the strong set order for dZ^i/dZm≥0d\hat Z_i/dZ_m\ge0dZ^i​/dZm​≥0 and for (I.3), increasing differences for the cross-partial. Strict ">0>0>0" claims become weak, because they are false when banks iii and mmm are not path-connected.

The goal is vacuous when a best-response set is empty. This is faithful, since Z^i\hat Z_iZ^i​ presupposes a maximizer, and best responses exist whenever PPP is continuous. A formalization that takes d∗d^*d∗ as an arbitrary solution under a uniqueness hypothesis, or as an sSup that could be junk, would trivialize the mission. The definition used here is shown, in a sorry-free check, to solve the clearing system.

Not posed: Lemma 1 (cited from Eisenberg–Noe), Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 (consequences of Proposition 1), and the later comparative statics (Propositions 3–9). Proposition 4, the comparison of complete and ring networks, is a separate mission of this series. Reusable contributions are welcome: monotonicity of greatest fixed points in a parameter, and a general Topkis-style argmax monotonicity on chains.

Selected references

  • Chong Shu, Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability, Management Science (accepted manuscript, 17 Sep 2024). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01519
  • Larry Eisenberg and Thomas H. Noe, Systemic Risk in Financial Systems, Management Science 47(2), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.2.236.9835
  • Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks, American Economic Review 105(2), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130456
  • Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities, Econometrica 58(6), 1990. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938316
  • Paul Milgrom and Chris Shannon, Monotone Comparative Statics, Econometrica 62(1), 1994. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479
  • Donald M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 3: With a Uniform Private Benefit on [0, B], the Acquirer Acquihires Exactly When v_a > v_s + (7 − 3√5)B/2 and Otherwise Hires DirectlyResearch Paper

Motivation

Large technology firms often buy small startups mainly to hire their staff, a practice known as acquihiring. Antitrust authorities review acquisitions that may reduce competition in product markets, but an acquihire can instead reduce competition in the labour market: a firm that buys the employer of a scarce worker no longer has to outbid that employer for her. Bar-Isaac, Johnson and Nocke study this effect in a three-player model: a startup, its essential employee, and a potential acquirer (CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper No. 500, 2024; published in Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.04604).

In the paper's baseline model (Proposition 1) the acquirer, whenever it hires the employee, does so by buying the startup, and the employee always prefers direct wage competition. This mission formalizes §6, where the employee's private benefit from staying at the startup is her private information. That uncertainty softens wage competition, so acquihiring is no longer always chosen, and the paper derives the exact threshold at which the acquirer switches.

Setting

An employee produces value vav_ava​ if she works for the acquirer and vsv_svs​ if she works for the startup. At the startup she also enjoys a private benefit bbb, which only she observes and which is uniformly distributed on [0,B][0,B][0,B]. She has an outside option worth 000, and wages are unrestricted real numbers. The standing assumptions of §6 are

0<B<min⁡{va,vs},vs−B<va<vs+2B.0 < B < \min\{v_a, v_s\}, \qquad v_s - B < v_a < v_s + 2B .0<B<min{va​,vs​},vs​−B<va​<vs​+2B.

The acquirer chooses between two modes.

  • Direct hiring. The acquirer and the startup make simultaneous wage offers waw_awa​ and wsw_sws​. A type-bbb employee joins the acquirer when wa>ws+bw_a > w_s + bwa​>ws​+b and wa≥0w_a \ge 0wa​≥0, and stays at the startup when ws+b≥waw_s + b \ge w_aws​+b≥wa​ and ws+b≥0w_s + b \ge 0ws​+b≥0. Expected profits are averages over b∼U[0,B]b \sim U[0,B]b∼U[0,B], for example
πa(wa,ws)=1B∫0B(va−wa) 1{type b joins the acquirer} db.\pi_a(w_a, w_s) = \frac1B \int_0^B (v_a - w_a)\,\mathbf 1\{\text{type } b \text{ joins the acquirer}\}\,db .πa​(wa​,ws​)=B1​∫0B​(va​−wa​)1{type b joins the acquirer}db.

A pair (wa,ws)(w_a, w_s)(wa​,ws​) is an equilibrium of this wage game when each offer is a best response to the other over all real wages.

  • Acquihiring. The acquirer bids for the startup. A startup that is a monopsonist pays wage 000 and earns vsv_svs​, so the acquisition succeeds at price vsv_svs​ exactly when va>vsv_a > v_sva​>vs​, and the acquirer then pays the employee 000. The acquirer's acquihiring profit is max⁡{0,va−vs}\max\{0, v_a - v_s\}max{0,va​−vs​} (Lemma 2 of the paper with wage floor 000).

The quantities named in the statements are Lemma 5's wages

wa∗=2va+vs−B3,ws∗=2vs+va−2B3,w_a^* = \frac{2v_a + v_s - B}{3}, \qquad w_s^* = \frac{2v_s + v_a - 2B}{3},wa∗​=32va​+vs​−B​,ws∗​=32vs​+va​−2B​,

the indifferent type b∗=(va−vs+B)/3=wa∗−ws∗b^* = (v_a - v_s + B)/3 = w_a^* - w_s^*b∗=(va​−vs​+B)/3=wa∗​−ws∗​, and the threshold

v^a=vs+7−352 B.\hat v_a = v_s + \frac{7 - 3\sqrt5}{2}\,B .v^a​=vs​+27−35​​B.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5

Under the standing assumptions, v^a>vs\hat v_a > v_sv^a​>vs​, (wa∗,ws∗)(w_a^*, w_s^*)(wa∗​,ws∗​) is a direct-hiring equilibrium, and

va>v^a  ⟹  πa(wa∗,ws∗)<max⁡{0,va−vs},v_a > \hat v_a \;\Longrightarrow\; \pi_a(w_a^*, w_s^*) < \max\{0, v_a - v_s\},va​>v^a​⟹πa​(wa∗​,ws∗​)<max{0,va​−vs​}, va<v^a  ⟹  max⁡{0,va−vs}<πa(wa∗,ws∗)  and the poaching probability is va−vs+B3B.v_a < \hat v_a \;\Longrightarrow\; \max\{0, v_a - v_s\} < \pi_a(w_a^*, w_s^*) \ \text{ and the poaching probability is } \frac{v_a - v_s + B}{3B}.va​<v^a​⟹max{0,va​−vs​}<πa​(wa∗​,ws∗​)  and the poaching probability is 3Bva​−vs​+B​.

In addition, every type b∈[0,B]b \in [0,B]b∈[0,B] of employee is strictly better off under direct hiring than under acquihiring.

Milestones

  1. A monopsonistic startup sets wage 000 and earns vsv_svs​; a monopsonistic acquirer sets wage 000 (§6, p. 15).
  2. Lemma 5: the direct-hiring wages, the poaching probability (va−vs+B)/(3B)∈(0,1)(v_a - v_s + B)/(3B) \in (0,1)(va​−vs​+B)/(3B)∈(0,1), and the acquirer's profit (va−vs+B)2/(9B)(v_a - v_s + B)^2/(9B)(va​−vs​+B)2/(9B).
  3. The two values of vav_ava​ at which the profits are equal, v^a\hat v_av^a​ and vs+(7+35)B/2v_s + (7 + 3\sqrt5)B/2vs​+(7+35​)B/2, and the fact that the second lies above vs+2Bv_s + 2Bvs​+2B.
  4. The welfare display in the proof of Corollary 4, and Corollary 4 itself: acquihiring is more efficient than direct hiring exactly when va>vs+45Bv_a > v_s + \tfrac45 Bva​>vs​+54​B, so on 7−352<(va−vs)/B<45\tfrac{7-3\sqrt5}{2} < (v_a - v_s)/B < \tfrac4527−35​​<(va​−vs​)/B<54​ the acquirer acquihires although direct hiring yields more surplus.

Significance

The proposition separates two effects that coincide in the baseline model. Without private information, wage competition is Bertrand-like: the winning firm must match the losing firm's full willingness to pay, so buying the competitor is always cheaper. With a privately known benefit, competition between the two employers resembles product differentiation, and each offers less than the employee's productive value. Direct hiring then becomes profitable when vav_ava​ is close to vsv_svs​, and acquihiring is chosen only when va−vsv_a - v_sva​−vs​ exceeds 7−352B≈0.146 B\frac{7-3\sqrt5}{2}B \approx 0.146\,B27−35​​B≈0.146B. Corollary 4 compares this threshold with the efficiency threshold 45B\frac45 B54​B and finds a band of parameters in which acquihiring occurs although it lowers total surplus. That band is the paper's case for labour-market scrutiny of acquisitions.

The results are proved on paper, by first-order conditions and a quadratic comparison. None of them has a machine-checked proof, and the platform has no prior formalization of wage competition, monopsony or acquisitions. The mission adds an explicit Bayesian wage game with expected profits written as integrals over the type distribution, with global best responses rather than first-order conditions. The objects are small enough to be reused for other two-firm wage-posting models with a uniformly distributed taste shock.

Difficulty

The algebra of Proposition 5 is a quadratic inequality in (va−vs)/B(v_a - v_s)/B(va​−vs​)/B. The work is in Lemma 5. The page solves first-order conditions inside the region wa≥0w_a \ge 0wa​≥0, 0<wa−ws<B0 < w_a - w_s < B0<wa​−ws​<B, where both expected profits are concave quadratics. An equilibrium, however, requires that no deviation pays anywhere on the real line, including offers so low that no type accepts and offers so high that every type accepts. Outside the interior region the profit functions are piecewise (zero below, linear above), and each piece has to be compared with the interior optimum. The expected profits are interval integrals of indicator functions, so evaluating them requires the measure of the set of accepting types. Ties between the two offers occur with probability zero, and the statements are insensitive to how they are broken.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The parameters vav_ava​, vsv_svs​, BBB form a structure, and the five standing inequalities form a predicate that every theorem except the pure-algebra milestone takes as a hypothesis (that milestone needs only B>0B > 0B>0). Expected profits, the poaching probability and direct-hiring welfare are 1B∫0B\frac1B \int_0^BB1​∫0B​ of bounded, piecewise-constant integrands, hence interval integrable. A verification file evaluates the acquirer's profit at Lemma 5's wages to its closed form on one instance, and exhibits instances of both branches of the proposition and of the window in Corollary 4. Ties b=wa−wsb = w_a - w_sb=wa​−ws​ go to the startup.

Conventions committed to:

  • best responses range over all real wages, which is stronger than the page's first-order conditions;
  • the direct-hiring branch is evaluated at Lemma 5's wages, and Lemma 5's uniqueness clause is claimed only within the interior region where the page derives it; uniqueness among all equilibria is not on the page and is not claimed;
  • the acquihiring profit max⁡{0,va−vs}\max\{0, v_a - v_s\}max{0,va​−vs​} and the employee's acquihiring payoff (000 if va>vsv_a > v_sva​>vs​, otherwise her benefit bbb) are Lemma 2's outcomes with wage floor 000, as §6 states; the milestone on the monopsonistic wage justifies this, and at va=vsv_a = v_sva​=vs​ the acquisition is taken to fail;
  • surplus under acquihiring is vav_ava​, the allocation with the employee at the acquirer, as in Corollary 4.

The direct-hiring profit is an integral over the type distribution evaluated at wages that are proved to be an equilibrium. It is not a closed-form payoff taken as a definition. Dropping any standing inequality would change Lemma 5 (the poaching probability leaves (0,1)(0,1)(0,1)) or Proposition 5 (the second root comes back into range). The employee-preference clause is part of the goal, and no equilibrium is claimed unique beyond what the page derives.

Contributions welcome: the interval-integral evaluations of step functions, the global best-response argument for Lemma 5, and the quadratic comparison with 5\sqrt55​.

