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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Multihoming and Network Effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or Both? I: Under Partial Multihoming, Weak Network Effects Raise Each Firm's Demand, Price and ProfitResearch Paper

Motivation

Video-game consoles, streaming services, ride-hailing apps and payment systems are sold in markets where the value of a product grows with the number of people who use it. In the classical analysis of such markets every consumer buys exactly one of the competing products (singlehoming). Under that assumption, a stronger network effect intensifies price competition in Hotelling models of incompatible products, so equilibrium prices fall (Farrell and Saloner, 1992; Shy, 2001); Katz and Shapiro (1985) find the same under Cournot competition. In practice many consumers own both a PlayStation and an Xbox, or subscribe to several streaming services (multihoming).

Foros, Kind and Stähler (Management Science, 2025; SNF Working Paper 16/21, 2021) let consumers choose endogenously whether to buy one good or both. Their Proposition 1 shows that the classical conclusion reverses once some consumers multihome: near the point without network effects, a stronger network effect raises each firm's demand, price and profit, even when the firms differ in size. This mission formalizes that proposition together with the computations on which the paper rests it.

Setting

Two firms i∈{0,1}i\in\{0,1\}i∈{0,1} are located at the ends of a Hotelling line of unit length, along which a unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed. A consumer at distance ddd from firm iii pays a mismatch cost tdtdtd, with t>0t>0t>0. Good iii has exclusive features worth eie_iei​ and shared features worth ooo; buying good iii also yields a network benefit μzi\mu z_iμzi​, where μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0 is the strength of the network effect and ziz_izi​ is the expected number of buyers of good iii. Throughout, μ<t\mu<tμ<t (Assumption 1 (i) of the paper), and jjj denotes the rival of iii.

When some consumers buy both goods and expectations are fulfilled (zi=xiz_i=x_izi​=xi​), the paper derives the demand for good iii at prices (pi,pj)(p_i,p_j)(pi​,pj​):

xiM(pi,pj)=μt+μ+t ei−pit2−μ2−μ ej−pjt2−μ2.(14)x_i^M(p_i,p_j)=\frac{\mu}{t+\mu}+t\,\frac{e_i-p_i}{t^2-\mu^2}-\mu\,\frac{e_j-p_j}{t^2-\mu^2}. \qquad (14)xiM​(pi​,pj​)=t+μμ​+tt2−μ2ei​−pi​​−μt2−μ2ej​−pj​​.(14)

Maximizing the profit pixiM(pi,pj)p_i x_i^M(p_i,p_j)pi​xiM​(pi​,pj​) (marginal costs are zero) gives the reaction function

piM(pj)=tμ−μ2+tei2t+μ pj−ej2t,(15)p_i^M(p_j)=\frac{t\mu-\mu^2+te_i}{2t}+\mu\,\frac{p_j-e_j}{2t}, \qquad (15)piM​(pj​)=2ttμ−μ2+tei​​+μ2tpj​−ej​​,(15)

and solving the two reaction functions gives the candidate prices

piM=t−μ2t−μ(μ+ei)+μt4t2−μ2(ei−ej).(16)p_i^M=\frac{t-\mu}{2t-\mu}(\mu+e_i)+\frac{\mu t}{4t^2-\mu^2}(e_i-e_j). \qquad (16)piM​=2t−μt−μ​(μ+ei​)+4t2−μ2μt​(ei​−ej​).(16)

At these prices the output of good iii is xi=xiM(piM,pjM)x_i=x_i^M(p_i^M,p_j^M)xi​=xiM​(piM​,pjM​), the number of singlehomers of good iii (consumers who buy only iii) is si=1−xjs_i=1-x_jsi​=1−xj​, the number of multihomers is m=1−s0−s1m=1-s_0-s_1m=1−s0​−s1​, and firm iii's profit is πi=piMxi\pi_i=p_i^Mx_iπi​=piM​xi​. All of these are functions of μ\muμ for fixed t,e0,e1t,e_0,e_1t,e0​,e1​. In Lean they are demandM, reactM, priceM, outM, singleM, multiM and profitM in the namespace Multihoming.Local, each taking its parameters in the order (t,μ,ei,ej)(t,\mu,e_i,e_j)(t,μ,ei​,ej​).

Partial multihoming means that some consumers buy both goods and some buy only one of each: m>0m>0m>0, s0>0s_0>0s0​>0, s1>0s_1>0s1​>0. At μ=0\mu=0μ=0 this is exactly e0<2te_0<2te0​<2t, e1<2te_1<2te1​<2t and 2t<e0+e12t<e_0+e_12t<e0​+e1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1

Assume t>0t>0t>0 and e0<2te_0<2te0​<2t, e1<2te_1<2te1​<2t, 2t<e0+e12t<e_0+e_12t<e0​+e1​. Then there is δ∈(0,t)\delta\in(0,t)δ∈(0,t) such that, for each i∈{0,1}i\in\{0,1\}i∈{0,1},

xi, piM, πi are strictly increasing and si is strictly decreasing in μ on [0,δ].x_i,\ p_i^M,\ \pi_i \text{ are strictly increasing and } s_i \text{ is strictly decreasing in } \mu \text{ on } [0,\delta].xi​, piM​, πi​ are strictly increasing and si​ is strictly decreasing in μ on [0,δ].

The goal fixes no constant and no size of the neighbourhood: it asserts the direction of every effect near μ=0\mu=0μ=0, for asymmetric firms.

Milestones

  1. (15) The reaction function maximizes p xiM(p,pj)p\,x_i^M(p,p_j)pxiM​(p,pj​) over all real ppp, for 0≤μ<t0\le\mu<t0≤μ<t.
  2. (16) The candidate prices solve the two reaction functions simultaneously.
  3. (19)–(20) Closed forms of sis_isi​, mmm and xix_ixi​ at the candidate prices.
  4. (22) ∂m∂μ∣μ=0=(2t−e0)+(2t−e1)4t2>0\dfrac{\partial m}{\partial\mu}\Big|_{\mu=0}=\dfrac{(2t-e_0)+(2t-e_1)}{4t^2}>0∂μ∂m​​μ=0​=4t2(2t−e0​)+(2t−e1​)​>0 and ∂si∂μ∣μ=0=−2t−ei4t2<0\dfrac{\partial s_i}{\partial\mu}\Big|_{\mu=0}=-\dfrac{2t-e_i}{4t^2}<0∂μ∂si​​​μ=0​=−4t22t−ei​​<0.
  5. Footnote 15 dπidμ∣μ=0=(2t−ej)ei4t2>0\dfrac{d\pi_i}{d\mu}\Big|_{\mu=0}=\dfrac{(2t-e_j)e_i}{4t^2}>0dμdπi​​​μ=0​=4t2(2t−ej​)ei​​>0.

Significance

The result separates two regimes that the classical theory does not distinguish. Under singlehoming, network effects are a force for competition and lower prices; under partial multihoming, a small network effect makes prices strategic complements (each firm's reaction function slopes upward in the rival's price) and raises the prices, outputs and profits of both firms. This is the paper's explanation for why firms facing multihoming consumers may welcome network effects, and it is the starting point of the paper's later analysis of symmetric firms, of the thresholds on exclusive content, and of mergers.

The proposition is proved in the paper by a short computation: differentiating closed forms at μ=0\mu=0μ=0. To our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof would confirm the closed forms (16), (19), (20), the derivative signs (22) and footnote 15, and would upgrade the paper's derivative-at-a-point argument to monotonicity on an explicit interval. The formalization also records a printed slip: the second constant of (22) is printed as 2t22t^22t2, while the value implied by (16) and (17) is 4t24t^24t2. The sign, and so Proposition 1, is unaffected.

Difficulty

Each identity is a rational-function computation with up to quartic denominators, which is tedious but routine once the denominators are known to be nonzero. The substantive step is from a derivative at one point to monotonicity on an interval. The paper computes one-sided derivatives at μ=0\mu=0μ=0. To conclude strict monotonicity on [0,δ][0,\delta][0,δ], one needs the derivatives to keep their sign on a neighbourhood, which requires continuity of the derivative of each of eight functions (four quantities for each of two firms) and a common δ\deltaδ. The price claim has no printed derivative at all. A further subtlety is that the profit derivative at 000 is positive only because ei>0e_i>0ei​>0, which is not a hypothesis but follows from ei>2t−ej>0e_i>2t-e_j>0ei​>2t−ej​>0.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. All parameters are real numbers. The overlapping features ooo cancel from every object and are not a parameter. The model's demand is (14) with fulfilled expectations, taken as given: its derivation from the consumer's choice problem (10)–(13), the single-homing regime and the full pricing game (regime switching, deviations) are not formalized. The prices are those of (16), the profit is piMxip_i^M x_ipiM​xi​ as in (5) with zero marginal costs, and milestones (15)–(16) tie the prices to profit maximization.
  • Standing assumptions. t>0t>0t>0; 0≤μ<t0\le\mu<t0≤μ<t (the model's μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0 and Assumption 1 (i)). Assumption 1 (ii)–(iii), which concern market coverage and positive shares in the full game, are not used and not assumed. Milestones 4–5 need only t>0t>0t>0: their functions are smooth near μ=0\mu=0μ=0, and the derivatives are two-sided.
  • Pinned hypotheses. "Assume partial multihoming" is the three inequalities e0<2te_0<2te0​<2t, e1<2te_1<2te1​<2t, 2t<e0+e12t<e_0+e_12t<e0​+e1​. The paper's text names only one condition 2t−ei>02t-e_i>02t−ei​>0; both firms' conditions are needed. "In the neighborhood of μ=0\mu=0μ=0" is strict monotonicity on [0,δ][0,\delta][0,δ] with 0<δ<t0<\delta<t0<δ<t.
  • Trivializations ruled out. The goal is about (14) evaluated at (16), not about the closed form (20); δ>0\delta>0δ>0 excludes a vacuous interval; the statement is monotonicity on an interval, not a derivative sign at one point; and every denominator is positive on the domain, so no claim holds through Lean's convention x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0.
  • Not posed. Proposition 4 of the paper, the characterization of the Nash equilibria, is not posed by this series because it is false as printed (a profitable deviation exists at some parameters the proposition covers). Expression (21), which mixes partial derivatives at fixed and at equilibrium prices, is not posed either.
  • Infrastructure. Only Mathlib's real analysis is needed (HasDerivAt, StrictMonoOn). Lemmas turning a positive continuous derivative on an interval into strict monotonicity are reusable. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal are welcome, as are proofs that derive the goal from the milestones.

Selected references

  • Ø. Foros, H. J. Kind and F. Stähler, Endogenous multihoming and network effects: PlayStation, Xbox, or both?, Management Science, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00613 (read from SNF Working Paper No. 16/21, NHH Bergen, December 2021).
  • J. Farrell and G. Saloner, Converters, compatibility, and the control of interfaces, Journal of Industrial Economics 40(1), 1992. https://doi.org/10.2307/2950625
  • O. Shy, The Economics of Network Industries, Cambridge University Press, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754401
  • M. L. Katz and C. Shapiro, Network externalities, competition, and compatibility, American Economic Review 75(3), 1985. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1814809
  • B.-C. Kim and D. Serfes, A duopoly model with consumers' multiple-purchase behavior, International Journal of Industrial Organization 24(6), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.10.008
  • S. P. Anderson, Ø. Foros and H. J. Kind, Product functionality, competition, and multipurchasing, International Economic Review 58(1), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12212
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Experimental DesignOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Pigeonhole Design: Balancing Sequential Experiments from an Online Matching Perspective 1: With T^η Uniform Pigeonholes on [0,1] the Expected Discrepancy Is O(T^(1/2−η/2) + T^(η/2)(log T)^(1/2))Research Paper

Motivation

Online platforms run controlled experiments in which subjects (users, sessions, sellers) arrive one at a time and must be assigned to control or treatment on arrival, before later subjects are seen. A good design makes the two groups look alike in their observed covariates, because covariate imbalance inflates the variance of treatment-effect estimates. Classical offline remedies such as matched-pair designs need all covariates in advance, and the simplest online design, complete randomization, ignores covariates altogether.

Zhao and Zhou (arXiv:2201.12936, Management Science 2025) measure imbalance by the cost of the best one-to-one matching between the treated and the control subjects, which links sequential experimental design to online matching. They propose the pigeonhole design: partition the covariate space into cells and, inside each cell, assign each arrival to the group that is currently short there. This mission formalizes their main upper bound for one continuous covariate.

Setting

A horizon TTT, assumed even, of subjects arrives sequentially. Subject ttt carries a covariate xt∈[0,1]x_t\in[0,1]xt​∈[0,1], and the whole sequence x=(x1,…,xT)x=(x_1,\dots,x_T)x=(x1​,…,xT​) is fixed in advance by an adversary who does not see the randomization (an oblivious adversary). Each subject is assigned, at arrival and irrevocably, to the control group AAA or the treated group BBB, and in the end ∣A∣=∣B∣=T/2|A|=|B|=T/2∣A∣=∣B∣=T/2.

The discrepancy of a split is the cost of a minimum-weight perfect matching between the two groups (display (1) of the paper):

dA,B=min⁡e:A→B bijective ∑a∈A∣xa−xe(a)∣.d_{A,B}=\min_{e:A\to B\ \text{bijective}}\ \sum_{a\in A}|x_a-x_{e(a)}| .dA,B​=e:A→B bijectivemin​ a∈A∑​∣xa​−xe(a)​∣.

The completely randomized design chooses AAA uniformly among the (TT/2)\binom{T}{T/2}(T/2T​) subsets of size T/2T/2T/2; its expected discrepancy is written ALGC(x)\mathrm{ALG}^{\mathsf C}(x)ALGC(x).

A pigeonhole design takes a partition of [0,1][0,1][0,1] into cells. When subject ttt arrives: (1) if one group already holds T/2T/2T/2 subjects, ttt joins the other; (2) otherwise, if the cell of xtx_txt​ currently holds fewer control than treated subjects, ttt joins control, if fewer treated, ttt joins treatment, and on a tie a fair coin decides. Its expected discrepancy is the average of dA,Bd_{A,B}dA,B​ over the coins.

The uniform pigeonholes with parameter η∈(0,1)\eta\in(0,1)η∈(0,1) are the TηT^{\eta}Tη cells [0,T−η),[T−η,2T−η),…,[1−T−η,1][0,T^{-\eta}),[T^{-\eta},2T^{-\eta}),\dots,[1-T^{-\eta},1][0,T−η),[T−η,2T−η),…,[1−T−η,1].

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 3

For every fixed η∈(0,1)\eta\in(0,1)η∈(0,1) there are C>0C>0C>0 and T0T_0T0​ such that, for every even T≥T0T\ge T_0T≥T0​ and every x∈[0,1]Tx\in[0,1]^Tx∈[0,1]T, the pigeonhole design with uniform pigeonholes satisfies

E[dA,B] ≤ C(T12−η2+Tη2(log⁡T)12).\mathbb E\bigl[d_{A,B}\bigr]\ \le\ C\Bigl(T^{\frac12-\frac\eta2}+T^{\frac\eta2}(\log T)^{\frac12}\Bigr).E[dA,B​] ≤ C(T21​−2η​+T2η​(logT)21​).

The constant may depend on η\etaη but on nothing else. Corollary 1, the case η=1/2\eta=1/2η=1/2 giving O(T1/4(log⁡T)1/2)O(T^{1/4}(\log T)^{1/2})O(T1/4(logT)1/2), is included as a separate statement.

Milestones

In attack order:

  1. Hoeffding's inequality for a binomial with deviation nlog⁡n\sqrt{n\log n}nlogn​ (Lemma EC.1).
  2. The value of ALGC\mathrm{ALG}^{\mathsf C}ALGC on the two-point instance (0,…,0,1,…,1)(0,\dots,0,1,\dots,1)(0,…,0,1,…,1) (Lemma EC.4, with corrected constant).
  3. Permutation invariance of the completely randomized design (Lemma EC.5).
  4. ALGC\mathrm{ALG}^{\mathsf C}ALGC is Θ(T1/2)\Theta(T^{1/2})Θ(T1/2) in the worst case (Lemma 2).
  5. Every run of a pigeonhole design is balanced (remark after Definition 3).
  6. A median-crossing swap does not decrease the single-cell design's expected discrepancy (Lemma EC.7, corrected).
  7. The single-cell design has expected discrepancy O(T1/2)O(T^{1/2})O(T1/2) (Proposition EC.1).
  8. At the stopping time τ\tauτ, each cell has at most one unmatched subject and ∣Hτ0−Hτ1∣=T−τ|H^0_\tau-H^1_\tau|=T-\tau∣Hτ0​−Hτ1​∣=T−τ.
  9. The subjects matched inside cells contribute O(T1/2−η/2)O(T^{1/2-\eta/2})O(T1/2−η/2) (Component 1).
  10. The unmatched subjects and the last T−τT-\tauT−τ subjects contribute O(Tη/2(log⁡T)1/2)O(T^{\eta/2}(\log T)^{1/2})O(Tη/2(logT)1/2) (Component 2).

Significance

Lemma 3 shows that a simple, time-invariant, covariate-aware online rule beats complete randomization by a polynomial factor: with η=1/2\eta=1/2η=1/2 the expected discrepancy is O(T1/4(log⁡T)1/2)O(T^{1/4}(\log T)^{1/2})O(T1/4(logT)1/2), against Θ(T1/2)\Theta(T^{1/2})Θ(T1/2) for complete randomization (Lemma 2). A companion result of the paper (Lemma 4) shows that no pigeonhole design does better than Ω(T1/4)\Omega(T^{1/4})Ω(T1/4), so the bound is tight up to the logarithm. The same two-component argument underlies the paper's multi-dimensional result.

The paper proves these statements in an e-companion; none is machine-checked. A formalization adds the following. It fixes the exact model behind each expectation, namely an average over coin vectors with the balancing rule included. It repairs the places where the printed argument does not close as written. The printed constant of Lemma EC.4 is wrong, and the stated value here is the corrected one. Lemma EC.7 is false as printed in its strict form and trivial in its weak form, and the stated version is the one the proof actually establishes. The printed proof of Lemma 2 passes through a lemma (EC.6) that is false. Component 2 relies on a conditional binomial law that does not hold literally. A complete development would certify Lemma 3 independently of these slips.

Difficulty

The natural first idea is to bound each cell separately and add the results. This handles subjects that are paired inside their own cell, but it leaves out the balancing rule. Once one group is full, every later subject is forced into the other group regardless of its covariate. These forced subjects can be far from everything they are matched to. The number of forced subjects, T−τT-\tauT−τ, equals the imbalance among the cells' leftover subjects, which is random and read at a random time. Bounding its expectation requires a concentration argument that is uniform over time.

A second difficulty is the per-cell bound itself. Inside one cell the design pairs consecutive arrivals with random orientation, but the number of pairs in a cell is random and depends on the stopping time. A bound of the form c ℓnc\,\ell\sqrt ncℓn​ for a cell of length ℓ\ellℓ holding nnn subjects must therefore survive a coin-dependent truncation. Finally, the discrepancy is a minimum over matchings, so every upper bound must exhibit a matching, and every comparison between instances (Lemma EC.7) is an exchange argument over all coin outcomes.

Formalization scope

All statements live in the namespace PigeonholeDesign.Upper, and the conventions are fixed as follows:

  • Time and assignments. Subjects are indexed by Fin T, from 000, so the paper's subject ttt is index t−1t-1t−1, and its odd index iii is an even 0-based position. An assignment is Fin T → Bool, with true meaning treated.
  • Discrepancy. The minimum over bijections between the two groups of the summed distances, which equals the assignment problem (1). When the groups differ in size this infimum is Lean's junk value 000. The balance milestone shows that the designs never produce such a split.
  • Randomness. The pigeonhole design is run on a coin vector in {0,1}T\{0,1\}^T{0,1}T, and coin ttt is read only when subject ttt meets a tie. Every expectation is the average over all 2T2^T2T coin vectors (respectively over all (TT/2)\binom{T}{T/2}(T/2T​) control sets), never one run or the best run.
  • Partition. The printed partition has TηT^{\eta}Tη cells, which is not an integer in general. It is pinned as K=⌈Tη⌉K=\lceil T^{\eta}\rceilK=⌈Tη⌉ equal cells of length 1/K≤T−η1/K\le T^{-\eta}1/K≤T−η, with the last cell closed. This coincides with the printed one when TηT^\etaTη is an integer.
  • Asymptotics. "O(f(T))O(f(T))O(f(T))" means that there exist C>0C>0C>0 and T0T_0T0​, chosen before TTT and xxx, depending only on η\etaη (an absolute CCC where the page says "absolute constant"). "Θ\ThetaΘ" means both bounds. The logarithm is natural.
  • Corrected statements. Lemma EC.4 uses 1/2π1/\sqrt{2\pi}1/2π​ in place of the printed 1/π1/\sqrt\pi1/π​. Lemma EC.7 is the non-strict inequality for the specific swap of positions i+1i+1i+1 and j+1j+1j+1. Component 2 states only its conclusion. Lemma EC.6 is not posed.

Several formalizations would make the statements easy for the wrong reason, and the statements rule them out. The junk value 000 of an unbalanced split never applies, because the designs are balanced. A bound on a single run, or on the best run, in place of the average over all coin vectors is not the claim. Constants may not depend on TTT or xxx. The partition is fixed, and the statements do not range over arbitrary partitions.

A complete development needs:

  • finite combinatorics of the design run;
  • one-dimensional matching (on the line the sorted matching is optimal);
  • binomial and hypergeometric tail and mean-absolute-deviation estimates;
  • a central-binomial asymptotic for Lemma EC.4.

The design definitions and the balance lemma are reusable by the paper's lower-bound and multi-dimensional missions. Contributions of any milestone, of alternative proofs that bypass the faulty printed steps, and of sharper constants are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Zhao and Z. Zhou, Pigeonhole Design: Balancing Sequential Experiments from an Online Matching Perspective, arXiv:2201.12936v6 (2024); Management Science (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.12936
  • W. Hoeffding, Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables, Journal of the American Statistical Association 58 (1963) 13–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830
  • C. R. Blyth, Expected absolute error of the usual estimator of the binomial parameter, The American Statistician 34 (1980) 155–157. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.1980.10483022
  • D. Bertsimas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific (1997), Chapter 7.8 (assignment problem).
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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales 2: With One Risky Asset the Equilibrium Shorting Cost and Lending Yield Are Explicit, Increasing and Convex in the Belief GapResearch Paper

Motivation

Short selling is never free. To sell a share short, an investor borrows it from a holder and pays that holder a lending fee, and the size of these fees has been documented empirically for decades (D'Avolio 2002; Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen 2002). Most equilibrium models of asset pricing either forbid short sales or take the fee as exogenous. Evgeniou, Hugonnier and Prieto build a continuous-time general-equilibrium economy where the fee is determined jointly with prices: investors disagree about expected dividend growth, the pessimist wants to short, the optimist owns the shares, and the cost of shorting clears the securities lending market. The paper uses the model to explain how a positive shorting cost can coexist with apparent mispricing, as in the 3Com/Palm spin-off.

In the special case of a single risky asset (the market portfolio), the equilibrium reduces to a pair of algebraic equations for the shorting cost and the lending yield at each state, and the paper solves them in closed form (Proposition 3). This mission formalizes that closed form and its comparative statics in the belief gap.

Setting

At a fixed state of the economy, three numbers describe the environment:

  • σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, the volatility of aggregate consumption, which in the one-asset case is also the volatility of the risky asset;
  • δ=σΔ=μ(o)−μ(p)≥0\delta=\sigma\Delta=\mu^{(o)}-\mu^{(p)}\ge 0δ=σΔ=μ(o)−μ(p)≥0, the unscaled difference in beliefs: the gap between the expected dividend growth rates perceived by the optimist ooo and the pessimist ppp (Δ\DeltaΔ is the same gap per unit of volatility);
  • s∈(0,1)s\in(0,1)s∈(0,1), the consumption share of the optimist.

Short selling is active only when the optimist holds a large enough share of consumption, namely on the shorting region s>s∗s>s^*s>s∗, where

s∗=min⁡{1,σΔ}=min⁡{1,σ2δ}.s^*=\min\Big\{1,\frac{\sigma}{\Delta}\Big\}=\min\Big\{1,\frac{\sigma^2}{\delta}\Big\}.s∗=min{1,Δσ​}=min{1,δσ2​}.

Two unknowns are determined in equilibrium: the shorting cost Φ\PhiΦ, the flow rate a short seller pays per unit of position, and the lending yield Γ\GammaΓ, the flow rate a lender receives per unit of shares held. The paper shows (p. 27) that with one risky asset they satisfy

Φ=1{s>s∗}(δ+Γ)s−σ21+s,Γ=1{s>s∗}(1−s)(sδ−Γ−σ2)((δ+Γ)s−σ2)σ2(1+s)2.(29–30)\Phi=\mathbb 1_{\{s>s^*\}}\frac{(\delta+\Gamma)s-\sigma^2}{1+s},\qquad \Gamma=\mathbb 1_{\{s>s^*\}}\frac{(1-s)(s\delta-\Gamma-\sigma^2)\big((\delta+\Gamma)s-\sigma^2\big)}{\sigma^2(1+s)^2}. \tag{29–30}Φ=1{s>s∗}​1+s(δ+Γ)s−σ2​,Γ=1{s>s∗}​σ2(1+s)2(1−s)(sδ−Γ−σ2)((δ+Γ)s−σ2)​.(29–30)

The proof of Proposition 3 works with the per-volatility yield γ=Γ/σ\gamma=\Gamma/\sigmaγ=Γ/σ and the quadratic

g(γ)=(1−s)(sΔ−γ−σ)((γ+Δ)s−σ)−γσ(1+s)2.g(\gamma)=(1-s)(s\Delta-\gamma-\sigma)\big((\gamma+\Delta)s-\sigma\big)-\gamma\sigma(1+s)^2 .g(γ)=(1−s)(sΔ−γ−σ)((γ+Δ)s−σ)−γσ(1+s)2.

In Lean these objects are costOne σ δ s, yieldOne σ δ s, IsOneAssetSystem σ δ s Φ Γ and gQuad σ Δ s γ, all in the namespace CostlyShort.OneAsset.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

For σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and s∈(0,1)s\in(0,1)s∈(0,1): for every δ≥0\delta\ge 0δ≥0 and every Γ≥0\Gamma\ge 0Γ≥0, the pair (Φ,Γ)(\Phi,\Gamma)(Φ,Γ) solves (29)–(30) if and only if

Φ=1{s>s∗}s(1−s)δ−2σ2+s2(1−s)2δ2+4σ4s2(1−s),(31)\Phi=\mathbb 1_{\{s>s^*\}}\frac{s(1-s)\delta-2\sigma^2+\sqrt{s^2(1-s)^2\delta^2+4\sigma^4 s}}{2(1-s)}, \tag{31}Φ=1{s>s∗}​2(1−s)s(1−s)δ−2σ2+s2(1−s)2δ2+4σ4s​​,(31) Γ=1{s>s∗}−s((1−s)2δ+4σ2)+(1+s)s2(1−s)2δ2+4σ4s2s(1−s),(32)\Gamma=\mathbb 1_{\{s>s^*\}}\frac{-s\big((1-s)^2\delta+4\sigma^2\big)+(1+s)\sqrt{s^2(1-s)^2\delta^2+4\sigma^4 s}}{2s(1-s)}, \tag{32}Γ=1{s>s∗}​2s(1−s)−s((1−s)2δ+4σ2)+(1+s)s2(1−s)2δ2+4σ4s​​,(32)

and both (31) and (32), as functions of δ\deltaδ, are non-decreasing and convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and strictly increasing for δ>σ2/s\delta>\sigma^2/sδ>σ2/s.

Milestones

  1. On the shorting region, (30) is equivalent to g(γ)=0g(\gamma)=0g(γ)=0 (proof of Proposition 3, p. 50).
  2. g(0)=(1−s)(sΔ−σ)2>0g(0)=(1-s)(s\Delta-\sigma)^2>0g(0)=(1−s)(sΔ−σ)2>0, g′(0)<0g'(0)<0g′(0)<0, g′′≡−2s(1−s)<0g''\equiv-2s(1-s)<0g′′≡−2s(1−s)<0 and g(γ)→−∞g(\gamma)\to-\inftyg(γ)→−∞ (p. 50).
  3. For s>s∗s>s^*s>s∗, ggg has a unique strictly positive root (p. 50).
  4. The closed form (32) is strictly positive and solves (30) on the region (p. 50).
  5. Substituting (32) into (29) gives (31) (p. 50).
  6. The market-clearing identity (33) with the utilization (34): Γ=ΦΥ/(1+Υ)\Gamma=\Phi\Upsilon/(1+\Upsilon)Γ=ΦΥ/(1+Υ), Υ=1−sσ2Φ\Upsilon=\frac{1-s}{\sigma^2}\PhiΥ=σ21−s​Φ (p. 28).
  7. Φ\PhiΦ is non-decreasing and convex in δ\deltaδ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), strictly increasing on the region (Proposition 3, p. 28).

A companion statement, not a milestone, formalizes the limits on p. 29: as s↑1s\uparrow 1s↑1, Φ→(1−s∗)δ/2\Phi\to(1-s^*)\delta/2Φ→(1−s∗)δ/2 and Γ→0\Gamma\to 0Γ→0.

Significance

Proposition 3 is the only fully explicit equilibrium of the paper. It gives the level of the shorting cost and of the lending yield as functions of disagreement and of the wealth distribution, and its monotonicity in δ\deltaδ is the model's prediction that short interest and lending fees rise with the dispersion of beliefs, which the paper checks against analysts' forecast dispersion (Table 1). Convexity says the effect accelerates with disagreement. The two-asset case of §4.2 has no closed form and is solved numerically; the one-asset formulas are its benchmark.

The result is proved in the paper, but the proof of the comparative statics is omitted ("We omit the details", p. 50), and the selection of the positive root is asserted ("it is clear"). A formal development supplies the omitted differentiation argument, including convexity across the kink at the boundary δ=σ2/s\delta=\sigma^2/sδ=σ2/s of the shorting region, and checks the paper's algebra. No part of this paper has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The algebra of milestones 1, 4 and 5 is mechanical but involves a square root and several divisions, whose signs must be tracked throughout. The substantive step is the comparative statics. Monotonicity and convexity of Φ\PhiΦ in δ\deltaδ need the derivative of a square-root expression on the open region, and then a separate argument at the kink: both functions vanish identically for δ≤σ2/s\delta\le\sigma^2/sδ≤σ2/s, so convexity on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) requires the one-sided derivative at σ2/s\sigma^2/sσ2/s to be non-negative, which is a computation rather than a consequence of convexity on each piece. For Γ\GammaΓ the paper's route is indirect: Γ=h(Φ)\Gamma=h(\Phi)Γ=h(Φ) with h(x)=cx2/(1+cx)h(x)=cx^2/(1+cx)h(x)=cx2/(1+cx), and composition of a non-decreasing convex hhh with a non-decreasing convex Φ\PhiΦ. Differentiating (32) directly is possible but heavier.

Formalization scope

Everything is pointwise in real numbers. The continuous-time economy of §2 (Brownian dividends, portfolio choice, the derivation of (29)–(30) from the equilibrium conditions (16), (20), (21)) is the paper's motivation and is not formalized; Proposition 3 is stated relative to (29)–(30), which is exactly where the paper's proof begins. Conventions committed to:

  • standing assumptions σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and 0<s<10<s<10<s<1 in every theorem; the endpoints s∈{0,1}s\in\{0,1\}s∈{0,1} are absorbing states where (31)–(32) divide by zero, and are excluded;
  • the indicator 1{s>s∗}\mathbb 1_{\{s>s^*\}}1{s>s∗}​ is encoded as σ2<sδ\sigma^2<s\deltaσ2<sδ, equivalent for σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, δ≥0\delta\ge 0δ≥0, s∈(0,1)s\in(0,1)s∈(0,1); it is never written as s>min⁡{1,σ/Δ}s>\min\{1,\sigma/\Delta\}s>min{1,σ/Δ}, where Lean's σ/0=0\sigma/0=0σ/0=0 would make every state a shorting state when Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0;
  • in the goal's equivalence the lending yield is restricted to Γ≥0\Gamma\ge 0Γ≥0. This is a disclosed pin: on the shorting region the quadratic also has a negative root, which solves (29)–(30) as well; the paper's proof selects "the unique strictly positive solution", and a lending yield is a non-negative flow rate;
  • "increasing" is stated as non-decreasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) plus strictly increasing on (σ2/s,∞)(\sigma^2/s,\infty)(σ2/s,∞), because both functions are zero below the region;
  • the paper prints g′′=−s(1−s)g''=-s(1-s)g′′=−s(1−s); the correct second derivative −2s(1−s)-2s(1-s)−2s(1−s) is stated (milestone 2);
  • only the outer equality of (34) is used; its middle expression involves the pessimist's portfolio and needs the economy.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: stating only that (31)–(32) satisfy (29)–(30), or convexity only on the open shorting region, would be strictly weaker than the paper and is not the goal.

Needed infrastructure is Mathlib's real analysis: Real.sqrt, deriv, MonotoneOn, ConvexOn, and convexity of compositions. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently. Facts about convexity of a function that vanishes up to a point and is convex beyond it are reusable outside this mission.

Selected references

  • T. Evgeniou, J. Hugonnier and R. Prieto, Asset Pricing with Costly Short Sales, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper N°22-21, version of September 22, 2022 (the source of this mission; §3.3, §4.1, App. A). Published as J. Hugonnier and R. Prieto, Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01887
  • G. D'Avolio, The market for borrowing stock, Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002) 271–306. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00206-4
  • D. Duffie, N. Gârleanu and L. H. Pedersen, Securities lending, shorting, and pricing, Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002) 307–339. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00226-X
  • J. Detemple and S. Murthy, Equilibrium asset prices and no-arbitrage with portfolio constraints, Review of Financial Studies 10 (1997) 1133–1174. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/10.4.1133
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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics CI: Complete Life Assurances, Lump Sums and Insurance–Annuity IdentitiesTextbook

Complete Life Assurances, Lump Sums and Insurance–Annuity Identities

Motivation

A life assurance pays a contingent lump sum under a policy-defined event, rather than a sequence of survivor-contingent instalments. A benefit paid at the end of the policy year of death has a different value from one paid immediately on death. A pure endowment pays instead when the insured survives to maturity, while an endowment assurance combines cover for death before maturity with a maturity payment to survivors. For these products, the event partition, contractual recipient and payment instant must be explicit before an expected present value is calculated.

Promislow (2015, Chapter 5, sections 5.1–5.8) derives a general annual insurance–annuity relationship from benefit vectors. Dickson, Hardy and Waters (2020, Chapter 4) develops the corresponding conventional life insurance factors. The mission makes the death, survival and maturity events visible as actual random cashflows, then derives the classical identities without taking the desired identities as assumptions.

Setting

Let the lifetime-state variable KKK take values 0,…,h0,\ldots,h0,…,h. For j<hj<hj<h, state K=jK=jK=j represents death during the policy year whose start is anniversary jjj and whose end is anniversary j+1j+1j+1. State K=hK=hK=h represents survival at the model's right-censoring anniversary. Nonnegative probabilities pjp_jpj​ satisfy ∑j=0hpj=1\sum_{j=0}^{h}p_j=1∑j=0h​pj​=1. The anniversary survival probability is S(j)=∑k=jhpkS(j)=\sum_{k=j}^{h}p_kS(j)=∑k=jh​pk​, for 0≤j≤h0\le j\le h0≤j≤h. The annual discount factor vvv satisfies 0<v≤10<v\le10<v≤1, and all values are expressed at policy commencement, time zero.

For an amount schedule bjb_jbj​ in money per death claim, the random present value of a death benefit payable at the end of the death year is

Z(K)=∑j=0h−1vj+1bj1{K=j}.Z(K)=\sum_{j=0}^{h-1}v^{j+1}b_j\mathbf{1}_{\{K=j\}}.Z(K)=j=0∑h−1​vj+1bj​1{K=j}​.

A temporary assurance of duration nnn includes deaths in policy years 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1. A deferred term assurance adds a waiting period aaa and covers deaths in years a,…,a+n−1a,\ldots,a+n-1a,…,a+n−1. A pure endowment is triggered by K≥nK\ge nK≥n and pays at time nnn. The term and maturity components are disjoint for 0≤n≤h0\le n\le h0≤n≤h. The specific settlement recipient can be identified contractually; if recipient survival or eligibility changes the payment event, that condition requires an additional model variable.

Formalization targets

Realised insurance values

The foundational result is a reconciliation between the expectation of the realised random present value ZZZ and a separate valuation made from the probability of death in each covered policy year. For a unit sum assured, both routes must produce an actuarial value from exactly the same state law. The analogous pure-endowment reconciliation averages realised survivor payments and independently discounts the survival tail.

Maturity-event partition and annuity identity

The next result establishes the endowment decomposition from disjoint actual payment events, including the zero-term boundary and a terminal survivor who must not receive a fictitious death claim. The year-end-of-death benefit and the maturity benefit are valued separately. Their combination is then reconciled with a survival-contingent annuity paid in advance at anniversaries 0,…,n−10,\ldots,n-10,…,n−1.

