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Markov ChainOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Throughput-Optimal Scheduling Algorithms for LLM Inference and AI Agents: Above Load b_max/t_{b_max} Every Scheduler Diverges, Below It Every Work-Conserving K-FCFS Scheduler Is Positive RecurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

A large language model (LLM) answers a request in two phases. In the prefill phase it reads the whole prompt; in the decode phase it generates the answer one token at a time, because each new token depends on all previous ones. Serving engines such as vLLM, SGLang and Sarathi-Serve run the GPU in iterations: each iteration processes one batch that may mix prefill tokens of some requests with single decode tokens of others, up to a token budget bmax⁡b_{\max}bmax​. Which tokens enter each batch is decided by a batch scheduling algorithm, and providers want to know how much traffic a given server can sustain and which scheduling rules achieve that.

Dai, Deng, Li and Peng (arXiv:2504.07347v3, 2026) cast this as a queueing problem: a two-class batch-service queue in which one batch couples the two classes through a shared budget, and a request contributes many tokens per batch in prefill but at most one in decode. Their Theorem 2 identifies the maximal throughput of a single server and shows that a broad class of practical schedulers attains it. The proof method is the fluid-limit approach to stability of stochastic processing networks (Dai 1995; Dai and Harrison, Processing Networks, 2020).

Setting

Time is divided into integer slots. A batch with token load bbb (its number of tokens) takes

tb=c+a⌈bb0⌉t_b = c + a\left\lceil \frac{b}{b_0}\right\rceiltb​=c+a⌈b0​b​⌉

slots (eq. (4)). Here c,a≥0c,a\ge 0c,a≥0 are integers and b0≥1b_0\ge 1b0​≥1 is a block size dividing bmax⁡b_{\max}bmax​ (Assumption 1).

Requests are labelled 0,1,2,…0,1,2,\dots0,1,2,… in order of arrival. Request iii brings vp(i)∈{1,…,vpmax⁡}v_p(i)\in\{1,\dots,v_p^{\max}\}vp​(i)∈{1,…,vpmax​} prefill tokens and vd(i)∈{1,…,vdmax⁡}v_d(i)\in\{1,\dots,v_d^{\max}\}vd​(i)∈{1,…,vdmax​} decode tokens. The arrival counts ana_nan​ of the slots are i.i.d. with mean λ\lambdaλ, the sizes are i.i.d. with means mp,mdm_p, m_dmp​,md​, and the two sequences are independent.

The state at the start of a slot is

X(n)=(R(n),{(Pi(n),Di(n)):i∈Qn}),X(n)=\big(R(n),\{(P_i(n),D_i(n)) : i\in Q_n\}\big),X(n)=(R(n),{(Pi​(n),Di​(n)):i∈Qn​}),

where R(n)R(n)R(n) is the remaining time of the current batch, QnQ_nQn​ the set of requests in the system, and Pi,DiP_i, D_iPi​,Di​ the unprocessed prefill and decode tokens of request iii. When R(n)=0R(n)=0R(n)=0 the algorithm picks (δip,δid)i∈Qn(\delta^p_i,\delta^d_i)_{i\in Q_n}(δip​,δid​)i∈Qn​​ subject to the following feasibility rules (eq. (6)):

  • prefill before decode;
  • δip≤Pi\delta^p_i\le P_iδip​≤Pi​;
  • δid≤1\delta^d_i\le 1δid​≤1;
  • total load b=∑i(δip+δid)≤bmax⁡b=\sum_i(\delta^p_i+\delta^d_i)\le b_{\max}b=∑i​(δip​+δid​)≤bmax​.

The batch then runs for tbt_btb​ slots. When it finishes, requests with no tokens left depart, and new arrivals join at the end of every slot. The total number of unprocessed tokens is ∣X(n)∣=∑i∈Qn(Pi(n)+Di(n))|X(n)|=\sum_{i\in Q_n}(P_i(n)+D_i(n))∣X(n)∣=∑i∈Qn​​(Pi​(n)+Di​(n)).

An algorithm is work-conserving if it forms a full batch (b=bmax⁡b=b_{\max}b=bmax​) whenever the supply ∑i(Pi+1(Pi=0))\sum_i\big(P_i+\mathbf 1(P_i=0)\big)∑i​(Pi​+1(Pi​=0)) is at least bmax⁡b_{\max}bmax​. It is K-FCFS if, whenever a request jjj receives a decode token, every request i≤j−Ki\le j-Ki≤j−K still in the system receives at least one token.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

  1. If λ(mp+md)>bmax⁡/tbmax⁡\lambda(m_p+m_d)>b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}λ(mp​+md​)>bmax​/tbmax​​, then under every scheduling algorithm and from every initial state
P{lim⁡n→∞∣X(n)∣=∞}=1.\mathbb P\Big\{\lim_{n\to\infty}|X(n)|=\infty\Big\}=1 .P{n→∞lim​∣X(n)∣=∞}=1.
  1. If λ(mp+md)<bmax⁡/tbmax⁡\lambda(m_p+m_d)<b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}λ(mp​+md​)<bmax​/tbmax​​, then for every work-conserving K-FCFS algorithm there is a finite set FFF of label-free configurations whose hitting time has finite expectation from every initial state whose requests respect the size bounds vpmax⁡,vdmax⁡v_p^{\max}, v_d^{\max}vpmax​,vdmax​:
∃F finite, ∀x:Ex[τF]<∞,τF=min⁡{n≥1:(R(n),(Pi(n),Di(n))i)∈F}.\exists F \text{ finite},\ \forall x:\quad \mathbb E_x\big[\tau_F\big]<\infty,\qquad \tau_F=\min\{n\ge 1: (R(n),(P_i(n),D_i(n))_{i})\in F\}.∃F finite, ∀x:Ex​[τF​]<∞,τF​=min{n≥1:(R(n),(Pi​(n),Di​(n))i​)∈F}.

Part 2 is the corrected form of the paper's "the DTMC {X(n)}\{X(n)\}{X(n)} is positive recurrent". The labelled state cannot recur, because each new request carries a new label.

Milestones

These follow the order of the paper's argument:

  1. The rate bound: b/tb≤bmax⁡/tbmax⁡b/t_b\le b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}b/tb​≤bmax​/tbmax​​ for 1≤b≤bmax⁡1\le b\le b_{\max}1≤b≤bmax​ (proof sketch, p. 16).
  2. The cumulative processing bound Bf(n2tbmax⁡)−Bf(n1tbmax⁡)≤(n2−n1+1)bmax⁡B_f(n_2t_{b_{\max}})-B_f(n_1t_{b_{\max}})\le (n_2-n_1+1)b_{\max}Bf​(n2​tbmax​​)−Bf​(n1​tbmax​​)≤(n2​−n1​+1)bmax​ (eq. (43), corrected).
  3. The strong law E(n)/n→λE(n)/n\to\lambdaE(n)/n→λ, Vf(N)/N→mfV_f(N)/N\to m_fVf​(N)/N→mf​ almost surely (eq. (56)).
  4. Bounded overtaking in departure order under K-FCFS (Lemma 11, corrected to departures).
  5. Stability of the work-conserving fluid model (Proposition 15, with nonnegative fluid levels).

Significance

Theorem 2 gives a sharp stability threshold for a single LLM server: the arriving token workload per slot, λ(mp+md)\lambda(m_p+m_d)λ(mp​+md​), against the maximal processing rate bmax⁡/tbmax⁡b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}bmax​/tbmax​​ of full batches. It shows that every work-conserving K-FCFS scheduler, a class containing Sarathi-Serve-style chunked-prefill schedulers, is throughput-optimal. Schedulers that do not mix prefill and decode tokens in one batch can lose throughput. The result is the base case for the paper's multi-server, multi-class and agent-network extensions.

The paper proves part (a) in a sketch and part (b) by the fluid-limit method, with a separate Lyapunov argument in Appendix C. No part of the result has a machine-checked proof. Several printed steps are false as stated:

  • the strict monotonicity of the step-endpoint rates;
  • the constant in eq. (43);
  • the prefill clause of Lemma 11;
  • Proposition 15 without nonnegativity;
  • the recurrence of the labelled chain.

A formalization fixes the exact statements that hold and supplies a complete argument.

Difficulty

Part (a) reduces to the rate bound, a pathwise count of completed batches, and the strong law. Part (b) is where the difficulty lies. A Lyapunov drift on the total token count fails directly: while a batch is in progress no tokens are completed, so the one-slot drift is positive whenever R(n)>0R(n)>0R(n)>0. A drift argument must account for the batch in progress. The naive bound "every slot completes bmax⁡/tbmax⁡b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}bmax​/tbmax​​ tokens on average when the system is large" also needs the supply condition (9) to hold. Requests in decode contribute at most one token per batch, so many tokens can sit in few decode-phase requests. The fluid-limit route needs bounded overtaking, and the paper's prefill version of that is false.

Formalization scope

The Lean development (namespace LLMThroughput.TokenBudget) commits to the following:

  • Slots and labels are 0-based, and c,a,b0,bmax⁡c, a, b_0, b_{\max}c,a,b0​,bmax​ are natural numbers with b0≥1b_0\ge 1b0​≥1, b0∣bmax⁡b_0\mid b_{\max}b0​∣bmax​, bmax⁡≥1b_{\max}\ge 1bmax​≥1 and tbmax⁡≥1t_{b_{\max}}\ge 1tbmax​​≥1.
  • The state is a list of requests (label, PiP_iPi​, DiD_iDi​) in label order, together with RRR and the next label.
  • A policy is any function from states to batch configurations. It must be feasible (and, where assumed, work-conserving and K-FCFS) at every admissible state.
  • Feasibility adds δid≤Di\delta^d_i\le D_iδid​≤Di​.
  • The dynamics is a pathwise recursion driven by sequences ana_nan​ and (vp(i),vd(i))(v_p(i),v_d(i))(vp​(i),vd​(i)).
  • The randomness is a probability space with measurable, i.i.d., mutually independent sequences and integrable a1a_1a1​.
  • The expectation of a hitting time is the Lebesgue integral of an N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}-valued time, so a time that is infinite with positive probability has infinite expectation.
  • Positive recurrence is stated for the label-free configuration, with the finite set FFF chosen before the initial state. In part 2 the initial requests obey the source's size bounds Pi≤vpmax⁡P_i\le v_p^{\max}Pi​≤vpmax​, Di≤vdmax⁡D_i\le v_d^{\max}Di​≤vdmax​; part 1 allows any admissible initial state.

A finite set FFF is essential. The set of all states with small token count is infinite once labels are included, and hitting it would be a much weaker claim. Quantifying over a single named policy instead of all work-conserving K-FCFS policies would also change the theorem.

A complete development needs:

  • sample-path lemmas for the recursion (admissibility is preserved, tokens are conserved);
  • the strong law from Mathlib (ProbabilityTheory.strong_law_ae);
  • a Foster–Lyapunov criterion for a process that is not a Markov kernel on the policy's input type;
  • for the fluid route, Lipschitz calculus for the fluid model.

The pathwise model and the bounded-overtaking lemma can be reused for other batch-service systems. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of part (b) (a direct drift argument on an augmented workload), are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. G. Dai, Y. Deng, Z. Li, Z. Peng, Throughput-Optimal Scheduling Algorithms for LLM Inference and AI Agents, arXiv:2504.07347v3, 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.07347
  • J. G. Dai, On positive Harris recurrence of multiclass queueing networks: a unified approach via fluid limit models, Annals of Applied Probability 5(1), 1995. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177004828
  • J. G. Dai, J. M. Harrison, Processing Networks: Fluid Models and Stability, Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108772662
  • A. Agrawal et al., Taming Throughput-Latency Tradeoff in LLM Inference with Sarathi-Serve, OSDI 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02310
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsLinear Optimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment: House-Monotone and Quota-Compliant Apportionments Are the Seat Counts of Extreme Points of a Network Flow LP with Lookahead Φ(p, H)Research Paper

Motivation

An apportionment method distributes the HHH seats of a house among nnn states in proportion to their populations. Exact proportionality is impossible with integer seats, so methods are judged by axioms. Two axioms date back to the debates over the seats of the US House of Representatives. Quota compliance asks that each state receive its exact proportional share rounded down or up. House monotonicity asks that no state lose a seat when the house grows; the Alabama paradox of 1880, in which Hamilton's method took a seat from Alabama when the house was enlarged, is the classic failure. The two axioms can hold together. Balinski and Young (Mathematics of Operations Research, 1979) and Still (SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 1979) characterized the methods satisfying both through a recursive, seat-by-seat construction. Gölz, Peters and Procaccia (EC 2022) later gave a description by a fractional matching polytope.

Cembrano, Correa, Schmidt-Kraepelin, Tsigonias-Dimitriadis and Verdugo (arXiv:2410.23869, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) give a third characterization, by a network-flow linear program. It replaces the recursive construction with the vertex set of a polytope that can be written down and optimized over. This mission formalizes that characterization, Theorem 3 of the paper.

Setting

An instance is a pair (p,H)(p,H)(p,H). Here p=(p1,…,pn)p=(p_1,\dots,p_n)p=(p1​,…,pn​) is a vector of n≥1n\ge1n≥1 strictly positive integers (the populations of the states) and H≥1H\ge1H≥1 is an integer, the house size. Write P=∑ipiP=\sum_i p_iP=∑i​pi​; the quota of state iii is qi=piPHq_i=\frac{p_i}{P}Hqi​=Ppi​​H.

A solution fff assigns to every instance one vector f(p,H)∈N0nf(p,H)\in\mathbb N_0^nf(p,H)∈N0n​ with ∑ifi(p,H)=H\sum_i f_i(p,H)=H∑i​fi​(p,H)=H. It is defined for every number of states nnn and every population vector. It is quota-compliant if fi(p,H)∈{⌊qi⌋,⌈qi⌉}f_i(p,H)\in\{\lfloor q_i\rfloor,\lceil q_i\rceil\}fi​(p,H)∈{⌊qi​⌋,⌈qi​⌉} always. It is house-monotone if f(p,H1)≤f(p,H2)≤f(p,H3)f(p,H_1)\le f(p,H_2)\le f(p,H_3)f(p,H1​)≤f(p,H2​)≤f(p,H3​) componentwise whenever H1<H2<H3H_1<H_2<H_3H1​<H2​<H3​. The set of apportionments such solutions produce is

A(p,H)={f(p,H):f a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution}.\mathcal A(p,H)=\{f(p,H): f\text{ a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution}\}.A(p,H)={f(p,H):f a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution}.

For LLL seats, the network-flow linear program (1)–(4) has a variable x(i,t)≥0x(i,t)\ge0x(i,t)≥0 for each state iii and seat t∈[L]t\in[L]t∈[L], subject to

∑i=1nx(i,t)=1,⌊tpiP⌋≤∑ℓ=1tx(i,ℓ)≤⌈tpiP⌉.\sum_{i=1}^n x(i,t)=1,\qquad \Big\lfloor\frac{tp_i}{P}\Big\rfloor\le\sum_{\ell=1}^t x(i,\ell)\le\Big\lceil\frac{tp_i}{P}\Big\rceil .i=1∑n​x(i,t)=1,⌊Ptpi​​⌋≤ℓ=1∑t​x(i,ℓ)≤⌈Ptpi​​⌉.

Its feasible region is K(p,L)K(p,L)K(p,L) and its set of extreme points is E(p,L)\mathcal E(p,L)E(p,L). The count Ai(x,T)=∑ℓ=1Tx(i,ℓ)A_i(x,T)=\sum_{\ell=1}^T x(i,\ell)Ai​(x,T)=∑ℓ=1T​x(i,ℓ) is the number of seats state iii holds after TTT seats.

The lookahead Φ(p,H)\Phi(p,H)Φ(p,H) is the number of seats the LP must model so that its first HHH seats are exactly the house-monotone, quota-compliant ones. For a vector yyy and k≥1k\ge1k≥1, let Sk(p,H,y)={i:⌊pi(H+k)/P⌋>yi}S_k(p,H,y)=\{i:\lfloor p_i(H+k)/P\rfloor>y_i\}Sk​(p,H,y)={i:⌊pi​(H+k)/P⌋>yi​}. Let k⋆(p,H,y)k^\star(p,H,y)k⋆(p,H,y) be the least k≥1k\ge1k≥1 with ∑i∈Sk(⌊pi(H+k)/P⌋−yi)≥k\sum_{i\in S_k}(\lfloor p_i(H+k)/P\rfloor-y_i)\ge k∑i∈Sk​​(⌊pi​(H+k)/P⌋−yi​)≥k. Set τ=k⋆\tau=k^\starτ=k⋆ unless Sk⋆=[n]S_{k^\star}=[n]Sk⋆​=[n], in which case τ=1\tau=1τ=1. Then Φ(p,0)=0\Phi(p,0)=0Φ(p,0)=0, Φ(p,1)=min⁡{k≥1:∑i⌊pik/P⌋≥k}\Phi(p,1)=\min\{k\ge1:\sum_i\lfloor p_ik/P\rfloor\ge k\}Φ(p,1)=min{k≥1:∑i​⌊pi​k/P⌋≥k}, and

Φ(p,H+1)=max⁡T∈[H]{T+max⁡{τ(p,T,A(x,T)):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}}.\Phi(p,H+1)=\max_{T\in[H]}\Big\{T+\max\{\tau(p,T,A(x,T)):x\in\mathcal E(p,\Phi(p,H))\}\Big\}.Φ(p,H+1)=T∈[H]max​{T+max{τ(p,T,A(x,T)):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}}.

The Lean names are IsPop, Solution, QuotaCompliant, HouseMonotone, calA, K, calE, A, S, kStar, tau, Phi, all in the namespace MonoApport.Flow.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

A(p,H)={A(x,H):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}for every instance (p,H).\mathcal A(p,H)=\big\{A(x,H): x\in\mathcal E(p,\Phi(p,H))\big\}\qquad\text{for every instance }(p,H).A(p,H)={A(x,H):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}for every instance (p,H).

Milestones

  1. Proposition 8. A solution is house-monotone if and only if f(p,H)≤f(p,H+1)f(p,H)\le f(p,H+1)f(p,H)≤f(p,H+1) for every ppp and HHH.
  2. Total unimodularity (proof of Lemma 3). The matrix with rows ei,te_{i,t}ei,t​, −ei,t-e_{i,t}−ei,t​, et′e'_tet′​, −et′-e'_t−et′​ is totally unimodular. Here ei,te_{i,t}ei,t​ is the prefix-sum row of state iii up to seat ttt, and et′e'_tet′​ is the column-sum row of seat ttt.
  3. Lemma 3. The linear program (1)–(4) is integral: every extreme point has integer coordinates.
  4. Remark after Lemma 3. E(p,L)\mathcal E(p,L)E(p,L) is exactly the set of integer points of K(p,L)K(p,L)K(p,L).
  5. Balinski–Young characterization (§C.4). fff is a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution if and only if, with f(p,0)=0f(p,0)=0f(p,0)=0, each seat H+1H+1H+1 goes to one state of L(p,H,f(p,H))∩U(p,H,f(p,H))\mathcal L(p,H,f(p,H))\cap\mathcal U(p,H,f(p,H))L(p,H,f(p,H))∩U(p,H,f(p,H)). Here L(p,H,y)={i:⌊piP(H+k⋆(p,H,y))⌋>yi}\mathcal L(p,H,y)=\{i:\lfloor\frac{p_i}{P}(H+k^\star(p,H,y))\rfloor>y_i\}L(p,H,y)={i:⌊Ppi​​(H+k⋆(p,H,y))⌋>yi​} and U(p,H,y)={i:piP(H+1)>yi}\mathcal U(p,H,y)=\{i:\frac{p_i}{P}(H+1)>y_i\}U(p,H,y)={i:Ppi​​(H+1)>yi​}.
  6. Lemma 5. If x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))x\in\mathcal E(p,\Phi(p,H))x∈E(p,Φ(p,H)) and T≤H−1T\le H-1T≤H−1, then x(i,T+1)=0x(i,T+1)=0x(i,T+1)=0 for every i∉L(p,T,A(x,T))∩U(p,T,A(x,T))i\notin\mathcal L(p,T,A(x,T))\cap\mathcal U(p,T,A(x,T))i∈/L(p,T,A(x,T))∩U(p,T,A(x,T)).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 turns a recursive definition into a polyhedral one. The apportionments at house size HHH that some house-monotone, quota-compliant solution can produce are the projections of the vertices of a network-flow polytope with Φ(p,H)\Phi(p,H)Φ(p,H) seats. Optimizing a linear objective over all such apportionments is then a linear program of size O(n Φ(p,H))O(n\,\Phi(p,H))O(nΦ(p,H)). The paper also bounds the lookahead: Φ(p,H)−H≤max⁡i⌈P/pi⌉\Phi(p,H)-H\le\max_i\lceil P/p_i\rceilΦ(p,H)−H≤maxi​⌈P/pi​⌉ for H≥2H\ge2H≥2, and the bound is tight up to constants. Through the correspondence between methods and solutions (Lemma 2 of the paper), the theorem also characterizes house-monotone, quota-compliant methods. It underlies the paper's construction of randomized methods that are house-monotone, quota-compliant and ex-ante proportional (Theorem 4).

The formalization. The paper proves Theorem 3. None of the statements here has a machine-checked proof, and the Balinski–Young characterization is cited by the paper rather than proved in it. A formal development would check the full chain: total unimodularity of an interval-type constraint matrix, integrality of the polytope, the lookahead bound of Lemma 5, and the combination with the Balinski–Young construction. It would also make the network-flow polytope and the lookahead Φ\PhiΦ available to later work on apportionment.

Difficulty

The inclusion A(p,H)⊆{A(x,H)}\mathcal A(p,H)\subseteq\{A(x,H)\}A(p,H)⊆{A(x,H)} looks routine: the seat increments of a house-monotone, quota-compliant solution give a 0/1 feasible point. But that point must have Φ(p,H)\Phi(p,H)Φ(p,H) seats, and it must be an extreme point, which requires the integrality of (1)–(4).

The reverse inclusion is the hard part. A vertex of the LP with HHH seats need not extend to a quota-compliant sequence: a seat assignment can respect every quota bound up to HHH and still force a violation a few seats later. The lookahead Φ\PhiΦ is designed so that this cannot happen. However, Φ\PhiΦ is defined by a recursion over extreme points of LPs of other sizes, and it is not monotone in HHH: for p=(1,2)p=(1,2)p=(1,2) the values are Φ=0,3,2,3,4,…\Phi=0,3,2,3,4,\dotsΦ=0,3,2,3,4,…. An argument that truncates a vertex for Φ(p,H)\Phi(p,H)Φ(p,H) seats to one for Φ(p,H−1)\Phi(p,H-1)Φ(p,H−1) seats, or assumes Φ(p,H)≥Φ(p,H−1)\Phi(p,H)\ge\Phi(p,H-1)Φ(p,H)≥Φ(p,H−1), is therefore unavailable.

Closing the inclusion also needs the Balinski–Young construction never to get stuck: L∩U\mathcal L\cap\mathcal UL∩U must be nonempty along every sequence it builds. The paper takes this from Balinski and Young without stating it separately.

Formalization scope

Populations are p : Fin n → ℕ with IsPop p (n>0n>0n>0 and every pi>0p_i>0pi​>0); house sizes carry 0 < H. A solution is one Lean function Solution := ∀ {n}, (Fin n → ℕ) → ℕ → (Fin n → ℕ) defined on vectors of every length. A(p,H)\mathcal A(p,H)A(p,H) quantifies over such families, exactly as in the paper; a per-ppp sequence of apportionments would be a different object. House monotonicity is axiom (c) with three house sizes; the one-step form is Proposition 8, a milestone. LP points with LLL seats are x : Fin n → Fin L → ℝ. Seats are 0-indexed, so column ttt is seat t+1t+1t+1, and the quota bounds at column ttt use t+1t+1t+1. Floors and ceilings are Nat.floor/Nat.ceil of the nonnegative rational quantity computed in R\mathbb RR. E(p,L)\mathcal E(p,L)E(p,L) is Set.extremePoints ℝ (K p L). The minima and maxima defining k⋆k^\stark⋆ and Φ\PhiΦ are sInf/sSup on N\mathbb NN, whose sets are nonempty, and finite where a maximum is taken, wherever they are used. The convention f(p,0)=0f(p,0)=0f(p,0)=0 is the function ext. The goal compares subsets of Rn\mathbb R^nRn: the image of A(p,H)\mathcal A(p,H)A(p,H) under the cast equals {A(x,H)}\{A(x,H)\}{A(x,H)}.

The goal must not be read with integer vectors on both sides. Writing A(p,H)={y:(yi:R)=Ai(x,H) for some x}\mathcal A(p,H)=\{y : (y_i:\mathbb R)=A_i(x,H)\text{ for some }x\}A(p,H)={y:(yi​:R)=Ai​(x,H) for some x} would silently ignore non-integral A(x,H)A(x,H)A(x,H) and empty the inclusion ⊇\supseteq⊇ of its content.

A complete development needs:

  • total unimodularity and the integrality of polytopes with totally unimodular constraints (Hoffman–Kruskal), partly available in Mathlib through Matrix.IsTotallyUnimodular;
  • the finiteness of the extreme points of a polytope;
  • a formal proof of the Balinski–Young characterization, including the nonemptiness of L∩U\mathcal L\cap\mathcal UL∩U along the construction.

The first two are reusable well beyond apportionment. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so are proofs of the cited Balinski–Young theorem and of the properties of Φ\PhiΦ the paper uses (Φ(p,H)≥H\Phi(p,H)\ge HΦ(p,H)≥H, and the finiteness and nonemptiness of the sets in its recursion).

Selected references

  • J. Cembrano, J. Correa, U. Schmidt-Kraepelin, A. Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, V. Verdugo, New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment, arXiv:2410.23869v1, 2024; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23869
  • M. Balinski, H. P. Young, Quotatone apportionment methods, Mathematics of Operations Research 4(1):31–38, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.1.31
  • M. Balinski, H. P. Young, The quota method of apportionment, The American Mathematical Monthly 82(7):701, 1975.
  • M. Balinski, H. P. Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
  • J. W. Still, A class of new methods for congressional apportionment, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 37(2):401–418, 1979.
  • P. Gölz, D. Peters, A. D. Procaccia, In this apportionment lottery, the house always wins, Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2022.
  • A. Ghouila-Houri, Caractérisation des matrices totalement unimodulaires, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris 254:1192–1194, 1962.
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Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions: Allocate Splits the Target Bundle into Demanded Bundles within |J|·C(n+1,2) IterationsResearch Paper

Motivation

The product-mix auction was developed in 2007–8 for the Bank of England (Klemperer 2010) to sell many differentiated goods (loans against different qualities of collateral) in a single round. Each bidder submits a list of simple bids, each naming a price for every good and a quantity, and the auctioneer chooses prices and allocations that respect every bid. Baldwin, Goldberg, Klemperer and Lock (arXiv:1909.07313v3, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) make the auction usable with positive and negative bids, a bidding language that expresses every strong-substitutes valuation (Baldwin–Klemperer 2019). The auctioneer then faces two computational tasks: finding a market-clearing price, and splitting the goods at that price among the bidders so that every bidder receives a bundle it demands. This mission formalizes the second task, the allocation algorithm ALLOCATE and its correctness and iteration bound (Theorem 19, p. 23).

