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Markov ChainOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks V: Optimal Capacity Allocation in a Network of QueuesTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 4 of F. P. Kelly's Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979) applies the product-form theory of Chapter 3 to concrete systems. Two of its results have numbered statements, and they answer two practical questions.

The first comes from the design of store-and-forward communication networks (telegraph and packet-switched data networks). Messages queue at channels; the designer chooses each channel's capacity subject to a budget, and wants to minimize the delay messages suffer. Because the equilibrium law at every channel is geometric under several different modelling assumptions (§4.1, pp. 95–96), the mean delay has a closed form, and the budget allocation problem becomes a small convex program with an explicit solution. This square-root capacity assignment goes back to L. Kleinrock's work on communication nets (Communication Nets, McGraw-Hill, 1964) and remains the textbook example of optimal design for a network of queues.

The second comes from compartmental models in biology, birth–illness–death processes and manpower planning (§4.5, pp. 113–115). Individuals enter a system as a Poisson stream and move through it independently. Equilibrium results follow from Chapter 3; Theorem 4.2 describes the transient behaviour exactly, starting from an empty system.

Setting

Capacity allocation (§4.1). A network has J≥1J \ge 1J≥1 channels. Channel jjj receives traffic at average rate aj>0a_j > 0aj​>0 and is given capacity ϕj\phi_jϕj​. In equilibrium the number njn_jnj​ of messages at channel jjj has the geometric law (4.1),

P(nj=n)=(1−ajϕj)(ajϕj)n,n=0,1,2,…,P(n_j = n) = \Big(1 - \frac{a_j}{\phi_j}\Big)\Big(\frac{a_j}{\phi_j}\Big)^n, \qquad n = 0, 1, 2, \dots,P(nj​=n)=(1−ϕj​aj​​)(ϕj​aj​​)n,n=0,1,2,…,

which requires ϕj>aj\phi_j > a_jϕj​>aj​. Its mean is aj/(ϕj−aj)a_j/(\phi_j - a_j)aj​/(ϕj​−aj​). Capacity on channel jjj costs fj>0f_j > 0fj​>0 per unit and the total budget is FFF, giving the cost constraint (4.2)

∑jfjϕj=F.\sum_j f_j\phi_j = F.j∑​fj​ϕj​=F.

The mean number of customers in the network is

N(ϕ)=∑jajϕj−aj,N(\phi) = \sum_j \frac{a_j}{\phi_j - a_j},N(ϕ)=j∑​ϕj​−aj​aj​​,

and the feasible set is the set of ϕ∈RJ\phi \in \mathbb{R}^Jϕ∈RJ with ϕj>aj\phi_j > a_jϕj​>aj​ for every jjj that satisfy (4.2). In Lean these are meanNumberInNetwork a φ and FeasibleCapacities a f F. The proof works with the Lagrangian lagrangian a f F y φ =N(ϕ)+y(∑jfjϕj−F)= N(\phi) + y(\sum_j f_j\phi_j - F)=N(ϕ)+y(∑j​fj​ϕj​−F).

Compartmental model (§4.5). Individuals arrive in a Poisson stream of rate ν>0\nu > 0ν>0 at a system of JJJ compartments that is empty at time 000. Let pj(s)p_j(s)pj​(s) be the probability that an individual is in compartment jjj a time sss after its arrival; pj(s)≥0p_j(s) \ge 0pj​(s)≥0 and ∑jpj(s)≤1\sum_j p_j(s) \le 1∑j​pj​(s)≤1, since individuals may leave. Let nj(t)n_j(t)nj​(t) be the number of individuals in compartment jjj at time t>0t > 0t>0, and

αj(t)=∫0tpj(u) du.\alpha_j(t) = \int_0^t p_j(u)\,du.αj​(t)=∫0t​pj​(u)du.

In Lean the model is the predicate IsCompartmentModel P ν t p M T Loc, the counts are compartmentCount M Loc j, and αj(t)\alpha_j(t)αj​(t) is alpha p j t.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1 (p. 97)

If J≥1J \ge 1J≥1, aj>0a_j > 0aj​>0, fj>0f_j > 0fj​>0 and F>∑kakfkF > \sum_k a_k f_kF>∑k​ak​fk​, then

ϕj∗=aj+ajfj∑kakfk⋅F−∑kakfkfj\phi^*_j = a_j + \frac{\sqrt{a_j f_j}}{\sum_k \sqrt{a_k f_k}}\cdot\frac{F - \sum_k a_k f_k}{f_j}ϕj∗​=aj​+∑k​ak​fk​​aj​fj​​​⋅fj​F−∑k​ak​fk​​

is feasible and minimizes NNN over the feasible set, and every other feasible ϕ\phiϕ has N(ϕ)>N(ϕ∗)N(\phi) > N(\phi^*)N(ϕ)>N(ϕ∗).

Milestones toward the goal

  1. The mean of the geometric law (4.1) is aj/(ϕj−aj)a_j/(\phi_j - a_j)aj​/(ϕj​−aj​) (p. 97).
  2. For y>0y > 0y>0 the Lagrangian is minimized over {ϕj>aj}\{\phi_j > a_j\}{ϕj​>aj​} by ϕj=aj+aj/(yfj)\phi_j = a_j + \sqrt{a_j/(y f_j)}ϕj​=aj​+aj​/(yfj​)​ (proof of Theorem 4.1).
  3. The choice 1/y=(F−∑kakfk)/∑kakfk1/\sqrt y = (F - \sum_k a_k f_k)/\sum_k\sqrt{a_k f_k}1/y​=(F−∑k​ak​fk​)/∑k​ak​fk​​ makes that minimizer equal to ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗ and feasible for (4.2).

Second result: Theorem 4.2 (pp. 114–115)

The proof's generating-function identity, for zj∈[0,1]z_j \in [0,1]zj​∈[0,1],

E(z1n1(t)⋯zJnJ(t))=∏j=1Jexp⁡[−(1−zj)ναj(t)],E\big(z_1^{n_1(t)}\cdots z_J^{n_J(t)}\big) = \prod_{j=1}^J \exp\big[-(1 - z_j)\nu\alpha_j(t)\big],E(z1n1​(t)​⋯zJnJ​(t)​)=j=1∏J​exp[−(1−zj​)ναj​(t)],

and the theorem itself: n1(t),…,nJ(t)n_1(t), \dots, n_J(t)n1​(t),…,nJ​(t) are independent and nj(t)n_j(t)nj​(t) is Poisson with mean ναj(t)\nu\alpha_j(t)ναj​(t).

Significance

Theorem 4.1 is a closed-form design rule. Every channel first receives the capacity aja_jaj​ needed to carry its traffic; the remaining budget is shared in proportion to ajfj\sqrt{a_j f_j}aj​fj​​, not to the traffic aja_jaj​. Sizing capacity in proportion to the load, which is the obvious rule, is therefore not optimal. The same calculation applies to any network whose stations have the geometric law (4.1), for example a manufacturing job shop (p. 97). The mean number in the network and the mean time a customer spends in it are minimized together.

Theorem 4.2 is the exact transient law of a network of infinite-server queues started empty. It holds however complicated the motion of an individual is, provided individuals move independently, and letting t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ it recovers the equilibrium Poisson law of §4.5.

Both results are classical and proved in the book. Neither is formalized on Prove2Me. The platform has the geometric equilibrium law of the M/M/1 queue (KellyStochasticNetworks.mm1_equilibrium) but not its mean, and no result on Poisson thinning or marking by independent random locations. The formal work for Theorem 4.1 is a strict-convexity and Lagrangian-sufficiency argument in RJ\mathbb{R}^JRJ. For Theorem 4.2 it is a Poisson marking theorem in measure-theoretic probability. Both pieces are reusable.

Difficulty

For Theorem 4.1, the book's proof sets the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian to zero. A stationary point is not a global minimizer in general, so the formal proof must show that LLL is (strictly) convex on the open region ϕj>aj\phi_j > a_jϕj​>aj​, and it must use Lagrangian sufficiency, not first-order conditions alone. The region is open and the objective is unbounded near its boundary. Feasibility of ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗ needs F>∑kakfkF > \sum_k a_k f_kF>∑k​ak​fk​, which the book leaves implicit.

For Theorem 4.2, the steps of the proof that read "conditional on MMM" have to be carried out with measure-theoretic independence. One step averages a product over MMM independent uniform instants. Another sums the Poisson mixture into an exponential. The last turns a factorized generating function into mutual independence of JJJ counts with Poisson marginals. Mathlib has the Poisson distribution (ProbabilityTheory.poissonMeasure) but no marking or thinning theorem, and no uniqueness theorem for multivariate probability generating functions.

Formalization scope

Channels and compartments are indexed by Fin J; all rates, costs and capacities are real numbers.

Theorem 4.1. The statement carries the book's implicit hypotheses explicitly: J≥1J \ge 1J≥1, aj>0a_j > 0aj​>0, fj>0f_j > 0fj​>0, F>∑kakfkF > \sum_k a_k f_kF>∑k​ak​fk​. Stability ϕj>aj\phi_j > a_jϕj​>aj​ is part of the feasible set. The conclusion is global optimality over the feasible set (IsMinOn) together with feasibility of ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗, plus strict optimality against every other feasible point. Uniqueness is a slight strengthening of the book's "the optimal allocation is", and it holds by strict convexity. A statement that ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗ satisfies (4.2), or that it is a stationary point of the Lagrangian, is not the theorem: those are one-line computations or the proof method, and the goal is stated as global optimality to rule them out.

Theorem 4.2. The model is pinned down as in the proof on p. 115:

  • the number MMM of arrivals in (0,t)(0,t)(0,t) is Poisson with mean νt\nu tνt;
  • an i.i.d. sequence of (arrival instant, location at time ttt) pairs is independent of MMM, and only its first MMM entries are used;
  • each instant is uniform on (0,t)(0,t)(0,t), and an individual arriving at uuu is in compartment jjj at time ttt with probability pj(t−u)p_j(t-u)pj​(t−u), or has left.

"Individuals move independently" is formalized as this conditional independence. The pjp_jpj​ are measurable sub-probabilities, not assumed to sum to one. The conclusion is mutual independence of the JJJ counts (iIndepFun) together with the Poisson probability mass function of each. Infinite time horizons and the point-process description of the system are out of scope.

Useful contributions: a reusable Lagrangian-sufficiency lemma for separable convex objectives under one linear constraint; a Poisson marking (colouring) theorem for finitely many colours; the multivariate generating-function uniqueness lemma for NJ\mathbb{N}^JNJ-valued random vectors.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, John Wiley & Sons, 1979, Chapter 4 (§4.1, pp. 95–97; §4.5, pp. 113–115).
  • L. Kleinrock, Communication Nets: Stochastic Message Flow and Delay, McGraw-Hill, 1964 (reprinted Dover, 1972).
  • J. F. C. Kingman, Poisson Processes, Oxford University Press, 1993 (colouring and marking theorems).
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Reversibility and Stochastic Networks III: Open Networks of Queues with General Customer Routes Have Product-Form EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

Networks of queues model systems in which jobs visit a sequence of service stations: items in a manufacturing job-shop, packets in a communication network, patients moving between hospital departments. The open migration process of Chapter 2 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979), and the job-shop networks of Jackson (Jackson 1963) route a customer leaving a queue at random, independently of where he has been. That rules out the most common situation in practice: an item that has passed machines 1 and 3 must next go to machine 4, while an item that has passed machines 2 and 3 must go to machine 5.

Section 3.1 of the book removes this restriction. Customers are divided into types, a type fixes a deterministic route through the queues, and a stochastic routing rule is recovered by using one type per possible route. Within each queue, the order of service is described by two position-dependent functions, which cover first-come first-served KKK-server queues, last-come first-served, processor sharing and service in random order. Theorem 3.1 states that, for every such network, the equilibrium distribution is a product of explicit single-queue factors. This is the result behind the "Kelly network" and "Kelly-type queue" terminology of later work (Kelly 1975; Baskett, Chandy, Muntz, Palacios 1975).

Setting

There are III customer types and JJJ queues. Customers of type iii enter the system in a Poisson stream of rate ν(i)>0\nu(i)>0ν(i)>0 and visit the queues r(i,1),r(i,2),…,r(i,S(i))r(i,1),r(i,2),\dots,r(i,S(i))r(i,1),r(i,2),…,r(i,S(i)) in that order before leaving; two successive stages of a route are at different queues.

Queue jjj holds its njn_jnj​ customers in positions 1,…,nj1,\dots,n_j1,…,nj​. Each customer needs an exponentially distributed amount of service with unit mean. The queue supplies total service effort at rate ϕj(nj)\phi_j(n_j)ϕj​(nj​), with ϕj(n)>0\phi_j(n)>0ϕj​(n)>0 for n>0n>0n>0; a proportion γj(l,nj)\gamma_j(l,n_j)γj​(l,nj​) goes to the customer in position lll. An arriving customer takes position lll with probability δj(l,nj+1)\delta_j(l,n_j+1)δj​(l,nj​+1). For each n≥1n\ge1n≥1, γj(⋅,n)\gamma_j(\cdot,n)γj​(⋅,n) and δj(⋅,n)\delta_j(\cdot,n)δj​(⋅,n) are probability vectors on {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n}.

The class of the customer in position lll of queue jjj is cj(l)=(tj(l),sj(l))c_j(l)=(t_j(l),s_j(l))cj​(l)=(tj​(l),sj​(l)), his type and the stage of his route. The state of queue jjj is cj=(cj(1),…,cj(nj))\mathbf c_j=(c_j(1),\dots,c_j(n_j))cj​=(cj​(1),…,cj​(nj​)) and the state of the network is C=(c1,…,cJ)\mathbf C=(\mathbf c_1,\dots,\mathbf c_J)C=(c1​,…,cJ​). Its transition rates q(C,D)q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)q(C,D), displays (3.1)–(3.6), are the sums of the intensities of all events taking C\mathbf CC to D\mathbf DD: a departure from the system (intensity ϕj(nj)γj(l,nj)\phi_j(n_j)\gamma_j(l,n_j)ϕj​(nj​)γj​(l,nj​)), a move from position lll of queue jjj to position mmm of the next queue kkk (intensity ϕj(nj)γj(l,nj)δk(m,nk+1)\phi_j(n_j)\gamma_j(l,n_j)\delta_k(m,n_k+1)ϕj​(nj​)γj​(l,nj​)δk​(m,nk​+1)), and an arrival into position mmm of the first queue kkk of a route (intensity ν(i)δk(m,nk+1)\nu(i)\delta_k(m,n_k+1)ν(i)δk​(m,nk​+1)).

With αj(i,s)=ν(i)\alpha_j(i,s)=\nu(i)αj​(i,s)=ν(i) if r(i,s)=jr(i,s)=jr(i,s)=j and 000 otherwise, set

aj=∑i,sαj(i,s),bj−1=∑n=0∞ajn∏l=1nϕj(l),πj(cj)=bj∏l=1njαj(tj(l),sj(l))ϕj(l).a_j=\sum_{i,s}\alpha_j(i,s),\qquad b_j^{-1}=\sum_{n=0}^{\infty}\frac{a_j^n}{\prod_{l=1}^{n}\phi_j(l)},\qquad \pi_j(\mathbf c_j)=b_j\prod_{l=1}^{n_j}\frac{\alpha_j(t_j(l),s_j(l))}{\phi_j(l)}.aj​=i,s∑​αj​(i,s),bj−1​=n=0∑∞​∏l=1n​ϕj​(l)ajn​​,πj​(cj​)=bj​l=1∏nj​​ϕj​(l)αj​(tj​(l),sj​(l))​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 61)

If every series defining bj−1b_j^{-1}bj−1​ converges, then

π(C)=∏j=1Jπj(cj)\pi(\mathbf C)=\prod_{j=1}^{J}\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)π(C)=j=1∏J​πj​(cj​)

is positive, sums to 111 over all network states, and satisfies the equilibrium equations

π(C)∑Dq(C,D)=∑Dπ(D) q(D,C)for every C.\pi(\mathbf C)\sum_{\mathbf D}q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)=\sum_{\mathbf D}\pi(\mathbf D)\,q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)\quad\text{for every }\mathbf C.π(C)D∑​q(C,D)=D∑​π(D)q(D,C)for every C.

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.2 (p. 62). The time-reversed rates π(D)q(D,C)/π(C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)/\pi(\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C)/π(C) are the rates of the reversed network: routes traversed backwards, γj\gamma_jγj​ and δj\delta_jδj​ interchanged.
  • Corollary 3.4 (p. 63). Queue jjj is independent of the rest of the network, is in state cj\mathbf c_jcj​ with probability πj(cj)\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)πj​(cj​), holds nnn customers with probability bjajn/∏l=1nϕj(l)b_ja_j^n/\prod_{l=1}^n\phi_j(l)bj​ajn​/∏l=1n​ϕj​(l) (3.7), and a customer in position lll is of class (i,s)(i,s)(i,s) with probability αj(i,s)/aj\alpha_j(i,s)/a_jαj​(i,s)/aj​.
  • Corollary 3.5 (p. 63). A type-iii customer reaching queue jjj at stage sss finds it in state cj\mathbf c_jcj​ with probability πj(cj)\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)πj​(cj​).
  • Lemma 3.13 (p. 89). For a multiclass queue with Poisson arrivals of rate ν(c)\nu(c)ν(c) and departure intensities ν(c)ϕc(n)\nu(c)\phi_c(\mathbf n)ν(c)ϕc​(n): reversible ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ quasi-reversible ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ Φ(n)=ϕc(n)Φ(n−ec)\Phi(\mathbf n)=\phi_c(\mathbf n)\Phi(\mathbf n-\mathbf e_c)Φ(n)=ϕc​(n)Φ(n−ec​) for some positive Φ\PhiΦ (3.26).

Significance

Theorem 3.1 gives the full joint law of a network in which routes carry memory, and its corollaries turn it into usable performance formulas: each queue behaves, in its marginal law and as seen by arriving customers, like an isolated queue fed by a Poisson stream of rate aja_jaj​, even though the actual arrival stream at queue jjj is not Poisson. Mean sojourn times along a route then follow from Little's result. Theorem 3.2 identifies the reversed process as a network of the same kind; it is the source of the departure-stream results (Corollary 3.3) and of the arrival theorem (Corollary 3.5). Lemma 3.13 isolates the condition (3.26) under which state-dependent arrival rates preserve the product form (Theorem 3.14).

The results are classical and proved in the book. None of them has a machine-checked proof: the Prove2Me catalogue holds the rate-level theorems for migration processes (Chapter 2 of Kelly–Yudovina), and open targets for the BCMP and Jackson models, which have different state descriptions. This mission adds a formal model of the position-structured multiclass network itself, with the summation over coinciding transitions that (3.2), (3.4) and (3.6) require, and product-form, reversal and arrival-theorem statements over it.

Difficulty

The obvious first attempt, detailed balance, fails: π(C)q(C,D)\pi(\mathbf C)q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)π(C)q(C,D) and π(D)q(D,C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C) differ in general, because a customer's route cannot be run backwards inside the same network (q(D,C)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)q(D,C) is usually 000 when q(C,D)>0q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)>0q(C,D)>0). The equilibrium equations therefore involve, for each state, all its predecessors at once. The rates are themselves sums over coinciding transitions, so a statement about individual events does not transfer to the rates without accounting for which positions lead to the same successor state. In Lean this brings in insertion into and deletion from position lists, the relabelling of stages, and the normalization of a product over a countable space of JJJ-tuples of lists, reorganized by queue length together with the identity ∑classes at jαj=aj\sum_{\text{classes at } j}\alpha_j=a_j∑classes at j​αj​=aj​.

Formalization scope

  • Finite types and queues. Types are Fin I, queues Fin J; the book allows countably many types with ∑iν(i)<∞\sum_i\nu(i)<\infty∑i​ν(i)<∞. A network state is a function assigning to each queue a list of classes (i,s)(i,s)(i,s) with r(i,s)=jr(i,s)=jr(i,s)=j; the state space is countable and all sums over it are tsum/HasSum.
  • Indexing. Stages and list positions are 000-based in Lean; γj(l,n)\gamma_j(l,n)γj​(l,n) and δj(l,n)\delta_j(l,n)δj​(l,n) keep the book's 111-based position argument.
  • Rate level. Equilibrium means: positive, summing to 111, and satisfying the equilibrium equations (the published KellyStochasticNetworks.FullBalance). The existence of the Markov process, irreducibility and non-explosion are not formalized. "The reversed process" (Theorem 3.2) is read through the reversed rates π(D)q(D,C)/π(C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)/\pi(\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C)/π(C); "the probability he finds" (Corollary 3.5) is read as a ratio of equilibrium arrival fluxes; quasi-reversibility is its rate characterization (3.8), (3.10).
  • Normalizing constants. bjb_jbj​ is defined through a tsum, which Lean sets to 000 for a divergent series; every theorem assumes the series converges, the book's "none of b1,…,bJb_1,\dots,b_Jb1​,…,bJ​ is zero".
  • No trivial instance. The goal holds for arbitrary III, JJJ, ν\nuν, routes, ϕj\phi_jϕj​, γj\gamma_jγj​, δj\delta_jδj​ subject only to the book's constraints; a proof for a single queue, or for fixed γ=δ\gamma=\deltaγ=δ disciplines, does not prove it. In Lemma 3.13 the function Φ\PhiΦ is required to be positive, since Φ≡0\Phi\equiv0Φ≡0 satisfies (3.26) for every queue.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs: list insertion/deletion lemmas for position bookkeeping, sums of products over ∏jList(⋅)\prod_j \mathrm{List}(\cdot)∏j​List(⋅), and a bijection-of-events argument for summed rates. The quasi-reversibility predicate and the reversed-rate apparatus are reusable for the closed networks of §3.4 and the symmetric queues of §3.3. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, in any order.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, John Wiley & Sons, 1979. https://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues with customers of different types, Journal of Applied Probability 12 (1975), 542–554. https://doi.org/10.2307/3212785
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, closed, and mixed networks of queues with different classes of customers, Journal of the ACM 22 (1975), 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • J. R. Jackson, Jobshop-like queueing systems, Management Science 10 (1963), 131–142. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.10.1.131
  • F. P. Kelly, E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565363
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Reversibility and Stochastic Networks IV: Symmetric Queues with Gamma-Mixture Service RequirementsTextbook

Why symmetric queues

The classical product-form results for queueing networks (Jackson, Kelly, Baskett–Chandy–Muntz–Palacios) assume exponentially distributed service requirements, because then the state of a queue need not record how much service each customer has received. Real service times are rarely exponential: telephone call lengths, job sizes in time-shared computers and web transfers are far from it. Symmetric queues, introduced in §3.3 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979), form the class of single queues for which the stationary distribution of the number of customers, and of their classes, depends on the service requirement distribution only through its mean. This property, insensitivity, is what makes Erlang's loss formula valid for arbitrarily distributed call lengths (Kelly, p. 79), and it is the reason processor-sharing, last-come-first-served preemptive and infinite-server stations may appear with general service in product-form networks.

Timeline. Sevastyanov (1957) proved that Erlang's loss formula holds for arbitrarily distributed call lengths. Kelly (1975, 1976) introduced queues with customers of different types whose effort and arrival-position functions coincide, and showed product form for networks of them with non-exponential service built from exponential stages; Barbour (1976) extended the method of stages; Baskett, Chandy, Muntz and Palacios (1975) gave product form for networks containing processor-sharing, LCFS-preemptive and infinite-server stations with phase-type service. Kelly's 1979 book presents the symmetric queue in the form formalized here.

Setting

A symmetric queue holds customers in positions 1,2,…,n1, 2, \dots, n1,2,…,n, where nnn is the number present. It operates as follows (Kelly, p. 72):

  1. the service requirement of a customer is a random variable whose distribution may depend on the class of the customer;
  2. a total service effort is supplied at rate ϕ(n)\phi(n)ϕ(n), with ϕ(n)>0\phi(n) > 0ϕ(n)>0 for n>0n > 0n>0;
  3. a proportion γ(l,n)\gamma(l, n)γ(l,n) of this effort, ∑l=1nγ(l,n)=1\sum_{l=1}^n \gamma(l, n) = 1∑l=1n​γ(l,n)=1, goes to the customer in position lll; when he leaves, the customers in positions l+1,…,nl+1, \dots, nl+1,…,n move down by one;
  4. an arriving customer moves into position l∈{1,…,n+1}l \in \{1, \dots, n+1\}l∈{1,…,n+1} with probability γ(l,n+1)\gamma(l, n+1)γ(l,n+1) — the same function — and the customers in positions l,…,nl, \dots, nl,…,n move up by one.

Server-sharing (γ(l,n)=1/n\gamma(l, n) = 1/nγ(l,n)=1/n), the stack (γ(n,n)=1\gamma(n, n) = 1γ(n,n)=1, last come first served preemptive), the queue with no waiting room and the infinite-server queue are examples (pp. 73–74).

Customers of class ccc arrive in a Poisson stream of rate ν(c)\nu(c)ν(c). On arrival a class-ccc customer receives a refined class (c,z)(c, z)(c,z) with probability p(c,z)p(c, z)p(c,z), ∑zp(c,z)=1\sum_z p(c, z) = 1∑z​p(c,z)=1, and then needs w(c,z)≥1w(c, z) \ge 1w(c,z)≥1 independent stages of service, each exponentially distributed with mean d(c,z)>0d(c, z) > 0d(c,z)>0. The class-ccc service requirement is therefore a mixture of gamma distributions with mean

a(c)=∑zp(c,z) w(c,z) d(c,z),a(c) = \sum_z p(c, z)\, w(c, z)\, d(c, z),a(c)=z∑​p(c,z)w(c,z)d(c,z),

and the work arriving per unit time is a=∑cν(c)a(c)a = \sum_c \nu(c) a(c)a=∑c​ν(c)a(c). The record of the customer in position lll is c(l)=(c(l),z(l),u(l))\mathbf c(l) = (c(l), z(l), u(l))c(l)=(c(l),z(l),u(l)), u(l)u(l)u(l) the stage in progress, and c=(c(1),…,c(n))\mathbf c = (\mathbf c(1), \dots, \mathbf c(n))c=(c(1),…,c(n)) is a Markov process. Its transitions are: an arrival of class (c,z)(c,z)(c,z) into position lll at stage 111, at rate ν(c)p(c,z)γ(l,n+1)\nu(c)p(c,z)\gamma(l, n+1)ν(c)p(c,z)γ(l,n+1); and, at rate ϕ(n)γ(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l))\phi(n)\gamma(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l))ϕ(n)γ(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l)), completion of the current stage of the customer in position lll, which moves him to the next stage or, after stage w(c(l),z(l))w(c(l), z(l))w(c(l),z(l)), out of the queue. The normalizing constant is

b−1=∑n=0∞an∏l=1nϕ(l).(3.15)b^{-1} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{a^n}{\prod_{l=1}^n \phi(l)}. \tag{3.15}b−1=n=0∑∞​∏l=1n​ϕ(l)an​.(3.15)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.8

When (3.15) converges, the distribution

π(c)=b∏l=1nν(c(l)) p(c(l),z(l)) d(c(l),z(l))ϕ(l)(3.18)\pi(\mathbf c) = b \prod_{l=1}^n \frac{\nu(c(l))\, p(c(l), z(l))\, d(c(l), z(l))}{\phi(l)} \tag{3.18}π(c)=bl=1∏n​ϕ(l)ν(c(l))p(c(l),z(l))d(c(l),z(l))​(3.18)

is the equilibrium distribution of c\mathbf cc, and under it

P(n customers)=b an∏l=1nϕ(l),P(classes c1,…,cn∣n)=∏l=1nν(cl) a(cl)a,\mathbb P(n \text{ customers}) = \frac{b\,a^n}{\prod_{l=1}^n \phi(l)}, \qquad \mathbb P(\text{classes } c_1, \dots, c_n \mid n) = \prod_{l=1}^n \frac{\nu(c_l)\, a(c_l)}{a},P(n customers)=∏l=1n​ϕ(l)ban​,P(classes c1​,…,cn​∣n)=l=1∏n​aν(cl​)a(cl​)​,

and the queue is quasi-reversible with respect to the classification ccc and to (c,z)(c, z)(c,z): from every state, the rate of arrivals of each class does not depend on the state, both for the process and its time reversal (relations (3.8) and (3.10) of p. 67).

Milestones

  • Eqs. (3.14)–(3.15): the case of one refinement per class, π(c)=b∏lν(c(l))d(c(l))/ϕ(l)\pi(\mathbf c) = b\prod_l \nu(c(l))d(c(l))/\phi(l)π(c)=b∏l​ν(c(l))d(c(l))/ϕ(l) with a=∑cν(c)d(c)w(c)a = \sum_c \nu(c)d(c)w(c)a=∑c​ν(c)d(c)w(c).
  • Eqs. (3.16)–(3.17): in that case, the law of nnn, and given nnn independent positions of class ccc with probability ν(c)d(c)w(c)/a\nu(c)d(c)w(c)/aν(c)d(c)w(c)/a and uniform stage.
  • Eq. (3.18): the equilibrium distribution under gamma-mixture service.
  • Lemma 3.9: mixtures of gamma distributions approximate, at continuity points, the distribution function of any positive random variable.

Significance

Theorem 3.8 gives the stationary law of a symmetric queue in closed form and shows that it depends on the service requirement distributions only through their means a(c)a(c)a(c). Quasi-reversibility (part (iii)) is the property that lets symmetric queues be placed in networks: Kelly's §3.2 shows that a network of quasi-reversible queues has a product-form equilibrium, so Theorem 3.8 is the single-queue input to product-form networks with processor-sharing, LCFS-preemptive and infinite-server stations and class-dependent, non-exponential service. Lemma 3.9 is the approximation step behind the extension to arbitrary service distributions (Theorem 3.10).

These results are classical and proved in the book. To our knowledge none of them is machine-checked; Mathlib has the gamma distribution and distribution functions but no queueing theory. The mission produces a formal model of the symmetric queue as a countable-state Markov process, its equilibrium distribution, the insensitive marginals and the rate characterization of quasi-reversibility, all reusable by the chapter on networks of quasi-reversible queues.

Difficulty

The obvious first attempt, detailed balance, fails: the stage process is not reversible in general, since an intermediate stage completion has no transition back. The equilibrium equations must be verified in full, over a countable state space in which a single state is reached from infinitely many others. The symmetry condition γ≡δ\gamma \equiv \deltaγ≡δ is essential and must enter the argument: without it (for first-come-first-served, say) the distribution (3.18) is false for non-exponential service. Positions shift on every arrival and departure, so the bookkeeping of which list results from which event, including coincidences when neighbouring customers have identical records, is the main formal burden. The marginal computations sum (3.18) over lists of records, where convergence must be tracked, and Lemma 3.9 needs an explicit construction of approximating gamma mixtures.

Formalization scope

  • The state is a List of customer records (class, refined class, stage); list index iii is position l=i+1l = i + 1l=i+1, and γ(l,n)\gamma(l, n)γ(l,n), ϕ(n)\phi(n)ϕ(n) keep the book's 111-based indexing. The state space consists of the lists whose records have ν(c)p(c,z)>0\nu(c)p(c,z) > 0ν(c)p(c,z)>0 and 1≤u≤w(c,z)1 \le u \le w(c, z)1≤u≤w(c,z): records of a refined class arriving at rate zero are unreachable and excluded.
  • Classes C\mathcal CC and refinements Z\mathcal ZZ are arbitrary countable types. All infinite sums are HasSum or tsum with explicit convergence hypotheses: ∑cν(c)<∞\sum_c \nu(c) < \infty∑c​ν(c)<∞ (finite exit rates, the book's standing assumption of §1.1), convergence of a(c)a(c)a(c), of aaa, and of (3.15). "Equilibrium distribution" means positive, summing to one, and satisfying the equilibrium equations with convergent series.
  • The statement is rate level: (3.18) is shown to satisfy the equilibrium equations of the stage process, and quasi-reversibility is its rate characterization (3.8), (3.10). That these describe the stationary process and its time reversal is the book's Chapter 1 and is not reformalized.
  • Trivializing readings ruled out: the goal keeps ppp, www and ddd general (not w≡1w \equiv 1w≡1, which would make the result Section 3.1's exponential case); the arrival position uses the same γ\gammaγ as the service split; and in Lemma 3.9 the approximants must be genuine gamma mixtures with integer shapes, which a point mass is not.
  • Not planned: Theorem 3.10 (arbitrary service distributions; only an outline of proof and a continuous state space the book does not construct) and Theorem 3.11 (reversibility of the number in queue, a non-Markov process).

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, lemmas about List.insertIdx/List.eraseIdx bookkeeping for queues with positions, and summation over lists of records.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, Chichester, 1979, §3.3, pp. 72–82. https://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues with customers of different types, Journal of Applied Probability 12 (1975), 542–554. https://www.jstor.org/journal/japplprob
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues, Advances in Applied Probability 8 (1976), 416–432. https://www.jstor.org/journal/advaapplprob
  • A. D. Barbour, Networks of queues and the method of stages, Advances in Applied Probability 8 (1976), 584–591. https://www.jstor.org/journal/advaapplprob
  • B. A. Sevastyanov, An ergodic theorem for Markov processes and its application to telephone systems with refusals, Theory of Probability and its Applications 2 (1957), 104–112.
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, closed, and mixed networks of queues with different classes of customers, Journal of the ACM 22 (1975), 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
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Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Variance-based Regularization with Convex Objectives IV: Fast Rates for Approximate Robust Minimizers under a Growth ConditionResearch Paper

Motivation

In stochastic optimization and statistical learning one chooses a parameter θ\thetaθ from a set Θ⊆Rd\Theta\subseteq\mathbb R^dΘ⊆Rd to make the risk R(θ)=EP[ℓ(θ;X)]R(\theta)=\mathbb E_P[\ell(\theta;X)]R(θ)=EP​[ℓ(θ;X)] small, having seen only a sample X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ from PPP. Generalization bounds suggest trading empirical risk against its standard deviation, but the variance-penalized objective is non-convex even for convex losses. Duchi and Namkoong (arXiv:1610.02581v3) replace it by the robustly regularized risk, the worst-case expected loss over a χ2\chi^2χ2-divergence ball around the empirical distribution. This objective is convex whenever ℓ\ellℓ is, and it agrees with the variance-penalized objective up to a small error.

When the risk has curvature near its minimizers, empirical risk minimization attains rates faster than 1/n1/\sqrt n1/n​ (Bartlett, Bousquet and Mendelson 2005; Shapiro, Dentcheva and Ruszczyński 2009). Section 4.1 of the paper asks whether minimizers of the robust risk, which carry an extra variance-dependent penalty of order ρ/n\sqrt{\rho/n}ρ/n​, keep these fast rates. Its Theorem 5 answers yes, and does so for approximate minimizers, which is what iterative solvers return.