Writing d=1−vd=1-vd=1−v for the annual effective discount rate, the central finite relationship for unit death and maturity benefits is

An1+vnS(n)+da¨n=1,a¨n=∑j=0n−1vjS(j).A_n^{1}+v^nS(n)+d\ddot a_n=1, \qquad \ddot a_n=\sum_{j=0}^{n-1}v^jS(j).An1​+vnS(n)+da¨n​=1,a¨n​=j=0∑n−1​vjS(j).

Here An1A_n^{1}An1​ includes deaths before maturity and settlement at the following policy-year end. The maturity mass vnS(n)v^nS(n)vnS(n) captures those alive at nnn. The formula is derived by telescoping discounted survival decrements. When the horizon is right-censored, a whole-horizon death-only assurance omits terminal survivors and requires a residual term. A familiar whole-life identity without that term needs certain death by the terminal horizon or an expressly defined terminal benefit.

Variable benefits and moments

The source also defines arithmetic increasing and decreasing insured amounts, geometric escalation and minimum-benefit floors. It constructs the second moment of the actual claim present value by squaring its realised value and compares it to a separate squared-benefit death-mass sum. Distinct death years are mutually exclusive, so mixed claim terms vanish. A variance is meaningful only with a normalised, nonnegative probability law. Additional families cover insurance-term extensions, the split of a deferred term, exact commutation recursions and benefit or discount ordering.

The principal capstone starts with a single finite lifetime law and one annual discount basis. It simultaneously derives the death-claim expectation, the pure-endowment expectation, the disjoint endowment decomposition, the finite insurance–annuity conservation identity and the independent second-moment formula. The conservation equation is the substantive conclusion rather than a restated hypothesis. Each item remains an open theorem statement until a valid Prove2Me proof is separately accepted.

Continuous and fractional-time valuation

The additional model uses an actual real future lifetime T with a specified probability measure μ supported on nonnegative times. It does not infer a continuous death-time distribution from annual mortality probabilities. At nonnegative maturity n, death in 0≤T<n triggers an immediately paid claim. Death at T=n instead belongs to the pure-endowment event T≥n, even if the probability law has an atom there.

At constant force of interest δ, put U=min(T,n). A continuously paid unit annuity has realised present value Y=(1−exp(−δU))/δ when δ≠0, and Y=U when δ=0. An immediate death benefit or maturity benefit pays exp(−δU) under exactly one of the two events. Therefore its pathwise conservation law is

exp⁡(−δU)+δY=1.\exp(-\delta U)+\delta Y=1.exp(−δU)+δY=1.

Taking expectations under the same μ produces the distinct continuous insurance–annuity identity

A‾n1+exp⁡(−δn)Pr⁡(T≥n)+δa‾n=1.\overline A_n^1+\exp(-\delta n)\Pr(T\ge n)+\delta\overline a_n=1.An1​+exp(−δn)Pr(T≥n)+δan​=1.

Fractional-time results specify m>0 annual instalment periods, each ending at (r+1)/m. A death in [r/m,(r+1)/m) is payable at the following subperiod end, without ambiguity at exact grid instants. At nonnegative force, immediate payment is at least as valuable as m-thly payment, which is at least as valuable as year-end payment. Supporting results cover cashflow moments, settlement lag, escalation and UDD-versus-constant-force survival. The annual–continuous bridge equates year-end claim values under matched policy-year death masses.

Significance

This event-level basis, grounded in the insurance benefit conventions of Dickson, Hardy and Waters (2020, Chapter 4), supports analyses of death-in-service benefits, death-in-deferment cover, pension-scheme lump sums, term life protection and survival maturity benefits. It also makes transparent why the expected value of a lump-sum death claim can be represented using an annuity schedule only after the schedules and discounting are related mathematically. The annuity correspondence reflects an exact payment-mass identity, and a denominator used for recurring premiums needs strict positivity before division.

These reusable cashflow models can support future dependent-beneficiary and pension-scheme guarantees, but true survivor entitlement requires an additional joint-life state.

Difficulty

Careful classification at anniversaries is essential. In the annual model, a death allocated to the policy year following maturity cannot generate both the pre-maturity death benefit and the maturity benefit. Terminal censoring distinguishes survival observed at the end of a finite table from guaranteed eventual death. The conservation identity should remain valid at zero interest and zero term; when no covered deaths occur, its insurance component must vanish. Later death-year payments also make valuation sensitive to the chosen discount factor.

Death-claim second moments require exclusive event indicators, not independence. The capstones derive values from cashflows rather than commutation-table definitions. These constraints exclude vacuous premises and cosmetic equalities.

Formalization scope

The private formal development contains two distinct models: a finite annual right-censored K-model with discount factor v and an actual real-lifetime T-model with exponential discounting at force δ. The annual root remains the main theorem, while the continuous insurance–annuity result is a separate supporting capstone. Targeted Mathlib imports encode a probability measure, real claim instants, fractional settlement and cashflow moments.

The classical actuarial identities are already established in the literature. The Draft contains 119 open theorem statements, including seven explicitly formulated reusable root-support lemmas, with no accepted mission proofs. Pinned-revision private Lean checks have verified 85 distinct theorem statements, including the complete 12-conjunct finite annual root, distribution-level insurance–annuity conservation and the annual–continuous settlement bridge. These are private compiler diagnostics, not accepted proofs of published mission targets.

Annual discount d=1−v differs from continuous force δ. The fractional branch models UDD and finite constant-force survival and bridges half-year survival to the payment grid. General-duration inequalities, death-time density valuation, select tables, dependent-survivor eligibility and infinite-horizon convergence remain open. A time-dependent recipient multiplier does not establish joint-life entitlement.

Selected references

  • David C. M. Dickson, Mary R. Hardy and Howard R. Waters (2020), Actuarial Mathematics for Life Contingent Risks, third edition, Chapter 4, Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108784184
  • S. David Promislow (2015), Fundamentals of Actuarial Mathematics, third edition, Chapters 5 and 7, and Chapter 8, section 8.8, Wiley, ISBN 9781118782460. https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Fundamentals+of+Actuarial+Mathematics%2C+3rd+Edition-p-9781118782521
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Differential GeometryMathematical PhysicsPartial Differential Equations·Captain: Lucas

Bray–Hamm–Hirsch–Wheeler–Zhang 2019: Flatly Foliated Relativity — Λ > 0 implies a unique vacuumResearch Paper

Motivation

Flatly Foliated Relativity (FFR) is a theory of gravity introduced by Bray, Hamm, Hirsch, Wheeler and Zhang (arXiv:1911.00967, 2019) that sits between special and general relativity. It keeps the Einstein–Hilbert action of general relativity (GR) but restricts it to spacetimes that are foliated by flat Euclidean spaces (Assumption 1 of the paper): "matter curves spacetime, but not space". The authors motivate this by the observed spatial flatness of the local universe. Since gravitational waves are excluded, FFR is proposed as an approximation of GR whose metric equations are much more tractable. It still contains the big bang (FLRW spacetimes with k=0k = 0k=0), accelerated expansion and the exterior Schwarzschild spacetime.

One headline feature of the theory is how a positive cosmological constant Λ>0\Lambda > 0Λ>0 (Assumption 2) shapes it. For Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0 the paper shows that the FFR metric equations are elliptic on every slice, that the mean curvature of the foliation gives a geometric arrow of time, and that there is exactly one vacuum solution among solutions that are spherically symmetric at infinity. For Λ=0\Lambda=0Λ=0 uniqueness fails, and for Λ<0\Lambda<0Λ<0 existence fails. This mission formalizes Sections 3.2–5 of the paper, which contain these statements.

Setting

All FFR equations live on a single flat slice Rt3\mathbb R^3_tRt3​, with no time derivatives, so the formalization works on R3\mathbb R^3R3 with coordinates x1,x2,x3x_1,x_2,x_3x1​,x2​,x3​. The spacetime metric is

g=(−η2+∣ω∣2) dt2−(ω⊗dt+dt⊗ω)+δR3,g = (-\eta^2+|\omega|^2)\,dt^2-(\omega\otimes dt+dt\otimes\omega)+\delta_{\mathbb R^3},g=(−η2+∣ω∣2)dt2−(ω⊗dt+dt⊗ω)+δR3​,

where η>0\eta>0η>0 is the lapse and ω\omegaω is a one-form on R3\mathbb R^3R3, identified with a vector field through the flat metric. Matter enters through the energy density μ\muμ and the momentum density JJJ. Writing ωi,j=∂jωi\omega_{i,j}=\partial_j\omega_iωi,j​=∂j​ωi​, ∇⋅ω=ωi,i\nabla\cdot\omega=\omega_{i,i}∇⋅ω=ωi,i​ and Δ\DeltaΔ for the flat Laplacian (summation over repeated indices), the FFR equations (34)–(35) are

2Λ+16πμ=1η2[(∇⋅ω)2−14∥ωi,j+ωj,i∥2],2\Lambda+16\pi\mu=\frac1{\eta^2}\Big[(\nabla\cdot\omega)^2-\tfrac14\|\omega_{i,j}+\omega_{j,i}\|^2\Big],2Λ+16πμ=η21​[(∇⋅ω)2−41​∥ωi,j​+ωj,i​∥2], 16πJi=1η(Δωi−∂i(∇⋅ω))+2η2(∇⋅ω)ηi−1η2(ωi,j+ωj,i)ηj.16\pi J_i=\frac1\eta\big(\Delta\omega_i-\partial_i(\nabla\cdot\omega)\big)+\frac2{\eta^2}(\nabla\cdot\omega)\eta_i-\frac1{\eta^2}(\omega_{i,j}+\omega_{j,i})\eta_j .16πJi​=η1​(Δωi​−∂i​(∇⋅ω))+η22​(∇⋅ω)ηi​−η21​(ωi,j​+ωj,i​)ηj​.

Substituting ω=df+ζ\omega=df+\zetaω=df+ζ with ∇⋅ζ=0\nabla\cdot\zeta=0∇⋅ζ=0 gives the elliptic form (39)–(41), with unknowns (f,ζ,η)(f,\zeta,\eta)(f,ζ,η). Here Qij=fij+12(ζi,j+ζj,i)Q_{ij}=f_{ij}+\tfrac12(\zeta_{i,j}+\zeta_{j,i})Qij​=fij​+21​(ζi,j​+ζj,i​):

(Δf)2−∥Q∥2=(16πμ+2Λ)η2,(\Delta f)^2-\|Q\|^2=(16\pi\mu+2\Lambda)\eta^2,(Δf)2−∥Q∥2=(16πμ+2Λ)η2, Δζi=16πJiη−2η(Δf δij−Qij)ηj,\Delta\zeta_i=16\pi J_i\eta-\tfrac2\eta(\Delta f\,\delta_{ij}-Q_{ij})\eta_j,Δζi​=16πJi​η−η2​(Δfδij​−Qij​)ηj​, (Δf δij−Qij)ηij=8π∇⋅(Jη2),(\Delta f\,\delta_{ij}-Q_{ij})\eta_{ij}=8\pi\nabla\cdot(J\eta^2),(Δfδij​−Qij​)ηij​=8π∇⋅(Jη2),

together with the requirement ∇⋅ζ→0\nabla\cdot\zeta\to0∇⋅ζ→0 at infinity. Vacuum means μ=0\mu=0μ=0 and J=0J=0J=0. When Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0, the paper fixes the time orientation by the arrow-of-time convention K=(∇⋅ω)/η=Δf/η>0K=(\nabla\cdot\omega)/\eta=\Delta f/\eta>0K=(∇⋅ω)/η=Δf/η>0 (Convention 1). A pair (ω,η)(\omega,\eta)(ω,η) is spherically symmetric at infinity if it is spherically symmetric on {r≥r0}\{r\ge r_0\}{r≥r0​} for some r0>0r_0>0r0​>0. Two vacuum solutions count as the same if they differ by an overall positive constant factor, which corresponds to rescaling ttt.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2

For Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0, the pair ω=Λ/3 r ∂r\omega=\sqrt{\Lambda/3}\,r\,\partial_rω=Λ/3​r∂r​, η=1\eta=1η=1 is a smooth vacuum solution that is spherically symmetric at infinity. Every smooth vacuum solution with η>0\eta>0η>0 and (∇⋅ω)/η>0(\nabla\cdot\omega)/\eta>0(∇⋅ω)/η>0 that is spherically symmetric at infinity has the form

η≡c,ω=cΛ/3  x(c>0).\eta\equiv c,\qquad \omega=c\sqrt{\Lambda/3}\;x\qquad(c>0).η≡c,ω=cΛ/3​x(c>0).

Milestones

Theorem 2 (equivalence with the elliptic form), Theorem 3 (arrow of time), Theorem 4 (ellipticity inequality), Lemma 1 (symmetrization), identity (82)–(83), Theorem 5 (uniqueness for the elliptic form under approximate spherical symmetry), Lemma 2 (Λ=0\Lambda=0Λ=0: many vacua) and Lemma 3 (Λ<0\Lambda<0Λ<0: no vacuum).

Significance

Corollary 2 is the fourth claim of the paper's main result (Theorem 1). It is the precise sense in which FFR with Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0 is rigid, in contrast to GR, which has many vacuum solutions that are spherically symmetric at infinity (gravitational waves). Together with Lemmas 2 and 3, it singles out the sign of Λ\LambdaΛ as the parameter that controls existence and uniqueness. The intermediate results are of independent use. Theorem 2 lets the elliptic system replace the original one, Theorem 4 is the ellipticity statement behind the existence question posed in the paper (Question 1), and Lemma 1 is a symmetrization inequality for the 222-Hessian operator σ2(∇2f)\sigma_2(\nabla^2 f)σ2​(∇2f).

These are paper proofs. No machine-checked version of any of them is known to the proposer. The mission asks for a complete formal proof of the goal and the milestones in Lean 4 with Mathlib.

Difficulty

The algebra is elementary. The difficulty is analytic. The uniqueness arguments rest on maximum principles for the elliptic equations (41) and (45) on all of R3\mathbb R^3R3 under conditions at infinity, on Liouville-type arguments for harmonic functions, and on a Newtonian-potential representation (convolution with the Green's function of Δ\DeltaΔ) used to show ζ→0\zeta\to0ζ→0. Lemma 1 needs averaging over rotations (spherical symmetrization), Jensen's inequality and a characterization of its equality case. Theorem 5 then needs a divergence-theorem argument on large balls that is controlled only by the approximate symmetry hypothesis. Mathlib provides the divergence theorem on boxes and some harmonic-function theory, but no ready-made maximum principle for second-order elliptic operators with variable coefficients on Rn\mathbb R^nRn.

Formalization scope

  • Space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin 3). One-forms ω,ζ,J\omega,\zeta,Jω,ζ,J are vector fields R3→R3\mathbb R^3\to\mathbb R^3R3→R3, and the paper's ω\omegaω is written w in Lean. Partial derivatives are fderiv applied to the standard basis vectors. Because fderiv returns 000 at non-differentiable points, every statement assumes smoothness (ContDiff ℝ ∞) of all fields, as the paper does.
  • "Spherically symmetric" means invariance (for scalars) or equivariance (for one-forms) under all linear isometries of R3\mathbb R^3R3. Because SO(3)SO(3)SO(3) acts transitively on spheres, this is equivalent to rotational symmetry.
  • The spherical symmetrization fˉ(x)\bar f(x)fˉ​(x) is the average of fff over the sphere of radius ∣x∣|x|∣x∣, taken with respect to the surface measure volume.toSphere. "Approximately spherically symmetric at ∞\infty∞" is read as: f−fˉf-\bar ff−fˉ​ is bounded and r2 ∥∇2(f−fˉ)∥ ∥∇(f−fˉ)∥→0r^2\,\|\nabla^2(f-\bar f)\|\,\|\nabla(f-\bar f)\|\to0r2∥∇2(f−fˉ​)∥∥∇(f−fˉ​)∥→0 uniformly as r→∞r\to\inftyr→∞, using operator norms.
  • The arrow-of-time convention Δf/η>0\Delta f/\eta>0Δf/η>0 (respectively (∇⋅ω)/η>0(\nabla\cdot\omega)/\eta>0(∇⋅ω)/η>0) is an explicit hypothesis wherever the paper invokes it. Without it, f↦−ff\mapsto-ff↦−f (time reversal) produces a second solution.
  • Existence parts are stated with explicit witnesses. A formalization that drops smoothness, η>0\eta>0η>0 or the convention would be trivial or false, and is not acceptable.
  • Contributions such as maximum principles, Liouville theorems and spherical averaging in Rn\mathbb R^nRn are reusable well beyond this mission and are welcome as separate lemmas.

Selected references

  • H. L. Bray, B. Hamm, S. Hirsch, J. Wheeler, Y. Zhang, Flatly Foliated Relativity, arXiv:1911.00967v2, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.00967
  • L. Caffarelli, L. Nirenberg, J. Spruck, The Dirichlet problem for nonlinear second order elliptic equations, III: Functions of the eigenvalues of the Hessian, Acta Mathematica 155 (1985), 261–301 (cited in the paper for the existence theory of the J=0J=0J=0 case).
  • J. Corvino, R. M. Schoen, On the asymptotics for the vacuum Einstein constraint equations, Journal of Differential Geometry 73(2) (2006), 185–217 (cited in the paper for the comparison with GR).
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Mathematical Physics·Captain: Lucas

Mass–Energy Equivalence (Wikipedia) I: E = mc², the Energy–Momentum Relation and the Low-Speed LimitTextbook

Motivation

Mass–energy equivalence is the relationship between mass and energy in a system's rest frame: the two differ only by the constant factor c2c^2c2, the square of the speed of light,

E=mc2.E = mc^2 .E=mc2.

It was proposed as a general principle by Albert Einstein in 1905 ("Does the inertia of a body depend upon its energy-content?") as a consequence of special relativity, and it underlies nuclear and particle physics: the mass defect of a nucleus measures its binding energy, and the energy released in fission or annihilation is accounted for by the change in rest mass.

Timeline. Electromagnetic-mass relations of the form m∝Eem/c2m \propto E_{em}/c^2m∝Eem​/c2 were considered in the late 1800s and by Poincaré (1900) and Hasenöhrl (1904). Einstein (1905) derived the relativistic kinetic energy Ek=mc2(γ−1)E_k = mc^2(\gamma-1)Ek​=mc2(γ−1) and stated that a body emitting energy LLL as radiation loses mass L/c2L/c^2L/c2. Planck, Stark, Lewis–Tolman and Lorentz (1907–1914) rewrote the relation in its modern forms, and von Laue (1911) gave a proof from the stress–energy tensor. This mission follows the Wikipedia article Mass–energy equivalence.

Setting

Velocities and momenta are vectors in R3\mathbb R^3R3 with Euclidean norm ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣. Fix a speed of light c>0c>0c>0. A body of rest mass m≥0m\ge0m≥0 moving with velocity v\mathbf vv, ∣v∣<c|\mathbf v|<c∣v∣<c, has

  • Lorentz factor γ=1/1−∣v∣2/c2\gamma = 1/\sqrt{1-|\mathbf v|^2/c^2}γ=1/1−∣v∣2/c2​,
  • relativistic energy Erel=γmc2E_{\mathrm{rel}} = \gamma mc^2Erel​=γmc2 and relativistic momentum p=γmv\mathbf p = \gamma m\mathbf vp=γmv,
  • rest energy E0=mc2E_0 = mc^2E0​=mc2, kinetic energy Ek=Erel−mc2E_k = E_{\mathrm{rel}} - mc^2Ek​=Erel​−mc2, and relativistic mass mrel=Erel/c2m_{\mathrm{rel}} = E_{\mathrm{rel}}/c^2mrel​=Erel​/c2.

For a finite system of free particles i∈si\in si∈s the invariant mass is M=c−2(∑iEi)2−c2∣∑ipi∣2M = c^{-2}\sqrt{(\sum_i E_i)^2 - c^2|\sum_i\mathbf p_i|^2}M=c−2(∑i​Ei​)2−c2∣∑i​pi​∣2​, the total energy over c2c^2c2 in the centre-of-momentum frame (zero total momentum). A Lorentz boost with speed ∣u∣<c|u|<c∣u∣<c along the first axis sends (E,p)(E,\mathbf p)(E,p) to E′=γu(E−up1)E' = \gamma_u(E-up_1)E′=γu​(E−up1​), p′=(γu(p1−uE/c2),p2,p3)\mathbf p' = (\gamma_u(p_1 - uE/c^2), p_2, p_3)p′=(γu​(p1​−uE/c2),p2​,p3​).

Formalization targets

Goal: energy–momentum relation

Erel2−∣p∣2c2=m02c4(c>0, m0≥0, ∣v∣<c).E_{\mathrm{rel}}^2 - |\mathbf p|^2c^2 = m_0^2c^4 \qquad (c>0,\ m_0\ge 0,\ |\mathbf v|<c).Erel2​−∣p∣2c2=m02​c4(c>0, m0​≥0, ∣v∣<c).

It contains E=mc2E=mc^2E=mc2 as the case p=0\mathbf p = 0p=0.

Milestones

  1. E=mc2E = mc^2E=mc2 in the rest frame (v=0⇒p=0, E=mc2\mathbf v = 0 \Rightarrow \mathbf p = 0,\ E = mc^2v=0⇒p=0, E=mc2).
  2. Erel=(m0c2)2+(pc)2E_{\mathrm{rel}} = \sqrt{(m_0c^2)^2 + (pc)^2}Erel​=(m0​c2)2+(pc)2​.
  3. Massless particles: E2−(pc)2=0E^2-(pc)^2 = 0E2−(pc)2=0, E,p≥0⇒E=pcE,p\ge0 \Rightarrow E = pcE,p≥0⇒E=pc.
  4. Relativistic mass: m0≤mrel=m0+Ek/c2m_0 \le m_{\mathrm{rel}} = m_0 + E_k/c^2m0​≤mrel​=m0​+Ek​/c2, with equality iff v=0\mathbf v = 0v=0 (for m0>0m_0>0m0​>0).
  5. Power series E=m0c2∑n(2nn)4−n(v/c)2n=m0c2[1+12(v/c)2+38(v/c)4+516(v/c)6+⋯ ]E = m_0c^2\sum_n \binom{2n}{n}4^{-n}(v/c)^{2n} = m_0c^2[1+\tfrac12(v/c)^2+\tfrac38(v/c)^4+\tfrac5{16}(v/c)^6+\cdots]E=m0​c2∑n​(n2n​)4−n(v/c)2n=m0​c2[1+21​(v/c)2+83​(v/c)4+165​(v/c)6+⋯].
  6. Correspondence principle: Ek=12m0v2+O(v4)E_k = \tfrac12 m_0v^2 + O(v^4)Ek​=21​m0​v2+O(v4) as v→0\mathbf v\to0v→0.
  7. Third-order approximation: E=m0c2+12m0v2(1+3v24c2)+O(v6)E = m_0c^2 + \tfrac12 m_0v^2(1+\tfrac{3v^2}{4c^2}) + O(v^6)E=m0​c2+21​m0​v2(1+4c23v2​)+O(v6).
  8. Parker Solar Probe: 3v24c2≈3.9×10−8\tfrac{3v^2}{4c^2}\approx 3.9\times10^{-8}4c23v2​≈3.9×10−8 for v=68 600v = 68\,600v=68600 m/s.
  9. c2=89 875 517 873 681 764c^2 = 89\,875\,517\,873\,681\,764c2=89875517873681764 J/kg.
  10. Boost invariance of E2−c2∣p∣2E^2 - c^2|\mathbf p|^2E2−c2∣p∣2: rest mass is the same in all inertial frames.
  11. Zero total momentum ⇒M=∑iEi/c2\Rightarrow M = \sum_i E_i/c^2⇒M=∑i​Ei​/c2.
  12. Non-additivity: ∑imi≤M\sum_i m_i \le M∑i​mi​≤M, with equality iff all constituents share one velocity.

Significance

The energy–momentum relation is the kinematic identity behind relativistic energy bookkeeping: rest energy, kinetic energy, invariant-mass reconstruction and the frame independence of rest mass all follow from it. The low-speed expansion makes precise in what sense Newtonian mechanics is the v≪cv\ll cv≪c limit of relativity. The composite-system statements formalize why, in relativity, mass is neither additive nor separately conserved while energy and momentum are conserved.

All results are classical and established in the physics literature. The mission produces machine-checked versions of these kinematic facts in a reusable R3\mathbb R^3R3-vector setting with an explicit speed of light.

Difficulty

Most single-particle statements are algebraic once the square roots are controlled; the work lies in handling the square-root and division conventions of a total formal language. The power-series milestone requires the binomial series of (1−x)−1/2(1-x)^{-1/2}(1−x)−1/2, and the asymptotic milestones require Taylor-type bounds near v=0\mathbf v = 0v=0. The non-additivity milestone is a reverse triangle inequality for future-pointing timelike four-vectors, including its equality case, which does not reduce to a one-line computation.

Formalization scope

Lean uses EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin 3) for R3\mathbb R^3R3, with explicit ccc (no natural units). All definitions are total functions: x=0\sqrt{x}=0x​=0 for x<0x<0x<0 and x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0, so every theorem assumes c>0c>0c>0 and ∣v∣<c|\mathbf v|<c∣v∣<c; rest masses are assumed non-negative. Massless particles cannot be described by velocity-based quantities (γ\gammaγ is undefined at ∣v∣=c|\mathbf v| = c∣v∣=c), so milestone 3 is phrased directly in terms of an energy–momentum pair. Only boosts along the first axis are formalized. Systems are finite and free (no interaction potential). Historical derivations (Einstein 1905, Rohrlich 1990) and the nuclear-physics applications are not formalized.

Selected references

  • A. Einstein, Ist die Trägheit eines Körpers von seinem Energieinhalt abhängig?, Annalen der Physik 18 (1905) 639–641. https://doi.org/10.1002/andp.19053231314
  • A. Einstein, Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper, Annalen der Physik 17 (1905) 891–921. https://doi.org/10.1002/andp.19053221004
  • Wikipedia, Mass–energy equivalence. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass%E2%80%93energy_equivalence
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Control TheoryConvex OptimizationLinear algebra+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Quadratic Matrix Inequalities with Applications to Data-Based Control III: Petersen's Lemma Recovered from the Matrix S-LemmasResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust control repeatedly meets linear matrix inequalities that must hold for every value of an unknown, norm-bounded matrix. A typical instance is

C+EFG+G⊤F⊤E⊤<0for all F with F⊤F⩽Fˉ,C + EFG + G^\top F^\top E^\top < 0 \quad\text{for all } F \text{ with } F^\top F \leqslant \bar F,C+EFG+G⊤F⊤E⊤<0for all F with F⊤F⩽Fˉ,

where FFF collects model uncertainty or noise. Such a condition quantifies over infinitely many matrices and cannot be checked directly. Petersen's lemma (Petersen and Hollot, Automatica 1986; Petersen, Systems & Control Letters 1987) replaces it by a single inequality in one scalar multiplier λ>0\lambda>0λ>0. The lemma is a standard tool in the design of quadratically stabilizing controllers for uncertain systems, and it was recently used for controller design from noisy data (Bisoffi, De Persis and Tesi, arXiv:2109.12175).

H. J. van Waarde, M. K. Camlibel, J. Eising and H. L. Trentelman (arXiv:2203.12959v3, 2023; SIAM J. Control Optim.) develop a theory of quadratic matrix inequalities (QMIs) and prove matrix versions of the S-lemma. In §4.5.3 they show that both the strict and the non-strict Petersen lemma follow from their matrix S-lemmas (Theorems 4.10 and 4.7) by a suitable choice of the two quadratic forms. This mission formalizes that derivation.

Timeline. Petersen and Hollot (1986) and Petersen (1987) state the lemma for stabilization of uncertain linear systems. Bisoffi, De Persis and Tesi (arXiv 2021) use strict and non-strict versions for data-driven stabilization. van Waarde, Camlibel, Eising and Trentelman (2023, Proposition 4.16) recover both versions from matrix S-lemmas.

Setting

All matrices are real. For a symmetric matrix AAA, A⩾0A \geqslant 0A⩾0 (A>0A>0A>0) means positive semidefinite (definite), and A⩽BA \leqslant BA⩽B means B−A⩾0B-A\geqslant0B−A⩾0; the notation includes symmetry. A†A^\daggerA† is the Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse and Fˉ1/2\bar F^{1/2}Fˉ1/2 the positive semidefinite square root of Fˉ⩾0\bar F\geqslant0Fˉ⩾0.

Quadratic matrix inequalities. A symmetric Π∈Sq+r\Pi \in \mathbb S^{q+r}Π∈Sq+r is partitioned into blocks Π11\Pi_{11}Π11​ (q×qq\times qq×q), Π12\Pi_{12}Π12​, Π21\Pi_{21}Π21​, Π22\Pi_{22}Π22​ (r×rr\times rr×r). Its solution sets are

Zr(Π)={Z∈Rr×q:[IqZ]⊤Π[IqZ]⩾0},\mathcal Z_r(\Pi)=\Big\{Z\in\mathbb R^{r\times q}: \begin{bmatrix}I_q\\ Z\end{bmatrix}^\top \Pi \begin{bmatrix}I_q\\ Z\end{bmatrix}\geqslant 0\Big\},Zr​(Π)={Z∈Rr×q:[Iq​Z​]⊤Π[Iq​Z​]⩾0},

and Zr+(Π)\mathcal Z_r^+(\Pi)Zr+​(Π) is defined in the same way with >0>0>0. The generalized Schur complement is Π ∣ Π22=Π11−Π12Π22†Π21\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22}=\Pi_{11}-\Pi_{12}\Pi_{22}^\dagger\Pi_{21}Π∣Π22​=Π11​−Π12​Π22†​Π21​, and the class Πq,r\boldsymbol\Pi_{q,r}Πq,r​ consists of the Π\PiΠ with Π22⩽0\Pi_{22}\leqslant0Π22​⩽0, Π ∣ Π22⩾0\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22}\geqslant0Π∣Π22​⩾0 and ker⁡Π22⊆ker⁡Π12\ker\Pi_{22}\subseteq\ker\Pi_{12}kerΠ22​⊆kerΠ12​.

Petersen's data. Fix C∈Rn×nC\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}C∈Rn×n symmetric, E∈Rn×pE\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}E∈Rn×p, Fˉ∈Rq×q\bar F\in\mathbb R^{q\times q}Fˉ∈Rq×q with Fˉ⩾0\bar F\geqslant0Fˉ⩾0, and G∈Rq×nG\in\mathbb R^{q\times n}G∈Rq×n. The uncertainty set is F={F∈Rp×q:F⊤F⩽Fˉ}\mathcal F=\{F\in\mathbb R^{p\times q}: F^\top F\leqslant\bar F\}F={F∈Rp×q:F⊤F⩽Fˉ}. Display (4.17) defines

M=[−C−E−E⊤0],N=[G⊤FˉG00−I].M=\begin{bmatrix}-C&-E\\-E^\top&0\end{bmatrix},\qquad N=\begin{bmatrix}G^\top\bar FG&0\\0&-I\end{bmatrix}.M=[−C−E⊤​−E0​],N=[G⊤FˉG0​0−I​].

In this proposition the letters q,rq,rq,r of the QMI section become n,pn,pn,p, so Zp(N)⊆Rp×n\mathcal Z_p(N)\subseteq\mathbb R^{p\times n}Zp​(N)⊆Rp×n.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.16 (Petersen's lemma)

(a) The robust strict inequality holds if and only if a single multiplier exists:

(∀F∈F: C+EFG+G⊤F⊤E⊤<0)  ⟺  ∃ λ>0: C+λEE⊤+λ−1G⊤FˉG<0.\big(\forall F\in\mathcal F:\ C+EFG+G^\top F^\top E^\top<0\big)\iff \exists\,\lambda>0:\ C+\lambda EE^\top+\lambda^{-1}G^\top\bar FG<0.(∀F∈F: C+EFG+G⊤F⊤E⊤<0)⟺∃λ>0: C+λEE⊤+λ−1G⊤FˉG<0.

(b) If E≠0E\neq0E=0, Fˉ>0\bar F>0Fˉ>0 and G≠0G\neq0G=0, the same equivalence holds with ⩽0\leqslant 0⩽0 in place of <0<0<0 on both sides.

Milestones

  1. Lemma A.1 (p. 26): A⊤A⩽B⊤BA^\top A\leqslant B^\top BA⊤A⩽B⊤B if and only if A=SBA=SBA=SB for some contraction SSS (S⊤S⩽IS^\top S\leqslant IS⊤S⩽I); the strict version under full column rank of BBB; and S=AB†S=AB^\daggerS=AB† is such a factor.
  2. Set identity (p. 17): {FG:F∈F}={SFˉ1/2G:S⊤S⩽I}={H:H⊤H⩽G⊤FˉG}\{FG: F\in\mathcal F\}=\{S\bar F^{1/2}G: S^\top S\leqslant I\}=\{H: H^\top H\leqslant G^\top\bar FG\}{FG:F∈F}={SFˉ1/2G:S⊤S⩽I}={H:H⊤H⩽G⊤FˉG}.
  3. Reformulation (4.17) (p. 17): the strict robust inequality is Zp(N)⊆Zp+(M)\mathcal Z_p(N)\subseteq\mathcal Z_p^+(M)Zp​(N)⊆Zp+​(M), the non-strict one is Zp(N)⊆Zp(M)\mathcal Z_p(N)\subseteq\mathcal Z_p(M)Zp​(N)⊆Zp​(M), and N∈Πn,pN\in\boldsymbol\Pi_{n,p}N∈Πn,p​ with N22<0N_{22}<0N22​<0.
  4. Theorem 4.10 (strict matrix S-lemma, p. 13): for N∈Πq,rN\in\boldsymbol\Pi_{q,r}N∈Πq,r​ with N22<0N_{22}<0N22​<0, Zr(N)⊆Zr+(M)\mathcal Z_r(N)\subseteq\mathcal Z_r^+(M)Zr​(N)⊆Zr+​(M) iff M−αN>0M-\alpha N>0M−αN>0 for some α⩾0\alpha\geqslant0α⩾0.
  5. Theorem 4.7 (matrix S-lemma, p. 12): for N∈Πq,rN\in\boldsymbol\Pi_{q,r}N∈Πq,r​ with a positive eigenvalue, Zr(N)⊆Zr(M)\mathcal Z_r(N)\subseteq\mathcal Z_r(M)Zr​(N)⊆Zr​(M) iff M−αN⩾0M-\alpha N\geqslant0M−αN⩾0 for some α⩾0\alpha\geqslant0α⩾0.
  6. Schur-complement step (p. 17): for α>0\alpha>0α>0, M−αN>0M-\alpha N>0M−αN>0 iff −C−αG⊤FˉG−α−1EE⊤>0-C-\alpha G^\top\bar FG-\alpha^{-1}EE^\top>0−C−αG⊤FˉG−α−1EE⊤>0, together with the non-strict analogue.
  7. Slater condition (p. 17): Fˉ>0\bar F>0Fˉ>0 and G≠0G\neq0G=0 imply that NNN has a positive eigenvalue.

Significance

The result itself. Petersen's lemma converts a semi-infinite family of matrix inequalities into one inequality that is jointly an LMI after a Schur complement. In controller synthesis this makes robust quadratic stabilization against norm-bounded uncertainty a convex feasibility problem. The derivation in this paper places the lemma inside a general theory: Petersen's lemma becomes the special case of the matrix S-lemmas for the pair (M,N)(M,N)(M,N) of (4.17), and the hypotheses E≠0E\neq0E=0, Fˉ>0\bar F>0Fˉ>0, G≠0G\neq0G=0 of the non-strict version become exactly the Slater condition of Theorem 4.7.

Formalizing it. All results here are proved in the paper. None of them, and no matrix S-lemma, has a machine-checked proof on this platform. The mission produces formal statements and proofs of Petersen's lemma in both forms, of the contraction factorization Lemma A.1, and of the strict and non-strict matrix S-lemmas, which are reused by the data-driven stabilization results of the same paper (Theorems 5.1 and 5.3).

Difficulty

The "if" directions are routine: a multiplier certificate yields the robust inequality by completing a square. The difficulty is the converse, which needs a lossless S-lemma for matrix-valued quadratic forms. The scalar S-lemma rests on the convexity of the joint range of two quadratic forms (Dines' theorem). It does not apply directly to matrix inequalities, and the reduction of Section 4.2 from the matrix case to the vector case is the main obstacle. A second, smaller obstacle is the non-strict case: an equivalence with ⩽0\leqslant 0⩽0 is false without a Slater-type condition, and the formal statement has to carry E≠0E\neq0E=0, Fˉ>0\bar F>0Fˉ>0 and G≠0G\neq0G=0 exactly where the paper does. Petersen's lemma does not follow from a pointwise choice of FFF. The quantifier over F\mathcal FF must first become a QMI in H=FGH=FGH=FG, which is what Lemma A.1 provides.

