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Operations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Portfolio Choice with Estimation Risk: No Risk-Free Asset Case: For h > N + 3 the Combining Coefficient c̃* = kψ²/(ψ² + (N−1)/h) Uniquely Maximizes the Expected Out-of-Sample UtilityResearch Paper

Why estimation risk matters for mean-variance portfolios

Mean-variance analysis (Markowitz, 1952) tells an investor which portfolio to hold once the mean vector μ\muμ and covariance matrix Σ\SigmaΣ of asset returns are known. In practice both are estimated from a finite window of past returns, and the portfolio built from the estimates (the plug-in portfolio) performs badly out of sample: its weights are noisy and its realized utility is often far below the theoretical optimum. A long literature asks how to choose portfolio rules that take this estimation risk into account; Kan and Zhou (2007) treat the case with a risk-free asset.

Kan, Wang and Zhou (2022) study the case without a risk-free asset, where the investor must be fully invested in NNN risky assets. There the optimal portfolio splits into the global minimum-variance (GMV) portfolio plus a scaled zero-investment portfolio, and estimation errors enter the two parts very differently. Their §2 derives the exact expected out-of-sample utility of the family of rules that rescale the estimated zero-investment part, and the coefficient that maximizes it. This mission formalizes that derivation.

Setting

An investor chooses weights w∈RNw \in \mathbb R^Nw∈RN with 1N′w=11_N' w = 11N′​w=1 to maximize the mean-variance utility

U(w)=w′μ−γ2 w′Σw,U(w) = w'\mu - \frac{\gamma}{2}\, w'\Sigma w,U(w)=w′μ−2γ​w′Σw,

where γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 is the risk-aversion coefficient and Σ\SigmaΣ is positive definite. The population quantities that matter are the GMV variance σg2=1/(1N′Σ−11N)\sigma_g^2 = 1/(1_N'\Sigma^{-1}1_N)σg2​=1/(1N′​Σ−11N​), the GMV mean μg=1N′Σ−1μ σg2\mu_g = 1_N'\Sigma^{-1}\mu\,\sigma_g^2μg​=1N′​Σ−1μσg2​, and the squared slope of the asymptote of the minimum-variance frontier, ψ2=μ′Σ−1μ−μg2/σg2≥0\psi^2 = \mu'\Sigma^{-1}\mu - \mu_g^2/\sigma_g^2 \ge 0ψ2=μ′Σ−1μ−μg2​/σg2​≥0.

The returns r1,…,rhr_1, \dots, r_hr1​,…,rh​ of an estimation window of length hhh are independent and identically distributed N(μ,Σ)\mathcal N(\mu, \Sigma)N(μ,Σ). The maximum-likelihood estimators are μ^t=1h∑srs\hat\mu_t = \frac1h\sum_s r_sμ^​t​=h1​∑s​rs​ and Σ^t=1h∑s(rs−μ^t)(rs−μ^t)′\hat\Sigma_t = \frac1h\sum_s (r_s - \hat\mu_t)(r_s - \hat\mu_t)'Σ^t​=h1​∑s​(rs​−μ^​t​)(rs​−μ^​t​)′. From them come the sample GMV portfolio and the sample zero-investment portfolio

w^g,t=Σ^t−11N1N′Σ^t−11N,w^z,t=Σ^t−1(μ^t−1Nμ^g,t),\hat w_{g,t} = \frac{\hat\Sigma_t^{-1}1_N}{1_N'\hat\Sigma_t^{-1}1_N}, \qquad \hat w_{z,t} = \hat\Sigma_t^{-1}(\hat\mu_t - 1_N\hat\mu_{g,t}),w^g,t​=1N′​Σ^t−1​1N​Σ^t−1​1N​​,w^z,t​=Σ^t−1​(μ^​t​−1N​μ^​g,t​),

with μ^g,t=1N′Σ^t−1μ^t/(1N′Σ^t−11N)\hat\mu_{g,t} = 1_N'\hat\Sigma_t^{-1}\hat\mu_t/(1_N'\hat\Sigma_t^{-1}1_N)μ^​g,t​=1N′​Σ^t−1​μ^​t​/(1N′​Σ^t−1​1N​). For a constant combining coefficient c~\tilde cc~ the paper considers

w^t(c~)=w^g,t+c~γ w^z,t;\hat w_t(\tilde c) = \hat w_{g,t} + \frac{\tilde c}{\gamma}\,\hat w_{z,t};w^t​(c~)=w^g,t​+γc~​w^z,t​;

c~=1\tilde c = 1c~=1 is the plug-in rule. The expected out-of-sample utility E[U(w^t(c~))]E[U(\hat w_t(\tilde c))]E[U(w^t​(c~))] evaluates UUU at the true μ\muμ, Σ\SigmaΣ and averages over the sample. The five random quantities μg,t=w^g,t′μ\mu_{g,t} = \hat w_{g,t}'\muμg,t​=w^g,t′​μ, μz,t=w^z,t′μ\mu_{z,t} = \hat w_{z,t}'\muμz,t​=w^z,t′​μ, σg,t2=w^g,t′Σw^g,t\sigma^2_{g,t} = \hat w_{g,t}'\Sigma\hat w_{g,t}σg,t2​=w^g,t′​Σw^g,t​, σz,t2=w^z,t′Σw^z,t\sigma^2_{z,t} = \hat w_{z,t}'\Sigma\hat w_{z,t}σz,t2​=w^z,t′​Σw^z,t​ and σgz,t=w^g,t′Σw^z,t\sigma_{gz,t} = \hat w_{g,t}'\Sigma\hat w_{z,t}σgz,t​=w^g,t′​Σw^z,t​ determine it.

Formalization targets

Goal: the optimal combining coefficient (§2.3, eqs. (20)–(21))

For N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 and h>N+3h > N + 3h>N+3, with

k=(h−N)(h−N−3)h(h−2),c~∗=kψ2ψ2+N−1h,k = \frac{(h-N)(h-N-3)}{h(h-2)}, \qquad \tilde c^* = \frac{k\psi^2}{\psi^2 + \frac{N-1}{h}},k=h(h−2)(h−N)(h−N−3)​,c~∗=ψ2+hN−1​kψ2​,

the coefficient c~∗\tilde c^*c~∗ is the unique maximizer of c~↦E[U(w^t(c~))]\tilde c \mapsto E[U(\hat w_t(\tilde c))]c~↦E[U(w^t​(c~))] over R\mathbb RR, and 0≤c~∗<10 \le \tilde c^* < 10≤c~∗<1, with c~∗>0\tilde c^* > 0c~∗>0 when ψ2>0\psi^2 > 0ψ2>0.

Lemma 1 (eq. (17))

For h>N+3h > N + 3h>N+3 and every constant c~\tilde cc~,

E[U(w^t(c~))]=μg−γ(h−2)σg22(h−N−1)+hγ(h−N−1)[c~ψ2−c~2(h−2)(hψ2+N−1)2(h−N)(h−N−3)].E[U(\hat w_t(\tilde c))] = \mu_g - \frac{\gamma(h-2)\sigma_g^2}{2(h-N-1)} + \frac{h}{\gamma(h-N-1)}\left[\tilde c\psi^2 - \frac{\tilde c^2(h-2)(h\psi^2+N-1)}{2(h-N)(h-N-3)}\right].E[U(w^t​(c~))]=μg​−2(h−N−1)γ(h−2)σg2​​+γ(h−N−1)h​[c~ψ2−2(h−N)(h−N−3)c~2(h−2)(hψ2+N−1)​].

The moments (A9)–(A13) and the auxiliary moments

E[μg,t]=μg,E[μz,t]=hψ2h−N−1,E[σg,t2]=(h−2)σg2h−N−1,E[\mu_{g,t}] = \mu_g,\quad E[\mu_{z,t}] = \frac{h\psi^2}{h-N-1},\quad E[\sigma^2_{g,t}] = \frac{(h-2)\sigma_g^2}{h-N-1},E[μg,t​]=μg​,E[μz,t​]=h−N−1hψ2​,E[σg,t2​]=h−N−1(h−2)σg2​​, E[σz,t2]=h(h−2)(hψ2+N−1)(h−N)(h−N−1)(h−N−3),E[σgz,t]=0,E[\sigma^2_{z,t}] = \frac{h(h-2)(h\psi^2+N-1)}{(h-N)(h-N-1)(h-N-3)},\quad E[\sigma_{gz,t}] = 0,E[σz,t2​]=(h−N)(h−N−1)(h−N−3)h(h−2)(hψ2+N−1)​,E[σgz,t​]=0,

together with the first and second moments of the auxiliary variables y1y_1y1​, y2y_2y2​ of Proposition 1 that the proof of Lemma 1 uses.

Significance

The result gives a closed-form, implementable-in-principle correction to the plug-in rule: since c~∗<1\tilde c^* < 1c~∗<1, the investor should always under-weight the estimated zero-investment portfolio, by a factor that depends only on hhh, NNN and ψ2\psi^2ψ2. Replacing ψ2\psi^2ψ2 by an adjusted estimator gives the paper's feasible rules (§2.4, §3), which are compared empirically in §4. The moment formulas (A9)–(A13) are of independent use: they give the exact out-of-sample mean and variance of the sample GMV and zero-investment portfolios, which recur in the shrinkage literature (for instance Lassance, Martín-Utrera and Simaan, 2024, who build on this paper's Proposition 1).

The result is proved in the paper, but the proof rests on Proposition 1, a stochastic representation of the out-of-sample moments whose detailed proof is in an online appendix. No machine-checked proof exists. On Prove2Me, Proposition 1 is posed (Open) as RiskEU.OOSUVar.kan_representation in Lassance et al.'s restatement, together with special cases (eq_IA60, eq_IA49) of the combinations μg,t+(κ/γ)μz,t\mu_{g,t} + (\kappa/\gamma)\mu_{z,t}μg,t​+(κ/γ)μz,t​ and of the portfolio variance for κ∈[0,1]\kappa \in [0, 1]κ∈[0,1] and h>N+7h > N + 7h>N+7. The closed-form vertex of the quadratic (17) is already proved there (RiskEU.RobustShrink.proposition_IA_1_3). What this mission adds is the statement about the actual expectation over the Gaussian sample, for all real c~\tilde cc~, under the paper's own threshold h>N+3h > N + 3h>N+3, with uniqueness of the maximizer.

Difficulty

Once Lemma 1 is available, the goal is the vertex of a concave quadratic. The difficulty is Lemma 1 itself: computing expectations of quadratic forms in Σ^t−1\hat\Sigma_t^{-1}Σ^t−1​ and in the normalized vector Σ^t−11N/(1N′Σ^t−11N)\hat\Sigma_t^{-1}1_N/(1_N'\hat\Sigma_t^{-1}1_N)Σ^t−1​1N​/(1N′​Σ^t−1​1N​). The weights are ratios of dependent random quantities, so linearity of expectation does not apply directly, and inverse-Wishart moment formulas alone do not cover the ratio in w^g,t\hat w_{g,t}w^g,t​. The threshold h>N+3h > N + 3h>N+3 is Lemma 1's hypothesis; the factor h−N−3h-N-3h−N−3 in the denominator of (A12) shows that it is what keeps the expected variance of the estimated zero-investment portfolio finite, so integrability is part of the content.

Formalization scope

The model is the published definition RiskEU.OOSUVar.Setting: Market N carries μ\muμ, Σ\SigmaΣ, γ\gammaγ; sigmaG2, muG, psi2, U, sampleMean, sampleCov (divided by hhh), wHatG, wHatZ and IsGaussianSample are the objects above (that setting calls the window TTT; here it is hhh). The auxiliary family of Proposition 1 and y1y_1y1​, y2y_2y2​ come from the published RiskEU.OOSUVar.KanRepresentation. The mission's own definitions (KanCombine.Optimal.Model) add the standing assumptions, the combining portfolio, the five sample moments, the expected utility, kkk and c~∗\tilde c^*c~∗.

Conventions committed to:

  • N≥2N \ge 2N≥2, Σ≻0\Sigma \succ 0Σ≻0 and γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 are explicit hypotheses (implicit in the paper); h>N+3h > N + 3h>N+3 is Lemma 1's. The yyy-moment milestone also assumes N>3N > 3N>3, as Proposition 1 does.
  • c~\tilde cc~ ranges over all of R\mathbb RR, and "the optimal value" is stated as a unique maximizer.
  • Every expectation identity asserts integrability: a Lean Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000.
  • Lean's matrix inverse is 000 on singular matrices; Σ^t\hat\Sigma_tΣ^t​ is almost surely nonsingular for h>Nh > Nh>N, so this does not change any expectation.
  • The page's "0<c~∗<10 < \tilde c^* < 10<c~∗<1" fails at ψ2=0\psi^2 = 0ψ2=0, where c~∗=0\tilde c^* = 0c~∗=0; the goal states 0≤c~∗<10 \le \tilde c^* < 10≤c~∗<1 and c~∗>0\tilde c^* > 0c~∗>0 under ψ2>0\psi^2 > 0ψ2>0.

The goal is about the integral over the Gaussian sample. Stating it about the closed-form right-hand side of (17) would reduce it to the vertex of a quadratic, which is already proved, and is ruled out. The hypotheses are satisfiable: N=2N = 2N=2, h=6h = 6h=6, μ=(0,1)\mu = (0, 1)μ=(0,1), Σ=I\Sigma = IΣ=I, γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1 meets them with the product Gaussian sample, and gives c~∗=1/8\tilde c^* = 1/8c~∗=1/8.

A complete development needs Wishart and inverse-Wishart theory (the Bartlett decomposition, moments of chi-squared ratios) and a formal version of Proposition 1. These are reusable well beyond this mission; contributions proving (A9)–(A13) by any route, including directly from inverse-Wishart moments, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Kan, X. Wang and G. Zhou, Optimal portfolio choice with estimation risk: No risk-free asset case, Management Science 68(3), 2022 (cited from the submitted manuscript, November 2020). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.3989 ; https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819254
  • R. Kan and G. Zhou, Optimal portfolio choice with parameter uncertainty, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42(3), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109000004129
  • H. Markowitz, Portfolio selection, Journal of Finance 7(1), 1952. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01525.x
  • N. Lassance, A. Martín-Utrera and M. Simaan, The risk of expected utility under parameter uncertainty, Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00178
  • R. J. Muirhead, Aspects of Multivariate Statistical Theory, Wiley, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316559
11 thms1 active userReviewed
Functional AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combined Custom Hedging: Optimal Design, Noninsurable Exposure, and Operational Risk Management: A Unique Optimal Combined Custom Hedge Exists When the Maximal Correlation Is Below OneResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms carry risks they cannot insure directly. A farmer's revenue depends on local yield and on local price; an airline's cost depends on jet fuel at a specific airport; an energy retailer's margin depends on load and on weather. Exchange-traded derivatives are written on standardized indices, so the exposure that matters is only partly claimable. Guiotto and Roncoroni (Operations Research 2022) study the design of a combined custom hedge: one over-the-counter claim written on the claimable part XXX of the firm's risk, plus a second claim written on a side index III that is correlated with the unclaimable part. The question is when such a pair is well defined, that is, when the firm's mean–variance hedging problem has one and only one optimal pair of claims.

Single-claim custom hedging goes back to Chowdhry and Howe (1999) and Caldentey and Haugh (2006; 2009, Operations Research 57(1)), whose framework prices claims through a pricing kernel dQ/dPdQ/dPdQ/dP known to the firm; that framework is adopted here. With two claims on two different random elements the optimal pair is coupled, and existence and uniqueness are no longer automatic.

Setting

Fix a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) carrying three random elements, valued in arbitrary measurable spaces: the claimable term XXX, the nonclaimable term YYY and the side index III. Write FX=σ(X)\mathcal F_X=\sigma(X)FX​=σ(X) and FI=σ(I)\mathcal F_I=\sigma(I)FI​=σ(I). The firm's business position is π=π(X,Y)\pi=\pi(X,Y)π=π(X,Y) for a Borel revenue function π\piπ, assumed square-integrable.

A claim on XXX is a random variable HHH that is FX\mathcal F_XFX​-measurable and has finite variance; the set of such claims is HX\mathcal H_XHX​, and HI\mathcal H_IHI​ is defined likewise. The centered subspace HX⊆HX\mathbb H_X\subseteq\mathcal H_XHX​⊆HX​ consists of claims with E[H]=0\mathbb E[H]=0E[H]=0.

Claims are priced by a pricing kernel dQ/dPdQ/dPdQ/dP, the density of an equivalent martingale measure QQQ: it is positive almost surely, has mean one and is square-integrable, and EQ[Z]=E[Z dQ/dP]\mathbb E_Q[Z]=\mathbb E[Z\,dQ/dP]EQ​[Z]=E[ZdQ/dP]. The firm ranks positions by the mean–variance criterion

U(Z)=ϱ E[Z]−a2Var⁡[Z],ϱ≥0, a>0.\mathcal U(Z)=\varrho\,\mathbb E[Z]-\tfrac a2\operatorname{Var}[Z],\qquad \varrho\ge 0,\ a>0 .U(Z)=ϱE[Z]−2a​Var[Z],ϱ≥0, a>0.

The value-centered design problem is

max⁡{U(π+[H+G]) : H∈HX, G∈HI, EQ[H]=EQ[G]=0}.(4)\max\Big\{\mathcal U\big(\pi+[H+G]\big)\ :\ H\in\mathcal H_X,\ G\in\mathcal H_I,\ \mathbb E_Q[H]=\mathbb E_Q[G]=0\Big\}.\qquad(4)max{U(π+[H+G]) : H∈HX​, G∈HI​, EQ​[H]=EQ​[G]=0}.(4)

A maximizer (H∗,G∗)(H^*,G^*)(H∗,G∗) is an optimal combined claim pair. The dependence between XXX and III is measured by the maximal correlation

rXI=sup⁡{ρ(ϕ,ψ) : ϕ∈HX, ψ∈HI}∈[0,1],(6)r_{XI}=\sup\big\{\rho(\phi,\psi)\ :\ \phi\in\mathbb H_X,\ \psi\in\mathbb H_I\big\}\in[0,1],\qquad(6)rXI​=sup{ρ(ϕ,ψ) : ϕ∈HX​, ψ∈HI​}∈[0,1],(6)

with ρ\rhoρ the Pearson correlation. Finally K=π+(ϱ/a) dQ/dP\mathcal K=\pi+(\varrho/a)\,dQ/dPK=π+(ϱ/a)dQ/dP is the optimal hedging kernel, Π0X=−E[K−E[K∣FI]∣FX]\Pi^X_0=-\mathbb E\big[\mathcal K-\mathbb E[\mathcal K\mid\mathcal F_I]\mid\mathcal F_X\big]Π0X​=−E[K−E[K∣FI​]∣FX​], and T[Z]=E[E[Z∣FI]∣FX]T[Z]=\mathbb E\big[\mathbb E[Z\mid\mathcal F_I]\mid\mathcal F_X\big]T[Z]=E[E[Z∣FI​]∣FX​].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 11)

If rXI<1r_{XI}<1rXI​<1, then

  1. an optimal combined claim pair (H∗,G∗)(H^*,G^*)(H∗,G∗) of (4) exists;
  2. it is unique up to PPP-null sets, and so is the hedge H∗+G∗H^*+G^*H∗+G∗;
  3. the value-centered optimal claim H0∗=H∗−E[H∗]H^*_0=H^*-\mathbb E[H^*]H0∗​=H∗−E[H∗] solves
H0∗=Π0X+E[E[H0∗∣FI]∣FX].(7)H^*_0=\Pi^X_0+\mathbb E\big[\mathbb E[H^*_0\mid\mathcal F_I]\mid\mathcal F_X\big].\qquad(7)H0∗​=Π0X​+E[E[H0∗​∣FI​]∣FX​].(7)

Milestones

  • Proposition 1 (p. 9): every optimal pair is H∗=H0∗−EQ[H0∗]H^*=H^*_0-\mathbb E_Q[H^*_0]H∗=H0∗​−EQ​[H0∗​], G∗=G0∗−EQ[G0∗]G^*=G^*_0-\mathbb E_Q[G^*_0]G∗=G0∗​−EQ​[G0∗​] with PPP-centered (H0∗,G0∗)(H^*_0,G^*_0)(H0∗​,G0∗​) solving the first-order system (5).
  • (EC.25)–(EC.26) (p. ec24): a centered solution of (5) satisfies H0=Π0+T[H0]H_0=\Pi_0+T[H_0]H0​=Π0​+T[H0​].
  • TTT on HX\mathbb H_XHX​ (p. ec24): E[T[Z]]=E[Z]\mathbb E[T[Z]]=\mathbb E[Z]E[T[Z]]=E[Z], T(HX)⊆HXT(\mathbb H_X)\subseteq\mathbb H_XT(HX​)⊆HX​, and Π0∈HX\Pi_0\in\mathbb H_XΠ0​∈HX​.
  • Inner-product bound (p. ec25): ⟨E[ϕ∣FI],ψ⟩≤rXI∥ϕ∥2∥ψ∥2\langle\mathbb E[\phi\mid\mathcal F_I],\psi\rangle\le r_{XI}\|\phi\|_2\|\psi\|_2⟨E[ϕ∣FI​],ψ⟩≤rXI​∥ϕ∥2​∥ψ∥2​ for ϕ∈HX\phi\in\mathbb H_Xϕ∈HX​, ψ∈HI\psi\in\mathbb H_Iψ∈HI​.
  • (EC.28) (p. ec25): ∥E[ϕ∣FI]∥2≤rXI∥ϕ∥2\|\mathbb E[\phi\mid\mathcal F_I]\|_2\le r_{XI}\|\phi\|_2∥E[ϕ∣FI​]∥2​≤rXI​∥ϕ∥2​.
  • ∥T∥≤rXI\|T\|\le r_{XI}∥T∥≤rXI​ (p. ec25) on HX\mathbb H_XHX​.
  • (EC.27) (p. ec25): if rXI<1r_{XI}<1rXI​<1, H0=Π0+T[H0]H_0=\Pi_0+T[H_0]H0​=Π0​+T[H0​] has a unique solution in HX\mathbb H_XHX​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 makes the combined hedge an object: without it the optimal pair may fail to exist or may be non-unique (the paper points to Appendix EC.1(F) for non-uniqueness), and the paper's later results, the design integral equation (Theorem 2) and the value of combining claims (Theorem 3 and Definitions 1–3), are stated for the optimal pair whose existence and uniqueness Theorem 1 provides. Equation (7) separates the optimal claim into a part determined by the kernel K\mathcal KK alone and a cross-claim feedback through III. The condition rXI<1r_{XI}<1rXI​<1 is checkable: for jointly lognormal (X,I)(X,I)(X,I) it reduces to ∣ρZ,W∣<1|\rho_{Z,W}|<1∣ρZ,W​∣<1 for the underlying normals (Example 4).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof needs a Hilbert-space treatment of conditional expectations onto two σ-algebras, a formal maximal-correlation index, and an existence argument for the maximization problem itself, which the paper's proof leaves implicit (see below). The intermediate statements are general facts about pairs of σ-algebras with maximal correlation below one and are reusable outside hedging.

Difficulty

The optimal pair is coupled: the claim on XXX depends on the conditional expectation of the claim on III given XXX and conversely, so neither can be computed first. When XXX and III share information, the two claim spaces overlap and the sum HX+HI\mathcal H_X+\mathcal H_IHX​+HI​ need not be closed in L2L^2L2; a maximizing sequence can then escape, and two different pairs can produce the same hedge. The condition rXI<1r_{XI}<1rXI​<1 excludes this, and the work lies in turning it into a quantitative bound on the alternating conditional-expectation operator.

A second difficulty is a gap in the printed argument. The paper derives the first-order system (5) as a necessary condition and then proves that the resulting fixed-point equation has a unique solution. It does not show that the pair built from that solution is optimal for (4), so existence of a maximizer needs a separate argument that the first-order condition is also sufficient or that the maximum is attained. The goal is stated for maximizers of (4), so this step cannot be skipped.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace CustomHedge.Exist. A Market bundles PPP, XXX, YYY, III, the revenue function, the kernel D =dQ/dP=dQ/dP=dQ/dP, rho =ϱ=\varrho=ϱ and a; Standing collects the assumptions above. Conventions:

  • Claims are random variables Ω→R\Omega\to\mathbb RΩ→R, strongly measurable for σ(X)\sigma(X)σ(X) (resp. σ(I)\sigma(I)σ(I)) and in L2(P)L^2(P)L2(P), not payoff functions x↦H(x)x\mapsto H(x)x↦H(x).
  • Optimality is maximization of U over all feasible pairs; uniqueness and the equations (5), (7), (EC.25), (EC.27) hold PPP-almost surely.
  • EQ\mathbb E_QEQ​ centers the budget constraint; E=EP\mathbb E=\mathbb E_PE=EP​ centers H0∗H^*_0H0∗​, HX\mathbb H_XHX​ and the maximal correlation.
  • The paper allows a≥0a\ge0a≥0; the formalization requires a>0a>0a>0, because K\mathcal KK divides by aaa and with a=0a=0a=0 problem (4) generally has no maximizer. ϱ=0\varrho=0ϱ=0 is allowed.
  • The maximal correlation is a real supremum over pairs with positive variances (where ρ\rhoρ is defined), with sup⁡∅=0\sup\emptyset=0sup∅=0; the set is bounded by one.
  • ∥Z∥2=(E[Z2])1/2\|Z\|_2=(\mathbb E[Z^2])^{1/2}∥Z∥2​=(E[Z2])1/2; conditional expectation is Mathlib's condExp.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal quantifies over maximizers of (4), not over solutions of the first-order system or of (EC.27), which are separate milestones. A sorry-free check confirms the standing assumptions and rXI<1r_{XI}<1rXI​<1 hold together with a non-trivial σ(X)\sigma(X)σ(X).

Needed infrastructure: L2L^2L2 conditional expectation as an orthogonal projection, the identity E[E[ϕ∣G]ψ]=E[ϕψ]\mathbb E[\mathbb E[\phi\mid\mathcal G]\psi]=\mathbb E[\phi\psi]E[E[ϕ∣G]ψ]=E[ϕψ] for G\mathcal GG-measurable ψ\psiψ, Banach's fixed-point theorem on a closed subspace of L2L^2L2, and concave maximization over a closed affine subspace. The maximal-correlation file is reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones, and a proof of the goal by any route, are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Guiotto and A. Roncoroni, Combined custom hedging: optimal design, noninsurable exposure, and operational risk management, Operations Research 70(3), 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2133 (cited from manuscript OPRE-2019-01-058.R3)
  • R. Caldentey and M. Haugh, Optimal control and hedging of operations in the presence of financial markets, Mathematics of Operations Research 31(2), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0193
  • B. Chowdhry and J. T. B. Howe, Corporate risk management for multinational corporations: financial and operational hedging policies, European Finance Review 2, 229–246, 1999 (as cited in the paper; no link verified).
  • A. Rényi, On measures of dependence, Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiarum Hungarica 10, 1959. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02024507
  • B. Schweizer and E. F. Wolff, On nonparametric measures of dependence for random variables, Annals of Statistics 9(4), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176345528
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Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Order Now, Pickup in 30 Minutes: Managing Queues with Static Delivery Guarantees: The Perfectly-Clairvoyant Cost of Any N Customers Lower-Bounds the Optimal Long-Run Average CostResearch Paper

Motivation

Restaurants that take orders online promise each customer a pickup time when the order is placed. A static quote promises every customer the same lead time δ\deltaδ, the form in common use. Once the promise is fixed, the kitchen still decides when to start each order. Starting too early means the food waits and cools (an earliness cost). Starting too late breaks the promise (a tardiness cost). Farahani, Dawande and Janakiraman (SSRN 3557605; published in Operations Research, 2022, doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2203) model this as a single-server queue and propose simple threshold policies. To judge those policies against the unknown optimum they need lower bounds on the optimal long-run average cost, and their first such bound is the subject of this mission.

The bound uses a clairvoyant relaxation: a decision maker who knows every future arrival and service time can do no worse than one who does not. Relaxations of this kind are standard for finite-horizon stochastic dynamic programs, where the relaxed problem is deterministic and its expected value can be estimated by Monte Carlo simulation (Brown, Smith and Sun, 2010, doi:10.1287/opre.1090.0796). Brown and Haugh (2017, doi:10.1287/opre.2017.1631) extended them to discounted infinite-horizon problems. The queue here is an undiscounted infinite-horizon problem: the clairvoyant problem involves an infinitely long sample path, which cannot be simulated directly. Theorem 4 of the paper resolves this by showing that the clairvoyant cost per customer over any finite number of customers is already a valid lower bound.

Setting

A probability space carries inter-arrival times T1,T2,…T_1, T_2, \dotsT1​,T2​,… and service times x1,x2,…x_1, x_2, \dotsx1​,x2​,…. The TnT_nTn​ are identically distributed with mean 1/λ1/\lambda1/λ, the xnx_nxn​ are identically distributed with mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ, the whole family is mutually independent, and λ<μ\lambda < \muλ<μ (the queue is stable). Customer n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 arrives at

tn=T1+⋯+Tnt_n = T_1 + \cdots + T_ntn​=T1​+⋯+Tn​

and is due at dn=tn+δd_n = t_n + \deltadn​=tn​+δ, where δ≥0\delta \ge 0δ≥0 is the quote time. The arrival rate is λ=1/E[T1]\lambda = 1/\mathbb E[T_1]λ=1/E[T1​].

A schedule assigns to each customer nnn a service start time yny_nyn​, which may depend on the sample path. It is FCFS-feasible if on every sample path

yn≥tn,yn+1≥yn+xn(n≥1).y_n \ge t_n, \qquad y_{n+1} \ge y_n + x_n \qquad (n \ge 1).yn​≥tn​,yn+1​≥yn​+xn​(n≥1).

Customer nnn departs at Dn=yn+xnD_n = y_n + x_nDn​=yn​+xn​ and pays g(Dn−dn)g(D_n - d_n)g(Dn​−dn​), where

g(ξ)=ce(−ξ)++cd(ξ)+,ce,cd≥0.g(\xi) = c_e(-\xi)^+ + c_d(\xi)^+, \qquad c_e, c_d \ge 0.g(ξ)=ce​(−ξ)++cd​(ξ)+,ce​,cd​≥0.

The long-run average cost of a schedule is (the paper's form (4))

C(y)=λlim sup⁡N→∞E[1N∑n=1Ng(yn+xn−dn)].C(y) = \lambda \limsup_{N \to \infty} \mathbb E\Big[\frac1N \sum_{n=1}^N g(y_n + x_n - d_n)\Big].C(y)=λN→∞limsup​E[N1​n=1∑N​g(yn​+xn​−dn​)].

The perfectly-clairvoyant cost of customers i,…,ji, \dots, ji,…,j on a sample path ω\omegaω (program (12)) is

γi:j(ω)=inf⁡y∑n=ijg(yn+xn−dn)s.t.yn≥tn (i≤n≤j),yn+1≥yn+xn (i≤n<j).\gamma_{i:j}(\omega) = \inf_y \sum_{n=i}^j g(y_n + x_n - d_n) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad y_n \ge t_n \ (i \le n \le j), \quad y_{n+1} \ge y_n + x_n \ (i \le n < j).γi:j​(ω)=yinf​n=i∑j​g(yn​+xn​−dn​)s.t.yn​≥tn​ (i≤n≤j),yn+1​≥yn​+xn​ (i≤n<j).

In Lean these are StaticQuote.Clairvoyant.Model with Standing, rate, arrival, due, g, IsFCFSSchedule, cost, IsSchedule and gamma.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 18)

For every FCFS-feasible schedule yyy and every N≥1N \ge 1N≥1,

C(y) ≥ λ E[γ1:N(ω)N].C(y) \ \ge\ \lambda\, \mathbb E\Big[\frac{\gamma_{1:N}(\omega)}{N}\Big].C(y) ≥ λE[Nγ1:N​(ω)​].

The paper writes the left side as Cπ∗C^{\pi^*}Cπ∗, the optimal cost. The statement here holds for every schedule, so it covers the optimum whenever one exists.

Milestones (in the order of the printed proof, pp. 18–19)

  1. Sample-path bound: γ1:M(ω)/M≤∑n=1Mg(Dn−dn)/M\gamma_{1:M}(\omega)/M \le \sum_{n=1}^M g(D_n - d_n)/Mγ1:M​(ω)/M≤∑n=1M​g(Dn​−dn​)/M on every path.
  2. (14): lim sup⁡Mλ E[γ1:M/M]≤C(y)\limsup_M \lambda\, \mathbb E[\gamma_{1:M}/M] \le C(y)limsupM​λE[γ1:M​/M]≤C(y).
  3. Superadditivity: γ1:2N(ω)≥γ1:N(ω)+γN+1:2N(ω)\gamma_{1:2N}(\omega) \ge \gamma_{1:N}(\omega) + \gamma_{N+1:2N}(\omega)γ1:2N​(ω)≥γ1:N​(ω)+γN+1:2N​(ω).
  4. Block stationarity: E[γ1:N]=E[γN+1:2N]\mathbb E[\gamma_{1:N}] = \mathbb E[\gamma_{N+1:2N}]E[γ1:N​]=E[γN+1:2N​].
  5. Doubling: E[γ1:2N]≥2 E[γ1:N]\mathbb E[\gamma_{1:2N}] \ge 2\,\mathbb E[\gamma_{1:N}]E[γ1:2N​]≥2E[γ1:N​].
  6. Dyadic bound: k↦E[γ1:2kN/2kN]k \mapsto \mathbb E[\gamma_{1:2^kN}/2^kN]k↦E[γ1:2kN​/2kN] is non-decreasing and E[γ1:N/N]≤lim sup⁡kE[γ1:2kN/2kN]\mathbb E[\gamma_{1:N}/N] \le \limsup_k \mathbb E[\gamma_{1:2^kN}/2^kN]E[γ1:N​/N]≤limsupk​E[γ1:2kN​/2kN].
  7. (15): E[γ1:N/N]≤lim sup⁡ME[γ1:M/M]\mathbb E[\gamma_{1:N}/N] \le \limsup_M \mathbb E[\gamma_{1:M}/M]E[γ1:N​/N]≤limsupM​E[γ1:M​/M].

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 turns an infinite-horizon lower bound into a finite computation: for any NNN, the deterministic clairvoyant problem over NNN customers can be solved on simulated sample paths, and the sample mean, scaled by λ\lambdaλ, estimates a lower bound on the optimal long-run cost. The paper uses this bound, with its refinements (Theorems 5 and 6), to certify the numerical quality of its threshold policies (§7). Without it, the only available benchmark is the asymptotic clairvoyant cost, which cannot be computed.

Formalizing it. The paper proves the theorem with an informal argument. No machine-checked proof of this bound, or of the sample-path GI/G/1 objects it needs, is known to exist. The mission produces a sample-path model of a single-server queue with due dates, a clairvoyant value defined as an extended-real infimum, and the measure-theoretic step that the clairvoyant cost of a block of customers has the same expectation as that of the first block.

Difficulty

Most steps are monotonicity of integrals and of lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup. The substantive step is block stationarity (milestone 4). γN+1:2N\gamma_{N+1:2N}γN+1:2N​ and γ1:N\gamma_{1:N}γ1:N​ are not functions of the same random variables, and γN+1:2N\gamma_{N+1:2N}γN+1:2N​ depends on the absolute arrival times tN+1,…,t2Nt_{N+1}, \dots, t_{2N}tN+1​,…,t2N​, which carry the whole history T1,…,TNT_1, \dots, T_NT1​,…,TN​. The equality of expectations needs the clairvoyant value to be expressed as a function of relative arrival times and service times only. It also needs that function to be measurable (it is an infimum over uncountably many schedules) and the joint law of a block of an i.i.d. family to be invariant under shifting the block. The doubling argument then has to pass from horizons 2kN2^kN2kN to all horizons MMM, which in the extended reals needs no integrability.

Formalization scope

  • Source. The statements follow the SSRN author version of 2021-08-05 (abstract 3557605), whose page and equation numbers are cited throughout; the published article's numbering is not used.
  • Indices start at 111: tn=T1+⋯+Tnt_n = T_1 + \cdots + T_ntn​=T1​+⋯+Tn​; the coordinates T0,x0T_0, x_0T0​,x0​ are unused and carry no hypothesis. N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 in the goal, in the dyadic bound and in (15) (the paper's N\mathbb NN starts at 111; the ratios are 0/00/00/0 at N=0N = 0N=0).
  • Sample paths. The outcome ω\omegaω is the full sample path of inter-arrival and service times; the page calls it "a sample path of inter-arrival times" on p. 18 and "of inter-arrival and service times" on p. 19.
  • Policy class. The paper's admissible, FCFS and Loynes stable policy classes are not modelled. The Loynes class asks for L1L^1L1 convergence of the waiting times WnπW^\pi_nWnπ​. For a nondegenerate GI/G/1 queue these converge only in law, so the class may be empty, and an infimum over it would be vacuous. Every statement instead quantifies over all schedules that are FCFS-feasible on every sample path. That class contains every policy the paper considers, so the statements imply the paper's. No measurability or adaptedness of yyy is required: the bound holds without it.
  • Cost. C(y)C(y)C(y) is defined by the per-customer form (4), not by the calendar-time form (1); the paper passes from (1) to (4) by citing Whitt (1991), and the proof of Theorem 4 uses (4) only.
  • Extended reals. γ\gammaγ is an infimum in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞] (the page writes min⁡\minmin, which is attained but not proved to be). Costs, expectations (lower Lebesgue integrals) and lim sup⁡\limsuplimsups are in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. Each cost term is max⁡(g,0)\max(g, 0)max(g,0), which is exact because g≥0g \ge 0g≥0.
  • Standing assumptions. The paper leaves some conditions implicit; they are made explicit: durations are nonnegative almost surely, δ,ce,cd≥0\delta, c_e, c_d \ge 0δ,ce​,cd​≥0, and "mean 1/λ1/\lambda1/λ, mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ" means 0<E[T1]<∞0 < \mathbb E[T_1] < \infty0<E[T1​]<∞ and 0<E[x1]<∞0 < \mathbb E[x_1] < \infty0<E[x1​]<∞. Stability λ<μ\lambda < \muλ<μ (E[x1]<E[T1]\mathbb E[x_1] < \mathbb E[T_1]E[x1​]<E[T1​]) is kept as the paper's standing assumption although Theorem 4 does not use it. A one-point model (T≡1T \equiv 1T≡1, x≡1/2x \equiv 1/2x≡1/2, δ=ce=cd=1\delta = c_e = c_d = 1δ=ce​=cd​=1) satisfies all of them and has finite γ1:N\gamma_{1:N}γ1:N​.
  • Ruled out. A real-valued γ\gammaγ, cost, expectation or lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup (junk value 000 on unbounded or non-integrable input); a policy class that may be empty; dropping the i.i.d. or independence hypotheses (milestone 4 and the goal fail without them); N=0N = 0N=0; and λ\lambdaλ as a free parameter (it is 1/E[T1]1/\mathbb E[T_1]1/E[T1​]).
  • Infrastructure. A complete development needs measurability of the clairvoyant value, invariance of block laws for i.i.d. families, and the comparison of a lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup along a subsequence with the full lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. The block-law invariance and the sample-path queue model can be reused in other missions. Proofs of any milestone, and lemmas towards milestone 4, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. H. Farahani, M. Dawande, G. Janakiraman, Order Now, Pickup in 30 Minutes: Managing Queues with Static Delivery Guarantees, SSRN 3557605, version of 2021-08-05; published in Operations Research, 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557605, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2203
  • D. B. Brown, J. E. Smith, P. Sun, Information relaxations and duality in stochastic dynamic programs, Operations Research 58(4), 785–801, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0796
  • D. B. Brown, M. B. Haugh, Information relaxation bounds for infinite horizon Markov decision processes, Operations Research 65(5), 1355–1379, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1631
  • R. M. Loynes, The stability of a queue with non-independent inter-arrival and service times, Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 58(3), 497–520, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100036094
  • W. Whitt, A review of L = λW and extensions, Queueing Systems 9(3), 235–268, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01158466
9 thms1 active userReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Interpretable Optimal Stopping: For Trees of Bounded Depth, the Optimal SAA Value of Tree Policies Converges Almost Surely to the Optimal Tree-Policy ValueResearch Paper

Motivation

Optimal stopping asks when to halt a stochastic process so as to maximize an expected reward. Examples are exercising an American option, selling an asset, or ending a clinical trial. The optimal policy is the solution of a dynamic program over the whole state space. In high dimension it cannot be computed exactly, and the usual approximations (regression on basis functions, as in Longstaff–Schwartz) produce policies that are hard to read: a decision maker cannot see why the policy stops in a given state.