Setting

There are nnn goods [n]={1,…,n}[n]=\{1,\dots,n\}[n]={1,…,n} and a notional reject good 000; [n]0={0,…,n}[n]_0=\{0,\dots,n\}[n]0​={0,…,n}. A price is p∈Rnp\in\mathbb R^np∈Rn, extended by p0=0p_0=0p0​=0. A bid b=(b1,…,bn;w)b=(b_1,\dots,b_n;w)b=(b1​,…,bn​;w) has integer entries and weight w(b)=±1w(b)=\pm1w(b)=±1, with b0=0b_0=0b0​=0. At prices ppp it demands the goods arg⁡max⁡i∈[n]0(bi−pi)\arg\max_{i\in[n]_0}(b_i-p_i)argmaxi∈[n]0​​(bi​−pi​) and is marginal if it demands more than one. Where no bid of a list B\mathcal BB is marginal, the list demands the bundle ∑bw(b)ei(b)\sum_{b}w(b)e^{i(b)}∑b​w(b)ei(b), with i(b)i(b)i(b) the good bbb demands. In general the demand DB(p)D_{\mathcal B}(p)DB​(p) is the discrete convex hull conv⁡(X)∩Zn\operatorname{conv}(X)\cap\mathbb Z^nconv(X)∩Zn of the set XXX of bundles demanded at non-marginal prices arbitrarily close to ppp. The indirect utility function is

fB(p)=∑b∈Bw(b)max⁡i∈[n]0(bi−pi),f_{\mathcal B}(p)=\sum_{b\in\mathcal B}w(b)\max_{i\in[n]_0}(b_i-p_i),fB​(p)=b∈B∑​w(b)i∈[n]0​max​(bi​−pi​),

and B\mathcal BB is valid if fBf_{\mathcal B}fB​ is convex. It is ε\varepsilonε-valid at ppp if fBf_{\mathcal B}fB​ is convex on the open L∞L^\inftyL∞-ball B(p;ε)B(p;\varepsilon)B(p;ε), and locally valid if it is ε\varepsilonε-valid for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0.

Each bidder j∈Jj\in Jj∈J has a valid list Bj\mathcal B^jBj; the aggregate list B\mathcal BB is their concatenation. The allocation problem (§2.5): given an integral price ppp and a target bundle t∈DB(p)t\in D_{\mathcal B}(p)t∈DB​(p), find bundles tj∈DBj(p)t^j\in D_{\mathcal B^j}(p)tj∈DBj​(p) with ∑jtj=t\sum_j t^j=t∑j​tj=t.

ALLOCATE works on generalised allocation problems A=[p,(Bj),(mj),r]\mathcal A=[p,(\mathcal B^j),(m^j),r]A=[p,(Bj),(mj),r] (Definition 4), with partial allocations mjm^jmj and residual supply rrr. Its progress is measured by the marginal bids graph GAG_{\mathcal A}GA​: the multigraph on [n]0[n]_0[n]0​ with an edge {i,i′}\{i,i'\}{i,i′} labelled jjj whenever bidder jjj has a bid demanding both iii and i′i'i′. Each loop iteration calls FindParams, which returns either a demand cluster (a connected component of the jjj-labelled edges) with at most one link good, or a cycle-link good i∗i^*i∗ of a multi-bidder cycle with an incident label j∗j^*j∗. It then runs UnambiguousMarginals on the cluster or ShiftProjectUnshift on (i∗,j∗)(i^*,j^*)(i∗,j∗), followed by NonMarginals. ShiftProjectUnshift shifts j∗j^*j∗'s bids by 110ei∗\tfrac1{10}e^{i^*}101​ei∗ and finds a nearby price pεp^\varepsilonpε by submodular function minimisation (SFM) on the Lyapunov function g(q)=fB′(q)+r⋅qg(q)=f_{\mathcal B'}(q)+r\cdot qg(q)=fB′​(q)+r⋅q. It then projects every bid, undoes the shift, and returns to ppp.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 19

For valid integral bid lists with weights ±1\pm1±1, an integral ppp and t∈DB(p)t\in D_{\mathcal B}(p)t∈DB​(p), any FindParams output rule meeting Lemma 10 and any SFM oracle that minimises submodular functions, there is

k≤∣J∣(n+12)k\le |J|\binom{n+1}{2}k≤∣J∣(2n+1​)

such that after kkk loop iterations every bid list is empty, every SFM call made was on a submodular function, and the partial allocations satisfy ∑jmj=t\sum_j m^j=t∑j​mj=t with mj∈DBj(p)m^j\in D_{\mathcal B^j}(p)mj∈DBj​(p).

Milestones

  • Proposition 6 (local validity criterion) and Lemma 9 (surplus gaps give a radius of validity).
  • Theorem 4, posed for valid bid lists: some partition t=∑jtjt=\sum_j t^jt=∑j​tj with tj∈DBj(p)t^j\in D_{\mathcal B^j}(p)tj∈DBj​(p) exists.
  • Lemma 11 (NonMarginals), Lemma 10 (FindParams' outputs), Lemma 12 (UnambiguousMarginals deletes an edge).
  • Lemma 13 (shifting keeps local validity), Lemma 26 (inverses of strong-substitutes matrices), Proposition 14 (after a shift, rrr is demanded at some p±εeSp\pm\varepsilon e^Sp±εeS, found by SFM), Lemma 16 (projection).
  • Lemma 18 (ShiftProjectUnshift is a reduction) and Lemma 17 (it deletes an edge).

Significance

Theorem 19 is the paper's main contribution (p. 5). With the price-finding method of §3 it makes the strong-substitutes product-mix auction computable in polynomial time, using only the bids. The allocation step is the delicate one: at a market-clearing price, bidders cannot simply be given any bundle they demand (p. 12), and random perturbation would need exponentially small amounts. The authors report Haskell and Python implementations of both algorithms and experiments on random instances (pp. 5, 27–28).

The paper proves the result, but no part of it is machine-checked. The mission adds to the platform a bidding-language layer (bids, demand as a discrete convex hull, local validity) and an algorithmic layer (allocation problems, valid reductions, the marginal bids multigraph, an SFM oracle). Both layers are reusable for later work on product-mix auctions and on discrete-convex equilibrium computation. Formalizing the proof will also check two printed slips found during planning: the definition of a closed path in FindParams, and the second Lyapunov difference h−h^-h−.

Difficulty

Dividing ttt bid by bid fails: each bid's choice among its demanded goods is constrained by the others, and independent choices can leave DBj(p)D_{\mathcal B^j}(p)DBj​(p) (p. 10). The two procedures that allocate directly cover only demand clusters with at most one link good. When ties form a cycle through several bidders, the algorithm must change the problem without losing a solution. The step to justify is Proposition 14: after a 110\tfrac1{10}101​-shift of one bidder, the residual supply is still demanded at a price of the special form p±εeSp\pm\varepsilon e^Sp±εeS. This needs local strong-substitutes valuations, the matrix identity of Lemma 26 and an integrality argument. The edge count drops in Lemma 17 because the shift enters a telescoped cycle identity exactly once. Local validity must also be tracked through every removal of bids (Proposition 6, Lemma 9), since global validity is lost after the first NonMarginals call.

Formalization scope

Goods [n]0[n]_0[n]0​ are Fin (n + 1), with 0 the reject good. Prices are Fin n → ℝ, extended by p0=0p_0=0p0​=0; the L∞L^\inftyL∞ ball is Metric.ball on Fin n → ℝ. Input bids are integral (IntBid). The run uses real bid vectors (Bid), because of the 110\tfrac1{10}101​ shifts, and does not force the reject entry to 000: ShiftProjectUnshift is read literally when i∗=0i^*=0i∗=0. Bid lists are Lists. Bundles, partial allocations and residuals are ℤ-valued and carry a reject coordinate; the goal drops it. Demand is one definition, the discrete convex hull of nearby non-marginal bundles, used at every price.

FindParams is "not fully specified" (p. 23). The goal quantifies over every selector that returns what Lemma 10 allows, which covers every walk of FindParams and PriorityParams. Lemma 10 is posed with the corrected notion of a closed path; a counterexample to the printed one is in its statement. The SFM oracle is arbitrary on non-submodular inputs, and the goal asserts that every call it receives is submodular. Running time is rendered as the iteration bound ∣J∣(n+12)|J|\binom{n+1}2∣J∣(2n+1​) together with the per-iteration structure (one selector call, at most two SFM calls). No machine model is formalized. Submodularity is the published NonmonotoneSubmod.Shared.Submodular.

The goal is not "an allocation exists" (that is Theorem 4) and not "the loop terminates" (that drops the bound). It is not posed for one fixed FindParams implementation or for an oracle correct on every input, which would narrow the quantifiers. It does not leave the oracle unconstrained without the genuineness clause, which would let a junk price through.

Contributions welcome: the bid-list layer (Proposition 6, Lemmas 9, 13, 16), the combinatorics of GAG_{\mathcal A}GA​ (Lemmas 10, 12, 17) and the matrix Lemma 26 are independent entry points.

Selected references

  • E. Baldwin, P. W. Goldberg, P. Klemperer, E. Lock, Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024; arXiv:1909.07313v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.07313v3
  • E. Baldwin, P. Klemperer, Understanding Preferences: "Demand Types", and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities, Econometrica 87(3), 2019. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13693
  • P. Klemperer, The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods, Journal of the European Economic Association 8(2–3), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00531.x
  • A. Shioura, A. Tamura, Gross Substitutes Condition and Discrete Concavity for Multi-Unit Valuations: A Survey, Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan 58(1), 2015. https://doi.org/10.15807/jorsj.58.61
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Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations: Duplicating a Strategy Commutes with the (μ,γ)-Decomposition into Potential, Harmonic and Nonstrategic ComponentsResearch Paper

Motivation

A finite game can be split into simpler pieces. Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo (Math. Oper. Res. 36 (2011)) showed that the space of finite games is the direct sum of potential, harmonic and nonstrategic games: potential games have pure equilibria and well-behaved learning dynamics, harmonic games generalize matching pennies, and nonstrategic games do not affect anyone's incentives. The decomposition is used to approximate a game by the closest potential game and to transfer equilibrium and dynamics results from the potential component to the original game.

Their decomposition depends on a uniform measure on each strategy set and an unweighted inner product. As a result it is not invariant under transformations that leave the strategic content of a game unchanged. The most basic such transformation is duplicating a strategy: giving a player a second, payoff-identical copy of one of her strategies. Abdou, Pnevmatikos, Scarsini and Venel (arXiv:1901.06048v2, 2020; Math. Oper. Res. 2022) introduce a weighted family of decompositions, parametrized by a measure vector and a co-measure vector, and show that duplication commutes with it once the weights are transformed accordingly. This mission formalizes that result together with the weighted decomposition it rests on.

Setting

There is a finite set NNN of players. Player iii has a finite strategy set SiS^iSi; S=∏i∈NSiS=\prod_{i\in N}S^iS=∏i∈N​Si is the set of profiles sss, s−is^{-i}s−i is sss without player iii, and (ti,s−i)(t^i,s^{-i})(ti,s−i) is sss with player iii's strategy replaced by tit^iti. A game is a vector g=(gi)i∈Ng=(g^i)_{i\in N}g=(gi)i∈N​ of payoff functions gi:S→Rg^i:S\to\mathbb Rgi:S→R; the games form a real vector space G\mathcal GG.

A measure vector μ=(μi)i∈N\mu=(\mu^i)_{i\in N}μ=(μi)i∈N​ assigns a strictly positive weight μi(si)\mu^i(s^i)μi(si) to every strategy; μ(s)=∏iμi(si)\mu(s)=\prod_i\mu^i(s^i)μ(s)=∏i​μi(si) is the product measure and μi(Si)\mu^i(S^i)μi(Si) the total mass. A co-measure vector γ=(γi)i∈N\gamma=(\gamma^i)_{i\in N}γ=(γi)i∈N​ assigns to player iii a strictly positive function γi(s−i)\gamma^i(s^{-i})γi(s−i) of the other players' strategies. A game ggg is

  • nonstrategic if each gi(si,s−i)g^i(s^i,s^{-i})gi(si,s−i) does not depend on sis^isi;
  • μ\muμ-normalized if ∑siμi(si)gi(si,s−i)=0\sum_{s^i}\mu^i(s^i)g^i(s^i,s^{-i})=0∑si​μi(si)gi(si,s−i)=0 for every iii and s−is^{-i}s−i;
  • γ\gammaγ-potential if some Ψ:S→R\Psi:S\to\mathbb RΨ:S→R satisfies γi(s−i)(gi(ti,s−i)−gi(si,s−i))=Ψ(ti,s−i)−Ψ(si,s−i)\gamma^i(s^{-i})\big(g^i(t^i,s^{-i})-g^i(s^i,s^{-i})\big)=\Psi(t^i,s^{-i})-\Psi(s^i,s^{-i})γi(s−i)(gi(ti,s−i)−gi(si,s−i))=Ψ(ti,s−i)−Ψ(si,s−i);
  • (μ,γ)(\mu,\gamma)(μ,γ)-harmonic if ∑i∑tiμi(ti)γi(s−i)(gi(si,s−i)−gi(ti,s−i))=0\sum_i\sum_{t^i}\mu^i(t^i)\gamma^i(s^{-i})\big(g^i(s^i,s^{-i})-g^i(t^i,s^{-i})\big)=0∑i​∑ti​μi(ti)γi(s−i)(gi(si,s−i)−gi(ti,s−i))=0 for every sss.

Games carry the inner product ⟨g1,g2⟩μ,γ=∑iμi(Si)∑sμ(s)γi(s−i)2g1i(s)g2i(s)\langle g_1,g_2\rangle_{\mu,\gamma}=\sum_i\mu^i(S^i)\sum_s\mu(s)\gamma^i(s^{-i})^2g_1^i(s)g_2^i(s)⟨g1​,g2​⟩μ,γ​=∑i​μi(Si)∑s​μ(s)γi(s−i)2g1i​(s)g2i​(s).

Duplication. Collapse each strategy set by a map πj:S′j→Sj\pi^j:S'^j\to S^jπj:S′j→Sj. The extended game is gˇj(s′)=gj(π(s′))\check g^j(s')=g^j(\pi(s'))gˇ​j(s′)=gj(π(s′)), the extended co-measure is γˇj(s′)=γj(π(s′))\check\gamma^j(s')=\gamma^j(\pi(s'))γˇ​j(s′)=γj(π(s′)), and an extension μˇ\check\muμˇ​ of μ\muμ is any strictly positive measure vector whose mass on each fibre (πj)−1(a)(\pi^j)^{-1}(a)(πj)−1(a) is μj(a)\mu^j(a)μj(a). Duplicating s1is^i_1s1i​ into s0i,s1is^i_0,s^i_1s0i​,s1i​ is the case S′i=Si∪{s0i}S'^i=S^i\cup\{s^i_0\}S′i=Si∪{s0i​}, πi(s0i)=s1i\pi^i(s^i_0)=s^i_1πi(s0i​)=s1i​, all other maps the identity: then μˇi(s0i)+μˇi(s1i)=μi(s1i)\check\mu^i(s^i_0)+\check\mu^i(s^i_1)=\mu^i(s^i_1)μˇ​i(s0i​)+μˇ​i(s1i​)=μi(s1i​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.15

Write (gNS,gP,gH)(g_{\text{NS}},g_{\text{P}},g_{\text{H}})(gNS​,gP​,gH​) for the (μ,γ)(\mu,\gamma)(μ,γ)-decomposition of ggg. Then

(gˇ)(μˇ,γˇ)-NS=gˇNS,(gˇ)(μˇ,γˇ)-P=gˇP,(gˇ)(μˇ,γˇ)-H=gˇH,\big(\check g\big)_{(\check\mu,\check\gamma)\text{-NS}}=\check g_{\text{NS}},\qquad \big(\check g\big)_{(\check\mu,\check\gamma)\text{-P}}=\check g_{\text{P}},\qquad \big(\check g\big)_{(\check\mu,\check\gamma)\text{-H}}=\check g_{\text{H}},(gˇ​)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-NS​=gˇ​NS​,(gˇ​)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-P​=gˇ​P​,(gˇ​)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-H​=gˇ​H​,

stated as: a triple of games on S′S'S′ is a (μˇ,γˇ)(\check\mu,\check\gamma)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-decomposition of gˇ\check ggˇ​ if and only if it equals the extension of (gNS,gP,gH)(g_{\text{NS}},g_{\text{P}},g_{\text{H}})(gNS​,gP​,gH​). Both directions are content: one is uniqueness for the extended weights, the other the invariance of each class.

The weighted decomposition: Theorem 2.11

G=(μ-NoG∩γ-PG)⊕μ,γ(μ-NoG∩(μ,γ)-HG)⊕μ,γNSG,\mathcal G=(\mu\text{-NoG}\cap\gamma\text{-PG})\oplus_{\mu,\gamma}(\mu\text{-NoG}\cap(\mu,\gamma)\text{-HG})\oplus_{\mu,\gamma}\mathsf{NSG},G=(μ-NoG∩γ-PG)⊕μ,γ​(μ-NoG∩(μ,γ)-HG)⊕μ,γ​NSG,

every game having exactly one decomposition and the three classes being pairwise orthogonal. Proposition 2.10 (G=μ-NoG⊕μ,γNSG\mathcal G=\mu\text{-NoG}\oplus_{\mu,\gamma}\mathsf{NSG}G=μ-NoG⊕μ,γ​NSG) and Lemma 3.14 (each class is preserved by extension) are the other main milestones; Lemmas A.1–A.11 and Propositions A.3–A.9 of the appendix are the intermediate steps, in the order of the milestone list.

Significance

The result says that the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic parts of a game are properties of its strategic content and not of the way it is written down, provided the measure is split among copies of a strategy and the co-measure is copied. Duplicate strategies appear whenever a game is derived from an extensive form or a mechanism, so a decomposition that is not invariant under duplication assigns different "closest potential games" to the same strategic situation. The same weighted machinery gives the paper's invariance results for relabellings and scalings and the elimination of duplicates (Theorem 3.19, derived from Theorem 3.15).

All results are proved in the paper. None of them is formalized: the platform has the uniform-weight decomposition of Candogan et al. (Theorem 4.1 of that paper, proved), with an unweighted inner product and a pseudo-inverse-based definition of the projections, but no weighted classes, no co-measures and no statement about duplication. This mission adds the weighted definitions, the weighted decomposition with its uniqueness and orthogonality, and the commutation theorem.

Difficulty

The commutation is an immediate consequence of two facts, and both carry the work. The first is uniqueness of the (μˇ,γˇ)(\check\mu,\check\gamma)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-decomposition on the larger profile set: this is Theorem 2.11 itself, whose proof needs the weighted flow operators, their adjoints and the orthogonality of normalized potential and normalized harmonic games under ⟨⋅,⋅⟩μ,γ\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_{\mu,\gamma}⟨⋅,⋅⟩μ,γ​. The second is that extension preserves each class, which fails for the obvious guess at the extended co-measure: the definition printed in the paper splits γj\gamma^jγj between the two copies, and with that choice a potential game's extension is no longer potential. Only the copied co-measure works. The weights also matter for normalization: without splitting μi(s1i)\mu^i(s^i_1)μi(s1i​) between the copies the extended game is not normalized.

Formalization scope

  • Players are a finite type ι, strategy sets finite types S i, profiles ∀ i, S i, and (ti,s−i)(t^i,s^{-i})(ti,s−i) is Function.update s i t. A game is ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ.
  • Measures are point-mass functions μ i : S i → ℝ with strict positivity as a hypothesis; a co-measure γ i is a positive function of the full profile that is invariant under changing coordinate i.
  • The standing assumptions n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and ∣Si∣≥2|S^i|\ge2∣Si∣≥2 are dropped; all statements hold without them.
  • The (μ,γ)(\mu,\gamma)(μ,γ)-decomposition is the predicate IsDecomposition μ γ g n p h in the order (nonstrategic, potential, harmonic) of (2.18); no decomposition function is defined, since Theorem 2.11 makes the triple unique.
  • Inner products are explicit finite sums: ⟨⋅,⋅⟩0\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_0⟨⋅,⋅⟩0​ with the unnormalized product measure, ⟨⋅,⋅⟩μ,γ\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_{\mu,\gamma}⟨⋅,⋅⟩μ,γ​ with the factor μi(Si)\mu^i(S^i)μi(Si), and ⟨⋅,⋅⟩1\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_1⟨⋅,⋅⟩1​ on flows with the factor 12\tfrac1221​. Flows are functions on pairs with a skew-symmetry hypothesis; δi∗\delta^{i*}δi∗ is defined by its explicit formula, and Proposition A.3 states that it is the adjoint.
  • Duplication is generalized to arbitrary collapsing maps π\piπ, which covers Definition 3.13 and iterated duplications. The extended co-measure is the copy γ∘π\gamma\circ\piγ∘π; the paper's printed sum version makes Lemma 3.14 and Theorem 3.15 false, and the copy is what its proof uses.
  • Lemma A.11 is stated for every solution of the normal equation δ∗δφ=δ∗D(g)\delta^*\delta\varphi=\delta^*D(g)δ∗δφ=δ∗D(g), together with existence of a solution, instead of through the Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse.

A statement asserting only that the extended triple is a (μˇ,γˇ)(\check\mu,\check\gamma)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-decomposition of gˇ\check ggˇ​ would be Lemma 3.14 and not the goal: the goal also excludes every other decomposition.

The weighted classes, inner products and flow operators are reusable for the paper's other invariance results (relabelling, pseudo-translations, scalings, elimination of duplicates) and for weighted versions of the closest-potential-game problem. Proofs of any milestone are welcome; the appendix lemmas are independent finite linear-algebra statements.

Selected references

  • J. Abdou, N. Pnevmatikos, M. Scarsini, X. Venel, Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations, arXiv:1901.06048v2, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research 47(1), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.06048v2
  • O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, P. A. Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3), 474–503, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0500
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14(1), 124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
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Search for an Immobile Hider on a Binary Tree with Unreliable Locational Information: The Value Is 2qμ + (p − q)D, Attained by the Recursive Hider Distribution and the Favoring-Bias SearcherResearch Paper

Searching a tree with unreliable directions

Search games model a Searcher looking for an object or a person whose location is chosen adversarially: a lost hiker, a mine, a hidden explosive device, a fugitive. In the classic search game on a tree, a Hider stands still at a point of a tree network, and a Searcher starts from the root and moves at unit speed. The payoff is the time to find the Hider. Gal (1979) solved this game for every tree. Its value is the total length μ\muμ of the tree, and an optimal Searcher randomizes over depth-first searches.

In practice, searchers often get hints: a witness who saw the hiker turn left, a sensor reading, a dog that picks one trail. Such hints are useful but fallible. Alpern and Lidbetter (arXiv:2303.13378, Operations Research, 2025) model this by a signal at each branching point. The signal points to the branch containing the Hider and is correct with a known probability p>12p>\tfrac12p>21​. They solve the resulting game exactly on every binary tree. The value, the optimal Hider distribution and the optimal Searcher strategy are all given in closed form by a recursion on the tree.

Timeline. Gal (1979) solved the game without signals on trees, with value μ\muμ. Biased depth-first strategies of the Searcher were introduced in other contexts by Alpern (2010) and by Alpern and Lidbetter (2014). Alpern and Lidbetter (2025) solved the game with signals of accuracy ppp, which as p→12p\to\tfrac12p→21​ reduces to Gal's.

The game G(Q,O,p)G(Q,O,p)G(Q,O,p)

A rooted tree (Q,O)(Q,O)(Q,O) is a finite tree whose arcs have positive lengths, with a distinguished root OOO. Write μ=μ(Q)\mu=\mu(Q)μ=μ(Q) for its total length and d(O,v)d(O,v)d(O,v) for the distance from the root to a node vvv. Every node other than the root has degree three (a branch node) or one (a leaf node). The root has degree one or two, and in the second case it is also a branch node. At a branch node jjj, the part of the tree beyond jjj splits into two branches Q1Q_1Q1​ and Q2Q_2Q2​.

The Hider picks a leaf node. The Searcher performs a depth-first search from OOO at unit speed. On her first arrival at a branch node jjj on the way to the Hider she receives a signal, either 1 or 2, naming the branch that contains the Hider. It is correct with probability ppp and wrong with probability q=1−pq=1-pq=1−p, where 12<p≤1\tfrac12<p\le121​<p≤1. She then chooses which branch to search first, as a function of the signal. There are four such actions: [1,1][1,1][1,1] and [2,2][2,2][2,2] ignore the signal, [1,2][1,2][1,2] follows it, and [2,1][2,1][2,1] does the opposite. If she enters the wrong branch first she searches all of it and returns, which costs twice its length. The payoff TTT is the time until she reaches the Hider. The Hider maximizes TTT and the Searcher minimizes its expectation.

The mean depth of QQQ with respect to a probability distribution λ\lambdaλ on its leaf nodes LLL is

D(Q,O,λ)=∑v∈Lλ(v) d(O,v).D(Q,O,\lambda)=\sum_{v\in L}\lambda(v)\,d(O,v).D(Q,O,λ)=v∈L∑​λ(v)d(O,v).

The Hider distribution λˉQ\bar\lambda_QλˉQ​ is defined by recursion on the tree. On a single arc it is the point mass at its leaf. At a root of degree one it is the distribution of the subtree. At a branch root with branches Q1,Q2Q_1,Q_2Q1​,Q2​ of lengths μ1,μ2\mu_1,\mu_2μ1​,μ2​, call Q1Q_1Q1​ the favored branch if DQ1≥DQ2D_{Q_1}\ge D_{Q_2}DQ1​​≥DQ2​​, where DQi=D(Qi,λˉQi)D_{Q_i}=D(Q_i,\bar\lambda_{Q_i})DQi​​=D(Qi​,λˉQi​​). Then

λˉ(v)=pμ1pμ1+qμ2 λˉQ1(v)  (v∈Q1),λˉ(v)=qμ2pμ1+qμ2 λˉQ2(v)  (v∈Q2).\bar\lambda(v)=\frac{p\mu_1}{p\mu_1+q\mu_2}\,\bar\lambda_{Q_1}(v)\ \ (v\in Q_1),\qquad \bar\lambda(v)=\frac{q\mu_2}{p\mu_1+q\mu_2}\,\bar\lambda_{Q_2}(v)\ \ (v\in Q_2).λˉ(v)=pμ1​+qμ2​pμ1​​λˉQ1​​(v)  (v∈Q1​),λˉ(v)=pμ1​+qμ2​qμ2​​λˉQ2​​(v)  (v∈Q2​).

Write DQ=D(Q,O,λˉQ)D_Q=D(Q,O,\bar\lambda_Q)DQ​=D(Q,O,λˉQ​). At a branch node with favored branch Q1Q_1Q1​, the favoring bias is

β=(p−q)(DQ1−DQ2)2(pμ1+qμ2).\beta=\frac{(p-q)(D_{Q_1}-D_{Q_2})}{2(p\mu_1+q\mu_2)}.β=2(pμ1​+qμ2​)(p−q)(DQ1​​−DQ2​​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

For every rooted tree with positive arc lengths and every 12<p≤1\tfrac12<p\le121​<p≤1:

  1. the value of G(Q,O,p)G(Q,O,p)G(Q,O,p) is
V(Q)=2qμ+(p−q)DQ;V(Q)=2q\mu+(p-q)D_Q;V(Q)=2qμ+(p−q)DQ​;
  1. λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ is an optimal Hider strategy;
  2. the Searcher strategy that, at every branch node, searches the favored branch first with probability β\betaβ and otherwise follows the signal is optimal.