Setting

A loss ℓ:Rd×X→R\ell:\mathbb R^d\times\mathcal X\to\mathbb Rℓ:Rd×X→R is fixed, with ℓ(⋅;x)\ell(\cdot;x)ℓ(⋅;x) convex and LLL-Lipschitz on a convex set Θ\ThetaΘ for every xxx, and ℓ(θ;⋅)\ell(\theta;\cdot)ℓ(θ;⋅) integrable. The risk is R(θ)=EP[ℓ(θ;X)]R(\theta)=\mathbb E_P[\ell(\theta;X)]R(θ)=EP​[ℓ(θ;X)].

For a radius ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0, the χ2\chi^2χ2 ball around the empirical distribution P^n\widehat P_nPn​ is the set of weight vectors

Pn={p∈R+n:12∥np−1∥22≤ρ, ⟨1,p⟩=1},\mathcal P_n=\Big\{p\in\mathbb R^n_+:\tfrac12\|np-\mathbf 1\|_2^2\le\rho,\ \langle\mathbf 1,p\rangle=1\Big\},Pn​={p∈R+n​:21​∥np−1∥22​≤ρ, ⟨1,p⟩=1},

and the robust risk is Rn(θ,Pn)=sup⁡p∈Pn∑ipi ℓ(θ;Xi)R_n(\theta,\mathcal P_n)=\sup_{p\in\mathcal P_n}\sum_i p_i\,\ell(\theta;X_i)Rn​(θ,Pn​)=supp∈Pn​​∑i​pi​ℓ(θ;Xi​).

For ϵ≥0\epsilon\ge0ϵ≥0 the ϵ\epsilonϵ-suboptimal sets of the risk and of the robust risk are

S⋆ϵ={θ∈Θ:R(θ)≤inf⁡ΘR+ϵ},S^⋆ϵ={θ∈Θ:Rn(θ,Pn)≤inf⁡ΘRn(⋅,Pn)+ϵ},S_\star^\epsilon=\{\theta\in\Theta:R(\theta)\le\inf_\Theta R+\epsilon\},\qquad\widehat S_\star^\epsilon=\{\theta\in\Theta:R_n(\theta,\mathcal P_n)\le\inf_\Theta R_n(\cdot,\mathcal P_n)+\epsilon\},S⋆ϵ​={θ∈Θ:R(θ)≤Θinf​R+ϵ},S⋆ϵ​={θ∈Θ:Rn​(θ,Pn​)≤Θinf​Rn​(⋅,Pn​)+ϵ},

with S⋆=S⋆0S_\star=S_\star^0S⋆​=S⋆0​ the solution set and πS⋆\pi_{S_\star}πS⋆​​ the Euclidean projection onto it. The risk satisfies a growth condition of order γ>1\gamma>1γ>1 if, for some λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and r>0r>0r>0,

R(θ)−inf⁡ΘR ≥ λ dist(θ,S⋆)γwhenever dist(θ,S⋆)≤r.(26)R(\theta)-\inf_\Theta R\ \ge\ \lambda\,\mathrm{dist}(\theta,S_\star)^\gamma\quad\text{whenever }\mathrm{dist}(\theta,S_\star)\le r.\tag{26}R(θ)−Θinf​R ≥ λdist(θ,S⋆​)γwhenever dist(θ,S⋆​)≤r.(26)

The complexity of the problem enters through the localized class {x↦ℓ(θ;x)−ℓ(πS⋆(θ);x):θ∈A}\{x\mapsto\ell(\theta;x)-\ell(\pi_{S_\star}(\theta);x):\theta\in A\}{x↦ℓ(θ;x)−ℓ(πS⋆​​(θ);x):θ∈A} and its empirical Rademacher complexity Rn(A)=Eε[sup⁡θ∈A1n∑iεi(ℓ(θ;Xi)−ℓ(πS⋆(θ);Xi))]\mathfrak R_n(A)=\mathbb E_\varepsilon\big[\sup_{\theta\in A}\frac1n\sum_i\varepsilon_i(\ell(\theta;X_i)-\ell(\pi_{S_\star}(\theta);X_i))\big]Rn​(A)=Eε​[supθ∈A​n1​∑i​εi​(ℓ(θ;Xi​)−ℓ(πS⋆​​(θ);Xi​))], with independent uniform signs εi∈{±1}\varepsilon_i\in\{\pm1\}εi​∈{±1}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p. 19)

For t>0t>0t>0, ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0, and 0<ϵ≤12λrγ0<\epsilon\le\frac12\lambda r^\gamma0<ϵ≤21​λrγ satisfying

ϵ≥(28γLγλ)1γ−1(ρn)γ2(γ−1)andϵ2≥2 E[Rn(S⋆2ϵ)]+L(2ϵλ)1γ2tn,(27)\epsilon\ge\Big(2\frac{8^\gamma L^\gamma}{\lambda}\Big)^{\frac1{\gamma-1}}\Big(\frac\rho n\Big)^{\frac\gamma{2(\gamma-1)}}\quad\text{and}\quad\frac\epsilon2\ge2\,\mathbb E[\mathfrak R_n(S_\star^{2\epsilon})]+L\Big(\frac{2\epsilon}\lambda\Big)^{\frac1\gamma}\sqrt{\frac{2t}n},\tag{27}ϵ≥(2λ8γLγ​)γ−11​(nρ​)2(γ−1)γ​and2ϵ​≥2E[Rn​(S⋆2ϵ​)]+L(λ2ϵ​)γ1​n2t​​,(27) P(S^⋆ϵ⊂S⋆2ϵ) ≥ 1−e−t.\mathbb P\big(\widehat S_\star^\epsilon\subset S_\star^{2\epsilon}\big)\ \ge\ 1-e^{-t}.P(S⋆ϵ​⊂S⋆2ϵ​) ≥ 1−e−t.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Localization (p. 44). Under (26), S⋆2ϵS_\star^{2\epsilon}S⋆2ϵ​ lies in {θ∈Θ:dist(θ,S⋆)≤(2ϵ/λ)1/γ}\{\theta\in\Theta:\mathrm{dist}(\theta,S_\star)\le(2\epsilon/\lambda)^{1/\gamma}\}{θ∈Θ:dist(θ,S⋆​)≤(2ϵ/λ)1/γ}.
  2. Theorem 1, upper half of (10) (p. 7). sup⁡p∈Pn⟨p,z⟩−zˉ≤2ρsn2/n\sup_{p\in\mathcal P_n}\langle p,z\rangle-\bar z\le\sqrt{2\rho s_n^2/n}supp∈Pn​​⟨p,z⟩−zˉ≤2ρsn2​/n​ for every z∈Rnz\in\mathbb R^nz∈Rn.
  3. Claim E.1 (p. 44). If S^⋆ϵ⊄S⋆2ϵ\widehat S_\star^\epsilon\not\subset S_\star^{2\epsilon}S⋆ϵ​⊂S⋆2ϵ​, the localized deviation Δn\Delta_nΔn​ plus a variance term reaches ϵ\epsilonϵ somewhere on S⋆2ϵS_\star^{2\epsilon}S⋆2ϵ​.
  4. Display (43) (p. 45). P(S^⋆ϵ⊄S⋆2ϵ)≤P(sup⁡S⋆2ϵΔn≥ϵ/2)\mathbb P(\widehat S_\star^\epsilon\not\subset S_\star^{2\epsilon})\le\mathbb P(\sup_{S_\star^{2\epsilon}}\Delta_n\ge\epsilon/2)P(S⋆ϵ​⊂S⋆2ϵ​)≤P(supS⋆2ϵ​​Δn​≥ϵ/2).
  5. Concentration (p. 45). P(sup⁡S⋆2ϵΔn≥2E[Rn(S⋆2ϵ)]+u)≤exp⁡(−nu22L2(λ2ϵ)2/γ)\mathbb P(\sup_{S_\star^{2\epsilon}}\Delta_n\ge2\mathbb E[\mathfrak R_n(S_\star^{2\epsilon})]+u)\le\exp(-\frac{nu^2}{2L^2}(\frac\lambda{2\epsilon})^{2/\gamma})P(supS⋆2ϵ​​Δn​≥2E[Rn​(S⋆2ϵ​)]+u)≤exp(−2L2nu2​(2ϵλ​)2/γ).

Significance

The theorem says that the variance penalty implicit in the robust objective does not cost the fast rates available under curvature. The ρ\rhoρ-dependent condition in (27) is of order (ρ/n)γ/(2(γ−1))(\rho/n)^{\gamma/(2(\gamma-1))}(ρ/n)γ/(2(γ−1)), which for quadratic growth (γ=2\gamma=2γ=2) is ρ/n\rho/nρ/n, the same order as the localized complexity term in typical parametric problems. Corollary 4.1 of the paper derives explicit rates of order dnlog⁡nd+tn+ρn\frac dn\log\frac nd+\frac tn+\frac\rho nnd​logdn​+nt​+nρ​ from it for a unique minimizer. The result applies to ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate minimizers, so it covers the output of the stochastic-gradient methods used to solve the robust problem.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix E). None of it is formalized: no statement about growth conditions, localized deviations of a robust objective, or fast rates for robust minimizers is on Prove2Me. A formal proof would check the printed constants, settle the boundary case ϵ=0\epsilon=0ϵ=0 (see below), and produce a localization lemma and a reduction from approximate robust minimizers to empirical processes that apply to other estimators.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at two points. First, a uniform deviation bound over all of Θ\ThetaΘ gives only the 1/n1/\sqrt n1/n​ rate: the speed-up comes from localizing to S⋆2ϵS_\star^{2\epsilon}S⋆2ϵ​, which requires transferring the growth condition, assumed only within distance rrr of S⋆S_\starS⋆​, to every 2ϵ2\epsilon2ϵ-suboptimal point by convexity. Second, the robust risk is not an empirical average, so standard comparisons between empirical and population minimizers do not apply. Claim E.1 handles this by moving along the segment from a bad approximate minimizer to its projection, which needs the projection to be preserved along that segment (a normal-cone property of πS⋆\pi_{S_\star}πS⋆​​) and the risk to be continuous there. The robust–empirical gap is then controlled by the variance expansion of Theorem 1. The concentration step needs a bounded-differences inequality for a supremum over an uncountable class, together with symmetrization; neither is in Mathlib in this form.

Formalization scope

Parameters live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), so norms, distances and projections are Euclidean. The sample is the coordinate process of the product measure P⊗nP^{\otimes n}P⊗n on Fin n → X, n≥1n\ge1n≥1, and probabilities are measures of sample sets (the outer measure for a set that is not measurable). The χ2\chi^2χ2 ball is the weight-vector form (8). The suboptimal sets are written without infima (R(θ)≤R(θ′)+ϵR(\theta)\le R(\theta')+\epsilonR(θ)≤R(θ′)+ϵ for all θ′∈Θ\theta'\in\Thetaθ′∈Θ). Each supremum "sup⁡≥c\sup\ge csup≥c" is written as "for every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 some θ\thetaθ reaches c−δc-\deltac−δ", so no statement relies on the default value of a real supremum. The Rademacher complexity is the published UnderstandingML.rademacher, and its expectation over the sample is assumed integrable, so that it is the true expectation and not the default value 000 of a Bochner integral. Lipschitz continuity is required on Θ\ThetaΘ, as printed.

Corrections and presuppositions:

  • ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0. The paper prints 0≤ϵ0\le\epsilon0≤ϵ. At ϵ=0\epsilon=0ϵ=0, ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0, both conditions of (27) hold, yet for ℓ(θ;x)=12(θ−x)2\ell(\theta;x)=\frac12(\theta-x)^2ℓ(θ;x)=21​(θ−x)2 on Θ=[−1,1]\Theta=[-1,1]Θ=[−1,1] with XXX uniform on [−12,12][-\frac12,\frac12][−21​,21​] the robust minimizer is the sample mean, which is almost surely not in S⋆={0}S_\star=\{0\}S⋆​={0}. The proof divides by ϵ\epsilonϵ (p. 45). The goal is stated for ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0.
  • S⋆S_\starS⋆​ nonempty and closed are assumed. The projection πS⋆\pi_{S_\star}πS⋆​​ presupposes them, and Appendix E calls S⋆S_\starS⋆​ closed.
  • Only the upper half of Theorem 1's (10) is stated; it needs no boundedness of the values.

The constant (2⋅8γLγ/λ)1/(γ−1)\big(2\cdot8^\gamma L^\gamma/\lambda\big)^{1/(\gamma-1)}(2⋅8γLγ/λ)1/(γ−1) is the printed one; the proof uses a smaller one, which the printed condition implies. The hypotheses ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, γ>1\gamma>1γ>1 and λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 make every power well defined. A formalization that assumed (26) vacuously, took ϵ=0\epsilon=0ϵ=0, or let the Rademacher term be a non-integrable Bochner integral would trivialize the goal; the statements rule these out.

Infrastructure: Euclidean projection onto closed convex sets and its normal-cone characterization (partly in Mathlib), convexity of integral functionals, McDiarmid's bounded-differences inequality, and symmetrization for suprema of empirical processes. The concentration tools and the localization lemma can be reused beyond this mission. Contributions toward McDiarmid's inequality and symmetrization are especially welcome.

Selected references

  • J. C. Duchi and H. Namkoong, Variance-based regularization with convex objectives, arXiv:1610.02581v3, 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02581
  • P. L. Bartlett, O. Bousquet and S. Mendelson, Local Rademacher complexities, Annals of Statistics 33(4), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1214/009053605000000282
  • S. Boucheron, G. Lugosi and P. Massart, Concentration Inequalities: A Nonasymptotic Theory of Independence, Oxford University Press, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535255.001.0001
  • A. Shapiro, D. Dentcheva and A. Ruszczyński, Lectures on Stochastic Programming: Modeling and Theory, SIAM, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718751
  • A. Maurer and M. Pontil, Empirical Bernstein bounds and sample variance penalization, COLT, 2009. https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.3740
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization 2: Randomized Double Greedy Achieves 1/2 of the Optimum in ExpectationResearch Paper

Motivation

Many selection problems assign a value to each subset of a finite collection: the coverage supplied by chosen facilities, the influence reached by chosen seeds, or the value of a coalition. A submodular set function has diminishing returns in the precise sense that the combined value of two sets, counting their overlap once, does not exceed the sum of their separate values. When the function is also monotone, taking more elements never hurts. The unconstrained problem studied here permits nonmonotone functions, so both accepting and rejecting an element can matter. The question is what a single pass through the elements can guarantee when the function is available through value queries. Buchbinder et al., FOCS 2012

The randomized algorithm in this mission attains an expected one-half approximation for every nonnegative submodular function. The paper presents this as tight in the value-oracle setting: it recalls the earlier result of Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák that a fixed improvement beyond one-half requires exponentially many queries. The contribution here is therefore both the guarantee and a short adaptive rule that attains it in a linear number of iterations. The local proposal follows the FOCS 2012 version of the paper; its theorem numbering differs from the later SIAM Journal on Computing article. Buchbinder et al., §I.A and Theorem I.2

Setting

Let N\mathcal NN be a finite ground set, and let f:2N→R≥0f:2^{\mathcal N}\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}f:2N→R≥0​ assign a nonnegative real value to every subset. The unconstrained submodular maximization problem asks for the largest value f(S)f(S)f(S) among all S⊆NS\subseteq\mathcal NS⊆N. Write OPTOPTOPT for that value when no confusion arises, and OOO for a set attaining it. Submodularity means

f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)≤f(A)+f(B)(A,B⊆N).f(A\cup B)+f(A\cap B)\le f(A)+f(B)\qquad(A,B\subseteq\mathcal N).f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)≤f(A)+f(B)(A,B⊆N).

There is no monotonicity or normalization assumption: f(∅)f(\varnothing)f(∅) and f(N)f(\mathcal N)f(N) may both be positive. A value oracle returns f(S)f(S)f(S) for a requested subset SSS. The paper's complexity claim counts such queries, assuming a query takes constant time. Buchbinder et al., §I and footnotes 1–2

Algorithm 2 visits the elements once in an arbitrary order u1,…,unu_1,\ldots,u_nu1​,…,un​. It keeps two sets, starting at X0=∅X_0=\varnothingX0​=∅ and Y0=NY_0=\mathcal NY0​=N. At step iii, it measures the gain aia_iai​ from adding uiu_iui​ to Xi−1X_{i-1}Xi−1​ and the gain bib_ibi​ from removing uiu_iui​ from Yi−1Y_{i-1}Yi−1​. It clips each gain at zero, giving ai′=max⁡(ai,0)a'_i=\max(a_i,0)ai′​=max(ai​,0) and bi′=max⁡(bi,0)b'_i=\max(b_i,0)bi′​=max(bi​,0). It adds uiu_iui​ to XXX with probability ai′/(ai′+bi′)a'_i/(a'_i+b'_i)ai′​/(ai′​+bi′​) and otherwise removes it from YYY. When both clipped gains vanish, the paper defines the add probability as one. After all elements have been processed, the two sets coincide, and the algorithm returns their common value. The state law is adaptive: its probability at step iii depends on the actual pair of sets produced by earlier choices. Buchbinder et al., Algorithm 2

Formalization targets

The main target is Theorem I.2 for this exact algorithm and for every enumeration of the ground set:

max⁡S⊆Nf(S)≤2 E[f(Xn)].\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}f(S)\le 2\,\mathbb E[f(X_n)].S⊆Nmax​f(S)≤2E[f(Xn​)].

The milestone statements retain the paper's key local quantities. For a comparison optimum OOO, set OPTi=(O∪Xi)∩YiOPT_i=(O\cup X_i)\cap Y_iOPTi​=(O∪Xi​)∩Yi​. Lemma II.1 asserts ai+bi≥0a_i+b_i\ge0ai​+bi​≥0. The endpoint statement identifies OPT0=OOPT_0=OOPT0​=O and OPTn=Xn=YnOPT_n=X_n=Y_nOPTn​=Xn​=Yn​. Inequality (3) bounds the conditional loss in the positive-gain case; Lemma III.1 compares the expected change of OPTiOPT_iOPTi​ with the expected combined change of XiX_iXi​ and YiY_iYi​. The telescoped display keeps the initial endpoint values f(∅)f(\varnothing)f(∅) and f(N)f(\mathcal N)f(N) before using nonnegativity. Buchbinder et al., Lemmas II.1 and III.1, inequality (3), proof of Theorem I.2

A companion target is Theorem I.4 via its second proof. For two normalized monotone submodular utilities f1,f2f_1,f_2f1​,f2​, let g(S)=f1(S)+f2(N∖S)g(S)=f_1(S)+f_2(\mathcal N\setminus S)g(S)=f1​(S)+f2​(N∖S). The maximum of ggg is exactly the optimal welfare of a two-player partition. Algorithm 2 on ggg is asked to satisfy

3max⁡S⊆Ng(S)≤4 E[g(Xn)].3\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}g(S)\le4\,\mathbb E[g(X_n)].3S⊆Nmax​g(S)≤4E[g(Xn​)].

This is the paper's three-quarter guarantee in its welfare application. Buchbinder et al., Theorem I.4 and Proof (2)

Significance

The main theorem gives a specific randomized rule whose expected value is at least half the best subset value, even when accepting an element can lower the objective. It applies without restricting the cardinality or shape of the chosen subset. The welfare corollary shows that keeping the initial endpoint values in the analysis yields a stronger guarantee for the objective formed from two monotone players. Buchbinder et al., Theorems I.2 and I.4

This mission formalizes the statement of the algorithm, its intermediate state laws, its comparison set, and the paper's numbered proof targets. The algorithmic guarantee is proved in the source paper; the local Lean theorem files are open statements with sorry and do not yet give machine-checked proofs of these results. A completed development would supply a reusable formal model of an adaptive finite random process over pairs of subsets, as well as the specific submodular inequalities. The published Submodular and OPT definitions from the earlier Feige–Mirrokni–Vondrák formalization are reused here.

Difficulty

The two possible updates cannot be assessed independently. The probability of each choice depends on the current state, and the comparison set OPTiOPT_iOPTi​ can gain or lose the processed element in a way that differs from the two algorithm sets. A bound on the expected value of XiX_iXi​ alone does not control the movement of OPTiOPT_iOPTi​. The proof must handle the clipped gains, including the case when both are zero, while preserving the exact joint law of (Xi,Yi)(X_i,Y_i)(Xi​,Yi​). Buchbinder et al., proof of Lemma III.1

Formalization scope

The ground set is a finite Lean type; subsets are Finset X, and values are real numbers. An order is a list with no repeated elements that covers the type, including the empty type. The run is an explicit finite mass function on pairs of subsets after every prefix of the list. Expectation is a finite weighted sum, so it has no integrability exception. The transition clips the two real marginal gains and handles 0/00/00/0 by assigning probability one to the add branch, exactly as Algorithm 2 specifies. The optimum is the published maximum over all subsets. No ratio divides by a possibly zero optimum.

The theorem fixes Algorithm 2 itself; an arbitrary process with nested sets or a process defined by its desired approximation property does not satisfy this scope. The Lean goal states the value bound and leaves the paper's linear-time claim outside the formal theorem. The algorithm uses four value evaluations per processed element in its printed rule; the Lean development represents those evaluations, not an implementation cost model. The statement that its two final sets coincide is a separate milestone.

The source's main-text decreasing-returns definition has an overbroad quantifier on the added element. This development uses the equivalent lattice inequality given in the paper's footnote, which permits nonmonotone functions. The proof of Lemma II.1 also has a set-index slip, and the proof of Theorem I.2 prints FFF for fff in one display; neither slip is copied into a formal statement. The one-step inequality (3) is stated for any nested pair with the processed element in Y∖XY\setminus XY∖X, a generalization of the conditioned reachable states in the paper. Contributions proving the endpoint invariant, conditional inequality, one-step expected estimate, and final bound are all within scope.

Selected references

  • Niv Buchbinder, Moran Feldman, Joseph Naor and Roy Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, Proceedings of the 53rd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2012. FOCS version used here.
  • Niv Buchbinder, Moran Feldman, Joseph Naor and Roy Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, SIAM Journal on Computing 44(5), 2015. DOI: 10.1137/130929205. The cited statement indices above refer to the FOCS version.
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Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms 4: Subgaussian Martingale Noise with Σ exp(−c/γ_n) < ∞ for Every c > 0 Satisfies Assumption A1 Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

A stochastic approximation algorithm is a recursion

xn+1−xn=γn+1(F(xn)+Un+1)x_{n+1}-x_n=\gamma_{n+1}\big(F(x_n)+U_{n+1}\big)xn+1​−xn​=γn+1​(F(xn​)+Un+1​)

in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, where FFF is a vector field, γn\gamma_nγn​ are small step sizes and Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is noise. Such recursions go back to Robbins and Monro's root-finding scheme (Robbins–Monro 1951) and underlie stochastic gradient descent, temporal-difference learning, adaptive control and learning in games. The ODE method studies them by comparing the iterates with the trajectories of x˙=F(x)\dot x=F(x)x˙=F(x).

Benaïm's lecture notes (Benaïm 1999) organize the ODE method in two steps. A deterministic step, Proposition 4.1, shows that whenever the noise satisfies a condition called A1 (together with a boundedness condition on the iterates), the interpolated process is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF. A probabilistic step then verifies A1 for concrete noise models. Proposition 4.2 does this for martingale difference noise with bounded qqq-th moments, at the price of step sizes with ∑nγn1+q/2<∞\sum_n\gamma_n^{1+q/2}<\infty∑n​γn1+q/2​<∞. This mission formalizes the second verification, Proposition 4.4: when the noise is subgaussian, A1 holds almost surely under the much weaker requirement that ∑ne−c/γn<∞\sum_ne^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty∑n​e−c/γn​<∞ for every c>0c>0c>0, which allows step sizes decaying only slightly faster than 1/log⁡n1/\log n1/logn. The notes attribute the result to Duflo (1997), see also Kushner and Yin (1997) and Benaïm and Hirsch (1996).

Setting

Let {γn}n≥1\{\gamma_n\}_{n\ge1}{γn​}n≥1​ be a deterministic sequence with γn≥0\gamma_n\ge0γn​≥0, ∑nγn=∞\sum_n\gamma_n=\infty∑n​γn​=∞ and γn→0\gamma_n\to0γn​→0 (a step sequence). Put τ0=0\tau_0=0τ0​=0, τn=∑i=1nγi\tau_n=\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_iτn​=∑i=1n​γi​, and let

m(t)=sup⁡{k≥0: t≥τk}m(t)=\sup\{k\ge0:\ t\ge\tau_k\}m(t)=sup{k≥0: t≥τk​}

be the index of the step that contains time t≥0t\ge0t≥0. For a sequence {Un}n≥1\{U_n\}_{n\ge1}{Un​}n≥1​ define the piecewise constant processes Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1\bar U(t)=U_{m(t)+1}Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1​ and γˉ(t)=γm(t)+1\bar\gamma(t)=\gamma_{m(t)+1}γˉ​(t)=γm(t)+1​, so that step n+1n+1n+1 occupies the time interval [τn,τn+1)[\tau_n,\tau_{n+1})[τn​,τn+1​) of length γn+1\gamma_{n+1}γn+1​.

Assumption A1 asks that for every T>0T>0T>0

lim⁡n→∞sup⁡{∥∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1∥: k=n+1,…,m(τn+T)}=0,\lim_{n\to\infty}\sup\Big\{\Big\|\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\|:\ k=n+1,\dots,m(\tau_n+T)\Big\}=0,n→∞lim​sup{​i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​​: k=n+1,…,m(τn​+T)}=0,

or, in the form the notes call equivalent, lim⁡t→∞Δ(t,T)=0\lim_{t\to\infty}\Delta(t,T)=0limt→∞​Δ(t,T)=0 for every T>0T>0T>0, where

Δ(t,T)=sup⁡0≤h≤T∥∫tt+hUˉ(s) ds∥.\Delta(t,T)=\sup_{0\le h\le T}\Big\|\int_t^{t+h}\bar U(s)\,ds\Big\|.Δ(t,T)=0≤h≤Tsup​​∫tt+h​Uˉ(s)ds​.

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space with a nondecreasing sequence {Fn}\{\mathcal F_n\}{Fn​} of sub-σ\sigmaσ-algebras, and F:Rd→RdF:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb R^dF:Rd→Rd continuous. A sequence {xn}\{x_n\}{xn​} given by the recursion above is a Robbins–Monro algorithm if γ\gammaγ is deterministic, UnU_nUn​ is Fn\mathcal F_nFn​-measurable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0. The noise is subgaussian if there is a number Γ>0\Gamma>0Γ>0 such that for all nnn and all θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd

E(exp⁡⟨θ,Un+1⟩ ∣ Fn)≤exp⁡(Γ2∥θ∥2).E\big(\exp\langle\theta,U_{n+1}\rangle\,\big|\,\mathcal F_n\big)\le\exp\Big(\frac\Gamma2\|\theta\|^2\Big).E(exp⟨θ,Un+1​⟩​Fn​)≤exp(2Γ​∥θ∥2).

Bounded noise, ∥Un∥≤Γ\|U_n\|\le\sqrt\Gamma∥Un​∥≤Γ​, is an example.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.4

For a Robbins–Monro algorithm with subgaussian noise and a deterministic step sequence such that

∑ne−c/γn<∞for each c>0,\sum_ne^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty\qquad\text{for each }c>0,n∑​e−c/γn​<∞for each c>0,

with probability one the realised noise sequence satisfies A1, in both of its forms, simultaneously for all T>0T>0T>0.

Milestones

  1. The exponential supermartingale. For every θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd,
Zn(θ)=exp⁡[∑i=1n⟨θ,γiUi⟩−Γ2∑i=1nγi2∥θ∥2]Z_n(\theta)=\exp\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n\langle\theta,\gamma_iU_i\rangle-\frac\Gamma2\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_i^2\|\theta\|^2\Big]Zn​(θ)=exp[i=1∑n​⟨θ,γi​Ui​⟩−2Γ​i=1∑n​γi2​∥θ∥2]

is a supermartingale. 2. Directional maximal tail bound. For every unit vector eee, α>0\alpha>0α>0, nnn and T>0T>0T>0,

P(sup⁡n<k≤m(τn+T)⟨e,∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1⟩≥α)≤exp⁡(−α22Γ∑i=nm(τn+T)−1γi+12).P\Big(\sup_{n<k\le m(\tau_n+T)}\Big\langle e,\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\rangle\ge\alpha\Big)\le\exp\Big(\frac{-\alpha^2}{2\Gamma\sum_{i=n}^{m(\tau_n+T)-1}\gamma_{i+1}^2}\Big).P(n<k≤m(τn​+T)sup​⟨e,i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​⟩≥α)≤exp(2Γ∑i=nm(τn​+T)−1​γi+12​−α2​).
  1. Eq. (18). There are C,C′>0C,C'>0C,C′>0 depending only on ddd and Γ\GammaΓ with
P(Δ(t,T)≥α)≤Cexp⁡(−α2C′∫tt+Tγˉ(s) ds)(t≥0, T>0, α>0).P(\Delta(t,T)\ge\alpha)\le C\exp\Big(\frac{-\alpha^2}{C'\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma(s)\,ds}\Big)\qquad(t\ge0,\ T>0,\ \alpha>0).P(Δ(t,T)≥α)≤Cexp(C′∫tt+T​γˉ​(s)ds−α2​)(t≥0, T>0, α>0).
  1. Block comparison. Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T)\Delta(t,T)\le2\Delta(kT,T)+\Delta((k+1)T,T)Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T) for kT≤t<(k+1)TkT\le t<(k+1)TkT≤t<(k+1)T.

Significance

Proposition 4.4 is the sufficient condition for the ODE method when the noise has Gaussian-type tails. Its step-size condition holds whenever γnlog⁡n→0\gamma_n\log n\to0γn​logn→0, so it admits steps that decrease far more slowly than the ∑γn2<∞\sum\gamma_n^2<\infty∑γn2​<∞ of the classical L2L^2L2 theory; slowly decreasing steps are what practitioners use to keep algorithms responsive. Combined with Proposition 4.1 it shows that the interpolated process of such an algorithm, with bounded iterates, is almost surely an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF, and the limit set theorems of the notes then locate the limit points of the algorithm.

The result is proved in the notes and in the cited literature; it has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A formal proof would add reusable pieces: an exponential supermartingale and maximal inequality for vector-valued martingale differences with a conditional subgaussian bound (Mathlib's conditional subgaussian notion is scalar), a Borel–Cantelli argument along the grid kTkTkT, and the continuous-time bookkeeping of Uˉ\bar UUˉ, γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ and Δ\DeltaΔ shared with the other missions of this series.

Difficulty

The moment method of Proposition 4.2 does not reach this regime: any fixed polynomial moment of the window sums decays only polynomially in the window's step sizes, and under ∑e−c/γn<∞\sum e^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty∑e−c/γn​<∞ alone polynomial bounds are not summable over windows. Exponential tail bounds are needed, and they must be maximal (uniform over the window) and must hold for the norm of a vector, not only for a scalar. The continuous-time deviation Δ(t,T)\Delta(t,T)Δ(t,T) involves partial steps at both ends of [t,t+h][t,t+h][t,t+h], so the bound must be stated in terms of ∫tt+Tγˉ\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma∫tt+T​γˉ​ rather than a sum over whole steps, with constants that do not depend on ttt, TTT or α\alphaα. Finally, A1 quantifies over all T>0T>0T>0: the almost-sure statement must hold on a single event of full probability for every TTT.

Formalization scope

The space is Rd\mathbb R^dRd as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) (the paper writes Rm\mathbb R^mRm); time is real. The sequences γ\gammaγ and UUU are indexed by N\mathbb NN, and their values at 000 are unused, as the paper indexes them from 111. The filtration is a Mathlib Filtration ℕ; Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is Fn+1\mathcal F_{n+1}Fn+1​-strongly measurable and integrable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0 almost surely. The subgaussian condition requires exp⁡⟨θ,Un+1⟩\exp\langle\theta,U_{n+1}\rangleexp⟨θ,Un+1​⟩ to be integrable for every θ\thetaθ and nnn. The summand e−c/γne^{-c/\gamma_n}e−c/γn​ is taken to be 000 when γn=0\gamma_n=0γn​=0, its limiting value. The suprema in A1 and Δ\DeltaΔ are taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the supremum over an empty range of kkk is 000. In Eq. (18) the constants are chosen before the probability space, the algorithm and t,T,αt,T,\alphat,T,α.

The following readings are excluded and are not acceptable formalizations: a subgaussian condition that holds vacuously because the exponential is not integrable (Lean's conditional expectation of a non-integrable function is 000); a summability condition made trivial or false by the convention c/0=0c/0=0c/0=0; and the conclusion "for each TTT, A1 holds almost surely" in place of "almost surely, A1 holds for all TTT". The second sentence of Proposition 4.4 (the asymptotic pseudotrajectory conclusion) is outside this mission.

All hypotheses are satisfiable: U=0U=0U=0, x=0x=0x=0, F=0F=0F=0, Γ=1\Gamma=1Γ=1 and γn=1/n\gamma_n=1/nγn​=1/n satisfy every one of them.

Contributions welcome: a maximal inequality for nonnegative supermartingales in the form needed here, vector subgaussian tail bounds for martingale transforms with deterministic weights (reusable well beyond this mission), lemmas on the step processes and Δ\DeltaΔ (measurability, local integrability, additivity), and the proofs of the milestones.

Selected references

  • M. Benaïm, Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms, Séminaire de Probabilités XXXIII, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1709, Springer, 1999, pp. 1–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0096509
  • M. Duflo, Random Iterative Models, Applications of Mathematics 34, Springer, 1997.
  • H. J. Kushner and G. G. Yin, Stochastic Approximation Algorithms and Applications, Springer, 1997.
  • M. Benaïm and M. W. Hirsch, Asymptotic pseudotrajectories and chain recurrent flows, with applications, Journal of Dynamics and Differential Equations 8 (1996), 141–176. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02218617
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, A stochastic approximation method, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22 (1951), 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
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Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case VI: Lower Semianalytic Functions — Analytically Measurable ε-Optimal Selectors (Jankov–von Neumann)Textbook

Motivation

Dynamic programming over uncountable state and control spaces needs two things at every stage: the optimal cost-to-go, obtained by minimizing over the control, must be a function that can be integrated against the next stage's transition probabilities, and a policy that nearly attains the minimum must be measurable, so that it defines a stochastic process. With Borel-measurable costs and Borel-measurable policies both requirements fail. Minimizing a Borel function of (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) over yyy produces a function whose level sets are projections of Borel sets, and such projections need not be Borel (Suslin, 1917). The repair, developed by Blackwell, Freedman and Orkin (1974), Shreve and Bertsekas, and set out in Chapter 7 of Bertsekas and Shreve's Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case (1978), is to enlarge the class of costs to the lower semianalytic functions and the class of policies to the analytically or universally measurable ones. Sections 7.6–7.7 of the book establish that this class is closed under partial minimization and admits measurable ε-optimal selectors. Chapters 8–10 of the book, and much of the later literature on Borel-space Markov decision processes (Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre; Feinberg and coauthors), build on these results.