Ciocan and Mišić (Interpretable Optimal Stopping, Management Science 2022; arXiv:1812.07211) propose to restrict the search to tree policies. These are binary decision trees whose split nodes compare one state variable with a threshold and whose leaves say stop or go. The tree is fitted by maximizing the average reward over a finite set of simulated trajectories, which is a sample average approximation (SAA) of the true problem. This mission formalizes the consistency guarantee that justifies the method: as the number of trajectories grows, the optimal SAA value over trees of bounded depth converges almost surely to the optimal true value over the same trees.

Setting

The state of the system is a vector x∈X=X1×⋯×Xn⊆Rn\mathbf x\in\mathcal X=\mathcal X_1\times\cdots\times\mathcal X_n\subseteq\mathbb R^nx∈X=X1​×⋯×Xn​⊆Rn. The process x(1),…,x(T)\mathbf x(1),\dots,\mathbf x(T)x(1),…,x(T) runs for TTT periods and starts at a fixed state x(1)=xˉ\mathbf x(1)=\bar{\mathbf x}x(1)=xˉ. Stopping in period ttt in state x\mathbf xx pays g(t,x)g(t,\mathbf x)g(t,x), and rewards are discounted by a factor β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] per period.

A stationary policy is a map π:X→{stop,go}\pi:\mathcal X\to\{\mathbf{stop},\mathbf{go}\}π:X→{stop,go}. Its stopping time on a path is τπ=min⁡{t:π(x(t))=stop}\tau_\pi=\min\{t:\pi(\mathbf x(t))=\mathbf{stop}\}τπ​=min{t:π(x(t))=stop}, and τπ=+∞\tau_\pi=+\inftyτπ​=+∞ if the policy never stops. Its value is

Jπ(xˉ)=E[βτπ−1g(τπ,x(τπ))],J^\pi(\bar{\mathbf x})=\mathbb E\big[\beta^{\tau_\pi-1}g(\tau_\pi,\mathbf x(\tau_\pi))\big],Jπ(xˉ)=E[βτπ​−1g(τπ​,x(τπ​))],

where a path on which π\piπ never stops earns 000. Given trajectories x(ω,⋅)\mathbf x(\omega,\cdot)x(ω,⋅) for ω=1,…,Ω\omega=1,\dots,\Omegaω=1,…,Ω, the sample-average value J^π(xˉ)\hat J^\pi(\bar{\mathbf x})J^π(xˉ) is the average of the same discounted reward over the Ω\OmegaΩ trajectories.

A tree policy π(⋅;T,v,θ,a)\pi(\cdot;\mathcal T,\mathbf v,\boldsymbol\theta,\mathbf a)π(⋅;T,v,θ,a) is given by four things:

  • a binary tree topology T\mathcal TT;
  • for each split node sss, a split variable index v(s)v(s)v(s);
  • for each split node sss, a real split point θs\theta_sθs​;
  • for each leaf ℓ\ellℓ, an action a(ℓ)a(\ell)a(ℓ).

A state descends to the left child of sss when xv(s)≤θsx_{v(s)}\le\theta_sxv(s)​≤θs​ and to the right child otherwise, and receives the action of the leaf it reaches. Πtree(d)\Pi_{\mathrm{tree}}(d)Πtree​(d) is the class of tree policies of depth at most ddd. Once ddd is fixed, the skeletons (T,v,a)(\mathcal T,\mathbf v,\mathbf a)(T,v,a) form a finite set, but the split points θ∈Rsplits\boldsymbol\theta\in\mathbb R^{\mathbf{splits}}θ∈Rsplits range over a continuum.

The paper's standing assumptions are:

  1. Assumption 1: X\mathcal XX is totally bounded and ∥x−y∥∞≤1\|\mathbf x-\mathbf y\|_\infty\le1∥x−y∥∞​≤1 on X\mathcal XX.
  2. Assumption 2: 0≤g(t,x)≤G0\le g(t,\mathbf x)\le G0≤g(t,x)≤G for all ttt and x∈X\mathbf x\in\mathcal Xx∈X.
  3. Assumption 3: there is a function fff, strictly increasing and continuous with f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0, such that Pr⁡[x(t)∈A]≤f(λ(A))\Pr[\mathbf x(t)\in A]\le f(\lambda(A))Pr[x(t)∈A]≤f(λ(A)) for every period 1<t≤T1<t\le T1<t≤T, where λ\lambdaλ is Lebesgue measure.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1 (p. 10)

Fix a depth ddd and ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0. With probability one there is a finite Ω0\Omega_0Ω0​ such that for all Ω≥Ω0\Omega\ge\Omega_0Ω≥Ω0​,

∣sup⁡π∈Πtree(d)Jπ(xˉ)−sup⁡π∈Πtree(d)J^π(xˉ)∣≤ϵ.\Big|\sup_{\pi\in\Pi_{\mathrm{tree}}(d)}J^\pi(\bar{\mathbf x})-\sup_{\pi\in\Pi_{\mathrm{tree}}(d)}\hat J^\pi(\bar{\mathbf x})\Big|\le\epsilon.​π∈Πtree​(d)sup​Jπ(xˉ)−π∈Πtree​(d)sup​J^π(xˉ)​≤ϵ.

This is the paper's headline consistency result: the optimal SAA value converges almost surely to the optimal tree-policy value.

Milestones

  1. Slab bound (proof of Lemma EC.2, p. ec3): Pr⁡[xv(s)(t)∈[min⁡{θ1s,θ2s},max⁡{θ1s,θ2s}]]≤f(∣θ1s−θ2s∣)\Pr[x_{v(s)}(t)\in[\min\{\theta_{1s},\theta_{2s}\},\max\{\theta_{1s},\theta_{2s}\}]]\le f(|\theta_{1s}-\theta_{2s}|)Pr[xv(s)​(t)∈[min{θ1s​,θ2s​},max{θ1s​,θ2s​}]]≤f(∣θ1s​−θ2s​∣) for t>1t>1t>1.
  2. Lemma EC.2: if two split-point vectors give the same skeleton and both continue at xˉ\bar{\mathbf x}xˉ, then ∣Jπθ1−Jπθ2∣≤GT∑sf(∣θ1,s−θ2,s∣)|J^{\pi_{\boldsymbol\theta_1}}-J^{\pi_{\boldsymbol\theta_2}}|\le GT\sum_{s}f(|\theta_{1,s}-\theta_{2,s}|)∣Jπθ1​​−Jπθ2​​∣≤GT∑s​f(∣θ1,s​−θ2,s​∣).
  3. Lemma EC.3: the deterministic sample analogue, ∣J^πθ1−J^πθ2∣≤GΩ∑ω∑t≠1∑sI{xv(s)(ω,t)∈slabs}|\hat J^{\pi_{\boldsymbol\theta_1}}-\hat J^{\pi_{\boldsymbol\theta_2}}|\le\frac G\Omega\sum_\omega\sum_{t\ne1}\sum_s\mathbb I\{x_{v(s)}(\omega,t)\in\text{slab}_s\}∣J^πθ1​​−J^πθ2​​∣≤ΩG​∑ω​∑t=1​∑s​I{xv(s)​(ω,t)∈slabs​}.
  4. Fixed-policy strong law (EC.1.1, p. ec1): for one tree policy, J^π→Jπ\hat J^\pi\to J^\piJ^π→Jπ almost surely.
  5. Lemma EC.1: for one skeleton, almost surely sup⁡θ∣Jπθ−J^πθ∣≤ϵ\sup_{\boldsymbol\theta}|J^{\pi_{\boldsymbol\theta}}-\hat J^{\pi_{\boldsymbol\theta}}|\le\epsilonsupθ​∣Jπθ​−J^πθ​∣≤ϵ for all large Ω\OmegaΩ.
  6. Theorem 1 (p. 10): the same, uniformly over all of Πtree(d)\Pi_{\mathrm{tree}}(d)Πtree​(d).

Significance

Corollary 1 is what makes the SAA tree-fitting procedure a consistent estimator of the best interpretable policy. A decision maker who optimizes a depth-ddd tree on enough simulated trajectories obtains an in-sample value that approximates, to any precision, the true value achievable by depth-ddd trees. The paper also shows (Section EC.1.2) that the conclusion fails when the depth is unbounded, so the depth restriction is part of the result and not a convenience. Theorem 1, the uniform law behind it, has its own uses: it also controls the out-of-sample value of the SAA-optimal tree.

The results are proved in the paper's electronic companion. To our knowledge they have no machine-checked proof. Formalizing them yields a reusable model of finite-horizon stopping with stationary policies and decision-tree policies, and a uniform strong law for a class of indicator-type functionals that is discontinuous in its parameters. The latter is a pattern that recurs in empirical-risk results for trees and threshold rules.

Difficulty

The strong law gives convergence for one policy at a time, outside a null set that depends on the policy. Uncountably many split points mean uncountably many null sets, so the pointwise law does not yield Theorem 1. The usual fix, a Lipschitz or continuity argument in the parameter, fails because J^π\hat J^\piJ^π is a step function of θ\boldsymbol\thetaθ: moving one threshold past a sampled state changes a decision and the sample value jumps. The jumps of the true value must instead be controlled by the probability that the process visits the thin slab between two thresholds, which is where Assumption 3 enters. The jumps of the sample value must be controlled by the empirical frequency of such visits, uniformly in the thresholds. The first period is excluded throughout, because x(1)=xˉ\mathbf x(1)=\bar{\mathbf x}x(1)=xˉ is deterministic and Assumption 3 does not apply to it.

Formalization scope

  • States and paths. States are Fin n → ℝ, whose Mathlib norm is the sup norm ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​. Paths are Fin T → (Fin n → ℝ), and periods are 0-indexed (k : Fin T is period t=k+1t=k+1t=k+1, so βτ−1\beta^{\tau-1}βτ−1 is β ^ k).
  • The process. The process is its path law μ, a probability measure, with x(1)=xˉ\mathbf x(1)=\bar{\mathbf x}x(1)=xˉ and x(t)∈X\mathbf x(t)\in\mathcal Xx(t)∈X almost surely.
  • Rewards. β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] and the rewards g k are measurable. Both are readings of "discounted" and of the expectation on the page.
  • The sample. The sample is an i.i.d. sequence of random paths with law μ, measurable and mutually independent (iIndepFun). The page says only "trajectories of the process" and its proofs use the strong law. J^\hat JJ^ averages the first m samples, and "with probability one" is ∀ᵐ.
  • Assumption 3. It is imposed on measurable sets of finite Lebesgue measure. The printed codomain f:[0,∞)→[0,1]f:[0,\infty)\to[0,1]f:[0,∞)→[0,1] is dropped. As printed, the assumption cannot hold for n≥1n\ge1n≥1, T≥2T\ge2T≥2: a box containing X\mathcal XX has probability 111, which forces f≡1f\equiv1f≡1 on a half-line. Dropping the codomain costs nothing, because r↦f(r)+rr\mapsto f(r)+rr↦f(r)+r converts any admissible [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued fff.
  • Trees. A tree is an inductive skeleton with split variables Fin n and leaf actions. Split points are a function of the node address. A split sends ties left (xi≤θx_i\le\thetaxi​≤θ). A leaf has depth 000. Πtree(d)\Pi_{\mathrm{tree}}(d)Πtree​(d) is the type of (skeleton of depth ≤d\le d≤d, split points), and the suprema in Corollary 1 are real suprema over it. They are genuine suprema because the type is nonempty and the values are bounded in [0,G][0,G][0,G] (for J^\hat JJ^, almost surely).
  • Readings of the lemmas. Lemma EC.2 carries Assumption 1, which its proof uses, although its statement names only Assumptions 2 and 3. The page's "θ∈X\boldsymbol\theta\in\mathcal Xθ∈X" in Lemmas EC.1–EC.3 is read as θ∈Rsplits\boldsymbol\theta\in\mathbb R^{\mathbf{splits}}θ∈Rsplits, the stronger statement.

The statements cannot be met by a degenerate policy class or a junk value. JJJ is the expectation under the true law, J^\hat JJ^ the average over i.i.d. trajectories, and the suprema range over every tree of depth at most ddd with arbitrary real split points. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable with a nonconstant reward and a split that changes the action. One example is n=1n=1n=1, T=2T=2T=2, X=[0,1]\mathcal X=[0,1]X=[0,1], x(2)\mathbf x(2)x(2) uniform, g(t,x)=xg(t,x)=xg(t,x)=x and f(r)=rf(r)=rf(r)=r.

A complete development needs:

  • measurability of the reward of a tree policy;
  • integrability from boundedness;
  • the Lebesgue measure of product boxes;
  • finiteness of the set of skeletons of bounded depth;
  • a covering argument for the bounded range of split points;
  • Mathlib's strong_law_ae.

Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are alternative proofs of Theorem 1 through Glivenko–Cantelli or VC-type arguments.

Selected references

  • D. F. Ciocan and V. V. Mišić, Interpretable Optimal Stopping, Management Science, 2022. Preprint arXiv:1812.07211v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.07211
  • F. A. Longstaff and E. S. Schwartz, Valuing American Options by Simulation: A Simple Least-Squares Approach, Review of Financial Studies 14(1), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/14.1.113
  • A. J. Kleywegt, A. Shapiro and T. Homem-de-Mello, The Sample Average Approximation Method for Stochastic Discrete Optimization, SIAM Journal on Optimization 12(2), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623499363220
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Role of Teletriage in Healthcare Demand Management: When Every Patient Calls, Teletriage Reduces ED Usage iff Overtriage Is Below β⁰ and Double-Dipping iff Undertriage Is Below α⁰Research Paper

Motivation

Emergency departments (EDs) are crowded in part by patients whose condition could have been treated by a primary care provider (PCP), while other patients first visit a PCP, are found to be critical, and are sent on to the ED, paying for two visits. Teletriage — a nurse telephone line that assesses symptoms and recommends where to seek care — is widely offered by health systems and insurers as a remedy for both. It is not error-free: a nurse can undertriage a critical patient (advise primary care) or overtriage a sick one (advise the ED). Whether such an imperfect advisor reduces ED usage, or merely sends more worried-but-well patients to the ED, is the question this mission formalizes.

Çakıcı and Mills (M&SOM, 2020; accepted manuscript at SSRN 2849635) model a patient who does not know whether she is merely sick or critical, chooses between the PCP, the ED and a teletriage call, and updates her belief after the call. Their Proposition 3 answers the question in closed form when every patient calls: teletriage reduces ED usage exactly when the overtriage rate is below an explicit threshold, and reduces double-dipping exactly when the undertriage rate is below another.

Setting

A patient is in one of two states, sick (SSS) or critical (CCC), and holds a belief b∈[0,1]b\in[0,1]b∈[0,1], the probability that she is critical. Three actions are available.

  • PCP: copay cPc_PcP​. A critical patient seen at the PCP is sent on to the ED, so she also pays cEc_EcE​; this is double-dipping. The expected cost is cP+b cEc_P+b\,c_EcP​+bcE​.
  • ED: copay cEc_EcE​, which ends the episode.
  • Teletriage (TT): copay cTc_TcT​. The line predicts sick (PS) or critical (PC) with undertriage rate α=Pr⁡(PS∣C)\alpha=\Pr(PS\mid C)α=Pr(PS∣C) and overtriage rate β=Pr⁡(PC∣S)\beta=\Pr(PC\mid S)β=Pr(PC∣S). The patient updates her belief by Bayes' rule to bPS=αb/(αb+(1−β)(1−b))b_{PS}=\alpha b/(\alpha b+(1-\beta)(1-b))bPS​=αb/(αb+(1−β)(1−b)) or bPC=(1−α)b/((1−α)b+β(1−b))b_{PC}=(1-\alpha)b/((1-\alpha)b+\beta(1-b))bPC​=(1−α)b/((1−α)b+β(1−b)), and then takes the better of PCP and ED at her posterior. She cannot call twice.

Without teletriage the patient's cost is V0(b)=min⁡{cE, cP+b cE}V_0(b)=\min\{c_E,\,c_P+b\,c_E\}V0​(b)=min{cE​,cP​+bcE​}, minimized by the ED exactly when b≥b0=1−cP/cEb\ge b_0=1-c_P/c_Eb≥b0​=1−cP​/cE​. With teletriage it is

V~0(b)=min⁡{cE,  cP+b cE,  cT+(αb+(1−β)(1−b))V0(bPS)+((1−α)b+β(1−b))V0(bPC)}.\tilde V_0(b)=\min\bigl\{c_E,\;c_P+b\,c_E,\;c_T+(\alpha b+(1-\beta)(1-b))V_0(b_{PS})+((1-\alpha)b+\beta(1-b))V_0(b_{PC})\bigr\}.V~0​(b)=min{cE​,cP​+bcE​,cT​+(αb+(1−β)(1−b))V0​(bPS​)+((1−α)b+β(1−b))V0​(bPC​)}.

Teletriage is informative when α+β<1\alpha+\beta<1α+β<1. Proposition 2 of the paper identifies an interval where calling is strictly optimal, bounded by two thresholds

b‾0=βb0+cTcP(1−b0)βb0+(1−α)(1−b0),bˉ0=(1−β)b0−cTcP(1−b0)(1−β)b0+α(1−b0).\underline b_0=\frac{\beta b_0+\frac{c_T}{c_P}(1-b_0)}{\beta b_0+(1-\alpha)(1-b_0)},\qquad \bar b_0=\frac{(1-\beta)b_0-\frac{c_T}{c_P}(1-b_0)}{(1-\beta)b_0+\alpha(1-b_0)}.b​0​=βb0​+(1−α)(1−b0​)βb0​+cP​cT​​(1−b0​)​,bˉ0​=(1−β)b0​+α(1−b0​)(1−β)b0​−cP​cT​​(1−b0​)​.

Write πED(b)\pi^{ED}(b)πED(b) and πDD(b)\pi^{DD}(b)πDD(b) for the probabilities that a patient with belief bbb who acts optimally ends up at the ED, resp. double-dips, without teletriage, and π~ED(b)\tilde\pi^{ED}(b)π~ED(b), π~DD(b)\tilde\pi^{DD}(b)π~DD(b) with it. When beliefs are uniform on [l,u][l,u][l,u], the population rates are the averages πED=1u−l∫luπED(s) ds\pi^{ED}=\frac1{u-l}\int_l^u\pi^{ED}(s)\,dsπED=u−l1​∫lu​πED(s)ds, and likewise for the others.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

Assume informative teletriage, beliefs uniform on [l,u]⊆[0,1][l,u]\subseteq[0,1][l,u]⊆[0,1], and b‾0<l<b0<u<bˉ0\underline b_0<l<b_0<u<\bar b_0b​0​<l<b0​<u<bˉ0​: with teletriage everyone calls, and without it some patients go to the PCP and some to the ED. Then

πED−π~ED>0  ⟺  β<β0=u−u22−(b0−b022)u−u22−(l−l22),πDD−π~DD>0  ⟺  α<α0=b02−l2u2−l2.\pi^{ED}-\tilde\pi^{ED}>0\iff\beta<\beta^0=\frac{u-\frac{u^2}{2}-\bigl(b_0-\frac{b_0^2}{2}\bigr)}{u-\frac{u^2}{2}-\bigl(l-\frac{l^2}{2}\bigr)},\qquad \pi^{DD}-\tilde\pi^{DD}>0\iff\alpha<\alpha^0=\frac{b_0^2-l^2}{u^2-l^2}.πED−π~ED>0⟺β<β0=u−2u2​−(l−2l2​)u−2u2​−(b0​−2b02​​)​,πDD−π~DD>0⟺α<α0=u2−l2b02​−l2​.

Milestones

  1. The no-teletriage threshold at b0b_0b0​ (§4.1).
  2. Proposition 1, informative case: bPS<b<bPCb_{PS}<b<b_{PC}bPS​<b<bPC​ for 0<b<10<b<10<b<1, α+β<1\alpha+\beta<1α+β<1.
  3. Steps of the proof of Proposition 2: the auxiliary thresholds b‾‾0≤b‾0\underline{\underline b}_0\le\underline b_0b​​0​≤b​0​, bˉ0≤bˉˉ0\bar b_0\le\bar{\bar b}_0bˉ0​≤bˉˉ0​ and where the posteriors fall; the cost of calling outside (b‾‾0,bˉˉ0)(\underline{\underline b}_0,\bar{\bar b}_0)(b​​0​,bˉˉ0​); the two linear comparisons inside it.
  4. Proposition 2.
  5. The closed forms of πED,πDD\pi^{ED},\pi^{DD}πED,πDD and π~ED,π~DD\tilde\pi^{ED},\tilde\pi^{DD}π~ED,π~DD (display on p. 11).
  6. The closed forms of πED−π~ED\pi^{ED}-\tilde\pi^{ED}πED−π~ED and πDD−π~DD\pi^{DD}-\tilde\pi^{DD}πDD−π~DD (proof of Proposition 3).

Significance

The result separates the two failure modes of a triage line. Overtriage alone governs whether ED visits fall, and undertriage alone governs whether double-dipping falls, with thresholds that depend only on the copays (through b0b_0b0​) and the belief range. A health system can therefore read off, for a given patient population, the overtriage rate a teletriage service must achieve before it relieves the ED. In the paper's example (cE=5cPc_E=5c_PcE​=5cP​, beliefs uniform on [0.15,0.85][0.15,0.85][0.15,0.85]), β0=0.025\beta^0=0.025β0=0.025: with an overtriage rate of 2.5% or more, teletriage does not reduce ED usage even though every patient calls.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. Formalizing it means checking the full chain from the patient's optimization to the population averages: that the argmin of V~0\tilde V_0V~0​ produces the threshold structure of Proposition 2 with the stated thresholds, that the per-belief probabilities on p. 11 follow from the optimal actions (including the boundary cases the page leaves implicit), and that the integrals evaluate as claimed. Two printing slips in the proofs (a right-hand side cP+bPScEc_P+b_{PS}c_EcP​+bPS​cE​ for cP+b cEc_P+b\,c_EcP​+bcE​, and a denominator u−l−(u22+l22)u-l-(\frac{u^2}2+\frac{l^2}2)u−l−(2u2​+2l2​) for u−l−(u22−l22)u-l-(\frac{u^2}2-\frac{l^2}2)u−l−(2u2​−2l2​)) are corrected in the milestone statements.

Difficulty

The final integrals are elementary once the integrands are known. The work is in the integrands. π~ED(b)\tilde\pi^{ED}(b)π~ED(b) is not given; it comes from which of three costs is smallest at bbb, and, for a caller, which provider is chosen at each of two posteriors that are rational functions of bbb. On the calling range the patient must go to the PCP after the prediction sick and to the ED after critical, i.e. bPS<b0<bPCb_{PS}<b_0<b_{PC}bPS​<b0​<bPC​, and this is what makes π~ED(b)=b+β(1−b)\tilde\pi^{ED}(b)=b+\beta(1-b)π~ED(b)=b+β(1−b). That in turn needs the inequalities b‾‾0≤b‾0\underline{\underline b}_0\le\underline b_0b​​0​≤b​0​ and bˉ0≤bˉˉ0\bar b_0\le\bar{\bar b}_0bˉ0​≤bˉˉ0​, which use cT≥0c_T\ge0cT​≥0 and informativeness, and the linearization of the teletriage cost in the middle range. Reading π~ED\tilde\pi^{ED}π~ED off the display on p. 11 skips exactly this argument.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace Teletriage.OneShot and in ℝ. A single definition file holds the parameters (cP,cE,cT,α,β)(c_P,c_E,c_T,\alpha,\beta)(cP​,cE​,cT​,α,β), the standing assumptions, the posteriors, the costs, the optimal actions, the probabilities, the uniform average and all thresholds.

Conventions:

  • Standing assumptions 0<cP<cE0<c_P<c_E0<cP​<cE​, 0≤cT0\le c_T0≤cT​, α,β∈[0,1]\alpha,\beta\in[0,1]α,β∈[0,1]. The first three are added. The thresholds divide by cPc_PcP​; cP<cEc_P<c_EcP​<cE​ is stated only in passing (p. 12) and makes b0∈(0,1)b_0\in(0,1)b0​∈(0,1); cTc_TcT​ is a copayment, and with cT<0c_T<0cT​<0 the display of π~ED\tilde\pi^{ED}π~ED is false. Informativeness α+β<1\alpha+\beta<1α+β<1 is a separate hypothesis, inherited by Proposition 3 from Proposition 2.
  • Ties in the argmin are broken ED ≻ teletriage ≻ PCP (and ED over PCP without teletriage), matching the displays on p. 11. Proposition 2 is stated in its strict open-region reading: at cT=0c_T=0cT​=0 teletriage ties the PCP at low beliefs, so the page's "if and only if" at the endpoints is false under any tie rule.
  • Probabilities are computed from the optimal actions, never defined by the closed forms on p. 11. Defining π~ED\tilde\pi^{ED}π~ED or π~DD\tilde\pi^{DD}π~DD by those displays, or the teletriage cost by its middle-range linear form, would make the goal a calculus exercise and is ruled out.
  • Averages are 1u−l∫lug\frac1{u-l}\int_l^u gu−l1​∫lu​g, the paper's ∫01gf\int_0^1 g f∫01​gf with the Uniform[l,u][l,u][l,u] density. No integrability hypotheses are added: the integrands are piecewise linear, and proving their integrability is part of the work.
  • Lean's division returns 000 on a zero denominator. The posteriors are only used multiplied by the probability of their prediction, so a junk value never enters a cost or a probability.

Not in scope: the traditional-access model (Propositions 4–5), the open- vs traditional-access comparisons (Propositions 6–7, Corollaries 1–2), the sequential POMDP (Lemma 1, Propositions 8–9), and the uninformative cases of Proposition 1.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones in any order. The algebra of milestones 3–4 is self-contained and reusable for the traditional-access analogue (Proposition 4).

Selected references

  • Ö. E. Çakıcı and A. F. Mills, On the Role of Teletriage in Healthcare Demand Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0908 (accepted manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2849635)
  • T. Ayer, O. Alagoz and N. K. Stout, OR Forum—A POMDP Approach to Personalize Mammography Screening Decisions, Operations Research 60(5), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.1019
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Loot Box Pricing and Design: The Optimal Normalized Revenue of Traditional Loot Boxes Converges to μ/e as the Number of Items GrowsResearch Paper

Motivation

Loot boxes are a selling format for virtual items in video games and digital collectibles: the customer pays a fixed price for a box whose content is a random item from a catalog. They generate a large share of revenue in the game industry and have drawn regulatory attention because the customer does not know what they are buying. From the seller's side they are a form of probabilistic selling, close to bundling: a box is a lottery over the catalog, and repeated purchases let a customer assemble a collection.

Chen, Elmachtoub, Hamilton and Lei (Loot Box Pricing and Design, Management Science 2021; the mission follows the authors' manuscript submitted in August 2019) compare two designs. A unique box never repeats an item the customer owns; a traditional box draws uniformly from the whole catalog, so duplicates occur. Their headline asymptotic results are that, as the catalog grows, the optimal unique box earns the mean valuation μ\muμ per item, as much as the grand bundle (Theorem 2), while the optimal traditional box earns exactly a fraction 1/e1/e1/e of it (Theorem 3). This mission formalizes the traditional-box result.

Setting

A monopolist sells N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 distinct virtual items. A customer's valuations V1,…,VNV_1, \dots, V_NV1​,…,VN​ are i.i.d. with a law FFF on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with mean μ\muμ and finite variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. A second copy of an item is worth nothing.

The seller offers a traditional box at a fixed price p>0p > 0p>0 in every period. Each box contains an item drawn uniformly at random from [N][N][N], independently of the valuations and of earlier draws. Let StS_tSt​ be the set of distinct items owned before the ttt-th box, so S1=∅S_1 = \emptysetS1​=∅. The expected utility of the ttt-th box is

Ut=1N∑i∈[N]∖StVi  −  p.U_t = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i \in [N]\setminus S_t} V_i \;-\; p .Ut​=N1​i∈[N]∖St​∑​Vi​−p.

The customer is myopic: they buy the ttt-th box if and only if Ut≥0U_t \ge 0Ut​≥0, and the first time Ut<0U_t < 0Ut​<0 they leave for good. The normalized revenue at price ppp and the optimal normalized revenue are

RTB(p)=p⋅E[# of traditional box purchases]N,RTB=sup⁡p>0RTB(p).R_{TB}(p) = \frac{p \cdot \mathbb E[\#\text{ of traditional box purchases}]}{N}, \qquad R_{TB} = \sup_{p>0} R_{TB}(p).RTB​(p)=Np⋅E[# of traditional box purchases]​,RTB​=p>0sup​RTB​(p).

The milestones use a random walk. For i.i.d. w0,w1,…w_0, w_1, \dotsw0​,w1​,… with law FFF, the first passage above a level ttt is r(t)=inf⁡{j≥1:t≤w0+⋯+wj−1}r(t) = \inf\{j \ge 1 : t \le w_0 + \dots + w_{j-1}\}r(t)=inf{j≥1:t≤w0​+⋯+wj−1​}; the paper's rNr_NrN​ is r(Np)r(Np)r(Np). Also ζN=∑i=1N1/i−log⁡N−γ\zeta_N = \sum_{i=1}^N 1/i - \log N - \gammaζN​=∑i=1N​1/i−logN−γ, where γ\gammaγ is the Euler–Mascheroni constant.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, the limit clause (p. 13)

lim⁡N→∞RTB=μe.\lim_{N\to\infty} R_{TB} = \frac{\mu}{e}.N→∞lim​RTB​=eμ​.

It holds for every valuation law in the model, with no condition on the shape of FFF beyond non-negativity and a finite variance.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 3, pp. 33–34)

  1. Eq. (16), index corrected. The revenue identity RTB(p)=p E[∑k=rNN1/k]R_{TB}(p) = p\,\mathbb E\big[\sum_{k=r_N}^{N} 1/k\big]RTB​(p)=pE[∑k=rN​N​1/k].
  2. Eq. (17). Npμ≤E[rN]≤Npμ+1+σ2μ2\frac{Np}{\mu} \le \mathbb E[r_N] \le \frac{Np}{\mu} + 1 + \frac{\sigma^2}{\mu^2}μNp​≤E[rN​]≤μNp​+1+μ2σ2​ when μ>0\mu > 0μ>0.
  3. Eq. (21). RTB(μ/e)≥μelog⁡(1/(1e+1+σ2/μ2N))R_{TB}(\mu/e) \ge \frac{\mu}{e}\log\Big(1\big/\big(\frac1e + \frac{1+\sigma^2/\mu^2}{N}\big)\Big)RTB​(μ/e)≥eμ​log(1/(e1​+N1+σ2/μ2​)), the finite-NNN lower bound of Theorem 3 at an explicit price.
  4. Eq. (22). P(rN≤(1−ϵ)Np/μ)≤σ2/(ϵ21−ϵNpμ)\mathbb P\big(r_N \le (1-\epsilon)Np/\mu\big) \le \sigma^2\big/\big(\frac{\epsilon^2}{1-\epsilon}Np\mu\big)P(rN​≤(1−ϵ)Np/μ)≤σ2/(1−ϵϵ2​Npμ) for 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1.
  5. Eqs. (24)–(26), corrected. For 0<ϵ<10 < \epsilon < 10<ϵ<1,
RTB≤μeζN−11−ϵ+μ(1−ϵ)N+(1−ϵ)σ2(1+log⁡N)ϵ2μN,R_{TB} \le \frac{\mu e^{\zeta_N-1}}{1-\epsilon} + \frac{\mu}{(1-\epsilon)N} + \frac{(1-\epsilon)\sigma^2(1+\log N)}{\epsilon^2\mu N},RTB​≤1−ϵμeζN​−1​+(1−ϵ)Nμ​+ϵ2μN(1−ϵ)σ2(1+logN)​,

whose right-hand side tends to μ/e\mu/eμ/e when ϵ=N−1/3\epsilon = N^{-1/3}ϵ=N−1/3.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 quantifies the price of duplicates. A traditional box loses a factor eee against the unique box, the grand bundle and the upper bound μ\muμ of the paper's Proposition 1, for every valuation distribution, so in large catalogs the unique box earns about 0.63μ0.63\mu0.63μ more per item. The constant 1/e1/e1/e comes from the interplay between the coupon-collector waiting times N/(N−j)N/(N-j)N/(N−j) and the price at which the myopic customer stops; the identity and the bounds expose that interplay as a statement about the first passage of a random walk.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper, not formalized. Two of the printed steps of the proof need repair: the harmonic-number rewriting in (16) drops one term, and the per-price upper bound (25) derived from it is false at small prices (for V≡1V \equiv 1V≡1, N=1000N = 1000N=1000, p=1/Np = 1/Np=1/N the revenue is ≈0.007485\approx 0.007485≈0.007485 while (25) gives ≈0.007014\approx 0.007014≈0.007014); its maximization also ignores prices above μ/(1−ϵ)\mu/(1-\epsilon)μ/(1−ϵ). The milestones state the corrected claims, and the limit survives. A machine-checked proof therefore settles the headline result independently of the printed argument.

Difficulty

The number of boxes a myopic customer buys depends on all valuations and on the random order in which distinct items arrive, and the index at which the customer stops is not a stopping time of the forward purchase process: whether the customer continues depends on valuations of items not yet collected. Applying Wald-type identities directly to the purchase sequence therefore fails. The revenue identity (16) also mixes two sources of randomness, the coupon-collector waiting times and the values in order of collection, whose independence must be established rather than assumed. On the upper side, the expected first-passage index needs an overshoot bound for renewal processes (Lorden's inequality), which Mathlib does not contain, and the limit needs an upper bound that is uniform over all prices, including prices far above μ\muμ where the per-price estimate of the paper breaks down.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace LootBox.TB. The valuation law is a probability measure F : Measure ℝ with F (Set.Iio 0) = 0 and MemLp id 2 F; μ\muμ is ∫ x, x ∂F and σ2\sigma^2σ2 the centred second moment. The sample space for NNN items is valuations × draws, (Fin N → ℝ) × (ℕ → Fin N), with the product of Measure.pi of FFF and Measure.infinitePi of the uniform law on Fin N; draw ttt is the item of the (t+1)(t+1)(t+1)-th box. The purchase count is the first ttt with Ut+1<0U_{t+1}<0Ut+1​<0, valued in ℕ∞; expectations are lower Lebesgue integrals and revenues live in ℝ≥0∞, so no expectation is truncated by toReal. The paper's max⁡p\max_pmaxp​ is a supremum over p>0p > 0p>0. The goal is indexed by N=n+1N = n + 1N=n+1 so that the uniform law is defined. The page's backward walk CjC_jCj​, extended by virtual i.i.d. variables, is represented by the partial sums of an i.i.d. sequence under walkLaw F = Measure.infinitePi (fun _ => F).

The hypothesis μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 appears in the milestones that divide by μ\muμ, not in the goal: when μ=0\mu = 0μ=0 nothing is bought and both sides of the limit are 000. A formalization in which revenue is a real number obtained by toReal, or in which prices may be 000 (where a customer with zero valuations buys forever), could make bounds vacuous; neither is used here.

A complete development needs the coupon-collector decomposition of the purchase count, the exchangeability of the values in order of collection, Wald's identity and Lorden's overshoot bound for i.i.d. non-negative walks, Chebyshev's inequality (meas_ge_le_variance_div_sq), Jensen's inequality for −log⁡-\log−log, and the bounds log⁡(n+1)≤Hn≤1+log⁡n\log(n+1) \le H_n \le 1 + \log nlog(n+1)≤Hn​≤1+logn and ζN→0\zeta_N \to 0ζN​→0 (Mathlib's NumberTheory/Harmonic). Wald's identity and Lorden's bound are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones, and of the renewal-theoretic lemmas they need, are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Chen, A. N. Elmachtoub, M. L. Hamilton, X. Lei, Loot Box Pricing and Design, Management Science 67(8), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3748
  • G. Lorden, On excess over the boundary, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 41(2), 1970. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177697092
  • Y. Bakos, E. Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency, Management Science 45(12), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.12.1613
  • A. Gut, Stopped Random Walks: Limit Theorems and Applications, 2nd ed., Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-87835-5
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchPartial Differential Equations·Captain: mikedeng1

Finite State Mean Field Games with Wright–Fisher Common Noise as Limits of N-Player Weighted Games: Normalized N-Player Equilibrium Values Converge to the Master Equation at a Polynomial RateResearch Paper

Motivation

Mean field games describe Nash equilibria of games with very many symmetric players by a single limiting object. Whether, and how fast, the equilibria of the NNN-player game converge to that limit is the convergence problem. For games with common noise, a source of randomness shared by all players, the standard route goes through the master equation, a PDE on the space of probability measures whose solution UUU gives the equilibrium value of a representative player as a function of the population's distribution (Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry and Lions, 2019, arXiv:1509.02505).

For finite state spaces the distribution is a point of the simplex. Bayraktar, Cecchin, Cohen and Delarue (J. Math. Pures Appl. 147, 2021) introduced a common noise of Wright–Fisher type, the noise of population genetics, which keeps the distribution in the simplex and makes the master equation uniquely solvable. Its NNN-player counterpart is not obvious, because the Wright–Fisher diffusion is the limit of a resampling of the population, not of independent player noises. The paper behind this mission (Bayraktar, Cecchin, Cohen and Delarue, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022, arXiv:2012.04845) builds such a game, in which players carry weights that are resampled at random times, and proves that its normalized equilibrium values converge to UUU at a polynomial rate.