All three parts are stated, for every tree and every ppp in the model's range. Nothing is fixed to a special tree or a special ppp.

Milestones

  • V(Q)=ℓ+V(Q′)V(Q)=\ell+V(Q')V(Q)=ℓ+V(Q′) at a root of degree one (proof of Theorem 7, p. 10).
  • Proposition 6: DQ=ℓ+DQ′D_Q=\ell+D_{Q'}DQ​=ℓ+DQ′​ at a degree-one root, and DQ=pμ1DQ1+qμ2DQ2pμ1+qμ2D_Q=\dfrac{p\mu_1D_{Q_1}+q\mu_2D_{Q_2}}{p\mu_1+q\mu_2}DQ​=pμ1​+qμ2​pμ1​DQ1​​+qμ2​DQ2​​​ at a branch root with Q1Q_1Q1​ favored.
  • Table 1: at a branch root, the game has the value of a 2×42\times42×4 matrix game whose entries are the lengths and values of the two branches (pp. 10–11).
  • "Follow" dominates "opposite": the two columns differ by (2μ2(2p−1), 2μ1(2p−1))(2\mu_2(2p-1),\,2\mu_1(2p-1))(2μ2​(2p−1),2μ1​(2p−1)) (p. 11).
  • Lemma 2: the game has a value, and it is at most μ\muμ.

What the result gives

The theorem gives a complete closed-form solution of a search game with imperfect information, on every tree. The value interpolates between Gal's μ\muμ (as p→12p\to\tfrac12p→21​) and the mean depth DQD_QDQ​ (at p=1p=1p=1). It quantifies how much a signal of accuracy ppp is worth to the Searcher. It also shows that always following the signal is almost never optimal: the Searcher should sometimes go to the favored branch without looking at the signal. The paper derives explicit formulas for penultimate nodes (Corollary 8), monotonicity of the value in ppp (Proposition 9) and the value on trees of constant depth (Corollary 10) from it.

The result is proved in the paper. To our knowledge no part of it has a machine-checked proof, and Gal's theorem for the game without signals is not formalized either. This mission produces a formal model of depth-first search games on weighted trees together with the full solution of the signal game. The model consists of trees as an inductive type, leaves and branch nodes as finite types, and the expected search time of a pure strategy.

Where the difficulty lies

The natural induction on the tree has to compare games of different sizes. At a branch root, the Searcher's pure strategies on the whole tree are combinations of a root action and arbitrary pure strategies on both branches. Reducing this game to the 2×42\times42×4 matrix of Table 1 requires an argument that optimal play in the branches can be composed with the root choice in both directions. A Hider strategy must be shown to guarantee the value against every combination, not only against strategies of the β-form. The mixing weights of the Hider distribution also depend on mean depths that are themselves defined through the distribution, so the induction must carry the identity of Proposition 6 alongside the value. Solving the 2×42\times42×4 game then needs the sign of the slope (p−q)(DQ1−DQ2)(p-q)(D_{Q_1}-D_{Q_2})(p−q)(DQ1​​−DQ2​​) and Lemma 2's bound V≤μV\le\muV≤μ on each branch. A Hider distribution proportional to lengths, which is optimal without signals, is not optimal here.

Formalization scope

Trees are an inductive type RTree with constructors for a single arc, an arc leading to a subtree, and a fork with two branches. This also admits interior nodes of degree two and forks whose branches start with a fork, which is the paper's own conversion of arbitrary trees to binary trees by arcs of length zero. Every arc has positive length. Signals and branches are booleans, and an action is a map from signals to the branch searched first. A pure Searcher strategy assigns an action to every branch node. The payoff is the expected search time. Signals off the path to the Hider do not matter, so it is computed from the marginal law of each signal on the path, and no joint law is assumed. Mixed strategies are probability vectors over all pure strategies. Value and optimality are the published matrix-game notions ZeroSumLP.DantzigExt.MatrixGame (min-max and max-min strategies of a finite zero-sum game). On a tie DQ1=DQ2D_{Q_1}=D_{Q_2}DQ1​​=DQ2​​ branch 1 is favored, and then β=0\beta=0β=0.

Neither the value nor the mean depth is defined by the formulas being proved. The value is the matrix-game value of the expected-time matrix. The mean depth is the sum of Definition 3, not the recursion of Proposition 6. The Hider's optimality must hold against every pure Searcher strategy.

A complete development needs finite sums over the leaves of a tree, the expected-time recursion, minimax for the 2×42\times42×4 game, and the induction of Theorem 7. The tree model and the fact that a finite game's value composes over subtrees can be reused for other search games on trees. Contributions to any milestone, or to Gal's theorem as a by-product, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Alpern, T. Lidbetter, Search for an Immobile Hider on a Binary Tree with Unreliable Locational Information, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2303.13378v2 (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13378
  • S. Gal, Search games with mobile and immobile hider, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 17(1), 99–122, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1137/0317009
  • S. Alpern, Search games on trees with asymmetric travel times, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 48(8), 5547–5563, 2010.
  • S. Alpern, T. Lidbetter, Searching a variable speed network, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(3), 697–711, 2014.
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Algebraic TopologyDifferential Geometry·Captain: xwh

Negative Einstein four-manifolds with b2=0b_2=0b2​=0 have nontrivial fundamental groupOpen Problem

Negative Einstein geometry and four-dimensional topology

An Einstein metric is a smooth positive-definite Riemannian metric whose Ricci tensor is a constant multiple of the metric. This mission asks whether negative Einstein curvature can coexist with simple connectedness and vanishing second real homology on a closed four-manifold. It contains one geometric conjecture. The separate K24 change-of-slice program has its own research specification and is not a second goal of this mission.

Exact research question

Let MMM be a closed, connected, orientable smooth manifold of real dimension four. Here closed means compact without boundary. Let ggg be a smooth Riemannian metric. Suppose one real number λ<0\lambda<0λ<0, independent of the point, satisfies Ric⁡g=λg\operatorname{Ric}_g=\lambda gRicg​=λg, and suppose H2(M;R)=0H_2(M;\mathbb R)=0H2​(M;R)=0, equivalently b2(M)=0b_2(M)=0b2​(M)=0. Prove or disprove:

∀p∈M,π1(M,p)≠{1}.\forall p\in M,\qquad \pi_1(M,p)\ne\{1\}.∀p∈M,π1​(M,p)={1}.

The conclusion is nontriviality, not infinitude. There is no assumption about sectional curvature, curvature pinching, symmetry, volume, collapse, or a prescribed decomposition. The target is not restricted to the standard smooth sphere: the potential class of arbitrary smooth homotopy four-spheres must be respected.

Formal statement and definitions

The mission reuses the published EinsteinFour definition bundle, then adds NegativeEinsteinFour. Smooth metrics live on the actual tangent bundle. The negative Einstein condition uses one spatially constant negative scalar and the coordinate Ricci tensor, with the sign convention giving positive Ricci curvature on the round sphere. Orientability is encoded by a clopen orientation component selection in the orthonormal-frame bundle. The second-homology condition uses the actual real singular homology object being zero; the conclusion uses the actual based fundamental group.

The exact environment is Lean leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib 0df444a360eaa60ab8c11dca51a86af692955474. Both definition files and the conjecture declaration compiled successfully on October 23, using precompiled Mathlib artifacts. The definitions contain no sorry; the conjecture has the required unproved placeholder. Independent Astra Ultra blind read-back and subsequent source comparison found no substantive mismatch in the hypotheses, conclusion, curvature convention, or boundary cases. Formal equivalence lemmas connecting the coordinate model to conventional intrinsic formulations are not included as separate Lean results.

Successful declaration compilation does not prove the conjecture. Future contributions must preserve its assumptions and scope. A disproof must construct a counterexample to the fully quantified statement, and a reduction must explicitly identify every remaining open child theorem.

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🏆Completed
cryptographyInformation Theory·Captain: queelius

GBFPlus: disclosure from public occupancyResearch Paper

Public occupancy as an observation

A data structure can hide each stored share individually while revealing their joint value through its visible layout. This distinction matters when a ledger publishes both a collection of shares and the markers identifying which cells were filled by genuine insertions. The GBFPlus protocol records cross-domain transfers in ledger attestations and uses a shared word containing an adjacent-domain identifier. Alexander Richard Towell's note identifies an allowed singleton snapshot in which its occupied cells reveal that identifier directly. The note also gives a sufficient occupied-count certificate for recovering an aggregate from a larger batch. These are the two results targeted here. Towell, v1.0.0

The observer in that setting is a reader of a permissioned ledger. Public visibility means visibility to such a reader, not unrestricted Internet access. The source protocol's construction, publication rules and adjacent-domain recovery checks provide the context; the contribution is limited to the particular metadata and view analyzed in the note. Qin et al., GBFPlus

A finite honest insertion history

A snapshot is an array of mmm cells. Each cell is either empty or occupied by a λ\lambdaλ-bit word. An occupied all-zero word is distinguishable from an empty cell. Public parameters include the share count κ\kappaκ, with 1≤κ≤m1\le\kappa\le m1≤κ≤m, and the identifier width ℓ\ellℓ, with 0<ℓ<λ0<\ell<\lambda0<ℓ<λ.

A row consists of a set SiS_iSi​ of exactly κ\kappaκ distinct positions, a (λ−ℓ)(\lambda-\ell)(λ−ℓ)-bit prefix PiP_iPi​ and an ℓ\ellℓ-bit adjacent-domain identifier NiN_iNi​. Its target is their concatenation Ti=Pi∥NiT_i=P_i\Vert N_iTi​=Pi​∥Ni​. The array starts empty. A successful insertion reserves an empty selected cell, retains existing occupied words, fills the other empty selected cells with free words, and sets the reserved cell to the residual required by the target. If every selected cell is already occupied, the insertion fails and leaves the array unchanged. These operations follow the construction preceding the note's two propositions. Towell, Section 2

An honest history is a finite sequence of attempts satisfying those rules at every step. Its successful rows and count ccc are derived from that sequence; an independently asserted integer is not substituted for ccc. Let OOO be the final occupied set, w=∣O∣w=|O|w=∣O∣, and ZjZ_jZj​ its occupied words. The public recovery statistic is

R(Z)=suffix⁡ℓ ⁣(⨁j∈OZj).R(Z)=\operatorname{suffix}_{\ell}\!\left(\bigoplus_{j\in O}Z_j\right).R(Z)=suffixℓ​​j∈O⨁​Zj​​.

The statistic takes the snapshot and public widths. It does not take a secret prefix, query token, selected support or insertion history as an input.

Formalization targets

The goal is Proposition 1, singleton disclosure: for every honest history with exactly one successful row,

c=1⟹R(Z)=N1.c=1\quad\Longrightarrow\quad R(Z)=N_1.c=1⟹R(Z)=N1​.

It quantifies over every admitted position set, prefix, pivot and free-share realization. The Lean statement names the sole row by requiring that the derived successful-row list is its singleton list. Towell, Proposition 1

The supporting milestones are:

  1. Honest-history invariants: final occupancy equals the union of successful supports; every successful row still XORs to its original target; admissible failed insertions leave the state unchanged.
  2. Disjoint-support certificate: the equality w=cκw=c\kappaw=cκ implies that the successful supports are pairwise disjoint. The support lemma also includes the empty history, where pairwise disjointness is vacuous.
  3. Proposition 2, aggregate disclosure: for an honest history,
c≥1 and w=cκ⟹R(Z)=⨁i=1cNi.c\ge1\ \text{and}\ w=c\kappa \quad\Longrightarrow\quad R(Z)=\bigoplus_{i=1}^{c}N_i.c≥1 and w=cκ⟹R(Z)=i=1⨁c​Ni​.

The positive-count condition is retained in this proposition. Its conclusion is an aggregate, not recovery of the individual identifiers or their multiset. Towell, Proposition 2 and its proof

What the formalization adds

The singleton identity identifies an adjacent-domain identifier from a complete share set exposed by occupancy. The larger-batch certificate establishes a narrower aggregate observation when the public occupied count matches the authentic successful count times the share count. It does not characterize every possible disclosure and does not estimate how often the certificate occurs. A deployment interpretation still needs the source's visibility and publication premises. Towell, Sections 1–2

Both propositions already have written proofs in the archived preprint. The accompanying source supplement provides finite computational checks. The remaining work here is to verify their universal statements from an explicit insertion model and preserve that construction-to-statement connection. The draft model has compiled concrete examples, including the published seven-cell array and an occupied zero word; the four theorem items remain open formal obligations. No new mathematical discovery or independent human proof review is claimed.

Where care is needed

The risk lies in changing what constitutes a snapshot or an honest insertion. Treating a zero word as empty changes the occupancy count. Allowing later writes to replace occupied shares can invalidate earlier row equations. Supplying an unrelated count can make the certificate appear applicable when the claimed aggregate is wrong. Assuming all final row equations as part of the definition of honesty would also remove the construction obligation that the mission is intended to check.

The recovery function must remain independent of hidden row data even though the theorem's conclusion refers to the identifier that was inserted. The model must admit genuine executions, including singleton, disjoint and overlapping histories, and must distinguish a legitimate full-support failure from an arbitrary skipped insertion.

Formalization scope

The shared namespace is GBFPlus.OccupancyDisclosure. A configuration stores positive prefix and suffix widths; their sum is λ\lambdaλ. Words are pairs of finite coordinate vectors over Z/2Z\mathbb Z/2\mathbb ZZ/2Z. Componentwise addition is XOR, and concatenation places the prefix coordinates before the suffix coordinates. Cells use optional words, so occupancy is represented independently of payload value. Supports are finite sets of valid cell indices with exact cardinality κ\kappaκ; successful occurrences retain their multiplicity in an ordered list.

Free words and valid pivots are explicit inputs. Universal quantification covers each realization; no probability distribution is needed for these identities. Honest histories are checked transition by transition from the empty state, without assuming the conclusions. The model uses Lean 4.33.1 and Mathlib revision 0df444a360eaa60ab8c11dca51a86af692955474.

Ledger read access, authentic publication, genuine occupancy and timeout rules admitting singleton release are external premises of the source interpretation. The formalization does not model cryptographic position derivation, authentication, ledger execution, the separate data-identifier privacy game, publisher identification, full paths, scan costs or a complete repair. Contributions closing the stated obligations or extracting reusable finite-share and occupancy lemmas are welcome. Alexander Richard Towell supplies the source research and direction; substantial OpenAI Codex assistance in model construction, checks and proposal preparation is disclosed. Independent AI read-backs accompany the draft items and do not substitute for human review.

Selected references

  • Alexander Richard Towell, Adjacent-Domain Disclosure from Public Occupancy in GBFPlus, archival preprint v1.0.0, 20 October 2026. DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23497466.
  • S. Qin, Y. Zhou, W. Dai, Y. Sun and W. Qiang, Privacy-Preserving On-Chain Attestation for Cross-Domain Data Flows via GBFPlus, Entropy 28 (2026), 947. DOI 10.3390/e28090947.
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Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Conjugate Degradability and the Quantum Capacity of Cloning ChannelsResearch Paper

Motivation

A quantum channel is conjugate degradable if the channel's environment can be simulated up to complex conjugation using the channel's output. For all such channels, the quantum capacity can be evaluated using a single-letter formula. In this article we introduce conjugate degradability and establish a number of its basic properties. We then use it to calculate the quantum capacity of N to N+1 and 1 to M universal quantum cloning machines as well as the quantum capacity of a channel that arises naturally when data is being transmitted to an accelerating receiver. All the channels considered turn out to have strictly positive quantum capacity, meaning they could be used as part of a communication system to send quantum states reliably.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Conjugate Degradability and the Quantum Capacity of Cloning Channels (arXiv:0909.3297v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

24 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is §II.C, Eq.(4): single-letter capacity of conjugate degradable channels (§II.C, Eq.(4): single-letter capacity of conjugate degradable channels, PDF p. 4). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

3 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • §III.B: printed polylogarithm capacity formula: A standard-polylogarithm expression with the bit normalization of Eq.(10) and Fig.1. (source-ambiguity)
  • Conjecture after Theorem 1: arbitrary N→M cloners: A single input-independent CPTP conjugate degrader for every general N→M cloner. (source-ambiguity)
  • Theorem 6(ii): printed mutual exclusion claim: A source-supported replacement for the false mutual-exclusion assertion, including singular channels. (source-ambiguity)

Selected references

  • Conjugate Degradability and the Quantum Capacity of Cloning Channels, arXiv:0909.3297v1, https://arxiv.org/abs/0909.3297v1
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🏆Completed
Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Gaussian hypothesis testing and quantum illuminationResearch Paper

Motivation

Quantum hypothesis testing is one of the most basic tasks in quantum information theory and has fundamental links with quantum communication and estimation theory. In this paper, we establish a formula that characterizes the decay rate of the minimal Type-II error probability in a quantum hypothesis test of two Gaussian states given a fixed constraint on the Type-I error probability. This formula is a direct function of the mean vectors and covariance matrices of the quantum Gaussian states in question. We give an application to quantum illumination, which is the task of determining whether there is a low-reflectivity object embedded in a target region with a bright thermal-noise bath. For the asymmetric-error setting, we find that a quantum illumination transmitter can achieve an error probability exponent stronger than a coherent-state transmitter of the same mean photon number, and furthermore, that it requires far fewer trials to do so. This occurs when the background thermal noise is either low or bright, which means that a quantum advantage is even easier to witness than in the symmetric-error setting because it occurs for a larger range of parameters. Going forward from here, we expect our formula to have applications in settings well beyond those considered in this paper, especially to quantum communication tasks involving quantum Gaussian channels.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Gaussian hypothesis testing and quantum illumination (arXiv:1608.06991v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

3 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Compatible ordinary diagonalization and Gibbs-matrix equivalence (Appendix A, (A4)–(A13), PDF p. 7). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

10 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • Theorem 1, (10), Appendix C and D: Independent relative entropy variance of full n-mode Gaussian density operators, including singular rho (hard)
  • Unnumbered expansion (1)–(2): Optimal IID quantum testing error and its separable Gaussian second-order expansion (hard)
  • Coherent-state formulas (15)–(16): Returned coherent thermal/displaced-thermal states and independent D,V (hard)
  • Quantum-illumination expansion (17)–(18): Actual quantum-illumination returned pair and large-NS D,V remainders (hard)
  • Quantum-illumination expansion (19)–(20): Actual quantum-illumination pair and large-NB D,V remainders (hard)
  • Qualitative claim and Figure 1: Quantified parameter ranges and finite-copy comparison for far fewer trials (source-ambiguity)
  • Fourth quadratic moment (14), Appendix B: Ordered unbounded fourth quadratic moment on the Gaussian oscillator domain (hard)
  • Proposition 2, (D1): Independent V and its equality to the grouped symplectic expression (hard)
  • Lemma 3, (E14): Independent two-mode relative entropy variance and reduced grouped extension (hard)
  • Lemma 4, corrected (E24): Independent Gaussian operator relative entropy and corrected E24 (hard)

Selected references

  • Gaussian hypothesis testing and quantum illumination, arXiv:1608.06991v2, https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.06991v2
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Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Capacity Theorems for Quantum Multiple Access Channels: Classical-Quantum and Quantum-Quantum Capacity RegionsResearch Paper

Motivation

We consider quantum channels with two senders and one receiver. For an arbitrary such channel, we give multi-letter characterizations of two different two-dimensional capacity regions. The first region is comprised of the rates at which it is possible for one sender to send classical information, while the other sends quantum information. The second region consists of the rates at which each sender can send quantum information. For each region, we give an example of a channel for which the corresponding region has a single-letter description. One of our examples relies on a new result proved here, perhaps of independent interest, stating that the coherent information over any degradable channel is concave in the input density operator. We conclude with connections to other work and a discussion on generalizations where each user simultaneously sends classical and quantum information.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Capacity Theorems for Quantum Multiple Access Channels: Classical-Quantum and Quantum-Quantum Capacity Regions (arXiv:quant-ph/0501045v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

17 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 1: regularized cq capacity (Theorem 1: regularized cq capacity, PDF p. 7). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

1 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • §6 simultaneous region announcement: Locally specified four-rate simultaneous classical/quantum operational code and exact joint success/resource criterion. (source-ambiguity)

Selected references

  • Capacity Theorems for Quantum Multiple Access Channels: Classical-Quantum and Quantum-Quantum Capacity Regions, arXiv:quant-ph/0501045v3, https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0501045v3
32 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Differences-in-Neighbors for Network Interference in Experiments: The DN Estimator Has Bias at Most d²ε Under ε-Smooth Neighborhood InterferenceResearch Paper

Motivation

Online platforms, social networks and marketplaces run randomized experiments (A/B tests) to estimate the effect of a new feature. The standard analysis assumes that one unit's treatment does not affect another unit's outcome. On a network this fails: a treated user changes what their friends see, a treated seller changes what competing sellers sell. The resulting interference biases the naive difference-in-means estimator, often by more than the effect being measured.

Two classical answers sit at opposite ends of a trade-off. The difference-in-means (DM) estimator ignores interference: its variance is small, but its bias is first order in the interference strength. The Horvitz–Thompson (HT) estimator removes the bias by importance weighting over each unit's whole neighbourhood, at a variance exponential in the degree. Peng, Ye and Zheng (arXiv:2503.02271v1, ACM EC 2025) propose the Differences-in-Neighbors (DN) estimator, which sits in between: its bias is second order in the interference strength, and its variance is polynomial in the degree. DN extends the Differences-in-Q estimator for Markovian interference of Farias et al. (2022) to general interference graphs.

This mission formalizes DN's bias bound, Theorem 1 of the paper, and the steps of its proof.

Setting

There are NNN units. Interference is an undirected graph GGG without self-loops: Ni\mathcal N_iNi​ is the set of neighbours of unit iii, and d=max⁡i∣Ni∣d = \max_i |\mathcal N_i|d=maxi​∣Ni​∣ is the maximum degree. A treatment vector is z∈{0,1}Nz \in \{0,1\}^Nz∈{0,1}N, and unit iii has a potential outcome function fi:{0,1}N→Rf_i : \{0,1\}^N \to \mathbb Rfi​:{0,1}N→R, with observed outcome Yi=fi(z)Y_i = f_i(z)Yi​=fi​(z).

Assumption 1 (neighborhood interference). fi(z)f_i(z)fi​(z) depends only on ziz_izi​ and on (zj)j∈Ni(z_j)_{j \in \mathcal N_i}(zj​)j∈Ni​​. The paper assumes this throughout.

The target is the average treatment effect

ATE=1N∑i=1N(fi(1⃗)−fi(0⃗)),\mathrm{ATE} = \frac1N \sum_{i=1}^N \bigl(f_i(\vec 1) - f_i(\vec 0)\bigr),ATE=N1​i=1∑N​(fi​(1)−fi​(0)),

the average difference between global treatment and global control. The conditional outcome functions fi1f^1_ifi1​, fi0f^0_ifi0​ are unit iii's outcome when its own treatment is 111 or 000, as a function of the other treatments.

The design draws ziz_izi​ i.i.d. Bernoulli(p)(p)(p), 0<p<10 < p < 10<p<1. The DN estimator is

ATEDN=1N∑i=1N(zip−1−zi1−p)(∑j∈NiYj ξj+Yi),ξj=zj(1−p)p+(1−zj)p1−p.\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}} = \frac1N \sum_{i=1}^N \Bigl(\frac{z_i}{p} - \frac{1 - z_i}{1 - p}\Bigr)\Bigl(\sum_{j \in \mathcal N_i} Y_j\, \xi_j + Y_i\Bigr), \qquad \xi_j = \frac{z_j(1-p)}{p} + \frac{(1 - z_j)p}{1 - p}.ATEDN​=N1​i=1∑N​(pzi​​−1−p1−zi​​)(j∈Ni​∑​Yj​ξj​+Yi​),ξj​=pzj​(1−p)​+1−p(1−zj​)p​.

Smoothness is measured by second-order finite differences. For h:{0,1}N→Rh : \{0,1\}^N \to \mathbb Rh:{0,1}N→R and units j,kj, kj,k,

Δjkh(z)=h(z(zj=1,zk=1))−h(z(zj=0,zk=1))−h(z(zj=1,zk=0))+h(z(zj=0,zk=0)),\Delta_{jk} h(z) = h(z^{(z_j=1,z_k=1)}) - h(z^{(z_j=0,z_k=1)}) - h(z^{(z_j=1,z_k=0)}) + h(z^{(z_j=0,z_k=0)}),Δjk​h(z)=h(z(zj​=1,zk​=1))−h(z(zj​=0,zk​=1))−h(z(zj​=1,zk​=0))+h(z(zj​=0,zk​=0)),

where z(zj=a,zk=b)z^{(z_j=a,z_k=b)}z(zj​=a,zk​=b) is zzz with entries j,kj, kj,k set to a,ba, ba,b. The function hhh is ϵ\epsilonϵ-smooth if ∣Δjkh(z)∣≤ϵ|\Delta_{jk} h(z)| \le \epsilon∣Δjk​h(z)∣≤ϵ for all zzz, jjj, kkk.