Selected references

  • H. Bar-Isaac, J. P. Johnson, V. Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper No. 500, January 2024 (the version formalized here; journal version below).
  • H. Bar-Isaac, J. P. Johnson, V. Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, Management Science, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04604
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EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 3: Under the Rotation Order, Marketing Lists Serve Low-Cost Marketers Efficiently and Over- (Under-) Supply High-Cost Ones Below (Above) the Rotation PointResearch Paper

Motivation

Data brokers sell two kinds of products to marketers. A marketing list supplies the contacts a marketer needs in order to act at all; a data append enriches a list the marketer already holds. In both cases the broker can also choose how informative its accompanying analytics are, and it can price a menu of plans of different informativeness to marketers whose costs of acting it cannot observe. Liang Guo's Selling Data to Marketers (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350) studies how such a seller should design this menu, and in particular when it should sell more or less information than would be efficient.

The paper first works with a two-point value distribution (Sections 2–3) and then, in Section 4, with a general information structure in which informativeness is ordered by the rotation order of the distribution of the posterior mean (Johnson and Myatt 2006). This mission formalizes the marketing-list result of Section 4.1: Proposition 4 (comparative statics of the efficient informativeness) and Proposition 5 (the optimal screening menu). It is the third mission of a four-mission series on the paper; the first two treat the two-point model, the fourth treats data appends under the rotation order.

Setting

A marketer's value uuu from targeting a consumer is unknown. The seller supplies a signal of informativeness α∈[α‾,αˉ]⊂(0,1)\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]\subset(0,1)α∈[α​,αˉ]⊂(0,1). The marketer's posterior mean v=E[u∣w]v=E[u\mid w]v=E[u∣w] has cumulative distribution function H(v,α)H(v,\alpha)H(v,α) on a support [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ], with a strictly positive density h(v,α)h(v,\alpha)h(v,α). Bayesian updating keeps the mean fixed: ∫v‾vˉv h(v,α) dv=u^\int_{\underline v}^{\bar v} v\,h(v,\alpha)\,dv=\hat u∫v​vˉ​vh(v,α)dv=u^ for every α\alphaα, where u^\hat uu^ is the prior mean. The rotation order (9) requires a point v+∈(v‾,vˉ)v^+\in(\underline v,\bar v)v+∈(v​,vˉ) such that

∂H(v,α)∂α>0 for v<v+,∂H(v,α)∂α<0 for v>v+.\frac{\partial H(v,\alpha)}{\partial\alpha}>0\ \text{for } v<v^+,\qquad \frac{\partial H(v,\alpha)}{\partial\alpha}<0\ \text{for } v>v^+ .∂α∂H(v,α)​>0 for v<v+,∂α∂H(v,α)​<0 for v>v+.

Raising α\alphaα moves probability mass from the middle of the distribution to its tails.

The seller incurs a selling cost k(α)k(\alpha)k(α), increasing, with k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0. A marketer's targeting cost is cHc_HcH​ with probability θ∈(0,1)\theta\in(0,1)θ∈(0,1) and cLc_LcL​ with probability 1−θ1-\theta1−θ, with cH>cL>0c_H>c_L>0cH​>cL​>0. A marketer with cost ccc targets exactly when v>cv>cv>c, so informativeness α\alphaα is worth

P(α,c)=∫cvˉ(v−c) dH(v,α).P(\alpha,c)=\int_c^{\bar v}(v-c)\,dH(v,\alpha).P(α,c)=∫cvˉ​(v−c)dH(v,α).

With observable costs (the benchmark), the seller sells to type iii the informativeness maximizing (12), Πi=θi [P(α,ci)−k(α)]\Pi_i=\theta_i\,[P(\alpha,c_i)-k(\alpha)]Πi​=θi​[P(α,ci​)−k(α)]; a maximizer is an efficient level αie\alpha^e_iαie​. With private costs, the seller offers a menu of plans (TH,αH)(T_H,\alpha_H)(TH​,αH​), (TL,αL)(T_L,\alpha_L)(TL​,αL​), with fees Tj≥0T_j\ge0Tj​≥0. A type-iii marketer choosing plan jjj gets Uij=−Tj+P(αj,ci)U_{ij}=-T_j+P(\alpha_j,c_i)Uij​=−Tj​+P(αj​,ci​) (13). The seller maximizes Π=θ[TH−k(αH)]+(1−θ)[TL−k(αL)]\Pi=\theta[T_H-k(\alpha_H)]+(1-\theta)[T_L-k(\alpha_L)]Π=θ[TH​−k(αH​)]+(1−θ)[TL​−k(αL​)] subject to individual rationality Uii≥0U_{ii}\ge0Uii​≥0 and incentive compatibility Uii≥Uii′U_{ii}\ge U_{ii'}Uii​≥Uii′​ (problem (6)). Its solutions are written αH∗,αL∗\alpha^*_H,\alpha^*_LαH∗​,αL∗​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5

In general αL∗=αLe\alpha^*_L=\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​, and if cL<cH<v+c_L<c_H<v^+cL​<cH​<v+ (resp. v+<cL<cHv^+<c_L<c_Hv+<cL​<cH​), then

αH∗>αHe(resp. αH∗<αHe).\alpha^*_H>\alpha^e_H\quad(\text{resp. } \alpha^*_H<\alpha^e_H).αH∗​>αHe​(resp. αH∗​<αHe​).

The first identity says that the low-cost marketer, the "high type" of the screening problem, receives the efficient informativeness. The second says that the high-cost marketer's informativeness is distorted, upward when both costs lie below the rotation point and downward when both lie above it. Both are stated for every optimal menu and every efficient level.

Milestones

  1. Integration by parts: P(α,c)=∫cvˉ[1−H(v,α)] dvP(\alpha,c)=\int_c^{\bar v}[1-H(v,\alpha)]\,dvP(α,c)=∫cvˉ​[1−H(v,α)]dv (proof of Proposition 4).
  2. The cross derivative ∂2Πi/∂αi∂ci=θi ∂H(ci,αi)/∂αi\partial^2\Pi_i/\partial\alpha_i\partial c_i=\theta_i\,\partial H(c_i,\alpha_i)/\partial\alpha_i∂2Πi​/∂αi​∂ci​=θi​∂H(ci​,αi​)/∂αi​ and its sign on either side of v+v^+v+.
  3. Proposition 4: αie\alpha^e_iαie​ first increases and then decreases with cic_ici​, with the turning point at v+v^+v+.
  4. The reduction of (6) to the two-variable problem (14) by the binding constraints IRHIR_HIRH​ and ICL,HIC_{L,H}ICL,H​.
  5. (14) integrated by parts, with the high type's rent R(αH)=∫cLcH[1−H(v,αH)] dvR(\alpha_H)=\int_{c_L}^{c_H}[1-H(v,\alpha_H)]\,dvR(αH​)=∫cL​cH​​[1−H(v,αH​)]dv, and its separation, which gives αL∗=αLe\alpha^*_L=\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​ for (14).
  6. The derivative ∂Π/∂αH\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha_H∂Π/∂αH​ of (14) compared with the benchmark derivative.

Significance

Proposition 4 states that the value of information to a marketer is non-monotone in the cost of acting: it is largest for costs near the rotation point v+v^+v+, where the targeting decision is hardest. Proposition 5 turns this into a pricing rule. In the two-point model the direction of the distortion depends only on the prior (Proposition 2, φ<1/2\varphi<1/2φ<1/2 or φ>1/2\varphi>1/2φ>1/2). Under the rotation order it depends on where the costs lie relative to v+v^+v+, so a seller facing marketers with low costs over-supplies information to its less profitable segment, and one facing high costs under-supplies it. The comparison with the two-point model (pp. 17–18 of the manuscript) connects the two settings through the single-crossing point of the posterior-mean distributions.

The results are proved in the paper, through integration by parts, signs of derivatives and Topkis's monotonicity theorem. None of them is formalized. Formalizing them checks the reduction of the screening problem, which the paper performs by analogy with the two-point model, including the constraints it drops without comment. It also produces a reusable treatment of rotation-ordered distribution families on an interval. Topkis's Theorem 2.8.4 is already proved on the platform and is part of this mission as a reference.

Difficulty

The obvious argument has two gaps. The first is the reduction (14). The paper substitutes the binding IRHIR_HIRH​ and ICL,HIC_{L,H}ICL,H​ constraints and drops IRLIR_LIRL​, ICH,LIC_{H,L}ICH,L​ and Tj≥0T_j\ge0Tj​≥0. That the dropped constraints hold at a solution of (14) is not shown in the paper. The second gap is strictness: Topkis's theorem compares maximizers weakly. The strict inequalities αH∗≷αHe\alpha^*_H\gtrless\alpha^e_HαH∗​≷αHe​ require showing that efficient levels are interior and that the first-order conditions differ there. This uses the footnote-5 behaviour of kkk at the endpoints and the mean-preserving property (10), which follows from (9) and the constancy of the mean.

Formalization scope

The model is one Lean structure, SellingData.ListsRotation.Model, with real parameters and its standing assumptions as fields. The committed conventions are:

  • The support [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ] is a bounded real interval; the paper allows an unbounded one.
  • H(⋅,α)H(\cdot,\alpha)H(⋅,α) is continuous on the support, with H(v‾,α)=0H(\underline v,\alpha)=0H(v​,α)=0, H(vˉ,α)=1H(\bar v,\alpha)=1H(vˉ,α)=1 and a strictly positive continuous density h(⋅,α)h(\cdot,\alpha)h(⋅,α). The derivative ∂H/∂α\partial H/\partial\alpha∂H/∂α exists on the support, for α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1).
  • dH(v,α)dH(v,\alpha)dH(v,α) is h(v,α) dvh(v,\alpha)\,dvh(v,α)dv, so P(α,c)=∫cvˉ(v−c) h(v,α) dvP(\alpha,c)=\int_c^{\bar v}(v-c)\,h(v,\alpha)\,dvP(α,c)=∫cvˉ​(v−c)h(v,α)dv.
  • The rotation order (9) is imposed on the open support. The mean property is a field of the model; (10) is not assumed, since it follows.
  • The costs satisfy v‾<cL<cH<vˉ\underline v<c_L<c_H<\bar vv​<cL​<cH​<vˉ.
  • kkk is monotone on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ] with k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0.

Two further hypotheses are pinned, and only on the statements that need strictness or differentiation under the integral sign:

  • the footnote-5 conditions on kkk: continuity on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ], differentiability inside, k′(α‾)=0k'(\underline\alpha)=0k′(α​)=0 from the right and k′(α)→+∞k'(\alpha)\to+\inftyk′(α)→+∞ as α→αˉ−\alpha\to\bar\alpha^-α→αˉ−; convexity and twice differentiability are not assumed;
  • joint continuity of ∂H/∂α\partial H/\partial\alpha∂H/∂α on [v‾,vˉ]×(0,1)[\underline v,\bar v]\times(0,1)[v​,vˉ]×(0,1).

Optimal menus and efficient levels are sets of maximizers, not chosen maximizers, because kkk need not be convex. "αL∗=αLe\alpha^*_L=\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​" is the equality of the set of low-cost plans of optimal menus with the set of efficient levels. The goal is stated for the screening problem (6) itself, with all four constraints and nonnegative fees. Defining the optimal menu through (14), or efficient levels through a first-order condition, would make half of the goal a restatement of a milestone, and is ruled out. As on the page, αL∗=αLe\alpha^*_L=\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​ is stated with no condition on the position of the costs relative to v+v^+v+; only the comparison of αH∗\alpha^*_HαH∗​ with αHe\alpha^e_HαHe​ carries the two cost ranges. A sorry-free instance shows that the model's hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: [v‾,vˉ]=[0,1][\underline v,\bar v]=[0,1][v​,vˉ]=[0,1], H(v,α)=v+α2v(1−v)(1−2v)H(v,\alpha)=v+\tfrac{\alpha}{2}v(1-v)(1-2v)H(v,α)=v+2α​v(1−v)(1−2v), v+=u^=1/2v^+=\hat u=1/2v+=u^=1/2.