Setting

There are d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 states [ ⁣[d] ⁣]={1,…,d}[\![d]\!] = \{1,\dots,d\}[[d]]={1,…,d} and N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 players. Player lll is at a state xlx^lxl and carries a weight yl≥0y^l \ge 0yl≥0; the weights are rational and sum to NNN, and the set of such weight tuples is Y\mathbb YY. The players interact through the weighted empirical measure

μx,yN[i]=1N∑lyl1{xl=i},\mu^N_{x,y}[i] = \frac1N\sum_{l} y^l \mathbb 1_{\{x^l = i\}},μx,yN​[i]=N1​l∑​yl1{xl=i}​,

a point of the simplex Sd−1={p∈Rd:pi≥0,∑ipi=1}\mathcal S_{d-1} = \{p \in \mathbb R^d : p_i \ge 0, \sum_i p_i = 1\}Sd−1​={p∈Rd:pi​≥0,∑i​pi​=1}.

Each player controls the rates at which it jumps between states, at quadratic cost. A drift φ(μ[j])\varphi(\mu[j])φ(μ[j]) pushes players towards nearly empty states, where φ\varphiφ is non-increasing and Lipschitz, equal to κ\kappaκ on [0,δ][0,\delta][0,δ] and to 000 beyond 2δ2\delta2δ. At rate εN\varepsilon NεN the common noise draws S∼Multinomial(N,μx,yN)S \sim \mathrm{Multinomial}(N, \mu^N_{x,y})S∼Multinomial(N,μx,yN​) and replaces every weight yly^lyl by ylS[xl]/(Nμx,yN[xl])y^l S[x^l]/(N\mu^N_{x,y}[x^l])ylS[xl]/(Nμx,yN​[xl]). Players pay ylf(xl,μ)y^l f(x^l, \mu)ylf(xl,μ) per unit time and ylg(xl,μT)y^l g(x^l,\mu_T)ylg(xl,μT​) at time TTT.

The equilibrium values divided by the weights, wN,l(t,x,y)w^{N,l}(t,x,y)wN,l(t,x,y), solve the normalized Nash system: a countable family of ordinary differential equations in ttt, indexed by (l,x,y)(l, x, y)(l,x,y), with the Hamiltonian H(i,u)=−12∑j≠i(ui−uj)+2H(i,u) = -\frac12\sum_{j\ne i}(u^i - u^j)_+^2H(i,u)=−21​∑j=i​(ui−uj)+2​ and the terminal condition wN,l(T,x,y)=g(xl,μx,yN)w^{N,l}(T,x,y) = g(x^l, \mu^N_{x,y})wN,l(T,x,y)=g(xl,μx,yN​).

The limit object is U=(U1,…,Ud)U = (U^1,\dots,U^d)U=(U1,…,Ud) on [0,T]×Sd−1[0,T]\times\mathcal S_{d-1}[0,T]×Sd−1​, solving the master equation

∂tUi+H(i,U)+fi+∑jφ(pj)(Uj−Ui)+∑j,kpk[φ(pj)+(Uk−Uj)+](djUi−dkUi)+ε∑j≠ipj(diUi−djUi)+ε2∑j,k(pjδjk−pjpk)dj,k2Ui=0\partial_tU^i + H(i, U) + f^i + \sum_j\varphi(p_j)(U^j - U^i) + \sum_{j,k}p_k[\varphi(p_j) + (U^k - U^j)_+](\mathfrak d_jU^i - \mathfrak d_kU^i) + \varepsilon\sum_{j\ne i}p_j(\mathfrak d_iU^i - \mathfrak d_jU^i) + \frac\varepsilon2\sum_{j,k}(p_j\delta_{jk} - p_jp_k)\mathfrak d^2_{j,k}U^i = 0∂t​Ui+H(i,U)+fi+j∑​φ(pj​)(Uj−Ui)+j,k∑​pk​[φ(pj​)+(Uk−Uj)+​](dj​Ui−dk​Ui)+εj=i∑​pj​(di​Ui−dj​Ui)+2ε​j,k∑​(pj​δjk​−pj​pk​)dj,k2​Ui=0

with Ui(T,⋅)=giU^i(T,\cdot) = g^iUi(T,⋅)=gi. Here di\mathfrak d_idi​ are the intrinsic derivatives on the simplex, dih(p)=1d∑m∂ei−emh(p)\mathfrak d_ih(p) = \frac1d\sum_m\partial_{e_i - e_m}h(p)di​h(p)=d1​∑m​∂ei​−em​​h(p), and the last term is the Kimura operator of Wright–Fisher diffusions. The mean-field prediction for player lll is zN,l(t,x,y)=Uxl(t,μx,yN)z^{N,l}(t,x,y) = U^{x^l}(t,\mu^N_{x,y})zN,l(t,x,y)=Uxl(t,μx,yN​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.4

For κ\kappaκ large enough, there are χ>0\chi > 0χ>0 and CCC such that for every NNN, lll, ttt, xxx and y∈Yy \in \mathbb Yy∈Y,

∣(zN,l−wN,l)(t,x,y)∣≤CN−χ(∏i1N−1/8+μx,yN[i])1/(2d)(1N∑m∣ym∣3)1/2.\big|(z^{N,l} - w^{N,l})(t,x,y)\big| \le CN^{-\chi}\Big(\prod_{i}\frac{1}{N^{-1/8} + \mu^N_{x,y}[i]}\Big)^{1/(2d)}\Big(\frac1N\sum_m|y^m|^3\Big)^{1/2}.​(zN,l−wN,l)(t,x,y)​≤CN−χ(i∏​N−1/8+μx,yN​[i]1​)1/(2d)(N1​m∑​∣ym∣3)1/2.

The exponent χ\chiχ is existential, so an improvement of the rate does not invalidate the target.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 3.1: the normalized Nash system has a unique bounded solution.
  2. Proposition 3.2: that solution is bounded by T∥f∥∞+∥g∥∞T\|f\|_\infty + \|g\|_\inftyT∥f∥∞​+∥g∥∞​, uniformly in NNN.
  3. Lemma 4.5: moment and deviation bounds for (Sμ[i]/(Nμ[i]))ℓ−1(S_\mu[i]/(N\mu[i]))^\ell - 1(Sμ​[i]/(Nμ[i]))ℓ−1.
  4. Lemmas 4.8–4.11: the common-noise, discrete-gradient, drift and Hamiltonian terms of the Nash system along zN,lz^{N,l}zN,l against those of the master equation.
  5. Proposition 4.6 with Remark 4.7: zN,lz^{N,l}zN,l solves the Nash system up to a rest O(N−η)O(N^{-\eta})O(N−η) on the set TN\mathcal T_NTN​ where min⁡iμx,yN[i]≥N−ϵ\min_i\mu^N_{x,y}[i] \ge N^{-\epsilon}mini​μx,yN​[i]≥N−ϵ and max⁡lyl≤12N1−ϵ\max_l y^l \le \frac12N^{1-\epsilon}maxl​yl≤21​N1−ϵ.

Significance

Theorem 2.4 gives a convergence rate for a finite-state mean field game whose common noise keeps the population on the simplex. It shows that the master equation of the earlier paper is the right limit of a concrete finite game, and with a diffusion-approximation argument it yields the paper's second main result, the weak convergence of the equilibrium empirical measure to the Wright–Fisher-type SDE (Theorem 2.6). The bound is not uniform in (x,y)(x,y)(x,y): it degenerates near the boundary of the simplex and for spread-out weights, which reflects the singular coefficient 1/μ[xl]1/\mu[x^l]1/μ[xl] in the resampling.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal statement of the convergence problem for a game with weighted players, a formal Nash system on a countable state space, intrinsic derivatives on the simplex, and multinomial moment estimates.

Difficulty

The usual proof of convergence plugs zN,lz^{N,l}zN,l into the Nash system, controls the rest, and closes with a Gronwall argument along the NNN-player dynamics. Here the rest is small only on TN\mathcal T_NTN​, away from the boundary of the simplex and for moderate weights; the second derivatives of UUU may blow up at the boundary, and the resampling ratio S[i]/(Nμ[i])S[i]/(N\mu[i])S[i]/(Nμ[i]) is unbounded as μ[i]→0\mu[i] \to 0μ[i]→0. A uniform estimate of sup⁡x,y∣zN,l−wN,l∣\sup_{x,y}|z^{N,l} - w^{N,l}|supx,y​∣zN,l−wN,l∣ is therefore not available, and the comparison must be weighted by functions of (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) whose expectations along the dynamics can be controlled. The weights are unbounded and enter through their moments.

Formalization scope

States are Fin d and players Fin N, with d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 and N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 (no N≥2N \ge 2N≥2). Weights are rational, and every equation and conclusion is required only for y∈Yy \in \mathbb Yy∈Y and t∈[0,T]t \in [0,T]t∈[0,T]. The simplex is Mathlib's stdSimplex. Intrinsic derivatives use lineDeriv; multinomial expectations are finite sums over Finset.Nat.antidiagonalTuple. The resampling ratio is 111 when μ[xl]=0\mu[x^l] = 0μ[xl]=0, as in the paper. Solutions of the Nash system and of the master equation are classical in ttt, with one-sided derivatives at 000 and TTT. The Nash system is solved by any bounded classical solution; Proposition 3.1 says there is exactly one.

The formalization commits to the following readings of the source.

  • ε\varepsilonε for ε2\varepsilon^2ε2. The master equation carries ε\varepsilonε and ε/2\varepsilon/2ε/2 in front of the common-noise terms where (2.3) prints ε2\varepsilon^2ε2 and ε2/2\varepsilon^2/2ε2/2. The NNN-player noise rings at rate εN\varepsilon NεN, and the limit SDE (2.4) has intensity ε\sqrt\varepsilonε​; with ε2\varepsilon^2ε2, Proposition 4.6 and Theorem 2.4 would be false.
  • Regularity class. The Wright–Fisher Hölder space of Proposition 2.1, which the paper only describes, is replaced by an explicit class: UUU continuous on [0,T]×Sd−1[0,T]\times\mathcal S_{d-1}[0,T]×Sd−1​, differentiable along the simplex in the interior together with dU\mathfrak dUdU, with UUU and dU\mathfrak dUdU bounded, and dU\mathfrak dUdU and pjpk dj,k2U\sqrt{p_jp_k}\,\mathfrak d^2_{j,k}Upj​pk​​dj,k2​U bounded and γ′/2\gamma'/2γ′/2-Hölder. These are the properties §7 says the proofs use. The Hölder assumptions on f,gf, gf,g are replaced by boundedness.
  • Constants. χ\chiχ is chosen after ddd and γ′\gamma'γ′, the threshold κˉ0\bar\kappa_0κˉ0​ after d,ε,Td, \varepsilon, Td,ε,T and the bounds of f,gf, gf,g, and CCC after all model data and UUU, before NNN and the point.
  • Remark 4.7. Lemmas 4.9–4.11 and Proposition 4.6 are stated for zN,lz^{N,l}zN,l, so no division by a vanishing weight occurs.
  • Two printed slips. Lemma 4.9's (4.28) uses dUj\mathfrak dU^jdUj, not dUxl\mathfrak dU^{x^l}dUxl, and Lemma 4.5's (4.19) assumes Nμ[i]≥1N\mu[i] \ge 1Nμ[i]≥1, without which it fails.

The bound is not trivial. Since ∣z−w∣≤2(T∥f∥∞+∥g∥∞)|z - w| \le 2(T\|f\|_\infty + \|g\|_\infty)∣z−w∣≤2(T∥f∥∞​+∥g∥∞​) and the right side is at least of order CN−χCN^{-\chi}CN−χ, a constant CCC chosen after NNN would make the theorem empty; CCC precedes NNN. The functions www and UUU enter only through the Nash system and the master equation, and the class of UUU is not empty: for d=1d = 1d=1 the function U1(t)=g1+(T−t)f1U^1(t) = g^1 + (T - t)f^1U1(t)=g1+(T−t)f1 is in it.

The mission takes UUU as given. Its existence for d≥2d \ge 2d≥2 is Theorems 3.2 and 3.4 of Bayraktar, Cecchin, Cohen and Delarue (2021), quoted as Proposition 2.1, which is not a target. Also outside the mission are the NNN-player game itself (Propositions 2.2–2.3), Theorem 2.6, and the process estimates of §4.1 (Theorem 4.1, Remark 4.2, Propositions 4.3–4.4), which need a continuous-time Markov chain with a martingale-problem characterization. Contributions are welcome on every milestone; the multinomial estimates and the simplex calculus are reusable elsewhere.

Selected references

  • E. Bayraktar, A. Cecchin, A. Cohen, F. Delarue, Finite state mean field games with Wright–Fisher common noise as limits of N-player weighted games, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. arXiv:2012.04845v2
  • E. Bayraktar, A. Cecchin, A. Cohen, F. Delarue, Finite state mean field games with Wright–Fisher common noise, Journal de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées 147:98–162, 2021. search
  • P. Cardaliaguet, F. Delarue, J.-M. Lasry, P.-L. Lions, The Master Equation and the Convergence Problem in Mean Field Games, Annals of Mathematics Studies 201, Princeton University Press, 2019. arXiv:1509.02505
  • C. L. Epstein, R. Mazzeo, Degenerate Diffusion Operators Arising in Population Biology, Annals of Mathematics Studies 185, Princeton University Press, 2013. search
  • S. N. Ethier, T. G. Kurtz, Markov Processes: Characterization and Convergence, Wiley, 1986. doi:10.1002/9780470316658
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Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynkin Game on Assets with Incomplete Information on the Return: The Entry Times of the Two Stopping Regions Form a Saddle Point When k > 0Research Paper

Motivation

A game option (or Israeli option, introduced by Kifer, Game options, 2000) is an American option whose seller may also cancel the contract at any time, paying the exercise payoff plus a penalty. Pricing it is a Dynkin game: a zero-sum optimal stopping game in which the buyer chooses an exercise time to maximise the discounted payoff and the seller chooses a cancellation time to minimise it. Such contracts model, for instance, a public concession that the granting authority may revoke against compensation.

In the classical theory the drift of the underlying asset is known. De Angelis, Gensbittel and Villeneuve (arXiv:1705.07352v4, 2019; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021) study the perpetual game call option when neither player knows whether the asset pays a dividend: the return is r−δ0Dr-\delta_0Dr−δ0​D with an unobservable D∈{0,1}D\in\{0,1\}D∈{0,1}. Both players learn about DDD only by watching the price. The paper's headline results are that the game has a value, that the value is globally C1C^1C1, and that under explicit conditions on the parameters the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies given by entry times into the two players' stopping regions. This mission formalizes the equilibrium result for the case k>0k>0k>0.

Timeline. Kifer (2000) introduced game options. Ekström and Villeneuve (AAP 2006) proved existence of the value for one-dimensional diffusions without uniform integrability and analysed the perpetual call with y=0y=0y=0. Ekström and Peskir (SICON 2008) proved existence of the value and of Nash equilibria for Markov processes under uniform integrability. Yam, Yung and Zhou (Game call options revisited, Mathematical Finance, 2012) treated the perpetual call with a known dividend (y=1y=1y=1). De Angelis, Gensbittel and Villeneuve (2017–2019) treated the case with an unknown dividend, y∈(0,1)y\in(0,1)y∈(0,1).

Setting

Fix a discount rate r>0r>0r>0, a dividend jump δ0>0\delta_0>0δ0​>0, a volatility σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, a strike K>0K>0K>0 and a penalty ε0>0\varepsilon_0>0ε0​>0, and set G1(x)=(x−K)+G_1(x)=(x-K)^+G1​(x)=(x−K)+ and G2(x)=(x−K)++ε0G_2(x)=(x-K)^++\varepsilon_0G2​(x)=(x−K)++ε0​. On a probability space carrying a Brownian motion BBB and an independent random variable D∈{0,1}D\in\{0,1\}D∈{0,1} with P(D=1)=y\mathbb P(D=1)=yP(D=1)=y, the asset is

Stx=xexp⁡(σBt+(r−δ0D)t−tσ22).S^x_t=x\exp\Big(\sigma B_t+(r-\delta_0D)t-\tfrac{t\sigma^2}{2}\Big).Stx​=xexp(σBt​+(r−δ0​D)t−2tσ2​).

The players observe only SSS: their stopping times are stopping times of F‾S\overline{\mathcal F}^SFS, the filtration generated by SSS and augmented by the null sets, with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. For such τ\tauτ (buyer) and γ\gammaγ (seller) the expected payoff is

Mx,y(τ,γ)=E[e−rτG1(Sτ)1{τ≤γ}+e−rγG2(Sγ)1{γ<τ}],M_{x,y}(\tau,\gamma)=\mathbb E\big[e^{-r\tau}G_1(S_\tau)\mathbf 1_{\{\tau\le\gamma\}}+e^{-r\gamma}G_2(S_\gamma)\mathbf 1_{\{\gamma<\tau\}}\big],Mx,y​(τ,γ)=E[e−rτG1​(Sτ​)1{τ≤γ}​+e−rγG2​(Sγ​)1{γ<τ}​],

with payoff 000 on {τ∧γ=∞}\{\tau\wedge\gamma=\infty\}{τ∧γ=∞}. The upper value is V‾=inf⁡γsup⁡τM\overline V=\inf_\gamma\sup_\tau MV=infγ​supτ​M and the lower value V‾=sup⁡τinf⁡γM\underline V=\sup_\tau\inf_\gamma MV​=supτ​infγ​M. A saddle point is a pair (τ∗,γ∗)(\tau_*,\gamma_*)(τ∗​,γ∗​) with M(τ,γ∗)≤M(τ∗,γ∗)≤M(τ∗,γ)M(\tau,\gamma_*)\le M(\tau_*,\gamma_*)\le M(\tau_*,\gamma)M(τ,γ∗​)≤M(τ∗​,γ∗​)≤M(τ∗​,γ) for all τ,γ\tau,\gammaτ,γ.

The filter Yt=E[D∣F‾tS]Y_t=\mathbb E[D\mid\overline{\mathcal F}^S_t]Yt​=E[D∣FtS​] is the players' posterior belief that a dividend is paid; it has the closed form Yt=yℓt/(yℓt+1−y)Y_t=y\ell_t/(y\ell_t+1-y)Yt​=yℓt​/(yℓt​+1−y) with ℓt\ell_tℓt​ the likelihood ratio of the observed path. The pair (X,Y)=(S,Y)(X,Y)=(S,Y)(X,Y)=(S,Y) is Markov. With V=V‾V=\overline VV=V the value, the stopping regions are S1={V=G1}\mathcal S_1=\{V=G_1\}S1​={V=G1​} (buyer) and S2={V=G2}\mathcal S_2=\{V=G_2\}S2​={V=G2​} (seller), and the entry times are

τ∗=inf⁡{t≥0∣V(Xt,Yt)≤G1(Xt)},γ∗=inf⁡{t≥0∣G2(Xt)≤V(Xt,Yt)}.\tau_*=\inf\{t\ge0\mid V(X_t,Y_t)\le G_1(X_t)\},\qquad\gamma_*=\inf\{t\ge0\mid G_2(X_t)\le V(X_t,Y_t)\}.τ∗​=inf{t≥0∣V(Xt​,Yt​)≤G1​(Xt​)},γ∗​=inf{t≥0∣G2​(Xt​)≤V(Xt​,Yt​)}.

Finally k:=r−σ2/2−δ0/2k:=r-\sigma^2/2-\delta_0/2k:=r−σ2/2−δ0​/2. In the coordinates Zt=ln⁡Xt+σ2δ0ln⁡Yt1−YtZ_t=\ln X_t+\frac{\sigma^2}{\delta_0}\ln\frac{Y_t}{1-Y_t}Zt​=lnXt​+δ0​σ2​ln1−Yt​Yt​​ one has Zt=Z0+ktZ_t=Z_0+ktZt​=Z0​+kt, so the sign of kkk decides whether this time-like variable increases or decreases.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7.3 (p. 26)

Under Assumption 7.1, σ2/δ0>1\sigma^2/\delta_0>1σ2/δ0​>1, and k>0k>0k>0: for every x>0x>0x>0 and y∈(0,1)y\in(0,1)y∈(0,1),

τ∗,γ∗∈TSandMx,y(τ,γ∗)≤Mx,y(τ∗,γ∗)≤Mx,y(τ∗,γ)∀ τ,γ∈TS.\tau_*,\gamma_*\in\mathcal T^S\quad\text{and}\quad M_{x,y}(\tau,\gamma_*)\le M_{x,y}(\tau_*,\gamma_*)\le M_{x,y}(\tau_*,\gamma)\quad\forall\,\tau,\gamma\in\mathcal T^S.τ∗​,γ∗​∈TSandMx,y​(τ,γ∗​)≤Mx,y​(τ∗​,γ∗​)≤Mx,y​(τ∗​,γ)∀τ,γ∈TS.

The goal asserts the shape of the equilibrium (entry times into the model's own stopping regions), with no constant to be improved.

Milestones

In attack order: the filter identity (§2, p. 5); the regularity of V‾,V‾\overline V,\underline VV,V​ (Lemma 3.1); the value, the seller's optimality, and the super- and submartingale properties (Theorem 3.2); positivity of VVV (Remarks 3.3); the location of the stopping regions (Proposition 4.1, Lemma 4.2 (i), (iii)); the boundaries b1,b2b_1,b_2b1​,b2​ (Corollary 4.5) and finiteness of b1b_1b1​ (Lemma 4.6); the parabolic change of coordinates (5.1)–(5.4); connectedness of the regions in parabolic coordinates (Lemmas 5.2, 5.4); the boundary c1c_1c1​ of S1′\mathcal S'_1S1′​ (Corollary 5.5, (5.20)); and positivity of c1c_1c1​ (Lemma 7.2).

Significance

The result. Existence of the value does not give an equilibrium: without uniform integrability the buyer's natural candidate τ∗\tau_*τ∗​ may fail to be optimal, and in the complete-information case y=0y=0y=0 the pair (τ∗,γ∗)(\tau_*,\gamma_*)(τ∗​,γ∗​) is indeed not a saddle point (Proposition C.1). Proposition 7.3 shows that partial information about the dividend restores a pure-strategy equilibrium when k>0k>0k>0, and identifies it: each player stops on entering their own stopping region, which is described by monotone free boundaries. This makes the option's hedging and cancellation policies explicit.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; nothing of it is machine-checked. The mission provides a Lean model of a continuous-time game with an unobservable parameter, built from Mathlib's Brownian motion, stopping times and martingales, and a decomposition of the proof into the paper's own lemmas. The theory the proofs use (optimal stopping games for Markov processes, Itô's formula, Girsanov's theorem) is largely absent from Mathlib.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the buyer's side. The seller's optimality comes with the value (Theorem 3.2); for the buyer one needs V(x,y)≤M(τ∗,γ)V(x,y)\le M(\tau_*,\gamma)V(x,y)≤M(τ∗​,γ) for every γ\gammaγ, i.e. that the submartingale e−r(t∧τ∗)Ve^{-r(t\wedge\tau_*)}Ve−r(t∧τ∗​)V can be sampled at τ∗∧γ\tau_*\wedge\gammaτ∗​∧γ. The payoffs are not uniformly integrable (Esup⁡te−rtGi(St)=+∞\mathbb E\sup_t e^{-rt}G_i(S_t)=+\inftyEsupt​e−rtGi​(St​)=+∞), so optional sampling cannot be applied directly and the term E[e−rtV(Xt,Yt)1{t≤τ∗∧γ}]\mathbb E[e^{-rt}V(X_t,Y_t)\mathbf 1_{\{t\le\tau_*\wedge\gamma\}}]E[e−rtV(Xt​,Yt​)1{t≤τ∗​∧γ}​] must be shown to vanish. That requires a pathwise bound on the price before τ∗\tau_*τ∗​, which in turn needs the geometry of S1\mathcal S_1S1​ in both coordinate systems, monotonicity of ZZZ (k>0k>0k>0), and strict positivity of the boundary c1c_1c1​ (Lemma 7.2, which needs σ2/δ0>1\sigma^2/\delta_0>1σ2/δ0​>1). Theorem 3.2 itself rests on the Ekström–Peskir theory of Markovian Dynkin games applied to a degenerate two-dimensional diffusion.

Formalization scope

  • Model. The paper's working process (X,Y)(X,Y)(X,Y) solves an SDE ((2.3)); Mathlib has no stochastic integral. The mission therefore states everything on the paper's original space (§2): X:=SX:=SX:=S as the explicit geometric Brownian motion (2.1), and YYY the closed-form Bayes filter, which has the same law as the paper's pair (p. 6). The item filter_condexp ties YYY to E[D∣F‾tS]\mathbb E[D\mid\overline{\mathcal F}^S_t]E[D∣FtS​] and records its observation measurability and continuous paths, while eq_5_3 ties the encoding to the paper's coordinates (Z,Y)(Z,Y)(Z,Y).
  • Probability space. A Setting carries a measure P\mathbb PP, a Brownian motion BBB with all paths continuous (a continuous modification), and UUU uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1] independent of BBB; then Dy=1{U<y}D^y=\mathbf 1\{U<y\}Dy=1{U<y} realises every prior yyy on one space, so V(x′,y′)V(x',y')V(x′,y′) is defined at every state.
  • Information. The ambient probability measure is complete. Thus F‾tS\overline{\mathcal F}^S_tFtS​ is generated by (Ss)s≤t(S_s)_{s\le t}(Ss​)s≤t​ and all its null sets; it depends on (x,y)(x,y)(x,y). Stopping times take values in WithTop ℝ≥0, so infinite stopping times are allowed.
  • Payoff and values. MMM is a Lebesgue integral (lintegral) in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], with payoff 000 on {τ∧γ=∞}\{\tau\wedge\gamma=\infty\}{τ∧γ=∞}; V‾,V‾∈[0,∞]\overline V,\underline V\in[0,\infty]V,V​∈[0,∞], and V:=V‾V:=\overline VV:=V as a real number (finite since V‾≤G2(x)\overline V\le G_2(x)V≤G2​(x)).
  • Entry times are Mathlib's hittingAfter … 0 into {G2≤V}\{G_2\le V\}{G2​≤V} and {V≤G1}\{V\le G_1\}{V≤G1​}, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ if never reached.
  • Boundaries. b1,b2b_1,b_2b1​,b2​ take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset=+\inftyinf∅=+∞, sup⁡∅=0\sup\emptyset=0sup∅=0. c1(z)=sup⁡({0}∪{y∈(0,1)∣(z,y)∈S1′})c_1(z)=\sup(\{0\}\cup\{y\in(0,1)\mid(z,y)\in\mathcal S'_1\})c1​(z)=sup({0}∪{y∈(0,1)∣(z,y)∈S1′​}) is an explicit choice of the boundary whose existence Corollary 5.5 asserts.
  • Domains and readings. The goal is posed for x>0x>0x>0, y∈(0,1)y\in(0,1)y∈(0,1), which the proof needs; it is false at y=0y=0y=0. Remarks 3.3 is posed for x>0x>0x>0 (V(0,y)=0V(0,y)=0V(0,y)=0). For the same reason the stopping regions and the boundaries b1,b2b_1,b_2b1​,b2​ live on (0,∞)×[0,1](0,\infty)\times[0,1](0,∞)×[0,1]: at the degenerate price x=0x=0x=0 one has V(0,y)=0=G1(0)V(0,y)=0=G_1(0)V(0,y)=0=G1​(0), and the page's literal x∈[0,∞)x\in[0,\infty)x∈[0,∞) in (4.2) and (4.11) would give b1≡0b_1\equiv0b1​≡0. Lemma 3.1 (iii)'s "a given constant CCC" is read as an existential constant. The standing assumption k≠0k\neq0k=0 of §5 is a hypothesis of Lemmas 5.2, 5.4, Corollary 5.5 and Lemma 7.2. Only clause (5.20) of Corollary 5.5 is formalized. Proposition 4.1 uses the explicit forms of A1,A2A_1,A_2A1​,A2​ printed on p. 9.
  • No trivialization. The filtration is that of the price, never one containing DDD (with DDD observed the game is the complete-information one, where the result fails); YYY is the posterior, not the prior; VVV in the entry times is the game's own value, never a free function; stopping times include infinite ones; and the payoff is not a Bochner integral, which would silently be 000 for non-integrable payoffs.
  • Not formalized. Proposition 6.4 (C1C^1C1 regularity), Proposition 7.6 (the case k<0k<0k<0), Proposition 5.6 and Lemmas 4.3, 4.4, 4.7 are not used by the goal's proof.
  • Infrastructure needed. Optional sampling for continuous-time super/submartingales with unbounded stopping times; hitting times of closed sets by continuous processes as stopping times of an augmented filtration; filtering for Brownian motion with a two-point drift; Itô's formula and Girsanov's theorem for the lemmas of §4–§7; existence of the value for Markovian Dynkin games. Each is reusable well beyond this mission, and contributions of any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. De Angelis, F. Gensbittel, S. Villeneuve, A Dynkin Game on Assets with Incomplete Information on the Return, arXiv:1705.07352v4, 2019; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07352v4
  • Y. Kifer, Game options, Finance and Stochastics 4(4), 443–463, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013527
  • E. Ekström, S. Villeneuve, On the value of optimal stopping games, The Annals of Applied Probability 16, 1576–1596, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1214/105051606000000204
  • E. Ekström, G. Peskir, Optimal stopping games for Markov processes, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 47, 684–702, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/060673916
  • S. C. P. Yam, S. P. Yung, W. Zhou, Game call options revisited, Mathematical Finance, 2012.
  • R. S. Liptser, A. N. Shiryaev, Statistics of Random Processes I: General Theory, 2nd ed., Springer, 2001.
22 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On Uniform Exponential Ergodicity of Markovian Multiclass Many-Server Queues in the Halfin–Whitt Regime: Positive Spare Capacity Makes the Limiting Diffusion Uniformly Exponentially ErgodicResearch Paper

Motivation

Call centres and hospital wards are run in the Halfin–Whitt regime: the number of servers nnn exceeds the offered load by a margin of order n\sqrt nn​, so that delays are short and servers are nearly always busy. With several customer classes, the operator must also choose a scheduling policy: which waiting class is served next. In the diffusion limit, every such policy becomes a control of an mmm-dimensional piecewise-linear diffusion (Atar, Mandelbaum and Reiman 2004; Harrison and Zeevi 2004). Ergodic control of this diffusion, and the justification that its optimal policies are asymptotically optimal for the queues, both need the diffusion to be stable under every admissible policy, with bounds that do not depend on the policy.

A. Arapostathis, H. Hmedi and G. Pang (arXiv:1812.03528v3) prove that positive spare capacity alone gives this: the limiting diffusion is exponentially ergodic, at a rate and with constants that are uniform over all stationary Markov controls.

Timeline.

  • 2004: Atar–Mandelbaum–Reiman and Harrison–Zeevi derive the controlled diffusion limit of the multiclass M/M/nM/M/nM/M/n queue in the Halfin–Whitt regime.
  • 2013: Dieker and Gao prove positive recurrence and, with abandonment, exponential ergodicity of piecewise Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes, for one specific static priority control.
  • 2019: Arapostathis, Pang and Sandrić show positive recurrence under every constant control when the spare capacity ϱ\varrhoϱ is positive, and transience under Markov controls when ϱ<0\varrho<0ϱ<0 (without abandonment).
  • 2019: this paper extends exponential ergodicity to all stationary Markov controls, with uniform constants.

Setting

Fix m≥1m\ge1m≥1 classes, service rates μi>0\mu_i>0μi​>0, abandonment rates γi≥0\gamma_i\ge0γi​≥0, and write M=diag(μi)M=\mathrm{diag}(\mu_i)M=diag(μi​), Γ=diag(γi)\Gamma=\mathrm{diag}(\gamma_i)Γ=diag(γi​), e=(1,…,1)e=(1,\dots,1)e=(1,…,1), βi=γi/μi\beta_i=\gamma_i/\mu_iβi​=γi​/μi​. Control values lie in the simplex Δ={u∈Rm:u≥0, ⟨e,u⟩=1}\Delta=\{u\in\mathbb R^m:u\ge0,\ \langle e,u\rangle=1\}Δ={u∈Rm:u≥0, ⟨e,u⟩=1}; uiu_iui​ is the fraction of the queue made up of class iii. The spare capacity is ϱ∈R\varrho\in\mathbb Rϱ∈R. The controlled drift is

b(x,u)=−ϱmMe−M(x−⟨e,x⟩+u)−⟨e,x⟩+Γu,b(x,u)=-\frac{\varrho}{m}Me-M\big(x-\langle e,x\rangle^+u\big)-\langle e,x\rangle^+\Gamma u ,b(x,u)=−mϱ​Me−M(x−⟨e,x⟩+u)−⟨e,x⟩+Γu,

and the diffusion is dXt=b(Xt,Ut) dt+σ dWt\mathrm dX_t=b(X_t,U_t)\,\mathrm dt+\sigma\,\mathrm dW_tdXt​=b(Xt​,Ut​)dt+σdWt​ with a constant positive diagonal σ=diag(ri)\sigma=\mathrm{diag}(r_i)σ=diag(ri​) and a standard Brownian motion WWW. The generator under the control value uuu is Luf=12trace(σσT∇2f)+⟨b(⋅,u),∇f⟩\mathcal L_uf=\frac12\mathrm{trace}(\sigma\sigma^{\mathsf T}\nabla^2f)+\langle b(\cdot,u),\nabla f\rangleLu​f=21​trace(σσT∇2f)+⟨b(⋅,u),∇f⟩.

A stationary Markov control is a Borel map v:Rm→Δv:\mathbb R^m\to\Deltav:Rm→Δ, used as Ut=v(Xt)U_t=v(X_t)Ut​=v(Xt​); the class is Usm\mathfrak U_{\mathrm{sm}}Usm​. Its transition probability is Ptv(x,⋅)P^v_t(x,\cdot)Ptv​(x,⋅), the law of XtX_tXt​ started at xxx. An invariant probability measure πv\pi_vπv​ satisfies ∫Ptv(x,⋅) πv(dx)=πv\int P^v_t(x,\cdot)\,\pi_v(\mathrm dx)=\pi_v∫Ptv​(x,⋅)πv​(dx)=πv​.

The Lyapunov function is built from the convex C2C^2C2 cut-off ψ\psiψ (ψ=−12\psi=-\frac12ψ=−21​ on (−∞,−1](-\infty,-1](−∞,−1], ψ(t)=t\psi(t)=tψ(t)=t on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞)): for ε,θ>0\varepsilon,\theta>0ε,θ>0,

Ψε,θ∗(x)=εθ∑iψ(−xi)μi+∑iψ(εxi)μi,V(x)=exp⁡(Ψε,θ∗(x)).\Psi^*_{\varepsilon,\theta}(x)=\varepsilon\theta\sum_i\frac{\psi(-x_i)}{\mu_i}+\sum_i\frac{\psi(\varepsilon x_i)}{\mu_i},\qquad V(x)=\exp\big(\Psi^*_{\varepsilon,\theta}(x)\big).Ψε,θ∗​(x)=εθi∑​μi​ψ(−xi​)​+i∑​μi​ψ(εxi​)​,V(x)=exp(Ψε,θ∗​(x)).

For a weight fff, the fff-norm of a signed measure is sup⁡∣g∣≤f∣∫g dν∣\sup_{|g|\le f}|\int g\,\mathrm d\nu|sup∣g∣≤f​∣∫gdν∣.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (p. 10)

Assume ϱ>0\varrho>0ϱ>0, θ(βmax⁡−1)+≤1\theta(\beta_{\max}-1)^+\le1θ(βmax​−1)+≤1 and 0<θ≤ϱ/(3m(2ϱ+m))0<\theta\le\varrho/(3m(2\varrho+m))0<θ≤ϱ/(3m(2ϱ+m)). Then there is ε0>0\varepsilon_0>0ε0​>0 such that for every 0<ε≤ε00<\varepsilon\le\varepsilon_00<ε≤ε0​ there is κ0>0\kappa_0>0κ0​>0 with

LuV(x)≤κ0−ε(ϱ2m+θ2∥x−∥1)V(x)∀(x,u)∈Rm×Δ,\mathcal L_uV(x)\le\kappa_0-\varepsilon\Big(\frac{\varrho}{2m}+\frac\theta2\|x^-\|_1\Big)V(x)\qquad\forall (x,u)\in\mathbb R^m\times\Delta,Lu​V(x)≤κ0​−ε(2mϱ​+2θ​∥x−∥1​)V(x)∀(x,u)∈Rm×Δ,

and there are γ,C>0\gamma,C>0γ,C>0 such that, for every v∈Usmv\in\mathfrak U_{\mathrm{sm}}v∈Usm​, an invariant probability measure πv\pi_vπv​ exists with

∫V dπv≤2mεϱκ0,∥Ptv(x,⋅)−πv∥1+V≤C V(x) e−γt∀(t,x).\int V\,\mathrm d\pi_v\le\frac{2m}{\varepsilon\varrho}\kappa_0,\qquad \big\|P^v_t(x,\cdot)-\pi_v\big\|_{1+V}\le C\,V(x)\,e^{-\gamma t}\quad\forall (t,x).∫Vdπv​≤εϱ2m​κ0​,​Ptv​(x,⋅)−πv​​1+V​≤CV(x)e−γt∀(t,x).

The rate γ\gammaγ and the constant CCC do not depend on the control: that uniformity is the content of the theorem.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. p. 5: under every v∈Usmv\in\mathfrak U_{\mathrm{sm}}v∈Usm​ the SDE has a unique strong solution and a strong Feller transition function.
  2. p. 7: the properties of ψ\psiψ, including ψε′′≤32ε2\psi_\varepsilon''\le\frac32\varepsilon^2ψε′′​≤23​ε2.
  3. (2.13a)–(2.13b), p. 8: the identities for ⟨∇Ψε,b⟩\langle\nabla\Psi_\varepsilon,b\rangle⟨∇Ψε​,b⟩ and ⟨∇Ψ(−⋅),b⟩\langle\nabla\Psi(-\cdot),b\rangle⟨∇Ψ(−⋅),b⟩.
  4. Lemma 2.1, p. 8: the drift inequalities (2.17) for the truncated drift bcb_cbc​, c∈[1,∞]c\in[1,\infty]c∈[1,∞].
  5. (2.31), p. 10: 12trace(a∇2V)≤ε(32(ε+θ)+εCˉ)V\frac12\mathrm{trace}(a\nabla^2V)\le\varepsilon(\frac32(\varepsilon+\theta)+\varepsilon\bar C)V21​trace(a∇2V)≤ε(23​(ε+θ)+εCˉ)V.
  6. (2.28), p. 10: the Foster–Lyapunov equation above (part (a) of the goal).
  7. (2.10), p. 7: Ψε,θ∗\Psi^*_{\varepsilon,\theta}Ψε,θ∗​ is comparable to ∥x∥1\|x\|_1∥x∥1​.
  8. (2.34), p. 11: ∫Ptv(x,dy)V(y)≤κ0/κ1+e−κ1tV(x)\int P^v_t(x,\mathrm dy)V(y)\le\kappa_0/\kappa_1+e^{-\kappa_1t}V(x)∫Ptv​(x,dy)V(y)≤κ0​/κ1​+e−κ1​tV(x) whenever LuV≤κ0−κ1V\mathcal L_uV\le\kappa_0-\kappa_1VLu​V≤κ0​−κ1​V.
  9. p. 11: the uniform minorization P1v(x,B)≥δ0P^v_1(x,\mathcal B)\ge\delta_0P1v​(x,B)≥δ0​ on a ball, from the parabolic Harnack inequality.