Timeline:

  • 1917: Suslin shows that projections of Borel sets need not be Borel and introduces analytic sets; Lusin proves that analytic sets are universally measurable.
  • 1941–1949: Jankov and von Neumann independently prove that an analytic subset of a product admits a selector measurable with respect to the σ-algebra generated by analytic sets.
  • 1974: Blackwell, Freedman and Orkin use analytic sets to construct ε-optimal policies in Borel dynamic programming.
  • 1978: Bertsekas and Shreve give the treatment used here (§7.6–7.7), including the selection theorem for lower semianalytic functions, Proposition 7.50.

Setting

A Borel space is a topological space homeomorphic to a Borel subset of a complete separable metric space (Definition 7.7); its Borel σ-algebra is BX\mathscr B_XBX​. The Baire space is N=NN\mathscr N=\mathbb N^{\mathbb N}N=NN with the product topology. A set A⊆XA\subseteq XA⊆X is analytic if it is empty or the image of N\mathscr NN under a continuous map; by Proposition 7.41 this is the book's Definition 7.16 (the Suslin operation applied to closed sets). Every Borel set is analytic, and the converse fails when XXX is uncountable.

Three σ-algebras on XXX are in play. The analytic σ-algebra AX\mathscr A_XAX​ is generated by the analytic sets (Definition 7.19). The universal σ-algebra is UX=⋂pBX(p)\mathscr U_X=\bigcap_{p}\mathscr B_X(p)UX​=⋂p​BX​(p), the intersection over all probability measures ppp on (X,BX)(X,\mathscr B_X)(X,BX​) of the ppp-completions of BX\mathscr B_XBX​ (Definition 7.18). For a function fff from D⊆XD\subseteq XD⊆X into a Borel space YYY, fff is analytically measurable if D∈AXD\in\mathscr A_XD∈AX​ and f−1(B)∈AXf^{-1}(B)\in\mathscr A_Xf−1(B)∈AX​ for every B∈BYB\in\mathscr B_YB∈BY​, and universally measurable if the same holds with UX\mathscr U_XUX​ (Definition 7.20).

Let R∗=[−∞,∞]R^*=[-\infty,\infty]R∗=[−∞,∞]. A function f:D→R∗f:D\to R^*f:D→R∗ is lower semianalytic if DDD is analytic and {x∈D∣f(x)<c}\{x\in D\mid f(x)<c\}{x∈D∣f(x)<c} is analytic for every real ccc (Definition 7.21). For D⊆X×YD\subseteq X\times YD⊆X×Y write Dx={y∣(x,y)∈D}D_x=\{y\mid (x,y)\in D\}Dx​={y∣(x,y)∈D}, projX(D)={x∣Dx≠∅}\mathrm{proj}_X(D)=\{x\mid D_x\neq\emptyset\}projX​(D)={x∣Dx​=∅}, and define the partial infimum

f∗(x)=inf⁡y∈Dxf(x,y),x∈projX(D).f^*(x)=\inf_{y\in D_x}f(x,y),\qquad x\in\mathrm{proj}_X(D).f∗(x)=y∈Dx​inf​f(x,y),x∈projX​(D).

A selector is a function φ:projX(D)→Y\varphi:\mathrm{proj}_X(D)\to Yφ:projX​(D)→Y whose graph Gr(φ)\mathrm{Gr}(\varphi)Gr(φ) lies in DDD.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7.50

Let X,YX,YX,Y be Borel spaces, D⊆X×YD\subseteq X\times YD⊆X×Y analytic, and f:D→R∗f:D\to R^*f:D→R∗ lower semianalytic.

(a) For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is an analytically measurable selector φ\varphiφ with

f[x,φ(x)]≤{f∗(x)+εif f∗(x)>−∞,−1/εif f∗(x)=−∞.f[x,\varphi(x)]\le\begin{cases}f^*(x)+\varepsilon&\text{if }f^*(x)>-\infty,\\-1/\varepsilon&\text{if }f^*(x)=-\infty.\end{cases}f[x,φ(x)]≤{f∗(x)+ε−1/ε​if f∗(x)>−∞,if f∗(x)=−∞.​

(b) The set III of points where the infimum is attained is universally measurable, and for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is a universally measurable selector φ\varphiφ with f[x,φ(x)]=f∗(x)f[x,\varphi(x)]=f^*(x)f[x,φ(x)]=f∗(x) on III and the bounds of (a) off III.

The goal fixes no constant beyond the book's ε\varepsilonε and −1/ε-1/\varepsilon−1/ε.

Milestones

In attack order: Proposition 7.40 (Borel images and preimages of analytic sets are analytic), Corollary 7.42.1 (AX⊆UX\mathscr A_X\subseteq\mathscr U_XAX​⊆UX​), Corollary 7.44.2 (composites of analytically measurable maps are universally measurable), and Proposition 7.49, the Jankov–von Neumann theorem:

A⊆X×Y analytic ⟹ ∃ φ:projX(A)→Y analytically measurable, Gr(φ)⊆A.A\subseteq X\times Y\text{ analytic}\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,\varphi:\mathrm{proj}_X(A)\to Y\ \text{analytically measurable},\ \mathrm{Gr}(\varphi)\subseteq A.A⊆X×Y analytic ⟹ ∃φ:projX​(A)→Y analytically measurable, Gr(φ)⊆A.

Further items of the mission, on the same definitions: Proposition 7.39 (projections of analytic sets are analytic, and every analytic set is a projection of a Borel set), Lemma 7.30(1) (strict and non-strict, real and extended level sets give the same class) and Proposition 7.47 (lower semianalytic functions are exactly partial infima of Borel functions).

Significance

Proposition 7.50 is the selection theorem behind the existence of ε-optimal policies in Borel-space dynamic programming. In the finite-horizon model of Chapter 8 the optimal cost-to-go at each stage is lower semianalytic, by Propositions 7.47 and 7.48. Proposition 7.50 then turns the one-stage minimization into a measurable policy, analytically measurable when only ε-optimality is required and universally measurable when the minimum is attained. Chapters 8–9 of the book (the finite-horizon recursion JK∗=TK(J0)J^*_K=T^K(J_0)JK∗​=TK(J0​) and the optimality equation under (P), (N), (D)) use it at every step. Downstream catalog papers on average-cost and stochastic shortest-path problems over Borel spaces cite these results.

All results here are proved in the book and in the descriptive set theory literature (Kechris, Classical Descriptive Set Theory, §18 and §29). None is formalized on Prove2Me. Mathlib has analytic sets in Polish-type settings, the Lusin separation theorem and Suslin's theorem, but it has no universal σ-algebra, no analytic σ-algebra, no lower semianalytic functions and no Jankov–von Neumann uniformization. The definitions in this mission are reusable by the later missions of the series (Chapters 8–10), which restate them locally until these are published.

Difficulty

The obvious route to a selector is to choose, for each xxx, a minimizing or near-minimizing yyy. The axiom of choice provides such a function, but nothing makes it measurable, and the conclusion of the theorem is exactly that measurability. The Borel route fails too: the set {x∣f∗(x)<c}\{x\mid f^*(x)<c\}{x∣f∗(x)<c} is a projection of a Borel set, which is analytic but in general not Borel, so no Borel-measurable selector exists in general. The Jankov–von Neumann theorem needs a lexicographically least branch of a continuous parametrization of AAA by N\mathscr NN, and an argument that the resulting map is measurable with respect to AX\mathscr A_XAX​, which is generated by sets that are not closed under complementation. Part (b) adds a further obstacle: the composite of two analytically measurable maps need not be analytically measurable, so the exact selector is only universally measurable. Proving that requires Lusin's theorem that analytic sets are measurable for every completed probability measure.

Formalization scope

  • A Borel space is a type with a topology satisfying the class IsBorelSpace (Definition 7.7, the ambient complete separable metric space taken in the same universe), together with Mathlib's [MeasurableSpace X] [BorelSpace X], so measurable sets are exactly the Borel sets. On X×YX\times YX×Y the product σ-algebra is used; it coincides with BX×Y\mathscr B_{X\times Y}BX×Y​ for separable metrizable spaces (Proposition 7.13).
  • Analytic sets are Mathlib's MeasureTheory.AnalyticSet (empty or a continuous image of ℕ → ℕ).
  • R∗R^*R∗ is EReal. The book uses ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞, and Mathlib's EReal uses ⊥+⊤=⊥\bot+\top=\bot⊥+⊤=⊥. No statement of this mission adds infinities of opposite sign; f∗(x)+εf^*(x)+\varepsilonf∗(x)+ε adds a real number.
  • Functions on DDD and on projX(D)\mathrm{proj}_X(D)projX​(D) are functions on subtypes. The graph condition Gr(φ)⊆D\mathrm{Gr}(\varphi)\subseteq DGr(φ)⊆D is part of every selector statement.
  • Universally measurable means NullMeasurableSet E p for every probability measure p.
  • "Analytically measurable" refers to the σ-algebra generated by analytic sets. Replacing it by the power set, dropping the graph condition, or dropping the −1/ε-1/\varepsilon−1/ε case would make the selection theorems a consequence of the axiom of choice. The statements rule all three out.

Not included: Lusin's theorem in Suslin-scheme form (Proposition 7.42, which needs the Suslin operation as a definition), Proposition 7.43 on P(X)P(X)P(X), the integration results of Propositions 7.46 and 7.48, and Lemma 7.30(2)–(4). None is used in the proof of the goal. Contributions welcome: the bridge between IsBorelSpace and Mathlib's StandardBorelSpace, the universal σ-algebra API, and the Jankov–von Neumann theorem itself.

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press 1978; Athena Scientific 1996, §7.6–7.7. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • D. Blackwell, D. Freedman and M. Orkin, The optimal reward operator in dynamic programming, Annals of Probability 2 (1974) 926–941. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996558
  • A. S. Kechris, Classical Descriptive Set Theory, Graduate Texts in Mathematics 156, Springer 1995, §18 (Jankov–von Neumann uniformization), §29 (measurability of analytic sets). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-4190-4
  • S. E. Shreve and D. P. Bertsekas, Universally measurable policies in dynamic programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 4 (1979) 15–30. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.1.15
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Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case V: Semicontinuous Functions — a Borel-Measurable Minimizing Selector for Lower Semicontinuous CostsTextbook

Motivation

Every step of the dynamic programming algorithm on a general state space does three things: it takes a conditional expectation of the cost-to-go under a transition kernel, it minimizes the resulting function of state and control over the control, and, if a policy is to be produced, it picks a control for each state that attains or nearly attains that minimum. On a finite or countable state space all three are harmless. On an uncountable state space each can destroy the measurability needed to take the next expectation: the infimum over an uncountable family of measurable functions need not be measurable, and a minimizer chosen state by state need not be a measurable function of the state, so it does not define a policy at all.

Section 7.5 of Bertsekas and Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case (1978; Athena Scientific reprint 1996), settles the three operations for semicontinuous costs and continuous kernels. The results are the topological half of the book's measurability theory; the descriptive set theory half (lower semianalytic functions and analytically measurable selectors, §7.6–7.7) is a separate mission in this series. The semicontinuous results are what Propositions 8.6–8.7 and Corollaries 9.17.2–9.17.3 of the book use to obtain Borel-measurable optimal policies for finite-horizon and infinite-horizon models with lower semicontinuous costs and compact control sets.

Timeline. The exact selection theorem for lower semicontinuous functions (Proposition 7.33 below) is credited by the book's notes to Dubins and Savage, How to Gamble If You Must (1965). The Hausdorff metric on closed sets goes back to Hausdorff's Set Theory. Measurable selection in the closed-valued setting was later systematized by Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski (1965), whose theorem gives a different route to results of this kind.

Setting

Throughout, R∗=[−∞,+∞]R^*=[-\infty,+\infty]R∗=[−∞,+∞] is the extended real line. A function f:X→R∗f:X\to R^*f:X→R∗ on a metrizable space XXX is lower semicontinuous if every sublevel set {x∣f(x)≤c}\{x\mid f(x)\le c\}{x∣f(x)≤c}, c∈Rc\in\mathbb Rc∈R, is closed, and upper semicontinuous if every superlevel set {x∣f(x)≥c}\{x\mid f(x)\ge c\}{x∣f(x)≥c} is closed (Definition 7.13). C(X)C(X)C(X) is the space of bounded continuous real-valued functions on XXX.

For a separable metrizable space YYY, P(Y)P(Y)P(Y) is the set of Borel probability measures on YYY with the weak topology (convergence of integrals of functions in C(Y)C(Y)C(Y)). A stochastic kernel q(dy∣x)q(dy\mid x)q(dy∣x) on YYY given XXX is a map x↦q(dy∣x)x\mapsto q(dy\mid x)x↦q(dy∣x) from XXX to P(Y)P(Y)P(Y), and it is continuous if this map is continuous (Definition 7.12). The integral of a Borel-measurable f:Y→R∗f:Y\to R^*f:Y→R∗ is ∫f dp=∫f+dp−∫f−dp\int f\,dp=\int f^+dp-\int f^-dp∫fdp=∫f+dp−∫f−dp with the convention −∞+∞=+∞−∞=+∞-\infty+\infty=+\infty-\infty=+\infty−∞+∞=+∞−∞=+∞ (Eq. (43) of Chapter 7).

For a compact metric space YYY, 2Y2^Y2Y is the collection of closed subsets of YYY with the topology of the Hausdorff metric (Appendix C). For D⊆X×YD\subseteq X\times YD⊆X×Y, the section at xxx is Dx={y∣(x,y)∈D}D_x=\{y\mid (x,y)\in D\}Dx​={y∣(x,y)∈D}, the projection is projX(D)={x∣Dx≠∅}\mathrm{proj}_X(D)=\{x\mid D_x\neq\emptyset\}projX​(D)={x∣Dx​=∅}, and a function φ:projX(D)→Y\varphi:\mathrm{proj}_X(D)\to Yφ:projX​(D)→Y has its graph in DDD if (x,φ(x))∈D(x,\varphi(x))\in D(x,φ(x))∈D for every x∈projX(D)x\in\mathrm{proj}_X(D)x∈projX​(D). "Borel-measurable" refers to the Borel σ-algebras of the topologies in question; on projX(D)\mathrm{proj}_X(D)projX​(D) this is the Borel σ-algebra of the subspace topology.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7.33

Let XXX be metrizable, YYY compact metrizable, D⊆X×YD\subseteq X\times YD⊆X×Y closed, and f:D→R∗f:D\to R^*f:D→R∗ lower semicontinuous. Put

f∗(x)=min⁡y∈Dxf(x,y),x∈projX(D).f^*(x)=\min_{y\in D_x}f(x,y),\qquad x\in\mathrm{proj}_X(D).f∗(x)=y∈Dx​min​f(x,y),x∈projX​(D).

Then projX(D)\mathrm{proj}_X(D)projX​(D) is closed, f∗f^*f∗ is lower semicontinuous, and there is a Borel-measurable φ:projX(D)→Y\varphi:\mathrm{proj}_X(D)\to Yφ:projX​(D)→Y with graph in DDD and

f(x,φ(x))=f∗(x)∀x∈projX(D).f\bigl(x,\varphi(x)\bigr)=f^*(x)\qquad\forall x\in\mathrm{proj}_X(D).f(x,φ(x))=f∗(x)∀x∈projX​(D).

Milestones

  • Proposition 7.32: for f∗(x)=inf⁡y∈Yf(x,y)f^*(x)=\inf_{y\in Y}f(x,y)f∗(x)=infy∈Y​f(x,y), lower semicontinuity of fff and compactness of YYY give lower semicontinuity of f∗f^*f∗ and attainment; upper semicontinuity of fff gives upper semicontinuity of f∗f^*f∗.
  • Lemma 7.18: there is a Borel-measurable σ:2Y−{∅}→Y\sigma:2^Y-\{\emptyset\}\to Yσ:2Y−{∅}→Y with σ(A)∈A\sigma(A)\in Aσ(A)∈A.
  • Lemma 7.20: for lower semicontinuous fff on a nonempty compact YYY, the argmin map x↦{y∣f(x,y)≤f∗(x)}x\mapsto\{y\mid f(x,y)\le f^*(x)\}x↦{y∣f(x,y)≤f∗(x)} is Borel-measurable into 2Y2^Y2Y.
  • Lemma 7.14: fff is lower semicontinuous and bounded below iff fn↑ff_n\uparrow ffn​↑f for some fn∈C(X)f_n\in C(X)fn​∈C(X) (and dually).
  • Proposition 7.30: x↦∫f(x,y) q(dy∣x)x\mapsto\int f(x,y)\,q(dy\mid x)x↦∫f(x,y)q(dy∣x) is continuous for f∈C(X×Y)f\in C(X\times Y)f∈C(X×Y) and continuous qqq.
  • Proposition 7.31: the same map is lower (upper) semicontinuous and bounded below (above) when fff is.
  • Lemma 7.21: an open G⊆X×YG\subseteq X\times YG⊆X×Y, YYY separable, has open projection and a Borel-measurable selector with graph in GGG.
  • Proposition 7.34: for open DDD and upper semicontinuous fff, projX(D)\mathrm{proj}_X(D)projX​(D) is open, f∗=inf⁡Dxff^*=\inf_{D_x}ff∗=infDx​​f is upper semicontinuous, and for each ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is a Borel-measurable φε\varphi_\varepsilonφε​ with graph in DDD and
f(x,φε(x))≤{f∗(x)+εif f∗(x)>−∞,−1/εif f∗(x)=−∞.f\bigl(x,\varphi_\varepsilon(x)\bigr)\le\begin{cases}f^*(x)+\varepsilon&\text{if }f^*(x)>-\infty,\\-1/\varepsilon&\text{if }f^*(x)=-\infty.\end{cases}f(x,φε​(x))≤{f∗(x)+ε−1/ε​if f∗(x)>−∞,if f∗(x)=−∞.​

Significance

The results. Propositions 7.31–7.33 are the closure properties that make the dynamic programming recursion stay inside the class of lower semicontinuous functions bounded below: the expectation step preserves the class (7.31), the minimization step preserves it (7.32, 7.33), and the minimization admits a Borel-measurable exact minimizer (7.33). This is why, in semicontinuous models, the optimal cost functions are lower semicontinuous and optimal policies can be taken Borel-measurable and nonrandomized. Proposition 7.34 gives the weaker, ε\varepsilonε-optimal counterpart for upper semicontinuous costs, where the infimum need not be attained.

Formalizing them. All of these results are proved in the book; none is open. As far as is known, none has a machine-checked proof: Mathlib has semicontinuity, the Hausdorff extended metric on closed and on nonempty compact sets, and the weak topology on probability measures, but no theorem combining them into a measurable selection result of this kind. A formal development would supply measurable selectors for semicontinuous minimization in Lean and the Borel-measurability of set-valued maps into the hyperspace of closed sets, both reusable well beyond dynamic programming.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt at the goal is to pick, for each xxx, some minimizer yyy of f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) over the compact section DxD_xDx​. The minimizer exists by compactness and lower semicontinuity, but the choice is made pointwise and gives no control on measurability: a minimizer chosen by the axiom of choice need not be Borel-measurable. The argmin sets F∗(x)F^*(x)F∗(x) vary with xxx only semicontinuously: they can jump from a single point to a large set, so a continuous selection generally does not exist, and continuity arguments cannot replace measurability. Lemma 7.18 isolates the hardest part: a choice of a point of each nonempty closed set that is measurable as a function of the set itself.

A second difficulty is bookkeeping at infinity. Values ±∞\pm\infty±∞ are allowed throughout, so sublevel sets, minima, integrals and ε\varepsilonε-bounds must all be handled in R∗R^*R∗; the integral in Proposition 7.31 uses the convention ∞−∞=+∞\infty-\infty=+\infty∞−∞=+∞, which is not Mathlib's.

Formalization scope

  • Extended reals. Values are in EReal. The only place where values of opposite infinite sign are combined is the integral, which is the published definition DupacovaWets.Consistency.expect (reused, not restated): ∫f+−∫f−\int f^+-\int f^-∫f+−∫f− with an explicit case returning +∞+\infty+∞ when ∫f+=∞\int f^+=\infty∫f+=∞, exactly the book's convention (42). The ε\varepsilonε-bound of Proposition 7.34 adds a real ε\varepsilonε to a value different from −∞-\infty−∞, which is safe in EReal.
  • Semicontinuity is Mathlib's LowerSemicontinuous/UpperSemicontinuous, equivalent to Definition 7.13 for EReal-valued functions. Lemma 7.13 of the book (the sequential characterization) is Mathlib's lowerSemicontinuous_iff_le_liminf together with first countability of metrizable spaces, and is not restated here.
  • Functions on DDD. Functions "on DDD" are functions on X×YX\times YX×Y with LowerSemicontinuousOn f D (resp. UpperSemicontinuousOn); values off DDD play no role. projX(D)\mathrm{proj}_X(D)projX​(D) is Prod.fst '' D, selectors are functions on that subtype, and its σ-algebra is the Borel σ-algebra of the subspace topology.
  • Hyperspace. 2Y2^Y2Y is Closeds Y, and 2Y−{∅}2^Y-\{\emptyset\}2Y−{∅} for compact YYY is NonemptyCompacts Y, each with the Hausdorff extended metric and the Borel σ-algebra of its topology. This topology agrees with the book's (the exponential topology of Appendix C, independent of the metric).
  • Boundedness. "Bounded below/above" is by a real constant. BddBelow in EReal would be vacuous and is not used.
  • Edge cases. Proposition 7.32(a)'s attainment clause is stated for nonempty YYY, since for Y=∅Y=\emptysetY=∅ the infimum is +∞+\infty+∞ and nothing attains it.
  • Argmin minimum. Lemma 7.20 assumes nonempty YYY because its defining formula uses a minimum; for empty YYY there is no minimizer.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. The graph condition (x,φ(x))∈D(x,\varphi(x))\in D(x,φ(x))∈D is part of every selection statement; without it the goal would follow from the unconstrained case. The selector must be Borel-measurable on projX(D)\mathrm{proj}_X(D)projX​(D) and must attain the minimum exactly, not up to ε\varepsilonε.

A complete development needs the Borel structure of the hyperspace (measurability of maps into Closeds Y from upper semicontinuity in the sense of Kuratowski, Proposition C.4 of the book), the construction of a measurable choice function on NonemptyCompacts Y, and approximation of semicontinuous functions by monotone sequences in C(X)C(X)C(X). Each of these is reusable on its own; proofs of individual milestones by any route are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press, 1978; Athena Scientific reprint, 1996, Section 7.5 and Appendix C. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • L. E. Dubins and L. J. Savage, How to Gamble If You Must: Inequalities for Stochastic Processes, McGraw-Hill, 1965.
  • K. Kuratowski and C. Ryll-Nardzewski, "A general theorem on selectors," Bull. Acad. Polon. Sci. 13 (1965), 397–403.
  • F. Hausdorff, Set Theory, Chelsea, New York, 1957.
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Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts 5: A 3e-Competitive Algorithm for the Graphic Matroid Secretary ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

In the secretary problem, nnn items with nonnegative values arrive one at a time in a uniformly random order, and an online algorithm must decide on each arrival, irrevocably, whether to keep it. The classical version keeps one item; the rule that observes a 1/e1/e1/e fraction of the arrivals and then takes the first item better than everything seen picks the best item with probability at least 1/e1/e1/e (Ferguson 1989).

Babaioff, Immorlica and Kleinberg (SODA 2007; journal version J. ACM 2018) introduced the matroid secretary problem: the kept set must be independent in a known matroid. It models online auctions in which the feasible sets of winners have matroid structure, for example hiring along the edges of a network without closing a cycle. They gave a 161616-competitive algorithm when the matroid is graphic, i.e. the items are the edges of a graph and a set is feasible when it contains no cycle.

Timeline for graphic matroids:

  • 2007, Babaioff–Immorlica–Kleinberg: 161616-competitive.
  • 2009, Babaioff–Dinitz–Gupta–Immorlica–Talwar (SODA 2009, Theorem 1.5): 3e≈8.153e\approx 8.153e≈8.15-competitive, through a random reduction to partition matroids. This mission formalizes that result.
  • 2009, Korula–Pál (ICALP 2009): 2e2e2e-competitive, by a different reduction.

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a finite simple graph. Each edge eee has a value v(e)≥0v(e)\ge 0v(e)≥0. A set S⊆ES\subseteq ES⊆E is independent in the graphic matroid of GGG if the graph (V,S)(V,S)(V,S) has no cycle. The offline optimum is

OPT(G,v)=max⁡{∑e∈Sv(e):S⊆E acyclic}.\mathrm{OPT}(G,v)=\max\Big\{\sum_{e\in S}v(e): S\subseteq E\ \text{acyclic}\Big\}.OPT(G,v)=max{e∈S∑​v(e):S⊆E acyclic}.

The edges arrive in a uniformly random order. An algorithm sees each edge and its value on arrival and decides at once whether to select it. The selected set must be acyclic. The algorithm is α\alphaα-competitive if OPT(G,v)≤α⋅E[value of the selected set]\mathrm{OPT}(G,v)\le\alpha\cdot\mathbb E[\text{value of the selected set}]OPT(G,v)≤α⋅E[value of the selected set] for every GGG and every v≥0v\ge 0v≥0.

A partition matroid on a subset U′⊆EU'\subseteq EU′⊆E is given by a family PPP of nonempty, pairwise disjoint parts with union U′U'U′: a set is independent when it lies in U′U'U′ and meets each part at most once. Its max-weight base has value val(P,v)=∑p∈Pmax⁡e∈pv(e)\mathrm{val}(P,v)=\sum_{p\in P}\max_{e\in p}v(e)val(P,v)=∑p∈P​maxe∈p​v(e).

Definition 5.1. A random partition μ\muμ (a probability distribution on such families, chosen from GGG alone) is an α\alphaα-partition scheme if every partition in its support has only acyclic independent sets, and for every v≥0v\ge 0v≥0,

OPT(G,v)≤α⋅EP∼μ[val(P,v)].\mathrm{OPT}(G,v)\le \alpha\cdot\mathbb E_{P\sim\mu}[\mathrm{val}(P,v)].OPT(G,v)≤α⋅EP∼μ​[val(P,v)].

The random partition of Lemma 5.3. Pick an edge {u,w}\{u,w\}{u,w} uniformly at random. With probability 12\tfrac1221​ colour uuu red and www blue, otherwise the reverse. Colour every other vertex red or blue independently with probability 12\tfrac1221​. Each red vertex xxx gets a part: the red-blue edges at xxx. Then repeat on the edges with both endpoints blue, with fresh randomness.

The algorithm. Draw the partition, let the edges arrive, and on each part run the classical secretary rule on that part's arrivals. Output all selected edges.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.5

For every finite simple graph GGG and every v≥0v\ge 0v≥0:

  1. every possible output of the algorithm is an acyclic set of edges of GGG;
OPT(G,v)≤3e⋅E[ALG].\mathrm{OPT}(G,v)\le 3e\cdot\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}].OPT(G,v)≤3e⋅E[ALG].

Part 1 is needed for the statement to have content: an algorithm that selects every edge would otherwise satisfy part 2.

Milestones

  • Section 2, p. 4. On m≥1m\ge1m≥1 arrivals, the classical rule selects the maximum with probability at least 1/e1/e1/e.
  • Theorem 5.4, first clause. For a fixed partition PPP, the per-part rule outputs a set independent in the partition matroid, and val(P,v)≤e⋅Eπ[ALG]\mathrm{val}(P,v)\le e\cdot\mathbb E_\pi[\mathrm{ALG}]val(P,v)≤e⋅Eπ​[ALG].
  • Lemma 5.3, independence. Every partition the random construction can produce is a partition matroid on a subset of EEE, and each of its independent sets is a forest.
  • Lemma 5.3. The construction is a 333-partition scheme.
  • Section 5, p. 10. Any α\alphaα-partition scheme for a graphic matroid, combined with the per-part rule, gives a feasible, eαe\alphaeα-competitive algorithm.

Significance

The theorem shows that the graphic matroid secretary problem admits a constant-competitive algorithm with a small explicit constant. It does so through a reduction: a random partition matroid that is feasible for the original matroid and loses only a constant factor in expectation. The reduction separates the combinatorics (Lemma 5.3) from the online part (Theorem 5.4). The same framework gives algorithms for uniform and transversal matroids and for the weighted and discounted variants on any matroid with an α\alphaα-partition property.

The result is proved in the paper; it has not been formalized. The mission contributes a machine-checked version of the reduction, a formal treatment of a recursively defined random partition, and the classical secretary bound in a reusable finite form. The constant 3e3e3e is not the best known for graphic matroids (Korula–Pál improve it to 2e2e2e), so the formal goal is this algorithm's guarantee, not the best possible ratio.

Difficulty

The online half is routine once the classical bound is available: the relative order of the edges in each part is uniform, and the parts are disjoint. The difficulty is Lemma 5.3. The natural idea of using a fixed optimal forest to build the partition is ruled out because the partition must be chosen before the values are seen. The expectation bound must therefore hold for every valuation at once, for a law that depends on the graph only. The construction is recursive and random: its expected value is not a closed-form sum, and any bound has to be carried through the random sequence of blue-blue subgraphs. Feasibility needs an invariant across rounds: the parts created later live inside the blue-blue edges of every earlier round.

Formalization scope

  • Graph. A SimpleGraph on a Fintype vertex type with decidable adjacency. The edges are G.edgeFinset, and acyclicity of SSS is (SimpleGraph.fromEdgeSet S).IsAcyclic. Multigraphs are not covered.
  • Values. Values are a real function v : Sym2 V → ℝ with ∀ e, 0 ≤ v e; only the values on edges matter.
  • OPT is a Finset.sup' over acyclic subsets of the edge set. A partition is a finite family of nonempty, pairwise disjoint parts inside the edge set. Its max-weight base value is the sum of the part maxima.
  • Random partition. A PMF defined by well-founded recursion on the number of edges. Empty parts are dropped, and edges with two red endpoints are discarded.
  • Random order. The edges are numbered by a fixed enumeration. An arrival order is a permutation of the numbers, and expectation over the order is the average over all ∣E∣!|E|!∣E∣! permutations.
  • Classical rule. It samples ⌊m/e⌋\lfloor m/e\rfloor⌊m/e⌋ arrivals of a part with mmm edges. Ties are broken by preferring the smaller edge number among equal values.
  • Constants. Competitiveness is multiplicative (OPT≤3e⋅E[ALG]\mathrm{OPT}\le 3e\cdot\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]OPT≤3e⋅E[ALG]), so a zero expectation is not a loophole.
  • Ruling out trivial formalizations. In Definition 5.1 the random partition is fixed before the valuation, and the independence requirement holds for every partition in its support. A partition allowed to depend on vvv would make every matroid 111-partitionable.

A complete development needs the classical secretary bound in finite form, the uniformity of induced sub-orders of a uniform permutation, expectations of PMF.bind along a well-founded recursion, and facts about forests in SimpleGraph. The first two, and a general graphic-matroid layer, are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, alternative proofs of Lemma 5.3, and extensions to the uniform and transversal cases of Theorem 5.2 are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Babaioff, M. Dinitz, A. Gupta, N. Immorlica, K. Talwar, Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts, Proc. 20th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973068.135
  • M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, R. Kleinberg, Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms, SODA 2007, pp. 434–443. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1283383.1283429
  • M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, D. Kempe, R. Kleinberg, Matroid Secretary Problems, Journal of the ACM 65(6), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3212512
  • N. Korula, M. Pál, Algorithms for Secretary Problems on Graphs and Hypergraphs, ICALP 2009, LNCS 5556. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02930-1_42
  • T. S. Ferguson, Who solved the secretary problem?, Statistical Science 4(3), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1177012493
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Linear OptimizationMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Dantzig Selector: Statistical Estimation When p Is Much Larger than n 2: Oracle Inequality within a Logarithmic Factor of the Ideal Mean Squared ErrorResearch Paper

Motivation

Many regression problems have far more unknown coefficients ppp than observations nnn: gene expression studies with tens of samples and thousands of genes, imaging from few measurements, nonparametric curve recovery from a finite number of noisy samples. Estimation is hopeless in general, but becomes possible when the parameter is sparse, that is, has few nonzero entries. Candès and Tao (arXiv:math/0506081; Ann. Statist. 35(6), 2007, doi:10.1214/009053606000001523) proposed the Dantzig selector, an estimator computed by a single linear program, and showed that its squared error is within a logarithmic factor of what an oracle that knew which coefficients matter could achieve.

The estimator became one of the two standard ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ methods for high-dimensional regression, alongside the Lasso; the comparison of the two by Bickel, Ritov and Tsybakov (arXiv:0801.1095, 2009) is built on it. This mission targets the paper's main result, the oracle inequality (Theorem 1.2). A companion mission covers the simpler ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ bound for sparse parameters (Theorem 1.1).

Setting

Observations follow the linear model

y=Xβ+z,y = X\beta + z,y=Xβ+z,

where X∈Rn×pX\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}X∈Rn×p is a deterministic design matrix with columns X1,…,XpX_1,\dots,X_pX1​,…,Xp​, each of Euclidean norm ∥Xj∥ℓ2=1\|X_j\|_{\ell_2}=1∥Xj​∥ℓ2​​=1; β∈Rp\beta\in\mathbb R^pβ∈Rp is an unknown deterministic parameter; and z=(z1,…,zn)z=(z_1,\dots,z_n)z=(z1​,…,zn​) has independent N(0,σ2)N(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) coordinates, σ>0\sigma>0σ>0. The vector β\betaβ is SSS-sparse if at most SSS of its entries are nonzero.

Two constants of XXX measure how close sparse sets of columns are to being orthonormal. The restricted isometry constant δS\delta_SδS​ is the smallest δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 such that (1−δ)∥c∥ℓ22≤∥Xc∥ℓ22≤(1+δ)∥c∥ℓ22(1-\delta)\|c\|_{\ell_2}^2\le\|Xc\|_{\ell_2}^2\le(1+\delta)\|c\|_{\ell_2}^2(1−δ)∥c∥ℓ2​2​≤∥Xc∥ℓ2​2​≤(1+δ)∥c∥ℓ2​2​ for every ccc supported on at most SSS indices. The restricted orthogonality constant θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​ (defined for S+S′≤pS+S'\le pS+S′≤p) is the smallest θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0 with ∣⟨Xc,Xc′⟩∣≤θ∥c∥ℓ2∥c′∥ℓ2|\langle Xc,Xc'\rangle|\le\theta\|c\|_{\ell_2}\|c'\|_{\ell_2}∣⟨Xc,Xc′⟩∣≤θ∥c∥ℓ2​​∥c′∥ℓ2​​ whenever c,c′c,c'c,c′ are supported on disjoint sets of sizes at most SSS and S′S'S′. Below δ:=δ2S\delta:=\delta_{2S}δ:=δ2S​ and θ:=θS,2S\theta:=\theta_{S,2S}θ:=θS,2S​.