Formalization scope

Matrices are Mathlib Matrix over ℝ. In the goal the sizes are Fin n, Fin p, Fin q. In the S-lemmas the two block index types are arbitrary finite types, and a partitioned matrix is a matrix over the sum type. X<0X<0X<0 is (−X).PosDef and X⩽0X\leqslant0X⩽0 is (−X).PosSemidef; both include symmetry, as the paper's notation does. F⊤F⩽FˉF^\top F\leqslant\bar FF⊤F⩽Fˉ is (F̄ − FᵀF).PosSemidef. The multiplier λ\lambdaλ is required positive, so λ−1\lambda^{-1}λ−1 is the true inverse. The pseudo-inverse is the unique matrix satisfying the four Penrose conditions, selected by Hilbert's ε, and the square root is Mathlib's CFC.sqrt under the scoped matrix order. "At least one positive eigenvalue" refers to the eigenvalues of the symmetric matrix NNN. "Full column rank" is B.rank = q.

Two choices differ from a literal transcription, and both are disclosed in the items. The strict "Moreover" of Lemma A.1 carries no rank hypothesis, because A⊤A<B⊤BA^\top A<B^\top BA⊤A<B⊤B already forces full column rank. The Schur step includes its non-strict analogue, which the paper uses implicitly ("the proof of statement (b) is analogous").

A trivializing formalization is excluded. The quantifier in the goal ranges over every F∈Rp×qF\in\mathbb R^{p\times q}F∈Rp×q with F⊤F⩽FˉF^\top F\leqslant\bar FF⊤F⩽Fˉ, not over a fixed FFF or over HHH. Part (b)'s extra hypotheses are not added to part (a), and the sanity instance n=p=q=1n=p=q=1n=p=q=1, C=−3C=-3C=−3, E=G=Fˉ=1E=G=\bar F=1E=G=Fˉ=1 satisfies every hypothesis and both multiplier conditions at λ=1\lambda=1λ=1.

A complete development needs: Loewner-order calculus and Schur complements for block matrices; Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse identities; positive semidefinite square roots; the scalar S-lemma (Dines' theorem); and the reduction from matrix to vector QMIs. The S-lemmas and Lemma A.1 are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the auxiliary results of §4.1–4.2 (Lemmas 4.1–4.5, Theorem 4.6) as supporting theorems, are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. J. van Waarde, M. K. Camlibel, J. Eising and H. L. Trentelman, Quadratic matrix inequalities with applications to data-based control, SIAM J. Control Optim., 2023; preprint arXiv:2203.12959v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.12959v3
  • I. R. Petersen, A stabilization algorithm for a class of uncertain linear systems, Systems & Control Letters 8 (1987) 351–357 (reference [35] of the paper).
  • I. R. Petersen and C. V. Hollot, A Riccati equation approach to the stabilization of uncertain linear systems, Automatica 22 (1986) 397–411 (reference [36] of the paper).
  • A. Bisoffi, C. De Persis and P. Tesi, Data-driven control via Petersen's lemma, preprint, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.12175
  • H. J. van Waarde, M. K. Camlibel and M. Mesbahi, From noisy data to feedback controllers: nonconservative design via a matrix S-lemma, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 67 (2022) 162–175 (reference [54] of the paper).
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Control TheoryConvex OptimizationLinear algebra+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Quadratic Matrix Inequalities with Applications to Data-Based Control I: Nonemptiness, Convexity, Boundedness and Interior of QMI Solution SetsResearch Paper

Motivation

Quadratic matrix inequalities (QMIs) describe sets of matrices rather than sets of vectors. They appear whenever an unknown matrix is constrained by a quadratic bound: in robust control, where an uncertain block of a system is only known to lie in a norm ball or a sector, and in data-driven control, where the system matrices (A,B)(A, B)(A,B) of a linear system x(t+1)=Ax(t)+Bu(t)+w(t)x(t+1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + w(t)x(t+1)=Ax(t)+Bu(t)+w(t) are unknown and the measured data, corrupted by noise satisfying a quadratic bound, only pin them down to a set defined by a QMI.

H. J. van Waarde, M. K. Camlibel, J. Eising and H. L. Trentelman (arXiv:2203.12959, SIAM J. Control Optim. 2023) develop a systematic theory of such sets, culminating in matrix versions of the S-lemma and of Finsler's lemma and in data-based stabilization tests. Before any of that can be used, one has to know when the set of matrices satisfying a QMI is nonempty, convex, bounded, has interior points, or contains strict and boundary solutions. Section 3.1 of the paper answers these questions in terms of the blocks of the matrix defining the QMI. This mission formalizes that section, Theorem 3.2, together with the Schur complement identities (3.2)–(3.4) on which it rests.

Setting

All matrices are real. Fix integers q,r≥0q, r \ge 0q,r≥0. For a matrix AAA, the Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse A†A^\daggerA† is the unique matrix XXX with

AXA=A,XAX=X,(AX)⊤=AX,(XA)⊤=XA.AXA = A,\quad XAX = X,\quad (AX)^\top = AX,\quad (XA)^\top = XA.AXA=A,XAX=X,(AX)⊤=AX,(XA)⊤=XA.

Sn\mathbb S^nSn is the set of symmetric n×nn\times nn×n matrices; for A∈SnA \in \mathbb S^nA∈Sn, A≥0A \ge 0A≥0 and A>0A > 0A>0 mean positive semidefinite and positive definite, A≤0A \le 0A≤0, A<0A < 0A<0 the negative versions, and A≥BA \ge BA≥B means A−B≥0A - B \ge 0A−B≥0 (the Loewner order).

A matrix Π∈Sq+r\Pi \in \mathbb S^{q+r}Π∈Sq+r is always partitioned as

Π=[Π11Π12Π21Π22],Π11∈Rq×q, Π22∈Rr×r, Π21=Π12⊤.\Pi = \begin{bmatrix}\Pi_{11} & \Pi_{12}\\ \Pi_{21} & \Pi_{22}\end{bmatrix},\qquad \Pi_{11}\in\mathbb R^{q\times q},\ \Pi_{22}\in\mathbb R^{r\times r},\ \Pi_{21} = \Pi_{12}^\top .Π=[Π11​Π21​​Π12​Π22​​],Π11​∈Rq×q, Π22​∈Rr×r, Π21​=Π12⊤​.

For Z∈Rr×qZ \in \mathbb R^{r\times q}Z∈Rr×q the QMI is

[IqZ]⊤Π[IqZ]≥0,\begin{bmatrix} I_q\\ Z\end{bmatrix}^\top \Pi \begin{bmatrix} I_q\\ Z\end{bmatrix} \ge 0,[Iq​Z​]⊤Π[Iq​Z​]≥0,

with solution set Zr(Π)\mathcal Z_r(\Pi)Zr​(Π). Replacing ≥0\ge 0≥0 by >0> 0>0 or =0= 0=0 gives the sets Zr+(Π)\mathcal Z_r^+(\Pi)Zr+​(Π) of strict solutions and Zr0(Π)\mathcal Z_r^0(\Pi)Zr0​(Π) of solutions of the quadratic matrix equation. The generalized Schur complement is

Π ∣ Π22:=Π11−Π12Π22†Π21,\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22} := \Pi_{11} - \Pi_{12}\Pi_{22}^\dagger\Pi_{21},Π∣Π22​:=Π11​−Π12​Π22†​Π21​,

and the class Πq,r\boldsymbol\Pi_{q,r}Πq,r​ (equation (3.5) of the paper) consists of the Π∈Sq+r\Pi \in \mathbb S^{q+r}Π∈Sq+r with

Π22≤0,Π ∣ Π22≥0,ker⁡Π22⊆ker⁡Π12.\Pi_{22} \le 0,\qquad \Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22} \ge 0,\qquad \ker\Pi_{22} \subseteq \ker\Pi_{12}.Π22​≤0,Π∣Π22​≥0,kerΠ22​⊆kerΠ12​.

In Lean these are pinv, qmiForm, ZSet, ZPlus, ZZero, schur and InPi in the namespace QuadMatIneq.Basic.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2

For Π∈Πq,r\Pi \in \boldsymbol\Pi_{q,r}Π∈Πq,r​:

  • (a) Zr(Π)\mathcal Z_r(\Pi)Zr​(Π) is nonempty and convex;
  • (b) for q≥1q \ge 1q≥1, Zr(Π)\mathcal Z_r(\Pi)Zr​(Π) is bounded if and only if Π22<0\Pi_{22} < 0Π22​<0;
  • (c) Zr(Π)\mathcal Z_r(\Pi)Zr​(Π) has nonempty interior if and only if Π22=0\Pi_{22} = 0Π22​=0 or Π ∣ Π22>0\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22} > 0Π∣Π22​>0;
  • (d) Zr+(Π)≠∅\mathcal Z_r^+(\Pi) \ne \varnothingZr+​(Π)=∅ if and only if Π ∣ Π22>0\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22} > 0Π∣Π22​>0;
  • (e) Zr0(Π)≠∅\mathcal Z_r^0(\Pi) \ne \varnothingZr0​(Π)=∅ if and only if rank⁡Π22≥rank⁡(Π ∣ Π22)\operatorname{rank}\Pi_{22} \ge \operatorname{rank}(\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22})rankΠ22​≥rank(Π∣Π22​).

Milestones

For Π∈Sq+r\Pi \in \mathbb S^{q+r}Π∈Sq+r with Π22≤0\Pi_{22} \le 0Π22​≤0 and ker⁡Π22⊆ker⁡Π12\ker\Pi_{22}\subseteq\ker\Pi_{12}kerΠ22​⊆kerΠ12​:

  • (3.2): ker⁡Π22⊆ker⁡Π12  ⟺  Π12Π22Π22†=Π12\ker\Pi_{22}\subseteq\ker\Pi_{12} \iff \Pi_{12}\Pi_{22}\Pi_{22}^\dagger = \Pi_{12}kerΠ22​⊆kerΠ12​⟺Π12​Π22​Π22†​=Π12​, and
Π=[IqΠ12Π22†0Ir][Π ∣ Π2200Π22][Iq0Π22†Π21Ir];\Pi = \begin{bmatrix} I_q & \Pi_{12}\Pi_{22}^\dagger\\ 0 & I_r\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22} & 0\\ 0 & \Pi_{22}\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix} I_q & 0\\ \Pi_{22}^\dagger\Pi_{21} & I_r\end{bmatrix};Π=[Iq​0​Π12​Π22†​Ir​​][Π∣Π22​0​0Π22​​][Iq​Π22†​Π21​​0Ir​​];
  • (3.3): [IqZ]⊤Π[IqZ]=Π ∣ Π22+(Z+Π22†Π21)⊤Π22(Z+Π22†Π21)\begin{bmatrix} I_q\\ Z\end{bmatrix}^\top \Pi \begin{bmatrix} I_q\\ Z\end{bmatrix} = \Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22} + (Z + \Pi_{22}^\dagger\Pi_{21})^\top\Pi_{22}(Z + \Pi_{22}^\dagger\Pi_{21})[Iq​Z​]⊤Π[Iq​Z​]=Π∣Π22​+(Z+Π22†​Π21​)⊤Π22​(Z+Π22†​Π21​);
  • (3.4): Π ∣ Π22\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22}Π∣Π22​ is the value at Z=−Π22†Π21Z = -\Pi_{22}^\dagger\Pi_{21}Z=−Π22†​Π21​ and dominates the value at every ZZZ in the Loewner order;
  • the claim after (3.4): Zr(Π)≠∅\mathcal Z_r(\Pi) \ne\varnothingZr​(Π)=∅ if and only if Π ∣ Π22≥0\Pi\,|\,\Pi_{22}\ge 0Π∣Π22​≥0;
  • Theorem 3.2(b), (c), (e) as separate items.

Significance

Theorem 3.2 turns geometric questions about a set of matrices into finite checks on the blocks of Π\PiΠ: semidefiniteness, definiteness, vanishing and a rank comparison. In the data-driven setting of the paper, Zr(Π)\mathcal Z_r(\Pi)Zr​(Π) (after transposition) is the set of noise samples, and hence of systems, consistent with the data; part (b) decides when that set is compact, part (c) when it has interior, and (a) guarantees convexity, which is what allows linear matrix inequalities to be used over it. The identities (3.2)–(3.4) are used throughout the rest of the paper, in the matrix S-lemma, the matrix Finsler lemma and the parametrization of solution sets.

The result and its proof appear in the paper; this mission produces machine-checked versions. Mathlib has the Schur complement for invertible blocks and positive semidefiniteness, but no Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse for matrices and nothing on QMI solution sets. To the knowledge of this mission no formalization of these statements exists.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is the classical Schur complement, which requires Π22\Pi_{22}Π22​ to be invertible. Here Π22\Pi_{22}Π22​ is only negative semidefinite, and the singular case is exactly where the interesting behaviour lives: the solution set is unbounded precisely when Π22\Pi_{22}Π22​ has a kernel, and Π22=0\Pi_{22} = 0Π22​=0 gives the whole space. Working with the pseudo-inverse requires the range and kernel identities of Π22†\Pi_{22}^\daggerΠ22†​ for a symmetric matrix and the kernel inclusion ker⁡Π22⊆ker⁡Π12\ker\Pi_{22}\subseteq\ker\Pi_{12}kerΠ22​⊆kerΠ12​ at every step. Part (c) needs a topological argument about the interior in Rr×q\mathbb R^{r\times q}Rr×q, and part (e) needs a factorization of one positive semidefinite matrix through another of possibly different size, which is a rank argument rather than an identity.

Formalization scope

  • Matrices are indexed by arbitrary finite types: ι\iotaι with ∣ι∣=q|\iota| = q∣ι∣=q and κ\kappaκ with ∣κ∣=r|\kappa| = r∣κ∣=r, so Π\PiΠ is a matrix over ι⊕κ\iota \oplus \kappaι⊕κ and its blocks are Mathlib's toBlocks₁₁, …, toBlocks₂₂. Nothing assumes q,r≥1q, r \ge 1q,r≥1 except part (b).
  • A†A^\daggerA† is defined by Classical.epsilon over the four Penrose conditions. Since a solution exists and is unique, this is the pseudo-inverse and not a default value; the total inverse A⁻¹, which is 000 on singular matrices, is not used anywhere.
  • ≥0\ge 0≥0 and >0> 0>0 are Mathlib's PosSemidef and PosDef, which include symmetry, matching the paper's convention that definiteness is only asserted for symmetric matrices. Π∈Sq+r\Pi\in\mathbb S^{q+r}Π∈Sq+r is IsHermitian.
  • Kernel inclusions are written ∀v, Π22v=0⇒Π12v=0\forall v,\ \Pi_{22}v = 0 \Rightarrow \Pi_{12}v = 0∀v, Π22​v=0⇒Π12​v=0.
  • "Bounded" means entrywise bounded, which is equivalent to boundedness in any norm on Rr×q\mathbb R^{r\times q}Rr×q. The interior is taken in Rr×q\mathbb R^{r\times q}Rr×q with its Euclidean topology, not relative to an affine hull.
  • Part (b) carries the hypothesis q≥1q \ge 1q≥1. For q=0q = 0q=0 the space Rr×0\mathbb R^{r\times 0}Rr×0 is a single point, so the solution set is bounded for every Π\PiΠ, including those with singular Π22\Pi_{22}Π22​, and (b) as printed fails. The other parts are stated without it and hold for q=0q = 0q=0 and for r=0r = 0r=0.
  • The trivializing formalizations are excluded: the pseudo-inverse is not a junk inverse, the class Πq,r\boldsymbol\Pi_{q,r}Πq,r​ is inhabited (e.g. Π=diag⁡(1,−1)\Pi = \operatorname{diag}(1, -1)Π=diag(1,−1) and Π=diag⁡(1,0)\Pi = \operatorname{diag}(1, 0)Π=diag(1,0) for q=r=1q = r = 1q=r=1), and the identities (3.2)–(3.4) are stated with the paper's exact block layouts.

Infrastructure needed and reusable beyond this mission: the existence and uniqueness of the matrix pseudo-inverse with its basic identities ((A†)⊤=(A⊤)†(A^\dagger)^\top = (A^\top)^\dagger(A†)⊤=(A⊤)†, AA†AA^\daggerAA† is the orthogonal projector onto the range), and the generalized Schur complement identities. Contributions of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. J. van Waarde, M. K. Camlibel, J. Eising, H. L. Trentelman, Quadratic matrix inequalities with applications to data-based control, SIAM J. Control Optim., 2023; preprint arXiv:2203.12959v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.12959
  • D. S. Bernstein, Matrix Mathematics: Theory, Facts, and Formulas, 2nd ed., Princeton University Press, 2009 (reference [4] of the paper, for eigenvalue and pseudo-inverse facts). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400833344
  • F. Zhang (ed.), The Schur Complement and Its Applications, Springer, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/b105056
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization 2: Under Regularized Reinforcement Learning, Every Strict Nash Equilibrium Is Asymptotically StableResearch Paper

Motivation

In a repeated game, players who do not know the payoff structure can still learn by reinforcement: each player keeps a running score for every action, the cumulative payoff that action would have earned, and plays a mixed strategy that favours actions with high scores. Turning scores into mixed strategies through a regularized best response (maximize score minus a convex penalty) gives a family of dynamics that includes exponential weights and the replicator dynamics (entropic penalty), and also the projection dynamics (quadratic penalty). The same scheme is the continuous-time counterpart of online mirror descent and dual averaging in online optimization.

For the replicator dynamics, the standard folk results of evolutionary game theory say that Nash equilibria are stationary, that limits of interior orbits are Nash equilibria, that Lyapunov stable states are Nash equilibria, and that strict equilibria are asymptotically stable (Weibull 1995; Hofbauer–Sigmund 1998). Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (arXiv:1407.6267v2, Math. Oper. Res. 41(4), 2016) show that all four results survive for the whole family. For steep, decomposable penalties several of them were known (Coucheney–Gaujal–Mertikopoulos 2015). The new part is the nonsteep case, where mixed strategies can hit the boundary of the simplex and the induced dynamics on strategies are no longer well defined.

Setting

A finite game G\mathcal GG has a finite set N\mathcal NN of players. Player kkk has a finite nonempty set Ak\mathcal A_kAk​ of pure strategies and a payoff function uk:∏ℓAℓ→Ru_k:\prod_\ell\mathcal A_\ell\to\mathbb Ruk​:∏ℓ​Aℓ​→R. A mixed profile is x=(xk)k∈X=∏kΔ(Ak)x=(x_k)_k\in\mathcal X=\prod_k\Delta(\mathcal A_k)x=(xk​)k​∈X=∏k​Δ(Ak​), and uk(x)u_k(x)uk​(x) is player kkk's expected payoff when the players randomize independently. The payoff vector is vkα(x)=uk(α;x−k)v_{k\alpha}(x)=u_k(\alpha;x_{-k})vkα​(x)=uk​(α;x−k​), the payoff of pure strategy α\alphaα against x−kx_{-k}x−k​.

A penalty function on a simplex Δ\DeltaΔ (Definition 2.1) is a function h:Δ→Rh:\Delta\to\mathbb Rh:Δ→R that is continuous, smooth on the relative interior of every face, and KKK-strongly convex:

h(tx1+(1−t)x2)≤t h(x1)+(1−t) h(x2)−12Kt(1−t)∥x1−x2∥22.h(tx_1+(1-t)x_2)\le t\,h(x_1)+(1-t)\,h(x_2)-\tfrac12Kt(1-t)\|x_1-x_2\|_2^2 .h(tx1​+(1−t)x2​)≤th(x1​)+(1−t)h(x2​)−21​Kt(1−t)∥x1​−x2​∥22​.

Steepness (gradients blowing up at the boundary) is not required. Its choice map is Q(y)=arg⁡max⁡x∈Δ{⟨y∣x⟩−h(x)}Q(y)=\arg\max_{x\in\Delta}\{\langle y|x\rangle-h(x)\}Q(y)=argmaxx∈Δ​{⟨y∣x⟩−h(x)}. Every player kkk has a penalty function hkh_khk​ with constant KkK_kKk​.

The reinforcement learning dynamics (RL) are

y˙kα=vkα(x),xk=Qk(yk),\dot y_{k\alpha}=v_{k\alpha}(x),\qquad x_k=Q_k(y_k),y˙​kα​=vkα​(x),xk​=Qk​(yk​),

and an orbit is a pair (y(t),x(t))(y(t),x(t))(y(t),x(t)), t≥0t\ge0t≥0, satisfying them. A Nash equilibrium is a profile x∗x^*x∗ with uk(x∗)≥uk(xk;x−k∗)u_k(x^*)\ge u_k(x_k;x^*_{-k})uk​(x∗)≥uk​(xk​;x−k∗​) for every kkk and every mixed xkx_kxk​. It is strict if the inequality is strict for every xk≠xk∗x_k\neq x^*_kxk​=xk∗​.

Because (RL) lives in the space of scores and QQQ is neither injective nor surjective, stability is defined on the trajectories of play (Definition 5.1):

  • x∗x^*x∗ is Lyapunov stable if for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is δ>0\delta>0δ>0 such that every orbit with ∥x(0)−x∗∥<δ\|x(0)-x^*\|<\delta∥x(0)−x∗∥<δ stays within ε\varepsilonε of x∗x^*x∗ forever;
  • it is attracting if every orbit started close enough to x∗x^*x∗ converges to x∗x^*x∗;
  • it is asymptotically stable if it is both;
  • it is stationary if x∗∈im⁡Qx^*\in\operatorname{im}Qx∗∈imQ and every orbit with x(0)=x∗x(0)=x^*x(0)=x∗ stays at x∗x^*x∗.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.2, Part IV

x∗ strict Nash equilibrium of G ⟹ x∗ asymptotically stable under (RL),x^*\ \text{strict Nash equilibrium of }\mathcal G\ \Longrightarrow\ x^*\ \text{asymptotically stable under (RL)},x∗ strict Nash equilibrium of G ⟹ x∗ asymptotically stable under (RL),

for every finite game and every choice of penalty functions hkh_khk​, steep or not.

Milestones (the steps of the proof, pp. 23–24, and the Appendix results it uses)

  • A strict equilibrium is a pure profile x∗=(α1∗,…,αN∗)x^*=(\alpha^*_1,\dots,\alpha^*_N)x∗=(α1∗​,…,αN∗​), and δk=min⁡μ≠αk∗{vkαk∗(x∗)−vkμ(x∗)}>0\delta_k=\min_{\mu\neq\alpha^*_k}\{v_{k\alpha^*_k}(x^*)-v_{k\mu}(x^*)\}>0δk​=minμ=αk∗​​{vkαk∗​​(x∗)−vkμ​(x∗)}>0.
  • Proposition A.1(iii): Qα(y)→0Q_\alpha(y)\to0Qα​(y)→0 whenever yα−yβ→−∞y_\alpha-y_\beta\to-\inftyyα​−yβ​→−∞.
  • Proposition C.3: the Fenchel coupling Fh(p,y)=h(p)+h∗(y)−⟨y∣p⟩F_h(p,y)=h(p)+h^*(y)-\langle y|p\rangleFh​(p,y)=h(p)+h∗(y)−⟨y∣p⟩ satisfies Fh(p,y)≥12K∥Q(y)−p∥2F_h(p,y)\ge\tfrac12K\|Q(y)-p\|^2Fh​(p,y)≥21​K∥Q(y)−p∥2.
  • Proposition C.2(i)–(iii): the Bregman divergence Dh(p,x)=h(p)−h(x)−h′(x;p−x)D_h(p,x)=h(p)-h(x)-h'(x;p-x)Dh​(p,x)=h(p)−h(x)−h′(x;p−x), built from the one-sided derivative, is finite, nonnegative with (C.6), and continuous on Δp={x:supp⁡x⊇supp⁡p}\Delta_p=\{x:\operatorname{supp}x\supseteq\operatorname{supp}p\}Δp​={x:suppx⊇suppp}.
  • (C.11): Fh(p,y)=Dh(p,Q(y))F_h(p,y)=D_h(p,Q(y))Fh​(p,y)=Dh​(p,Q(y)) whenever Q(y)∈ΔpQ(y)\in\Delta_pQ(y)∈Δp​.
  • The monotonicity step: h∗(y)−yα∗=max⁡x{∑μ≠α∗xμzμ−h(x)}h^*(y)-y_{\alpha^*}=\max_{x}\{\sum_{\mu\ne\alpha^*}x_\mu z_\mu-h(x)\}h∗(y)−yα∗​=maxx​{∑μ=α∗​xμ​zμ​−h(x)} is nondecreasing in the relative scores zμ=yμ−yα∗z_\mu=y_\mu-y_{\alpha^*}zμ​=yμ​−yα∗​.

Companions

Theorem 5.2, Parts I–III (stationary   ⟺  \iff⟺ Nash and in im⁡Q\operatorname{im}QimQ; limits of orbits and Lyapunov stable states are Nash), Proposition 5.3, Proposition 3.1 (global existence and uniqueness of orbits) and Proposition A.1(i)–(ii).

Significance

Theorem 5.2 says that, as far as the qualitative long-run behaviour is concerned, the whole class of regularized reinforcement dynamics behaves like the replicator dynamics. Part IV is the positive half: strict equilibria are robust attractors of learning. This is used to justify equilibrium selection by learning, and Proposition 5.4 (not part of this mission) builds the rates of convergence, including convergence in finite time for nonsteep penalties, on top of it.

The result is proved in the paper; none of it is formalized. A Lean development would provide a reusable layer of game-theoretic learning dynamics: penalty functions without steepness, choice maps as regularized argmax, the Fenchel coupling and the one-sided Bregman divergence on the simplex. Two companion missions on the same paper use the same layer, for the extinction of dominated strategies and for time averages in zero-sum games. As far as is known, the stability theory of Section 5 has no machine-checked proof even for the replicator dynamics.

Difficulty

The obvious argument would be a Lyapunov argument for the induced dynamics on X\mathcal XX, as for the replicator equation. For nonsteep penalties these dynamics are not well defined: orbits reach the boundary and QQQ is not invertible there. The proof works in the dual space instead, where the natural Lyapunov candidate is the Fenchel coupling Fh(x∗,y)F_h(x^*,y)Fh​(x∗,y). The coupling is not differentiable along the orbit in the usual sense, and its sublevel sets in score space must be related to genuine neighbourhoods of x∗x^*x∗ in X\mathcal XX. That needs the Bregman divergence with one-sided derivatives at boundary points and its continuity across faces of different dimension (Proposition C.2(iii)). A second obstacle is that the coupling does not strictly decrease when the maximizer sits at the vertex. The page states a strict inequality there, which fails for nonsteep penalties, so the argument has to be run with the weak inequality and a first-exit-time argument.

Formalization scope

  • The game uses the published agt_games vocabulary: AGT.IsLottery, AGT.IsMixedProfile, AGT.expectedPayoff, and AGT.IsMixedNash for (5.1). Players form a Fintype ι, and actions are A k with Fintype and DecidableEq.
  • Penalty functions are IsPenalty h K, Definition 2.1 with the Euclidean norm in (2.5) and C∞C^\inftyC∞ smoothness along curves inside the relative interiors of faces. There is no steepness.
  • The choice map is the predicate IsChoice h y x, never a chosen argmax.
  • Orbits are IsRLOrbit u h y x, the differential form (3.1) with one-sided derivatives at t=0t=0t=0. Statements quantify over orbits and never construct one.
  • Neighbourhoods of x∗x^*x∗ in X\mathcal XX are balls of the sup metric on ∏kRAk\prod_k\mathbb R^{\mathcal A_k}∏k​RAk​, and Definition 5.1 is stated in ε\varepsilonε–δ\deltaδ form.
  • Strict equilibria are not assumed pure; purity is a milestone.
  • The one-sided derivative (C.3) is a limit predicate with a real value, so the Bregman divergence's value +∞+\infty+∞ is never represented by a junk number.
  • Proposition 3.1 adds that every Ak\mathcal A_kAk​ is nonempty. This is implicit in "finite game", and without it no orbit exists.
  • The monotonicity step is stated with ≤\le≤, not the printed <<<.

Trivializing encodings are excluded. Q is not a chosen maximizer that could be chosen badly. Orbit hypotheses are not vacuous: a verification file exhibits an orbit and a strict equilibrium together with a penalty function. Steepness is not added to the hypotheses. The conclusion is genuine convergence x(t)→x∗x(t)\to x^*x(t)→x∗ together with Lyapunov stability, not a lim inf⁡\liminfliminf or a stability-only statement. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. The conjugate and Bregman layer (Appendix C), the regularized-argmax lemmas (Appendix A) and the well-posedness of (RL) (Proposition 3.1) are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • P. Mertikopoulos and W. H. Sandholm, Learning in games via reinforcement and regularization, Math. Oper. Res. 41(4), 2016. Cited as arXiv:1407.6267v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.6267v2
  • P. Coucheney, B. Gaujal and P. Mertikopoulos, Penalty-regulated dynamics and robust learning procedures in games, Math. Oper. Res. 40(3), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0687
  • J. W. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press, 1995. https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262731218/
  • J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179
  • K. C. Kiwiel, Free-steering relaxation methods for problems with strictly convex costs and linear constraints, Math. Oper. Res. 22(2), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.2.326
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Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization 3: In 2-Player Zero-Sum Games with an Interior Equilibrium, Time-Averaged Play Converges to the Nash SetResearch Paper

Motivation

Learning dynamics in games describe how players who repeatedly interact adjust their strategies from observed payoffs. A central question is whether such dynamics lead to Nash equilibrium. For the replicator dynamics, the canonical model of evolutionary game theory, the answer is negative in general: in Matching Pennies and in generic zero-sum games with a unique interior equilibrium, replicator trajectories cycle forever. A classical positive result survives: if a replicator trajectory of a 2-player game stays a bounded distance away from the boundary of the strategy space, its time average converges to the Nash set (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Ch. 7).

Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (arXiv:1407.6267v2; Math. Oper. Res. 41(4), 2016) study a broad family of continuous-time learning dynamics, regularized reinforcement learning: each player aggregates payoffs into scores and plays the mixed strategy that maximizes score minus a strongly convex penalty function. The family contains the replicator dynamics (entropic penalty) and the projection dynamics (quadratic penalty). For non-steep penalties, trajectories can enter and leave the boundary of the strategy space infinitely often, so the classical "stay away from the boundary" criterion is no longer natural. Section 6 of the paper replaces it with a condition on scores and derives convergence of time averages in zero-sum games with an interior equilibrium.

Setting

A 2-player finite game G\mathcal GG has players k=1,2k = 1, 2k=1,2, finite pure strategy sets Ak\mathcal A_kAk​, and payoff functions uku_kuk​ on pure profiles. A mixed strategy xkx_kxk​ is a probability vector on Ak\mathcal A_kAk​; X\mathcal XX is the set of mixed profiles x=(x1,x2)x = (x_1, x_2)x=(x1​,x2​) and uk(x)u_k(x)uk​(x) the expected payoff (2.1). The payoff vector of player kkk is vkα(x)=uk(α;x−k)v_{k\alpha}(x) = u_k(\alpha; x_{-k})vkα​(x)=uk​(α;x−k​), the payoff of the pure strategy α\alphaα against the opponent's mixed strategy (2.2). A profile x∗x^*x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if no player gains by a unilateral deviation to another mixed strategy; it is interior if xkα∗>0x^*_{k\alpha} > 0xkα∗​>0 for every kkk and α\alphaα. The game is zero-sum if u1=−u2u_1 = -u_2u1​=−u2​.

On the simplex Δ\DeltaΔ of a finite set, a penalty function hhh (Definition 2.1) is continuous on Δ\DeltaΔ, smooth on the relative interior of every face, and KKK-strongly convex for some K>0K > 0K>0:

h(tx1+(1−t)x2)≤th(x1)+(1−t)h(x2)−12Kt(1−t)∥x1−x2∥2.h(tx_1 + (1-t)x_2) \le t h(x_1) + (1-t) h(x_2) - \tfrac12 K t(1-t)\|x_1 - x_2\|^2 .h(tx1​+(1−t)x2​)≤th(x1​)+(1−t)h(x2​)−21​Kt(1−t)∥x1​−x2​∥2.

No steepness is required. The choice map is Q(y)=arg⁡max⁡x∈Δ{⟨y∣x⟩−h(x)}Q(y) = \arg\max_{x\in\Delta}\{\langle y|x\rangle - h(x)\}Q(y)=argmaxx∈Δ​{⟨y∣x⟩−h(x)} (Definition 2.2), the convex conjugate is h∗(y)=max⁡x∈Δ{⟨y∣x⟩−h(x)}h^*(y) = \max_{x\in\Delta}\{\langle y|x\rangle - h(x)\}h∗(y)=maxx∈Δ​{⟨y∣x⟩−h(x)} (C.1), and the Fenchel coupling is Fh(p,y)=h(p)+h∗(y)−⟨y∣p⟩F_h(p, y) = h(p) + h^*(y) - \langle y|p\rangleFh​(p,y)=h(p)+h∗(y)−⟨y∣p⟩ (C.10).

Each player kkk has its own penalty function hkh_khk​. An orbit of (RL) is a pair of trajectories (y(t),x(t))(y(t), x(t))(y(t),x(t)), t≥0t \ge 0t≥0, of score vectors and mixed profiles with

y˙k(t)=vk(x(t)),xk(t)=Qk(yk(t)).\dot y_k(t) = v_k(x(t)), \qquad x_k(t) = Q_k(y_k(t)) .y˙​k​(t)=vk​(x(t)),xk​(t)=Qk​(yk​(t)).

The time average of the orbit is xˉ(t)=t−1∫0tx(s) ds\bar x(t) = t^{-1}\int_0^t x(s)\,dsxˉ(t)=t−1∫0t​x(s)ds.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6.2 (p. 26)

If G\mathcal GG is a 2-player zero-sum game with an interior Nash equilibrium, then for every orbit of (RL),

dist⁡(xˉ(t),NE(G))→t→∞0.\operatorname{dist}\big(\bar x(t), \mathrm{NE}(\mathcal G)\big) \xrightarrow[t\to\infty]{} 0 .dist(xˉ(t),NE(G))t→∞​0.

The statement fixes no rate and no particular penalty function: it holds for every choice of h1,h2h_1, h_2h1​,h2​.

Milestones

  1. Proposition C.1 (p. 33): QQQ is Lipschitz and Q=dh∗Q = dh^*Q=dh∗.
  2. Lemma C.6 (p. 36): along (RL), ddtFhk(pk,yk(t))=⟨vk(x(t))∣xk(t)−pk⟩\frac{d}{dt}F_{h_k}(p_k, y_k(t)) = \langle v_k(x(t)) | x_k(t) - p_k\rangledtd​Fhk​​(pk​,yk​(t))=⟨vk​(x(t))∣xk​(t)−pk​⟩.
  3. (6.5) (p. 26): in the goal's setting, Fh(x∗,y(t))=∑kFhk(xk∗,yk(t))F_h(x^*, y(t)) = \sum_k F_{h_k}(x_k^*, y_k(t))Fh​(x∗,y(t))=∑k​Fhk​​(xk∗​,yk​(t)) is constant.
  4. Proposition A.1(iii) (p. 31): Qα(y)→0Q_\alpha(y) \to 0Qα​(y)→0 when yα−yβ→−∞y_\alpha - y_\beta \to -\inftyyα​−yβ​→−∞.
  5. Proposition C.5 (pp. 35–36): for interior ppp, bounded Fh(p,yj)F_h(p, y_j)Fh​(p,yj​) forces bounded score differences.
  6. Theorem 6.1 (p. 25): in any 2-player game, bounded score differences imply convergence of xˉ(t)\bar x(t)xˉ(t) to the Nash set.

Significance

The result. Proposition 6.2 shows that the time-average convergence known for the replicator dynamics in zero-sum games is a property of the whole class of regularized reinforcement learning schemes, including those whose trajectories hit the boundary of the strategy space infinitely often, such as the projection dynamics. Time-averaged play of no-regret-type dynamics in zero-sum games is the continuous-time counterpart of the standard argument that averaged learning computes minimax strategies. Theorem 6.1 isolates the mechanism for general 2-player games: bounded score differences suffice, with no zero-sum assumption.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none has a machine-checked proof. A complete formalization produces reusable components: differentiability of the conjugate of a strongly convex function on the simplex (a Danskin-type statement), the Fenchel-coupling identity along the dynamics, and a conservation law for zero-sum games. These are the building blocks of many analyses of mirror-descent and follow-the-regularized-leader dynamics.

Difficulty

The first idea, comparing x(t)x(t)x(t) itself with the equilibrium, fails: x(t)x(t)x(t) need not converge, and for non-steep penalties it does not stay in the interior, so the Kullback–Leibler argument used for the replicator dynamics is unavailable. The conserved quantity is a function of the scores y(t)y(t)y(t), not of x(t)x(t)x(t), and turning its boundedness into control of score differences requires the asymptotic behaviour of the choice map when some scores diverge. The second difficulty is analytic: hhh is not differentiable at the boundary of Δ\DeltaΔ, yet h∗h^*h∗ must be differentiable everywhere on the score space, with derivative QQQ, for the chain rule along (RL) to apply. Finally, the passage from score differences to the time average uses that vkv_kvk​ is linear in the single opponent's strategy, which is specific to two players.