Significance

The result. Uniform exponential ergodicity makes the ergodic control problem for the multiclass Halfin–Whitt diffusion well posed over all stationary Markov policies: invariant measures form a tight family with uniformly integrable exponential moments, and long-run averages converge at a policy-independent geometric rate. In the paper it is the base for the prelimit results of Section 3, where the drift inequalities of Lemma 2.1 are compared with those of the nnn-server queues. With Γ=0\Gamma=0Γ=0 the condition ϱ>0\varrho>0ϱ>0 is sharp, since ϱ<0\varrho<0ϱ<0 gives transience under every Markov control (Arapostathis, Pang and Sandrić 2019).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; none of it is formalized. The mission produces a machine-checked version with two printed slips corrected (see Formalization scope). Its analytic half, Lemma 2.1, (2.13), (2.10), (2.31) and the Foster–Lyapunov equation, is finite-dimensional calculus and is reachable now. The probabilistic half needs Itô's formula for SDEs with additive noise, existence and uniqueness for SDEs with Borel drifts, and a Harnack-type minorization, none of which Mathlib has.

Difficulty

The control enters the drift only through ⟨e,x⟩+u\langle e,x\rangle^+u⟨e,x⟩+u, but a Markov control may switch arbitrarily, so no single linear or quadratic Lyapunov function works for all policies; Dieker and Gao's common quadratic Lyapunov functions cover one static priority only. The function VVV mixes an ε\varepsilonε-scaled workload term with a θ\thetaθ-weighted idleness term, and the drift inequality must hold on both half-spaces {⟨e,x⟩≤0}\{\langle e,x\rangle\le0\}{⟨e,x⟩≤0} and {⟨e,x⟩≥0}\{\langle e,x\rangle\ge0\}{⟨e,x⟩≥0} with explicit constants, which forces case splits over the classes with βi≤1\beta_i\le1βi​≤1 and βi>1\beta_i>1βi​>1.

For part (b), a Foster–Lyapunov inequality alone gives ergodicity for each control but not a control-independent rate: the constants of the standard Meyn–Tweedie argument depend on a minorization on a small set, and that minorization must be shown uniformly over all Borel controls, for which there is no regularity in vvv to exploit.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. States are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m); classes are Fin m; control values are vectors in stdSimplex ℝ (Fin m). The model data is the published ManyServerQED.Scheduling.DiffusionData with its drift ℓ+(μ−γ)⟨e,x⟩+u−μx\ell+(\mu-\gamma)\langle e,x\rangle^+u-\mu xℓ+(μ−γ)⟨e,x⟩+u−μx; the SDE equation, invariant measures, generator and weighted total-variation norm use published GPhNGIDiffusion.EMError definitions. The local IsStrongSolution and IsMarkovTransition specify measurable, adapted solutions and their transition laws. The cut-off ψ\psiψ is the published cutoff.
  • Committed conventions.
    1. The drift is centred, ℓ=−ϱmMe\ell=-\frac{\varrho}{m}Meℓ=−mϱ​Me (Remark 2.3, "without loss of generality").
    2. σ=diag(ri)\sigma=\mathrm{diag}(r_i)σ=diag(ri​) is constant (the proof uses σ=diag(2λ~i)1/2\sigma=\mathrm{diag}(2\tilde\lambda_i)^{1/2}σ=diag(2λ~i​)1/2), and ∑iri2/(2μi)=1\sum_ir_i^2/(2\mu_i)=1∑i​ri2​/(2μi​)=1, i.e. ∑iλ~i/μi=1\sum_i\tilde\lambda_i/\mu_i=1∑i​λ~i​/μi​=1, the identity the proof invokes in (2.31). Without it the Foster–Lyapunov equation fails numerically.
    3. θ(βmax⁡−1)+≤1\theta(\beta_{\max}-1)^+\le1θ(βmax​−1)+≤1 is written as θ(βi−1)+≤1\theta(\beta_i-1)^+\le1θ(βi​−1)+≤1 for all iii.
    4. A transition function is the law of every measurable strong solution on every probability space; "positive recurrent" is read as the existence of an invariant probability measure. The published transition predicate quantifies over arbitrary pathwise solutions, including nonmeasurable ones for which Measure.map returns a junk zero measure, so a local predicate is used here.
    5. The VVV-norm uses the weight 1+V1+V1+V, since VVV can be below 111 while the paper's fff-norm needs f≥1f\ge1f≥1; the norm is +∞+\infty+∞ unless both measures integrate 1+V1+V1+V.
    6. The truncation level c∈[1,∞]c\in[1,\infty]c∈[1,∞] of Lemma 2.1 is an extended real.
  • Printed slips, corrected.
    1. (2.28) is quoted as printed in its milestone but posed with θ2\frac\theta22θ​ in place of θ\thetaθ on ∥x−∥1\|x^-\|_1∥x−∥1​: as printed it fails along x=−Rex=-Rex=−Re, R→∞R\to\inftyR→∞, where the left side exceeds the right by ε(θϱ+ϱ2m+εθ2Cˉ)V→∞\varepsilon(\theta\varrho+\frac{\varrho}{2m}+\varepsilon\theta^2\bar C)V\to\inftyε(θϱ+2mϱ​+εθ2Cˉ)V→∞. The rest of the theorem is unaffected.
    2. The lower bound of (2.10) is quoted as printed but posed with the constant m(1∨εθ)/(2μmin⁡)m(1\vee\varepsilon\theta)/(2\mu_{\min})m(1∨εθ)/(2μmin​) in place of m2\frac m22m​, which fails when μmin⁡<1\mu_{\min}<1μmin​<1.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. The transition-function hypothesis is not vacuous: milestone 1 asserts existence of solutions and of a transition function under every Borel control. The constants γ,C\gamma,Cγ,C are quantified before the control, the Foster–Lyapunov inequality ranges over u∈Δu\in\Deltau∈Δ only, the norm is never a junk value, and the moment bound on πv\pi_vπv​ uses the same κ0\kappa_0κ0​ as the Foster–Lyapunov equation.
  • Constructed ball. The minorization uses an existential ball whose complement satisfies the inequality chosen after (2.34), with its lower bound uniform over controls.
  • Needed infrastructure and welcome contributions. Calculus for ψ\psiψ and VVV (reusable for every Lyapunov argument built on this cut-off); Itô's formula with localization for additive-noise SDEs; strong existence and pathwise uniqueness for Borel drifts of linear growth; a Harnack or Girsanov lower bound for transition probabilities on balls; the Meyn–Tweedie computable geometric bound. Each is reusable beyond this mission, and proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • A. Arapostathis, H. Hmedi, G. Pang, On uniform exponential ergodicity of Markovian multiclass many-server queues in the Halfin–Whitt regime, arXiv:1812.03528v3, 2019 (Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021). https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.03528
  • A. Arapostathis, V. S. Borkar, M. K. Ghosh, Ergodic Control of Diffusion Processes, Cambridge University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139003605
  • A. Arapostathis, G. Pang, N. Sandrić, Ergodicity of a Lévy-driven SDE arising from multiclass many-server queues, Ann. Appl. Probab. 29(2), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1214/18-AAP1430
  • R. Atar, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Scheduling a multi class queue with many exponential servers: asymptotic optimality in heavy traffic, Ann. Appl. Probab. 14(3), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1214/105051604000000233
  • A. B. Dieker, X. Gao, Positive recurrence of piecewise Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes and common quadratic Lyapunov functions, Ann. Appl. Probab. 23(4), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1214/12-aap870
  • M. Gruber, Harnack inequalities for solutions of general second order parabolic equations and estimates of their Hölder constants, Math. Z. 185(1), 1984. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01214972
  • I. Gyöngy, N. Krylov, Existence of strong solutions for Itô's stochastic equations via approximations, Probab. Theory Related Fields 105(2), 1996. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01203833
  • J. M. Harrison, A. Zeevi, Dynamic scheduling of a multiclass queue in the Halfin–Whitt heavy traffic regime, Oper. Res. 52(2), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0084
  • S. P. Meyn, R. L. Tweedie, Computable bounds for geometric convergence rates of Markov chains, Ann. Appl. Probab. 4(4), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177004900
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Quantum InformationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Approximate Counting, Simplified: A Grover-Only Algorithm Estimates K to Within Relative Error ε with Probability 1 − δ Using O(√(N/K) ε⁻¹ log(1/δ)) QueriesResearch Paper

Motivation

Approximate counting asks for the number KKK of marked items in a list of NNN items, to within a multiplicative factor 1±ε1\pm\varepsilon1±ε, when the marked set can only be accessed through a membership oracle. Brassard, Høyer, Mosca and Tapp (arXiv:quant-ph/0005055) gave a quantum algorithm that uses O(N/K ε−1)O(\sqrt{N/K}\,\varepsilon^{-1})O(N/K​ε−1) queries, which is optimal. Their algorithm combines Grover iterations with phase estimation, and so it needs the quantum Fourier transform (QFT). Counting is a basic subroutine in quantum algorithms for estimation, numerical integration and Monte Carlo speed-ups, so the circuit it requires matters.

Aaronson and Rall (arXiv:1908.10846, SOSA 2020) give an algorithm with the same query complexity that uses only Grover iterations and classical post-processing of measurement outcomes. Its analysis is short and elementary, and every constant in it is explicit. This mission formalizes their Theorem 1, the rotation lemma it rests on, and the numbered estimates of its proof (arXiv:1908.10846v6, pp. 4–10).

Timeline (as recounted on pp. 1–3 of the paper):

  • 1996: Grover introduced the iteration whose powers rotate the uniform superposition towards the marked items.
  • 1998: Brassard, Høyer, Mosca and Tapp gave counting with O(N/K ε−1)O(\sqrt{N/K}\,\varepsilon^{-1})O(N/K​ε−1) queries by phase estimation of the Grover operator. The journal version appeared in 2002.
  • 1997–1999: Grover outlined a broadly similar Grover-only approach. Abrams and Williams discussed it further, for estimating integrals to additive error with O(ε−1)O(\varepsilon^{-1})O(ε−1) queries. Neither proved the approach correct.
  • 2019: Suzuki et al. gave an O(ε−1N/K)O(\varepsilon^{-1}\sqrt{N/K})O(ε−1N/K​)-query QFT-free algorithm that uses maximum-likelihood post-processing, supported by numerical experiments rather than a proof. Wie sketched a QFT-free algorithm based on Hadamard tests, also without proof.
  • 2019–2021: Aaronson and Rall proved a Grover-only algorithm correct with the optimal O(N/K ε−1log⁡δ−1)O(\sqrt{N/K}\,\varepsilon^{-1}\log\delta^{-1})O(N/K​ε−1logδ−1) bound. The constants used here are those of v6.

Setting

Let S⊆[N]={0,…,N−1}S\subseteq[N]=\{0,\dots,N-1\}S⊆[N]={0,…,N−1} be a nonempty marked set with K=∣S∣K=|S|K=∣S∣. The algorithm first pads the list to N′=(106+1)NN'=(10^6+1)NN′=(106+1)N items, the added items being unmarked, and then works on CN′\mathbb C^{N'}CN′. The membership oracle is the diagonal unitary U∣x⟩=(−1)[x∈S]∣x⟩U|x\rangle=(-1)^{[x\in S]}|x\rangleU∣x⟩=(−1)[x∈S]∣x⟩. The uniform superposition is ∣ψ⟩=N′−1/2∑x∣x⟩|\psi\rangle=N'^{-1/2}\sum_x|x\rangle∣ψ⟩=N′−1/2∑x​∣x⟩, and the Grover operator is

G=(I−2∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣) U.G=(I-2|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)\,U .G=(I−2∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣)U.

Preparing G(r−1)/2∣ψ⟩G^{(r-1)/2}|\psi\rangleG(r−1)/2∣ψ⟩ for an odd rrr costs (r−1)/2(r-1)/2(r−1)/2 queries. Measuring it in the computational basis yields a marked item with probability ppp given by the Born rule. With θ=arcsin⁡K/N′≤0.001\theta=\arcsin\sqrt{K/N'}\le0.001θ=arcsinK/N′​≤0.001 this probability is sin⁡2(rθ)\sin^2(r\theta)sin2(rθ), so mmm repetitions give a Bin(m,sin⁡2(rθ))\mathrm{Bin}(m,\sin^2(r\theta))Bin(m,sin2(rθ)) count of marked outcomes.

The algorithm has two loops. Step 1 tries rkr_krk​, the largest odd integer at most 1.05k1.05^k1.05k, for k=0,1,…k=0,1,\dotsk=0,1,…, with ⌈5000ln⁡(5/δ)⌉\lceil5000\ln(5/\delta)\rceil⌈5000ln(5/δ)⌉ measurements per round. It stops at the first k=:kendk=:k_{\mathrm{end}}k=:kend​ at which at least 95% of the outcomes are marked. Step 2 keeps a bracket [θmin⁡,θmax⁡][\theta_{\min},\theta_{\max}][θmin​,θmax​], initially θmin⁡=0.9⋅1.05−kend\theta_{\min}=0.9\cdot1.05^{-k_{\mathrm{end}}}θmin​=0.9⋅1.05−kend​ and θmax⁡=1.65 θmin⁡\theta_{\max}=1.65\,\theta_{\min}θmax​=1.65θmin​. In round ttt it computes rtr_trt​ from the bracket by the rotation lemma (Lemma 2):

k=round(θmin⁡2(θmax⁡−θmin⁡)),r=closest odd integer to πkθmin⁡.k=\mathrm{round}\Big(\frac{\theta_{\min}}{2(\theta_{\max}-\theta_{\min})}\Big),\qquad r=\text{closest odd integer to }\frac{\pi k}{\theta_{\min}} .k=round(2(θmax​−θmin​)θmin​​),r=closest odd integer to θmin​πk​.

It then measures ⌈250ln⁡δt−1⌉\lceil250\ln\delta_t^{-1}\rceil⌈250lnδt−1​⌉ times, with δt=(δε/65) 0.9−t\delta_t=(\delta\varepsilon/65)\,0.9^{-t}δt​=(δε/65)0.9−t, and shrinks γ=θmax⁡/θmin⁡−1\gamma=\theta_{\max}/\theta_{\min}-1γ=θmax​/θmin​−1 by the factor 0.90.90.9: it raises θmin⁡\theta_{\min}θmin​ if at least 12% of the outcomes are marked and lowers θmax⁡\theta_{\max}θmax​ otherwise. It stops once θmax⁡≤(1+ε/5)θmin⁡\theta_{\max}\le(1+\varepsilon/5)\theta_{\min}θmax​≤(1+ε/5)θmin​ and returns K^=N′sin⁡2θmax⁡\hat K=N'\sin^2\theta_{\max}K^=N′sin2θmax​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For nonempty S⊆[N]S\subseteq[N]S⊆[N], K=∣S∣K=|S|K=∣S∣:

  1. for 0<ε,δ<10<\varepsilon,\delta<10<ε,δ<1 there is a fuel bound FFF such that
Pr⁡[the algorithm outputs K^ with K(1−ε)<K^<K(1+ε)]≥1−δ;\Pr\big[\text{the algorithm outputs }\hat K\text{ with }K(1-\varepsilon)<\hat K<K(1+\varepsilon)\big]\ge1-\delta ;Pr[the algorithm outputs K^ with K(1−ε)<K^<K(1+ε)]≥1−δ;
  1. there is an absolute constant CCC such that for 0<ε,δ≤1/20<\varepsilon,\delta\le1/20<ε,δ≤1/2, every run that outputs an accurate K^\hat KK^ has made fewer than CN/K ε−1ln⁡δ−1C\sqrt{N/K}\,\varepsilon^{-1}\ln\delta^{-1}CN/K​ε−1lnδ−1 queries.

Milestones

In the order of the proof:

  • eq. (1), the Grover state and its marked probability sin⁡2(rθ)\sin^2(r\theta)sin2(rθ);
  • eqs. (2)–(6), the ideal bracket after step 1;
  • eqs. (7)–(12) and (15)–(28), no late and no early termination of step 1, with the Kullback–Leibler form (13)–(14) of the Chernoff bound;
  • eqs. (52), (57), (58)–(66) and (68)–(74), the estimates behind the rotation lemma;
  • Lemma 2 itself;
  • eqs. (30)–(32), the union bound over step 2;
  • footnote 2, the conversion from angle to count;
  • eqs. (37)–(44), the arithmetico-geometric sum in the query bound.

Significance

Theorem 1 shows that the optimal query complexity of approximate counting is achieved without the quantum Fourier transform. The circuits involved are powers of the Grover operator followed by computational-basis measurements, and the classical control is a pair of loops with explicit thresholds. The same argument gives QFT-free amplitude estimation (Theorem 3 of the paper), and its rotation lemma is a reusable tool for any algorithm that brackets a rotation angle by biased coin tosses.

The result is proved on paper but not formalized. The platform has Grover's iteration for a single marked item; it has no Grover state for a marked set, no counting algorithm and no query-complexity statement of this kind. A complete development would provide a machine-checked quantum query algorithm whose output law is derived from the Born rule and the actual Grover operator. It would also provide a Chernoff bound in Kullback–Leibler form for the binomial distribution, which Mathlib does not have.

Difficulty

The deterministic estimates are elementary but numerous, and each constant (0.96, 7.5%, 16.5%, 1.102, 0.27, 0.42) must be checked against interval arithmetic for sin⁡\sinsin and π\piπ. Two printed steps are numerically loose, (8) and (26), and must be replaced by correct intermediate values.

The probabilistic part has two difficulties. First, the success event of step 1 is not a single tail bound. Termination too early is controlled by a union bound over rounds k≤k0k\le k_0k≤k0​, and the additive Hoeffding bound is too weak there: it needs the KL form (13). Second, step 2's output law is defined by a recursion whose bracket is random, and Lemma 2 applies to a round only while the bracket still contains θ\thetaθ. The union bound over rounds has to be carried through this recursion. Third, the paper bounds the queries only on its "ideal" event. Part 2 of the goal requires the bound on every run that ends with an accurate estimate, including runs in which step 1 stopped late.

Formalization scope

  • States are vectors Fin N' → ℂ, operators are Matrix (Fin N') (Fin N') ℂ, and ∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣ is vecMulVec ψ (star ψ). The padding embeds Fin N as the first NNN indices of Fin N'.
  • The algorithm approxCount N S ε δ F : PMF (Option (ℝ × ℕ)) is defined, not quantified. Its outputs are some (K̂, queries), or none when either loop runs out of its fuel F. Fuel exhaustion counts as failure. Measurement counts are Mathlib's binomial law with the Born probability ∑x∈S∣⟨x∣Gj∣ψ⟩∣2\sum_{x\in S}|\langle x|G^j|\psi\rangle|^2∑x∈S​∣⟨x∣Gj∣ψ⟩∣2 computed from UUU, ψ\psiψ and GGG.
  • The algorithm sees SSS only through these probabilities. rkr_krk​ depends on kkk only, rtr_trt​ on the bracket only, and the repetition counts and thresholds on ε,δ,t\varepsilon,\delta,tε,δ,t only. A formalization in which the algorithm reads KKK or θ\thetaθ directly, or in which "there exists an algorithm" is quantified, is trivial (output KKK with zero queries) and is ruled out.
  • "At least mmm times" means exactly ⌈m⌉\lceil m\rceil⌈m⌉ times. Mathlib's round breaks ties upward, a choice the paper permits. The step-2 threshold is "at least 12%", as in the algorithm box; Lemma 2 is stated for both "more than" and "at least".
  • Eq. (1) is stated in corrected form: the printed identity misses the global sign (−1)(r−1)/2(-1)^{(r-1)/2}(−1)(r−1)/2 coming from G=−(2∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣−I)UG=-(2|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|-I)UG=−(2∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣−I)U.
  • The O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) of Theorem 1 is one absolute constant chosen before N,S,ε,δ,FN,S,\varepsilon,\delta,FN,S,ε,δ,F, in the regime ε,δ≤1/2\varepsilon,\delta\le1/2ε,δ≤1/2. The rotation lemma's O(θ−1γ−1)O(\theta^{-1}\gamma^{-1})O(θ−1γ−1) is pinned to r≤5/(γθ)r\le5/(\gamma\theta)r≤5/(γθ).
  • Not formalized: the O(log⁡N)O(\log N)O(logN)-qubit space bound (there is no circuit model), Theorem 3 (amplitude estimation), and the unquantified remark on K=0K=0K=0.

Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome, in particular the KL-form Chernoff bound for ProbabilityTheory.binomial and lemmas on powers of a reflection product acting on a two-dimensional invariant subspace.

Selected references

  • S. Aaronson, P. Rall, Quantum Approximate Counting, Simplified, Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA) 2020; arXiv:1908.10846v6, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10846
  • G. Brassard, P. Høyer, M. Mosca, A. Tapp, Quantum Amplitude Amplification and Estimation, Contemporary Mathematics 305, 2002. https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0005055
  • G. Brassard, P. Høyer, A. Tapp, Quantum Counting, ICALP 1998. https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9805082
  • L. K. Grover, A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search, STOC 1996. https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9605043
  • Y. Suzuki et al., Amplitude estimation without phase estimation, Quantum Information Processing 19, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.10246
  • D. S. Abrams, C. P. Williams, Fast quantum algorithms for numerical integrals and stochastic processes, 1999. https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9908083
  • C. R. Wie, Simpler quantum counting, arXiv preprint, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.08119
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Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Shipment Policies for Products with Fixed Shelf Lives: Impact on Profits and Waste: Shipping Oldest First Minimizes the Long-Run Average Warehouse Waste and the Total WasteResearch Paper

Motivation

Manufacturers of products with fixed shelf lives must decide both how much to send from a warehouse to a store and which age cohorts to send. A shipment can reduce expiry at the warehouse while changing the age mix seen by shoppers at the store. In the two-echelon system studied by Akkaş and Honhon, the store does not control which items each shopper takes: some shoppers select older items first and the remainder select newer items first. The resulting waste at the warehouse and store can move in different directions when the manufacturer changes a shipment. The paper uses this setting to ask whether ship oldest first (SOF), a simple age-selection rule, minimizes waste over an infinite horizon. Akkaş and Honhon, SSRN manuscript.

The paper reports an inventory-age audit of a consumer packaged goods supplier and then studies the shipment decision analytically. Its Theorem 1 separates warehouse waste from the sum of warehouse and store waste. The former has a specified SOF policy that ships in full; the latter has an SOF age-selection rule but allows the shipped quantity to vary with the state. This mission formalizes those two claims, with a correction to one printed clause described below. Akkaş and Honhon, §3 and Theorem 1.

Setting

A unit remains saleable for NNN periods, where N≥1N\ge1N≥1. At the start of a period the warehouse holds xix_ixi​ units of age iii, and the store holds yiy_iyi​ units of that age, for i=1,…,N−1i=1,\ldots,N-1i=1,…,N−1. Both age-zero entries are zero before replenishment. A plant then delivers fresh units so the warehouse's total post-replenishment stock reaches the exogenous order-up-to level SWS^WSW. Thus its age-zero stock is x0post=SW−∑i=1N−1xix^{\mathrm{post}}_0=S^W-\sum_{i=1}^{N-1}x_ix0post​=SW−∑i=1N−1​xi​. The manufacturer sends qiq_iqi​ units of age iii from the warehouse to the store, subject to warehouse availability and the store's shelf capacity LLL. In particular, qi≤xipostq_i\le x^{\mathrm{post}}_iqi​≤xipost​ and ∑iqi+∑iyi≤L\sum_iq_i+\sum_i y_i\le L∑i​qi​+∑i​yi​≤L. Akkaş and Honhon, §4.1, pp. 10–13, and §4.2, p. 15.

The period's shopper population is λ\lambdaλ. A fraction γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1] selects inventory first in, first out (FIFO), meaning older units first; the remaining shoppers select it last in, first out (LIFO), meaning newer units first. The discrete FIFO population is ⌈γλ⌉\lceil\gamma\lambda\rceil⌈γλ⌉. If zi=yi+qiz_i=y_i+q_izi​=yi​+qi​ is the store stock after delivery, the paper's age-specific demand is

Di(z,λ;γ)=(⌈γλ⌉−∑j>izj)++(λ−⌈γλ⌉−∑j<izj)+.D_i(z,\lambda;\gamma)=\left(\lceil\gamma\lambda\rceil-\sum_{j>i}z_j\right)^+ +\left(\lambda-\lceil\gamma\lambda\rceil-\sum_{j<i}z_j\right)^+.Di​(z,λ;γ)=(⌈γλ⌉−j>i∑​zj​)++(λ−⌈γλ⌉−j<i∑​zj​)+.

Here u+=max⁡(u,0)u^+=\max(u,0)u+=max(u,0). Only units of age N−1N-1N−1 expire at the end of the period. Warehouse waste is WW=xN−1post−qN−1W^W=x^{\mathrm{post}}_{N-1}-q_{N-1}WW=xN−1post​−qN−1​, store waste is WR=(zN−1−DN−1)+W^R=(z_{N-1}-D_{N-1})^+WR=(zN−1​−DN−1​)+, and total waste is W=WW+WRW=W^W+W^RW=WW+WR. The remaining units advance one age before the next period. An SOF shipment uses a younger unit only when every older available unit has been shipped. An SOF shipment in full fills the remaining store space or ships the entire available warehouse stock. Akkaş and Honhon, §4.1, pp. 11–12, and §4.2.1, p. 15.

Formalization targets

Warehouse waste

Let W‾W,+\overline W^{W,+}WW,+ and W‾W,−\overline W^{W,-}WW,− denote the upper and lower limits of expected Cesàro averages of warehouse waste. The first sentence of Theorem 1 is the mission's sole milestone:

W‾W,+(SOF-full;s0)≤W‾W,−(σ;s0)for every feasible initial state s0 and every admissible policy σ.\overline W^{W,+}(\mathrm{SOF\text{-}full};s_0) \le \overline W^{W,-}(\sigma;s_0) \quad\text{for every feasible initial state }s_0\text{ and every admissible policy }\sigma.WW,+(SOF-full;s0​)≤WW,−(σ;s0​)for every feasible initial state s0​ and every admissible policy σ.

Total waste and mission goal

The full goal also asserts that one stationary, feasible SOF policy fff minimizes total waste from every feasible initial state:

∃f  stationary and SOF,W‾+(f;s0)≤W‾−(σ;s0)for all feasible s0 and admissible σ.\exists f\;\text{stationary and SOF},\qquad \overline W^+(f;s_0)\le\overline W^-(\sigma;s_0) \quad\text{for all feasible }s_0\text{ and admissible }\sigma.∃fstationary and SOF,W+(f;s0​)≤W−(σ;s0​)for all feasible s0​ and admissible σ.

The policy fff chooses its shipping quantity from the current state; the theorem does not prescribe shipping in full for this second objective. These are waste objectives, independent of the paper's separate revenue, labor, and expiration-cost parameters. Akkaş and Honhon, Theorem 1, p. 15.

Significance

The warehouse result identifies a fixed, implementable shipment rule for minimizing waste at that location across the paper's whole FIFO/LIFO range. The total-waste result says that optimal age selection can remain SOF even when the quantity decision must respond to the store inventory and shopper behavior. Together they distinguish the two decisions in a setting where moving an expiring unit out of the warehouse can merely move the expiry to the store. The paper later uses its waste comparison in the analysis of profit policies under additional cost assumptions. Akkaş and Honhon, Appendix A.2–A.3.

The theorem is a published paper result, but this mission starts with open Lean statements rather than a machine-checked proof. A complete development would provide a reusable formal model of age-structured two-echelon inventory, stochastic shopper depletion, feasible shipment policies, and long-run waste criteria. The general controlled-process and Cesàro-average definitions can also support other finite inventory models.

Difficulty

An age-selection decision changes the stock carried into future periods, and a quantity decision changes the next warehouse replenishment. A comparison of immediate waste therefore does not by itself compare long-run averages. In particular, simply reordering each shipment to send older units first while keeping its quantity fixed can increase later warehouse waste for some policies; it cannot serve as an unrestricted policy-level argument. The store's FIFO/LIFO mixture introduces another intertemporal effect because a shipped younger unit can be sold ahead of an older one. Akkaş and Honhon, Appendix A.1, Appendix p. 1.

Formalization scope

Lean uses finite age vectors indexed by Fin N, natural-number stocks and shipments, a real γ\gammaγ constrained to [0,1][0,1][0,1], and an arbitrary probability mass function for shopper population. The standing condition N≥1N\ge1N≥1 makes the final age cohort defined; SW=0S^W=0SW=0 and L=0L=0L=0 remain allowed. Demand samples are independent and identically distributed across periods, as in the stationary transition model of §4.2. Policies are time-dependent deterministic Markov rules: at period ttt they choose a shipment from the current inventory state. This is the finite-state class used by the paper's dynamic program. The comparison includes every feasible rule in that class, every feasible initial state, and a common stationary SOF witness for total waste; it does not restrict competitors to SOF or full shipments. Standard finite-MDP results explain why stationary deterministic optimal policies suffice among broader history-dependent randomized classes. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes, Theorem 9.1.8.

Costs and expectations live in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and long-run criteria use upper and lower limits of expected Cesàro averages. The paper prints a plain limit without specifying what happens when a policy's average fails to converge. The upper-versus-lower comparison states the stronger optimality claim without relying on that convergence. Lean time starts at zero. Natural-number subtraction implements the paper's positive-part operation, and the post-replenishment stock formula is used only for feasible states. The model follows the printed balance equations when discarding the final-age store stock, despite a tension with the narrative timing of expired-unit pickup.

Three transcription corrections are explicit. The demand formula's sums use zjz_jzj​, the running index, where the page prints ziz_izi​; the action sum runs through age N−1N-1N−1; and the waste objectives are minimized despite a printed “max” in §4.2.1. More consequentially, Theorem 1's last clause says shipping is in full under pure FIFO. This is false and is omitted: for γ=1\gamma=1γ=1, N=2N=2N=2, SW=1S^W=1SW=1, L=2L=2L=2, and a Bernoulli(1/2)(1/2)(1/2) shopper population, SOF in full has average total waste 1/21/21/2 while an SOF policy that holds stock back attains 1/41/41/4. The formal goal neither assumes this clause nor asserts its negation. Its feasible-policy and feasible-initial-state quantifiers rule out vacuous or artificially easy readings.

A complete proof may need finite-state inventory invariants, admissibility of the SOF-in-full rule, comparisons of age profiles over time, and results about average costs of controlled chains. Contributions establishing those reusable facts, or the stated warehouse and total-waste targets, are within scope. The separate profit theorems and numerical studies of the paper are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Akkaş, A., and D. Honhon. Shipment Policies for Products with Fixed Shelf Lives: Impact on Profits and Waste. Authors' SSRN manuscript 3247290, 2021; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. SSRN manuscript; journal DOI.
  • Puterman, M. L. Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming. Wiley, 1994. DOI.
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications: Under Unknown Post Accuracy, Screening for the Largest Expected Variance Reduction Selects the Post Closest to the BeliefResearch Paper

Why consumers read the posts that agree with them

Online platforms show a reader many short signals about the same question (posts, headlines, tweets), more than the reader can absorb. The reader screens the menu and consumes only a few items. Allon, Drakopoulos and Manshadi (Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications, SSRN 3385627; Operations Research, 2021, doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2119) ask what a purely information-seeking reader picks when the accuracy of each post is unknown. Their answer, Proposition 1, is that she picks the post closest to her current belief, the effect the paper calls screening bias. It is the mechanism behind the paper's later results on slow learning and polarization, and it explains a pattern resembling confirmation bias without assuming any bias in how beliefs are updated. Confirmation bias was documented empirically by Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) and modelled through source reputation by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) and Suen (2004). In those models the bias comes from repeated interaction with strategic sources; here it comes from a single screening decision by a Bayesian reader.

The screening model

An unknown fact is a real number θ\thetaθ. A post is a noisy observation

Z=θ+Σ ϵ,Z=\theta+\Sigma\,\epsilon,Z=θ+Σϵ,

where ϵ∼N(0,1)\epsilon\sim\mathcal N(0,1)ϵ∼N(0,1) and the accuracy Σ\SigmaΣ (a standard deviation) is drawn independently from a publicly known law G\mathbb GG. The paper assumes throughout (§3, p. 8) that G\mathbb GG is a probability law whose support lies in an interval [σ‾,σ‾][\underline\sigma,\overline\sigma][σ​,σ] with 0<σ‾≤σ‾0<\underline\sigma\le\overline\sigma0<σ​≤σ.

A consumer holds a normal belief N(μ,s2)\mathcal N(\mu,s^2)N(μ,s2) about θ\thetaθ, with s>0s>0s>0. From her point of view, a post of accuracy σ\sigmaσ is distributed N(μ,σ2+s2)\mathcal N(\mu,\sigma^2+s^2)N(μ,σ2+s2), so its likelihood is

P(Z∣σ;μ,s)=ψ((Z−μ)2,2(σ2+s2)),ψ(x,y)=1π ye−x/y2.(5)P(Z\mid\sigma;\mu,s)=\psi\big((Z-\mu)^2,\sqrt{2(\sigma^2+s^2)}\big),\qquad\psi(x,y)=\frac{1}{\sqrt\pi\,y}e^{-x/y^2}.\tag{5}P(Z∣σ;μ,s)=ψ((Z−μ)2,2(σ2+s2)​),ψ(x,y)=π​y1​e−x/y2.(5)

By Bayes rule (4), her posterior on the accuracy after seeing the post value ZZZ has density proportional to P(Z∣σ;μ,s)P(Z\mid\sigma;\mu,s)P(Z∣σ;μ,s) with respect to G\mathbb GG; write E[ ⋅∣Z;μ,s]\mathbb E[\,\cdot\mid Z;\mu,s]E[⋅∣Z;μ,s] for the posterior expectation.

If she reads a post and learns its accuracy σ\sigmaσ (ex-post known accuracy), her belief becomes normal with standard deviation s′(σ)=s2σ2/(s2+σ2)s'(\sigma)=\sqrt{s^2\sigma^2/(s^2+\sigma^2)}s′(σ)=s2σ2/(s2+σ2)​ (Belief Updating Equations). Before reading, she scores each post by the expected reduction of her uncertainty. The Screening Equation prints the score as

Ssd(Z)=s−E[s′(Σ)∣Z;μ,s],S_{\mathrm{sd}}(Z)=s-\mathbb E\big[s'(\Sigma)\mid Z;\mu,s\big],Ssd​(Z)=s−E[s′(Σ)∣Z;μ,s],

while the text calls it the expected decrease in posterior variance, Svar(Z)=s2−E[s′(Σ)2∣Z;μ,s]S_{\mathrm{var}}(Z)=s^2-\mathbb E[s'(\Sigma)^2\mid Z;\mu,s]Svar​(Z)=s2−E[s′(Σ)2∣Z;μ,s]. A menu is a finite list Z1,…,ZKZ_1,\dots,Z_KZ1​,…,ZK​ of post values, and she picks a post in the argmax of the score.

In Lean the model lives in InfoInundation.Screening.Model: AccuracyLaw G (the standing assumption), psi, likelihood, postExp (the Bayes ratio), nextSd, sdScore, varScore, argmaxMenu, closestPosts, and the auxiliary moments auxMoment/auxExp used in the proof.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 10)

For every accuracy law G\mathbb GG satisfying the standing assumption, every belief (μ,s)(\mu,s)(μ,s) with s>0s>0s>0 and every menu Z1,…,ZKZ_1,\dots,Z_KZ1​,…,ZK​:

(a) if G\mathbb GG is not a point mass,

arg max⁡iS(Zi)=arg min⁡i(Zi−μ)2for S=Ssd and for S=Svar;\operatorname*{arg\,max}_{i}S(Z_i)=\operatorname*{arg\,min}_{i}(Z_i-\mu)^2\quad\text{for }S=S_{\mathrm{sd}}\text{ and for }S=S_{\mathrm{var}};iargmax​S(Zi​)=iargmin​(Zi​−μ)2for S=Ssd​ and for S=Svar​;

(b) if G=δσ\mathbb G=\delta_\sigmaG=δσ​ with σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, the argmax of both scores is the whole menu.

Milestones

The proof on pp. 10–11 has no numbered lemmas; the milestones are its labelled steps:

  1. (5): given Σ=σ\Sigma=\sigmaΣ=σ, the post is N(μ,σ2+s2)\mathcal N(\mu,\sigma^2+s^2)N(μ,σ2+s2) and its density is the ψ\psiψ expression.
  2. (4): in the joint model (θ,Σ,ϵ)(\theta,\Sigma,\epsilon)(θ,Σ,ϵ), the Bayes ratio is a version of E[h(Σ)∣Z]\mathbb E[h(\Sigma)\mid Z]E[h(Σ)∣Z].
  3. (3): Svar(Z)=s4 E[(s2+Σ2)−1∣Z]S_{\mathrm{var}}(Z)=s^4\,\mathbb E[(s^2+\Sigma^2)^{-1}\mid Z]Svar​(Z)=s4E[(s2+Σ2)−1∣Z].
  4. Auxiliary density (p. 11): E[(Σ2+s2)−1∣Z]=Eg[(Σ2+s2)−3/2]/Eg[(Σ2+s2)−1/2]\mathbb E[(\Sigma^2+s^2)^{-1}\mid Z]=\mathbb E_g[(\Sigma^2+s^2)^{-3/2}]/\mathbb E_g[(\Sigma^2+s^2)^{-1/2}]E[(Σ2+s2)−1∣Z]=Eg​[(Σ2+s2)−3/2]/Eg​[(Σ2+s2)−1/2], with g∝dG(σ) e−(Z−μ)2/(2(σ2+s2))g\propto d\mathbb G(\sigma)\,e^{-(Z-\mu)^2/(2(\sigma^2+s^2))}g∝dG(σ)e−(Z−μ)2/(2(σ2+s2)).
  5. Cauchy–Schwarz (p. 11): Eg[w3/2]2≤Eg[w5/2] Eg[w1/2]\mathbb E_g[w^{3/2}]^2\le\mathbb E_g[w^{5/2}]\,\mathbb E_g[w^{1/2}]Eg​[w3/2]2≤Eg​[w5/2]Eg​[w1/2] with w=(Σ2+s2)−1w=(\Sigma^2+s^2)^{-1}w=(Σ2+s2)−1, strict when G\mathbb GG is not a point mass.
  6. Derivative display (p. 11): the derivative in r=(Z−μ)2r=(Z-\mu)^2r=(Z−μ)2 of the ratio in 4, and its sign.
  7. Monotonicity (p. 10): E[(s2+Σ2)−1∣Z]\mathbb E[(s^2+\Sigma^2)^{-1}\mid Z]E[(s2+Σ2)−1∣Z] is non-increasing in (Z−μ)2(Z-\mu)^2(Z−μ)2, strictly decreasing when G\mathbb GG is not a point mass.
  8. Part (b) (p. 10): for G=δσ\mathbb G=\delta_\sigmaG=δσ​ both scores are constant in ZZZ.