For a tuning level λp>0\lambda_p>0λp​>0, a Dantzig selector β^\hat\betaβ^​ is any solution of

min⁡β~∈Rp∥β~∥ℓ1subject to∥X∗(y−Xβ~)∥ℓ∞=sup⁡1≤j≤p∣⟨y−Xβ~,Xj⟩∣≤λpσ.\min_{\tilde\beta\in\mathbb R^p}\|\tilde\beta\|_{\ell_1}\quad\text{subject to}\quad\|X^*(y-X\tilde\beta)\|_{\ell_\infty}=\sup_{1\le j\le p}|\langle y-X\tilde\beta,X_j\rangle|\le\lambda_p\sigma .β~​∈Rpmin​∥β~​∥ℓ1​​subject to∥X∗(y−Xβ~​)∥ℓ∞​​=1≤j≤psup​∣⟨y−Xβ~​,Xj​⟩∣≤λp​σ.

The ideal mean squared error is ∑i=1pmin⁡(βi2,σ2)\sum_{i=1}^p\min(\beta_i^2,\sigma^2)∑i=1p​min(βi2​,σ2): the risk of an oracle that keeps exactly the coordinates above the noise level.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.2 (pp. 8–9)

Let t>0t>0t>0, a≥0a\ge0a≥0, and λp:=(1+a+t−1)2log⁡p\lambda_p:=(\sqrt{1+a}+t^{-1})\sqrt{2\log p}λp​:=(1+a​+t−1)2logp​. If β\betaβ is SSS-sparse and δ2S+θS,2S<1−t\delta_{2S}+\theta_{S,2S}<1-tδ2S​+θS,2S​<1−t, then with probability exceeding 1−(πlog⁡p⋅pa)−11-(\sqrt{\pi\log p}\cdot p^a)^{-1}1−(πlogp​⋅pa)−1 every Dantzig selector obeys

∥β^−β∥ℓ22≤C22⋅λp2⋅(σ2+∑i=1pmin⁡(βi2,σ2)),\|\hat\beta-\beta\|_{\ell_2}^2\le C_2^2\cdot\lambda_p^2\cdot\Big(\sigma^2+\sum_{i=1}^p\min(\beta_i^2,\sigma^2)\Big),∥β^​−β∥ℓ2​2​≤C22​⋅λp2​⋅(σ2+i=1∑p​min(βi2​,σ2)),

with the explicit constant (1.14)

C2=2C01−δ−θ+2θ(1+δ)(1−δ−θ)2+1+δ1−δ−θ,C0=22(1+1−δ21−δ−θ)+(1+12)(1+δ)21−δ−θ.C_2=\frac{2C_0}{1-\delta-\theta}+\frac{2\theta(1+\delta)}{(1-\delta-\theta)^2}+\frac{1+\delta}{1-\delta-\theta},\qquad C_0=2\sqrt2\Big(1+\frac{1-\delta^2}{1-\delta-\theta}\Big)+\Big(1+\frac1{\sqrt2}\Big)\frac{(1+\delta)^2}{1-\delta-\theta}.C2​=1−δ−θ2C0​​+(1−δ−θ)22θ(1+δ)​+1−δ−θ1+δ​,C0​=22​(1+1−δ−θ1−δ2​)+(1+2​1​)1−δ−θ(1+δ)2​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.2: ∥Xβ∥ℓ2≤1+δ (∥β∥ℓ2+(2S)−1/2∥β∥ℓ1)\|X\beta\|_{\ell_2}\le\sqrt{1+\delta}\,(\|\beta\|_{\ell_2}+(2S)^{-1/2}\|\beta\|_{\ell_1})∥Xβ∥ℓ2​​≤1+δ​(∥β∥ℓ2​​+(2S)−1/2∥β∥ℓ1​​) for every β\betaβ.
  2. Lemma A.1 (dual sparse reconstruction, ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ version): for ccc supported on ∣T∣≤2S|T|\le2S∣T∣≤2S, a vector β\betaβ on TTT whose correlations ⟨Xβ,Xj⟩\langle X\beta,X_j\rangle⟨Xβ,Xj​⟩ equal cjc_jcj​ on TTT and are small off TTT except on an exceptional set of size at most SSS, with bounds (6.1)–(6.6).
  3. Corollary A.2 (ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ version): the same without exceptional set, constants 1/(1−δ−θ)1/(1-\delta-\theta)1/(1−δ−θ).
  4. Corollary A.3 (constrained thresholding): an SSS-sparse β\betaβ with ∥β∥ℓ2<λS\|\beta\|_{\ell_2}<\lambda\sqrt S∥β∥ℓ2​​<λS​ splits as β′+β′′\beta'+\beta''β′+β′′ with β′\beta'β′ small in ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ and ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ and ∥X∗Xβ′′∥ℓ∞<1−δ21−δ−θλ\|X^*X\beta''\|_{\ell_\infty}<\frac{1-\delta^2}{1-\delta-\theta}\lambda∥X∗Xβ′′∥ℓ∞​​<1−δ−θ1−δ2​λ.
  5. Gaussian tail bound (Section 3, p. 15): P(sup⁡j∣⟨z,Xj⟩∣>u)≤2p φ(u)/uP(\sup_j|\langle z,X_j\rangle|>u)\le2p\,\varphi(u)/uP(supj​∣⟨z,Xj​⟩∣>u)≤2pφ(u)/u for standard Gaussian noise.
  6. Lemma 3.1: the ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ mass of hhh on T0T_0T0​ and its top SSS positions outside T0T_0T0​ is controlled by ∥XT01TXh∥ℓ2\|X^T_{T_{01}}Xh\|_{\ell_2}∥XT01​T​Xh∥ℓ2​​ and ∥h∥ℓ1(T0c)\|h\|_{\ell_1(T_0^c)}∥h∥ℓ1​(T0c​)​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1.2 says that a single linear program, which knows neither the support of β\betaβ nor which coefficients exceed the noise, matches the oracle risk ∑imin⁡(βi2,σ2)\sum_i\min(\beta_i^2,\sigma^2)∑i​min(βi2​,σ2) up to a factor O(log⁡p)O(\log p)O(logp), uniformly over SSS-sparse parameters and with explicit, nonasymptotic constants. For coefficients well below the noise level it is far sharper than the σ2Slog⁡p\sigma^2 S\log pσ2Slogp bound of Theorem 1.1. It is the template for later oracle inequalities for ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-penalized estimators under restricted isometry or restricted eigenvalue conditions.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, but parts of the argument are only sketched: Corollary A.2 refers to the 2005 Decoding by Linear Programming paper for its convergence argument, and Corollary A.3's ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ bound is printed with a constant its own proof does not deliver. A machine-checked proof settles these steps. The restricted isometry and orthogonality constants used here are already published on the platform from the decoding series; the appendix lemmas on dual vectors are reusable for any compressed-sensing result in that framework. No formalization of the Dantzig selector's oracle inequality is known to us.

Difficulty

The natural proof compares β^\hat\betaβ^​ with the hard-thresholded parameter β(1)\beta^{(1)}β(1) that keeps only the large coefficients: if β(1)\beta^{(1)}β(1) were feasible for the Dantzig constraint, the analysis of Theorem 1.1 would apply directly. It is not feasible in general, because the small coefficients β(2)\beta^{(2)}β(2), though individually below the noise level, can add up to a large correlation X∗Xβ(2)X^*X\beta^{(2)}X∗Xβ(2). The central difficulty is to split β(2)\beta^{(2)}β(2) into a part with controlled ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ and ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ norm and a part invisible to the constraint; this requires constructing dual vectors with prescribed correlations (Lemma A.1, Corollary A.2), via an iterative, geometrically convergent correction. The probabilistic part is a Gaussian tail estimate plus a union bound, and the bookkeeping of constants must be carried through exactly.

Formalization scope

Vectors are functions Fin p → ℝ, the design is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin p) ℝ, and the noise is a family z : Fin n → Ω → ℝ of mutually independent random variables (iIndepFun) each with law gaussianReal 0 σ². δ2S\delta_{2S}δ2S​ and θS,2S\theta_{S,2S}θS,2S​ are the published CandesTao.Decoding.restrictedIsometryConst X (2*S) and restrictedOrthogonalityConst X S (2*S) (infima, absolute value in the orthogonality condition). Domain: S≥1S\ge1S≥1 and 3S≤p3S\le p3S≤p (the paper defines θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​ for S+S′≤pS+S'\le pS+S′≤p), which forces p≥3p\ge3p≥3 and log⁡p>0\log p>0logp>0. A Dantzig selector is any ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ minimizer over the feasible set; the ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ constraint is a bound on every coordinate.

The goal bounds from above the (outer) probability of the bad event "no Dantzig selector exists, or some Dantzig selector violates (1.13)". Because the event includes non-existence, a definition no vector satisfies cannot make the theorem vacuous; and the constant C2C_2C2​ is the printed (1.14), evaluated at δ2S\delta_{2S}δ2S​, θS,2S\theta_{S,2S}θS,2S​ of XXX, not a free constant chosen after the fact.

Corrected constant: Corollary A.3 is stated with ∥β′∥ℓ1≤21+δ1−δ−θ∥β∥ℓ22/λ\|\beta'\|_{\ell_1}\le2\frac{1+\delta}{1-\delta-\theta}\|\beta\|_{\ell_2}^2/\lambda∥β′∥ℓ1​​≤21−δ−θ1+δ​∥β∥ℓ2​2​/λ, the bound its proof gives once Corollary A.2 is applied at an integer sparsity level; the printed statement omits the factor 222. Corollary A.2 carries Lemma A.1's standing hypothesis δ+θ<1\delta+\theta<1δ+θ<1. The deterministic lemmas (3.1, 3.2, A.1–A.3) assume nothing about column norms, since their statements do not need it.

Useful infrastructure: monotonicity of δS\delta_SδS​ and θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​ in their indices (the proof applies the lemmas at a smaller sparsity level), the Gaussian tail bound 1−Φ(u)<φ(u)/u1-\Phi(u)<\varphi(u)/u1−Φ(u)<φ(u)/u, existence of minimizers of the Dantzig linear program, and a sorting/blocking toolkit for "the SSS largest positions". Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • E. Candès and T. Tao, The Dantzig selector: statistical estimation when p is much larger than n, Ann. Statist. 35(6):2313–2351, 2007. arXiv:math/0506081v3, doi:10.1214/009053606000001523
  • E. Candès and T. Tao, Decoding by linear programming, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 51(12):4203–4215, 2005. arXiv:math/0502327, doi:10.1109/TIT.2005.858979
  • P. Bickel, Y. Ritov and A. Tsybakov, Simultaneous analysis of Lasso and Dantzig selector, Ann. Statist. 37(4):1705–1732, 2009. arXiv:0801.1095, doi:10.1214/08-AOS620
  • D. Donoho and I. Johnstone, Ideal spatial adaptation by wavelet shrinkage, Biometrika 81(3):425–455, 1994. doi:10.1093/biomet/81.3.425
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Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms 6: An Attractor Whose Basin Meets the Attainable Set Contains the Limit Set with Positive ProbabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

A stochastic approximation algorithm is a recursion xn+1=xn+γn+1(F(xn)+Un+1)x_{n+1}=x_n+\gamma_{n+1}\big(F(x_n)+U_{n+1}\big)xn+1​=xn​+γn+1​(F(xn​)+Un+1​) with decreasing step sizes γn\gamma_nγn​ and a noise term Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​. Recursions of this form appear in stochastic gradient methods, adaptive control, learning in games (fictitious play, reinforcement learning) and urn models. The ODE method compares the iterates with the solutions of x˙=F(x)\dot x=F(x)x˙=F(x). In Benaïm's lecture notes (Benaïm 1999), the comparison is phrased through the continuous-time interpolated process XXX. Under standard noise conditions, XXX is almost surely an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF, and its limit set is almost surely internally chain transitive.

That theorem constrains where the process may end up. It does not say which of several candidate sets the process actually reaches. When the ODE has several attractors, for example several stable equilibria of a learning dynamic or several stable compositions of an urn, an application needs to know that each attractor is reached with positive probability. Section 7 of the notes answers this question. The answer is a criterion of attainability: if the process can, with positive probability and at arbitrarily late times, enter the basin of an attractor, then it converges to that attractor with positive probability.

Timeline.

  • Kushner and Clark (1978) proved convergence statements for processes that visit a compact subset of the domain of attraction of an asymptotically stable equilibrium infinitely often.
  • Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1983) and Pemantle (1990) studied urn processes whose limit points depend on the trajectory.
  • Benaïm (1997) and Duflo (1997, Random Iterative Models) developed the attainability argument for general stochastic approximation processes.
  • Benaïm (1999) states it for arbitrary attractors of a semiflow on a locally compact metric space, under a single conditional shadowing condition (24).

Setting

Let (M,d)(M,d)(M,d) be a metric space and let Φ=(Φt)t≥0\Phi=(\Phi_t)_{t\ge0}Φ=(Φt​)t≥0​ be a semiflow on MMM: a continuous map (t,x)↦Φt(x)(t,x)\mapsto\Phi_t(x)(t,x)↦Φt​(x) with Φ0=Id\Phi_0=\mathrm{Id}Φ0​=Id and Φt+s=Φt∘Φs\Phi_{t+s}=\Phi_t\circ\Phi_sΦt+s​=Φt​∘Φs​.

  • A set AAA is invariant if Φt(A)=A\Phi_t(A)=AΦt​(A)=A for all t≥0t\ge0t≥0, and positively invariant if Φt(A)⊂A\Phi_t(A)\subset AΦt​(A)⊂A.
  • An attractor is a nonempty compact invariant set AAA with a neighbourhood WWW on which dist⁡(Φtx,A)→0\operatorname{dist}(\Phi_tx,A)\to0dist(Φt​x,A)→0 uniformly. Its basin B(A)B(A)B(A) is the set of points xxx with dist⁡(Φtx,A)→0\operatorname{dist}(\Phi_tx,A)\to0dist(Φt​x,A)→0.
  • A continuous curve X:R+→MX:\mathbb R_+\to MX:R+​→M is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory if sup⁡0≤h≤Td(X(t+h),Φh(X(t)))→0\sup_{0\le h\le T}d(X(t+h),\Phi_h(X(t)))\to0sup0≤h≤T​d(X(t+h),Φh​(X(t)))→0 as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞, for every T>0T>0T>0.
  • The limit set of XXX is L(X)=⋂t≥0X([t,∞))‾L(X)=\bigcap_{t\ge0}\overline{X([t,\infty))}L(X)=⋂t≥0​X([t,∞))​.
  • For T>0T>0T>0, dX(T)=sup⁡k∈Nd(ΦT(X(kT)),X(kT+T))d_X(T)=\sup_{k\in\mathbb N}d(\Phi_T(X(kT)),X(kT+T))dX​(T)=supk∈N​d(ΦT​(X(kT)),X(kT+T)).

Now let X=(X(t))t≥0X=(X(t))_{t\ge0}X=(X(t))t≥0​ be a process on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) with continuous paths in MMM, adapted to a filtration (Ft)t≥0(\mathcal F_t)_{t\ge0}(Ft​)t≥0​. The standing assumption of Section 7 is that for all δ>0\delta>0δ>0, T>0T>0T>0 and t≥0t\ge0t≥0,

P(sup⁡s≥t sup⁡0≤h≤Td(X(s+h),Φh(X(s)))≥δ ∣ Ft)≤w(t,δ,T)(24)P\Big(\sup_{s\ge t}\ \sup_{0\le h\le T}d\big(X(s+h),\Phi_h(X(s))\big)\ge\delta\ \Big|\ \mathcal F_t\Big)\le w(t,\delta,T)\tag{24}P(s≥tsup​ 0≤h≤Tsup​d(X(s+h),Φh​(X(s)))≥δ ​ Ft​)≤w(t,δ,T)(24)

for a function w≥0w\ge0w≥0 with w(t,δ,T)↓0w(t,\delta,T)\downarrow0w(t,δ,T)↓0 as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞.

A point ppp is attainable if P(∃s≥t:X(s)∈U)>0P(\exists s\ge t: X(s)\in U)>0P(∃s≥t:X(s)∈U)>0 for every t>0t>0t>0 and every open neighbourhood UUU of ppp. Att(X)\mathrm{Att}(X)Att(X) is the set of attainable points.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.3, first statement

If MMM is locally compact, AAA is an attractor of Φ\PhiΦ, and Att(X)∩B(A)≠∅\mathrm{Att}(X)\cap B(A)\neq\emptysetAtt(X)∩B(A)=∅, then

P(L(X)⊂A)>0.P\big(L(X)\subset A\big)>0 .P(L(X)⊂A)>0.

This statement contains no constants and no rates, so it does not depend on how (24) is quantified for a particular algorithm.

Theorem 7.3, second statement

If UUU is open and relatively compact with U‾⊂B(A)\overline U\subset B(A)U⊂B(A), there are T,δ>0T,\delta>0T,δ>0, depending only on UUU (and on Φ\PhiΦ, AAA), such that for every process satisfying the standing assumption and every t≥0t\ge0t≥0

P(L(X)⊂A)≥(1−w(t,δ,T)) P(∃s≥t: X(s)∈U).P\big(L(X)\subset A\big)\ge\big(1-w(t,\delta,T)\big)\,P\big(\exists s\ge t:\ X(s)\in U\big).P(L(X)⊂A)≥(1−w(t,δ,T))P(∃s≥t: X(s)∈U).

Milestones

  • Lemma 6.8. For a nonempty compact K⊂B(A)K\subset B(A)K⊂B(A) there are T,δ>0T,\delta>0T,δ>0 such that every asymptotic pseudotrajectory with X(0)∈KX(0)\in KX(0)∈K and dX(T)<δd_X(T)<\deltadX​(T)<δ has L(X)⊂AL(X)\subset AL(X)⊂A.
  • Lemma 7.1, in three parts:
    • Att(X)\mathrm{Att}(X)Att(X) is closed;
    • it is positively invariant;
    • it contains L(X)L(X)L(X) almost surely.

Significance

The result. Theorem 7.3 turns a question about the long-run limit of a random process into a question about where the process can go. Attainability is usually checked by a controllability argument: the noise can push the iterates in every direction. For urn processes with an urn function mapping the simplex into its interior, every point is attainable (Example 7.2 of the notes). Then every attractor of the mean ODE is reached with positive probability. Combined with nonconvergence results for unstable sets (Section 9 of the notes), this characterizes the possible limits of many learning and urn processes. Theorem 7.3 is the positive half of that picture.

Formalizing it. The theorem has a published proof (p. 32 of the notes) and no machine-checked version. A formal proof needs the following:

  • a precise reading of the conditional shadowing condition (24) as a conditional expectation of an indicator;
  • the stopping-time decomposition of the event {∃s≥t:X(s)∈U}\{\exists s\ge t: X(s)\in U\}{∃s≥t:X(s)∈U} over dyadic times;
  • the deterministic Lemma 6.8, which rests on the limit set theorem for precompact asymptotic pseudotrajectories (Theorem 5.7 of the notes, the subject of mission 1 of this series).

Difficulty

The obvious argument says: once XXX enters a compact part of the basin, the flow carries it into AAA. That fails because XXX is not a trajectory of the flow. Each window of length TTT adds an error, and errors over infinitely many windows can push the process out of the basin.

Two things are needed instead:

  • A uniform version of the deterministic statement, with TTT and δ\deltaδ fixed in advance from the compact set alone. This is Lemma 6.8, which needs local compactness of MMM and the structure of limit sets of asymptotic pseudotrajectories.
  • A probabilistic step that applies (24) at the random time when XXX first enters UUU. That time is not a stopping time on a continuum, and conditioning at it needs care.

A naive union bound over all times is useless: it does not use the conditional form of (24).

Formalization scope

  • The semiflow is Mathlib's Flow ℝ≥0 M on a metric space; local compactness is LocallyCompactSpace M.
  • The process is X : ℝ≥0 → Ω → M with continuous paths. The paper's alternative of càdlàg paths is not covered.
  • Adaptedness is Borel measurability of X(t)X(t)X(t) with respect to Ft\mathcal F_tFt​, for a Mathlib Filtration ℝ≥0. PPP is a probability measure.
  • The suprema in (24) and in dX(T)d_X(T)dX​(T) are computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with the extended distance, so that "sup ≥δ\ge\delta≥δ" and "sup <δ<\delta<δ" are exact even when the supremum is infinite or not attained.
  • The conditional probability in (24) is the conditional expectation of the indicator of the event. The event is required to be measurable, so the condition cannot hold vacuously through a junk conditional expectation.
  • www is required to be both nonincreasing in ttt and convergent to 000.
  • The events {L(X)⊂A}\{L(X)\subset A\}{L(X)⊂A} and {∃s≥t:X(s)∈U}\{\exists s\ge t: X(s)\in U\}{∃s≥t:X(s)∈U} are measured with PPP as an outer measure, so no measurability hypothesis is added for them.
  • In the second statement of Theorem 7.3, TTT and δ\deltaδ are chosen before the probability space, the process, www and ttt.
  • Invariance in the definition of an attractor is the equality Φt(A)=A\Phi_t(A)=AΦt​(A)=A, not inclusion.
  • The almost-sure clause of Lemma 7.1 is stated for separable MMM. Without separability it cannot be proved in ordinary set theory.

These choices rule out the trivializing formalizations: a conditional-probability hypothesis that holds vacuously, invariance read as inclusion, constants T,δT,\deltaT,δ that depend on the process or on ttt, and a probability bound www without monotonicity.

A complete development needs:

  • limit sets of asymptotic pseudotrajectories and the fact that an internally chain transitive set meeting the basin of an attractor lies in the attractor (shared with missions 1 and 5 of this series);
  • measurability of path functionals of continuous processes;
  • conditioning on events of the form {τ=tn(k)}\{\tau=t_n(k)\}{τ=tn​(k)} at dyadic times.

The first and second are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions toward either, and alternative proofs of Lemma 6.8, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Benaïm, Dynamics of stochastic approximation algorithms, Séminaire de Probabilités XXXIII, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1709, Springer, 1999, pp. 1–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0096509
  • M. Benaïm, M. W. Hirsch, Asymptotic pseudotrajectories and chain recurrent flows, with applications, Journal of Dynamics and Differential Equations 8 (1996), 141–176. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02218617
  • M. Benaïm, Vertex-reinforced random walks and a conjecture of Pemantle, Annals of Probability 25 (1997), 361–392. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1024404292
  • M. Duflo, Random Iterative Models, Applications of Mathematics 34, Springer, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-12880-0
  • H. J. Kushner, D. S. Clark, Stochastic Approximation Methods for Constrained and Unconstrained Systems, Springer, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9352-8
  • C. Conley, Isolated Invariant Sets and the Morse Index, CBMS Regional Conference Series in Mathematics 38, AMS, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1090/cbms/038
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Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms 3: Martingale Noise with Bounded q-th Moments and Summable γ_n^(1+q/2) Satisfies Assumption A1 Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

A stochastic approximation algorithm is a recursion

xn+1−xn=γn+1(F(xn)+Un+1)x_{n+1}-x_n=\gamma_{n+1}\big(F(x_n)+U_{n+1}\big)xn+1​−xn​=γn+1​(F(xn​)+Un+1​)

in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, where FFF is a vector field, γn\gamma_nγn​ are small step sizes and Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is noise. Such recursions go back to Robbins and Monro's root-finding scheme (Robbins–Monro 1951) and underlie stochastic gradient descent, temporal-difference learning, adaptive control and learning in games. The ODE method studies them by comparing the iterates with the trajectories of x˙=F(x)\dot x=F(x)x˙=F(x).

Benaïm's lecture notes (Benaïm 1999) organize the ODE method in two steps. A deterministic step, Proposition 4.1, shows that whenever the noise satisfies a condition called A1 (and the iterates are bounded, or FFF is Lipschitz and bounded on a neighbourhood of them), the interpolated process is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF. A probabilistic step then verifies A1 for concrete noise models. This mission formalizes the first such verification, Proposition 4.2: martingale difference noise with bounded qqq-th moments and step sizes with ∑nγn1+q/2<∞\sum_n\gamma_n^{1+q/2}<\infty∑n​γn1+q/2​<∞. The result is described as a particular case of a general theorem of Métivier and Priouret (1987); the same estimates reappear later in the notes.

Setting

Let {γn}n≥1\{\gamma_n\}_{n\ge1}{γn​}n≥1​ be a deterministic sequence with γn≥0\gamma_n\ge0γn​≥0, ∑nγn=∞\sum_n\gamma_n=\infty∑n​γn​=∞ and γn→0\gamma_n\to0γn​→0 (a step sequence). Put τ0=0\tau_0=0τ0​=0, τn=∑i=1nγi\tau_n=\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_iτn​=∑i=1n​γi​, and let

m(t)=sup⁡{k≥0: t≥τk}m(t)=\sup\{k\ge0:\ t\ge\tau_k\}m(t)=sup{k≥0: t≥τk​}

be the index of the step that contains time t≥0t\ge0t≥0. For a sequence {Un}n≥1\{U_n\}_{n\ge1}{Un​}n≥1​ define the piecewise constant processes Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1\bar U(t)=U_{m(t)+1}Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1​ and γˉ(t)=γm(t)+1\bar\gamma(t)=\gamma_{m(t)+1}γˉ​(t)=γm(t)+1​, so that step n+1n+1n+1 occupies the time interval [τn,τn+1)[\tau_n,\tau_{n+1})[τn​,τn+1​) of length γn+1\gamma_{n+1}γn+1​.

Assumption A1 asks that for every T>0T>0T>0

lim⁡n→∞sup⁡{∥∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1∥: k=n+1,…,m(τn+T)}=0,\lim_{n\to\infty}\sup\Big\{\Big\|\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\|:\ k=n+1,\dots,m(\tau_n+T)\Big\}=0,n→∞lim​sup{​i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​​: k=n+1,…,m(τn​+T)}=0,

or, in the form the notes call equivalent, lim⁡t→∞Δ(t,T)=0\lim_{t\to\infty}\Delta(t,T)=0limt→∞​Δ(t,T)=0 for every T>0T>0T>0, where

Δ(t,T)=sup⁡0≤h≤T∥∫tt+hUˉ(s) ds∥.\Delta(t,T)=\sup_{0\le h\le T}\Big\|\int_t^{t+h}\bar U(s)\,ds\Big\|.Δ(t,T)=0≤h≤Tsup​​∫tt+h​Uˉ(s)ds​.

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space with a nondecreasing sequence {Fn}\{\mathcal F_n\}{Fn​} of sub-σ\sigmaσ-algebras, and F:Rd→RdF:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb R^dF:Rd→Rd continuous. A sequence {xn}\{x_n\}{xn​} given by the recursion above is a Robbins–Monro algorithm if γ\gammaγ is deterministic, UnU_nUn​ is Fn\mathcal F_nFn​-measurable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.2

For a Robbins–Monro algorithm and some real q≥2q\ge2q≥2, if

sup⁡nE(∥Un+1∥q)<∞and∑nγn1+q/2<∞,\sup_nE\big(\|U_{n+1}\|^q\big)<\infty\qquad\text{and}\qquad\sum_n\gamma_n^{1+q/2}<\infty,nsup​E(∥Un+1​∥q)<∞andn∑​γn1+q/2​<∞,

then with probability one the realised noise sequence satisfies A1, in both of its forms, simultaneously for all T>0T>0T>0.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (13), an instance of Burkholder's inequality with a universal constant CqC_qCq​:
E{sup⁡n<k≤m(τn+T)∥∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1∥q}≤Cq E{[∑i=nm(τn+T)−1γi+12∥Ui+1∥2]q/2}.E\Big\{\sup_{n<k\le m(\tau_n+T)}\Big\|\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\|^q\Big\}\le C_q\,E\Big\{\Big[\sum_{i=n}^{m(\tau_n+T)-1}\gamma_{i+1}^2\|U_{i+1}\|^2\Big]^{q/2}\Big\}.E{n<k≤m(τn​+T)sup​​i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​​q}≤Cq​E{[i=n∑m(τn​+T)−1​γi+12​∥Ui+1​∥2]q/2}.
  1. Inequality (14), for finite families with αi≥0\alpha_i\ge0αi​≥0, u>1u>1u>1, 0<δ<10<\delta<10<δ<1:
(∑i∣αiβi∣)u≤(∑iαiδu/(u−1))u−1∑iαi(1−δ)u∣βi∣u.\Big(\sum_i|\alpha_i\beta_i|\Big)^u\le\Big(\sum_i\alpha_i^{\delta u/(u-1)}\Big)^{u-1}\sum_i\alpha_i^{(1-\delta)u}|\beta_i|^u.(i∑​∣αi​βi​∣)u≤(i∑​αiδu/(u−1)​)u−1i∑​αi(1−δ)u​∣βi​∣u.
  1. Eq. (16): for every T>0T>0T>0 there is C(q,T)C(q,T)C(q,T) with E(Δ(t,T)q)≤C(q,T)∫tt+Tγˉq/2(s) dsE(\Delta(t,T)^q)\le C(q,T)\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma^{q/2}(s)\,dsE(Δ(t,T)q)≤C(q,T)∫tt+T​γˉ​q/2(s)ds for all t≥0t\ge0t≥0.
  2. Eq. (17): ∑k≥0E(Δ(kT,T)q)<∞\sum_{k\ge0}E(\Delta(kT,T)^q)<\infty∑k≥0​E(Δ(kT,T)q)<∞ for every T>0T>0T>0.
  3. Block comparison: Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T)\Delta(t,T)\le2\Delta(kT,T)+\Delta((k+1)T,T)Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T) for kT≤t<(k+1)TkT\le t<(k+1)TkT≤t<(k+1)T.

Significance

Proposition 4.2 is the standard sufficient condition under which the ODE method applies to stochastic gradient-type recursions with martingale noise. With q=2q=2q=2 it covers step sizes with ∑γn2<∞\sum\gamma_n^2<\infty∑γn2​<∞ (for example γn=1/n\gamma_n=1/nγn​=1/n) and noise with bounded variance; larger qqq trades stronger moment assumptions for slower decay of the steps, down to ∑γn1+q/2<∞\sum\gamma_n^{1+q/2}<\infty∑γn1+q/2​<∞. Combined with Proposition 4.1 it shows that the interpolated process of a Robbins–Monro algorithm with bounded iterates is almost surely an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF; the limit set theorems of the notes then locate the limit points of the algorithm.

The result is proved in the notes and in the cited literature; it has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A formal proof would supply reusable pieces that Mathlib currently lacks, most notably a Burkholder (or Burkholder–Davis–Gundy) inequality for discrete-time vector martingales in LqL^qLq, and the continuous-time bookkeeping of the step processes Uˉ\bar UUˉ, γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ and the noise deviation Δ\DeltaΔ, shared by the other missions of this series.

Difficulty

The obvious argument controls each window by Doob's L2L^2L2 maximal inequality and sums over windows. That works for q=2q=2q=2 only. For q>2q>2q>2 the second moment of the window sums is not summable under ∑γn1+q/2<∞\sum\gamma_n^{1+q/2}<\infty∑γn1+q/2​<∞, and one needs an LqL^qLq maximal inequality whose right-hand side is the q/2q/2q/2-th moment of the square function. That inequality, Burkholder's, is not in Mathlib. Converting the square function into the moment bound requires a Hölder-type inequality with tuned exponents, and passing from the discrete sums to Δ(t,T)\Delta(t,T)Δ(t,T) requires handling partial steps at both ends of [t,t+h][t,t+h][t,t+h]. A second subtlety is that A1 quantifies over all T>0T>0T>0: the almost-sure statement must hold on a single event of full probability for every TTT, not on an event that depends on TTT.

Formalization scope

The space is Rd\mathbb R^dRd as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d); time is real; qqq is a real number with q≥2q\ge2q≥2, and all powers are real powers of nonnegative quantities. The sequences γ\gammaγ and UUU are indexed by N\mathbb NN, and their values at 000 are unused, as the paper indexes them from 111. The filtration is a Mathlib Filtration ℕ, Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is required to be Fn+1\mathcal F_{n+1}Fn+1​-strongly measurable and integrable, and the martingale difference condition is E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0 almost surely. Expectations of nonnegative quantities, the suprema in A1 and Δ\DeltaΔ, and the moment bound are taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so no default value of a non-integrable expectation or of an empty supremum can make a statement hold vacuously; the supremum over an empty range of kkk is 000.

The following readings are excluded and are not acceptable formalizations: a moment hypothesis that holds vacuously, a conditional expectation hypothesis on non-integrable noise, the conclusion "for each TTT, A1 holds almost surely" in place of "almost surely, A1 holds for all TTT", and qqq fixed to 222 or restricted to integers.

All hypotheses are satisfiable: U=0U=0U=0, x=0x=0x=0, F=0F=0F=0 and γn=1/n\gamma_n=1/nγn​=1/n with q=2q=2q=2 satisfy every one of them.

Contributions welcome: a general Burkholder inequality for discrete-time martingales in finite-dimensional spaces (reusable well beyond this mission), lemmas on the step processes and Δ\DeltaΔ (measurability, local integrability, additivity), and the proofs of the milestones.

Selected references

  • M. Benaïm, Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms, Séminaire de Probabilités XXXIII, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1709, Springer, 1999, pp. 1–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0096509
  • M. Benaïm and M. W. Hirsch, Asymptotic pseudotrajectories and chain recurrent flows, with applications, Journal of Dynamics and Differential Equations 8 (1996), 141–176. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02218617
  • M. Métivier and P. Priouret, Théorèmes de convergence presque sûre pour une classe d'algorithmes stochastiques à pas décroissant, Probability Theory and Related Fields 74 (1987), 403–428.
  • D. L. Burkholder, Distribution function inequalities for martingales, Annals of Probability 1 (1973), 19–42. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176997023
  • D. W. Stroock, Probability Theory: An Analytic View, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, A stochastic approximation method, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22 (1951), 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
  • H. J. Kushner and G. G. Yin, Stochastic Approximation Algorithms and Applications, Springer, 1997.
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An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands I. The Average-Cost Criterion: With Finite Storage a Modified Base-Stock Policy Is Strongly Average-Cost OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A manufacturer that makes one product to stock faces random demand, can produce at most bbb units per period, and can store at most UUU units. The classical result without the production limit is that a base-stock policy is optimal: raise inventory to a fixed level yˉ\bar yyˉ​ each period. With a production limit, the natural modification is to produce up to yˉ\bar yyˉ​ when that is possible and to produce at full capacity otherwise. Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) proved that this modified base-stock (critical-number) policy is optimal under the long-run average-cost criterion, for discrete demand with a general convex cost. Production-capacity models of this type are standard in operations management texts, and the result underlies the computational and comparative-static work that followed, starting with Part II of the same paper, which treats discounted costs.

Timeline.

