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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Old and New Methods for Lost-Sales Inventory Systems 1: Under Any Policy in Z(s) the State Enters X(s) and Never Leaves, So Every State Outside X(s) Is TransientResearch Paper

Why the lost-sales state space matters

The lost-sales inventory system with a positive lead time is one of the basic models of inventory theory. Demand that cannot be met from stock is lost rather than backlogged, and orders arrive a fixed number LLL of periods after they are placed. Unlike the backlog system, where the inventory position is a sufficient one-dimensional state and a base-stock policy is optimal, the lost-sales system needs the whole pipeline of outstanding orders as its state, and its optimal policy has no simple form. Computing optimal policies by dynamic programming therefore runs into the size of an LLL-dimensional state space.

Paul Zipkin's paper Old and New Methods for Lost-Sales Inventory Systems (Operations Research 56(5), 2008, doi:10.1287/opre.1070.0471) revisits this model, compares classical and new heuristics against optimal policies, and prepares the computation with a state-reduction result. Morton (1969, SIAM Review 11, Equation (83)) showed that under an optimal policy the state remains in a bounded set; Zipkin's §4 extends the argument to every policy in a class Z(s)Z(s)Z(s) that contains the usual heuristics. This mission formalizes that section: the reduced state space X(s)X(s)X(s), the policy class Z(s)Z(s)Z(s), and Claim 1, which says that states outside X(s)X(s)X(s) are transient.

Setting

Fix the lead time L≥1L\ge 1L≥1. The state is the LLL-vector x=(x0,…,xL−1)x=(x_0,\dots,x_{L-1})x=(x0​,…,xL−1​): x0x_0x0​ is the stock on hand after this period's delivery, and xlx_lxl​ (1≤l≤L−11\le l\le L-11≤l≤L−1) is the order that arrives lll periods later, so xL−1x_{L-1}xL−1​ is the most recent order. Given the state xxx, an order z≥0z\ge 0z≥0 and a demand d≥0d\ge 0d≥0, the next state is

x+=([x0−d]++x1, x2, …, xL−1, z),[a]+=max⁡(a,0).x_+ = \bigl([x_0-d]^+ + x_1,\ x_2,\ \dots,\ x_{L-1},\ z\bigr),\qquad [a]^+=\max(a,0).x+​=([x0​−d]++x1​, x2​, …, xL−1​, z),[a]+=max(a,0).

Demands in successive periods are independent with a common law DDD on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The pipeline partial sums are vl=∑m=lL−1xmv_l=\sum_{m=l}^{L-1}x_mvl​=∑m=lL−1​xm​ for l=0,…,L−1l=0,\dots,L-1l=0,…,L−1 and vL=0v_L=0vL​=0; v0v_0v0​ is the inventory position and vL−1=xL−1v_{L-1}=x_{L-1}vL−1​=xL−1​ the most recent order. A level vector is s=(s0,…,sL)s=(s_0,\dots,s_L)s=(s0​,…,sL​) with s0≥s1≥⋯≥sL≥0s_0\ge s_1\ge\dots\ge s_L\ge 0s0​≥s1​≥⋯≥sL​≥0. For a level vector sss,

X(s)={x≥0: vl≤sl, l=0,…,L−1},X(s)=\{x\ge 0:\ v_l\le s_l,\ l=0,\dots,L-1\},X(s)={x≥0: vl​≤sl​, l=0,…,L−1},

and Z(s)Z(s)Z(s) is the set of stationary policies zzz (an order z(x)≥0z(x)\ge 0z(x)≥0 in each state x≥0x\ge 0x≥0) with z(x)=0z(x)=0z(x)=0 for x∉X(s)x\notin X(s)x∈/X(s) and vl+z(x)≤slv_l+z(x)\le s_lvl​+z(x)≤sl​ for l=0,…,Ll=0,\dots,Ll=0,…,L and x∈X(s)x\in X(s)x∈X(s). The vector base-stock policy with parameter sss is

zs(x)=[min⁡{sl−vl, l=0,…,L}]+,z_s(x)=\bigl[\min\{s_l-v_l,\ l=0,\dots,L\}\bigr]^+,zs​(x)=[min{sl​−vl​, l=0,…,L}]+,

equation (5) of the paper with a general sss in place of Morton's sˉ\bar ssˉ. Under a stationary policy zzz, from an initial state xxx and along a demand path (dt)(d_t)(dt​), the state process is x0=xx_0=xx0​=x, xt+1=(xt)+x_{t+1}=(x_t)_+xt+1​=(xt​)+​ with order z(xt)z(x_t)z(xt​) and demand dtd_tdt​. In Lean these are next, v, IsLevelVector, Xs, Zs, vectorBaseStock and traj in the namespace LostSalesOldNew.StateReduction.

Formalization targets

Goal: Claim 1 (p. 1259)

For a level vector sss, a policy z∈Z(s)z\in Z(s)z∈Z(s), i.i.d. demands with law DDD on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and P(d>0)>0P(d>0)>0P(d>0)>0, and any initial state x≥0x\ge 0x≥0, almost surely

∃ T ∀ t≥T:xt∈X(s).\exists\,T\ \forall\,t\ge T:\quad x_t\in X(s).∃T ∀t≥T:xt​∈X(s).

The paper's word is "transient"; the statement above says that every state outside X(s)X(s)X(s), indeed the whole complement, is visited only finitely often.

Milestones

  1. (5) and §4: for every level vector sss, zs∈Z(s)z_s\in Z(s)zs​∈Z(s).
  2. Invariance (proof of Claim 1): x∈X(s)x\in X(s)x∈X(s), z∈Z(s)z\in Z(s)z∈Z(s), d≥0d\ge 0d≥0 imply x+∈X(s)x_+\in X(s)x+​∈X(s).
  3. Entrance (proof of Claim 1): along a demand path with dt≥0d_t\ge 0dt​≥0 and ∑t<ndt→∞\sum_{t<n}d_t\to\infty∑t<n​dt​→∞, the process started at any x≥0x\ge 0x≥0 visits X(s)X(s)X(s).

A further item records the paper's remark that X(s)X(s)X(s) and Z(s)Z(s)Z(s) are increasing in sss.

Significance

Claim 1 lets the dynamic program be solved on the compact set X(sˉ)X(\bar s)X(sˉ) with policies restricted to Z(sˉ)Z(\bar s)Z(sˉ), which is what makes the paper's exact computations (lead times up to four, §6) feasible. Since Z(s)Z(s)Z(s) contains the vector base-stock policies and, for sss large enough, any policy that stops ordering in large states, the claim also says that every plausible policy eventually confines the state to a bounded set.

The result has a short proof in the paper and no machine-checked version. Formalizing it produces a reusable encoding of the lost-sales pipeline with general stationary policies, and makes explicit two points the paper leaves implicit: the probabilistic reading of "transient", and the demand condition under which the process must leave the complement of X(s)X(s)X(s). Related platform material treats the backlog analogue (VeinottBaseStock.base_stock_level_absorbing, a base-stock level set is absorbing) and lost-sales dynamics under other conventions (CappedBaseStock_Model, from an empty initial state under capped base-stock policies with average cost); those formulations use another state convention and cost criterion and are not imported here.

Difficulty

The invariance step is algebra on partial sums. The content of the claim is the entrance step: outside X(s)X(s)X(s) the policy orders nothing, so the process can only reach X(s)X(s)X(s) through demand draining the stock and the pipeline. That requires the cumulative demand to diverge, which fails pathwise (demand identically zero leaves a state with x0>s0x_0>s_0x0​>s0​ fixed forever) and holds only almost surely, from independence and P(d>0)>0P(d>0)>0P(d>0)>0. The naive reading of "transient" as invariance alone, or as the pathwise statement with divergent demand assumed, misses this step.

Formalization scope

  • States are Fin L → ℝ with L≥1L\ge 1L≥1 in the goal; theorems quantify over nonnegative states. The vector (x,z)(x,z)(x,z) is Fin.snoc x z; vvv takes a natural-number index and vanishes at l≥Ll\ge Ll≥L, so vL=0v_L=0vL​=0.
  • Level vectors are Fin (L+1) → ℝ, antitone with nonnegative last entry. X(s)X(s)X(s) constrains v0,…,vL−1v_0,\dots,v_{L-1}v0​,…,vL−1​; Z(s)Z(s)Z(s) constrains vl+z(x)v_l+z(x)vl​+z(x) for l=0,…,Ll=0,\dots,Ll=0,…,L.
  • Policies are deterministic stationary functions of the state, with no measurability required. The zero condition and the sign condition of Z(s)Z(s)Z(s) range over states x≥0x\ge 0x≥0 (the paper's state space); over all of RL\mathbb R^LRL the vector base-stock policy would not be in Z(s)Z(s)Z(s).
  • Demand is a probability measure DDD on R\mathbb RR with D((−∞,0))=0D((-\infty,0))=0D((−∞,0))=0; the demand sequence is the coordinate process under Measure.infinitePi (fun _ : ℕ => D). The hypothesis D((0,∞))>0D((0,\infty))>0D((0,∞))>0 is added to the paper's assumptions; without it the claim is false.
  • "Transient" is read as: almost surely the state lies in X(s)X(s)X(s) from some period on.
  • Ruled out: the goal is neither the invariance statement alone, which says nothing about states outside X(s)X(s)X(s), nor the pathwise entrance statement with divergent cumulative demand assumed, which drops the probabilistic content.

A complete development needs the partial-sum algebra of the pipeline, the second Borel–Cantelli lemma or the strong law for i.i.d. nonnegative sequences under Measure.infinitePi, and induction along traj. The pipeline encoding is shared with the second mission of this series (lead-time monotonicity). Proofs of any milestone and of the goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Zipkin, Old and New Methods for Lost-Sales Inventory Systems, Operations Research 56(5):1256–1263, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0471
  • T. Morton, Bounds on the Solution of the Lagged Optimal Inventory Equation with No Demand Backlogging and Proportional Costs, SIAM Review 11:572–576, 1969 (as cited in Zipkin 2008).
  • T. Morton, The Near-Myopic Nature of the Lagged-Proportional-Cost Inventory Problem with Lost Sales, Operations Research 19(7):1708–1716, 1971. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.19.7.1708
  • R. Levi, G. Janakiraman, M. Nagarajan, Provably Near-Optimal Balancing Policies for Stochastic Inventory Control Models with Lost Sales, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2008 (forthcoming at the time of Zipkin 2008).
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Structure of Lost-Sales Inventory Models 1: In the Transformed State v = J⁻¹x, the Optimal Cost Functions f̄_t(v) and ḡ_t(v, ζ) Are L♮-ConvexResearch Paper

Motivation

The lost-sales inventory system is the inventory model in which demand that cannot be met from stock is lost, not backlogged. It is the natural model for retail and for any setting where a customer who finds the shelf empty buys elsewhere. With a positive order lead time it is also one of the classical hard problems of inventory theory. In the backorder model the state collapses to a single number, the inventory position, and a base-stock policy is optimal. Under lost sales the whole pipeline of outstanding orders matters, the state is an LLL-dimensional vector, and no simple policy is optimal.

Its structure has a long history:

  • Karlin and Scarf (1958) formulated the model and showed, for lead time one and continuous demand, that the optimal order decreases in on-hand inventory with slope bounded by one.
  • Morton (1969) extended these qualitative properties to general lead times, again by differentiating the optimal cost function, which required smooth demand distributions.
  • Zipkin (2008), the paper formalized here, recovered and unified both results with a change of state variables and a single structural property, L♮-convexity, from discrete convex analysis (Murota 2003). The argument needs no smoothness and works for discrete as well as continuous demand.

Setting

Time is discrete. In each period the order due arrives, a new order z≥0z\ge0z≥0 is placed, demand d≥0d\ge0d≥0 occurs, and a holding or penalty cost is charged. The lead time L≥1L\ge1L≥1 is an integer. The original state x=(x0,…,xL−1)x=(x_0,\dots,x_{L-1})x=(x0​,…,xL−1​) records on-hand inventory x0x_0x0​ followed by the orders in transit. Demands are independent with a common law μ\muμ. The costs are linear and stationary: unit procurement cost ccc, unit holding cost h^\hat hh^, unit lost-sales penalty ppp, and discount factor γ\gammaγ.

The transformed state is the vector of partial sums vl=∑k=lL−1xkv_l=\sum_{k=l}^{L-1}x_kvl​=∑k=lL−1​xk​, 0≤l<L0\le l<L0≤l<L, with the convention vL=0v_L=0vL​=0. It ranges over the cone

V={v∈RL:v0≥v1≥⋯≥vL−1≥0}.V=\{v\in\mathbb R^L : v_0\ge v_1\ge\dots\ge v_{L-1}\ge 0\}.V={v∈RL:v0​≥v1​≥⋯≥vL−1​≥0}.

The transformed order is ζ=−z≤0\zeta=-z\le0ζ=−z≤0. With eee the all-ones vector, the state moves to

v+=([v0−v1−d]++v1, v2, …, vL−1, 0)−ζe.v_+=\big([v_0-v_1-d]^+ + v_1,\ v_2,\ \dots,\ v_{L-1},\ 0\big)-\zeta e .v+​=([v0​−v1​−d]++v1​, v2​, …, vL−1​, 0)−ζe.

The one-period cost is q^(u)=h^u++pu−\hat q(u)=\hat hu^+ + pu^-q^​(u)=h^u++pu− on u=y−du=y-du=y−d, where y=v0−v1y=v_0-v_1y=v0​−v1​ is the on-hand stock, and q^0(y)=E[q^(y−d)]\hat q^0(y)=E[\hat q(y-d)]q^​0(y)=E[q^​(y−d)]. With kkk periods to go, the optimal cost functions are

fˉ0≡0,gˉk(v,ζ)=−γLcζ+q^0(v0−v1)+γE[fˉk(v+)],fˉk+1(v)=inf⁡ζ≤0gˉk(v,ζ).\bar f_0\equiv0,\qquad \bar g_k(v,\zeta)=-\gamma^Lc\zeta+\hat q^0(v_0-v_1)+\gamma E\big[\bar f_k(v_+)\big],\qquad \bar f_{k+1}(v)=\inf_{\zeta\le0}\bar g_k(v,\zeta).fˉ​0​≡0,gˉ​k​(v,ζ)=−γLcζ+q^​0(v0​−v1​)+γE[fˉ​k​(v+​)],fˉ​k+1​(v)=ζ≤0inf​gˉ​k​(v,ζ).

A function φ\varphiφ is submodular on a set S⊆RnS\subseteq\mathbb R^nS⊆Rn if φ(x∨y)+φ(x∧y)≤φ(x)+φ(y)\varphi(x\vee y)+\varphi(x\wedge y)\le\varphi(x)+\varphi(y)φ(x∨y)+φ(x∧y)≤φ(x)+φ(y) for all x,y∈Sx,y\in Sx,y∈S, with ∨,∧\vee,\wedge∨,∧ the componentwise maximum and minimum. A function f:V→Rf:V\to\mathbb Rf:V→R is L♮-convex if ψ(v,ζ)=f(v−ζe)\psi(v,\zeta)=f(v-\zeta e)ψ(v,ζ)=f(v−ζe) is submodular on V×ℜ−V\times\Re^-V×ℜ−. A function g(v,ζ)g(v,\zeta)g(v,ζ) on V×ℜ−V\times\Re^-V×ℜ− is L♮-convex if g((v,ζ)−ξ(e,1))g\big((v,\zeta)-\xi(e,1)\big)g((v,ζ)−ξ(e,1)) is submodular in (v,ζ,ξ)(v,\zeta,\xi)(v,ζ,ξ) over v∈Vv\in Vv∈V, ζ≤ξ≤0\zeta\le\xi\le0ζ≤ξ≤0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 939)

For every number of periods to go kkk,

fˉk is L♮-convex on Vandgˉk is L♮-convex on V×ℜ−.\bar f_k \text{ is L♮-convex on } V \quad\text{and}\quad \bar g_k \text{ is L♮-convex on } V\times\Re^- .fˉ​k​ is L♮-convex on Vandgˉ​k​ is L♮-convex on V×ℜ−.

The statement fixes no constants. It holds for every lead time, every demand law in the class below, and every cost vector.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 938): if f(v)f(v)f(v) is L♮-convex, so is ψ(v,ζ)=f(v−ζe)\psi(v,\zeta)=f(v-\zeta e)ψ(v,ζ)=f(v−ζe).
  2. Lemma 2 (p. 939): if g(v,ζ)g(v,\zeta)g(v,ζ) is L♮-convex, so is f(v)=min⁡ζ≤0g(v,ζ)f(v)=\min_{\zeta\le0}g(v,\zeta)f(v)=minζ≤0​g(v,ζ).
  3. Optimal filling (proof of Theorem 4): in the end-of-period program (3), filling as much demand as possible is optimal (a=min⁡{d,v0−v1}a=\min\{d,v_0-v_1\}a=min{d,v0​−v1​}). Consequently κˉt(v,ζ∣d)=q^(v0−v1−d)+γfˉt+1(v+)\bar\kappa_t(v,\zeta\mid d)=\hat q(v_0-v_1-d)+\gamma\bar f_{t+1}(v_+)κˉt​(v,ζ∣d)=q^​(v0​−v1​−d)+γfˉ​t+1​(v+​).
  4. ψt\psi_tψt​ is L♮-convex: the objective ψt(v+,v,ζ)=h^(v+−v1)+p(v+−v0+d)+γfˉt+1[(v+,v2,…,vL−1,0)−ζe]\psi_t(v_+,v,\zeta)=\hat h(v_+-v_1)+p(v_+-v_0+d)+\gamma\bar f_{t+1}[(v_+,v_2,\dots,v_{L-1},0)-\zeta e]ψt​(v+​,v,ζ)=h^(v+​−v1​)+p(v+​−v0​+d)+γfˉ​t+1​[(v+​,v2​,…,vL−1​,0)−ζe] of program (4) is L♮-convex on its constraint set.
  5. κˉt\bar\kappa_tκˉt​ is L♮-convex: the end-of-period cost κˉt(v,ζ∣d)\bar\kappa_t(v,\zeta\mid d)κˉt​(v,ζ∣d) is L♮-convex in (v,ζ)(v,\zeta)(v,ζ) for each ddd.
  6. gˉt\bar g_tgˉ​t​ is L♮-convex: if fˉt+1\bar f_{t+1}fˉ​t+1​ is L♮-convex, so is gˉt=−γLcζ+Ed[κˉt]\bar g_t=-\gamma^Lc\zeta+E_d[\bar\kappa_t]gˉ​t​=−γLcζ+Ed​[κˉt​], by (5).

Significance

The result. L♮-convexity of fˉt\bar f_tfˉ​t​ implies that fˉt\bar f_tfˉ​t​ is submodular and convex in the transformed state. L♮-convexity of gˉt\bar g_tgˉ​t​ yields, through Lemma 3 and Corollary 5 of the paper, that the optimal order zˉt(v)\bar z_t(v)zˉt​(v) is nonincreasing in vvv and changes by at most ω\omegaω when every component of vvv increases by ω\omegaω. These are exactly the Karlin–Scarf and Morton sensitivity results, obtained without derivatives. The same property underlies the paper's later results: the bounds on the optimal policy (§4), the monotonicity of cost in demand variability (§5), and the extensions to capacity limits, correlated demand and stochastic lead times (§6).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing here is open mathematically. To our knowledge no machine-checked proof of L♮-convexity of an inventory value function exists. The mission produces three things:

  • a formal L♮-convexity theory on real cones (the shift characterization, its preservation under partial minimization, and its preservation under expectation);
  • a checked version of the induction behind Theorem 4;
  • a verified model of the lost-sales recursion in the transformed state, which missions on Corollary 5 and the later sections can import.

Difficulty

The obvious argument works with ordinary convexity and submodularity in the original state xxx. It stalls: the lost-sales transition [x0−d]+[x_0-d]^+[x0​−d]+ is not linear, and the order enters only the last pipeline component, so the comparative statics Karlin and Scarf and Morton obtained by differentiation do not follow from convexity in xxx. The paper's structure appears only in the partial sums vvv. Submodularity alone, moreover, is not preserved by the step that minimizes over the order. The shift structure of L♮-convexity is what survives the minimization over ζ\zetaζ (Lemma 2). Proving plain submodularity of fˉt\bar f_tfˉ​t​ on VVV therefore does not close the induction.

A second difficulty is the end-of-period program. Writing the next state as the minimum of a program over a constraint set that is a sublattice requires checking the order-theoretic structure of the set together with the sign pattern of every term. The equality between the program's value and the recursion's one-period cost (milestone 3) is a property of the model's own value function, not of an arbitrary L♮-convex continuation.

A third difficulty is measure-theoretic. Preservation under expectation needs integrability and measurability of d↦fˉk(v+)d\mapsto\bar f_k(v_+)d↦fˉ​k​(v+​), and these come from the model rather than from the definitions.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. States are functions Fin L → ℝ, indexed 0,…,L−10,\dots,L-10,…,L−1 as in the paper. A helper returns vlv_lvl​ for l<Ll<Ll<L and 000 at l=Ll=Ll=L. A function g(v,ζ)g(v,\zeta)g(v,ζ) is encoded on Fin (L+1) → ℝ with ζ\zetaζ last. The objective ψt\psi_tψt​ of (4) is encoded on Fin (L+2) → ℝ with coordinates (v+,v0,…,vL−1,ζ)(v_+,v_0,\dots,v_{L-1},\zeta)(v+​,v0​,…,vL−1​,ζ). The order is componentwise.
  • L♮-convexity on a domain DDD: (x,ξ)↦f(x−ξe)(x,\xi)\mapsto f(x-\xi e)(x,ξ)↦f(x−ξe) is submodular on {ξ≤0, x∈D, x−ξe∈D}\{\xi\le0,\ x\in D,\ x-\xi e\in D\}{ξ≤0, x∈D, x−ξe∈D}, with eee the all-ones vector on every coordinate. For D=VD=VD=V this is the paper's definition verbatim. This is the paper's definition, not Murota's translation-submodularity form, and it is stated on real vectors. The platform's discrete-convexity library (DiscreteConvex.LConvexFunctions.*) works on ZV\mathbb Z^VZV with values in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}, a different domain and definition, and is not reused.
  • Time. Data are stationary, so the paper's fˉt\bar f_tfˉ​t​ depends on ttt only through the number of periods to go k=T+L+1−tk=T+L+1-tk=T+L+1−t, and "for all ttt" is "for all kkk". The minimum over z≥0z\ge0z≥0 is taken in every period, as printed in (1).
  • Explicit readings of the paper's phrases.
    • "min" (over ζ≤0\zeta\le0ζ≤0, over v+v_+v+​, over (a,w)(a,w)(a,w)) is an infimum over the constraint set. In the model every cost is nonnegative, so the infimum is genuine. The generic Lemma 2 assumes the values bounded below, and the generic milestone 5 assumes the continuation nonnegative on VVV.
    • "the dtd_tdt​ are independent and nonnegative": one law μ\muμ with μ(−∞,0)=0\mu(-\infty,0)=0μ(−∞,0)=0, since data are stationary.
    • "unit cost", "discount rate": c,h^,p≥0c,\hat h,p\ge0c,h^,p≥0 and 0<γ≤10<\gamma\le10<γ≤1.
    • Finite mean demand is added: without it q^0\hat q^0q^​0 is infinite.
    • "the optimal a=min⁡{d,v0−v1}a=\min\{d,v_0-v_1\}a=min{d,v0​−v1​}": stated as the equality of the infimum of program (4) with its value at v+=max⁡(v0−d,v1)v_+=\max(v_0-d,v_1)v+​=max(v0​−d,v1​).
  • Ruled out. A statement that holds because a value function is the junk constant 000 (constants are L♮-convex), plain submodularity on VVV in place of the shift condition, quantification over all of RL\mathbb R^LRL instead of VVV, and a goal about an arbitrary function assumed to satisfy the recursion. None of these is the paper's theorem; the goal is stated for the recursion itself.
  • Not in scope. "L♮-convex implies convex" for a generic function, which is false without regularity (a non-measurable additive function is L♮-convex in this sense); Lemma 3 and Corollary 5, for a follow-up mission that references Theorem 4; the smooth-case Hessian discussion; the infinite-horizon remarks.
  • Welcome contributions. Reusable lemmas on submodularity over sublattices of Rn\mathbb R^nRn (partial minimization, Topkis 2.7.6), on preservation of submodularity under integration, and on measurability of the value functions.

Selected references

  • P. Zipkin, On the structure of lost-sales inventory models, Operations Research 56(4) (2008) 937–944. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0482
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory models of the Arrow–Harris–Marschak type with time lag, in Arrow, Karlin, Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958.
  • T. E. Morton, Bounds on the solution of the lagged optimal inventory equation with no demand backlogging and proportional costs, SIAM Review 11(4) (1969) 572–596. https://doi.org/10.1137/1011090
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management 2: For a Compact Convex Set of Discrete Distributions, Worst-Case CVaR Equals min_α max_π G_β(x, α, π)Research Paper

Motivation

Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) is the standard coherent measure of tail risk in portfolio selection and risk-averse optimization: for a confidence level β\betaβ it is, roughly, the expected loss in the worst (1−β)(1-\beta)(1−β) fraction of outcomes. Its practical appeal comes from the representation of Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000, 2002), which writes CVaR as the minimum over a scalar threshold α\alphaα of a convex function, so that minimizing CVaR over decisions becomes a single convex (often linear) program.

That representation presupposes that the distribution of the uncertain data is known exactly. In practice the scenario probabilities are estimated, and decisions that are optimal for the estimate can perform poorly under a nearby distribution. Zhu and Fukushima (Oper. Res. 57(5), 2009) study the worst-case CVaR: the largest CVaR over a set of distributions that the decision maker considers plausible. For a finite scenario model they show (Theorem 2) that when the plausible set of probability vectors is compact and convex, the worst-case CVaR again has a min–max representation in the threshold α\alphaα. This is what makes worst-case CVaR minimization tractable: under box uncertainty it becomes a linear program and under ellipsoidal uncertainty a second-order cone program (§2.2.1–2.2.2 of the paper).

Setting

A decision x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn incurs the loss f(x,y)f(x,y)f(x,y), where y∈Rmy \in \mathbb R^my∈Rm is random. In the discrete model yyy takes the finitely many values y[1],…,y[S]y_{[1]},\dots,y_{[S]}y[1]​,…,y[S]​, the scenarios, with probabilities π1,…,πS\pi_1,\dots,\pi_Sπ1​,…,πS​, where πk≥0\pi_k \ge 0πk​≥0 and ∑kπk=1\sum_k \pi_k = 1∑k​πk​=1. Fix a confidence level 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 and write [t]+=max⁡{t,0}[t]^+ = \max\{t,0\}[t]+=max{t,0}. The Rockafellar–Uryasev function for the distribution π\piπ is

Gβ(x,α,π)=α+11−β∑k=1Sπk [f(x,y[k])−α]+,α∈R,G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi) = \alpha + \frac{1}{1-\beta}\sum_{k=1}^S \pi_k\,[f(x,y_{[k]})-\alpha]^+, \qquad \alpha\in\mathbb R,Gβ​(x,α,π)=α+1−β1​k=1∑S​πk​[f(x,y[k]​)−α]+,α∈R,

and the CVaR of the loss at xxx under π\piπ is

CVaRβ(x,π)=min⁡α∈RGβ(x,α,π).\mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x,\pi) = \min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi).CVaRβ​(x,π)=α∈Rmin​Gβ​(x,α,π).

The distribution is not known; it is only known to lie in an ambiguity set Pπ⊆RS\mathcal P_\pi \subseteq \mathbb R^SPπ​⊆RS of probability vectors. The worst-case CVaR at xxx is

WCVaRβ(x)=sup⁡π∈PπCVaRβ(x,π)=sup⁡π∈Pπmin⁡α∈RGβ(x,α,π).\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x) = \sup_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}\mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x,\pi) = \sup_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi).WCVaRβ​(x)=π∈Pπ​sup​CVaRβ​(x,π)=π∈Pπ​sup​α∈Rmin​Gβ​(x,α,π).

In the Lean development these objects are WorstCaseCVaR.Discrete.G, cvar and wcvar, with the scenarios given as ys : Fin S → (Fin m → ℝ) and Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ as a set P of vectors Fin S → ℝ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 1159)

If Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ is a nonempty compact convex set of probability vectors, then for each xxx

WCVaRβ(x)=min⁡α∈Rmax⁡π∈PπGβ(x,α,π),\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x) = \min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}\max_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi),WCVaRβ​(x)=α∈Rmin​π∈Pπ​max​Gβ​(x,α,π),

with the inner maximum attained for every α\alphaα and the outer minimum attained at some α0\alpha_0α0​. The statement fixes no constants and no particular ambiguity set.

Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof, p. 1167)

  1. Gβ(x,α,π)G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi)Gβ​(x,α,π) is convex in α\alphaα for each probability vector π\piπ and affine in π\piπ for each α\alphaα.
  2. There is one nonempty closed bounded interval A\mathcal AA such that, for every π∈Pπ\pi\in\mathcal P_\piπ∈Pπ​, min⁡α∈RGβ(x,α,π)=min⁡α∈AGβ(x,α,π)\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi) = \min_{\alpha\in\mathcal A} G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi)minα∈R​Gβ​(x,α,π)=minα∈A​Gβ​(x,α,π).
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 1157, Ky Fan's minimax theorem): for convex–concave, suitably semicontinuous ϕ\phiϕ on a product of nonempty compact convex sets, min⁡xmax⁡yϕ=max⁡ymin⁡xϕ\min_x\max_y\phi = \max_y\min_x\phiminx​maxy​ϕ=maxy​minx​ϕ.
  4. Lemma 1 on A×Pπ\mathcal A\times\mathcal P_\piA×Pπ​: max⁡π∈Pπmin⁡α∈AGβ=min⁡α∈Amax⁡π∈PπGβ\max_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}\min_{\alpha\in\mathcal A}G_\beta = \min_{\alpha\in\mathcal A}\max_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}G_\betamaxπ∈Pπ​​minα∈A​Gβ​=minα∈A​maxπ∈Pπ​​Gβ​.
  5. The min-max inequality inf⁡α∈Rsup⁡π∈PπGβ(x,α,π)≥sup⁡π∈Pπmin⁡α∈RGβ(x,α,π)\inf_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}\sup_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi) \ge \sup_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}G_\beta(x,\alpha,\pi)infα∈R​supπ∈Pπ​​Gβ​(x,α,π)≥supπ∈Pπ​​minα∈R​Gβ​(x,α,π).

Significance

Theorem 2 converts a supremum over distributions of a minimum over thresholds into a minimum over thresholds of a worst case of a function that is affine in π\piπ. Minimizing WCVaRβ(x)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)WCVaRβ​(x) over decisions xxx is therefore the single minimization problem (16)–(20) of the paper in the variables (x,u,α,θ)(x,u,\alpha,\theta)(x,u,α,θ), whose only nonstandard constraint is max⁡π∈Pπ(α+11−βπTu)≤θ\max_{\pi\in\mathcal P_\pi}(\alpha+\frac{1}{1-\beta}\pi^Tu)\le\thetamaxπ∈Pπ​​(α+1−β1​πTu)≤θ. For box and ellipsoidal ambiguity sets that constraint is dualized into linear or conic constraints, which gives the robust portfolio models of §§2.2.1–3 of the paper. The same exchange of sup⁡π\sup_\pisupπ​ and min⁡α\min_\alphaminα​ underlies many later distributionally robust CVaR models.