Contributions are welcome on the integration-by-parts and differentiation-under-the-integral lemmas for families of distributions on an interval, which are reusable beyond this paper, and on any milestone in any order.

Selected references

  • Liang Guo, Selling Data to Marketers, Management Science, 2025, author's manuscript. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350
  • Justin P. Johnson and David P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design, American Economic Review 96(3), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.756
  • Donald M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998 (Theorem 2.8.4). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Imperfect Targeting and Advertising Strategies: With Costless Advertising and A < 1/4, Equilibrium Industry Profit Falls as Targeting Improves, Jumps Up at α̂₂(A), Then Stays ConstantResearch Paper

Motivation

Online advertising lets a firm aim its messages at the consumers most likely to want its product, but the data behind that aim is noisy: a platform's prediction of who belongs to a demographic or interest segment is right only with some probability. A natural expectation is that sharper targeting raises firms' profits, since fewer messages are wasted. Karle and Reisinger (SSRN 4626076, March 2024; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03632) show that this can fail: when both firms chase the same valuable consumers, better targeting also increases the number of consumers who see both firms' advertisements, which intensifies price competition.

The model combines a targeting stage with the clearinghouse price-competition model of Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988), in which some consumers are informed about one firm only (loyal consumers) and others about both (shoppers), and equilibrium prices are dispersed. This mission formalizes the paper's result for costless advertising: industry profit first falls as targeting improves, then jumps up when firms switch to segmenting the market, then stays flat.

Setting

There are two consumer groups aaa and bbb, each of mass one. Group-bbb consumers value the product at 111, group-aaa consumers at AAA, with 0<A<10 < A < 10<A<1. Two firms produce at zero cost. For every consumer each firm receives a signal of the consumer's group that is correct with probability α∈(1/2,1]\alpha \in (1/2, 1]α∈(1/2,1], independently across firms. Only consumers of the group a firm targets are interested in its product.

Stage 1. Each firm chooses a target group k∈{a,b}k \in \{a, b\}k∈{a,b} and a message scope: expected (message only the consumers its signal places in group kkk, which reaches a mass α\alphaα of group kkk) or all (message every consumer, which reaches all of group kkk). Messages cost c≥0c \ge 0c≥0 each; in this mission c=0c = 0c=0.

Stage 2. Having observed stage 1, firms set prices. For a stage-1 profile sss, if both firms target the same group, the shoppers S(s)=r1r2S(s) = r_1 r_2S(s)=r1​r2​ are the targeted consumers reached by both, where ri∈{α,1}r_i \in \{\alpha, 1\}ri​∈{α,1} is firm iii's reach; firm iii's loyal mass is Li(s)=ri−S(s)L_i(s) = r_i - S(s)Li​(s)=ri​−S(s). If they target different groups, S(s)=0S(s) = 0S(s)=0 and Li(s)=riL_i(s) = r_iLi​(s)=ri​. A consumer buys if the price does not exceed her valuation; shoppers buy from the cheaper firm and split equally on ties. Firm iii's profit at prices (p,q)(p, q)(p,q) is p (Li+S)p\,(L_i + S)p(Li​+S), p (Li+S/2)p\,(L_i + S/2)p(Li​+S/2) or p Lip\,L_ipLi​ according as p<qp < qp<q, p=qp = qp=q or p>qp > qp>q, and 000 if ppp exceeds the valuation.

Firms may randomize prices: a price strategy is a probability measure on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and Ui(s;μ,ν)U_i(s; \mu, \nu)Ui​(s;μ,ν) is firm iii's expected profit. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is a pure stage-1 profile s⋆s^\stars⋆ and a continuation that assigns to each of the sixteen stage-1 profiles a Nash equilibrium of its pricing subgame, such that no firm gains at stage 1 by changing its action. The sum of expected profits is V1(s⋆)+V2(s⋆)V_1(s^\star) + V_2(s^\star)V1​(s⋆)+V2​(s⋆).

Two cumulative distribution functions appear, on [1−α,1)[1-\alpha, 1)[1−α,1):

F(p)=1α−1−ααp,H(p)=p−(1−α)p,F(p) = \frac1\alpha - \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha p}, \qquad H(p) = \frac{p - (1-\alpha)}{p},F(p)=α1​−αp1−α​,H(p)=pp−(1−α)​,

both 000 below 1−α1-\alpha1−α and 111 from 111 on, so HHH has an atom 1−α1 - \alpha1−α at p=1p = 1p=1. The thresholds are α^1(A)=1−A\hat\alpha_1(A) = 1 - Aα^1​(A)=1−A and α^2(A)=(1+1−4A)/2\hat\alpha_2(A) = \bigl(1 + \sqrt{1 - 4A}\bigr)/2α^2​(A)=(1+1−4A​)/2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 15)

For 0<A<1/40 < A < 1/40<A<1/4: 1/2<α^2(A)<α^1(A)1/2 < \hat\alpha_2(A) < \hat\alpha_1(A)1/2<α^2​(A)<α^1​(A); for every α∈(1/2,α^2(A))\alpha \in (1/2, \hat\alpha_2(A))α∈(1/2,α^2​(A)) there is an SPNE with

∑iE[πi⋆(α)]=1−α2,\textstyle\sum_i E[\pi_i^\star(\alpha)] = 1 - \alpha^2,∑i​E[πi⋆​(α)]=1−α2,

which is strictly decreasing in α\alphaα; for every α∈(α^2(A),1]\alpha \in (\hat\alpha_2(A), 1]α∈(α^2​(A),1] there is an SPNE with sum 1+A1 + A1+A; and 1−α^2(A)2<1+A1 - \hat\alpha_2(A)^2 < 1 + A1−α^2​(A)2<1+A (the upward jump).

Milestones

  1. Display (1), p. 11. If both firms target bbb and message expected consumers, both pricing by FFF is an equilibrium with profit α(1−α)\alpha(1-\alpha)α(1−α) each.
  2. Lemma 2 part 1, display (2), pp. 14–15. If firm 1 messages expected and firm 2 all group-bbb consumers, (F,H)(F, H)(F,H) is an equilibrium with profits α(1−α)\alpha(1-\alpha)α(1−α) and 1−α1-\alpha1−α.
  3. Bertrand, p. 13. If both message all group-bbb consumers, pricing at 000 is an equilibrium with zero profits.
  4. Segmentation, pp. 9, 13. If firm 1 targets aaa and firm 2 targets bbb, prices AAA and 111 are an equilibrium.
  5. Threshold, p. 14. For α∈(1/2,1]\alpha \in (1/2, 1]α∈(1/2,1] and A≤1/4A \le 1/4A≤1/4: α(1−α)≥A  ⟺  α≤α^2(A)\alpha(1-\alpha) \ge A \iff \alpha \le \hat\alpha_2(A)α(1−α)≥A⟺α≤α^2​(A).
  6. Footnote 36, p. 15. α^2(A)<α^1(A)\hat\alpha_2(A) < \hat\alpha_1(A)α^2​(A)<α^1​(A) for 0<A<1/40 < A < 1/40<A<1/4.
  7. Lemma 2, pp. 14–15. The SPNE with c=0c = 0c=0 in both regimes.

Significance

The proposition shows that the non-monotonicity of industry profit in targeting precision, which the paper first derives for high advertising costs, does not rely on advertising being costly. With free messages a firm could inform every consumer, which is equivalent to perfect targeting; the equilibrium instead has one firm refrain from doing so, because the resulting asymmetry keeps prices high. For regulation of consumer data and for platforms selling targeting precision, the result says that better targeting technology can lower sellers' profits over a range of precisions and raise them discontinuously elsewhere.

The result is proved in the paper (main text and Online Appendix A). It has not been machine-checked. Formalizing it means verifying mixed-strategy equilibria of a pricing game with a continuum of prices, including an atom at the valuation, in all sixteen subgames of a two-stage game, a pattern that recurs throughout the clearinghouse and price-dispersion literature.

Difficulty

The stage-1 comparison is arithmetic once the stage-2 payoffs are known; the work is in the pricing subgames. Each mixed equilibrium must be verified against every real price deviation, which needs the expected profit at price ppp against a distribution with an atom, where the tie-splitting rule matters exactly at the atom. Subgame perfection requires a pricing equilibrium in every off-path subgame too, including those where both firms target group aaa (the group-bbb equilibria rescaled by AAA) and the Bertrand subgames. The obvious shortcut, assigning each subgame its textbook profit as a number, is not available: the stage-1 values are defined as integrals against the equilibrium strategies.

Formalization scope

Lean 4 with Mathlib. The pricing game is a separate definition (a general clearinghouse duopoly with valuations viv_ivi​, loyal masses LiL_iLi​ and shopper mass SSS); the targeting game builds on it. Committed conventions:

  • price strategies are probability measures on R\mathbb RR with no mass outside [0,1][0,1][0,1]; expected profits are Bochner integrals; deviations range over all real prices;
  • a consumer buys at a price equal to her valuation (the page says "lower than"; the atom of HHH at 111 needs the sale);
  • targeting is in pure strategies (the paper's footnotes 26 and 34); the message scope is binary, the paper's options (1) and (2); the no-message option and the continuous message masses of the appendix proof are not modelled;
  • cdfs are Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.cdf; statements about all measures with cdf FFF also assert that such a measure exists;
  • the paper's "firm iii / firm −i-i−i" are firm 1 (the expected-only firm, and the group-aaa firm) and firm 2;
  • for A>1/4A > 1/4A>1/4 Lean's square root gives α^2(A)=1/2\hat\alpha_2(A) = 1/2α^2​(A)=1/2, the reading Lemma 2's range (max⁡{1/2,α^2(A)},1](\max\{1/2, \hat\alpha_2(A)\}, 1](max{1/2,α^2​(A)},1] needs;
  • pricing-stage profits exclude the sunk message cost; the goal and Lemma 2 are at c=0c = 0c=0.

The goal is Proposition 2 in existence form: it asserts an SPNE with the stated total. The paper exhibits that equilibrium; uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is not claimed. Propositions 1 and 3 (high and general costs) are not posed. Trivializing encodings are excluded by construction: stage-1 values are integrals of the continuation strategies, not a table; the equilibrium condition quantifies over all sixteen subgames, not just the path; strategies are probability measures on [0,1][0,1][0,1], so no integral takes a junk value; and statements quantifying over measures with a given cdf include the existence of one.

Contributions welcome: integration of the tie-split profit against cdfs with atoms, a reusable lemma that a clearinghouse with given loyal and shopper masses has an equilibrium, and the rescaling of equilibria by the valuation.

Selected references

  • H. Karle and M. Reisinger, Imperfect Targeting and Advertising Strategies, SSRN working paper 4626076, March 25, 2024. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4626076 ; published in Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03632
  • H. R. Varian, A Model of Sales, American Economic Review 70(4), 651–659, 1980. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805229
  • C. Narasimhan, Competitive Promotional Strategies, Journal of Business 61(4), 427–449, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1086/296442
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 4: Under the Rotation Order, Data Appends with Costs Below the Prior Mean Serve High-Cost Marketers Efficiently and Under- (Over-) Supply Low-Cost Ones Below (Above) v⁺Research Paper

Motivation

Data brokers sell consumer data to firms that use it to decide whom to target, whom to lend to, or where to open a store. Two kinds of products are common: a marketing list, which supplies contact information without which the buyer cannot act at all, and a data append, which enriches information about consumers the buyer can already reach (Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers, 2014). A seller who does not know a buyer's cost of acting must screen buyers with a menu of plans that differ in price and in how informative the data are.