Significance

Proposition 1 turns a modelling choice (each reader maximizes expected information) into a behavioural prediction (each reader consumes the post nearest her belief). Every later result of the paper is built on it: the slow-learning theorem, in which the speed of learning decreases with menu size, and the multimodal belief distribution, both come from feeding the closest post back into the belief dynamics. Part (b) is the benchmark: with known equal accuracy there is no screening bias, and learning is fast.

The result is proved in the paper; it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces one, and with it a small reusable library on posteriors over a Gaussian scale mixture: the predictive density of a normal belief under a known noise scale (milestone 1), a measure-theoretic Bayes rule for the noise scale given one observation (milestone 2), and moment inequalities under exponentially tilted mixing laws (milestones 5–6). The formalization also settles two points that the printed proof leaves open (see Difficulty): which of the two scores the conclusion holds for, and why the conclusion is an equality of sets rather than an inclusion.

Difficulty

The proof covers the variance score. Reducing it to the monotonicity of r↦E[(Σ2+s2)−1∣Z]r\mapsto\mathbb E[(\Sigma^2+s^2)^{-1}\mid Z]r↦E[(Σ2+s2)−1∣Z] in r=(Z−μ)2r=(Z-\mu)^2r=(Z−μ)2 is algebra. The monotonicity itself requires differentiating a ratio of G\mathbb GG-integrals under the integral sign, for an arbitrary law G\mathbb GG, which in turn needs the boundedness of the support to dominate the integrands.

Three places need more than the printed argument:

  • Strictness. The page shows the derivative is ≤0\le0≤0. That gives only "the closest posts are among the maximizers"; the claimed equality of argmax and argmin needs strict decrease, hence the equality case of Cauchy–Schwarz, which uses that the support of G\mathbb GG lies in (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Without that standing bound, G=12δ−1+12δ1\mathbb G=\tfrac12\delta_{-1}+\tfrac12\delta_1G=21​δ−1​+21​δ1​ is not a point mass yet every post has the same score.
  • The printed score. The standard-deviation score SsdS_{\mathrm{sd}}Ssd​ is not an affine function of E[(s2+Σ2)−1∣Z]\mathbb E[(s^2+\Sigma^2)^{-1}\mid Z]E[(s2+Σ2)−1∣Z], so steps (3)–(7) do not cover it. It needs the posterior expectation of the increasing function σ↦s′(σ)\sigma\mapsto s'(\sigma)σ↦s′(σ) to increase strictly in (Z−μ)2(Z-\mu)^2(Z−μ)2, a statement the paper does not prove.
  • The derivative display omits a factor 12\tfrac1221​; the sign is unaffected.

Formalization scope

  • All quantities are real; G\mathbb GG is a Measure ℝ with AccuracyLaw G: a probability measure with G([σ‾,σ‾]c)=0\mathbb G([\underline\sigma,\overline\sigma]^{\mathrm c})=0G([σ​,σ]c)=0 for some 0<σ‾≤σ‾0<\underline\sigma\le\overline\sigma0<σ​≤σ. "Supp(G\mathbb GG) includes at least two distinct values" is ∀ σ, G ≠ Measure.dirac σ; "Supp(G\mathbb GG) = {σ}" is G = Measure.dirac σ with σ>0\sigma>0σ>0.
  • "For any consumer xxx and time ttt" is any μ∈R\mu\in\mathbb Rμ∈R and s>0s>0s>0. Reachable states have s∈(0,1]s\in(0,1]s∈(0,1], so this is a mild generalization.
  • Accuracy is ex-post known (σ^=Σ\hat\sigma=\Sigmaσ^=Σ inside the expectation), which is the case the proof treats. The paper's remark that the conclusion also holds for ex-post unknown accuracy is not formalized.
  • The menu is Z : Fin K → ℝ; argmax and argmin are Finset (Fin K), so posts of equal value are distinct posts, and "=Kx(t)=K_x(t)=Kx​(t)" is Finset.univ.
  • The goal states the conclusion for both SsdS_{\mathrm{sd}}Ssd​ (as printed) and SvarS_{\mathrm{var}}Svar​ (as described and as proved).
  • Added relative to the page, and disclosed in each item: the strict forms of milestones 5 and 7, and the factor 12\tfrac1221​ in milestone 6.
  • No trivialization. The posterior is the Bayes ratio (4) with the Gaussian likelihood (5) for an arbitrary G\mathbb GG; neither score is defined through (Z−μ)2(Z-\mu)^2(Z−μ)2, and a statement in which the score is replaced by a closed form, the menu by two posts, or the set equality by an inclusion is not this goal.

Needed infrastructure: dominated differentiation of parameter-dependent integrals against a finite measure on a bounded set (Mathlib's hasDerivAt_integral_of_dominated_loc_of_deriv_le), the equality case of Cauchy–Schwarz in L2(g)L^2(g)L2(g), Gaussian convolution (gaussianReal_add_gaussianReal_of_indepFun) and conditional expectation via densities for milestone 2. Contributions of a covariance or likelihood-ratio ordering lemma for the standard-deviation conjunct are welcome as supporting theorems.

Selected references

  • G. Allon, K. Drakopoulos, V. Manshadi, Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications, SSRN 3385627, version of 2020-04-05. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385627 ; Operations Research, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2119
  • M. Gentzkow, J. M. Shapiro, Media Bias and Reputation, Journal of Political Economy 114(2), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1086/499414
  • W. Suen, The Self-Perpetuation of Biased Beliefs, The Economic Journal 114(495), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00213.x
  • C. G. Lord, L. Ross, M. R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37(11), 1979. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098
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Enabling Entrepreneurial Choice: A Strategy-Biased Test (λ_s = 1) Is Preferred to an Idea-Biased Test (λ_v = 1) if (1 − p₀)e₀(1 − λ_s)C > (1 − λ_v)p₀(1 − e₀)(e₀v − C)Research Paper

Motivation

A new venture rarely knows two things at once: whether its core idea is worth anything, and whether the particular way it has chosen to bring the idea to market — its strategy — will work. A failed pilot, a disappointing A/B test or a lukewarm customer experiment can mean either, and the founder cannot tell which. Work on entrepreneurial experimentation (Kerr, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2014, doi:10.1257/jep.28.3.25; Gans, Stern and Wu, Strategic Management Journal, 2019, doi:10.1002/smj.3010) treats testing as the main tool founders have to resolve uncertainty before they commit resources.

Agrawal, Gans and Stern (NBER Working Paper 27379, 2020; published in Management Science, 2021, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3920) give a two-period model in which a single test produces a conflated signal about the idea and the strategy together. Two consequences come out of it. A signal that the strategy is good can still lead the entrepreneur to abandon the venture. And when a mentor can sharpen a test, the better direction to sharpen it depends on the founder's prior beliefs. This mission formalizes the model and its two propositions.

Setting

The idea is worth v>0v>0v>0 (state hhh) with prior probability p0p_0p0​, or 000 (state lll). Value is realized only if the strategy used is effective (state ggg, against ineffective bbb). Every strategy is effective with prior probability e0e_0e0​, independently of every other strategy and of the idea, and there are several strategies to choose from. Implementing a strategy costs CCC and testing one costs ccc. The standing assumptions are

0<p0<1,0<e0<1,V0:=e0p0v−C=0,c<C,0<p_0<1,\qquad 0<e_0<1,\qquad V_0 := e_0p_0v - C = 0,\qquad c<C,0<p0​<1,0<e0​<1,V0​:=e0​p0​v−C=0,c<C,

where V0=0V_0=0V0​=0 means that launching a randomly chosen strategy without testing exactly breaks even.

A test of the selected strategy has precisions (λv,λs)∈[0,1]2(\lambda_v,\lambda_s)\in[0,1]^2(λv​,λs​)∈[0,1]2 and emits one of four signals, (H,G)(H,G)(H,G), (H,B)(H,B)(H,B), (L,G)(L,G)(L,G) or (L,B)(L,B)(L,B):

hhhlll
ggg(H,G)(H,G)(H,G) w.p. 111(L,G)(L,G)(L,G) w.p. λs\lambda_sλs​, (H,B)(H,B)(H,B) w.p. 1−λs1-\lambda_s1−λs​
bbb(H,B)(H,B)(H,B) w.p. λv\lambda_vλv​, (L,G)(L,G)(L,G) w.p. 1−λv1-\lambda_v1−λv​(L,B)(L,B)(L,B) w.p. 111

Write p1(σ)p_1(\sigma)p1​(σ) and e1(σ)e_1(\sigma)e1​(σ) for the posterior probabilities that the idea is high-value and that the tested strategy is effective, given signal σ\sigmaσ. Assumption (A1), that tests are weakly informative, requires

p1(H,B)≥p0,p1(L,G)≤p0,e1(H,B)≤e0,e1(L,G)≥e0.p_1(H,B)\ge p_0,\quad p_1(L,G)\le p_0,\quad e_1(H,B)\le e_0,\quad e_1(L,G)\ge e_0 .p1​(H,B)≥p0​,p1​(L,G)≤p0​,e1​(H,B)≤e0​,e1​(L,G)≥e0​.

After the signal the entrepreneur picks one of three period-1 actions:

  • implement the tested strategy, which pays v−Cv-Cv−C in state (h,g)(h,g)(h,g) and −C-C−C otherwise;
  • implement another randomly chosen strategy, which pays e0v−Ce_0v-Ce0​v−C in expectation when the idea is high-value and −C-C−C when it is not;
  • abandon the venture, which pays 000.

V1(σ)V_1(\sigma)V1​(σ) is the best of these three conditional values. The value of testing is

V0(λv,λs)=∑σPr⁡(σ) V1(σ)−c.V_0(\lambda_v,\lambda_s)=\sum_{\sigma}\Pr(\sigma)\,V_1(\sigma)-c .V0​(λv​,λs​)=σ∑​Pr(σ)V1​(σ)−c.

The strategy-biased test is (λv,1)(\lambda_v,1)(λv​,1) and the idea-biased test is (1,λs)(1,\lambda_s)(1,λs​), where (λv,λs)(\lambda_v,\lambda_s)(λv​,λs​) is the baseline test.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 17)

For baseline precisions λv,λs∈[0,1]\lambda_v,\lambda_s\in[0,1]λv​,λs​∈[0,1], if both precise tests satisfy (A1) and

(1−p0)e0(1−λs)C>(1−λv)p0(1−e0)(e0v−C),(1-p_0)e_0(1-\lambda_s)C>(1-\lambda_v)p_0(1-e_0)(e_0v-C),(1−p0​)e0​(1−λs​)C>(1−λv​)p0​(1−e0​)(e0​v−C),

then

V0(1,λs)<V0(λv,1).V_0(1,\lambda_s)<V_0(\lambda_v,1).V0​(1,λs​)<V0​(λv​,1).

The statement leaves p0,e0,v,cp_0,e_0,v,cp0​,e0​,v,c and the baseline precisions free, subject only to the standing assumptions.

Milestones

  1. Bayes posteriors (§3.1, p. 9): closed forms of p1p_1p1​ and e1e_1e1​ after (H,B)(H,B)(H,B) and (L,G)(L,G)(L,G).
  2. (A1) in ratio form (p. 9): for 0<λv,λs<10<\lambda_v,\lambda_s<10<λv​,λs​<1, each posterior clause is equivalent to a ratio condition such as λv/(1−λs)≥e0/(1−e0)\lambda_v/(1-\lambda_s)\ge e_0/(1-e_0)λv​/(1−λs​)≥e0​/(1−e0​).
  3. Case 3 (p. 11): after (H,B)(H,B)(H,B), switching to another strategy is optimal, and V1(H,B)=e0p1(H,B)v−CV_1(H,B)=e_0p_1(H,B)v-CV1​(H,B)=e0​p1​(H,B)v−C.
  4. Case 4 (p. 11): after (L,G)(L,G)(L,G), abandoning is optimal and V1(L,G)=0V_1(L,G)=0V1​(L,G)=0.
  5. Proposition 1 (p. 12): the tested strategy is implemented only after (H,G)(H,G)(H,G); after (H,B)(H,B)(H,B) and (L,G)(L,G)(L,G), switching beats implementing the tested strategy; after (L,B)(L,B)(L,B), and after (L,G)(L,G)(L,G) when V0=0V_0=0V0​=0, the venture is abandoned.
  6. The V0V_0V0​ display, first line (p. 12): for every (A1) test,
V0(λv,λs)=p0e0(v−C)+(p0(1−e0)λv+(1−p0)e0(1−λs))V1(H,B)−c.V_0(\lambda_v,\lambda_s)=p_0e_0(v-C)+\bigl(p_0(1-e_0)\lambda_v+(1-p_0)e_0(1-\lambda_s)\bigr)V_1(H,B)-c .V0​(λv​,λs​)=p0​e0​(v−C)+(p0​(1−e0​)λv​+(1−p0​)e0​(1−λs​))V1​(H,B)−c.

Significance

Proposition 2 answers the question a mentor faces when it can make a test more precise in one direction only. A test with high λs\lambda_sλs​ makes abandoning a poor idea more efficient. A test with high λv\lambda_vλv​ makes it more efficient to continue the idea with a different strategy. The condition weighs these two benefits, and it shows that the choice is driven by the prior (p0,e0)(p_0,e_0)(p0​,e0​). Proposition 1 shows why: the idea is the same in every test while the strategy can change, so switching strategies after an ambiguous signal is how the entrepreneur learns about the idea. The paper's later sections (differing priors between mentor and entrepreneur, §5.2) start from these two results.

The results are proved in the paper by hand-calculation, and Proposition 2 has no printed proof. No part of the model has been machine-checked before. The formalization produces an explicit, reusable encoding of a two-dimensional Bayesian test with a conflated signal, together with machine-checked versions of the case analysis that Proposition 1 summarizes. It also gives a checked replacement for the printed V0V_0V0​ display: the second line of that display does not follow from the first.

Difficulty

The obvious argument reads the paper's prose, takes V1(L,G)=0V_1(L,G)=0V1​(L,G)=0 and V1(H,B)=e0p1(H,B)v−CV_1(H,B)=e_0p_1(H,B)v-CV1​(H,B)=e0​p1​(H,B)v−C as given, and subtracts. In the formal model these values are optima over three actions, computed from the signal table, and each one needs an argument.

  • The (L,G)(L,G)(L,G) case is not what intuition suggests. The posterior on the tested strategy rises, yet implementing it is never profitable, because a good strategy produces (L,G)(L,G)(L,G) only when the idea is worthless.
  • At the precise tests some signals have probability zero. For example, (H,B)(H,B)(H,B) never occurs at (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and the posterior p1(H,B)p_1(H,B)p1​(H,B) is undefined there. The comparison has to stay valid on that boundary.
  • (A1) is weak, so several of the paper's strict inequalities hold only with equality allowed. The case analysis has to be done without them.

Formalization scope

The model lives in the namespace EntrepChoice.TestChoice. Params holds p0,e0,v,C,cp_0,e_0,v,C,cp0​,e0​,v,C,c. Standing collects the standing assumptions, with V0=0V_0=0V0​=0 kept as the hypothesis e0p0v−C=0e_0p_0v-C=0e0​p0​v−C=0 rather than substituted. Test holds (λv,λs)(\lambda_v,\lambda_s)(λv​,λs​), and Test.Valid bounds both in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The states, signals and actions are small inductive types, and sums over them are written out explicitly.

Action values are unnormalized: Pr⁡(σ)\Pr(\sigma)Pr(σ) times the conditional expected payoff. With this choice V0(λv,λs)V_0(\lambda_v,\lambda_s)V0​(λv​,λs​) (testValue) needs no division. (A1) is stated cross-multiplied by Pr⁡(σ)\Pr(\sigma)Pr(σ). It agrees with the posterior form whenever Pr⁡(σ)>0\Pr(\sigma)>0Pr(σ)>0 and is harmless when Pr⁡(σ)=0\Pr(\sigma)=0Pr(σ)=0. The posteriors p1 and e1 are real quotients, equal to 000 on a probability-zero signal.

Several conventions are disclosed readings of the paper:

  • Proposition 1's second sentence is missing its verb; it is read as "is strictly better than".
  • The strict inequalities that weak (A1) cannot support are stated weakly.
  • Proposition 1 is posed for the baseline range 0<λv,λs<10<\lambda_v,\lambda_s<10<λv​,λs​<1 of p. 7.
  • The goal assumes (A1) for the two precise tests. (A1) at the baseline test implies this.
  • The second printed line of the V0V_0V0​ display is not stated.

testValue is the maximum over the three period-1 actions, built from the signal table. It is never defined by the closed form of milestone 6, and neither Standing nor A1 mentions it, so the goal cannot be closed by unfolding a definition.

Contributions are welcome on every milestone. Further results of the paper — testing order under irreversibility (§4.1), heterogeneous strategy priors (§4.2) and the mentor–entrepreneur game with differing priors (§5.2) — are natural follow-on missions on the same definitions.

Selected references

  • A. K. Agrawal, J. S. Gans, S. Stern, Enabling Entrepreneurial Choice, NBER Working Paper 27379, June 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w27379 — published in Management Science, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3920
  • J. S. Gans, S. Stern, J. Wu, Foundations of Entrepreneurial Strategy, Strategic Management Journal 40(5), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3010
  • W. R. Kerr, R. Nanda, M. Rhodes-Kropf, Entrepreneurship as Experimentation, Journal of Economic Perspectives 28(3), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.28.3.25
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Information Provision and Farmer Welfare in Developing Economies: Giving the Public Signal to One Farmer or to None Maximizes Total Farmer WelfareResearch Paper

Motivation

Farmers who sell the same crop can benefit from better forecasts of the market price, but their production decisions also affect one another through the price. A forecast sent to one farmer may improve that farmer’s decision; a forecast sent to many farmers can make their output responses move together. A planner choosing who receives a common forecast therefore faces a question that differs from asking whether the forecast is accurate. Zhou, Fan, Chen and Tang study this question for a public signal about the uncertain intercept of a Cournot market’s inverse demand curve in Information Provision and Farmer Welfare in Developing Economies (SSRN preprint dated June 27, 2019, §§3–4).

The paper’s base model concerns a publicly funded information service. The planner can send the same signal to any number of farmers without charging them, and its objective is the sum of farmers’ expected profits. The target here is the paper’s Proposition 2, which says that the planner should inform either exactly one farmer or none, according to the sign of an explicit polynomial in the model’s signal precisions and number of farmers. The statement is about equilibrium production choices and the resulting profits, rather than about forecast quality alone (Zhou et al., pp. 11, 14).

Setting

There are n≥4n\geq4n≥4 farmers producing the same good with deterministic yield. Farmer iii chooses a quantity qiq_iqi​ and pays cqicq_icqi​. The total harvest is Q=∑iqiQ=\sum_iq_iQ=∑i​qi​, and the inverse demand at sale is P(Q)=a−bQ+uP(Q)=a-bQ+uP(Q)=a−bQ+u, where a>0a>0a>0 is market potential, b>0b>0b>0 measures price sensitivity, and uuu is a centered Gaussian demand shock. Farmer iii earns (P(Q)−c)qi(P(Q)-c)q_i(P(Q)−c)qi​. The quantities in this formalization are real valued, as required by the paper’s affine equilibrium formula; this interpretation is explained below (Zhou et al., p. 8, (1); p. 10, (2)–(3)).

Each farmer sees a private signal xi=u+ϵix_i=u+\epsilon_ixi​=u+ϵi​. The ϵi\epsilon_iϵi​ are independent centered Gaussian noises of common precision γ>0\gamma>0γ>0; the shock uuu has precision α>0\alpha>0α>0. Thus their variances are 1/γ1/\gamma1/γ and 1/α1/\alpha1/α. A planner also observes a public signal y=u+ϵry=u+\epsilon_ry=u+ϵr​, where the independent Gaussian noise ϵr\epsilon_rϵr​ has precision β>0\beta>0β>0 and variance 1/β1/\beta1/β. The planner chooses an informed set III of farmers who may see yyy; every farmer sees only its own xix_ixi​, and an uninformed farmer cannot use yyy. Write n1=∣I∣n_1=|I|n1​=∣I∣, so n1n_1n1​ is an integer from zero through nnn (Zhou et al., pp. 8–9).

A farmer’s strategy is a measurable function of the information available to that farmer. The realized quantity must be square-integrable under the joint Gaussian law. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a profile of such strategies in which no farmer can increase ex-ante expected profit by changing only its own admissible strategy. Write welfare⁡(I,σ)\operatorname{welfare}(I,\sigma)welfare(I,σ) for the sum of the expected profits of all farmers at a profile σ\sigmaσ. Proposition 1 gives a linear equilibrium and its almost-sure uniqueness. Lemma 2 gives the ex-ante profit of each informed and uninformed farmer at that equilibrium (Zhou et al., pp. 12, 14, 34).

Formalization targets

The goal is the equilibrium welfare conclusion of Proposition 2. Let V(n,β;γ)V(n,\beta;\gamma)V(n,β;γ) be the explicit polynomial displayed in that proposition, with α\alphaα also fixed by the model. For every informed set, an equilibrium exists. When V>0V>0V>0, every one-farmer informed set strictly outperforms all sets of another size. When V≤0V\leq0V≤0, the empty informed set is optimal; for V<0V<0V<0 it strictly outperforms every nonempty set:

n1∗=1if V(n,β;γ)>0,n1∗=0if V(n,β;γ)≤0.n_1^*=1\quad\text{if }V(n,\beta;\gamma)>0,\qquad n_1^*=0\quad\text{if }V(n,\beta;\gamma)\leq0.n1∗​=1if V(n,β;γ)>0,n1∗​=0if V(n,β;γ)≤0.

At V=0V=0V=0, informing zero and one farmer gives the same welfare, so the second case asserts that zero is an optimal choice rather than the unique choice. The goal compares welfare⁡(I,σ)\operatorname{welfare}(I,\sigma)welfare(I,σ) for every Bayesian Nash equilibrium of each informed set, allowing any subset of the prescribed size (Zhou et al., p. 14, Proposition 2; p. 36).

The milestone statements follow the claims used for that result: Lemma 1’s two Gaussian posterior identities; Proposition 1’s equilibrium existence and almost-sure uniqueness; Lemma 2’s profit formulas and advantage for informed farmers; and the Appendix A claims that welfare declines after two recipients, one recipient beats two, and the sign of W(1)−W(0)W(1)-W(0)W(1)−W(0) is controlled by VVV (Zhou et al., pp. 10, 12, 14, 35–36). Here W(t)W(t)W(t) is the paper’s closed-form welfare expression for the linear equilibrium, extended from integer n1n_1n1​ to real ttt only for the paper’s continuous analysis.

Significance

The result identifies the welfare-optimal reach of a common forecast in a competitive production market. Under the stated model, informing more farmers does not necessarily raise their aggregate expected profit. The threshold VVV decides whether the planner should send the signal to one farmer or withhold it. Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 are needed to connect that policy claim to farmers’ actual equilibrium decisions, rather than to a free-standing polynomial comparison (Zhou et al., pp. 12–14).

The paper proves the result mathematically. This mission asks for a machine-checked development of the Gaussian signal model, the equilibrium result, the profit identities, and the final optimization statement. The Gaussian posterior and square-integrable game infrastructure can be reused in other information provision models. The proposal statements compile, but their proofs are open; no machine-checked proof of these mission claims is asserted here.

Difficulty

The planner can compare policies only after accounting for how all farmers change production when the public signal is shared. Informed farmers use both their private observation and the common signal, while uninformed farmers use only their private observation; the same signal changes both the informed farmers’ expected profit and the Cournot price faced by everyone. The linear equilibrium formula alone does not justify restricting all possible strategies to linear ones. The proof must establish that it is an equilibrium against every admissible deviation and that any equilibrium gives the same realized quantities almost surely. The integer policy choice must then be related to the paper’s real extension W(t)W(t)W(t) without allowing noninteger informed sets (Zhou et al., pp. 32–36).

Formalization scope

Lean represents the uncertainty by a product of independent Gaussian measures for uuu, the nnn private noises, and the public noise. The variances are the reciprocals of the positive precisions α\alphaα, γ\gammaγ, and β\betaβ. Informed sets are finite subsets of Fin n, including the empty and full sets. The observation map gives (xi,y)(x_i,y)(xi​,y) to a member of III and (xi,0)(x_i,0)(xi​,0) to a farmer outside III, so neither type sees another farmer’s private signal. Strategies are measurable functions with square-integrable realized quantities, and both equilibria and deviations satisfy that condition. Welfare is the sum of integrals of realized Cournot profit. The goal quantifies over all equilibria and does not replace their welfare by the closed-form function WWW.

The base game assumes n≥4n\geq4n≥4, a>0a>0a>0, b>0b>0b>0, and positive α,β,γ\alpha,\beta,\gammaα,β,γ; no sign condition is imposed on ccc. The paper mentions γ=0\gamma=0γ=0 as an unavailable-private-signal limiting case, but a Gaussian noise with variance 1/γ1/\gamma1/γ is undefined there, so that separate regime is outside this mission. The positive public precision likewise excludes the degenerate β=0\beta=0β=0 case. Equations (2)–(3) print qi≥0q_i\geq0qi​≥0, but the claimed affine equilibrium takes negative values with positive Gaussian probability; the formalization uses unrestricted real quantities, which is the game solved by the paper’s displayed first-order calculations. All of these choices are explicit in the statements and should be checked against the source’s intended reading (Zhou et al., pp. 8–10, 12).

The coefficient definitions kI,mI,kJ,Ψ,A0,A1,A2,B0,B1k_I,m_I,k_J,\Psi,A_0,A_1,A_2,B_0,B_1kI​,mI​,kJ​,Ψ,A0​,A1​,A2​,B0​,B1​, the linear profile, the two type-specific expected profits, and VVV are fixed to the source displays. The useful contributions are proofs of the posterior identities, unrestricted equilibrium existence and uniqueness, expected-profit identities, and the welfare inequalities. Neither an arbitrarily chosen equilibrium nor an affine-only strategy class would establish the target.

Selected references

  • J. Zhou, X. Fan, Y.-J. Chen and C. S. Tang, Information Provision and Farmer Welfare in Developing Economies, SSRN preprint dated June 27, 2019, SSRN 3369334; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (2019), DOI 10.1287/msom.2019.0831. All page and result references above use the dated SSRN preprint.
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Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Queueing Model and Analysis for Autonomous Vehicles on Highways: Under Heavy Load, a Designated AV Lane Beats the No-AV Benchmark in Mean Travel Time Exactly Above a Jam-Speed AV ThresholdResearch Paper

Motivation

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) can drive closer to one another than human drivers, because they react faster and can coordinate in platoons. Transport agencies and industry groups have therefore proposed reserving a designated lane for AVs on highways, so that AVs can exploit short headways without mixing with human-driven vehicles (HVs). Whether such a lane helps depends on a trade-off that is familiar from queueing theory: splitting a highway into two separate lanes loses the efficiency of pooled capacity, while a lane reserved for AVs moves faster when it is busy.

Mirzaeian, Cho and Scheller-Wolf (Management Science, 2021; manuscript SSRN 3278330) model a highway segment as a state-dependent loss queue and compare a no-AV benchmark with the designated-lane policy (the D policy). Their headline finding is that the D policy reduces mean travel time only when the highway is heavily loaded and AVs make up a large enough share of traffic. This mission formalizes that finding.

The queueing model is the state-dependent M/Gn/c/cM/G_n/c/cM/Gn​/c/c queue of Cheah and Smith (1994), developed for pedestrian flows, which Jain and Smith (1997) applied to vehicular traffic; its stationary law, display (12) below, is due to Cheah and Smith.

Setting

A highway segment has length L>0L > 0L>0 and N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 lanes, each holding at most c≥1c \ge 1c≥1 vehicles. Vehicles arrive as a Poisson process of rate λ\lambdaλ; a vehicle that finds the segment full is turned away. When nnn vehicles are on a segment of capacity κ\kappaκ, each travels at mean speed VnV_nVn​, for 1≤n≤κ1 \le n \le \kappa1≤n≤κ, with V1≥V2≥⋯≥Vκ>0V_1 \ge V_2 \ge \dots \ge V_\kappa > 0V1​≥V2​≥⋯≥Vκ​>0. This is the M/Gn/κ/κM/G_n/\kappa/\kappaM/Gn​/κ/κ queue. Its stationary law is (display (12) of the paper)

πn=(λL)nn! Vn⋯V1 π0,π0=(1+∑n=1κ(λL)nn! Vn⋯V1)−1,\pi_n = \frac{(\lambda L)^n}{n!\,V_n\cdots V_1}\,\pi_0, \qquad \pi_0 = \Bigl(1 + \sum_{n=1}^{\kappa} \frac{(\lambda L)^n}{n!\,V_n\cdots V_1}\Bigr)^{-1},πn​=n!Vn​⋯V1​(λL)n​π0​,π0​=(1+n=1∑κ​n!Vn​⋯V1​(λL)n​)−1,

its throughput is θ=λ(1−πκ)\theta = \lambda(1-\pi_\kappa)θ=λ(1−πκ​), and its mean travel time is, by Little's law, W=(∑n=1κnπn)/θW = \bigl(\sum_{n=1}^{\kappa} n\pi_n\bigr)/\thetaW=(∑n=1κ​nπn​)/θ (display (13)).

The benchmark pools all lanes into one queue of capacity NcNcNc with speeds VnBV^B_nVnB​; its mean travel time is WB(λ)W^B(\lambda)WB(λ). Under the D policy, a fraction p∈[0,1]p \in [0,1]p∈[0,1] of arrivals are AVs and must use the designated lane, so there are two independent queues: the AV queue (capacity ccc, speeds VnDAV^{DA}_nVnDA​, arrival rate pλp\lambdapλ) and the HV queue (capacity (N−1)c(N-1)c(N−1)c, speeds VnDHV^{DH}_nVnDH​, arrival rate (1−p)λ(1-p)\lambda(1−p)λ). The overall mean travel time is

WD(p,λ)=p WDA+(1−p) WDH.W^D(p,\lambda) = p\,W^{DA} + (1-p)\,W^{DH}.WD(p,λ)=pWDA+(1−p)WDH.

The jam speeds VNcBV^B_{Nc}VNcB​, VcDAV^{DA}_cVcDA​, V(N−1)cDHV^{DH}_{(N-1)c}V(N−1)cDH​ are the speeds of full queues. The paper assumes V(N−1)cDH<VNcBV^{DH}_{(N-1)c} < V^B_{Nc}V(N−1)cDH​<VNcB​ throughout, and the AV lane is faster when full than the HV lanes, V(N−1)cDH<VcDAV^{DH}_{(N-1)c} < V^{DA}_cV(N−1)cDH​<VcDA​. The threshold is

p(D,W)=VcDAVNcB−VcDAV(N−1)cDHVcDAVNcB−VNcBV(N−1)cDH.p^{(D,W)} = \frac{V^{DA}_c V^B_{Nc} - V^{DA}_c V^{DH}_{(N-1)c}}{V^{DA}_c V^B_{Nc} - V^B_{Nc} V^{DH}_{(N-1)c}}.p(D,W)=VcDA​VNcB​−VNcB​V(N−1)cDH​VcDA​VNcB​−VcDA​V(N−1)cDH​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1(a), heavy-load clause (corrected)

For every p∈[0,1]p \in [0,1]p∈[0,1] with p≠p(D,W)p \ne p^{(D,W)}p=p(D,W) there is λˉ(D,W)(p)>0\bar\lambda^{(D,W)}(p) > 0λˉ(D,W)(p)>0 such that

λ≥λˉ(D,W)(p)  ⟹  (WD(p,λ)≤WB(λ)  ⟺  p≥p(D,W)).\lambda \ge \bar\lambda^{(D,W)}(p) \implies \bigl(W^D(p,\lambda) \le W^B(\lambda) \iff p \ge p^{(D,W)}\bigr).λ≥λˉ(D,W)(p)⟹(WD(p,λ)≤WB(λ)⟺p≥p(D,W)).

Milestones

  1. The closed form (16): W=L∑n=0c−1(Lλ)nn!Vn+1⋯V1/(1+∑n=1c−1(Lλ)nn!Vn⋯V1)W = L\sum_{n=0}^{c-1}\frac{(L\lambda)^n}{n!V_{n+1}\cdots V_1} \Big/ \bigl(1 + \sum_{n=1}^{c-1}\frac{(L\lambda)^n}{n!V_n\cdots V_1}\bigr)W=L∑n=0c−1​n!Vn+1​⋯V1​(Lλ)n​/(1+∑n=1c−1​n!Vn​⋯V1​(Lλ)n​) for λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0.
  2. Lemma 1: WWW is increasing in λ\lambdaλ.
  3. Display (20): lim⁡λ→∞W=L/Vc\lim_{\lambda\to\infty} W = L/V_climλ→∞​W=L/Vc​.
  4. The policy limits: W∞B=L/VNcBW^B_\infty = L/V^B_{Nc}W∞B​=L/VNcB​ and W∞D(p)=pLVcDA+(1−p)LV(N−1)cDHW^D_\infty(p) = \frac{pL}{V^{DA}_c} + \frac{(1-p)L}{V^{DH}_{(N-1)c}}W∞D​(p)=VcDA​pL​+V(N−1)cDH​(1−p)L​.
  5. W∞D(p)≤W∞BW^D_\infty(p) \le W^B_\inftyW∞D​(p)≤W∞B​ if and only if p≥p(D,W)p \ge p^{(D,W)}p≥p(D,W).

Significance

The goal makes precise the paper's main policy conclusion: under heavy load a designated AV lane lowers mean travel time relative to the benchmark exactly when the AV share exceeds a threshold that depends only on the three jam speeds. Below the threshold, the loss of pooling dominates. This is the basis for the paper's caution against designating lanes for AVs while AV penetration is low, and the same heavy-traffic argument underlies its comparisons with the integrated policy (Propositions 2 and 3).

The printed Proposition 1(a) is not correct as stated, and the formal statement records the repair. Its heavy-load clause asserts a single λˉ(D,W)\bar\lambda^{(D,W)}λˉ(D,W) valid for every ppp; the travel-time gap behaves like G(p)+K/λG(p) + K/\lambdaG(p)+K/λ with GGG affine and vanishing at p(D,W)p^{(D,W)}p(D,W), so no single threshold works for AV shares arbitrarily close to p(D,W)p^{(D,W)}p(D,W), and at p=p(D,W)p = p^{(D,W)}p=p(D,W) the equivalence can fail for all λ\lambdaλ. Its light-load clause ("WD(p)≥WBW^D(p) \ge W^BWD(p)≥WB for p∈[0,1]p\in[0,1]p∈[0,1] when λ\lambdaλ is small") fails at p=1p = 1p=1 whenever the AV lane is as fast as the benchmark at low occupancy and faster at higher occupancy, which includes the paper's calibrated model. The mission therefore poses the heavy-load clause pointwise in ppp, excluding p=p(D,W)p = p^{(D,W)}p=p(D,W), which is what the paper's proof establishes. None of these results has a machine-checked proof; the queueing layer (the M/Gn/c/cM/G_n/c/cM/Gn​/c/c stationary law, travel time and their heavy-traffic limits) is new on the platform.

Difficulty

The heavy-traffic limits are the core. The obvious route, letting λ→∞\lambda \to \inftyλ→∞ in the definition W=∑nπn/(λ(1−πc))W = \sum n\pi_n/(\lambda(1-\pi_c))W=∑nπn​/(λ(1−πc​)), gives the indeterminate form c/(λ⋅0)c/(\lambda\cdot 0)c/(λ⋅0): the blocking probability πc→1\pi_c \to 1πc​→1 and λ(1−πc)\lambda(1-\pi_c)λ(1−πc​) tends to the jam throughput. The limit has to be read off a rearranged expression, the closed form (16), whose leading terms in λ\lambdaλ cancel to L/VcL/V_cL/Vc​. Lemma 1 is a genuine monotonicity statement about a ratio of polynomials in λ\lambdaλ whose coefficients depend on an arbitrary nonincreasing speed sequence; it cannot be checked degree by degree. The goal then needs strict separation of the two limits away from p(D,W)p^{(D,W)}p(D,W), together with an eventually-in-λ\lambdaλ argument, and care at p∈{0,1}p \in \{0,1\}p∈{0,1}, where one of the two D-policy queues receives no traffic.

Formalization scope

The queue is represented by its closed-form stationary law (12), exactly as in the paper; no continuous-time Markov chain is constructed. Speeds are arbitrary real sequences V:N→RV : \mathbb N \to \mathbb RV:N→R, read at n=1,…,κn = 1,\dots,\kappan=1,…,κ; the platooning model of §3.1.2 (a Markovian arrival process that generates the speeds) is out of scope, and Proposition 1 is stated in terms of the speeds only. "Decreasing" speeds are read as nonincreasing (AntitoneOn on {1,…,κ}\{1,\dots,\kappa\}{1,…,κ}), and "increasing" in Lemma 1 as weakly increasing. Capacity ccc is per lane. The arrival rate is real, and the limit is λ→+∞\lambda \to +\inftyλ→+∞ in R\mathbb RR. Lean's x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0 assigns W=0W = 0W=0 at λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0, where the throughput vanishes; Lemma 1 and (16) are therefore stated for λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, and the goal's λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ is positive. At p=0p = 0p=0 or p=1p = 1p=1 the idle queue's junk value carries weight zero. The strict inequality V(N−1)cDH<VcDAV^{DH}_{(N-1)c} < V^{DA}_cV(N−1)cDH​<VcDA​ (the proof writes ≤0\le 0≤0) keeps the threshold's denominator nonzero, and it is necessary for the equivalence. The goal is not trivialized by vacuous hypotheses: the instance N=2N = 2N=2, c=1c = 1c=1, VB≡2V^B \equiv 2VB≡2, VDH≡1V^{DH} \equiv 1VDH≡1, VDA≡4V^{DA} \equiv 4VDA≡4 satisfies all of them, with p(D,W)=2/3p^{(D,W)} = 2/3p(D,W)=2/3 strictly inside (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). A statement that drops the exclusion p≠p(D,W)p \ne p^{(D,W)}p=p(D,W), uses one λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ for all ppp, or feeds the full rate λ\lambdaλ to both D-policy queues would not be this result.