Formalization scope

  • Game. Players are Fin 2, strategy types A k are finite, payoffs are real functions on pure profiles; mixed profiles, expected payoffs and mixed Nash equilibria come from the published agt_games vocabulary (AGT.IsMixedNash). Zero-sum is u0(s)+u1(s)=0u_0(s) + u_1(s) = 0u0​(s)+u1​(s)=0 for every pure profile; interiority is xkα∗>0x^*_{k\alpha} > 0xkα∗​>0.
  • Penalty functions. IsPenalty h K is Definition 2.1 with strong convexity in the Euclidean norm; since KKK is existential the class does not depend on the norm. Steepness is not assumed. Each player has its own hkh_khk​.
  • Choice map and orbits. x=Q(y)x = Q(y)x=Q(y) is the predicate IsChoice h y x (maximizer of ⟨y∣x⟩−h(x)\langle y|x\rangle - h(x)⟨y∣x⟩−h(x) over Δ\DeltaΔ), never a chosen argmax. An orbit is IsRLOrbit u h y x: for t≥0t \ge 0t≥0, xk(t)=Qk(yk(t))x_k(t) = Q_k(y_k(t))xk​(t)=Qk​(yk​(t)) and y˙kα(t)=vkα(x(t))\dot y_{k\alpha}(t) = v_{k\alpha}(x(t))y˙​kα​(t)=vkα​(x(t)), a right derivative at t=0t = 0t=0. This differential form is equivalent to the integral form (RL) because xxx is continuous along an orbit.
  • Time average and convergence. xˉ(t)\bar x(t)xˉ(t) is defined coordinatewise with the interval integral; only t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ is used. Convergence to the Nash set is Metric.infDist →0\to 0→0 in the sup metric on profiles. For Theorem 6.1, which has no equilibrium among its hypotheses, the conclusion also asserts that the Nash set is nonempty, because the distance to the empty set is 000 in Lean.
  • Ruled out. A chosen argmax for QQQ, orbits that are vacuous, steepness added to the penalty, convergence of a subsequence or a liminf in place of the limit, and a Nash set that may be empty are all excluded by the encoding. A sorry-free check exhibits a game, penalty functions and an orbit satisfying all hypotheses of the goal, and verifies that Matching Pennies has the interior equilibrium ((12,12),(12,12))((\tfrac12,\tfrac12),(\tfrac12,\tfrac12))((21​,21​),(21​,21​)).
  • Not included. Theorem 6.3 (chain transitivity under the best-response dynamics) depends on the theory of perturbed solutions of differential inclusions, which is not available. Proposition 6.4 is omitted (see the mission notes).

Contributions are welcome on any milestone; Proposition C.1 and Proposition A.1(iii) are self-contained convex-analysis statements about a single penalty function.

Selected references

  • P. Mertikopoulos and W. H. Sandholm, Learning in games via reinforcement and regularization, Mathematics of Operations Research 41(4), 2016. Preprint arXiv:1407.6267v2 (cited version). https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.6267
  • J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179
  • J. Hofbauer, S. Sorin and Y. Viossat, Time average replicator and best-reply dynamics, Mathematics of Operations Research 34(2), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1080.0359
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
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Projected Reflected Gradient Methods for Monotone Variational Inequalities 2: Under Strong Monotonicity the Projected Reflected Gradient Method Converges R-LinearlyResearch Paper

Why projection methods for variational inequalities

A variational inequality asks for a point of a convex set at which a vector field points "inward" against every feasible direction. It is the common form of convex minimization (with FFF a gradient), of saddle-point problems (with FFF the monotone operator of a convex–concave function), of Nash equilibria of convex games, of complementarity problems and of traffic and economic equilibria. Iterative methods that use only evaluations of FFF and projections onto the feasible set are the methods of choice when the problem is large, because each step is cheap.

The classical such method, the projected gradient iteration xn+1=PC(xn−λF(xn))x_{n+1}=P_C(x_n-\lambda F(x_n))xn+1​=PC​(xn​−λF(xn​)), does not converge for merely monotone FFF. Korpelevich's extragradient method (1976) does, at the price of two projections and two evaluations of FFF per step, and it is known to converge R-linearly under strong monotonicity (Tseng 1995, reference [19] of the paper). Popov (1980), Tseng (2000) and Censor–Gibali–Reich (2011) reduced the number of projections or evaluations. Yu. Malitsky's projected reflected gradient method (arXiv:1502.04968, SIAM J. Optim. 25(1), 2015, doi:10.1137/14097238X) uses one projection and one evaluation of FFF per step, evaluating FFF at the reflected point 2xn−xn−12x_n-x_{n-1}2xn​−xn−1​ instead of at xnx_nxn​. This mission formalizes the paper's second main result: under strong monotonicity the method keeps the R-linear rate of the extragradient method.

Setting

Let HHH be a real Hilbert space with inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ and norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥, let C⊆HC\subseteq HC⊆H be closed and convex, and let F:H→HF:H\to HF:H→H. The metric projection PC(z)P_C(z)PC​(z) is the unique point of CCC nearest to zzz. The variational inequality (1.1) is

find x∗∈C  such that  ⟨F(x∗), x−x∗⟩ ≥ 0for all x∈C,\text{find } x^*\in C\ \text{ such that }\ \langle F(x^*),\,x-x^*\rangle\ \ge\ 0\quad\text{for all } x\in C,find x∗∈C  such that  ⟨F(x∗),x−x∗⟩ ≥ 0for all x∈C,

with solution set SSS. The paper's standing assumptions for this result are

  • (C1) S≠∅S\neq\emptysetS=∅;
  • (C2*) FFF is strongly monotone with modulus m>0m>0m>0: ⟨F(x)−F(y),x−y⟩≥m∥x−y∥2\langle F(x)-F(y),x-y\rangle\ge m\|x-y\|^2⟨F(x)−F(y),x−y⟩≥m∥x−y∥2 for all x,y∈Hx,y\in Hx,y∈H;
  • (C3) FFF is Lipschitz with constant L>0L>0L>0: ∥F(x)−F(y)∥≤L∥x−y∥\|F(x)-F(y)\|\le L\|x-y\|∥F(x)−F(y)∥≤L∥x−y∥ for all x,y∈Hx,y\in Hx,y∈H.

Algorithm 3.1 chooses x0=y0∈Hx_0=y_0\in Hx0​=y0​∈H and a step λ∈(0,(2−1)/L)\lambda\in\big(0,(\sqrt2-1)/L\big)λ∈(0,(2​−1)/L) and iterates

xn+1=PC(xn−λF(yn)),yn+1=2xn+1−xn.x_{n+1}=P_C\big(x_n-\lambda F(y_n)\big),\qquad y_{n+1}=2x_{n+1}-x_n .xn+1​=PC​(xn​−λF(yn​)),yn+1​=2xn+1​−xn​.

The Lean development names these objects proj, solSet, IsStronglyMonotoneMap, IsLipschitzMap and IsPRGRun in the namespace ProjReflGrad.Linear.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 6)

Under (C1), (C2*), (C3) and 0<λ<(2−1)/L0<\lambda<(\sqrt2-1)/L0<λ<(2​−1)/L, every run of Algorithm 3.1 converges to the solution zzz of (1.1) at least R-linearly:

∃ γ∈(0,1), M>0:∥xn−z∥ ≤ Mγnfor all n≥0.\exists\,\gamma\in(0,1),\ M>0:\qquad \|x_n-z\|\ \le\ M\gamma^n\quad\text{for all } n\ge0 .∃γ∈(0,1), M>0:∥xn​−z∥ ≤ Mγnfor all n≥0.

The goal fixes neither γ\gammaγ nor MMM; the proof produces them from λ\lambdaλ, LLL and mmm, but the theorem asserts only the shape of the rate.

Milestones

In attack order:

  1. Uniqueness (p. 6): under (C2*) the solution set has at most one point.
  2. The identity for ∥yn−z∥2\|y_n-z\|^2∥yn​−z∥2 (p. 6, via Lemma 2.5): ∥yn−z∥2=2∥xn−z∥2−∥xn−1−z∥2+2∥xn−xn−1∥2≥2∥xn−z∥2−∥xn−1−z∥2\|y_n-z\|^2=2\|x_n-z\|^2-\|x_{n-1}-z\|^2+2\|x_n-x_{n-1}\|^2\ge2\|x_n-z\|^2-\|x_{n-1}-z\|^2∥yn​−z∥2=2∥xn​−z∥2−∥xn−1​−z∥2+2∥xn​−xn−1​∥2≥2∥xn​−z∥2−∥xn−1​−z∥2.
  3. (3.8) (p. 7): the strong-monotonicity estimate at yny_nyn​ with a free modulus m1∈(0,m]m_1\in(0,m]m1​∈(0,m].
  4. (3.2) (p. 4): ∥xn+1−z∥2≤∥xn−z∥2−∥xn+1−xn∥2−2λ⟨F(yn),xn+1−z⟩\|x_{n+1}-z\|^2\le\|x_n-z\|^2-\|x_{n+1}-x_n\|^2-2\lambda\langle F(y_n),x_{n+1}-z\rangle∥xn+1​−z∥2≤∥xn​−z∥2−∥xn+1​−xn​∥2−2λ⟨F(yn​),xn+1​−z⟩.
  5. (3.4) (p. 5): 2λ⟨F(yn−1),yn−xn+1⟩≤∥xn+1−xn∥2−∥xn−yn∥2−∥xn+1−yn∥22\lambda\langle F(y_{n-1}),y_n-x_{n+1}\rangle\le\|x_{n+1}-x_n\|^2-\|x_n-y_n\|^2-\|x_{n+1}-y_n\|^22λ⟨F(yn−1​),yn​−xn+1​⟩≤∥xn+1​−xn​∥2−∥xn​−yn​∥2−∥xn+1​−yn​∥2, n≥2n\ge2n≥2.
  6. (3.5) (p. 5): the Lipschitz estimate of 2λ⟨F(yn)−F(yn−1),yn−xn+1⟩2\lambda\langle F(y_n)-F(y_{n-1}),y_n-x_{n+1}\rangle2λ⟨F(yn​)−F(yn−1​),yn​−xn+1​⟩.
  7. (3.9) (p. 7): the two-step recursion an+1+bn+1≤(1−2α)an+αan−1+βbna_{n+1}+b_{n+1}\le(1-2\alpha)a_n+\alpha a_{n-1}+\beta b_nan+1​+bn+1​≤(1−2α)an​+αan−1​+βbn​ in the iterates, with β=max⁡{λL/(1−2λL),12}\beta=\max\{\lambda L/(1-\sqrt2\lambda L),\tfrac12\}β=max{λL/(1−2​λL),21​}.
  8. Lemma 2.8 (p. 3): a nonnegative pair of sequences satisfying that recursion for all α∈(0,α0)\alpha\in(0,\alpha_0)α∈(0,α0​) has an≤γnMa_n\le\gamma^nMan​≤γnM.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.3 shows that halving the per-step cost of the extragradient method does not cost the linear rate under strong monotonicity. For strongly monotone problems (strongly convex minimization, strongly convex–strongly concave saddle points, strictly monotone games with a quadratic margin) the method therefore reaches accuracy ε\varepsilonε in O(log⁡(1/ε))O(\log(1/\varepsilon))O(log(1/ε)) iterations with one projection each, which matters when projecting onto CCC dominates the cost. The two-step recursion (3.9) and Lemma 2.8 are also a reusable template: the same mechanism gives linear rates for other methods with a memory of one past iterate.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. No machine-checked proof of it, or of its lemmas, is on the platform. A formal proof needs the projection inequality in a general real Hilbert space, a careful account of the reflected iterate, and a rigorous version of Lemma 2.8, whose printed proof leaves the range of nnn and the positivity of MMM implicit. The deliverable is a checked R-linear rate for a one-projection method in infinite dimension.

Difficulty

The natural first attempt, a contraction ∥xn+1−z∥≤q∥xn−z∥\|x_{n+1}-z\|\le q\|x_n-z\|∥xn+1​−z∥≤q∥xn​−z∥ (Q-linear convergence), is not what the paper proves and is not available: the reflected point yny_nyn​ depends on xn−1x_{n-1}xn−1​, so the error at step n+1n+1n+1 is controlled only by the errors at steps nnn and n−1n-1n−1, together with auxiliary terms ∥xn−yn−1∥2\|x_n-y_{n-1}\|^2∥xn​−yn−1​∥2 and ⟨F(z),xn−1−z⟩\langle F(z),x_{n-1}-z\rangle⟨F(z),xn−1​−z⟩. Strong monotonicity is applied at yny_nyn​, not at xnx_nxn​, and ∥yn−z∥2\|y_n-z\|^2∥yn​−z∥2 can be smaller than ∥xn−z∥2\|x_n-z\|^2∥xn​−z∥2; the lower bound 2∥xn−z∥2−∥xn−1−z∥22\|x_n-z\|^2-\|x_{n-1}-z\|^22∥xn​−z∥2−∥xn−1​−z∥2 may even be negative. The step range λ<(2−1)/L\lambda<(\sqrt2-1)/Lλ<(2​−1)/L is exactly what keeps the coefficients of the Lipschitz error terms below the gain from the projection inequality, and the resulting two-step recursion needs Lemma 2.8, with its choice of γ\gammaγ and δ\deltaδ, to yield a geometric bound.

Formalization scope

  • HHH is a general real inner product space, complete where a projection is used ([CompleteSpace H]); it is never specialized to Rn\mathbb R^nRn.
  • PCP_CPC​ is defined by choice as a nearest point, returning its argument when none exists; every statement using it assumes CCC closed, convex and nonempty (through z∈Cz\in Cz∈C, C≠∅C\neq\emptysetC=∅, or (C1)), so the junk value is never reached.
  • Runs of Algorithm 3.1 are infinite sequences without the stopping rule; a stopped run continues as a constant sequence. x0x_0x0​ is any point of HHH, as in the paper, so statements that need xn−1∈Cx_{n-1}\in Cxn−1​∈C are stated for n≥2n\ge2n≥2.
  • (C2*) and (C3) are required on all of HHH with real constants m>0m>0m>0, L>0L>0L>0 (not LipschitzWith, whose R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​ constant admits L=0L=0L=0). (C1) stays in the goal: it is the paper's assumption and its only source of C≠∅C\neq\emptysetC=∅.
  • R-linear convergence means domination by MγnM\gamma^nMγn with 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1 and M>0M>0M>0; a goal allowing γ=1\gamma=1γ=1, γ=0\gamma=0γ=0 or only an O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) bound would be a different and weaker (or trivially false) statement and is ruled out. The goal does not mention the auxiliary sequences an,bna_n,b_nan​,bn​, the constants β,m1,α0\beta,m_1,\alpha_0β,m1​,α0​, or Lemma 2.8.
  • Departures from the page are recorded in each item's Formalization Note: the ranges n≥1n\ge1n≥1/n≥2n\ge2n≥2, the range n≥1n\ge1n≥1 of (2.1) in Lemma 2.8, the proof's "Lemma 2.1" that means Lemma 2.8, and "m1m_1m1​ arbitrary in (0,m)(0,m)(0,m)" where the argument uses (0,m](0,m](0,m].
  • The projection theorem (existence and characterization of the nearest point) is the published Proved theorem VectorSpaceOpt.min_distance_convex_set, included as a reference. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order; Lemma 2.8 and the identity of milestone 2 are self-contained.

Selected references

  • Yu. Malitsky, Projected Reflected Gradient Methods for Monotone Variational Inequalities, SIAM J. Optim. 25(1), 2015. arXiv:1502.04968v1. https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.04968 , https://doi.org/10.1137/14097238X
  • G. M. Korpelevich, The extragradient method for finding saddle points and other problems, Ekonomika i Matematicheskie Metody 12, 747–756, 1976.
  • P. Tseng, On linear convergence of iterative methods for the variational inequality problem, J. Comput. Appl. Math. 60, 237–252, 1995.
  • L. D. Popov, A modification of the Arrow–Hurwicz method for finding saddle points, Math. Notes 28, 845–848, 1980.
  • Y. Censor, A. Gibali, S. Reich, The subgradient extragradient method for solving variational inequalities in Hilbert space, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 148, 318–335, 2011.
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Projected Reflected Gradient Methods for Monotone Variational Inequalities 1: The Projected Reflected Gradient Method Converges Weakly to a SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in optimization, game theory and mechanics come down to a variational inequality: find a point of a convex set at which a given vector field points "inward" against every feasible direction. Constrained convex minimization (where the field is a gradient), saddle-point problems (where it is the gradient of a convex–concave function with one sign flipped), Nash equilibria of convex games and complementarity problems are all of this form. In large-scale and infinite-dimensional settings the methods of choice are projection methods, which use only evaluations of the field and projections onto the feasible set.

The plain projected gradient iteration xn+1=PC(xn−λF(xn))x_{n+1}=P_C(x_n-\lambda F(x_n))xn+1​=PC​(xn​−λF(xn​)) does not converge for merely monotone fields: on a rotation field in the plane it spirals outward for every step size. Korpelevich's extragradient method (1976) repairs this with two field evaluations and two projections per iteration. Later methods (Tseng's forward–backward–forward method, 2000; the subgradient extragradient method of Censor, Gibali and Reich, 2011) reduce the number of projections to one, but still need two evaluations of the field.

Yu. Malitsky's paper (arXiv:1502.04968, SIAM J. Optim. 25(1), 2015, doi:10.1137/14097238X) introduces the projected reflected gradient method, which uses one projection and one field evaluation per iteration, evaluated at a "reflected" point, and proves that it converges weakly under the same assumptions as the extragradient method. This mission formalizes that convergence theorem, Theorem 3.2 of the paper.

Setting

Let HHH be a real Hilbert space with inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ and norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥. Let C⊆HC\subseteq HC⊆H be closed and convex, and let F:H→HF:H\to HF:H→H be a mapping. For z∈Hz\in Hz∈H, the metric projection PC(z)P_C(z)PC​(z) is the unique point of CCC nearest to zzz (it exists when CCC is nonempty). The variational inequality (1.1) asks for x∗∈Cx^*\in Cx∗∈C with

⟨F(x∗), x−x∗⟩ ≥ 0for all x∈C,\langle F(x^*),\,x-x^*\rangle\ \ge\ 0\qquad\text{for all }x\in C,⟨F(x∗),x−x∗⟩ ≥ 0for all x∈C,

and SSS denotes its solution set. The standing assumptions are:

  • (C1) SSS is nonempty;
  • (C2) FFF is monotone: ⟨F(x)−F(y),x−y⟩≥0\langle F(x)-F(y),x-y\rangle\ge0⟨F(x)−F(y),x−y⟩≥0 for all x,y∈Hx,y\in Hx,y∈H;
  • (C3) FFF is Lipschitz continuous with a constant L>0L>0L>0: ∥F(x)−F(y)∥≤L∥x−y∥\|F(x)-F(y)\|\le L\|x-y\|∥F(x)−F(y)∥≤L∥x−y∥ for all x,y∈Hx,y\in Hx,y∈H.

Algorithm 3.1 (projected reflected gradient method). Fix a step size λ∈(0,(2−1)/L)\lambda\in\big(0,(\sqrt2-1)/L\big)λ∈(0,(2​−1)/L) and a starting point x0=y0∈Hx_0=y_0\in Hx0​=y0​∈H, and iterate

xn+1=PC(xn−λF(yn)),yn+1=2xn+1−xn.x_{n+1}=P_C\big(x_n-\lambda F(y_n)\big),\qquad y_{n+1}=2x_{n+1}-x_n .xn+1​=PC​(xn​−λF(yn​)),yn+1​=2xn+1​−xn​.

The point yn+1y_{n+1}yn+1​ is the reflection of xnx_nxn​ through xn+1x_{n+1}xn+1​. A sequence (xn)(x_n)(xn​) converges weakly to x∗x^*x∗, written xn⇀x∗x_n\rightharpoonup x^*xn​⇀x∗, if ⟨xn,v⟩→⟨x∗,v⟩\langle x_n,v\rangle\to\langle x^*,v\rangle⟨xn​,v⟩→⟨x∗,v⟩ for every v∈Hv\in Hv∈H.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (p. 5)

Under (C1)–(C3), for 0<λ<(2−1)/L0<\lambda<(\sqrt2-1)/L0<λ<(2​−1)/L and every run of Algorithm 3.1 there is x∗∈Sx^*\in Sx∗∈S with

xn⇀x∗.x_n\rightharpoonup x^* .xn​⇀x∗.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. Lemma 2.1 (i), p. 3: ⟨PMx−x, y−PMx⟩≥0\langle P_Mx-x,\,y-P_Mx\rangle\ge0⟨PM​x−x,y−PM​x⟩≥0 for y∈My\in My∈M (already proved on the platform, referenced).
  2. Lemma 2.1 (ii), p. 3: ∥PMx−y∥2≤∥x−y∥2−∥x−PMx∥2\|P_Mx-y\|^2\le\|x-y\|^2-\|x-P_Mx\|^2∥PM​x−y∥2≤∥x−y∥2−∥x−PM​x∥2 for y∈My\in My∈M.
  3. Lemma 3.1, p. 4: for z∈Sz\in Sz∈S and n≥2n\ge2n≥2,
∥xn+1−z∥2≤∥xn−z∥2−(1−λL(1+2))∥xn−xn−1∥2+λL∥xn−yn−1∥2−(1−2λL)∥xn+1−yn∥2−2λ⟨F(z),yn−z⟩.\|x_{n+1}-z\|^2\le\|x_n-z\|^2-\big(1-\lambda L(1+\sqrt2)\big)\|x_n-x_{n-1}\|^2+\lambda L\|x_n-y_{n-1}\|^2-\big(1-\sqrt2\lambda L\big)\|x_{n+1}-y_n\|^2-2\lambda\langle F(z),y_n-z\rangle .∥xn+1​−z∥2≤∥xn​−z∥2−(1−λL(1+2​))∥xn​−xn−1​∥2+λL∥xn​−yn−1​∥2−(1−2​λL)∥xn+1​−yn​∥2−2λ⟨F(z),yn​−z⟩.
  1. (3.6), p. 5: the descent inequality an+1≤an−bna_{n+1}\le a_n-b_nan+1​≤an​−bn​ with an=∥xn−z∥2+λL∥xn−yn−1∥2+2λ⟨F(z),xn−1−z⟩a_n=\|x_n-z\|^2+\lambda L\|x_n-y_{n-1}\|^2+2\lambda\langle F(z),x_{n-1}-z\ranglean​=∥xn​−z∥2+λL∥xn​−yn−1​∥2+2λ⟨F(z),xn−1​−z⟩ and bn=(1−λL(1+2))∥xn−xn−1∥2b_n=(1-\lambda L(1+\sqrt2))\|x_n-x_{n-1}\|^2bn​=(1−λL(1+2​))∥xn​−xn−1​∥2.
  2. Lemma 2.7, p. 3: nonnegative sequences with an+1≤an−bna_{n+1}\le a_n-b_nan+1​≤an​−bn​ have (an)(a_n)(an​) bounded and bn→0b_n\to0bn​→0.
  3. Proof of Theorem 3.2, pp. 5–6: (xn)(x_n)(xn​) is bounded, ∥xn+1−xn∥→0\|x_{n+1}-x_n\|\to0∥xn+1​−xn​∥→0 and ∥xn+1−yn∥→0\|x_{n+1}-y_n\|\to0∥xn+1​−yn​∥→0.
  4. Lemma 2.2 (Minty), p. 3: for continuous monotone FFF, x∗∈Sx^*\in Sx∗∈S iff x∗∈Cx^*\in Cx∗∈C and ⟨F(y),y−x∗⟩≥0\langle F(y),y-x^*\rangle\ge0⟨F(y),y−x∗⟩≥0 for all y∈Cy\in Cy∈C.
  5. (3.7), p. 6: every weak cluster point of (xn)(x_n)(xn​) lies in SSS.
  6. Proof of Theorem 3.2, p. 6: for each z∈Sz\in Sz∈S, ∥xn−z∥2+2λ⟨F(z),xn−1−z⟩\|x_n-z\|^2+2\lambda\langle F(z),x_{n-1}-z\rangle∥xn​−z∥2+2λ⟨F(z),xn−1​−z⟩ converges.
  7. Lemma 2.3 (Opial), p. 3: if xn⇀xx_n\rightharpoonup xxn​⇀x and y≠xy\ne xy=x, then lim inf⁡∥xn−x∥<lim inf⁡∥xn−y∥\liminf\|x_n-x\|<\liminf\|x_n-y\|liminf∥xn​−x∥<liminf∥xn​−y∥.

Companion items, not milestones: the defined projection is the metric projection (so runs of Algorithm 3.1 exist from every starting point), Remark 2.1 (SSS is closed and convex), and the characterization of SSS as the zeros of the projected residual r(x,y)=∥y−PC(x−λF(y))∥+∥x−y∥r(x,y)=\|y-P_C(x-\lambda F(y))\|+\|x-y\|r(x,y)=∥y−PC​(x−λF(y))∥+∥x−y∥ (§3, p. 4).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.2 shows that a monotone Lipschitz variational inequality in Hilbert space can be solved by an iteration costing one projection and one evaluation of FFF per step, the minimum for a projection method, with no knowledge beyond the Lipschitz constant. This halves the cost of each iteration relative to the extragradient method when evaluating FFF is expensive, and keeps the cost of projections at one when projecting onto CCC is expensive. The method and its analysis became the basis for several later algorithms, including the adaptive variant in §4 of the same paper and the golden ratio algorithm of Malitsky (2020).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof is known to exist. The formal development needs, beyond the main argument, a usable library of facts about projections onto closed convex sets in Hilbert space, weak convergence of sequences (boundedness of weakly convergent sequences, weak sequential compactness of bounded sets) and Opial's property. These are reused by every weak-convergence proof for splitting and projection methods, and several companion missions of this series and of related papers rely on the same facts.

Difficulty

The naive Lyapunov function ∥xn−z∥2\|x_n-z\|^2∥xn​−z∥2 is not monotone along the iteration: because FFF is evaluated at the reflected point yny_nyn​ rather than at xnx_nxn​, the cross terms do not cancel as they do for the extragradient method. The quantity that does decrease (milestones 3–4) carries extra terms, and the step bound (2−1)/L(\sqrt2-1)/L(2​−1)/L is what the decrease requires. As a consequence, ∥xn−z∥\|x_n-z\|∥xn​−z∥ itself is not known to converge, so the standard Opial lemma ("if ∥xn−z∥\|x_n-z\|∥xn​−z∥ converges for every z∈Sz\in Sz∈S and all weak cluster points lie in SSS, then xnx_nxn​ converges weakly") does not apply directly; the uniqueness of the weak cluster point has to be argued with the perturbed quantity and Opial's inequality. In infinite dimension, the weak cluster point step also needs weak sequential compactness of bounded sets, which is not norm compactness.

Formalization scope

  • HHH is an arbitrary real inner product space with [CompleteSpace H] in every statement that needs completeness; it is never specialised to Rn\mathbb R^nRn, where weak and norm convergence coincide.
  • Weak convergence is stated elementarily: ⟨xn,v⟩→⟨x∗,v⟩\langle x_n,v\rangle\to\langle x^*,v\rangle⟨xn​,v⟩→⟨x∗,v⟩ for every v∈Hv\in Hv∈H. Subsequences are x∘φx\circ\varphix∘φ with φ\varphiφ strictly increasing.
  • The projection PC(z)P_C(z)PC​(z) is defined by choice as a nearest point, with the junk value zzz when none exists. Every statement that uses it assumes CCC closed, convex and nonempty (directly or through S≠∅S\ne\emptysetS=∅ or z∈Sz\in Sz∈S), and a companion item certifies that it is then the metric projection.
  • (C2) and (C3) are imposed on all of HHH, as in the paper; LLL is a real number with L>0L>0L>0, and the step range 0<λ<(2−1)/L0<\lambda<(\sqrt2-1)/L0<λ<(2​−1)/L is strict on both sides.
  • Runs of Algorithm 3.1 carry no stopping rule: a run reaching a solution xn=yn∈Sx_n=y_n\in Sxn​=yn​∈S stays constant, so infinite runs subsume stopped ones. The starting point x0x_0x0​ is any point of HHH, not necessarily in CCC; for this reason Lemma 3.1 and (3.6) are stated for n≥2n\ge2n≥2, which is the range the proof of Theorem 3.2 uses.
  • Opial's inequality is stated with liminfs in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], where they are always defined.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal assumes exactly (C1)–(C3), closedness and convexity of CCC and the step range, and concludes weak convergence to a point of SSS; it does not assume boundedness of the iterates, a starting point in CCC, finite dimension, or any of the intermediate estimates.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order; general Hilbert-space lemmas (boundedness of weakly convergent sequences via the uniform boundedness principle, weak sequential compactness of bounded sets, Opial's inequality) are useful well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • Yu. Malitsky, Projected reflected gradient methods for monotone variational inequalities, SIAM J. Optim. 25(1) (2015), 502–520. arXiv:1502.04968, doi:10.1137/14097238X
  • G. M. Korpelevich, The extragradient method for finding saddle points and other problems, Ekonomika i Matematicheskie Metody 12 (1976), 747–756.
  • P. Tseng, A modified forward-backward splitting method for maximal monotone mappings, SIAM J. Control Optim. 38(2) (2000), 431–446. doi:10.1137/S0363012998338806
  • Y. Censor, A. Gibali, S. Reich, The subgradient extragradient method for solving variational inequalities in Hilbert space, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 148 (2011), 318–335. doi:10.1007/s10957-010-9757-3
  • Z. Opial, Weak convergence of the sequence of successive approximations for nonexpansive mappings, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 73 (1967), 591–597. doi:10.1090/S0002-9904-1967-11761-0
  • H. H. Bauschke, P. L. Combettes, Convex Analysis and Monotone Operator Theory in Hilbert Spaces, 2nd ed., Springer, 2017. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48311-5
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Synchronization via Pinning Control on General Complex Networks I: A Kronecker LMI Weighted by the Positive Left Null Vector of G Globally Synchronizes a Pinned Strongly Connected NetworkResearch Paper

Motivation

Many engineered and natural systems are networks of identical dynamical units coupled through a directed interaction graph: arrays of oscillators, power grids, sensor and multi-agent networks, gene regulatory circuits. A basic control question for such a network is how to force every unit onto a prescribed reference trajectory (an equilibrium, a periodic orbit or a chaotic solution of a single unit) by acting on only a few of them. Applying a feedback controller to a small fraction of the vertices and letting the coupling spread its effect is called pinning control. It was introduced for scale-free networks by Wang and Chen (2002), shown to work with a single controller on undirected networks by Chen, Liu and Lu (2007), and turned into checkable criteria for undirected networks by Yu, Chen and Lü (2009).

Directed networks are harder. Earlier criteria for directed networks (Zhou, Lu and Lü 2008; Song and Cao 2010) were stated through the symmetric part G+GTG+G^TG+GT of the coupling matrix, which may have eigenvalues with positive real part even when the network synchronizes, so they lose the structural information of the graph. Yu, Chen, Lü and Kurths (SIAM J. Control Optim., 2013) replaced the standard quadratic Lyapunov function by one weighted with the positive left null vector of the coupling matrix. This mission formalizes their main criterion for strongly connected networks (§3 of the paper) together with the matrix-theoretic lemmas it rests on (§2).

Setting

The network has NNN vertices with states xi(t)∈Rnx_i(t)\in\mathbb R^nxi​(t)∈Rn. A coupling matrix G=(Gij)∈RN×NG=(G_{ij})\in\mathbb R^{N\times N}G=(Gij​)∈RN×N has Gij≥0G_{ij}\ge 0Gij​≥0 for i≠ji\ne ji=j (Gij>0G_{ij}>0Gij​>0 means a connection from vertex jjj to vertex iii) and zero row sums, Gii=−∑j≠iGijG_{ii}=-\sum_{j\ne i}G_{ij}Gii​=−∑j=i​Gij​. The network is strongly connected if any vertex can be reached from any other by a directed path; GGG is irreducible if no simultaneous permutation of rows and columns brings it to block lower-triangular form (G~110G~21G~22)\begin{pmatrix}\tilde G_{11}&0\\\tilde G_{21}&\tilde G_{22}\end{pmatrix}(G~11​G~21​​0G~22​​) with square diagonal blocks of sizes mmm and N−mN-mN−m, 1≤m≤N−11\le m\le N-11≤m≤N−1. The in-degree of vertex iii is kiin=∑j≠iGijk_i^{\mathrm{in}}=\sum_{j\ne i}G_{ij}kiin​=∑j=i​Gij​.

Each vertex runs the dynamics x˙=f(x,t)\dot x=f(x,t)x˙=f(x,t) for a continuously differentiable f:Rn×R+→Rnf:\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R_+\to\mathbb R^nf:Rn×R+​→Rn. A reference trajectory sss solves s˙=f(s,t)\dot s=f(s,t)s˙=f(s,t). With coupling strength ccc, inner coupling matrix Γ∈Rn×n\Gamma\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}Γ∈Rn×n and control gains di≥0d_i\ge0di​≥0 (vertex iii is pinned when di>0d_i>0di​>0), the controlled network is

x˙i=f(xi,t)+c∑j=1NGijΓxj−c diΓ(xi−s),i=1,…,N.\dot x_i=f(x_i,t)+c\sum_{j=1}^N G_{ij}\Gamma x_j-c\,d_i\Gamma(x_i-s),\qquad i=1,\dots,N.x˙i​=f(xi​,t)+cj=1∑N​Gij​Γxj​−cdi​Γ(xi​−s),i=1,…,N.

It is globally synchronized if xi(t)−s(t)→0x_i(t)-s(t)\to0xi​(t)−s(t)→0 for every iii, every reference trajectory and every solution. The vector field satisfies Assumption 1 if, for a constant matrix KKK,

(x−y)T(f(x,t)−f(y,t))≤(x−y)TKΓ(x−y)∀x,y∈Rn, t≥0.(x-y)^T\bigl(f(x,t)-f(y,t)\bigr)\le(x-y)^TK\Gamma(x-y)\qquad\forall x,y\in\mathbb R^n,\ t\ge0 .(x−y)T(f(x,t)−f(y,t))≤(x−y)TKΓ(x−y)∀x,y∈Rn, t≥0.

For positive weights ξ1,…,ξN\xi_1,\dots,\xi_Nξ1​,…,ξN​ put Ξ=diag⁡(ξ)\Xi=\operatorname{diag}(\xi)Ξ=diag(ξ), D=diag⁡(d)D=\operatorname{diag}(d)D=diag(d) and G^=12(ΞG+GTΞ)\widehat G=\tfrac12(\Xi G+G^T\Xi)G=21​(ΞG+GTΞ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 1402)

Let fff satisfy Assumption 1 with Γ\GammaΓ symmetric, let GGG be a strongly connected coupling matrix, and let ξ\xiξ be positive with G^\widehat GG having zero row sums (the weights of Lemma 2.12). If

Ξ⊗KΓ+ΓTKT2+c G^⊗Γ+ΓT2−c (ΞD)⊗Γ+ΓT2<0,\Xi\otimes\frac{K\Gamma+\Gamma^TK^T}{2}+c\,\widehat G\otimes\frac{\Gamma+\Gamma^T}{2}-c\,(\Xi D)\otimes\frac{\Gamma+\Gamma^T}{2}<0,Ξ⊗2KΓ+ΓTKT​+cG⊗2Γ+ΓT​−c(ΞD)⊗2Γ+ΓT​<0,

then the controlled network is globally synchronized.

Milestones

The path to the goal follows the paper: Lemma 2.5 (irreducible   ⟺  \iff⟺ strongly connected), Lemma 2.9 (ρ(A)=∥A∥∞\rho(A)=\|A\|_\inftyρ(A)=∥A∥∞​ for nonnegative AAA with constant row sums), Lemma 2.8 (Perron–Frobenius, already on the platform), Lemma 2.11 (a positive vector xxx with GTx=0G^Tx=0GTx=0), Lemma 2.12 (the weights Ξ\XiΞ), and the derivative estimate (3.4) for V=12∑iξieiTeiV=\tfrac12\sum_i\xi_ie_i^Te_iV=21​∑i​ξi​eiT​ei​, ei=xi−se_i=x_i-sei​=xi​−s:

V˙≤eT[Ξ⊗(KΓ)+c(G^−ΞD)⊗Γ]e.\dot V\le e^T\bigl[\Xi\otimes(K\Gamma)+c(\widehat G-\Xi D)\otimes\Gamma\bigr]e .V˙≤eT[Ξ⊗(KΓ)+c(G−ΞD)⊗Γ]e.

Companion results

Lemma 2.7, Lemma 2.10, and, under the paper's standing assumptions (KΓ=ΓKK\Gamma=\Gamma KKΓ=ΓK, θ=λmax⁡(K+KT2)≥0\theta=\lambda_{\max}(\tfrac{K+K^T}{2})\ge0θ=λmax​(2K+KT​)≥0) with Γ\GammaΓ positive definite: Corollary 3.2 (the N×NN\times NN×N condition θΞ+c(G^−ΞD)<0\theta\Xi+c(\widehat G-\Xi D)<0θΞ+c(G−ΞD)<0 suffices), Corollary 3.3 (i) (an explicit coupling threshold c>λmax⁡(θΞ)/∣λmax⁡(G^−ΞD)∣c>\lambda_{\max}(\theta\Xi)/|\lambda_{\max}(\widehat G-\Xi D)|c>λmax​(θΞ)/∣λmax​(G−ΞD)∣), and Corollary 3.4 (the necessary conditions di>θ/c−kiind_i>\theta/c-k_i^{\mathrm{in}}di​>θ/c−kiin​ at pinned and kiin>θ/ck_i^{\mathrm{in}}>\theta/ckiin​>θ/c at unpinned vertices).