The result is proved in the paper (appendix, p. 1167) and is not open. The mission produces a machine-checked proof of it, which to our knowledge does not exist. Mathlib contains Sion's minimax theorem (Sion.exists_isSaddlePointOn), which covers Lemma 1; what is missing is the CVaR-specific part: the convexity of GβG_\betaGβ​ in α\alphaα, the reduction of the threshold to a compact interval uniform over Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​, and the passage from the compact interval back to all of R\mathbb RR.

Difficulty

The obvious approach applies a minimax theorem directly to GβG_\betaGβ​ on R×Pπ\mathbb R\times\mathcal P_\piR×Pπ​. That fails because R\mathbb RR is not compact, and minimax equalities on a noncompact factor can fail; the threshold must first be confined to a bounded interval, and the interval must work for every π∈Pπ\pi\in\mathcal P_\piπ∈Pπ​ simultaneously. After the exchange on the interval, the minimum over the interval has to be identified with the infimum over all of R\mathbb RR, which needs the min-max inequality on the unrestricted line. A second subtlety is attainment: every "min" and "max" in the statement is a claim that an extremum exists, and in the real-valued formalization each must be exhibited rather than read off from a supremum.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in the Lean statements:

  • Scenarios are indexed zero-based by Fin S; probability vectors are elements of stdSimplex ℝ (Fin S).
  • The confidence level satisfies 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 in every statement (the paper says only that β\betaβ is a confidence level, usually above 0.90.90.9).
  • CVaRβ(x,π)\mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x,\pi)CVaRβ​(x,π) is defined as the paper does for discrete distributions, as the minimum of Gβ(x,⋅,π)G_\beta(x,\cdot,\pi)Gβ​(x,⋅,π), encoded as the real infimum of its values; WCVaRβ(x)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)WCVaRβ​(x) is the real supremum of the image of Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​. Both are true infima and suprema under the hypotheses carried by every theorem.
  • Theorem 2's hypothesis "Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ is a compact convex set" is completed by two standing assumptions of §2.2: Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ consists of probability vectors, and it is nonempty. Without the first, Gβ(x,⋅,π)G_\beta(x,\cdot,\pi)Gβ​(x,⋅,π) can be unbounded below and the real infimum returns a junk value; without the second the supremum is over the empty set.
  • Lemma 1 is stated with lower semicontinuity in xxx and upper semicontinuity in yyy, which the paper omits and which are needed for the extrema to exist; its conclusion is a saddle point, equivalent to the attained min–max equality.
  • In the goal, the right-hand side exhibits an explicit minimizer α0\alpha_0α0​ and the inner maximum is shown to be attained; neither is replaced by a bare infimum or supremum.

No vacuous version of the goal is admissible: the ambiguity set must be nonempty and consist of probability vectors, and the minimum over α\alphaα must be witnessed.

The development needs only finite sums, convexity on R\mathbb RR and on the simplex, compactness of Pπ\mathcal P_\piPπ​ and of closed intervals, and Mathlib's minimax theorem. The reduction to a bounded interval and the min-max inequality are reusable for other finite-scenario CVaR results. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of the goal that avoid the interval reduction.

Selected references

  • S. Zhu and M. Fukushima, Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management, Operations Research 57(5):1155–1168, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0684
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Optimization of Conditional Value-at-Risk, Journal of Risk 2(3):21–41, 2000. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Conditional Value-at-Risk for General Loss Distributions, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7):1443–1471, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00271-6
  • K. Fan, Minimax Theorems, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 39(1):42–47, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.1.42
  • M. Sion, On General Minimax Theorems, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 8(1):171–176, 1958. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management 1: Under Mixture Distribution Uncertainty, Worst-Case CVaR Equals the Minimum over α of max_i F^i_β(x, α)Research Paper

Motivation

Conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) is the standard coherent measure of tail risk in portfolio selection, insurance and stochastic programming. Its practical appeal comes from a variational formula of Rockafellar and Uryasev (J. Risk 2000; J. Banking Finance 2002): CVaR at level β\betaβ is the minimum over a scalar α\alphaα of a convex function, so that minimizing CVaR over decisions becomes a single convex program, a linear program when the distribution is given by scenarios.

The formula needs the distribution of the random returns, and in practice that distribution is estimated and uncertain. Zhu and Fukushima (Oper. Res. 57(5), 2009) introduce the worst-case CVaR: the supremum of CVaR over a set P\mathcal PP of candidate distributions. They show it is again a coherent risk measure and that, for several natural choices of P\mathcal PP, minimizing it remains a tractable convex program. This mission formalizes the first of these results, for P\mathcal PP the set of all mixtures of finitely many given distributions, a model used in robust statistics and in finance to describe returns under several market regimes.

Setting

A decision x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn and a random vector y∈Rmy\in\mathbb R^my∈Rm determine a loss f(x,y)∈Rf(x,y)\in\mathbb Rf(x,y)∈R. A confidence level β\betaβ satisfies 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 (in applications β≥0.9\beta\ge0.9β≥0.9). Write [t]+=max⁡{t,0}[t]^+=\max\{t,0\}[t]+=max{t,0}.

For a probability distribution PPP of yyy under which f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) is integrable, the Rockafellar–Uryasev function is

Fβ(x,α)=α+11−β∫Rm[f(x,y)−α]+ dP(y),α∈R,(1)F_\beta(x,\alpha)=\alpha+\frac1{1-\beta}\int_{\mathbb R^m}[f(x,y)-\alpha]^+\,dP(y),\qquad\alpha\in\mathbb R, \tag{1}Fβ​(x,α)=α+1−β1​∫Rm​[f(x,y)−α]+dP(y),α∈R,(1)

and CVaR is its minimum over α\alphaα:

CVaRβ(x)=min⁡α∈RFβ(x,α).(2)\mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x)=\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}F_\beta(x,\alpha). \tag{2}CVaRβ​(x)=α∈Rmin​Fβ​(x,α).(2)

Fix l≥1l\ge1l≥1 likelihood distributions P1,…,PlP^1,\dots,P^lP1,…,Pl on Rm\mathbb R^mRm and let Λ={λ∈Rl:λi≥0, ∑iλi=1}\Lambda=\{\lambda\in\mathbb R^l:\lambda_i\ge0,\ \sum_i\lambda_i=1\}Λ={λ∈Rl:λi​≥0, ∑i​λi​=1} be the probability simplex. The ambiguity set is the set of mixtures

PM={∑i=1lλiPi: λ∈Λ},\mathcal P_M=\Big\{\textstyle\sum_{i=1}^l\lambda_iP^i:\ \lambda\in\Lambda\Big\},PM​={∑i=1l​λi​Pi: λ∈Λ},

and the worst-case CVaR of xxx is

WCVaRβ(x)=sup⁡λ∈Λ CVaRβ(x)  under  ∑iλiPi.(3)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)=\sup_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\ \mathrm{CVaR}_\beta(x)\ \text{ under }\ \textstyle\sum_i\lambda_iP^i. \tag{3}WCVaRβ​(x)=λ∈Λsup​ CVaRβ​(x)  under  ∑i​λi​Pi.(3)

Write Fβi(x,α)F^i_\beta(x,\alpha)Fβi​(x,α) for the function (1) with P=PiP=P^iP=Pi, FβL(x,α)=max⁡i∈LFβi(x,α)F^{\mathcal L}_\beta(x,\alpha)=\max_{i\in\mathcal L}F^i_\beta(x,\alpha)FβL​(x,α)=maxi∈L​Fβi​(x,α) with L={1,…,l}\mathcal L=\{1,\dots,l\}L={1,…,l}, and Hβ(x,α,λ)H_\beta(x,\alpha,\lambda)Hβ​(x,α,λ) for the function (1) of the mixture ∑iλiPi\sum_i\lambda_iP^i∑i​λi​Pi.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every xxx with f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) integrable under every PiP^iPi,

WCVaRβ(x)=min⁡α∈R max⁡i∈LFβi(x,α),\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)=\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}\ \max_{i\in\mathcal L}F^i_\beta(x,\alpha),WCVaRβ​(x)=α∈Rmin​ i∈Lmax​Fβi​(x,α),

with the minimum attained. The supremum over infinitely many distributions on the left becomes a minimum of the pointwise maximum of lll functions on the right.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's appendix proof (pp. 1166–1167) in order:

  1. (53): Hβ(x,α,λ)=∑iλiFβi(x,α)H_\beta(x,\alpha,\lambda)=\sum_i\lambda_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)Hβ​(x,α,λ)=∑i​λi​Fβi​(x,α) for λ∈Λ\lambda\in\Lambdaλ∈Λ.
  2. (54): WCVaRβ(x)=max⁡λ∈Λmin⁡αHβ(x,α,λ)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)=\max_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\min_{\alpha}H_\beta(x,\alpha,\lambda)WCVaRβ​(x)=maxλ∈Λ​minα​Hβ​(x,α,λ), both extrema attained.
  3. The minimizer set of Fβ(x,⋅)F_\beta(x,\cdot)Fβ​(x,⋅) is a nonempty closed bounded interval [α‾∗,α‾∗][\underline\alpha^*,\overline\alpha^*][α​∗,α∗].
  4. Minimizers of a nonnegative combination of two convex functions on R\mathbb RR lie between the extreme endpoints of their minimizer intervals.
  5. Every minimizer of Hβ(x,⋅,λ)H_\beta(x,\cdot,\lambda)Hβ​(x,⋅,λ) lies in A=[min⁡iα‾i∗,max⁡iα‾i∗]\mathcal A=[\min_i\underline\alpha^*_i,\max_i\overline\alpha^*_i]A=[mini​α​i∗​,maxi​αi∗​], and the minimum over R\mathbb RR is attained in A\mathcal AA.
  6. Lemma 1, the minimax equality for convex–concave functions on compact convex sets.
  7. (55): max⁡λmin⁡RHβ=max⁡λmin⁡AHβ=min⁡Amax⁡λHβ\max_\lambda\min_{\mathbb R}H_\beta=\max_\lambda\min_{\mathcal A}H_\beta=\min_{\mathcal A}\max_\lambda H_\betamaxλ​minR​Hβ​=maxλ​minA​Hβ​=minA​maxλ​Hβ​.
  8. (56)–(57): WCVaRβ(x)=min⁡α∈Rmax⁡λ∈Λ∑iλiFβi(x,α)\mathrm{WCVaR}_\beta(x)=\min_{\alpha\in\mathbb R}\max_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\sum_i\lambda_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)WCVaRβ​(x)=minα∈R​maxλ∈Λ​∑i​λi​Fβi​(x,α).
  9. (58)–(59): max⁡λ∈Λ∑iλiFβi(x,α)=max⁡iFβi(x,α)\max_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\sum_i\lambda_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)=\max_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)maxλ∈Λ​∑i​λi​Fβi​(x,α)=maxi​Fβi​(x,α).

An additional item states Corollary 1: (x∗,α∗)(x^*,\alpha^*)(x∗,α∗) minimizes FβLF^{\mathcal L}_\betaFβL​ over X×R\mathcal X\times\mathbb RX×R exactly when x∗x^*x∗ minimizes WCVaRβ\mathrm{WCVaR}_\betaWCVaRβ​ over X\mathcal XX and α∗\alpha^*α∗ minimizes FβL(x∗,⋅)F^{\mathcal L}_\beta(x^*,\cdot)FβL​(x∗,⋅).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 makes worst-case CVaR under mixture uncertainty no harder to optimize than ordinary CVaR. Since each FβiF^i_\betaFβi​ is jointly convex in (x,α)(x,\alpha)(x,α) when fff is convex in xxx, FβLF^{\mathcal L}_\betaFβL​ is convex, and Corollary 1 turns robust CVaR minimization into one convex program in (x,α)(x,\alpha)(x,α); with sampled scenarios it is a linear program (the paper's (10)–(15)). It is the starting point for the paper's robust portfolio models (§3), whose ambiguity sets are mixtures of a few estimated return distributions.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof contributes a measure-theoretic treatment of the Rockafellar–Uryasev function for arbitrary distributions (the paper argues with densities and appeals to Remark 1 for the general case), a reusable statement that the minimizer set of FβF_\betaFβ​ is a compact interval, and a worked instance of the minimax theorem in Mathlib (Sion) applied to a problem with an unbounded variable.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to exchange sup⁡λ\sup_\lambdasupλ​ and min⁡α\min_\alphaminα​ in sup⁡λmin⁡α∑iλiFβi(x,α)\sup_\lambda\min_\alpha\sum_i\lambda_iF^i_\beta(x,\alpha)supλ​minα​∑i​λi​Fβi​(x,α), since the function is convex in α\alphaα and affine in λ\lambdaλ. Minimax theorems for this exchange need compactness of one of the two sets, and the variable α\alphaα ranges over all of R\mathbb RR. The step that has to be supplied is a localization: all minimizers in α\alphaα, for every λ\lambdaλ at once, lie in one compact interval A\mathcal AA determined by the minimizer sets of the components. This in turn requires knowing that each Fβi(x,⋅)F^i_\beta(x,\cdot)Fβi​(x,⋅) has a nonempty bounded minimizer set, which uses 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 and integrability of the loss: at β=0\beta=0β=0 the minimizer set can be a half-line and the localization fails. A second point is attainment: the outer supremum over Λ\LambdaΛ is a maximum only because the inner minimum depends continuously on λ\lambdaλ.

Formalization scope

  • Distributions are probability measures on Fin m → ℝ (not densities); Remark 1 of the paper extends all results to general distributions, and a density is a special case. Decisions are Fin n → ℝ, the loss is f : (Fin n → ℝ) → (Fin m → ℝ) → ℝ, and the likelihood distributions are P : Fin l → Measure (Fin m → ℝ) with indices zero-based and [NeZero l].
  • Every theorem assumes 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1, that each PiP^iPi is a probability measure, and that f(x,⋅)f(x,\cdot)f(x,⋅) is integrable under each PiP^iPi (the paper's E∣f(x,y)∣<∞E|f(x,y)|<\inftyE∣f(x,y)∣<∞).
  • CVaR is defined by (2) as the infimum of the values of Fβ(x,⋅)F_\beta(x,\cdot)Fβ​(x,⋅); the tail-mean definition and the Rockafellar–Uryasev identity between the two are not part of the mission. The mixture is the finite sum of measures ∑iλiPi\sum_i\lambda_iP^i∑i​λi​Pi, Λ\LambdaΛ is Mathlib's stdSimplex, and WCVaR is the supremum of the image of Λ\LambdaΛ.
  • Every min and max in the paper is stated as attained, with an explicit minimizer or as IsGreatest/IsLeast; no real sInf or sSup is evaluated on an empty or unbounded set, so no statement can hold through Lean's junk value 000.
  • Lemma 1 is stated with lower semicontinuity in xxx and upper semicontinuity in yyy, which the printed statement omits and without which the extrema need not exist.
  • The definitions FβF_\betaFβ​, CVaR, mixture and WCVaR are reusable for any risk-measure development; the interval property of arg⁡min⁡Fβ\arg\min F_\betaargminFβ​ is of independent use. Proofs of any milestone, and lemmas on the Rockafellar–Uryasev function for general measures, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Zhu and M. Fukushima, Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management, Operations Research 57(5):1155–1168, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0684
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Optimization of conditional value-at-risk, Journal of Risk 2(3):21–41, 2000. https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2000.038
  • R. T. Rockafellar and S. Uryasev, Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7):1443–1471, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00271-6
  • K. Fan, Minimax theorems, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 39(1):42–47, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.1.42
  • P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber and D. Heath, Coherent measures of risk, Mathematical Finance 9(3):203–228, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9965.00068
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Convex OptimizationNumerical AnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Coordinate Gradient Descent Method for Nonsmooth Separable Minimization 1: With the Armijo Rule and the Generalized Gauss–Seidel Rule, Every Cluster Point of the CGD Iterates Is StationaryResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization models combine a smooth loss with a convex penalty or constraint. The penalty can be nonsmooth: an absolute-value penalty encourages sparse solutions, while an indicator function enforces a feasible set. A coordinate gradient descent (CGD) method updates selected coordinates by minimizing a quadratic model and then applies a line search. Tseng and Yun studied this method for an extended-valued convex penalty, including penalties that separate by blocks of coordinates. Their global convergence result addresses a basic question for such an iteration: if its iterates have an accumulation point, must that point satisfy the first-order stationarity condition? The result and examples appear in Tseng and Yun (2009).

Coordinate updates are appealing when changing a small block is cheaper than changing the whole vector. Their convergence is delicate when the penalty is nonsmooth: a direction can be useful on one block without revealing whether the full point is stationary. The paper's Theorem 1(e) establishes a guarantee for a generalized Gauss–Seidel selection rule and a block-separable penalty. The authors note that this rules out cycling on Powell's coordinate-minimization example under their stated conditions Tseng and Yun (2009), p. 404.

Setting

Let x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn, c>0c>0c>0, and let P:Rn→(−∞,+∞]P:\mathbb R^n\to(-\infty,+\infty]P:Rn→(−∞,+∞] be proper, convex and lower semicontinuous. Its effective domain D=dom⁡PD=\operatorname{dom}PD=domP contains precisely the points where PPP is finite. Let fff be continuously differentiable on an open set containing DDD. The objective is Fc(x)=f(x)+cP(x)F_c(x)=f(x)+cP(x)Fc​(x)=f(x)+cP(x), with value +∞+\infty+∞ outside DDD. No convexity of fff is assumed.

At iteration kkk, choose a nonempty set of coordinates Jk\mathcal J^kJk and a positive-definite symmetric matrix HkH^kHk. The search direction dkd^kdk minimizes

∇f(xk)⊤d+12d⊤Hkd+cP(xk+d)subject to dj=0 for j∉Jk.\nabla f(x^k)^\top d+\tfrac12 d^\top H^k d+cP(x^k+d) \quad\text{subject to }d_j=0\text{ for }j\notin\mathcal J^k.∇f(xk)⊤d+21​d⊤Hkd+cP(xk+d)subject to dj​=0 for j∈/Jk.

The next iterate is xk+1=xk+αkdkx^{k+1}=x^k+\alpha^k d^kxk+1=xk+αkdk. The Armijo rule tests the geometric sequence αinitkβj\alpha^k_{\mathrm{init}}\beta^jαinitk​βj and takes its largest accepted member, using the paper's decrease quantity Δk=∇f(xk)⊤dk+γ(dk)⊤Hkdk+cP(xk+dk)−cP(xk)\Delta^k=\nabla f(x^k)^\top d^k+\gamma(d^k)^\top H^kd^k+cP(x^k+d^k)-cP(x^k)Δk=∇f(xk)⊤dk+γ(dk)⊤Hkdk+cP(xk+dk)−cP(xk). Its parameters satisfy αinitk>0\alpha^k_{\mathrm{init}}>0αinitk​>0, 0<β,σ<10<\beta,\sigma<10<β,σ<1, and 0≤γ<10\le\gamma<10≤γ<1. The accepted step obeys Fc(xk+1)≤Fc(xk)+σαkΔkF_c(x^{k+1})\le F_c(x^k)+\sigma\alpha^k\Delta^kFc​(xk+1)≤Fc​(xk)+σαkΔk.

The generalized Gauss–Seidel rule means that some fixed number T≥1T\ge1T≥1 of consecutive coordinate sets covers every coordinate, starting at every iteration. The penalty is block-separable with respect to Jk\mathcal J^kJk when it is the sum of a proper closed convex function of the selected coordinates and another of their complement. A point xˉ\bar xxˉ is stationary when it lies in DDD and the one-sided directional derivative Fc′(xˉ;v)F_c'(\bar x;v)Fc′​(xˉ;v) is nonnegative for every direction v∈Rnv\in\mathbb R^nv∈Rn.

Formalization targets

Global convergence under generalized Gauss–Seidel selection

The goal is Theorem 1(e) Tseng and Yun (2009), p. 399. Under the CGD and Armijo rules, Assumption 1's uniform matrix bounds, a positive lower bound on the initial trial steps, block separability for each chosen coordinate set, and a finite upper bound on the accepted steps,

xˉ a cluster point of {xk}k≥0⟹Fc′(xˉ;v)≥0 for every v∈Rn.\bar x\text{ a cluster point of }\{x^k\}_{k\ge0} \quad\Longrightarrow\quad F_c'(\bar x;v)\ge0\text{ for every }v\in\mathbb R^n.xˉ a cluster point of {xk}k≥0​⟹Fc′​(xˉ;v)≥0 for every v∈Rn.

The mission milestones state the paper's Lemma 1, its Armijo existence claim after equation (10), Lemmas 2 and 3, and Theorem 1(a) and (b). They connect the direction subproblem, descent, stationarity and subsequence behavior to the goal. The theorem asserts stationarity of every cluster point; it does not assert that a cluster point exists or that the full sequence converges.

Significance

The result supplies a global first-order guarantee for a block update method even when the smooth part fff is nonconvex. It applies to extended-valued convex penalties, so the same statement covers both nonsmooth regularization and constraints represented by indicator functions. The bounded-window coverage condition allows varying coordinate sets rather than a fixed cyclic schedule Tseng and Yun (2009), Theorem 1(e).

The paper proves the theorem. This mission asks for a machine-checked Lean proof of that known claim and its selected supporting results. The reusable output includes a precise interface for an extended-valued penalty, the exact quadratic coordinate subproblem, Armijo backtracking with first accepted exponent, and the distinction between a convergent subsequence and a cluster point. The current draft statements compile with proof placeholders; they are proof obligations, not completed machine-checked results.

Difficulty

The descent bound alone controls decrease in objective value; it does not directly show that every coordinate has a vanishing stationarity residual. The coordinate set may vary at each iteration, and the penalty need only separate with respect to the current block. A cluster point may be reached along a subsequence that samples only one of those blocks. The argument therefore has to connect behavior along a convergent subsequence to nearby iterations within a full coverage window. The nonsmooth penalty also prevents replacing directional stationarity by a statement solely about an ordinary gradient.

Formalization scope

Vectors use EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and its Euclidean norm; Fin n starts at zero, whereas the paper numbers coordinates from one. A penalty is represented by its effective domain DDD and finite values PPP on D,usingthepublished‘ProxNewton.Inexact.IsProperClosedConvex‘definition.Everyobjectivecomparisonincludesdomainmembership;valuesoutsideD, using the published `ProxNewton.Inexact.IsProperClosedConvex` definition. Every objective comparison includes domain membership; values outside D,usingthepublished‘ProxNewton.Inexact.IsProperClosedConvex‘definition.Everyobjectivecomparisonincludesdomainmembership;valuesoutsideDareinterpretedasare interpreted asareinterpretedas+\infty.Thesmoothnessassumptionnamesanopenneighborhoodof. The smoothness assumption names an open neighborhood of .ThesmoothnessassumptionnamesanopenneighborhoodofD.Thedirection. The direction .Thedirectiond_H(x;\mathcal J)ischosenfromtheexactminimizers;alltheoremusesplaceis chosen from the exact minimizers; all theorem uses placeischosenfromtheexactminimizers;alltheoremusesplacexinininDandandandH$ positive definite. A CGD run records the chosen minimizers, so it does not rely on any unspecified value of that choice outside its valid inputs.

The Armijo predicate records the first successful geometric trial, including rejection of all earlier trials. The matrix bounds in Assumption 1 are quadratic-form bounds. Lemma 3 represents eigenvalue extremes by Rayleigh quotients on the selected coordinates; its generalized spectrum is that of the pair of principal submatrices. These extrema are used only with a nonempty block and positive-definite matrices. The paper's o(α)o(\alpha)o(α) is represented by a remainder whose quotient by α\alphaα tends to zero from the right. In Lemma 1 the line segment remains in DDD. A convergent subsequence is indexed by a strictly increasing map; a cluster point is represented separately by MapClusterPt.

No convergence of the entire iterate sequence is assumed. Stationarity requires the nonnegative directional derivative in every direction, not only the coordinates selected at one step. A valid development needs convex analysis of the subproblem, estimates for positive-definite quadratic forms, properties of lower semicontinuity and directional derivatives, and finite-dimensional subsequence arguments. Contributions proving those reusable facts and the named milestones are within scope.

Selected references

  • Paul Tseng and Sangwoon Yun, A coordinate gradient descent method for nonsmooth separable minimization, Mathematical Programming, Series B 117 (2009), 387–423. DOI: 10.1007/s10107-007-0170-0.
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Machine LearningProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Rates for Support Vector Machines Using Gaussian Kernels 2: An Envelope of Order γ and Tsybakov Noise Exponent q Give Geometric Noise Exponent (q+1)γ/dResearch Paper

Motivation

A binary classifier is learned from a sample of a distribution PPP on X×{−1,1}X \times \{-1, 1\}X×{−1,1}, and its quality is measured by its excess classification risk over the Bayes classifier. Without assumptions on PPP no learning method converges at a uniform rate, so every rate theorem rests on a condition that describes how hard PPP is. Two such conditions are standard: Tsybakov's noise condition (Tsybakov 2004), which bounds the mass of the region where the label is close to a fair coin flip, and smoothness of the regression function η(x)=P(y=1∣x)\eta(x) = P(y = 1 \mid x)η(x)=P(y=1∣x).

Steinwart and Scovel (arXiv:0708.1838v1, the reprint of Ann. Statist. 35 (2007) 575–607) analyse support vector machines with Gaussian RBF kernels. Their rates rest on a new condition, the geometric noise exponent, which measures how much of the weighted measure ∣2η−1∣ dPX|2\eta - 1|\,dP_X∣2η−1∣dPX​ lies close to the decision boundary. It is tailored to the approximation properties of the Gaussian kernel and is less familiar than the classical conditions. Theorem 2.6 of the paper connects it to them: an envelope condition on η\etaη near the decision boundary, together with a Tsybakov exponent, yields an explicit geometric noise exponent. This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

Let X⊂RdX \subset \mathbb R^dX⊂Rd be compact and let PPP be a distribution on X×{−1,1}X \times \{-1, 1\}X×{−1,1} with marginal PXP_XPX​ and regression function η(x)=P(y=1∣x)∈[0,1]\eta(x) = P(y = 1 \mid x) \in [0, 1]η(x)=P(y=1∣x)∈[0,1]. The classes of PPP are X−1={η<12}X_{-1} = \{\eta < \tfrac12\}X−1​={η<21​}, X1={η>12}X_1 = \{\eta > \tfrac12\}X1​={η>21​} and X0={η=12}X_0 = \{\eta = \tfrac12\}X0​={η=21​}, all intersected with XXX. The distance to the decision boundary is

τx=d(x,X0∪X1) on X−1,τx=d(x,X0∪X−1) on X1,τx=0 otherwise,\tau_x = d(x, X_0 \cup X_1) \text{ on } X_{-1}, \qquad \tau_x = d(x, X_0 \cup X_{-1}) \text{ on } X_1, \qquad \tau_x = 0 \text{ otherwise},τx​=d(x,X0​∪X1​) on X−1​,τx​=d(x,X0​∪X−1​) on X1​,τx​=0 otherwise,

with d(x,A)d(x, A)d(x,A) the Euclidean distance of xxx to AAA (equation (7), p. 7).

  • Tsybakov noise exponent q∈[0,∞]q \in [0, \infty]q∈[0,∞] (Definition 2.2, p. 6): for some C>0C > 0C>0 and all sufficiently small t>0t > 0t>0, PX(∣2η−1∣≤t)≤CtqP_X(|2\eta - 1| \le t) \le C t^qPX​(∣2η−1∣≤t)≤Ctq.
  • Geometric noise exponent α>0\alpha > 0α>0 (Definition 2.3, p. 7): for some C>0C > 0C>0,
∫X∣2η(x)−1∣ e−τx2/t PX(dx)≤C tαd/2,t>0.\int_X |2\eta(x) - 1|\, e^{-\tau_x^2/t}\, P_X(dx) \le C\, t^{\alpha d/2}, \qquad t > 0.∫X​∣2η(x)−1∣e−τx2​/tPX​(dx)≤Ctαd/2,t>0.
  • Envelope of order γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 (Definition 2.5, p. 8): for some cγ>0c_\gamma > 0cγ​>0, ∣2η(x)−1∣≤cγτxγ|2\eta(x) - 1| \le c_\gamma \tau_x^\gamma∣2η(x)−1∣≤cγ​τxγ​ for PXP_XPX​-almost all x∈Xx \in Xx∈X.

In Lean these are TsybakovNoise, GeometricNoise and Envelope, built on Tau, in the namespace FastRatesSVM.GeomNoise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.6 (p. 8)

If PPP has an envelope of order γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 and Tsybakov noise exponent q∈[0,∞)q \in [0, \infty)q∈[0,∞), then

q≥1  ⟹  P has geometric noise exponent (q+1)γd,0≤q<1  ⟹  P has geometric noise exponent α for all 0<α<(q+1)γd.q \ge 1 \;\Longrightarrow\; P \text{ has geometric noise exponent } \frac{(q+1)\gamma}{d}, \qquad 0 \le q < 1 \;\Longrightarrow\; P \text{ has geometric noise exponent } \alpha \text{ for all } 0 < \alpha < \frac{(q+1)\gamma}{d}.q≥1⟹P has geometric noise exponent d(q+1)γ​,0≤q<1⟹P has geometric noise exponent α for all 0<α<d(q+1)γ​.

Both clauses are stated, as one conjunction.

Milestones

  1. Display (33), pp. 18–19. Under the Tsybakov bound for all s>0s > 0s>0 with constant CCC and the envelope bound with constant cγc_\gammacγ​, for all t>0t > 0t>0 and τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0:
EPX(∣2η−1∣ e−τx2/t)≤Cτq+1+exp⁡(−(τ/cγ)2/γt−1).\mathbb E_{P_X}\big(|2\eta - 1|\, e^{-\tau_x^2/t}\big) \le C\tau^{q+1} + \exp\big(-(\tau/c_\gamma)^{2/\gamma} t^{-1}\big).EPX​​(∣2η−1∣e−τx2​/t)≤Cτq+1+exp(−(τ/cγ​)2/γt−1).
  1. The τ\tauτ-estimate, p. 19. With a^=cγ2/γ(q+1)\hat a = c_\gamma^{2/\gamma}(q+1)a^=cγ2/γ​(q+1), for all small t>0t > 0t>0 the equation τq+1=exp⁡(−(τ/cγ)2/γt−1)\tau^{q+1} = \exp(-(\tau/c_\gamma)^{2/\gamma}t^{-1})τq+1=exp(−(τ/cγ​)2/γt−1) has a positive solution, and every positive solution satisfies τ≤(a^γ/2)γ/2 (tln⁡1a^t)γ/2\tau \le (\hat a\gamma/2)^{\gamma/2}\,(t\ln\frac{1}{\hat a t})^{\gamma/2}τ≤(a^γ/2)γ/2(tlna^t1​)γ/2.
  2. Theorem 2.6, case 0≤q<10 \le q < 10≤q<1.
  3. Theorem 2.6, case q≥1q \ge 1q≥1.