A complete development needs finite sums and products, factorials, polynomial-ratio limits at infinity, and a monotonicity argument for ratios of power series truncations. The loss-queue layer (stationary law, throughput, travel time, its closed form, monotonicity and heavy-traffic limit) is reusable for any M/Gn/c/cM/G_n/c/cM/Gn​/c/c model, including the paper's integrated policy. Contributions to any milestone, and alternative proofs of Lemma 1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Mirzaeian, S.-H. Cho, A. Scheller-Wolf, A Queueing Model and Analysis for Autonomous Vehicles on Highways, Management Science, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3692 (manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3278330)
  • J. Y. Cheah, J. MacGregor Smith, Generalized M/G/C/C state dependent queueing models and pedestrian traffic flows, Queueing Systems 15(1):365–386, 1994.
  • R. Jain, J. MacGregor Smith, Modeling vehicular traffic flow using M/G/C/C state dependent queueing models, Transportation Science 31(4):324–336, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.31.4.324
8 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Demand Pooling in Omnichannel Operations: When the Online Waiting Cost Is Relatively Low and the Store Visiting Cost Even Lower, Buy-Online-Pickup-at-Store Benefits the RetailerResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers that sell both through physical stores and online increasingly offer buy-online-pickup-at-store (BOPS): a customer reserves an item online against the store's inventory and collects it in the store. Whether this helps the retailer is not obvious. BOPS changes which customers draw on the store inventory, and therefore how much stock the store should carry and how often a visiting customer finds the item. Gao and Su (Management Science, 2017) modelled BOPS with customers who respond to store inventory availability and found that it need not be profitable for every product; Hu, Xu, Xue and Yang (Management Science 68(2), 2022; accepted manuscript SSRN 3214047) ask when it helps, through the inventory side. They identify two opposing effects: demand pooling, where BOPS moves online demand onto the store inventory, and demand depooling, where BOPS splits off customers who used to buy in the store. This mission formalizes their first effect, Proposition 3: in a stated region of costs, BOPS benefits the retailer.

Setting

A retailer owns one brick-and-mortar store and an online channel fulfilled from a distribution centre. On a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\mathbb P)(Ω,F,P) there are two customer segments with random market sizes: Ds≥0D_s\ge 0Ds​≥0 store-only customers, who buy only in the store, and Dm≥0D_m\ge0Dm​≥0 omni-customers, who may buy in the store or online. The store sells at price pbp_bpb​ with unit cost cbc_bcb​; the online channel sells at pop_opo​ with unit cost co≤cbc_o\le c_bco​≤cb​. A store visit costs a customer k>0k>0k>0, waiting for an online delivery costs ttt. The base surpluses are uo=vo−pou_o=v_o-p_ouo​=vo​−po​ online and ub=vb−pbu_b=v_b-p_bub​=vb​−pb​ in the store, and Assumption (U) uo≥max⁡(t,ub)u_o\ge\max(t,u_b)uo​≥max(t,ub​) holds throughout.

The retailer chooses a store order quantity q≥0q\ge0q≥0 before demand is realized. A customer who visits the store finds the item with probability equal to the store's fill rate E[min⁡(D,q)]/E[D]\mathbb E[\min(D,q)]/\mathbb E[D]E[min(D,q)]/E[D], where DDD is the demand facing the store (Deneckere and Peck). Customers decide on the basis of a belief ζ^\hat\zetaζ^​ about the fill rate; the retailer orders on the basis of beliefs ϕ^s,ϕ^m\hat\phi_s,\hat\phi_mϕ^​s​,ϕ^​m​ about the fractions of each segment that shop in the store.

  • BASE (independent channels). A store visit is worth ζ^ub−k\hat\zeta u_b-kζ^​ub​−k, an online purchase uo−tu_o-tuo​−t. Store-only customers buy if ζ^ub−k≥0\hat\zeta u_b-k\ge0ζ^​ub​−k≥0; omni-customers go to the store if ζ^ub−k≥uo−t\hat\zeta u_b-k\ge u_o-tζ^​ub​−k≥uo​−t and buy online otherwise. The retailer's expected profit is
πB(q)=pbE[min⁡(ϕ^mDm+ϕ^sDs,q)]−cbq+(po−co)E[(1−ϕ^m)Dm].\pi_B(q)=p_b\mathbb E[\min(\hat\phi_mD_m+\hat\phi_sD_s,q)]-c_bq+(p_o-c_o)\mathbb E[(1-\hat\phi_m)D_m].πB​(q)=pb​E[min(ϕ^​m​Dm​+ϕ^​s​Ds​,q)]−cb​q+(po​−co​)E[(1−ϕ^​m​)Dm​].
  • BOPS. Omni-customers reserve against the store inventory when k≤tk\le tk≤t; store-only customers are served first; an omni-customer who meets a stockout buys online instead. The expected profit is
πP(q)=pbE[min⁡(ϕ^sDs,q)]+poE[min⁡(1{k≤t}Dm,(q−ϕ^sDs)+)]−cbq+(po−co)E[1{k>t}Dm+(1{k≤t}Dm−(q−ϕ^sDs)+)+].\pi_P(q)=p_b\mathbb E[\min(\hat\phi_sD_s,q)]+p_o\mathbb E[\min(\mathbf 1_{\{k\le t\}}D_m,(q-\hat\phi_sD_s)^+)]-c_bq+(p_o-c_o)\mathbb E[\mathbf 1_{\{k>t\}}D_m+(\mathbf 1_{\{k\le t\}}D_m-(q-\hat\phi_sD_s)^+)^+].πP​(q)=pb​E[min(ϕ^​s​Ds​,q)]+po​E[min(1{k≤t}​Dm​,(q−ϕ^​s​Ds​)+)]−cb​q+(po​−co​)E[1{k>t}​Dm​+(1{k≤t}​Dm​−(q−ϕ^​s​Ds​)+)+].

A rational-expectations (RE) equilibrium is a profile in which customers' choices are optimal for the believed fill rate, the order quantity is optimal for the believed choices, and both beliefs are correct. When several exist, the paper selects the Pareto-dominant one. The optimal order quantities qsq_sqs​, qsmq_{sm}qsm​ (BASE, with only store-only customers, respectively both segments, in the store) and qpq_pqp​ (BOPS, store-only customers in the store) define fill rates ζs,ζsm,ζp\zeta_s,\zeta_{sm},\zeta_pζs​,ζsm​,ζp​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (demand pooling effect)

If

ζsmub−uo+t<k≤min⁡(t,ζpub),\zeta_{sm}u_b-u_o+t<k\le\min(t,\zeta_pu_b),ζsm​ub​−uo​+t<k≤min(t,ζp​ub​),

then Pareto-dominant RE equilibria exist under BASE and under BOPS, and at any such pair the retailer's expected profits satisfy

ΠB≤ΠP.\Pi_B\le\Pi_P .ΠB​≤ΠP​.

Milestones

  • Lemma 2: qsm≥qp≥qsq_{sm}\ge q_p\ge q_sqsm​≥qp​≥qs​ and ζp≥ζs\zeta_p\ge\zeta_sζp​≥ζs​ (when k≤tk\le tk≤t).
  • Proposition 1(ii): if ζsmub−(uo−t)<k≤ζsub\zeta_{sm}u_b-(u_o-t)<k\le\zeta_su_bζsm​ub​−(uo​−t)<k≤ζs​ub​ (and ζs≤ζsm\zeta_s\le\zeta_{sm}ζs​≤ζsm​), the BASE equilibrium is qB=qsq^B=q_sqB=qs​, (ϕsB,ϕmB)=(1,0)(\phi^B_s,\phi^B_m)=(1,0)(ϕsB​,ϕmB​)=(1,0).
  • Proposition 1(iii): if k>max⁡(ζsub,ζsmub−(uo−t))k>\max(\zeta_su_b,\zeta_{sm}u_b-(u_o-t))k>max(ζs​ub​,ζsm​ub​−(uo​−t)), the BASE equilibrium is qB=0q^B=0qB=0, (ϕsB,ϕmB)=(0,0)(\phi^B_s,\phi^B_m)=(0,0)(ϕsB​,ϕmB​)=(0,0).
  • Proposition 2(i): if k≤min⁡(t,ζpub)k\le\min(t,\zeta_pu_b)k≤min(t,ζp​ub​), the BOPS equilibrium is qP=qpq^P=q_pqP=qp​, ϕsP=1\phi^P_s=1ϕsP​=1, with omni-customers choosing BOPS.
  • Areas (I-2) and (I-3) of the proof of Proposition 3: the optimal BASE profit with beliefs (1,0)(1,0)(1,0), and the BASE profit with beliefs (0,0)(0,0)(0,0), are at most the optimal BOPS profit.

Significance

Proposition 3 is one half of the paper's comparison of BOPS with independent channels (Figure 3 of the paper): together with the depooling effect (Proposition 4) it partitions the cost region below the diagonal k<tk<tk<t into areas where BOPS helps, hurts, or is neutral. It isolates a mechanism that does not appear in models with exogenous store demand: the fill rate, and hence customers' channel choices, respond to the inventory decision.

The paper's proof is short once the equilibria are characterized, but it is a proof in the paper's normal-demand model, where the statement does not hold (see below). The mission produces a corrected, machine-checked version: an explicit equilibrium model with rational expectations and Pareto selection, the characterization of the equilibria that the comparison needs, and the comparison itself. None of these results has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The comparison of profits is easy once one knows which equilibrium each strategy selects; the work lies in the equilibrium analysis. Equilibria are fixed points of a map that couples a newsvendor problem with a discrete choice through the fill rate, and the fill rate is a ratio of expectations of the optimizer. Showing that a candidate profile is consistent, that the remaining profiles are not, and that the selected one Pareto-dominates every other, requires comparing optimal values of different newsvendor objectives and monotonicity of optimizers between them (Lemma 2), without closed forms. The obvious shortcut, reading off the equilibria from the paper's case tables, is not available: the tables are the theorems to be proved.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace OmniPool.BOPS; a single definitions file encodes the profits (2) and (4) term by term, the fill rates, the choice rules in utility form, and the RE equilibria of Definitions A1 and A2 as fixed points.

  • Corrected demand model. The paper assumes jointly normal market sizes with equal coefficients of variation. Normal market sizes are negative with positive probability; the expected BOPS sales term can then be negative, and the step "Clearly, ΠB≤ΠP\Pi_B\le\Pi_PΠB​≤ΠP​" fails (a numerical counterexample is recorded with the mission). Here Ds,DmD_s,D_mDs​,Dm​ are arbitrary nonnegative integrable random variables with positive means. Assumption (M), the correlation and the coefficient-of-variation condition are not used.
  • Order quantities range over q≥0q\ge0q≥0; qs,qsm,qpq_s,q_{sm},q_pqs​,qsm​,qp​ are the unique maximizers over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) of the respective profits.
  • Beliefs are real numbers that the choice rules set to 000 or 111; each equilibrium carries one copy of ζ\zetaζ and ϕ\phiϕ, so beliefs equal realizations by construction. The fill rate is defined as 000 when nobody shops in the store.
  • Pareto dominance under BASE compares the retailer, store-only customers and omni-customers; under BOPS, where the paper defines no omni-customer payoff, the retailer and store-only customers.
  • Lemma 1 (ζsm≥ζs\zeta_{sm}\ge\zeta_sζsm​≥ζs​) is a normal-model fact; it is a hypothesis of Proposition 1(ii) and is not used by the goal.
  • "Benefits the retailer" is the weak inequality ΠB≤ΠP\Pi_B\le\Pi_PΠB​≤ΠP​ of the proof.

The goal asserts existence of Pareto-dominant equilibria under both strategies; without these conjuncts the universally quantified comparison could hold vacuously. Defining ΠB,ΠP\Pi_B,\Pi_PΠB​,ΠP​ by the paper's region tables instead of through equilibria would make the goal a tautology and is ruled out.

Infrastructure needed: integrability of truncated demands, monotone comparative statics for maximizers of functions with increasing differences, and pointwise identities between the profit expressions. The equilibrium definitions are reusable for the paper's other results (Propositions 4 and 5) and for RE models of omnichannel retail. Proofs of the milestones, and formalizations of Propositions 1(i) and 2(ii)–(iii), are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Hu, X. Xu, W. Xue, Y. Yang, Demand Pooling in Omnichannel Operations, Management Science 68(2):883–894, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.3964 (accepted manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3214047)
  • F. Gao, X. Su, Omnichannel Retail Operations with Buy-Online-and-Pick-up-in-Store, Management Science 63(8):2478–2492, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2473
  • R. Deneckere, J. Peck, Competition over Price and Service Rate when Demand is Stochastic: A Strategic Analysis, RAND Journal of Economics 26(1):148–162, 1995. https://doi.org/10.2307/2556040
  • X. Su, F. Zhang, Strategic Customer Behavior, Commitment, and Supply Chain Performance, Management Science 54(10):1759–1773, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0886
  • G. P. Cachon, R. Swinney, Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers, Management Science 55(3):497–511, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0948
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Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynamic Mean-Variance Analysis for Log Returns: In a Complete Market, Holding the Constant Fraction (μ − r)/((1 + γ)σ²) of Wealth in Stock Is an Equilibrium StrategyResearch Paper

Motivation

Mean-variance analysis, the trade-off between the expected value and the variance of a portfolio's outcome, is the most widely used criterion for portfolio choice in practice. In continuous time it has two well-known defects when applied to terminal wealth: the criterion is time-inconsistent (a strategy that is optimal today is no longer optimal tomorrow), and the resulting equilibrium strategies of Basak and Chabakauri (2010) and Björk, Murgoci and Zhou (2014) prescribe a dollar amount in the stock that does not scale with wealth, which is at odds with how investors and advisers think in terms of portfolio fractions.

Dai, Jin, Kou and Xu apply the mean-variance criterion to the log-return of the portfolio instead of to wealth. They show that, in the classical complete market with constant coefficients, the resulting equilibrium strategy is a constant fraction of wealth, that it coincides with the classical optimal strategy of Merton (1969) for a CRRA investor with relative risk aversion 1+γ1+\gamma1+γ, and that the investor's preference parameter γ\gammaγ is in one-to-one correspondence with a target annual return. The last fact is what the paper uses to elicit γ\gammaγ from an investor's stated target return.

Setting

A bond pays the constant interest rate rrr. One stock has price dSt=μSt dt+σSt dBtdS_t=\mu S_t\,dt+\sigma S_t\,dB_tdSt​=μSt​dt+σSt​dBt​ with constant drift μ\muμ, volatility σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, and BBB a standard Brownian motion on a probability space. An investor with horizon T>0T>0T>0 holds the fraction πt\pi_tπt​ of wealth WtW_tWt​ in the stock. A feedback strategy is a function π(τ,y)\pi(\tau,y)π(τ,y) of time and current log-wealth yyy. The log-wealth Rt=ln⁡WtR_t=\ln W_tRt​=lnWt​ then solves the stochastic differential equation (6)

dRs=[r+(μ−r)πs−12σ2πs2]ds+σπs dBs.dR_s=\Big[r+(\mu-r)\pi_s-\tfrac12\sigma^2\pi_s^2\Big]ds+\sigma\pi_s\,dB_s .dRs​=[r+(μ−r)πs​−21​σ2πs2​]ds+σπs​dBs​.

For a time t∈[0,T)t\in[0,T)t∈[0,T) and a log-wealth yyy, the investor evaluates a strategy through the reward function

J(t,y;π)=Et[RTπ]−γ2 Vart[RTπ],J(t,y;\pi)=\mathbb E_t\big[R^\pi_T\big]-\frac\gamma2\,\mathrm{Var}_t\big[R^\pi_T\big],J(t,y;π)=Et​[RTπ​]−2γ​Vart​[RTπ​],

the mean minus γ/2\gamma/2γ/2 times the variance of terminal log-wealth for the process started at Rt=yR_t=yRt​=y. Here γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 is a constant (Assumption A). A strategy is admissible if Et∫tT∣σπs∣2ds<∞\mathbb E_t\int_t^T|\sigma\pi_s|^2ds<\inftyEt​∫tT​∣σπs​∣2ds<∞.

Because JJJ is time-inconsistent, optimality is replaced by an equilibrium, following Björk, Khapko and Murgoci (2017). For h>0h>0h>0 and v∈Rv\in\mathbb Rv∈R, the perturbation πh,v\pi^{h,v}πh,v holds the constant fraction vvv on [t,t+h)[t,t+h)[t,t+h) and follows π^\hat\piπ^ afterwards. An admissible π^\hat\piπ^ is an equilibrium strategy (Definition 1) if, at every t∈[0,T)t\in[0,T)t∈[0,T), every yyy and every vvv,

lim inf⁡h→0+J(t,y;π^)−J(t,y;πh,v)h ≥ 0.\liminf_{h\to0^+}\frac{J(t,y;\hat\pi)-J(t,y;\pi^{h,v})}{h}\ \ge\ 0 .h→0+liminf​hJ(t,y;π^)−J(t,y;πh,v)​ ≥ 0.

With θ=(μ−r)/σ\theta=(\mu-r)/\sigmaθ=(μ−r)/σ the market price of risk, the mission's two named quantities are

π^=μ−r(1+γ)σ2,a^=r+(11+γ−12⋅1(1+γ)2)θ2.\hat\pi=\frac{\mu-r}{(1+\gamma)\sigma^2},\qquad \hat a=r+\Big(\frac1{1+\gamma}-\frac12\cdot\frac1{(1+\gamma)^2}\Big)\theta^2 .π^=(1+γ)σ2μ−r​,a^=r+(1+γ1​−21​⋅(1+γ)21​)θ2.

In Lean these are piHat M and aHat M for a market M : Market with fields μ r σ γ T; the SDE is IsLogReturn, admissibility Admissible, the reward J, the perturbation spike and Definition 1 IsEquilibrium.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (pp. 11–12)

  1. The constant strategy π^\hat\piπ^ and every perturbation πh,v\pi^{h,v}πh,v of it are admissible, and π^\hat\piπ^ is an equilibrium strategy.
  2. For every t∈[0,T)t\in[0,T)t∈[0,T), every yyy and every solution R^\hat RR^ of (6) under π^\hat\piπ^ started at R^t=y\hat R_t=yR^t​=y,
1T−t Et[R^T−R^t]=a^.\frac1{T-t}\,\mathbb E_t\big[\hat R_T-\hat R_t\big]=\hat a .T−t1​Et​[R^T​−R^t​]=a^.
  1. If μ≠r\mu\neq rμ=r, then a^∈(r, r+12θ2)\hat a\in(r,\,r+\tfrac12\theta^2)a^∈(r,r+21​θ2).

Milestones (Appendix C.2 and Theorem 2(ii))

  • Moments under a deterministic policy (p. O–10): for πs=p(s)\pi_s=p(s)πs​=p(s) deterministic, RT∈L2R_T\in L^2RT​∈L2, Et[RT]=Rt+∫tT(r+p(s)(μ−r)−12p(s)2σ2)ds\mathbb E_t[R_T]=R_t+\int_t^T\big(r+p(s)(\mu-r)-\tfrac12p(s)^2\sigma^2\big)dsEt​[RT​]=Rt​+∫tT​(r+p(s)(μ−r)−21​p(s)2σ2)ds and Vart(RT)=∫tTp(s)2σ2ds\mathrm{Var}_t(R_T)=\int_t^Tp(s)^2\sigma^2dsVart​(RT​)=∫tT​p(s)2σ2ds.
  • Spike decomposition (p. O–11): J(πh,v)=J(π^)+∫tt+h([v(μ−r)−1+γ2v2σ2]−[π^s(μ−r)−1+γ2π^s2σ2])dsJ(\pi^{h,v})=J(\hat\pi)+\int_t^{t+h}\big([v(\mu-r)-\tfrac{1+\gamma}2v^2\sigma^2]-[\hat\pi_s(\mu-r)-\tfrac{1+\gamma}2\hat\pi_s^2\sigma^2]\big)dsJ(πh,v)=J(π^)+∫tt+h​([v(μ−r)−21+γ​v2σ2]−[π^s​(μ−r)−21+γ​π^s2​σ2])ds for a deterministic π^\hat\piπ^.
  • Pointwise maximizer (p. O–11): π^=argmax⁡v∈R{v(μ−r)−1+γ2v2σ2}\hat\pi=\operatorname{argmax}_{v\in\mathbb R}\{v(\mu-r)-\tfrac{1+\gamma}2v^2\sigma^2\}π^=argmaxv∈R​{v(μ−r)−21+γ​v2σ2}.
  • No perturbation helps (p. O–11): J(t,y;πh,v)≤J(t,y;π^)J(t,y;\pi^{h,v})\le J(t,y;\hat\pi)J(t,y;πh,v)≤J(t,y;π^) for every h>0h>0h>0 and vvv.
  • Range of the target return (p. 12): r<a^<r+12θ2r<\hat a<r+\tfrac12\theta^2r<a^<r+21​θ2 when μ≠r\mu\ne rμ=r.

A supporting item (not a milestone) states the reward of an admissible deterministic policy, J(t,y;π)=y+∫tT(r+p(s)(μ−r)−1+γ2p(s)2σ2)dsJ(t,y;\pi)=y+\int_t^T\big(r+p(s)(\mu-r)-\tfrac{1+\gamma}2p(s)^2\sigma^2\big)dsJ(t,y;π)=y+∫tT​(r+p(s)(μ−r)−21+γ​p(s)2σ2)ds (p. O–10); another states that π^\hat\piπ^ and all its perturbations are admissible.

Significance

Part (i) shows that the dynamic mean-variance criterion on log-returns and CRRA expected utility of terminal wealth share the same optimal strategy in a complete market, although the first is time-inconsistent and the second is not. Part (ii) gives a closed-form, strictly increasing link between the target annual return and 1/(1+γ)1/(1+\gamma)1/(1+γ), which is the basis of the paper's procedure for eliciting the risk parameter (Corollary 1) and of its comparisons with terminal-wealth mean-variance strategies.

The result is proved on paper; nothing in it has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing it requires a working account of the Itô integral of deterministic integrands against Brownian motion (Gaussianity of the integral, its mean and variance, and uniqueness of solutions of an SDE with deterministic coefficients) in the form of the published step-sum relation EthierKurtz.HasBrownianItoIntegral. That account is reusable by any mission that computes moments of linear SDEs.

Difficulty

The paper's proof is three displays long because it takes the moment formulas for granted. Mathlib has Brownian motion (IsBrownianReal) but no Itô integral, no Itô isometry and no existence theory for SDEs, so each of the following is real work:

  • Existence. Every perturbation is a two-step deterministic strategy; one must exhibit, from every start (t,y)(t,y)(t,y), a solution of (6) whose stochastic integral satisfies the step-sum relation, i.e. control the in-probability convergence of the Itô sums using the continuity of Brownian paths.
  • Uniqueness. JJJ is defined on an arbitrary solution of (6); uniqueness (almost surely, on the whole interval) of the in-probability limit is what makes JJJ independent of the choice and lets the moment milestone speak about every solution.
  • Moments. The Itô integral of a deterministic square-integrable integrand is centred Gaussian with variance σ2∫p2\sigma^2\int p^2σ2∫p2. For step integrands this follows from independent increments; for a general deterministic integrand it needs an L2L^2L2-approximation argument.

The equilibrium inequality itself is pointwise algebra once the reward is known.

Formalization scope

  • Markovian reading. Et\mathbb E_tEt​ and Vart\mathrm{Var}_tVart​ are the mean and variance of the process started at (t,y)(t,y)(t,y), driven by the increments Bt+u−BtB_{t+u}-B_tBt+u​−Bt​ and adapted to their natural filtration. They are not conditional expectations given a filtration.
  • No state variable. The complete market has no factor XXX; strategies are functions π(τ,y)\pi(\tau,y)π(τ,y).
  • Itô integral. The stochastic integral is the published relation EthierKurtz.HasBrownianItoIntegral, in elapsed time from ttt, with the integrand set to 000 after the horizon.
  • Admissibility adds three conditions to the printed one: existence of a solution, almost-sure uniqueness on [t,T][t,T][t,T], and RT∈L2R_T\in L^2RT​∈L2. Without them JJJ is not a real number.
  • Reward. JJJ evaluates one chosen solution (Classical.epsilon); under admissibility the choice is immaterial.
  • Equilibrium. The lim inf⁡≥0\liminf\ge0liminf≥0 is written in ε\varepsilonε-form, and the perturbation is defined for every h>0h>0h>0, half-open at t+ht+ht+h as printed.
  • Constants. σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 (Assumption A) and T>0T>0T>0 are the predicate Market.Standing. The coordinates of BBB are assumed measurable.
  • Printed slip. The interval claim a^∈(r,r+12θ2)\hat a\in(r,r+\tfrac12\theta^2)a^∈(r,r+21​θ2) is false for μ=r\mu=rμ=r (a^=r\hat a=ra^=r), so it is stated under μ≠r\mu\ne rμ=r. Part (i) and identity (10) are stated for every μ\muμ.

Trivializing encodings are ruled out: JJJ is defined from the SDE and never by the closed form of Appendix C.2, and the goal's conclusion (not its hypotheses) asserts admissibility of π^\hat\piπ^ and of every perturbation, so the equilibrium claim cannot hold vacuously. The moment milestone concludes RT∈L2R_T\in L^2RT​∈L2, because Lean's integral and variance are 000 on non-integrable inputs.

Welcome contributions: the Gaussian law of ∫p dB\int p\,dB∫pdB for deterministic ppp under the step-sum relation; existence and uniqueness for (6) with deterministic coefficients; and the algebraic milestones, which are independent of the stochastic layer.

Selected references

  • M. Dai, H. Jin, S. Kou, Y. Xu, A Dynamic Mean-Variance Analysis for Log Returns, SSRN working paper 3437268, version of Aug 2019; published in Management Science 67(2), 2021. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437268, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3493
  • T. Björk, M. Khapko, A. Murgoci, On time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous time, Finance and Stochastics 21(2), 331–360, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-017-0327-5
  • T. Björk, A. Murgoci, X. Y. Zhou, Mean-variance portfolio optimization with state-dependent risk aversion, Mathematical Finance 24(1), 1–24, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.2011.00515.x
  • S. Basak, G. Chabakauri, Dynamic mean-variance asset allocation, Review of Financial Studies 23(8), 2970–3016, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq028
  • R. C. Merton, Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: the continuous-time case, Review of Economics and Statistics 51(3), 247–257, 1969. https://doi.org/10.2307/1926560
11 thms1 active userReviewed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Technical Note—Two-Stage Sample Robust Optimization: The Multi-Policy Approximation with Linear Decision Rules Is Asymptotically Optimal for Two-Stage Stochastic Linear OptimizationResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic linear optimization is the standard model for decisions taken before uncertainty is revealed and corrected after it: capacity before demand, inventory before transport capacities, generation commitments before load. In practice the probability distribution of the uncertainty is unknown and only historical samples are available, so the stochastic problem has to be replaced by a data-driven one. The sample average approximation (SAA) is consistent but can overfit badly on small samples; distributionally robust formulations hedge against this, but for two-stage problems they are typically intractable.

Bertsimas, Shtern and Sturt (arXiv:1907.07142v4, published as a Technical Note in Operations Research, 2022) study sample robust optimization (SRO): each sample is perturbed adversarially within a small ball intersected with a known support polyhedron. SRO is equivalent to two-stage distributionally robust optimization over a type-∞ Wasserstein ball (Bertsimas, Shtern, Sturt 2018, Proposition 3, as cited on p. 7), and evaluating its objective is NP-hard even for one sample. The paper proposes a tractable multi-policy approximation (MP), with one linear decision rule per sample, and proves that it recovers the optimal value and the optimal decisions of the underlying stochastic problem as the data grow, without assuming relatively complete recourse.

Setting

The data are c∈Rnc\in\mathbb R^nc∈Rn, q∈Rrq\in\mathbb R^rq∈Rr, T∈Rm×nT\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}T∈Rm×n, W∈Rm×rW\in\mathbb R^{m\times r}W∈Rm×r and an affine right-hand side h(ζ)=h0+Hζh(\zeta)=h^0+H\zetah(ζ)=h0+Hζ. The second-stage cost of a first-stage decision xxx under the realization ζ∈Rd\zeta\in\mathbb R^dζ∈Rd is

Q(x,ζ)=inf⁡y∈Rr{q⊤y: Tx+Wy≥h(ζ)},Q(x,\zeta)=\inf_{y\in\mathbb R^r}\{q^\top y:\ Tx+Wy\ge h(\zeta)\},Q(x,ζ)=y∈Rrinf​{q⊤y: Tx+Wy≥h(ζ)},

equal to +∞+\infty+∞ when no recourse yyy is feasible. With ξ\xiξ a random vector of law μ\muμ, the stochastic problem is

v∗=inf⁡x∈RnV∗(x),V∗(x)=c⊤x+E[Q(x,ξ)].(OPT)v^*=\inf_{x\in\mathbb R^n}V^*(x),\qquad V^*(x)=c^\top x+\mathbb E[Q(x,\xi)].\tag{OPT}v∗=x∈Rninf​V∗(x),V∗(x)=c⊤x+E[Q(x,ξ)].(OPT)

The support of ξ\xiξ lies in a known polyhedron Ξ={ζ:Gζ≥g0}\Xi=\{\zeta: G\zeta\ge g^0\}Ξ={ζ:Gζ≥g0}. Given i.i.d. samples ξ1,…,ξN\xi^1,\dots,\xi^Nξ1,…,ξN, a radius ϵN≥0\epsilon_N\ge0ϵN​≥0 and an ℓp\ell_pℓp​-norm, the uncertainty sets are UNi={ζ∈Ξ:∥ζ−ξi∥≤ϵN}U^i_N=\{\zeta\in\Xi:\|\zeta-\xi^i\|\le\epsilon_N\}UNi​={ζ∈Ξ:∥ζ−ξi∥≤ϵN​} and

v^NSRO=inf⁡x{c⊤x+1N∑i=1Nsup⁡ζ∈UNiQ(x,ζ)}.\hat v^{SRO}_N=\inf_x\Big\{c^\top x+\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\sup_{\zeta\in U^i_N}Q(x,\zeta)\Big\}.v^NSRO​=xinf​{c⊤x+N1​i=1∑N​ζ∈UNi​sup​Q(x,ζ)}.

A linear decision rule is a policy y(ζ)=y0+Yζy(\zeta)=y^0+Y\zetay(ζ)=y0+Yζ; the set of them is L\mathcal LL. The multi-policy approximation chooses, besides xxx, one rule yi∈Ly^i\in\mathcal Lyi∈L per sample, feasible on its own set:

v^NMP=inf⁡x, y1,…,yN∈L{c⊤x+1N∑i=1Nsup⁡ζ∈UNiq⊤yi(ζ) : Tx+Wyi(ζ)≥h(ζ) ∀ζ∈UNi, i∈[N]}.\hat v^{MP}_N=\inf_{x,\ y^1,\dots,y^N\in\mathcal L}\Big\{c^\top x+\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\sup_{\zeta\in U^i_N}q^\top y^i(\zeta)\ :\ Tx+Wy^i(\zeta)\ge h(\zeta)\ \forall\zeta\in U^i_N,\ i\in[N]\Big\}.v^NMP​=x, y1,…,yN∈Linf​{c⊤x+N1​i=1∑N​ζ∈UNi​sup​q⊤yi(ζ) : Tx+Wyi(ζ)≥h(ζ) ∀ζ∈UNi​, i∈[N]}.

The single-policy approximation (SP) uses one shared rule for all iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 12)

Assume [A1] ϵN→0\epsilon_N\to0ϵN​→0; [A2] v∗v^*v∗ is finite and E∥ξ∥<∞\mathbb E\|\xi\|<\inftyE∥ξ∥<∞; [A3] the optimal set of (OPT) is nonempty and bounded; [A4] there are xxx and ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 such that around every ζ^∈Ξ\hat\zeta\in\Xiζ^​∈Ξ some linear decision rule is feasible on B(ζ^,ϵ)∩ΞB(\hat\zeta,\epsilon)\cap\XiB(ζ^​,ϵ)∩Ξ. Then

lim⁡N→∞v^NSRO=lim⁡N→∞v^NMP=v∗a.s.,\lim_{N\to\infty}\hat v^{SRO}_N=\lim_{N\to\infty}\hat v^{MP}_N=v^*\quad\text{a.s.},N→∞lim​v^NSRO​=N→∞lim​v^NMP​=v∗a.s.,

and almost surely every accumulation point of optimal first-stage decisions of (SRO) or (MP) is optimal for (OPT).

Milestones

  1. SAA value consistency, cited in the proof of Theorem 2 (p. 20): v^NSAA→v∗\hat v^{SAA}_N\to v^*v^NSAA​→v∗ a.s. under [A2]–[A3].
  2. Theorem 1 (p. 10): v^NSRO≤v^NMP≤v^NSP\hat v^{SRO}_N\le\hat v^{MP}_N\le\hat v^{SP}_Nv^NSRO​≤v^NMP​≤v^NSP​, pointwise in xxx as well, for any policy class.
  3. Lemma 5 (p. 34) and Lemma 9 (p. 40): below the radius ΔΞ\Delta_\XiΔΞ​ of a point, B(ζ^,ϵ)∩ΞB(\hat\zeta,\epsilon)\cap\XiB(ζ^​,ϵ)∩Ξ scales about ζ^\hat\zetaζ^​ and translates along the relative interior of a face.
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 14): [A4] is equivalent to a condition on minimal faces ([A5]) and to feasibility with finitely many recourse matrices ([A6]).
  5. Display (3) (p. 16) and Lemma 2 (p. 16): feasibility of rules with matrices in a set C\mathcal CC moves to decisions λx∗+(1−λ)x\lambda x^*+(1-\lambda)xλx∗+(1−λ)x near x∗x^*x∗, with a uniform smaller radius.
  6. Lemma 3 (p. 17): QϵC(x,ζ)≤Q(x∗,ζ)+ϵηC+L∥x−x∗∥∗Q^{\mathcal C}_\epsilon(x,\zeta)\le Q(x^*,\zeta)+\epsilon\eta^{\mathcal C}+L\|x-x^*\|_*QϵC​(x,ζ)≤Q(x∗,ζ)+ϵηC+L∥x−x∗∥∗​ on the set Ξ∗\Xi^*Ξ∗ of realizations feasible for x∗x^*x∗.
  7. SAA argmin consistency, cited on p. 22: accumulation points of near-optimal SAA solutions are a.s. optimal.

Significance

Theorem 2 says that a linear or second-order cone program with O(N)O(N)O(N) variables and constraints (Proposition 1) is a consistent estimator of the optimal value and decisions of a two-stage stochastic linear program, under assumptions comparable to those for SAA, for unbounded Ξ\XiΞ and without relatively complete recourse. Theorem 1 adds that (MP) is always a valid upper approximation of (SRO), so the same limit holds for the intractable SRO problem.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. No part of it has been machine-checked. A complete development would give a verified model of two-stage linear programs with extended-valued recourse, a verified sample-robust and multi-policy layer, and the polyhedral lemmas on balls intersected with polyhedra (Lemmas 5, 9 and display (3)), which are reusable for other robust and distributionally robust convergence results. The two cited consistency statements (milestones 1 and 7) would be the first formal consistency results for SAA with extended-valued convex integrands.

Difficulty

The upper bound lim sup⁡v^NMP≤v∗\limsup\hat v^{MP}_N\le v^*limsupv^NMP​≤v∗ cannot be obtained by plugging an optimal x∗x^*x∗ into (MP): x∗x^*x∗ need not admit any linear decision rule feasible on a neighbourhood of a sample, and without relatively complete recourse a sample near the boundary of the feasible region may admit none at all. The proof perturbs x∗x^*x∗ towards the point given by [A4], which requires the uniform radius of display (3), obtained from an induction over the faces of Ξ∗\Xi^*Ξ∗ in Appendix C. Lemma 1's direction [A4] ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ [A6] is a second induction over face dimension (Appendix B).

The lower bound reduces to SAA, but the SAA consistency it needs is for an extended-valued, merely lower semicontinuous convex integrand (King and Wets 1991), for which Mathlib has no epi-convergence theory and no law of large numbers for random lower semicontinuous functions. A uniform law of large numbers on a compact set does not apply: the feasible region need not be bounded and QQQ is +∞+\infty+∞ off a polyhedron.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin k → ℝ; the ℓp\ell_pℓp​-norm is that of PiLp p for an arbitrary p : ℝ≥0∞ with 1 ≤ p, the dual norm is sup⁡{u⊤v:∥u∥≤1}\sup\{u^\top v:\|u\|\le1\}sup{u⊤v:∥u∥≤1}, and the same p is used on Rn\mathbb R^nRn in Lemma 3. Every optimal value (QQQ, V∗V^*V∗, v∗v^*v∗, the SAA, SRO, SP and MP values, QϵCQ^{\mathcal C}_\epsilonQϵC​, ηC\eta^{\mathcal C}ηC, ΔΞ\Delta_\XiΔΞ​) is an infimum or supremum in EReal: "min" and "max" are read as inf and sup, attainment is never assumed, infeasibility gives +∞+\infty+∞, and the factor 1/N1/N1/N is the real N−1N^{-1}N−1. The expectation is the platform definition DupacovaWets.Consistency.expect (+∞+\infty+∞ when ∫Q+=∞\int Q^+=\infty∫Q+=∞, else ∫Q+−∫Q−\int Q^+-\int Q^-∫Q+−∫Q−), which agrees with the usual expectation whenever v∗v^*v∗ is finite. Samples are ξ 0, ξ 1, …, independent with law μ\muμ and μ(Ξc)=0\mu(\Xi^c)=0μ(Ξc)=0; the paper's ξ1,…,ξN\xi^1,\dots,\xi^Nξ1,…,ξN are the first NNN. The radii ϵN≥0\epsilon_N\ge0ϵN​≥0 are deterministic. (MP) is stated as printed with NNN policies. Faces of Ξ\XiΞ are nonempty sets {ζ∈Ξ:GIζ=gI0}\{\zeta\in\Xi: G_I\zeta=g^0_I\}{ζ∈Ξ:GI​ζ=gI0​}, and the relative interior is intrinsicInterior.

Trivializing encodings are ruled out: QQQ is not real-valued with a junk value for infeasibility, the expectation is not a Bochner integral of a real truncation, optimal values are not real sInfs, [A4] is the printed local condition and not the global single-rule condition of Proposition 2, and the accumulation-point clauses quantify over sequences that are optimal for all large NNN (requiring optimality at N=0N=0N=0 would make them vacuous).