The proof uses the multilinear extension F(w)=∑z∏j(zjwj+(1−zj)(1−wj))h(z)F(w) = \sum_{z} \prod_j \bigl(z_j w_j + (1 - z_j)(1 - w_j)\bigr) h(z)F(w)=∑z​∏j​(zj​wj​+(1−zj​)(1−wj​))h(z), the expectation of h(Z)h(Z)h(Z) when the ZjZ_jZj​ are independent Bernoulli(wj)(w_j)(wj​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 9)

Under Assumption 1 and the Bernoulli(p)(p)(p) design, if fi1f^1_ifi1​ and fi0f^0_ifi0​ are ϵ\epsilonϵ-smooth for every unit iii, then

∣ATE−E[ATEDN]∣≤d2ϵ.\bigl|\mathrm{ATE} - \mathbb E[\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}}]\bigr| \le d^2 \epsilon.​ATE−E[ATEDN​]​≤d2ϵ.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 1, §3, §3.3)

The proof has no numbered lemmas. The milestones are its displayed claims, in the order the proof uses them:

  1. Credit assignment (5): ATEDN=1N∑i(ηi+ξi∑j∈Niηj)Yi\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}} = \frac1N \sum_i \bigl(\eta_i + \xi_i \sum_{j \in \mathcal N_i} \eta_j\bigr) Y_iATEDN​=N1​∑i​(ηi​+ξi​∑j∈Ni​​ηj​)Yi​ with ηj=zj/p−(1−zj)/(1−p)\eta_j = z_j/p - (1 - z_j)/(1 - p)ηj​=zj​/p−(1−zj​)/(1−p).
  2. First partial derivative: ∂F/∂wj=E[h(Z)∣Zj=1]−E[h(Z)∣Zj=0]\partial F/\partial w_j = \mathbb E[h(Z) \mid Z_j = 1] - \mathbb E[h(Z) \mid Z_j = 0]∂F/∂wj​=E[h(Z)∣Zj​=1]−E[h(Z)∣Zj​=0].
  3. Propensity weights: E[fi1(Z)]=E[(Zi/p)Yi]\mathbb E[f^1_i(Z)] = \mathbb E[(Z_i/p) Y_i]E[fi1​(Z)]=E[(Zi​/p)Yi​], E[fi0(Z)]=E[((1−Zi)/(1−p))Yi]\mathbb E[f^0_i(Z)] = \mathbb E[((1 - Z_i)/(1 - p)) Y_i]E[fi0​(Z)]=E[((1−Zi​)/(1−p))Yi​], and E[fia(Z)∣Zj=b]=E[1{Zi=a}Pr⁡(Zi=a)1{Zj=b}Pr⁡(Zj=b)Yi]\mathbb E[f^a_i(Z) \mid Z_j = b] = \mathbb E\bigl[\frac{\mathbf 1\{Z_i = a\}}{\Pr(Z_i = a)} \frac{\mathbf 1\{Z_j = b\}}{\Pr(Z_j = b)} Y_i\bigr]E[fia​(Z)∣Zj​=b]=E[Pr(Zi​=a)1{Zi​=a}​Pr(Zj​=b)1{Zj​=b}​Yi​].
  4. Unbiasedness for the first-order approximation: E[ATEDN]\mathbb E[\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}}]E[ATEDN​] equals the node average of the first-order Taylor approximations of Fi1(1)−Fi0(0)F^1_i(1) - F^0_i(0)Fi1​(1)−Fi0​(0) around ppp.
  5. Second partial derivatives: ∂2F/∂wj∂wk=E[Δjkh(Z)]\partial^2 F/\partial w_j \partial w_k = \mathbb E[\Delta_{jk} h(Z)]∂2F/∂wj​∂wk​=E[Δjk​h(Z)] for j≠kj \neq kj=k, and ∂2F/∂wj2=0\partial^2 F/\partial w_j^2 = 0∂2F/∂wj2​=0.
  6. Taylor remainder (corrected): the error of the first-order approximation to Fa(a)F^a(a)Fa(a) is 12(a−p)⊤Ha(p′)(a−p)\frac12 (a - p)^\top H^a(p')(a - p)21​(a−p)⊤Ha(p′)(a−p) for some p′p'p′ between (p,…,p)(p, \dots, p)(p,…,p) and (a,…,a)(a, \dots, a)(a,…,a).
  7. Remainder bound: ∣∑j≠k∈Ni(a−p)2 Ep′[Δjkfia(Z)]∣≤d2ϵ\bigl|\sum_{j \neq k \in \mathcal N_i} (a - p)^2\, \mathbb E_{p'}[\Delta_{jk} f^a_i(Z)]\bigr| \le d^2 \epsilon​∑j=k∈Ni​​(a−p)2Ep′​[Δjk​fia​(Z)]​≤d2ϵ.

Milestone 6 corrects the paper. The page states the remainder without the factor 12\frac1221​ of Taylor's theorem, which is false: a unit with two neighbours and f1(z)=z1z2f^1(z) = z_1 z_2f1(z)=z1​z2​ at p=12p = \frac12p=21​ has error 14\frac1441​, while (a−p)⊤H(a−p)=12(a - p)^\top H (a - p) = \frac12(a−p)⊤H(a−p)=21​. With the 12\frac1221​ restored, milestones 6 and 7 bound each treatment's error by 12d2ϵ\frac12 d^2 \epsilon21​d2ϵ, and Theorem 1's d2ϵd^2\epsilond2ϵ is their sum.

Significance

Theorem 1 is the main bias guarantee for DN. Specialized to the paper's outcome model with interference magnitude δ\deltaδ (Corollary 1), it gives bias O(d2δ2)O(d^2 \delta^2)O(d2δ2), compared with Θ(dδ)\Theta(d\delta)Θ(dδ) for DM. Together with the variance bound O(d4/N)O(d^4/N)O(d4/N) of Theorem 2, it places DN strictly between DM and HT in the bias–variance trade-off, and it covers the Markovian interference models of Farias et al. as a special case of the graph.

The proof also shows how DN is derived: DN is the unbiased propensity-weighted estimate of a first-order Taylor expansion of the multilinear extension. Higher-order expansions give higher-order estimators with the same analysis.

As far as a search of Prove2Me shows, no network-interference model, neighbourhood potential-outcome framework or DN-type estimator has been formalized. The platform's experiment-design items are temporal (Markovian or switchback) interference models. The paper's result is proved on paper; it has not been machine-checked. The mission also states one correction (the factor 12\frac1221​ above).

Difficulty

Most of the proof is exact finite algebra: the credit-assignment identity, the propensity-weight identities and unbiasedness are rearrangements of sums over {0,1}N\{0,1\}^N{0,1}N using independence. The analytic step is the Taylor remainder. FFF is a polynomial in NNN variables, and Taylor's theorem must be applied along the diagonal segment from (p,…,p)(p, \dots, p)(p,…,p) to (a,…,a)(a, \dots, a)(a,…,a). The second derivative along that segment must then be identified with the off-diagonal Hessian entries Ep′[Δjkh]\mathbb E_{p'}[\Delta_{jk} h]Ep′​[Δjk​h]. One natural shortcut, bounding each Hessian entry separately and summing over all of {0,1}N\{0,1\}^N{0,1}N, loses the restriction to j,k∈Nij, k \in \mathcal N_ij,k∈Ni​. That restriction is where Assumption 1 enters, and it is what yields d2d^2d2 rather than N2N^2N2. Without Assumption 1 the theorem is false: on the empty graph with two units and f1(z)=z2f_1(z) = z_2f1​(z)=z2​, the ATE is 12\frac1221​, E[ATEDN]=0\mathbb E[\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}}] = 0E[ATEDN​]=0, and d=ϵ=0d = \epsilon = 0d=ϵ=0.

Formalization scope

  • Units are a finite type ι with NNN = Fintype.card ι, and treatments are ι → Bool. The graph is a Mathlib SimpleGraph, with Ni\mathcal N_iNi​ = G.neighborFinset i and ddd = G.maxDegree.
  • Outcomes are f : ι → (ι → Bool) → ℝ. Assumption 1 is the predicate NeighborhoodInterference G f. It is a hypothesis of the goal and is omitted from milestones whose statements hold without it.
  • Expectations are finite sums. mlExt h w is the multilinear extension, and bernExp p h = mlExt h (p, …, p) is the expectation under the design. Conditional expectations given Zj=bZ_j = bZj​=b set coordinate jjj to bbb (Function.update), which is exact by independence.
  • fiaf^a_ifia​ is condOutcome f i a, the function z↦fi(z with zi:=a)z \mapsto f_i(z \text{ with } z_i := a)z↦fi​(z with zi​:=a) on the whole vector. Under Assumption 1 it depends only on zNiz_{\mathcal N_i}zNi​​.
  • ϵ\epsilonϵ-smoothness quantifies all zzz and all j,kj, kj,k, as printed (so Δjj≡0\Delta_{jj} \equiv 0Δjj​≡0 forces ϵ≥0\epsilon \ge 0ϵ≥0). The hypotheses 0<p<10 < p < 10<p<1 make the weights 1/p1/p1/p and 1/(1−p)1/(1-p)1/(1−p) meaningful.
  • The estimator is (3) exactly, with the factor 1/N1/N1/N and the correction ξj\xi_jξj​, for general ppp. It is not the p=12p = \frac12p=21​ form (4).

Two formalizations would make the goal a different theorem and are ruled out. In the first, the expectation is taken at a single fixed treatment vector instead of under the Bernoulli design. In the second, ϵ\epsilonϵ-smoothness is imposed on fif_ifi​ itself instead of on fi1f^1_ifi1​ and fi0f^0_ifi0​: that also constrains the pairs (i,k)(i, k)(i,k), which are not second-order interference terms.

The development needs only Mathlib: finite sums over ι → Bool, HasDerivAt, and Taylor's theorem in one variable (taylor_mean_remainder_lagrange). Lemmas about multilinear extensions of functions on the Boolean cube are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are the variance bound (Theorem 2) and the clustered estimator results (Theorems 3–4) as follow-up statements.

Selected references

  • T. Peng, N. Ye, A. Zheng, Differences-in-Neighbors for Network Interference in Experiments, ACM EC 2025; arXiv:2503.02271v1, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.02271v1
  • V. F. Farias, A. A. Li, T. Peng, A. Zheng, Markovian Interference in Experiments, NeurIPS 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.02371
  • J. Ugander, B. Karrer, L. Backstrom, J. Kleinberg, Graph Cluster Randomization: Network Exposure to Multiple Universes, KDD 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.6979
  • P. M. Aronow, C. Samii, Estimating Average Causal Effects Under General Interference, with Application to a Social Network Experiment, Annals of Applied Statistics 11(4), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1214/16-AOAS1005
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Internal Capital Allocation, Voluntary Disclosure, and Investment Efficiency: When a Multi-Divisional Firm Beats Two Stand-Alone FirmsResearch Paper

Motivation

Conglomerates and stand-alone firms finance projects differently. A multi-divisional firm runs an internal capital market: headquarters raises funds externally and then decides which division gets them. A stand-alone firm must raise capital project by project. A long line of work in corporate finance asks when the internal market is more efficient: Stein (1997) argues that headquarters can "pick winners", while managers with empire-building motives may over-invest.

Hwang (Management Science, 2025) adds voluntary disclosure to this comparison. Managers may disclose a project's profitability to investors at a cost, and investors set their financing terms from what is disclosed and what is withheld. Withholding information becomes a strategic choice, and the organizational form changes what a manager gains by disclosing. The paper's main result says exactly when a founder should prefer a single multi-divisional firm to two stand-alone firms.

Setting

A founder owns two projects i∈{1,2}i \in \{1,2\}i∈{1,2}. Each needs one unit of capital and pays θiX\theta_i Xθi​X, where X>1X > 1X>1 and θi∈{0,1}\theta_i \in \{0,1\}θi​∈{0,1}. The types are independent, with Pr⁡(θi=1)=p∈(0,1)\Pr(\theta_i = 1) = p \in (0,1)Pr(θi​=1)=p∈(0,1).

  • Disclosure. A manager who knows θi\theta_iθi​ chooses di∈{D,ND}d_i \in \{D, ND\}di​∈{D,ND}. Disclosure is truthful and raises the capital required for project iii by c>0c > 0c>0. Write #D\#D#D for the number of disclosures.
  • Investors are competitive. After observing the disclosures they hold a belief about the undisclosed types: a probability vector on type profiles that agrees with every disclosed value, given by Bayes' rule whenever the message is sent in equilibrium. They fund kkk projects in exchange for a share α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1] of cash flows that lets them break even. In the multi-divisional firm (o=mo = mo=m) one manager sees (θ1,θ2)(\theta_1,\theta_2)(θ1​,θ2​). Investors choose k=2k = 2k=2 if some α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1] solves
(E[θ1]+E[θ2]) αX=2+c #D,(E[\theta_1] + E[\theta_2])\,\alpha X = 2 + c\,\#D,(E[θ1​]+E[θ2​])αX=2+c#D,

otherwise k=1k = 1k=1 if some α\alphaα solves E[θλ] αX=1+c #DE[\theta_\lambda]\,\alpha X = 1 + c\,\#DE[θλ​]αX=1+c#D, otherwise k=0k = 0k=0. With one unit the manager implements the better project (λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1 iff θ1≥θ2\theta_1 \ge \theta_2θ1​≥θ2​). This choice is the internal capital allocation.

  • Payoffs. The manager receives q(1−α)Xq(1-\alpha)Xq(1−α)X from each profitable implemented project, with q∈(0,1)q \in (0,1)q∈(0,1), plus an empire-building benefit β\betaβ per implemented project, where β>qX\beta > qXβ>qX.
  • Stand-alone firms (o=so = so=s). Each firm has its own manager, who sees only θi\theta_iθi​. Investors fund firm iii iff some αi∈[0,1]\alpha_i \in [0,1]αi​∈[0,1] solves E[θi] αiX=1+c I(di)E[\theta_i]\,\alpha_i X = 1 + c\,I(d_i)E[θi​]αi​X=1+cI(di​).

An equilibrium is a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The disclosure strategy is a best response for every type. Investors act on admissible, Bayes-consistent beliefs. Ties are broken toward silence: a disclosure is made only if withholding it would strictly lower the manager's payoff. A structure's investment efficiency is the expected net cash flow of the implemented projects. Following the paper, each structure is evaluated at its equilibrium with the highest efficiency. These values are VmV_mVm​ and VsV_sVs​. The founder chooses the structure with the larger value.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3, the founder's choice (corrected on one line)

Assume X≥1+cX \ge 1 + cX≥1+c. Then VmV_mVm​ and VsV_sVs​ exist and:

1−p2p<c<1−p22p2, X<min⁡{2+c,1+pp} ⟹ Vs<Vm,\tfrac{1-p}{2p} < c < \tfrac{1-p^2}{2p^2},\ X < \min\{2+c, \tfrac{1+p}{p}\} \ \Longrightarrow\ V_s < V_m,2p1−p​<c<2p21−p2​, X<min{2+c,p1+p​} ⟹ Vs​<Vm​, c<1−pp, X≥2+c ⟹ Vm<Vs,c < \tfrac{1-p}{p},\ X \ge 2 + c \ \Longrightarrow\ V_m < V_s,c<p1−p​, X≥2+c ⟹ Vm​<Vs​,

and Vm=VsV_m = V_sVm​=Vs​ everywhere else. The first region with c=1−p2pc = \frac{1-p}{2p}c=2p1−p​ included gives Vs≤VmV_s \le V_mVs​≤Vm​. On that line the two values are equal, although the printed statement claims a strict preference there.

Milestones

  1. Appendix B.1: no equilibrium of the multi-divisional firm discloses an unprofitable project.
  2. Proposition 1: the stand-alone equilibria and their efficiencies p(X−1−c)p(X-1-c)p(X−1−c) and pX−1pX-1pX−1.
  3. Proposition 2 (ii), (iii): disclosure of exactly the profitable projects, with efficiencies 2p(X−1−c)2p(X-1-c)2p(X−1−c) and 2p(X+p−2−c)2p(X+p-2-c)2p(X+p−2−c).
  4. Proposition 2 (i): the internal-capital-allocation equilibrium, with efficiency p(2X−p(1+2c))−1p(2X - p(1+2c)) - 1p(2X−p(1+2c))−1.
  5. Proposition 2 (iv): no disclosure and full funding, with efficiency 2(pX−1)2(pX-1)2(pX−1).

Significance

The result. Proposition 3 splits the parameter space into three regions:

  • Where disclosure costs are intermediate and cash flows low, the internal capital market strictly wins. The multi-divisional manager raises one unit without disclosing and directs it to a profitable project, which saves the disclosure cost a stand-alone firm must pay to be funded.
  • Where disclosure is cheap and cash flows high, stand-alone firms strictly win. Disclosing one profitable project lets the empire-building manager fund an unprofitable one as well.
  • Elsewhere the two structures are equally efficient.

The comparison is the paper's answer to when internal capital markets create value under voluntary disclosure. Its extensions (§6) are measured against this baseline.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper by hand. It has no machine-checked proof. The proof's selection argument, "the equilibrium with the highest efficiency", ranges over every equilibrium with arbitrary off-path beliefs, and it is easy to get wrong at the boundaries. A check of the printed statements against an exact enumeration of equilibria found that the strict preference in part (i) fails on c=1−p2pc = \frac{1-p}{2p}c=2p1−p​. The uniqueness claims of Propositions 1 (ii), 2 (i) and 2 (iv) also fail on tie lines. A formal proof settles the corrected statement. The model, a finite signaling game with verifiable costly disclosure and break-even investors, can be reused for other disclosure models.

Difficulty

The selected values are maxima over all pure-strategy equilibria. The off-path beliefs are any admissible beliefs. An upper bound on VmV_mVm​ therefore needs a classification of every equilibrium:

  • first rule out the disclosure of unprofitable projects, which depends on the tie-breaking rule, since a manager with two unprofitable projects is indifferent among many messages;
  • then determine the region in which each remaining disclosure pattern is an equilibrium, and its efficiency.

Lower bounds need explicit belief systems that support the selected equilibrium off the path. Each step mixes a combinatorial case split over 444 types and 444 disclosure vectors with real inequalities in (p,c,X)(p, c, X)(p,c,X). The regions of Proposition 2 meet along several curves. On each curve, every strict comparison must be checked again, because the corrections above sit exactly there. Comparing only the equilibria the paper names does not bound VmV_mVm​: an equilibrium outside that list could have higher efficiency.

Formalization scope

Lean representation (namespace IntCapAlloc.OrgChoice):

  • A type profile and a disclosure vector are Fin 2 → Bool. Project 1 is index 0. A message is Fin 2 → Option Bool.
  • A belief is a function from messages to weights on profiles. It is admissible if it is a probability vector on the profiles consistent with the message. It must satisfy Bayes' rule only after messages that some type sends.
  • Investors' kkk uses the existential break-even rule of the paper. The share is the solution of the break-even equation.
  • IsEquilibrium requires optimality against all four disclosure vectors and the tie rule per project. effSetM is the set of efficiencies of all equilibria. effSetS is the set of sums of two single-firm equilibrium efficiencies.
  • Selected values are stated with IsGreatest, so existence is part of every claim.

Conventions:

  • The standing assumptions 0<p<10<p<10<p<1, X>1X>1X>1, c>0c>0c>0, 0<q<10<q<10<q<1, β>qX\beta > qXβ>qX and the paper's focus X≥1+cX \ge 1 + cX≥1+c are hypotheses. The goal fails without the focus.
  • Footnote 7's "sufficiently high β" is not assumed. The game uses β only through β>qX\beta > qXβ>qX, so the statements cover the footnote's case.
  • The rule λ = 1 iff θ₁ ≥ θ₂ is the paper's (p. 11).
  • Investors' kkk in the milestones is the value after messages sent in equilibrium.
  • Each milestone adds the efficiency its proof states, and posts the uniqueness clause only where it holds.

The goal is not trivial in any of the following ways:

  • Off-path beliefs are not fixed, for example to "an undisclosed project is unprofitable".
  • The equilibrium set is not limited to the paper's named equilibria.
  • VmV_mVm​ and VsV_sVs​ are not defined by formulas.

Any of these would turn the goal into arithmetic.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over Fin 2 → Bool, case analysis over messages, and real inequalities on the regions. Proofs of the milestones are welcome. So are general lemmas about the break-even rule (investment is monotone in the posterior mean) and about tie-breaking, which several milestones share.

Selected references

  • H. Hwang, Internal Capital Allocation, Voluntary Disclosure, and Investment Efficiency, Management Science, 2025 (author manuscript, March 2025). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01295
  • J. C. Stein, Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources, Journal of Finance 52(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04813.x
  • R. A. Dye, Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information, Journal of Accounting Research 23(1), 1985. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490910
  • R. E. Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Dynamic Assortment Optimization in the Presence of Outlier Customers: Active Elimination Has TOTE Regret O(ε̄K²T log T + (K²√ε̄ + √K)√(NT log³T) + K²N log²T) Under ε-ContaminationResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that learns customer preferences online, for example an e-commerce platform choosing which products to display, observes purchases that are not all generated by the population it is trying to learn. Some arrivals are bots, fraudulent accounts or atypical buyers, and their choices can be arbitrary or deliberately misleading. Standard learning algorithms for dynamic assortment optimization under the multinomial-logit (MNL) model assume every customer follows the same choice model. Chen, Krishnamurthy and Wang (arXiv:1910.04183v2, Operations Research 2024) study what can be guaranteed when an ε\varepsilonε fraction of customers are outliers controlled by an adaptive adversary.

The uncontaminated problem has an established regret theory. Agrawal, Avadhanula, Goyal and Zeevi (Operations Research 2019) proved an O~(NT)\tilde O(\sqrt{NT})O~(NT​) regret bound for an epoch-based UCB policy. Chen and Wang (Operations Research Letters 2018) gave a matching Ω(NT)\Omega(\sqrt{NT})Ω(NT​) lower bound. Robustness to adversarial corruption was first analysed for multi-armed bandits by Lykouris, Mirrokni and Paes Leme (STOC 2018). The present paper carries that question to MNL assortment optimization, where one observation reveals information about a whole offered set.

Setting

There are NNN items. Item iii has a known revenue ri∈[0,1]r_i \in [0,1]ri​∈[0,1] and an unknown utility vi∈[0,1]v_i \in [0,1]vi​∈[0,1]; the no-purchase option has utility v0=1v_0 = 1v0​=1. In each of TTT periods the retailer offers an assortment St⊆[N]S_t \subseteq [N]St​⊆[N] with ∣St∣≤K|S_t| \le K∣St​∣≤K. A typical customer buys item i∈Sti \in S_ti∈St​ with probability vi/(1+∑j∈Stvj)v_i/(1 + \sum_{j\in S_t} v_j)vi​/(1+∑j∈St​​vj​) and nothing with probability 1/(1+∑j∈Stvj)1/(1+\sum_{j\in S_t}v_j)1/(1+∑j∈St​​vj​). The expected revenue of SSS under utilities www is

R(S;w)=∑i∈Sriwi1+∑i∈Swi.R(S; w) = \frac{\sum_{i\in S} r_i w_i}{1 + \sum_{i\in S} w_i}.R(S;w)=1+∑i∈S​wi​∑i∈S​ri​wi​​.

An outlier customer chooses from St∪{0}S_t \cup \{0\}St​∪{0} according to an arbitrary distribution QtQ_tQt​. An adaptive adversary decides, from the whole public past (types, assortments and purchases), whether the period-ttt customer is an outlier and which QtQ_tQt​ it uses, subject to sending at most εT\varepsilon TεT outliers. Performance is measured by the TOTE regret (typically-optimal, typically-evaluated):

RegretTOTE(T)=E[∑t=1TR(S∗;v)−R(St;v)],R(S∗;v)=max⁡∣S∣≤KR(S;v).\mathrm{Regret}_{\mathrm{TOTE}}(T) = \mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T R(S^*; v) - R(S_t; v)\Big],\qquad R(S^*;v) = \max_{|S|\le K} R(S;v).RegretTOTE​(T)=E[t=1∑T​R(S∗;v)−R(St​;v)],R(S∗;v)=∣S∣≤Kmax​R(S;v).

Algorithm 1 (active elimination) receives an upper bound εˉ≥ε\bar\varepsilon \ge \varepsilonεˉ≥ε. It runs in doubling epochs Tτ=2τT0T_\tau = 2^\tau T_0Tτ​=2τT0​, T0=128(K+1)2Nln⁡TT_0 = 128(K+1)^2N\ln TT0​=128(K+1)2NlnT, and keeps an active item set A(τ)\mathcal A^{(\tau)}A(τ) and estimates v^(τ)\hat v^{(\tau)}v^(τ). In each epoch it computes, for every active item iii, the best assortment Sτ(i)S_\tau^{(i)}Sτ(i)​ containing iii under the current estimates. It eliminates items whose best assortment falls 2Δ^εˉ(τ)2\hat\Delta_{\bar\varepsilon}(\tau)2Δ^εˉ​(τ) below the best, and then offers Sτ(i)S_\tau^{(i)}Sτ(i)​ for a uniformly drawn active iii. It re-estimates viv_ivi​ by the ratio of purchases of iii to no-purchases, and computes a new error bound Δ^εˉ(τ+1)\hat\Delta_{\bar\varepsilon}(\tau+1)Δ^εˉ​(τ+1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 12)

There are universal constants C0C_0C0​ and T1T_1T1​ such that the following holds for every T≥T1T \ge T_1T≥T1​, 1≤N≤T1 \le N \le T1≤N≤T, K≥1K \ge 1K≥1, r,v∈[0,1]Nr, v \in [0,1]^Nr,v∈[0,1]N and 0≤ε≤εˉ0 \le \varepsilon \le \bar\varepsilon0≤ε≤εˉ, every adaptive adversary with at most εT\varepsilon TεT outliers and every tie-break in the argmax:

RegretTOTE(T)≤C0(εˉK2Tlog⁡T+(K2εˉ+K)NTlog⁡3T+K2Nlog⁡2T).\mathrm{Regret}_{\mathrm{TOTE}}(T) \le C_0\Big(\bar\varepsilon K^2T\log T + \big(K^2\sqrt{\bar\varepsilon}+\sqrt K\big)\sqrt{NT\log^3T} + K^2N\log^2T\Big).RegretTOTE​(T)≤C0​(εˉK2TlogT+(K2εˉ​+K​)NTlog3T​+K2Nlog2T).

The second clause (6) states that if εˉ≤c1/K3\bar\varepsilon \le c_1/K^3εˉ≤c1​/K3 and K3Nlog⁡T≤c2TK^3N\log T \le c_2TK3NlogT≤c2​T, the regret is O(εˉK2Tlog⁡T+KNTlog⁡3T)O\big(\bar\varepsilon K^2T\log T + \sqrt{KNT\log^3T}\big)O(εˉK2TlogT+KNTlog3T​).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 13): with probability 1−O(τ0N/T2)1 - O(\tau_0N/T^2)1−O(τ0​N/T2), the estimation error of every active item after a completed epoch is at most Δε∗(i,τ+1)\Delta^*_\varepsilon(i,\tau+1)Δε∗​(i,τ+1) of (7).
  2. Lemma 2 (p. 14): ∣R(S;v^)−R(S;v)∣≤2∑i∈S∣v^i−vi∣/(1+∑i∈Svi)|R(S;\hat v) - R(S;v)| \le 2\sum_{i\in S}|\hat v_i - v_i|/(1+\sum_{i\in S}v_i)∣R(S;v^)−R(S;v)∣≤2∑i∈S​∣v^i​−vi​∣/(1+∑i∈S​vi​).
  3. Corollary 1 (p. 14, corrected): on Lemma 1's success events, the revenue error of every candidate assortment is at most the (corrected) computed bound.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 14): with high probability every optimal assortment survives elimination.
  5. Lemma 4 (p. 14): with high probability every assortment offered in epoch τ\tauτ loses at most 4Δ^εˉ(τ)4\hat\Delta_{\bar\varepsilon}(\tau)4Δ^εˉ​(τ) against S∗S^*S∗.
  6. (8)–(11) (pp. 14–15): the sum ∑τ≤τ04Δ^εˉ(τ)Tτ\sum_{\tau\le\tau_0}4\hat\Delta_{\bar\varepsilon}(\tau)T_\tau∑τ≤τ0​​4Δ^εˉ​(τ)Tτ​ obeys the bound of Theorem 1.

Significance

The theorem shows that a known contamination level costs an additive εˉK2Tlog⁡T\bar\varepsilon K^2T\log TεˉK2TlogT and otherwise leaves the uncontaminated NT\sqrt{NT}NT​ rate intact up to logarithms. Proposition 1 of the paper shows that a cost linear in εT\varepsilon TεT is unavoidable. Theorem 1 is also the base case of the paper's algorithm for unknown ε\varepsilonε (Theorem 2), which runs copies of Algorithm 1 at geometrically spaced levels, and of its gap-dependent bound (Theorem 3).

The result is proved on paper, not formalized. The formalization would give the platform its first contaminated-bandit protocol with an adaptive adversary, and its first elimination policy for MNL assortment. During drafting, three printed statements were found to be false as stated (Corollary 1, clause (6), and line 14 of Algorithm 1); they are posed in corrected form. The printed proofs of Lemmas 3, 4 and Theorem 1 rely on the uncorrected Corollary 1. With the corrected Corollary 1, the printed argument gives Theorem 1 only with K\sqrt KK​ replaced by roughly KKK in the NTlog⁡3T\sqrt{NT\log^3T}NTlog3T​ term. No counterexample to Lemma 3, Lemma 4 or Theorem 1 is known. Completing their proofs at the printed strength is open work in this mission.