Significance

Theorem 2.6 makes the paper's learning rates usable under familiar assumptions. The main rate theorem of the paper (Theorem 2.8) is stated in terms of the geometric noise exponent; through Theorem 2.6 it becomes a rate in terms of a Tsybakov exponent and the order of an envelope, which is a Hölder-type behaviour of η\etaη at the decision boundary. Example: with d=1d = 1d=1, X=[−1,1]X = [-1, 1]X=[−1,1], PXP_XPX​ uniform and η(x)=(1+x)/2\eta(x) = (1 + x)/2η(x)=(1+x)/2, the distribution has envelope order 111 and Tsybakov exponent 111, hence geometric noise exponent 222.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as known, none of it is machine-checked: none of these noise conditions has a Lean formalization, on Prove2Me or in Mathlib. The mission produces the definitions themselves (the class decomposition, τx\tau_xτx​ and the three noise conditions), which any later formalization of margin-based classification rates can import, and a formal proof of the implication. A companion mission of the same series formalizes the paper's rate theorem, which takes the geometric noise exponent as its hypothesis.

Difficulty

The case 0≤q<10 \le q < 10≤q<1 is elementary once the right splitting level is chosen: the expectation is split at a level τ\tauτ of ∣2η−1∣|2\eta - 1|∣2η−1∣, and τ\tauτ is then tuned to ttt. Tuning it requires the asymptotics of the solution of a transcendental equation. This yields every exponent below the critical value (q+1)γ/d(q+1)\gamma/d(q+1)γ/d, but not the critical value itself: a logarithmic factor is lost.

Reaching the critical exponent when q≥1q \ge 1q≥1 is the substantial step. The paper does it with Hölder's inequality for Lorentz spaces Lq,∞L_{q,\infty}Lq,∞​ and Lq′,1L_{q',1}Lq′,1​ and an estimate of a nonincreasing rearrangement (display (32)). Mathlib has neither Lorentz spaces nor nonincreasing rearrangements, so this part either builds that infrastructure or replaces it with a direct layer-cake argument against the distribution function of ∣2η−1∣|2\eta - 1|∣2η−1∣. The obvious approach, the same splitting as for q<1q < 1q<1, does not work: it always loses the logarithm.

Formalization scope

  • Representation of PPP. PPP is given by μ=PX\mu = P_Xμ=PX​, a probability measure on EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with μ(Xc)=0\mu(X^c) = 0μ(Xc)=0, and a measurable version η\etaη of the regression function with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1] everywhere. Every Borel distribution on X×{−1,1}X \times \{-1,1\}X×{−1,1} has this form, and the paper defines τx\tau_xτx​ "for some choice of η\etaη".
  • Pinned convention d(x,∅):=0d(x, \emptyset) := 0d(x,∅):=0. The paper leaves d(x,∅)d(x, \emptyset)d(x,∅) undefined. Lean's Metric.infDist gives 000. For Theorem 2.6 both readings give a true statement. Under the reading ∞\infty∞, the companion statements Theorem 2.7 and Lemma 4.1 are false for a version of η\etaη with an empty class. The convention is chosen for agreement with the companion mission.
  • Integrals. All integrals are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued Lebesgue integrals of nonnegative integrands (lintegral), so a bound can never hold through a junk value of a non-integrable function.
  • Added hypotheses. d≥1d \ge 1d≥1, because the exponent (q+1)γ/d(q+1)\gamma/d(q+1)γ/d divides by ddd. In the second clause, α>0\alpha > 0α>0: this is the range of Definition 2.3, not a new restriction.
  • Display (33). It is stated for every q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, where it holds verbatim, and for t>0t > 0t>0 (the page writes t≥0t \ge 0t≥0, but t−1t^{-1}t−1 is undefined at 000). Its hypotheses are the all-ttt form of (5), which by the remark on p. 6 is equivalent to Definition 2.2 for q<∞q < \inftyq<∞ up to the constant, and (10) with its constant named. The page's equality that splits the integral is not stated separately.
  • Printed slip. The proof on p. 19 ends "for the case 0<q<10 < q < 10<q<1", while the statement covers q=0q = 0q=0. The milestone is stated for 0≤q<10 \le q < 10≤q<1; the argument works verbatim at q=0q = 0q=0.
  • Small ttt. In Definition 2.2, "sufficiently small" is a threshold t0∈(0,1)t_0 \in (0,1)t0​∈(0,1). The τ\tauτ-estimate has its threshold chosen before ttt and τ\tauτ, and it also states the existence of a solution, which the page presupposes.
  • No trivializing reading. The hypotheses are satisfiable: the example in Significance meets all of them. τx\tau_xτx​ is not identically 000 there, since it equals ∣x∣|x|∣x∣. So the goal cannot hold vacuously.
  • Not formalized. The Lorentz-space step (30) and the rearrangement estimate (32) are not milestones. Contributions of Lorentz quasi-norms or a layer-cake lemma are welcome as supporting theorems.

The source is arXiv:0708.1838v1, the reprint of the Annals article. Its printed page numbers equal the PDF page numbers, and every page cited here is that number.

Selected references

  • I. Steinwart, C. Scovel, Fast Rates for Support Vector Machines Using Gaussian Kernels, Annals of Statistics 35(2), 575–607, 2007. arXiv reprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/0708.1838 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1214/009053606000001226
  • A. B. Tsybakov, Optimal aggregation of classifiers in statistical learning, Annals of Statistics 32(1), 135–166, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1079120131
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bounded Rationality in Newsvendor Models I: Under Uniform Demand the Logit Newsvendor's Order Is Truncated Normal and Its Mean Is Pulled from x* Toward the MidpointResearch Paper

Motivation

The newsvendor problem is the basic single-period inventory model: a decision maker orders xxx units at unit cost ccc before a random demand DDD is observed, sells min⁡(D,x)\min(D, x)min(D,x) units at price ppp, and loses unsold units. Its optimal order is the critical fractile x∗=F−1(1−c/p)x^* = F^{-1}(1 - c/p)x∗=F−1(1−c/p) of the demand distribution FFF. Laboratory experiments show that human subjects do not order x∗x^*x∗. Schweitzer and Cachon (Management Science 46(3), 2000) gave subjects uniform demand on [0,300][0, 300][0,300] and found that the average order lay below x∗x^*x∗ for a high-margin product and above x∗x^*x∗ for a low-margin product: orders are pulled toward the center of the demand range.

Su (Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(4), 2008) explains this pattern with a model of bounded rationality: the decision maker does not pick the best order with certainty, but picks better orders more often, through a logit choice rule. This mission formalizes the first results of that paper, the case of uniform demand, where the logit order has an explicit law and the pull toward the center can be proved exactly. The source is the published MSOM 2008 article; all page numbers are its printed pages.

Setting

A decision maker with utility uuu over an interval S⊆RS \subseteq \mathbb RS⊆R and bounded-rationality parameter β>0\beta > 0β>0 makes a random choice YYY with the logit density

ψ(y)=eu(y)/β∫Seu(v)/β dv,y∈S,\psi(y) = \frac{e^{u(y)/\beta}}{\int_S e^{u(v)/\beta}\,dv}, \qquad y \in S,ψ(y)=∫S​eu(v)/βdveu(y)/β​,y∈S,

and ψ(y)=0\psi(y) = 0ψ(y)=0 off SSS (eq. (2), p. 571). Large β\betaβ means noisy choices; small β\betaβ concentrates the choice near the maximizer of uuu.

In the newsvendor problem the price ppp and unit cost ccc satisfy 0<c<p0 < c < p0<c<p. Demand DDD has density fff and distribution function FFF. The expected profit of ordering xxx units is

π(x)=p Emin⁡(D,x)−cx(eq. (3), p. 572),\pi(x) = p\,\mathbb E\min(D, x) - c x \qquad \text{(eq. (3), p. 572)},π(x)=pEmin(D,x)−cx(eq. (3), p. 572),

and the optimal solution x∗x^*x∗ is its maximizer. The behavioral solution X♭X^\flatX♭ is the logit choice with utility u=πu = \piu=π over the decision domain SSS, the smallest interval containing the support of fff (eq. (4), p. 572).

This mission takes uniform demand D∼U[a,b]D \sim U[a, b]D∼U[a,b] with b>a≥0b > a \ge 0b>a≥0: f=1/(b−a)f = 1/(b-a)f=1/(b−a) on [a,b][a, b][a,b] and S=[a,b]S = [a, b]S=[a,b]. The midpoint of the demand range is m=(a+b)/2m = (a + b)/2m=(a+b)/2. Two parameters recur:

μ=b−cp(b−a),σ2=β b−ap.\mu = b - \frac{c}{p}(b - a), \qquad \sigma^2 = \beta\,\frac{b-a}{p}.μ=b−pc​(b−a),σ2=βpb−a​.

A truncated normal law on [a,b][a, b][a,b] with parameters μ,σ2\mu, \sigma^2μ,σ2 has density proportional to e−(x−μ)2/2σ2e^{-(x-\mu)^2/2\sigma^2}e−(x−μ)2/2σ2 on [a,b][a, b][a,b] and zero elsewhere (eq. (37), p. 586). Write ϕ\phiϕ and Φ\PhiΦ for the standard normal density and distribution function.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 577), midpoint bias

x∗>m  ⟹  EX♭<x∗,x∗<m  ⟹  EX♭>x∗.x^* > m \implies \mathbb E X^\flat < x^*, \qquad x^* < m \implies \mathbb E X^\flat > x^*.x∗>m⟹EX♭<x∗,x∗<m⟹EX♭>x∗.

The goal is stated for every β>0\beta > 0β>0 and every 0<c<p0 < c < p0<c<p, with x∗x^*x∗ any maximizer of π\piπ over R\mathbb RR; it fixes only the sign of the bias, not its size.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (5), p. 572. On [a,b][a, b][a,b], π(x)=Ax2+Bx+C\pi(x) = Ax^2 + Bx + Cπ(x)=Ax2+Bx+C with A=−p/(2(b−a))A = -p/(2(b-a))A=−p/(2(b−a)), B=pb/(b−a)−cB = pb/(b-a) - cB=pb/(b−a)−c, C=−pa2/(2(b−a))C = -pa^2/(2(b-a))C=−pa2/(2(b−a)).
  2. The optimum, pp. 572–573. π\piπ is maximized over R\mathbb RR exactly at μ\muμ, and F(μ)=1−c/pF(\mu) = 1 - c/pF(μ)=1−c/p, so x∗=F−1(1−c/p)=μx^* = F^{-1}(1 - c/p) = \mux∗=F−1(1−c/p)=μ.
  3. Proposition 1, pp. 572–573. The density of X♭X^\flatX♭ equals the truncated normal density on [a,b][a,b][a,b] with parameters μ\muμ and σ2\sigma^2σ2.
  4. Corollary 1, p. 573.
EX♭=μ−σ ϕ((b−μ)/σ)−ϕ((a−μ)/σ)Φ((b−μ)/σ)−Φ((a−μ)/σ).(8)\mathbb E X^\flat = \mu - \sigma\,\frac{\phi((b-\mu)/\sigma) - \phi((a-\mu)/\sigma)}{\Phi((b-\mu)/\sigma) - \Phi((a-\mu)/\sigma)}. \qquad (8)EX♭=μ−σΦ((b−μ)/σ)−Φ((a−μ)/σ)ϕ((b−μ)/σ)−ϕ((a−μ)/σ)​.(8)

Significance

Proposition 3 gives a single mechanism, noise in the choice of the order, that produces both directions of the bias observed by Schweitzer and Cachon: under uniform demand, a high-profit product (x∗>mx^* > mx∗>m) is underordered on average and a low-profit product (x∗<mx^* < mx∗<m) is overordered. Proposition 1 gives the full law of the boundedly rational order, which is what makes the model testable: the paper fits the truncated normal law to experimental order data and estimates β\betaβ (§5). Corollary 1 is the closed-form mean used in that fit and in Proposition 3.

These results are proved in the paper by direct computation; none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission adds a checked development of the continuous logit choice model on an interval, of the truncated normal law and its mean, and of the uniform-demand newsvendor profit, together with exact statements of what the paper's informal phrases mean (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Each step is elementary on paper, but the formal content sits in the integrals. Expected sales Emin⁡(D,x)\mathbb E\min(D, x)Emin(D,x) must be computed as a piecewise integral to obtain eq. (5), and the maximizer must be identified over all of R\mathbb RR, not only on [a,b][a, b][a,b], which needs the profit outside the support as well. Proposition 1 is an identity between two normalized densities, so both normalizing integrals must be shown positive and finite. Corollary 1 requires the mean of a truncated Gaussian in terms of Mathlib's Gaussian density and distribution function, which is not in Mathlib. For Proposition 3, the natural shortcut "the mean of a truncated normal is μ\muμ" is false whenever μ≠m\mu \ne mμ=m, and it is exactly the asymmetry of the truncation that produces the bias.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers, with the paper's standing assumptions as hypotheses: b>a≥0b > a \ge 0b>a≥0, 0<c<p0 < c < p0<c<p (the page states p>cp > cp>c; c>0c > 0c>0 is read so that x∗x^*x∗ lies inside (a,b)(a, b)(a,b)), and β>0\beta > 0β>0 (eq. (2) divides by β\betaβ; β=0\beta = 0β=0, perfect rationality, is a limit, not a value of the formula). The decision domain is the closed interval [a,b][a, b][a,b]; the logit density is zero off it, and expectations are integrals over R\mathbb RR. The parameter σ\sigmaσ is the positive square root of β(b−a)/p\beta(b-a)/pβ(b−a)/p, and ϕ\phiϕ, Φ\PhiΦ are Mathlib's gaussianPDFReal 0 1 and the distribution function of gaussianReal 0 1.

Corrections and readings relative to the printed text:

  • Eq. (5) is stated for x∈[a,b]x \in [a, b]x∈[a,b] only; outside it π\piπ is linear.
  • Proposition 1 says the truncated normal has "mean μ\muμ and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2"; these are the parameters before truncation (as in eq. (37)), and the statement is the equality of densities. The mean of X♭X^\flatX♭ is (8), not μ\muμ.
  • In Proposition 3, "fff constant over [a,b][a, b][a,b]" is read as uniform demand on [a,b][a,b][a,b], as in its proof. The conclusions are inequalities on EX♭\mathbb E X^\flatEX♭, because the §6 preamble (p. 577) defines "overorders" and "underorders" with the inequalities swapped relative to the proof (p. 586); the formal statement follows the proof.

The optimal solution x∗x^*x∗ in the goal is a hypothesis that x∗x^*x∗ maximizes π\piπ over R\mathbb RR, never a variable set to a closed form by fiat; milestone 2 shows the hypothesis is satisfiable and identifies x∗x^*x∗. No statement holds vacuously through a junk value: on [a,b][a, b][a,b] with a<ba < ba<b the logit normalizer is the integral of a continuous positive function over an interval of positive length, and the denominator of (8) is positive because σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0.

Reusable beyond this mission: the logit density on an interval, the truncated normal density, and its mean formula. Proofs of any milestone, and of the mean of a truncated normal law in general, are welcome.

Selected references

  • X. Su, Bounded Rationality in Newsvendor Models, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(4):566–589, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0200
  • M. E. Schweitzer, G. P. Cachon, Decision Bias in the Newsvendor Problem with a Known Demand Distribution: Experimental Evidence, Management Science 46(3):404–420, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.404.12070
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Understanding the Efficiency of Multi-Server Service Systems II: In the M/M/s Queue with (1 − ρ)√s = γ, the Wait of a Delayed Customer Is Exponential with Mean 1/(γ√s)Research Paper

Motivation

A service system with several servers can use a larger fraction of its capacity than a single-server system while still giving customers an acceptable wait. The design question is how much unused capacity is needed as the number of servers grows. Ward Whitt's study begins with a factory manager deciding whether to put four machines in one work area. It uses queueing models to connect the number of machines, their utilization, and the delays customers experience. The proposed utilization rule, (1−ρ)s=γ(1-\rho)\sqrt{s}=\gamma(1−ρ)s​=γ, keeps the unused fraction 1−ρ1-\rho1−ρ proportional to 1/s1/\sqrt{s}1/s​ as the number of servers sss changes (Whitt 1992, pp. 708–710).

The paper distinguishes the chance that a customer waits at all from the length of the wait once a delay occurs. That distinction matters when a staffing choice must control a long wait rather than merely the fraction of customers who wait. The exact M/M/sM/M/sM/M/s result in §3.1 gives a benchmark for the paper's later approximations to more general arrival and service processes (Whitt 1992, pp. 719–720).

Setting

An M/M/sM/M/sM/M/s queue has Poisson arrivals at rate λ\lambdaλ, sss identical servers, independent exponential service times, unlimited waiting room, and first-come first-served service. Time is measured so that each server's service rate is one. The server utilization is ρ=λ/s\rho=\lambda/sρ=λ/s. We consider s≥1s\geq1s≥1 and 0<λ<s0<\lambda<s0<λ<s, so the queue has a stationary distribution. Let pnp_npn​ be the stationary probability that nnn customers are in the system. Its state process is a birth–death process: arrivals occur at rate λ\lambdaλ and departures from state nnn occur at rate min⁡(n,s)\min(n,s)min(n,s).

Let WWW be an arriving customer's steady-state time in the queue before service begins. An arrival finding fewer than sss customers starts service at once. An arrival finding s+js+js+j customers waits for j+1j+1j+1 service completions while all servers are occupied. In the formal model, the law of WWW has an atom at zero of mass ∑n<spn\sum_{n<s}p_n∑n<s​pn​ and, for each j≥0j\geq0j≥0, a gamma component with shape j+1j+1j+1, rate sss, and weight ps+jp_{s+j}ps+j​. The arrival-state weights use the Poisson-arrivals-see-time-averages property. This construction represents the FCFS waiting time independently of any claim about its eventual conditional distribution.

For an event W>0W>0W>0 of positive probability, L(W∣W>0)\mathcal L(W\mid W>0)L(W∣W>0) denotes the conditional waiting-time law. The paper calls a customer delayed exactly when W>0W>0W>0. The scale parameter γ\gammaγ is defined by the utilization equation (1−ρ)s=γ(1-\rho)\sqrt{s}=\gamma(1−ρ)s​=γ; because ρ<1\rho<1ρ<1, this equation makes γ\gammaγ positive.

Formalization targets

The supporting target is the §3.1 statement that a delayed customer's waiting time is exponential with rate s(1−ρ)s(1-\rho)s(1−ρ), equivalently with mean 1/[s(1−ρ)]1/[s(1-\rho)]1/[s(1−ρ)]:

L(W∣W>0)=Exp⁡(s(1−ρ)).\mathcal L(W\mid W>0)=\operatorname{Exp}\bigl(s(1-\rho)\bigr).L(W∣W>0)=Exp(s(1−ρ)).

The goal is Proposition 3.1 under the utilization equation. It records both the entire conditional tail and its mean, for every x≥0x\geq0x≥0:

P(W>x∣W>0)=e−γs x,E[W∣W>0]=1γs.\mathbb P(W>x\mid W>0)=e^{-\gamma\sqrt{s}\,x}, \qquad \mathbb E[W\mid W>0]=\frac{1}{\gamma\sqrt{s}}.P(W>x∣W>0)=e−γs​x,E[W∣W>0]=γs​1​.

The goal also asserts P(W>0)>0\mathbb P(W>0)>0P(W>0)>0, so these conditional quantities are defined. The scan of Proposition 3.1 prints the exponent without xxx and the mean denominator with 2\sqrt22​; the statement here uses the values determined by the preceding exponential-law sentence and by the paragraph following the proposition (Whitt 1992, pp. 719–720).

Significance

The result gives an exact delay distribution for the Markovian multi-server system. With sss servers and the utilization equation held fixed, the conditional tail at any positive threshold and the mean wait of a delayed customer both depend on sss through γs\gamma\sqrt{s}γs​. Thus the same rule that organizes the probability-of-delay discussion has a definite implication for customers who actually wait. It is also the exact comparison point for the paper's later, explicitly approximate analysis of general G/G/sG/G/sG/G/s queues (Whitt 1992, §3.2).

Formalizing this result supplies a reusable representation of the stationary FCFS waiting-time law as a mixture of Erlang distributions, together with a precise connection between birth–death state probabilities and delay. The related platform items QueueingFundamentals.BirthDeath.mmc_steady_state and QueueingFundamentals.BirthDeath.erlang_c_formula state the stationary state probabilities and the probability of delay, respectively; both are open and neither states this waiting-time law. The open QueueingFundamentals.BirthDeath.halfin_whitt concerns the heavy-traffic limit for the M/M/cM/M/cM/M/c case, a different target. The current result is known mathematically from Whitt's 1992 paper; this mission asks for its machine-checked proof in the specified model.

Difficulty

The conditional distribution is not immediate from an individual service time. A delayed arrival can encounter any queue length s+js+js+j, so its waiting time is a gamma law whose shape varies with jjj. The stationary probabilities provide the weights of infinitely many such components. Showing that this whole mixture has one exponential law requires a relation among the stationary tail probabilities and control of the infinite sum. The same mixture must have a well-defined first moment for the conditional mean formula.

Formalization scope

Lean uses a natural number s≥1s\geq1s≥1, a real arrival rate 0<λ<s0<\lambda<s0<λ<s, and a real sequence pnp_npn​ satisfying the published QueueingFundamentals.BirthDeath.IsSteadyState predicate with constant birth rate λ\lambdaλ and death rate min⁡(n,s)\min(n,s)min(n,s). That predicate includes nonnegativity, total mass one, and the global balance equations. Its published definition is imported as a reference. Service rate is exactly one, as fixed in §2.1 of the paper. The conditional waiting-time law is a measure on real time, with a point mass at zero and a countable gamma mixture. The positive-time restriction of this measure expresses conditioning in the milestone; real measure values and an integral express the tail and mean in the goal.

The formal hypotheses spell out positive arrival rate, at least one server, and subcritical utilization. These make the stationary law and the positive exponential rate meaningful. The goal states positive delay probability before dividing by it. The waiting-time law is built from stationary queue lengths and service completions, rather than being defined as exponential; proving that it becomes exponential is the mathematical task. Solvers may develop reusable measure-mixture identities, stationary-tail facts, and gamma or exponential distribution results. The approximation formulas of §3.2 and the paper's numerical tables are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Ward Whitt, Understanding the Efficiency of Multi-Server Service Systems, Management Science 38(5):708–723, 1992. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.38.5.708.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research III: Minimum Average Journey Time on Alternative Routes — Equal Marginal Times ε and the Closed Forms (32)–(33)Research Paper

Motivation

J. G. Wardrop's 1952 paper Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research (DOI 10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259) introduced the two criteria that still organise traffic assignment. When a flow of traffic can choose between several routes from one origin to one destination, the paper (p. 345) considers two ways the traffic might divide:

  1. the journey times on all the routes actually used are equal, and less than those that a single vehicle would experience on any unused route;
  2. the average journey time is a minimum.

The first is now called Wardrop's first principle, or user equilibrium: no driver can shorten their trip by switching route. The second, Wardrop's second principle, is the system optimum: it "minimizes the vehicle-hours spent on the journey". The gap between the two is the quantity later studied as the price of anarchy of selfish routing (Roughgarden and Tardos, J. ACM 2002), and the marginal-cost characterisation of the system optimum underlies congestion pricing (Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, 1956).

This mission formalizes the paper's solution of criterion (2) on parallel routes, section (2) Minimum Average Time, pp. 345–347. Mission II of the same series treats criterion (1) on the same model.

Setting

A total additional flow QQQ is divided among DDD alternative routes i=1,…,Di = 1, \dots, Di=1,…,D. Route iii carries an additional flow qiq_iqi​ and has journey time, equation (22),

ti(qi)=bi1−qi/pi,t_i(q_i) = \frac{b_i}{1 - q_i/p_i},ti​(qi​)=1−qi​/pi​bi​​,

where bi>0b_i > 0bi​>0 is the journey time on route iii with no additional flow and pi>0p_i > 0pi​>0 is the additional flow at which its speed would fall to zero (routeTime b p i x). A feasible split of QQQ is a vector qqq with 0≤qi<pi0 \le q_i < p_i0≤qi​<pi​ for every iii and ∑iqi=Q\sum_i q_i = Q∑i​qi​=Q (IsFeasible p Q q).

The number of additional vehicles on route iii at an instant is zi=qitiz_i = q_i t_izi​=qi​ti​, and Z=∑iziZ = \sum_i z_iZ=∑i​zi​ (totalExtra b p q). The average journey time is, equations (25)–(26),

T=∑i=1DqitiQ=ZQT = \sum_{i=1}^D \frac{q_i t_i}{Q} = \frac{Z}{Q}T=i=1∑D​Qqi​ti​​=QZ​

(avgTime b p Q q). Criterion (2) asks for a feasible split qqq with T(q)≤T(z)T(q) \le T(z)T(q)≤T(z) for every feasible split zzz (IsMinAvgTime b p Q q).

The marginal journey time of route iii is d(qiti)/dqid(q_i t_i)/dq_id(qi​ti​)/dqi​, the rate at which ZZZ grows when flow is added to that route. For a threshold ε\varepsilonε, U(ε)={i:bi<ε}U(\varepsilon) = \{i : b_i < \varepsilon\}U(ε)={i:bi​<ε} (usedSet b ε) is the set of routes whose marginal time at zero flow lies below ε\varepsilonε; with the routes labelled so that b1<⋯<bDb_1 < \dots < b_Db1​<⋯<bD​ it is the paper's "first jjj routes".

Formalization targets

Goal: the closed forms (32)–(33)

For bi,pi>0b_i, p_i > 0bi​,pi​>0 and 0<Q<∑ipi0 < Q < \sum_i p_i0<Q<∑i​pi​, every split qqq minimizing TTT admits a threshold ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0 with ∑i∈Upi>Q\sum_{i \in U} p_i > Q∑i∈U​pi​>Q, where U=U(ε)U = U(\varepsilon)U=U(ε), such that

qh={ph{1−(∑i∈Upi−Q)bh∑i∈Upibi},bh<ε,0,otherwise,T=1Q{(∑i∈Upibi)2∑i∈Upi−Q−∑i∈Upibi}.q_h = \begin{cases} p_h\left\{1 - \dfrac{\left(\sum_{i\in U} p_i - Q\right)\sqrt{b_h}}{\sum_{i\in U} p_i\sqrt{b_i}}\right\}, & b_h < \varepsilon,\\[1ex] 0, & \text{otherwise,}\end{cases} \qquad T = \frac1Q\left\{\frac{\left(\sum_{i\in U} p_i\sqrt{b_i}\right)^2}{\sum_{i\in U} p_i - Q} - \sum_{i\in U} p_i b_i\right\}.qh​=⎩⎨⎧​ph​{1−∑i∈U​pi​bi​​(∑i∈U​pi​−Q)bh​​​},0,​bh​<ε,otherwise,​T=Q1​{∑i∈U​pi​−Q(∑i∈U​pi​bi​​)2​−i∈U∑​pi​bi​}.

Milestones

  1. (29)–(30): d(qiti)/dqi=bi/(1−qi/pi)2d(q_i t_i)/dq_i = b_i/(1 - q_i/p_i)^2d(qi​ti​)/dqi​=bi​/(1−qi​/pi​)2, equal to bib_ibi​ at qi=0q_i = 0qi​=0.
  2. (27)–(28): at a minimum, all routes in use have the same marginal time ε\varepsilonε.
  3. A route jjj with bj≥εb_j \ge \varepsilonbj​≥ε is not used.
  4. The routes in use are exactly those with bi<εb_i < \varepsilonbi​<ε, and on them 1−qi/pi=bi/ε1 - q_i/p_i = \sqrt{b_i/\varepsilon}1−qi​/pi​=bi​/ε​.
  5. (31): ∑i∈Upi−Q=∑i∈Upibi/ε\sum_{i\in U} p_i - Q = \sum_{i\in U} p_i\sqrt{b_i/\varepsilon}∑i∈U​pi​−Q=∑i∈U​pi​bi​/ε​.

A companion theorem states that a minimizing split exists whenever 0<Q<∑ipi0 < Q < \sum_i p_i0<Q<∑i​pi​.

Significance

The closed forms give the system-optimal assignment on parallel routes with the travel-time law (22) explicitly: which routes carry traffic, how much, and the resulting average time. Together with the equal-times solution (23)–(24) of mission II they quantify, for this model, how much average time selfish route choice costs; the paper's Fig. 8 compares the two numerically and finds the difference small in its example. The marginal-time conditions (27)–(28) are the parallel-route instance of the general statement that a system optimum is an equilibrium with respect to marginal costs.

The derivation on pp. 346–347 is a first-order argument that the paper does not make rigorous: it assumes a minimizer exists, that it satisfies the stationarity condition, and leaves (32)–(33) to "a few lines of algebra". This mission produces the rigorous version, including existence. No machine-checked statement of (27)–(33) is on the platform; the related platform items on Wardrop equilibria concern the Beckmann potential and atomic congestion games, not the system optimum of this model.

Difficulty

The stationarity condition (27) comes from moving an infinitesimal flow between two routes in use. Turning this into a theorem needs the one-sided version at unused routes, since qj=0q_j = 0qj​=0 is a boundary point and the condition there is an inequality, and needs the constraint ∑iqi=Q\sum_i q_i = Q∑i​qi​=Q to be preserved by the perturbation. The step "only the first jjj routes will be in use" is the converse direction: a route with bi<εb_i < \varepsilonbi​<ε that carries no flow must be shown to contradict minimality, not just to violate the equal-marginals equation.

Existence is not a compactness argument on a closed set: the feasible set is open in the direction qi→piq_i \to p_iqi​→pi​, where qiti→∞q_i t_i \to \inftyqi​ti​→∞, and that coercivity has to be used. The algebra from (31) to (32)–(33) is routine once the set UUU and the value of ε\varepsilonε are fixed.

Formalization scope

Routes are indexed by Fin D; all quantities are real. The standing hypotheses are bi>0b_i > 0bi​>0, pi>0p_i > 0pi​>0, 0<Q0 < Q0<Q and Q<∑ipiQ < \sum_i p_iQ<∑i​pi​; without the last the feasible set is empty and every statement about a minimizer is vacuous, and with Q≤0Q \le 0Q≤0 the average time Z/QZ/QZ/Q is undefined. Feasibility requires qi<piq_i < p_iqi​<pi​, of the minimizer and of every competitor: at qi=piq_i = p_iqi​=pi​ Lean evaluates bi/0b_i/0bi​/0 as 000, which would let a "minimizer" place flow at capacity for free. The paper's labelling b1<⋯<bDb_1 < \dots < b_Db1​<⋯<bD​ is not assumed; "the first jjj routes" is U(ε)U(\varepsilon)U(ε). Marginal times are written in the closed form (29), and milestone 1 identifies that form with the derivative via HasDerivAt. Minimality is stated for TTT, the paper's criterion, not for ZZZ.

Corrected slip. The paper prints the denominator of (33) as ∑i=1jpibi\sum_{i=1}^j p_i b_i∑i=1j​pi​bi​. The formalization uses ∑i=1jpibi\sum_{i=1}^j p_i\sqrt{b_i}∑i=1j​pi​bi​​: from (31), 1/ε=(∑pi−Q)/∑pibi1/\sqrt\varepsilon = (\sum p_i - Q)/\sum p_i\sqrt{b_i}1/ε​=(∑pi​−Q)/∑pi​bi​​, and qh=ph(1−bh/ε)q_h = p_h(1 - \sqrt{b_h/\varepsilon})qh​=ph​(1−bh​/ε​). The printed form is not dimensionally consistent and gives wrong flows, e.g. for b=(4,9)b = (4, 9)b=(4,9), p=(10,10)p = (10, 10)p=(10,10), Q=35/3Q = 35/3Q=35/3. Equation (32) is correct as printed.