Disclosed readings: the accumulation-point clauses of Theorem 2 hold on one almost-sure event for every eventually-optimal sequence; Lemmas 2 and 3 and display (3) carry §4.2's standing [A2]–[A3], the support condition, and optimality of x∗x^*x∗; Lemmas 5 and 9 assume the appendix's normalization ∥gi∥∗=1\|g_i\|_*=1∥gi​∥∗​=1 but not minimality of the representation; display (3)'s set-builder, which omits its bound variable, is read as in Theorem 3; Lemma 2 is stated as printed with λx∗+(1−λ)x\lambda x^*+(1-\lambda)xλx∗+(1−λ)x, although its proof derives the equivalent form with λ\lambdaλ and 1−λ1-\lambda1−λ swapped.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, in particular LP strong duality in this inequality form for Lemma 3, the polyhedral Lemmas 5 and 9, and the SAA consistency results, which are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, S. Shtern, B. Sturt, Two-Stage Sample Robust Optimization, arXiv:1907.07142v4, 3 Nov 2020 (the version formalized; later a Technical Note in Operations Research, 2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.07142v4
  • D. Bertsimas, S. Shtern, B. Sturt, A data-driven approach to multi-stage stochastic linear optimization, preprint, 2018. http://www.optimization-online.org/DB_HTML/2018/11/6907.html
  • A. J. King, R. J.-B. Wets, Epi-consistency of convex stochastic programs, Stochastics and Stochastic Reports 34(1–2):83–92, 1991.
  • S. M. Robinson, Analysis of sample-path optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 21(3):513–528, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.21.3.513
  • M. Conforti, G. Cornuéjols, G. Zambelli, Integer Programming, Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11008-0
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Why Perfect Tests May Not Be Worth Waiting For: Information as a Commodity: With Scarce Tests Allocated Uniformly at Random, a Slightly Imperfect Test Can Beat the Perfect TestResearch Paper

Motivation

In the first weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic, diagnostic testing capacity in many countries was a small fraction of the population, and policy discussion centred on waiting for more accurate tests before deploying them widely. Drakopoulos and Randhawa (SSRN 3565245; Management Science, 2021, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4029) treat a test as an information product: an agent's decision to request a test depends on how much the test's result could change that agent's own action. When tests are rationed among those who ask, the accuracy of a test therefore determines not only what is learned from each test but also who asks for one. The paper shows that, under scarcity and uniformly random rationing, a planner can strictly prefer a slightly imperfect test to a perfect one. The result speaks to operations managers and public-health planners who allocate scarce diagnostic capacity, and to the literature on pricing and allocating information goods.

Setting

A unit mass of agents has private priors μ∈[0,1]\mu\in[0,1]μ∈[0,1] of being infected, distributed with density fff on [0,1][0,1][0,1] and distribution function F(x)=∫0xfF(x)=\int_0^x fF(x)=∫0x​f; write μˉ=∫01μf(μ) dμ\bar\mu=\int_0^1\mu f(\mu)\,d\muμˉ​=∫01​μf(μ)dμ. An agent who acts (seeks treatment, self-isolates) earns 1(I=1)−c\mathbb 1(I=1)-c1(I=1)−c, where c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1) is a normalized cost; an untested agent acts iff μ≥c\mu\ge cμ≥c, with expected utility (μ−c)+(\mu-c)^+(μ−c)+.

A (φ,σ)(\varphi,\sigma)(φ,σ)-test has false positive rate φ=P(T=1∣I=0)\varphi=P(T=1\mid I=0)φ=P(T=1∣I=0) and true positive rate σ=P(T=1∣I=1)\sigma=P(T=1\mid I=1)σ=P(T=1∣I=1), with 0≤φ≤σ≤10\le\varphi\le\sigma\le10≤φ≤σ≤1; the (0,1)(0,1)(0,1)-test is the perfect test. The value of the test to an agent is Vtest(μ)=Utest(μ)−(μ−c)+V_{test}(\mu)=U_{test}(\mu)-(\mu-c)^+Vtest​(μ)=Utest​(μ)−(μ−c)+, where UtestU_{test}Utest​ is the expected utility of acting optimally after observing the result. Two critical values

tL=cφcφ+(1−c)σ,tH=c(1−φ)c(1−φ)+(1−c)(1−σ)t_L=\frac{c\varphi}{c\varphi+(1-c)\sigma},\qquad t_H=\frac{c(1-\varphi)}{c(1-\varphi)+(1-c)(1-\sigma)}tL​=cφ+(1−c)σcφ​,tH​=c(1−φ)+(1−c)(1−σ)c(1−φ)​

split the agents into low-likelihood (μ≤tL\mu\le t_Lμ≤tL​, never act), medium-likelihood (tL<μ<tHt_L<\mu<t_HtL​<μ<tH​, follow the test) and high-likelihood (μ≥tH\mu\ge t_Hμ≥tH​, always act). Only medium-likelihood agents request a test, so the demand is D(φ,σ)=F(tH)−F(tL)D(\varphi,\sigma)=F(t_H)-F(t_L)D(φ,σ)=F(tH​)−F(tL​).

A mass κ<1\kappa<1κ<1 of kits is scarce and is allocated uniformly at random among requesting agents, so each requester is tested with probability A(tL,tH)=min⁡{1,κ/(F(tH)−F(tL))}A(t_L,t_H)=\min\{1,\kappa/(F(t_H)-F(t_L))\}A(tL​,tH​)=min{1,κ/(F(tH​)−F(tL​))}. The planner gains 111 for every infected agent who acts and loses β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1) for every uninfected one; its objective S(φ,σ)S(\varphi,\sigma)S(φ,σ) is the expected net gain over the population (display (9) of the paper with α=1\alpha=1α=1). Finally

δ=∫c1(1−μ)f(μ) dμ,γ=∫0cμf(μ) dμ.\delta=\int_c^1(1-\mu)f(\mu)\,d\mu,\qquad\gamma=\int_0^c\mu f(\mu)\,d\mu.δ=∫c1​(1−μ)f(μ)dμ,γ=∫0c​μf(μ)dμ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

Assume a perfect test is available, 0<κ<10<\kappa<10<κ<1, and 1>F(c)>01>F(c)>01>F(c)>0. Then δ,γ>0\delta,\gamma>0δ,γ>0, and

(i)f(0)>(β(1−μˉ)βδ+γ)(1−cc) ⟹ ∃ φ‾∈(0,1): S(φ‾,1)>S(0,1),\text{(i)}\quad f(0)>\Big(\frac{\beta(1-\bar\mu)}{\beta\delta+\gamma}\Big)\Big(\frac{1-c}{c}\Big)\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,\underline\varphi\in(0,1):\ S(\underline\varphi,1)>S(0,1),(i)f(0)>(βδ+γβ(1−μˉ​)​)(c1−c​) ⟹ ∃φ​∈(0,1): S(φ​,1)>S(0,1), (ii)f(1)>(c1−c)(μˉβδ+γ) ⟹ ∃ σˉ∈(0,1): S(0,σˉ)>S(0,1).\text{(ii)}\quad f(1)>\Big(\frac{c}{1-c}\Big)\Big(\frac{\bar\mu}{\beta\delta+\gamma}\Big)\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,\bar\sigma\in(0,1):\ S(0,\bar\sigma)>S(0,1).(ii)f(1)>(1−cc​)(βδ+γμˉ​​) ⟹ ∃σˉ∈(0,1): S(0,σˉ)>S(0,1).

Milestones

In the order of the paper's argument:

  1. display (5): tL≤c≤tHt_L\le c\le t_HtL​≤c≤tH​;
  2. Lemma 1: the classification of agents by tL,tHt_L,t_HtL​,tH​;
  3. display (6): D=F(tH)−F(tL)D=F(t_H)-F(t_L)D=F(tH​)−F(tL​) and the availability A(tL,tH)A(t_L,t_H)A(tL​,tH​);
  4. the simplified objective of p. 22, SSS as integrals over [c,1][c,1][c,1], [c,tH][c,t_H][c,tH​], [tL,c][t_L,c][tL​,c];
  5. δ,γ>0\delta,\gamma>0δ,γ>0;
  6. for σ=1\sigma=1σ=1: tH=1t_H=1tH​=1, tL(φ)t_L(\varphi)tL​(φ) and dtL/dφ(0)=c/(1−c)dt_L/d\varphi(0)=c/(1-c)dtL​/dφ(0)=c/(1−c);
  7. ∂A/∂tL(0,1)=κf(0)\partial A/\partial t_L(0,1)=\kappa f(0)∂A/∂tL​(0,1)=κf(0);
  8. the right derivative dS/dφ(0,1)dS/d\varphi(0,1)dS/dφ(0,1);
  9. Proposition 2(i);
  10. for φ=0\varphi=0φ=0: tL=0t_L=0tL​=0, tH(σ)t_H(\sigma)tH​(σ) and dtH/dσ(1)=(1−c)/cdt_H/d\sigma(1)=(1-c)/cdtH​/dσ(1)=(1−c)/c;
  11. ∂A/∂tH(0,1)=−κf(1)\partial A/\partial t_H(0,1)=-\kappa f(1)∂A/∂tH​(0,1)=−κf(1);
  12. the left derivative dS/dσ(0,1)dS/d\sigma(0,1)dS/dσ(0,1);
  13. Proposition 2(ii).

Significance

The result. Proposition 2 gives explicit sufficient conditions, in terms of the density of priors at the extremes, under which accuracy and social value come apart: when many agents have priors near 000 (respectively near 111), lowering the specificity (respectively the sensitivity) of the test discourages those agents from requesting it and frees kits for agents whose actions depend on the result. It is the paper's main formal argument against waiting for a perfect test under scarcity, and it isolates the mechanism — demand that responds to test quality — that the paper's later examples and observations build on.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; it has no machine-checked proof. A formalization fixes the model unambiguously (who requests, how kits are rationed, what the planner counts) and checks the proof's calculus, including one-sided derivatives at the boundary of the set of tests and a derivative of a parametric integral whose limits and integrand both move. Formalizing the proof also checks the printed derivative dS/dσ(0,1)dS/d\sigma(0,1)dS/dσ(0,1), whose middle term is printed as κ∫0cμf\kappa\int_0^c\mu fκ∫0c​μf although the condition the paper derives from it, and the corrected computation, give κμˉ\kappa\bar\muκμˉ​; milestone 12 states the corrected value.

Difficulty

The planner's objective is defined agent by agent from behaviour, so the first obstacle is to show that the set of requesting agents is exactly the interval (tL,tH)(t_L,t_H)(tL​,tH​) (Lemma 1) and to turn SSS into the three-integral closed form; only then is SSS a function of (φ,σ)(\varphi,\sigma)(φ,σ) through tLt_LtL​, tHt_HtH​ and AAA. The second is the derivative at the perfect test. At (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) the thresholds sit at the endpoints 000 and 111 of the prior's support, so the derivatives exist only from one side, the integrand fff is evaluated at an endpoint where a density is not determined pointwise, and the availability κ/(F(tH)−F(tL))\kappa/(F(t_H)-F(t_L))κ/(F(tH​)−F(tL​)) moves with the thresholds. The naive argument "a more accurate test always helps" holds when tests are plentiful (Proposition 1 of the paper, where A≡1A\equiv1A≡1); under scarcity the congestion term ∂A\partial A∂A is what can reverse the sign, and it has to be tracked exactly.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace ScarceTesting.PerfectTest, in one definitions file Setting. Conventions:

  • The prior is a real function f with IsPriorDensity f: nonnegative on [0,1][0,1][0,1], interval-integrable on [0,1][0,1][0,1], total mass 111; cdf f x is ∫0xf\int_0^x f∫0x​f. Values f(0)f(0)f(0), f(1)f(1)f(1) are read with ContinuousWithinAt f (Icc 0 1) at the endpoint, a disclosed reading of "density fff with value f(0)f(0)f(0)".
  • Tests satisfy 0≤φ≤σ≤10\le\varphi\le\sigma\le10≤φ≤σ≤1, and statements about tL,tHt_L,t_HtL​,tH​ add σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, φ<1\varphi<1φ<1, which keep their denominators positive (Lean's 0/0=00/0=00/0=0).
  • UtestU_{test}Utest​ is written in joint-probability form, with no division. Agents request a test iff its value is strictly positive; an untested agent acts iff μ≥c\mu\ge cμ≥c; a tested agent acts iff the result is positive. Ties concern a null set of priors.
  • The availability min⁡{1,κ/D}\min\{1,\kappa/D\}min{1,κ/D} is if D ≤ κ then 1 else κ / D, so that zero demand gives 111.
  • S integrates each agent's expected contribution against fff; it is not defined by the paper's simplified formula, which is a milestone.
  • δ\deltaδ and γ\gammaγ are the integrals of p. 22, and the goal asserts their positivity. Reading the page's "there exist constants δ,γ>0\delta,\gamma>0δ,γ>0" existentially would trivialize both parts, since small enough δ,γ\delta,\gammaδ,γ make the hypotheses false; this formalization rules that out.
  • κ>0\kappa>0κ>0 is assumed; with κ=0\kappa=0κ=0 no test changes SSS. β<1\beta<1β<1 is the paper's standing assumption.
  • Derivatives in φ\varphiφ and tLt_LtL​ at 000 are within [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and in σ\sigmaσ and tHt_HtH​ at 111 within (−∞,1](-\infty,1](−∞,1].
  • Witness tests satisfy 0<φ‾<10<\underline\varphi<10<φ​<1 and 0<σˉ<10<\bar\sigma<10<σˉ<1; they are genuine tests away from the degenerate corners.

A complete development needs Lebesgue and interval integrals with variable limits, the fundamental theorem of calculus at an endpoint of continuity, and one-sided derivatives of parametric integrals. The Bayesian value-of-a-test layer (Lemma 1, display (6)) is reusable for other models of testing and information products. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • K. Drakopoulos and R. S. Randhawa, Why Perfect Tests May Not Be Worth Waiting For: Information as a Commodity, SSRN preprint 3565245 (version of January 13, 2021). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3565245
  • K. Drakopoulos and R. S. Randhawa, Why Perfect Tests May Not Be Worth Waiting For: Information as a Commodity, Management Science 67(11), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4029
15 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Fair Division of a Random Object: The Bottom-Heavy Rule Dominates Every Other Symmetric Almost Prior-Independent Rule for Bads Satisfying Fair ShareResearch Paper

Motivation

Many allocation problems divide an object whose value to the participants is uncertain at the time the division rule is designed: computing time on a shared cluster, a recurring chore, the cost of a service used jointly. If the rule must be fixed before the realizations are known, and must treat everyone fairly in expectation, the designer faces a tradeoff between ex ante fairness and ex post efficiency. Bogomolnaia, Moulin and Sandomirskiy (arXiv:1903.10361, published in Management Science, 2022) study this tradeoff for a single divisible object, in the setting of online and repeated fair division (Moulin 2019).

The paper characterizes the most efficient fair rules that need almost no knowledge of the underlying distribution. For a good the efficient fair rules form a one-parameter family; for a bad (a chore, a cost) there is a single most efficient fair rule, the Bottom-Heavy rule. This mission formalizes the bads result, Theorem 17 of the paper.

Setting

There are n≥2n\ge2n≥2 agents N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} and one divisible bad. A profile x∈R+Nx\in\mathbb R^N_+x∈R+N​ lists the agents' disutilities for the whole bad; zero disutilities are allowed. Write xN=∑ixix_N=\sum_i x_ixN​=∑i​xi​, xˉ=xN/n\bar x=x_N/nxˉ=xN​/n and eN=(1,…,1)e^N=(1,\dots,1)eN=(1,…,1). The disutility profile is random, with distribution μ\muμ on R+N\mathbb R^N_+R+N​; the coordinates may be correlated. A problem is normalized if EμXi=1\mathbb E_\mu X_i=1Eμ​Xi​=1 for every iii.

A division rule maps each realized profile xxx to a lottery φ(x)∈Δ(N)\varphi(x)\in\Delta(N)φ(x)∈Δ(N); agent iii bears the fraction φi(x)\varphi_i(x)φi​(x) of the bad. A rule is almost prior-independent (API) if it is a single measurable map, used for every distribution once disutilities are normalized by their means. It is symmetric if permuting agents permutes shares. It satisfies Fair Share if in every normalized problem each agent's expected disutility is at most 1/n1/n1/n of her expected disutility for the whole bad:

Eμ(φi(X) Xi)≤1n.\mathbb E_\mu\big(\varphi_i(X)\,X_i\big)\le\frac1n .Eμ​(φi​(X)Xi​)≤n1​.

The social cost of φ\varphiφ at xxx is ∑iφi(x)xi\sum_i\varphi_i(x)x_i∑i​φi​(x)xi​, and φ\varphiφ dominates ψ\psiψ if its social cost is at most that of ψ\psiψ at every profile and strictly lower at some profile.

For θ∈[0,1]\theta\in[0,1]θ∈[0,1], let ψiθ(x)=1n+θn−1(xˉxi−1)\psi^\theta_i(x)=\frac1n+\frac{\theta}{n-1}\big(\frac{\bar x}{x_i}-1\big)ψiθ​(x)=n1​+n−1θ​(xi​xˉ​−1) (with 1/0=+∞1/0=+\infty1/0=+∞). The Bottom-Heavy rule φθ\varphi^\thetaφθ orders agents by disutility, gives the full ψiθ(x)\psi^\theta_i(x)ψiθ​(x) to the longest prefix of low-disutility agents that fits into the simplex, splits the remainder equally among the next class of tied agents, and gives nothing to the others. The canonical rule is φ1\varphi^1φ1, whose prefix shares are xN∖{i}/(n(n−1)xi)x_{N\setminus\{i\}}/(n(n-1)x_i)xN∖{i}​/(n(n−1)xi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 17 (p. 16)

For every n≥2n\ge2n≥2, φ1\varphi^1φ1 is a symmetric API rule satisfying Fair Share, and for every symmetric API rule φ\varphiφ satisfying Fair Share with φ≠φ1\varphi\ne\varphi^1φ=φ1 somewhere on R+N\mathbb R^N_+R+N​,

∑iφi1(x)xi≤∑iφi(x)xi  ∀x∈R+N,with strict inequality for some x.\sum_i\varphi^1_i(x)x_i\le\sum_i\varphi_i(x)x_i\ \ \forall x\in\mathbb R^N_+,\quad\text{with strict inequality for some }x .i∑​φi1​(x)xi​≤i∑​φi​(x)xi​  ∀x∈R+N​,with strict inequality for some x.

Milestones

  1. Proof of Proposition 14 (p. 25). Fair Share gives a supporting vector α\alphaα with φ1(x)x1≤α⋅(x−eN)+1n\varphi_1(x)x_1\le\alpha\cdot(x-e^N)+\frac1nφ1​(x)x1​≤α⋅(x−eN)+n1​ on R+N\mathbb R^N_+R+N​, and then δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 with φi(x)≤1n+δ(xˉxi−1)\varphi_i(x)\le\frac1n+\delta\big(\frac{\bar x}{x_i}-1\big)φi​(x)≤n1​+δ(xi​xˉ​−1).
  2. Proposition 14 (p. 15). A symmetric API rule satisfies Fair Share iff for some θ∈[0,1]\theta\in[0,1]θ∈[0,1]
φi(x)≤min⁡{1n+θn−1(xˉxi−1),1}∀i, x∈R+N.(9)\varphi_i(x)\le\min\Big\{\frac1n+\frac{\theta}{n-1}\Big(\frac{\bar x}{x_i}-1\Big),1\Big\}\quad\forall i,\ x\in\mathbb R^N_+ .\tag{9}φi​(x)≤min{n1​+n−1θ​(xi​xˉ​−1),1}∀i, x∈R+N​.(9)
  1. Step 1 (p. 25). ψiθ≥0\psi^\theta_i\ge0ψiθ​≥0 and ∑iψiθ≥1\sum_i\psi^\theta_i\ge1∑i​ψiθ​≥1, strictly off the diagonal for θ≠0\theta\ne0θ=0; with a helper stating that φθ\varphi^\thetaφθ is a symmetric API rule satisfying (9).
  2. Remark after Definition 15 (p. 16). The shares φi1(x)\varphi^1_i(x)φi1​(x) are anti-monotonic to the xix_ixi​.
  3. Step 2 (p. 25). For θ=0\theta=0θ=0, (9) forces Equal Split on profiles with positive coordinates; for θ∈(0,1]\theta\in(0,1]θ∈(0,1], a symmetric API rule satisfying (9) equals φθ\varphi^\thetaφθ or is dominated by it.
  4. Step 3 (p. 26). φθ+\varphi^{\theta^+}φθ+ dominates φθ−\varphi^{\theta^-}φθ− for 1≥θ+>θ−>01\ge\theta^+>\theta^->01≥θ+>θ−>0.

Significance

Theorem 17 says that, for a bad, the efficiency cost of ex ante fairness without knowledge of the prior is resolved by a single explicit rule: no fair API rule is ever cheaper ex post, at any realization, than the Bottom-Heavy rule. This is the basis of the paper's worst-case and asymptotic comparisons for bads (competitive ratio and price of fairness, §5–6), and it contrasts with goods, where the undominated fair rules form a family. Proposition 14 is of independent use: it turns a condition on all priors (Fair Share) into a pointwise inequality on the rule.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof; this mission produces the first formal statement of the model (normalized random objects, API rules, Fair Share, ex post domination) and a path of eight milestones to the main theorem. The formalization also makes precise two points the printed proof leaves implicit: the convention 1/0=+∞1/0=+\infty1/0=+∞ at θ=0\theta=0θ=0 and at zero disutilities, and the case θ=0\theta=0θ=0 of the final domination argument, which Step 3 does not cover.

Difficulty

The "only if" direction of Proposition 14 is the analytic core. Fair Share is a statement about expectations under every normalized distribution, and has to be turned into a bound on the rule at each profile. Testing Fair Share on finitely supported normalized laws shows that f(x)=φ1(x)x1f(x)=\varphi_1(x)x_1f(x)=φ1​(x)x1​ agrees with its concave majorant at eNe^NeN; extracting a supporting affine function there and pinning down its coefficients needs the symmetry of the rule and the boundary profiles x=e{i}x=e^{\{i\}}x=e{i}. Mathlib has supporting-hyperplane and separation theorems but no concavification operator.

The domination steps are exchange arguments around the threshold t~\tilde tt~ that defines the Bottom-Heavy rule. Step 3 compares two thresholds as θ\thetaθ varies; it is proved on profiles with distinct coordinates, and ties need a separate argument (the paper invokes continuity of the total disutility, while the rule itself is discontinuous there). The natural first idea, that φ1\varphi^1φ1 minimizes cost among rules satisfying (9) for θ=1\theta=1θ=1, does not suffice: a fair rule may satisfy (9) only for a smaller θ\thetaθ, so the comparison across the whole family is needed, and the case θ=0\theta=0θ=0 (Equal Split) requires the anti-monotonicity of φ1\varphi^1φ1 and Chebyshev's sum inequality.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n (0-based; the paper's agent 1 is agent 0), and n≥2n\ge2n≥2 throughout. Profiles are vectors x : Fin n → ℝ; R+N\mathbb R^N_+R+N​ is 0 ≤ x and includes zero coordinates. A distribution is a measure on Fin n → ℝ, normalized meaning probability, carried by the orthant, integrable coordinates with mean 111. An API rule is a measurable map (Fin n → ℝ) → (Fin n → ℝ) that is simplex-valued on the orthant; values off the orthant never matter. Fair Share quantifies over all normalized laws, not only finitely supported ones. Domination is for a bad: lower social cost, weakly everywhere on the orthant and strictly somewhere.

The convention 1/0=+∞1/0=+\infty1/0=+∞ is explicit: the bound (9) is 111 whenever xi=0x_i=0xi​=0, for every θ\thetaθ; in φθ\varphi^\thetaφθ with θ>0\theta>0θ>0, agents with zero disutility split the bad equally (at x=0x=0x=0 this is eN/ne^N/neN/n). The threshold t~\tilde tt~ is encoded at the level of values (prefix masses ∑j:xj≤vψjθ\sum_{j:x_j\le v}\psi^\theta_j∑j:xj​≤v​ψjθ​) rather than by sorting. Two printed claims are posed in corrected form and disclosed in the statements: the case θ=0\theta=0θ=0 of Step 2 holds only on profiles with all coordinates positive, and "α ≥ 0" in the proof of Proposition 14 is β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal asserts that φ1\varphi^1φ1 is itself a symmetric API rule satisfying Fair Share (so a mis-encoded φ1\varphi^1φ1, such as the cost-minimizing utilitarian rule, cannot pass), "other" means differing at some profile of the orthant, and domination includes a strict inequality.

A complete development needs: integrals of bounded measurable functions against probability measures on Fin n → ℝ; a supporting-hyperplane or concave-envelope argument for Proposition 14; finite-sum manipulations over filtered Finsets and Chebyshev's sum inequality for the domination steps; measurability of piecewise-defined maps. The model layer (normalized random objects, API rules, Fair Share, domination) is reusable for the goods half of the paper. Proofs of any milestone, and sanity checks of the definitions (Example 16 for n=2n=2n=2), are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, F. Sandomirskiy, On the Fair Division of a Random Object, arXiv:1903.10361v4, 2021; Management Science 68(2), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.10361
  • H. Moulin, Fair Division in the Internet Age, Annual Review of Economics 11, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025559
  • R. Laraki, On the Regularity of the Convexification Operator on a Compact Set, Journal of Convex Analysis 11(1), 2004.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Shortfall Risk Models When Information on Loss Function Is Incomplete: Preference Robust Shortfall Risk Equals the Worst Utility-Based Shortfall Risk over the Set of Loss FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

A financial position can have many possible outcomes, and a risk measure assigns a number to the cash needed to make that position acceptable. A risk manager who uses expected disutility must choose a loss function to describe how strongly different losses matter. That choice is often uncertain: several functions can fit the available preference comparisons. Delage, Guo and Xu study how to measure risk when the loss function belongs to a set rather than being known exactly. Their model keeps one common probability law and makes the preference uncertainty explicit. This matters when an optimization problem uses risk as its objective or as a constraint, because the chosen loss function can change the resulting decision. The paper develops this model and later studies preference information, discrete optimization reformulations, and sample approximation (Delage, Guo and Xu, §§1, 3–5).

Setting

Fix a probability space (Ω,B,P)(\Omega,\mathcal B,P)(Ω,B,P). A position Z:Ω→RZ:\Omega\to\mathbb RZ:Ω→R is a real random variable with finite pppth moment, where 1≤p<∞1\le p<\infty1≤p<∞. Positive ZZZ represents a gain, so the loss after adding cash t∈Rt\in\mathbb Rt∈R is −Z−t-Z-t−Z−t. A loss function l:R→Rl:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rl:R→R transforms that loss before expectation. The paper's class L\mathcal LL consists of convex, nondecreasing functions that are strictly increasing on [z0,∞)[z_0,\infty)[z0​,∞) for some z0<0z_0<0z0​<0 (Definition 2.1). This excludes a loss function that remains flat around zero and fixes the normalized benchmark l(0)l(0)l(0).

The individual shortfall risk is the least cash amount for which expected loss is no greater than the benchmark:

SRlP(Z)=inf⁡{t∈R:EP[l(−Z−t)]−l(0)≤0}.SR_l^P(Z)=\inf\{t\in\mathbb R:\mathbb E_P[l(-Z-t)]-l(0)\le0\}.SRlP​(Z)=inf{t∈R:EP​[l(−Z−t)]−l(0)≤0}.

If L⊆LL\subseteq\mathcal LL⊆L is a set of plausible loss functions, the preference robust shortfall risk requires the same cash amount to satisfy every member of LLL:

SRLP(Z)=inf⁡{t∈R:sup⁡l∈L(EP[l(−Z−t)]−l(0))≤0}.SR_L^P(Z)=\inf\left\{t\in\mathbb R:\sup_{l\in L}\bigl(\mathbb E_P[l(-Z-t)]-l(0)\bigr)\le0\right\}.SRLP​(Z)=inf{t∈R:l∈Lsup​(EP​[l(−Z−t)]−l(0))≤0}.

The normalization l(0)l(0)l(0) belongs to each function separately. The paper also defines the worst risk of a set R\mathcal RR of risk measures as ϱR(Z)=sup⁡ρ∈Rρ(Z)\varrho_{\mathcal R}(Z)=\sup_{\rho\in\mathcal R}\rho(Z)ϱR​(Z)=supρ∈R​ρ(Z); these are (1.2)–(1.4) of the dated preprint (Delage, Guo and Xu, pp. 2–3 of the April 25, 2018 preprint).

Formalization targets

The goal is all three claims of Theorem 2.1. First, for every L⊆LL\subseteq\mathcal LL⊆L and every admissible ZZZ,

SRLP(Z)=sup⁡l∈LSRlP(Z).SR_L^P(Z)=\sup_{l\in L}SR_l^P(Z).SRLP​(Z)=l∈Lsup​SRlP​(Z).

Second, with RL={SRlP:l∈L}\mathcal R_L=\{SR_l^P:l\in L\}RL​={SRlP​:l∈L}, the same value is ϱRL(Z)\varrho_{\mathcal R_L}(Z)ϱRL​​(Z). Third, if R\mathcal RR is a set of normalized convex utility-based shortfall risk measures and LR={l∈L:SRlP∈R}L_{\mathcal R}=\{l\in\mathcal L:SR_l^P\in\mathcal R\}LR​={l∈L:SRlP​∈R}, then

ϱR(Z)=SRLRP(Z).\varrho_{\mathcal R}(Z)=SR_{L_{\mathcal R}}^P(Z).ϱR​(Z)=SRLR​P​(Z).

The supporting targets follow the statements used on pp. 5–7: divergence of each l∈Ll\in\mathcal Ll∈L at +∞+\infty+∞ (Lemma 2.1(ii)); the extended Jensen inequality and its supremum form (2.11); divergence of the robust gap as cash tends to −∞-\infty−∞ (2.12); the inequality SRLP(Z)≥sup⁡l∈LSRlP(Z)SR_L^P(Z)\ge\sup_{l\in L}SR_l^P(Z)SRLP​(Z)≥supl∈L​SRlP​(Z) (2.13); feasibility of the finite worst individual risk; and the infinite-value case. These targets retain the source's separate finite and infinite regimes (Delage, Guo and Xu, Theorem 2.1 and proof).

Significance

The identity gives two ways to use preference uncertainty. A decision problem may impose one common expected-loss constraint across all plausible preferences, or it may evaluate the worst individual shortfall risk. Theorem 2.1 says these produce the same risk for the admissible position. The paper uses this connection before characterizing loss-function sets from preference information and deriving optimization formulations. It also clarifies that robust shortfall risk need not itself equal the shortfall risk of one fixed loss function: the worst function can depend on the position (Proposition 2.2, Delage, Guo and Xu).

The theorem is proved in the cited paper. The remaining work here is a machine-checked proof of the exact extended-value statement and its supporting steps. The proposal contains compiled Lean statements with proof placeholders; no new machine-checked proof of Theorem 2.1 is claimed. A completed development would also provide reusable definitions for loss classes, extended shortfall risks, and worst-risk operators.

Difficulty

The tempting interchange of an infimum over cash with a supremum over loss functions is not valid for arbitrary constraint families. Here each loss function belongs to L\mathcal LL, and the proof must account for the behavior of its expected loss as cash varies. The expected loss can be infinite even when ZZZ has a finite pppth moment, and the common feasible set can be empty. At the other boundary, an empty loss set makes every cash amount feasible. The proof therefore has to establish the finite case and handle the two extended endpoints without silently replacing them by ordinary real values. The page's finite-case argument also uses feasibility at an individual infimum; this requires a continuity fact that is implicit in its displayed calculation.

Formalization scope

The Lean model represents ZZZ by a real function with MemLp Z p P, 1≤p<∞1\le p<\infty1≤p<∞, on a probability measure. It represents L\mathcal LL by convexity, monotonicity, and strict increase from a negative threshold. It imports the published DupacovaWets.Consistency.expect for extended expectation, which returns +∞+\infty+∞ when the positive part has infinite integral. Risk values live in EReal. An infimum over cash is taken after embedding its feasible real cash amounts into EReal; this preserves +∞+\infty+∞ for an empty feasible set and −∞-\infty−∞ for one unbounded below. The supremum over an empty LLL is −∞-\infty−∞, as in the extended-real convention.

The definition of SRLPSR_L^PSRLP​ uses the paper's single supremum constraint, with l(0)l(0)l(0) subtracted inside that supremum. It is not defined through the theorem's proposed right-hand side. Individual risk maps are total on real functions, while the goal evaluates them only for positions in Lp\mathcal L_pLp​. The converse describes the members of R\mathcal RR as maps SRlPSR_l^PSRlP​ for some l∈Ll\in\mathcal Ll∈L, using the characterization in Proposition 2.1 without formalizing that proposition. The divergence target (2.12) requires LLL nonempty; the source's displayed limit fails for an empty set, although the main theorem includes that case. Supporting statements use Integrable Z P, a consequence of the source's Lp\mathcal L_pLp​ condition on a probability space. Contributions proving the extended Jensen step, endpoint behavior, and the representation are within scope; the paper's later numerical and sample-approximation results are separate work.

Selected references

  • E. Delage, S. Guo and H. Xu, Shortfall Risk Models When Information on Loss Function Is Incomplete, Operations Research 70(6), 2022. DOI. The formalization uses the authors' preprint dated April 25, 2018, pp. 2–8 and Appendix A.1, with that preprint's theorem and equation numbering.
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CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mallows-Smoothed Distribution over Rankings Approach for Modeling Choice: A Dynamic Program Computes the Exact Choice Probabilities of the Mallows ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

An assortment decision determines which products a customer can buy, but its expected revenue depends on the probability that the customer chooses each offered product. A distribution over complete rankings gives a direct model: sample a customer's ranking, then take the highest-ranked product in the assortment. The resulting choice probabilities are easy to define and expensive to evaluate by direct enumeration, because a universe of nnn products has n!n!n! rankings. Désir, Goyal, Jagabathula and Segev study this issue for distributions built from Mallows models and use the resulting probabilities in assortment optimization and a case study (manuscript, §§2–5). This mission isolates their exact dynamic program for a single Mallows model, Theorem 1 of the manuscript.

Setting

Let the product universe be {a1,…,an}\{a_1,\ldots,a_n\}{a1​,…,an​}, with n≥1n\ge1n≥1. A ranking σ\sigmaσ assigns each product a distinct position from 111 to nnn; a smaller position means higher preference. The modal ranking is ω=a1⋯an\omega=a_1\cdots a_nω=a1​⋯an​, meaning that aia_iai​ has position iii. This choice follows the manuscript's relabelling of the products in §4.1. It fixes a reference order without restricting which ranking a customer may draw.

The Kendall–Tau distance d(σ,ω)d(\sigma,\omega)d(σ,ω) counts pairs of products whose order in σ\sigmaσ disagrees with their order in ω\omegaω. For a concentration parameter θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0, the Mallows distribution assigns probability

λθ(σ)=exp⁡(−θd(σ,ω))ψn(θ),ψn(θ)=∑τexp⁡(−θd(τ,ω)).\lambda_\theta(\sigma)=\frac{\exp(-\theta d(\sigma,\omega))}{\psi_n(\theta)}, \qquad \psi_n(\theta)=\sum_{\tau}\exp(-\theta d(\tau,\omega)).λθ​(σ)=ψn​(θ)exp(−θd(σ,ω))​,ψn​(θ)=τ∑​exp(−θd(τ,ω)).

The normalizer sums over all n!n!n! rankings. At θ=0\theta=0θ=0 they are equally likely; larger θ\thetaθ gives less weight to rankings with more pairwise disagreements. Every summand in ψn(θ)\psi_n(\theta)ψn​(θ) is positive, so the distribution is well-defined (manuscript, §2.1, p. 7).

An offer set SSS is a subset of the products. For an offered product ai∈Sa_i\in Sai​∈S, its choice probability is the Mallows weight of rankings that place aia_iai​ before every other member of SSS:

P(ai∣S)=∑σλθ(σ)1 ⁣[σ(ai)<σ(b) for every b∈S∖{ai}].P(a_i\mid S)=\sum_{\sigma}\lambda_\theta(\sigma) \mathbf 1\!\left[\sigma(a_i)<\sigma(b) \text{ for every }b\in S\setminus\{a_i\}\right].P(ai​∣S)=σ∑​λθ​(σ)1[σ(ai​)<σ(b) for every b∈S∖{ai​}].

This is equation (1) of the manuscript for one Mallows component (§2.2, p. 8). The formula is an exact definition, but its sum ranges over every ranking.

Algorithm 1 is the repeated insertion method. It starts with a1a_1a1​ and inserts each next product aia_iai​ at a position s∈{1,…,i}s\in\{1,\ldots,i\}s∈{1,…,i} with probability

αs,i=e−θ(i−s)∑k=0i−1e−θk.\alpha_{s,i}=\frac{e^{-\theta(i-s)}}{\sum_{k=0}^{i-1}e^{-\theta k}}.αs,i​=∑k=0i−1​e−θke−θ(i−s)​.

Write γs,m=∑ℓ=1sαℓ,m\gamma_{s,m}=\sum_{\ell=1}^{s}\alpha_{\ell,m}γs,m​=∑ℓ=1s​αℓ,m​. After step mmm, let π(i,s,m)\pi(i,s,m)π(i,s,m) denote the probability that aia_iai​ is first among the offered products inserted so far and occupies position sss. The manuscript's Algorithm 2 computes a separate table, πDP(i,s,m)\pi_{\mathrm{DP}}(i,s,m)πDP​(i,s,m), by its initial condition and recursions (3)–(4), without enumerating rankings (§4.1, pp. 16–18).

Formalization targets

Exact choice probabilities

For a1∈Sa_1\in Sa1​∈S, the mission's goal is Theorem 1: Algorithm 2 returns the Mallows choice probability of each offered product.

P(ai∣S)=∑s=1nπDP(i,s,n)for every ai∈S.P(a_i\mid S)=\sum_{s=1}^{n}\pi_{\mathrm{DP}}(i,s,n) \qquad\text{for every }a_i\in S.P(ai​∣S)=s=1∑n​πDP​(i,s,n)for every ai​∈S.

The table also returns zero for every product outside SSS. The milestone list follows the source's intermediate claims: the repeated insertion law is Mallows; choice probability decomposes by final position; and the probabilities obey the two cases of the insertion transition (Lemma 1 and §4.1, pp. 17–18).

Significance

The result replaces an n!n!n!-term probability sum with the manuscript's O(n3)O(n^3)O(n3) dynamic program for all offered products at once. Those probabilities are inputs to its later assortment optimization model and permit computations on product universes where direct ranking enumeration is impractical (manuscript, pp. 16, 18–21). This mission targets the exact identity, not a numerical approximation or the later mixed-integer formulation.

The result is already proved in the cited manuscript; the goal here is a machine-checked Lean proof. A completed development would provide reusable finite-ranking definitions, a formal repeated insertion law, and verified transitions between a probabilistic model and an explicit recurrence. The definitions and theorem statements in this proposal compile locally; the theorem proofs remain open.

Difficulty

At a single insertion, the chosen offered product can keep its position, move down one position, or be displaced by the new product. Which outcome matters depends on whether the newly inserted product is offered and on where the previous best offered product stood. A naive table recording only each product's total choice probability loses the position information needed for the next insertion. Algorithm 2 retains that information in π(i,s,m)\pi(i,s,m)π(i,s,m), so a proof must connect its state and boundary values to the distribution over complete rankings (manuscript, §4.1, pp. 17–18).