Difficulty

The estimator ni/n0(i)n_i/n_0(i)ni​/n0​(i) is a ratio of two counts. An adaptive adversary can choose which periods to corrupt, and it does so after seeing the past and which assortment is about to be offered. The counts are therefore not sums of independent variables. Bounding them needs a martingale (Freedman-type) concentration argument combined with a perturbation bound for the ratio, and the variance depends on the assortment used to estimate each item.

The natural route to Lemmas 3 and 4 is to bound the revenue error of an arbitrary candidate assortment by summing per-item errors, which is what Corollary 1 does. This route breaks for large KKK. The per-item error Δ∗\Delta^*Δ∗ carries the utility mass of the assortment that estimated item iii, not of the candidate assortment. Summing these errors therefore loses a factor K\sqrt KK​. The page's argument therefore does not deliver the stated K\sqrt KK​ dependence, and a sharper joint concentration of the revenue estimate is needed.

Formalization scope

  • Types. Items are Fin N, outcomes Option (Fin N) (none is no purchase), periods 0,…,T−10,\dots,T-10,…,T−1.
  • Revenue. R(S;w)R(S;w)R(S;w) is the published ChoiceCDLP.MNL.mnlObjective w r 1 S.
  • Adversary. The adversary is deterministic, as in Definition 1, and reads the public past. Its outlier model QtQ_tQt​ may depend on the offered assortment, which is a declared generalization. The budget (A1) holds on every public record of the TTT periods.
  • The run. A run is a record of (drawn item, customer type, purchase) per period. Its law is an explicit product of step probabilities, and expectations and probabilities are finite sums. No measure theory is used.
  • Algorithm 1. It is encoded line by line, with the following conventions:
    • T0=⌈128(K+1)2Nln⁡T⌉T_0 = \lceil 128(K+1)^2N\ln T\rceilT0​=⌈128(K+1)2NlnT⌉, and the last epoch τ0\tau_0τ0​ is truncated at TTT;
    • line 14 is read as v^i=min⁡{1,ni/n0(i)}\hat v_i = \min\{1, n_i/n_0(i)\}v^i​=min{1,ni​/n0​(i)}, with v^i=1\hat v_i = 1v^i​=1 when n0(i)=0n_0(i)=0n0​(i)=0 (correction: the printed max⁡\maxmax makes the algorithm eliminate the optimal item);
    • the argmax of line 5 is any routine sel satisfying IsArgmaxSel, and every theorem quantifies over all of them.
  • Constants. "Universal constant" and "sufficiently large TTT" are existentials placed before every other quantifier. "With probability 1−O(τ0N/T2)1-O(\tau_0N/T^2)1−O(τ0​N/T2)" is a bound Cτ0N/T2C\tau_0N/T^2Cτ0​N/T2 on the path-law mass of the bad event (C(τ0+1)N/T2C(\tau_0+1)N/T^2C(τ0​+1)N/T2 in Lemma 1, counting all τ0+1\tau_0+1τ0​+1 epochs).
  • Corrections. Clause (6) carries the added hypothesis K3Nlog⁡T≤c2TK^3N\log T \le c_2TK3NlogT≤c2​T, without which it is false. Corollary 1 multiplies the last term of Δ^\hat\DeltaΔ^ by max⁡{1,K+1/2}\max\{1,\sqrt{K+1}/2\}max{1,K+1​/2}. Its second inequality bounds ∣R(S;v^)−R(S;v)∣|R(S;\hat v)-R(S;v)|∣R(S;v^)−R(S;v)∣ by the bound at max⁡{ε,εˉ}\max\{\varepsilon,\bar\varepsilon\}max{ε,εˉ}, because Δ^\hat\DeltaΔ^ is not monotone in its parameter. Lemma 1 drops its unused condition on εˉ\bar\varepsilonεˉ.
  • Ruling out trivializations. The regret is an expectation over the true law of the run against every adaptive adversary and every tie-break, so a fixed history, an oblivious adversary, a policy that knows vvv, or constants chosen after NNN and KKK do not satisfy the statement.

A complete development needs Freedman's martingale inequality for bounded increments with a predictable variance bound, which several Open platform items state. It also needs a perturbation analysis of ratio estimators and bookkeeping over doubling epochs. The concentration and summation lemmas are reusable for other elimination policies. Proofs of any milestone, and a corrected proof of Corollary 1's consequences at full strength, are welcome.

Selected references

  • X. Chen, A. Krishnamurthy, Y. Wang, Robust Dynamic Assortment Optimization in the Presence of Outlier Customers, Operations Research, 2024; arXiv:1910.04183v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.04183
  • S. Agrawal, V. Avadhanula, V. Goyal, A. Zeevi, MNL-Bandit: A Dynamic Learning Approach to Assortment Selection, Operations Research 67(5), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1832
  • X. Chen, Y. Wang, A note on a tight lower bound for MNL-bandit assortment selection models, Operations Research Letters 46(5):534–537, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.06109
  • T. Lykouris, V. Mirrokni, R. Paes Leme, Stochastic Bandits Robust to Adversarial Corruptions, STOC 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09353
  • D. A. Freedman, On Tail Probabilities for Martingales, Annals of Probability 3(1), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996452
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EconomicsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Decision Forest: A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Irrational Choice: Every Customer Choice Model Is a Decision Forest of Depth at Most N + 1Research Paper

Why universal choice models matter

Retailers, airlines and platforms decide which products to offer by predicting how customers substitute among them. Such predictions rest on a discrete choice model: for every set of offered products, a probability distribution over what a customer buys. The classical models are built on random utility maximization (RUM): each customer draws utilities and buys the best offered option. Every RUM model satisfies regularity (adding a product never raises the probability of choosing an existing one), yet observed behavior violates it: the decoy (attraction) effect of Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) is a documented case where adding a dominated product increases the share of another.

This has driven a search for universal choice models, families rich enough to represent every choice model:

  • Block and Marschak (1959) showed that RUM models are exactly the probability distributions over rankings (ranking-based models), a class that is not universal because it obeys regularity.
  • McFadden and Train (2000) showed that mixtures of logit models approximate every RUM model, again inside the RUM class.
  • Farias, Jagabathula and Shah (2013) made the ranking-based model a data-driven tool for revenue prediction.
  • Outside RUM, randomized game-tree models (building on Xu and Zhou (2007)) and the pro-con model of Dogan and Yildiz (2018) represent every choice model; the latter needs signed weights.

Chen and Mišić (arXiv:1904.11532v3) propose the decision forest model, a probability distribution over binary decision trees, which is estimable from transaction data, and prove that it is universal (Theorem 1, p. 11). This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

There are NNN products N={1,…,N}\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,N\}N={1,…,N} and the purchase options N+={0,1,…,N}\mathcal N^+=\{0,1,\dots,N\}N+={0,1,…,N}, where 000 is the no-purchase option. An assortment is any S⊆NS\subseteq\mathcal NS⊆N, the empty one included.

A customer choice model P(⋅∣⋅)\mathbf P(\cdot\mid\cdot)P(⋅∣⋅) assigns to every assortment SSS a probability distribution P(⋅∣S)\mathbf P(\cdot\mid S)P(⋅∣S) on N+\mathcal N^+N+, with P(p∣S)=0\mathbf P(p\mid S)=0P(p∣S)=0 for every product p∉Sp\notin Sp∈/S: a customer cannot buy a product that is not offered.

A purchase decision tree ttt is a binary tree. Each split node sss carries a product xsx_sxs​ (Requirement 1); each leaf carries a purchase option. A customer following ttt and offered SSS starts at the root, moves to the left child when the split's product is in SSS and to the right child otherwise, and buys the option at the leaf reached; this option is A^(S,t)∈N+\hat A(S,t)\in\mathcal N^+A^(S,t)∈N+. Two further conditions make the tree meaningful:

  • Requirement 2: a leaf buys either 000 or a product found present on the way down (the product of a split at which the path went left);
  • Requirement 3: no product is tested twice on a root-to-leaf path.

The depth of ttt is the number of nodes on a longest root-to-leaf path, so a single leaf has depth 111. Let FdF_dFd​ be the set of trees satisfying Requirements 1–3 with depth at most ddd. For a finite forest FFF and a probability distribution λ\lambdaλ on FFF, the decision forest model is

P(F,λ)(o∣S)=∑t∈Fλt I{o=A^(S,t)}.(3)\mathbf P^{(F,\lambda)}(o\mid S)=\sum_{t\in F}\lambda_t\,\mathbb I\{o=\hat A(S,t)\}. \tag{3}P(F,λ)(o∣S)=t∈F∑​λt​I{o=A^(S,t)}.(3)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 11)

For every customer choice model P\mathbf PP there is a probability distribution λ\lambdaλ over FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​ such that

P(o∣S)=P(FN+1,λ)(o∣S)for every assortment S⊆N and option o∈N+.\mathbf P(o\mid S)=\mathbf P^{(F_{N+1},\lambda)}(o\mid S)\qquad\text{for every assortment } S\subseteq\mathcal N \text{ and option } o\in\mathcal N^+ .P(o∣S)=P(FN+1​,λ)(o∣S)for every assortment S⊆N and option o∈N+.

Milestones

  1. Depth and finiteness (§3.2, p. 8). Requirement 3 forces Depth(t)≤N+1\mathrm{Depth}(t)\le N+1Depth(t)≤N+1, so only finitely many trees satisfy Requirements 1–3.
  2. The balanced trees (pp. ec1–ec2). For a tuple o=(oS)S⊆N\mathbf o=(o_S)_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}o=(oS​)S⊆N​ of options, the balanced tree tot_{\mathbf o}to​ tests product kkk at level kkk; it has 2N2^N2N leaves, one per assortment, with A^(S,to)=oS\hat A(S,t_{\mathbf o})=o_SA^(S,to​)=oS​, depth N+1N+1N+1, and it satisfies Requirement 3.
  3. The weights (EC.5): λo=∏SP(oS∣S)\lambda_{\mathbf o}=\prod_{S}\mathbf P(o_S\mid S)λo​=∏S​P(oS​∣S) is nonnegative and sums to one over the (N+1)2N(N+1)^{2^N}(N+1)2N tuples.
  4. Pruning (p. ec2): if tot_{\mathbf o}to​ violates Requirement 2 then λo=0\lambda_{\mathbf o}=0λo​=0.
  5. The marginal identity (p. ec3): ∑oλo I{o=A^(S,to)}=P(o∣S)\sum_{\mathbf o}\lambda_{\mathbf o}\,\mathbb I\{o=\hat A(S,t_{\mathbf o})\}=\mathbf P(o\mid S)∑o​λo​I{o=A^(S,to​)}=P(o∣S) for all SSS and ooo.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 says that a mixture of deterministic tree-shaped decision rules captures any choice behavior, including the decoy effect, preference cycles and every other violation of regularity, while each tree remains interpretable as a customer type. It justifies fitting decision forests to transaction data without first deciding which behavioral anomalies to allow, and it reproves that ranking-based models are decision forest models (Proposition 1, p. 9). The depth bound N+1N+1N+1 is the reference point for the paper's model complexity results (§4), which ask when much shallower forests suffice.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces a reusable Lean vocabulary for choice models with an outside option, binary purchase decision trees and the requirements on them, which the paper's later results (Theorem 2 on depth for MMM assortments, Lemma EC.1 on removing repeated products) and other nonparametric choice models can build on.

Difficulty

The paper calls the proof simple, and its individual steps are elementary; the difficulty is bookkeeping that the informal proof leaves implicit. The forest is indexed by all (N+1)2N(N+1)^{2^N}(N+1)2N assignments of options to assortments, and the paper identifies leaves, assortments and tuple coordinates through left-to-right enumerations that a formal proof must make precise. The goal asks for a distribution over trees in FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​, not over tuples: the constructed trees must be shown to satisfy Requirement 3 and to have depth N+1N+1N+1, the tuples whose trees violate Requirement 2 must carry zero weight, and the weights must be transferred to trees without double counting. The final identity is a rearrangement of a sum of products over a function space with one coordinate held fixed, and it uses the absent-product clause and the normalization of P(⋅∣S)\mathbf P(\cdot\mid S)P(⋅∣S) at every assortment, the empty one included. A formalization that drops any of these points proves a different statement.

Formalization scope

Lean conventions:

  • products are Fin N, so the paper's product kkk is k - 1; options are Option (Fin N) with none the no-purchase option 000; assortments are Finset (Fin N); probabilities are real numbers;
  • a choice model is P : Option (Fin N) → Finset (Fin N) → ℝ with IsChoiceModel P: nonnegative, summing to one over all options for every assortment (the empty one included), and zero on products outside the assortment;
  • trees are the inductive type PTree N with leaf o and split p l r; the left child is taken when p ∈ S. Requirement 1 holds by typing; Req2 and Req3 are computed along paths; depth counts nodes, so depth (leaf o) = 1;
  • FdF_dFd​ is FSet N d; the forest model (3) is forestProb F lam o S for a Finset of trees F and weights lam; a distribution over FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​ is a finite set of trees contained in FSet N (N + 1) with weights nonnegative on it and summing to one (equivalent, as FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​ is finite);
  • the balanced tree of a tuple o : Finset (Fin N) → Option (Fin N) is fullTree o, and its weight (EC.5) is prodWeight P o. Leaves are indexed by assortments instead of the paper's left-to-right enumeration.

The goal rules out the trivializing formalizations: the trees must lie in FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​ (a distribution over arbitrary trees, or over trees violating Requirement 2, would be a different and easier statement); the choice model keeps the absent-product clause and the no-purchase option for every assortment; and the weights are nonnegative and sum to one, never signed.

Needed infrastructure is light: Mathlib's Finset sums and products over function types (Finset.prod_univ_sum, Fintype.piFinset), finiteness of trees of bounded depth over a finite label type, and induction on List.finRange N. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the goal that bypass the milestones.

Selected references

  • Y.-C. Chen and V. V. Mišić, Decision Forest: A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Irrational Choice, Management Science, 2022; read as arXiv:1904.11532v3, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.11532v3
  • H. D. Block and J. Marschak, Random Orderings and Stochastic Theories of Response, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 66, 1959. https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d00/d0066.pdf
  • D. McFadden and K. Train, Mixed MNL Models for Discrete Response, Journal of Applied Econometrics 15(5):447–470, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-1255(200009/10)15:5%3C447::AID-JAE570%3E3.0.CO;2-1
  • V. F. Farias, S. Jagabathula and D. Shah, A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Choice with Limited Data, Management Science 59(2):305–322, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1610
  • J. Huber, J. W. Payne and C. Puto, Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis, Journal of Consumer Research 9(1):90–98, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1086/208899
  • Y. Xu and L. Zhou, Rationalizability of Choice Functions by Game Trees, Journal of Economic Theory 134(1):548–556, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.005
  • S. Dogan and K. Yildiz, Choice Through a Unified Lens: The Prudential Model, SSRN working paper 3085542, 2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3085542
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Experimental DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Experimental Design for Staggered Rollouts: S-Shaped, Covariate-Balanced Rollouts Maximize the Trace of the GLS Precision of Instantaneous and Lagged EffectsResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms and public agencies often roll a new product, feature or policy out gradually: a few markets first, more later, every market eventually. When the rollout is itself an experiment, its schedule determines how precisely the effect of the treatment can be estimated. A staggered rollout is the common design in which treatment, once switched on in a unit, stays on. Examples are a ride-sharing feature introduced city by city, a hospital protocol adopted ward by ward, or a stepped-wedge clinical trial. The effect of such a treatment often builds up over several periods, so the analyst wants the instantaneous effect and the lagged ones. The design question is then: in which period should each unit adopt?

Xiong, Athey, Bayati and Imbens (arXiv:1911.03764, Management Science 2024) answer this question in closed form for the trace criterion. Their non-adaptive result, Theorem 3.1, says that an optimal rollout has a treated fraction that follows a fixed S-shaped curve in time, and that each adoption cohort balances the observed and latent covariates.

Setting

There are NNN units and TTT periods. A design assigns to every unit iii an adoption time Ai∈[T]∪{∞}A_i\in[T]\cup\{\infty\}Ai​∈[T]∪{∞}, where ∞\infty∞ means never treated. The treatment indicator is coded zit=+1z_{it}=+1zit​=+1 if Ai≤tA_i\le tAi​≤t and zit=−1z_{it}=-1zit​=−1 otherwise. The outcome model, (3.1) of the paper, is

Yit=αi+βt+Xi⊤θt+τ0zit+τ1zi,t−1+⋯+τℓzi,t−ℓ+ui⊤vt+εit.Y_{it}=\alpha_i+\beta_t+X_i^\top\theta_t+\tau_0z_{it}+\tau_1z_{i,t-1}+\dots+\tau_\ell z_{i,t-\ell}+u_i^\top v_t+\varepsilon_{it}.Yit​=αi​+βt​+Xi⊤​θt​+τ0​zit​+τ1​zi,t−1​+⋯+τℓ​zi,t−ℓ​+ui⊤​vt​+εit​.

It has unit effects αi\alpha_iαi​, time effects βt\beta_tβt​, observed covariates Xi∈RdxX_i\in\mathbb R^{d_x}Xi​∈Rdx​ with period-specific slopes θt\theta_tθt​, and ℓ≥0\ell\ge0ℓ≥0 known lags. Latent covariates ui∈Rduu_i\in\mathbb R^{d_u}ui​∈Rdu​ load on random factors vtv_tvt​ with covariance Σv\Sigma_vΣv​, and the noise εit\varepsilon_{it}εit​ has variance σε2\sigma_\varepsilon^2σε2​. The effects τ=(τ0,…,τℓ)\tau=(\tau_0,\dots,\tau_\ell)τ=(τ0​,…,τℓ​) are estimated by generalized least squares on periods ℓ+1,…,T\ell+1,\dots,Tℓ+1,…,T. The per-period error covariance is Ψ=UΣvU⊤+σε2IN\Psi=U\Sigma_vU^\top+\sigma_\varepsilon^2I_NΨ=UΣv​U⊤+σε2​IN​, and the errors are uncorrelated across periods.

By the Gauss–Markov (Aitken) theorem, which is proved on Prove2Me as VectorSpaceOpt.gauss_markov, the covariance of the GLS estimator is (W⊤Σe−1W)−1(W^\top\Sigma_e^{-1}W)^{-1}(W⊤Σe−1​W)−1 for the regressor matrix WWW. The precision Prec⁡(τ^;A)\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau;A)Prec(τ^;A) is therefore a deterministic matrix, (EC.2.1)–(EC.2.2): the Schur complement of the nuisance block. The T-optimal design problem (3.2) is

max⁡A∈([T]∪{∞})N tr⁡Prec⁡(τ^;A).\max_{A\in([T]\cup\{\infty\})^N}\ \operatorname{tr}\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau;A).A∈([T]∪{∞})Nmax​ trPrec(τ^;A).

With h=⌊ℓ/2⌋h=\lfloor\ell/2\rfloorh=⌊ℓ/2⌋, the paper defines a vector a(ℓ)=(M(ℓ))−1b(ℓ)a^{(\ell)}=(M^{(\ell)})^{-1}b^{(\ell)}a(ℓ)=(M(ℓ))−1b(ℓ) of length ℓ−h\ell-hℓ−h from explicit M(ℓ)M^{(\ell)}M(ℓ), b(ℓ)b^{(\ell)}b(ℓ) ((EC.1.2)–(EC.1.3)). The S-shaped fraction ωℓ,t∗\omega^*_{\ell,t}ωℓ,t∗​ of (3.4) has five stages: it is −1-1−1 for t≤ht\le ht≤h, equals at−h(ℓ)a^{(\ell)}_{t-h}at−h(ℓ)​ for h<t≤ℓh<t\le\ellh<t≤ℓ, is linear, −1+(2t−(ℓ+1))/(T−ℓ)-1+(2t-(\ell+1))/(T-\ell)−1+(2t−(ℓ+1))/(T−ℓ), for ℓ<t≤T−ℓ\ell<t\le T-\ellℓ<t≤T−ℓ, is antisymmetric in the fourth stage, and is 111 at the end.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

Assume σε2>0\sigma_\varepsilon^2>0σε2​>0, Σv=σε2I\Sigma_v=\sigma_\varepsilon^2IΣv​=σε2​I, centred rows ∑iXi=0\sum_iX_i=0∑i​Xi​=0 and ∑iui=0\sum_iu_i=0∑i​ui​=0, ∑iXiui⊤=0\sum_iX_iu_i^\top=0∑i​Xi​ui⊤​=0, and, when ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0, T>(ℓ3+13ℓ2+7ℓ+3)/(8ℓ)T>(\ell^3+13\ell^2+7\ell+3)/(8\ell)T>(ℓ3+13ℓ2+7ℓ+3)/(8ℓ). If

A∈Aℓ∩AX∩AU,A\in\mathbb A_\ell\cap\mathbb A_X\cap\mathbb A_U,A∈Aℓ​∩AX​∩AU​,

then tr⁡Prec⁡(τ^;A′)≤tr⁡Prec⁡(τ^;A)\operatorname{tr}\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau;A')\le\operatorname{tr}\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau;A)trPrec(τ^;A′)≤trPrec(τ^;A) for every design A′A'A′. Here Aℓ\mathbb A_\ellAℓ​ is the set of designs whose treated fraction at every ttt is (1+ωℓ,t∗)/2(1+\omega^*_{\ell,t})/2(1+ωℓ,t∗​)/2, and AX\mathbb A_XAX​, AU\mathbb A_UAU​ are the sets of designs whose adoption cohorts in periods 2,…,T2,\dots,T2,…,T have zero sum of XiX_iXi​ (respectively uiu_iui​).

Milestones

  1. Lemma EC.1.2 (corrected): tr⁡Prec⁡(τ^)=−Nσε2∑j(fj,1+fj,X+fj,U)\operatorname{tr}\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau)=-\frac N{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\sum_{j}\big(f_{j,1}+f_{j,X}+f_{j,U}\big)trPrec(τ^)=−σε2​N​∑j​(fj,1​+fj,X​+fj,U​). The first term depends only on the treated fractions, the second only on XXX, the third only on UUU.
  2. The vector a(ℓ)a^{(\ell)}a(ℓ) exists, and the resulting ω∗\omega^*ω∗ is feasible: nondecreasing, with values in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1], and the stage-2 values lie in [−1,−1+(ℓ+1)/(T−ℓ)][-1,-1+(\ell+1)/(T-\ell)][−1,−1+(ℓ+1)/(T−ℓ)].
  3. ω∗\omega^*ω∗ minimizes f1=∑jfj,1f_1=\sum_jf_{j,1}f1​=∑j​fj,1​ over all nondecreasing paths in [−1,1]T[-1,1]^T[−1,1]T.
  4. The covariate terms are nonnegative, and they vanish when X⊤ztX^\top z_tX⊤zt​ and U⊤ztU^\top z_tU⊤zt​ are constant in ttt.

Significance

The theorem turns a combinatorial design problem over (T+1)N(T+1)^N(T+1)N schedules into explicit conditions. The fraction of treated units follows a universal curve that depends only on (ℓ,T)(\ell,T)(ℓ,T), and the cohorts must balance the covariates. Two features are useful in practice. Without lags the optimal fraction grows linearly. With lags the optimal rollout starts and ends more slowly, which is what the extra stages capture. The paper uses these conditions to build practical designs (rounding the fractions to integers, stratifying on estimated latent factors) and an adaptive version.

The result is proved in the paper; this mission formalizes it. Formalizing it also repairs the record. Two statements in the printed proof are false as printed, and so is one display. The vector bℓb_\ellbℓ​ of Lemma EC.1.2 has an off-by-one, and its observed-covariate term is correct only when X⊤X=N IX^\top X=N\,IX⊤X=NI. The linear term of (EC.2.6) is summed over the wrong range. The mission states the corrected versions, each with a counterexample to the printed one. Theorem 3.1 itself is true as printed. Planning checked it by brute force on small instances, and checked the optimality of ω∗\omega^*ω∗ with an exact certificate for ℓ≤12\ell\le12ℓ≤12. As far as a search of Prove2Me shows, nothing about panel experimental design or GLS precision has been formalized there before.

Difficulty

The objective is a trace of a Schur complement, and the design enters through ±1\pm1±1 entries in a large regression. Expanding that objective into the separable form of Lemma EC.1.2 requires exact control of the projection onto the two-way fixed effects and the period-specific covariate slopes. This is where the printed lemma goes wrong. The relaxed problem in ω\omegaω is a convex quadratic program with monotonicity and box constraints. Its solution is not linear when ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0: the stage-2 values solve a linear system whose feasibility (bounds and monotonicity) holds only above a threshold in TTT. That is the role of the cubic threshold. A natural first idea is that "spread adoption evenly" is optimal. It is optimal only for ℓ=0\ell=0ℓ=0; for ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0 the KKT system forces nonlinear stages at both ends. A second step must also be checked: the ±1\pm1±1 designs, whose fractions satisfy Aℓ\mathbb A_\ellAℓ​ and whose cohorts satisfy the balance conditions, minimize all three terms at once.

Formalization scope

  • Units and periods are Fin N and Fin T, with periods 0-based. A design is Fin N → WithTop (Fin T), with ⊤ for never treated, and zit=±1z_{it}=\pm1zit​=±1.
  • The precision trace is ∑j=0ℓmin⁡γ\sum_{j=0}^{\ell}\min_\gamma∑j=0ℓ​minγ​ of the Ψ−1\Psi^{-1}Ψ−1-weighted residual sum of squares of the lag-jjj column regressed on the nuisance columns. These are all NNN unit dummies, a time dummy for each observed period, and a slope on XiX_iXi​ for each observed period. This equals the trace of (EC.2.2) wherever that formula is defined. It is defined for every design and every XXX, with no matrix inverse of a possibly singular matrix.
  • The random model enters only through Σe=I⊗Ψ\Sigma_e=I\otimes\PsiΣe​=I⊗Ψ. Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1 are encoded by the design type and this covariance; σε2>0\sigma_\varepsilon^2>0σε2​>0 is a hypothesis.
  • The threshold is read as "if ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0 then T>…T>\dotsT>…", because the expression is undefined at ℓ=0\ell=0ℓ=0.
  • Lemma EC.1.2 is stated with bℓ,t=(Tℓ+1−2t)/Tℓb_{\ell,t}=(T_\ell+1-2t)/T_\ellbℓ,t​=(Tℓ​+1−2t)/Tℓ​, and its XXX-term is 1Nz⊤(P⊗HX)z\frac1N z^\top(P\otimes H_X)zN1​z⊤(P⊗HX​)z, with HXH_XHX​ the projector onto the column space of XXX, written without a pseudo-inverse.

The comparison design A′A'A′ ranges over all designs, never over Aℓ\mathbb A_\ellAℓ​ or relaxed fractions. The coding is ±1\pm1±1, not 0/10/10/1. The estimator uses only periods ℓ+1,…,T\ell+1,\dots,Tℓ+1,…,T. Coding with 0/10/10/1 or dropping the period-specific slopes would change ω∗\omega^*ω∗ and the covariate term, and would be a different theorem. The set Aopt\mathbb A_{\mathrm{opt}}Aopt​ can be empty for some NNN, in which case the goal holds vacuously, exactly as the paper's "if" allows. A sanity file exhibits nonempty instances, at ℓ=0\ell=0ℓ=0 with dx=du=1d_x=d_u=1dx​=du​=1 and at ℓ=1\ell=1ℓ=1, and reproduces a value of Example EC.1.4.