The goal cannot be satisfied trivially: the threshold ε\varepsilonε is existential and the flows and TTT are pinned to explicit formulas, and the companion existence theorem shows the hypothesis IsMinAvgTime is met for every admissible QQQ. The route time and feasible split come from the shared WardropTraffic.EqualTimes.Setting definition; this mission adds the total and average time and criterion (2). Proofs of any item, including the existence theorem and a uniqueness statement (the objective is strictly convex), are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, Proc. Instn Civ. Engrs Part II 1 (1952), 325–362. https://doi.org/10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259
  • M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, C. B. Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transportation, Yale University Press, 1956.
  • T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing?, J. ACM 49(2) (2002), 236–259. https://doi.org/10.1145/506147.506153
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear Optimization+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximating Minimum Bounded Degree Spanning Trees to within One of Optimal 1: Iterative Rounding Finds a Spanning Tree of Cost at Most the LP Optimum with Every Degree at Most B_v + 1Research Paper

Motivation

A network designer may need a cheap connection that keeps the number of links at each site within a local capacity. The minimum bounded-degree spanning tree problem asks for the cheapest spanning tree of a weighted, undirected graph whose vertex degrees respect prescribed upper bounds. The capacity constraints matter in settings where a low-cost tree alone can overload a few hubs. They also make the optimization problem difficult: even with unit edge weights and a bound of two at every vertex, feasibility includes the Hamiltonian path problem. Singh and Lau study the useful relaxation in which the returned tree may exceed each degree bound by one while its cost stays no greater than the best tree satisfying every original bound Singh–Lau 2007.

The weighted result settled the bounded-degree form of a conjecture discussed in their paper. Goemans had obtained a cost-preserving degree guarantee of Bv+2B_v+2Bv​+2; an earlier unweighted local-search result attained a +1+1+1 degree allowance but did not cover arbitrary real costs. Singh and Lau's Theorem 1.2 gives the +1+1+1 allowance in the weighted setting, without assuming nonnegative costs or triangle inequalities Singh–Lau 2007, pp. 661–662. The platform's open WilliamsonShmoys.minimum_degree_tree_local_search_approximation concerns the related unweighted minimum-degree local-search problem, with a different objective and guarantee.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite vertex set and EEE a finite set of unordered, non-loop edges. A spanning tree T⊆ET\subseteq ET⊆E connects every vertex without a cycle. Every edge eee has a real cost cec_ece​, so c(T)=∑e∈Tcec(T)=\sum_{e\in T}c_ec(T)=∑e∈T​ce​. Each vertex vvv has an integer upper bound BvB_vBv​ on its tree degree dT(v)d_T(v)dT​(v). A feasible original solution has dT(v)≤Bvd_T(v)\le B_vdT​(v)≤Bv​ for all vvv.

The paper studies a broader connecting-tree problem. A forest FFF is already selected; its connected components, including isolated vertices, are supernodes. The remaining graph has edges EEE disjoint from FFF. A set H⊆EH\subseteq EH⊆E is an FFF-tree if H∪FH\cup FH∪F is a spanning tree. Degree bounds are active only at vertices in W⊆VW\subseteq VW⊆V, and dH(v)d_H(v)dH​(v) counts edges of HHH, not edges of FFF. The initial spanning-tree problem is the case F=∅F=\varnothingF=∅ and W=VW=VW=V Singh–Lau 2007, p. 665.

For an edge set QQQ and vertex set SSS, write Q(S)Q(S)Q(S) for edges of QQQ with both endpoints in SSS, and δE(v)\delta_E(v)δE​(v) for edges of EEE incident to vvv. The LP-MBDCT relaxation has a nonnegative variable xex_exe​ for each e∈Ee\in Ee∈E. It requires x(E)=∣V∣−∣F∣−1x(E)=|V|-|F|-1x(E)=∣V∣−∣F∣−1, requires x(E(S))≤∣S∣−∣F(S)∣−1x(E(S))\le |S|-|F(S)|-1x(E(S))≤∣S∣−∣F(S)∣−1 for every nonempty union SSS of supernodes, and requires x(δE(v))≤Bvx(\delta_E(v))\le B_vx(δE​(v))≤Bv​ for v∈Wv\in Wv∈W. Its objective is ∑e∈Ecexe\sum_{e\in E}c_ex_e∑e∈E​ce​xe​. At F=∅F=\varnothingF=∅, W=VW=VW=V, this is the spanning-tree LP in equations (1)–(5) Singh–Lau 2007, pp. 662, 665.

Formalization targets

Theorem 1.2: bounded-degree spanning trees

For every feasible initial LP, the paper's Figure 4 algorithm has a terminating run. Every possible run returns a spanning tree TTT satisfying

dT(v)≤Bv+1(v∈V),c(T)≤∑e∈Ecexefor every LP-feasible x.d_T(v)\le B_v+1\quad(v\in V),\qquad c(T)\le\sum_{e\in E}c_ex_e\quad\text{for every LP-feasible }x.dT​(v)≤Bv​+1(v∈V),c(T)≤e∈E∑​ce​xe​for every LP-feasible x.

In particular, c(T)c(T)c(T) is at most the cost of every spanning tree satisfying the original bounds, and thus at most the original optimum. Every run has at most 2∣V∣−12|V|-12∣V∣−1 iterations. The cost comparison against every LP-feasible vector states the stronger bound used by Theorem 4.2 Singh–Lau 2007, pp. 661, 666.

Theorem 4.2 and its milestones

The connecting-tree theorem makes the same cost and degree guarantee for an arbitrary feasible state (E,B,W,F)(E,B,W,F)(E,B,W,F), with dH(v)≤Bv+1d_H(v)\le B_v+1dH​(v)≤Bv​+1 only for v∈Wv\in Wv∈W. The attack path follows the paper's numbered results: Lemma 4.3 describes tight constraints by a laminar family, Claim 4.5 classifies vertices with one excess token, Lemma 4.6 bounds tokens inside a laminar subtree, and Lemma 4.1 says each nonterminal basic solution has either a unit-valued edge or a removable degree constraint. Theorem 4.2 then supplies the general guarantee Singh–Lau 2007, pp. 666–667.

Significance

The result allows one unit of violation at each local degree bound while preserving the cost benchmark exactly. It applies even when negative edge costs make standard multiplicative cost ratios awkward. The connecting-tree statement is useful beyond the initial instance because it covers a forest already accumulated and a subset of degree constraints still active.

This mission formalizes the known 2007 result as an open Lean proof target; the paper proves the mathematics, while the declarations here currently have no machine-checked proofs. A completed development would provide a reusable account of a spanning-tree LP with forest contraction, basic solutions defined by tight rows, and a finite relational algorithm with all choices exposed. These objects could support the paper's lower-and-upper-bound extension and other iterative-rounding results.

Difficulty

Rounding an arbitrary fractional edge upward can increase cost beyond the LP benchmark. Restricting the algorithm to edges with value exactly one protects that benchmark, but a nonterminal basic solution need not present a unit-valued edge. The central structural question is then whether some active degree constraint can be removed with only a one-unit effect on the final degree. The tight subtour rows and degree rows overlap, so counting edges from the support alone is insufficient; Lemmas 4.3–4.6 resolve the dependency and token-counting issues that make the direct argument fail Singh–Lau 2007, pp. 666–667.

Formalization scope

Lean represents edges as Sym2 V in finite sets, excluding diagonal edges. It represents LP vectors on all unordered pairs but requires zero values outside the current edge set. A forest is acyclic on the full vertex set. A compatible subtour set is a union of its connected components. Subtour right-hand sides are real numbers, so subtraction does not truncate at zero; the empty set is excluded because the literal row would make the LP infeasible. Degree bounds are integers so the algorithm's decrements are total. A basic feasible solution is determined uniquely by its tight equality rows among vectors supported on the current edge set. Linear independence in Lemma 4.3 is checked on the positive support.

Figure 4 is a relation because the LP optimum, a unit-valued edge, and a qualifying vertex may each be chosen in several ways. Its edge and vertex tests are mandatory when their conditions hold. The vertex test uses the support before deleting the selected edge and bounds after decrementing its endpoints, following the printed order. “The algorithm returns” is represented by existence of a run, an iteration bound on every step chain, and guarantees for every returned set. “Cost at most the LP optimum” means cost no greater than the objective at every feasible LP vector. “Polynomial time” is represented by the iteration count; the ellipsoid LP solver and separation-oracle complexity are outside this mission. Lemma 4.6's token distribution is expressed as its explicit counting inequality.

The goal asserts the Figure 4 output and its LP cost guarantee. Bare existence of a tree with cost at most the optimum and degrees at most Bv+1B_v+1Bv​+1 would be witnessed by an original optimal tree and would lose the algorithmic theorem. A return guarantee without run existence would hold vacuously for a stuck relation. Contributions that prove the stated structural lemmas, establish the LP oracle's basic-optimum availability, or close the algorithm invariant are within scope. No existing platform item treats this bounded-degree LP and iterative-rounding algorithm under these conventions; the plain minimum-spanning-tree LP definition uses a different edge representation and no forest or degree constraints.

Selected references

  • Mohit Singh and Lap Chi Lau, Approximating Minimum Bounded Degree Spanning Trees to within One of Optimal, Proceedings of the 39th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2007, pp. 661–670. DOI: 10.1145/1250790.1250887.
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

The G/GI/N Queue in the Halfin–Whitt Regime 3: The Number in a Non-Idling G/GI/N System Satisfies the Infinite-Server System Equation (2.8)Research Paper

Motivation

A many-server queue has NNN identical servers, a stream of arriving customers, and a buffer in which customers wait when every server is busy. It models call centres, hospital wards and server farms, and the regime of practical interest is the Halfin–Whitt or quality-and-efficiency-driven regime, in which the number of servers NNN grows with the arrival rate λN\lambda_NλN​ so that N(1−λN/N)→β\sqrt N(1-\lambda_N/N)\to\betaN​(1−λN​/N)→β: servers are almost fully used, yet only a vanishing fraction of customers waits.

  • Halfin and Whitt (1981, Oper. Res. 29) identified the regime and proved a diffusion limit for exponential service times (GI/M/NGI/M/NGI/M/N).
  • Puhalskii and Reiman (2000, Adv. Appl. Probab. 32) treated phase-type service distributions (GI/PH/NGI/PH/NGI/PH/N).
  • Reed (2009, arXiv:0912.2837), the source of this mission, obtained the fluid and diffusion limits of the number in system for the G/GI/NG/GI/NG/GI/N queue with a general service-time distribution, assuming only a finite mean. Its approach rests on a sample-path identity, the system equation (2.8), which writes the number in system of the NNN-server queue through quantities of an infinite-server queue fed by the same arrivals.

This mission formalizes that identity and the proposition that yields it.

Setting

Fix one realisation of the queue (Reed, §2, p. 6).

  • There are NNN servers. At time 0−0-0− there are Q0Q_0Q0​ customers; the first min⁡(Q0,N)\min(Q_0,N)min(Q0​,N) are in service, with residual service times η~i\tilde\eta_iη~​i​, and the other (Q0−N)+(Q_0-N)^+(Q0​−N)+ wait.
  • Customers then arrive at times 0≤τ1≤τ2≤⋯0\le\tau_1\le\tau_2\le\cdots0≤τ1​≤τ2​≤⋯ (with τ0=0\tau_0=0τ0​=0); the arrival process is A(t)=#{i≥1:τi≤t}A(t)=\#\{i\ge1:\tau_i\le t\}A(t)=#{i≥1:τi​≤t}. Arrivals at time 000 are counted in A(0)A(0)A(0), so in general Q(0)≠Q0Q(0)\ne Q_0Q(0)=Q0​.
  • The iii-th customer to enter service after time 0−0-0− has service time ηi\eta_iηi​. Service is first come first served, so the first (Q0−N)+(Q_0-N)^+(Q0​−N)+ of these are the initial waiting customers and the iii-th arrival has service time η(Q0−N)++i\eta_{(Q_0-N)^++i}η(Q0​−N)++i​.
  • wi≥0w_i\ge0wi​≥0 is the waiting time of the iii-th arrival and w~i≥0\tilde w_i\ge0w~i​≥0 that of the initial customer N+iN+iN+i.
  • FFF is the service-time distribution, with tail G=1−FG=1-FG=1−F, and F0F_0F0​ the residual service-time distribution, with tail Fˉ0\bar F_0Fˉ0​; both are carried by [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The number in system is (2.2):

Q(t)=∑i=1min⁡(Q0,N)1{η~i>t}+∑i=1(Q0−N)+1{w~i+ηi>t}+∑i=1A(t)1{τi+wi+η(Q0−N)++i>t}.Q(t)=\sum_{i=1}^{\min(Q_0,N)}1\{\tilde\eta_i>t\}+\sum_{i=1}^{(Q_0-N)^+}1\{\tilde w_i+\eta_i>t\}+\sum_{i=1}^{A(t)}1\{\tau_i+w_i+\eta_{(Q_0-N)^++i}>t\}.Q(t)=i=1∑min(Q0​,N)​1{η~​i​>t}+i=1∑(Q0​−N)+​1{w~i​+ηi​>t}+i=1∑A(t)​1{τi​+wi​+η(Q0​−N)++i​>t}.

Centring each indicator at its (conditional) mean produces the terms

W0(t)=∑i=1min⁡(Q0,N)(1{η~i>t}−Fˉ0(t)),AG(t)=∫0tG(t−s) dA(s),I(t)=min⁡(Q0,N)Fˉ0(t)+(Q0−N)+G(t),W_0(t)=\sum_{i=1}^{\min(Q_0,N)}\big(1\{\tilde\eta_i>t\}-\bar F_0(t)\big),\qquad A_G(t)=\int_0^tG(t-s)\,dA(s),\qquad I(t)=\min(Q_0,N)\bar F_0(t)+(Q_0-N)^+G(t),W0​(t)=i=1∑min(Q0​,N)​(1{η~​i​>t}−Fˉ0​(t)),AG​(t)=∫0t​G(t−s)dA(s),I(t)=min(Q0​,N)Fˉ0​(t)+(Q0​−N)+G(t),

and M2(t)M_2(t)M2​(t), the analogous centred sum (2.5) over the customers who entered service after time 0−0-0−. AG(t)A_G(t)AG​(t) is the conditional mean number in a G/GI/∞G/GI/\inftyG/GI/∞ queue fed by the same arrivals.

A sample path is non-idling if for every t≥0t\ge0t≥0

(Q(t)−N)+=∑i=1(Q0−N)+1{t<w~i}+∑i=1A(t)1{τi≤t<τi+wi},(Q(t)-N)^+=\sum_{i=1}^{(Q_0-N)^+}1\{t<\tilde w_i\}+\sum_{i=1}^{A(t)}1\{\tau_i\le t<\tau_i+w_i\},(Q(t)−N)+=i=1∑(Q0​−N)+​1{t<w~i​}+i=1∑A(t)​1{τi​≤t<τi​+wi​},

that is, the customers waiting at time ttt are exactly those who have arrived and not yet entered service. This holds for every first-come-first-served NNN-server path that never idles a server while a customer waits; the paper uses it at the start of the proof of Proposition 2.1 (p. 8).

Formalization targets

Goal: the system equation (2.8), p. 9

For a non-idling sample path and every t≥0t\ge 0t≥0,

Q(t)=I(t)+W0(t)+M2(t)+AG(t)+∫0t(Q(t−s)−N)+ dF(s).Q(t)=I(t)+W_0(t)+M_2(t)+A_G(t)+\int_0^t\big(Q(t-s)-N\big)^+\,dF(s).Q(t)=I(t)+W0​(t)+M2​(t)+AG​(t)+∫0t​(Q(t−s)−N)+dF(s).

Milestones

  1. The first two equalities of the proof of Proposition 2.1 (p. 8): ∑i≤A(t)(G(t−τi−wi)−G(t−τi))=∑i≤A(t)∫0∞1{t−(τi+wi)<s≤t−τi} dF(s)\sum_{i\le A(t)}\big(G(t-\tau_i-w_i)-G(t-\tau_i)\big)=\sum_{i\le A(t)}\int_0^\infty 1\{t-(\tau_i+w_i)<s\le t-\tau_i\}\,dF(s)∑i≤A(t)​(G(t−τi​−wi​)−G(t−τi​))=∑i≤A(t)​∫0∞​1{t−(τi​+wi​)<s≤t−τi​}dF(s).
  2. The "reverse argument" of the proof (p. 9): ∫0t∑i≤(Q0−N)+1{w~i>t−s} dF(s)=∑i≤(Q0−N)+(G(t−w~i)−G(t))\int_0^t\sum_{i\le(Q_0-N)^+}1\{\tilde w_i>t-s\}\,dF(s)=\sum_{i\le(Q_0-N)^+}\big(G(t-\tilde w_i)-G(t)\big)∫0t​∑i≤(Q0​−N)+​1{w~i​>t−s}dF(s)=∑i≤(Q0​−N)+​(G(t−w~i​)−G(t)).
  3. Proposition 2.1 (p. 8): for a non-idling path and t≥0t\ge0t≥0,
∑i=1A(t)(G(t−τi−wi)−G(t−τi))=∫0t(Q(t−s)−N)+ dF(s)−∑i=1(Q0−N)+(G(t−w~i)−G(t)).\sum_{i=1}^{A(t)}\big(G(t-\tau_i-w_i)-G(t-\tau_i)\big)=\int_0^t(Q(t-s)-N)^+\,dF(s)-\sum_{i=1}^{(Q_0-N)^+}\big(G(t-\tilde w_i)-G(t)\big).i=1∑A(t)​(G(t−τi​−wi​)−G(t−τi​))=∫0t​(Q(t−s)−N)+dF(s)−i=1∑(Q0​−N)+​(G(t−w~i​)−G(t)).
  1. The decomposition (2.7) (p. 7): Q(t)=I(t)+W0(t)+M2(t)+AG(t)+∑i≤(Q0−N)+(G(t−w~i)−G(t))+∑i≤A(t)(G(t−τi−wi)−G(t−τi))Q(t)=I(t)+W_0(t)+M_2(t)+A_G(t)+\sum_{i\le(Q_0-N)^+}\big(G(t-\tilde w_i)-G(t)\big)+\sum_{i\le A(t)}\big(G(t-\tau_i-w_i)-G(t-\tau_i)\big)Q(t)=I(t)+W0​(t)+M2​(t)+AG​(t)+∑i≤(Q0​−N)+​(G(t−w~i​)−G(t))+∑i≤A(t)​(G(t−τi​−wi​)−G(t−τi​)).

Significance

The result. Equation (2.8) is the paper's starting point for both of its limit theorems. Writing Q−N=x+∫0t(Q(t−s)−N)+dF(s)Q-N=x+\int_0^t(Q(t-s)-N)^+dF(s)Q−N=x+∫0t​(Q(t−s)−N)+dF(s) with x=I+W0+M2+AG−Nx=I+W_0+M_2+A_G-Nx=I+W0​+M2​+AG​−N shows that the number in system is the image of the infinite-server quantities under the regulator map of the paper's §3, the unique solution of z(t)=x(t)+∫0t(z(t−s)+a)+dB(s)z(t)=x(t)+\int_0^t(z(t-s)+a)^+dB(s)z(t)=x(t)+∫0t​(z(t−s)+a)+dB(s). The fluid limit (Theorem 4.1, p. 12) and the diffusion limit (Theorem 5.1, p. 23) then follow from limit theorems for the infinite-server terms and the continuity of that map. Without (2.8), the NNN-server queue has no closed equation in terms of quantities whose limits are known.

Formalizing it. The identity is proved in the paper on pp. 7–9; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. This mission produces a sample-path model of the G/GI/NG/GI/NG/GI/N queue (initial customers, arrivals, FCFS service order, waiting times) together with the decomposition of its number in system, reusable for other many-server results stated pathwise. The limit theorems 4.1 and 5.1 themselves are weak-convergence statements in the Skorohod space and are not part of this mission; the regulator map (Proposition 3.1) is the subject of a separate mission of this series.

Difficulty

The decomposition (2.7) is bookkeeping. The content is Proposition 2.1, which converts a sum over customers of tail differences into an integral, against FFF, of the number of waiting customers at earlier times. The step that needs care is the change of viewpoint from "customer iii's service time falls in a window of length wiw_iwi​" to "customer iii is waiting at time t−st-st−s", after which the sum over customers must be recognised, at each time t−st-st−s, as the waiting count of the non-idling identity, with the arrivals counted up to A(t−s)A(t-s)A(t−s) rather than A(t)A(t)A(t). A second point is the treatment of an atom of FFF at 000: the half-open windows (t−τi−wi, t−τi](t-\tau_i-w_i,\,t-\tau_i](t−τi​−wi​,t−τi​] and the closed integration range [0,t][0,t][0,t] must match, and G(x)=1G(x)=1G(x)=1 for x<0x<0x<0 is used whenever a customer is still waiting.

Formalization scope

  • Paths are data, not random. A sample path is a structure holding NNN, Q0Q_0Q0​ and the sequences η~,η,τ,w,w~:N→R\tilde\eta,\eta,\tau,w,\tilde w:\mathbb N\to\mathbb Rη~​,η,τ,w,w~:N→R, indexed from 111 as in the paper. The arrival times are primary and A(t)A(t)A(t) is their counting function; for a counting process with A(0−)=0A(0-)=0A(0−)=0 this is the same data as the paper's τi=inf⁡{t≥0:A(t)≥i}\tau_i=\inf\{t\ge0:A(t)\ge i\}τi​=inf{t≥0:A(t)≥i}. The encoding has infinitely many arrivals, finitely many in each bounded interval.
  • Distributions are probability measures μ\muμ (for FFF) and μ0\mu_0μ0​ (for F0F_0F0​) on R\mathbb RR with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0), and G(x)=μ((x,∞))G(x)=\mu((x,\infty))G(x)=μ((x,∞)) for every real xxx. The paper's i.i.d. assumptions and the mean-111 assumption on FFF are not used by these pathwise identities and are omitted.
  • Integrals ∫0t⋅ dF(s)\int_0^t\cdot\,dF(s)∫0t​⋅dF(s) are over the closed interval [0,t][0,t][0,t], an atom of FFF at 000 included; AG(t)A_G(t)AG​(t), a Stieltjes integral against the counting measure of arrivals, is the finite sum ∑i≤A(t)G(t−τi)\sum_{i\le A(t)}G(t-\tau_i)∑i≤A(t)​G(t−τi​).
  • Non-idling is a hypothesis on the sample path, exactly the identity displayed above. No hypothesis mentions (2.8), Proposition 2.1 or an integral against FFF, and QQQ is not a free function: it is defined by (2.2). Integrability of s↦(Q(t−s)−N)+s\mapsto(Q(t-s)-N)^+s↦(Q(t−s)−N)+ is part of what must be proved, not assumed. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable, so the goal is not vacuous.
  • Needed infrastructure: finite sums, set integrals of indicator functions against a finite measure on R\mathbb RR, and the identity G(a)−G(b)=μ((a,b])G(a)-G(b)=\mu((a,b])G(a)−G(b)=μ((a,b]). All of it is in Mathlib.

Related platform items: WhittEfficiency.IS.* (the M/G/∞M/G/\inftyM/G/∞ queue with Poisson arrivals, the infinite-server object behind AGA_GAG​) and PalmQueueing.Palm.swiss_army_formula (a pathwise queueing identity of Palm calculus) are the nearest queueing results; neither is the object of this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Reed, The G/GI/N queue in the Halfin–Whitt regime, Ann. Appl. Probab. 19(6), 2009, 2211–2269. arXiv:0912.2837v1. https://arxiv.org/abs/0912.2837 , https://doi.org/10.1214/09-AAP609
  • S. Halfin and W. Whitt, Heavy-traffic limits for queues with many exponential servers, Oper. Res. 29, 1981, 567–588. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567 (MR629195)
  • A. A. Puhalskii and M. I. Reiman, The multiclass GI/PH/N queue in the Halfin–Whitt regime, Adv. Appl. Probab. 32, 2000, 564–595. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=1778580
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 3: With Indifference Allowed, a Strategy-Proof Voting Procedure with at Least Three Possible Outcomes Is DictatorialResearch Paper

Motivation

A committee that chooses one alternative by voting would like a procedure under which nobody gains by misreporting their preferences. Gibbard (Econometrica 41, 1973) and Satterthwaite (J. Econ. Theory 10, 1975) showed that, once at least three outcomes are possible, the only voting procedures with this property are dictatorial. The theorem is the starting point of the theory of strategy-proof mechanisms and of implementation theory.

Most proofs, including the main argument of Satterthwaite's paper, assume strict ballots: no voter is indifferent between two distinct alternatives. Real ballots, and most economic models of preferences, allow indifference. The last section of Satterthwaite's paper carries the theorem over to ballots that are arbitrary weak orders, by decomposing a voting procedure into a tie-breaking function followed by a strict voting procedure. This mission formalizes that extension.

Timeline. Gibbard (1973) proved the impossibility for game forms; the 1974 discussion paper formalized here proved it for strict ballots by induction on the number of voters (Theorem 1), allowing the range of the procedure to be a proper subset of the alternatives, and extended it to weak orders (Theorem 1′). Later short proofs (Barberà 1983; Benoît 2000; Reny 2001) also treat strict ballots.

Setting

A committee is a finite set InI_nIn​ of nnn individuals and a finite set SmS_mSm​ of mmm alternatives. A weak order RRR on SmS_mSm​ is a complete and transitive relation, with x R yx\,R\,yxRy read "xxx is preferred or indifferent to yyy"; its strict part is x Rˉ yx\,\bar R\,yxRˉy iff x R yx\,R\,yxRy and not y R xy\,R\,xyRx. The weak orders form πm\pi_mπm​. A strong order is a weak order with no indifference between distinct alternatives; the strong orders form ρm⊆πm\rho_m\subseteq\pi_mρm​⊆πm​. A ballot set is B=(B1,…,Bn)∈πmnB=(B_1,\dots,B_n)\in\pi_m^nB=(B1​,…,Bn​)∈πmn​.

A voting procedure is a map v:πmn→Smv:\pi_m^n\to S_mv:πmn​→Sm​. Its range is Tp=v(πmn)T_p=v(\pi_m^n)Tp​=v(πmn​), with p=∣Tp∣p=|T_p|p=∣Tp​∣. A strict voting procedure is a map ν:ρmn→Sm\nu:\rho_m^n\to S_mν:ρmn​→Sm​.

vvv is strategy-proof if there are no ballot set BBB, individual iii and ballot Bi′∈πmB_i'\in\pi_mBi′​∈πm​ with

v(B1,…,Bi′,…,Bn) Bˉi v(B1,…,Bi,…,Bn).v(B_1,\dots,B_i',\dots,B_n)\ \bar B_i\ v(B_1,\dots,B_i,\dots,B_n).v(B1​,…,Bi′​,…,Bn​) Bˉi​ v(B1​,…,Bi​,…,Bn​).

For a strict procedure, ballot sets and substituted ballots are strong orders.

vvv is dictatorial if some individual iii exists such that, for every ballot set BBB, the outcome v(B)v(B)v(B) is among the BiB_iBi​-maximal elements of TpT_pTp​: v(B) Bi yv(B)\,B_i\,yv(B)Bi​y for all y∈Tpy\in T_py∈Tp​.

A tie-breaking function is a map α:πmn→ρmn\alpha:\pi_m^n\to\rho_m^nα:πmn​→ρmn​ that keeps every strict preference: if C=α(B)C=\alpha(B)C=α(B) then x Bˉi yx\,\bar B_i\,yxBˉi​y implies x Cˉi yx\,\bar C_i\,yxCˉi​y. It is regular if there are fixed strong orders Q1,…,QnQ_1,\dots,Q_nQ1​,…,Qn​ such that every indifference x Bi yx\,B_i\,yxBi​y, y Bi xy\,B_i\,xyBi​x is broken as QiQ_iQi​ breaks it.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1′ (p. 43)

For n≥2n\ge 2n≥2 and m≥p≥3m\ge p\ge 3m≥p≥3, every strategy-proof voting procedure on weak-order ballots is dictatorial:

v strategy-proof, ∣Tp∣≥3 ⟹ ∃ i ∀B∈πmn ∀y∈Tp: v(B) Bi y.v \text{ strategy-proof},\ |T_p|\ge 3 \ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\, i\ \forall B\in\pi_m^n\ \forall y\in T_p:\ v(B)\,B_i\,y.v strategy-proof, ∣Tp​∣≥3 ⟹ ∃i ∀B∈πmn​ ∀y∈Tp​: v(B)Bi​y.

The converse fails once indifference is admissible: a dictator's ties may be broken by a manipulable rule, such as a Borda count of the other ballots (pp. 10–11). The goal is therefore a one-way implication.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1 (p. 11), the strict case: for n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 and p≥3p\ge 3p≥3, a strict voting procedure is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial.
  2. Lemma 9, first sentence (p. 41): if v=ν∘γv=\nu\circ\gammav=ν∘γ with ν\nuν strict and strategy-proof and γ\gammaγ a regular tie-breaking function, then vvv is strategy-proof.
  3. Lemma 9, second sentence (p. 41): every strategy-proof vvv can be written v=ν∘αv=\nu\circ\alphav=ν∘α with ν\nuν strict and strategy-proof and α\alphaα a tie-breaking function, not necessarily regular.

Significance

The result shows that allowing voters to express indifference does not escape the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility: the dictatorial conclusion survives, and only the equivalence is lost. It is the form of the theorem most directly applicable to economic environments, where preference domains usually contain indifference, and the decomposition of Lemma 9 is the device by which strict-ballot results are transferred to weak-order ballots throughout §6 of the paper, including the weak-order version of Arrow's theorem.

The theorem is proved and classical. What is not yet available is a machine-checked proof of the weak-order version with a range that may be a proper subset of the alternatives. The strict, full-range case is proved on the platform (AGT.gibbard_satterthwaite, on strict total orders with a surjective rule); the strict case with an arbitrary range of size at least three is the goal of the companion mission on strict committees. This mission adds the decomposition of Lemma 9 and the extension to indifference.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to restrict a strategy-proof vvv to strict ballot sets, apply the strict theorem, and conclude. Two steps fail. First, the restriction's range may a priori be smaller than TpT_pTp​, so the hypothesis p≥3p\ge 3p≥3 need not transfer. Second, knowing that vvv is dictatorial on strict ballot sets says nothing directly about ballot sets with indifference: one needs, for each BBB, a strict refinement CCC of BBB with v(C)=v(B)v(C)=v(B)v(C)=v(B), and the refinement of one individual's ballot may depend on the others' ballots. Lemma 9's second sentence is exactly the existence of such refinements, and the tie-breaking function it produces is generally not regular.

