New Techniques for Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge 2: On a Perfectly Hiding Key the Circuit-SAT Proof from a Homomorphic Proof Commitment Is Perfect Zero-KnowledgeResearch Paper
Motivation
A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof lets a prover convince a verifier that a statement is true by sending a single message, computed from a common reference string that both parties share, without revealing anything beyond the truth of the statement. NIZK proofs were introduced by Blum, Feldman and Micali (STOC 1988) and are a building block of chosen-ciphertext secure encryption, signatures and secure multi-party computation. For a long time every NIZK proof for all of NP was zero-knowledge only computationally: a simulator produced proofs that no efficient adversary could tell apart from real ones.
Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai (J. ACM 59(3), 2012; conference versions at Eurocrypt 2006 and Crypto 2006) gave the first NIZK argument for all of NP whose zero-knowledge is perfect: real and simulated proofs have exactly the same distribution, so even an unbounded adversary learns nothing. The construction is the Circuit SAT proof of their Figure 3, run on a perfectly hiding key of a homomorphic proof commitment scheme. Its zero-knowledge is Lemma 8 of the paper, and it is the zero-knowledge half of their Theorem 11.
Setting
A homomorphic proof commitment scheme has a message space (a finite cyclic group with generator , here ), a randomizer space and a commitment space , all finite abelian groups, and a commitment function . A hiding key generator outputs a commitment key together with a trapdoor . The scheme is assumed to have:
- the homomorphic property, ;
- perfect trapdoor opening: returns with ;
- perfect trapdoor opening indistinguishability: for uniform , the opening is distributed, jointly with , as a fresh uniform randomizer;
- perfect witness indistinguishability of a proof that a commitment contains or : if , the proofs made from and from have the same law.
A NAND circuit on wires is a list of gates and an output wire ; a witness satisfies it, , if for every gate and . The prover of Figure 3, with , commits to every wire, with , proves that each commitment contains or , and for each gate proves that contains or .
The simulator is , returning and , and , which commits to on every wire except the output wire, and makes all the 0/1 proofs from openings it knows or obtains with the trapdoor. In the zero-knowledge game an adaptive adversary reads , submits pairs to an oracle one at a time, sees each answer before choosing the next, and outputs a bit. The real oracle answers with , the simulation oracle with ; both answer failure when .
Formalization targets
Goal: Lemma 8, perfect zero-knowledge
For every adaptive adversary ,
where is restricted to its first output.
Milestones, in the order the proof uses them
- Gate witness (proof of Lemma 8, p. 15): with commitments to and ,
- Trapdoor-opened wires: , and the simulated commitments have the law of the honest commitments .
- Witness indistinguishability for two 0/1 openings: 0/1 proofs made from any two openings , of the same commitment, , have the same law.
- One query: for every hiding key and every with , .
Significance
Lemma 8 makes the Circuit SAT argument of Section 7 the first perfect NIZK argument for every language in NP. Combined with the computational indistinguishability of binding and hiding keys it also gives the computational zero-knowledge of the proof of Figure 3 (Theorem 6), and it is the template for the perfect zero-knowledge of the universally composable NIZK of the paper's Section 8. The same simulation pattern, commit to everywhere and use the trapdoor where an opening is needed, recurs in later pairing-based proof systems such as Groth–Sahai proofs.
The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. A formal proof fixes the simulator completely, including the cases the paper leaves to the reader, and makes the adaptive multi-query argument explicit: the paper's proof treats one proof at a time and does not spell out why answering many adaptively chosen queries preserves equality of distributions.
Difficulty
The real and simulated proofs never use the same randomizers, so the proof cannot compare outputs value by value; it must compare laws. Two gaps in the printed argument need to be closed. First, witness indistinguishability is assumed only for one opening to against one opening to , while comparing a simulated gate proof with a real one compares two openings that may carry the same message; the trapdoor supplies the missing intermediate opening. Second, the printed gate recipe gives the gate commitment the message only when no input of the gate is the output wire; when the output wire is an input, the message is or , and has no 0/1 opening, so the simulator must open the gate commitment itself with the trapdoor. The adaptive adversary adds a third point: equality of laws must survive an arbitrary interaction in which later queries depend on earlier answers.
Formalization scope
- The message space is
ZMod Nwith (the paper describes Figure 3 for order at least 4, p. 14); and are finite nonempty types, a commutative group. Key generators and the 0/1 prover's randomness are probability mass functions; the coins are uniform. - Probability-one properties are stated for every key in the support of ; equalities of probabilities for all adversaries are stated as equalities of laws. Trapdoor opening indistinguishability is the joint law with , since the adversary does not see .
- The adversary is a well-founded tree of fair coin tosses and adaptive oracle queries that reads . Quantifying over all such trees is stronger than quantifying over polynomial-time adversaries. No running-time bound is imposed on the simulator.
- The simulator is the specific defined in the mission, a function of , , the circuit and fresh coins. A "simulator" that runs the honest prover on the witness would make the statement trivial and is ruled out by this definition. Each gate commitment is opened to with , which covers the output-wire case.
- Out of scope: key indistinguishability and every computational statement (computational soundness of Theorem 11, adaptive culpable soundness, the UC results); the second sentence of Lemma 8 (perfect non-erasure zero-knowledge); the verifier of Figure 3, which zero-knowledge does not involve.
- Reusable beyond this mission: the query-tree adversary with its output law, and the abstract homomorphic proof commitment with its perfect properties. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and a general lemma that oracles with equal laws give equal output laws to every adaptive adversary.
Selected references
- J. Groth, R. Ostrovsky, A. Sahai, New Techniques for Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge, Journal of the ACM 59(3), Article 11, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1145/2220357.2220358
- J. Groth, R. Ostrovsky, A. Sahai, Perfect Non-interactive Zero Knowledge for NP, EUROCRYPT 2006, LNCS 4004. https://doi.org/10.1007/11761679_21
- J. Groth, R. Ostrovsky, A. Sahai, Non-interactive Zaps and New Techniques for NIZK, CRYPTO 2006, LNCS 4117. https://doi.org/10.1007/11818175_6
- M. Blum, P. Feldman, S. Micali, Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge and Its Applications, STOC 1988. https://doi.org/10.1145/62212.62222
- U. Feige, D. Lapidot, A. Shamir, Multiple NonInteractive Zero Knowledge Proofs Under General Assumptions, SIAM J. Comput. 29(1), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539792230010
- J. Groth, A. Sahai, Efficient Non-interactive Proof Systems for Bilinear Groups, EUROCRYPT 2008, LNCS 4965. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78967-3_24