Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? I: Under Partial Multihoming, Weak Network Effects Raise Each Firm's Demand, Price and ProfitResearch Paper
Motivation
Video-game consoles, streaming services, ride-hailing apps and payment systems are sold in markets where the value of a product grows with the number of people who use it. In the classical analysis of such markets every consumer buys exactly one of the competing products (singlehoming). Under that assumption, a stronger network effect intensifies price competition in Hotelling models of incompatible products, so equilibrium prices fall (Farrell and Saloner, 1992; Shy, 2001); Katz and Shapiro (1985) find the same under Cournot competition. In practice many consumers own both a PlayStation and an Xbox, or subscribe to several streaming services (multihoming).
Foros, Kind and Stähler (Management Science, 2025; SNF Working Paper 16/21, 2021) let consumers choose endogenously whether to buy one good or both. Their Proposition 1 shows that the classical conclusion reverses once some consumers multihome: near the point without network effects, a stronger network effect raises each firm's demand, price and profit, even when the firms differ in size. This mission formalizes that proposition together with the computations on which the paper rests it.
Setting
Two firms are located at the ends of a Hotelling line of unit length, along which a unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed. A consumer at distance from firm pays a mismatch cost , with . Good has exclusive features worth and shared features worth ; buying good also yields a network benefit , where is the strength of the network effect and is the expected number of buyers of good . Throughout, (Assumption 1 (i) of the paper), and denotes the rival of .
When some consumers buy both goods and expectations are fulfilled (), the paper derives the demand for good at prices :
Maximizing the profit (marginal costs are zero) gives the reaction function
and solving the two reaction functions gives the candidate prices
At these prices the output of good is , the number of singlehomers of good (consumers who buy only ) is , the number of multihomers is , and firm 's profit is . All of these are functions of for fixed . In Lean they are demandM, reactM, priceM, outM, singleM, multiM and profitM in the namespace Multihoming.Local, each taking its parameters in the order .
Partial multihoming means that some consumers buy both goods and some buy only one of each: , , . At this is exactly , and .
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 1
Assume and , , . Then there is such that, for each ,
The goal fixes no constant and no size of the neighbourhood: it asserts the direction of every effect near , for asymmetric firms.
Milestones
- (15) The reaction function maximizes over all real , for .
- (16) The candidate prices solve the two reaction functions simultaneously.
- (19)–(20) Closed forms of , and at the candidate prices.
- (22) and .
- Footnote 15 .
Significance
The result separates two regimes that the classical theory does not distinguish. Under singlehoming, network effects are a force for competition and lower prices; under partial multihoming, a small network effect makes prices strategic complements (each firm's reaction function slopes upward in the rival's price) and raises the prices, outputs and profits of both firms. This is the paper's explanation for why firms facing multihoming consumers may welcome network effects, and it is the starting point of the paper's later analysis of symmetric firms, of the thresholds on exclusive content, and of mergers.
The proposition is proved in the paper by a short computation: differentiating closed forms at . To our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof would confirm the closed forms (16), (19), (20), the derivative signs (22) and footnote 15, and would upgrade the paper's derivative-at-a-point argument to monotonicity on an explicit interval. The formalization also records a printed slip: the second constant of (22) is printed as , while the value implied by (16) and (17) is . The sign, and so Proposition 1, is unaffected.
Difficulty
Each identity is a rational-function computation with up to quartic denominators, which is tedious but routine once the denominators are known to be nonzero. The substantive step is from a derivative at one point to monotonicity on an interval. The paper computes one-sided derivatives at . To conclude strict monotonicity on , one needs the derivatives to keep their sign on a neighbourhood, which requires continuity of the derivative of each of eight functions (four quantities for each of two firms) and a common . The price claim has no printed derivative at all. A further subtlety is that the profit derivative at is positive only because , which is not a hypothesis but follows from .
Formalization scope
- Representation. All parameters are real numbers. The overlapping features cancel from every object and are not a parameter. The model's demand is (14) with fulfilled expectations, taken as given: its derivation from the consumer's choice problem (10)–(13), the single-homing regime and the full pricing game (regime switching, deviations) are not formalized. The prices are those of (16), the profit is as in (5) with zero marginal costs, and milestones (15)–(16) tie the prices to profit maximization.
- Standing assumptions. ; (the model's and Assumption 1 (i)). Assumption 1 (ii)–(iii), which concern market coverage and positive shares in the full game, are not used and not assumed. Milestones 4–5 need only : their functions are smooth near , and the derivatives are two-sided.
- Pinned hypotheses. "Assume partial multihoming" is the three inequalities , , . The paper's text names only one condition ; both firms' conditions are needed. "In the neighborhood of " is strict monotonicity on with .
- Trivializations ruled out. The goal is about (14) evaluated at (16), not about the closed form (20); excludes a vacuous interval; the statement is monotonicity on an interval, not a derivative sign at one point; and every denominator is positive on the domain, so no claim holds through Lean's convention .
- Not posed. Proposition 4 of the paper, the characterization of the Nash equilibria, is not posed by this series because it is false as printed (a profitable deviation exists at some parameters the proposition covers). Expression (21), which mixes partial derivatives at fixed and at equilibrium prices, is not posed either.
- Infrastructure. Only Mathlib's real analysis is needed (
HasDerivAt,StrictMonoOn). Lemmas turning a positive continuous derivative on an interval into strict monotonicity are reusable. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal are welcome, as are proofs that derive the goal from the milestones.
Selected references
- Ø. Foros, H. J. Kind and F. Stähler, Endogenous multihoming and network effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or both?, Management Science, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00613 (read from SNF Working Paper No. 16/21, NHH Bergen, December 2021).
- J. Farrell and G. Saloner, Converters, compatibility, and the control of interfaces, Journal of Industrial Economics 40(1), 1992. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950625
- O. Shy, The Economics of Network Industries, Cambridge University Press, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754401
- M. L. Katz and C. Shapiro, Network externalities, competition, and compatibility, American Economic Review 75(3), 1985. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1814809
- B.-C. Kim and D. Serfes, A duopoly model with consumers' multiple-purchase behavior, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(6), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.10.008
- S. P. Anderson, Ø. Foros and H. J. Kind, Product functionality, competition, and multipurchasing, International Economic Review 58(1), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12212