Liang Guo's paper Selling Data to Marketers (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350) characterizes the optimal menu, first for a binary-value model (§3) and then for a general information structure ordered by rotation (§4), following Johnson and Myatt (2006). This mission formalizes Proposition 7: data appends under the rotation order. It is the fourth mission of a series built from the same manuscript; the first three cover marketing lists and data appends in the binary model and marketing lists under the rotation order.

Setting

A marketer can take an action (target a consumer) at cost ccc; the action's value uuu is uncertain with prior mean u^\hat uu^. A data service of informativeness α∈[α‾,αˉ]⊂(0,1)\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]\subset(0,1)α∈[α​,αˉ]⊂(0,1) produces a signal, and its information is summarized by the posterior mean vvv. For each α\alphaα, vvv has cumulative distribution function H(v,α)H(v,\alpha)H(v,α) on a support [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ], with a strictly positive density h(v,α)h(v,\alpha)h(v,α) and mean u^\hat uu^ for every α\alphaα. The family is rotation ordered: there is a point v+∈(v‾,vˉ)v^+\in(\underline v,\bar v)v+∈(v​,vˉ) with

∂H(v,α)∂α>0 (v<v+),∂H(v,α)∂α<0 (v>v+).\frac{\partial H(v,\alpha)}{\partial\alpha}>0 \ (v<v^+),\qquad \frac{\partial H(v,\alpha)}{\partial\alpha}<0 \ (v>v^+).∂α∂H(v,α)​>0 (v<v+),∂α∂H(v,α)​<0 (v>v+).

A more informative service spreads the posterior mean away from u^\hat uu^.

A service plan (T,α)(T,\alpha)(T,α) charges a fixed fee T≥0T\ge0T≥0. Serving a marketer with informativeness α\alphaα costs the seller k(α)k(\alpha)k(α), with k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0 and kkk increasing. A marketer targets exactly when v>cv>cv>c, so a marketer with cost cic_ici​ who buys (Tj,αj)(T_j,\alpha_j)(Tj​,αj​) earns

Uij=−Tj+∫civˉ(v−ci) dH(v,αj).U_{ij}=-T_j+\int_{c_i}^{\bar v}(v-c_i)\,dH(v,\alpha_j).Uij​=−Tj​+∫ci​vˉ​(v−ci​)dH(v,αj​).

Costs are cHc_HcH​ with probability θ∈(0,1)\theta\in(0,1)θ∈(0,1) and cLc_LcL​ with probability 1−θ1-\theta1−θ, 0<cL<cH0<c_L<c_H0<cL​<cH​. A data-append buyer can act without the data, so its outside option is Ui0=max⁡{u^−ci,0}U_{i0}=\max\{\hat u-c_i,0\}Ui0​=max{u^−ci​,0}.

The seller offers a menu (TH,αH),(TL,αL)(T_H,\alpha_H),(T_L,\alpha_L)(TH​,αH​),(TL​,αL​) and maximizes Π=θ[TH−k(αH)]+(1−θ)[TL−k(αL)]\Pi=\theta[T_H-k(\alpha_H)]+(1-\theta)[T_L-k(\alpha_L)]Π=θ[TH​−k(αH​)]+(1−θ)[TL​−k(αL​)] subject to individual rationality Uii≥Ui0U_{ii}\ge U_{i0}Uii​≥Ui0​ and incentive compatibility Uii≥Uii′U_{ii}\ge U_{ii'}Uii​≥Uii′​ for both types. Call any maximizer an optimal menu, with levels αH∗,αL∗\alpha^*_H,\alpha^*_LαH∗​,αL∗​. The benchmark with observable costs is

max⁡α∈[α‾,αˉ] θi[∫civˉ(v−ci) dH(v,α)−k(α)],\max_{\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]}\ \theta_i\Big[\int_{c_i}^{\bar v}(v-c_i)\,dH(v,\alpha)-k(\alpha)\Big],α∈[α​,αˉ]max​ θi​[∫ci​vˉ​(v−ci​)dH(v,α)−k(α)],

and its maximizers are the efficient levels αie\alpha^e_iαie​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7

Assume cL<cH<u^c_L<c_H<\hat ucL​<cH​<u^. If cL<cH<v+c_L<c_H<v^+cL​<cH​<v+, then

αH∗=αHe,αL∗<αLe,\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_H,\qquad \alpha^*_L<\alpha^e_L ,αH∗​=αHe​,αL∗​<αLe​,

and if v+<cL<cHv^+<c_L<c_Hv+<cL​<cH​, then

αH∗=αHe,αL∗>αLe.\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_H,\qquad \alpha^*_L>\alpha^e_L .αH∗​=αHe​,αL∗​>αLe​.

Here αH∗=αHe\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_HαH∗​=αHe​ means that the set of αH\alpha_HαH​-levels of optimal menus equals the set of efficient levels, and each strict inequality holds for every optimal menu and every efficient level.

Milestones

  1. The willingness to pay for a data append (p. 20): for c≤u^c\le\hat uc≤u^, Uij−Ui0=−Tj+∫v‾ci(ci−v) dH(v,αj)U_{ij}-U_{i0}=-T_j+\int_{\underline v}^{c_i}(c_i-v)\,dH(v,\alpha_j)Uij​−Ui0​=−Tj​+∫v​ci​​(ci​−v)dH(v,αj​), which is increasing in cic_ici​.
  2. Its integrated form (proof of Proposition 8, p. 33): Uij−Ui0=−Tj+∫v‾ciH(v,αj) dvU_{ij}-U_{i0}=-T_j+\int_{\underline v}^{c_i}H(v,\alpha_j)\,dvUij​−Ui0​=−Tj​+∫v​ci​​H(v,αj​)dv.
  3. The reduction (15) (p. 20): substituting the binding IRLIR_LIRL​ and ICH,LIC_{H,L}ICH,L​ turns the screening problem into a maximization over (αH,αL)(\alpha_H,\alpha_L)(αH​,αL​).
  4. (15) integrated by parts, and αH∗=αHe\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_HαH∗​=αHe​ for it (p. 33).
  5. The derivative ∂Π/∂αL\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha_L∂Π/∂αL​ of (15) compared with the benchmark's (p. 33).

Significance

Proposition 7 is the general-distribution form of a "double reversal". With marketing lists the low-cost marketers are the high type: they get efficient information, and the high-cost marketers' information is distorted (Proposition 5 of the paper). With data appends and costs below the prior mean, the outside option makes the high-cost marketers value data more. The roles of the types swap, and the direction of the distortion flips with the position of the costs relative to the rotation point. The result tells a data seller which customers to under- or over-supply, and shows that the answer depends on whether its data enable an action or only refine it.

The paper proves the result on a few pages, partly by phrases such as "it can be readily verified". No machine-checked version exists. A formalization makes explicit what the printed argument leaves implicit: that the dropped constraints hold at the reduced optimum, which regularity of kkk and HHH the strict inequalities need, and that statements about "the" optimum hold for every optimum when maximizers are not unique.

Difficulty

The obvious approach substitutes the binding constraints and compares first-order conditions. Two steps of it fail as stated. First, the reduction to (15) drops IRHIR_HIRH​ and ICL,HIC_{L,H}ICL,H​; ICL,HIC_{L,H}ICL,H​ holds at a maximizer of (15) only when the two informativeness levels are ordered as the rotation order dictates. That ordering is available only when both costs lie on the same side of v+v^+v+. Second, first-order conditions say nothing at a corner of [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ]. The strict comparison αL∗≠αLe\alpha^*_L\ne\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​ needs the efficient level to be interior, where the derivative of kkk exists. That comes from the conditions of footnote 5 together with the mean-preserving property of the family. The selling cost need not be convex, so maximizers can be non-unique, and every comparison must hold for every pair of maximizers.

Formalization scope

  • Information structure. A structure RotationFamily with a bounded support v‾<vˉ\underline v<\bar vv​<vˉ (the paper allows an unbounded one). H(⋅,α)H(\cdot,\alpha)H(⋅,α) is continuous on [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ] with H(v‾,α)=0H(\underline v,\alpha)=0H(v​,α)=0, H(vˉ,α)=1H(\bar v,\alpha)=1H(vˉ,α)=1 and derivative h(⋅,α)>0h(\cdot,\alpha)>0h(⋅,α)>0, continuous on the closed support. ∂H/∂α\partial H/\partial\alpha∂H/∂α exists on the closed support. The rotation order (9) holds on the open support, and the mean is u^\hat uu^ for every α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). Condition (10) is not assumed; it follows.
  • Model. Model extends it with 0<α‾<αˉ<10<\underline\alpha<\bar\alpha<10<α​<αˉ<1, θ∈(0,1)\theta\in(0,1)θ∈(0,1), and 0<cL<cH0<c_L<c_H0<cL​<cH​ with both costs in (v‾,vˉ)(\underline v,\bar v)(v​,vˉ) (a pin: the integrals ∫civˉ\int_{c_i}^{\bar v}∫ci​vˉ​ presume it). It also fixes k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0 with kkk monotone on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ]. dHdHdH is written as h dvh\,dvhdv.
  • Objects of the goal. Optimal menus are maximizers of the full problem: fees T≥0T\ge0T≥0, levels in [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ], IRiIR_iIRi​ with outside option max⁡{u^−ci,0}\max\{\hat u-c_i,0\}max{u^−ci​,0}, and both IC constraints. Efficient levels are maximizers of the benchmark (12). Neither is defined through (15) or a first-order condition. That would make the first half of the goal a restatement of milestone 4, and writing the outside option as u^−c\hat u-cu^−c instead of the maximum would change the model.
  • Pinned hypotheses. On the goal only: the part of footnote 5 the strict results use (kkk continuous on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ], differentiable inside, k′(α‾)=0k'(\underline\alpha)=0k′(α​)=0 from the right, k′(α)→+∞k'(\alpha)\to+\inftyk′(α)→+∞ as α→αˉ−\alpha\to\bar\alpha^-α→αˉ−) and joint continuity of ∂H/∂α\partial H/\partial\alpha∂H/∂α on [v‾,vˉ]×(0,1)[\underline v,\bar v]\times(0,1)[v​,vˉ]×(0,1). The derivative milestone uses only the latter. Convexity of kkk is not assumed.
  • Range restriction. The first sentence of Proposition 7 (αH∗=αHe\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_HαH∗​=αHe​) is posed on the full problem only within the two ranges cH<v+c_H<v^+cH​<v+ and v+<cLv^+<c_Lv+<cL​. For (15) it is posed without restriction in milestone 4. The branch v+<cL<cH<u^v^+<c_L<c_H<\hat uv+<cL​<cH​<u^ is empty when v+≥u^v^+\ge\hat uv+≥u^, for example for symmetric structures; non-symmetric rotation families with v+<u^v^+<\hat uv+<u^ inhabit it.
  • Reuse. Topkis's monotonicity theorem (Theorem 2.8.4) is on the platform and is the tool the paper invokes. The integration-by-parts facts for distribution functions on a bounded support, and differentiation of ∫cvˉH(v,α) dv\int_c^{\bar v}H(v,\alpha)\,dv∫cvˉ​H(v,α)dv in α\alphaα, are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome.