Formalization scope

Lean commits to the following conventions, all in the definitions file StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS.Basic:

  • Individuals and alternatives are finite types ι and A; nnn and mmm are their cardinalities. The theorems state n≥1n\ge 1n≥1 or n≥2n\ge 2n≥2 as printed, and m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 where the paper's standing committee assumption is all that applies (Lemma 9). m≥pm\ge pm≥p is automatic.
  • A weak order is a structure (relation, completeness, transitivity); strong orders are the subtype with no indifference between distinct alternatives, so a strict ballot is literally a weak ballot.
  • Voting procedures are total functions on profiles of weak orders (resp. strong orders). There are no inadmissible inputs, and the range TpT_pTp​ is Set.range v.
  • Strategy-proofness compares outcomes by the strict part of the true ballot; the substituted ballot is any weak order (any strong order in the strict case).
  • The paper defines dictatorship through a function fTif^i_TfTi​ that selects some BiB_iBi​-maximal element of TpT_pTp​ with an unspecified tie-break. Lean states the equivalent condition that v(B)v(B)v(B) is BiB_iBi​-maximal in TpT_pTp​, without fixing a tie-break. Fixing one would make Theorem 1′ false.
  • The tie-breaking condition is stated once for all x,yx,yx,y; the paper's two clauses are the same condition with x,yx,yx,y renamed. α(B)i\alpha(B)_iα(B)i​ may depend on all of BBB.
  • In Lemma 9 the page prints the composition with a Latin vvv on both sides; it is read as νnm[γ(B)]\nu^{nm}[\gamma(B)]νnm[γ(B)], as the sentence and proof require.

A trivializing formalization would measure manipulation by the weak relation BiB_iBi​ instead of its strict part, which makes "strategy-proof" nearly unsatisfiable and the goal vacuous; the definitions use the strict part, and a sorry-free check confirms that a strategy-proof procedure with range of size 3 exists.

A complete development needs the strict Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with partial range (milestone 1) and the refinement construction of Lemma 9. The weak-order and tie-breaking vocabulary is reusable for the weak-order Arrow theorem of the companion mission. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal that bypass Lemma 9, are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, Northwestern University CMS-EMS Discussion Paper No. 122, rev. Dec. 12, 1974; J. Econ. Theory 10 (1975) 187–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2
  • A. Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica 41 (1973) 587–601. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
  • S. Barberà, Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem, International Economic Review 24 (1983) 413–417. https://doi.org/10.2307/2648754
  • J.-P. Benoît, The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem: A Simple Proof, Economics Letters 69 (2000) 319–322. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00312-8
  • P. J. Reny, Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach, Economics Letters 70 (2001) 99–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00332-3
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A D.C. Optimization Algorithm for Solving the Trust-Region Subproblem I: A Point x Solves the D.C. Program min(g − h) if and only if ∂_εh(x) ⊂ ∂_εg(x) for Every ε > 0Research Paper

Motivation

A d.c. program minimizes a difference of two convex functions. Many nonconvex problems of practical interest have this form: every function with a locally Lipschitz gradient on Rn\mathbb R^nRn is d.c., the class is closed under finite sums, products and finite suprema, and constrained problems enter through indicator functions. Pham Dinh Tao and Le Thi Hoai An (SIAM J. Optim. 8 (1998)) use this structure to build the DCA, an algorithm for the trust-region subproblem min⁡{12x⊤Ax+b⊤x:∥x∥≤r}\min\{\tfrac12 x^\top Ax+b^\top x:\|x\|\le r\}min{21​x⊤Ax+b⊤x:∥x∥≤r}, a basic step of trust-region methods in nonlinear optimization. The algorithm rests on a duality theory for d.c. programs, which §3.1 of the paper sets out. This mission is the global half of that theory.

Timeline.

  • 1978–1979: J. F. Toland introduces the duality inf⁡(g−h)=inf⁡(h∗−g∗)\inf(g-h)=\inf(h^*-g^*)inf(g−h)=inf(h∗−g∗) and the inclusions between primal and dual solution sets, in a general setting of linear spaces in separating duality (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 66 (1978); Bull. Soc. Math. France, Mémoire 60 (1979), pp. 177–183, numdam).
  • 1988: J.-B. Hiriart-Urruty proves that xxx minimizes g−hg-hg−h if and only if ∂εh(x)⊂∂εg(x)\partial_\varepsilon h(x)\subset\partial_\varepsilon g(x)∂ε​h(x)⊂∂ε​g(x) for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, through the behaviour of the ε\varepsilonε-directional derivative as a function of ε\varepsilonε (From convex optimization to non convex optimization. Part I, in Nonsmooth Optimization and Related Topics, Plenum, 1988; reference [9] of the paper). The same year Pham Dinh and Elbernoussi introduce the DCA on the basis of d.c. duality (reference [23]).
  • 1998: Pham Dinh and Le Thi give a short proof of Hiriart-Urruty's condition through the d.c. duality (Theorem 3.1, p. 483) and use the duality to design and analyse the DCA for the trust-region subproblem.

Setting

Let X=RnX=\mathbb R^nX=Rn with its canonical inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩, and identify the dual space YYY with XXX. Functions take values in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}. A function θ\thetaθ is in Γ0(X)\Gamma_0(X)Γ0​(X) if it is convex, lower semicontinuous, never −∞-\infty−∞, and finite at some point. Its effective domain is dom⁡θ={x:θ(x)<+∞}\operatorname{dom}\theta=\{x:\theta(x)<+\infty\}domθ={x:θ(x)<+∞}, and its conjugate is

θ∗(y)=sup⁡{⟨x,y⟩−θ(x):x∈X}.\theta^*(y)=\sup\{\langle x,y\rangle-\theta(x):x\in X\}.θ∗(y)=sup{⟨x,y⟩−θ(x):x∈X}.

For x0∈dom⁡θx_0\in\operatorname{dom}\thetax0​∈domθ, the subdifferential ∂θ(x0)\partial\theta(x_0)∂θ(x0​) is the set of yyy with θ(x)≥θ(x0)+⟨x−x0,y⟩\theta(x)\ge\theta(x_0)+\langle x-x_0,y\rangleθ(x)≥θ(x0​)+⟨x−x0​,y⟩ for all xxx. For ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 the ε\varepsilonε-subdifferential is

∂εθ(x0)={y∈Y:θ(x)≥θ(x0)+⟨x−x0,y⟩−ε  ∀x∈X}.\partial_\varepsilon\theta(x_0)=\{y\in Y:\theta(x)\ge\theta(x_0)+\langle x-x_0,y\rangle-\varepsilon\ \ \forall x\in X\}.∂ε​θ(x0​)={y∈Y:θ(x)≥θ(x0​)+⟨x−x0​,y⟩−ε  ∀x∈X}.

Given g,h∈Γ0(X)g,h\in\Gamma_0(X)g,h∈Γ0​(X), the d.c. program and its dual are

(P)α=inf⁡{g(x)−h(x):x∈X},(D)α=inf⁡{h∗(y)−g∗(y):y∈Y},\text{(P)}\quad\alpha=\inf\{g(x)-h(x):x\in X\},\qquad \text{(D)}\quad\alpha=\inf\{h^*(y)-g^*(y):y\in Y\},(P)α=inf{g(x)−h(x):x∈X},(D)α=inf{h∗(y)−g∗(y):y∈Y},

with the convention +∞−(+∞)=+∞+\infty-(+\infty)=+\infty+∞−(+∞)=+∞. Throughout, the paper assumes the inclusions

dom⁡g⊂dom⁡h,dom⁡h∗⊂dom⁡g∗.(3)\operatorname{dom}g\subset\operatorname{dom}h,\qquad\operatorname{dom}h^*\subset\operatorname{dom}g^*.\tag{3}domg⊂domh,domh∗⊂domg∗.(3)

P\mathcal PP and D\mathcal DD denote the solution sets of (P) and (D).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1(i), p. 483

For every x∈dom⁡hx\in\operatorname{dom}hx∈domh,

x∈P  ⟺  ∂εh(x)⊂∂εg(x)∀ε>0.x\in\mathcal P\iff\partial_\varepsilon h(x)\subset\partial_\varepsilon g(x)\quad\forall\varepsilon>0.x∈P⟺∂ε​h(x)⊂∂ε​g(x)∀ε>0.

Milestones (the proof on pp. 483–484)

  1. d.c. duality (§3, pp. 481–482): inf⁡{g−h}=inf⁡{h∗−g∗}\inf\{g-h\}=\inf\{h^*-g^*\}inf{g−h}=inf{h∗−g∗}.
  2. (6)–(7) (p. 483): x∗∈Px^*\in\mathcal Px∗∈P iff x∗∈dom⁡gx^*\in\operatorname{dom}gx∗∈domg and g(x∗)+g∗(y)≤h(x∗)+h∗(y)g(x^*)+g^*(y)\le h(x^*)+h^*(y)g(x∗)+g∗(y)≤h(x∗)+h∗(y) for all y∈dom⁡h∗y\in\operatorname{dom}h^*y∈domh∗.
  3. (8) (p. 484): for x∗∈dom⁡hx^*\in\operatorname{dom}hx∗∈domh, the inclusions ∂εh(x∗)⊂∂εg(x∗)\partial_\varepsilon h(x^*)\subset\partial_\varepsilon g(x^*)∂ε​h(x∗)⊂∂ε​g(x∗) for all ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 are equivalent to ⟨x∗,y⟩+ε≥h(x∗)+h∗(y)⇒⟨x∗,y⟩+ε≥g(x∗)+g∗(y)\langle x^*,y\rangle+\varepsilon\ge h(x^*)+h^*(y)\Rightarrow\langle x^*,y\rangle+\varepsilon\ge g(x^*)+g^*(y)⟨x∗,y⟩+ε≥h(x∗)+h∗(y)⇒⟨x∗,y⟩+ε≥g(x∗)+g∗(y) for all ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and yyy.
  4. (7) ⇔ (8) (p. 484), for x∗∈dom⁡hx^*\in\operatorname{dom}hx∗∈domh.

Companions

  • Theorem 3.1(ii): for y∈dom⁡g∗y\in\operatorname{dom}g^*y∈domg∗, y∈D  ⟺  ∂εg∗(y)⊂∂εh∗(y)y\in\mathcal D\iff\partial_\varepsilon g^*(y)\subset\partial_\varepsilon h^*(y)y∈D⟺∂ε​g∗(y)⊂∂ε​h∗(y) for all ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0.
  • Theorem 3.1(iii): ⋃{∂h(x):x∈P}⊂D⊂dom⁡h∗\bigcup\{\partial h(x):x\in\mathcal P\}\subset\mathcal D\subset\operatorname{dom}h^*⋃{∂h(x):x∈P}⊂D⊂domh∗, with equality in the first inclusion when g∗g^*g∗ is subdifferentiable on D\mathcal DD.
  • Theorem 3.1(iv): ⋃{∂g∗(y):y∈D}⊂P⊂dom⁡g\bigcup\{\partial g^*(y):y\in\mathcal D\}\subset\mathcal P\subset\operatorname{dom}g⋃{∂g∗(y):y∈D}⊂P⊂domg, with equality when hhh is subdifferentiable on P\mathcal PP.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.1(i) characterizes global minimizers of a nonconvex function by inclusions between convex objects. It is a certificate of global optimality that uses only convex analysis. Parts (iii) and (iv) say that a solution of either program yields a solution of the other through a subgradient. This is the mechanism of the DCA, which alternates yk∈∂h(xk)y^k\in\partial h(x^k)yk∈∂h(xk), xk+1∈∂g∗(yk)x^{k+1}\in\partial g^*(y^k)xk+1∈∂g∗(yk). The paper notes that condition (i) is hard to use in an algorithm and that the DCA rests on local conditions instead. The global condition remains the reference statement that the local theory and the DCA approximate.

Formalizing it. All results here are classical and proved on paper. Parts (iii) and (iv) are proved in references the paper cites, not in the paper itself. None of them has a machine-checked proof on the platform. The mission provides a Lean layer for d.c. programming on Rn\mathbb R^nRn: the convention-respecting difference, the ε\varepsilonε-subdifferential, the standing assumptions, and the primal and dual solution sets. Missions II and III of the series reuse this layer for local optimality and for the convergence of the DCA.

Difficulty

The paper's proof is short, but each step uses a fact that needs separate work. The duality requires the biconjugation h=h∗∗h=h^{**}h=h∗∗ for h∈Γ0h\in\Gamma_0h∈Γ0​, and an exchange of two infima in the extended reals under the convention +∞−(+∞)=+∞+\infty-(+\infty)=+\infty+∞−(+∞)=+∞. The step (7) ⇔ (8) has a hidden case: a point of dom⁡h∖dom⁡g\operatorname{dom}h\setminus\operatorname{dom}gdomh∖domg. Ruling it out needs ∂εh(x∗)≠∅\partial_\varepsilon h(x^*)\neq\emptyset∂ε​h(x∗)=∅ for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, a nontrivial property of lower semicontinuous proper convex functions. The obvious approach, computing with real numbers, fails because ggg, hhh, g∗g^*g∗ and h∗h^*h∗ all take the value +∞+\infty+∞, and the extended-real arithmetic of Lean does not follow the paper's convention.

Formalization scope

  • Space. X=YX=YX=Y is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). Functions are EReal-valued.
  • Published definitions. Γ0\Gamma_0Γ0​ is ThreeOpSplitting.ConvexRates.IsProperClosedConvex, ∂\partial∂ is InertialFB.IFB.IsSubgradient, and the conjugate is CondatPD.FinDim.conj, an extended-real supremum over all of XXX.
  • Convention. Mathlib has ⊤−⊤=⊥\top-\top=\bot⊤−⊤=⊥. Every difference g−hg-hg−h and h∗−g∗h^*-g^*h∗−g∗ of the paper is the explicit dcSub, which returns +∞+\infty+∞ when the first term is +∞+\infty+∞. P\mathcal PP, D\mathcal DD and α\alphaα are defined through it.
  • Domains. The ε\varepsilonε-subdifferential is empty outside the domain, as in the paper's definition. Theorem 3.1(i) is stated for x∈dom⁡hx\in\operatorname{dom}hx∈domh, the case its proof treats. For x∉dom⁡hx\notin\operatorname{dom}hx∈/domh the right-hand side holds vacuously while x∉Px\notin\mathcal Px∈/P. Every solution lies in dom⁡g⊂dom⁡h\operatorname{dom}g\subset\operatorname{dom}hdomg⊂domh, and for x∈dom⁡h∖dom⁡gx\in\operatorname{dom}h\setminus\operatorname{dom}gx∈domh∖domg both sides are false, so the restriction loses nothing. Part (ii) is restricted to y∈dom⁡g∗y\in\operatorname{dom}g^*y∈domg∗ for the same reason.
  • Standing assumptions. g,h∈Γ0g,h\in\Gamma_0g,h∈Γ0​ and the inclusions (3) are a hypothesis of every item. Finiteness of α\alphaα is not assumed: when α=−∞\alpha=-\inftyα=−∞, both solution sets are empty.
  • Not a trivialization. Defining the ε\varepsilonε-subdifferential without the domain clause, or using Mathlib's subtraction for g−hg-hg−h, would change the theorem: the first makes every yyy an ε\varepsilonε-subgradient at points where the function is +∞+\infty+∞, and the second sets g−h=−∞g-h=-\inftyg−h=−∞ wherever ggg and hhh are both +∞+\infty+∞, since Lean's ⊤−⊤=⊥\top-\top=\bot⊤−⊤=⊥. The goal does not mention (6), (7), (8) or the duality.
  • Parts (iii) and (iv) include the paper's "in particular" sufficient conditions, with the relative interior written as Mathlib's intrinsicInterior, and the "in this case" inclusions into dom⁡∂g∗∩dom⁡∂h∗\operatorname{dom}\partial g^*\cap\operatorname{dom}\partial h^*dom∂g∗∩dom∂h∗ and dom⁡∂g∩dom⁡∂h\operatorname{dom}\partial g\cap\operatorname{dom}\partial hdom∂g∩dom∂h.
  • Contributions welcome. Biconjugation and Fenchel–Young for EReal-valued functions on EuclideanSpace in the conventions of CondatPD.FinDim.conj, nonemptiness of ε\varepsilonε-subdifferentials, and the extended-real infimum exchange. These are reusable well beyond d.c. programming.

Selected references

  • Pham Dinh Tao and Le Thi Hoai An, A d.c. optimization algorithm for solving the trust-region subproblem, SIAM J. Optim. 8(2):476–505, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623494274313
  • J. F. Toland, Duality in nonconvex optimization, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 66:399–415, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247X(78)90243-3
  • J. F. Toland, On subdifferential calculus and duality in nonconvex optimization, Bull. Soc. Math. France, Mémoire 60:177–183, 1979. http://www.numdam.org/item/MSMF_1979__60__177_0/
  • J.-B. Hiriart-Urruty, From convex optimization to non convex optimization. Part I: Necessary and sufficient conditions for global optimality, in Nonsmooth Optimization and Related Topics, Ettore Majorana Internat. Sci. Ser. Phys. Sci. 43, Plenum Press, New York, 1988 (no persistent link; cited as [9] in the paper above).
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem II: Every Equilibrium of Every Choice Mechanism Yields an Incentive-Feasible Allocation, F** = F*Research Paper

Motivation

An arbitrator who must choose among collective options for a group of players usually does not know the players' private characteristics. The arbitrator can only ask, and a player who expects to profit from a false answer may give one. Before designing any procedure, the arbitrator therefore needs to know which expected-payoff allocations can be reached at all once strategic misreporting is taken into account.

Myerson (1979) answers this for Bayesian collective choice problems with finitely many types. Restricting attention to mechanisms that simply ask each player for their type, and that make honest answers optimal, loses nothing: every expected-payoff allocation that any mechanism can produce in equilibrium is already produced honestly by such a direct mechanism, and conversely. This is the revelation principle in the form used throughout Bayesian mechanism design. It is what makes incentive-compatibility constraints the starting point for auction design, bilateral trade, and the bargaining solution in the second half of the same paper.

Timeline. Gibbard (1973) gave the dominant-strategy form of the principle. Rosenthal (Review of Economic Studies, 1978) studied arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty; Myerson notes that Theorem 2 could be derived as a corollary of Rosenthal's Theorem 3. Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) gave general Bayesian implementation results in the same year. Myerson's Theorem 2 states the principle as an equality of interim payoff sets over all finite response sets. Myerson (1982) later extended it to principal–agent problems with moral hazard.

Setting

A Bayesian collective choice problem (C,A1,…,An,U1,…,Un,P)(C,A_1,\dots,A_n,U_1,\dots,U_n,P)(C,A1​,…,An​,U1​,…,Un​,P) has a nonempty finite set of players iii, a nonempty finite set AiA_iAi​ of types for each player, a nonempty finite set CCC of collective choices, utilities Ui(c,α)U_i(c,\alpha)Ui​(c,α) depending on the choice and on the true type profile α=(α1,…,αn)\alpha=(\alpha_1,\dots,\alpha_n)α=(α1​,…,αn​), and a probability distribution PPP on type profiles. With Ri(ai)=∑β:βi=aiP(β)R_i(a_i)=\sum_{\beta:\beta_i=a_i}P(\beta)Ri​(ai​)=∑β:βi​=ai​​P(β) the marginal of type aia_iai​, a player of type aia_iai​ assigns the conditional probability Pi(α∣ai)=P(α)/Ri(ai)P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)=P(\alpha)/R_i(a_i)Pi​(α∣ai​)=P(α)/Ri​(ai​) to profiles with αi=ai\alpha_i=a_iαi​=ai​, and 000 to the others.

A choice mechanism on response sets S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​ (nonempty finite sets of possible answers) is a function π(c∣s)≥0\pi(c\mid s)\ge0π(c∣s)≥0 with ∑cπ(c∣s)=1\sum_{c}\pi(c\mid s)=1∑c​π(c∣s)=1 for every response profile sss. On the standard response sets Si=AiS_i=A_iSi​=Ai​, the payoff of type aia_iai​ who reports bib_ibi​ while the others are honest is

Zi(π,bi∣ai)=∑α∑cPi(α∣ai) π(c∣α−i,bi) Ui(c,α).Z_i(\pi,b_i\mid a_i)=\sum_\alpha\sum_{c}P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)\,\pi(c\mid\alpha_{-i},b_i)\,U_i(c,\alpha).Zi​(π,bi​∣ai​)=α∑​c∑​Pi​(α∣ai​)π(c∣α−i​,bi​)Ui​(c,α).

The mechanism is Bayesian incentive-compatible if Zi(π,ai∣ai)≥Zi(π,bi∣ai)Z_i(\pi,a_i\mid a_i)\ge Z_i(\pi,b_i\mid a_i)Zi​(π,ai​∣ai​)≥Zi​(π,bi​∣ai​) for all i,ai,bii,a_i,b_ii,ai​,bi​. Its honest allocation is the vector V(π)V(\pi)V(π) with coordinates Vi(π∣ai)=Zi(π,ai∣ai)V_i(\pi\mid a_i)=Z_i(\pi,a_i\mid a_i)Vi​(π∣ai​)=Zi​(π,ai​∣ai​), indexed by the disjoint union of the AiA_iAi​. The incentive-feasible set is

F∗={V(π):π a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism on the standard response sets}.F^*=\{V(\pi):\pi\text{ a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism on the standard response sets}\}.F∗={V(π):π a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism on the standard response sets}.

On general response sets, a response plan σi(si∣ai)\sigma_i(s_i\mid a_i)σi​(si​∣ai​) is a probability distribution over SiS_iSi​ for each type aia_iai​. Plans σ=(σ1,…,σn)\sigma=(\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_n)σ=(σ1​,…,σn​) give type aia_iai​ the payoff

Wi(π,σ∣ai)=∑α∑s∑cPi(α∣ai)(∏jσj(sj∣αj))π(c∣s) Ui(c,α).W_i(\pi,\sigma\mid a_i)=\sum_\alpha\sum_s\sum_c P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)\Big(\prod_{j}\sigma_j(s_j\mid\alpha_j)\Big)\pi(c\mid s)\,U_i(c,\alpha).Wi​(π,σ∣ai​)=α∑​s∑​c∑​Pi​(α∣ai​)(j∏​σj​(sj​∣αj​))π(c∣s)Ui​(c,α).

They form a response-plan equilibrium for π\piπ if no type aia_iai​ of any player gains by switching to any other response plan σi′\sigma_i'σi′​. The equilibrium-feasible set F∗∗F^{**}F∗∗ collects W(π,σ)W(\pi,\sigma)W(π,σ) over all choice mechanisms π\piπ, on all nonempty finite response sets, and all response-plan equilibria σ\sigmaσ for π\piπ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

F∗∗=F∗.F^{**}=F^*.F∗∗=F∗.

Both inclusions are asserted for every Bayesian collective choice problem. F∗∗⊆F∗F^{**}\subseteq F^*F∗∗⊆F∗ says equilibrium behaviour under any mechanism can be replicated honestly by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. F∗⊆F∗∗F^*\subseteq F^{**}F∗⊆F∗∗ says honest reporting is itself an equilibrium of every incentive-compatible mechanism.

Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof)

  1. For any choice mechanism π\piπ and response plans σ\sigmaσ, the induced direct mechanism π′(c∣α)=∑sπ(c∣s)∏iσi(si∣αi)\pi'(c\mid\alpha)=\sum_s\pi(c\mid s)\prod_i\sigma_i(s_i\mid\alpha_i)π′(c∣α)=∑s​π(c∣s)∏i​σi​(si​∣αi​) is a choice mechanism and V(π′)=W(π,σ)V(\pi')=W(\pi,\sigma)V(π′)=W(π,σ).
  2. If σ\sigmaσ is a response-plan equilibrium for π\piπ, then π′\pi'π′ is Bayesian incentive-compatible.
  3. If π′\pi'π′ is a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism, the honest plans σi′(bi∣ai)=1[bi=ai]\sigma_i'(b_i\mid a_i)=\mathbf 1[b_i=a_i]σi′​(bi​∣ai​)=1[bi​=ai​] form a response-plan equilibrium for π′\pi'π′, and W(π′,σ′)=V(π′)W(\pi',\sigma')=V(\pi')W(π′,σ′)=V(π′).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 reduces a search over all communication protocols, an unbounded family of response sets and mixed reporting behaviours, to a finite system of linear inequalities in π\piπ on a fixed finite domain. Combined with Theorem 1 of the paper, which shows F∗F^*F∗ is a nonempty compact convex set, it justifies applying a bargaining solution to F∗F^*F∗ rather than to some larger, ill-defined set of attainable outcomes. The same reduction underlies the use of incentive constraints in optimal auctions, bilateral trade and correlated-type mechanism design.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and its proof is short, but it is a statement about all finite response sets at once, and the equality of two sets of payoff vectors is sensitive to the conventions: which plans are allowed as deviations, where the conditioning happens, and whether the induced mechanism is a genuine probability distribution. A machine-checked version pins these down. To our knowledge no formal proof of this finite Bayesian revelation principle exists. The platform has related, unproved items in other models: MechanismDesign.Robust.revelation_principle (Börgers, Prop. 10.2, on a countable Harsanyi type space with PMF lotteries; one inclusion, outcome equivalence) and single-agent, quasi-linear and dominant-strategy revelation principles from the same book. None of them is the statement here.

Difficulty

The mathematics consists of finite sums, but the bookkeeping is the obstacle. Milestone 1 requires exchanging a sum over response profiles with a product over players and using that each plan sums to one. Milestone 2 requires recognizing a lie bib_ibi​ in π′\pi'π′ as a particular whole response plan in π\piπ: the plan that, at every type, behaves as type bib_ibi​ would. Because Pi(α∣ai)P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)Pi​(α∣ai​) vanishes off αi=ai\alpha_i=a_iαi​=ai​, only its value at aia_iai​ matters. For milestone 3, a mixed deviation from honesty has to be bounded by the best pure misreport, a convex-combination argument over AiA_iAi​. Identifying the F∗∗F^{**}F∗∗ side of the goal also needs instances on an existentially chosen family of types.

Formalization scope

All objects live in MyersonBargaining.Revelation. Players form a nonempty finite type ι; types A i, choices C and response sets S i are nonempty finite types in Type. Mechanisms and plans are real-valued functions with the probability constraints as predicates (IsChoiceMechanism, IsResponsePlan), event first and condition second: π c s, σ i s a. Allocation vectors are functions on Σ i, A i. The paper's loose phrases are read as follows:

  • "probability distribution" means nonnegativity and sum one;
  • (3) divides by Ri(ai)R_i(a_i)Ri​(ai​), so the problem requires Ri(ai)>0R_i(a_i)>0Ri​(ai​)>0; individual profiles may have probability zero;
  • the consistent (common-prior) reading of (3)–(4) is formalized, not the subjective reading the paper permits on p. 63;
  • "for every possible alternative response plan" in (14) ranges over all mixed response plans, compared type by type;
  • "π\piπ is a choice mechanism" in (15) ranges over all nonempty finite response sets, with an explicit existential over the family S : ι → Type and its instances;
  • "incentive-compatible mechanism" means a choice mechanism satisfying (6).

The product in (12) is printed with σj(sj∣aj)\sigma_j(s_j\mid a_j)σj​(sj​∣aj​); it is formalized with αj\alpha_jαj​, as the paper's own induced mechanism on p. 66 uses. Milestone 1 is stated for arbitrary response plans, not only for equilibria. Section 6's numerical example is not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out explicitly: fixing Si=AiS_i=A_iSi​=Ai​ in F∗∗F^{**}F∗∗, restricting deviations to pure plans, or stating only F∗∗⊆F∗F^{**}\subseteq F^*F∗∗⊆F∗ would each change the theorem, and none is done.

A complete development needs finite sums over dependent product types (Fintype.piFinset, Finset.prod_univ_sum), Function.update on dependent families, and nothing beyond Mathlib. The two definition modules (the model and the response-plan objects) are reusable by any finite Bayesian mechanism-design formalization. Proofs of any milestone, alternative proofs via Rosenthal's argument, and cleaner restatements as lemmas about stochastic matrices are welcome.

Selected references

  • Roger B. Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47(1), 61–73, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346
  • Robert W. Rosenthal, Arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty, Review of Economic Studies 45(3), 1978 (cited in the source as reference [8], "forthcoming").
  • Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica 41(4), 587–601, 1973. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
  • Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond, Eric Maskin, The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility, Review of Economic Studies 46(2), 185–216, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297045
  • Roger B. Myerson, Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1), 67–81, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Regenerative Stochastic Processes 2: The Ergodic Theorem — a Cumulative Process Satisfies w_t/t → κ₁/μ₁ with Probability OneResearch Paper

Motivation

Many quantities in operations research accumulate over time in a system that periodically starts afresh: the cost incurred by an inventory system that returns to the same stock level, the work completed by a server between successive moments it empties, the reward collected by a machine between repairs. The basic question about such a quantity is its long-run rate: does the amount accumulated by time ttt, divided by ttt, settle down, and to what?

W. L. Smith's 1955 paper Regenerative stochastic processes (DOI 10.1098/rspa.1955.0198) introduced the class of cumulative processes to answer this question, and §5·3 of the paper proves the answer, Theorem 7, which Smith calls "the ergodic theorem": the long-run rate equals the expected accumulation per cycle divided by the expected cycle length. In later textbooks this is the renewal–reward theorem, the standard tool for computing long-run averages of regenerative systems in queueing, inventory and reliability models.

Timeline. Doob (1948) proved the strong law nt/t→1/μ1n_t/t \to 1/\mu_1nt​/t→1/μ1​ for renewal counting processes (Trans. AMS 63). Smith (1955) defined cumulative processes by conditions (C1)–(C2) and proved Theorem 7 under a first-moment condition on the variation per cycle, together with central limit theorems (Theorems 9–10) for the same processes.

Setting

Fix a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, P)(Ω,F,P).

A renewal process is a sequence t1,t2,…t_1, t_2, \dotst1​,t2​,… of independent, identically distributed, non-negative random variables that are not zero with probability one, i.e. P{t1=0}<1P\{t_1 = 0\} < 1P{t1​=0}<1. Write μ1=Et1\mu_1 = E t_1μ1​=Et1​. In this mission the delay is t0=0t_0 = 0t0​=0, the regeneration epochs are Tk=t0+t1+⋯+tkT_k = t_0 + t_1 + \dots + t_kTk​=t0​+t1​+⋯+tk​, and the counting variable

nt=#{k≥0:Tk≤t}n_t = \#\{k \ge 0 : T_k \le t\}nt​=#{k≥0:Tk​≤t}

is the number of regenerations in [0,t][0, t][0,t] (the paper's "greatest integer kkk such that Tk−1≤tT_{k-1} \le tTk−1​≤t"). The forward variable Zt=∑i=1nt+1ti−tZ_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n_t+1} t_i - tZt​=∑i=1nt​+1​ti​−t measures how far ttt is from the regeneration epoch Tnt+1T_{n_t+1}Tnt​+1​.

Let w=(wt)w = (w_t)w=(wt​) be a real-valued process with w0=0w_0 = 0w0​=0. Its cycle increments are yn=wTn−wTn−1y_n = w_{T_n} - w_{T_{n-1}}yn​=wTn​​−wTn−1​​, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, and κ1=Ey1\kappa_1 = E y_1κ1​=Ey1​. On a path of bounded variation on every finite interval, the variation process w~t=∫0t∣dwt∣\tilde w_t = \int_0^t |\mathrm d w_t|w~t​=∫0t​∣dwt​∣ is the total variation of the path over [0,t][0, t][0,t]; the cycle variations are y~n=w~Tn−w~Tn−1\tilde y_n = \tilde w_{T_n} - \tilde w_{T_{n-1}}y~​n​=w~Tn​​−w~Tn−1​​, and κ~p=Ey~1 p\tilde\kappa_p = E \tilde y_1^{\,p}κ~p​=Ey~​1p​.

