Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 2: Every Set of Assortments Has a Unique Profile of Thresholds Equal to Expected UtilitiesResearch Paper
Motivation
Online matching platforms for dating, freelancing or ride sharing do not match agents themselves. They decide whom each agent gets to see and how often, and the agents then accept or reject. Immorlica, Lucier, Manshadi and Wei (arXiv:2102.09017, Management Science 2023) model this as directed search. The platform designs assortments, which are rates at which types of agents meet, and the agents play an equilibrium of the induced search game. The platform's design problem only makes sense if every choice of assortments leads to a single, well-defined equilibrium outcome. Otherwise "the welfare of an assortment" is not a function of the assortment. This is not automatic: even for simple asymmetric preferences under random meetings, multiple stationary equilibria can arise (Burdett and Coles 1997).
This mission formalizes that well-posedness result, Proposition 3.1(1) of the paper, together with the fixed-point and iteration lemmas of Appendix A.3 and Appendix B.3 on which its proof rests. It is the companion of the mission on the paper's quarter-approximation theorem (Theorem 4.1), which uses the same model.
The source is the arXiv v2 preprint (18 Aug 2021). The Management Science version may number results differently.
Setting
There are finitely many agent types on each side of the market, a set and a set , with . Agents of every type leave the market unmatched at a life-event rate , and type arrives at rate . When an agent of type meets an agent of type , the pair draws one utility . Valuations are symmetric: both agents receive if they match, and . Each is a probability law on with no atoms (a "continuous distribution").
An assortment for type is a family of rates at which type- agents meet type- agents on the opposite side. Under a threshold strategy with threshold , a type- agent accepts a meeting if and only if . A meeting turns into a match when both agents accept, i.e. when . If every type plays a threshold strategy, the expected utility of a type- agent is (equation (5))
A type's own threshold enters its own utility through .
One type's equation. Fix the thresholds of the opposite types. Write for the right-hand side of (5) with replaced by . Lemma A.3 states that has exactly one solution. The best-response map of Appendix A.3 sends a profile to the profile in which each type's new threshold is that solution, computed against the opposite side's thresholds in . A best-response sequence starts at the all-zero profile and applies this map repeatedly.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 3.1, item 1 (fixed-point form)
For any fixed assortments there is exactly one threshold profile with
Uniqueness ranges over all real profiles.
Milestones
- Lemma B.1 (p. 40). With and , is attained and satisfies . is weakly increasing on and weakly decreasing on .
- Lemma A.3 (p. 35). With and arbitrary , the equation has exactly one real solution.
- §A.3, p. 37, first claim. Along a best-response sequence , the odd iterates are weakly decreasing and the even iterates are weakly increasing, componentwise.
- §A.3, p. 37, second claim. Every odd iterate dominates every even iterate: .
- Proposition A.4 (p. 36). There is a universal such that is a fixed point of the best-response map, and the sequence is constant from that index on.
Significance
Proposition 3.1 is what makes the platform's problem OptimalDirectedSearch well defined. Assortments determine a unique threshold profile. That profile determines the matching rates (Lemma 3.2) and, through stationarity, the population masses. Welfare is then a function of the assortments, and the program (6) used for Theorem 4.1 encodes exactly this fixed point as its incentive constraint (6e). The constructive proof also yields an algorithm: iterate best responses from zero, and the iteration stops after rounds.
Formalizing it adds three things beyond the paper. First, a checked version of an argument the paper gives informally, including the odd/even sandwich of the iteration, which the paper proves in a few lines. Second, a reusable fixed-point and unimodality lemma for ratios of tail integrals, , which recurs in reservation-value arguments in search theory. Third, an exact accounting of the hypotheses: integrable utilities and the reading of the best-response map. To our knowledge none of these results has been machine-checked.
Difficulty
The obvious route to uniqueness, a contraction argument for the map , fails. That map is neither monotone nor contractive in general, since raising a type's own threshold can raise or lower its utility. Existence by Brouwer's fixed-point theorem gives no uniqueness and no algorithm. The best-response iteration does not converge monotonically either: its odd and even iterates move in opposite directions, so convergence in finitely many rounds is a combinatorial statement about the order of the thresholds, not a limit argument. A formal proof also needs continuity and monotonicity of tail integrals of atomless laws, which Mathlib provides only in pieces.
Formalization scope
The two sides are separate finite types M and W. A threshold profile is a pair of functions (M → ℝ) × (W → ℝ), ordered componentwise. A market records , and the laws F m w : Measure ℝ. The standing assumptions are:
- ;
- , which is implicit in the paper and stated explicitly;
- each is a probability measure with no atoms (
NullSingletonClass); - each has an integrable identity. This is implicit in the paper, which uses as a real number, and is stated explicitly.
Tails are and . Capacity (2), flow balance (3) and stationarity (1) are not hypotheses, because Proposition 3.1 holds for any fixed assortments.
The best-response map is encoded as a relation: each new threshold solves its own equation against the opposite side's input thresholds. This is the paper's reading ("This map is a best response by Lemma A.3"). Evaluating (5) at the old profile, own old threshold included, would be a different map. Under that reading finite convergence and the p. 37 claims are false: with one type per side, , and uniform on , its iterates are rational and converge only in the limit to .
Two formalizations would trivialize the goal, and both are ruled out. Uniqueness is over all real profiles, not only nonnegative ones or those reached by the iteration. The tail integrals are not allowed to vanish by default for non-integrable laws, because integrability is a hypothesis. is encoded with a constant chosen before the market.
Not formalized: the agents' Markov decision process of Appendix A.1. Consequently "this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium", item 2 of Proposition 3.1, Lemmas A.1–A.2 and the best-response sentences of Lemma A.3 and Proposition A.4 are out of scope.
Contributions welcome: continuity and monotonicity lemmas for and for atomless integrable laws, which are reusable well beyond this mission, and proofs of the milestones in any order.
Selected references
- N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, V. Manshadi, A. Wei, Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms, Management Science, 2023; preprint arXiv:2102.09017v2, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.09017
- K. Burdett, M. G. Coles, Marriage and Class, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555127