Selected references

  • Liang Guo, Selling Data to Marketers, Management Science, 2025 (author's manuscript used here). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350
  • Justin P. Johnson and David P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design, American Economic Review 96(3), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806777211946
  • Donald M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, 2014. https://www.ftc.gov/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014
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AnalysisFunctional Analysis·Captain: Lucas

Hamburger Moment Problem (Wikipedia) I: Characterization and Uniqueness of SolutionsTextbook

Motivation

A sequence of real numbers (m0,m1,m2,… )(m_0, m_1, m_2, \dots)(m0​,m1​,m2​,…) often arrives as a list of moments: averages E[Xn]\mathbb E[X^n]E[Xn] of powers of a random variable, traces ⟨Tne,e⟩\langle T^n e, e\rangle⟨Tne,e⟩ of powers of a self-adjoint operator, or coefficients of a continued fraction. The Hamburger moment problem, named after Hans Ludwig Hamburger (1920–21), asks when such a list really comes from a measure on the whole real line, and, when it does, whether the measure is determined by its moments. The question sits at the junction of probability (the method of moments, identification of limit laws), spectral theory of symmetric operators and Jacobi matrices, and the theory of orthogonal polynomials; standard monographs include Shohat–Tamarkin (1943) and Schmüdgen (2017).

Timeline (as summarized in the source article and its references):

  1. 1894 — Stieltjes treats the analogous problem on [0,+∞)[0,+\infty)[0,+∞) (the Stieltjes moment problem).
  2. 1920–21 — Hamburger extends the theory to the whole real line: solvability is equivalent to positivity of the Hankel kernel (mj+k)(m_{j+k})(mj+k​).
  3. 1920s — Carleman gives a growth condition on the moments guaranteeing uniqueness (Carleman's condition); the factorial growth bound ∣mn∣≤CDnn!|m_n| \le C D^n n!∣mn​∣≤CDnn! is a special case (Reed–Simon 1975, p. 205).
  4. Later — the operator-theoretic treatment through self-adjoint extensions of the shift operator and its spectral measure becomes standard (Reed–Simon 1975, p. 145).

Setting

Let m=(mn)n≥0m = (m_n)_{n \ge 0}m=(mn​)n≥0​ be a sequence of real numbers. A solution of the Hamburger moment problem for mmm is a positive Borel measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR such that every power xnx^nxn is μ\muμ-integrable and

mn=∫−∞∞xn dμ(x)(n=0,1,2,… ).m_n = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x^n \, d\mu(x) \qquad (n = 0, 1, 2, \dots).mn​=∫−∞∞​xndμ(x)(n=0,1,2,…).

The sequence mmm is a moment sequence if at least one solution exists.

The Hankel kernel of mmm is the infinite matrix A=(mj+k)j,k≥0A = (m_{j+k})_{j,k \ge 0}A=(mj+k​)j,k≥0​. It is positive definite (in the sense of the source) if

∑j,k≥0mj+k cjck‾  ≥  0\sum_{j,k \ge 0} m_{j+k}\, c_j \overline{c_k} \;\ge\; 0j,k≥0∑​mj+k​cj​ck​​≥0

for every finitary complex sequence (cj)j≥0(c_j)_{j \ge 0}(cj​)j≥0​, i.e. cj=0c_j = 0cj​=0 for all but finitely many jjj. Its finite sections are the (n+1)×(n+1)(n+1)\times(n+1)(n+1)×(n+1) Hankel matrices

Δn=(mi+j)0≤i,j≤n.\Delta_n = (m_{i+j})_{0 \le i,j \le n}.Δn​=(mi+j​)0≤i,j≤n​.

In the Lean development these objects are IsMomentMeasure m μ, IsMomentSequence m, hankelForm m c, HankelPosDef m and hankelMatrix m n, all in the namespace HamburgerMoment.

Formalization targets

Goal — Hamburger's characterization

m is a moment sequence  ⟺  ∑j,k≥0mj+kcjck‾≥0 for every finitary (cj)⊂C.m \text{ is a moment sequence} \iff \sum_{j,k \ge 0} m_{j+k} c_j \overline{c_k} \ge 0 \text{ for every finitary } (c_j) \subset \mathbb C.m is a moment sequence⟺j,k≥0∑​mj+k​cj​ck​​≥0 for every finitary (cj​)⊂C.

Milestones

  1. The identity ∑j,kmj+kcjck‾=∫∣∑jcjxj∣2 dμ(x)\sum_{j,k} m_{j+k} c_j \overline{c_k} = \int |\sum_j c_j x^j|^2 \, d\mu(x)∑j,k​mj+k​cj​ck​​=∫∣∑j​cj​xj∣2dμ(x) for any solution μ\muμ, and the resulting "only if" direction.
  2. The "if" direction: a positive definite Hankel kernel is the kernel of a moment sequence.
  3. The solution set is convex; hence a solvable problem has either a unique solution or infinitely many.
  4. Positivity of AAA gives det⁡Δn≥0\det \Delta_n \ge 0detΔn​≥0 for all nnn; if det⁡Δn=0\det \Delta_n = 0detΔn​=0 for some nnn, the solution is unique and finitely supported.
  5. Uniqueness under the growth bound ∣mn∣≤CDnn!|m_n| \le C D^n n!∣mn​∣≤CDnn!.
  6. Existence of moment sequences with more than one solution.
  7. The real-polynomial identity ∫p2 dμ=∑j,kajakmj+k≥0\int p^2 \, d\mu = \sum_{j,k} a_j a_k m_{j+k} \ge 0∫p2dμ=∑j,k​aj​ak​mj+k​≥0, and the characterization of moment sequences by positive semidefiniteness of all real Hankel matrices Δn\Delta_nΔn​.

Significance

The result. Hamburger's theorem turns an existence question about measures into a family of finite-dimensional positivity conditions that can be checked on the data. It is the basic tool behind the method of moments in probability (identifying a distribution from its moments, when the problem is determinate), behind the spectral theory of Jacobi matrices, and behind Gauss quadrature and orthogonal polynomials on the line. The uniqueness criteria decide when moments determine a law; the non-uniqueness examples (for instance the log-normal distribution) show that they do not always do so.

Formalizing it. All results here are classical and proved in the literature; to the best of the captain's knowledge none of them is currently available as a formal statement in Mathlib, which has neither moment problems nor Hankel kernels. The mission produces a reusable vocabulary (moment measures, Hankel forms and matrices) and machine-checked versions of the existence theorem, the uniqueness criteria and the non-uniqueness phenomenon.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction is a direct computation. The converse is the substance: from positivity of countably many finite quadratic forms one must produce a countably additive measure on a non-compact space with all moments matching. Compactness arguments on finite sections give measures whose low-order moments match, but mass can escape to infinity and higher moments need not converge; the source's route instead goes through the Hilbert space completion of finitary sequences, self-adjoint extensions of the (generally unbounded) shift operator and the spectral theorem for unbounded self-adjoint operators — machinery that is only partly present in Mathlib. An alternative route via positive linear functionals on polynomials (M. Riesz extension, Riesz–Markov–Kakutani) has to control the same escape of mass. The uniqueness criterion requires quasi-analyticity or Carleman-type estimates.

Formalization scope

  1. Sequences are m : ℕ → ℝ; measures are Measure ℝ on the Borel σ-algebra of R\mathbb RR. A solution must have every power xnx^nxn integrable, so in particular μ\muμ is finite with total mass m0m_0m0​.
  2. Finitary complex sequences are finitely supported functions ℕ →₀ ℂ, and the Hankel form is the finite double sum over the support. "≥0\ge 0≥0" is the order on C\mathbb CC (the value is a nonnegative real number), matching the source.
  3. Δn\Delta_nΔn​ is the real matrix indexed by Fin (n + 1); positive semidefiniteness is Mathlib's Matrix.PosSemidef.
  4. Uniqueness statements quantify over all solutions; finite support means the solution vanishes outside a finite set.

Needed infrastructure and welcome contributions: polynomial integrability under finite moments, positive linear functionals on R[x]\mathbb R[x]R[x], a Riesz–Markov or spectral-measure construction on R\mathbb RR, Vandermonde arguments for finitely supported measures, and Carleman / quasi-analyticity estimates. The definitions of moment measures and Hankel kernels are reusable for the Stieltjes and Hausdorff moment problems.

Selected references

  • Wikipedia, Hamburger moment problem, revision oldid=1356180072, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hamburger_moment_problem&oldid=1356180072
  • H. Hamburger, Über eine Erweiterung des Stieltjesschen Momentenproblems, Math. Ann. 81 (1920), 235–319; 82 (1921), 120–164, 168–187.
  • M. Reed, B. Simon, Methods of Modern Mathematical Physics II: Fourier Analysis, Self-Adjointness, Academic Press, 1975, pp. 145, 205.
  • T. S. Chihara, An Introduction to Orthogonal Polynomials, Gordon and Breach, 1978, pp. 56, 73.
  • K. Schmüdgen, The Moment Problem, Graduate Texts in Mathematics 277, Springer, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64546-9
  • J. A. Shohat, J. D. Tamarkin, The Problem of Moments, AMS, 1943.
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Optimization·Captain: Lucas

Secretary Problem: the 37% RuleTextbook

Motivation

The secretary problem is the standard example of an optimal stopping problem with partial information. It is also known as the marriage problem, the sultan's dowry problem, the fussy suitor problem, the googol game and the best choice problem. It is studied in applied probability, statistics and decision theory. Its solution is often called the 37% rule: a simple rule picks the single best of nnn applicants with probability about 1/e≈0.3681/e \approx 0.3681/e≈0.368, whether there are 100 or 100 million applicants (Wikipedia: Secretary problem). The problem is a standard example of the exploration–exploitation dilemma.

Timeline (as recounted in the Wikipedia article's History section, following Ferguson 1989):

  • 1949: Merrill M. Flood introduces the problem (as the "fiancée problem") in a lecture. It then spreads as folklore through the 1950s.
  • 1958: Flood circulates a letter outlining a proof of the optimal strategy. Its appendix by R. Palermo proves that every strategy is dominated by one of the form "reject the first ppp unconditionally, then accept the next candidate who is better".
  • 1960: First publication, in Martin Gardner's Scientific American column (February 1960), with the analysis supplied by Leo Moser and J. R. Pounder.
  • 1966: Gilbert and Mosteller, "Recognizing the maximum of a sequence", a detailed study of the problem and many variants.
  • 1989: Ferguson, "Who solved the secretary problem?", a historical survey.
  • 2000: Bruss's odds theorem, which the article calls the shortest rigorous proof known.

Setting

There is a single position and there are nnn applicants, where nnn is known. If seen together, the applicants can be ranked from best to worst with no ties. They are interviewed one at a time in a uniformly random order: each of the n!n!n! orders is equally likely. Right after each interview the applicant is either accepted, which ends the process, or rejected for good. The decision may depend only on the relative ranks of the applicants interviewed so far. The objective is to maximize the probability of selecting the best applicant of the whole group.

An order is a permutation σ\sigmaσ of {0,…,n−1}\{0,\dots,n-1\}{0,…,n−1}. The applicant interviewed at time iii has quality σ(i)\sigma(i)σ(i), where larger means better. The relative rank of the applicant interviewed at time jjj is the number of applicants interviewed before time jjj who are worse than them. A stopping rule sss maps the list of relative ranks observed so far to "accept" or "reject". Its success probability Pn(s)P_n(s)Pn​(s) is the fraction of the n!n!n! orders on which the applicant accepted by sss is the overall best. A rule that never accepts anyone fails. The optimal success probability is

Vn=sup⁡sPn(s).V_n = \sup_s P_n(s).Vn​=ssup​Pn​(s).

A candidate is an applicant who is better than every applicant interviewed before them. The cutoff rule with cutoff rrr rejects the first r−1r-1r−1 applicants and then accepts the first candidate after that point.

Formalization targets

Goal: the 37% rule

lim⁡n→∞Vn=1e.\lim_{n\to\infty} V_n = \frac1e .n→∞lim​Vn​=e1​.