The process www is a cumulative process when

  • (C1) y1,y2,…y_1, y_2, \dotsy1​,y2​,… are independent and identically distributed, and
  • (C2) with probability one, www is of bounded variation in every finite interval.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (the ergodic theorem)

If www is a cumulative process, μ1<∞\mu_1 < \inftyμ1​<∞, κ~1<∞\tilde\kappa_1 < \inftyκ~1​<∞, t0=0t_0 = 0t0​=0 and w0=0w_0 = 0w0​=0, then

lim⁡t→∞wtt=κ1μ1with probability one.\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{w_t}{t} = \frac{\kappa_1}{\mu_1} \quad \text{with probability one.}t→∞lim​twt​​=μ1​κ1​​with probability one.

The statement fixes no rate and no constant; it is the exact limit of the paper.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Lemma 7. For i.i.d. xnx_nxn​ with E∣xn∣p<∞E|x_n|^p < \inftyE∣xn​∣p<∞, p>0p > 0p>0: xn/n1/p→0x_n / n^{1/p} \to 0xn​/n1/p→0 with probability one.
  2. Renewal strong law (proof of Lemma 8): nt/t→1/μ1n_t / t \to 1/\mu_1nt​/t→1/μ1​ with probability one when μ1<∞\mu_1 < \inftyμ1​<∞.
  3. Lemma 8. If t0=0t_0 = 0t0​=0, μ1<∞\mu_1 < \inftyμ1​<∞ and κ~p<∞\tilde\kappa_p < \inftyκ~p​<∞ (p>0p > 0p>0), then
lim⁡t→∞wt+Zt−wtt1/p=0with probability one.\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{w_{t+Z_t} - w_t}{t^{1/p}} = 0 \quad \text{with probability one.}t→∞lim​t1/pwt+Zt​​−wt​​=0with probability one.
  1. (5·3·4). ∑i=1nt+1yi/(nt+1)→κ1\sum_{i=1}^{n_t+1} y_i / (n_t + 1) \to \kappa_1∑i=1nt​+1​yi​/(nt​+1)→κ1​ with probability one.
  2. The limit along regeneration epochs. wt+Zt/t→κ1/μ1w_{t+Z_t} / t \to \kappa_1/\mu_1wt+Zt​​/t→κ1​/μ1​ with probability one.

Significance

The ergodic theorem turns a question about a whole sample path into a question about one cycle. Once a system is shown to regenerate, its long-run average cost, throughput or utilization is the ratio of two one-cycle expectations, which can often be computed in closed form. This is how long-run averages are evaluated for M/G/1M/G/1M/G/1-type queues, (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) inventory policies and alternating-renewal reliability models, and it is the first step in average-cost analyses of regenerative Markov decision processes. Lemma 8, with p>1p > 1p>1, also controls the error term in Smith's central limit theorem for cumulative processes.

The result is classical and proved. As far as the platform and Mathlib are concerned, it is not formalized: Mathlib has the strong law of large numbers for i.i.d. sequences (ProbabilityTheory.strong_law_ae) but no renewal counting process, no renewal strong law, and no renewal–reward theorem. A complete development gives machine-checked versions of all three, stated for real time and for cycle lengths that may vanish with positive probability.

Difficulty

The obvious argument writes wt/tw_t / twt​/t as (∑i≤ntyi/nt)⋅(nt/t)\big(\sum_{i \le n_t} y_i / n_t\big) \cdot (n_t / t)(∑i≤nt​​yi​/nt​)⋅(nt​/t) and applies the strong law to each factor. This fails in two places. First, wtw_twt​ is not a sum of whole cycles: the cycle containing ttt is only partly completed, and its contribution has to be shown negligible. The increment yny_nyn​ does not control it, because www may oscillate inside a cycle and return; it is the variation y~n\tilde y_ny~​n​ that bounds the partial contribution, which is why the hypothesis is on κ~1\tilde\kappa_1κ~1​ rather than on κ1\kappa_1κ1​. Second, the strong law is a statement about a deterministic index n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞, while here the index ntn_tnt​ is random and depends on the cycle lengths, which need not be independent of the increments. Transferring almost-sure convergence through the random index requires nt→∞n_t \to \inftynt​→∞ almost surely, which in turn uses P{t1=0}<1P\{t_1 = 0\} < 1P{t1​=0}<1.

Formalization scope

Time is real: every limit is along t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ in R\mathbb RR (Filter.atTop on ℝ), and "with probability one" is an almost-everywhere statement placed outside the limit. Random variables are real-valued. The renewal process is the structure IsRenewalProcess (cycle lengths measurable, mutually independent, identically distributed, non-negative everywhere, P{t1=0}<1P\{t_1 = 0\} < 1P{t1​=0}<1); t0=0t_0 = 0t0​=0 and w0=0w_0 = 0w0​=0 are explicit hypotheses holding at every sample point. Moments are Bochner integrals guarded by integrability hypotheses: μ1<∞\mu_1 < \inftyμ1​<∞ is integrability of t1t_1t1​, κ~p<∞\tilde\kappa_p < \inftyκ~p​<∞ is integrability of y~1 p\tilde y_1^{\,p}y~​1p​. The positivity μ1>0\mu_1 > 0μ1​>0 is never assumed; it follows from P{t1=0}<1P\{t_1 = 0\} < 1P{t1​=0}<1.

The count ntn_tnt​ is a cardinality; on the null event where infinitely many epochs lie below ttt it takes the value 000, and finiteness is never assumed. The variation process is Mathlib's eVariationOn of the path over [0,t][0, t][0,t], set to 000 on paths that are not of bounded variation, exactly as the paper prescribes.

Condition (C1) is read literally: only the increments yny_nyn​ are i.i.d., and no independence between cycle lengths and increments is assumed. In addition the cycle variations y~n\tilde y_ny~​n​ are assumed identically distributed; the paper's notation κ~p\tilde\kappa_pκ~p​ presupposes this. The statement is not trivialized by a stronger model: taking www to be a Lévy process, or a deterministic multiple of ttt, would make the theorem immediate and is not what is formalized.

Two misprints of the paper are corrected in the formal statements and kept in the verbatim milestone text: (5·3·4) prints the limit as ν1\nu_1ν1​, which must be κ1\kappa_1κ1​; and the proof bound (5·3·1) uses y~nt+1\tilde y_{n_t+1}y~​nt​+1​ alone, where the interval [t,t+Zt][t, t+Z_t][t,t+Zt​] also meets cycle ntn_tnt​.

Needed infrastructure: a renewal counting process in continuous time with its strong law; a lemma that almost-sure convergence of a sequence passes to a random index tending to infinity; the comparison ∣wb−wa∣≤w~b−w~a|w_b - w_a| \le \tilde w_b - \tilde w_a∣wb​−wa​∣≤w~b​−w~a​ for paths of bounded variation. All three are reusable well beyond this mission (renewal–reward arguments, regenerative simulation, average-cost Markov decision processes). Contributions of any milestone, and of these general lemmas as separate theorems, are welcome.

Selected references

  • W. L. Smith, Regenerative stochastic processes, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A 232(1188):6–31, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.1955.0198
  • J. L. Doob, Renewal theory from the point of view of the theory of probability, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 63(3):422–438, 1948. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1948-0025098-8
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Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games 2: Oceanic Values Are Limits of Values of Finite Weighted Majority GamesResearch Paper

Motivation

Weighted voting models assign a coalition a win when its combined vote reaches a quota. The Shapley value measures a player's contribution by averaging the change it makes when added to every possible predecessor coalition. This is straightforward to define for a finite list of voters, but a voting body may contain a few major holders and a very large population of individually small holders. A calculation made for a finite approximation should then have a stable meaning as the small holdings are divided more finely. Milnor and Shapley's oceanic game gives that question a precise form and asks whether its major-player values agree with the limits of finite weighted majority games. Milnor and Shapley, RAND RM-2649 (1961).

The question matters whenever a finite voting model is used to represent a diffuse electorate or ownership base. Without a continuity result, the measured power of a major voter could depend on how an otherwise identical mass of minor votes was artificially split. The memo's Theorem 1 establishes the required stability under an explicit small-weight condition. The result is a known theorem from the 1961 memorandum; the task here is its Lean formalization, including the mathematical objects that make its statement meaningful.

Setting

Fix a finite set M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\ldots,m\}M={1,…,m} of major players, with nonnegative weights wiw_iwi​. The ocean is a continuum of individually insignificant voters represented by the unit interval I=[0,1]I=[0,1]I=[0,1], with total weight α>0\alpha>0α>0. A coalition's vote is its major-player weight plus α\alphaα times the Lebesgue measure of its oceanic part. It wins when that vote reaches a quota c≥0c\ge0c≥0. The formal development uses Fin m for MMM and real weights; the underlying voting rule is the one in §2 of the memorandum. Milnor and Shapley, §2.

To assign a value to a major player, insert each major player independently and uniformly into the ordered ocean. A position vector x=(x1,…,xm)x=(x_1,\ldots,x_m)x=(x1​,…,xm​) lies in the cube ImI^mIm. Write P(t)={j∈M:xj<t}P(t)=\{j\in M:x_j<t\}P(t)={j∈M:xj​<t} and w(S)=∑j∈Swjw(S)=\sum_{j\in S}w_jw(S)=∑j∈S​wj​. Major player iii is pivotal when the predecessor weight is below the quota and adding iii reaches it, in the memo's weak-boundary form

w(P(xi))+αxi≤c≤w(P(xi))+wi+αxi.w(P(x_i))+\alpha x_i\le c\le w(P(x_i))+w_i+\alpha x_i.w(P(xi​))+αxi​≤c≤w(P(xi​))+wi​+αxi​.

The oceanic major-player value ϕi\phi_iϕi​ is the probability of this event. Since the insertion positions are uniform, it is also the mmm-dimensional Lebesgue volume of the corresponding set Ai⊆ImA_i\subseteq I^mAi​⊆Im. Equalities at boundary positions have zero volume. Milnor and Shapley, (2.3)–(2.4), pp. 4–5.

At stage ℓ\ellℓ, the finite approximation has the same mmm major players, followed by nℓn_\ellnℓ​ minor players with nonnegative weights aj,ℓa_{j,\ell}aj,ℓ​. Its quota and major weights are cℓc_\ellcℓ​ and wi,ℓw_{i,\ell}wi,ℓ​. A coalition has value one if its weight is at least cℓc_\ellcℓ​, and zero otherwise. The finite-game value ϕi,ℓ\phi_{i,\ell}ϕi,ℓ​ is the Shapley value of that coalition function. The published Shapley-value definition is reused for this general finite-game object; only the quota game and its oceanic limit are defined for this mission. Milnor and Shapley, Appendix (A.1), (A.4).

Formalization targets

Theorem 1: continuity of major-player values

The principal target says that if quotas and major weights converge, the total minor weight tends to α\alphaα, and every minor weight becomes small, then each major-player value converges:

cℓ→c,wi,ℓ→wi,∑jaj,ℓ→α>0,max⁡jaj,ℓ→0⟹ϕi,ℓ→ϕi.c_\ell\to c,\quad w_{i,\ell}\to w_i,\quad \sum_j a_{j,\ell}\to\alpha>0,\quad \max_j a_{j,\ell}\to0 \quad\Longrightarrow\quad \phi_{i,\ell}\to\phi_i.cℓ​→c,wi,ℓ​→wi​,j∑​aj,ℓ​→α>0,jmax​aj,ℓ​→0⟹ϕi,ℓ​→ϕi​.

This is Theorem 1, equations (3.1)–(3.2), of the memorandum. Its conclusion refers to the pivotal-probability definition of ϕi\phi_iϕi​ above. Milnor and Shapley, Theorem 1, p. 6.

Supporting statements

The milestone list follows three statements present in the source: equation (3.4) partitions AiA_iAi​ by the predecessor set SSS; equations (3.5)–(3.6) give the volume of each part as a one-variable integral with clamped endpoints; and Appendix (A.1)–(A.3) states the finite-game limit as a sum of those integrals. Their shared expression is

Li(c,w,α)=∑S⊆M∖{i}∫[0,1]∩[(c−w(S)−wi)/α,(c−w(S))/α]t∣S∣(1−t)m−∣S∣−1 dt.L_i(c,w,\alpha)=\sum_{S\subseteq M\setminus\{i\}}\int_{[0,1]\cap[(c-w(S)-w_i)/\alpha,(c-w(S))/\alpha]} t^{|S|}(1-t)^{m-|S|-1}\,dt.Li​(c,w,α)=S⊆M∖{i}∑​∫[0,1]∩[(c−w(S)−wi​)/α,(c−w(S))/α]​t∣S∣(1−t)m−∣S∣−1dt.

The appendix's limit statement concerns LiL_iLi​; Theorem 1 concerns ϕi\phi_iϕi​. Both are separate targets in the formalization. Milnor and Shapley, §3 and Appendix.

Significance

The theorem makes the major-player value independent of a particular fine division of the minor vote, provided the total minor weight and the other parameters converge as stated. The same oceanic game can therefore stand for many finite approximating sequences. The integral expression also gives a precise comparison point between finite Shapley values and the geometric definition by pivotal volume. Milnor and Shapley, §1 and Theorem 1.

The mathematical result is proved in the cited memorandum, and its appendix recapitulates a limit theorem from the preceding work in the series. The formalization work is to state and prove these known claims over Lean's finite index types, Lebesgue measure, integrals, and limits. Reusable components include the quota-game characteristic function and the interface between a finite Shapley value and a changing number of minor players. The mission does not claim that the historical theorem is open, nor that these target statements already have machine-checked proofs.

Difficulty

The number of minor players changes with ℓ\ellℓ, so the finite Shapley sum does not have a fixed set of coalitions. Merely taking a limit term by term in that sum does not justify its limit: the number and weights of the terms also change. The condition that the largest minor weight tends to zero controls a triangular family of games, while the oceanic definition is a measure of a geometric pivotal event. Matching the two descriptions requires care at the quota boundaries and at intervals that may be empty. These are the central issues represented by the appendix milestone and by equations (3.4)–(3.6). Milnor and Shapley, §3 and Appendix.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses Fin m for major players and Fin (n l) for minor players at stage lll, concatenated with majors first. It uses a real-valued quota characteristic function, the published finite Shapley-value definition, and product Lebesgue volume on the cube [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m for uniform insertion positions. The predecessor relation is strict, xj<xix_j<x_ixj​<xi​, exactly as in §2; the complementary cell relation is weak. The pivotal inequalities follow (2.4), and the oceanic value is defined from their volume. Defining it as LiL_iLi​ would make the comparison demanded by Theorem 1 empty, so that equality remains a theorem-level obligation.

The source defines oceanic games with c≥0c\ge0c≥0, wi≥0w_i\ge0wi​≥0, and α>0\alpha>0α>0. The finite approximants are read as weighted majority games with nonnegative weights; that condition is explicit in Lean. No sign condition is imposed on the stage quotas cℓc_\ellcℓ​, since (3.2) states none (only the limit satisfies c≥0c\ge0c≥0). The statement does not impose the footnote's upper bound c≤w(M)+αc\le w(M)+\alphac≤w(M)+α because Theorem 1 only concerns major-player values, which are zero in a null game. An empty minor list is permitted at an early stage. Rather than taking the maximum of an empty list, Lean says that for each ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, all minor weights are eventually at most ε\varepsilonε; with nonnegative weights this is the paper's vanishing-maximum condition. A positive limiting ocean weight also excludes an eventually empty minor population.

The integral in (A.3) is a set integral over the stated intersection of closed intervals, so an empty intersection contributes zero. For (3.5), the endpoints are clamped to [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The condition S⊆M∖{i}S\subseteq M\setminus\{i\}S⊆M∖{i} ensures m−∣S∣−1m-|S|-1m−∣S∣−1 is nonnegative before it is represented as a natural-number exponent. Contributions that strengthen the measure-theoretic partition, the cell-volume computation, or the varying-population finite limit are within scope; a proof may use other intermediate lemmas while keeping the sourced target statements unchanged.

Selected references

  • John W. Milnor and Lloyd S. Shapley, Values of Large Games, II: Oceanic Games, RAND Research Memorandum RM-2649, 1961. RAND publication page.
  • Lloyd S. Shapley and Norman Shapiro, Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem, RAND Research Memorandum RM-2648, 1960. RAND publication page.
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Relationship Between Inventory Costs and Variety Benefits in Retail Assortments I: An Optimal Assortment Always Consists of the k Most Popular Variants for Some kResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer deciding which variants of a product to carry (colors, sizes, flavors) trades the extra sales that variety brings against the inventory cost of stocking many low-volume items. van Ryzin and Mahajan (Management Science 45(11), 1999) gave the first model that couples a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model of consumer substitution with newsvendor inventory costs, and showed that the resulting assortment problem has a simple structure. Their paper is a standard starting point of the assortment-planning literature in operations management: the "popular set" structure it proves is the benchmark that later work on assortment optimization under MNL demand (with capacity constraints, dynamic substitution, or other choice models) compares against.

This mission formalizes the paper's first main result, Theorem 1, together with the facts its proof rests on.

Setting

A store offers a subset SSS of the variants N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} of a category. Each variant jjj has an MNL preference vj>0v_j>0vj​>0, and the option of buying nothing has preference v0>0v_0>0v0​>0. A customer facing SSS buys variant j∈Sj\in Sj∈S with probability

qj(S)=vj∑i∈Svi+v0.q_j(S)=\frac{v_j}{\sum_{i\in S}v_i+v_0}.qj​(S)=∑i∈S​vi​+v0​vj​​.

Variants are labelled so that v1≥v2≥⋯≥vnv_1\ge v_2\ge\cdots\ge v_nv1​≥v2​≥⋯≥vn​, and the most-popular sets are Ai={1,…,i}A_i=\{1,\dots,i\}Ai​={1,…,i}.

The retailer sells at price ppp and buys at unit cost ccc, with 0<c<p0<c<p0<c<p, and stocks xjx_jxj​ units of each variant before the season. The critical fractile is z=Φ−1(1−c/p)z=\Phi^{-1}(1-c/p)z=Φ−1(1−c/p), with Φ\PhiΦ the standard normal distribution function. Two models of aggregate demand YjY_jYj​ are considered, both with store volume λ>0\lambda>0λ>0:

  • Independent population model. YjY_jYj​ is normal with mean λqj\lambda q_jλqj​ and standard deviation σ(λqj)β\sigma(\lambda q_j)^\betaσ(λqj​)β, where σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1. The optimal expected profit max⁡x≥0∑j∈SE[pmin⁡{xj,Yj}−cxj]\max_{x\ge0}\sum_{j\in S}E[p\min\{x_j,Y_j\}-cx_j]maxx≥0​∑j∈S​E[pmin{xj​,Yj​}−cxj​] equals
πI(S,v)=(p−c)λ∑j∈Sqj−pσλβe−z2/22π∑j∈Sqjβ.\pi_I(S,v)=(p-c)\lambda\sum_{j\in S}q_j-\frac{p\sigma\lambda^\beta e^{-z^2/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{j\in S}q_j^\beta .πI​(S,v)=(p−c)λj∈S∑​qj​−2π​pσλβe−z2/2​j∈S∑​qjβ​.
  • Trend-following population model. All customers make the same choice, so Yj=λY_j=\lambdaYj​=λ with probability qjq_jqj​ and Yj=0Y_j=0Yj​=0 otherwise. The optimal expected profit is
πT(S,v)=∑j∈S(pqj−c)+λ.\pi_T(S,v)=\sum_{j\in S}(pq_j-c)^+\lambda .πT​(S,v)=j∈S∑​(pqj​−c)+λ.

The assortment problem is max⁡S⊆Nπ(S,v)\max_{S\subseteq N}\pi(S,v)maxS⊆N​π(S,v) for π=πI\pi=\pi_Iπ=πI​ or π=πT\pi=\pi_Tπ=πT​.

For Lemma 1, fix SSS and let δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 be the preference of a variant added to it: f(δ)=∑j∈Svj+δ+v0f(\delta)=\sum_{j\in S}v_j+\delta+v_0f(δ)=∑j∈S​vj​+δ+v0​, gIg_IgI​ and gTg_TgT​ are the numerators of the profit after the addition, and hI=gI/fh_I=g_I/fhI​=gI​/f, hT=gT/fh_T=g_T/fhT​=gT​/f.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 1503)

For each demand model there is a most-popular set that is optimal among all 2n2^n2n assortments:

∃ i∈{0,…,n} ∀S⊆N: πI(S,v)≤πI(Ai,v),∃ i∈{1,…,n} ∀S⊆N: πT(S,v)≤πT(Ai,v).\exists\,i\in\{0,\dots,n\}\ \forall S\subseteq N:\ \pi_I(S,v)\le\pi_I(A_i,v),\qquad \exists\,i\in\{1,\dots,n\}\ \forall S\subseteq N:\ \pi_T(S,v)\le\pi_T(A_i,v).∃i∈{0,…,n} ∀S⊆N: πI​(S,v)≤πI​(Ai​,v),∃i∈{1,…,n} ∀S⊆N: πT​(S,v)≤πT​(Ai​,v).

The paper prints i∈{1,…,n}i\in\{1,\dots,n\}i∈{1,…,n} for both models. In the independent model the empty assortment can be the unique optimum (when πI(A1,v)<0\pi_I(A_1,v)<0πI​(A1​,v)<0, for instance at small λ\lambdaλ), so i=0i=0i=0 is allowed there; the trend-following range is the printed one.

Milestones

  1. (4)–(7): under normal demand, xj∗=λqj+zσ(λqj)βx^*_j=\lambda q_j+z\sigma(\lambda q_j)^\betaxj∗​=λqj​+zσ(λqj​)β is the optimal stocking vector and the optimal profit is πI(S,v)\pi_I(S,v)πI​(S,v).
  2. (8): under trend-following demand, stocking λ\lambdaλ exactly when pqj≥cpq_j\ge cpqj​≥c is optimal and the optimal profit is πT(S,v)\pi_T(S,v)πT​(S,v).
  3. Mangasarian (1969): a convex function divided by a positive affine function is quasiconvex.
  4. Appendix: gIg_IgI​ and gTg_TgT​ are convex in δ\deltaδ on [0,v1][0,v_1][0,v1​].
  5. Lemma 1: hIh_IhI​ and hTh_ThT​ are quasi-convex on [0,v1][0,v_1][0,v1​].
  6. §3.1: h(vj)=π(S∪{j},v)h(v_j)=\pi(S\cup\{j\},v)h(vj​)=π(S∪{j},v) for j∉Sj\notin Sj∈/S, and h(0)=π(S,v)h(0)=\pi(S,v)h(0)=π(S,v).

Significance

The search over assortments is a priori a search over 2n2^n2n subsets. Theorem 1 cuts it to the n+1n+1n+1 nested sets A0⊂A1⊂⋯⊂AnA_0\subset A_1\subset\cdots\subset A_nA0​⊂A1​⊂⋯⊂An​, so the optimal assortment is found by comparing n+1n+1n+1 numbers. The result is not obvious: the paper's example (n=8n=8n=8, v1=v2=10v_1=v_2=10v1​=v2​=10, v8=1v_8=1v8​=1) shows that {1,8}\{1,8\}{1,8} can beat {1,2}\{1,2\}{1,2}, so the best assortment of a given size need not be the most popular one, and yet the overall optimum is always a most-popular set. The structure is used in the paper's own comparative statics (how optimal variety moves with price, store volume and the no-purchase preference) and its comparison of fashion categories under majorization, which are the other two missions of this series.

The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge no part of it, nor the closed-form normal newsvendor optimum (7), has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing it fixes the edge cases the printed statement glosses over (the empty assortment, the β=0\beta=0β=0 boundary) and produces reusable pieces: the normal newsvendor profit formula and Mangasarian's ratio criterion for quasiconvexity.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "add variants in order of popularity", fails because adding a variant both brings new sales and cannibalizes the shares of the others, and the inventory term ∑qjβ\sum q_j^\beta∑qjβ​ is concave in the shares, so profit is not monotone or submodular in SSS in any simple sense. The proof instead compares a set with the sets obtained by removing its least popular member or exchanging it for a more popular outside variant, and needs the profit after adding a variant of preference δ\deltaδ to be quasi-convex in δ\deltaδ. That quasi-convexity is not visible from (7) directly; it requires rewriting the profit as a ratio g/fg/fg/f with fff affine and proving gIg_IgI​ convex, which in turn needs concavity of (∑j∈Svjβ+δβ)(∑j∈Svj+δ+v0)1−β(\sum_{j\in S}v_j^\beta+\delta^\beta)(\sum_{j\in S}v_j+\delta+v_0)^{1-\beta}(∑j∈S​vjβ​+δβ)(∑j∈S​vj​+δ+v0​)1−β. The exchange argument must also handle ties among the vjv_jvj​, which the printed proof passes over. Milestone 1 needs the derivative of the normal newsvendor objective and the identity E(Z−z)+=φ(z)−z(1−Φ(z))E(Z-z)^+=\varphi(z)-z(1-\Phi(z))E(Z−z)+=φ(z)−z(1−Φ(z)), neither of which is in Mathlib in this form.

Formalization scope

  • Variants are Fin n, 0-based: the paper's variant jjj is index j−1j-1j−1, AiA_iAi​ is the set of indices below iii, and the paper's v1v_1v1​ is the first entry v ⟨0, _⟩. The no-purchase preference v0v_0v0​ is a separate real v0, never a variant. Preferences are strictly positive and the sorting v1≥⋯≥vnv_1\ge\cdots\ge v_nv1​≥⋯≥vn​ is the hypothesis Antitone v.
  • Standing hypotheses: 0<c<p0<c<p0<c<p, λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1; the goal also assumes n≥1n\ge1n≥1 (the trend-following range 1≤i≤n1\le i\le n1≤i≤n needs it).
  • zzz is defined from ppp and ccc as the least xxx with Φ(x)≥1−c/p\Phi(x)\ge1-c/pΦ(x)≥1−c/p, Φ\PhiΦ the c.d.f. of Mathlib's gaussianReal 0 1; a separate theorem states Φ(z)=1−c/p\Phi(z)=1-c/pΦ(z)=1−c/p and uniqueness.
  • Powers are Real.rpow, so 00=10^0=100=1. At β=0\beta=0β=0 this keeps (7) correct (∑j∈Sqj0=∣S∣\sum_{j\in S}q_j^0=|S|∑j∈S​qj0​=∣S∣), but hI(0)=πI(S,v)h_I(0)=\pi_I(S,v)hI​(0)=πI​(S,v) then fails; that one clause carries β>0\beta>0β>0. The goal keeps 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1.
  • The positive part (⋅)+(\cdot)^+(⋅)+ is max · 0. In (11), λ\lambdaλ multiplies both terms; the printed (11) has it on the sum only, which would break hT(vj)=πT(S∪{j},v)h_T(v_j)=\pi_T(S\cup\{j\},v)hT​(vj​)=πT​(S∪{j},v) unless λ=1\lambda=1λ=1.
  • "Optimal" means π(S,v)≤π(Ai,v)\pi(S,v)\le\pi(A_i,v)π(S,v)≤π(Ai​,v) for every S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, including S=∅S=\emptysetS=∅. A formalization that maximizes only over prefix sets, assumes the optimum nonempty or the profit nonnegative, treats zzz as a free real unrelated to ppp and ccc, or drops one of the two demand models, is a different and weaker statement and does not count.
  • In milestone 1 the order-up-to levels xj∗x^*_jxj∗​ are assumed nonnegative, the formal content of the paper's assumption λ1−βqj≫σqjβ\lambda^{1-\beta}q_j\gg\sigma q_j^\betaλ1−βqj​≫σqjβ​.

Needed infrastructure: the normal loss function and the first-order condition for the newsvendor under gaussianReal; quasiconvexity of convex-over-positive-affine ratios; concavity of weighted geometric means. The newsvendor and quasiconvexity pieces are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative routes to Theorem 1 that avoid Lemma 1, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. van Ryzin, S. Mahajan, On the Relationship Between Inventory Costs and Variety Benefits in Retail Assortments, Management Science 45(11):1496–1509, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.11.1496
  • O. L. Mangasarian, Nonlinear Programming, McGraw-Hill, 1969 (reprinted SIAM Classics in Applied Mathematics 10, 1994). https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971255
  • R. D. Luce, Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis, Wiley, 1959.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Semiconductor Burn-In Operations 5: Full-Batch LPT Is Within 4/3 − 1/(3m) of the Optimal Makespan on Parallel Batch MachinesResearch Paper

Motivation

Burn-in is the final reliability test of integrated circuits: boards loaded with chips are held in an oven at elevated temperature for a minimum specified time, so that marginal devices fail before shipment. An oven holds several boards at once, and a load may stay in the oven longer than its specification but never shorter. Lee, Uzsoy and Martin-Vega (Oper. Res. 40(4), 1992) model such an oven as a batch processing machine and study the resulting scheduling problems. Burn-in is often the bottleneck of the test stage, which is why throughput (makespan) and due-date performance on several ovens in parallel are of practical interest.

This mission covers the paper's makespan result for parallel ovens. On ordinary identical parallel machines, Graham (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17, 1969) proved that the LPT rule (list the jobs longest first and give each to the machine that frees up first) has worst-case ratio 4/3−1/(3m)4/3 - 1/(3m)4/3−1/(3m) on mmm machines. The paper shows that the same factor holds for batch machines once the jobs are first grouped into full batches of the longest jobs.

Setting

There are nnn jobs with processing times pj>0p_j > 0pj​>0, all available at time 000, and m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 identical batch processing machines. Each machine processes up to B≥1B \ge 1B≥1 jobs at the same time. A batch is a set of at most BBB jobs processed together; once started it cannot be interrupted or joined, and its batch time is that of its longest job,

p(P)=max⁡j∈Ppj.p(P) = \max_{j \in P} p_j .p(P)=j∈Pmax​pj​.

A schedule forms the jobs into disjoint nonempty batches covering all jobs, assigns each batch to a machine, and runs every machine's batches back to back from time 000. The makespan is the largest machine load, the total batch time on a machine. The problem of minimizing it is written P/B/Cmax⁡P/B/C_{\max}P/B/Cmax​, and C∗C^*C∗ denotes its optimal value, over every way of forming batches (any sizes up to BBB, any grouping) and every assignment. For B=1B = 1B=1 it is the classical problem P//Cmax⁡P//C_{\max}P//Cmax​.

Algorithm BLPT.

  1. Rank the jobs in nonincreasing order of processing time and cut the ranked list into successive groups of BBB jobs, the last possibly smaller.
  2. Order these batches in nonincreasing order of batch time and assign each in turn to a machine with least current load.

C(BLPT)C(\mathrm{BLPT})C(BLPT) is the resulting makespan.

For the optional lateness result, each job also has a due date dj≥0d_j \ge 0dj​≥0. The maximum lateness of a schedule is Lmax⁡=max⁡j(Cj−dj)L_{\max} = \max_j (C_j - d_j)Lmax​=maxj​(Cj​−dj​), LLL is its value under BLPT, L∗L^*L∗ its optimum and dmax⁡=max⁡jdjd_{\max} = \max_j d_jdmax​=maxj​dj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 773)

C(BLPT)≤(43−13m)C∗.C(\mathrm{BLPT}) \le \left(\frac43 - \frac1{3m}\right) C^* .C(BLPT)≤(34​−3m1​)C∗.