Significance

The criterion reduces global synchronization of an nNnNnN-dimensional nonlinear system to one linear matrix inequality in the data (G,Γ,K,c,D)(G,\Gamma,K,c,D)(G,Γ,K,c,D), and the corollaries reduce it further to an N×NN\times NN×N inequality and to explicit bounds. Corollary 3.4 turns this into a pinning rule: vertices whose in-degree is below θ/c\theta/cθ/c must be controlled. Weighting by the left null vector of GGG is the device that later work on directed consensus and pinning reuses; Lemmas 2.11 and 2.12 isolate it as a statement about Metzler matrices.

The paper's results are proved on paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof that this mission is aware of. A formalization adds three things: a corrected statement of Theorem 3.1 (see the scope section), a Lean library of directed-network matrix facts (irreducibility in the permutation form, its equivalence with strong connectivity, positive left null vectors, the weighted symmetrization G^\widehat GG), and a reusable Lyapunov argument for linearly coupled networks with Kronecker-structured quadratic forms.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea, the unweighted Lyapunov function 12∑ieiTei\tfrac12\sum_ie_i^Te_i21​∑i​eiT​ei​, produces the symmetric part of GGG, which for a directed network need not be negative semidefinite; this is exactly the defect of earlier criteria. The weights must come from a positive left null vector of GGG, whose existence is a Perron–Frobenius statement that needs irreducibility, hence the graph–matrix equivalence of Lemma 2.5. The analytic part needs a derivative of VVV along solutions on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), the conversion of a sum over vertices into a Kronecker quadratic form, and the passage from a negative definite form to convergence of every error component. On the Mathlib side, irreducibility in the paper's permutation sense, spectral radius through characteristic roots, and largest eigenvalues of symmetric matrices all have to be connected to existing API.

Formalization scope

States are Fin n → ℝ and matrices are indexed by Fin N, Fin n and, for Kronecker products, by pairs (i, a) with (A⊗B)(i,a),(j,b)=AijBab(A\otimes B)_{(i,a),(j,b)}=A_{ij}B_{ab}(A⊗B)(i,a),(j,b)​=Aij​Bab​; the stacked error uses the same order. Convergence (2.7) is stated with the neighbourhood filter of 000 in Rn\mathbb R^nRn, which does not depend on the norm. Derivatives are taken within [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Pinning is encoded by di>0d_i>0di​>0 instead of the paper's reordering of the first lll vertices. "M<0M<0M<0" is positive definiteness of −M-M−M (Mathlib PosDef, which includes symmetry); every matrix compared with 000 is symmetric by construction. λmax⁡(A)\lambda_{\max}(A)λmax​(A) of a symmetric matrix is the least rrr with vTAv≤r vTvv^TAv\le r\,v^TvvTAv≤rvTv for all vvv; ρ(A)\rho(A)ρ(A) is the largest modulus of a complex characteristic root. Global synchronization quantifies over every reference solution and every network solution; existence of solutions is not asserted.

Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item: ΓT=Γ\Gamma^T=\GammaΓT=Γ in Theorem 3.1 and (3.4), because the printed theorem allows any Γ\GammaΓ and is then false (a directed 3-cycle with Γ=(13−31)\Gamma=\begin{pmatrix}1&3\\-3&1\end{pmatrix}Γ=(1−3​31​) satisfies (3.2) but its error grows); c>0c>0c>0 in Corollary 3.4; at least one pinned vertex in Corollary 3.3 (i); N≥1N\ge1N≥1 in Lemma 2.10. The weights Ξ\XiΞ are not arbitrary: Theorem 3.1 and the corollaries require G^\widehat GG to have zero row sums, which for a coupling matrix is equivalent to GTξ=0G^T\xi=0GTξ=0. Assuming the derivative bound (3.4), negative definiteness of G^−ΞD\widehat G-\Xi DG−ΞD or decay of VVV in the goal would trivialize it and is excluded.

The mission needs: graph reachability for matrices with nonnegative off-diagonal entries; Perron–Frobenius for irreducible nonnegative matrices (referenced from the platform); Gershgorin-type bounds; Kronecker products and positive definiteness; and calculus of quadratic forms along solutions. The matrix lemmas (2.5, 2.7, 2.9–2.12) are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any item, and alternative proofs of the milestones, are welcome. Corollary 3.3 (ii) is not posed.

Selected references

  • W. Yu, G. Chen, J. Lü, J. Kurths, Synchronization via pinning control on general complex networks, SIAM J. Control Optim. 51(2) (2013), 1395–1416. https://doi.org/10.1137/100781699
  • X. F. Wang, G. Chen, Pinning control of scale-free dynamical networks, Physica A 310 (2002), 521–531. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4371(02)00772-0
  • T. Chen, X. Liu, W. Lu, Pinning complex networks by a single controller, IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. I 54 (2007), 1317–1326. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSI.2007.895383
  • J. Zhou, J. Lu, J. Lü, Pinning adaptive synchronization of a general complex dynamical network, Automatica 44 (2008), 996–1003. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2007.08.016
  • W. Yu, G. Chen, J. Lü, On pinning synchronization of complex dynamical networks, Automatica 45 (2009), 429–435. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2008.07.016
  • Q. Song, J. Cao, On pinning synchronization of directed and undirected complex dynamical networks, IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. I 57 (2010), 672–680. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSI.2009.2024971
  • R. Olfati-Saber, R. M. Murray, Consensus problems in networks of agents with switching topology and time-delays, IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 49 (2004), 1520–1533. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2004.834113
  • R. A. Horn, C. R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511810817
  • R. A. Brualdi, H. J. Ryser, Combinatorial Matrix Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107325708
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Joint Chance Constraints with Second-Order Moment Information I: Worst-Case CVaR Is Exact for Individual Chance Constraints with Concave or Quadratic LossesResearch Paper

Motivation

A chance constraint asks that an uncertain constraint hold with high probability: a decision is acceptable if the loss L(ξ~)L(\tilde\xi)L(ξ~​) it incurs is nonpositive with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ. Chance constraints appear in portfolio selection, power-system dispatch, inventory control and engineering design, wherever an occasional violation is tolerable but a frequent one is not. Two obstacles stand in the way of using them. The distribution of ξ~\tilde\xiξ~​ is rarely known exactly, and even when it is, the feasible set of a chance constraint is in general nonconvex and hard to compute.

Distributionally robust chance constraints address the first obstacle by requiring the constraint to hold for every distribution consistent with the available information. Zymler, Kuhn and Rustem (Math. Program. 137, 2013) take that information to be the mean and the covariance of ξ~\tilde\xiξ~​. The standard way around the second obstacle is to replace the probability by the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) of Rockafellar and Uryasev (J. Risk 2, 2000): a nonpositive CVaR implies the chance constraint, and the worst-case CVaR over a moment set can be computed by semidefinite programming. The approximation is conservative, and the question this mission formalizes is when it loses nothing.

Timeline. Isii (Ann. Inst. Statist. Math. 12, 1960) established strong duality for moment problems, the basis of generalized Chebyshev bounds; Calafiore, Topcu and El Ghaoui (Systems & Control Letters 58, 2009) gave the semidefinite form of the worst-case probability of a set under mean and covariance information that the paper uses as Lemma A.2. El Ghaoui, Oks and Oustry (Oper. Res. 51, 2003) computed the worst-case Value-at-Risk of a portfolio under mean and covariance information. Calafiore and El Ghaoui (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 130, 2006) showed that a distributionally robust individual chance constraint with a loss affine in ξ~\tilde\xiξ~​ is a second-order cone constraint. Zymler, Kuhn and Rustem (2013) showed that the worst-case CVaR approximation is exact for every continuous loss that is concave or quadratic in ξ~\tilde\xiξ~​ (Theorem 2.2), which is the goal of this mission, and extended the approach to joint chance constraints (the companion mission II).

Setting

Let ξ~\tilde\xiξ~​ be a random vector in Rk\mathbb R^kRk. Fix a mean vector μ∈Rk\mu\in\mathbb R^kμ∈Rk and a covariance matrix Σ∈Sk\Sigma\in\mathbb S^kΣ∈Sk with Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0 (positive definite). The moment set P\mathcal PP is the set of all probability distributions P\mathbb PP on Rk\mathbb R^kRk with finite second moments, EP[ξ~]=μ\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[\tilde\xi]=\muEP​[ξ~​]=μ and EP[(ξ~−μ)(ξ~−μ)⊤]=Σ\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[(\tilde\xi-\mu)(\tilde\xi-\mu)^\top]=\SigmaEP​[(ξ~​−μ)(ξ~​−μ)⊤]=Σ. The second-order moment matrix is

Ω=[Σ+μμ⊤μμ⊤1],\Omega=\begin{bmatrix}\Sigma+\mu\mu^\top & \mu\\ \mu^\top & 1\end{bmatrix},Ω=[Σ+μμ⊤μ⊤​μ1​],

and ⟨X,Y⟩=Tr⁡(XY)\langle X,Y\rangle=\operatorname{Tr}(XY)⟨X,Y⟩=Tr(XY) is the trace scalar product.

Fix a tolerance ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1) and a loss L:Rk→RL:\mathbb R^k\to\mathbb RL:Rk→R. Write x+=max⁡{x,0}x^+=\max\{x,0\}x+=max{x,0}. The CVaR of L(ξ~)L(\tilde\xi)L(ξ~​) under P\mathbb PP is

P-CVaRϵ(L(ξ~))=inf⁡β∈R{β+1ϵ EP((L(ξ~)−β)+)},\mathbb P\text{-}\mathrm{CVaR}_\epsilon(L(\tilde\xi))=\inf_{\beta\in\mathbb R}\Big\{\beta+\frac1\epsilon\,\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}\big((L(\tilde\xi)-\beta)^+\big)\Big\},P-CVaRϵ​(L(ξ~​))=β∈Rinf​{β+ϵ1​EP​((L(ξ~​)−β)+)},

and the worst-case CVaR is its supremum over P∈P\mathbb P\in\mathcal PP∈P. The distributionally robust individual chance constraint is inf⁡P∈PP(L(ξ~)≤0)≥1−ϵ\inf_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P(L(\tilde\xi)\le0)\ge1-\epsiloninfP∈P​P(L(ξ~​)≤0)≥1−ϵ. The worst-case Value-at-Risk is

WC-VaRϵ(L(ξ~))=inf⁡{γ∈R: inf⁡P∈PP(L(ξ~)≤γ)≥1−ϵ}.\mathrm{WC\text{-}VaR}_\epsilon(L(\tilde\xi))=\inf\Big\{\gamma\in\mathbb R:\ \inf_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\big(L(\tilde\xi)\le\gamma\big)\ge1-\epsilon\Big\}.WC-VaRϵ​(L(ξ~​))=inf{γ∈R: P∈Pinf​P(L(ξ~​)≤γ)≥1−ϵ}.

A loss is quadratic if L(ξ)=ξ⊤Qξ+q⊤ξ+q0L(\xi)=\xi^\top Q\xi+q^\top\xi+q^0L(ξ)=ξ⊤Qξ+q⊤ξ+q0, with no sign condition on QQQ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.2

For a continuous loss LLL that is either concave or (possibly nonconcave) quadratic in ξ\xiξ,

sup⁡P∈PP-CVaRϵ(L(ξ~))≤0  ⟺  inf⁡P∈PP(L(ξ~)≤0)≥1−ϵ.\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\text{-}\mathrm{CVaR}_\epsilon\big(L(\tilde\xi)\big)\le0\iff\inf_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P\big(L(\tilde\xi)\le0\big)\ge1-\epsilon .P∈Psup​P-CVaRϵ​(L(ξ~​))≤0⟺P∈Pinf​P(L(ξ~​)≤0)≥1−ϵ.

The implication from left to right holds for every loss; the content of the theorem is the converse.

Milestones

  1. (15): for every measurable LLL, the chance constraint holds iff WC-VaRϵ(L(ξ~))≤0\mathrm{WC\text{-}VaR}_\epsilon(L(\tilde\xi))\le0WC-VaRϵ​(L(ξ~​))≤0.
  2. Lemma A.2: for a Borel set S\mathcal SS, sup⁡P∈PP(ξ~∈S)=inf⁡{⟨Ω,M⟩:M⪰0, [ξ⊤1]M[ξ⊤1]⊤≥1 ∀ξ∈S}\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb P(\tilde\xi\in\mathcal S)=\inf\{\langle\Omega,M\rangle: M\succeq0,\ [\xi^\top 1]M[\xi^\top 1]^\top\ge1\ \forall\xi\in\mathcal S\}supP∈P​P(ξ~​∈S)=inf{⟨Ω,M⟩:M⪰0, [ξ⊤1]M[ξ⊤1]⊤≥1 ∀ξ∈S}.
  3. Lemma 2.1 (nonlinear Farkas lemma) for convex functions under a Slater point.
  4. Lemma 2.2 (the S\mathcal SS-lemma), through the platform's proved lossless S-procedure.
  5. (20): for the losses of Theorem 2.2,
WC-VaRϵ(L(ξ~))=inf⁡{β+1ϵ⟨Ω,M⟩: M⪰0, [ξ⊤ 1]M[ξ⊤ 1]⊤+β−L(ξ)≥0 ∀ξ}.\mathrm{WC\text{-}VaR}_\epsilon(L(\tilde\xi))=\inf\Big\{\beta+\tfrac1\epsilon\langle\Omega,M\rangle:\ M\succeq0,\ [\xi^\top\ 1]M[\xi^\top\ 1]^\top+\beta-L(\xi)\ge0\ \forall\xi\Big\}.WC-VaRϵ​(L(ξ~​))=inf{β+ϵ1​⟨Ω,M⟩: M⪰0, [ξ⊤ 1]M[ξ⊤ 1]⊤+β−L(ξ)≥0 ∀ξ}.
  1. Lemma A.1: sup⁡P∈PEP((f(ξ~))+)=inf⁡{⟨Ω,M⟩:M⪰0, [ξ⊤1]M[ξ⊤1]⊤≥f(ξ) ∀ξ}\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P}\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}((f(\tilde\xi))^+)=\inf\{\langle\Omega,M\rangle: M\succeq0,\ [\xi^\top 1]M[\xi^\top 1]^\top\ge f(\xi)\ \forall\xi\}supP∈P​EP​((f(ξ~​))+)=inf{⟨Ω,M⟩:M⪰0, [ξ⊤1]M[ξ⊤1]⊤≥f(ξ) ∀ξ} for measurable fff.
  2. The display after (20): for the losses of Theorem 2.2, the worst-case CVaR equals inf⁡β{β+1ϵsup⁡PEP((L(ξ~)−β)+)}\inf_\beta\{\beta+\frac1\epsilon\sup_{\mathbb P}\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}((L(\tilde\xi)-\beta)^+)\}infβ​{β+ϵ1​supP​EP​((L(ξ~​)−β)+)} and the value of the program in (20).
  3. The identity of p. 9: for the losses of Theorem 2.2, the worst-case CVaR equals the worst-case VaR.

Significance

The theorem says that for concave and for quadratic losses the worst-case CVaR constraint, which is a linear matrix inequality in the decision through (20), describes exactly the feasible set of the distributionally robust chance constraint. Its affine special case (Corollary 2.1 of the paper) gives an exact semidefinite representation of robust individual chance constraints with affine dependence on the uncertainty, the case most used in robust portfolio and engineering models. The same equality between worst-case CVaR and worst-case VaR is the starting point of the paper's treatment of joint chance constraints, where an exact representation is obtained by optimizing over scaling parameters (mission II). The quadratic case covers losses such as portfolio variance terms or quadratic constraint functions, which are neither convex nor concave in general.

The results are proved in the paper, but parts of the argument are sketches. Lemmas A.1 and A.2 are strong duality theorems for moment problems that the paper cites from Isii and from Calafiore et al. rather than proves, and the interchange of supremum and infimum in the worst-case CVaR is justified by a citation to a stochastic saddle-point theorem. To our knowledge none of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces a checked moment-duality theorem with given mean and covariance, a nonlinear Farkas lemma, and a complete proof of the exactness theorem.

Difficulty

The direction from the worst-case CVaR constraint to the chance constraint is elementary. The converse cannot be obtained distribution by distribution: for a single distribution the CVaR is strictly larger than the VaR in general, and for a convex piecewise-linear loss the worst-case equivalence fails (Example 2.1 of the paper). The identity therefore depends on the specific moment set and the specific loss classes, and passes through two infinite-dimensional dualities. The moment set P\mathcal PP is not compact in the weak topology, since mass can escape to infinity while the first two moments stay fixed, so the minimax interchange in the worst-case CVaR does not follow from a standard compact minimax theorem. Lemmas A.1 and A.2 are stated for an arbitrary measurable function and an arbitrary Borel set; their strong duality uses Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0 in an essential way. Finally, the semi-infinite constraint "for all ξ\xiξ with L(ξ)>γL(\xi)>\gammaL(ξ)>γ" involves a strict inequality on a nonconvex set, and turning it into a matrix inequality is where concavity or quadraticity of LLL enters.

Formalization scope

  • Rk\mathbb R^kRk is Fin k → ℝ; matrices in Sk+1\mathbb S^{k+1}Sk+1 are indexed by Fin k ⊕ Unit with the extra coordinate last, so that [ξ⊤1]M[ξ⊤1]⊤[\xi^\top 1]M[\xi^\top 1]^\top[ξ⊤1]M[ξ⊤1]⊤ is liftQuad M ξ. Ω\OmegaΩ is built from the published ConvexOptimization.symQuadBlock.
  • P\mathcal PP is every probability measure with every coordinate in L2L^2L2, mean μ\muμ and covariance Σ\SigmaΣ (the published MomentDRO.Conf.HasSecondMoments, meanVec, covMat). It is not restricted to discrete laws, densities or a support set.
  • The standing assumptions Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0 and ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon\in(0,1)ϵ∈(0,1) are hypotheses of every theorem. Lemma 2.1 involves no distribution and does not carry them. Lemma A.1 needs measurability of fff and Lemma A.2 a Borel set, as printed; (15) is stated for every measurable loss.
  • CVaR, the worst-case CVaR, the worst-case expectation, the worst-case VaR and the values of the semidefinite programs are extended reals. Expectations of positive parts are lower Lebesgue integrals and may be +∞+\infty+∞; an infimum over an empty feasible set is +∞+\infty+∞. A formalization with real-valued suprema would assign 000 to an unbounded worst-case CVaR and make the constraint "worst-case CVaR ≤0\le 0≤0" hold by a default value; this encoding rules that out.
  • A quadratic loss is ξ⊤Qξ+q⊤ξ+q0\xi^\top Q\xi+q^\top\xi+q^0ξ⊤Qξ+q⊤ξ+q0 with QQQ neither symmetric nor definite; concavity is on all of Rk\mathbb R^kRk.
  • The printed S\mathcal SS-lemma (homogeneous forms, general ppp) is replaced by the platform's proved lossless S-procedure for two inhomogeneous quadratics under a Slater point, which is the form the proof uses.

A complete development needs moment-problem duality on Rk\mathbb R^kRk, a convex Farkas lemma, and the S-procedure (already proved on the platform). The first two are reusable beyond this mission, in particular by mission II, which uses Lemmas A.1 and A.2 verbatim. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • S. Zymler, D. Kuhn, B. Rustem, Distributionally robust joint chance constraints with second-order moment information, Mathematical Programming 137 (2013) 167–198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0494-7
  • R. T. Rockafellar, S. Uryasev, Optimization of conditional value-at-risk, Journal of Risk 2 (2000) 21–41. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
  • K. Isii, The extrema of probability determined by generalized moments (I) bounded random variables, Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics 12 (1960) 119–134 (reference [14] of the paper).
  • G. Calafiore, U. Topcu, L. El Ghaoui, Parameter estimation with expected and residual-at-risk criteria, Systems & Control Letters 58 (2009) 39–46 (reference [7] of the paper).
  • L. El Ghaoui, M. Oks, F. Oustry, Worst-case value-at-risk and robust portfolio optimization: a conic programming approach, Operations Research 51 (2003) 543–556. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.4.543.16101
  • G. C. Calafiore, L. El Ghaoui, On distributionally robust chance-constrained linear programs, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 130 (2006) 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-006-9084-x
  • I. Pólik, T. Terlaky, A survey of the S-lemma, SIAM Review 49 (2007) 371–418. https://doi.org/10.1137/S003614450444614X
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Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Modern Introduction to Online Learning VII: The Perceptron's Mistakes Exceed the Competitor's Hinge-Power Loss by at Most q²R²‖u‖²/2 + qR‖u‖√(q²R²‖u‖²/4 + L_q)Textbook

Motivation

An online classifier must predict a label before learning the correct answer. Its errors matter directly: a low numerical loss is useful only if it controls the number of wrong predictions. Chapter 8 of Orabona's textbook examines this connection for linear classification, where a vector of weights produces a score by taking an inner product with the incoming example. The Perceptron is a particularly spare example: it changes its weights only after a mistake, and it needs no learning rate or chosen comparator. This makes its guarantee a useful point of contact between classification mistakes and the convex losses used elsewhere in online optimization.

Theorem 8.2 compares the Perceptron's mistake count with a whole family of comparator losses, indexed by a real exponent q≥1q\ge1q≥1. The theorem is a known result in the book, not an unsolved conjecture. The mission concerns a faithful Lean statement and, subsequently, its machine-checked proof. The distinction matters because other Perceptron bounds on the platform address batch separability, multiclass prediction, or a hinge loss only on update rounds; those results do not state this theorem with its constants and quantifiers.

Setting

Fix a dimension ddd and a sequence of feature vectors zt∈Rdz_t\in\mathbb R^dzt​∈Rd with binary labels yt∈{−1,1}y_t\in\{-1,1\}yt​∈{−1,1}, for rounds t=1,…,Tt=1,\ldots,Tt=1,…,T. The Perceptron begins at x1=0x_1=0x1​=0. At round ttt it predicts y~t=sign⁡(⟨zt,xt⟩)\widetilde y_t=\operatorname{sign}(\langle z_t,x_t\rangle)y​t​=sign(⟨zt​,xt​⟩), where sign⁡(0)=0\operatorname{sign}(0)=0sign(0)=0. It records a mistake when yty~t≤0y_t\widetilde y_t\le0yt​y​t​≤0 and, on exactly those rounds, adds ytzty_tz_tyt​zt​ to its weights. Write τt=1{yty~t≤0}\tau_t=\mathbf 1\{y_t\widetilde y_t\le0\}τt​=1{yt​y​t​≤0} and M=∑t=1TτtM=\sum_{t=1}^T\tau_tM=∑t=1T​τt​. A zero score is a mistake even though it is not a strict sign disagreement.

For a score m∈Rm\in\mathbb Rm∈R, a label y∈{−1,1}y\in\{-1,1\}y∈{−1,1}, and a real power q≥1q\ge1q≥1, the hinge-power loss is ℓq(m,y)=max⁡(1−ym,0)q\ell_q(m,y)=\max(1-ym,0)^qℓq​(m,y)=max(1−ym,0)q. A fixed competitor u∈Rdu\in\mathbb R^du∈Rd has cumulative loss Lq(u)=∑t=1Tℓq(⟨zt,u⟩,yt)L_q(u)=\sum_{t=1}^T\ell_q(\langle z_t,u\rangle,y_t)Lq​(u)=∑t=1T​ℓq​(⟨zt​,u⟩,yt​). The loss is zero when uuu gives every example the correct sign with margin at least one. The book assumes the input vectors obey ∥zt∥2≤R\|z_t\|_2\le R∥zt​∥2​≤R; RRR is a nonnegative radius. The sequence is arbitrary, so the result includes examples chosen with knowledge of earlier predictions.

Formalization targets

Perceptron mistake guarantee

The goal is Theorem 8.2, p. 144 of Orabona. For every u∈Rdu\in\mathbb R^du∈Rd and every real q≥1q\ge1q≥1,

M−Lq(u)≤q2R2∥u∥222+qR∥u∥2q2R2∥u∥224+Lq(u).M-L_q(u)\le\frac{q^2R^2\|u\|_2^2}{2} +qR\|u\|_2\sqrt{\frac{q^2R^2\|u\|_2^2}{4}+L_q(u)}.M−Lq​(u)≤2q2R2∥u∥22​​+qR∥u∥2​4q2R2∥u∥22​​+Lq​(u)​.

All constants and the full family of powers are part of the target. For a competitor with Lq(u)=0L_q(u)=0Lq​(u)=0, choosing q=1q=1q=1 yields the finite mistake bound M≤R2∥u∥22M\le R^2\|u\|_2^2M≤R2∥u∥22​, as the book explains on p. 144. For a nonseparable sequence, the same statement measures mistakes relative to the competitor's nonzero loss.

Milestone statements

The milestone list follows the book's named ingredients: Lemma 4.29 converts an implicit square-root inequality into an explicit one; the constant-step clause of Theorem 2.13 gives the linear-loss gradient bound; and displays (8.4) and (8.5) relate the Perceptron updates to the comparator and to the hinge loss. Theorem 2.13 is stated in the linear, whole-space case used on p. 145. The printed (8.4) has an invalid extra term on its left; the milestone retains the printed text for provenance, while the Lean statement gives the valid comparator inequality used by (8.5). The correction is described in the item and moderation notes.

Significance

The guarantee answers a practical question about a simple online rule: how many classification errors can it make when a fixed linear predictor has small convex loss? The answer has explicit dependence on the feature radius, comparator norm, loss exponent, and comparator loss. It contains the separable margin case and also applies when no comparator classifies every example with margin one. The quantifier over all uuu permits a later analyst to choose a competitor after seeing the sequence without changing the algorithm or the theorem.

A complete formalization would provide a reusable account of a deterministic online classifier, its exact zero-score convention, and the passage from update counts to a family of hinge losses. The local Lean declarations currently compile as statements with proof placeholders; compilation does not establish the mathematical inequalities. A proof of the goal and milestones remains to be supplied and checked. In particular, the correction to (8.4) should be made explicit in any downstream development so that later results never depend on the false printed left side.

Difficulty

The mistake count is discontinuous in the prediction score, while the competitor is measured by a smooth family of convex surrogates. A direct comparison of their per-round losses does not give the theorem's constants. The update rule also depends on its own current score, so its condition must be tied to the weight sequence generated by earlier rounds. Treating the update indicators as free variables, or counting only rounds with a strictly negative score, changes the statement.

The book's proof passes through an implicit inequality involving M\sqrt MM​. That relation alone is weaker than the displayed goal until its constants and nonnegative domains are handled precisely. Real powers require special attention at a zero hinge value. The printed (8.4) introduces an additional difficulty: with u=0u=0u=0 and two one-dimensional examples z1=1z_1=1z1​=1, z2=−1z_2=-1z2​=−1 carrying positive labels, its left side is positive while its right side is zero. The valid comparator inequality has to be distinguished from that printed display.

Formalization scope

Lean uses EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) for Rd\mathbb R^dRd, its Euclidean inner product and norm, and sequences indexed by natural numbers with active rounds 1,…,T1,\ldots,T1,…,T. Index zero carries no data requirement. A total recursive definition fixes x1=0x_1=0x1​=0 and every later Perceptron update. Mathlib's Real.sign supplies sign⁡(0)=0\operatorname{sign}(0)=0sign(0)=0; an indicator records both a wrong sign and a zero score. The comparator loss uses a maximum with zero before taking a real power. No probability space is needed because Algorithm 8.2 is deterministic.

The Lean theorems explicitly require binary labels on the active rounds, q≥1q\ge1q≥1 for the goal, R≥0R\ge0R≥0, and ∥zt∥2≤R\|z_t\|_2\le R∥zt​∥2​≤R. They allow T=0T=0T=0, d=0d=0d=0, and R=0R=0R=0; the formulas remain meaningful in these cases. The set XXX in the book's theorem is omitted because the assertion uses only the given feature sequence and its norm bound. The constant-step milestone requires η>0\eta>0η>0 because its formula divides by η\etaη. The definitions include a mistake count, hinge-power loss, cumulative comparator loss, and the fixed algorithm; the theorem layer can reuse Mathlib's inner-product and real-analysis results. Contributions toward these statements, the algebraic milestone, or the full theorem proof are in scope. A run that can skip a zero-score update or whose iterates are chosen independently of the recursion is outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Francesco Orabona, Online Learning: A Modern Introduction Using Convex Optimization, arXiv:1912.13213v10, 2026, Chapter 8, pp. 141–146; Lemma 4.29, p. 45; Theorem 2.13, p. 13. arXiv PDF.
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Convex OptimizationLinear algebraOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Phase Recovery, MaxCut and Complex Semidefinite Programming 2: If Weak PhaseLift Is C-Stable at x₀, Then PhaseCut Is (2C + 2√2 + 1)-Stable at x₀Research Paper

Phase recovery and its two convex relaxations

Phase recovery asks to reconstruct a complex signal x0∈Cpx_0 \in \mathbb{C}^px0​∈Cp from the moduli of linear measurements, b=∣Ax0∣∈Rnb = |Ax_0| \in \mathbb{R}^nb=∣Ax0​∣∈Rn, where A∈Cn×pA \in \mathbb{C}^{n\times p}A∈Cn×p is known. The problem arises in X-ray crystallography, diffraction imaging and microscopy, where detectors record intensities but not phases (Shechtman et al., 2015). Since the map x↦∣Ax∣x \mapsto |Ax|x↦∣Ax∣ is not linear, the problem is non-convex, and a line of work since 2011 replaces it by semidefinite programs over Hermitian matrices.

Two such relaxations are compared in this mission. PhaseLift (Candès, Strohmer and Voroninski, 2013) lifts xxx to X=xx∗X = xx^*X=xx∗ and asks for a positive semidefinite XXX with Tr⁡(aiai∗X)=bi2\operatorname{Tr}(a_ia_i^*X) = b_i^2Tr(ai​ai∗​X)=bi2​; its trace-free version is called Weak PhaseLift. PhaseCut (Waldspurger, d'Aspremont and Mallat, 2015) separates amplitude and phase, Ax=diag⁡(b)uAx = \operatorname{diag}(b)uAx=diag(b)u with ∣ui∣=1|u_i| = 1∣ui​∣=1, and relaxes the resulting complex MaxCut-type problem to a semidefinite program in a Hermitian matrix UUU with unit diagonal. In the noiseless case the two relaxations are equivalent (Corollary 4.3 of that paper). This mission formalizes the paper's comparison of the two in the presence of noise: Theorem 4.7 and the two lemmas of Appendix A behind it.

Setting

Write Hn\mathbf{H}_nHn​ for the Hermitian n×nn \times nn×n complex matrices and Hn+\mathbf{H}_n^+Hn+​ for the positive semidefinite ones. Let P=AA†P = AA^\daggerP=AA† be the orthogonal projector onto the range R(A)\mathcal{R}(A)R(A), with A†A^\daggerA† the Moore–Penrose pseudoinverse. Define the face

F={V∈Hn:x∗Vx=0 for all x∈R(A)⊥},\mathcal{F} = \{V \in \mathbf{H}_n : x^*Vx = 0 \text{ for all } x \in \mathcal{R}(A)^\perp\},F={V∈Hn​:x∗Vx=0 for all x∈R(A)⊥},

the affine section Hb={V∈Hn:Vii=bi2, i=1,…,n}\mathcal{H}_b = \{V \in \mathbf{H}_n : V_{ii} = b_i^2,\ i = 1,\dots,n\}Hb​={V∈Hn​:Vii​=bi2​, i=1,…,n}, and the trace-norm distance d1(V,F)=inf⁡W∈F∥V−W∥1d_1(V,\mathcal{F}) = \inf_{W\in\mathcal{F}}\|V - W\|_1d1​(V,F)=infW∈F​∥V−W∥1​, where ∥X∥1=Tr⁡X∗X\|X\|_1 = \operatorname{Tr}\sqrt{X^*X}∥X∥1​=TrX∗X​.

After rescaling, PhaseCut minimizes Tr⁡(V(I−AA†))\operatorname{Tr}(V(I - AA^\dagger))Tr(V(I−AA†)) over V∈Hn+V \in \mathbf{H}_n^+V∈Hn+​ with diag⁡(V)=b2\operatorname{diag}(V) = b^2diag(V)=b2. By Lemma 4.1 this objective equals d1(V,F)d_1(V,\mathcal{F})d1​(V,F) for V⪰0V \succeq 0V⪰0, so PhaseCut is the projection problem

minimize d1(V,F)subject to V∈Hn+∩Hb.(13)\text{minimize } d_1(V,\mathcal{F}) \quad \text{subject to } V \in \mathbf{H}_n^+ \cap \mathcal{H}_b. \tag{13}minimize d1​(V,F)subject to V∈Hn+​∩Hb​.(13)

Weak PhaseLift, as solved by first-order methods with an ℓs\ell^sℓs distance (s≥1s \ge 1s≥1), is the projection problem in the other direction,

minimize (∑i∣Vii−bi2∣s)1/ssubject to V∈Hn+∩F.(14)\text{minimize } \Big(\sum_i |V_{ii} - b_i^2|^s\Big)^{1/s} \quad \text{subject to } V \in \mathbf{H}_n^+ \cap \mathcal{F}. \tag{14}minimize (i∑​∣Vii​−bi2​∣s)1/ssubject to V∈Hn+​∩F.(14)

Both aim at a point of Hn+∩F∩Hb\mathbf{H}_n^+\cap\mathcal{F}\cap\mathcal{H}_bHn+​∩F∩Hb​; PhaseCut starts from Hn+∩Hb\mathbf{H}_n^+\cap\mathcal{H}_bHn+​∩Hb​, Weak PhaseLift from Hn+∩F\mathbf{H}_n^+\cap\mathcal{F}Hn+​∩F.

Noise enters through b=∣Ax0∣+bnoiseb = |Ax_0| + b_{\rm noise}b=∣Ax0​∣+bnoise​ with bnoise∈Rnb_{\rm noise} \in \mathbb{R}^nbnoise​∈Rn. With ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​ the Frobenius norm of a matrix and the Euclidean norm of a vector, an algorithm is CCC-stable at x0x_0x0​ (Definition 4.5) if, for every bnoiseb_{\rm noise}bnoise​ close enough to zero, every minimizer VVV of its problem satisfies

∥V−(Ax0)(Ax0)∗∥2≤C ∥Ax0∥2 ∥bnoise∥2.\|V - (Ax_0)(Ax_0)^*\|_2 \le C\,\|Ax_0\|_2\,\|b_{\rm noise}\|_2 .∥V−(Ax0​)(Ax0​)∗∥2​≤C∥Ax0​∥2​∥bnoise​∥2​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.7

For A≠0A \ne 0A=0, x0∈Cpx_0 \in \mathbb{C}^px0​∈Cp, C>0C > 0C>0 and s≥1s \ge 1s≥1:

Weak PhaseLift is C-stable at x0  ⟹  PhaseCut is (2C+22+1)-stable at x0.\text{Weak PhaseLift is } C\text{-stable at } x_0 \;\Longrightarrow\; \text{PhaseCut is } (2C + 2\sqrt{2} + 1)\text{-stable at } x_0 .Weak PhaseLift is C-stable at x0​⟹PhaseCut is (2C+22​+1)-stable at x0​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4.1: Tr⁡(V(I−AA†))=d1(V,F)\operatorname{Tr}(V(I - AA^\dagger)) = d_1(V,\mathcal{F})Tr(V(I−AA†))=d1​(V,F) for every V⪰0V \succeq 0V⪰0.
  2. (21): with V/ ⁣/=PVPV^{/\!/} = PVPV//=PVP and V⊥=(I−P)V(I−P)V^\perp = (I-P)V(I-P)V⊥=(I−P)V(I−P), ∥V−V/ ⁣/∥22≤(2Tr⁡V/ ⁣/Tr⁡V⊥+Tr⁡V⊥)2\|V - V^{/\!/}\|_2^2 \le (\sqrt2\sqrt{\operatorname{Tr}V^{/\!/}}\sqrt{\operatorname{Tr}V^\perp} + \operatorname{Tr}V^\perp)^2∥V−V//∥22​≤(2​TrV//​TrV⊥​+TrV⊥)2 for V⪰0V \succeq 0V⪰0.
  3. The bound cited as (22): a minimizer VPCV_{PC}VPC​ of (13) for b=∣Ax0∣+bn,PCb = |Ax_0| + b_{n,PC}b=∣Ax0​∣+bn,PC​ has Tr⁡VPC⊥≤∥bn,PC∥22\operatorname{Tr}V_{PC}^\perp \le \|b_{n,PC}\|_2^2TrVPC⊥​≤∥bn,PC​∥22​.
  4. Trace split: Tr⁡V=Tr⁡V/ ⁣/+Tr⁡V⊥\operatorname{Tr}V = \operatorname{Tr}V^{/\!/} + \operatorname{Tr}V^\perpTrV=TrV//+TrV⊥.
  5. Lemma A.2: with bn,PL,i=(VPC/ ⁣/)ii−∣Ax0∣ib_{n,PL,i} = \sqrt{(V_{PC}^{/\!/})_{ii}} - |Ax_0|_ibn,PL,i​=(VPC//​)ii​​−∣Ax0​∣i​, ∥bn,PL∥2≤2∥bn,PC∥2\|b_{n,PL}\|_2 \le 2\|b_{n,PC}\|_2∥bn,PL​∥2​≤2∥bn,PC​∥2​.
  6. Lemma A.1: if moreover ∥bn,PC∥2≤∥Ax0∥2\|b_{n,PC}\|_2 \le \|Ax_0\|_2∥bn,PC​∥2​≤∥Ax0​∥2​ and ∥VPC−(Ax0)(Ax0)∗∥2>(2C+22+1)∥Ax0∥2∥bn,PC∥2\|V_{PC} - (Ax_0)(Ax_0)^*\|_2 > (2C+2\sqrt2+1)\|Ax_0\|_2\|b_{n,PC}\|_2∥VPC​−(Ax0​)(Ax0​)∗∥2​>(2C+22​+1)∥Ax0​∥2​∥bn,PC​∥2​, then ∥VPC/ ⁣/−(Ax0)(Ax0)∗∥2>2C∥Ax0∥2∥bn,PC∥2\|V_{PC}^{/\!/} - (Ax_0)(Ax_0)^*\|_2 > 2C\|Ax_0\|_2\|b_{n,PC}\|_2∥VPC//​−(Ax0​)(Ax0​)∗∥2​>2C∥Ax0​∥2​∥bn,PC​∥2​.
  7. VPC/ ⁣/V_{PC}^{/\!/}VPC//​ minimizes (14) for b=∣Ax0∣+bn,PLb = |Ax_0| + b_{n,PL}b=∣Ax0​∣+bn,PL​.