  • 1950s–60s: optimality of base-stock (critical-number) policies for uncapacitated periodic-review models; see Heyman and Sobel's Stochastic Models in Operations Research, Vol. II (1984).
  • 1986: Federgruen and Zipkin, Part I (average cost, MOR 11(2):193–207) and Part II (discounted cost, MOR 11(2):208–215) establish the capacitated case. Part I handles the unbounded state space with a general average-cost theory for countable-state Markov decision processes by Federgruen, Schweitzer and Tijms (1983).

Setting

Time is divided into periods t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \dotst=0,1,…. The demands D0,D1,…D_0, D_1, \dotsD0​,D1​,… are independent copies of a random variable DDD with values in {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…} and probability mass function p(j)p(j)p(j); write μ=E(D)\mu = E(D)μ=E(D) and P(j)=Pr⁡{D≤j}P(j) = \Pr\{D \le j\}P(j)=Pr{D≤j}. At the start of period ttt the inventory is an integer xtx_txt​ (negative values are backorders). The decision maker raises it to

yt∈Y(xt)={y∈Z:xt≤y≤xt+b, y≤U},y_t \in Y(x_t) = \{y \in \mathbb Z : x_t \le y \le x_t + b,\ y \le U\},yt​∈Y(xt​)={y∈Z:xt​≤y≤xt​+b, y≤U},

pays the expected one-period cost G(yt)G(y_t)G(yt​), and demand is subtracted: xt+1=yt−Dtx_{t+1} = y_t - D_txt+1​=yt​−Dt​. The order cost per unit is set to zero, as in the paper; this loses no generality because every policy with finite average cost has the same average order cost.

The standing assumptions are: G≥0G \ge 0G≥0 is convex and G(y)→∞G(y) \to \inftyG(y)→∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞ (Assumption 1); the characteristic function of DDD is analytic at the origin (Assumption 2), and 0<μ0 < \mu0<μ; G(y)≤A+B∣y∣ρG(y) \le A + B|y|^\rhoG(y)≤A+B∣y∣ρ for some positive integer ρ\rhoρ (Assumption 3); b>μb > \mub>μ and P(b)<1P(b) < 1P(b)<1 (Assumption 4). The smallest global minimizer of GGG is yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞, and U≥yˉ∞U \ge \bar y^\inftyU≥yˉ​∞.

A Markov policy is a sequence π=(π0,π1,… )\pi = (\pi_0, \pi_1, \dots)π=(π0​,π1​,…) of maps with πt(x)∈Y(x)\pi_t(x) \in Y(x)πt​(x)∈Y(x). The critical-number policy with critical number yˉ\bar yyˉ​ is δ[yˉ](x)=max⁡(x,min⁡(yˉ,x+b))\delta[\bar y](x) = \max(x, \min(\bar y, x + b))δ[yˉ​](x)=max(x,min(yˉ​,x+b)). A stationary policy δ\deltaδ is strongly optimal with average cost ggg if, from every initial state x≤Ux \le Ux≤U, its average cost t−1E{∑i<tG(yi)}t^{-1}E\{\sum_{i<t} G(y_i)\}t−1E{∑i<t​G(yi​)} converges to ggg, while every Markov policy has lim-inf average cost at least ggg from every initial state.

The analysis uses the operators Rv(y)=G(y)+E v(y−D)Rv(y) = G(y) + E\,v(y - D)Rv(y)=G(y)+Ev(y−D) and Sv(x)=min⁡y∈Y(x)Rv(y)Sv(x) = \min_{y \in Y(x)} Rv(y)Sv(x)=miny∈Y(x)​Rv(y), and the optimality equation

g+v(x)=Sv(x),x≤U.(6)g + v(x) = Sv(x),\qquad x \le U. \tag{6}g+v(x)=Sv(x),x≤U.(6)

For an interval ι=[l,u]\iota = [l, u]ι=[l,u], Hιv(x)H_\iota v(x)Hι​v(x) is the largest expected sum of v(yt)v(y_t)v(yt​), over policies forced to produce at capacity below lll and to produce nothing above uuu, until the inventory first returns to ι\iotaι.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 202)

There exist g∗g^*g∗, v∗v^*v∗ and y∗≥yˉ∞y^* \ge \bar y^\inftyy∗≥yˉ​∞ such that (g∗,v∗)(g^*, v^*)(g∗,v∗) solves (6), v∗v^*v∗ is convex with global minimizer y∗y^*y∗, and

δ∗=δ[y∗] is strongly optimal with average cost g∗.\delta^* = \delta[y^*] \text{ is strongly optimal with average cost } g^*.δ∗=δ[y∗] is strongly optimal with average cost g∗.

The y∗y^*y∗ in the optimality claim is the minimizer constructed in part (a).

Milestones

  • Lemma 2(a)–(c) (pp. 196–197): a normal-tail inequality and two series estimates.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 198): if v(x)=O(∣x∣q)v(x) = O(|x|^q)v(x)=O(∣x∣q) then Hιv(x)=O(∣x∣q+3)H_\iota v(x) = O(|x|^{q+3})Hι​v(x)=O(∣x∣q+3).
  • Corollary 1 (p. 200): Hι1=O(∣x∣3)H_\iota 1 = O(|x|^3)Hι​1=O(∣x∣3) and HιG=O(∣x∣ρ+3)H_\iota G = O(|x|^{\rho+3})Hι​G=O(∣x∣ρ+3), both finite.
  • Corollary 2 (p. 201): (t+1)−1P[δ0t]⋯P[δtt](Hι1+HιG)(x)→0(t+1)^{-1}P[\delta_{0t}]\cdots P[\delta_{tt}](H_\iota 1 + H_\iota G)(x) \to 0(t+1)−1P[δ0t​]⋯P[δtt​](Hι​1+Hι​G)(x)→0.
  • Lemma 4 (p. 201): reachability of every state in [L,U−D−][L, U - D_-][L,U−D−​] under some policy that produces at capacity below LLL.
  • Lemma 5 (p. 202): SSS and QQQ preserve the class VVV of convex functions of growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3) that are nonincreasing below yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 reduces an infinite-state average-cost control problem to a one-parameter search over critical numbers. The paper then evaluates the average cost of δ[yˉ]\delta[\bar y]δ[yˉ​] by a renewal formula, proves it convex in yˉ\bar yyˉ​ (Theorem 2), and in §5 extends optimality to unlimited storage. The strong form of optimality matters: it compares with every Markov policy from every starting state, and it compares lim-infs, not only lim-sups.

Formalizing it. The theorem has a published proof, but no machine-checked one, and its proof relies on external results that are themselves unformalized: the countable-state average-cost theory of Federgruen, Schweitzer and Tijms, a fixed-point theorem on a compact convex subset of a product space, and a large-deviation estimate quoted from Feller. A formal development produces reusable infrastructure: expected first-passage sums for integer-valued random walks with a reflecting control, polynomial moment bounds for them, and the convexity-preservation argument for capacitated value iteration.

Difficulty

The state space is unbounded below, so the finite-state theory of average-cost Markov decision processes does not apply, and the one-period cost is unbounded. The obvious approach, letting the discount factor tend to one in the discounted problem, needs uniform bounds on relative value functions. Those bounds come from the expected cost until the inventory returns to a fixed interval, and with capacity limits that expectation must be controlled with growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3) uniformly over a class of policies. This is the content of Lemma 3, whose proof combines a large-deviation estimate for the demand sums with a renewal-type recursion. A second obstacle is strong optimality: comparing with policies whose lim-inf average cost is smaller requires that the relative value function grows sublinearly along every admissible trajectory (Corollary 2).

Formalization scope

All objects are in the namespace FedergruenZipkin.AvgCost, defined in one file. States x,yx, yx,y and the capacity UUU are integers; demands are natural numbers with a real probability mass function p; bbb is a positive natural number. Convexity on Z\mathbb ZZ is the second-difference inequality. Expectations of a real function are series ∑jp(j) v(y−j)\sum_j p(j)\,v(y-j)∑j​p(j)v(y−j); expected policy costs and hitting sums are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued and need no integrability side condition. Feasibility and all properties of value functions are required only on states x≤Ux \le Ux≤U, which are the only states visited. Assumption 2 is stated literally, as real-analyticity of θ↦∑jp(j)eiθj\theta \mapsto \sum_j p(j)e^{i\theta j}θ↦∑j​p(j)eiθj at 000. The order cost is zero, as in the paper. yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞ is a parameter characterised as the least minimizer of GGG, not an infimum.

"Strongly optimal" has no displayed definition in the paper; it is read from eq. (7) in the proof of Theorem 1(b): convergence of the average cost of δ∗\delta^*δ∗ to g∗g^*g∗ from every state, together with a lim-inf lower bound for every Markov (memoryless, possibly nonstationary) policy from every state. The class is neither widened to history-dependent policies nor narrowed to stationary ones. The goal additionally records that E v∗(y−D)E\,v^*(y-D)Ev∗(y−D) converges, that v∗v^*v∗ has growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3), and that g∗≥0g^* \ge 0g∗≥0; all three follow from the paper's proof.

A trivializing reading is ruled out: the existence of ggg, vvv and y∗y^*y∗ is one existential, so y∗y^*y∗ cannot be decoupled from the solution of (6), and strong optimality includes the convergence of δ∗\delta^*δ∗'s own average cost to g∗g^*g∗, so g=0g = 0g=0 does not satisfy it vacuously.

Not posed: Lemma 1 (quoted from Feller, and replaceable by a Chernoff bound); the renewal formulas (10)–(11) and Theorem 2; and §5 (unlimited storage). Useful contributions include a formal theory of expected hitting sums for skip-free-upward random walks, and a proof of Lemma 3 by any route.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands I. The Average-Cost Criterion, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(2):193–207, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.11.2.193
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands II. The Discounted-Cost Criterion, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(2):208–215, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.11.2.208
  • A. Federgruen, P. J. Schweitzer and H. C. Tijms, Denumerable Undiscounted Semi-Markov Decision Processes with Unbounded Rewards, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(2):298–314, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.2.298
  • D. P. Heyman and M. J. Sobel, Stochastic Models in Operations Research, Vol. II, McGraw-Hill, 1984.
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1971.
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Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information 1: Centralizing Demand Information Does Not Eliminate the Bullwhip EffectResearch Paper

Motivation

The bullwhip effect is the observation that the variability of orders increases as one moves up a supply chain, from the retailer towards the manufacturer and its suppliers. It was documented in industry and in classroom experiments such as the Beer Game (Sterman 1989), and analysed by Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997), who named demand forecasting, lead times, batch ordering, rationing and price variations as its main causes. A remedy often proposed is to centralize demand information: give every stage of the chain the customer demand data, so that no stage forecasts from the distorted orders of its downstream neighbour.

Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000) quantified the effect for a retailer that forecasts with a moving average and orders with an order-up-to policy. They gave an explicit lower bound on the ratio of the order variance to the demand variance in terms of the lead time, the forecasting window and the demand autocorrelation. They then showed that in a multistage chain with fully centralized demand information this ratio still grows with the total lead time upstream of each stage. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 3.1 of the paper, together with the single-stage analysis it rests on.

Setting

Time is indexed by the integers. The customer demands DtD_tDt​ seen by the retailer follow the AR(1) model

Dt=μ+ρDt−1+ϵt,(1)D_t = \mu + \rho D_{t-1} + \epsilon_t, \tag{1}Dt​=μ+ρDt−1​+ϵt​,(1)

where μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0, ∣ρ∣<1|\rho| < 1∣ρ∣<1, and the errors ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ are independent and identically distributed from a symmetric distribution with mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. The demand is in steady state, so that E(Dt)=μ/(1−ρ)E(D_t) = \mu/(1-\rho)E(Dt​)=μ/(1−ρ) and Var(D)=Var(Dt)=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}(D) = \mathrm{Var}(D_t) = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var(D)=Var(Dt​)=σ2/(1−ρ2) for every ttt.

The retailer does not know the demand process. With a window of p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 past observations it forms the moving-average estimates

D^tL=L ∑i=1pDt−ip,et=Dt−D^t1,σ^etL=CL,ρ∑i=1pet−i2p,\hat D^L_t = L\,\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}}{p}, \qquad e_t = D_t - \hat D^1_t, \qquad \hat\sigma^L_{et} = C_{L,\rho}\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p e_{t-i}^2}{p}},D^tL​=Lp∑i=1p​Dt−i​​,et​=Dt​−D^t1​,σ^etL​=CL,ρ​p∑i=1p​et−i2​​​,

where LLL is the lead-time parameter (L=1L = 1L=1 means an order placed at the end of period ttt arrives at the start of period t+1t+1t+1) and CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ is a constant the paper leaves unspecified. The order-up-to point is yt=D^tL+z σ^etLy_t = \hat D^L_t + z\,\hat\sigma^L_{et}yt​=D^tL​+zσ^etL​ for a safety factor zzz, and the order placed in period ttt is qt=yt−yt−1+Dt−1q_t = y_t - y_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt​=yt​−yt−1​+Dt−1​. It may be negative: excess inventory is returned without cost.

In the multistage chain with centralized information, stages k=1,2,…k = 1, 2, \dotsk=1,2,… (stage 111 is the retailer) all observe DtD_tDt​ and use the same estimate D^t=∑i=1pDt−i/p\hat D_t = \sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}/pD^t​=∑i=1p​Dt−i​/p. Stage kkk has lead time LkL_kLk​ and safety factor zkz_kzk​ and uses the order-up-to point ytk=LkD^t+zkσ^etLky^k_t = L_k\hat D_t + z_k\hat\sigma^{L_k}_{et}ytk​=Lk​D^t​+zk​σ^etLk​​. Following the paper's sequence of events, stage 111 orders qt1=yt1−yt−11+Dt−1q^1_t = y^1_t - y^1_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt1​=yt1​−yt−11​+Dt−1​, and stage k≥2k \ge 2k≥2, receiving qtk−1q^{k-1}_tqtk−1​, orders qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 441)

For every stage k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and every period ttt,

Var(qtk)Var(D)≥1+(2∑i=1kLip+2(∑i=1kLi)2p2)(1−ρp),\frac{\mathrm{Var}(q^k_t)}{\mathrm{Var}(D)} \ge 1 + \left(\frac{2\sum_{i=1}^k L_i}{p} + \frac{2\left(\sum_{i=1}^k L_i\right)^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p),Var(D)Var(qtk​)​≥1+​p2∑i=1k​Li​​+p22(∑i=1k​Li​)2​​(1−ρp),

with equality when z1=⋯=zk=0z_1 = \dots = z_k = 0z1​=⋯=zk​=0. The bound holds for every choice of the constants CLk,ρC_{L_k,\rho}CLk​,ρ​ and of the safety factors.

Milestones (p. 438)

  1. The AR(1) moments Var(Dt)=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}(D_t) = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var(Dt​)=σ2/(1−ρ2) and Cov(Dt−1,Dt−p−1)=ρpσ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, D_{t-p-1}) = \rho^p\sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Cov(Dt−1​,Dt−p−1​)=ρpσ2/(1−ρ2).
  2. Eq. (4): qt=(1+L/p)Dt−1−(L/p)Dt−p−1+z(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L)q_t = (1 + L/p)D_{t-1} - (L/p)D_{t-p-1} + z(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})qt​=(1+L/p)Dt−1​−(L/p)Dt−p−1​+z(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​) for every outcome.
  3. Lemma 2.1: Cov(Dt−i,σ^etL)=0\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-i}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}) = 0Cov(Dt−i​,σ^etL​)=0 for i=1,…,pi = 1, \dots, pi=1,…,p.
  4. The variance identity after Eq. (4):
Var(qt)=[1+(2Lp+2L2p2)(1−ρp)]Var(D)+2z(1+2Lp)Cov(Dt−1,σ^etL)+z2 Var(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L).\mathrm{Var}(q_t) = \left[1 + \left(\tfrac{2L}{p} + \tfrac{2L^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p)\right]\mathrm{Var}(D) + 2z\left(1+\tfrac{2L}{p}\right)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}) + z^2\,\mathrm{Var}(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1}).Var(qt​)=[1+(p2L​+p22L2​)(1−ρp)]Var(D)+2z(1+p2L​)Cov(Dt−1​,σ^etL​)+z2Var(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​).
  1. Theorem 2.2, the single-stage case:
Var(q)Var(D)≥1+(2Lp+2L2p2)(1−ρp),(5)\frac{\mathrm{Var}(q)}{\mathrm{Var}(D)} \ge 1 + \left(\frac{2L}{p} + \frac{2L^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p), \tag{5}Var(D)Var(q)​≥1+(p2L​+p22L2​)(1−ρp),(5)

with equality when z=0z = 0z=0.

Significance

Theorem 2.2 shows that forecasting with a positive lead time is enough to make orders more variable than demand, even for independent demands (ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0). It also says how the effect depends on each parameter: the bound decreases in the window ppp and increases in the lead time LLL. Theorem 3.1 is the paper's answer to the centralization remedy. When every stage sees the true customer demand and uses the same forecast and the same policy, the variability of orders at stage kkk is still bounded below by the single-stage expression with the cumulative lead time ∑i≤kLi\sum_{i\le k}L_i∑i≤k​Li​. Centralization reduces the bullwhip effect but does not remove it. The decentralized comparison (Theorem 3.2, where the bound becomes multiplicative across stages) is a separate mission in this series.

On the formalization side, the Gaussian special case of the single-stage results is on the platform. Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory states Theorem 2.2, Lemma 2.1, Eq. (4) and the AR(1) moments for normally distributed errors, as the items SupplyChainTheory.bullwhip_signal_processing, bullwhip_lemma_13_1, bullwhip_order_identity and ar1_moments. This mission states them under the paper's weaker hypothesis of a symmetric error distribution. The multistage Theorem 3.1 has no machine-checked counterpart. The paper proves only Theorem 2.2 in print. For the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 3.1 it refers to Ryan (1997) and to a working paper, so a formalization supplies arguments the published article does not contain.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is routine. The difficulty is Lemma 2.1 and the covariances like it. The estimate σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​ is a square root of a quadratic form in past demands, so its covariance with a demand cannot be computed from second moments. Under Gaussian errors one can appeal to properties of Gaussian vectors. With only a symmetric error law, every distributional fact has to come from the symmetry of the errors and from the representation of the steady-state demand as an infinite series in past errors.

The printed derivation also moves faster than a proof. Expanding Var(qt)\mathrm{Var}(q_t)Var(qt​) from Eq. (4) produces the cross terms Cov(Dt−1,σ^e,t−1L)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})Cov(Dt−1​,σ^e,t−1L​) and Cov(Dt−p−1,σ^etL)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-p-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et})Cov(Dt−p−1​,σ^etL​), which lie outside the lags 1,…,p1, \dots, p1,…,p of Lemma 2.1. The display after Eq. (4) does not account for them. A complete proof of milestone 4 must show that these terms vanish too. For the chain, the stage orders are defined by a recursion across stages, and the variance of qtkq^k_tqtk​ involves the estimates σ^etLi\hat\sigma^{L_i}_{et}σ^etLi​​ of all stages i≤ki \le ki≤k.

Formalization scope

Random variables are real functions on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), and time is Z\mathbb ZZ, so that Dt−p−1D_{t-p-1}Dt−p−1​ exists for every ttt. Variance and covariance are Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.variance and ProbabilityTheory.covariance. The demand structure ChenBullwhip.Centralized.AR1Demand records (1) for every outcome and the paper's error hypotheses: independence, identical distribution, symmetry, mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. It adds four disclosed conditions:

  1. σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0, since the results divide by Var(D)\mathrm{Var}(D)Var(D);
  2. square integrability of errors and demands, since Mathlib's variance of a non-square-integrable function is 000;
  3. a steady-state condition: every DtD_tDt​ is square integrable with the law of D0D_0D0​, which is the stationary solution the paper's moment formulas presuppose;
  4. p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 in every result.

The published Gaussian structure SupplyChainTheory.AR1Demand satisfies these conditions, so this mission generalizes the Snyder–Shen items rather than referencing them. The constants CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ are free real parameters, and in the chain CLk,ρC_{L_k,\rho}CLk​,ρ​ is C(Lk)C(L_k)C(Lk​) for an arbitrary function CCC. Lead times are natural numbers, L=0L = 0L=0 included. Sums ∑i=1p\sum_{i=1}^p∑i=1p​ and ∑i=1k\sum_{i=1}^k∑i=1k​ run over {1,…,p}\{1,\dots,p\}{1,…,p} and {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k}, and stages are numbered from 111. The order recursion qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​ is read from the paper's sequence of events, because the paper prints no formula for qtkq^k_tqtk​.

The orders are computed from the demands through the definitions above. They are never arbitrary random variables with assumed moments. "Tight" is formalized as equality, and orders are never truncated at zero. Without the steady-state condition, a process started from an arbitrary D0D_0D0​ satisfies (1) but has time-dependent moments, and the results fail; with σ=0\sigma = 0σ=0 the ratio form would be false. Both cases are excluded by the structure, not by vacuous hypotheses. The structure is satisfiable: i.i.d. standard Gaussian demands on Z→R\mathbb Z \to \mathbb RZ→R form an instance.

A complete development needs: the L2L^2L2 series representation of a stationary AR(1) process; distributional symmetry facts for i.i.d. sequences with a symmetric law; and covariance bookkeeping for finite linear combinations. The first two are reusable for any linear time-series model with symmetric innovations. Contributions to any milestone, and to general lemmas about stationary AR(1) processes, are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. Chen, Z. Drezner, J. K. Ryan, D. Simchi-Levi, Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information, Management Science 46(3):436–443, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.436.12069
  • H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, S. Whang, Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect, Management Science 43(4):546–558, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
  • J. D. Sterman, Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment, Management Science 35(3):321–339, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.3.321
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 13. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • J. K. Ryan, Analysis of Inventory Models with Limited Demand Information, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1997 (cited by the paper for the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 3.1).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 3: Order-Oblivious Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Uniform Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981) maximizes a seller's expected revenue when buyers have independent private values, but it is a sealed-bid mechanism: every buyer reports a value, and the allocation and payments are computed from all reports at once. Real sellers more often post prices: buyers arrive, each sees a take-it-or-leave-it price, and buys or leaves. Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435) ask how much revenue such simple mechanisms lose. Their strongest notion is the order-oblivious posted-price mechanism (OPM): the prices are fixed in advance, and the guarantee must hold whatever order the buyers arrive in, even an adversarial one.

The tool behind the guarantee for sellers of kkk identical units is a prophet inequality. In the single-choice version, a gambler inspects independent random rewards one at a time and must accept or reject each on the spot; Krengel and Sucheston, and Samuel-Cahn (Ann. Probab. 1984), showed that a single fixed threshold earns at least half of what a prophet who sees all rewards earns. The paper extends Samuel-Cahn's threshold rule to kkk choices (Appendix D.2) and turns it into a revenue guarantee (Theorem 10).

Setting

There are nnn agents [n][n][n]. Agent iii's value viv_ivi​ for being served is drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​; the virtual valuation is ϕi(v)=v−(1−Fi(v))/fi(v)\phi_i(v) = v - (1 - F_i(v))/f_i(v)ϕi​(v)=v−(1−Fi​(v))/fi​(v) (Definition 1), and FiF_iFi​ is regular if ϕi\phi_iϕi​ is non-decreasing (Definition 2). The seller may serve any set of agents in a downward-closed set system J\mathcal JJ; this mission uses the kkk-uniform matroid, where a set is feasible exactly when it has at most kkk members.

A mechanism MMM maps reported values v\mathbf vv to an allocation M(v)∈JM(\mathbf v) \in \mathcal JM(v)∈J and payments πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v). It is truthful if reporting the true value is a dominant strategy and no agent ever gets negative utility. Its expected revenue is RM=Ev[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M = \mathbb E_{\mathbf v}[\sum_i \pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=Ev​[∑i​πi​(v)], and RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM denotes the revenue of Myerson's mechanism, the largest over truthful mechanisms (Theorem 19).

Given prices p\mathbf pp and values v\mathbf vv, agent iii desires service if vi≥piv_i \ge p_ivi​≥pi​. Let Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​ be the class of maximal feasible sets of desiring agents. When agents arrive in an arbitrary order and each buys if it desires service and can still be feasibly served, the set of buyers lies in Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​. The paper's pessimistic revenue estimate is

Rpobl=Ev∼F min⁡S∈Sv∑i∈Spi.\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p} = \mathbb E_{\mathbf v \sim \mathbf F}\ \min_{S \in \mathcal S_{\mathbf v}} \sum_{i \in S} p_i .Rpobl​=Ev∼F​ S∈Sv​min​i∈S∑​pi​.

For the prophet inequality, X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are independent nonnegative random variables with order statistics X(1)≥⋯≥X(n)X_{(1)} \ge \dots \ge X_{(n)}X(1)​≥⋯≥X(n)​, and (x)+=max⁡(0,x)(x)^+ = \max(0, x)(x)+=max(0,x). The threshold rule with threshold ccc picks indices t1(c),…,tk(c)t_1(c), \dots, t_k(c)t1​(c),…,tk​(c), where ti(c)t_i(c)ti​(c) is the lesser of n−k+in-k+in−k+i and the iii-th smallest index jjj with Xj≥cX_j \ge cXj​≥c (or n−k+in - k + in−k+i if there is none). The numbers a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ are the unique solutions of

a=∑i=1kE(X(i)−a/k)+,b=∑i=1nE(Xi−b/k)+.a = \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big(X_{(i)} - a/k\big)^+, \qquad b = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb E\big(X_i - b/k\big)^+ .a=i=1∑k​E(X(i)​−a/k)+,b=i=1∑n​E(Xi​−b/k)+.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10 (p. 9)

∃ p  ∀M truthful:RM≤2 Rpobl\exists\, \mathbf p\ \ \forall M \text{ truthful}:\qquad \mathcal R^M \le 2\, \mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}∃p  ∀M truthful:RM≤2Rpobl​

for every instance with regular distributions and a kkk-uniform matroid constraint. The prices are chosen once, before the mechanism it is compared with; this is the paper's "Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ 2-approximates RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM".

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 5): under regularity, the expected revenue of a truthful mechanism equals its expected virtual surplus E[∑i∈M(v)ϕi(vi)]\mathbb E[\sum_{i \in M(\mathbf v)} \phi_i(v_i)]E[∑i∈M(v)​ϕi​(vi​)] (with the lowest type receiving zero utility).
  2. a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ exist and are unique (App. D.2, p. 18).
  3. The claim a∗≤b∗a^* \le b^*a∗≤b∗ (App. D.2, p. 18).
  4. Theorem 24 (p. 18), the kkk-choice prophet inequality: for a∗≤kc≤b∗a^* \le k c \le b^*a∗≤kc≤b∗,
∑i=1kE[X(i)]≤2∑i=1kE[Xti(c)].\sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big[X_{(i)}\big] \le 2 \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big[X_{t_i(c)}\big].i=1∑k​E[X(i)​]≤2i=1∑k​E[Xti​(c)​].

Significance

The theorem says that a seller of kkk identical units can fix one price per buyer, ignore the arrival order entirely, and still collect half of the optimal revenue. The factor 2 is tight: Appendix D.2 gives a single-item example with two buyers where no order-oblivious pricing does better. Corollary 11 extends the result to partition matroids, and Theorem 24 is reused for the graphical-matroid result (Theorem 12, App. D.3). Theorem 24 is a statement in optimal stopping independent of mechanism design, and kkk-choice prophet inequalities are now a standard tool for online allocation.

The results are proved in the paper (preprint arXiv:0907.2435v2; a conference version appeared at STOC 2010). To our knowledge none of them, nor any prophet inequality, has a machine-checked proof; Mathlib has independence of random variables but no order statistics, stopping-rule prophet inequalities, or Myerson's revenue characterization in this multi-agent dominant-strategy form. A related single-unit, Bayesian-incentive-compatible form of Proposition 1 exists on the platform (MechanismDesign.Auctions.revenue_eq_virtual_surplus), in a different model.

Difficulty

The threshold rule picks the first values above ccc, not the largest, and its picks are dependent random indices; the expectation E[Xti(c)]\mathbb E[X_{t_i(c)}]E[Xti​(c)​] does not factor. The obvious comparison of the gambler with the prophet term by term fails, because the gambler can exhaust its kkk picks on early, small values. The bound has to balance two events: either at least kkk values reach ccc, or a value is picked whenever it exceeds ccc; independence enters exactly in the second. The rule also has forced picks at the end of the sequence, which must be handled as stated.

On the mechanism side, Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ is a minimum over an adversarially chosen family, not the revenue of one run, so it cannot be read off from a single sequential mechanism. Proposition 1 needs the full revenue-equivalence argument: monotone allocations, the payment identity, and an integration by parts against the density.

Formalization scope

  • Distributions: each FiF_iFi​ has a bounded support [v‾i,v‾i][\underline v_i, \overline v_i][v​i​,vi​] with 0≤v‾i0 \le \underline v_i0≤v​i​, and a measurable density positive on it (a pinned convention; the paper says only "with density fif_ifi​"). Regularity is required on the support. The prior is the product of the marginals.
  • Mechanisms: deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational on the type space, with measurable allocation events and measurable, integrable payments. Payments of unserved agents are not forced to be zero.
  • RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM is not constructed. The goal is stated against every truthful mechanism, which by Theorem 19 is equivalent. Quantifier order matters: "for every mechanism there are prices" is a weaker statement and is not the goal.
  • Proposition 1 carries the normalization that an agent of the lowest type gets zero utility, which the paper presupposes on p. 12.
  • Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ is a genuine minimum over the finite, nonempty family Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​; maximality is essential, since without it the empty set makes the estimate 000 and the goal false. Prices are arbitrary reals.
  • a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ are characterised by their equations as hypotheses, not defined by an infimum. Order statistics count multiplicity. Lean indices are 0-based. The threshold rule includes the page's forced picks ti(c)=n−k+it_i(c) = n - k + iti​(c)=n−k+i; it is not replaced by a pure threshold rule. Theorem 24 and the claims about a∗,b∗a^*, b^*a∗,b∗ assume 1≤k≤n1 \le k \le n1≤k≤n; the goal assumes nothing about kkk.
  • Out of scope: non-regular distributions (ironing), Corollary 11, and the p. 19 identity rewriting Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ as a sum of virtual values (a proof step, not a milestone).

Useful reusable infrastructure: order statistics and their measurability, Samuel-Cahn-type threshold rules, and Myerson's payment identity for dominant-strategy mechanisms. Proofs of any milestone, and supporting lemmas on these objects, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010 (STOC 2010). https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • E. Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of Threshold Stop Rules and Maximum for Independent Nonnegative Random Variables, Annals of Probability 12(4), 1984. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993150
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 2: Sequential Posted Prices e/(e−1)-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Partition Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who knows the distributions of buyers' values can maximise expected revenue with Myerson's optimal mechanism (Myerson 1981): collect bids, compute virtual values, serve a feasible set of maximum virtual surplus, and charge threshold payments. Real sellers seldom run such auctions. They post prices: a buyer is offered a take-it-or-leave-it price and either accepts or walks away. Posted prices need no bidding, involve no competition between buyers, and are trivially truthful. The question is how much revenue they give up.

Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435, STOC 2010) answer this for a range of feasibility constraints with a single construction, the sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM) S\mathcal SS. For general matroids it loses at most a factor 222 (Theorem 5). For uniform and partition matroids, that is, multi-unit sales and unions of multi-unit sales, it loses at most a factor e/(e−1)≈1.58e/(e-1)\approx1.58e/(e−1)≈1.58 (Theorem 6), and the paper shows this factor is tight for its mechanism. This mission targets Theorem 6.

Timeline. Myerson (1981) characterised the optimal single-parameter mechanism. Blumrosen and Holenstein (2008) showed that the best single-unit SPM can be a factor π/2\sqrt{\pi/2}π/2​ below Myerson's revenue even with i.i.d. buyers. Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg (EC 2007) used posted prices to approximate multi-parameter unit-demand pricing. Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (2010) gave the matroid, partition-matroid and matroid-intersection bounds. Yan (SODA 2011) explained the e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) factor through the correlation gap of submodular functions and sharpened it for kkk units to 1−kke−k/k!1-k^ke^{-k}/k!1−kke−k/k!.

Setting

There are nnn agents. Agent iii has a private value viv_ivi​ for being served, drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​. The virtual value is φi(v)=v−1−Fi(v)fi(v)\varphi_i(v)=v-\frac{1-F_i(v)}{f_i(v)}φi​(v)=v−fi​(v)1−Fi​(v)​, and FiF_iFi​ is regular if φi\varphi_iφi​ is non-decreasing. The seller may serve any set in a downward-closed family J⊆2[n]\mathcal J\subseteq2^{[n]}J⊆2[n].

A partition matroid assigns each agent iii to a part part(i)\mathrm{part}(i)part(i) and each part bbb a capacity cap(b)∈N\mathrm{cap}(b)\in\mathbb Ncap(b)∈N. A set is feasible iff it contains at most cap(b)\mathrm{cap}(b)cap(b) agents of every part bbb. With one part of capacity kkk this is the kkk-uniform matroid: at most kkk agents are served.

A truthful mechanism MMM maps a value vector v\mathbf vv to a feasible set M(v)M(\mathbf v)M(v) and payments πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v). It is dominant-strategy incentive compatible and individually rational. Its expected revenue is RM=E[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M=\mathbb E[\sum_i\pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=E[∑i​πi​(v)], and qiM=Pr⁡[i∈M(v)]q^M_i=\Pr[i\in M(\mathbf v)]qiM​=Pr[i∈M(v)] is its service probability for agent iii.

The sequential posted-price mechanism S\mathcal SS built from MMM sets the price pi=Fi−1(1−qiM)p_i=F_i^{-1}(1-q^M_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​) for agent iii, so that agent iii accepts with probability exactly qiMq^M_iqiM​. It approaches the agents one at a time in decreasing order of price (σ\sigmaσ is the ordering). It offers agent iii the price pip_ipi​ if adding iii to the agents already served keeps the set feasible. The agent accepts iff pi≤vip_i\le v_ipi​≤vi​. Its expected revenue is Rpσ\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}Rpσ​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6, partition matroids

For every partition matroid, every truthful MMM, and S\mathcal SS built from MMM as above,

RM≤ee−1 Rpσ.\mathcal R^M\le\frac{e}{e-1}\,\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}.RM≤e−1e​Rpσ​.