A complete development needs least-squares projections, Schur complements, centring matrices, and a KKT certificate for a monotone-constrained quadratic program. The first three are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Xiong, S. Athey, M. Bayati, G. Imbens, Optimal Experimental Design for Staggered Rollouts, Management Science, 2024; arXiv:1911.03764v6. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.03764
  • A. C. Atkinson, V. V. Fedorov, The design of experiments for discriminating between two rival models, Biometrika 62(1), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/62.1.57
  • J. Bai, Inferential theory for factor models of large dimensions, Econometrica 71(1), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00392
  • M. A. Hussey, J. P. Hughes, Design and analysis of stepped wedge cluster randomized trials, Contemporary Clinical Trials 28(2), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cct.2006.05.007
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Blind Dynamic Resource Allocation in Closed Networks via Mirror Backpressure: Mirror Backpressure Loses at Most O(K/T + 1/K + √(ηK)) Payoff per CustomerResearch Paper

Motivation

Ride-hailing, car-sharing and bike-sharing platforms, as well as scrip systems, move a fixed stock of reusable resources around a network. Each customer that is served relocates one unit, from a pick-up location to a drop-off location. The operator decides, customer by customer, whether to serve and with which unit. Supply can run dry at a location, which forbids serving from there. Demand also varies over the day, and the operator rarely knows the arrival rates.

Kanoria and Qian (arXiv:1903.02764v4; Management Science, 2024) propose Mirror Backpressure (MBP), a policy that uses only the current queue lengths and never estimates the rates. They prove that it is near-optimal against the best policy that knows the rates. Earlier guarantees for closed networks, such as Banerjee, Freund and Lykouris (arXiv:1608.06819), need exact knowledge of stationary rates and bound only the steady state. Classical backpressure (Tassiulas and Ephremides, 1992) and the drift-plus-penalty method (Neely, 2010) address open networks, where the no-underflow constraint is handled by idling, not by a fixed stock of units.

Setting

A closed network has a finite set VVV of m=∣V∣>1m = |V| > 1m=∣V∣>1 nodes and KKK identical supply units. The state is the vector of queue lengths q∈ΩK={q∈Z+m:1⊤q=K}\mathbf q \in \Omega_K = \{\mathbf q \in \mathbb Z_+^m : \mathbf 1^\top \mathbf q = K\}q∈ΩK​={q∈Z+m​:1⊤q=K}. In each period t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \dotst=0,1,… exactly one customer arrives. Her type τ\tauτ lies in a finite set T\mathcal TT and is drawn from a probability vector ϕt\boldsymbol\phi^tϕt, independently of the past. Type τ\tauτ has nonempty pick-up and drop-off neighborhoods P(τ),D(τ)⊆V\mathcal P(\tau), \mathcal D(\tau) \subseteq VP(τ),D(τ)⊆V.

After seeing τ\tauτ, the controller drops the customer or serves her with a pair (j,k)∈P(τ)×D(τ)(j,k) \in \mathcal P(\tau) \times \mathcal D(\tau)(j,k)∈P(τ)×D(τ). Serving collects a payoff wjτkw_{j\tau k}wjτk​, with ∣wjτk∣≤1|w_{j\tau k}| \le 1∣wjτk​∣≤1, and moves one unit from jjj to kkk. Serving from jjj requires qj>0q_j > 0qj​>0: this is the no-underflow constraint. A feasible policy may randomize, depend on the whole history and the period, and know the rates.

Write JTπ(q)J^\pi_T(\mathbf q)JTπ​(q) for the expected payoff of π\piπ in periods 0,…,T−10, \dots, T-10,…,T−1 from q[0]=q\mathbf q[0] = \mathbf qq[0]=q. The benchmark is WT∗=sup⁡πmax⁡qJTπ(q)/TW^*_T = \sup_\pi \max_{\mathbf q} J^\pi_T(\mathbf q)/TWT∗​=supπ​maxq​JTπ​(q)/T, and a policy is evaluated from its worst initial state, WTπ=min⁡qJTπ(q)/TW^\pi_T = \min_{\mathbf q} J^\pi_T(\mathbf q)/TWTπ​=minq​JTπ​(q)/T. The loss is LTπ=WT∗−WTπL^\pi_T = W^*_T - W^\pi_TLTπ​=WT∗​−WTπ​.

The rates vary η\etaη-slowly if 1T−1∑t∥ϕt+1−ϕt∥1≤η\frac{1}{T-1}\sum_{t} \|\boldsymbol\phi^{t+1} - \boldsymbol\phi^t\|_1 \le \etaT−11​∑t​∥ϕt+1−ϕt∥1​≤η. The connectedness

α(ϕ)=min⁡∅≠S⊊V∑τ: P(τ)∩S≠∅, D(τ)∖S≠∅ϕτ\alpha(\boldsymbol\phi) = \min_{\emptyset \ne S \subsetneq V} \sum_{\tau:\ \mathcal P(\tau) \cap S \ne \emptyset,\ \mathcal D(\tau) \setminus S \ne \emptyset} \phi_\tauα(ϕ)=∅=S⊊Vmin​τ: P(τ)∩S=∅, D(τ)∖S=∅∑​ϕτ​

is the smallest rate of demand that can carry supply out of any proper node set. Condition 1 requires α(ϕt)>0\alpha(\boldsymbol\phi^t) > 0α(ϕt)>0 in every period, and αmin⁡=min⁡tα(ϕt)\alpha_{\min} = \min_t \alpha(\boldsymbol\phi^t)αmin​=mint​α(ϕt).

MBP normalizes queue lengths as qˉi=(qi+K)/K~\bar q_i = (q_i + \sqrt K)/\tilde Kqˉ​i​=(qi​+K​)/K~ with K~=K+mK\tilde K = K + m\sqrt KK~=K+mK​, and uses the congestion function f(x)=−m x−1/2f(x) = -\sqrt m\, x^{-1/2}f(x)=−m​x−1/2. For a type-τ\tauτ customer it picks (j∗,k∗)(j^*, k^*)(j∗,k∗) maximizing the score wjτk+f(qˉj)−f(qˉk)w_{j\tau k} + f(\bar q_j) - f(\bar q_k)wjτk​+f(qˉ​j​)−f(qˉ​k​) over P(τ)×D(τ)\mathcal P(\tau) \times \mathcal D(\tau)P(τ)×D(τ). It serves with that pair if the score is nonnegative and qj∗>0q_{j^*} > 0qj∗​>0, and drops the customer otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

There are a universal CCC and K1=poly(m,1/αmin⁡)K_1 = \mathrm{poly}(m, 1/\alpha_{\min})K1​=poly(m,1/αmin​) such that for every instance and every K≥K1K \ge K_1K≥K1​,

LTMBP≤Cm(KT+ηK)+Cm2K.L^{\mathrm{MBP}}_T \le Cm\Big(\frac KT + \sqrt{\eta K}\Big) + \frac{Cm^2}{K}.LTMBP​≤Cm(TK​+ηK​)+KCm2​.

The constants are existential and fixed before the instance. A sharper constant is a stronger result that does not invalidate the goal.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof.

  • Lemmas 4–6 and Proposition 1. Any policy's average payoff is at most the value of the static planning LP at the average rate ϕˉ\bar{\boldsymbol\phi}ϕˉ​, with flow balance relaxed by K/TK/TK/T. The relaxation costs at most mK/TmK/TmK/T, so WT∗≤WSPP(ϕˉ)+mK/TW^*_T \le W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\bar{\boldsymbol\phi}) + mK/TWT∗​≤WSPP(ϕˉ​)+mK/T.
  • Strong duality for the partial dual g(y)=∑τϕτmax⁡j,k(wjτk+yj−yk)+g(\mathbf y) = \sum_\tau \phi_\tau \max_{j,k}(w_{j\tau k} + y_j - y_k)^+g(y)=∑τ​ϕτ​maxj,k​(wjτk​+yj​−yk​)+.
  • Lemmas 1–3. A one-period decomposition of MBP's suboptimality into a potential drift V1\mathcal V_1V1​, a stochastic term V2\mathcal V_2V2​, a dual gap V3\mathcal V_3V3​ and an underflow indicator V4\mathcal V_4V4​. Then V3≤−α(ϕ)[max⁡jyj−min⁡jyj−2m]+\mathcal V_3 \le -\alpha(\boldsymbol\phi)[\max_j y_j - \min_j y_j - 2m]^+V3​≤−α(ϕ)[maxj​yj​−minj​yj​−2m]+ at y=f(qˉ)\mathbf y = \mathbf f(\bar{\mathbf q})y=f(qˉ​), and V2+V3+V4≤Cm2/K~\mathcal V_2 + \mathcal V_3 + \mathcal V_4 \le Cm^2/\tilde KV2​+V3​+V4​≤Cm2/K~.
  • Propositions 3, 4, 2. The policy gap 1T∑tWSPP(ϕt)−WTMBP≤CmK/T+Cm2/K\frac1T\sum_t W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\boldsymbol\phi^t) - W^{\mathrm{MBP}}_T \le CmK/T + Cm^2/KT1​∑t​WSPP(ϕt)−WTMBP​≤CmK/T+Cm2/K. The variation gap 1T∑tWSPP(ϕt)≥WSPP(ϕˉ)−mηT\frac1T\sum_t W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\boldsymbol\phi^t) \ge W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\bar{\boldsymbol\phi}) - m\eta TT1​∑t​WSPP(ϕt)≥WSPP(ϕˉ​)−mηT. Batching them gives LTMBP≤CmK/ΔT+Cm2/K+ΔTmηL^{\mathrm{MBP}}_T \le CmK/\Delta_T + Cm^2/K + \Delta_T m\etaLTMBP​≤CmK/ΔT​+Cm2/K+ΔT​mη for every 0<ΔT<T0 < \Delta_T < T0<ΔT​<T.

Significance

Theorem 1 gives a finite-KKK, finite-horizon guarantee for a policy that is blind to the arrival rates. Its steady-state per-customer loss is O(1/K)O(1/K)O(1/K) for stationary demand, the same order as rate-aware state-independent policies. Under imperfect rate estimates, any state-independent policy suffers a loss of order one (Banerjee, Kanoria and Qian, 2018, Proposition 4). The bound holds for arbitrary slowly varying demand. It does not degrade in the large-market regime where KKK and the demand grow together.

The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing in it is formalized anywhere. This mission would give the platform its first controlled closed-network model: demand types with pick-up and drop-off sets, the no-underflow constraint, and history-dependent randomized policies over a finite horizon. It would also add a fully machine-checked drift-plus-penalty argument with an underflow term. One printed statement is corrected: Lemma 1 as printed has V2\mathcal V_2V2​ with coefficient 1/(2K~)1/(2\tilde K)1/(2K~), which a two-node instance refutes. The milestone uses 1/K~1/\tilde K1/K~, and Theorem 1 is unaffected.

Difficulty

The natural route is the backpressure argument: score each pair by payoff plus congestion difference and bound the Lyapunov drift. That argument assumes that serving from an empty queue is either impossible or harmless. Here the no-underflow constraint binds. The congestion-adjusted score can be positive at an empty queue, so the policy is forced to drop customers that the fluid solution would serve. Virtual-queue workarounds fail in a closed network because fake units never leave. Linear congestion costs, as in regular backpressure, can lose a constant per customer.

The proof needs three ingredients. First, a potential whose gradient is the steep congestion function. Second, the observation that the dual gap V3\mathcal V_3V3​ is very negative exactly when some queue is short. Third, a growth estimate with the K\sqrt KK​ offset showing that V3\mathcal V_3V3​ absorbs V2+V4\mathcal V_2 + \mathcal V_4V2​+V4​ once K≥poly(m,1/α)K \ge \mathrm{poly}(m, 1/\alpha)K≥poly(m,1/α). The finite-horizon benchmark separately requires a flow-decomposition argument and LP sensitivity in the rates.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Nodes and types are Fintypes, with 1 < Fintype.card V. Decisions are Option (V × V). Periods are numbered from 000, with rates phi : ℕ → Ty → ℝ.
  • Policies and payoff. Policies are probability vectors on feasible decisions as a function of the period, the past (state, type, decision) triples, the current state and the current type. The history includes past decisions, so the class contains the paper's. The expected payoff is a finite recursion over types and decisions, with no measure theory.
  • Loss. The loss is stated without a supremum: for every policy π\piπ and initial states q,q′\mathbf q, \mathbf q'q,q′, (JTπ(q)−JTMBP(q′))/T≤(J^\pi_T(\mathbf q) - J^{\mathrm{MBP}}_T(\mathbf q'))/T \le(JTπ​(q)−JTMBP​(q′))/T≤ bound.
  • Constants and tie-breaks. "Poly" is c (m+1/α)Nc\,(m + 1/\alpha)^Nc(m+1/α)N, with C,c,NC, c, NC,c,N quantified before every type and instance. MBP is Algorithm 1 exactly, under every argmax tie-break. Payoffs satisfy ∣w∣≤1|w| \le 1∣w∣≤1 rather than max⁡∣w∣=1\max|w| = 1max∣w∣=1.
  • Readings. Proposition 1's "W∗≤WSPP(ϕˉ)W^* \le W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\bar{\boldsymbol\phi})W∗≤WSPP(ϕˉ​)" is read as W∗≤lim sup⁡TWSPP(ϕˉT)W^* \le \limsup_T W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\bar{\boldsymbol\phi}_T)W∗≤limsupT​WSPP(ϕˉ​T​). The maximum of ∣f′∣|f'|∣f′∣ in V2\mathcal V_2V2​ is rendered as any upper bound BBB.

The statement has a trivializing formalization that is excluded. If K1K_1K1​ or CCC could depend on TTT, ϕ\boldsymbol\phiϕ or η\etaη, the choice K1=TK_1 = TK1​=T would make CmK/T≥2≥LTCmK/T \ge 2 \ge L_TCmK/T≥2≥LT​ and the theorem empty. Likewise, a benchmark restricted to Markov or deterministic policies, or a supremum over an unconstrained set, would change what is proved.

The definitions of the closed network, the static planning LP with its relaxed flow balance, acyclic flows and the partial dual are reusable for other closed-network and ride-hailing results. Contributions are welcome on every milestone. The LP lemmas (4–6, strong duality, Lemma 2, Proposition 4) are independent of the policy and can be attacked first. Platform results LinearOptimization.lp_strong_duality and LinearOptimization.network_flow_decomposition_including_zero are available as tools.

Selected references

  • Y. Kanoria, P. Qian, Blind Dynamic Resource Allocation in Closed Networks via Mirror Backpressure, arXiv:1903.02764v4, 2022; Management Science, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.02764v4
  • S. Banerjee, D. Freund, T. Lykouris, Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework, Operations Research, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.06819
  • S. Banerjee, Y. Kanoria, P. Qian, Dynamic Assignment Control of a Closed Queueing Network under Complete Resource Pooling, arXiv:1803.04959, 2018 (also ACM SIGMETRICS 2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04959
  • M. J. Neely, Stochastic Network Optimization with Application to Communication and Queueing Systems, Morgan & Claypool, 2010. https://doi.org/10.2200/S00271ED1V01Y201006CNT007
  • L. Tassiulas, A. Ephremides, Stability Properties of Constrained Queueing Systems and Scheduling Policies for Maximum Throughput in Multihop Radio Networks, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1109/9.182479
  • A. Beck, M. Teboulle, Mirror Descent and Nonlinear Projected Subgradient Methods for Convex Optimization, Operations Research Letters, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6377(02)00231-6
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Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

When Is Assortment Optimization Optimal?: Under History-Monotone Futures, Assortments Are Optimal Among All IC MechanismsResearch Paper

Why compare assortments with mechanisms

Assortment optimization is the problem of choosing which items to offer a customer who buys at most one item, when each item has a fixed, exogenous price. It is one of the central problems of revenue management: the customer's behaviour is described by a choice model, and a large literature computes optimal assortments under specific models, from the general discrete choice framework of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) to the Markov Chain choice model of Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal (2016) and Feldman and Topaloglu (2017).

An assortment is one way to sell. A seller can also run a lottery, or ask the customer for their preferences and allocate at random. Ma (arXiv:2105.10433) asks when offering an assortment is already the best a seller can do among all such selling schemes. It is the ordinal analogue of the single-buyer auction setting of Myerson (1981), where an optimal mechanism is a posted price. The answer measures what assortment optimization computes: when assortments are optimal, the optimal assortment's revenue is the economic limit of the seller's revenue, not only the best value within one restricted class. The paper shows by a four-item example (Example 1, p. 2) that a top-2 lottery can strictly beat every assortment, so the question has content.

Setting

There are items N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} with prices rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0. A buyer's private type is a list ℓ\ellℓ, a strictly ordered subset of NNN (most preferred first; items not on the list are worse than buying nothing). Lists are drawn from a list distribution: a finite support L\mathcal LL with probabilities p(ℓ)>0p(\ell) > 0p(ℓ)>0 summing to 111. Write ℓk\ell_kℓk​ for the kkk'th item and ℓ1:k\ell_{1:k}ℓ1:k​ for the first kkk items.

Offering an assortment S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N, the buyer buys the first item of SSS on their list; Pr⁡[j⪰S0]\Pr[j \succeq S_0]Pr[j⪰S0​] is the probability that this is jjj, and REV[S]=∑j∈SrjPr⁡[j⪰S0]\mathsf{REV}[S] = \sum_{j \in S} r_j \Pr[j \succeq S_0]REV[S]=∑j∈S​rj​Pr[j⪰S0​]. OPTS\mathsf{OPT}^SOPTS is the largest REV[S]\mathsf{REV}[S]REV[S].

A mechanism assigns, on report ℓ∈L\ell \in \mathcal Lℓ∈L, item j∈ℓj \in \ellj∈ℓ with probability xj(ℓ)x_j(\ell)xj​(ℓ). It is IC (incentive compatible) if for every kkk, reporting truthfully maximizes the probability of receiving one of the buyer's kkk favourite items:

∑j∈ℓ1:kxj(ℓ)≥∑j∈ℓ1:k∩ℓ′xj(ℓ′)∀ℓ,ℓ′∈L, k≤∣ℓ∣,∑j∈ℓxj(ℓ)≤1,xj(ℓ)≥0.\sum_{j \in \ell_{1:k}} x_j(\ell) \ge \sum_{j \in \ell_{1:k} \cap \ell'} x_j(\ell') \quad \forall \ell, \ell' \in \mathcal L,\ k \le |\ell|, \qquad \sum_{j \in \ell} x_j(\ell) \le 1, \qquad x_j(\ell) \ge 0.j∈ℓ1:k​∑​xj​(ℓ)≥j∈ℓ1:k​∩ℓ′∑​xj​(ℓ′)∀ℓ,ℓ′∈L, k≤∣ℓ∣,j∈ℓ∑​xj​(ℓ)≤1,xj​(ℓ)≥0.

REV[x]=∑ℓp(ℓ)∑j∈ℓrjxj(ℓ)\mathsf{REV}[x] = \sum_{\ell} p(\ell) \sum_{j \in \ell} r_j x_j(\ell)REV[x]=∑ℓ​p(ℓ)∑j∈ℓ​rj​xj​(ℓ), and OPTx\mathsf{OPT}^xOPTx is the optimal value of this linear program. Every assortment is an IC mechanism, so OPTS≤OPTx\mathsf{OPT}^S \le \mathsf{OPT}^xOPTS≤OPTx.

A prefix ρ\rhoρ is an ordered subset of NNN; Pr⁡[ρ]\Pr[\rho]Pr[ρ] is the probability that the list starts with ρ\rhoρ, and ρ\rhoρ is realizable if Pr⁡[ρ]>0\Pr[\rho] > 0Pr[ρ]>0. For nonempty ρ\rhoρ, ρend\rho_{\mathrm{end}}ρend​ is its last item and ρpre\rho_{\mathrm{pre}}ρpre​ the items before it. Pr⁡[j⪰S0∣ρ]\Pr[j \succeq S_0 \mid \rho]Pr[j⪰S0​∣ρ] is the probability that jjj is the first item of SSS on the list, given that the list starts with ρ\rhoρ. The future from ρ\rhoρ dominates the future from ρ′\rho'ρ′ if Pr⁡[j⪰S0∣ρ]≥Pr⁡[j⪰S0∣ρ′]\Pr[j \succeq S_0 \mid \rho] \ge \Pr[j \succeq S_0 \mid \rho']Pr[j⪰S0​∣ρ]≥Pr[j⪰S0​∣ρ′] for all S⊆N∖(ρ∪ρ′)S \subseteq N \setminus (\rho \cup \rho')S⊆N∖(ρ∪ρ′) and j∈Sj \in Sj∈S. The distribution has history-monotone futures if, for all realizable ρ,ρ′\rho, \rho'ρ,ρ′ with ρend=ρend′\rho_{\mathrm{end}} = \rho'_{\mathrm{end}}ρend​=ρend′​ and ρpre⊈ρpre′\rho_{\mathrm{pre}} \not\subseteq \rho'_{\mathrm{pre}}ρpre​⊆ρpre′​ as sets, the future from ρ\rhoρ dominates the future from ρ′\rho'ρ′.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18)

For a list distribution with history-monotone futures and any prices r≥0r \ge 0r≥0, there is an assortment SSS with

REV[S]=max⁡{REV[x]:x IC},i.e. OPTS=OPTx.\mathsf{REV}[S] = \max\{\mathsf{REV}[x] : x \text{ IC}\}, \qquad \text{i.e. } \mathsf{OPT}^S = \mathsf{OPT}^x.REV[S]=max{REV[x]:x IC},i.e. OPTS=OPTx.

Milestones

The proof passes through a chain of relaxations OPTS≤OPTx≤OPTf≤OPTϕ\mathsf{OPT}^S \le \mathsf{OPT}^x \le \mathsf{OPT}^f \le \mathsf{OPT}^\phiOPTS≤OPTx≤OPTf≤OPTϕ, where OPTf\mathsf{OPT}^fOPTf maximizes a revenue over increasing set functions f:2N→[0,1]f : 2^N \to [0,1]f:2N→[0,1] and OPTϕ\mathsf{OPT}^\phiOPTϕ over monotone stopping policies ϕj:2N∖{j}→{0,1}\phi_j : 2^{N \setminus \{j\}} \to \{0,1\}ϕj​:2N∖{j}→{0,1} on the tree of prefixes. The milestones, in attack order:

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 9): assortments are IC mechanisms with the same revenue, and deterministic IC mechanisms are assortments.
  2. Proposition 2 (p. 11): f(S)=max⁡ℓ∑j∈S∩ℓxj(ℓ)f(S) = \max_{\ell} \sum_{j \in S \cap \ell} x_j(\ell)f(S)=maxℓ​∑j∈S∩ℓ​xj​(ℓ) turns an IC mechanism into an increasing set function of equal revenue.
  3. Proposition 3 (p. 14, posed with a corrected clause): OPTf\mathsf{OPT}^fOPTf has a boolean optimum, and boolean fff with f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0 become stopping policies of equal revenue.
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 19, posed corrected): for SSS inside the set of items where ϕ\phiϕ always stops, REV[ϕ]−REV[S]\mathsf{REV}[\phi] - \mathsf{REV}[S]REV[ϕ]−REV[S] is a weighted sum of SSS-adjusted prices rS(ρ)=rρend−∑j′∈Srj′Pr⁡[j′⪰S0∣ρ]r^S(\rho) = r_{\rho_{\mathrm{end}}} - \sum_{j' \in S} r_{j'} \Pr[j' \succeq S_0 \mid \rho]rS(ρ)=rρend​​−∑j′∈S​rj′​Pr[j′⪰S0​∣ρ].
  5. Lemma 2 (p. 20): under history-monotone futures, the SSS-disjoint prefixes ending in jjj split into tiers ordered by inclusion and by conditional choice probabilities.
  6. Corollary 1 (p. 20): adjusted prices are monotone over the tiers.
  7. Display (43) (p. 45): the identity of Lemma 1 rewritten as a sum over lists.
  8. The extremal claim of §E.2 (p. 43): under history-monotone futures some optimal monotone stopping policy is an assortment, so OPTϕ=OPTS\mathsf{OPT}^\phi = \mathsf{OPT}^SOPTϕ=OPTS.

Significance

History-monotone futures hold for Markov Chain choice models (hence MNL), for Elimination by Aspects, and for MNL mixed with singleton lists (Propositions 4–6). Theorem 2 therefore says that for these widely used models no lottery or other IC selling scheme beats the best assortment, and the many algorithms that compute optimal assortments under them compute the seller's optimal revenue over all mechanisms. Without the condition the conclusion fails (Example 1).

The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof exists. A formalization contributes a verified development of the relaxation chain (mechanisms, set functions, stopping policies on a prefix tree), which applies to any list distribution, and pins down the hypotheses of two intermediate statements that are false as printed (Lemma 1 and the "Moreover" clause of Proposition 3; see below).

Difficulty

The natural argument is an exchange argument: if a policy stops on a prefix ρ\rhoρ but continues on ρ′\rho'ρ′ with the same endpoint, history-monotone futures should make it profitable to stop on ρ′\rho'ρ′ as well. This fails: a policy can earn strictly more by continuing from a dominated future than from a dominating one (p. 19, discussing Example 2), because which items it later stops on depends on the history. A pairwise comparison of prefixes is therefore not enough: the condition has to be used on all prefixes with a given endpoint at once, and the relevant quantity is not the revenue of a prefix's future but its price net of the future revenue of an assortment. The relaxation from set functions to boolean set functions (Proposition 3) is a further step that a direct argument does not supply.

Formalization scope

Items are Fin n (0-based), lists are List (Fin n), and a list distribution is a finite support of Nodup lists with positive weights summing to one; n=0n = 0n=0 and the empty list are allowed. Prices satisfy rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0, the paper's standing assumption. A mechanism is a function of a list and an item, of which only the values at ℓ∈L\ell \in \mathcal Lℓ∈L, j∈ℓj \in \ellj∈ℓ are read. Realizable prefixes are the nonempty prefixes of support lists; domination, history-monotone futures, adjusted prices and tiers quantify over realizable prefixes only, so a conditional probability is never taken at Pr⁡[ρ]=0\Pr[\rho] = 0Pr[ρ]=0. Quantifying over all prefixes would compare Lean's x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0 against positive probabilities and make the hypothesis fail for almost every distribution. Stopping policies are Bool-valued.

The goal states attainment: some REV[S]\mathsf{REV}[S]REV[S] is the greatest value of REV[x]\mathsf{REV}[x]REV[x] over IC mechanisms. A weakened IC constraint (only ℓ′=ℓ\ell' = \ellℓ′=ℓ, or only k=∣ℓ∣k = |\ell|k=∣ℓ∣) would admit first-best mechanisms and make the goal false; constraint (3) is stated for every ℓ,ℓ′∈L\ell, \ell' \in \mathcal Lℓ,ℓ′∈L and every k≤∣ℓ∣k \le |\ell|k≤∣ℓ∣.

Two printed statements are corrected. Lemma 1 holds only when ϕj\phi_jϕj​ is the all-1 function for every j∈Sj \in Sj∈S, as in the proof of Theorem 2; it fails for ϕ≡0\phi \equiv 0ϕ≡0 and S≠∅S \ne \emptysetS=∅. The "Moreover" clause of Proposition 3 needs f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0; it fails for f≡1f \equiv 1f≡1. Each corrected item lists its counterexample.