The constant 2C+22+12C + 2\sqrt2 + 12C+22​+1 is the paper's. The paper remarks that any D>2C+2D > 2C + \sqrt2D>2C+2​ would do, but that variant is printed without proof and is not a target.

Significance

The theorem says that PhaseCut is "almost as stable as" Weak PhaseLift: any stability guarantee proved for the lifted relaxation, such as the noisy recovery bounds of Candès and Li for Gaussian measurements (Candès and Li, 2014), carries over to PhaseCut with a constant of the same order. This justifies using PhaseCut, whose block-coordinate algorithms are cheap, with the stability theory developed for PhaseLift. The paper notes that the converse transfer does not seem to hold.

The result is proved in the paper. No part of it has a machine-checked proof that we know of. Formalizing it means proving the trace-norm identity of Lemma 4.1, which needs a Hölder-type bound ∣Tr⁡(XQ)∣≤∥X∥1|\operatorname{Tr}(XQ)| \le \|X\|_1∣Tr(XQ)∣≤∥X∥1​ for an orthogonal projector QQQ, the matrix Cauchy–Schwarz estimates of Appendix A, and the contradiction argument of Theorem 4.7, all for complex Hermitian matrices and an arbitrary, possibly non-injective, AAA.

Difficulty

The obvious argument transports a PhaseCut minimizer VPCV_{PC}VPC​ to a Weak PhaseLift minimizer, but VPCV_{PC}VPC​ is in general not in F\mathcal{F}F, and its compression VPC/ ⁣/V_{PC}^{/\!/}VPC//​ is not in Hb\mathcal{H}_bHb​ for the same noise. Two estimates are needed at once: the distance between VPCV_{PC}VPC​ and VPC/ ⁣/V_{PC}^{/\!/}VPC//​, and the size of the new noise vector bn,PLb_{n,PL}bn,PL​. Both rest on bounding Tr⁡VPC⊥\operatorname{Tr}V_{PC}^\perpTrVPC⊥​ by the squared noise, which uses the optimality of VPCV_{PC}VPC​ in (13) against a specific competitor, and on Lemma 4.1, whose printed proof is incomplete: the matrix it calls the projection of VVV onto F\mathcal{F}F is not the trace-norm projection in general, so the identity requires a separate lower bound.

Formalization scope

Matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin p) ℂ, and signals are vectors Fin p → ℂ. AA†AA^\daggerAA† is the matrix of Mathlib's orthogonal projection onto LinearMap.range (toEuclideanLin A); no pseudoinverse is built. The trace norm is the published definition WildeQIT.traceNorm (Re⁡Tr⁡X∗X\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{Tr}\sqrt{X^*X}ReTrX∗X​), and d1d_1d1​ is a real infimum over a nonempty set bounded below by 000. Frobenius and Euclidean norms are written out as square roots of sums of squares. Diagonal entries and traces of Hermitian matrices are read through their real parts. Lemma 4.1 is stated in C\mathbb{C}C, so it also asserts that the trace is real. "Close enough to zero" is ∃ δ>0\exists\,\delta > 0∃δ>0, and stability quantifies every minimizer for every small noise.

The formal statements depart from the print in three places:

  • x0x_0x0​ lies in Cp\mathbb{C}^pCp. The page writes Cn\mathbb{C}^nCn, but Ax0Ax_0Ax0​ needs the column dimension.
  • A≠0A \ne 0A=0 is assumed. For A=0A = 0A=0 and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 the printed theorem is false: F={0}\mathcal{F} = \{0\}F={0}, Weak PhaseLift is trivially stable, and (13) has nonzero minimizers while the bound forces zero. The proof itself works under A≠0A \neq 0A=0.
  • s≥1s \ge 1s≥1 is a parameter. The theorem is stated for each sss.

The case Ax0=0Ax_0 = 0Ax0​=0 is not excluded; there the hypothesis on Weak PhaseLift fails, as the paper notes. The milestones keep only the hypotheses their proofs use, listed in each statement.

A trivializing formalization would define the minimizer predicates so that no matrix satisfies them, or quantify the noise before δ\deltaδ. Here (13) and (14) both have minimizers (checked for n=p=1n = p = 1n=p=1), and δ\deltaδ precedes the noise.

Needed infrastructure: the trace norm and its duality with the operator norm on Hermitian matrices, compressions by orthogonal projectors, and Cauchy–Schwarz for positive semidefinite forms. These are reusable for other trace-norm and semidefinite-relaxation missions. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are proofs of the general facts as separate lemmas.

Selected references

  • I. Waldspurger, A. d'Aspremont and S. Mallat, Phase recovery, MaxCut and complex semidefinite programming, Mathematical Programming 149 (2015); arXiv:1206.0102v3, 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.0102
  • E. J. Candès, T. Strohmer and V. Voroninski, PhaseLift: exact and stable signal recovery from magnitude measurements via convex programming, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 66 (2013). https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.4499
  • E. J. Candès and X. Li, Solving quadratic equations via PhaseLift when there are about as many equations as unknowns, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 14 (2014). https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.6247
  • Y. Shechtman, Y. C. Eldar, O. Cohen, H. N. Chapman, J. Miao and M. Segev, Phase retrieval with application to optical imaging, IEEE Signal Processing Magazine 32 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2014.2352673
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A Modern Introduction to Online Learning III: Adaptive Online Subgradient Descent on s-Self-Bounded Losses Has Regret 4sD² + 2D√(s Σ_t ℓ_t(u))Textbook

Motivation

In online convex optimization, a learner selects a point before seeing the current loss. A useful guarantee compares the learner's accumulated loss with that of a single fixed point chosen in hindsight. A step size chosen from a preannounced bound on all future gradients can be wasteful when the realized gradients are small. Chapter 4 of Orabona's online learning text studies step sizes determined from the gradients observed so far. Its adaptive online subgradient descent bound uses the actual sum of squared subgradient norms, without requiring that sum in advance (Theorem 4.14, p. 40).

The chapter then asks for a more informative guarantee when the losses have small values at a good competitor. For self-bounded losses, a small loss at a point limits the size of its subgradients. Theorem 4.30 on p. 45 turns that relation into a bound in terms of the competitor's cumulative loss. This is useful for problems such as the squared hinge loss discussed immediately after the theorem: if one feasible comparator has zero loss on every round, the regret bound becomes independent of the number of rounds. These are known textbook results. The goal here is a machine-checked formulation and, eventually, a proof of the stated constants.

Setting

Fix a finite horizon T≥1T\ge1T≥1 and a nonempty, closed, convex decision set V⊆RdV\subseteq\mathbb R^dV⊆Rd. Its Euclidean diameter is at most DDD: every a,b∈Va,b\in Va,b∈V satisfy ∥a−b∥2≤D\|a-b\|_2\le D∥a−b∥2​≤D. In round t∈{1,…,T}t\in\{1,\ldots,T\}t∈{1,…,T}, the learner plays xt∈Vx_t\in Vxt​∈V and receives a convex loss ℓt\ell_tℓt​. The loss sequence is arbitrary. A subgradient gtg_tgt​ of ℓt\ell_tℓt​ at xtx_txt​ satisfies ℓt(y)≥ℓt(xt)+⟨gt,y−xt⟩\ell_t(y)\ge\ell_t(x_t)+\langle g_t,y-x_t\rangleℓt​(y)≥ℓt​(xt​)+⟨gt​,y−xt​⟩ for every y∈Rdy\in\mathbb R^dy∈Rd. The regret against a fixed competitor u∈Vu\in Vu∈V is

Regret⁡T(u)=∑t=1T(ℓt(xt)−ℓt(u)).\operatorname{Regret}_T(u)=\sum_{t=1}^{T}\bigl(\ell_t(x_t)-\ell_t(u)\bigr).RegretT​(u)=t=1∑T​(ℓt​(xt​)−ℓt​(u)).

The learner uses projected online subgradient descent. After observing gtg_tgt​, it sets

ηt=2D2∑i=1t∥gi∥22,xt+1=ΠV(xt−ηtgt)\eta_t=\frac{\sqrt2D}{2\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{t}\|g_i\|_2^2}}, \qquad x_{t+1}=\Pi_V(x_t-\eta_tg_t)ηt​=2∑i=1t​∥gi​∥22​​2​D​,xt+1​=ΠV​(xt​−ηt​gt​)

when gt≠0g_t\ne0gt​=0. If gt=0g_t=0gt​=0, the algorithm leaves xt+1=xtx_{t+1}=x_txt+1​=xt​. Here ΠV\Pi_VΠV​ is a Euclidean nearest point in VVV. The current gradient appears in the sum defining ηt\eta_tηt​ because the update is made after that gradient is observed. The initial point x1x_1x1​ is any member of VVV, and every admissible choice of subgradient is allowed.

A loss fff is sss-self-bounded on VVV when it is bounded below, has a subgradient at each point of VVV, and every subgradient ggg at every x∈Vx\in Vx∈V satisfies

∥g∥22≤2s(f(x)−inf⁡y∈Rdf(y)).\|g\|_2^2\le 2s\left(f(x)-\inf_{y\in\mathbb R^d}f(y)\right).∥g∥22​≤2s(f(x)−y∈Rdinf​f(y)).

The infimum is over the whole ambient space. The target theorem additionally assumes that each loss is nonnegative everywhere. The sss in these formulas is nonnegative. These conventions follow Definition 4.26 and Theorem 4.30 of the pinned preprint.

Formalization targets

Adaptive gradient bound

The first milestone is Theorem 4.14. Under the setting above, for every u∈Vu\in Vu∈V,

Regret⁡T(u)≤D2∑t=1T∥gt∥22.\operatorname{Regret}_T(u)\le D\sqrt{2\sum_{t=1}^{T}\|g_t\|_2^2}.RegretT​(u)≤D2t=1∑T​∥gt​∥22​​.

This bound depends on the gradient sequence encountered by the algorithm. The printed theorem also equates this expression with a minimum over constant positive step sizes. At zero accumulated gradient energy that minimum is an unattained infimum, so the formal milestone states the regret inequality in every case and the identity with the minimum only when the accumulated squared gradient norm is positive.

Self-bounded loss bound

The goal is Theorem 4.30. If every loss is nonnegative, convex, and sss-self-bounded on VVV, then for every fixed u∈Vu\in Vu∈V,

Regret⁡T(u)≤4sD2+2Ds∑t=1Tℓt(u).\operatorname{Regret}_T(u) \le 4sD^2+2D\sqrt{s\sum_{t=1}^{T}\ell_t(u)}.RegretT​(u)≤4sD2+2Dst=1∑T​ℓt​(u)​.

The target includes the intermediate displayed bound on p. 45 and Lemma 4.29 as milestones. Their statements capture the passage from a regret bound involving the learner's cumulative loss to one involving the competitor's cumulative loss. The constants 444 and 222 are those printed in the theorem; the goal does not replace them with asymptotic notation.

Significance

Theorem 4.14 provides a guarantee without supplying a gradient bound or the horizon-dependent sum of squared gradients to the learner. Theorem 4.30 sharpens the interpretation when the losses are self-bounded: for a comparator with ∑tℓt(u)=0\sum_t\ell_t(u)=0∑t​ℓt​(u)=0, the regret is at most 4sD24sD^24sD2. For larger comparator losses, the bound changes continuously with their accumulated value. The guarantee holds against each competitor, not merely one selected by an infimum over VVV.

A formal development would make the algorithm's timing, its zero-gradient branch, the ambient-space infimum, and the exact numerical constants explicit. These details are reusable in later analyses of adaptive step sizes and small-loss bounds. The proposal contains open Lean theorem statements and a compiled definitions file; it does not claim that these results already have machine-checked proofs in this mission. The metric projection relation is reused from an existing published definition, and the intended work is proving the open statements and developing their supporting inequalities.

Difficulty

A fixed step size can be selected after looking at all gradients, but that selection does not define an online update. The adaptive step size must use only gradients observed through the current round. The zero-gradient case needs an explicit update rule because its displayed quotient has a zero denominator on an all-zero prefix. These issues already appear in the first milestone.

For the goal, the self-bounded inequality controls subgradient norms using loss at the learner's own points. Substituting that control into the gradient bound yields a right-hand side containing ∑tℓt(xt)\sum_t\ell_t(x_t)∑t​ℓt​(xt​), although the desired statement is expressed using ∑tℓt(u)\sum_t\ell_t(u)∑t​ℓt​(u). The intermediate estimate on p. 45 is therefore implicit. The square-root inequality of Lemma 4.29 supplies the separate arithmetic statement needed to express the final result with the printed constants. A direct substitution that treats the learner's loss as the competitor's loss would not justify the theorem.

Formalization scope

The Lean carrier is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), including dimension zero; the theorem remains valid there. Rounds are indexed from one, with index zero unused, and sums range over Finset.Icc 1 T. The loss functions are real-valued on the whole Euclidean space. The book permits extended-real losses that take +∞+\infty+∞ outside their domain; this formalization addresses the real-valued case. Full-space subgradients retain the source's definition. Convexity and nonnegativity hold on the whole Euclidean space, and self-boundedness holds at every feasible point, for each round through TTT.

The adaptive run is a relation covering every legal selection of subgradients and projections. It requires the update after every nonzero gradient and the unchanged point after a zero gradient. The closed, convex, nonempty set assumptions ensure that Euclidean projection is meaningful. The diameter condition is written as ∥a−b∥2≤D\|a-b\|_2\le D∥a−b∥2​≤D for all feasible a,ba,ba,b, so it also covers any valid upper bound on the diameter. Self-boundedness uses the real infimum of the full range of each loss, together with boundedness below; global nonnegativity in the goal guarantees that condition. The explicit T≥1T\ge1T≥1 and s≥0s\ge0s≥0 conditions prevent boundary values from silently changing the meaning of a quotient or a square root.

The goal must hold for every comparator u∈Vu\in Vu∈V and every admissible run. A definition that checks self-boundedness only at uuu, or permits arbitrary next decisions, would lose the algorithmic guarantee. The reusable components are the regret and gradient-energy definitions, the adaptive run relation, the self-boundedness predicate, and the scalar inequality in Lemma 4.29. Contributions that establish the projection analysis and the three listed milestones directly support the goal.

Selected references

  • Francesco Orabona, Online Learning: A Modern Introduction Using Convex Optimization, arXiv:1912.13213v10, 2026, Chapter 4, pp. 34–49. arXiv
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A Modern Introduction to Online Learning I: Projected Online Gradient Descent Has Regret D²/(2η_T) + Σ_t η_t‖g_t‖²/2Textbook

Why online gradient descent matters

In online learning, a decision is made before the loss for that round is revealed. The learner cannot optimize a known objective once and use its minimizer forever: the sequence of objectives may be arbitrary. A basic performance measure is regret, the learner's total loss minus the loss of one fixed decision chosen with hindsight. A regret bound that grows more slowly than the number of rounds shows that the learner's average excess loss vanishes. Orabona's introduction develops this measure and derives a bound for projected online gradient descent without requiring advance knowledge of the loss sequence (Orabona, Chapter 1 and Theorem 2.13).

The result is useful because it separates the geometry of the feasible set from the size of the gradients seen during play. It also supports step sizes that change with time, which matters when a learner adjusts its updates as more rounds pass. The exact endpoint term in the theorem records information that would be discarded by a coarser regret estimate (Orabona, Theorem 2.13 and the discussion on p. 14).

Decisions, losses, and projection

Let VVV be a nonempty closed convex set in a real inner-product space. At round t=1,…,Tt=1,\ldots,Tt=1,…,T, the learner chooses xt∈Vx_t\in Vxt​∈V, receives a differentiable convex loss function ℓt\ell_tℓt​, and incurs ℓt(xt)\ell_t(x_t)ℓt​(xt​). For a fixed competitor u∈Vu\in Vu∈V, the book's regret is

Regret⁡T(u)=∑t=1T(ℓt(xt)−ℓt(u)).\operatorname{Regret}_T(u)=\sum_{t=1}^{T}\bigl(\ell_t(x_t)-\ell_t(u)\bigr).RegretT​(u)=t=1∑T​(ℓt​(xt​)−ℓt​(u)).

The competitor stays fixed through all TTT rounds; it is not the best separate decision for each round. The losses may differ on every round, and their sequence is arbitrary (Orabona, p. 2).

A metric projection ΠV(z)\Pi_V(z)ΠV​(z) is a point of VVV nearest to zzz in Euclidean distance. Convexity makes the projection single valued when VVV is nonempty and closed. Projected online gradient descent, Algorithm 2.1, starts from an arbitrary x1∈Vx_1\in Vx1​∈V, chooses positive step sizes ηt\eta_tηt​, forms gt=∇ℓt(xt)g_t=\nabla\ell_t(x_t)gt​=∇ℓt​(xt​), and sets

xt+1=ΠV(xt−ηtgt).x_{t+1}=\Pi_V(x_t-\eta_t g_t).xt+1​=ΠV​(xt​−ηt​gt​).

The projection keeps the next decision feasible even when the unconstrained gradient step leaves VVV (Orabona, Algorithm 2.1, p. 12). The first-order optimality condition of Theorem 2.8, the projection inequality of Proposition 2.11, and the one-round inequality of Lemma 2.12 are the numbered milestones leading to the main statement. Lemma 2.31 records the parallel one-round statement for subgradients (Orabona, pp. 11–13, 19).

Formalization targets

For VVV of finite diameter D=sup⁡x,y∈V∥x−y∥2D=\sup_{x,y\in V}\|x-y\|_2D=supx,y∈V​∥x−y∥2​, positive nonincreasing step sizes, and any u∈Vu\in Vu∈V, the main target is the complete first inequality of Theorem 2.13:

Regret⁡T(u)≤D22ηT+∑t=1Tηt2∥gt∥22−∥xT+1−u∥222ηT.\operatorname{Regret}_T(u)\le \frac{D^2}{2\eta_T} +\sum_{t=1}^{T}\frac{\eta_t}{2}\|g_t\|_2^2 -\frac{\|x_{T+1}-u\|_2^2}{2\eta_T}.RegretT​(u)≤2ηT​D2​+t=1∑T​2ηt​​∥gt​∥22​−2ηT​∥xT+1​−u∥22​​.

The negative terminal term is part of the target. The constant-step clause of the same theorem is a separate companion item. If ηt=η>0\eta_t=\eta>0ηt​=η>0 on every round, it states

Regret⁡T(u)≤∥u−x1∥222η+η2∑t=1T∥gt∥22−∥xT+1−u∥222η.\operatorname{Regret}_T(u)\le \frac{\|u-x_1\|_2^2}{2\eta} +\frac{\eta}{2}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\|g_t\|_2^2 -\frac{\|x_{T+1}-u\|_2^2}{2\eta}.RegretT​(u)≤2η∥u−x1​∥22​​+2η​t=1∑T​∥gt​∥22​−2η∥xT+1​−u∥22​​.

This clause has no finite-diameter hypothesis, so it applies on unbounded feasible sets as well (Orabona, Theorem 2.13, p. 13).

What the bound supplies

The theorem gives a deterministic guarantee against every fixed feasible competitor, for every loss sequence and every valid run of the algorithm. It exposes the cumulative effect of the gradient magnitudes and the step sizes. Its constant-step form uses the distance from the initial decision to the comparator rather than the diameter of the whole set. The bound is therefore informative on some unbounded sets where the diameter term has no finite value (Orabona, Theorem 2.13 and p. 14).

This is a known textbook theorem, not an open conjecture. The mission asks for machine-checked proofs of the source statements in a reusable Lean interface: a fixed-comparator regret definition, a finite-horizon run predicate, and the projection and one-step results. The published metric-projection predicate is reused, while the one-based regret and run definitions are specific to this book's convention.

Where the argument is delicate

An immediate attempt to sum the one-round estimate leaves squared-distance terms with different coefficients when the step size varies. They do not cancel as they would with a fixed coefficient. The theorem's monotonicity condition on the step sizes and the finite diameter of VVV are what make a uniform bound possible; omitting either changes the first displayed claim. Keeping the final negative squared-distance term also requires more care than proving only the weaker bound obtained by dropping it. On the nonsmooth side, an arbitrary vector cannot replace a subgradient: its defining inequality supplies the link between a loss difference and the linearized direction (Orabona, Lemmas 2.12 and 2.31, Theorem 2.13).

Formalization scope

Lean uses a complete real inner-product space, covering the book's Rd\mathbb R^dRd and using only the geometry needed by this chapter. Time remains one based: round zero is unused, sums run from 111 through TTT, and the output after the last round is xT+1x_{T+1}xT+1​. The horizon satisfies T≥1T\ge1T≥1, so the last step size and the terminal iterate are part of an actual run. The run predicate requires a gradient and a metric projection at every round through TTT; it does not select a favorable projection after seeing the comparator. The theorem requires each loss to be convex and differentiable on an open neighborhood containing VVV, as in Algorithm 2.1.

The diameter in the main target is Mathlib's real Metric.diam V, with boundedness imposed so that it is the finite supremum in the book. The constant-step clause has no boundedness requirement. The projection relation is the published OnlineConvexOpt.FirstOrder.IsMetricProjection: it includes membership in VVV and minimal distance to the point being projected. Thus, the update cannot be satisfied by an arbitrary point of VVV. Every regret claim quantifies over a comparator u∈Vu\in Vu∈V; extending the quantifier outside VVV would assert a different result.

For Lemma 2.31, losses are real valued on VVV, and the stated subgradient inequality is relative to VVV. The book defines a full-space subgradient for an extended-real-valued function; every such subgradient gives the relative inequality used here. This is the precise convention for that milestone and is disclosed in its item description. Contributions that establish the projection inequality, the single-round inequalities, and either complete form of Theorem 2.13 fit the mission. The regret and run definitions can be reused in later deterministic online optimization results, while the projection predicate is already shared with another textbook development.

Selected references

  • Francesco Orabona, Online Learning: A Modern Introduction Using Convex Optimization, arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.13213v10, 2026. Pinned preprint
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationMachine Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games I: If Every Player Runs Optimistic FTRL with Step Size 1/(2(n−1)), the Sum of All Players' Regrets Is at Most 2n(n−1)RResearch Paper

Motivation

When the players of a game repeatedly adjust their strategies with no-regret learning algorithms, the empirical distribution of play converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium, and in smooth games the average social welfare approaches the price-of-anarchy guarantee of the game (Roughgarden 2009). For generic no-regret algorithms such as Hedge the convergence rate is O(1/T)O(1/\sqrt T)O(1/T​), because each player's regret after TTT rounds is of order T\sqrt TT​ in the worst case, against an adversary.

Other players are not adversaries: they are also learning, and their strategies change slowly. Syrgkanis, Agarwal, Luo and Schapire (NIPS 2015, arXiv:1507.00407v5) identify a property of learning algorithms, regret bounded by variation in utilities (RVU), under which this predictability can be exploited in general multi-player games, and show that a natural class of algorithms has it. This mission formalizes their first main consequence: if every player uses optimistic follow the regularized leader (OFTRL), the sum of all players' regrets stays bounded by a constant independent of TTT, so the average welfare converges at rate O(1/T)O(1/T)O(1/T).

Timeline. Rakhlin and Sridharan (COLT 2013; NIPS 2013) introduced optimistic mirror descent and showed O(log⁡T/T)O(\log T / T)O(logT/T) convergence to the minimax value in two-player zero-sum games when both players use it. Syrgkanis et al. (2015) extend the fast-rate phenomenon to general nnn-player games and arbitrary no-regret algorithms with the RVU property (Theorem 4), and establish RVU for OFTRL (Proposition 7), giving Corollary 8.

Setting

A game has nnn players. Each player iii has a finite strategy set SiS_iSi​ with ∣Si∣=d|S_i| = d∣Si​∣=d, and a utility ui(s)∈[0,1]u_i(s) \in [0,1]ui​(s)∈[0,1] for each pure profile s=(s1,…,sn)s = (s_1, \dots, s_n)s=(s1​,…,sn​). A mixed strategy is a point wiw_iwi​ of the probability simplex Δ=Δ(Si)⊂Rd\Delta = \Delta(S_i) \subset \mathbb R^dΔ=Δ(Si​)⊂Rd, and a mixed profile w=(w1,…,wn)w = (w_1, \dots, w_n)w=(w1​,…,wn​) induces the product distribution on pure profiles.

The game is played for TTT rounds. At round ttt each player picks wit∈Δw_i^t \in \Deltawit​∈Δ and then observes the utility vector uit∈Rdu_i^t \in \mathbb R^duit​∈Rd with entries

ui,xt=Es−i∼w−it[ui(x,s−i)],x∈Si,u^t_{i,x} = \mathbb E_{s_{-i}\sim w^t_{-i}}\big[u_i(x, s_{-i})\big], \qquad x \in S_i ,ui,xt​=Es−i​∼w−it​​[ui​(x,s−i​)],x∈Si​,

so that ⟨wit,uit⟩\langle w_i^t, u_i^t\rangle⟨wit​,uit​⟩ is the expected utility of player iii at round ttt. The regret of player iii is

ri(T)=sup⁡w∗∈Δ∑t=1T⟨w∗−wit,uit⟩.r_i(T) = \sup_{w^* \in \Delta} \sum_{t=1}^T \langle w^* - w_i^t, u_i^t\rangle .ri​(T)=w∗∈Δsup​t=1∑T​⟨w∗−wit​,uit​⟩.

The primal norm is ∥v∥=∥v∥1\|v\| = \|v\|_1∥v∥=∥v∥1​ and its dual is ∥v∥∗=∥v∥∞\|v\|_* = \|v\|_\infty∥v∥∗​=∥v∥∞​. A regularizer R:Δ→R\mathcal R : \Delta \to \mathbb RR:Δ→R is 1-strongly convex if R(a+b2)≤R(a)+R(b)2−∥a−b∥128\mathcal R(\tfrac{a+b}{2}) \le \tfrac{\mathcal R(a) + \mathcal R(b)}{2} - \tfrac{\|a-b\|_1^2}{8}R(2a+b​)≤2R(a)+R(b)​−8∥a−b∥12​​ for all a,b∈Δa, b \in \Deltaa,b∈Δ, and RRR denotes a bound on its range, R(f)−R(g)≤R\mathcal R(f) - \mathcal R(g) \le RR(f)−R(g)≤R on Δ\DeltaΔ. Optimistic FTRL with step size η>0\eta > 0η>0 and predictors MitM^t_iMit​ plays wi0=argmin⁡ΔRw_i^0 = \operatorname{argmin}_\Delta \mathcal Rwi0​=argminΔ​R and, for T≥1T \ge 1T≥1,

wiT∈argmax⁡w∈Δ ⟨w,∑t=1T−1uit+MiT⟩−R(w)η.w_i^T \in \operatorname*{argmax}_{w \in \Delta}\ \Big\langle w, \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} u_i^t + M_i^T\Big\rangle - \frac{\mathcal R(w)}{\eta}.wiT​∈w∈Δargmax​ ⟨w,t=1∑T−1​uit​+MiT​⟩−ηR(w)​.

With one-step recency bias, MiT=uiT−1M_i^T = u_i^{T-1}MiT​=uiT−1​: the algorithm bets that the next utility vector equals the last one.

An algorithm has the RVU property with constants α>0\alpha > 0α>0, 0<β≤γ0 < \beta \le \gamma0<β≤γ if for every utility sequence

∑t=1T⟨w∗−wt,ut⟩≤α+β∑t=1T∥ut−ut−1∥∗2−γ∑t=1T∥wt−wt−1∥2.\sum_{t=1}^T\langle w^* - w^t, u^t\rangle \le \alpha + \beta\sum_{t=1}^T \|u^t - u^{t-1}\|_*^2 - \gamma \sum_{t=1}^T \|w^t - w^{t-1}\|^2 .t=1∑T​⟨w∗−wt,ut⟩≤α+βt=1∑T​∥ut−ut−1∥∗2​−γt=1∑T​∥wt−wt−1∥2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 8

If every player runs OFTRL with Mit=uit−1M_i^t = u_i^{t-1}Mit​=uit−1​ and η=1/(2(n−1))\eta = 1/(2(n-1))η=1/(2(n−1)), n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, then for every TTT

∑iri(T)≤nRη=2n(n−1)R.\sum_{i} r_i(T) \le \frac{nR}{\eta} = 2n(n-1)R .i∑​ri​(T)≤ηnR​=2n(n−1)R.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 19 (supp. p. 3): the regret of OFTRL with any predictor sequence is at most R/η+∑t∥ut−Mt∥∗∥wt−gt∥−12η∑t(∥wt−gt∥2+∥wt−gt−1∥2)R/\eta + \sum_t \|u^t - M^t\|_*\|w^t - g^t\| - \frac{1}{2\eta}\sum_t(\|w^t - g^t\|^2 + \|w^t - g^{t-1}\|^2)R/η+∑t​∥ut−Mt∥∗​∥wt−gt∥−2η1​∑t​(∥wt−gt∥2+∥wt−gt−1∥2), where gtg^tgt is the leader sequence.
  2. Lemma 20 (supp. p. 4): ∥wt−gt∥≤η∥Mt−ut∥∗\|w^t - g^t\| \le \eta\|M^t - u^t\|_*∥wt−gt∥≤η∥Mt−ut∥∗​ and ∥gt−wt+1∥≤η∥Mt+1∥∗\|g^t - w^{t+1}\| \le \eta\|M^{t+1}\|_*∥gt−wt+1∥≤η∥Mt+1∥∗​.
  3. Proposition 7 (p. 5): OFTRL with Mt=ut−1M^t = u^{t-1}Mt=ut−1 has RVU with α=R/η\alpha = R/\etaα=R/η, β=η\beta = \etaβ=η, γ=1/(4η)\gamma = 1/(4\eta)γ=1/(4η).
  4. Display (2) (p. 4): ∥uit−uit−1∥∗\|u_i^t - u_i^{t-1}\|_*∥uit​−uit−1​∥∗​ is at most the total variation between the opponents' product distributions, which is at most ∑j≠i∥wjt−wjt−1∥1\sum_{j \ne i}\|w_j^t - w_j^{t-1}\|_1∑j=i​∥wjt​−wjt−1​∥1​.
  5. The variation bound (p. 4): ∑i∥uit−uit−1∥∗2≤(n−1)2∑i∥wit−wit−1∥12\sum_i \|u^t_i - u^{t-1}_i\|_*^2 \le (n-1)^2 \sum_i \|w_i^t - w_i^{t-1}\|_1^2∑i​∥uit​−uit−1​∥∗2​≤(n−1)2∑i​∥wit​−wit−1​∥12​.
  6. Theorem 4 (p. 4): if every player satisfies RVU with β≤γ/(n−1)2\beta \le \gamma/(n-1)^2β≤γ/(n−1)2 and ∥⋅∥=∥⋅∥1\|\cdot\| = \|\cdot\|_1∥⋅∥=∥⋅∥1​, then ∑iri(T)≤αn\sum_i r_i(T) \le \alpha n∑i​ri​(T)≤αn.

A companion statement, Proposition 2 (p. 3), turns a regret bound into a welfare bound in a (λ,μ)(\lambda,\mu)(λ,μ)-smooth game: 1T∑tW(wt)≥λ1+μOPT−11+μ1T∑iri(T)\frac1T\sum_t W(w^t) \ge \frac{\lambda}{1+\mu}\mathrm{OPT} - \frac{1}{1+\mu}\frac1T\sum_i r_i(T)T1​∑t​W(wt)≥1+μλ​OPT−1+μ1​T1​∑i​ri​(T).

Significance

Corollary 8 says that uncoupled learning dynamics, in which each player sees only its own utility vectors, can keep the total regret of all players bounded by a constant in an arbitrary finite game. By Proposition 2 this gives O(1/T)O(1/T)O(1/T) convergence of the average welfare to the price-of-anarchy bound in smooth games, against O(1/T)O(1/\sqrt T)O(1/T​) for generic no-regret algorithms. The RVU framework has since become a standard tool in the analysis of optimistic learning in games, and Theorem 4 decouples the game-level argument from the choice of algorithm.

The paper's proofs are in its supplementary material (App. A and C). None of the results here has a machine-checked proof to our knowledge. A complete formalization produces a reusable layer: utility vectors of mixed profiles, total-variation subadditivity for finite product distributions, and the regret analysis of optimistic FTRL under an ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-strongly convex regularizer.

Difficulty

The game-level step (Theorem 4) is short once display (2) is available, but (2) itself, subadditivity of total variation over products of n−1n-1n−1 finite distributions, is not available in Mathlib in this form.

The core is the single-player analysis. Theorem 19 and Lemma 20 compare the iterates with the leader sequence, an object the algorithm never computes, and both rest on the quadratic-growth fact that a maximizer www of a 1/η1/\eta1/η-strongly concave function FFF satisfies F(w)≥F(g)+12η∥w−g∥2F(w) \ge F(g) + \frac{1}{2\eta}\|w - g\|^2F(w)≥F(g)+2η1​∥w−g∥2. Footnote 3's midpoint inequality does not give the constant 12η\frac{1}{2\eta}2η1​ in a single application; it has to be upgraded to the standard form of strong convexity first.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n, strategies Fin d; time keeps the paper's indices t=1,…,Tt = 1, \dots, Tt=1,…,T with w0w^0w0 and u0u^0u0. ui0u_i^0ui0​ is the utility vector against w−i0w^0_{-i}w−i0​, the formula of p. 2 at t=0t = 0t=0, which the paper uses but never writes. Mixed profiles and expectations come from the published definition agt_games. ∥⋅∥1\|\cdot\|_1∥⋅∥1​ is defined explicitly and ∥⋅∥∗\|\cdot\|_*∥⋅∥∗​ is Mathlib's sup norm. Regret and RRR are never written as suprema: a bound on ∑iri(T)\sum_i r_i(T)∑i​ri​(T) is stated for every profile of comparators in Δ\DeltaΔ, and RRR is any upper bound on the range of every regularizer.

Added hypotheses, each disclosed in its statement:

  • each regularizer is continuous on Δ\DeltaΔ, which makes footnote 3 equivalent to standard strong convexity;
  • n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 in the goal;
  • Theorem 4's condition is written as β(n−1)2≤γ\beta(n-1)^2 \le \gammaβ(n−1)2≤γ, so n=1n = 1n=1 involves no division by zero;
  • RVU is assumed in Theorem 4 only on the realized play, a weaker hypothesis than the paper's;
  • T≥1T \ge 1T≥1 and 1+μ>01 + \mu > 01+μ>0 in Proposition 2;
  • per-player regularizers Ri\mathcal R_iRi​ (footnote 2).

Theorem 19, Lemma 20 and Proposition 7 are stated for ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​; the paper allows any norm.

OFTRL is an argmax predicate, so the goal holds for every trajectory the dynamics can produce, not for a chosen one. It is not the entropic closed form (Optimistic Hedge). The utility bound ui∈[0,1]u_i \in [0,1]ui​∈[0,1] is kept, since the game-level statements are false without it. A sanity file shows that R(w)=d2∑xwx2\mathcal R(w) = \frac d2\sum_x w_x^2R(w)=2d​∑x​wx2​ satisfies the strong-convexity hypothesis and that OFTRL runs exist, so the hypotheses are satisfiable.