Taking MMM to be Myerson's mechanism gives the paper's statement.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (regular case): RM≤∑ipiMqiM\mathcal R^M\le\sum_ip^M_iq^M_iRM≤∑i​piM​qiM​ with piM=Fi−1(1−qiM)p^M_i=F_i^{-1}(1-q^M_i)piM​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​).
  2. Rank bound (§4): ∑i∈SqiM≤rank⁡(S)\sum_{i\in S}q^M_i\le\operatorname{rank}(S)∑i∈S​qiM​≤rank(S) for every set SSS; for a part bbb this reads ∑part(i)=bqiM≤cap(b)\sum_{\mathrm{part}(i)=b}q^M_i\le\mathrm{cap}(b)∑part(i)=b​qiM​≤cap(b).
  3. Single-unit revenue formula (App. C.2): RS=∑kckpkqk\mathcal R^{\mathcal S}=\sum_kc_kp_kq_kRS=∑k​ck​pk​qk​ with ck=∏j<k(1−qj)c_k=\prod_{j<k}(1-q_j)ck​=∏j<k​(1−qj​), positions in offer order.
  4. Lemma 20: with ppp defined by ∑kpkqk=p∑kqk\sum_kp_kq_k=p\sum_kq_k∑k​pk​qk​=p∑k​qk​ (equation (2)) and prices decreasing, p∑kckqk≤∑kckpkqkp\sum_kc_kq_k\le\sum_kc_kp_kq_kp∑k​ck​qk​≤∑k​ck​pk​qk​.
  5. Display (3): if ∑kqk=s≤1\sum_kq_k=s\le1∑k​qk​=s≤1, then p∑kckqk=p(1−∏k(1−qk))≥p(1−(1−s/n)n)≥(1−1/e)psp\sum_kc_kq_k=p(1-\prod_k(1-q_k))\ge p(1-(1-s/n)^n)\ge(1-1/e)psp∑k​ck​qk​=p(1−∏k​(1−qk​))≥p(1−(1−s/n)n)≥(1−1/e)ps.
  6. Theorem 21: the goal for the 111-uniform matroid.
  7. Theorem 22: the goal for the kkk-uniform matroid, every kkk.

Significance

The theorem shows that a mechanism with no bidding loses at most about 37%37\%37% of the optimal revenue when the constraint is a union of multi-unit supplies. That covers selling several kinds of goods, each in limited stock, to single-minded buyers. The prices are computed once from the distributions. The order is fixed before any value is seen. No agent's payment depends on another agent's report. The factor is tight for this mechanism (App. C.2), and the same template (prices from service probabilities, decreasing order) gives factor 222 for all matroids and m+1m+1m+1 for intersections of mmm matroids.

On the formal side, the paper's results are proved but none is machine-checked as far as we know. The platform has Myerson-type results for a single unit with Bayesian incentive compatibility and a common support (Börgers), and for i.i.d. buyers with a fixed number of units (Talluri and van Ryzin). Neither covers independent, non-identical buyers under a set-system constraint with dominant-strategy truthfulness. A complete development would include the ex-ante revenue bound of Lemma 2 for regular distributions, which is reusable for any posted-price or prophet-inequality argument, and the 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e correlation-gap inequality.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares S\mathcal SS with Myerson's mechanism one agent at a time. That fails, because S\mathcal SS may stop offering to an agent once the units of its part are gone, and the agents blocked this way can be the ones Myerson's mechanism serves. The loss has to be bounded in aggregate, using only the ex-ante constraint ∑part(i)=bqi≤cap(b)\sum_{\mathrm{part}(i)=b}q_i\le\mathrm{cap}(b)∑part(i)=b​qi​≤cap(b). The single-unit case reduces to an inequality about products ∏(1−qj)\prod(1-q_j)∏(1−qj​). For kkk units, the printed proof (pp. 15–16) is an induction that compares the run with a hypothetical single-unit instance with probabilities qi/kq_i/kqi​/k. Its second case is informal, so a formal proof needs its own argument for the kkk-unit bound. Passing from uniform to partition matroids needs the observation that with a global order the run inside each part depends only on that part's agents. Lemma 2 needs the revenue-curve concavity that regularity gives, stated through densities rather than derivatives.

Formalization scope

  • Values. Each FiF_iFi​ has a density that is measurable and strictly positive on a bounded interval [v‾i,vˉi][\underline v_i,\bar v_i][v​i​,vˉi​] with 0≤v‾i0\le\underline v_i0≤v​i​, integrates to 111 there, and has no mass outside. The paper says only "with density fif_ifi​". This pin rules out point masses, so the randomised-price variant of S\mathcal SS never arises. The prior is the product of these laws.
  • Regularity is φi\varphi_iφi​ non-decreasing on the support, assumed for every agent in the goal, as in the paper's §4 analyses. The non-regular extension (second paragraph of Lemma 2, Appendix E) is out of scope.
  • Truthful means deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible over the support, ex-post individually rational, feasible, with measurable allocations and integrable payments.
  • Prices are arguments tied to MMM by pi∈[v‾i,vˉi]p_i\in[\underline v_i,\bar v_i]pi​∈[v​i​,vˉi​] and Fi(pi)=1−qiMF_i(p_i)=1-q^M_iFi​(pi​)=1−qiM​. No inverse distribution function is defined.
  • Order. The order σ\sigmaσ is a permutation with σ(0)\sigma(0)σ(0) first, decreasing in price, and ties are arbitrary. It is global across parts. Parts of capacity 000 are allowed.
  • Constant. The constant is exactly e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1).
  • No free prices. The theorem is not stated with free or existentially chosen prices. Prices are pinned to MMM's service probabilities, and S\mathcal SS uses the same constraint as MMM. A statement in which the prices could be chosen after the fact, or in which MMM were not required to be individually rational, would be a different or false theorem.
  • Every truthful MMM. The comparison is with every truthful MMM, not with a constructed Myerson mechanism. This form is at least as strong as the paper's, and it is what the paper's proof shows.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the algebraic milestones (Lemma 20, display (3)), the revenue formula, Lemma 2 (reusable payment-identity infrastructure for dominant-strategy mechanisms), and a correlation-gap argument for kkk units.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. L. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, STOC 2010; arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • L. Blumrosen, T. Holenstein, Posted Prices vs. Negotiations: An Asymptotic Analysis, ACM EC 2008.
  • Q. Yan, Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap, ACM-SIAM SODA 2011.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 1: Sequential Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Why posted prices

A seller who must decide whom to serve among several buyers with private values can, in principle, run Myerson's revenue-optimal mechanism: collect bids, compute virtual values, serve the feasible set of largest virtual surplus, and charge threshold payments (Myerson 1981). In practice sellers rarely do this. Retail, ticketing and online platforms mostly use posted prices: each buyer is offered a take-it-or-leave-it price and accepts if and only if the price does not exceed the buyer's value. Posted prices are simple to explain, are trivially truthful, and do not require buyers to reveal their values.

Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435, STOC 2010) asked how much revenue is lost by this simplification, and showed that for a wide range of feasibility constraints a sequential posted-price mechanism recovers a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. The matroid case, a factor of 2, is the first and most widely cited of their results. It is a revenue analogue of the prophet inequality and was one of the starting points of the literature on "simple versus optimal" mechanisms.

Setting

There are nnn single-parameter agents, indexed by [n][n][n], and one seller. Agent iii has a private value viv_ivi​ for being served, drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​. The virtual valuation of agent iii is

ϕi(vi)=vi−1−Fi(vi)fi(vi),\phi_i(v_i) = v_i - \frac{1 - F_i(v_i)}{f_i(v_i)},ϕi​(vi​)=vi​−fi​(vi​)1−Fi​(vi​)​,

and FiF_iFi​ is regular if ϕi\phi_iϕi​ is non-decreasing.

The seller faces a feasibility constraint: a downward-closed family J\mathcal JJ of subsets of [n][n][n], the sets of agents that can be served together. The rank of a set SSS is rank⁡(S)=max⁡S′⊆S, S′∈J∣S′∣\operatorname{rank}(S) = \max_{S' \subseteq S,\, S' \in \mathcal J} |S'|rank(S)=maxS′⊆S,S′∈J​∣S′∣. The constraint is a matroid if it satisfies the augmentation axiom: whenever A,B∈JA, B \in \mathcal JA,B∈J and ∣A∣>∣B∣|A| > |B|∣A∣>∣B∣, some e∈A∖Be \in A \setminus Be∈A∖B has B∪{e}∈JB \cup \{e\} \in \mathcal JB∪{e}∈J. Examples are kkk identical units (kkk-uniform matroids) and disjoint markets with separate capacities (partition matroids).

A mechanism MMM maps reported values v\mathbf vv to a feasible set M(v)∈JM(\mathbf v) \in \mathcal JM(v)∈J of served agents and a payment πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v) for each agent. It is truthful if reporting the true value is a dominant strategy and no agent ends with negative utility. Its expected revenue is RM=E[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M = \mathbb E[\sum_i \pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=E[∑i​πi​(v)], and qiM=Pr⁡[i∈M(v)]q^M_i = \Pr[i \in M(\mathbf v)]qiM​=Pr[i∈M(v)] is the probability that it serves agent iii.

A sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM) with ordering σ\sigmaσ and prices p\mathbf pp approaches the agents in the order σ\sigmaσ. When agent iii's turn comes, if adding iii to the set AAA of agents served so far keeps AAA feasible, iii is offered price pip_ipi​ and is served (and pays pip_ipi​) if pi≤vip_i \le v_ipi​≤vi​; otherwise iii is blocked. Its expected revenue is Rpσ\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}Rpσ​.

The mechanism S\mathcal SS of the paper sets pi=Fi−1(1−qiM)p_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q^M_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​), so that agent iii accepts an offer with probability exactly qiMq^M_iqiM​, and approaches the agents in decreasing order of price.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

For regular, independent values and a matroid constraint, for every truthful mechanism MMM and the SPM S\mathcal SS built from its service probabilities,

RM≤2 Rpσ.\mathcal R^M \le 2\, \mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}.RM≤2Rpσ​.

Taking MMM to be Myerson's optimal mechanism gives the paper's statement that S\mathcal SS 2-approximates the optimal revenue.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 5): the expected revenue of a truthful mechanism equals its expected virtual surplus E[∑i∈M(v)ϕi(vi)]\mathbb E[\sum_{i \in M(\mathbf v)} \phi_i(v_i)]E[∑i∈M(v)​ϕi​(vi​)].
  2. Lemma 2 (p. 5): RM≤∑ipiMqiM\mathcal R^M \le \sum_i p^M_i q^M_iRM≤∑i​piM​qiM​ with piM=Fi−1(1−qiM)p^M_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q^M_i)piM​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​).
  3. Revenue of an SPM (§2.2, p. 4): Rpσ=∑iciqipi\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p} = \sum_i c_i q_i p_iRpσ​=∑i​ci​qi​pi​, where cic_ici​ is the probability that agent iii is offered service and qi=1−Fi(pi)q_i = 1 - F_i(p_i)qi​=1−Fi​(pi​).
  4. Rank bound (§4, p. 6): ∑i∈SqiM≤rank⁡(S)\sum_{i \in S} q^M_i \le \operatorname{rank}(S)∑i∈S​qiM​≤rank(S) for every set SSS.
  5. Lost revenue (proof of Theorem 5, p. 7): in any run under a matroid, with prices in decreasing order and weights qqq satisfying the rank bound, ∑i blockedpiqi≤∑i servedpi\sum_{i \text{ blocked}} p_i q_i \le \sum_{i \text{ served}} p_i∑i blocked​pi​qi​≤∑i served​pi​.
  6. Half of the benchmark (p. 7): under the same conditions, ∑ipiqi≤2Rpσ\sum_i p_i q_i \le 2 \mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}∑i​pi​qi​≤2Rpσ​.

Significance

The theorem shows that under a matroid constraint the optimal mechanism's advantage over a single round of posted prices is at most a factor of 2, uniformly over all regular distributions. Prices, rather than an auction, then suffice up to a constant, which justifies posted pricing in settings where an auction is impractical. The same argument, with the matroid replaced by an intersection of mmm matroids, gives the paper's Theorems 7 and 8, and the bound underlies the analysis of VCG with reserve prices (Theorem 32). Lemma 2's benchmark ∑ipiMqiM\sum_i p^M_i q^M_i∑i​piM​qiM​ became a standard tool for "ex ante relaxation" arguments.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires Myerson's revenue characterization in a multi-agent, dominant-strategy setting with a general feasibility constraint, which Lean's libraries do not have, and a probabilistic analysis of a sequential process over a product measure. Related formalizations exist for narrower models: the single-unit, Bayesian incentive compatible revenue identity MechanismDesign.Auctions.revenue_eq_virtual_surplus (Börgers' textbook, common support) and the i.i.d. multi-unit RevenueManagement.revenue_equivalence. Neither covers per-agent supports, set-system constraints or dominant-strategy truthfulness.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the SPM with the hypothetical mechanism that ignores the feasibility constraint, whose revenue is exactly ∑ipiqi\sum_i p_i q_i∑i​pi​qi​. The SPM loses the revenue of agents who would have accepted but are blocked. The difficulty is that blocking is correlated with the values of earlier agents, and the lost revenue must be bounded by revenue actually collected. A naive per-agent charge fails in a general matroid, because one served agent can block many others; the bound has to use the matroid's rank structure together with the decreasing price order.

On the mechanism side, Lemma 2 needs the full Myerson theory: monotonicity of truthful allocations, the payment identity, and an optimization over interim allocation rules with a fixed service probability, where regularity is used.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CHMSPricing.SpmMatroid. Agents are Fin n. The following conventions are fixed.

  • Distributions. Each FiF_iFi​ is given by a measurable density, strictly positive on a bounded interval [v‾i,v‾i][\underline v_i, \overline v_i][v​i​,vi​] with 0≤v‾i<v‾i0 \le \underline v_i < \overline v_i0≤v​i​<vi​, integrating to 111 there, with no mass outside. There are no point masses, so the randomized variant of S\mathcal SS in §4 does not arise. The prior is the product measure.
  • Regularity. Monotone non-decreasing virtual values on the support (Definition 2). All goals assume regular distributions, as the body's analyses do; the non-regular case (the second paragraph of Lemma 2, Appendix E) uses randomized prices and is out of scope.
  • Truthfulness. Deterministic mechanisms, dominant-strategy incentive compatible with deviations within the support, ex-post individually rational, feasible on the type space, with measurable allocation events and measurable integrable payments. Payments of unserved agents are not forced to zero.
  • Benchmark. The goal is stated for every truthful MMM, with S\mathcal SS built from MMM's own service probabilities; this is stronger than comparing with Myerson's mechanism alone and avoids constructing it.
  • Prices. pi=Fi−1(1−qi)p_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qi​) is passed as an argument with the hypotheses pi∈[v‾i,v‾i]p_i \in [\underline v_i, \overline v_i]pi​∈[v​i​,vi​] and Fi(pi)=1−qiF_i(p_i) = 1 - q_iFi​(pi​)=1−qi​, rather than through a generalized inverse.
  • SPM. Positions are 000-based; the price belongs to the agent; acceptance is pi≤vip_i \le v_ipi​≤vi​; ties in the decreasing price order are arbitrary, and the goal holds for every such order.
  • Proposition 1 additionally assumes the normalization that an agent with value v‾i\underline v_iv​i​ has zero utility, which is how the paper's payments are pinned down.

The goal cannot be trivialized by a free choice of prices: the prices are tied to the mechanism's service probabilities, and the SPM uses the same matroid as the mechanism. Individual rationality is essential, since without it a "truthful" mechanism can extract unbounded revenue.

A complete development needs Myerson's lemma for dominant-strategy single-parameter mechanisms, a quantile/revenue-curve argument under regularity, matroid span and rank facts for the paper's finite set systems, and independence arguments for a sequential process on a product measure. The rank bound and the deterministic lost-revenue inequality are independent of the probabilistic parts and are good first contributions; the Myerson-side lemmas are reusable for the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010; STOC 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58–73, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • J. Bulow, J. Roberts, The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions, Journal of Political Economy 97(5):1060–1090, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1086/261643
  • R. Kleinberg, S. M. Weinberg, Matroid Prophet Inequalities, STOC 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.4764
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Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory IX: Kingman's Upper Bound on the G/G/1 Queue WaitTextbook

Motivation

The single-server queue with general independent interarrival and service times, the G/G/1 queue, is the basic model of a congested resource: a machine, a link, a checkout. For Markovian arrivals or services the mean wait has a closed form (the Pollaczek–Khintchine formula for M/G/1, the geometric law for G/M/1). For general distributions it has none, and the mean wait depends on the whole distributions of the interarrival and service times, not only on their moments. Capacity planning still needs numbers. Bounds that use only the first two moments are therefore the practical tool. They say how bad congestion can be for any queue with a given arrival rate, service rate and variabilities, and they become exact as the traffic intensity approaches one.

This mission formalizes Chapter 7, §7.1 of Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., Wiley 2008, DOI 10.1002/9781118625651), together with the heavy-traffic Theorem 7.1 of §7.2.3.

Timeline. Lindley (Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc., 1952) derived the recursion for successive waiting times and characterized the stationary law. Kingman (Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc., 1961, 1962) proved the heavy-traffic exponential limit. In "Some inequalities for the queue GI/G/1" (Biometrika, 1962) he proved the two-moment upper bound. Marshall (1968) derived further moment relations and bounds (Operations Research, 1968). Marchal (Operations Research, 1978) gave the lower bound (7.14).

Setting

A G/G/1 queue is specified by two probability laws on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞): the law AAA of an interarrival time TTT and the law BBB of a service time SSS. Both have finite second moments, and

E[T]=1λ,E[S]=1μ,σA2=Var[T],σB2=Var[S],ρ=λμ.E[T] = \frac1\lambda,\quad E[S] = \frac1\mu,\quad \sigma_A^2 = \mathrm{Var}[T],\quad \sigma_B^2 = \mathrm{Var}[S],\quad \rho = \frac{\lambda}{\mu}.E[T]=λ1​,E[S]=μ1​,σA2​=Var[T],σB2​=Var[S],ρ=μλ​.

The pairs (S(n),T(n))(S^{(n)}, T^{(n)})(S(n),T(n)) are independent and identically distributed, and S(n)S^{(n)}S(n) is independent of T(n)T^{(n)}T(n). Customers are served first come, first served. The line delay Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ of the nnnth customer obeys Lindley's recursion

Wq(n+1)=max⁡(0, Wq(n)+U(n)),U(n)=S(n)−T(n),(7.1)W_q^{(n+1)} = \max\bigl(0,\ W_q^{(n)} + U^{(n)}\bigr), \qquad U^{(n)} = S^{(n)} - T^{(n)}, \tag{7.1}Wq(n+1)​=max(0, Wq(n)​+U(n)),U(n)=S(n)−T(n),(7.1)

and Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ is independent of (S(n),T(n))(S^{(n)}, T^{(n)})(S(n),T(n)). The idle gap X(n)=−min⁡(0,Wq(n)+U(n))X^{(n)} = -\min(0, W_q^{(n)} + U^{(n)})X(n)=−min(0,Wq(n)​+U(n)) is the time between the nnnth departure and the next start of service.

The queue is stationary when the law ν\nuν of Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ does not depend on nnn, that is, when one step of (7.1) maps ν\nuν to itself. The mean stationary line delay is Wq=E[Wq(n)]=∫w dν(w)W_q = E[W_q^{(n)}] = \int w\,d\nu(w)Wq​=E[Wq(n)​]=∫wdν(w). In the Lean development these objects are IsGG1Input A B lam mu, lindley, idleX, IsStationaryWaitLaw A B ν and meanWait ν, in the namespace QueueingFundamentals.Bounds.

Formalization targets

Goal: Kingman's upper bound (7.13)

For every stationary G/G/1 queue with ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1, WqW_qWq​ is finite and

Wq≤λ(σA2+σB2)2(1−ρ).W_q \le \frac{\lambda(\sigma_A^2 + \sigma_B^2)}{2(1-\rho)}.Wq​≤2(1−ρ)λ(σA2​+σB2​)​.

Milestones

  • the idle-gap identity E[X]=−E[U]=1/λ−1/μE[X] = -E[U] = 1/\lambda - 1/\muE[X]=−E[U]=1/λ−1/μ (7.4), and the mean-wait formula (7.7)
Wq=E[X2]−E[U2]2E[U];W_q = \frac{E[X^2] - E[U^2]}{2E[U]};Wq​=2E[U]E[X2]−E[U2]​;
  • the variance of the interdeparture time D=S(n+1)+X(n)D = S^{(n+1)} + X^{(n)}D=S(n+1)+X(n) (7.12): Var[D]=2σB2+σA2−2Wq(1/λ−1/μ)\mathrm{Var}[D] = 2\sigma_B^2 + \sigma_A^2 - 2W_q(1/\lambda - 1/\mu)Var[D]=2σB2​+σA2​−2Wq​(1/λ−1/μ);
  • Marchal's lower bound (7.14), Wq≥(λ2σB2+ρ(ρ−2))/(2λ(1−ρ))W_q \ge (\lambda^2\sigma_B^2 + \rho(\rho-2))/(2\lambda(1-\rho))Wq​≥(λ2σB2​+ρ(ρ−2))/(2λ(1−ρ));
  • the distributional lower bound Wq≥r0W_q \ge r_0Wq​≥r0​, with r0r_0r0​ the unique nonnegative root of f(z)=z−∫−z∞[1−U(t)] dtf(z) = z - \int_{-z}^\infty [1 - U(t)]\,dtf(z)=z−∫−z∞​[1−U(t)]dt and U(t)U(t)U(t) the CDF of S−TS - TS−T ((7.15), (7.16));
  • the two-sided estimate (7.17), max⁡(0,r0,λ2σB2+ρ(ρ−2)2λ(1−ρ))≤Wq≤λ(σA2+σB2)2(1−ρ)\max\bigl(0, r_0, \tfrac{\lambda^2\sigma_B^2 + \rho(\rho-2)}{2\lambda(1-\rho)}\bigr) \le W_q \le \tfrac{\lambda(\sigma_A^2+\sigma_B^2)}{2(1-\rho)}max(0,r0​,2λ(1−ρ)λ2σB2​+ρ(ρ−2)​)≤Wq​≤2(1−ρ)λ(σA2​+σB2​)​;
  • Theorem 7.1 (heavy traffic): for a sequence of G/G/1 queues with ρj→1\rho_j \to 1ρj​→1, αj=−E[Sj−Tj]\alpha_j = -E[S_j - T_j]αj​=−E[Sj​−Tj​] and βj2=Var[Sj−Tj]\beta_j^2 = \mathrm{Var}[S_j - T_j]βj2​=Var[Sj​−Tj​], under convergence of the input laws, Var[S−T]>0\mathrm{Var}[S - T] > 0Var[S−T]>0 and uniformly bounded (2+δ)(2+\delta)(2+δ)-moments,
2αjβj2 Wq,j→dExp(1).\frac{2\alpha_j}{\beta_j^2}\,W_{q,j} \xrightarrow{d} \mathrm{Exp}(1).βj2​2αj​​Wq,j​d​Exp(1).

The goal is (7.13) rather than the stronger (7.17) because it depends only on the first two moments of the input.

Significance

Kingman's bound is the most widely used performance estimate for single-server queues. It needs no distributional form, only two means and two variances. It yields the "Kingman formula" approximation used across manufacturing and service operations, and it is asymptotically exact as ρ→1\rho \to 1ρ→1 (Theorem 7.1). The departure variance (7.12) drives the decomposition approximations for networks of §7.3. The heavy-traffic theorem is the entry point to diffusion approximations of queues.

All results here are proved in the literature (Theorem 7.1 is stated in the book without proof). This mission produces the first machine-checked versions. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of these statements, and no stationary Lindley recursion, has been formalized. The substrate it needs is reusable for any mission on G/G/1, G/G/c or random walks: stationary laws of a recursion on distributions, moment identities for max⁡(0,⋅)\max(0,\cdot)max(0,⋅), and convergence in distribution.

Difficulty

The book's derivation squares (7.3) and takes expectations, using E[(Wq(n+1))2]=E[(Wq(n))2]E[(W_q^{(n+1)})^2] = E[(W_q^{(n)})^2]E[(Wq(n+1)​)2]=E[(Wq(n)​)2]. That step is valid only if the stationary wait has a finite second moment. It is not assumed here and fails in general: with finite second moments of SSS and TTT the stationary wait has a finite mean, but its second moment is finite only if E[S3]<∞E[S^3] < \inftyE[S3]<∞. So the moment identity (7.7) cannot be obtained by cancelling second moments. A truncation or limiting argument is needed, and even the finiteness of WqW_qWq​ has to be proved rather than assumed. The lower bound Wq≥r0W_q \ge r_0Wq​≥r0​ further needs a Jensen argument for the conditional mean of one Lindley step. Theorem 7.1 needs a uniform-integrability argument across a sequence of queues.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • laws, not random variables: AAA, BBB and the stationary law ν\nuν are Measure ℝ; independence of Wq(n),S(n),T(n)W_q^{(n)}, S^{(n)}, T^{(n)}Wq(n)​,S(n),T(n) (and S(n+1)S^{(n+1)}S(n+1) for DDD) is the product measure;
  • the input laws are probability measures on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with finite second moments (MemLp id 2), E[T]=1/λE[T] = 1/\lambdaE[T]=1/λ, E[S]=1/μE[S] = 1/\muE[S]=1/μ, λ,μ>0\lambda, \mu > 0λ,μ>0, ρ=λ/μ<1\rho = \lambda/\mu < 1ρ=λ/μ<1;
  • stationarity is invariance of the whole law ν\nuν under one step of (7.1), not equality of means;
  • WqW_qWq​, the variances (Mathlib variance) and f1f_1f1​ are Lebesgue integrals. Every theorem therefore asserts, as part of its conclusion, that ν\nuν has a finite mean, and none assumes a finite second moment of ν\nuν;
  • U(t)U(t)U(t) is Mathlib's cdf of the law of S−TS - TS−T;
  • convergence in distribution is convergence of ∫g\int g∫g for all bounded continuous ggg, and Exp(1)\mathrm{Exp}(1)Exp(1) is expMeasure 1.

Closed forms carried by the statements: (7.4), (7.7), (7.12), (7.13), (7.14) and (7.17) exactly as printed, and the scaling 2αj/βj22\alpha_j/\beta_j^22αj​/βj2​ of Theorem 7.1.

Stating (7.13) with WqW_qWq​, E[X2]E[X^2]E[X2] or the idle probability as free real numbers constrained by (7.7) would reduce it to algebra. Here WqW_qWq​ is always the mean of a stationary law of the queue.

Not formalized: (7.5) and (7.8), which need the idle-period law III and the arrival-point probability q0q_0q0​ as separate objects, and the multiserver bounds of §7.1.3. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are reusable lemmas on stationary laws of Lindley's recursion (existence, uniqueness, and finiteness of the mean under E[S2]<∞E[S^2] < \inftyE[S2]<∞).

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • D. V. Lindley, The theory of queues with a single server, Math. Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 48 (1952)
  • J. F. C. Kingman, The single server queue in heavy traffic, Math. Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 57 (1961)
  • J. F. C. Kingman, Some inequalities for the queue GI/G/1, Biometrika 49 (1962)
  • K. T. Marshall, Some inequalities in queuing, Operations Research 16 (1968)
  • W. G. Marchal, Some simpler bounds on the mean queuing time, Operations Research 26 (1978)
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Linear OptimizationMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Dantzig Selector: Statistical Estimation When p Is Much Larger than n 1: ℓ2 Error Bound for Sparse Parameters under the Uniform Uncertainty PrincipleResearch Paper

Motivation

In many statistical applications the number of unknown parameters ppp is far larger than the number of observations nnn: gene-expression studies with tens of samples and thousands of genes, imaging problems with fewer measurements than pixels, and nonparametric curve estimation from finitely many noisy samples. Least squares is useless in this regime, since the system Xβ=yX\beta=yXβ=y is underdetermined. If the parameter is sparse (only a few of its entries are nonzero), estimation becomes possible, and the question is how accurate a computationally tractable estimator can be.

Candès and Tao (arXiv:math/0506081; Ann. Statist. 35(6), 2007, doi:10.1214/009053606000001523) introduced the Dantzig selector, an estimator computed by a linear program, and proved that its squared error is within a factor of order log⁡p\log plogp of the error of an oracle that knows where the nonzero entries are. The paper, with its discussion in the same issue, is one of the founding results of high-dimensional sparse regression, alongside the Lasso analysis of Bickel, Ritov and Tsybakov (arXiv:0801.1095).

Timeline. Candès and Tao (2005, arXiv:math/0502327) showed that ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ minimization recovers a sparse vector exactly from noiseless data when the restricted isometry constants of the design satisfy δS+θS,S+θS,2S<1\delta_S+\theta_{S,S}+\theta_{S,2S}<1δS​+θS,S​+θS,2S​<1. The Dantzig selector paper (first posted 2005, published 2007) carried this to Gaussian noise, with the ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ error bound formalized here (Theorem 1.1) and an oracle inequality (Theorem 1.2). Bickel, Ritov and Tsybakov (2009) replaced the restricted isometry hypothesis by weaker restricted eigenvalue conditions and showed that the Lasso and the Dantzig selector behave alike.

Setting

Observe y∈Rny\in\mathbb R^ny∈Rn from the linear model

y=Xβ+z,y=X\beta+z ,y=Xβ+z,

where X∈Rn×pX\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}X∈Rn×p is a deterministic design matrix with columns X1,…,XpX_1,\dots,X_pX1​,…,Xp​, each of Euclidean norm ∥Xj∥ℓ2=1\|X_j\|_{\ell_2}=1∥Xj​∥ℓ2​​=1; β∈Rp\beta\in\mathbb R^pβ∈Rp is an unknown deterministic parameter; and z=(z1,…,zn)z=(z_1,\dots,z_n)z=(z1​,…,zn​) is a vector of independent N(0,σ2)N(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) random variables with σ>0\sigma>0σ>0. The vector β\betaβ is SSS-sparse if at most SSS of its entries are nonzero.

For T⊆{1,…,p}T\subseteq\{1,\dots,p\}T⊆{1,…,p} let XTX_TXT​ be the submatrix of the columns indexed by TTT. The restricted isometry constant δS\delta_SδS​ is the smallest δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 with

(1−δ)∥c∥ℓ22≤∥XTc∥ℓ22≤(1+δ)∥c∥ℓ22(1-\delta)\|c\|_{\ell_2}^2\le\|X_Tc\|_{\ell_2}^2\le(1+\delta)\|c\|_{\ell_2}^2(1−δ)∥c∥ℓ2​2​≤∥XT​c∥ℓ2​2​≤(1+δ)∥c∥ℓ2​2​

for all ∣T∣≤S|T|\le S∣T∣≤S and all coefficient vectors ccc; the restricted orthogonality constant θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​ (for S+S′≤pS+S'\le pS+S′≤p) is the smallest θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0 with ∣⟨XTc,XT′c′⟩∣≤θ∥c∥ℓ2∥c′∥ℓ2|\langle X_Tc,X_{T'}c'\rangle|\le\theta\|c\|_{\ell_2}\|c'\|_{\ell_2}∣⟨XT​c,XT′​c′⟩∣≤θ∥c∥ℓ2​​∥c′∥ℓ2​​ for all disjoint T,T′T,T'T,T′ with ∣T∣≤S|T|\le S∣T∣≤S, ∣T′∣≤S′|T'|\le S'∣T′∣≤S′.

Given a tuning parameter λp>0\lambda_p>0λp​>0, the Dantzig selector β^\hat\betaβ^​ is any solution of

min⁡β~∈Rp∥β~∥ℓ1subject to∥X∗(y−Xβ~)∥ℓ∞=max⁡1≤j≤p∣⟨y−Xβ~,Xj⟩∣≤λp⋅σ.\min_{\tilde\beta\in\mathbb R^p}\|\tilde\beta\|_{\ell_1}\quad\text{subject to}\quad\|X^*(y-X\tilde\beta)\|_{\ell_\infty}=\max_{1\le j\le p}|\langle y-X\tilde\beta,X_j\rangle|\le\lambda_p\cdot\sigma .β~​∈Rpmin​∥β~​∥ℓ1​​subject to∥X∗(y−Xβ~​)∥ℓ∞​​=1≤j≤pmax​∣⟨y−Xβ~​,Xj​⟩∣≤λp​⋅σ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.1

Let S≥1S\ge1S≥1, 3S≤p3S\le p3S≤p, β\betaβ SSS-sparse, and δ2S+θS,2S<1\delta_{2S}+\theta_{S,2S}<1δ2S​+θS,2S​<1. For every a≥0a\ge0a≥0, with λp=2(1+a)log⁡p\lambda_p=\sqrt{2(1+a)\log p}λp​=2(1+a)logp​, with probability exceeding 1−(πlog⁡p⋅pa)−11-(\sqrt{\pi\log p}\cdot p^a)^{-1}1−(πlogp​⋅pa)−1 the program has a solution and every solution satisfies

∥β^−β∥ℓ22≤C12⋅λp2⋅S⋅σ2,C1=41−δ2S−θS,2S.\|\hat\beta-\beta\|_{\ell_2}^2\le C_1^2\cdot\lambda_p^2\cdot S\cdot\sigma^2,\qquad C_1=\frac{4}{1-\delta_{2S}-\theta_{S,2S}} .∥β^​−β∥ℓ2​2​≤C12​⋅λp2​⋅S⋅σ2,C1​=1−δ2S​−θS,2S​4​.

For a=0a=0a=0 this is ∥β^−β∥ℓ22≤C12⋅(2log⁡p)⋅S⋅σ2\|\hat\beta-\beta\|_{\ell_2}^2\le C_1^2\cdot(2\log p)\cdot S\cdot\sigma^2∥β^​−β∥ℓ2​2​≤C12​⋅(2logp)⋅S⋅σ2, display (1.10) of the paper. The constant is the one the paper's proof establishes (see Formalization scope).

