Supply Chain Performance with Target-Oriented Firms: a target-oriented retailer raises wholesale-price supply-chain profit for moderate targets and reaches first-best at Research Paper
Why wholesale prices and targets
A wholesale price contract is the simplest agreement between a supplier and a retailer: the supplier names a unit price and the retailer chooses how much to buy. It is widely used and it is known to be inefficient when both firms maximize expected profit. The retailer bears all the demand risk and orders less than a centralized firm would, the double marginalization effect of Spengler (1950). The price-only model of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) is the standard reference for this game, and the survey of Cachon (2003) records the accepted conclusion that a wholesale price contract does not coordinate a supply chain.
That conclusion assumes risk-neutral firms. Many firms instead plan around targets. Brown and Sim (2009) proposed the CVaR-satisficing measure, which scores a random payoff by how robustly it reaches a target, and Chen, Long and Perakis (2015) applied it to the newsvendor. Chen and Tang (2021) ask what happens to the supply chain as a whole when the retailer is target-oriented. This mission formalizes their answer for the total supply-chain profit.
Setting
A supplier with marginal cost sells to a retailer at wholesale price . The retailer sells at a fixed retail price and faces demand uniformly distributed on , with , , . Unsold units have no salvage value and unmet demand is lost. An order yields the random retailer profit
The extended CVaR of a random variable at level is a tail average: for the average of the worst of the distribution, and for the average of the best . The CVaR-satisficing measure with target is
when that set is nonempty, and otherwise.
The supplier is a Stackelberg leader and maximizes . A risk-neutral retailer answers with an order maximizing . A target-oriented retailer with target coefficient answers with an order maximizing , where . These are the settings "NN" and "NT". Write for the critical fractile. The total profit at a decision pair is , and the centralized profit is , with maximum over .
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 8
For , NN and NT outcomes exist, and there are thresholds such that
is concave in from on and attains its maximum at ; and
The thresholds are existential, as printed, and one pair serves the first two parts. Every clause is part of the goal.
Milestones
In the order the paper's argument uses them:
- the centralized solution for uniform demand (display after (8), p.11);
- the NN solution (9)–(10) and footnote 6 (p.12);
- the uniform clause of Lemma 1, the target-oriented retailer's order (Online Appendix p.1);
- Proposition 2, the NT decisions in the three target regimes (p.13);
- the step for from the proof of Proposition 6 (Online Appendix p.6), which the proof of Proposition 8 cites.
Significance
The result. Part 3 is the paper's contribution to the coordination literature: with a suitably chosen target, a wholesale price contract alone delivers the first-best supply-chain profit. Parts 1 and 2 locate it. Total profit rises above the risk-neutral level only on a middle band of targets, so both a modest and an overly ambitious retailer leave the chain no better off. The paper's other comparisons (Proposition 7 on the firms' individual profits, Propositions 9 to 17 on the other settings) are not part of this mission.
The formalization. The results are proved in the paper's Online Appendix. They have no machine-checked proof on this platform: the goal and the milestones are all new statements here. The mission adds to the platform an extended, two-sided CVaR, the Brown–Sim satisficing measure with its infeasible branch, and a price-only newsvendor Stackelberg game in which the leader's supremum need not be attained. Building these exposes three places where the printed statements need a correction or a precise reading, listed under Formalization scope.
Difficulty
The retailer's objective is not expected profit, so the classical critical-fractile calculation does not apply. Finding the order that maximizes the satisficing measure means working with tail averages of a law that has an atom, because every unit beyond realized demand is wasted and every order caps sales. The retailer's reaction then has two regimes with a kink, which depend on whether the optimal measure is positive or negative, and the supplier optimizes against that kinked reaction. The supplier's problem has three target regimes: in one the optimum sits at the kink, in one it has a radical closed form, and in one the supremum is not attained. The comparison in Proposition 8 has to hold across all of these regimes and across the two regimes of the risk-neutral benchmark.
Formalization scope
Representation. Demand is the law Lebesgue measure restricted to , and is its push-forward. CVaR is defined from the quantile function (the published RiskFunctionals_StochDominance_QuantileFunction) as the average of over , respectively . Best responses are defined as maximizers of (6) and (7) over . None of the closed forms of the retailer's reaction or of the equilibria is a definition. Only the quantities named by Proposition 2 are transcribed.
Conventions and corrections.
- Quantile averages. The paper's conditional expectations presuppose a unique -quantile. has an atom at , so that quantile does not exist in general, and the average form is used.
- The excluded endpoint. , which the paper's ranges include, is excluded. There every order has satisficing measure , every is a best response, and the NT outcome is undefined.
- Lemma 1 at . The uniform clause is stated for . At the printed value is wrong: the maximizers are exactly , as the paper itself says on p.13.
- "". The paper's "infinitely small" is read as a limit. An outcome is a limit of pairs with , a best response, and supplier profits tending to the supremum. Profits at an outcome are evaluated at the limit pair.
- Conditions on are written without division, for example , so that means .
Non-triviality. Outcome statements are quantified over all outcomes and also assert that outcomes exist, so they cannot hold vacuously.
Infrastructure. A complete development needs tail-average calculus for laws with one atom and the attainment and uniqueness analysis for the two retailer problems. The extended CVaR and satisficing measure are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions welcome: the general log-concave analogues of the milestones, and the paper's other settings as further statements.
Selected references
- J. J. Spengler, Vertical integration and antitrust policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950, 347–352. https://doi.org/10.1086/256962
- M. A. Lariviere, E. L. Porteus, Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4), 2001, 293–305. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
- G. P. Cachon, Supply chain coordination with contracts, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003, 227–339. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
- D. B. Brown, M. Sim, Satisficing measures for analysis of risky positions, Management Science 55(1), 2009, 71–84. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0929
- L. G. Chen, D. Z. Long, G. Perakis, The impact of a target on newsvendor decisions, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 17(1), 2015, 78–86. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2014.0500
- L. G. Chen, Q. Tang, Supply chain performance with target-oriented firms, SSRN 3533746, version of July 6, 2021, with Online Appendix. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533746