All definitions live in one module (AssortOpt.HMF.Setting); the list-distribution, mechanism and stopping-policy layer is reusable for the paper's other results (Theorem 1 on Markov Chains, Propositions 4–9, the approximation bounds of §5). Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are follow-up missions on those results.

Selected references

  • W. Ma, When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?, Management Science (forthcoming); arXiv:2105.10433v5, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10433
  • J. Blanchet, G. Gallego, V. Goyal, A Markov chain approximation to choice modeling, Operations Research 64(4), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1505
  • J. B. Feldman, H. Topaloglu, Revenue management under the Markov chain choice model, Operations Research 65(5), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1628
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
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Learning to Rank an Assortment of Products: The Simple Learning Algorithm Hooks Half the Optimal Ranking's Customers up to ε with Probability 1 − δResearch Paper

Why rank an assortment

Online retailers display hundreds of products in a list or a grid, and most visitors never scroll far. A customer who finds nothing appealing near the top leaves without engaging at all, so the order of the first few slots decides whether a visit turns into a click, and through it into a sale. Ferreira, Parthasarathy and Sekar (SSRN 3395992; Management Science, 2021, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4130) model this with a first impression window: each customer is guaranteed to look at a number of top positions, and is hooked if she clicks at least one product there. The retailer wants a ranking that hooks as many customers as possible, without knowing customer preferences in advance, learning them only from observed clicks.

The paper shows that the offline problem, with full knowledge of the customer distribution, is NP-hard (Proposition 1), that a greedy ranking hooks at least half as many customers as the best ranking (Theorem 1), and that a learning algorithm built on any off-the-shelf PAC bandit algorithm matches that factor up to an arbitrarily small additive error (Theorem 3). This mission formalizes the last result for general customer populations.

Setting

There are nnn products [n]={1,…,n}[n] = \{1,\dots,n\}[n]={1,…,n}. A ranking is a permutation π\piπ of [n][n][n]; π−1(j)\pi^{-1}(j)π−1(j) is the product in position jjj. A customer type is a triple (p,f,k)(p, f, k)(p,f,k):

  • p=(p1,…,pn)p = (p_1,\dots,p_n)p=(p1​,…,pn​) with pi∈[0,1]p_i \in [0,1]pi​∈[0,1], the intrinsic click probabilities;
  • fi:2[n]→[−pi,1−pi]f_i : 2^{[n]} \to [-p_i, 1-p_i]fi​:2[n]→[−pi​,1−pi​], the bias functions, with fi(∅)=0f_i(\emptyset) = 0fi​(∅)=0;
  • k∈[n]k \in [n]k∈[n], the first impression window.

Customers arrive with types drawn independently from an arbitrary distribution D\mathcal DD on types; the three components may be correlated. A customer facing π\piπ inspects positions 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k in order. If χ\chiχ is the set of products she has clicked so far, she clicks the product iii in front of her with probability pi+fi(χ)p_i + f_i(\chi)pi​+fi​(χ). Clicks beyond position kkk are ignored. She is hooked, H(π)=1H(\pi) = 1H(π)=1, if she clicks some product in positions 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k. The objective is the expected hook E[H(π)]\mathbb E[H(\pi)]E[H(π)], the expectation taken over the type and the clicks.

The marginal benefit of placing product iii right after a partial ranking σ\sigmaσ is E[H(σ∪i)]−E[H(σ)]\mathbb E[H(\sigma\cup i)] - \mathbb E[H(\sigma)]E[H(σ∪i)]−E[H(σ)]. The Simple Learning Algorithm (Algorithm 2) fills ranks 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n in order. At rank rrr it runs an (ϵ′,δ′)(\epsilon',\delta')(ϵ′,δ′)-PAC algorithm for the multi-armed bandit problem (Definition 1, after Even-Dar, Mannor and Mansour 2006: with probability at least 1−δ′1-\delta'1−δ′ it returns an arm whose mean is within ϵ′\epsilon'ϵ′ of the best) on the products not yet ranked. The reward of arm iii is H(π~∪i)−H(π~)H(\tilde\pi\cup i) - H(\tilde\pi)H(π~∪i)−H(π~) for the current prefix π~\tilde\piπ~, and the algorithm places the returned product at rank rrr.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, part 1 (pp. 22–23)

For ϵ,δ>0\epsilon,\delta > 0ϵ,δ>0 and any (ϵ′,δ′)(\epsilon',\delta')(ϵ′,δ′)-PAC black box with ϵ′=2ϵ/n\epsilon' = 2\epsilon/nϵ′=2ϵ/n and δ′=δ/n\delta' = \delta/nδ′=δ/n, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ the returned ranking π~\tilde\piπ~ satisfies

E[H(π~)] ≥ 12 E[H(π∗)]−ϵfor every ranking π∗.\mathbb E[H(\tilde\pi)] \ \ge\ \tfrac12\,\mathbb E[H(\pi^*)] - \epsilon \quad\text{for every ranking } \pi^* .E[H(π~)] ≥ 21​E[H(π∗)]−ϵfor every ranking π∗.

Milestones

  1. First-click identity (proof of Lemma 1, p. 53): without a prior click, a click on iii is Bernoulli(pi)(p_i)(pi​). Hence the hook probability given the type is 1−∏j≤k(1−pπ−1(j))1 - \prod_{j\le k}(1-p_{\pi^{-1}(j)})1−∏j≤k​(1−pπ−1(j)​), and equals the probability of the same event under a coupling with one like-coin per product.
  2. (6) (p. 50): E[H(π)]=∑rE[Cˉ(r−1,π)Cπ−1(r)(π)]\mathbb E[H(\pi)] = \sum_{r} \mathbb E[\bar C(r-1,\pi)C_{\pi^{-1}(r)}(\pi)]E[H(π)]=∑r​E[Cˉ(r−1,π)Cπ−1(r)​(π)], where Cˉ(r,π)\bar C(r,\pi)Cˉ(r,π) indicates no click in the top rrr positions. Each term is the marginal benefit of the product at rank rrr.
  3. (10) (p. 51): E[H(π∗)]≤E[H(π)]+∑rE[Cˉ(r−1,π)Cˉ(r−1,π∗)Cπ∗−1(r)(π∗)]\mathbb E[H(\pi^*)] \le \mathbb E[H(\pi)] + \sum_r \mathbb E[\bar C(r-1,\pi)\bar C(r-1,\pi^*)C_{\pi^{*-1}(r)}(\pi^*)]E[H(π∗)]≤E[H(π)]+∑r​E[Cˉ(r−1,π)Cˉ(r−1,π∗)Cπ∗−1(r)​(π∗)] for any rankings π,π∗\pi,\pi^*π,π∗.
  4. (26) (p. 59): each joint term is at most the marginal benefit of π∗−1(r)\pi^{*-1}(r)π∗−1(r) placed after [π~]r−1[\tilde\pi]_{r-1}[π~]r−1​.
  5. Approximate-greedy bound (p. 58, proved by (25)–(28)): a ranking whose every rank is 2ϵ/n2\epsilon/n2ϵ/n-approximately best satisfies E[H(π∗)]≤2E[H(π~)]+2ϵ\mathbb E[H(\pi^*)] \le 2\mathbb E[H(\tilde\pi)] + 2\epsilonE[H(π∗)]≤2E[H(π~)]+2ϵ.
  6. (24) (p. 58): by the union bound, every rank is approximately best with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ.

Significance

The result says that learning costs nothing in the approximation factor. The best known factor for general customer populations is the greedy algorithm's ½, and a retailer who knows nothing about D\mathcal DD attains it up to ϵ\epsilonϵ by plugging in any PAC bandit algorithm. Sample-efficient best-arm algorithms such as LUCB can be used unchanged, and the learning phase is nnn times the black box's sample complexity (Corollary 1). The same template is reused later in the paper for the threshold-acceptance and revenue variants.

On the formal side, the mission produces a reusable model of position-based browsing with biased sequential clicks, with a proof that the bias functions do not affect the hook probability (milestone 1). It also produces a statement of an "approximate greedy" guarantee that does not pass through submodularity: the paper notes (p. 25) that the hook objective is not presented as a submodular set function. The paper's proofs are on paper only. No machine-checked version of any result of the paper is known.

Difficulty

The obvious route to the ½ factor is to view E[H(⋅)]\mathbb E[H(\cdot)]E[H(⋅)] as a monotone submodular function of the set of displayed products and invoke the greedy guarantee. That route fails here: the objective is a function of an order, the bias functions fif_ifi​ make clicks depend on earlier clicks, and windows vary across customers. Comparing two rankings on the same customer needs a joint law of her clicks under both, which the model does not supply; the paper fixes a coupling (p. 53), and the coupled events must agree with the sequential law, which is where fi(∅)=0f_i(\emptyset) = 0fi​(∅)=0 enters. And the probabilistic step on p. 59 that writes a conditional probability as Et[pi∗t]\mathbb E_t[p_{i^*t}]Et​[pi∗t​] holds only type by type, so (26) has to be argued per type before averaging. On the probabilistic side, the black box's guarantee holds conditionally on the random prefix built so far, and the union bound must be taken over ranks after averaging over prefixes.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n and rankings are duplicate-free lists of length nnn. Ranks are 0-based in Lean (the paper's rank rrr is index r−1r-1r−1). Probabilities are real numbers. A type is the structure CustomerType n with every constraint above as a field. The type distribution is a probability measure DDD on a measurable space Θ\ThetaΘ together with a type map τ\tauτ. The added hypothesis TypeMeasurable τ asks that every coordinate of the type be measurable; the page treats (p,f,k)∼D(p,f,k)\sim\mathcal D(p,f,k)∼D as a random variable, and without measurability the Bochner integrals would be 000. The expected hook is computed from the sequential click law with bias (an explicit sum over click patterns inside the window), not from a closed form. The comparisons in (6), (10) and (26) use the paper's coupling (p. 53): one Bernoulli(pi)(p_i)(pi​) like-variable per product, shared by all rankings. The maximum in (23) is over unranked products, as in Algorithm 2.

The black box is formalized through its guarantee. A SimpleLearningRun is a random output ranking whose rank-rrr product, conditionally on every prefix already fixed, fails to be ϵ′\epsilon'ϵ′-approximately best with probability at most δ′\delta'δ′. This is Definition 1 applied at each call (p. 58). The black box's sampling and its sample complexity are not modelled, since they enter only Corollaries 1–2. The goal rules out three trivializing readings. It does not assume that all ranks are good with probability 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, which is the conclusion of (24). The expected hook is not the closed form 1−∏(1−p)1-\prod(1-p)1−∏(1−p), which would make the bias decorative. And the optimal ranking is quantified over every ranking inside the event, not chosen after π~\tilde\piπ~.

Not formalized: Theorem 3 part 2 (independent p,f,kp,f,kp,f,k, factor 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e, not proved in the paper), Theorems 1, 2, 4, 5, Proposition 1 and the sample-complexity and regret corollaries. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. Milestone 5 at ϵ=0\epsilon = 0ϵ=0 contains Theorem 1 and could seed a follow-up.

Selected references

  • K. J. Ferreira, S. Parthasarathy, S. Sekar, Learning to Rank an Assortment of Products, Management Science, 2021. SSRN author manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395992 ; https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4130
  • E. Even-Dar, S. Mannor, Y. Mansour, Action Elimination and Stopping Conditions for the Multi-Armed Bandit and Reinforcement Learning Problems, JMLR 7, 2006. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v7/evendar06a.html
  • F. Radlinski, R. Kleinberg, T. Joachims, Learning Diverse Rankings with Multi-Armed Bandits, ICML 2008. https://doi.org/10.1145/1390156.1390255
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Joint Determination of Haircuts and Interest Rates for Collateralized Loans in Shadow Banking: Better Downside Collateral Quality Lowers the Haircut Iff E[ω | ω > ω*] > (e₀ − e₁)/KResearch Paper

Motivation

Collateralized short-term loans, repurchase agreements above all, are the funding market of shadow banking. Each such loan carries two terms: an interest rate and a haircut, the fraction of the collateral's value that the lender does not finance. Studies of repo terms by collateral type around the 2007–2009 crisis (Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov, 2014) show that haircuts and rates can move differently. The evidence on collateral quality and haircuts is mixed: the paper's §5.1 cites a negative relationship in bilateral repos (Baklanova et al., 2019) and haircuts in the high-risk segment of tri-party repos that are not sensitive to collateral concentration (Hu, Pan and Wang, 2019). The collateral-equilibrium literature (Geanakoplos, 2009; Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2015; Simsek, 2013) explains the haircut through the face value of the debt that collateral can back.

J. Hao, The joint determination of haircuts and interest rates for collateralized loans in shadow banking (Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.00541), determines both terms in one general-equilibrium model with risk-averse depositors. Its first comparative static, Proposition 2, says that better downside collateral quality lowers the face value and the rate and raises the asset price. It lowers the haircut only when the upside is good enough relative to how scarce collateral is. This mission formalizes that proposition and the chain of lemmas the paper uses to prove it. The citation basis is the author's version of 19 February 2025.

Setting

There are two dates. Date-1 states are ω∈Ω=[ω‾,ωˉ]⊂(0,∞)\omega\in\Omega=[\underline\omega,\bar\omega]\subset(0,\infty)ω∈Ω=[ω​,ωˉ]⊂(0,∞), with density fff and distribution function F(x)=∫ω‾xfF(x)=\int_{\underline\omega}^x fF(x)=∫ω​x​f. A mass K>0K>0K>0 of a risky asset pays ω\omegaω in state ω\omegaω. Depositors hold endowments e0d>e1d≥0e^d_0>e^d_1\ge0e0d​>e1d​≥0 at dates 0 and 1, and have a strictly increasing, strictly concave utility uuu. Write E[φ]=∫ω‾ωˉφf\mathbb E[\varphi]=\int_{\underline\omega}^{\bar\omega}\varphi fE[φ]=∫ω​ωˉ​φf and D=(e0d−e1d)/KD=(e^d_0-e^d_1)/KD=(e0d​−e1d​)/K.

Banks issue, against each unit of the asset, a bond with face value xxx. Depositors price it with their marginal rate of substitution, which gives the bond pricing curve (23)

qbp(x)=E[u′(e1d+Kmin⁡(ω,x))u′(e1d+Kx)min⁡(ω,x)].q^{bp}(x)=\mathbb E\Big[\frac{u'(e^d_1+K\min(\omega,x))}{u'(e^d_1+Kx)}\min(\omega,x)\Big].qbp(x)=E[u′(e1d​+Kx)u′(e1d​+Kmin(ω,x))​min(ω,x)].

Theorem 1 of the paper shows that the competitive equilibrium is implemented by one bond whose face value ω∗\omega^*ω∗ solves

ω∗+qbp(ω∗)=D.(29)\omega^*+q^{bp}(\omega^*)=D.\qquad(29)ω∗+qbp(ω∗)=D.(29)

The bond price is q=qbp(ω∗)q=q^{bp}(\omega^*)q=qbp(ω∗). The equity component is E=E[max⁡(ω−ω∗,0)]E=\mathbb E[\max(\omega-\omega^*,0)]E=E[max(ω−ω∗,0)], the asset price is p=q+Ep=q+Ep=q+E, the quoted interest rate is R=ω∗/q−1R=\omega^*/q-1R=ω∗/q−1, and the haircut is H=E/pH=E/pH=E/p.

Two assumptions are in force. Assumption 2 says that collateral is scarce, 2ω‾<D2\underline\omega<D2ω​<D (20), but not extremely so: ωˉ+E[u′(e1d+Kω)u′(e1d+Kωˉ)ω]>D\bar\omega+\mathbb E\big[\tfrac{u'(e^d_1+K\omega)}{u'(e^d_1+K\bar\omega)}\omega\big]>Dωˉ+E[u′(e1d​+Kωˉ)u′(e1d​+Kω)​ω]>D (21). Assumption 3 bounds relative risk aversion: −u′′(e1d+c)c/u′(e1d+c)<1-u''(e^d_1+c)c/u'(e^d_1+c)<1−u′′(e1d​+c)c/u′(e1d​+c)<1 for c∈[Kω‾,Kωˉ]c\in[K\underline\omega,K\bar\omega]c∈[Kω​,Kωˉ] (32).

A downside FOSD improvement at the pre-shock face value ω∗\omega^*ω∗ is a perturbation f+τψf+\tau\psif+τψ, τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0. Here ψ\psiψ vanishes outside (ω‾,ω∗)(\underline\omega,\omega^*)(ω​,ω∗) and has ∫ω‾ω∗ψ=0\int_{\underline\omega}^{\omega^*}\psi=0∫ω​ω∗​ψ=0, and ∫ω‾ω∗vψ>0\int_{\underline\omega}^{\omega^*}v\psi>0∫ω​ω∗​vψ>0 for every strictly increasing vvv (p. 22 and footnote 23).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 20), haircut clause in Gateaux form

Let τ0>0\tau_0>0τ0​>0 be such that f+τψ≥0f+\tau\psi\ge0f+τψ≥0 for τ∈[0,τ0]\tau\in[0,\tau_0]τ∈[0,τ0​]. Then for every τ∈(0,τ0]\tau\in(0,\tau_0]τ∈(0,τ0​]

ω∗(τ)<ω∗(0),R(τ)<R(0),p(τ)>p(0),\omega^*(\tau)<\omega^*(0),\qquad R(\tau)<R(0),\qquad p(\tau)>p(0),ω∗(τ)<ω∗(0),R(τ)<R(0),p(τ)>p(0),

and τ↦H(τ)\tau\mapsto H(\tau)τ↦H(τ) has a right derivative at 000 with

H′(0+)<0  ⟺  ∫ω∗ωˉω dF(ω)>(1−F(ω∗)) e0d−e1dK,H'(0^+)<0\iff\int_{\omega^*}^{\bar\omega}\omega\,dF(\omega)>(1-F(\omega^*))\,\frac{e^d_0-e^d_1}{K},H′(0+)<0⟺∫ω∗ωˉ​ωdF(ω)>(1−F(ω∗))Ke0d​−e1d​​,

which is condition (33), E[ω∣ω>ω∗]>(e0d−e1d)/K\mathbb E[\omega\mid\omega>\omega^*]>(e^d_0-e^d_1)/KE[ω∣ω>ω∗]>(e0d​−e1d​)/K, multiplied out.

Milestones

In attack order:

  • (B.1), the derivative of qbpq^{bp}qbp, and Lemma 1, that qbpq^{bp}qbp is strictly increasing.
  • Theorem 1's equation (29): a unique root ω∗∈(ω‾,ωˉ)\omega^*\in(\underline\omega,\bar\omega)ω∗∈(ω​,ωˉ) under Assumption 2.
  • Lemma 2: EEE falls, ppp rises and HHH falls in the face value.
  • The first sentence of the proof of Proposition 2: under Assumption 3, u′(e1d+c)cu'(e^d_1+c)cu′(e1d​+c)c is strictly increasing.
  • Lemma 3: RRR rises in the face value.
  • Footnote 26: ∂q/∂τ>0\partial q/\partial\tau>0∂q/∂τ>0.
  • (34): dω∗/dτ=−(∂q/∂τ)(1+∂q/∂ω∗)−1<0d\omega^*/d\tau=-(\partial q/\partial\tau)(1+\partial q/\partial\omega^*)^{-1}<0dω∗/dτ=−(∂q/∂τ)(1+∂q/∂ω∗)−1<0.
  • (B.6)–(B.8): the sign of ∂(E/q)/∂ω∗\partial(E/q)/\partial\omega^*∂(E/q)/∂ω∗.
  • (35): d(E/q)/dτd(E/q)/d\taud(E/q)/dτ equals the positive factor (∂q/∂τ)/(q2(1+∂q/∂ω∗))(\partial q/\partial\tau)/(q^2(1+\partial q/\partial\omega^*))(∂q/∂τ)/(q2(1+∂q/∂ω∗)) times minus the (33) margin.

Significance

Proposition 2 separates two channels through which collateral quality reaches the haircut. Better downside quality raises the bond price directly, which lowers the haircut. It also lowers the face value, which raises the haircut by Lemma 2. Condition (33) says which channel dominates. It is the paper's explanation of why haircuts on high-quality collateral can rise when quality improves, while the rate always falls. Proposition 5 (risk aversion) has the same form, and §5.1 of the paper confronts the prediction with the mixed empirical evidence on collateral quality and haircuts.

The result is proved in the paper, with appendix proofs that are short and partly informal. Nothing in it has been machine-checked. Formalizing it means turning several informal steps into proofs: the differentiation under the integral sign with a kinked integrand min⁡(ω,x)\min(\omega,x)min(ω,x) and an integrable, possibly discontinuous density; the implicit differentiation of the root of (29) along a perturbation of the density; and the finite-shock monotonicity of ω∗\omega^*ω∗, RRR and ppp. The paper's printed iff for the haircut is the infinitesimal statement its derivation (34)–(35) establishes. For a finite shock, the sign of the change in HHH is not decided by (33) at the pre-shock face value: along the equilibrium, E/qE/qE/q is a function of ω∗\omega^*ω∗ that first falls and then rises. The mission therefore poses the haircut clause as the sign of the right derivative at τ=0\tau=0τ=0, and the face-value, rate and price clauses for every finite τ∈(0,τ0]\tau\in(0,\tau_0]τ∈(0,τ0​], where they are true. The finite-shock haircut iff is not posed, nor its negation.

Difficulty

The first idea is to differentiate (29) in τ\tauτ and read off the signs, as the paper does. That presupposes that ω∗(τ)\omega^*(\tau)ω∗(τ) is differentiable, which needs its continuity in τ\tauτ and a derivative of qbpq^{bp}qbp in both arguments at the root. In the face value, qbpq^{bp}qbp is an integral whose integrand has a kink at ω=x\omega=xω=x, and the density need not be continuous. The positivity of ∂q/∂τ\partial q/\partial\tau∂q/∂τ uses Assumption 3 through the FOSD class, which constrains ψ\psiψ only through integrals against increasing functions. The finite-shock clauses cannot be obtained from the derivative. They need a separate argument comparing roots of (29) under two densities, with the asset price evaluated under the shocked density.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace HaircutRate.Downside; one definitions file holds the model. Conventions:

  • Expectations are interval integrals ∫ω‾ωˉφf\int_{\underline\omega}^{\bar\omega}\varphi f∫ω​ωˉ​φf. The density is nonnegative and integrable on Ω\OmegaΩ with mass one, and no continuity is assumed.
  • "Strictly increasing and strictly concave" is read as u∈C2(0,∞)u\in C^2(0,\infty)u∈C2(0,∞) with u′>0u'>0u′>0, u′′<0u''<0u′′<0. u′u'u′ and u′′u''u′′ are deriv u and deriv (deriv u). e1d≥0e^d_1\ge0e1d​≥0 is a disclosed reading, so every argument e1d+Kωe^d_1+K\omegae1d​+Kω is positive.
  • The equilibrium is taken in the closed form of Theorem 1. Definition 1's Arrow–Debreu equilibrium, with its consumption plans and Arrow prices, is not formalized, and neither is the uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium.
  • The face value is a chosen root of (29) in Ω\OmegaΩ. Every statement that evaluates it assumes Assumption 2, under which the root exists and is unique, so its junk value ω‾\underline\omegaω​ is never used.
  • The shock is f+τψf+\tau\psif+τψ with ψ\psiψ in the class of p. 22, fixed relative to the pre-shock ω∗\omega^*ω∗, and τ0>0\tau_0>0τ0​>0 keeping f+τψf+\tau\psif+τψ nonnegative. Its support excludes (ω∗,ωˉ)(\omega^*,\bar\omega)(ω∗,ωˉ), which is the paper's "upside unchanged".
  • Derivatives are stated with HasDerivAt/HasDerivWithinAt and explicit values, one-sided on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) in τ\tauτ. Lemmas 2 and 3 read "increasing" as non-decreasing, and Lemma 1 is strict.

Trivializing readings are ruled out. The derivative is never a bare deriv … < 0, whose junk value 000 would make the iff vacuous. Clause (i) is stated for every τ∈(0,τ0]\tau\in(0,\tau_0]τ∈(0,τ0​], not for small τ\tauτ. The class of ψ\psiψ is nonempty: ψ=∓1\psi=\mp1ψ=∓1 on the two halves of (ω‾,ω∗)(\underline\omega,\omega^*)(ω​,ω∗) belongs to it. And Assumptions 2 and 3 involve no junk division or integral, since u′>0u'>0u′>0 and every integrand is fff times a continuous function.

Needed infrastructure: differentiation of parametric integrals with Lipschitz, almost-everywhere differentiable integrands; a one-dimensional implicit-function argument for a strictly increasing family; and integration against FOSD directions. These parts are reusable for other collateral-equilibrium comparative statics: Proposition 1, Propositions 3–5 of the same paper, and Simsek (2013)-type models. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are formalizations of Propositions 1, 3, 4 and 5.

Selected references

  • J. Hao, The joint determination of haircuts and interest rates for collateralized loans in shadow banking, Management Science, 2025 (author's version of 19 Feb 2025). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00541
  • G. Gorton and A. Metrick, Securitized banking and the run on repo, Journal of Financial Economics 104, 425–451, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.002
  • A. Krishnamurthy, S. Nagel and D. Orlov, Sizing up repo, Journal of Finance 69, 2381–2417, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12168
  • J. Geanakoplos, The leverage cycle, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 24, 1–65, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1086/648285
  • A. Fostel and J. Geanakoplos, Leverage and default in binomial economies: a complete characterization, Econometrica 83, 2191–2229, 2015. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11618
  • A. Simsek, Belief disagreements and collateral constraints, Econometrica 81, 1–53, 2013. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9956
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On Time-Consistent Equilibrium Stopping Under Aggregation of Diverse Discount Rates: The Smallest One-Barrier Equilibrium Is the Optimal EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

A group that shares one stopping decision (a board deciding when to abandon an R&D project, a fund deciding when to exercise a real option) rarely shares one discount rate. A standard way to aggregate heterogeneous time preferences is to treat the discount rate ρ\rhoρ as random with law FρF_\rhoFρ​ and to average discounted payoffs over it. Weitzman (2001) showed that averaging exponential discount factors over a distribution of rates produces a decreasing discount rate, so the resulting stopping problem is time-inconsistent: a rule that is optimal today is overturned tomorrow. When the average is taken after a nonlinear attitude function ϕ\phiϕ (the smooth-ambiguity form of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji, 2005), the problem is no longer even a mixture of exponential problems.

Time-inconsistent stopping is handled by looking for equilibria: stopping rules that no future self wants to deviate from, in the sense of Strotz (1956). Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018) introduced the iterative fixed-point approach for non-exponential discounting, Huang and Zhou (Mathematical Finance, 2020) showed that in continuous time the smallest equilibrium is optimal under non-exponential discounting, and Huang and Yu (Mathematical Finance, 2021) carried the approach to stopping under model ambiguity. Deng, Yu and Zhang (arXiv:2302.07470) extend the approach to aggregated discount rates with a nonlinear attitude, where the payoff is a double integral and the earlier arguments do not apply.

Setting

The state is a diffusion Xtx≥0X^x_t\ge0Xtx​≥0 started at x≥0x\ge0x≥0, with drift μ\muμ and volatility σ\sigmaσ (μ,σ\mu,\sigmaμ,σ Lipschitz, σ2(x)>0\sigma^2(x)>0σ2(x)>0 for x>0x>0x>0). The payoff is the Put payoff g(x)=(K−x)+g(x)=(K-x)^+g(x)=(K−x)+ with K>0K>0K>0. The discount rate has law FρF_\rhoFρ​ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), independent of XXX, and the attitude function ϕ\phiϕ is strictly increasing.