It is claimed for every run of BLPT, whatever order the algorithm gives to equal processing times and equal batch times.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2 (p. 772). With the jobs re-indexed longest first, some optimal schedule has batches of consecutive jobs, all full except possibly the one containing the last job. In other words, its batches are exactly the groups formed in Step 1 of BLPT.
  2. The reduction (§5, p. 772). C∗C^*C∗ equals the optimal makespan of P//Cmax⁡P//C_{\max}P//Cmax​ on the aggregate jobs p(B1),…,p(B⌈n/B⌉)p(B_1), \dots, p(B_{\lceil n/B\rceil})p(B1​),…,p(B⌈n/B⌉​).
  3. Graham's LPT bound, as quoted (p. 772). For jobs q0≥⋯≥qM−1≥0q_0 \ge \dots \ge q_{M-1} \ge 0q0​≥⋯≥qM−1​≥0 on mmm machines, list scheduling in that order has makespan at most (4/3−1/(3m))(4/3 - 1/(3m))(4/3−1/(3m)) times the optimum.
  4. Proposition 5 (p. 773, further result).
L−L∗L∗+dmax⁡≤(13−13m)+dmax⁡L∗+dmax⁡.\frac{L - L^*}{L^* + d_{\max}} \le \left(\frac13 - \frac1{3m}\right) + \frac{d_{\max}}{L^* + d_{\max}} .L∗+dmax​L−L∗​≤(31​−3m1​)+L∗+dmax​dmax​​.

Significance

Proposition 3 gives a constant-factor guarantee for a strongly NP-hard problem. The guarantee does not depend on BBB, whereas arbitrary batch list scheduling only gets B+1−1/mB + 1 - 1/mB+1−1/m (Proposition 1 of the same paper). For one machine the factor is 111, so BLPT is then exact. Proposition 2 is a structural statement: it fixes the batch composition of an optimal schedule before any assignment decision. It turns the batch problem into an ordinary parallel-machine problem, so other results for P//Cmax⁡P//C_{\max}P//Cmax​ transfer as well. Proposition 5 carries the guarantee over to maximum lateness, measured relative to L∗+dmax⁡L^* + d_{\max}L∗+dmax​ because L∗L^*L∗ may be negative.

All results are proved in the paper, Proposition 3 by a one-line appeal to Proposition 2 and Graham. This mission produces machine-checked versions of the reduction and the bound. Graham's LPT bound itself is not formalized anywhere on the platform. Its proof here is a reusable result about the published list-scheduling definitions, independent of batching.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is "batch as in Step 1, then apply Graham". It has two gaps. First, C∗C^*C∗ ranges over all batchings, and an optimal schedule need not use full batches or consecutive jobs. The exchange argument behind Proposition 2 has to move jobs between batches, possibly on different machines, without increasing any machine's load. Ties among equal processing times also have to be handled, since the claim is made for every longest-first ranking. Second, Graham's bound is not on the platform and has to be proved. It is a finite combinatorial statement, but its known proofs are not short. Proposition 5 additionally needs the bound for sub-instances formed by a prefix of the batches.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin n, 0-based. Processing times are real, p : Fin n → ℝ with 0 < p j; due dates (Proposition 5 only) are d : Fin n → ℝ with 0 ≤ d j. A batching is a list of nonempty, pairwise disjoint Finsets of size at most B covering every job. The batch time is the maximum of p over the batch.

Machine loads, assignments, the per-batching optimum and list scheduling reuse the published definitions NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.ListSchedule (firstAvailable, lsLoads, listMakespan) and NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.Makespan (machineLoad, makespan, optMakespan) from the Rinnooy Kan–Stougie mission, applied to the sequence of batch times (padded with zeros beyond the last batch, which these definitions never read). C∗C^*C∗ is the infimum of optMakespan over all valid batchings, never only over the consecutive ones of Step 1, which would assume Proposition 2.

Explicit readings of the paper's phrases:

  • "rank jobs in decreasing order" is any list of all jobs that is nonincreasing in p;
  • the batches of Step 1 are List.toChunks B of that list;
  • "order the batches in nonincreasing order of p(Bk)p(B_k)p(Bk​)" is any permutation of those chunks that is nonincreasing in batch time;
  • every statement is quantified over both choices;
  • "assign them to the machines as they become free" is least-loaded list scheduling with the published lowest-index tie rule. With no idle time, the machine that becomes free first is a least-loaded one, and the tie rule does not change the multiset of loads;
  • "1/3m1/3m1/3m" is 1/(3m)1/(3m)1/(3m);
  • "optimal solution" in Proposition 2 is a valid batching with an assignment whose makespan equals C∗C^*C∗, and "consecutive, all full except the one containing the highest indexed job" is "equal, up to order, to the chunks of the ranked list";
  • schedules on each machine run in list order without idle time, and every processing order is a reordering of the list. For L∗L^*L∗ this covers every semi-active schedule.

Proposition 5 adds the hypothesis dj≥0d_j \ge 0dj​≥0, which the paper's proof uses but does not print. It also makes L∗+dmax⁡L^* + d_{\max}L∗+dmax​ positive, so the printed ratios are well defined. Running times and the paper's other algorithms are out of scope.

A statement with C∗C^*C∗ restricted to consecutive batches, a sorry-free bound obtained from a degenerate m=0m = 0m=0 or empty-job reading, or a BLPT fixed to one convenient tie-break would trivialize or weaken the goal and is ruled out by the statements as posed. Welcome contributions: Graham's LPT bound on the published list-scheduling definitions (reusable for any P//Cmax⁡P//C_{\max}P//Cmax​ work), the exchange lemma behind Proposition 2, and the permutation invariance of optMakespan under reordering of items.

Selected references

  • C.-Y. Lee, R. Uzsoy, L. A. Martin-Vega, Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Semiconductor Burn-In Operations, Operations Research 40(4), 764–775, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.764
  • R. L. Graham, Bounds on Multiprocessing Timing Anomalies, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 17(2), 416–429, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117039
  • A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, L. Stougie, Stochastic Integer Programming, Ch. 8 of Y. Ermoliev, R. J.-B. Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer, 1988 (source of the reused list-scheduling definitions). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
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CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryGraph Theory+1·Captain: mikedeng1

The Geometry of Graphs and Some of Its Algorithmic Applications 4: The m-Cube Has Isometric Dimension mResearch Paper

Why graph dimension matters

A finite graph has distances defined by the lengths of its shortest paths. Representing those distances inside a normed vector space lets geometric language describe a combinatorial object, but the number of coordinates required can depend sharply on the graph. The isometric dimension asks for the smallest dimension of any real normed space that preserves every graph distance exactly. Linial, London, and Rabinovich study this invariant alongside metric embeddings and algorithmic uses of graph geometry in their 1995 paper. The cube is a useful test case: its vertices already have an obvious coordinate description, while the theorem must show that no different norm compresses those exact distances into fewer coordinates.

The paper's Section 5.3 relates isometric dimension to the rank of a matrix recording vertex distances in a maximum norm. It then computes the dimension of an even cycle and uses an isometric cycle inside the cube. These are known results of the paper, not an open conjecture. The mission isolates the rank characterization, the cycle calculation, and the cube calculation as reusable formal targets.

Graphs, norms, and the cube

For a finite connected simple graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E), let dG(x,y)d_G(x,y)dG​(x,y) be the minimum number of edges in a path from xxx to yyy. A norm NNN on Rd\mathbb R^dRd is nonnegative, vanishes only at zero, satisfies N(av)=∣a∣N(v)N(av)=|a|N(v)N(av)=∣a∣N(v), and obeys N(u+v)≤N(u)+N(v)N(u+v)\leq N(u)+N(v)N(u+v)≤N(u)+N(v). An isometric embedding is a map φ:V→Rd\varphi:V\to\mathbb R^dφ:V→Rd such that N(φ(x)−φ(y))=dG(x,y)N(\varphi(x)-\varphi(y))=d_G(x,y)N(φ(x)−φ(y))=dG​(x,y) for every pair of vertices. The number dim⁡(G)\dim(G)dim(G) is the least ddd for which some norm and some such map exist. The paper states the more general metric-space definition in Definition 2.1 and adopts connected graphs as the standing convention in Section 5.1 (pp. 218–219, 229).

The mmm-cube has binary strings x=(x1,…,xm)x=(x_1,\ldots,x_m)x=(x1​,…,xm​) as vertices. Two strings are adjacent when exactly one coordinate differs. Its graph distance is the Hamming distance, the number of differing coordinates. For m≥2m\geq2m≥2, the even cycle C2mC_{2m}C2m​ has 2m2m2m vertices in cyclic order, each adjacent to its two neighbors. A graph JJJ is an isometric subgraph of GGG when its distances between its own vertices agree with their distances in GGG.

An ∣V∣×r|V|\times r∣V∣×r real matrix MMM implements GGG when the maximum absolute coordinate difference between rows iii and jjj is dG(i,j)d_G(i,j)dG​(i,j), for every pair. The number of columns rrr is allowed to vary; the matrix rank is its ordinary linear-algebraic rank. This is the matrix object in Theorem 5.7, p. 232.

Formalization targets

The first main intermediate target is the rank characterization

dim⁡(G)=min⁡M implements Grank⁡(M).\dim(G)=\min_{M\text{ implements }G}\operatorname{rank}(M).dim(G)=M implements Gmin​rank(M).

The next is the even-cycle result, stated for m≥2m\geq2m≥2:

dim⁡(C2m)=m.\dim(C_{2m})=m.dim(C2m​)=m.

The goal is Corollary 5.12, p. 233, for every positive integer mmm:

dim⁡(m-Cube)=m.\boxed{\dim(m\text{-Cube})=m.}dim(m-Cube)=m.​

The milestone list also records the isometric-subgraph lower bound, the nonsingularity of the distance matrix of a path, an isometric embedding of the cube into ℓ1m\ell_1^mℓ1m​, and an isometric C2mC_{2m}C2m​ inside the cube. The paper's proof of the corollary names the last two facts in consecutive sentences (p. 233).

What the result establishes

The upper bound says the familiar mmm binary coordinates suffice: the cube embeds in ℓ1m\ell_1^mℓ1m​ with all distances preserved. The lower bound is stronger than a claim about that particular norm or embedding. It rules out every real normed space of dimension below mmm, regardless of its norm. The even cycle provides a separate exact dimension calculation, while Theorem 5.7 gives a matrix-rank way to study other finite graph metrics. These statements separate the graph invariant from whichever embedding happens to be easiest to draw (Section 5.3, pp. 232–233).

The paper proves these claims mathematically. The remaining formalization work is to build machine-checked proofs of their precise statements, including the finite-dimensional norm interface, graph-distance calculations, implementing matrices, and the rank lower bound. The definitions of normed realization and implementing matrix can be reused for other graphs; the path-distance determinant can be used independently of graph embedding questions. The mission's theorem files are open proof targets, not claims that these proofs have already been checked in Lean.

Where the difficulty lies

Placing binary cube vertices in ℓ1m\ell_1^mℓ1m​ gives an immediate candidate for an upper bound, but it cannot by itself exclude embeddings into lower-dimensional spaces with a different norm. The lower bound has to control all norms. Theorem 5.7 converts that unrestricted geometric question into a rank statement for every implementing matrix, and Proposition 5.10 supplies the exact cycle dimension needed by the cube argument (pp. 232–233).

The paper's printed proof of Proposition 5.10 first obtains only rank⁡(A)≥m−1\operatorname{rank}(A)\geq m-1rank(A)≥m−1, then says a more careful analysis yields mmm without spelling it out. That final rank step is a genuine proof obligation for solvers; the stated proposition and its use in Corollary 5.12 are retained exactly (p. 233). The path-distance matrix cited in that proof is nonsingular when its size is at least two; size one would be a zero matrix.

Formalization scope

Lean represents an arbitrary ddd-dimensional real normed space by a norm function on Fin d → ℝ. This includes every finite-dimensional real normed space up to a choice of coordinates. The isoDim definition takes the least natural-number dimension admitting an isometric embedding, with equality of distances for every vertex pair. The graph metric comes from SimpleGraph.dist; connectedness is explicit where the paper assumes it. The cube is the graph on Fin m → Bool with Hamming-distance-one adjacency, and C2mC_{2m}C2m​ is Mathlib's cycleGraph (2 * m). The goal assumes m≥1m\geq1m≥1; its m=1m=1m=1 case is direct, while the cycle milestones use m≥2m\geq2m≥2. A zero-dimensional cube consists of one vertex and is covered by the auxiliary upper-bound statement, though the goal follows the paper's positive-dimensional convention.

An implementing matrix has arbitrary finite column count. Instead of taking a maximum over an empty index set, the formal definition requires all column differences to be bounded by the graph distance and a column to attain that distance for distinct rows. This agrees with the paper's maximum formula whenever columns are present and handles a one-vertex graph with zero columns. Matrix rank is taken over R\mathbb RR; the path-distance matrix has entries ∣r−s∣|r-s|∣r−s∣ for indices 0,…,m−10,\ldots,m-10,…,m−1. The infimum over achievable dimensions or ranks is a minimum, since these are nonempty subsets of N\mathbb NN for finite connected graphs. No asymptotic O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) or Ω(⋅)\Omega(\cdot)Ω(⋅) bound occurs in these targets, so there is no hidden constant to instantiate.

The statements require genuine norm axioms and exact graph distances. Allowing a seminorm, assuming the desired dimension bound, or replacing the cube by a path would empty the main claim. Useful contributions include the cube-distance calculation, the path determinant, an exact even-cycle lower bound, and the general rank characterization. The paper makes no running-time claim for these particular results; no algorithmic complexity assertion is included.

Selected references

  • N. Linial, E. London, Y. Rabinovich, The geometry of graphs and some of its algorithmic applications, Combinatorica 15(2), 215–245, 1995. DOI: 10.1007/BF01200757.
  • J. H. van Lint, R. M. Wilson, A Course in Combinatorics, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 64–65, cited as [44] by Linial et al. for the path distance-matrix fact. Book record.
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Machine LearningOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

The Weighted Majority Algorithm 1: WM Makes at Most log(w_init/w_fin)/log(2/(1+β)) Mistakes on Any SequenceResearch Paper

Motivation

In online prediction, a learner makes a forecast before seeing the next label. A collection of other forecasters may offer useful advice, but the learner need not know beforehand which forecaster will perform well. Littlestone and Warmuth's Weighted Majority Algorithm (WM) gives a deterministic way to combine such advice. Its guarantees hold for every finite sequence of instances and labels, including sequences chosen without any probability model. That worst-case setting is useful when the reliability of the forecasters can change or when no data-generating distribution has been justified. The paper develops WM and several variants; this mission isolates its basic mistake bound. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994.

Setting

A finite pool has nnn members, each of which predicts either 000 or 111 on every trial. The true label on trial ttt is ρt∈{0,1}\rho_t\in\{0,1\}ρt​∈{0,1}, and member iii predicts xt,i∈{0,1}x_{t,i}\in\{0,1\}xt,i​∈{0,1}. The master prediction is λt∈{0,1}\lambda_t\in\{0,1\}λt​∈{0,1}. Pool members may themselves be learning algorithms, so their predictions may reflect all earlier labels. The mission treats their prediction vectors and the labels as arbitrary finite sequences; no independence or stationarity is assumed.

Each member begins with a strictly positive real weight w0,iw_{0,i}w0,i​. Before trial ttt, let wt,iw_{t,i}wt,i​ be its current weight. For b∈{0,1}b\in\{0,1\}b∈{0,1}, let qt,bq_{t,b}qt,b​ be the sum of weights of members predicting bbb. WM predicts the value with the larger backing total. When the two totals tie, either binary prediction is allowed. After the label is revealed, WM changes weights only if its own prediction was wrong. On such a trial, each member that predicted the wrong label has its weight multiplied by a fixed factor β\betaβ with 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1; every other member retains its weight. If WM predicted correctly, every weight stays as it was. This is the version of the algorithm stated in §1 of the paper. A footnote there says the bounds also apply to the variant that updates on every trial. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, p. 215.

Write Wt=∑iwt,iW_t=\sum_i w_{t,i}Wt​=∑i​wt,i​ for the total pool weight at a trial boundary. Thus W0=winitW_0=w_{\mathrm{init}}W0​=winit​ and WT=wfinW_T=w_{\mathrm{fin}}WT​=wfin​ after TTT trials. Let mmm count the trials with λt≠ρt\lambda_t\ne\rho_tλt​=ρt​. The default initial weights in the paper are all one, but its Theorem 2.1 permits arbitrary positive initial weights. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, pp. 220–221.

Formalization targets

The two milestones state the weight facts used immediately before and within Theorem 2.1. First, on each trial where WM errs,

Wt+1≤1+β2Wt.W_{t+1}\le \frac{1+\beta}{2}W_t.Wt+1​≤21+β​Wt​.

Across the whole sequence, with mmm master mistakes, the corresponding estimate is

WT≤W0(1+β2)m.W_T\le W_0\left(\frac{1+\beta}{2}\right)^m.WT​≤W0​(21+β​)m.

The goal is the paper's Theorem 2.1, retaining its explicit constant:

m≤log⁡(W0/WT)log⁡ ⁣(2/(1+β))when WT>0.m\le \frac{\log(W_0/W_T)} {\log\!\left(2/(1+\beta)\right)} \qquad\text{when }W_T>0.m≤log(2/(1+β))log(W0​/WT​)​when WT​>0.

The logarithm base is immaterial because the same base occurs above and below the fraction. The paper explicitly uses this convention for ratios of logarithms. The positive-final-weight condition represents the paper's statement that the displayed logarithmic bound is vacuous when all weight has vanished, which can happen for β=0\beta=0β=0. The whole-sequence weight estimate remains meaningful in that case. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, pp. 220–221.

Significance

The result limits the mistakes of a master predictor without assigning probabilities to the predictions or labels. It relates a visible property of the run, the reduction of total weight, to the number of master errors. Later bounds in the paper use this starting point to compare WM with an individual pool member and to analyze related algorithms; this mission fixes the initial, exact-constant result on which those comparisons rest. The β=0\beta=0β=0 case includes the paper's Halving Algorithm interpretation when initial weights are equal. Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994, pp. 215, 221–222.

The mathematical theorem is proved in the 1994 paper. The remaining task here is to represent its algorithm and finite-sequence bound in Lean and supply machine-checked proofs. A complete development would give later formalizations a reusable finite-pool voting and weight-update model, along with a checked potential estimate. The local draft statements compile; their proofs remain open. A separate, sorry-free local check constructs a run for every finite prediction and label sequence with a nonempty pool and valid weights and parameter, so the quantified run relation has witnesses.

Difficulty

The master can be wrong even when some pool members are right, and members may change their predictions over time. Counting one member's errors therefore does not directly control the master's error count. The exact contraction constant also depends on which side of a weighted vote the master chose, including the permitted tie case. When β=0\beta=0β=0, a single mistake can erase all weight backing the wrong label, so the logarithmic expression must be interpreted with care if no positive weight remains. These are features of the stated algorithm, rather than assumptions about how the sequence was generated.

Formalization scope

The formalization indexes pool members by Fin n and trials by Fin T. Booleans represent binary predictions and labels; weights and β\betaβ are real. A WM run is a relation on the full sequence of weights and master predictions, admitting every choice at a tied vote. Its update rule changes weights only after a master mistake, scales exactly the members that disagreed with the label, and leaves all other weights unchanged. Theorems require 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1 and strictly positive initial member weights. The goal additionally requires WT>0W_T>0WT​>0, while the two weight inequalities permit WT=0W_T=0WT​=0. Natural logarithms instantiate the paper's common-base logarithm convention. Finite sums and a finite mistake count match the paper's finite-sequence convention.

The statement ranges over arbitrary pool predictions and labels, so it cannot be satisfied merely by selecting an easy input sequence. The run relation allows both legal outcomes of a tie; selecting one favorable tie rule would weaken the target. The sorry-free run-existence check also rules out a vacuous theorem caused by an inconsistent update relation. The paper's update-on-every-trial variant, its member-specific corollaries, and its later algorithms are outside this mission's goal.

A completed formalization needs finite sums of real weights, cardinalities of finite sets of mistake trials, a finite induction over trial boundaries, and real logarithm inequalities. The run definition and the first two bounds can be reused in the later parts of this paper's formalization. Contributions that prove the exact stated milestones or supply supporting facts about legal runs and nonnegative weights are within scope.

Selected references

  • Nick Littlestone and Manfred K. Warmuth, The Weighted Majority Algorithm, Information and Computation 108(2), 212–261, 1994. DOI: 10.1006/inco.1994.1009.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Semiconductor Burn-In Operations 3: Dynamic Program DP3 Minimizes the Number of Tardy Equal-Length Jobs on a Batch Machine with Agreeable Release and Due DatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Semiconductor burn-in tests hold several jobs in an oven at once. A production planner must decide which jobs share each oven run and in what order those runs take place. A job may become available only after earlier manufacturing steps, and a due date marks when its test should finish. The planning objective here is to minimize how many jobs finish after their due dates. Lee, Uzsoy, and Martin-Vega studied this batch scheduling problem and gave a dynamic program for the case of equal processing times and compatible release and due-date orders (Lee, Uzsoy, and Martin-Vega 1992, §4, pp. 770–771).

Setting

There are nnn jobs and one batch processing machine with capacity B≥1B\ge1B≥1. Job jjj has release time rjr_jrj​, due date djd_jdj​, and processing time pjp_jpj​. In the main problem every processing time equals a common value ppp. A batch is a nonempty set of at most BBB jobs. Its processing time is the longest processing time among its members; it begins only after all its jobs have been released and the previous batch has finished. Processing is uninterrupted. A schedule is an ordered list of disjoint batches that covers every job. Each batch starts at the earliest time allowed by these conditions.

The completion time Cj(S)C_j(S)Cj​(S) of job jjj in schedule SSS is the completion time of its batch. A job is on time when Cj(S)≤djC_j(S)\le d_jCj​(S)≤dj​ and tardy when dj<Cj(S)d_j<C_j(S)dj​<Cj​(S). Write U(S)=#{j:dj<Cj(S)}U(S)=\#\{j:d_j<C_j(S)\}U(S)=#{j:dj​<Cj​(S)} and let U∗U^*U∗ be the minimum of U(S)U(S)U(S) over all valid complete batch schedules. Tardy jobs still belong to a schedule and consume machine time. An on-time batch is one whose every member is on time.

For the structural lemmas, agreeable release times and due dates mean that ri<rjr_i<r_jri​<rj​ implies di≤djd_i\le d_jdi​≤dj​. For the dynamic program, jobs are indexed so that both rjr_jrj​ and djd_jdj​ are nondecreasing. A batch is in batch-EDD order relative to later batches when no job in it has a later due date than a job in a later batch. A batch of consecutive jobs contains exactly an index interval. These are the paper's Lemmas 4 and 5 and Definition 1 (pp. 767, 770).

Formalization targets

Structural optimal schedules

Lemma 4 asserts that some optimum has an initial list of wholly on-time batches in batch-EDD order, followed by batches containing only tardy jobs. Lemma 5 asserts that some optimum has every wholly on-time batch made of consecutive indexed jobs. These are existence statements about schedules of all jobs; neither restricts the feasible schedules over which U∗U^*U∗ is defined.

Correctness of Algorithm DP3

Let f(i,j)f(i,j)f(i,j) be the table defined by Algorithm DP3 for the first jjj jobs and a selected count iii of on-time jobs. Its boundary values are f(0,j)=0f(0,j)=0f(0,j)=0 and f(i,j)=+∞f(i,j)=+\inftyf(i,j)=+∞ for i>ji>ji>j. For 1≤i≤j1\le i\le j1≤i≤j, it takes the minimum of f(i,j−1)f(i,j-1)f(i,j−1) and the eligible transitions that append a batch of kkk jobs, 1≤k≤min⁡(B,i)1\le k\le\min(B,i)1≤k≤min(B,i). A transition uses max⁡{f(i−k,j−k),rj}+p\max\{f(i-k,j-k),r_j\}+pmax{f(i−k,j−k),rj​}+p and is eligible when that completion time does not exceed dj−k+1d_{j-k+1}dj−k+1​. The main target is

U∗=n−max⁡{i∈{0,…,n}:f(i,n)<+∞}.U^*=n-\max\{i\in\{0,\ldots,n\}:f(i,n)<+\infty\}.U∗=n−max{i∈{0,…,n}:f(i,n)<+∞}.

The maximum includes zero, which is always feasible in the table. The printed range begins at one and has no value when every job is tardy. This is the corrected boundary reading of the displayed answer on p. 771 (source).

Unequal processing times

The paper also gives a variant for jobs available at time zero, with nondecreasing processing times and due dates. Its transition replaces the release-time maximum and common ppp by f(i−k,j−k)+pjf(i-k,j-k)+p_jf(i−k,j−k)+pj​. The corresponding correctness statement is a further milestone (p. 771).

Significance

The structural results connect the optimization over arbitrary complete batch schedules to the restricted arrangements represented by the table. DP3 correctness then identifies the number of tardy jobs from finite table entries, including instances with no on-time job. The variable-time extension covers the related case where each job has its own duration but all jobs are available together.

The paper proves these results informally; this mission leaves their Lean proofs open. A complete formalization would supply reusable definitions of batch schedules, release-limited completion times, tardy-job counts, and a finite dynamic program with an explicit infinite value. The machine-checked statements and the local instance check establish the interface for that work, while the structural and correctness theorems remain solver targets.

Difficulty

The objective ranges over every valid batching and every processing order. The table examines an indexed prefix and places the last on-time batch among consecutive jobs. Establishing that the table's choices preserve the full optimum requires the existence statements in Lemmas 4 and 5. Reordering jobs is delicate because delaying a batch can change release feasibility and can make an earlier on-time job late. Equal due dates also require care: a due-date order alone need not put the latest release of a proposed batch at its last index.

Formalization scope

Jobs use Fin n, with index zero representing the paper's job 1; the table's jjj is a prefix length. Data and completion times are natural numbers, matching the paper's integer-data setting; +∞+\infty+∞ in the table is WithTop ℕ. The schedule model uses nonempty batches of cardinality at most BBB, pairwise disjointness, and complete coverage. A batch starts at the maximum of its latest release and the preceding completion time. This earliest-start convention is sufficient for minimizing the regular tardy-job objective. The empty job set is included: its empty schedule has zero tardy jobs.

The strict implication ri<rj⇒di≤djr_i<r_j\Rightarrow d_i\le d_jri​<rj​⇒di​≤dj​ makes the paper's loose “agreeable” condition precise without forcing equal due dates for tied release times. For the recurrence, both release times and due dates are nondecreasing in job index, including their ties. This ensures that rjr_jrj​ is the last batch's latest release and dj−k+1d_{j-k+1}dj−k+1​ its earliest due date. The variable-time version similarly indexes by nondecreasing processing times and due dates, so the last job gives the batch duration. The table uses a minimum over exactly the paper's range 1≤k≤min⁡(B,i)1\le k\le\min(B,i)1≤k≤min(B,i), with an empty range giving +∞+\infty+∞. Zero is included in the final maximum. Tardy jobs are scheduled in the underlying optimum; defining the optimum as an on-time subset or defining the table as that optimum would erase the two structural claims.

This mission covers correctness only. The paper's O(n2B)O(n^2B)O(n2B) running-time statement and the bisection procedure are outside the formalization because they would need a specified computational cost model. The paper's FBEDD remark for this objective is also excluded: a three-job instance contradicts it. Contributions to the open theorem proofs, schedule-existence facts, and reusable batch scheduling lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • C.-Y. Lee, R. Uzsoy, and L. A. Martin-Vega, Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Semiconductor Burn-In Operations, Operations Research 40(4), 1992, pp. 764–775. DOI: 10.1287/opre.40.4.764.
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Application of the Branch and Bound Technique to Some Flow-Shop Scheduling Problems 2: Branch and Bound with the Two-Machine Lower Bound Finds a Sequence of Least Mean Completion TimeResearch Paper

Motivation

In a two-machine flow shop, each of nnn jobs is processed first on machine AAA and then on machine BBB, and the order of the jobs is to be chosen. For the makespan (the finishing time of the last job), Johnson (1954) gave an exact sorting rule. For the sum (equivalently, the mean) of the completion times, no such rule is known: the problem is NP-hard in the strong sense (Garey, Johnson and Sethi, 1976), and exact methods search the n!n!n! sequences implicitly.

Ignall and Schrage (1965) were among the first to apply branch and bound to sequencing. They view the n!n!n! sequences as the leaves of a tree of partial sequences, keep a list of partial sequences ranked by a lower bound, and always extend the most promising one. For the two-machine mean-completion-time problem they introduced a lower bound, built from two relaxations (one where machine AAA is the bottleneck, one where machine BBB is), that became the template for many later flow-shop bounds.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 jobs; job iii has processing time aia_iai​ on machine AAA and bib_ibi​ on machine BBB. A sequence is a permutation σ\sigmaσ of the jobs, processed in that order on both machines with every operation started as early as possible. The completion time di(σ)d_i(\sigma)di​(σ) of job iii is the time machine BBB finishes it, and the objective is ∑i=1ndi(σ)\sum_{i=1}^n d_i(\sigma)∑i=1n​di​(σ).

A node JrJ_rJr​ is a partial sequence of rrr jobs; Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ is the set of the n−rn-rn−r jobs not in it; kkk is the last job of JrJ_rJr​ and dkd_kdk​ its completion time; did_idi​ (i∈Jri\in J_ri∈Jr​) are the completion times of the jobs of JrJ_rJr​. For an ordering (i1,…,in−r)(i_1,\dots,i_{n-r})(i1​,…,in−r​) of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​,

Tr=∑p=1n−r[∑j∈Jraj+(n−r−p+1)aip+bip],T_r=\sum_{p=1}^{n-r}\Big[\sum_{j\in J_r}a_j+(n-r-p+1)a_{i_p}+b_{i_p}\Big],Tr​=p=1∑n−r​[j∈Jr​∑​aj​+(n−r−p+1)aip​​+bip​​],

and for an ordering (j1,…,jn−r)(j_1,\dots,j_{n-r})(j1​,…,jn−r​) of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​,

Sr=∑p=1n−r[max⁡(dk,∑j∈Jraj+min⁡i∈Jˉrai)+(n−r−p+1)bjp].S_r=\sum_{p=1}^{n-r}\Big[\max\Big(d_k,\sum_{j\in J_r}a_j+\min_{i\in\bar J_r}a_i\Big)+(n-r-p+1)b_{j_p}\Big].Sr​=p=1∑n−r​[max(dk​,j∈Jr​∑​aj​+i∈Jˉr​min​ai​)+(n−r−p+1)bjp​​].

T^r\hat T_rT^r​ and S^r\hat S_rS^r​ are their minima over all orderings of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​, and the lower bound of the node is

LB(Jr)=∑i∈Jrdi+max⁡(T^r,S^r).LB(J_r)=\sum_{i\in J_r}d_i+\max(\hat T_r,\hat S_r).LB(Jr​)=i∈Jr​∑​di​+max(T^r​,S^r​).

The procedure starts with a list holding only the empty node. A step removes the first node, creates one child for every unscheduled job by appending it, and inserts the children into the list ranked by LBLBLB (a new node goes before old nodes with equal bound). It stops the first time the first node of the list is terminal, i.e. has scheduled n−1n-1n−1 jobs, so that its last job is forced.