Milestones (following the article's derivation)

  1. Pn(cutoff 1)=1/nP_n(\text{cutoff } 1) = 1/nPn​(cutoff 1)=1/n.
  2. For 2≤r≤n2\le r\le n2≤r≤n: Pn(cutoff r)=r−1n∑i=rn1i−1P_n(\text{cutoff } r) = \dfrac{r-1}{n}\displaystyle\sum_{i=r}^{n}\frac{1}{i-1}Pn​(cutoff r)=nr−1​i=r∑n​i−11​.
  3. Some cutoff rule with 1≤r≤n1\le r\le n1≤r≤n is optimal among all rank-based stopping rules.
  4. The table of optimal cutoffs and optimal success probabilities for n=1,…,10n=1,\dots,10n=1,…,10.
  5. If rn/n→x∈[0,1]r_n/n\to x\in[0,1]rn​/n→x∈[0,1], then Pn(cutoff rn)→x∫x1dtt=−xlog⁡xP_n(\text{cutoff } r_n)\to x\int_x^1 \frac{dt}{t} = -x\log xPn​(cutoff rn​)→x∫x1​tdt​=−xlogx.
  6. On [0,1][0,1][0,1] the function −xlog⁡x-x\log x−xlogx has maximum value 1/e1/e1/e, attained only at x=1/ex=1/ex=1/e.
  7. Optimal cutoffs satisfy rn/n→1/er_n/n\to 1/ern​/n→1/e.
  8. Vn≥1/eV_n \ge 1/eVn​≥1/e for every n≥1n\ge 1n≥1.

Significance

The result. The 37% rule is the classical result of optimal stopping. It shows that a fixed fraction of the best possible success probability survives as the number of options grows without bound, and that a simple threshold policy achieves it. The structure of its solution has three parts: optimal rules may be taken to be threshold rules, there is an exact formula in terms of the records of a uniformly random permutation, and a limit turns a harmonic sum into an integral. This structure recurs throughout the best-choice literature, including the prophet-secretary and multi-choice secretary problems.

Formalizing it. The result has been proved since the late 1950s and early 1960s. The remaining work is to formalize the known proof: a model of rank-based stopping rules over uniformly random permutations, the exact success probability of cutoff rules, the optimality of cutoff rules among all rank-based rules, and the asymptotics.

Difficulty

The success probability of a fixed cutoff rule and the calculus limit are elementary. The central step is the optimality of cutoff rules (Milestone 3). A stopping rule may depend arbitrarily on the whole history of relative ranks, and one has to show that no such rule beats the best cutoff rule. Evaluating cutoff rules alone does not prove the goal, because VnV_nVn​ is a supremum over all rank-based rules. A second, smaller difficulty is that the limit statements need control of the harmonic sums along a varying cutoff rnr_nrn​, not only along a fixed ratio.

Formalization scope

  • The sample space is the finite set Equiv.Perm (Fin n) with uniform weights. successProb n s is the ratio (number of winning permutations) / n!n!n! in R\mathbb RR.
  • A stopping rule is a deterministic function List ℕ → Bool, applied to the list of relative ranks observed so far. Through the length of the list it also knows the current time. It never sees absolute qualities. Randomized rules are not modelled. A randomized rule is a mixture of deterministic ones, so it cannot do better.
  • optimalProb n is the real supremum of successProb n s over all such rules. The values lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1], so the supremum is the usual least upper bound.
  • Times are 0-based in Lean (Fin n). Cutoffs rrr are 1-based, as in the article: cutoffRule r accepts at time iii exactly when i+1≥ri+1 \ge ri+1≥r and the current applicant is a candidate.
  • 1/e1/e1/e is written Real.exp (-1).
  • The 1/e-law of best choice (unknown number of applicants, Bruss 1984), the odds algorithm, cardinal-payoff variants and the other generalizations in the article are outside this mission.

All declarations live in the namespace ClassicalSecretary. Reusable contributions are welcome, in particular facts about records of uniformly random permutations (independence of relative ranks, the probability that position iii is a record) and a backward-induction principle for finite-horizon stopping problems.

Selected references

  • Wikipedia contributors, Secretary problem, sections "Formulation" and "Deriving the optimal policy". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_problem
  • T. S. Ferguson, Who solved the secretary problem?, Statistical Science 4(3), 282–289, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1177012493
  • J. Gilbert, F. Mosteller, Recognizing the maximum of a sequence, Journal of the American Statistical Association 61(313), 35–73, 1966. https://doi.org/10.2307/2283044
  • F. T. Bruss, Sum the odds to one and stop, Annals of Probability 28(3), 1384–1391, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1019160340
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Operations Research·Captain: Lucas

Symmetric Rendezvous on the LineOpen Problem

Motivation

Rendezvous search asks how two agents who cannot communicate should move so as to meet as quickly as possible. It was introduced as a mathematical problem by Alpern (The rendezvous search problem, SIAM J. Control Optim. 1995) and developed systematically in Alpern and Gal's monograph The Theory of Search Games and Rendezvous (Kluwer, 2003). Besides its game-theoretic interest, it is a model for coordination without prior agreement: robots or searchers that must find each other with no shared map or orientation.

The simplest non-trivial domain is the line. Even there, the version in which both agents must follow the same strategy remains open, and it is listed on the Open Problem Garden with importance "High".

Timeline:

  • 1995. Alpern formulates symmetric rendezvous search problems, in which the players must use the same mixed strategy.
  • 1995. Alpern and Gal (Rendezvous search on the line with distinguishable players, SIAM J. Control Optim. 33(4)) solve the asymmetric problem on the line, where the players may use different strategies: the optimal expected meeting time is 3.253.253.25.
  • 1995–2008. A series of papers improve upper and lower bounds on the symmetric value.
  • 2008. Han, Du, Vera and Zuluaga (Improved bounds for the symmetric rendezvous search problem on the line, Operations Research 56(3)) show that strategies moving at full speed and turning only at integer times dominate, reducing the problem to a discrete one, prove 4.1520<R<4.25744.1520 < R < 4.25744.1520<R<4.2574, and conjecture R=4.25R = 4.25R=4.25.

Setting

Two players are placed on the real line at distance 222; player I starts at 000 and player II at 222. Each player has a private sense of "forward", fixed by an independent fair coin, so neither knows in which direction the other lies. Both move with speed at most 111.

A feasible path is a function fff with f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0 and ∣f(s)−f(t)∣≤∣s−t∣|f(s)-f(t)|\le |s-t|∣f(s)−f(t)∣≤∣s−t∣ for s,t≥0s,t\ge 0s,t≥0, describing a player's position in its own frame. A mixed strategy SSS is a probability distribution over feasible paths, realised as a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,P)(Ω,P) and a random path ω↦fω\omega\mapsto f_\omegaω↦fω​ whose position at each fixed time is measurable.

If player I follows fff with orientation ε1∈{±1}\varepsilon_1\in\{\pm1\}ε1​∈{±1} and player II follows ggg with orientation ε2\varepsilon_2ε2​, their positions are ε1f(t)\varepsilon_1 f(t)ε1​f(t) and 2+ε2g(t)2+\varepsilon_2 g(t)2+ε2​g(t). The meeting time is

T=inf⁡{t≥0: ε1f(t)=2+ε2g(t)}∈[0,∞].T=\inf\{t\ge 0:\ \varepsilon_1 f(t) = 2+\varepsilon_2 g(t)\}\in[0,\infty].T=inf{t≥0: ε1​f(t)=2+ε2​g(t)}∈[0,∞].

For strategies S1,S2S_1,S_2S1​,S2​ with independent randomisations, the expected meeting time E(S1,S2)E(S_1,S_2)E(S1​,S2​) averages TTT over f∼S1f\sim S_1f∼S1​, g∼S2g\sim S_2g∼S2​ and the four equally likely orientation pairs. The symmetric rendezvous value and the asymmetric rendezvous value are

R=inf⁡SE(S,S),Ra=inf⁡S1,S2E(S1,S2).R=\inf_{S} E(S,S),\qquad R^a=\inf_{S_1,S_2}E(S_1,S_2).R=Sinf​E(S,S),Ra=S1​,S2​inf​E(S1​,S2​).

An integer zigzag is a path that on each interval [n,n+1][n,n+1][n,n+1], n∈Nn\in\mathbb Nn∈N, moves with velocity +1+1+1 or −1-1−1; RdiscR_{\mathrm{disc}}Rdisc​ denotes the infimum of E(S,S)E(S,S)E(S,S) over strategies supported on integer zigzags.

Formalization targets

Goal: the conjectured value

R=174.R=\frac{17}{4}.R=417​.

This is the Han–Du–Vera–Zuluaga conjecture and answers the Open Problem Garden question. A formal disproof is equally valuable.

Milestones from the literature

  1. Alpern–Gal: Ra=134R^a = \dfrac{13}{4}Ra=413​.
  2. Han–Du–Vera–Zuluaga reduction: R=RdiscR = R_{\mathrm{disc}}R=Rdisc​.
  3. Han–Du–Vera–Zuluaga lower bound: 4.1520<R4.1520 < R4.1520<R.
  4. Han–Du–Vera–Zuluaga upper bound: R<4.2574R < 4.2574R<4.2574.

Significance

The value RRR measures the cost of symmetry in the most basic rendezvous problem: Ra=3.25R^a = 3.25Ra=3.25 when roles can be pre-assigned, while the best known symmetric strategies need about 4.254.254.25. Determining RRR exactly would settle a problem that has been open since 1995 and would calibrate numerical methods (linear and semidefinite relaxations over discretised strategies) used for related search games.

None of these results is formalized. The milestones are proved on paper; formalizing them requires a measure-theoretic treatment of mixed strategies over path space, a rigorous version of the discretisation argument, and certified numerical bounds. The goal itself is open.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to optimise over finitely many turning times, but a symmetric strategy must be randomised (any deterministic symmetric strategy fails to meet with probability 1/21/21/2, when both players face the same way), so the optimisation is over probability distributions on infinite paths and the objective is a quadratic, non-convex function of the distribution. Truncating to finite horizons gives upper bounds by explicit strategies, but lower bounds require controlling all strategies, including those that delay indefinitely, and the known gap 4.15204.15204.1520–4.25744.25744.2574 has resisted closing.

Formalization scope

All values live in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and expectations are Lebesgue integrals of non-negative functions; a strategy that fails to meet with positive probability has value ∞\infty∞. Sample spaces range over a fixed universe, which loses no generality. Paths are required to be 111-Lipschitz on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0, and positions at fixed times are measurable, so meeting times are random variables. The four orientation pairs are weighted equally. The infimum in RRR ranges over all such strategies, not only over integer zigzags; the restriction appears only in RdiscR_{\mathrm{disc}}Rdisc​. A trivializing reading (e.g. a meeting time of 000 or an unrestricted speed) is excluded: by construction every strategy pair has expected meeting time at least 111.

Contributions are welcome on: measurability of hitting times for continuous processes, the discretisation argument, explicit strategies with certified expected meeting times, and certified lower-bound certificates.

