A Dynamic Principal Agent Problem with One-sided Commitment: The Principal's Value Function Is the Minimal Continuous Viscosity Solution of the Type-Indexed HJB SystemResearch Paper
Motivation
In a principal–agent problem with moral hazard, a principal (an employer) pays an agent whose effort she cannot observe; she sees only an output process whose drift the effort controls. Continuous-time versions of the problem, starting with Holmström–Milgrom (1987) and Sannikov (2008), are solved by turning the agent's continuation utility into a state variable and writing a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation for the principal's value.
Most of this literature assumes two-sided commitment: the agent cannot leave. In labour markets the agent can quit whenever an outside offer beats his continuation utility, and the principal must then hire someone else. Zhang and Zhu (arXiv:2208.06473; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) study this one-sided commitment: the principal is committed to the contract, the agent is free to quit at a stopping time of his choice, and after each quitting the principal pays a cost and hires a new agent, possibly of another type. The principal's value then depends on every future hire, and the paper characterises it by a coupled system of HJB equations.
Setting
Fix a horizon and a payment cap . A standard Brownian motion on is the output. Agents have types . An agent of type receiving a payment rate and exerting effort has running utility and running cost ; is increasing and concave in , is convex in (Assumption 2.2). Effort shifts the drift of through the Girsanov measure (weak formulation). The agent's optimal effort against a sensitivity process is , the inverse of , and denotes expectation under the corresponding measure.
A contract started at time is described in forward form by : the agent's continuation utility is
with and the constraint . The agent's utility is capped by the upper barrier . He quits at the first time reaches the lower barrier , where is his market value and his quitting cost (Assumptions 2.7, 3.1). The relevant domain is
When the -th agent quits at , the principal pays and hires an agent of type at utility (the quitting sequence (5.8)). The principal's value is
and the value of the best new hire at time is .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6.3
The family is the minimal continuous viscosity solution of
with boundary conditions
The last condition couples the equations for different types. The goal also asserts that the value sets in (6.1) are nonempty and bounded above, so that is a genuine real-valued function.
Milestones
- Lemma 3.4: explicit contracts with under which the agent never quits.
- Lemma 2.5 (2.20): a priori estimates for admissible contracts.
- Proposition 2.8 and Lemma 3.6: the self-enforcing value and the new-hire value are uniformly continuous with modulus .
- Theorem 4.5: with at most one quitting, is the minimal continuous viscosity solution of the same equation with boundary datum .
- Proposition 5.4: a non-recursive representation of (at most quittings).
- Proposition 6.1: , and .
- Proposition 6.2: monotonicity and uniform continuity of , regularity of , and the boundary conditions.
- (6.7): the dynamic programming principle for .
Significance
The theorem identifies the principal's value under one-sided commitment as a PDE object, which makes it computable and comparable with other contracting regimes. Along the way the paper shows that the principal sees only finitely many quittings (Proposition 6.1) and that tolerating more quittings never lowers her value, so contracts that prevent quitting altogether (self-enforcing contracts) are in general suboptimal. The coupling through turns the problem into an infinite system of HJB equations indexed by agent types, a structure that also appears in switching and re-hiring problems.
The result is proved in the paper; none of it is formalized. A formalization would add to the platform a continuous-time moral-hazard model in the weak formulation, hitting-time stopping driven by an Itô integral, a quitting sequence with random restarts and type switching, and a viscosity-solution notion for a fully nonlinear HJB equation on a time-dependent domain. The paper's own proof leaves several steps to the reader (the dynamic programming principle, the viscosity property, comparison for a truncated equation), so a complete development would also supply these.
Difficulty
The obvious route is "dynamic programming principle, then viscosity property, then comparison". Each step is harder here than in a textbook control problem. The control is unbounded, so the Hamiltonian can be and the viscosity property must be derived without a finite Hamiltonian. The process is stopped at a hitting time of a moving barrier and restarted at a random level with a new type, so the dynamic programming principle must handle restarts. Minimality cannot come from a standard comparison principle, because the boundary datum at depends on the competitor itself and no growth condition is imposed on competitors; the paper argues through approximation by and Theorem 4.5 instead.
Formalization scope
All objects are defined in the namespace DynPrincipalAgent.HJB. Process time is ; deterministic data are functions of real time. The Itô integral is the published Peng1990.SMP.IsItoIntegral, with a continuous version required wherever hitting times read paths. Controls started at are progressively measurable for the filtration of . Value functions are real suprema of value sets that record an expectation only when it is genuine (integrable payoffs, almost surely integrable drifts and running rewards, summable quitting costs); these conditions hold for every admissible control.
Pinned readings, all disclosed in the items: viscosity solutions are the standard Crandall–Ishii–Lions notion with test functions on , tested on the interior of , with the supremum in the HJB operator never formed; the boundary condition at requires a real right limit compared against every ; carries a σ-algebra and , , are jointly measurable; Assumption 2.7 (ii) is read as ; a modulus of continuity is nondecreasing, vanishes at and satisfies ; generic constants depend only on and are fixed before the model; and take the closed forms of (2.11)–(2.12). The agent's BSDE and reflected BSDE (Propositions 2.3, 3.2), §7's standard contracts and the economic interpretation of , , are out of scope.
A formalization in which a value function equals a junk value (an empty or unbounded real supremum, a Bochner integral of a non-integrable payoff, a hitting time of an empty set) or in which the viscosity notion is vacuous does not count: the goal states that the value sets are nonempty and bounded, and the definitions avoid junk by construction. Competitors in the minimality clause satisfy exactly the printed boundary conditions, with no added growth bound.
Reusable infrastructure: Girsanov measures for BMO drifts, forward utility processes, hitting times of continuous semimartingales, and viscosity solutions of HJB equations on non-cylindrical domains. Contributions on any milestone, and on general lemmas such as the dynamic programming principle for controlled diffusions stopped at hitting times, are welcome.
Selected references
- J. Zhang, Z. Zhu, A Dynamic Principal Agent Problem with One-sided Commitment, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. Preprint arXiv:2208.06473v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.06473
- Y. Sannikov, A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem, Review of Economic Studies 75 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00486.x
- B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives, Econometrica 55 (1987). https://doi.org/10.2307/1913238
- M. G. Crandall, H. Ishii, P.-L. Lions, User's guide to viscosity solutions of second order partial differential equations, Bull. AMS 27 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1090/S0273-0979-1992-00266-5