Contributions are welcome for each milestone. The quadratic-growth lemma for midpoint strongly convex continuous functions on the simplex and the total-variation bound for products are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • V. Syrgkanis, A. Agarwal, H. Luo, R. E. Schapire, Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games, NIPS 2015. arXiv:1507.00407v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.00407
  • A. Rakhlin, K. Sridharan, Online Learning with Predictable Sequences, COLT 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.3728
  • A. Rakhlin, K. Sridharan, Optimization, Learning, and Games with Predictable Sequences, NIPS 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.1869
  • T. Roughgarden, Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy, STOC 2009. https://doi.org/10.1145/1536414.1536485
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerated Gradient Methods for Nonconvex Nonlinear and Stochastic Programming 4: The Mini-Batch RSAG Method Bounds the Expected Gradient Mapping on Nonconvex Stochastic Composite ProblemsResearch Paper

Motivation

Training a model by stochastic gradients on a constrained or regularized loss is a stochastic composite problem: a smooth expected loss, observed only through noisy gradients, plus a simple non-smooth term such as a constraint set or an ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ penalty. For convex losses, accelerated stochastic approximation methods attain the optimal rates (Lan 2012; Ghadimi & Lan 2012). For nonconvex losses, the available guarantees came from randomized stochastic gradient methods (Ghadimi & Lan 2013) and their mini-batch proximal versions (Ghadimi, Lan & Zhang 2016), which are not optimal when the problem happens to be convex.

Ghadimi and Lan (arXiv:1310.3787v1, 2013; Math. Program. 156, 2016) gave one accelerated scheme covering both cases. This mission formalizes its most general result, Theorem 4 (§3.2): the randomized stochastic accelerated gradient (RSAG) method with mini-batches, on a composite objective whose smooth part may be nonconvex and whose gradients are noisy.

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean norm. The problem (1.3) is

min⁡x∈Rn Φ(x):=Ψ(x)+X(x),Ψ=f+h,\min_{x\in\mathbb R^n}\ \Phi(x):=\Psi(x)+\mathcal X(x),\qquad\Psi=f+h,x∈Rnmin​ Φ(x):=Ψ(x)+X(x),Ψ=f+h,

where fff is differentiable with LfL_fLf​-Lipschitz gradient and may be nonconvex, hhh is convex and differentiable with LhL_hLh​-Lipschitz gradient, LΨ=Lf+LhL_\Psi=L_f+L_hLΨ​=Lf​+Lh​, and X\mathcal XX is a convex, possibly non-smooth function with bounded domain KKK (for instance the indicator of a convex compact set, or that indicator plus ∥⋅∥1\|\cdot\|_1∥⋅∥1​).

The prox map (2.37) is P(x,y,c)=argmin⁡u{⟨y,u⟩+12c∥u−x∥2+X(u)}\mathcal P(x,y,c)=\operatorname{argmin}_u\{\langle y,u\rangle+\frac1{2c}\|u-x\|^2+\mathcal X(u)\}P(x,y,c)=argminu​{⟨y,u⟩+2c1​∥u−x∥2+X(u)} for c>0c>0c>0, and the gradient mapping (2.38) is G(x,y,c)=1c[x−P(x,y,c)]\mathcal G(x,y,c)=\frac1c[x-\mathcal P(x,y,c)]G(x,y,c)=c1​[x−P(x,y,c)]. With y=∇Ψ(x)y=\nabla\Psi(x)y=∇Ψ(x), a small ∥G∥\|\mathcal G\|∥G∥ certifies approximate stationarity. Assumption 2 asks for MMM with ∥P(x,y,c)∥≤M\|\mathcal P(x,y,c)\|\le M∥P(x,y,c)∥≤M for all x,yx,yx,y and c>0c>0c>0.

Gradients come from a stochastic oracle: queried at xxx, it returns G(x,ξ)G(x,\xi)G(x,ξ) for a random sample ξ\xiξ. Assumption 1 asks that the output be unbiased, E[G(x,ξ)]=∇Ψ(x)\mathbb E[G(x,\xi)]=\nabla\Psi(x)E[G(x,ξ)]=∇Ψ(x), with variance at most σ2\sigma^2σ2.

Algorithm 4 takes α1=1\alpha_1=1α1​=1, αk∈(0,1)\alpha_k\in(0,1)αk​∈(0,1) for k≥2k\ge2k≥2, βk,λk>0\beta_k,\lambda_k>0βk​,λk​>0, batch sizes mk≥1m_k\ge1mk​≥1, starts from x0=x0agx_0=x^{ag}_0x0​=x0ag​, and for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 sets

xkmd=(1−αk)xk−1ag+αkxk−1,Gˉk=1mk∑i=1mkG(xkmd,ξk,i),x^{md}_k=(1-\alpha_k)x^{ag}_{k-1}+\alpha_kx_{k-1},\qquad\bar G_k=\frac1{m_k}\sum_{i=1}^{m_k}G(x^{md}_k,\xi_{k,i}),xkmd​=(1−αk​)xk−1ag​+αk​xk−1​,Gˉk​=mk​1​i=1∑mk​​G(xkmd​,ξk,i​), xk=P(xk−1,Gˉk,λk),xkag=P(xkmd,Gˉk,βk).x_k=\mathcal P(x_{k-1},\bar G_k,\lambda_k),\qquad x^{ag}_k=\mathcal P(x^{md}_k,\bar G_k,\beta_k).xk​=P(xk−1​,Gˉk​,λk​),xkag​=P(xkmd​,Gˉk​,βk​).

With Γ1=1\Gamma_1=1Γ1​=1 and Γk=(1−αk)Γk−1\Gamma_k=(1-\alpha_k)\Gamma_{k-1}Γk​=(1−αk​)Γk−1​ (2.6), the output is (xRmd,xRag)(x^{md}_R,x^{ag}_R)(xRmd​,xRag​), where R∈{1,…,N}R\in\{1,\dots,N\}R∈{1,…,N} is drawn independently of the oracle with

Prob{R=k}=Γk−1βk(1−LΨβk)∑j=1NΓj−1βj(1−LΨβj).(3.7)\mathrm{Prob}\{R=k\}=\frac{\Gamma_k^{-1}\beta_k(1-L_\Psi\beta_k)}{\sum_{j=1}^N\Gamma_j^{-1}\beta_j(1-L_\Psi\beta_j)}.\tag{3.7}Prob{R=k}=∑j=1N​Γj−1​βj​(1−LΨ​βj​)Γk−1​βk​(1−LΨ​βk​)​.(3.7)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (pp. 21–22)

Fix N≥1N\ge1N≥1, assume for k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N

αkλk≤βk<1LΨ  (2.9),α1λ1Γ1≥α2λ2Γ2≥⋯  (2.10),\alpha_k\lambda_k\le\beta_k<\frac1{L_\Psi}\ \ (2.9),\qquad\frac{\alpha_1}{\lambda_1\Gamma_1}\ge\frac{\alpha_2}{\lambda_2\Gamma_2}\ge\cdots\ \ (2.10),αk​λk​≤βk​<LΨ​1​  (2.9),λ1​Γ1​α1​​≥λ2​Γ2​α2​​≥⋯  (2.10),

let x∗x^*x∗ be an optimal solution and S=∑k=1NΓk−1βk(1−LΨβk)S=\sum_{k=1}^N\Gamma_k^{-1}\beta_k(1-L_\Psi\beta_k)S=∑k=1N​Γk−1​βk​(1−LΨ​βk​). Then

E[∥G(xRmd,∇Ψ(xRmd),βR)∥2]≤8S[∥x0−x∗∥22λ1+LfΓN(∥x∗∥2+2M2)+σ2∑k=1Nβk(4+(1−LΨβk)2)4Γk(1−LΨβk)mk],(3.30)\mathbb E\big[\|\mathcal G(x^{md}_R,\nabla\Psi(x^{md}_R),\beta_R)\|^2\big]\le\frac8S\Big[\frac{\|x_0-x^*\|^2}{2\lambda_1}+\frac{L_f}{\Gamma_N}(\|x^*\|^2+2M^2)+\sigma^2\sum_{k=1}^N\frac{\beta_k(4+(1-L_\Psi\beta_k)^2)}{4\Gamma_k(1-L_\Psi\beta_k)m_k}\Big],\tag{3.30}E[∥G(xRmd​,∇Ψ(xRmd​),βR​)∥2]≤S8​[2λ1​∥x0​−x∗∥2​+ΓN​Lf​​(∥x∗∥2+2M2)+σ2k=1∑N​4Γk​(1−LΨ​βk​)mk​βk​(4+(1−LΨ​βk​)2)​],(3.30)

and, if Lf=0L_f=0Lf​=0,

E[Φ(xRag)−Φ(x∗)]≤1S∑k=1Nβk(1−LΨβk)(∥x0−x∗∥22λ1+σ2∑j=1kβj(4+(1−LΨβj)2)4Γj(1−LΨβj)mj).(3.31)\mathbb E\big[\Phi(x^{ag}_R)-\Phi(x^*)\big]\le\frac1S\sum_{k=1}^N\beta_k(1-L_\Psi\beta_k)\Big(\frac{\|x_0-x^*\|^2}{2\lambda_1}+\sigma^2\sum_{j=1}^k\frac{\beta_j(4+(1-L_\Psi\beta_j)^2)}{4\Gamma_j(1-L_\Psi\beta_j)m_j}\Big).\tag{3.31}E[Φ(xRag​)−Φ(x∗)]≤S1​k=1∑N​βk​(1−LΨ​βk​)(2λ1​∥x0​−x∗∥2​+σ2j=1∑k​4Γj​(1−LΨ​βj​)mj​βj​(4+(1−LΨ​βj​)2)​).(3.31)

The expectations are over RRR and all samples. The goal keeps general step sizes and batch sizes; Corollaries 4 and 5 (explicit policies) are left for follow-up work.

Milestones

In the order of the proof: Lemma 4 (G(x,⋅,c)\mathcal G(x,\cdot,c)G(x,⋅,c) is 1-Lipschitz); the mini-batch variance bound (3.28) and its consequence (3.29) for the gradient mapping; Lemma 1, (2.16) and Lemma 5, the two-sided bound −Lf2∥y−x∥2≤Ψ(y)−Ψ(x)−⟨∇Ψ(x),y−x⟩≤LΨ2∥y−x∥2-\frac{L_f}2\|y-x\|^2\le\Psi(y)-\Psi(x)-\langle\nabla\Psi(x),y-x\rangle\le\frac{L_\Psi}2\|y-x\|^2−2Lf​​∥y−x∥2≤Ψ(y)−Ψ(x)−⟨∇Ψ(x),y−x⟩≤2LΨ​​∥y−x∥2; the three-point inequalities (3.32)–(3.33) and their combination (3.34); the descent bound (2.46) (already proved on the platform) and (2.47); the one-step and summed inequalities of p. 22; the iterate bound (2.52); the summed inequality at x=x∗x=x^*x=x∗; and the expected bound (3.35).

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 covers stochastic composite problems whether or not Ψ\PsiΨ is convex, with one step-size policy. Under Corollary 4's policy and batch sizes it gives a sample complexity for E∥G∥2≤ϵ\mathbb E\|\mathcal G\|^2\le\epsilonE∥G∥2≤ϵ that improves the dependence on LhL_hLh​ over mini-batch proximal stochastic gradient [Ghadimi, Lan & Zhang 2016], and when Lf=0L_f=0Lf​=0 it recovers the optimal rate for convex stochastic composite optimization. Its proof is a template for later variance-controlled accelerated methods: a weighted Lyapunov argument in which nonconvexity enters only through LfL_fLf​ and noise only through the martingale and variance terms.

Formalizing it. The result has been proved and refereed since 2016. As far as is known, no proof assistant has a formalization of it, and the platform has no accelerated stochastic method with a nonconvex guarantee. A complete development gives machine-checked versions of the mini-batch variance bound for martingale-difference noise, the Lipschitz property of the gradient mapping, the proximal three-point inequality on a convex domain, and the composite accelerated analysis with noise. Each of these can be reused in other stochastic proximal methods.

Difficulty

Copying the deterministic composite proof (Theorem 2) fails in two places. First, the deterministic step bounds min⁡k∥Gk∥\min_k\|\mathcal G_k\|mink​∥Gk​∥ through the decrease ∥xkag−xkmd∥2\|x^{ag}_k-x^{md}_k\|^2∥xkag​−xkmd​∥2, but here xkagx^{ag}_kxkag​ is computed from Gˉk\bar G_kGˉk​, so this decrease measures the stochastic gradient mapping. Passing back to the exact one costs an extra variance term, which is why the constant is 8 rather than 2. Second, the noise δˉk\bar\delta_kδˉk​ appears in two ways. The linear term ⟨δˉk,x∗−xk−1⟩\langle\bar\delta_k,x^*-x_{k-1}\rangle⟨δˉk​,x∗−xk−1​⟩ vanishes only in expectation, and only because xk−1x_{k-1}xk−1​ is fixed before the batch is drawn. The quadratic terms need the variance of an average of dependent samples, which is σ2/mk\sigma^2/m_kσ2/mk​ only when the samples within a batch are conditionally unbiased given the earlier ones. A pathwise argument cannot remove either term, and an unconditional reading of Assumption 1 does not give the second.

Formalization scope

  • Space and smoothness. Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) (the published GhadimiLan.RSG.E). Smoothness of fff and hhh is the platform's ConvexOptAlg.SmoothGD.IsBetaSmooth. Ψ\PsiΨ, ∇Ψ\nabla\Psi∇Ψ and LΨL_\PsiLΨ​ are given with the identities Ψ=f+h\Psi=f+hΨ=f+h, ∇Ψ=∇f+∇h\nabla\Psi=\nabla f+\nabla h∇Ψ=∇f+∇h, LΨ=Lf+LhL_\Psi=L_f+L_hLΨ​=Lf​+Lh​.
  • The convex term is its domain K with finite values X and ConvexOn ℝ K X; the prox map is a function P with the minimizer hypothesis IsProxMap K X P. A real-valued X\mathcal XX on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn is excluded: it makes Assumption 2 unsatisfiable and the goal vacuous. So is a free P with no minimizer property.
  • The noise. Oracle calls are numbered consecutively; iteration kkk makes calls Sk−1+1,…,Sk−1+mkS_{k-1}+1,\dots,S_{k-1}+m_kSk−1​+1,…,Sk−1​+mk​ with Sk=m1+⋯+mkS_k=m_1+\dots+m_kSk​=m1​+⋯+mk​, all at xkmdx^{md}_kxkmd​. Assumption 1 is the published GhadimiLan.RSG.AssumptionA1 along these query points: conditional unbiasedness given a filtration of the earlier calls, and conditional variance bound σ2\sigma^2σ2. This conditional form is what the paper's proof uses, and the i.i.d. setting satisfies it. The oracle is jointly measurable. The variance bound (3.28) is a milestone and is never assumed.
  • The output index RRR is measurable, takes values in {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} with mass function (3.7), and is independent of the whole sample sequence. Algorithm 4 runs pathwise, for every kkk, and is evaluated at RRR, which is the paper's "run NNN steps, output the RRR-th iterate". Integrability of every expected quantity is part of each conclusion.
  • Excluded trivializations: batch size fixed to 1 (general mkm_kmk​ is kept), σ=0\sigma=0σ=0, a fixed RRR, and (3.28) taken as a hypothesis.
  • Conventions. Indexing is 1-based, and Γk=∏i=2k(1−αi)\Gamma_k=\prod_{i=2}^k(1-\alpha_i)Γk​=∏i=2k​(1−αi​), so Γ1=1\Gamma_1=1Γ1​=1. (2.9) and (2.10) are imposed for k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N, and βk<1/LΨ\beta_k<1/L_\Psiβk​<1/LΨ​ is written LΨβk<1L_\Psi\beta_k<1LΨ​βk​<1. Two hypotheses are added: an optimal x∗x^*x∗ exists (the statement uses it), and ∥x0∥≤M\|x_0\|\le M∥x0​∥≤M (used silently in (2.52) at k=1k=1k=1). The page prints Φ(x)\Phi(x)Φ(x) on the left of (3.35) where Φ(x∗)\Phi(x^*)Φ(x∗) is meant; the Lean states Φ(x∗)\Phi(x^*)Φ(x∗).

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone. Lemma 4, (3.28) and the three-point inequality are self-contained and reusable. Also welcome: the measurability of the iterates, and Corollaries 4–5 as follow-up statements.

Selected references

  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Accelerated Gradient Methods for Nonconvex Nonlinear and Stochastic Programming, arXiv:1310.3787v1, 2013; Math. Program. 156 (2016) 59–99. https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.3787v1 · https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-015-0871-8
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, H. Zhang, Mini-batch stochastic approximation methods for nonconvex stochastic composite optimization, Math. Program. 155 (2016) 267–305 (reference [13] of the paper: the mini-batch variance bound and Proposition 1, the Lipschitz property of G\mathcal GG). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-014-0846-1
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic first- and zeroth-order methods for nonconvex stochastic programming, SIAM J. Optim. 23 (2013) 2341–2368 (the randomized stochastic gradient method). https://doi.org/10.1137/120880811
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Optimal stochastic approximation algorithms for strongly convex stochastic composite optimization, I: a generic algorithmic framework, SIAM J. Optim. 22 (2012) 1469–1492 (reference [11] of the paper; its Lemma 2 is the three-point inequality). https://doi.org/10.1137/110848864
  • G. Lan, An optimal method for stochastic composite optimization, Math. Program. 133 (2012) 365–397. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-010-0434-y
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Modern Introduction to Online Learning VIII: Tsallis-INF Has Adversarial Regret 32L∞√((d − 1)T) and Stochastic Pseudo-Regret 256L∞² Σ_i (1 + ln T)/Δ_iTextbook

Why bandit feedback matters

In online learning with bandit feedback, the learner chooses one action and sees only that action's loss. This is the information pattern of sequential trials in which testing one option does not reveal the outcomes of the others. The learner must keep its cumulative loss close to that of a good fixed action while learning which actions are good. A full-information method can update from every arm's loss each round; here the unseen losses have to be handled through the observations the learner actually receives. Chapter 9 of Orabona's text develops this distinction for multi-armed bandits.

Two environments are treated in the chapter. With an oblivious adversary, all losses are fixed before play, although the learner does not know them. With a stochastic environment, each arm has a fixed loss distribution and new losses are drawn across rounds. An algorithm with a guarantee in both environments does not need to be told which generated its data. Theorem 9.17 gives such a pair of guarantees for the FTRL version of Tsallis-INF, using the precise constants stated in the pinned version of the book.

Arms, losses, and the algorithm

There are ddd arms and TTT rounds, numbered 1,…,T1,\ldots,T1,…,T. In round ttt, the learner forms a probability vector xt=(xt,1,…,xt,d)x_t=(x_{t,1},\ldots,x_{t,d})xt​=(xt,1​,…,xt,d​) on the simplex Δd−1\Delta^{d-1}Δd−1, draws an arm AtA_tAt​ with probability xt,ix_{t,i}xt,i​ of choosing iii, and observes only gt,Atg_{t,A_t}gt,At​​. The loss gt,ig_{t,i}gt,i​ of an unchosen arm is not revealed. For an oblivious adversary, the entire table (gt,i)(g_{t,i})(gt,i​) is deterministic and the expectation is over the learner's draws.

Algorithm 9.6 uses the importance-weighted estimate g~t,i=gt,i/xt,i\widetilde g_{t,i}=g_{t,i}/x_{t,i}g​t,i​=gt,i​/xt,i​ if At=iA_t=iAt​=i, and 000 otherwise. Its Tsallis-INF FTRL prediction minimizes, over x∈Δd−1x\in\Delta^{d-1}x∈Δd−1,

⟨∑s=1t−1g~s,x⟩−4L∞t∑i=1dxi.\left\langle\sum_{s=1}^{t-1}\widetilde g_s,x\right\rangle -4L_\infty\sqrt t\sum_{i=1}^{d}\sqrt{x_i}.⟨s=1∑t−1​g​s​,x⟩−4L∞​t​i=1∑d​xi​​.

The minimizer has positive coordinates. Thus each denominator xt,ix_{t,i}xt,i​ used by the estimator is positive. In the stochastic environment, arm iii has mean μi\mu_iμi​; if jjj is a best arm, its gap is Δi=μi−μj\Delta_i=\mu_i-\mu_jΔi​=μi​−μj​. The pull count ST,iS_{T,i}ST,i​ is the number of rounds through TTT in which arm iii is selected. Stochastic pseudo-regret compares the learner's expected loss with TμjT\mu_jTμj​, the expected loss of always playing the best arm.

Formalization targets

The mission's main theorem is the adversarial claim of Theorem 9.17, p. 165. For every fixed comparator arm kkk and losses in [0,L∞][0,L_\infty][0,L∞​],

E ⁣[∑t=1T(gt,At−gt,k)]≤32L∞(d−1)T.\mathbb E\!\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T}(g_{t,A_t}-g_{t,k})\right] \le 32L_\infty\sqrt{(d-1)T}.E[t=1∑T​(gt,At​​−gt,k​)]≤32L∞​(d−1)T​.

Taking kkk to be the best arm in the fixed loss table yields the stated adversarial regret bound. The companion item formalizes the second claim of the same theorem: if the losses are stochastic with a unique best arm and T≥1T\ge1T≥1, then

P ⁣-⁡RegretT≤256L∞2∑i:Δi≠01+ln⁡TΔi.\mathrm{P\!\operatorname{-}Regret}_T \le256L_\infty^2\sum_{i:\Delta_i\ne0}\frac{1+\ln T}{\Delta_i}.P-RegretT​≤256L∞2​i:Δi​=0∑​Δi​1+lnT​.

The milestone list contains the chapter's pseudo-regret decomposition (Lemma 9.10), its sub-Gaussian sample-mean bound (Corollary 9.9, reused from an existing formal statement), and the probability-sensitive Tsallis-INF inequality (9.8). These are distinct mathematical claims rather than alternate names for the final bound.

What the result provides

The adversarial bound grows like T\sqrt{T}T​ and remains valid for any fixed bounded loss table. The stochastic bound instead measures the difficulty of distinguishing arms through the positive gaps Δi\Delta_iΔi​ and grows logarithmically with the horizon for fixed gaps. Both refer to the same FTRL update and the same importance-weighted estimator. The finite-horizon constants 323232 and 256256256 are part of the target, not unspecified factors hidden in asymptotic notation.

Both claims are proved in the book. The work here is to give their hypotheses, random experiment, and algorithm a machine-checkable Lean interface, then formalize the known arguments. At this drafting stage the theorem bodies are open Lean problems; a successful build checks that their statements are well formed, not that the regret bounds have been proved. The resulting finite-history bandit protocol and stochastic pseudo-regret definitions can also support other loss-based bandit algorithms. The existing formalized sub-Gaussian tail bound can be reused for concentration results elsewhere in the chapter.

Where the proof is difficult

The learner observes only one coordinate, while regret is measured against losses across all arms. The importance-weighted estimate corrects the missing observations in expectation, but its size can grow when a selected arm has small probability. Consequently, a bound based only on a uniform estimate of its magnitude loses the probability dependence needed for the theorem's constants. The stochastic claim adds another difficulty: the learner's choices depend on past observed losses, so a current loss must be related to a random pull count without letting the choice depend on that current loss.

There are two tempting but invalid shortcuts. Permitting xtx_txt​ to inspect gtg_tgt​ would change the bandit protocol, and taking an expectation under an arbitrary path measure would no longer describe the arm draws of Algorithm 9.6. The formal statements tie each prediction to its FTRL objective and each path probability to the predictions made along that history.

Formalization scope

Arms are Fin d; the main theorem permits d=1d=1d=1, where both its regret and bound are zero. Rounds retain the book's 1,…,T1,\ldots,T1,…,T indexing. A finite path has a dummy coordinate zero, fixed to an arbitrary anchor arm; this coordinate is never played or scored. The adversarial losses are a fixed table, selected before any draw. A path has probability equal to the product of the algorithm's conditional arm probabilities, and regret against a fixed arm is a finite weighted sum over paths. The FTRL run predicate requires simplex membership, strict positivity, minimization against every simplex point, and dependence only on past arm choices. The last two properties specify the intended update on every possible history.

The stochastic model first samples a loss table from a probability measure and then draws an arm path conditionally using the same Algorithm 9.6. Current-round loss vectors are independent across rounds, while coordinates within one round need not be independent. Each arm has the same mean in every round. The policy is a measurable function of the observed history (past arms and their losses); its expected loss is explicitly integrable. Loss bounds are imposed on every outcome in the chosen sample space, which can be taken as the support of bounded distributions. The stochastic statement adds T≥1T\ge1T≥1 to make the logarithmic formula's domain explicit, and the unique-best-arm assumption ensures every denominator Δi\Delta_iΔi​ in the displayed sum is positive. Lemma 9.10 also spells out the integrability of its means and pull counts.

The development needs finite probability laws, real integrals, simplex geometry, and properties of the square-root regularizer. The independent tail bound for sample means is already available as a referenced theorem. Contributions that establish existence and interiority of the FTRL minimizer, the normalization of the path law, or the stated regret inequalities fit this scope. A choice rule that sees the current loss, a path law unrelated to xtx_txt​, or a zero integrability default does not satisfy the intended bandit model.

Selected references

  • Francesco Orabona, Online Learning: A Modern Introduction Using Convex Optimization, arXiv:1912.13213v10, 2026, Chapter 9, pp. 151–169. arXiv
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Provably Efficient Reinforcement Learning with Linear Function Approximation 1: LSVI-UCB Has Regret O(√(d³H³Tι²)) with Probability 1 − p on Linear MDPsResearch Paper

Motivation

Reinforcement learning with large or continuous state spaces is done in practice with function approximation: the agent represents value functions in a low-dimensional parametric family instead of a table indexed by states. For tabular Markov decision processes, regret bounds of order H2SAT\sqrt{H^2SAT}H2SAT​ have been known since the work on UCRL and UCBVI, but they scale with the number of states SSS and actions AAA and say nothing when SSS is infinite. Before 2019, provable guarantees for function approximation either needed a simulator, assumed deterministic transitions, or had regret exponential in the horizon.

Jin, Yang, Wang and Jordan, Provably Efficient Reinforcement Learning with Linear Function Approximation (arXiv:1907.05388, COLT 2020), identified a model, the linear MDP, in which an optimistic version of least-squares value iteration has regret polynomial in the feature dimension ddd and the horizon HHH and independent of SSS and AAA. The model and the algorithm, LSVI-UCB, became a standard reference point for the theory of RL with function approximation.

Timeline:

  • 2017–2018: Azar, Osband, Munos (arXiv:1703.05449) and Jin, Allen-Zhu, Bubeck, Jordan (arXiv:1807.03765) give near-optimal T\sqrt TT​ regret for tabular episodic MDPs.
  • 2019: Yang and Wang (arXiv:1902.04779) study linear transition models with a simulator; Jin, Yang, Wang, Jordan prove Theorem 3.1 below without a simulator.
  • 2020: Zanette, Lazaric, Kochenderfer, Brunskill (arXiv:2003.00153) improve the dependence on ddd under a low inherent Bellman error assumption.

Setting

An episodic MDP MDP(S,A,H,P,r)\mathrm{MDP}(\mathcal S,\mathcal A,H,\mathbb P,r)MDP(S,A,H,P,r) has a measurable state space S\mathcal SS, a finite action set A\mathcal AA, a horizon HHH, transition kernels Ph(⋅∣x,a)\mathbb P_h(\cdot\mid x,a)Ph​(⋅∣x,a) and deterministic rewards rh(x,a)∈[0,1]r_h(x,a)\in[0,1]rh​(x,a)∈[0,1] for steps h=1,…,Hh=1,\dots,Hh=1,…,H. A policy π(x,h)\pi(x,h)π(x,h) chooses an action at each state and step. Its value functions satisfy the Bellman equation Qhπ=rh+PhVh+1πQ^\pi_h=r_h+\mathbb P_hV^\pi_{h+1}Qhπ​=rh​+Ph​Vh+1π​, Vhπ(x)=Qhπ(x,π(x,h))V^\pi_h(x)=Q^\pi_h(x,\pi(x,h))Vhπ​(x)=Qhπ​(x,π(x,h)), VH+1π=0V^\pi_{H+1}=0VH+1π​=0, where PhV(x,a)=∫V dPh(⋅∣x,a)\mathbb P_hV(x,a)=\int V\,d\mathbb P_h(\cdot\mid x,a)Ph​V(x,a)=∫VdPh​(⋅∣x,a); the optimal values Vh⋆V^\star_hVh⋆​, Qh⋆Q^\star_hQh⋆​ satisfy the same recursion with a maximum over actions.

The MDP is linear (Assumption A) with feature map ϕ:S×A→Rd\phi:\mathcal S\times\mathcal A\to\mathbb R^dϕ:S×A→Rd if ∥ϕ∥≤1\|\phi\|\le1∥ϕ∥≤1 and for each step there are signed measures μh=(μh(1),…,μh(d))\boldsymbol\mu_h=(\mu_h^{(1)},\dots,\mu_h^{(d)})μh​=(μh(1)​,…,μh(d)​) and a vector θh\theta_hθh​ with

Ph(⋅∣x,a)=⟨ϕ(x,a),μh(⋅)⟩,rh(x,a)=⟨ϕ(x,a),θh⟩,\mathbb P_h(\cdot\mid x,a)=\langle\phi(x,a),\boldsymbol\mu_h(\cdot)\rangle,\qquad r_h(x,a)=\langle\phi(x,a),\theta_h\rangle,Ph​(⋅∣x,a)=⟨ϕ(x,a),μh​(⋅)⟩,rh​(x,a)=⟨ϕ(x,a),θh​⟩,

and ∥θh∥≤d\|\theta_h\|\le\sqrt d∥θh​∥≤d​, ∥(∣μh(1)∣(S),…,∣μh(d)∣(S))∥≤d\|(|\mu_h^{(1)}|(\mathcal S),\dots,|\mu_h^{(d)}|(\mathcal S))\|\le\sqrt d∥(∣μh(1)​∣(S),…,∣μh(d)​∣(S))∥≤d​.

In each episode k=1,…,Kk=1,\dots,Kk=1,…,K an adversary chooses the initial state x1kx^k_1x1k​; the agent then plays HHH steps, the next state xh+1kx^k_{h+1}xh+1k​ being drawn from Ph(⋅∣xhk,ahk)\mathbb P_h(\cdot\mid x^k_h,a^k_h)Ph​(⋅∣xhk​,ahk​). LSVI-UCB (Algorithm 1) computes, backwards over hhh, the Gram matrix Λhk=∑τ<kϕhτ(ϕhτ)⊤+λI\Lambda^k_h=\sum_{\tau<k}\phi^\tau_h(\phi^\tau_h)^\top+\lambda IΛhk​=∑τ<k​ϕhτ​(ϕhτ​)⊤+λI of the past features ϕhτ=ϕ(xhτ,ahτ)\phi^\tau_h=\phi(x^\tau_h,a^\tau_h)ϕhτ​=ϕ(xhτ​,ahτ​), the ridge-regression weight whkw^k_hwhk​ for the targets rh+max⁡aQh+1kr_h+\max_aQ^k_{h+1}rh​+maxa​Qh+1k​, and the optimistic estimate

Qhk(x,a)=min⁡{(whk)⊤ϕ(x,a)+βϕ(x,a)⊤(Λhk)−1ϕ(x,a), H},Q^k_h(x,a)=\min\Big\{(w^k_h)^\top\phi(x,a)+\beta\sqrt{\phi(x,a)^\top(\Lambda^k_h)^{-1}\phi(x,a)},\ H\Big\},Qhk​(x,a)=min{(whk​)⊤ϕ(x,a)+βϕ(x,a)⊤(Λhk​)−1ϕ(x,a)​, H},

and then plays greedily with respect to QhkQ^k_hQhk​. Its policy in episode kkk is πk\pi_kπk​, and the regret is

Regret(K)=∑k=1K[V1⋆(x1k)−V1πk(x1k)],T=KH.\mathrm{Regret}(K)=\sum_{k=1}^K\big[V^\star_1(x^k_1)-V^{\pi_k}_1(x^k_1)\big],\qquad T=KH.Regret(K)=k=1∑K​[V1⋆​(x1k​)−V1πk​​(x1k​)],T=KH.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

There are absolute constants c,C>0c,C>0c,C>0 such that for every linear MDP, every p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1) and every run of LSVI-UCB with λ=1\lambda=1λ=1 and β=c⋅dHι\beta=c\cdot dH\sqrt\iotaβ=c⋅dHι​, ι=log⁡(2dT/p)\iota=\log(2dT/p)ι=log(2dT/p),

P(Regret(K)≤Cd3H3Tι2)≥1−p.\mathbb P\Big(\mathrm{Regret}(K)\le C\sqrt{d^3H^3T\iota^2}\Big)\ge1-p .P(Regret(K)≤Cd3H3Tι2​)≥1−p.

Milestones

The milestones follow Appendix B of the paper: linearity of QπQ^\piQπ (Proposition 2.3) and the weight bounds (Lemmas B.1, B.2, with Lemma D.1); the covering bound for the value class (Lemma D.6, with the Euclidean-ball covering of Lemma D.5); the uniform self-normalized concentration (Lemma D.4, with Theorem D.3) and the good event (Lemma B.3); the error propagation (Lemma B.4), optimism (Lemma B.5) and the recursion (Lemma B.6); and the bonus-sum bound (17)–(18), with Lemma D.2. Lemma D.2, Theorem D.3 and Lemma D.5 are already on the platform and are referenced.

A companion statement, not a milestone, formalizes Proposition 5.1 (§5): on a finite state space with non-degenerate features, if the Bellman operators Thπ\mathbb T^\pi_hThπ​ of (8) map linear action-value functions to linear ones for every policy, then Ph\mathbb P_hPh​ is linear in ϕ\phiϕ.

Significance

The theorem shows that exploration with function approximation can be sample-efficient without a simulator: the regret depends on the intrinsic dimension ddd of the features and polynomially on HHH, not on the size of the state space. Its analysis, a uniform concentration bound over a data-dependent class of value functions combined with optimism, is the template for a large later literature: misspecified and low-rank MDPs, kernel and neural function approximation, and reward-free exploration.

The result has a published proof, but no machine-checked one. A formalization supplies the measure-theoretic episodic MDP on a general state space, an interaction protocol with adaptive initial states, the LSVI-UCB algorithm, and a checked chain from self-normalized martingale bounds to the regret theorem. The formal statements also record two points where the printed paper is imprecise: the normalization of the measures μh\boldsymbol\mu_hμh​ (see Formalization scope) and the existential reading of the weights in Lemma B.1.

Difficulty

The regression targets rh+max⁡aQh+1k(xh+1τ,⋅)r_h+\max_aQ^k_{h+1}(x^\tau_{h+1},\cdot)rh​+maxa​Qh+1k​(xh+1τ​,⋅) depend on all past data through Qh+1kQ^k_{h+1}Qh+1k​. The self-normalized bound for vector-valued martingales (Theorem D.3) therefore cannot be applied to them directly: the natural first idea, conditioning on the past and treating Vh+1kV^k_{h+1}Vh+1k​ as fixed, fails because Vh+1kV^k_{h+1}Vh+1k​ is not measurable with respect to the past at the time xh+1τx^\tau_{h+1}xh+1τ​ is drawn. The concentration must hold uniformly over a function class, which requires a covering-number bound for a class parametrized by vectors and matrices (Lemma D.6) and a union bound in the right scale.

A second difficulty is formal: the probabilistic protocol mixes an adversary, a learning algorithm reading its own past outputs, and transition kernels on a general measurable space, and the martingale argument (Azuma–Hoeffding over the KHKHKH steps) needs every object to be measurable with respect to the right σ-algebra.

