Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers 2: Both Fixed Prices Rise with the Buyer Arrival Rate and Fall with the Seller Arrival Rate; Matches and Fluid Profit Rise with BothResearch Paper
Why market size changes prices
Two-sided intermediaries charge buyers and pay sellers while trying to match the two groups. A larger arrival stream on one side changes both the number of possible matches and the prices that clear the market. Chen and Hu study this in a model of buyers and sellers who arrive over time and may wait before requesting a match. Their market-size theorem concerns the deterministic fluid benchmark used to choose fixed prices for the dynamic system. This mission formalizes that theorem from the submitted manuscript, main text §6, rather than the performance of the waiting-adjusted policy itself.
The fluid benchmark matters because it supplies an interpretable price and quantity for each pair of arrival rates. When buyers become more numerous, the model predicts that both the buyer price and the seller payment rise. When sellers become more numerous, both prices fall. In either direction, more arrivals raise the maximum matching quantity and the fluid profit. These claims concern the same valuation and cost distributions as the rates vary, so they isolate the effect of market size.
The two-sided fluid market
Buyer valuations lie in , with density and distribution function . Seller costs lie in , with density and distribution function . Write . Buyer and seller arrival rates are and , and the horizon has length . A buyer accepts a fixed ask price when the valuation is at least ; a seller accepts a fixed bid price when the cost is at most . Thus and are the corresponding acceptance rates.
The buyer virtual value is , and the seller virtual cost is . Assumptions 1 and 2 of the manuscript say these functions are weakly increasing on their respective supports. The supports overlap in the sense . The density assumptions ensure that the survival and cost distribution functions have inverse quantiles on . For a candidate volume , the virtual surplus is
The optimal fluid matching quantity is the largest in for which . The corresponding fixed prices are and .
The fluid program (D) permits any measurable nonnegative ask and bid price path on that clears the market at every time: . Its value is the supremum of buyer revenue minus seller payments, integrated over the horizon. Proposition 1 states that the constant path attains this value and that .
Formalization targets
The goal is Theorem 3, the eight weak comparisons of prices, volume, and fluid profit. For with fixed, it asserts
For with fixed, the two price inequalities reverse while the volume and profit inequalities retain their directions. The goal leaves the rates and the two distributions as variables, so it states the market-size result across all systems meeting the paper's assumptions.
The milestones follow the source's dependency structure: Proposition 1 identifies the fluid optimizer; the proof of Lemma S.5 notes that decreases in ; Lemma S.5 establishes the volume and profit comparisons; and the two parts of the proof of Theorem 3 compare the fractions and served on the growing side. The paper's proofs are in the Supplemental Note, with related proofs in the Online Appendix.
What the result provides
The theorem gives directional predictions without differentiating optimal prices with respect to arrival rates. A platform comparing two otherwise identical markets can infer which way its fluid ask and bid prices move, whether it matches more units, and whether the benchmark profit increases. Proposition 1 also connects the optimization over time-varying paths to a fixed price pair, so the static claims apply to the entire feasible fluid program.
The result is proved in the manuscript; this mission asks for a machine-checked proof of the same statement. The formal development would make the inverse-quantile construction, attainment of the optimal volume, and the nonempty bounded fluid optimization problem explicit. Those objects can be reused in other two-sided pricing or matching models. This mission does not claim that the corresponding stochastic system has identical comparative statics; the manuscript itself focuses on the fluid regime in §6.
Where the proof is difficult
Increasing one arrival rate expands the feasible number of matches, but the two optimal prices do not follow from that fact alone. The buyer price depends on the fraction of buyers served, and the seller price depends on the fraction of sellers served. A growing side can have a larger matched volume yet a smaller matched fraction. The proof must control both quantities under the appropriate inverse distribution function. Profit also needs a comparison of two separate fluid optimization problems, rather than only a comparison of their candidate fixed-price formulas.
Formalization scope
The Lean model reuses the published bilateral-trade environment for the two positive densities, interval supports, cumulative distributions, and virtual values. The new definitions clamp both cumulative distributions to their supports so a price outside the support still has the correct acceptance probability. Inverse quantiles are supported level-set infima, used only at arguments in . All rates and the horizon are positive; both densities are continuous on their supports; the virtual functions satisfy the paper's regularity assumptions; and . Density continuity is a disclosed addition needed for the asserted inverse-quantile and maximum properties.
The claims involving the value of (D) assume a nonnegative seller cost support. This disclosed domain correction puts the fixed seller price in (D), whose price paths take values in ; the imported bilateral-trade environment itself permits negative supports. The virtual-surplus and served-fraction inequalities hold without this condition. Every feasible path is measurable, nonnegative on , clears the market at every point of that interval, and has integrable buyer and seller revenue terms. The fluid value is defined as the supremum over those paths. It is never defined by Proposition 1's fixed-price identity, which would erase the optimization claim. The volume set is restricted to , so its supremum has the source's intended domain. The source uses “increasing” and “decreasing” in the weak sense.
Useful contributions include lemmas showing the clamped distributions are monotone, their supported inverses have the stated identities, the candidate volume set has a greatest member, the fluid feasible set is nonempty and bounded above, and the two fraction comparisons. These are substantive mathematical obligations: no arbitrary inverse, empty feasible set, non-integrable path, or preassigned fluid value should satisfy the goal by a default value.
Selected references
- Y. Chen and M. Hu, Pricing and Matching with Forward-Looking Buyers and Sellers, submitted manuscript, SSRN 2859864, 2020; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 22(4), 717–734. SSRN manuscript.
- T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, §3.4.1. Publisher.