Formalization scope

Products and ranks are represented by Fin n and rankings by permutations of Fin n, interpreted as product-to-rank maps. Lean's indices begin at zero; the paper's aia_iai​, insertion position sss, and table indices begin at one. The modal ranking is identity after the paper's relabelling. Offer sets are finite subsets of Fin n, and n≥1n\ge1n≥1 wherever a1a_1a1​ is named. The concentration parameter satisfies θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0. The Mallows normalizer is the finite sum displayed above, rather than the manuscript's printed product formula.

Algorithm 2 says “without loss of generality” that a1∈Sa_1\in Sa1​∈S. The printed recurrence actually needs that condition, so the goal and the new-product transition state it explicitly. Equation (1), read literally for ai∉Sa_i\notin Sai​∈/S, can be positive because its indicator does not test membership. The main equality is therefore about ai∈Sa_i\in Sai​∈S; the table's zero output for unoffered products is stated separately. Outside the paper's index ranges, α\alphaα, the probabilistic π\piπ, and the dynamic-program table have explicit zero values. In particular, γ0,m=0\gamma_{0,m}=0γ0,m​=0 and π(i,0,m)=0\pi(i,0,m)=0π(i,0,m)=0 settle the boundary in recursion (3).

The left side of the goal is the weighted sum over every ranking; the right side is the table computed from recursions (3)–(4) and never examines a ranking. A proof needs finite permutation reasoning, normalization of the insertion probabilities, and a link between the insertion law and the table's meaning. Lemmas about these pieces, as well as proofs of the listed milestones, are welcome contributions.

Selected references

  • A. Désir, V. Goyal, S. Jagabathula and D. Segev, Mallows-Smoothed Distribution over Rankings Approach for Modeling Choice, manuscript submitted to Operations Research, OPRE-2018-04-176, version of 2019-09-25; published in Operations Research, 2021. SSRN 3172997; DOI 10.1287/opre.2020.2085.
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Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Large-Scale Bundle-Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis: With Identical Marginal Costs, Optimal Bundle-Size Pricing Asymptotically Achieves Perfect Price DiscriminationResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that sell large catalogues of digital goods (streaming titles, cable channels, software features) rarely price every subset of products separately: with NNN products there are 2N2^N2N bundles. A common simplification is bundle-size pricing (BSP), where the price depends only on how many items the customer takes and the customer picks which items go into the bundle. BSP sits between pure bundling (one price for everything) and full mixed bundling, and its menu has only NNN prices.

Bakos and Brynjolfsson (Management Science, 1999) showed that for many products a pure bundle extracts almost all surplus under suitable concentration. Armstrong (Review of Economic Studies, 1999) showed that a cost-based two-part tariff asymptotically achieves the perfect-price-discrimination profit. Chu, Leslie and Sorensen (American Economic Review, 2011) computed optimal BSP menus numerically for up to five goods. Abdallah, Asadpour and Reed (Operations Research, 2021) develop an asymptotic theory of BSP as N→∞N \to \inftyN→∞. This mission formalizes their homogeneous-cost result: with identical marginal costs, optimal BSP asymptotically earns the perfect-price-discrimination profit.

Setting

A firm sells NNN products to one customer with valuations X1,…,XN≥0X_1, \dots, X_N \ge 0X1​,…,XN​≥0, additive over bundles. Let X(1)≤⋯≤X(N)X_{(1)} \le \dots \le X_{(N)}X(1)​≤⋯≤X(N)​ be the order statistics. A bundle of size nnn is worth VN(n)=∑k=0n−1X(N−k)V_N(n) = \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} X_{(N-k)}VN​(n)=∑k=0n−1​X(N−k)​ to the customer, the sum of her nnn largest valuations, with VN(0)=0V_N(0) = 0VN​(0)=0. The firm incurs a marginal cost cn≥0c_n \ge 0cn​≥0 for item nnn, so a bundle of size nnn costs cN(n)=∑k=0n−1cτ(N−k)c_N(n) = \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} c_{\tau(N-k)}cN​(n)=∑k=0n−1​cτ(N−k)​, where τ\tauτ lists the items by valuation and ties go to the lowest index.

A BSP menu is p=(p(1),…,p(N))p = (p(1), \dots, p(N))p=(p(1),…,p(N)) with p(n)∈R+∪{+∞}p(n) \in \mathbb R_+ \cup \{+\infty\}p(n)∈R+​∪{+∞}, where +∞+\infty+∞ means size nnn is not offered. The customer buys a size ζ(X,p)∈arg⁡max⁡0≤n≤N(VN(n)−p(n))\zeta(X,p) \in \arg\max_{0 \le n \le N} (V_N(n) - p(n))ζ(X,p)∈argmax0≤n≤N​(VN​(n)−p(n)), with n=0n = 0n=0 the free no-purchase option. The firm's profit is π(p)=∑n=1N(p(n)−cN(n)) 1{ζ(X,p)=n}\pi(p) = \sum_{n=1}^N (p(n) - c_N(n))\,\mathbf 1\{\zeta(X,p) = n\}π(p)=∑n=1N​(p(n)−cN​(n))1{ζ(X,p)=n}, and the BSP problem is E[π(pN⋆)]=sup⁡pE[π(p)]\mathbb E[\pi(p^\star_N)] = \sup_p \mathbb E[\pi(p)]E[π(pN⋆​)]=supp​E[π(p)]. The benchmark is perfect price discrimination, PPD=∑n=1NE[(Xn−cn)+]\mathrm{PPD} = \sum_{n=1}^N \mathbb E[(X_n - c_n)^+]PPD=∑n=1N​E[(Xn​−cn​)+], the most any selling mechanism can earn.

The large-offering regime describes the valuations as one random sequence X1,X2,…X_1, X_2, \dotsX1​,X2​,…:

  • (Assumption 1) the empirical distribution function FX,N(x)=1N∑n≤N1{Xn≤x}\mathbb F_{X,N}(x) = \frac1N\sum_{n \le N}\mathbf 1\{X_n \le x\}FX,N​(x)=N1​∑n≤N​1{Xn​≤x} converges in probability to FX(x)F_X(x)FX​(x) for each x≥0x \ge 0x≥0, where FXF_XFX​ is the distribution function of a nonnegative variable with finite mean μ\muμ;
  • (Assumption 2) {Xn}\{X_n\}{Xn​} is uniformly integrable and 1N∑n≤NXn→μ\frac1N\sum_{n\le N} X_n \to \muN1​∑n≤N​Xn​→μ in probability;
  • (Assumption 3) the costs are bounded and their empirical distribution converges.

The normalized curves are VˉN(t)=1NVN(⌊Nt⌋)\bar V_N(t) = \frac1N V_N(\lfloor Nt\rfloor)VˉN​(t)=N1​VN​(⌊Nt⌋) and cˉN(t)=1NcN(⌊Nt⌋)\bar c_N(t) = \frac1N c_N(\lfloor Nt\rfloor)cˉN​(t)=N1​cN​(⌊Nt⌋) for t∈[0,1]t \in [0,1]t∈[0,1]. The quantile function is FX−1(s)=inf⁡{x≥0:FX(x)≥s}F_X^{-1}(s) = \inf\{x \ge 0 : F_X(x) \ge s\}FX−1​(s)=inf{x≥0:FX​(x)≥s}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

With identical costs cn=c≥0c_n = c \ge 0cn​=c≥0, for every t∈[0,1]t \in [0,1]t∈[0,1],

VˉN(t)⇒Vˉ(t)=∫0tFX−1(1−s) ds,cˉN(t)⇒tc.\bar V_N(t) \Rightarrow \bar V(t) = \int_0^t F_X^{-1}(1-s)\,ds, \qquad \bar c_N(t) \Rightarrow t c.VˉN​(t)⇒Vˉ(t)=∫0t​FX−1​(1−s)ds,cˉN​(t)⇒tc.

The size fraction t⋆=sup⁡{s:FX−1(1−s)≥c}t^\star = \sup\{s : F_X^{-1}(1-s) \ge c\}t⋆=sup{s:FX−1​(1−s)≥c} maximizes Vˉ(t)−tc\bar V(t) - tcVˉ(t)−tc over [0,1][0,1][0,1], and t⋆=1−FX(c)t^\star = 1 - F_X(c)t⋆=1−FX​(c) when ccc is a continuity point of FXF_XFX​. If FX(c)<1F_X(c) < 1FX​(c)<1,

lim⁡N→∞E[π(pN⋆)]PPD=1.\lim_{N\to\infty}\frac{\mathbb E[\pi(p^\star_N)]}{\mathrm{PPD}} = 1.N→∞lim​PPDE[π(pN⋆​)]​=1.

Theorem 1 and the steps of the proofs

Theorem 1 is the general principle behind the goal. Suppose VˉN⇒Vˉ\bar V_N \Rightarrow \bar VVˉN​⇒Vˉ and cˉN⇒cˉ\bar c_N \Rightarrow \bar ccˉN​⇒cˉ pointwise, with nondecreasing continuous limits, and t⋆∈arg⁡max⁡Vˉ−cˉt^\star \in \arg\max \bar V - \bar ct⋆∈argmaxVˉ−cˉ. Offer the single size ⌊Nt⋆⌋\lfloor Nt^\star\rfloor⌊Nt⋆⌋ at price NVˉ(t⋆)−g(N)N\bar V(t^\star) - g(N)NVˉ(t⋆)−g(N), where g(N)g(N)g(N) grows faster than E[(VN(⌊Nt⋆⌋)−NVˉ(t⋆))2]\sqrt{\mathbb E[(V_N(\lfloor Nt^\star\rfloor) - N\bar V(t^\star))^2]}E[(VN​(⌊Nt⋆⌋)−NVˉ(t⋆))2]​ but is o(N)o(N)o(N). Then

E[π(pN)]E[π(pN⋆)]→1,E[π(pN)]N(Vˉ(t⋆)−cˉ(t⋆))→1.\frac{\mathbb E[\pi(p_N)]}{\mathbb E[\pi(p^\star_N)]} \to 1, \qquad \frac{\mathbb E[\pi(p_N)]}{N(\bar V(t^\star) - \bar c(t^\star))} \to 1.E[π(pN⋆​)]E[π(pN​)]​→1,N(Vˉ(t⋆)−cˉ(t⋆))E[π(pN​)]​→1.

The milestones follow the appendix proofs in order:

  1. the pathwise bound π(p)/N≤sup⁡tVˉN(t)−cˉN(t)\pi(p)/N \le \sup_t \bar V_N(t) - \bar c_N(t)π(p)/N≤supt​VˉN​(t)−cˉN​(t);
  2. the upper limit (A1);
  3. the purchase probability (A4);
  4. the lower limit (A5);
  5. Theorem 1;
  6. (A6), with μ=∫01FX−1(1−s) ds\mu = \int_0^1 F_X^{-1}(1-s)\,dsμ=∫01​FX−1​(1−s)ds;
  7. the identity between VˉN\bar V_NVˉN​ at grid points and integrals of the empirical quantile function;
  8. convergence of empirical quantiles at continuity points;
  9. (A7);
  10. PPD/N→Vˉ(t⋆)−t⋆c\mathrm{PPD}/N \to \bar V(t^\star) - t^\star cPPD/N→Vˉ(t⋆)−t⋆c;
  11. ∫01(FX−1(1−s)−c)+ds=Vˉ(t⋆)−t⋆c\int_0^1 (F_X^{-1}(1-s) - c)^+ds = \bar V(t^\star) - t^\star c∫01​(FX−1​(1−s)−c)+ds=Vˉ(t⋆)−t⋆c.

Significance

Theorem 2 says that, with identical marginal costs and enough statistical concentration across products, a menu of NNN size prices earns, to first order, everything a seller who knew each valuation could earn. Theorem 1 says more: one well-chosen bundle size, sold at a price slightly below its fluid value, is asymptotically as good as the optimal BSP menu. The paper's later results on heterogeneous costs (Theorems 3–4), clustered BSP and unknown budgets reuse this framework: Theorem 1 reduces each of them to computing the limit curves Vˉ\bar VVˉ and cˉ\bar ccˉ.

The results are proved in the paper and have no machine-checked version. This mission formalizes them under a weak-convergence hypothesis on the empirical distribution, with no independence assumption. The formal statements also fix points the page leaves implicit: the tie-breaking rules, the value of the BSP problem as a supremum, and the case FX(c)=1F_X(c) = 1FX​(c)=1, where the goal's ratio degenerates.

Difficulty

The obvious route to Theorem 2 goes through Theorem 1, as the paper does. That needs a g(N)g(N)g(N) dominating the L2L^2L2 fluctuation of VN(⌊Nt⋆⌋)V_N(\lfloor Nt^\star\rfloor)VN​(⌊Nt⋆⌋), and Assumptions 1–2 give no second moments. A proof of the goal must therefore avoid Theorem 1's g(N)g(N)g(N) condition or replace it with a weaker device.

The convergence VˉN(t)⇒Vˉ(t)\bar V_N(t) \Rightarrow \bar V(t)VˉN​(t)⇒Vˉ(t) is a statement about sums of top order statistics of a dependent sequence. Pointwise convergence of the empirical cdf does not by itself control the upper tail, which carries the mass of VNV_NVN​. The weak law and uniform integrability have to supply that control.

The upper bound (A1) requires exchanging a supremum over ttt with a limit in probability, which uses monotonicity of VˉN,cˉN\bar V_N, \bar c_NVˉN​,cˉN​ in ttt and continuity of the limits. The step "VˉN(t)=∫0tFX,N−1(1−s) ds\bar V_N(t) = \int_0^t \mathbb F^{-1}_{X,N}(1-s)\,dsVˉN​(t)=∫0t​FX,N−1​(1−s)ds for 0≤t≤10 \le t \le 10≤t≤1" holds only at grid points t=n/Nt = n/Nt=n/N, so the off-grid error must be bounded separately.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace LargeBSP.Homog. Items are 0-indexed: coordinate n < N is the paper's item n+1n+1n+1. The valuations are one sequence X : ℕ → Ω → ℝ on a probability space, measurable and nonnegative; the NNN-product model uses its first NNN terms. FXF_XFX​ is cdf ν for a probability measure ν on R\mathbb RR with ν(−∞,0)=0\nu(-\infty,0) = 0ν(−∞,0)=0 and finite mean. "⇒\Rightarrow⇒" toward a constant is convergence in probability (TendstoInMeasure); deterministic sequences use Tendsto.

Menus are ℕ → WithTop ℝ, with ⊤ meaning "not offered". Within a bundle size, items are ranked by valuation with ties to the lowest index, as on the page. Among sizes, the customer picks the smallest maximizer of surplus, a disclosed tie-break, so an indifferent customer does not buy. E[π(pN⋆)]\mathbb E[\pi(p^\star_N)]E[π(pN⋆​)] is the real supremum of the expected profit over all menus with prices in R+∪{∞}\mathbb R_+\cup\{\infty\}R+​∪{∞}. It is bounded by E∑n≤NXn\mathbb E\sum_{n\le N}X_nE∑n≤N​Xn​, so it is never the junk value of an unbounded supremum.

The quantile is inf⁡{y≥0:F(y)≥s}\inf\{y \ge 0 : F(y) \ge s\}inf{y≥0:F(y)≥s}. Its set is empty only outside (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), where Lean returns 000; every use is at s∈(0,1)s\in(0,1)s∈(0,1) or inside an integral. The set defining t⋆t^\start⋆ is taken over (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

Disclosed readings:

  • the hypothesis FX(c)<1F_X(c) < 1FX​(c)<1 on the goal's ratio claim (otherwise PPD/N→0\mathrm{PPD}/N \to 0PPD/N→0 and the ratio is undetermined);
  • in Theorem 1, continuity of Vˉ,cˉ\bar V, \bar cVˉ,cˉ (stated where the theorem is introduced and used in its proof) and Vˉ(t⋆)>cˉ(t⋆)\bar V(t^\star) > \bar c(t^\star)Vˉ(t⋆)>cˉ(t⋆) (the second ratio's denominator);
  • ω+\omega_+ω+​ and o(⋅)o(\cdot)o(⋅) encoded as E[⋅2]/g2→0\mathbb E[\cdot^2]/g^2 \to 0E[⋅2]/g2→0 and g/N→0g/N \to 0g/N→0 with ggg eventually positive;
  • the grid-point form of the VˉN\bar V_NVˉN​–quantile identity.

The tail condition (6) of the paper is not assumed: neither proof uses it.

The goal cannot be satisfied trivially. E[π(pN⋆)]\mathbb E[\pi(p^\star_N)]E[π(pN⋆​)] is the value of the BSP problem over all menus, not a chosen menu. PPD is the sum of the per-item expectations. The instance Xn≡1X_n \equiv 1Xn​≡1, c=1/2c = 1/2c=1/2 satisfies every hypothesis with PPD=N/2>0\mathrm{PPD} = N/2 > 0PPD=N/2>0, Vˉ(t)=t\bar V(t) = tVˉ(t)=t and t⋆=1t^\star = 1t⋆=1. So the ratio is neither 0/00/00/0 nor fixed by a degenerate menu.

Needed infrastructure: order statistics of a finite family through a rank function, empirical distribution and quantile functions, the identity "mean = integral of the quantile function", convergence of quantiles under weak convergence (van der Vaart, Lemma 21.2), and uniform integrability of averages. These parts are reusable well beyond pricing. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, and on proofs of the goal that bypass Theorem 1's second-moment condition.

Selected references

  • T. Abdallah, A. Asadpour, J. Reed, Large-Scale Bundle-Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis, Operations Research 69(4), 2021 (author's manuscript used). https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2097
  • Y. Bakos, E. Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency, Management Science 45(12), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.12.1613
  • M. Armstrong, Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm, Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00079
  • C. S. Chu, P. Leslie, A. Sorensen, Bundle-Size Pricing as an Approximation to Mixed Bundling, American Economic Review 101(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.263
  • A. W. van der Vaart, Asymptotic Statistics, Cambridge University Press, 2000, Chapter 21. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511802256
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Evolution of Shares in a Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrency: Under Coin Rewards R_t = ρN_{t−1}^γ, Limiting Investor Shares Concentrate at the Initial Share as N → ∞ if and only if γ < 1Research Paper

Motivation

In a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) cryptocurrency, new coins are not mined with computing power: before each date the protocol picks one coin holder at random, with probability equal to the fraction of coins she holds, and pays her a reward of new coins. A common claim in the cryptocurrency press is that this makes the rich richer: larger holders are selected more often, so their holdings should grow faster. Roşu and Saleh (Management Science 67(2), 2021) test this claim in a model that is, for a buy-and-hold investor, a generalized Pólya urn whose number of added balls RtR_tRt​ varies with time.

Their first result (Proposition 1) is that an investor's share is a martingale with an almost-sure limit whose mean is the initial share, which the paper itself calls standard for Pólya urns. The sharper question is whether shares are stable in the strict sense: does the limiting share concentrate at the initial share when the economy starts with many coins? The answer depends on how fast the reward grows with the coin supply, and Proposition 4 locates the threshold exactly.

Setting

Time is discrete, t∈Nt \in \mathbb{N}t∈N. Fix a probability space with a filtration (Ft)(\mathcal{F}_t)(Ft​). Initially N0=N>0N_0 = N > 0N0​=N>0 coins are outstanding, and the tracked investor (investor 1) holds n0∈[0,N0]n_0 \in [0, N_0]n0​∈[0,N0​] of them. At each date t≥1t \ge 1t≥1 the protocol pays a deterministic reward Rt≥0R_t \ge 0Rt​≥0, so the coin supply is

Nt=N0+∑n=1tRn.N_t = N_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t} R_n .Nt​=N0​+n=1∑t​Rn​.

Let 1St∈{0,1}\mathbf{1}_{S_t} \in \{0,1\}1St​​∈{0,1}, Ft\mathcal{F}_tFt​-measurable, indicate that investor 1 is selected at ttt. She never trades, so her coins follow nt=nt−1+Rt1Stn_t = n_{t-1} + R_t \mathbf{1}_{S_t}nt​=nt−1​+Rt​1St​​, and her share is πt=nt/Nt\pi_t = n_t / N_tπt​=nt​/Nt​. The PoS selection rule is

E[1St+1∣Ft]=πta.s., for every t≥0.\mathbb{E}\big[\mathbf{1}_{S_{t+1}} \mid \mathcal{F}_t\big] = \pi_t \qquad \text{a.s., for every } t \ge 0 .E[1St+1​​∣Ft​]=πt​a.s., for every t≥0.

The other investors enter only through NtN_tNt​. The power reward is Rt=ρNt−1γR_t = \rho N_{t-1}^{\gamma}Rt​=ρNt−1γ​ for t≥1t \ge 1t≥1, with constants ρ,γ>0\rho, \gamma > 0ρ,γ>0.

The variance sequence is a0=0a_0 = 0a0​=0, at+1=at+(Rt+1/Nt+1)2(1−at)a_{t+1} = a_t + (R_{t+1}/N_{t+1})^2(1 - a_t)at+1​=at​+(Rt+1​/Nt+1​)2(1−at​), the paper's (A12). Proposition 1 gives an almost-sure limit π1,∞=lim⁡tπt\pi_{1,\infty} = \lim_t \pi_tπ1,∞​=limt​πt​. For the goal, the initial share π1\pi_1π1​ is fixed and the initial supply NNN varies: model NNN has N0=NN_0 = NN0​=N and n0=π1Nn_0 = \pi_1 Nn0​=π1​N.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4 (p. 14)

For ρ,γ>0\rho, \gamma > 0ρ,γ>0 and π1∈(0,1)\pi_1 \in (0,1)π1​∈(0,1),

lim⁡N→∞P(∣π1,∞−π1∣≥ε)=0  for every ε>0  ⟺  γ<1.\lim_{N \to \infty} \mathbb{P}\big(|\pi_{1,\infty} - \pi_1| \ge \varepsilon\big) = 0 \ \text{ for every } \varepsilon > 0 \iff \gamma < 1 .N→∞lim​P(∣π1,∞​−π1​∣≥ε)=0  for every ε>0⟺γ<1.

The statement fixes no constant and no rate. It is the full equivalence, as printed.

Milestones (in the order the proof uses them)

  1. (A2), p. 17: πt+1−πt=Rt+1(1St+1−πt)/Nt+1\pi_{t+1} - \pi_t = R_{t+1}(\mathbf{1}_{S_{t+1}} - \pi_t)/N_{t+1}πt+1​−πt​=Rt+1​(1St+1​​−πt​)/Nt+1​.
  2. Proposition 1, p. 8: (πt)(\pi_t)(πt​) is a martingale with an a.s. limit π∞∈[0,1]\pi_\infty \in [0,1]π∞​∈[0,1] and Eπ∞=π0\mathbb{E}\pi_\infty = \pi_0Eπ∞​=π0​.
  3. Lemma 1, p. 19: Vart(πt+1)=(Rt+1/Nt+1)2πt(1−πt)\mathrm{Var}_t(\pi_{t+1}) = (R_{t+1}/N_{t+1})^2 \pi_t(1-\pi_t)Vart​(πt+1​)=(Rt+1​/Nt+1​)2πt​(1−πt​).
  4. Lemma 2, p. 20: Var(πt+1)=at+1π0(1−π0)\mathrm{Var}(\pi_{t+1}) = a_{t+1}\pi_0(1-\pi_0)Var(πt+1​)=at+1​π0​(1−π0​).
  5. Lemma 3, pp. 20–21: the recursion stays in [0,1][0,1][0,1] and is nondecreasing.
  6. Lemma 5, p. 22: for γ∈[0,1)\gamma \in [0,1)γ∈[0,1), at+1≤ρ1−γNγ−1a_{t+1} \le \frac{\rho}{1-\gamma} N^{\gamma - 1}at+1​≤1−γρ​Nγ−1.
  7. Lemma 6, p. 23: lim⁡NVar(π1,∞)=0\lim_N \mathrm{Var}(\pi_{1,\infty}) = 0limN​Var(π1,∞​)=0 implies concentration.
  8. p. 24: Var(π∞)=lim⁡tat π0(1−π0)\mathrm{Var}(\pi_\infty) = \lim_t a_t\, \pi_0(1-\pi_0)Var(π∞​)=limt​at​π0​(1−π0​).
  9. p. 24: for γ≥1\gamma \ge 1γ≥1 and each N>0N > 0N>0, at→1a_t \to 1at​→1.
  10. (A31), p. 24: a [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued XXX with mean π1\pi_1π1​ and variance π1(1−π1)\pi_1(1-\pi_1)π1​(1−π1​) has P(∣X−π1∣>ε)≥π1(1−π1)−ε21−ε2>0\mathbb{P}(|X - \pi_1| > \varepsilon) \ge \frac{\pi_1(1-\pi_1) - \varepsilon^2}{1-\varepsilon^2} > 0P(∣X−π1​∣>ε)≥1−ε2π1​(1−π1​)−ε2​>0.

Significance

The result. Proposition 4 separates two regimes of PoS reward schedules that grow with the supply. For sublinear growth (γ<1\gamma < 1γ<1) a large economy keeps every holder's share near its starting value: the protocol does not redistribute wealth. For linear or faster growth (γ≥1\gamma \ge 1γ≥1) the limiting share has the maximal variance π1(1−π1)\pi_1(1-\pi_1)π1​(1−π1​) whatever the initial supply. The share then ends near 000 or 111 with probability bounded away from zero, even though its mean is unchanged. Proposition 3 of the same paper covers non-increasing rewards. Together they say which PoS implementations give stable shares.

Formalizing it. The paper's proofs are short and informal. This mission produces a machine-checked version of the model and of the equivalence, and a reusable Lean treatment of a time-inhomogeneous two-colour Pólya urn: the martingale property, the closed-form variance recursion, and the variance of the limit. None of these results has a machine-checked proof on Prove2Me or in Mathlib.

Difficulty

The "if" direction combines Lemma 5 with Chebyshev's inequality. Lemma 5 needs a Riemann-sum comparison: the sum ∑nRnRn+1/Nn2\sum_n R_n R_{n+1}/N_n^2∑n​Rn​Rn+1​/Nn2​ is bounded by ρ∫N∞xγ−2 dx\rho\int_N^\infty x^{\gamma-2}\,dxρ∫N∞​xγ−2dx. This uses that RRR is increasing and x↦xγ−2x \mapsto x^{\gamma - 2}x↦xγ−2 is decreasing, and the details matter at the first index. The step from the variances of πt\pi_tπt​ to the variance of the limit π∞\pi_\inftyπ∞​ needs dominated convergence for squares.

The "only if" direction is where the printed argument is loose. The page lets N→∞N \to \inftyN→∞ inside a statement about t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞. What is true and needed is that for each fixed NNN the ratio Rt+1/Nt+1R_{t+1}/N_{t+1}Rt+1​/Nt+1​ stays bounded below in ttt, so at→1a_t \to 1at​→1. The tail bound (A31) must then be derived from the exact variance alone, uniformly in NNN. Neither Doob's convergence theorem nor Chebyshev's inequality gives this lower bound directly.

Formalization scope

All objects are defined in the namespace PoSShares.Stability. A Model Ω carries the filtration, N0N_0N0​, n0n_0n0​, RRR and the indicators ξt=1St\xi_t = \mathbf{1}_{S_t}ξt​=1St​​. coinSupply, coins, share, IsPoS and IsPowerReward are its supply, coins (5), share (1), selection rule and power reward. aSeq and alphaSeq are (A12) and (A16), both started at index 000 with value 000. Committed conventions:

  • Selection rule. The page assumes StS_tSt​ is "independent of all other random variables", which cannot hold literally, because its probability πt−1\pi_{t-1}πt−1​ depends on past selections. The formalization uses the conditional probability E[1St+1∣Ft]=πt\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}_{S_{t+1}} \mid \mathcal{F}_t] = \pi_tE[1St+1​​∣Ft​]=πt​ that the proofs use. It is not independence of ξ\xiξ from F\mathcal{F}F, which would force a constant selection probability.
  • One tracked investor. The others enter only through NtN_tNt​, as in §3.3.1 of the paper.
  • Real endowments. n0n_0n0​ is real; the paper takes n0∈Nn_0 \in \mathbb{N}n0​∈N, which with fixed π1\pi_1π1​ and N→∞N \to \inftyN→∞ would force π1N∈N\pi_1 N \in \mathbb{N}π1​N∈N.
  • Added hypotheses. The goal adds 0<π1<10 < \pi_1 < 10<π1​<1: for π1∈{0,1}\pi_1 \in \{0,1\}π1​∈{0,1} the share never moves and the "only if" fails. Lemma 5 adds N>0N > 0N>0, which Lemma 4 states and Lemma 5 omits.
  • Corrected reading. Milestone 9 states at→1a_t \to 1at​→1 as t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ for each N>0N > 0N>0; the page writes lim⁡N→∞at=1\lim_{N\to\infty} a_t = 1limN→∞​at​=1. Milestone 10 keeps the printed strict >ε> \varepsilon>ε.
  • One probability space. The family of models indexed by N∈NN \in \mathbb{N}N∈N lives on one probability space. Model N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 has N0=NN_0 = NN0​=N; model 000 is unconstrained beyond the shared hypotheses. π1,∞\pi_{1,\infty}π1,∞​ is any measurable a.s. limit, and probabilities are μ.real.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out:

  • IsPoS is satisfiable for every N0>0N_0 > 0N0​>0, n0∈[0,N0]n_0 \in [0,N_0]n0​∈[0,N0​] and R≥0R \ge 0R≥0, and the power reward rule has a solution for all ρ,N0>0\rho, N_0 > 0ρ,N0​>0.
  • The limit π1,∞\pi_{1,\infty}π1,∞​ is a hypothesis whose existence Proposition 1 asserts; it is not a limUnder default.
  • Every variance concerns a bounded random variable, so no L2L^2L2 junk value enters.
  • The endowment is pinned to π1N0\pi_1 N_0π1​N0​, so the share cannot move with NNN.
  • The goal is the full equivalence, not one implication.

A complete development needs Mathlib's conditional expectation and conditional variance, the martingale convergence theorem for bounded martingales, the law of total variance, Chebyshev's inequality, and integral comparison for monotone functions. The urn lemmas (milestones 1–5 and 8) apply to any deterministic reward schedule and are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative arguments for Lemma 5.

Selected references

  • I. Roşu and F. Saleh, Evolution of Shares in a Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrency, Management Science 67(2), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3791 (formalized from the authors' manuscript of July 30, 2020).
  • R. Pemantle, A survey of random processes with reinforcement, Probability Surveys 4:1–79, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1214/07-PS094
  • G. Pólya, Sur quelques points de la théorie des probabilités, Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 1(2):117–161, 1930. http://www.numdam.org/item/AIHP_1930__1_2_117_0/
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Allocation and Pricing: Constant Regret via Bellman Inequalities: Regret Is at Most the Information Loss Plus the Bellman LossResearch Paper

Motivation

An online allocator must commit to an action after each arrival, although later arrivals can change which actions would have been best. Revenue management and online resource allocation use regret to measure the expected reward lost against a benchmark. If the benchmark sees too much future information, this gap can grow with the horizon even when the online controller behaves optimally. Vera, Banerjee, and Gurvich use a benchmark whose extra information can be chosen for the application, and relate regret to two quantities that can be studied separately: how often the online action disagrees with an informed action, and how accurately a proposed value function satisfies a Bellman equation (Vera–Banerjee–Gurvich, 2020, §§2–3).

The paper proves constant-regret application results for online probing, dynamic pricing, and learning by combining this framework with estimates particular to each model. This mission isolates the framework's Theorem 5 and the displayed statements leading to it. Its result is known on paper; the work here is to give the model, the conditional expectations, and the regret bound machine-checkable statements.

Setting

There are TTT decision periods, indexed by time to go t=T,T−1,…,1t=T,T-1,\ldots,1t=T,T−1,…,1. At the start of period ttt the controller is in state St∈SS^t\in\mathcal SSt∈S and observes an input ξt∈Ξ\xi^t\in\Xiξt∈Ξ. It selects an action uuu from a nonempty feasible set U(St,ξt)\mathcal U(S^t,\xi^t)U(St,ξt), collects real reward R(St,ξt,u)R(S^t,\xi^t,u)R(St,ξt,u), and moves to St−1=T(St,ξt,u)S^{t-1}=\mathcal T(S^t,\xi^t,u)St−1=T(St,ξt,u). The initial state is the fixed state ST=s0S^T=s_0ST=s0​.

The observed filtration Ft\mathcal F_tFt​ is generated by the arrivals ξt,…,ξT\xi^t,\ldots,\xi^Tξt,…,ξT. A non-anticipative policy chooses an Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-measurable action from the current state. Offline has the augmented filtration Gt=Ft∨H\mathcal G_t=\mathcal F_t\vee\mathcal HGt​=Ft​∨H, where H\mathcal HH is a fixed sigma-algebra carrying extra information. Offline's value V(t,s)V(t,s)V(t,s) is the feasible-action maximum in the conditional Bellman equation (2), with V(0,s)=0V(0,s)=0V(0,s)=0. Its expected initial value is the benchmark for the online policy's expected reward. Regret is their difference.

A relaxed value ϕ(t,s)\phi(t,s)ϕ(t,s) and a Bellman loss LB(t,s)L_B(t,s)LB​(t,s) obey the Bellman inequalities if ϕ\phiϕ initially bounds the conditional Offline value, ends at zero, and at each state is at most one feasible action's immediate reward plus its expected relaxed continuation and LBL_BLB​. An action meeting this inequality is satisfying. A maximum-loss bound rrr controls the shortfall of every feasible action. For a policy with action U^t\widehat U^tUt on its actual trajectory, QtQ_tQt​ is the event that U^t\widehat U^tUt is not satisfying under this same ϕ\phiϕ and LBL_BLB​.

Formalization targets

Satisfying actions under augmented information

Proposition 1 concerns a feasible Gt\mathcal G_tGt​-adapted policy that always takes satisfying actions. It bounds its shortfall from Offline by the expected accumulated Bellman loss:

E[V(T,s0)]−E ⁣[∑t=1TR(St,ξt,Ut)]≤E ⁣[∑t=1TLB(t,St)].\mathbb E[V(T,s_0)]-\mathbb E\!\left[\sum_{t=1}^T R(S^t,\xi^t,U^t)\right]\le\mathbb E\!\left[\sum_{t=1}^T L_B(t,S^t)\right].E[V(T,s0​)]−E[t=1∑T​R(St,ξt,Ut)]≤E[t=1∑T​LB​(t,St)].

The proposal also states the one-step displayed inequality from its proof, where a conditional continuation at a fixed state and action becomes the conditional continuation of the policy's random trajectory.

Regret decomposition

Theorem 5 concerns a feasible non-anticipative policy. It states the pathwise-compensation expectation bound and, when LBL_BLB​ is nonnegative, the paper's two-term bound:

E[Regret]≤E ⁣[∑t=1T(r1Qt+1QtcLB(t,St))]≤∑t=1T(r P(Qt)+E[LB(t,St)]).\mathbb E[\mathrm{Regret}]\le\mathbb E\!\left[\sum_{t=1}^T\left(r\mathbf1_{Q_t}+\mathbf1_{Q_t^c}L_B(t,S^t)\right)\right]\le\sum_{t=1}^T\left(r\,\mathbb P(Q_t)+\mathbb E[L_B(t,S^t)]\right).E[Regret]≤E[t=1∑T​(r1Qt​​+1Qtc​​LB​(t,St))]≤t=1∑T​(rP(Qt​)+E[LB​(t,St)]).

The milestones include the paper's maximum-loss, compensated one-step, and iterated displays on the route to this target. The first inequality is also stated for signed LBL_BLB​; only the second requires LB≥0L_B\ge0LB​≥0.

Significance

The theorem turns a regret analysis into two concrete estimates. An application can count or bound the periods when the online action fails the informed satisfying-action test, and can separately quantify the error in its chosen relaxed value. Neither quantity alone certifies small regret; the theorem supplies the inequality connecting both to the benchmark's actual reward gap. The paper's constant-regret claims use application-specific bounds on these terms (Vera–Banerjee–Gurvich, 2020, §§4–6).

A complete formalization would establish the conditional-expectation and measurability infrastructure needed to apply this template to other finite-horizon allocation models. The paper gives a proof of Theorem 5, but the theorem and its applications have no machine-checked proofs in this mission. The proposal records the open Lean statements and a statement-only non-vacuity check for the exact Bellman value with zero loss.

Difficulty

Definition 5 describes a satisfying action for a fixed state and action, while Theorem 5 evaluates it at a random state and a policy's random action. The conditional expectation in that definition cannot simply be substituted syntactically for the conditional expectation of the ensuing trajectory. Countable states and finite actions make the substitution meaningful, but measurability of the selected state and action still has to be established. The same issue appears in the maximum-loss display. Time runs backward, so the information at t−1t-1t−1 contains the information at ttt; a forward-indexed filtration would change the conditional expectation in the paper's formulas.

The second displayed inequality presents a separate statement issue: removing 1Qtc\mathbf1_{Q_t^c}1Qtc​​ from LBL_BLB​ is valid only for nonnegative LBL_BLB​. The paper allows signed Bellman losses elsewhere, so nonnegativity is attached to that inequality rather than to the definition of Bellman inequalities.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses a countable state type, a finite nonempty action type, real rewards, and an explicit nonempty feasible-action set. The probability space carries a probability measure, measurable arrivals, and an auxiliary sub-sigma-algebra H\mathcal HH. The observed and augmented information families are plain sigma-algebra families because their order decreases with time to go. The index t=0t=0t=0 is terminal; decision sums and hypotheses use exactly t∈{1,…,T}t\in\{1,\ldots,T\}t∈{1,…,T}. Offline's value is defined by the feasible-action Bellman recursion and is never a free benchmark variable.

The source bounds the maximum reward above. This formalization additionally bounds feasible rewards, ϕ\phiϕ, and LBL_BLB​ in absolute value over the finite horizon, and requires measurable reward, transition, and feasibility data. These assumptions ensure the real integrals and conditional expectations have their intended values. Definition 4 is an almost-sure real upper bound rrr rather than a supremum that could take a default value. The feasible-action maximum in the Bellman inequality is represented by a feasible witness. The source's family GΘG_\ThetaGΘ​ is represented by the single sigma-algebra it generates, H\mathcal HH.

The goal covers every feasible Ft\mathcal F_tFt​-adapted state-feedback policy; RABBI is in this class. Proposition 1 retains its distinct Gt\mathcal G_tGt​-adapted policy class. The disagreement event uses the same LBL_BLB​ as the Bellman inequalities. The maximum-loss display follows Definition 4's parentheses and sign, correcting a printed slip on p. 14. The nonnegative-loss condition corrects the second inequality of the printed Theorem 5. A complete development needs reusable lemmas on finite feasible maxima, measurable state-feedback trajectories, conditional expectations under decreasing information, and integration of finite sums. Contributions to those lemmas and to the five stated milestones are in scope.

Selected references

  • Alberto Vera, Siddhartha Banerjee, and Itai Gurvich, Online Allocation and Pricing: Constant Regret via Bellman Inequalities, arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.06361v2, 2020. arXiv.
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