Milestones

  1. The cone constraint (3.2): if ∥β+h∥ℓ1≤∥β∥ℓ1\|\beta+h\|_{\ell_1}\le\|\beta\|_{\ell_1}∥β+h∥ℓ1​​≤∥β∥ℓ1​​ and β\betaβ vanishes off T0T_0T0​, then ∥hT0c∥ℓ1≤∥hT0∥ℓ1\|h_{T_0^c}\|_{\ell_1}\le\|h_{T_0}\|_{\ell_1}∥hT0c​​∥ℓ1​​≤∥hT0​​∥ℓ1​​.
  2. The tube constraint (3.3): with unit-normed columns, if ∣⟨z,Xj⟩∣≤λp|\langle z,X_j\rangle|\le\lambda_p∣⟨z,Xj​⟩∣≤λp​ for all jjj and β^\hat\betaβ^​ is feasible, then ∥X∗X(β^−β)∥ℓ∞≤2λp\|X^*X(\hat\beta-\beta)\|_{\ell_\infty}\le2\lambda_p∥X∗X(β^​−β)∥ℓ∞​​≤2λp​.
  3. Lemma 3.1 (under the section’s unit-column assumption): an ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ bound on hhh over T0∪T1T_0\cup T_1T0​∪T1​ (T1T_1T1​ the SSS largest entries of hhh off T0T_0T0​) in terms of ∥XT01TXh∥ℓ2\|X_{T_{01}}^TXh\|_{\ell_2}∥XT01​T​Xh∥ℓ2​​ and ∥h∥ℓ1(T0c)\|h\|_{\ell_1(T_0^c)}∥h∥ℓ1​(T0c​)​, and ∥h∥ℓ22≤∥h∥ℓ2(T01)2+S−1∥h∥ℓ1(T0c)2\|h\|_{\ell_2}^2\le\|h\|_{\ell_2(T_{01})}^2+S^{-1}\|h\|_{\ell_1(T_0^c)}^2∥h∥ℓ2​2​≤∥h∥ℓ2​(T01​)2​+S−1∥h∥ℓ1​(T0c​)2​.
  4. The deterministic core: with σ=1\sigma=1σ=1, on the event ∣⟨z,Xj⟩∣≤λp|\langle z,X_j\rangle|\le\lambda_p∣⟨z,Xj​⟩∣≤λp​ for all jjj, every Dantzig selector satisfies ∥β^−β∥ℓ22≤C12λp2S\|\hat\beta-\beta\|_{\ell_2}^2\le C_1^2\lambda_p^2S∥β^​−β∥ℓ2​2​≤C12​λp2​S.
  5. The Gaussian tail bound: for standard normal zzz and Zj=⟨z,Xj⟩Z_j=\langle z,X_j\rangleZj​=⟨z,Xj​⟩, P(sup⁡j∣Zj∣>u)≤2p φ(u)/u\mathbb P(\sup_j|Z_j|>u)\le2p\,\varphi(u)/uP(supj​∣Zj​∣>u)≤2pφ(u)/u with φ(u)=(2π)−1/2e−u2/2\varphi(u)=(2\pi)^{-1/2}e^{-u^2/2}φ(u)=(2π)−1/2e−u2/2.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1.1 shows that an estimator computable by linear programming reaches, up to the factor 2log⁡p2\log p2logp and the constant C12C_1^2C12​, the squared error Sσ2S\sigma^2Sσ2 that least squares would attain if the support of β\betaβ were known in advance, even when p≫np\gg np≫n. The factor log⁡p\log plogp is the price of not knowing the support; the paper argues (p. 5) that, apart from this factor, (1.10) is unimprovable in general. The bound is non-asymptotic, with an explicit constant and an explicit failure probability, and it holds for every SSS-sparse β\betaβ simultaneously in the sense that the good event (the noise being nearly orthogonal to every column) does not depend on β\betaβ. Its deterministic part, Lemma 3.1, is reused verbatim in the proof of the paper's oracle inequality (Theorem 1.2) and became a standard tool in compressed sensing.

Formalizing it. The result is proved, and to our knowledge no machine-checked proof exists. A formalization produces a checked version of the cone-and-tube argument behind most ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-recovery guarantees, a Lean statement of the restricted isometry machinery for noisy data, and a checked Gaussian maximal inequality usable for other high-dimensional estimators. It also settles the exact constant: the paper prints C1=4/(1−δS−θS,2S)C_1=4/(1-\delta_S-\theta_{S,2S})C1​=4/(1−δS​−θS,2S​), while its proof gives δ2S\delta_{2S}δ2S​ in place of δS\delta_SδS​.

Difficulty

Lemma 3.1 is the main obstacle. The obvious approach bounds ∥h∥ℓ2\|h\|_{\ell_2}∥h∥ℓ2​​ directly through restricted isometry, and it fails because the error hhh is not sparse: it spreads over all ppp coordinates, and restricted isometry controls XXX only on vectors with at most 2S2S2S nonzero entries. The two constraints (3.2) and (3.3) only say that hhh is concentrated in ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ on the SSS coordinates of T0T_0T0​ and that X∗XhX^*XhX∗Xh is small coordinatewise, and turning that into an ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ bound on all of hhh is where the work lies. In Lean this requires bookkeeping that is routine on paper: ordering the coordinates of hhh off T0T_0T0​ by magnitude, with ties and a possibly incomplete last group of coordinates, and working with the span of a selected set of columns. On the probabilistic side, the tail bound needs the law of ⟨z,Xj⟩\langle z,X_j\rangle⟨z,Xj​⟩ (a weighted sum of independent Gaussians), a sharp Gaussian tail estimate of Mills-ratio type, and a union over ppp events. A cruder sub-Gaussian bound 2e−u2/22e^{-u^2/2}2e−u2/2 would not give the stated failure probability.

Formalization scope

Indices are Fin n and Fin p; vectors are functions into ℝ. The norms, the column XjX_jXj​ and the constants δS\delta_SδS​, θS,S′\theta_{S,S'}θS,S′​ are the published definitions CandesTao_Decoding_Norms and CandesTao_Decoding_RestrictedIsometry (the smallest admissible constants, via sInf), from the formalization of Candès and Tao's Decoding by Linear Programming. The noise is a family z : Fin n → Ω → ℝ on a probability space, mutually independent (iIndepFun), each coordinate with law gaussianReal 0 σ². The ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ constraint is coordinatewise. A Dantzig selector is any minimizer; uniqueness is not assumed. Section 3 works with σ=1\sigma=1σ=1; the goal is stated for general σ>0\sigma>0σ>0.

Committed conventions and corrections:

  • Corrected constant. Theorem 1.1 is printed with C1=4/(1−δS−θS,2S)C_1=4/(1-\delta_S-\theta_{S,2S})C1​=4/(1−δS​−θS,2S​), but the proof (pp. 18–19) applies Lemma 3.1, whose δ\deltaδ is δ2S\delta_{2S}δ2S​. Since δS≤δ2S\delta_S\le\delta_{2S}δS​≤δ2S​, the printed constant is stronger than what is proved. The goal and the deterministic core are stated with C1=4/(1−δ2S−θS,2S)C_1=4/(1-\delta_{2S}-\theta_{S,2S})C1​=4/(1−δ2S​−θS,2S​).
  • Domain. 1≤S1\le S1≤S and 3S≤p3S\le p3S≤p, because θS,2S\theta_{S,2S}θS,2S​ is defined only for S+2S≤pS+2S\le pS+2S≤p. This forces p≥3p\ge3p≥3 and log⁡p>0\log p>0logp>0.
  • Failure event. The probability bounded is that of the set where no Dantzig selector exists or some Dantzig selector violates the bound. A version that only constrains existing solutions, or that assumes the feasible set is nonempty, would be weaker. The bound is strict, as in the paper's "exceeding", and is on the outer measure, so no measurability of the event is assumed.
  • Standing assumptions are binders: unit-normed columns, independent Gaussian noise, deterministic XXX and β\betaβ.

A trivializing formalization is excluded: the hypothesis δ2S+θS,2S<1\delta_{2S}+\theta_{S,2S}<1δ2S​+θS,2S​<1 is on the actual least constants of XXX, not on free parameters, and it is satisfiable (for instance by X=IpX=I_pX=Ip​, where both constants vanish).

Needed infrastructure: sums of independent real Gaussians (Mathlib has gaussianReal and its convolution), a Mills-ratio tail bound, a sorting-based block decomposition of a Finset, and orthogonal projection onto the span of finitely many columns. The block decomposition and the tail bound are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of Lemma 3.1.

Selected references

  • E. Candès and T. Tao, The Dantzig selector: statistical estimation when p is much larger than n, Ann. Statist. 35(6) (2007), 2313–2351. arXiv:math/0506081, doi:10.1214/009053606000001523
  • E. Candès and T. Tao, Decoding by linear programming, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 51(12) (2005), 4203–4215. arXiv:math/0502327
  • P. Bickel, Y. Ritov and A. Tsybakov, Simultaneous analysis of Lasso and Dantzig selector, Ann. Statist. 37(4) (2009), 1705–1732. arXiv:0801.1095
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Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Randomization in On-Line Algorithms 3: An Augmented Potential Function Yields an Explicit Deterministic α∘β-Competitive AlgorithmResearch Paper

Motivation

Competitive analysis measures an online algorithm, which must answer each request before seeing the next, against the best off-line answer to the whole request sequence. Randomized online algorithms are often much better than deterministic ones against an oblivious adversary, who fixes the requests in advance; the paging problem is the standard example. Against an adaptive adversary, who sees the algorithm's answers before choosing the next request, the advantage can disappear.

Ben-David, Borodin, Karp, Tardos and Wigderson (Algorithmica 11, 1994; preliminary version STOC 1990) made this precise in an abstract framework of request-answer games. Their Corollary 2.1 says: if a game has a randomized algorithm that is α\alphaα-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries and one that is β\betaβ-competitive against oblivious adversaries, then it has a deterministic α∘β\alpha\circ\betaα∘β-competitive algorithm. That proof is non-constructive: it goes through a game-theoretic determinacy argument. Section 3 of the paper gives a constructive version. Most competitive analyses of randomized algorithms against adaptive adversaries are carried out with a potential function, in the style of Manasse, McGeoch and Sleator (J. Algorithms 11, 1990). The paper shows that such a potential function, together with any oblivious-competitive algorithm HHH, determines an explicit deterministic algorithm MMM, answer by answer. This mission formalizes that construction and its guarantee.

Setting

A request-answer game has a request set RRR, a finite answer set AAA and cost functions fn:Rn×An→Rf_n : R^n \times A^n \to \mathbb Rfn​:Rn×An→R. The off-line optimum of r∈Rnr \in R^nr∈Rn is c(r)=min⁡a∈Anfn(r,a)c(r) = \min_{a \in A^n} f_n(r, a)c(r)=mina∈An​fn​(r,a). A deterministic online algorithm MMM is a sequence of maps mi:Ri→Am_i : R^i \to Ami​:Ri→A; on r=(r1,…,rn)r = (r_1,\dots,r_n)r=(r1​,…,rn​) it answers M(r)=(m1(r1),m2(r1,r2),…,mn(r))M(r) = (m_1(r_1), m_2(r_1,r_2), \dots, m_n(r))M(r)=(m1​(r1​),m2​(r1​,r2​),…,mn​(r)), at cost cM(r)=fn(r,M(r))c_M(r) = f_n(r, M(r))cM​(r)=fn​(r,M(r)). It is α\alphaα-competitive if cM(r)≤α(c(r))c_M(r) \le \alpha(c(r))cM​(r)≤α(c(r)) for all rrr. Throughout, α\alphaα and β\betaβ are affine maps R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R (the paper's "linear functions").

A randomized online algorithm HHH is a probability distribution over deterministic algorithms HyH_yHy​; it is β\betaβ-competitive against any oblivious adversary if Ey[fn(r,Hy(r))]≤β(c(r))\mathbb E_y[f_n(r, H_y(r))] \le \beta(c(r))Ey​[fn​(r,Hy​(r))]≤β(c(r)) for all rrr. The algorithm GGG analysed by the potential function is described by its next-answer laws gn+1(rrn+1,a)g_{n+1}(r r_{n+1}, a)gn+1​(rrn+1​,a) on AAA, given the requests so far, the new request and its own past answers. An adaptive on-line adversary SSS chooses each request from the algorithm's past answers and answers it itself, before the algorithm does, for at most dQd_QdQ​ rounds; a configuration after nnn rounds is (r,a,b)∈Rn×An×An(r, a, b) \in R^n \times A^n \times A^n(r,a,b)∈Rn×An×An: requests, algorithm's answers, adversary's answers.

An augmented potential function for α\alphaα and GGG (Definition 3.1) is a family Φn:Rn×An×An→R\Phi_n : R^n \times A^n \times A^n \to \mathbb RΦn​:Rn×An×An→R with (1) Φ0=0\Phi_0 = 0Φ0​=0; (2) Φn(r,a,b)≤α(fn(r,b))−fn(r,a)\Phi_n(r,a,b) \le \alpha(f_n(r,b)) - f_n(r,a)Φn​(r,a,b)≤α(fn​(r,b))−fn​(r,a) for every configuration; (3) Ean+1∼gn+1(rrn+1,a)[Φn+1(rrn+1,aan+1,bbn+1)]≥Φn(r,a,b)\mathbb E_{a_{n+1} \sim g_{n+1}(r r_{n+1}, a)}[\Phi_{n+1}(r r_{n+1}, a a_{n+1}, b b_{n+1})] \ge \Phi_n(r,a,b)Ean+1​∼gn+1​(rrn+1​,a)​[Φn+1​(rrn+1​,aan+1​,bbn+1​)]≥Φn​(r,a,b) for every configuration, every rn+1∈Rr_{n+1} \in Rrn+1​∈R and every bn+1∈Ab_{n+1} \in Abn+1​∈A.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 15)

Let Φ\PhiΦ be an augmented potential function for α\alphaα and GGG, and HHH a β\betaβ-competitive algorithm against oblivious adversaries. Say that MMM obeys the potential rule if for every r∈Rnr \in R^nr∈Rn and r′=rtr' = rtr′=rt,

Ey[Φn+1(r′,M(r) mn+1(r′),Hy(r′))] ≥ Ey[Φn(r,M(r),Hy(r))].\mathbb E_y\big[\Phi_{n+1}(r', M(r)\,m_{n+1}(r'), H_y(r'))\big] \ \ge\ \mathbb E_y\big[\Phi_n(r, M(r), H_y(r))\big].Ey​[Φn+1​(r′,M(r)mn+1​(r′),Hy​(r′))] ≥ Ey​[Φn​(r,M(r),Hy​(r))].

Then such an MMM exists, and every such MMM satisfies

cM(r)≤α(β(c(r)))for all r.c_M(r) \le \alpha\big(\beta(c(r))\big) \quad \text{for all } r .cM​(r)≤α(β(c(r)))for all r.

Both parts are part of the goal: the rule can be followed, and following it guarantees α∘β\alpha\circ\betaα∘β-competitiveness.

Milestones

  1. In every play of GGG against an adaptive on-line adversary, the expected final potential is nonnegative (proof of Lemma 3.1).
  2. Lemma 3.1, "if" direction: an augmented potential function for α\alphaα and GGG makes GGG α\alphaα-competitive against any adaptive on-line adversary, E[cG(S)]≤E[α(cS(G))]\mathbb E[c_G(S)] \le \mathbb E[\alpha(c_S(G))]E[cG​(S)]≤E[α(cS​(G))].
  3. For every rrr, ttt and every a∈Ana \in A^na∈An, some a′∈Aa' \in Aa′∈A satisfies Ey[Φn+1(rt,aa′,Hy(rt))]≥Ey[Φn(r,a,Hy(r))]\mathbb E_y[\Phi_{n+1}(rt, aa', H_y(rt))] \ge \mathbb E_y[\Phi_n(r, a, H_y(r))]Ey​[Φn+1​(rt,aa′,Hy​(rt))]≥Ey​[Φn​(r,a,Hy​(r))].
  4. If MMM obeys the rule, Ey[Φn(r,M(r),Hy(r))]≥0\mathbb E_y[\Phi_n(r, M(r), H_y(r))] \ge 0Ey​[Φn​(r,M(r),Hy​(r))]≥0 for every rrr.
  5. If MMM obeys the rule, fn(r,M(r))≤Ey[α(fn(r,Hy(r)))]f_n(r, M(r)) \le \mathbb E_y[\alpha(f_n(r, H_y(r)))]fn​(r,M(r))≤Ey​[α(fn​(r,Hy​(r)))] for every rrr: MMM is α\alphaα-competitive against the randomized adaptive adversary that serves its requests with HHH.

Significance

The theorem turns two separate analyses into one deterministic algorithm with an explicit description. The potential function certifies GGG against the strongest on-line adversary; the oblivious algorithm HHH need not be related to GGG, and the paper remarks that HHH may be GGG itself. The next answer of MMM is computable whenever the expected potential under HHH is (Corollary 3.1, stated informally in the paper), and the paper notes that for the potential functions used in the KKK-server literature this expectation is computable in time polynomial in the number of nodes and KKK. Read in this light, a potential-function proof for a randomized algorithm doubles as a deterministic algorithm.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as is known, neither this theorem nor the abstract framework of request-answer games with adaptive adversaries has a machine-checked formalization. The mission produces that framework and a checked derandomization principle that applies to every request-answer game with real costs, not to one problem.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for the existence of mn+1(r′)m_{n+1}(r')mn+1​(r′) averages property (3) of Φ\PhiΦ; the work is in seeing which configuration to apply it to. The rule compares MMM's configuration against HyH_yHy​'s answers, not against an adversary playing GGG, and the paper argues through an auxiliary on-line adversary that asks r′r'r′ and serves it with HyH_yHy​. Making this rigorous requires interchanging the expectation over HHH's coins with the finite expectation over GGG's next answer, and checking that the needed expectations are finite.

The second difficulty is the two kinds of randomness. GGG enters only through its next-answer laws, while HHH must be a single distribution over deterministic algorithms: the rule evaluates Hy(r)H_y(r)Hy​(r) and Hy(r′)H_y(r')Hy​(r′) with the same coins yyy. Replacing HHH by a behavioural description breaks the coupling between consecutive rounds.

Formalization scope

Requests and answers are Lean lists, oldest first, and fn(r,a)f_n(r,a)fn​(r,a) is F.cost r a on lists of common length; values on lists of different lengths are never used. Costs are real: the paper allows fn=+∞f_n = +\inftyfn​=+∞, so every statement here is about the real-valued games. The answer type is finite and nonempty, so the minimum c(r)c(r)c(r) exists. Affine maps are written α(x)=cx+d\alpha(x) = c x + dα(x)=cx+d. The goal additionally assumes α\alphaα nondecreasing: the last step of the paper's proof applies α\alphaα to an inequality, which needs it, and the paper's examples are positive ratios. In Lemma 3.1 and milestone 5 linearity of α\alphaα is kept as the paper's standing convention, although with α\alphaα inside the expectation the argument does not use it.

GGG is a map from (requests, own answers) to a probability mass function on AAA (behavioural form); its play against an adaptive on-line adversary is a probability mass function on final configurations, with finite support, and its expectations are finite sums. HHH is a probability measure on a coin space with a deterministic algorithm per coin, each answer measurable in the coins; expectations over HHH are Bochner integrals of functions with finitely many values. α\alphaα stays inside expectations, as in the paper's definition of competitiveness against adaptive adversaries. Adversaries stop by returning none and have a uniform depth bound.

The goal cannot be satisfied vacuously: it states the existence of an algorithm obeying the rule alongside the guarantee for every such algorithm, and Definition 3.1 is required at every configuration, not only at reachable ones.

Not formalized: the "only if" direction of Lemma 3.1, which the paper only sketches, and Corollary 3.1, whose notion of computability the paper leaves unspecified. The definitions of request-answer games, online algorithms, adversaries and competitiveness are reusable for the other missions of this paper and for any problem-specific competitive analysis. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and a lemma relating the mixed and behavioural forms of a randomized algorithm.

Selected references

  • S. Ben-David, A. Borodin, R. Karp, G. Tardos, A. Wigderson, On the power of randomization in on-line algorithms, Algorithmica 11 (1994), 2–14. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01294260
  • M. Manasse, L. McGeoch, D. Sleator, Competitive algorithms for server problems, Journal of Algorithms 11 (1990), 208–230. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-6774(90)90003-W
  • D. Sleator, R. Tarjan, Amortized efficiency of list update and paging rules, Communications of the ACM 28 (1985), 202–208. https://doi.org/10.1145/2786.2793
  • A. Borodin, R. El-Yaniv, Online Computation and Competitive Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-521-56392-5
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Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Randomization in On-Line Algorithms 1: α-Competitiveness Against Adaptive On-Line and β Against Oblivious Adversaries Give a Deterministic α∘β-Competitive AlgorithmResearch Paper

Why randomization matters in online algorithms

An online algorithm must answer each request before it sees the next one. Its performance is compared with an optimum that may choose all its answers after seeing the complete request string. Randomization can improve an online algorithm's guarantee when the request string is fixed in advance. The comparison changes when an adversary chooses later requests after seeing the algorithm's earlier answers. Ben-David, Borodin, Karp, Tardos and Wigderson studied these choices of adversary in a common request-answer model and proved a general relation between their competitive guarantees (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript §§2–3).

The paper distinguishes three adversaries. An oblivious adversary fixes the request string before the algorithm's random choices affect any answer. An adaptive off-line adversary chooses the next request from previous answers but serves the resulting request string optimally after the play. An adaptive on-line adversary also chooses its own answer as each request arrives. The ability to react to answers makes the latter two adversaries materially different from the oblivious one for randomized algorithms (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript pp. 7–9).

Request-answer games and competitive cost

A request-answer game has a request set RRR, a finite nonempty answer set AAA, and a real cost fn(r,a)f_n(r,a)fn​(r,a) for a request string r∈Rnr\in R^nr∈Rn and an answer string a∈Ana\in A^na∈An. The off-line optimum for rrr is c(r)=min⁡a∈Anfn(r,a)c(r)=\min_{a\in A^n}f_n(r,a)c(r)=mina∈An​fn​(r,a). A deterministic online algorithm DDD returns its iiith answer from the first iii requests alone; it has no access to the rest of rrr or to the eventual stopping time. Its cost on rrr is cD(r)=fn(r,D(r))c_D(r)=f_n(r,D(r))cD​(r)=fn​(r,D(r)).

A randomized online algorithm is a distribution over deterministic online algorithms. With coins ω\omegaω, write GωG_\omegaGω​ for the resulting deterministic algorithm. For a fixed request string rrr, GGG is β\betaβ-competitive against oblivious adversaries when Eω[cGω(r)]≤β(c(r))\mathbb E_\omega[c_{G_\omega}(r)]\leq\beta(c(r))Eω​[cGω​​(r)]≤β(c(r)). The paper calls a transformation “linear” when it has the affine form x↦ux+vx\mapsto ux+vx↦ux+v (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript p. 7).

An adaptive off-line adversary QQQ has a rule from prior answer strings to either the next request or a stop signal, together with a common finite upper bound on play length. Let r(Gω,Q)r(G_\omega,Q)r(Gω​,Q) denote its request string and cQ(Gω)=c(r(Gω,Q))c_Q(G_\omega)=c(r(G_\omega,Q))cQ​(Gω​)=c(r(Gω​,Q)). Its competitiveness condition places the transformation inside the expectation: Eω[cGω(Q)]≤Eω[α(cQ(Gω))]\mathbb E_\omega[c_{G_\omega}(Q)]\leq\mathbb E_\omega[\alpha(c_Q(G_\omega))]Eω​[cGω​​(Q)]≤Eω​[α(cQ​(Gω​))]. An adaptive on-line adversary SSS has the same request rule and an additional answer rule; its own cost is cS(Gω)c_S(G_\omega)cS​(Gω​), and the corresponding condition uses Eω[α(cS(Gω))]\mathbb E_\omega[\alpha(c_S(G_\omega))]Eω​[α(cS​(Gω​))] on the right (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript pp. 8–9).

Formalization targets

Randomization against adaptive off-line adversaries

The first target is Theorem 2.1: if some randomized algorithm is α\alphaα-competitive against every adaptive off-line adversary, a deterministic algorithm has that same guarantee on every request string:

∃G  ∀Q,E[cG(Q)]≤E[α(cQ(G))]⟹∃D  ∀r,cD(r)≤α(c(r)).\exists G\;\forall Q,\quad \mathbb E[c_G(Q)]\leq\mathbb E[\alpha(c_Q(G))]\quad\Longrightarrow\quad\exists D\;\forall r,\quad c_D(r)\leq\alpha(c(r)).∃G∀Q,E[cG​(Q)]≤E[α(cQ​(G))]⟹∃D∀r,cD​(r)≤α(c(r)).

Composition of two guarantees

Theorem 2.2 takes an α\alphaα guarantee for GGG against adaptive on-line adversaries and a β\betaβ guarantee for another randomized algorithm against oblivious adversaries. It concludes that GGG has the composed guarantee against adaptive off-line adversaries:

E[cG(Q)]≤E[(α∘β)(cQ(G))]for every Q.\mathbb E[c_G(Q)]\leq\mathbb E[(\alpha\circ\beta)(c_Q(G))]\qquad\text{for every }Q.E[cG​(Q)]≤E[(α∘β)(cQ​(G))]for every Q.

The mission goal is Corollary 2.1, the deterministic consequence of these two results:

∃D  ∀r,cD(r)≤(α∘β)(c(r)).\exists D\;\forall r,\qquad c_D(r)\leq(\alpha\circ\beta)(c(r)).∃D∀r,cD​(r)≤(α∘β)(c(r)).

The milestones follow the paper's two theorems and the stated claims in their proofs, including the finite-horizon winning-position formulation and the adversary that simulates a fixed online algorithm (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript pp. 9–13).

What the result supplies

The corollary turns the existence of two randomized guarantees under different information rules into the existence of a deterministic online strategy with an explicit composed cost transformation. It is an existence result: it does not say that the deterministic strategy can be computed efficiently from the randomized algorithms. The paper itself notes that such a construction is unavailable in full generality and then examines settings where constructive versions are possible (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript p. 13).

The mathematical results were proved in the 1994 paper; this mission asks for machine-checked Lean proofs of the abstract model, the intermediate claims, and Corollary 2.1. The local draft currently contains compiled statements with proof placeholders, so it does not yet provide checked proofs. A completed development would make the adversary distinctions and the exact placement of expectations available for reuse in later online-algorithm formalizations.

Why the proof is difficult

The apparent shortcut is to treat an adaptive request sequence as fixed and apply a guarantee against oblivious adversaries directly. That loses the dependence of later requests on the algorithm's earlier answers. For Theorem 2.1, a winning request strategy must have one finite horizon that works for every answer path; separate finite horizons for each branch do not suffice when the answer set is infinite. For Theorem 2.2, the simulated adversary must make its own answers before the algorithm answers the current request, while still matching a fixed online benchmark along every resulting play. The expectation inequalities must remain valid when the request string itself depends on the algorithm's coins (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript pp. 9–11).

Formalization scope

Lean represents requests and answers as oldest-first lists. List index zero is request one in the paper. The general game is a separate definition; the algorithm, adversary, and competitiveness definitions build on it. An off-line adversary's rule returns Option R, where none is the stop signal, and has a uniform finite depth bound. A randomized algorithm consists of a coin probability space and a deterministic prefix algorithm for each coin; its answer events are measurable. Finiteness of AAA and bounded play depth make the cost of each fixed adversarial play take finitely many values, so its real expectation is an ordinary integrable expectation.

The formal game uses real-valued costs, a deliberate restriction of the paper's R∪{∞}\mathbb R\cup\{\infty\}R∪{∞} costs. The answer set is finite and nonempty, while the request set may be infinite. The transformations α\alphaα and β\betaβ are affine. Theorem 2.2 and the goal assume α\alphaα is monotone: the paper applies α\alphaα to an inequality in its proof, and its competitive-ratio examples have positive slope. Theorem 2.1 does not need this added assumption. The two randomized algorithms may have different coin spaces, each an arbitrary Lean type at the declaration's universe level. The off-line and on-line adaptive comparisons retain α\alphaα inside the expectation.

The target ranges over every equal-length request and answer play generated by these rules, including an adversary that stops without a request. It does not allow the deterministic algorithm to see future requests or choose a different policy for each adversary. Reusable contributions include the game interface, bounded adaptive plays, measurable randomized algorithms, and finite-horizon winning positions. The statements of all three principal results, their intervening claims, and proofs of those statements are within scope.

Selected references

  • S. Ben-David, A. Borodin, R. Karp, G. Tardos and A. Wigderson, On the Power of Randomization in On-Line Algorithms, Algorithmica 11, 1994. DOI: 10.1007/BF01294260. The local source is the authors' 20-page manuscript; citations above use its page numbers.
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Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Randomization in On-Line Algorithms 2: The Bound α∘β Against Adaptive Off-Line Adversaries Is TightResearch Paper

Motivation

An on-line algorithm must answer each request as it arrives, without knowing the requests to come; paging, caching, the kkk-server problem and metrical task systems are standard examples. Its quality is measured by competitive analysis: its cost is compared with the cost of an optimal off-line solution that knows the whole request sequence. For randomized on-line algorithms the comparison depends on how much the adversary producing the requests is allowed to see. Ben-David, Borodin, Karp, Tardos and Wigderson (Algorithmica 11, 1994; conference version STOC 1990) introduced the three standard adversaries — oblivious, adaptive on-line and adaptive off-line — and related the competitive ratios achievable against each.

Their Theorem 2.2 (manuscript p. 10) shows that if a randomized algorithm is α\alphaα-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries and some randomized algorithm is β\betaβ-competitive against oblivious adversaries, then the first algorithm is αβ\alpha\betaαβ-competitive against adaptive off-line adversaries. This mission formalizes the paper's claim (manuscript p. 11) that this product bound cannot be improved in general, together with the explicit construction on pp. 12–13 that proves it.

Setting

A request-answer game consists of a request set RRR, a finite answer set AAA, and cost functions fn:Rn×An→Rf_n : R^n \times A^n \to \mathbb Rfn​:Rn×An→R. For a request sequence r‾∈Rn\underline r \in R^nr​∈Rn, the off-line optimum is c(r‾)=min⁡a‾∈Anfn(r‾,a‾)c(\underline r) = \min_{\underline a \in A^n} f_n(\underline r, \underline a)c(r​)=mina​∈An​fn​(r​,a​). A deterministic on-line algorithm GGG answers the iii-th request with ai=gi(r1,…,ri)a_i = g_i(r_1, \dots, r_i)ai​=gi​(r1​,…,ri​); a randomized one is a probability distribution over deterministic algorithms GxG_xGx​, xxx being the coin tosses.

An adaptive off-line adversary QQQ chooses each request ri+1=qi(a1,…,ai)r_{i+1} = q_i(a_1, \dots, a_i)ri+1​=qi​(a1​,…,ai​) from the answers given so far, stops after at most dQd_QdQ​ requests, and pays the off-line optimum cQ(G)=c(r‾)c_Q(G) = c(\underline r)cQ​(G)=c(r​) of the requests it made; the algorithm pays cG(Q)=fn(r‾,a‾)c_G(Q) = f_n(\underline r, \underline a)cG​(Q)=fn​(r​,a​). An adaptive on-line adversary SSS must in addition answer each request itself, before the algorithm does, with bi+1=pi(a1,…,ai)b_{i+1} = p_i(a_1, \dots, a_i)bi+1​=pi​(a1​,…,ai​), and pays cS(G)=fn(r‾,b‾)c_S(G) = f_n(\underline r, \underline b)cS​(G)=fn​(r​,b​). An oblivious adversary fixes r‾\underline rr​ in advance and pays c(r‾)c(\underline r)c(r​). A randomized GGG is α\alphaα-competitive against oblivious adversaries if Ex[cGx(r‾)]≤α c(r‾)\mathbb E_x[c_{G_x}(\underline r)] \le \alpha\, c(\underline r)Ex​[cGx​​(r​)]≤αc(r​) for all r‾\underline rr​, and against adaptive on-line adversaries if Ex[cGx(S)]≤Ex[α cS(Gx)]\mathbb E_x[c_{G_x}(S)] \le \mathbb E_x[\alpha\, c_S(G_x)]Ex​[cGx​​(S)]≤Ex​[αcS​(Gx​)] for all SSS.

The construction uses the mates game: R=AR = AR=A is a set of 2t2t2t elements split into ttt pairs of mates, and for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 the cost depends only on the first answer a1a_1a1​ and the second request r2r_2r2​: it is 111 if a1=r2a_1 = r_2a1​=r2​, MMM if a1a_1a1​ is the mate of r2r_2r2​, and mmm otherwise. The algorithm GGG draws a1a_1a1​ uniformly at random. The parameters solve

β=(2t−2)m+M+12t,α=1+(2t−1)M2+(2t−2)m.\beta = \frac{(2t-2)m + M + 1}{2t}, \qquad \alpha = \frac{1 + (2t-1)M}{2 + (2t-2)m}.β=2t(2t−2)m+M+1​,α=2+(2t−2)m1+(2t−1)M​.

Formalization targets

Goal: tightness of Theorem 2.2

For 1<β≤α1 < \beta \le \alpha1<β≤α (or α=β=1\alpha = \beta = 1α=β=1) and every C<αβC < \alpha\betaC<αβ, there are a game and a randomized algorithm GGG such that

G is α-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries,G is β-competitive against oblivious adversaries,G \text{ is } \alpha\text{-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries}, \qquad G \text{ is } \beta\text{-competitive against oblivious adversaries},G is α-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries,G is β-competitive against oblivious adversaries,

and for every randomized algorithm KKK some adaptive off-line adversary QQQ achieves

E[cQ(K)]>0,E[cK(Q)]≥C⋅E[cQ(K)].\mathbb E[c_Q(K)] > 0, \qquad \mathbb E[c_K(Q)] \ge C\cdot \mathbb E[c_Q(K)].E[cQ​(K)]>0,E[cK​(Q)]≥C⋅E[cQ​(K)].

Milestones (pp. 12–13)

  1. The closed forms m(t)m(t)m(t), M(t)M(t)M(t) are the unique solution of the two equations.
  2. m(t)→βm(t) \to \betam(t)→β and M(t)→αβM(t) \to \alpha\betaM(t)→αβ as t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞.
  3. For all large ttt: M(t)≥max⁡(m(t)2,C)M(t) \ge \max(m(t)^2, C)M(t)≥max(m(t)2,C), 1≤m(t)≤M(t)1 \le m(t) \le M(t)1≤m(t)≤M(t), α(m(t)−1)≤M(t)−m(t)\alpha(m(t)-1) \le M(t) - m(t)α(m(t)−1)≤M(t)−m(t).
  4. GGG is β\betaβ-competitive against oblivious adversaries in the mates game.
  5. GGG is α\alphaα-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries in the mates game.
  6. An adaptive off-line adversary makes every algorithm pay MMM while paying 111.

Significance

The result. Together with Theorem 2.2, the claim pins down exactly how much the adaptive off-line adversary can gain over the other two: the product αβ\alpha\betaαβ is an upper bound for every game and is approached by a single game for every admissible pair (α,β)(\alpha, \beta)(α,β). It shows that no general argument relating the three adversary models can give a bound better than the product, so any improvement for a specific problem (paging, kkk-server) must use the structure of that problem. The paging example cited on p. 11 (RANDOM against the three adversaries) gives one instance of tightness; the mates game gives tightness for every admissible pair.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper, in about one page, with two steps left to the reader ("by inspection of the equations", "a simple case analysis"). No machine-checked proof of this or of any statement about adaptive adversaries is known to us. The formalization makes the model of §2 precise (sequences, stopping, the order in which adversary and algorithm commit, expectations over coins), checks the asymptotics of the parameters, and verifies the case analysis, which on inspection needs an inequality the page does not state. Two printed formulas on p. 12 contain typos; the formal statements carry the correct values.