Selected references

  • S. Alpern, The rendezvous search problem, SIAM J. Control Optim. 33(3) (1995), 673–683.
  • S. Alpern, S. Gal, Rendezvous search on the line with distinguishable players, SIAM J. Control Optim. 33(4) (1995), 1270–1276.
  • S. Alpern, S. Gal, The Theory of Search Games and Rendezvous, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 55, Kluwer, 2003.
  • Q. Han, D. Du, J. C. Vera, L. F. Zuluaga, Improved bounds for the symmetric rendezvous search problem on the line, Operations Research 56(3) (2008).
  • Open Problem Garden, Rendezvous on a line. http://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/rendezvous_on_a_line
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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics LXXXVIII: Stochastic Investment Returns and Regular Contribution MomentsTextbook

Motivation

Uncertain financial returns affect funded pensions, DC saving and endowment adequacy. A single investment rate selected once and held fixed for the full projection is fundamentally different from a genuinely independent sequence of annual investment returns. The former produces expected powers of a single random variable while the latter factorises independent annual gross-return moments. These distinctions underpin the financial risk assumptions in stochastic finance models. Existing actuarial missions cover discounted deterministic cashflows but not these stochastic accumulation and contributions.

Setting

Annual gross returns equal one plus their annual net investment returns. A finite probability space has actual scenario masses with total one, so expectation and variance are weighted finite sums. The fixed-rate accumulation raises the same scenario gross factor to the investment horizon. For independent years the model explicitly constructs a product joint mass p(a)q(b) and verifies the first and second product moments. A real pension fund receives a contribution at the beginning of the year before earning its realised gross return.

Formalization targets

The formalisation develops a connected set of actuarial identities, beginning with precise model definitions and ending with the prospective valuation result.

Finite-scenario investment returns and fixed random rates

A finite discrete fixed-rate model begins at a sure one.

Sn=(1+I)n,E[Sn]=∑ωpω(1+Iω)nS_n=(1+I)^n,\quad \mathbb{E}[S_n]=\sum_{\omega}p_{\omega}(1+I_{\omega})^nSn​=(1+I)n,E[Sn​]=ω∑​pω​(1+Iω​)n

Independent annual returns on actual product scenarios

Actual joint product probability laws establish two independent annual accumulation moments.

E[G1G2]=E[G1]E[G2]\mathbb{E}[G_1G_2]=\mathbb{E}[G_1]\mathbb{E}[G_2]E[G1​G2​]=E[G1​]E[G2​]

Regular contributions and fund first/second-moment recursions

The independent-return pension accumulation recursions reconcile first and second fund moments including contribution cross terms.

An+1=(An+c)Gn+1,mn+1=(mn+c)GˉA_{n+1}=(A_n+c)G_{n+1},\quad m_{n+1}=(m_n+c)\bar GAn+1​=(An​+c)Gn+1​,mn+1​=(mn​+c)Gˉ

Capstone theorem

The independent-return pension accumulation recursions reconcile first and second fund moments including contribution cross terms.

An+1=(An+c)Gn+1,mn+1=(mn+c)GˉA_{n+1}=(A_n+c)G_{n+1},\quad m_{n+1}=(m_n+c)\bar GAn+1​=(An​+c)Gn+1​,mn+1​=(mn​+c)Gˉ

Significance

As discussed in Shreve's stochastic-finance treatment, The capstones distinguish random fixed returns from actually independent annual returns without presupposing a target identity. For the latter, the true two-year joint probability law factorises the expected growth and its second moment. Under subsequent iid moment factorisation, a multi-year first and second return moment model yields an exact variance recursion. The fund valuation then derives consistent one-step mean, second-moment and variance formulae with contributions, including the cross-term from previously accumulated assets. The model is useful for genuine stochastic saving, actuarial adequacy and projected pension risk.

Difficulty

It is mathematically false in general that expected compound returns equal the power of the expected rate for a fixed but random interest assumption. Genuine product probability weights, not a definition of independence as the desired conclusion, support the two-year factorisation. For a regular savings fund, the contribution is invested with the previous fund, so the second moment includes a cross term twice the contribution times the prior expected fund. The variance has to be derived from the two independently defined moments with positive gross-return second-moment bounds. All signs and independence restrictions should be preserved at every step.

Formalization scope

Fixed stochastic-rate model and independent annual returns are distinct mathematical constructs in this model. A future substantial probability model could construct fully independent n-year return families and an exact savings accumulation probability distribution, rather than stopping at the two-year product law. The present source has nontrivial results because it independently calculates both moments of an actual joint scenario distribution and reconciles the cross terms in the savings fund variance. Existing stochastic insurance claims calculations alone do not provide an investment growth scenario model. This finite product model and fund recursion are reusable for defined contribution pensions, insurance asset adequacy testing and later cashflow simulations.

For a random interest rate sampled once at issue and held fixed, the expected n-year accumulation is an expectation of a random power, not generally a power of the expected return. If annual investment returns instead vary independently, the gross growth factors are multiplied across years and their expected product factorises. This mission proves the two-year factorisation from genuine independent finite product-state probability masses, without taking independence to mean the target moment identity by definition. For regular savings, contribution timing matters because a beginning-of-period contribution earns that period's return. The second-moment recursion must therefore contain the mixed term twice the contribution times the previous expected fund. These identities provide an actuarial basis for testing pension fund accumulation and capital adequacy, but do not justify a normal or lognormal fund distribution merely from calculated means and variances.

The principal independence derivation is from an actual finite two-year product scenario model, while the general n-year variance is stated as an explicit algebraic moment-factorisation law. Deriving n-way stochastic independence under a full probability measure, lognormal approximate fund distribution and path-dependent contributions remains work for subsequent substantial probability theory. No normal approximation or lognormality is assumed from mean and variance alone. These open theorem targets are not accepted proofs.

These are original derived finite/analytic Actuarial formalisation targets rather than reproductions of a numbered textbook theorem. Exact Lean binder declarations are authoritative. The complete source uses targeted Mathlib imports and no local Lean compilation. All proof bodies remain genuinely open and do not constitute accepted results. Assumptions about negative rates, survival, policyholder independence, discounting and benefit timing must be preserved exactly.

Selected references

  • S. E. Shreve (2004), Stochastic Calculus for Finance I: The Binomial Asset Pricing Model, Springer. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-0-387-22527-2
  • S. David Promislow (2015), Fundamentals of Actuarial Mathematics, Wiley, accumulation and stochastic investment model chapters. https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Fundamentals+of+Actuarial+Mathematics%2C+3rd+Edition-p-9781118782521
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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics XCII: Unit-Linked Fund Charges, Non-Unit Cashflows and Profit TestingTextbook

Motivation

Unit-linked life and pension policies require careful accounting for where gross premiums go, which underlying fund units are purchased and which charges are received by the insurer. The FCA's unit-linked review identifies allocation, management, surrender and other policy charges as distinct insurer cashflows. Earlier actuarial missions XLVI and LXIX already formalise simple unit funds and guarantees, but lack explicit offer/bid unit pricing and a fully reconciled insurer non-unit profit signature.

Setting

A policyholder pays a gross premium, of which an allocation percentage is invested at the offer price and the remainder is retained by the insurer. Unit-holders value their existing holdings using the bid price. Management and fixed administration charges reduce fund assets; a guaranteed minimum death benefit creates an insurer mortality risk above the unit-linked fund. The insurer's non-unit account collects charges and premium differences and separately pays expenses, commissions and mortality guarantee strain.

Formalization targets

The formalisation develops a connected set of actuarial identities, beginning with precise model definitions and ending with the prospective valuation result.

Premium allocation, bid and offer prices and fund charges

Cancelling no more units than held retains a nonnegative unit account.

Ut=Ut−1+atPtOt−CtBtU_t=U_{t-1}+\frac{a_t P_t}{O_t}-\frac{C_t}{B_t}Ut​=Ut−1​+Ot​at​Pt​​−Bt​Ct​​

Risk guarantees, surrender payments and reserve strain

A nonnegative surrender charge cannot increase the positive fund value.

Btdeath=max⁡(Ft,Gt),Rt=(Gt−Ft)+B_t^{\text{death}}=\max(F_t,G_t),\quad R_t=(G_t-F_t)^+Btdeath​=max(Ft​,Gt​),Rt​=(Gt​−Ft​)+

Non-unit profit signatures and discounted insurer margins

Actual unit premium allocation and bid-offer cost reconcile with the insurer's separate death guarantee obligations and complete non-unit cashflow profit account.

Π=∑tvtpt(incomet−outgot)\Pi=\sum_t v^t p_t\left(\text{income}_t-\text{outgo}_t\right)Π=t∑​vtpt​(incomet​−outgot​)

Capstone theorem

Actual unit premium allocation and bid-offer cost reconcile with the insurer's separate death guarantee obligations and complete non-unit cashflow profit account.

Π=∑tvtpt(incomet−outgot)\Pi=\sum_t v^t p_t\left(\text{income}_t-\text{outgo}_t\right)Π=t∑​vtpt​(incomet​−outgot​)

Significance

As discussed in the FCA's unit-linked review, The target reconciles every gross premium unit purchase and retained amount; it values immediate bid-offer spread costs, decomposes guaranteed death benefits into the invested fund plus net insurer amount at risk, and establishes an independent non-unit profit cashflow balance. Additional supporting theorems make the risk discount present value additive across the profit signature, with correct timing of beginning-year premium allocations and end-year fund costs. This provides an exact starting point for insurance policy profit testing and the analysis of charge sensitivity.

Difficulty

Bid and offer prices cannot be interchanged: a unit bought at offer is valued at bid and a positive spread produces a real cost even with unchanged market prices. A premium allocation percentage is not identical to the percentage of bid value created. Death insurance cost is the excess guaranteed benefit above the fund, rather than the total benefit, because fund assets already cover the remainder. The non-unit income and the actual expenses/commission/insurance risk must be kept separate rather than silently netted inside fund performance. The proof must impose suitable positivity on offer prices and fund values.

Formalization scope

Bid-offer spread and non-unit profit signature are distinct mathematical constructs in this model. A future extension will include surrender probabilities, partial withdrawal, guaranteed annuity options and stochastic policyholder behaviour, together with a non-unit reserve liability under the prospective profit-testing basis. The current identities are nontrivial because they distinguish bid-valued units bought at an offer price, actual management charges, underlying expenses and the top-up death cost. Existing unit account and zeroisation missions do not include all these separate components in one coherent insurer profit signature. The explicit fund and charge functions are reusable for product pricing sensitivities, reserve testing and financial reporting.

Insurance premiums credited to unit-linked funds are converted into units at the offer price, but the policyholder's fund is valued using the bid price. A positive spread therefore creates an immediate difference even when financial markets have not moved. Management fees and policy administration charges reduce the unit fund, whereas amounts charged to policyholders generate insurer non-unit income and are not synonymous with the actual expenses incurred. A guaranteed death benefit creates mortality cost only on the positive excess above the linked fund value; it would double-count fund assets to charge the full guaranteed amount as non-unit insurer cost. The non-unit profit signature then recognises unallocated premiums, spreads and management and administration charges less commission, expenses, additional death cover and any guarantee cost. Future cashflows are discounted year by year. These identities form a precise accounting model, not a regulatory determination of fair consumer value.

The mission develops one-period unit accounting and finite annual expected profit signatures. It is not a market conduct or compliance assessment of a particular insurer. Fund return and projected mortality are explicit model inputs and do not assert a complete stochastic-policy profit distribution. Complex paid-up terms, partial surrender and non-unit reserve zeroisation have related earlier mission infrastructure and require further integration. Every Lean theorem remains open.

These are original derived finite/analytic Actuarial formalisation targets rather than reproductions of a numbered textbook theorem. Exact Lean binder declarations are authoritative. The complete source uses targeted Mathlib imports and no local Lean compilation. All proof bodies remain genuinely open and do not constitute accepted results. Assumptions about negative rates, survival, policyholder independence, discounting and benefit timing must be preserved exactly.