Formalization scope

  • Model. S\mathcal SS is any measurable space; A\mathcal AA is a finite nonempty type with its discrete σ-algebra and a linear order used only to break ties in the argmax. Steps and episodes are 1-based. VπV^\piVπ, QπQ^\piQπ, V⋆V^\starV⋆, Q⋆Q^\starQ⋆ are defined by the Bellman recursions (1) and (2), with value 000 outside 1≤h≤H1\le h\le H1≤h≤H; theorems about general policies assume them measurable.
  • Assumption A is stated with the total-variation normalization ∥(∣μh(i)∣(S))i∥≤d\|(|\mu_h^{(i)}|(\mathcal S))_i\|\le\sqrt d∥(∣μh(i)​∣(S))i​∥≤d​ instead of the printed ∥μh(S)∥≤d\|\boldsymbol\mu_h(\mathcal S)\|\le\sqrt d∥μh​(S)∥≤d​; under the printed condition Lemma B.1 is false. The feature map is assumed measurable.
  • Runs. A run is a process on a probability space with a filtration over the flattened time (k−1)(H+1)+(h−1)(k-1)(H+1)+(h-1)(k−1)(H+1)+(h−1): states are adapted, actions are those of Algorithm 1, and the conditional law of xh+1kx^k_{h+1}xh+1k​ given the past is Ph(⋅∣xhk,ahk)\mathbb P_h(\cdot\mid x^k_h,a^k_h)Ph​(⋅∣xhk​,ahk​). The initial states are otherwise unrestricted.
  • Constants. ccc and CCC are quantified before the spaces, ddd, HHH, KKK, ppp, the MDP and the run; d,H,K≥1d,H,K\ge1d,H,K≥1 and p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1). "With probability 1−p1-p1−p" is an upper bound on the outer measure of the failure event.
  • Ruling out trivializations. The goal does not assume the good event, optimism, or any milestone conclusion; β\betaβ is fixed by the existentially quantified ccc, not free; the regret uses the model value of the greedy policy, not a realized return. A sorry-free check exhibits a linear MDP and a run satisfying all hypotheses.
  • Known gap. Algorithm 1 clips QhkQ^k_hQhk​ only from above, so the bound ∣Vh+1k∣≤H|V^k_{h+1}|\le H∣Vh+1k​∣≤H that Lemma B.3's proof needs (and the target bound in Lemma B.2's proof, here an explicit hypothesis) is not automatic off the good event. Lemma B.3 is stated as printed, for every cβ>0c_\beta>0cβ​>0; a solver who finds it unprovable should report this in the discussion.
  • Infrastructure needed: covering numbers of norm balls, the self-normalized martingale bound, Azuma–Hoeffding (in Mathlib), integration against signed measures, and measurability of the algorithm's outputs. The MDP and run definitions are reusable for other episodic RL results; contributions of general lemmas about them are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Jin, Z. Yang, Z. Wang, M. I. Jordan, Provably Efficient Reinforcement Learning with Linear Function Approximation, COLT 2020; arXiv:1907.05388v2, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.05388
  • Y. Abbasi-Yadkori, D. Pál, Cs. Szepesvári, Improved Algorithms for Linear Stochastic Bandits, NeurIPS 2011. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/2011/hash/e1d5be1c7f2f456670de3d53c7b54f4a-Abstract.html
  • M. G. Azar, I. Osband, R. Munos, Minimax Regret Bounds for Reinforcement Learning, ICML 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.05449
  • C. Jin, Z. Allen-Zhu, S. Bubeck, M. I. Jordan, Is Q-learning Provably Efficient?, NeurIPS 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.03765
  • L. F. Yang, M. Wang, Sample-Optimal Parametric Q-Learning Using Linearly Additive Features, ICML 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.04779
  • A. Zanette, A. Lazaric, M. Kochenderfer, E. Brunskill, Learning Near Optimal Policies with Low Inherent Bellman Error, ICML 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.00153
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Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Joint Assortment Optimization and Customization under a Mixture of Multinomial Logit Models 1: Augmented Greedy Earns a (1 − 1/e) Fraction of the Optimal Revenue from the Complete Customer TypesResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers that carry a limited range of products often know something about a customer before choosing which of those products to display. The customized assortment problem asks which products to carry when the displayed assortment may be tailored to the arriving customer's type. This separates the first-stage capacity decision from the later offer decision. El Housni and Topaloglu study the problem under a mixture of multinomial logit choice models and develop an approximation framework for it in their SSRN paper. This mission isolates their structural guarantee for Augmented Greedy, Theorem 4.2 of the PDF version dated 7 December 2021. The theorem identifies the revenue recovered from customer types whose optimal personalized offers agree with a chosen product subset.

The paper contrasts this setting with ordinary assortment optimization, where every type sees the same products. Its later approximation results use the structural guarantee here as a component. The classical comparison is the cardinality-constrained greedy bound for monotone submodular functions, associated with Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher (1978). The paper's Appendix B gives an instance in which the customized revenue function lacks global submodularity, so that classical result does not apply directly. El Housni and Topaloglu, §§4 and App. B.

Setting

Let N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\ldots,n\}N={1,…,n} be a finite product set. Product iii has positive revenue rir_iri​, and products are indexed with r1≥⋯≥rn>0r_1\ge\cdots\ge r_n>0r1​≥⋯≥rn​>0. Let M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\ldots,m\}M={1,…,m} be customer types. A type-jjj customer arrives with probability θj≥0\theta_j\ge0θj​≥0, with ∑j∈Mθj=1\sum_{j\in M}\theta_j=1∑j∈M​θj​=1, and assigns each product iii a nonnegative preference weight vijv_{ij}vij​. The no-purchase option has weight one. Offering an assortment T⊆NT\subseteq NT⊆N to that customer gives MNL expected revenue

Rev⁡j(T)=∑i∈Trivij1+∑i∈Tvij.\operatorname{Rev}_j(T)= \frac{\sum_{i\in T}r_i v_{ij}}{1+\sum_{i\in T}v_{ij}}.Revj​(T)=1+∑i∈T​vij​∑i∈T​ri​vij​​.

If the retailer initially carries only S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, it can still choose the best offer to each customer type. Thus fj(S)=max⁡T⊆SRev⁡j(T)f_j(S)=\max_{T\subseteq S}\operatorname{Rev}_j(T)fj​(S)=maxT⊆S​Revj​(T). For C⊆MC\subseteq MC⊆M, write fC(S)=∑j∈Cθjfj(S)f^C(S)=\sum_{j\in C}\theta_j f_j(S)fC(S)=∑j∈C​θj​fj​(S), and abbreviate f=fMf=f^Mf=fM. The first-stage capacity is KKK; an optimal solution S∗S^*S∗ of CAP maximizes f(S)f(S)f(S) among sets with at most KKK products. These definitions and the standing data assumptions are stated in §2 and §4 of the paper.

For each product iii, the prefix Vi={1,…,i}V_i=\{1,\ldots,i\}Vi​={1,…,i} contains products at least as early in the revenue ordering. Greedy starts at the empty set, repeatedly adds an available product that maximizes the new objective value, and stops at cardinality kkk or when the prefix is exhausted. Augmented Greedy runs Greedy on ViV_iVi​ for each iii, using S↦∑j∈Cθjmin⁡(fj(S),ri)S\mapsto\sum_{j\in C}\theta_j\min(f_j(S),r_i)S↦∑j∈C​θj​min(fj​(S),ri​), and returns whichever candidate has the greatest fCf^CfC value. Both stages may break ties arbitrarily. El Housni and Topaloglu, §4.1.

For type jjj, use the optimal personalized assortment Sj∗={i∈S∗:ri≥fj(S∗)}S_j^*=\{i\in S^*:r_i\ge f_j(S^*)\}Sj∗​={i∈S∗:ri​≥fj​(S∗)}, characterized by Lemma E.1. A type j∈Cj\in Cj∈C is complete with respect to P⊆NP\subseteq NP⊆N when P∩Sj∗=P∩S∗P\cap S_j^*=P\cap S^*P∩Sj∗​=P∩S∗; let CPC_PCP​ collect these types. The threshold choice matters because zero-weight products can be present in other optimal offers without helping a customer. El Housni and Topaloglu, Definition 4.1 and App. E.

Formalization targets

Theorem 4.2: complete-type revenue

For every C⊆MC\subseteq MC⊆M, P⊆NP\subseteq NP⊆N, kkk with ∣P∩S∗∣≤k|P\cap S^*|\le k∣P∩S∗∣≤k, and every output Δ\DeltaΔ of Augmented Greedy on C,kC,kC,k,

fC(Δ)≥(1−1/e) fCP(P∩S∗).f^C(\Delta)\ge(1-1/e)\,f^{C_P}(P\cap S^*).fC(Δ)≥(1−1/e)fCP​(P∩S∗).

This is the mission goal, the structural performance statement of Theorem 4.2, p. 11. It does not assert a constant-factor approximation to all of CAP: it identifies the contribution from complete customer types.

Supporting targets

The milestone list follows the results used with this bound: monotonicity of fjf_jfj​ from Appendix C; the MNL threshold assortment of Lemma E.1; submodularity of S↦min⁡(fj(S),ri)S\mapsto\min(f_j(S),r_i)S↦min(fj​(S),ri​) on ViV_iVi​ from Lemma 4.3; and the cited 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e Greedy guarantee for a nonnegative monotone submodular objective. The greedy milestone compares its output against every feasible set of cardinality at most kkk.

Significance

The theorem says that one algorithmic output captures a fixed fraction of the benchmark supplied by complete types, despite the absence of global submodularity of fff. It connects the local behavior of truncated type revenues to the full customized assortment objective. The paper uses this result in the development of later algorithms; without it, the standard submodular greedy theorem gives no immediate conclusion for CAP. El Housni and Topaloglu, §§4–5.

The mathematical results are proved in the 2021 paper. The formalization work here is to give machine-checkable statements for the objective, the algorithm with all its legal tie choices, and the four supporting targets, then supply proofs. The MNL revenue formula is already available as a published platform definition; the local CAP and algorithm definitions specify the extra model needed by this theorem. A completed development could also support later CAP missions that use the same threshold and submodularity properties.

Difficulty

The tempting argument applies the classical greedy guarantee directly to fff, since fff increases when more products are carried. Appendix B of the paper shows that this fails: even for one customer type, fff need not be submodular. Restricting the ground set to a revenue prefix and truncating each fjf_jfj​ at that prefix's revenue level changes the submodularity question, but the final guarantee must still concern the untruncated fCf^CfC objective. The threshold condition in the definition of CPC_PCP​ is what makes that comparison meaningful. El Housni and Topaloglu, App. B, Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.2.

Formalization scope

Products and types are Fin n and Fin m; their zero-based Lean indices correspond to the paper's indices plus one. Assortments and type groups are finite sets. The model assumes ri>0r_i>0ri​>0, vij≥0v_{ij}\ge0vij​≥0, θj≥0\theta_j\ge0θj​≥0, ∑jθj=1\sum_j\theta_j=1∑j​θj​=1, and decreasing revenue order. The no-purchase weight is exactly one. CAP and personalized revenue use maxima over nonempty finite powersets, so empty input sets have their intended value rather than an arbitrary real supremum. The theorem keeps the source's optimality assumption on S∗S^*S∗, even though its particular inequality uses less.

The Greedy predicate describes each successive maximizer and the exact stopping rule. Augmented Greedy requires a Greedy output at every prefix and an fCf^CfC-maximizing choice among them. Thus the output is constrained by the printed algorithm, and the statement covers every tie-break. The type-jjj assortment is defined from S∗S^*S∗ by the Lemma E.1 threshold, rather than supplied as a free set. These choices rule out a size-only output condition, an arbitrarily chosen Sj∗S_j^*Sj∗​, a vacuous run predicate, and real supremum defaults. The target includes the corner cases k=0k=0k=0, C=∅C=\varnothingC=∅, and P∩S∗=∅P\cap S^*=\varnothingP∩S∗=∅, where its right side is zero. Arrival probabilities summing to one force m≥1m\ge1m≥1; Augmented Greedy has an output only when at least one product exists.

The reusable parts are the MNL threshold characterization, finite-set submodularity and the general Greedy bound. Contributions toward those lemmas, the paper's case analysis for Lemma 4.3, and the final structural theorem are in scope. Runtime claims, the paper's later logarithmic approximation theorems and its computational experiments are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Omar El Housni and Huseyin Topaloglu, Joint Assortment Optimization and Customization under a Mixture of Multinomial Logit Models: Value of Personalized Assortments, SSRN 3830082, version of 7 December 2021; published as Operations Research 71(4), 2023. SSRN preprint. The mission's numbering and page citations use the pinned 2021 PDF.
  • George L. Nemhauser, Laurence A. Wolsey and Marshall L. Fisher, An Analysis of Approximations for Maximizing Submodular Set Functions—I, Mathematical Programming 14, 265–294, 1978. DOI.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Settling the Complexity of Computing Approximate Two-Player Nash Equilibria: An (ε, δ)-WeakNash of a Bipartite Polymatrix Game Yields a (√ε(√ε + 5), δ)-Well-Supported WeakNashResearch Paper

Motivation

Computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of a two-player game is one of the central questions of algorithmic game theory. For a constant approximation ϵ\epsilonϵ, the algorithm of Lipton, Markakis and Mehta runs in quasi-polynomial time nO(log⁡n/ϵ2)n^{O(\log n/\epsilon^2)}nO(logn/ϵ2), and for a long time it was unknown whether polynomial time is possible. A. Rubinstein, Settling the Complexity of Computing Approximate Two-Player Nash Equilibria (FOCS 2016, arXiv:1606.04550), proved that, assuming an exponential-time hypothesis for PPAD, quasi-polynomial time is also necessary.

The proof is a chain of reductions. Its middle links produce multiplayer games in which only most players are approximately best-responding (the WeakNash notions of Babichenko, Papadimitriou and Rubinstein, Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy?, ITCS 2016). Its last link turns a bipartite multiplayer game into a two-player game. Section 8.1 of the paper sits between the two: it shows that the weaker mixed-response notion of WeakNash can be converted into the stronger support-based notion, with a loss of only a square root in the approximation. This mission formalizes that step, Lemma 8.1, together with the intermediate claims of its proof.

Timeline. Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (SIAM J. Comput. 2009, doi:10.1137/070699652) introduced the trimming argument (their Lemma 4.28 and Claim 6) for exact-all-players ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate equilibria of general games. Babichenko–Papadimitriou–Rubinstein (2016) introduced (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)(ϵ,δ)-WeakNash. Rubinstein (2016) adapted the trimming argument to WeakNash of bipartite polymatrix games, where the constant no longer grows with the number of players.

Setting

A finite game has a finite set of players I\mathcal II, a finite action set SvS^vSv for each player vvv, and utilities uvu_vuv​ on action profiles. A mixed strategy xvx^vxv is a probability vector on SvS^vSv; a mixed profile x=(xv)vx=(x^v)_vx=(xv)v​ is one mixed strategy per player, drawn independently. For an action s∈Svs\in S^vs∈Sv, Usv(x−v)U^v_s(x^{-v})Usv​(x−v) is the expected utility of vvv when vvv plays sss and the others play x−vx^{-v}x−v, and Umax⁡v(x−v)=max⁡sUsv(x−v)U^v_{\max}(x^{-v})=\max_{s}U^v_s(x^{-v})Umaxv​(x−v)=maxs​Usv​(x−v).

  • xvx^vxv is an ϵ\epsilonϵ-best mixed response if Ea∼x[uv(a)]≥max⁡y∈ΔSvEa∼(y;x−v)[uv(a)]−ϵ\mathbb E_{a\sim x}[u_v(a)]\ge\max_{y\in\Delta S^v}\mathbb E_{a\sim(y;x^{-v})}[u_v(a)]-\epsilonEa∼x​[uv​(a)]≥maxy∈ΔSv​Ea∼(y;x−v)​[uv​(a)]−ϵ.
  • xxx is an (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)(ϵ,δ)-WeakNash if at least a (1−δ)(1-\delta)(1−δ)-fraction of all players play an ϵ\epsilonϵ-best mixed response.
  • xxx is an (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)(ϵ,δ)-Well-Supported WeakNash if, for at least a (1−δ)(1-\delta)(1−δ)-fraction of all players vvv, every action in the support of xvx^vxv satisfies Usv(x−v)≥Umax⁡v(x−v)−ϵU^v_s(x^{-v})\ge U^v_{\max}(x^{-v})-\epsilonUsv​(x−v)≥Umaxv​(x−v)−ϵ.

A polymatrix game is one in which each pair of players plays a two-player subgame, each player uses one action in all of its subgames, and its utility is the sum of its subgame payoffs. In a complete bipartite polymatrix game the players form two sides VAV_AVA​, VBV_BVB​ with nA=∣VA∣n_A=|V_A|nA​=∣VA​∣, nB=∣VB∣n_B=|V_B|nB​=∣VB​∣; every v∈VAv\in V_Av∈VA​ plays a bimatrix subgame Uv,wU^{v,w}Uv,w against every w∈VBw\in V_Bw∈VB​, and same-side pairs play nothing. Lemma 8.1 assumes the payoffs of VAV_AVA​-vertices lie in [0,1/nB][0,1/n_B][0,1/nB​] and those of VBV_BVB​-vertices in [0,1/nA][0,1/n_A][0,1/nA​], so every utility lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

The trimmed profile x^\hat xx^ with parameter kkk: every player vvv that plays ϵ\epsilonϵ-optimally in xxx drops the actions with Usv(x−v)<Umax⁡v(x−v)−ϵkU^v_s(x^{-v})<U^v_{\max}(x^{-v})-\epsilon kUsv​(x−v)<Umaxv​(x−v)−ϵk, whose total mass is zvz^vzv, and renormalises, x^sv=xsv/(1−zv)\hat x^v_s=x^v_s/(1-z^v)x^sv​=xsv​/(1−zv) on the kept actions; every other player keeps xvx^vxv.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 8.1

For a complete bipartite polymatrix game with the payoff ranges above, ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, and an (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon,\delta)(ϵ,δ)-WeakNash xxx, the trimmed profile with k=1+1/ϵk=1+1/\sqrt\epsilonk=1+1/ϵ​ satisfies

x^ is a (ϵ (ϵ+5), δ)-Well-Supported WeakNash.\hat x\ \text{is a}\ \bigl(\sqrt\epsilon\,(\sqrt\epsilon+5),\ \delta\bigr)\text{-Well-Supported WeakNash}.x^ is a (ϵ​(ϵ​+5), δ)-Well-Supported WeakNash.

Milestones (proof of Lemma 8.1)

  1. For k>1k>1k>1 and an ϵ\epsilonϵ-optimal player vvv: zv≤1/k<1z^v\le 1/k<1zv≤1/k<1.
  2. Claim 8.2: ∑s∣x^sv−xsv∣≤2/(k−1)\sum_{s}|\hat x^v_s-x^v_s|\le 2/(k-1)∑s​∣x^sv​−xsv​∣≤2/(k−1) for every player vvv.
  3. For every vertex vvv and action sss: ∣Usv(x−v)−Usv(x^−v)∣≤2/(k−1)|U^v_s(x^{-v})-U^v_s(\hat x^{-v})|\le 2/(k-1)∣Usv​(x−v)−Usv​(x^−v)∣≤2/(k−1).
  4. For every k>1k>1k>1: x^\hat xx^ is a (kϵ+2k−1,δ)\bigl(k\epsilon+\tfrac{2}{k-1},\delta\bigr)(kϵ+k−12​,δ)-Well-Supported WeakNash.

Significance

The result. Lemma 8.1 is the link that allows the hardness of WeakNash, the notion the PPAD-hardness argument naturally produces, to be transferred to the support-based notion used by the two-player reduction of Section 8.2 (Lemma 8.3, via Althöfer's games). The polynomial loss ϵ↦O(ϵ)\epsilon\mapsto O(\sqrt\epsilon)ϵ↦O(ϵ​) and the unchanged δ\deltaδ are what keep the final constant approximation constant. The same trimming technique, with constants that do not depend on the number of players, applies to any polymatrix game with normalised payoffs.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; it is not formalized anywhere. The published platform items DGPNash.WellSupported.* formalize the Daskalakis–Goldberg–Papadimitriou version, which assumes every player is ϵ\epsilonϵ-optimal and has a constant growing with the number of players; this mission produces the WeakNash and polymatrix version and a reusable vocabulary of WeakNash notions (Definitions 2.5–2.9) for the rest of the paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument applies the trimming of Daskalakis–Goldberg–Papadimitriou to every player, and it fails in two places. First, only a (1−δ)(1-\delta)(1−δ)-fraction of players are ϵ\epsilonϵ-optimal; for the others the trimmed mass zvz^vzv can equal 111, so the renormalisation is undefined and those players cannot be trimmed, while their neighbours' payoffs still depend on them. Second, the general bound on how much a payoff moves when the other players' strategies move grows with the number of players, which would make the final constant depend on nAn_AnA​ and nBn_BnB​; Lemma 8.1 has no such dependence, and the payoff normalisation [0,1/nB][0,1/n_B][0,1/nB​], [0,1/nA][0,1/n_A][0,1/nA​] is what must absorb it. The constant 2/(k−1)2/(k-1)2/(k−1) of milestone 4 is tight enough that the page's own displayed chain, which ends at 4/(k−1)4/(k-1)4/(k−1), does not reach it directly.

Formalization scope

  • Players are the disjoint union VA ⊕ VB; action sets are finite types S i; subgame payoffs are PA v w (for v∈VAv\in V_Av∈VA​ against w∈VBw\in V_Bw∈VB​) and PB w v. The general polymatrix payoff (Definition 2.9) sums over j≠ij\ne ij=i; the bipartite instance sets same-side subgames to zero.
  • Mixed profiles, lotteries and expected payoffs are those of the published agt_games bundle. UsvU^v_sUsv​ is DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff; Umax⁡vU^v_{\max}Umaxv​, zvz^vzv and the trim formula are maxPurePayoff, trimMass, trim of DGPNash_WellSupported_Equilibria.
  • The "(1−δ)(1-\delta)(1−δ)-fraction of iii's" is (1−δ) ∣I∣≤#{i:…}(1-\delta)\,|\mathcal I|\le\#\{i:\ldots\}(1−δ)∣I∣≤#{i:…}, over all players of both sides. The support of xvx^vxv is {s:xsv>0}\{s: x^v_s>0\}{s:xsv​>0}. Maxima over strategies are written as "for every lottery / every action".
  • Added hypotheses: ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 (needed for k=1+1/ϵk=1+1/\sqrt\epsilonk=1+1/ϵ​); k>1k>1k>1 in every general-kkk milestone (the page's "for k>1k>1k>1").
  • Conventions: players that are not ϵ\epsilonϵ-optimal keep xvx^vxv in x^\hat xx^, since the page defines x^v\hat x^vx^v only for the ϵ\epsilonϵ-optimal ones. "Bounded away from 1" is stated as zv≤1/kz^v\le 1/kzv≤1/k. "In polynomial time" is not formalized.
  • Milestones 1 and 2 use no polymatrix structure and are stated for arbitrary finite games.

The bare existence of some (ϵ(ϵ+5),δ)(\sqrt\epsilon(\sqrt\epsilon+5),\delta)(ϵ​(ϵ​+5),δ)-Well-Supported WeakNash is a consequence of Nash's theorem and does not use xxx; the goal therefore names the specific trimmed profile x^\hat xx^ computed from xxx.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones; general lemmas expressing UsvU^v_sUsv​ of a polymatrix game as a bilinear sum and the multilinearity of expected payoffs, which are reusable for the rest of the paper.

Selected references

  • A. Rubinstein, Settling the Complexity of Computing Approximate Two-Player Nash Equilibria, FOCS 2016; arXiv:1606.04550 (version dated August 26, 2016). https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04550
  • C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg, C. H. Papadimitriou, The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium, SIAM J. Comput. 39(1):195–259, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/070699652
  • Y. Babichenko, C. H. Papadimitriou, A. Rubinstein, Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy?, Proc. ITCS 2016, pp. 1–9.
  • R. J. Lipton, E. Markakis, A. Mehta, Playing Large Games Using Simple Strategies, EC 2003. https://doi.org/10.1145/779928.779933
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerated Gradient Methods for Nonconvex Nonlinear and Stochastic Programming 2: One Aggressive Stepsize Policy Drives the AG Gradient Mapping to Zero on Nonconvex Composite ProblemsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in statistics, signal processing and machine learning have the form "smooth loss plus simple non-smooth term": a differentiable data-fit term together with a constraint set or a sparsity-inducing penalty such as the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ norm. When the loss is convex, Nesterov's accelerated gradient (AG) method and its proximal variants are known to be optimal among first-order methods: after NNN iterations the optimality gap is O(L/N2)O(L/N^2)O(L/N2), against O(L/N)O(L/N)O(L/N) for plain proximal gradient (Nesterov 1983, reference [24] of the paper; Beck & Teboulle 2009). When the loss is nonconvex, the classical accelerated schemes come with no convergence guarantee at all, and practitioners must choose between a method that is fast on convex problems and one that is guaranteed to make progress on nonconvex ones.

Ghadimi and Lan (arXiv:1310.3787v1, 2013; Math. Program. 156, 2016) proposed a single AG scheme that does both. This mission formalizes their result for composite problems (§2.2, Theorem 2), where the smooth part is split into a possibly nonconvex piece with Lipschitz constant LfL_fLf​ and a convex piece, and a non-smooth convex term is handled through a proximal step. The theorem shows that one aggressive step-size policy, the one that is optimal in the convex case, still drives a stationarity measure to zero when the smooth part is nonconvex.

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean norm. The problem (1.3) is

min⁡x∈Rn Φ(x):=Ψ(x)+X(x),Ψ=f+h,\min_{x\in\mathbb R^n}\ \Phi(x):=\Psi(x)+\mathcal X(x),\qquad \Psi=f+h,x∈Rnmin​ Φ(x):=Ψ(x)+X(x),Ψ=f+h,

where:

  • f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf:Rn→R is differentiable with LfL_fLf​-Lipschitz gradient and may be nonconvex;
  • h:Rn→Rh:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rh:Rn→R is convex and differentiable with LhL_hLh​-Lipschitz gradient, so Ψ\PsiΨ has LΨL_\PsiLΨ​-Lipschitz gradient with LΨ=Lf+LhL_\Psi=L_f+L_hLΨ​=Lf​+Lh​;
  • X\mathcal XX is a convex, possibly non-smooth function with bounded domain K={u:X(u)<+∞}K=\{u:\mathcal X(u)<+\infty\}K={u:X(u)<+∞}, for instance the indicator of a convex compact set, or that indicator plus ∥⋅∥1\|\cdot\|_1∥⋅∥1​.

The prox map (2.37) is

P(x,y,c)=argmin⁡u∈Rn{⟨y,u⟩+12c∥u−x∥2+X(u)},c>0,\mathcal P(x,y,c)=\operatorname*{argmin}_{u\in\mathbb R^n}\Big\{\langle y,u\rangle+\frac1{2c}\|u-x\|^2+\mathcal X(u)\Big\},\qquad c>0,P(x,y,c)=u∈Rnargmin​{⟨y,u⟩+2c1​∥u−x∥2+X(u)},c>0,

and the gradient mapping (2.38) is G(x,y,c)=1c[x−P(x,y,c)]\mathcal G(x,y,c)=\frac1c[x-\mathcal P(x,y,c)]G(x,y,c)=c1​[x−P(x,y,c)]. With y=∇Ψ(x)y=\nabla\Psi(x)y=∇Ψ(x) it reduces to ∇Ψ(x)\nabla\Psi(x)∇Ψ(x) when X≡0\mathcal X\equiv0X≡0, and a small ∥G∥\|\mathcal G\|∥G∥ certifies approximate stationarity of (1.3). Assumption 2 asks for a constant MMM with ∥P(x,y,c)∥≤M\|\mathcal P(x,y,c)\|\le M∥P(x,y,c)∥≤M for all x,yx,yx,y and c>0c>0c>0; it holds whenever X\mathcal XX is proper, closed, convex with bounded domain (Lemma 2).

Algorithm 2 takes step sizes with α1=1\alpha_1=1α1​=1, αk∈(0,1)\alpha_k\in(0,1)αk​∈(0,1) for k≥2k\ge2k≥2, βk>0\beta_k>0βk​>0, λk>0\lambda_k>0λk​>0, starts from x0=x0agx_0=x^{ag}_0x0​=x0ag​, and for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 sets

xkmd=(1−αk)xk−1ag+αkxk−1,xk=P(xk−1,∇Ψ(xkmd),λk),xkag=P(xkmd,∇Ψ(xkmd),βk).x^{md}_k=(1-\alpha_k)x^{ag}_{k-1}+\alpha_kx_{k-1},\quad x_k=\mathcal P\big(x_{k-1},\nabla\Psi(x^{md}_k),\lambda_k\big),\quad x^{ag}_k=\mathcal P\big(x^{md}_k,\nabla\Psi(x^{md}_k),\beta_k\big).xkmd​=(1−αk​)xk−1ag​+αk​xk−1​,xk​=P(xk−1​,∇Ψ(xkmd​),λk​),xkag​=P(xkmd​,∇Ψ(xkmd​),βk​).

The weights are Γ1=1\Gamma_1=1Γ1​=1, Γk=(1−αk)Γk−1\Gamma_k=(1-\alpha_k)\Gamma_{k-1}Γk​=(1−αk​)Γk−1​ (2.6).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 11)

Fix N≥1N\ge1N≥1 and assume, for k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N,

αkλk≤βk<1LΨ  (2.9),α1λ1Γ1≥α2λ2Γ2≥⋯  (2.10).\alpha_k\lambda_k\le\beta_k<\frac1{L_\Psi}\ \ (2.9),\qquad \frac{\alpha_1}{\lambda_1\Gamma_1}\ge\frac{\alpha_2}{\lambda_2\Gamma_2}\ge\cdots\ \ (2.10).αk​λk​≤βk​<LΨ​1​  (2.9),λ1​Γ1​α1​​≥λ2​Γ2​α2​​≥⋯  (2.10).

Let x∗x^*x∗ be an optimal solution of (1.3). Then

min⁡k=1,…,N∥G(xkmd,∇Ψ(xkmd),βk)∥2≤2[∑k=1NΓk−1βk(1−LΨβk)]−1[∥x0−x∗∥22λ1+LfΓN(∥x∗∥2+2M2)],(2.44)\min_{k=1,\dots,N}\big\|\mathcal G(x^{md}_k,\nabla\Psi(x^{md}_k),\beta_k)\big\|^2\le2\Big[\sum_{k=1}^N\Gamma_k^{-1}\beta_k(1-L_\Psi\beta_k)\Big]^{-1}\Big[\frac{\|x_0-x^*\|^2}{2\lambda_1}+\frac{L_f}{\Gamma_N}\big(\|x^*\|^2+2M^2\big)\Big],\tag{2.44}k=1,…,Nmin​​G(xkmd​,∇Ψ(xkmd​),βk​)​2≤2[k=1∑N​Γk−1​βk​(1−LΨ​βk​)]−1[2λ1​∥x0​−x∗∥2​+ΓN​Lf​​(∥x∗∥2+2M2)],(2.44)

and, if Lf=0L_f=0Lf​=0,

Φ(xNag)−Φ(x∗)≤ΓN∥x0−x∗∥22λ1.(2.45)\Phi(x^{ag}_N)-\Phi(x^*)\le\frac{\Gamma_N\|x_0-x^*\|^2}{2\lambda_1}.\tag{2.45}Φ(xNag​)−Φ(x∗)≤2λ1​ΓN​∥x0​−x∗∥2​.(2.45)

The goal is stated for general step sizes, so it does not hard-code the constants of a particular policy; Corollary 2 (the policy αk=2/(k+1)\alpha_k=2/(k+1)αk​=2/(k+1), βk=1/(2LΨ)\beta_k=1/(2L_\Psi)βk​=1/(2LΨ​), λk=kβk/2\lambda_k=k\beta_k/2λk​=kβk​/2) is a specialization left for follow-up work.

Milestones

In the order of the proof: Lemma 1 (unrolling a Γk\Gamma_kΓk​-weighted recursion) and (2.16); the identity (2.42) linking G\mathcal GG to xkmd−xkagx^{md}_k-x^{ag}_kxkmd​−xkag​; Lemma 5, the two-sided bound −Lf2∥y−x∥2≤Ψ(y)−Ψ(x)−⟨∇Ψ(x),y−x⟩≤LΨ2∥y−x∥2-\frac{L_f}2\|y-x\|^2\le\Psi(y)-\Psi(x)-\langle\nabla\Psi(x),y-x\rangle\le\frac{L_\Psi}2\|y-x\|^2−2Lf​​∥y−x∥2≤Ψ(y)−Ψ(x)−⟨∇Ψ(x),y−x⟩≤2LΨ​​∥y−x∥2; the descent bound (2.46) (already proved on the platform); the one-step inequalities (2.47)–(2.51); the summed inequality after (2.51); and the bounds (2.52)–(2.53).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 gives a uniform treatment of convex and nonconvex composite problems. The same step sizes yield the optimal O(LΨ∥x0−x∗∥2/N2)O(L_\Psi\|x_0-x^*\|^2/N^2)O(LΨ​∥x0​−x∗∥2/N2) optimality gap when fff is affine, and a bound on the gradient mapping when fff is nonconvex. Under Corollary 2's policy that bound gives an iteration count of O(LΨ2/3/ϵ1/3+LΨLf/ϵ)O(L_\Psi^{2/3}/\epsilon^{1/3}+L_\Psi L_f/\epsilon)O(LΨ2/3​/ϵ1/3+LΨ​Lf​/ϵ) for ∥G∥2≤ϵ\|\mathcal G\|^2\le\epsilon∥G∥2≤ϵ, which depends on the Lipschitz constant LhL_hLh​ of the convex part more mildly than projected gradient does. The proof template (a weighted Lyapunov argument in which the nonconvexity appears only through LfL_fLf​) recurs in later stochastic and variance-reduced accelerated methods, including the paper's own Theorem 4.

Formalizing it. The result has been proved and refereed since 2016. As far as is known it has not been formalized in any proof assistant, and the platform holds no accelerated method with a nonconvex guarantee. A complete development would give a machine-checked proximal three-point inequality for convex functions on a convex domain, a checked composite AG analysis, and a checked version of Lemma 5. These are reusable pieces for any accelerated proximal method.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to copy the convex analysis of accelerated methods. It breaks at the convexity step: the bound Ψ(xkmd)≤(1−αk)Ψ(xk−1ag)+αkΨ(x)+…\Psi(x^{md}_k)\le(1-\alpha_k)\Psi(x^{ag}_{k-1})+\alpha_k\Psi(x)+\dotsΨ(xkmd​)≤(1−αk​)Ψ(xk−1ag​)+αk​Ψ(x)+… needs convexity of Ψ\PsiΨ, which is now available only up to LfL_fLf​-quadratic errors. Those errors involve ∥xkmd−x∥\|x^{md}_k-x\|∥xkmd​−x∥ and ∥xk−1ag−xk−1∥\|x^{ag}_{k-1}-x_{k-1}\|∥xk−1ag​−xk−1​∥, which do not telescope and are not controlled by the usual potential; without some a priori bound on the iterates they can grow with NNN. A formal proof also has to track the extended-valued X\mathcal XX carefully, since its convexity is used only at points of its domain, and the first iteration, where x0ag=x0x^{ag}_0=x_0x0ag​=x0​ is not a prox output.

Formalization scope

  • Space. Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). Smoothness of fff and hhh is the platform's ConvexOptAlg.SmoothGD.IsBetaSmooth (differentiable with an explicit gradient map, Lipschitz gradient, nonnegative constant). Ψ\PsiΨ and ∇Ψ\nabla\Psi∇Ψ are written as f+hf+hf+h and ∇f+∇h\nabla f+\nabla h∇f+∇h.
  • The convex term. X\mathcal XX is represented by its domain K and its finite values X : E n → ℝ on K, with ConvexOn ℝ K X. Points outside K never enter: Φ\PhiΦ is compared only on K, x∗x^*x∗ is optimal over K, and (2.48)–(2.51) quantify over x∈Kx\in Kx∈K. A real-valued X\mathcal XX on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn is ruled out, because Assumption 2 is then unsatisfiable (P(x,y,c)→x\mathcal P(x,y,c)\to xP(x,y,c)→x as c→0c\to0c→0) and the goal would hold vacuously.
  • The prox map is a function P x y c with the hypothesis IsProxMap K X P: for every c>0c>0c>0, P x y c ∈ K and it minimizes the prox objective over K. Without this minimizer hypothesis the three-point inequalities and the goal are false, so it cannot be dropped.
  • Indexing is 1-based as in the paper. Γk=∏i=2k(1−αi)\Gamma_k=\prod_{i=2}^k(1-\alpha_i)Γk​=∏i=2k​(1−αi​), so Γ1=1\Gamma_1=1Γ1​=1. The minimum in (2.44) is Finset.inf' over {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}. Conditions (2.9)–(2.10) are imposed for k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N, and βk<1/LΨ\beta_k<1/L_\Psiβk​<1/LΨ​ is written LΨβk<1L_\Psi\beta_k<1LΨ​βk​<1.
  • One added hypothesis, ∥x0∥≤M\|x_0\|\le M∥x0​∥≤M. The paper uses it silently in (2.52) at k=1k=1k=1; it holds whenever x0∈dom⁡Xx_0\in\operatorname{dom}\mathcal Xx0​∈domX.
  • A typo is corrected. (2.53) prints ∥x0−x∥2\|x_0-x\|^2∥x0​−x∥2 after substituting x=x∗x=x^*x=x∗; the Lean states ∥x0−x∗∥2\|x_0-x^*\|^2∥x0​−x∗∥2.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone. The three-point inequality (2.48)–(2.49) and Lemma 5 are self-contained and reusable. Also welcome: a proof of Lemma 2 (bounded domain implies Assumption 2), and Corollary 2 as a follow-up statement.

Selected references

  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Accelerated Gradient Methods for Nonconvex Nonlinear and Stochastic Programming, arXiv:1310.3787v1, 2013; Math. Program. 156 (2016) 59–99. https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.3787v1 · https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-015-0871-8
  • A. Beck, M. Teboulle, A Fast Iterative Shrinkage-Thresholding Algorithm for Linear Inverse Problems, SIAM J. Imaging Sci. 2 (2009) 183–202. https://doi.org/10.1137/080716542
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, H. Zhang, Mini-batch stochastic approximation methods for nonconvex stochastic composite optimization, Math. Program. 155 (2016) 267–305 (reference [13] of the paper: the projected-gradient bound compared against). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-014-0846-1
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Optimal stochastic approximation algorithms for strongly convex stochastic composite optimization, I: a generic algorithmic framework, SIAM J. Optim. 22 (2012) 1469–1492 (reference [11] of the paper; its Lemma 2 is the three-point inequality (2.48)–(2.49)). https://doi.org/10.1137/110848864
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