Formalization targets

Goal: the procedure finds a sequence of least mean completion time

For all real data, (i) the procedure reaches a list whose first node PPP is terminal, and (ii) whenever that happens, the sequence σ∗\sigma^\astσ∗ formed by PPP and its one unscheduled job satisfies

∑i=1ndi(σ∗)≤∑i=1ndi(σ)for every sequence σ.\sum_{i=1}^n d_i(\sigma^\ast)\le\sum_{i=1}^n d_i(\sigma)\qquad\text{for every sequence }\sigma .i=1∑n​di​(σ∗)≤i=1∑n​di​(σ)for every sequence σ.

Milestones

  1. For 1≤r≤n−11\le r\le n-11≤r≤n−1 and every sequence σ\sigmaσ beginning with JrJ_rJr​: TrT_rTr​ of the order in which σ\sigmaσ processes Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ is at most ∑i∈Jˉrdi(σ)\sum_{i\in\bar J_r}d_i(\sigma)∑i∈Jˉr​​di​(σ), hence so is T^r\hat T_rT^r​ (pp. 405–406).
  2. An ordering of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ by increasing aia_iai​ attains T^r\hat T_rT^r​ (p. 406).
  3. An ordering of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ by increasing bjb_jbj​ attains S^r\hat S_rS^r​ (p. 406).
  4. The analogue of 1 for SrS_rSr​ and S^r\hat S_rS^r​ (p. 406).
  5. LB(Jr)≤∑idi(σ)LB(J_r)\le\sum_i d_i(\sigma)LB(Jr​)≤∑i​di​(σ) for every σ\sigmaσ beginning with JrJ_rJr​ (p. 406).
  6. At depth n−1n-1n−1, LBLBLB equals the value of the node's unique completion (labelled: what the stopping rule of p. 402 needs).
  7. Without delays, job ipi_pip​ completes at ∑Jraj+ai1+⋯+aip+bip\sum_{J_r}a_j+a_{i_1}+\dots+a_{i_p}+b_{i_p}∑Jr​​aj​+ai1​​+⋯+aip​​+bip​​ and ∑Jˉrdi=Tr\sum_{\bar J_r}d_i=T_r∑Jˉr​​di​=Tr​ (pp. 405–406).
  8. The three-job example of p. 408: 1–2 is optimal for jobs 1, 2, while 3–2–1 is optimal for all three.

Significance

The goal is the correctness of the paper's algorithm for the two-machine problem: the sequence it returns is optimal, not merely good, and it returns one for every input. The lower-bound milestones are the paper's own justification of its bound, and the sorting milestones show that the bound is computable in O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) per node rather than by a minimization over (n−r)!(n-r)!(n−r)! orderings.

On the formal side, no item on the platform treats flow-shop lower bounds or branch and bound over sequences; the nearest is the branch-and-bound mission for jointly constrained biconvex programs (BiconvexProg.BranchBound, Al-Khayyal and Falk 1983), an unrelated algorithm over boxes. The paper's arguments are short and informal ("it should be evident"); the formalization makes explicit that the SrS_rSr​ bound holds for every order and every input, which the paper derives only by analogy with TrT_rTr​. The published definitions of Johnson's as-soon-as-possible schedule (from the Johnson 1954 missions) are reused for the completion times.

Difficulty

The two halves of the bound are relaxations of different kinds. TrT_rTr​ ignores waiting on machine BBB; SrS_rSr​ ignores idle time on machine BBB after its first job of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ and replaces that job's machine-AAA time by the smallest one. The paper's description of SrS_rSr​ as "the sum of the completion times" when min⁡b≥max⁡a\min b\ge\max aminb≥maxa is not an identity, since min⁡a\min amina replaces aj1a_{j_1}aj1​​; only the inequality is true, and it has to be proved for the given order directly. The sorting claims are rearrangement inequalities, with the coefficient n−r−p+1n-r-p+1n−r−p+1 decreasing in the position.

The goal is a statement about all n!n!n! sequences, while the procedure only ever looks at the nodes on its list, whose length changes at every step. The tempting one-line justification, that the first terminal node has the smallest bound, says nothing by itself about sequences that are not descendants of nodes still on the list, nor about whether the bound of a terminal node is the value of its sequence; and termination of the search has to be shown, not assumed.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs are Fin n (the paper's 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n shifted to 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1); processing times are arbitrary reals, with no sign condition; all statements are true without one.
  • Completion times of a full sequence come from Johnson's asapC2 (referenced definition JohnsonFlowShop.TwoStage.asapStart2). The objective is the sum of the completion times; the paper's mean differs by the fixed factor 1/n1/n1/n.
  • A node is a list of jobs; "a sequence begins with JrJ_rJr​" means JrJ_rJr​ is a prefix of its list of jobs.
  • T^r\hat T_rT^r​ and S^r\hat S_rS^r​ are defined as minima over all orderings of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​, not by a sorted order; that sorting attains them is milestones 2 and 3. Defining them by sorting would make those milestones true by definition.
  • At the root (r=0r=0r=0) dkd_kdk​ is read as 000; the root is never ranked, and the lower-bound milestones are stated for 1≤r≤n−11\le r\le n-11≤r≤n−1.
  • Terminal nodes are at depth n−1n-1n−1. The paper says "a node that has scheduled all nnn jobs"; its own example stops at a node with three of four jobs, and its node counts end at level n−1n-1n−1.
  • Explicit readings: "is a lower bound" means ≤\le≤ the objective of every sequence beginning with the node; "will exceed" means ≥\ge≥; "the problem is solved: that node's sequence is an optimal one" means termination plus optimality over all n!n!n! sequences.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the bound is not taken over an unrestricted or empty set of orderings (the set of orderings of Jˉr\bar J_rJˉr​ is nonempty), optimality is over all permutations rather than over the nodes the run visits, and termination is part of the goal.
  • Not formalized: the reduction to permutation schedules (the paper's footnote on p. 401 asserts it for mean completion time without proof, and no platform item proves it), dominance discarding (pp. 403–405), the jobset generator, Tables I–III and the 9-job examples.

Proofs of any milestone, and reusable lemmas on as-soon-as-possible two-machine schedules (completion times of a prefix, monotonicity in the start time), are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. Ignall and L. Schrage, Application of the branch and bound technique to some flow-shop scheduling problems, Operations Research 13(3), 400–412, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.13.3.400
  • S. M. Johnson, Optimal two- and three-stage production schedules with setup times included, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 1(1), 61–68, 1954. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800010110
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson and R. Sethi, The complexity of flowshop and jobshop scheduling, Mathematics of Operations Research 1(2), 117–129, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.2.117
  • A. H. Land and A. G. Doig, An automatic method of solving discrete programming problems, Econometrica 28(3), 497–520, 1960. https://doi.org/10.2307/1910129
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 6: When Workers Are Alike in Production, Gross Substitutes Is Equivalent to Nonincreasing Returns to WorkersResearch Paper

Motivation

Kelso and Crawford's 1982 Econometrica paper studies a labor market in which firms hire sets of heterogeneous workers at individually negotiated salaries. Their existence results for the core and for competitive equilibrium, and the convergence of their salary-adjustment process, all rest on one hypothesis about each firm's technology, the gross-substitutes condition (GS): raising some workers' salaries never makes a firm drop a worker whose salary did not change. The condition has since become central to matching with contracts, ascending auctions and the theory of discrete convexity (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005; Fujishige and Yang 2003). It is defined through the firm's demand correspondence rather than through the production function, so its economic content is not obvious.

Section 6 of the paper explains that content. Its first result, Theorem 6, says that when workers are alike in production, (GS) is exactly the familiar requirement of nonincreasing returns to workers. This mission formalizes Theorem 6, the two halves of its proof, and the companion claim that with two heterogeneous workers (GS) is equivalent to subadditivity.

Setting

Fix a finite set WWW of mmm workers and a single firm. Its production technology is a function y:2W→Ry : 2^W \to \mathbb{R}y:2W→R; y(C)y(C)y(C) is the gross product when the firm hires the set CCC. A salary vector s∈RWs \in \mathbb{R}^Ws∈RW assigns to each worker iii the salary sis_isi​ the firm must pay to hire him or her. The firm's net profit is

π(C;s)=y(C)−∑i∈Csi,\pi(C; s) = y(C) - \sum_{i \in C} s_i ,π(C;s)=y(C)−i∈C∑​si​,

and CCC is demanded at sss, written C∈M(s)C \in M(s)C∈M(s), if it maximizes π( ⋅ ;s)\pi(\,\cdot\,; s)π(⋅;s) over all subsets of WWW (problem (A) of the paper). The technology satisfies (GS) if for all salary vectors s≤s~s \le \tilde ss≤s~ and every C∈M(s)C \in M(s)C∈M(s) there is C~∈M(s~)\tilde C \in M(\tilde s)C~∈M(s~) with

T(C)={ i∈C:s~i=si }⊆C~.T(C) = \{\, i \in C : \tilde s_i = s_i \,\} \subseteq \tilde C .T(C)={i∈C:s~i​=si​}⊆C~.

Workers are alike in production when the product depends only on how many are hired: y(C)=yˉ(∣C∣)y(C) = \bar y(|C|)y(C)=yˉ​(∣C∣) for some yˉ:N→R\bar y : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}yˉ​:N→R. The workers remain distinct individuals, since their salaries can differ. The function yˉ\bar yyˉ​ has nonincreasing returns to workers (DR) if

yˉ(w+1)−yˉ(w)≤yˉ(w)−yˉ(w−1)for every integer w, 1≤w≤m−1.\bar y(w + 1) - \bar y(w) \le \bar y(w) - \bar y(w - 1) \qquad \text{for every integer } w,\ 1 \le w \le m - 1 .yˉ​(w+1)−yˉ​(w)≤yˉ​(w)−yˉ​(w−1)for every integer w, 1≤w≤m−1.

A technology yyy is subadditive if y(C∪D)≤y(C)+y(D)y(C \cup D) \le y(C) + y(D)y(C∪D)≤y(C)+y(D) for disjoint C,D⊆WC, D \subseteq WC,D⊆W.

In the Lean development these are profit, IsDemanded, GrossSubstitutesOn y Set.univ, DR (Fintype.card W) ybar and Subadditive y, in the namespace KelsoCrawford.Returns.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 1499)

For every yˉ:N→R\bar y : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}yˉ​:N→R,

(DR) for yˉ on {0,…,m}  ⟺  C↦yˉ(∣C∣) satisfies (GS) on RW.\text{(DR) for } \bar y \text{ on } \{0, \dots, m\} \iff C \mapsto \bar y(|C|) \text{ satisfies (GS) on } \mathbb{R}^W .(DR) for yˉ​ on {0,…,m}⟺C↦yˉ​(∣C∣) satisfies (GS) on RW.

Milestones

  1. (DR) implies (GS) (proof of Theorem 6, p. 1499).
  2. If (DR) fails, (GS) fails (proof of Theorem 6, pp. 1499–1500): if for some www with 1≤w≤m−11 \le w \le m - 11≤w≤m−1
yˉ(w+1)−yˉ(w)>yˉ(w)−yˉ(w−1),(19)\bar y(w + 1) - \bar y(w) > \bar y(w) - \bar y(w - 1), \tag{19}yˉ​(w+1)−yˉ​(w)>yˉ​(w)−yˉ​(w−1),(19)

then C↦yˉ(∣C∣)C \mapsto \bar y(|C|)C↦yˉ​(∣C∣) violates (GS). 3. Two workers (p. 1500), off the goal's path: if ∣W∣=2|W| = 2∣W∣=2 and y(∅)=0y(\emptyset) = 0y(∅)=0, then yyy satisfies (GS) if and only if yyy is subadditive, that is v1+v2≥v12v_1 + v_2 \ge v_{12}v1​+v2​≥v12​.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 6 gives a production-side reading of (GS): restricted to identical workers it is nonincreasing returns, so (GS) can be viewed as the generalization of that convexity condition to heterogeneous workers. The paper uses this reading to explain why something like (GS) is needed for existence: without it the core and the competitive equilibrium may fail to exist, as the example of Section 6 shows (mission 7 of this series). The two-worker claim locates the boundary further: with two workers (GS) is subadditivity, while with three or more subadditivity is no longer enough.

Formalizing it. Nothing of this paper was on Prove2Me before this series. Theorem 6 is a proved result in the paper. This draft provides compiling Lean statements of both directions, with (GS) in the paper's own form (real salary vectors and the set T(C)T(C)T(C)), and of the two-worker characterization; their proofs remain open. A completed mission would provide machine-checked proofs of those statements. The statements fix the boundary conventions exactly (which www are constrained, what happens with zero or one worker), which the informal argument leaves implicit. The definitions of profit, demand and (GS) are the same as in the other missions of the series (1–5 and 7), so proofs here are reusable there.

Difficulty

For (DR) ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (GS), the natural argument sorts workers by salary and observes that a profit-maximizing firm hires the w∗w^*w∗ cheapest workers. With ties among salaries this description is not literally true (any w∗w^*w∗ cheapest workers will do), and after a salary increase the new optimal size and the new ranking change at once; showing that some new maximizer keeps every worker whose salary stayed fixed requires a careful exchange argument rather than a monotone comparison of indices. For the converse, a single failure of (DR) must be turned into an explicit pair of salary vectors; the construction must make one worker strictly demanded before the change and strictly undemanded after it, which requires controlling every competing set, not only the sets of the critical sizes www and w+1w + 1w+1. The two-worker characterization requires a case analysis over the four candidate demands at every salary pair, including ties.

Formalization scope

Workers form an arbitrary finite type W with m = Fintype.card W; a technology is a function Finset W → ℝ, and "alike in production" is the technology fun C => ybar C.card with ybar : ℕ → ℝ. Salaries are arbitrary real vectors W → ℝ, and (GS) is required on all of RW\mathbb{R}^WRW (Set.univ), the continuous version that Theorem 6 is about. A discrete market can satisfy (GS) on its salary grid while its continuous version does not, so the discrete version is a different statement and is not targeted here. (DR) is written for natural numbers with 1 ≤ w and w + 1 ≤ m, so that w - 1 never truncates. For m≤1m \le 1m≤1 it is vacuous, and no lower bound on mmm is imposed. Neither (MP) nor (NFL), yˉ(0)=0\bar y(0) = 0yˉ​(0)=0, is assumed in Theorem 6: the paper uses neither, and adding them would weaken the theorem. The two-worker claim keeps the paper's normalization y(∅)=0y(\emptyset) = 0y(∅)=0 and uses its general definition of subadditivity over disjoint pairs.

A trivializing formalization would restrict (GS) to a single salary vector, quantify demand over a subfamily of sets, or replace "some demanded set contains T(C)T(C)T(C)" by "the given set does", and is ruled out by the definitions above, which follow the paper's (A) and (GS) word for word. The read-out of the goal as two milestones is the paper's own split of its proof.

Infrastructure needed: finite sums over Finset, sorting of a finite salary vector, and elementary facts on concave sequences. Contributions that would be reusable beyond this mission include a general lemma that concave functions of cardinality yield gross-substitutes demand, and the link between (GS) and M♮^\natural♮-concavity of set functions (Murota's gross-substitutes axioms are on Prove2Me as Shuze Chen's DiscreteConvex_MConvexFunctionsC_MNatGS, a related but different object: one price per good and integer bundles). Proofs of either direction, of the two-worker claim, or of intermediate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. S. Kelso, Jr. and V. P. Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50(6) (1982), 1483–1504. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913392
  • V. P. Crawford and E. M. Knoer, Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers, Econometrica 49(2) (1981), 437–450. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913320
  • S. Fujishige and Z. Yang, A note on Kelso and Crawford's gross substitutes condition, Mathematics of Operations Research 28(3) (2003), 463–469. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.28.3.463.16393
  • J. W. Hatfield and P. R. Milgrom, Matching with contracts, American Economic Review 95(4) (2005), 913–935. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466
  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898718508
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Monotone Comparative Statics I: The Argmax Is Monotone Nondecreasing in (t, S) If and Only If f Is Quasisupermodular in x and Has the Single Crossing Property in (x; t)Research Paper

Why monotone comparative statics matters

An optimization problem often changes when a parameter changes: a price rises, a constraint expands, or a strategic environment shifts. Comparative statics asks whether the optimal choice moves in a predictable direction. The usual numerical tools, such as derivatives, can be unavailable when choices form a discrete set or the objective is neither smooth nor concave. Milgrom and Shannon's Monotonicity Theorem gives a condition expressed entirely through order and preference comparisons. It applies to individual optimization problems and supplies the order argument used later in their paper for games with strategic complementarities.

Their 1994 paper moves beyond cardinal conditions such as supermodularity and increasing differences. Those conditions imply useful comparative statics, but they can change under a strictly increasing transformation of the objective even though every argmax set stays the same. Quasisupermodularity and single crossing describe the comparisons that actually govern the argmax. The theorem characterizes these conditions through the behavior of optimizers over all constraint sets, rather than giving only a sufficient test. The historical relationship and the claims in this paragraph are described in Milgrom and Shannon, Sections 1–2.

Ordered choices, constraints, and preferences

Let XXX be a lattice: a partially ordered choice set in which every two choices x,yx,yx,y have a meet x∧yx\wedge yx∧y and a join x∨yx\vee yx∨y. Let TTT be a partially ordered parameter set and f:X×T→Rf:X\times T\to\mathbb Rf:X×T→R an objective. For any constraint set S⊆XS\subseteq XS⊆X, define the possibly empty maximizer set

M(t,S)=argmax⁡x∈Sf(x,t)={x∈S:f(y,t)≤f(x,t) for every y∈S}.M(t,S)=\operatorname{argmax}_{x\in S}f(x,t)=\{x\in S: f(y,t)\le f(x,t)\text{ for every }y\in S\}.M(t,S)=argmaxx∈S​f(x,t)={x∈S:f(y,t)≤f(x,t) for every y∈S}.

The strong set order, written A≤sBA\le_s BA≤s​B, compares subsets of the lattice by requiring a∧b∈Aa\wedge b\in Aa∧b∈A and a∨b∈Ba\vee b\in Ba∨b∈B for every a∈Aa\in Aa∈A and b∈Bb\in Bb∈B. It can compare feasible sets as well as sets of optimizers. On singleton sets it agrees with the order on XXX. It also holds vacuously if either set is empty; it is reflexive at SSS exactly when SSS is a sublattice. These are the paper's conventions on page 159.

A function g:X→Rg:X\to\mathbb Rg:X→R is quasisupermodular if, for every x,y∈Xx,y\in Xx,y∈X, both

g(x∧y)≤g(x)⇒g(y)≤g(x∨y),g(x∧y)<g(x)⇒g(y)<g(x∨y)g(x\wedge y)\le g(x)\Rightarrow g(y)\le g(x\vee y),\qquad g(x\wedge y)<g(x)\Rightarrow g(y)<g(x\vee y)g(x∧y)≤g(x)⇒g(y)≤g(x∨y),g(x∧y)<g(x)⇒g(y)<g(x∨y)

hold. The single crossing property of fff in (x;t)(x;t)(x;t) requires, whenever x′′<x′x''<x'x′′<x′ and t′′<t′t''<t't′′<t′, that a weak or strict preference for x′x'x′ over x′′x''x′′ at t′′t''t′′ remains respectively weak or strict at t′t't′. The strict version sends even a weak preference at t′′t''t′′ to a strict one at t′t't′. These definitions are given on pages 160 and 162.

Formalization targets

Theorem 4: the monotonicity equivalence

The main target is Theorem 4 on page 162:

[∀t≤t′, S≤sS′:M(t,S)≤sM(t′,S′)]⟺[∀t, f(⋅,t) is quasisupermodular on X]∧[f has single crossing in (x;t)].\bigl[\forall t\le t',\ S\le_s S': M(t,S)\le_s M(t',S')\bigr] \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \bigl[\forall t,\ f(\cdot,t)\text{ is quasisupermodular on }X\bigr] \land\bigl[f\text{ has single crossing in }(x;t)\bigr].[∀t≤t′, S≤s​S′:M(t,S)≤s​M(t′,S′)]⟺[∀t, f(⋅,t) is quasisupermodular on X]∧[f has single crossing in (x;t)].

The milestone list records the two necessity claims and the sufficiency claim separately, using the three corresponding passages of the paper's proof. The goal keeps both directions together. It imposes no restriction on which subsets may be used as constraints.

Consequences and the stronger selection statement

Corollary 1 characterizes quasisupermodularity alone through monotonicity as the constraint set changes, with no varying parameter. Corollary 2 says that the maximizers over a sublattice themselves form a sublattice. The reflexivity remark identifies when S≤sSS\le_s SS≤s​S holds. Theorem 4′ uses the strict single crossing property and a nondecreasing feasible-set correspondence S:T→2XS:T\to 2^XS:T→2X to conclude that every selection of maximizers is nondecreasing. These nearby results share the definition layer with the main theorem and give distinct targets for the formal development.

What the result supplies

The equivalence turns an order property of an entire family of optimization problems into two properties of the objective. In particular, its converse shows that if every feasible-set comparison produces monotone maximizers, then quasisupermodularity and single crossing are forced. This matters for problems where an analyst can reason about choice behavior more directly than about algebraic properties of fff. The corollaries also separate the effects of constraints and parameters and describe the structure of the optimal-choice set. The paper develops these consequences on pages 162–163.

The theorem is proved in the paper. The remaining work here is a machine-checked Lean proof of the ordinal characterization, its two directions, and the adjacent consequences. Published Prove2Me definitions already encode the strong set order, and its Topkis series covers related cardinal hypotheses such as supermodularity and increasing differences. This mission adds the paper's quasisupermodularity and single crossing predicates and seeks formal proofs of the distinct ordinal results. The separate characterization and linear-perturbation results of the same paper are targets of the other missions in this series.

Where the proof is difficult

The obstacle is the interaction of two orders. An increase in ttt changes preferences, while an increase in SSS changes which choices can be compared. A pointwise claim that an optimizer rises does not follow from either order condition alone, particularly when maximizers tie or are incomparable. The main theorem concerns sets of maximizers under the strong set order, so both the meet and join of optimizers at two parameter–constraint pairs must land in the correct maximizing sets. Conversely, observing monotonicity for one fixed feasible set cannot establish quasisupermodularity; the equivalence relies on monotonicity across every constraint set. The weak and strict preference clauses have different roles, so replacing either by the other changes the target. These are the distinctions visible in Theorem 4 and its proof.

Formalization scope

Lean represents XXX with Lattice, TTT with PartialOrder, and f:X→T→Rf:X\to T\to\mathbb Rf:X→T→R in curried form. No finiteness, total order, topology, measurability, or maximizer-attainment hypothesis is imposed. The paper's product order for product lattices is Lean's usual componentwise order. The imported Supermodularity.Lattices.InducedSetOrder is exactly the paper's strong set order, including its behavior on empty sets. The definition argmaxOn returns the set of points in SSS whose objective value bounds every value attained in SSS; it may be empty.

Quasisupermodularity is encoded with a reusable set argument but applied to Set.univ in every theorem here, so the property concerns the whole lattice. Single crossing compares strictly ordered choices and strictly ordered parameters and preserves both weak and strict preferences. ArgmaxMonotone compares weakly ordered parameters and all constraint sets under the strong set order. Theorem 4′ encodes a selection on an arbitrary domain D⊆TD\subseteq TD⊆T where maximizers actually exist; it makes no global existence assertion. For Corollary 2, an arbitrary parameter is fixed and its objective is written g:X→Rg:X\to\mathbb Rg:X→R.

These choices rule out easy specializations that would change the theorem: taking XXX to be a chain, restricting quasisupermodularity to a selected feasible set, demanding nonempty argmax sets, or dropping strict preference clauses. The reusable development consists of the maximizer-set definition, the two ordinal predicates, and their relation to the published strong set order. Contributions proving the goal, its three proof-direction milestones, the corollaries, and the selection theorem all fit this scope.

Selected references

  • Paul Milgrom and Chris Shannon, Monotone Comparative Statics, Econometrica 62(1), 1994, 157–180. DOI: 10.2307/2951479.
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Potential Games 1: A Game Is an Exact Potential Game If and Only If I(γ, u) = 0 on Every Simple Closed Path of Length 4Research Paper

Why this question matters

In a strategic game, each player evaluates a change in their own strategy using that player's own payoff. These incentives need not point in a common direction. A potential game is a case in which one real-valued function records every player's payoff change under a unilateral deviation. This common function lets questions about incentives be expressed as questions about one object on the space of strategy profiles. Monderer and Shapley's 1996 paper introduced several kinds of potential and gave a local characterization of the exact kind. The characterization is the subject of this mission.

The local test matters because the defining condition appears to require finding an unknown potential on the entire profile space. Theorem 2.8 says that a condition on four-step cycles already determines whether such a function exists, even when individual strategy sets are infinite. The paper compares this characterization with the familiar idea that a conservative field has zero integral around closed curves; here the “integral” is a finite sum of payoff changes along unilateral deviations (Monderer and Shapley, pp. 130–131).

Games, deviations, and path sums

Let NNN be a finite set of players. For each player i∈Ni\in Ni∈N, let YiY^iYi be a strategy set, and let Y=∏i∈NYiY=\prod_{i\in N}Y^iY=∏i∈N​Yi be the set of pure strategy profiles. The payoff of player iii is a function ui:Y→Ru^i:Y\to\mathbb Rui:Y→R. If y∈Yy\in Yy∈Y, the notation (y−i,x)(y^{-i},x)(y−i,x) means the profile obtained by replacing only player iii's strategy with x∈Yix\in Y^ix∈Yi. The strategy sets themselves are not required to be finite in this section of the paper (p. 127).

An exact potential is a function P:Y→RP:Y\to\mathbb RP:Y→R such that, for every iii, every opponents' profile y−iy^{-i}y−i, and every x,z∈Yix,z\in Y^ix,z∈Yi,

ui(y−i,x)−ui(y−i,z)=P(y−i,x)−P(y−i,z).u^i(y^{-i},x)-u^i(y^{-i},z) =P(y^{-i},x)-P(y^{-i},z).ui(y−i,x)−ui(y−i,z)=P(y−i,x)−P(y−i,z).

A game admitting such a function is an exact potential game. The paper uses the shorter term “potential game” for this class when the adjective is clear (pp. 127–128, equation (2.2)).

A path γ=(y0,…,yL)\gamma=(y_0,\ldots,y_L)γ=(y0​,…,yL​) is a sequence in which each step changes exactly one player's strategy to a different value. Write iki_kik​ for the unique player who moves from yk−1y_{k-1}yk−1​ to yky_kyk​. The path sum of the payoff vector uuu is

I(γ,u)=∑k=1L(uik(yk)−uik(yk−1)).I(\gamma,u)=\sum_{k=1}^{L} \bigl(u^{i_k}(y_k)-u^{i_k}(y_{k-1})\bigr).I(γ,u)=k=1∑L​(uik​(yk​)−uik​(yk−1​)).

The path is closed when y0=yLy_0=y_Ly0​=yL​. It is simple closed when, in addition, the vertices y0,…,yL−1y_0,\ldots,y_{L-1}y0​,…,yL−1​ are pairwise distinct. Its length is LLL, the number of steps and the number of vertices before the final return. These definitions follow pp. 128, 130–131.

Formalization targets

Theorem 2.8: four equivalent conditions

For a game with finitely many players, Theorem 2.8 asserts the equivalence of all four claims:

Γ has an exact potential;I(γ,u)=0for every finite closed path γ;I(γ,u)=0for every finite simple closed path γ;I(γ,u)=0for every simple closed path γ of length 4.\begin{aligned} &\Gamma\text{ has an exact potential};\\ &I(\gamma,u)=0\quad\text{for every finite closed path }\gamma;\\ &I(\gamma,u)=0\quad\text{for every finite simple closed path }\gamma;\\ &I(\gamma,u)=0\quad\text{for every simple closed path }\gamma\text{ of length }4. \end{aligned}​Γ has an exact potential;I(γ,u)=0for every finite closed path γ;I(γ,u)=0for every finite simple closed path γ;I(γ,u)=0for every simple closed path γ of length 4.​

The last condition is a local criterion, but the goal keeps the full four-way equivalence of the published theorem, p. 131. The milestone list follows five claims in its Appendix A proof: vanishing path sums from a potential, path independence, construction of a potential from vanishing closed-path sums, the local exchange of two different players' moves, and the reduction from all closed paths to length-four simple cycles (pp. 138–139).

Related results in the same development

Corollary 2.9 expresses the length-four test directly as a zero sum of payoff changes around four corners obtained by varying two players' strategies. Lemma 2.7 says that two exact potentials for the same game differ by one additive constant. Both are included as supporting statements from the same definition layer, although they are not milestones in the attack path for Theorem 2.8 (pp. 130–131).

What the result provides

Theorem 2.8 turns existence of a global function into a test on local cycles. Corollary 2.9 makes those cycles visible in payoff tables: fixing all but two players, the alternating sum around each two-player rectangle must vanish. For finite strategy sets this gives a direct finite collection of conditions; for infinite strategy sets the theorem remains a mathematical characterization without claiming a finite algorithm (Monderer and Shapley, p. 131).

The original paper proves these statements. The formalization work is to represent games, paths, path sums, and the four-way equivalence in Lean, then supply machine-checked proofs. The present mission contains compiled statements with open proofs. Its definition modules are also reusable for the paper's other results about potentials, improvement paths, and congestion games.

Where the proof is difficult

The challenging direction is that zero sums on simple length-four cycles force zero sums on every closed path. A closed path may repeat vertices and may involve more than two players. A direct appeal to the local condition does not cover such a path. The Appendix A argument uses changes to a path's sequence of deviators, and its informal treatment of adjacent moves by the same player leaves a boundary case: the two moves can cancel, so replacing them by one move would create a null step, which the definition of a path excludes. A formal proof must account for this case while preserving the paper's exact statement (pp. 138–139).

Formalization scope

Lean represents the finite player set by a finite type ι\iotaι and a profile by a dependent function y:∏i:ιYiy:\prod_{i:\iota}Y^iy:∏i:ι​Yi. Strategy sets YiY^iYi remain arbitrary types. The operation (y−i,x)(y^{-i},x)(y−i,x) is a one-coordinate update. A finite path stores L+1L+1L+1 vertices and its deviator at each of the LLL steps; the step condition determines that deviator uniquely. Closed paths of length zero are allowed and have sum zero. The paper prints nnn, the number of players, as the upper limit of the path sum on p. 130, although its summands are indexed by path steps. The Lean definition sums over all LLL steps, as the surrounding definition and later equations require.

The four-cycle hypothesis quantifies only over simple closed paths of exactly four genuine steps. It is not replaced by all four-step walks or by cycles with null or simultaneous deviations. The goal retains all four clauses rather than only its shortest equivalence. Corollary 2.9 explicitly requires the two varying players to be distinct; this is implicit in the paper's four-corner construction. No finite-strategy assumption is imposed on Theorem 2.8, Corollary 2.9, or Lemma 2.7.

The development needs ordinary finite sums, dependent functions, coordinate updates, and finite-indexed paths. Its path and potential definitions are intended as an interface for later work. Contributions proving any of the five source-backed milestones, the goal, or the two related statements are within scope.

Selected references

  • Dov Monderer and Lloyd S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14 (1996), 124–143. DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0044.
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