Selected references

  • Financial Conduct Authority (2026), Unit-linked pensions and savings: price and value practices. https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/unit-linked-pensions-and-savings-multi-firm-review-consumer-duty-price-and-value-practices
  • Financial Conduct Authority (2016), Fair treatment of long-standing customers in the life insurance sector, TR16/2. https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/thematic-reviews/tr16-02
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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics LXXXVII: Inflation-Adjusted Claim Triangles and Average Cost ReservingTextbook

Motivation

General-insurance reserving methods must distinguish development of claim payments from changes in their price level. The IFoA inflation reserving guidance distinguishes implicit and explicit inflation adjustments. Its earlier claims reserving report identifies inflation and average cost per claim methods alongside standard chain ladder. Earlier actuarial missions LIII and LIX cover volume chain ladder and reserve variances but not these two methods.

Setting

Incremental claims are paid in calendar years determined by accident year plus development year. A strictly positive index converts nominal claims into a constant valuation-year price level before applying development factors. The projected real future claim payment is then reinflated to its expected future calendar-year cost. Separately, an average cost per claim development triangle and a count triangle project ultimate claim frequency and mean severity.

Formalization targets

The formalisation develops a connected set of actuarial identities, beginning with precise model definitions and ending with the prospective valuation result.

Inflation indices and real-claims transformations

A price index remains positive for growth greater than minus one.

Ci,jreal=Ci,jIbaseIi+jC^{\text{real}}_{i,j}=C_{i,j}\frac{I_{\text{base}}}{I_{i+j}}Ci,jreal​=Ci,j​Ii+j​Ibase​​

Incremental triangles and cumulative development

Sufficient projected ultimate value gives nonnegative outstanding reserve.

Ci,j=∑k=0jXi,k,Ui=Ci,jfjC_{i,j}=\sum_{k=0}^{j}X_{i,k},\quad U_i=C_{i,j}f_jCi,j​=k=0∑j​Xi,k​,Ui​=Ci,j​fj​

Average-cost-per-claim projection and reserve reconciliation

The inflation-adjusted chain-ladder projection and the independently developed average-cost claim reserve both reconcile nominal cashflows, real development and ultimate claims without treating the projection as an observed fact.

Ui=NiultAiult,Ri=Ui−PiU_i=N_i^{\text{ult}}A_i^{\text{ult}},\quad R_i=U_i-P_iUi​=Niult​Aiult​,Ri​=Ui​−Pi​

Capstone theorem

The inflation-adjusted chain-ladder projection and the independently developed average-cost claim reserve both reconcile nominal cashflows, real development and ultimate claims without treating the projection as an observed fact.

Ui=NiultAiult,Ri=Ui−PiU_i=N_i^{\text{ult}}A_i^{\text{ult}},\quad R_i=U_i-P_iUi​=Niult​Aiult​,Ri​=Ui​−Pi​

Significance

As discussed in the IFoA claims-reserving literature, The target establishes exact no-loss conversion between nominal and real claims, proper telescoping between incremental and cumulative triangles, the composition of real development factors, and the multiplication of projected ultimate claim numbers by projected average severity. It then reconciles both ultimate and outstanding amounts in an independent combined capstone. A payment-year inflation assumption is distinguishable from a development-year link factor, which guards against projecting historical calendar-year inflation twice.

Difficulty

The proof must preserve accident-year, development-year and calendar-year indexing and impose positivity on every ratio's index, claim count and growth denominator before invoking any reconstruction identity. The dollar value of a claim that has already been paid must never be reinflated as if it were a future payment. Volume development and average-cost development use different denominators and cannot be conflated in a single grossing-up factor without an additional model assumption. The capstone reconciles separately constructed projections rather than defining reserves by the desired equality.

Formalization scope

Historical inflation adjustment and claim-development factors are distinct mathematical constructs in this model. A future extension could integrate stochastic calendar-year inflation factors, accident-year trends, and parameter-estimation uncertainty into a single insurer liability distribution. The current exact algebraic target is nontrivial because it reconstructs nominal cashflows after applying conversion and development operations to independently constructed real and count-based projections. Known chain-ladder methods do not eliminate the need to prove that the resulting factors and projected reserve components reconcile. The finite triangle definitions and their transformations are reusable for other claims reserving methods, including tail development and multiple accident years.

A loss development triangle involves three separate notions of time: accident-year origin, settlement development lag and payment calendar year. Past inflation must be removed according to the actual payment year before development is extrapolated. Only after the real-valued development has been projected should future expected payment-year inflation be reinstated, and only once. A claim volume development factor does not represent a price inflation rate. The average-cost-per-claim method separately projects ultimate claim numbers and average claim sizes, then multiplies them. This decomposition distinguishes frequency development from claim inflation and severity development. The actuarial motivation is substantial, as long-tailed insured losses can have irregular calendar-year price patterns. The mathematical statements in this source are exact projection identities, not claims that past development patterns predict future claim payments without residual risk.

This is a mathematically exact deterministic claims triangle and projected cashflow formalisation, not a claim that chain-ladder assumptions hold for a particular line of business or that the selected inflation index is statistically correct. The index rate and link factors are model inputs, and the full stochastic process/reserve estimation error remains covered only in related Mack mission LIX. Interactions of separate inflation by payment type and stochastic calendar effects are future research problems. All Lean theorem bodies are open.

These are original derived finite/analytic Actuarial formalisation targets rather than reproductions of a numbered textbook theorem. Exact Lean binder declarations are authoritative. The complete source uses targeted Mathlib imports and no local Lean compilation. All proof bodies remain genuinely open and do not constitute accepted results. Assumptions about negative rates, survival, policyholder independence, discounting and benefit timing must be preserved exactly.

Selected references

  • Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2025), High-level Methods for Incorporating Changing Inflation into Claims Reserve Estimates. https://vle.actuaries.org.uk/pluginfile.php/168696/mod_resource/content/1/Reserving%20During%20Volatile%20Inflation%20v1.9.pdf
  • Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2004), Claims reserving, §5. https://www.actuaries.org.uk/system/files/documents/pdf/0353-0413.pdf
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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics LXXXI: Stochastic First-Passage Ruin and Stopped Exponential BoundsTextbook

Motivation

The Cramér–Lundberg model describes insurer capital invested in premium revenue while discrete random claims are paid at unpredictable arrival times. The model's classical adjustment coefficient and ruin probability are treated in risk theory and in modern ruin-probability bounds. Earlier mission LXXVIII derives a candidate ruin formula satisfying a renewal equation, but does not model the actual first-passage event. This mission supplies genuine stochastic first passage and measurable ruin events with an explicit stopped exponential-moment route to a rigorous bound.

Setting

Let W_j and Y_j be random waiting times and severities on a measurable probability space. At n-th claim arrival, cumulative elapsed time is the sum of W_0 through W_{n−1}, aggregate paid claims are the corresponding sum of Y_j, and the surplus is initial capital plus premium rate c times elapsed time minus claims. Ruin means surplus strictly less than zero and is only tested at claim boundaries, where a positive continuous premium slope allows a crossing to occur. The first-hit event excludes every earlier ruin, and its union over n is ultimate ruin.

Formalization targets

The formalisation develops a connected set of actuarial identities, beginning with precise model definitions and ending with the prospective valuation result.

Embedded Poisson-arrival capital paths and first-passage partition

Larger capital cannot create pathwise ruin.

Un=u+c∑j<nWj−∑j<nYjU_n=u+c\sum_{j<n}W_j-\sum_{j<n}Y_jUn​=u+cj<n∑​Wj​−j<n∑​Yj​

Probability of ruin, monotonicity and severity overshoot

Observation of more arrivals can only increase probability of ruin.

ψN(u)=P(min⁡n≤NUn<0)\psi_N(u)=\mathbb{P}(\min_{n\le N}U_n<0)ψN​(u)=P(n≤Nmin​Un​<0)

Stopped exponential-loss process and conditional Lundberg capital bound

The actual stochastic first-passage event and stopped exponential moment condition derive a nonvacuous ultimate Lundberg capital bound.

E[Mτ∧N]≤1 ⟹ ψN(u)≤e−Ru\mathbb{E}[M_{\tau\wedge N}]\le1\ \Longrightarrow\ \psi_N(u)\le e^{-Ru}E[Mτ∧N​]≤1 ⟹ ψN​(u)≤e−Ru

Capstone theorem

The actual stochastic first-passage event and stopped exponential moment condition derive a nonvacuous ultimate Lundberg capital bound.

E[Mτ∧N]≤1 ⟹ ψN(u)≤e−Ru\mathbb{E}[M_{\tau\wedge N}]\le1\ \Longrightarrow\ \psi_N(u)\le e^{-Ru}E[Mτ∧N​]≤1 ⟹ ψN​(u)≤e−Ru

Significance

The mission establishes a real measured probability of ultimate ruin, monotonicity under capital and arrival horizon, and a disjoint partition by the first claim causing ruin. It then uses a stopped exponential loss process and an explicit moment upper bound to derive a Lundberg inequality for finite and ultimate ruin probabilities. The auxiliary stopped expectation condition is an independent martingale-style hypothesis, not an assumption of the desired probability bound. This helps distinguish authentic probability claims from an explicit exponential candidate whose equation has been verified. The risk-theory literature motivates the exponential-capital tail.

Difficulty

Nontrivial probability analysis is required to link a finite first-passage indicator to a stopped exponential transform. The first-hit sum cannot count multiple ruin dates on the same path, and the no-ruin terminal term must appear exactly once. Strict ruin, equality at zero and an observed negative surplus require distinct treatment. The finite-horizon inequality then uses measurability, positivity of exponential loss and a moment expectation hypothesis. Passing to ultimate ruin requires the countable union of nested ruin events and probability measure continuity, without assuming the theorem's conclusion.

Formalization scope

Existing actuarial theory establishes the analytical principle, whereas the formal work here must prove the stated identities in Lean using the true distribution and event definitions. Some prior mission targets describe finite distributions or a candidate valuation, but they do not establish these stronger infinite-support or measured first-passage results. The boundary assumptions are part of each mathematical statement and cannot be replaced by a tautological definition. A complete proof requires independent source lemmas, explicit handling of the limiting case and verification of every transformation before concluding the capstone.

The pathwise event uses a strict negative surplus, not failure on equality at zero. The first-passage index is a disjoint union of finite-arrival failure events, and the increasing union gives ultimate ruin. A conditional moment hypothesis provides a nontrivial route to an exponential capital inequality. It is not the same assertion as the inequality on the ultimate ruin probability. The model does not claim to establish the Poisson arrival distribution or full independence of exponential severities from this conditional input. Those must be proved in a later, more elaborate stochastic source model.

The capstone proves the conditional stopped-moment Lundberg inequality for an actual measurable first-passage event, not yet the complete exponential-claims distributional identification. Independent exponential waiting times and independent claim severities supply the classical route to the stopped moment hypothesis but are not themselves constructed or verified in this graph. A future mission should derive that moment condition from fully specified iid waiting and severity distributions and prove uniqueness of the exact ruin probability. The pathwise framework is reusable for continuous-time embedding, overshoot losses, first-passage service tables and capital assessment. All Lean proof obligations remain open.

These are original derived finite/analytic Actuarial formalisation targets rather than reproductions of a numbered textbook theorem. Exact Lean binder declarations are authoritative. The complete source uses targeted Mathlib imports and no local Lean compilation. All proof bodies remain genuinely open and do not constitute accepted results. Assumptions about negative rates, survival, policyholder independence, discounting and benefit timing must be preserved exactly.

Selected references

  • S. David Promislow (2015), Fundamentals of Actuarial Mathematics, Chapter 23. https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/fundamentals-of-actuarial/9781118782521/ftoc.xhtml
  • Hanspeter Schmidli (2017), Risk Theory, first edition, Springer. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-72005-0
  • Bounds for the Ruin Probability in the Sparre–Andersen Model (2024), Risks 12(2), 28. https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/2/28
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