Difficulty

The construction is explicit, but each competitiveness claim quantifies over all adversaries, which may adapt their requests to the algorithm's random answers, stop at any time, and (for the on-line adversary) commit to their own answers in advance. The algebra of α\alphaα-competitiveness is tight: the adversary's best expected advantage is exactly zero, so every case of its best reply must be checked with no slack. The page's condition M≥m2M \ge m^2M≥m2 does not suffice for this: when a1a_1a1​ is neither the adversary's first answer nor its mate, the reply "mate of a1a_1a1​" beats the reply "the adversary's own answer" only when α(m−1)≤M−m\alpha(m-1) \le M - mα(m−1)≤M−m, which holds for the solved parameters but is not implied by M≥m2M \ge m^2M≥m2. At β=1<α\beta = 1 < \alphaβ=1<α the solved parameter mmm is below 111 for every ttt, and the oblivious bound fails.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in OnlineRandomization.Tightness. The conventions:

  • Costs are real-valued; the paper allows +∞+\infty+∞, so the game class is a special case.
  • Answer sets are nonempty finite types; request sets are arbitrary types.
  • Sequences are Lean lists, oldest first; cost r a is fnf_nfn​ on lists of equal length nnn.
  • Adversaries return none for "stop" and carry a depth bound dQd_QdQ​; an on-line adversary's answer bi+1b_{i+1}bi+1​ depends only on a1,…,aia_1, \dots, a_ia1​,…,ai​.
  • Randomized algorithms are a probability space of coins with a deterministic algorithm per coin and measurable answers; expectations are Bochner integrals, with α\alphaα applied inside the expectation. In the goal, coin spaces range over Type.
  • Competitiveness uses the ratio functions x↦αxx \mapsto \alpha xx↦αx and x↦βxx \mapsto \beta xx↦βx, with no additive constant.
  • The mates game is on Fin t × Bool, with mate (i,b)↦(i,¬b)(i, b) \mapsto (i, \lnot b)(i,b)↦(i,¬b). The paper leaves the costs of plays with fewer than two requests undefined; the formalization sets f0=0f_0 = 0f0​=0 and f1≡1f_1 \equiv 1f1​≡1 (with f1≡0f_1 \equiv 0f1​≡0 the algorithm would not be α\alphaα-competitive).
  • Range. The goal assumes 1<β≤α1 < \beta \le \alpha1<β≤α or α=β=1\alpha = \beta = 1α=β=1; the page's case β=1<α\beta = 1 < \alphaβ=1<α is not covered by its construction and is left out. In fact the claim is false there for 1<C<α1 < C < \alpha1<C<α: an algorithm that is 111-competitive against oblivious adversaries answers optimally, almost surely, on every request sequence (its cost is never below the optimum and its expected cost does not exceed it), and an adaptive off-line adversary reaches only finitely many request sequences, so against K=GK = GK=G every adversary has E[cG(Q)]=E[cQ(G)]\mathbb E[c_G(Q)] = \mathbb E[c_Q(G)]E[cG​(Q)]=E[cQ​(G)], a ratio of 1<C1 < C1<C.

The positivity requirement E[cQ(K)]>0\mathbb E[c_Q(K)] > 0E[cQ​(K)]>0 in the goal is essential: without it the adversary that asks nothing satisfies E[cK(Q)]≥C⋅0\mathbb E[c_K(Q)] \ge C \cdot 0E[cK​(Q)]≥C⋅0 for every KKK, and the third clause would hold vacuously.

A complete development needs: finite expectations over a uniform coin, the evaluation of the play of an adversary against a constant algorithm, and limit and eventual-inequality arguments for rational functions of ttt. The model of §2 is shared with the other missions of this series and is reusable for any request-answer formulation of an on-line problem. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Ben-David, A. Borodin, R. Karp, G. Tardos, A. Wigderson, On the power of randomization in on-line algorithms, Algorithmica 11 (1994) 2–14. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01294260 (cited from the authors' manuscript, manuscript pp. 7–13).
  • A. Borodin, R. El-Yaniv, Online Computation and Competitive Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-521-56392-5.
  • P. Raghavan, M. Snir, Memory versus randomization in on-line algorithms, IBM Journal of Research and Development 38 (1994) 683–707. https://doi.org/10.1147/rd.386.0683
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Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts 3: An O(log n)-Competitive Algorithm for the Discounted Secretary ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

In the secretary problem, nnn candidates with arbitrary values arrive one at a time in a uniformly random order, and an online decision maker must accept or reject each candidate on arrival, irrevocably, keeping at most one. The rule that observes the first n/en/en/e candidates and then accepts the first one better than everything seen so far selects the best candidate with probability about 1/e1/e1/e (Dynkin, 1963). The problem is a basic model of online selection and, read economically, of posted-price mechanisms for agents who arrive in random order: a rule that compares each agent only against a threshold set by earlier agents is truthful.

Babaioff, Dinitz, Gupta, Immorlica and Talwar (SODA 2009) study a variant in which time costs value. Selecting the candidate who arrives at time ttt earns that candidate's value multiplied by a discount d(t)d(t)d(t), for an arbitrary non-negative discount function ddd known in advance. Earlier work treated only specific discount shapes, such as geometric discounting d(t)=βtd(t)=\beta^td(t)=βt (Rasmussen and Pliska, 1976). For a general ddd the classical rule can fail badly: if all the discount mass sits in the first few time steps, a rule that waits through a sample of size n/en/en/e earns nothing. The paper shows that the best competitive ratio for arbitrary discounts lies between Ω(log⁡n/log⁡log⁡n)\Omega(\log n/\log\log n)Ω(logn/loglogn) (its Theorem 4.3) and O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) (its Theorem 4.4). This mission formalizes the upper bound.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 elements, indexed {0,…,n−1}\{0,\dots,n-1\}{0,…,n−1}, with values v(e)≥0v(e)\ge 0v(e)≥0, and nnn times with discounts d(t)≥0d(t)\ge0d(t)≥0. A uniformly random permutation π\piπ fixes the order of arrivals: element π(t)\pi(t)π(t) arrives at time ttt. An algorithm knows ddd but not vvv; it sees each value on arrival and may select the current element, irrevocably, earning d(t) v(π(t))d(t)\,v(\pi(t))d(t)v(π(t)). Expectations over π\piπ are exact averages over the n!n!n! orders.

The offline optimum on order π\piπ is OPT(π)=max⁡td(t) v(π(t))\mathsf{OPT}(\pi)=\max_t d(t)\,v(\pi(t))OPT(π)=maxt​d(t)v(π(t)); it is a random variable, and the benchmark is its expectation Eπ[OPT]\mathbb E_\pi[\mathsf{OPT}]Eπ​[OPT] (p. 4 of the paper).

Let dmax⁡=max⁡td(t)d_{\max}=\max_t d(t)dmax​=maxt​d(t) and vmax⁡=max⁡ev(e)v_{\max}=\max_e v(e)vmax​=maxe​v(e). For c≥1c\ge1c≥1 the ccc-th discount class is the set of times

Pc={ i:2−cdmax⁡<d(i)≤2−(c−1)dmax⁡ }.P_c=\{\,i : 2^{-c}d_{\max}<d(i)\le 2^{-(c-1)}d_{\max}\,\}.Pc​={i:2−cdmax​<d(i)≤2−(c−1)dmax​}.

The quantity OPTc\mathsf{OPT}_cOPTc​ is the part of Eπ[OPT]\mathbb E_\pi[\mathsf{OPT}]Eπ​[OPT] earned when the optimal time (the smallest time attaining the maximum) lies in PcP_cPc​.

The classical secretary rule on mmm arrivals observes the first ⌊m/e⌋\lfloor m/e\rfloor⌊m/e⌋ and then selects the first arrival that ranks above every earlier arrival. Ranks use a fixed tie-break order: larger value first, and smaller element index among equal values.

The algorithm A\mathcal AA sets M=3⌈log⁡2n⌉+2M=3\lceil\log_2 n\rceil+2M=3⌈log2​n⌉+2, draws c∈{1,…,M}c\in\{1,\dots,M\}c∈{1,…,M} uniformly, and runs the classical rule on the subsequence of arrivals at the times of PcP_cPc​, ignoring all other arrivals.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4 with its explicit constant

Eπ[OPT]  ≤  4e (3⌈log⁡2n⌉+2)  E[A](n≥1, d≥0, v≥0).\mathbb E_\pi[\mathsf{OPT}]\;\le\;4e\,\bigl(3\lceil\log_2 n\rceil+2\bigr)\;\mathbb E[\mathcal A]\qquad(n\ge1,\ d\ge0,\ v\ge0).Eπ​[OPT]≤4e(3⌈log2​n⌉+2)E[A](n≥1, d≥0, v≥0).

The paper states E[OPT]/E[A]≤O(log⁡n)\mathbb E[\mathsf{OPT}]/\mathbb E[\mathcal A]\le O(\log n)E[OPT]/E[A]≤O(logn); the constant 4e4e4e is the one its proof yields.

Milestones

  1. The classical secretary rule selects the top-ranked of m≥1m\ge1m≥1 elements with probability at least 1/e1/e1/e (§2, p. 4).
  2. OPT1≥vmax⁡dmax⁡/n\mathsf{OPT}_1\ge v_{\max}d_{\max}/nOPT1​≥vmax​dmax​/n (proof of Theorem 4.4, p. 7).
  3. OPTc≤2−c 2n2dmax⁡vmax⁡\mathsf{OPT}_c\le 2^{-c}\,2n^2d_{\max}v_{\max}OPTc​≤2−c2n2dmax​vmax​ for every c≥1c\ge1c≥1 (p. 7).
  4. ∑c=13⌈log⁡2n⌉+1OPTc≥12Eπ[OPT]\sum_{c=1}^{3\lceil\log_2 n\rceil+1}\mathsf{OPT}_c\ge\tfrac12\mathbb E_\pi[\mathsf{OPT}]∑c=13⌈log2​n⌉+1​OPTc​≥21​Eπ​[OPT] (p. 7).
  5. E[Ac]≥OPTc/2e\mathbb E[\mathcal A_c]\ge\mathsf{OPT}_c/2eE[Ac​]≥OPTc​/2e for every c≥1c\ge1c≥1, where Ac\mathcal A_cAc​ is the classical rule on PcP_cPc​ (p. 7).

Significance

The theorem shows that a general discount function costs only a logarithmic factor against the offline benchmark, and that one algorithm achieves this without any knowledge of the values. Together with the lower bound of Theorem 4.3 it pins the competitive ratio of the discounted secretary problem between log⁡n/log⁡log⁡n\log n/\log\log nlogn/loglogn and log⁡n\log nlogn. The same scale-splitting idea, stated in the paper as Theorem 4.5 without full proof, extends the bound to the weighted discounted problem.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been formalized. A complete development would also produce a machine-checked proof of the classical secretary guarantee for the rule with sample size exactly ⌊m/e⌋\lfloor m/e\rfloor⌊m/e⌋ at every finite mmm, with an explicit tie-break, which is reusable by every secretary-type mission. Milestone 1 is that statement. Sharper constants or a smaller class range are welcome as additional statements but do not replace the goal, which is about this algorithm with this MMM.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, running the classical rule on all nnn arrivals, fails because the discounts can be concentrated at times the rule spends sampling. Splitting by discount scale fixes this but creates two problems. First, there are unboundedly many scales, and one has to show that the offline optimum's mass outside the top O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) of them is negligible against E[OPT]\mathbb E[\mathsf{OPT}]E[OPT], a random quantity rather than a fixed maximum. Second, the classical rule on a class sees only a random subset of the elements, in random order, and the guarantee must be transferred to this subsequence, conditioning on which elements land in PcP_cPc​. Neither step is deep, but both require careful bookkeeping of permutations, and the classical 1/e1/e1/e bound at finite mmm with a floor in the sample size is itself a nontrivial estimate.

Formalization scope

Elements and times are Fin n, an order is π : Equiv.Perm (Fin n) read as time ↦\mapsto↦ element, and the paper's time t=1,…,nt=1,\dots,nt=1,…,n is index t−1t-1t−1. Values and discounts are Fin n → ℝ with non-negativity hypotheses. Every expectation is the finite average 1n!∑π\frac1{n!}\sum_\pin!1​∑π​; the algorithm's random class is the explicit average 1M∑c=1M\frac1M\sum_{c=1}^MM1​∑c=1M​. Maxima are suprema over the finite index set. The logarithm is base 2, ⌈log⁡2n⌉\lceil\log_2 n\rceil⌈log2​n⌉ is Nat.clog 2 n, and the sample size is Nat.floor (m / Real.exp 1). Ties are broken by the order on Lex (ℝ × (Fin n)ᵒᵈ) (larger value, then smaller index); distinct values are not assumed. The optimal time is the smallest maximizing time, so that the OPTc\mathsf{OPT}_cOPTc​ add up to E[OPT]\mathbb E[\mathsf{OPT}]E[OPT]. Competitiveness is stated multiplicatively, never as a quotient, so E[A]=0\mathbb E[\mathcal A]=0E[A]=0 is not a loophole.

The goal is a statement about the specific algorithm A\mathcal AA, not "there exists an algorithm": an existential over unrestricted algorithms is witnessed by a clairvoyant rule that reads the values in advance. A\mathcal AA sees the values only through comparisons among arrivals that have already occurred, and E[OPT]\mathbb E[\mathsf{OPT}]E[OPT] is the expected offline maximum over the same random order, not dmax⁡vmax⁡d_{\max}v_{\max}dmax​vmax​.

Needed infrastructure: averages over permutations and the fact that the elements landing at a fixed set of times form a uniformly random subset in uniformly random order; the finite-mmm analysis of the classical rule; and elementary estimates on geometric sums. Contributions of general lemmas about uniform permutations are welcome and reusable.

Selected references

  • M. Babaioff, M. Dinitz, A. Gupta, N. Immorlica, K. Talwar, Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts, Proc. 20th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973068.139
  • E. B. Dynkin, The optimum choice of the instant for stopping a Markov process, Soviet Math. Doklady 4, 1963.
  • T. S. Ferguson, Who solved the secretary problem?, Statistical Science 4(3), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1177012493
  • L. T. Rasmussen, S. R. Pliska, Choosing the maximum from a sequence with a discount function, Applied Mathematics and Optimization 2, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01458209
  • M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, R. Kleinberg, Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms, SODA 2007. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1283383.1283429
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality I: Bayes Rationality at Every State Yields Exactly the Correlated Equilibrium DistributionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Nash equilibrium is the standard solution concept for strategic games, but it is usually justified by appeal to what players "would" do once they somehow coordinate on a profile. Correlated equilibrium, introduced by Aumann (J. Math. Econ. 1, 1974), enlarges the set of outcomes by letting players condition their actions on correlated private signals. In Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (Econometrica 55, 1987), Aumann gave the concept a decision-theoretic foundation: if the players share a common prior over the states of the world and each player maximizes expected utility given his information at every state, then what they play is a correlated equilibrium — and every correlated equilibrium arises this way. The result is a standard entry point to the epistemic foundations of game theory, and correlated equilibria are central in algorithmic game theory because no-swap-regret learning dynamics converge to them (Foster–Vohra 1997; Hart–Mas-Colell 2000).

Timeline:

  • 1974, Aumann: correlated equilibrium defined, in a measure-theoretic model with subjective probabilities and information σ-fields.
  • 1987, Aumann: the Main Theorem (Bayes rationality at every state under a common prior implies correlated equilibrium play) and its converse, in a finite model with information partitions.

Setting

A game GGG in strategic form has players iii, action sets SiS^iSi, action nnn-tuples s∈S=S1×⋯×Sns\in S=S^1\times\dots\times S^ns∈S=S1×⋯×Sn, and payoffs hi(s)∈Rh^i(s)\in\mathbb Rhi(s)∈R.

A correlated strategy nnn-tuple is a function f:Γ→Sf:\Gamma\to Sf:Γ→S on a finite probability space (Γ,q)(\Gamma,q)(Γ,q), with q≥0q\ge 0q≥0 and ∑γq(γ)=1\sum_\gamma q(\gamma)=1∑γ​q(γ)=1. Its expected payoff is Ehi(f)=∑γq(γ)hi(f(γ))Eh^i(f)=\sum_\gamma q(\gamma)h^i(f(\gamma))Ehi(f)=∑γ​q(γ)hi(f(γ)). For gi:Γ→Sig^i:\Gamma\to S^igi:Γ→Si, the profile (f−i,gi)(f^{-i},g^i)(f−i,gi) replaces player iii's coordinate of fff by gig^igi. The function fff is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 2.1) if

Ehi(f) ≥ Ehi(f−i,gi)(2.2)Eh^i(f)\ \ge\ Eh^i(f^{-i},g^i)\qquad(2.2)Ehi(f) ≥ Ehi(f−i,gi)(2.2)

for every player iii and every gig^igi that is a function of fif^ifi (i.e. gi=φ∘fig^i=\varphi\circ f^igi=φ∘fi). The distribution of fff assigns to each s∈Ss\in Ss∈S the number q{f−1(s)}q\{f^{-1}(s)\}q{f−1(s)}, and a correlated equilibrium distribution (c.e.d.) is the distribution of some correlated equilibrium.

An information system consists of a finite set Ω\OmegaΩ of states of the world, a common prior ppp on Ω\OmegaΩ, an information partition Pi\mathcal P^iPi of Ω\OmegaΩ for each player, and action functions si:Ω→Si\mathbf s^i:\Omega\to S^isi:Ω→Si with s=(s1,…,sn)\mathbf s=(\mathbf s^1,\dots,\mathbf s^n)s=(s1,…,sn), each si\mathbf s^isi constant on the elements of Pi\mathcal P^iPi (each player knows his own action). For a random variable xxx, E(x∣Pi)(ω)E(x\mid\mathcal P^i)(\omega)E(x∣Pi)(ω) is the ppp-average of xxx over the element of Pi\mathcal P^iPi containing ω\omegaω. Player iii is Bayes rational at ω\omegaω if

E(hi(s)∣Pi)(ω) ≥ E(hi(s−i,a)∣Pi)(ω)for every a∈Si.E\big(h^i(\mathbf s)\mid\mathcal P^i\big)(\omega)\ \ge\ E\big(h^i(\mathbf s^{-i},a)\mid\mathcal P^i\big)(\omega)\quad\text{for every }a\in S^i .E(hi(s)∣Pi)(ω) ≥ E(hi(s−i,a)∣Pi)(ω)for every a∈Si.

Formalization targets

Goal: Main Theorem with its converse

Q is a c.e.d. of G  ⟺  ∃ information system (Ω,p,(Pi),s): every player is Bayes rational at every state, and Q(a)=p{s=a} ∀a.Q\ \text{is a c.e.d. of }G\iff\exists\ \text{information system }(\Omega,p,(\mathcal P^i),\mathbf s):\ \text{every player is Bayes rational at every state, and } Q(a)=p\{\mathbf s=a\}\ \forall a.Q is a c.e.d. of G⟺∃ information system (Ω,p,(Pi),s): every player is Bayes rational at every state, and Q(a)=p{s=a} ∀a.

This is the two-sided statement the paper announces in its introduction (p. 2) and closes in Sect. 4d (p. 11): "under Bayesian rationality, the set of all information systems corresponds precisely to the set of all correlated equilibria."

Milestones

  1. Main Theorem, proof: summing the cell-wise inequalities over the partition, Ehi(s−i,gi)≤Ehi(s)Eh^i(\mathbf s^{-i},g^i)\le Eh^i(\mathbf s)Ehi(s−i,gi)≤Ehi(s) for gig^igi constant on the cells of Pi\mathcal P^iPi.
  2. Main Theorem, proof: s\mathbf ss itself is a correlated equilibrium on (Ω,p)(\Omega,p)(Ω,p).
  3. Main Theorem (p. 7): the distribution of s\mathbf ss is a c.e.d.
  4. Sect. 4d: in the system generated by fff (partitions generated by fif^ifi), Bayes rationality everywhere is equivalent to (2.2).
  5. Sect. 4d: every correlated equilibrium is realized by a Bayes-rational information system with the same distribution.

The mission also states, as a supporting lemma without a milestone, the cell-wise step of the proof of the Main Theorem: Bayes rationality at every state gives E(hi(s−i,gi)∣P)≤E(hi(s)∣P)E(h^i(\mathbf s^{-i},g^i)\mid P)\le E(h^i(\mathbf s)\mid P)E(hi(s−i,gi)∣P)≤E(hi(s)∣P) on every cell PPP for gig^igi constant on cells.

Significance

The theorem identifies correlated equilibrium as the outcome of individual Bayesian decision making under a common prior, without any assumption that players randomize or that their choices are independent. It shows that the Nash equilibrium's independence requirement is not implied by rationality alone, and it is the template for later epistemic characterizations of solution concepts. On the computational side, correlated equilibrium distributions form a polytope described by linear inequalities (the companion mission of this series), which is why they are the tractable equilibrium notion in algorithmic game theory.

The result is proved in the paper; it has no machine-checked formalization known to this mission. Formalizing it pins down the exact role of the standing assumptions — finiteness, a common prior, measurability of each player's action with respect to his own partition, rationality at every state — and of the conditional expectation on cells of probability zero. The definitions (information systems, Bayes rationality, correlated equilibria as functions on a finite probability space) are reusable for later formalizations of the paper's Sect. 5 (subjective correlated equilibrium) and of other epistemic results.

Difficulty

The mathematics is short; the difficulty lies in the bookkeeping that the paper's notation hides. The hypothesis is interim (a conditional inequality at each state), while Definition 2.1 is ex ante (an unconditional inequality). Passing between them requires the law of total expectation over a partition whose cells may have probability zero, where conditional expectations are undefined. Deviations in Definition 2.1 are functions of fif^ifi, not arbitrary maps, and must be shown constant on cells, which uses measurability of si\mathbf s^isi. A tempting first idea — that rationality against every fixed action already gives rationality against every deviation — fails without measurability: a player who does not know his own action could be rational at each state against constant deviations while a deviation φ∘si\varphi\circ\mathbf s^iφ∘si varies inside his cells. The converse direction needs an information system that satisfies every axiom of the goal's right-hand side, not just one that is Bayes rational.

Formalization scope

  • Players form a finite type ι with decidable equality; action sets S i are arbitrary types (the paper's finiteness of SiS^iSi is not used); payoffs are h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ.
  • Probability spaces are finite types with a real weight vector satisfying AGT.IsLottery (from the published definition agt_games). State spaces and the witnessing probability spaces of a c.e.d. range over Type; for finite sets this loses nothing.
  • Partitions are Setoids. The Common Prior Assumption is built into the information system, which has a single prior. Measurability of each action function is a field of the structure.
  • Conditional expectation on a cell is a ratio of finite sums; on a cell of probability zero Lean returns 000, so Bayes rationality at such states holds vacuously. The prior is not required to have full support. This matches the paper, whose argument multiplies each cell inequality by the cell's probability.
  • Deviations in Definition 2.1 are exactly the compositions φ∘fi\varphi\circ f^iφ∘fi; neither all maps nor only constant maps. A c.e.d. requires a genuine probability vector, ruling out the trivializing reading in which the zero weight function witnesses every QQQ.
  • Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a general law-of-total-expectation lemma for finite partitions, and lemmas relating distr to sums over action profiles.

Selected references

  • R. J. Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), no. 1, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911154
  • R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
  • D. P. Foster and R. V. Vohra, Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium, Games and Economic Behavior 21 (1997), 40–55. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0595
  • S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium, Econometrica 68 (2000), 1127–1150. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00153
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Operations ResearchStatisticsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory VIII: Lindley's Integral Equation for the G/G/1 QueueTextbook

Why the G/G/1 queue

The single-server queue with general interarrival times and general service times, written G/G/1 in Kendall's notation, is the model left when every distributional assumption is removed from the classical single-server queue. Customers arrive one at a time, wait in line in first-come, first-served order, and are served one at a time. Almost nothing about it can be computed in closed form. What survives is a recursion for the waiting times of successive customers and the integral equation of its steady state, due to Lindley (Lindley, 1952). Every exact and approximate treatment of the G/G/1 waiting time, including the bounds of the next chapter of the book, starts from that equation.

This mission is the eighth of a series formalizing Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., Wiley 2008, DOI 10.1002/9781118625651). It covers Chapter 6, "General Models and Theoretical Topics". The chapter also treats the G/E_k/1 characteristic equation (§6.1), the M/D/c queue (§6.3) and maximum-likelihood estimation for M/M/1 (§6.7), which appear here as further milestones.

Timeline. Lindley (1952) derived the recursion and the integral equation and showed that a limiting waiting-time distribution exists when the mean service time is smaller than the mean interarrival time. Loynes (1962) gave the stationary solution as a supremum over the past of a random walk, for stationary rather than independent inputs. Clarke (1957) derived the maximum-likelihood estimators for M/M/1, and Crommelin (1932) the M/D/c generating function. Chaudhry, Harris and Marchal (1990) located the roots of the G/E_k/1 characteristic equation.

Setting

The interarrival times T(n)T^{(n)}T(n) are independent with common distribution AAA, the service times S(n)S^{(n)}S(n) are independent with common distribution BBB, and the two sequences are independent. Both AAA and BBB are lifetime laws: probability distributions on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The means are E[T]=1/λ\mathrm E[T]=1/\lambdaE[T]=1/λ and E[S]=1/μ\mathrm E[S]=1/\muE[S]=1/μ, and the traffic intensity is ρ=λ/μ=E[S]/E[T]\rho=\lambda/\mu=\mathrm E[S]/\mathrm E[T]ρ=λ/μ=E[S]/E[T].

The line delay Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ of the nnnth customer satisfies Lindley's recursion

Wq(n+1)=max⁡(0,  Wq(n)+S(n)−T(n)).W_q^{(n+1)}=\max\bigl(0,\;W_q^{(n)}+S^{(n)}-T^{(n)}\bigr).Wq(n+1)​=max(0,Wq(n)​+S(n)−T(n)).

Write UUU for the distribution of S−TS-TS−T with S∼BS\sim BS∼B and T∼AT\sim AT∼A independent. Since Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ is independent of (S(n),T(n))(S^{(n)},T^{(n)})(S(n),T(n)), one step of the recursion sends the distribution ν\nuν of Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ to the distribution of max⁡(0,W+U)\max(0,W+U)max(0,W+U) with W∼νW\sim\nuW∼ν independent of UUU. A stationary delay distribution is a probability distribution ν\nuν that this step maps to itself; its CDF is Wq(t)=ν((−∞,t])W_q(t)=\nu((-\infty,t])Wq​(t)=ν((−∞,t]).

Formalization targets

Goal: Lindley's equation (6.8)

If E[T]\mathrm E[T]E[T] and E[S]\mathrm E[S]E[S] are finite and ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1, then a stationary delay distribution exists, and the CDF of every stationary delay distribution satisfies

Wq(t)={∫−∞tWq(t−x) dU(x)(0≤t<∞),0(t<0),U(x)=∫max⁡(0,x)∞B(y) dA(y−x).W_q(t)=\begin{cases}\displaystyle\int_{-\infty}^{t}W_q(t-x)\,dU(x) & (0\le t<\infty),\\ 0 & (t<0),\end{cases} \qquad U(x)=\int_{\max(0,x)}^{\infty}B(y)\,dA(y-x).Wq​(t)=⎩⎨⎧​∫−∞t​Wq​(t−x)dU(x)0​(0≤t<∞),(t<0),​U(x)=∫max(0,x)∞​B(y)dA(y−x).

The goal consists of the existence statement and the equation together. The equation alone is close to unfolding one step of the recursion. Existence is what ties it to a queue in steady state.

Milestones

  • (6.9), the CDF of U=S−TU=S-TU=S−T as a convolution of BBB and AAA.
  • The one-step convolution (p.285): Wq(n+1)(t)=∫−∞tWq(n)(t−x) dU(x)W_q^{(n+1)}(t)=\int_{-\infty}^{t}W_q^{(n)}(t-x)\,dU(x)Wq(n+1)​(t)=∫−∞t​Wq(n)​(t−x)dU(x) for t≥0t\ge0t≥0.
  • (6.10)–(6.12), the Wiener–Hopf form: Wq−(t)+Wq(t)=∫−∞tWq(t−x) dU(x)W_q^-(t)+W_q(t)=\int_{-\infty}^t W_q(t-x)\,dU(x)Wq−​(t)+Wq​(t)=∫−∞t​Wq​(t−x)dU(x) for all ttt, and Wˉq(s)=Wˉq−(s)/(A∗(−s)B∗(s)−1)\bar W_q(s)=\bar W_q^-(s)/(A^*(-s)B^*(s)-1)Wˉq​(s)=Wˉq−​(s)/(A∗(−s)B∗(s)−1) for two-sided Laplace transforms.
  • The G/E_k/1 root result (p.278): the characteristic equation zk=A∗[kμ(1−z)]z^k=A^*[k\mu(1-z)]zk=A∗[kμ(1−z)] has exactly one root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), one in (−1,0)(-1,0)(−1,0) exactly when kkk is even, and, when A∗=[A1∗]kA^*=[A_1^*]^kA∗=[A1∗​]k, exactly kkk distinct roots in the open unit disk.
  • (6.18)–(6.20), the M/D/c generating function and p0p_0p0​ in terms of the roots of zc=e−λ(1−z)z^c=e^{-\lambda(1-z)}zc=e−λ(1−z).
  • (6.33), the maximum-likelihood estimators λ^=na/t\hat\lambda=n_a/tλ^=na​/t, μ^=nc/tb\hat\mu=n_c/t_bμ^​=nc​/tb​ for M/M/1.

Significance

Lindley's equation characterizes the stationary G/G/1 waiting time without any distributional assumption. The M/M/1, M/G/1 and G/M/1 waiting-time distributions of earlier chapters are its special cases. The transform relation (6.12) reduces the G/G/1 delay to a factorization problem for A∗(−s)B∗(s)−1A^*(-s)B^*(s)-1A∗(−s)B∗(s)−1. The recursion and the equation are the starting point of Kingman's bound, of heavy-traffic approximations and of simulation of single-server systems.

All of these results are classical and proved. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of them is formalized. The platform's forward-coupling mission proves convergence to a stationary workload of a continuous-time queue that it assumes to exist. It proves neither the existence of a stationary law of Lindley's discrete recursion nor Lindley's equation. The mission therefore produces a machine-checked account of the G/G/1 recursion on distributions, a Loynes-type existence theorem for it, and the Wiener–Hopf transform identity. Its definitions (lifetime laws, the law of S−TS-TS−T, the law map of the recursion, two-sided transforms) are reusable for Kingman's bound in the next mission of the series.

Difficulty

The obvious route to existence is to iterate the recursion from Wq(0)=0W_q^{(0)}=0Wq(0)​=0 and take a limit. The distributions of Wq(n)W_q^{(n)}Wq(n)​ from zero increase stochastically, but a limit of CDFs need not be a probability distribution: mass can escape to infinity, and it does when ρ>1\rho>1ρ>1. Ruling this out under ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1 is the whole content of the existence half. It is a statement about the entire past of the input sequences, not about one step of the recursion, and the book asserts it without argument ("In the steady state (ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1) …", p.285).

The transform identity (6.12) needs the right strip of convergence, which the book does not state. A∗(−s)A^*(-s)A∗(−s) is finite only where the interarrival time has an exponential moment.

Formalization scope

Distributions are Mathlib measures on R\mathbb RR. AAA and BBB are probability measures with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0), with integrable identity where means are used. ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1 is stated as E[S]/E[T]<1\mathrm E[S]/\mathrm E[T]<1E[S]/E[T]<1 with E[T]>0\mathrm E[T]>0E[T]>0. Independence is encoded by product measures: UUU is the image of B⊗AB\otimes AB⊗A under (s,t)↦s−t(s,t)\mapsto s-t(s,t)↦s−t, and one step of the recursion is the image of ν⊗U\nu\otimes Uν⊗U under (w,u)↦max⁡(0,w+u)(w,u)\mapsto\max(0,w+u)(w,u)↦max(0,w+u). Stieltjes integrals over (−∞,t](-\infty,t](−∞,t] are Lebesgue integrals over the closed half-line, so the atom Wq(0)=q0W_q(0)=q_0Wq​(0)=q0​ is counted. Transforms take complex arguments.

The closed forms carried by the statements are the following.

  • (6.8), in both of the book's forms, ∫−∞tWq(t−x) dU(x)\int_{-\infty}^t W_q(t-x)\,dU(x)∫−∞t​Wq​(t−x)dU(x) and −∫0∞Wq(y) dU(t−y)-\int_0^\infty W_q(y)\,dU(t-y)−∫0∞​Wq​(y)dU(t−y).
  • (6.9) as an integral against the law of T+xT+xT+x.
  • U∗(s)=A∗(−s)B∗(s)U^*(s)=A^*(-s)B^*(s)U∗(s)=A∗(−s)B∗(s) and (6.12), for 0<Re⁡s0<\operatorname{Re}s0<Res with ∫e(Re⁡s)x dA(x)<∞\int e^{(\operatorname{Re}s)x}\,dA(x)<\infty∫e(Res)xdA(x)<∞. The division is stated only where A∗(−s)B∗(s)≠1A^*(-s)B^*(s)\ne1A∗(−s)B∗(s)=1.
  • (6.18) and (6.19) with the denominator 1−zceλ(1−z)1-z^ce^{\lambda(1-z)}1−zceλ(1−z) cleared on ∣z∣≤1|z|\le1∣z∣≤1, and (6.20) for c≥2c\ge2c≥2. The roots z1,…,zc−1z_1,\dots,z_{c-1}z1​,…,zc−1​ are hypotheses: distinct, ≠1\ne1=1, and exhausting the roots in the closed disk.
  • (6.33) as the unique maximizer of −λt−μtb+naln⁡λ+ncln⁡μ-\lambda t-\mu t_b+n_a\ln\lambda+n_c\ln\mu−λt−μtb​+na​lnλ+nc​lnμ over λ,μ>0\lambda,\mu>0λ,μ>0.

A stationary delay distribution is a fixed point of the law map of the recursion, not an arbitrary CDF assumed to satisfy (6.8). A statement of (6.8) for "any CDF with Wq=Wq∗UW_q=W_q*UWq​=Wq​∗U on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞)" would assume its own conclusion, and is excluded. The statement for M/D/c includes existence of a steady state under λ<c\lambda<cλ<c as well as the formula for every steady state.

Not formalized: §6.1.1–6.1.2 (G/PH_k/1, quasi-birth–death processes), §6.4 (semi-Markov processes, whose limit theorems the book quotes without hypotheses), §6.5 (random-order and last-come service, series representations), §6.6 (design and control), and the rest of §6.7.

Contributions are welcome on the random-walk representation of the recursion, on the existence theorem under ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1, and on the transform identities. The first two are reusable for any single-server or storage model driven by a reflected random walk.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • D. V. Lindley, "The theory of queues with a single server", Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 48(2), 1952. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100027638
  • R. M. Loynes, "The stability of a queue with non-independent inter-arrival and service times", Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 58(3), 1962. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100036094
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1971.
  • A. B. Clarke, "Maximum likelihood estimates in a simple queue", Annals of Mathematical Statistics 28(4), 1957. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177706796
  • M. L. Chaudhry, C. M. Harris, W. G. Marchal, "Robustness of rootfinding in single-server queueing models", ORSA Journal on Computing 2(3), 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.2.3.273
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