A stopping policy is a Borel set RRR, the region where the planner stops. Its entry time is τ(x,R)=inf⁡{t>0:Xtx∈R}\tau(x,R)=\inf\{t>0:X^x_t\in R\}τ(x,R)=inf{t>0:Xtx​∈R}, and the planner who continues today while every future self follows RRR receives

J(x,R)=∫0∞ϕ(E[e−rτ(x,R)g(Xτ(x,R)x)]) dFρ(r).J(x,R)=\int_0^\infty\phi\Big(\mathbb E\big[e^{-r\tau(x,R)}g(X^x_{\tau(x,R)})\big]\Big)\,dF_\rho(r).J(x,R)=∫0∞​ϕ(E[e−rτ(x,R)g(Xτ(x,R)x​)])dFρ​(r).

Comparing with the immediate payoff ϕ(g(x))\phi(g(x))ϕ(g(x)) gives the stopping region SR={ϕ(g(x))>J(x,R)}S_R=\{\phi(g(x))>J(x,R)\}SR​={ϕ(g(x))>J(x,R)}, the indifference region IR={ϕ(g(x))=J(x,R)}I_R=\{\phi(g(x))=J(x,R)\}IR​={ϕ(g(x))=J(x,R)} and the policy improvement operator Θ(R)=SR∪(IR∩R)\Theta(R)=S_R\cup(I_R\cap R)Θ(R)=SR​∪(IR​∩R). An equilibrium is a Borel RRR with Θ(R)=R\Theta(R)=RΘ(R)=R. The value of an equilibrium is V(x,R)=ϕ(g(x))∨J(x,R)V(x,R)=\phi(g(x))\vee J(x,R)V(x,R)=ϕ(g(x))∨J(x,R).

The analysis uses the hitting time τax=inf⁡{t>0:Xtx=a}\tau^x_a=\inf\{t>0:X^x_t=a\}τax​=inf{t>0:Xtx​=a} and its Laplace transform. By Borodin and Salminen (Remark 4.3 of the paper), E[e−rτax]=φr(x)/φr(a)\mathbb E[e^{-r\tau^x_a}]=\varphi_r(x)/\varphi_r(a)E[e−rτax​]=φr​(x)/φr​(a) for x≥ax\ge ax≥a, where φr\varphi_rφr​ is the positive decreasing solution of 12σ2u′′+μu′=ru\tfrac12\sigma^2u''+\mu u'=ru21​σ2u′′+μu′=ru. Write m~r=−φr′/φr\tilde m_r=-\varphi_r'/\varphi_rm~r​=−φr′​/φr​ and G(a)=∫0∞φr′(a)/φr(a) dFρ(r)G(a)=\int_0^\infty\varphi_r'(a)/\varphi_r(a)\,dF_\rho(r)G(a)=∫0∞​φr′​(a)/φr​(a)dFρ​(r). The conditions of the paper are: C-(i) μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0; C-(ii) ϕ1(x)=(μ+μ2+2rσ2)/σ2\phi_1(x)=(\mu+\sqrt{\mu^2+2r\sigma^2})/\sigma^2ϕ1​(x)=(μ+μ2+2rσ2​)/σ2 is strictly decreasing, lim sup⁡x→∞(μ+1)/σ2<∞\limsup_{x\to\infty}(\mu+1)/\sigma^2<\inftylimsupx→∞​(μ+1)/σ2<∞, and the Feller integrals I1,I2I_1,I_2I1​,I2​ at +∞+\infty+∞ diverge; C-(iii) ϕ\phiϕ is C1C^1C1, strictly increasing, and ϕ′(x)x\phi'(x)xϕ′(x)x is increasing.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.8, optimality among one-barrier equilibria

Under C-(i)–C-(iii) there is a∗∈[0,K)a^*\in[0,K)a∗∈[0,K) such that, for every barrier a>0a>0a>0,

[0,a] is an equilibrium  ⟺  a≥a∗,[0,a]\ \text{is an equilibrium}\iff a\ge a^*,[0,a] is an equilibrium⟺a≥a∗,

and for a∗≤a≤ba^*\le a\le ba∗≤a≤b (with a>0a>0a>0) the value decreases as the barrier rises,

V(x,[0,b])≤V(x,[0,a])(x≥0),V(x,[0,b])\le V(x,[0,a])\qquad(x\ge0),V(x,[0,b])≤V(x,[0,a])(x≥0),

so that, when a∗>0a^*>0a∗>0, the smallest one-barrier equilibrium [0,a∗][0,a^*][0,a∗] dominates every other one-barrier equilibrium at every initial state.

Milestones

In attack order: Lemma 2.2 for R=[0,a]R=[0,a]R=[0,a] (points of the region stop immediately); Lemma 4.6 and Proposition 4.4 (m~r<ϕ1\tilde m_r<\phi_1m~r​<ϕ1​, hence m~r\tilde m_rm~r​ decreasing in xxx); the natural-boundary limits φr→0\varphi_r\to0φr​→0 and φr′e∫2μ/σ2→0\varphi_r'e^{\int2\mu/\sigma^2}\to0φr′​e∫2μ/σ2→0 used in the proof of Proposition 4.7; Proposition 4.7 (m~r\tilde m_rm~r​ increasing in rrr); Proposition 4.2 (the same two facts for H(r,a,x)=ln⁡E[e−rτax]H(r,a,x)=\ln\mathbb E[e^{-r\tau^x_a}]H(r,a,x)=lnE[e−rτax​]); the Harris–FKG inequality on a probability measure; the right derivative (4.7) of J(x,[0,a])J(x,[0,a])J(x,[0,a]) at the barrier; the threshold (4.8)–(4.9); and the strict ordering (4.10) of JJJ in the barrier.

Significance

The theorem identifies, in closed form through the sign of G(a)+1/(K−a)G(a)+1/(K-a)G(a)+1/(K−a), every one-barrier equilibrium of the aggregated problem and selects the best of them independently of the initial state. This turns an equilibrium concept that typically admits a continuum of fixed points into a single recommended policy. The threshold a∗a^*a∗ does not depend on the attitude function ϕ\phiϕ (Remark 4.9), so the planner's attitude affects the value but not the equilibrium barrier; for geometric Brownian motion and the Bessel process the paper computes a∗a^*a∗ explicitly ((4.12), (4.13)).

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in this mission is open mathematics. What the mission adds is a machine-checked version of the argument together with reusable statements about one-dimensional diffusions: Riccati comparison for m~r\tilde m_rm~r​, monotonicity of hitting-time Laplace transforms in the barrier and in the rate, and the boundary behaviour of decreasing solutions at a natural boundary. To our knowledge none of these has been formalized; the only related platform items are Harris/FKG inequalities on finite lattices or compact spaces.

Difficulty

The main obstacle is the comparison of barriers. Raising the barrier changes J(x,[0,a])J(x,[0,a])J(x,[0,a]) through ϕ\phiϕ applied to an expectation, inside an integral over rrr, so the sign of ∂aJ\partial_aJ∂a​J is not determined term by term: the natural first idea, to differentiate under the integral and sign each integrand, fails because the integrand's derivative in aaa changes sign across rrr. Controlling it requires two monotonicity properties of m~r=−φr′/φr\tilde m_r=-\varphi_r'/\varphi_rm~r​=−φr′​/φr​, in xxx and in rrr, and the second depends on the behaviour of φr\varphi_rφr​ at a natural boundary at infinity, a classical but unformalized piece of Feller's boundary theory (Cecchi, Marini and Villari). A second difficulty is that the threshold a∗a^*a∗ may be 000, where the barrier [0,0][0,0][0,0] cannot be evaluated through φr(0)\varphi_r(0)φr​(0); the statement must keep content in that case.

Formalization scope

Mathlib has no stochastic differential equations, so the diffusion is not constructed. It is encoded as a family of paths Xtx(ω)X^x_t(\omega)Xtx​(ω) on a probability space, with X0x=xX^x_0=xX0x​=x, continuous paths, and non-negative paths from x≥0x\ge0x≥0, together with the Laplace representation of Remark 4.3 as a hypothesis: a family of positive, decreasing, C2C^2C2 solutions φr\varphi_rφr​ of 12σ2u′′+μu′=ru\tfrac12\sigma^2u''+\mu u'=ru21​σ2u′′+μu′=ru on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), one for each r≥0r\ge0r≥0, with E[e−rτax]=φr(x)/φr(a)\mathbb E[e^{-r\tau^x_a}]=\varphi_r(x)/\varphi_r(a)E[e−rτax​]=φr​(x)/φr​(a) for 0<a≤x0<a\le x0<a≤x. The process is not asserted to solve the SDE; the strong Markov property and time-homogeneity are not used by the goal and not encoded.

Conventions: time is R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​; the entry time is an infimum over t>0t>0t>0 (strict), and a path that never enters RRR contributes 000; SRS_RSR​, IRI_RIR​ and hence Θ\ThetaΘ live on x≥0x\ge0x≥0; "increasing" means non-decreasing (p. 9); barriers are a>0a>0a>0, since 000 is never hit for geometric Brownian motion and φr(0)=+∞\varphi_r(0)=+\inftyφr​(0)=+∞. Added hypotheses or readings: C-(ii)-1 holds for every r≥0r\ge0r≥0 on x>0x>0x>0; C-(iii) is read as continuity on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), C1C^1C1 on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) (so ln⁡x\ln xlnx is excluded, xp/px^p/pxp/p admitted); GGG is finite (integrability of r↦φr′(a)/φr(a)r\mapsto\varphi_r'(a)/\varphi_r(a)r↦φr′​(a)/φr​(a)); Lemma 2.2 is posed for R=[0,a]R=[0,a]R=[0,a]; the natural-boundary limits for r>0r>0r>0; Proposition 4.2(b) for a<xa<xa<x; one-sided limits of derivatives are derivatives within [a,∞)[a,\infty)[a,∞); Λ(x,a)=J(x,(0,a])\Lambda(x,a)=J(x,(0,a])Λ(x,a)=J(x,(0,a]) is replaced by J(x,[0,a])J(x,[0,a])J(x,[0,a]).

Optimality is posed among one-barrier equilibria. The paper's Theorem 4.8 states that [0,a∗][0,a^*][0,a∗] is "the optimal equilibrium" in the sense of Definition 4.1, dominance over every equilibrium; its proof compares [0,a∗][0,a^*][0,a∗] only with regions [0,a][0,a][0,a] (pp. 17–18), in line with §4's aim "when all equilibrium stopping policies fit the type of one-barrier stopping region" (p. 9). The mission therefore poses the one-barrier form, and neither the all-equilibria claim nor its negation.

The following readings would trivialize the goal and are ruled out by the statements: existence of an equilibrium [0,a∗][0,a^*][0,a∗] alone; the equivalence only for a≤Ka\le Ka≤K or only in one direction; optimality through a supremum of VVV; dropping the monotonicity conjunct, which is the whole content when a∗=0a^*=0a∗=0; an equilibrium without Borel measurability; a JJJ computed through a non-integrable integrand; and an entry time without the "enters" guard, under which a path that never enters RRR would stop at time 000 and collect g(x)g(x)g(x).

A complete development needs: one-sided calculus for parametric integrals, Riccati comparison on a half-line, the Feller classification of a natural boundary (Cecchi et al.), and the Harris–FKG inequality for a probability measure on R\mathbb RR. The Harris–FKG milestone and the ODE milestones are independent of the stopping model and reusable. Contributions toward a genuine construction of the diffusion that discharges the Laplace representation are welcome but not required.

Selected references

  • S. Deng, X. Yu, J. Zhang, On time-consistent equilibrium stopping under aggregation of diverse discount rates, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2302.07470v4. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.07470
  • Y.-J. Huang, Z. Zhou, Optimal equilibria for time-inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time, Mathematical Finance 30(3): 1103–1134, 2020.
  • Y.-J. Huang, A. Nguyen-Huu, Time-consistent stopping under decreasing impatience, Finance and Stochastics 22(1): 69–95, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-017-0350-6
  • Y.-J. Huang, X. Yu, Optimal stopping under model ambiguity: a time-consistent equilibrium approach, Mathematical Finance 31(3): 979–1012, 2021.
  • A. N. Borodin, P. Salminen, Handbook of Brownian Motion — Facts and Formulae, 2nd ed., Birkhäuser, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-8163-0
  • M. Cecchi, M. Marini, G. Villari, On the monotonicity property for a certain class of second order differential equations, Journal of Differential Equations 82: 15–27, 1989.
  • M. L. Weitzman, Gamma discounting, American Economic Review 91(1), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.1.260
  • P. Klibanoff, M. Marinacci, S. Mukerji, A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity, Econometrica 73(6), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00640.x
  • R. H. Strotz, Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization, Review of Economic Studies 23(3), 1956. https://doi.org/10.2307/2295722
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Exact Penalization of Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems: Under a Slater-Type Condition, Every Equilibrium of the ℓq-Penalized Nash Game Solves the Generalized Game for All Large PenaltiesResearch Paper

Motivation

In a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) each player's feasible set depends on the strategies of the other players. Such coupled constraints arise wherever players share a resource: transmission capacity in electricity and telecommunication markets, emission caps in environmental games, track time in railway pricing, road capacity in transportation equilibria. The coupling is what makes GNEPs harder than ordinary Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs): an equilibrium solves a quasi-variational inequality rather than a variational inequality (Harker 1991; Pang–Fukushima 2005), and most existence theory and algorithms for NEPs do not apply directly.

Exact penalization removes the coupling. Each player's coupled constraints are moved into the objective as a residual function multiplied by a penalty parameter ρ\rhoρ, leaving a NEP in which each player faces only a private strategy set. The question is when one finite ρ\rhoρ, the same for all players, suffices for every equilibrium of the penalized NEP to be an equilibrium of the GNEP.

Timeline. Facchinei and Pang (2006) introduced exact penalty functions for GNEPs. Facchinei and Kanzow (SIAM J. Optim. 2010) and Facchinei and Lampariello (J. Global Optim. 2011) proved penalty results for inequality-constrained GNEPs under the extended Mangasarian–Fromovitz constraint qualification (EMFCQ), in full and partial penalization forms; Fukushima (2011) and Kanzow and Steck (2016) followed with related penalty and augmented Lagrangian schemes. All of these treat inequality constraints only. Ba and Pang (arXiv:1811.10674, Operations Research 2022) gave a theory covering shared and non-shared coupled constraints, including equality constraints, under a Slater-type condition instead of EMFCQ.

Setting

There are NNN players. Player ν\nuν chooses xν∈Rnνx^\nu \in \mathbb R^{n_\nu}xν∈Rnν​ from a private set CνC^\nuCν, and x−νx^{-\nu}x−ν denotes the rivals' strategies. Player ν\nuν minimizes a cost θν(xν,x−ν)\theta_\nu(x^\nu, x^{-\nu})θν​(xν,x−ν) subject to xν∈Cνx^\nu \in C^\nuxν∈Cν and the coupled constraint xν∈Xν(x−ν)x^\nu \in X^\nu(x^{-\nu})xν∈Xν(x−ν). A profile xxx lies in the graph of XXX if xν∈Xν(x−ν)x^\nu \in X^\nu(x^{-\nu})xν∈Xν(x−ν) for every ν\nuν. An equilibrium of the GNEP (C,X;θ)(C, X; \theta)(C,X;θ) is a profile x∗x^*x∗ such that, for every ν\nuν, x∗,νx^{*,\nu}x∗,ν is feasible and minimizes θν(⋅,x∗,−ν)\theta_\nu(\cdot, x^{*,-\nu})θν​(⋅,x∗,−ν) over Cν∩Xν(x∗,−ν)C^\nu \cap X^\nu(x^{*,-\nu})Cν∩Xν(x∗,−ν).

In the non-shared finitely representable case (16),

Xν(x−ν)={xν∈Rnν∣gν(xν,x−ν)≤0, hν(x)=0},X^\nu(x^{-\nu}) = \{x^\nu \in \mathbb R^{n_\nu} \mid g^\nu(x^\nu, x^{-\nu}) \le 0,\ h^\nu(x) = 0\},Xν(x−ν)={xν∈Rnν​∣gν(xν,x−ν)≤0, hν(x)=0},

with giν(⋅,x−ν)g^\nu_i(\cdot, x^{-\nu})giν​(⋅,x−ν) convex and differentiable and hνh^\nuhν affine. For q∈(1,∞)q \in (1, \infty)q∈(1,∞) the ℓq\ell_qℓq​ residual of player ν\nuν is

rν;q(x)=(∑imax⁡(giν(x),0)q+∑j∣hjν(x)∣q)1/q,r_{\nu;q}(x) = \Big( \sum_{i} \max(g^\nu_i(x), 0)^q + \sum_j |h^\nu_j(x)|^q \Big)^{1/q},rν;q​(x)=(i∑​max(giν​(x),0)q+j∑​∣hjν​(x)∣q)1/q,

which vanishes exactly on the coupled set. The penalized NEP (C;θ+ρ rX;q)(C; \theta + \rho\, r_{X;q})(C;θ+ρrX;q​) has player ν\nuν minimize θν(xν,x−ν)+ρ rν;q(xν,x−ν)\theta_\nu(x^\nu, x^{-\nu}) + \rho\, r_{\nu;q}(x^\nu, x^{-\nu})θν​(xν,x−ν)+ρrν;q​(xν,x−ν) over xν∈Cνx^\nu \in C^\nuxν∈Cν alone; its equilibria are profiles in CCC from which no player can lower this penalized cost unilaterally.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 11 (b)

Let each CνC^\nuCν be compact and convex, each θν(⋅,x−ν)\theta_\nu(\cdot, x^{-\nu})θν​(⋅,x−ν) convex and Lipschitz on CνC^\nuCν with a common constant Lipθ>0\mathrm{Lip}_\theta > 0Lipθ​>0, and q∈(1,∞)q \in (1, \infty)q∈(1,∞). Suppose there is α>0\alpha > 0α>0 such that every x∈Cx \in Cx∈C outside the graph of XXX admits x^∈C\hat x \in Cx^∈C and an infeasible player ν^\hat\nuν^ along whose block every violated constraint decreases at rate at least α\alphaα:

∇xν^giν^(x)T(x^ν^−xν^)≤−α  (giν^(x)>0),[sgn⁡hjν^(x)] ∇xν^hjν^(x)T(x^ν^−xν^)≤−α  (hjν^(x)≠0).\nabla_{x^{\hat\nu}} g^{\hat\nu}_i(x)^T(\hat x^{\hat\nu} - x^{\hat\nu}) \le -\alpha \ \ (g^{\hat\nu}_i(x) > 0), \qquad [\operatorname{sgn} h^{\hat\nu}_j(x)]\, \nabla_{x^{\hat\nu}} h^{\hat\nu}_j(x)^T(\hat x^{\hat\nu} - x^{\hat\nu}) \le -\alpha \ \ (h^{\hat\nu}_j(x) \ne 0).∇xν^​giν^​(x)T(x^ν^−xν^)≤−α  (giν^​(x)>0),[sgnhjν^​(x)]∇xν^​hjν^​(x)T(x^ν^−xν^)≤−α  (hjν^​(x)=0).

Then

∃ ρˉ>0  ∀ρ>ρˉ:every equilibrium of (C;θ+ρ rX;q) is an equilibrium of (C,X;θ).\exists\, \bar\rho > 0\ \ \forall \rho > \bar\rho:\quad \text{every equilibrium of } (C; \theta + \rho\, r_{X;q}) \text{ is an equilibrium of } (C, X; \theta).∃ρˉ​>0  ∀ρ>ρˉ​:every equilibrium of (C;θ+ρrX;q​) is an equilibrium of (C,X;θ).

The threshold is existential; no formula for ρˉ\bar\rhoρˉ​ is fixed.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 3 (a): a penalized equilibrium is a GNEP equilibrium if and only if it lies in the graph of XXX.
  2. Equation (5): the gradient of the ℓq\ell_qℓq​ residual off the constraint set.
  3. A constant cq>0c_q > 0cq​>0 with cq∥⋅∥q≤∥⋅∥q−1c_q \|\cdot\|_q \le \|\cdot\|_{q-1}cq​∥⋅∥q​≤∥⋅∥q−1​ in every dimension.
  4. The descent bound ∇xν^rν^;q(x)T(x^ν^−xν^)≤−α(rν^,q−1/rν^,q)q−1≤−αcqq−1\nabla_{x^{\hat\nu}} r_{\hat\nu;q}(x)^T(\hat x^{\hat\nu} - x^{\hat\nu}) \le -\alpha (r_{\hat\nu,q-1}/r_{\hat\nu,q})^{q-1} \le -\alpha c_q^{q-1}∇xν^​rν^;q​(x)T(x^ν^−xν^)≤−α(rν^,q−1​/rν^,q​)q−1≤−αcqq−1​.
  5. The first-order inequality at a penalized best response, with the directional derivative of θν^\theta_{\hat\nu}θν^​ bounded by Lipθ∥x^ν^−x∗,ν^∥2\mathrm{Lip}_\theta \|\hat x^{\hat\nu} - x^{*,\hat\nu}\|_2Lipθ​∥x^ν^−x∗,ν^∥2​.

Significance

The theorem converts a GNEP with non-shared coupled inequality and equality constraints into a standard NEP with one penalty parameter for all players. NEPs with private convex constraints admit the classical existence theory and the solution methods for variational inequalities, so the result transfers both to this class of GNEPs once feasibility of penalized equilibria is guaranteed. The hypothesis is required only at infeasible points of CCC; the paper's Proposition 12 shows that the commonly used EMFCQ implies it, so the theorem extends the EMFCQ-based penalty results while also allowing equality constraints.

The result is proved in the paper (pp. 17–18). As far as a search of the Prove2Me library shows, no part of it, of the ℓq\ell_qℓq​ residual calculus, or of GNEP penalization is formalized. A formal development would supply a reusable layer for GNEPs (equilibria with coupled constraints, residual functions, penalized NEPs) and the differential calculus of ℓq\ell_qℓq​ residuals, which also underlies exact penalty theory for single optimization problems.

Difficulty

The obvious argument penalizes each player's problem separately: for fixed rivals, a classical exact penalty theorem gives a threshold above which the penalized best response is feasible. That threshold depends on the rivals' strategies, and can degenerate when Cν∩Xν(x−ν)C^\nu \cap X^\nu(x^{-\nu})Cν∩Xν(x−ν) is empty for some rivals' profiles, which is allowed here; then no uniform ρ\rhoρ follows. What is needed is control of the penalty terms that is uniform over all infeasible profiles in CCC, which is exactly what the Slater-type hypothesis is about. Formally, the statement also involves the gradient of a nonsmooth-looking ℓq\ell_qℓq​ norm of positive parts and absolute values, valid only off the constraint set, and the comparison of ℓq\ell_qℓq​ and ℓq−1\ell_{q-1}ℓq−1​ sums for q<2q < 2q<2, where the latter is not a norm.

Formalization scope

Player ν\nuν's space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin (n ν)); a profile is a dependent function, and (y,x−ν)(y, x^{-\nu})(y,x−ν) is Function.update x ν y. Strategy spaces, profiles and NEP equilibria are the published definition LeiBR.Sync.NashGame. The coupled multifunction is a family X ν x read as Xν(x−ν)X^\nu(x^{-\nu})Xν(x−ν); the GNEP equilibrium includes feasibility. The residual is written as an explicit sum of real powers, partial gradients applied to a direction are Fréchet derivatives in one player's block, and sgn⁡\operatorname{sgn}sgn is Real.sign with sgn⁡0=0\operatorname{sgn} 0 = 0sgn0=0. "For all x−ν∈C−νx^{-\nu} \in C^{-\nu}x−ν∈C−ν" quantifies over profiles whose rival blocks lie in their private sets. The numbers of constraints may be zero.

The following formalizations would trivialize or change the goal and are excluded: penalized players also constrained by XνX^\nuXν; a GNEP equilibrium without feasibility; a ρˉ\bar\rhoρˉ​ chosen after the equilibrium; an α\alphaα that may depend on xxx; the hypothesis required at feasible points as well; an ℓq\ell_qℓq​ residual with the wrong exponent.

Objects defined: the GNEP (C,X;θ)(C, X; \theta)(C,X;θ) and its equilibria, the graph of XXX, TTT-residual functions, the finitely representable sets (16), the ℓq\ell_qℓq​ residual (4)/(17), and the Slater-type condition of Theorem 11 (b). A complete development needs one-variable calculus of t↦max⁡(t,0)qt \mapsto \max(t,0)^qt↦max(t,0)q and ∣t∣q|t|^q∣t∣q, chain rules through Function.update, monotonicity of ℓp\ell_pℓp​ sums in ppp, and directional derivatives of convex Lipschitz functions along segments; the last three are reusable well beyond this mission. Theorem 11 (a), existence of penalized equilibria, is not part of the mission. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Qin Ba and Jong-Shi Pang, Exact penalization of generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Operations Research, 2022; arXiv:1811.10674v2, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.10674
  • Patrick T. Harker, Generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities, European Journal of Operational Research 54(1):81–94, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(91)90325-P
  • Jong-Shi Pang and Masao Fukushima, Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games, Computational Management Science 2:21–56, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-004-0010-0
  • Francisco Facchinei and Christian Kanzow, Penalty methods for the solution of generalized Nash equilibrium problems, SIAM Journal on Optimization 20(5):2228–2253, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1137/090749499
  • Francisco Facchinei and Lorenzo Lampariello, Partial penalization for the solution of generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Journal of Global Optimization 50(1):39–50, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-010-9579-8
  • Christian Kanzow and Daniel Steck, Augmented Lagrangian and exact penalty methods for generalized Nash equilibrium problems, SIAM Journal on Optimization 26(4):2034–2058, 2016.
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Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing with Samples: Posting 0.76 Times a Single Sample Earns at Least 64% of the Optimal Revenue Against Every Monotone Hazard Rate DistributionResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who knows the distribution FFF of a buyer's value can post the revenue-maximizing price. In practice the seller rarely knows FFF; often it has only a handful of past observations. Pricing with samples asks how much revenue such data can guarantee: the seller sees NNN independent draws from FFF, posts a price that depends on them, and is judged by the worst-case ratio of its expected revenue to the revenue of an oracle that knows FFF. The question connects prior-independent mechanism design in computer science (Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden and Yan, 2015; Huang, Mansour and Roughgarden, 2018) with data-driven pricing in operations research.

Without restrictions on FFF no mechanism has a positive guarantee (Cole and Roughgarden, 2014), so the literature works with shape classes. Two are central: regular distributions, whose virtual value is non-decreasing, and monotone hazard rate (mhr) distributions, whose hazard rate f/Fˉf/\bar Ff/Fˉ is non-decreasing.

Timeline for one sample against mhr distributions.

  • 2015: Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden and Yan show that posting the sample itself guarantees half the oracle revenue for regular distributions.
  • 2015/2018: Huang, Mansour and Roughgarden give the best previous lower bound for deterministic mechanisms against mhr distributions, 58.9%, and show that no deterministic mechanism exceeds 68%.
  • 2019–2022: Allouah, Bahamou and Besbes (Pricing with Samples, Operations Research 2022; SSRN 3334650) raise the lower bound to 64.4%, attained by posting 0.760.760.76 times the sample, and show that no mechanism, even a randomized one, exceeds 64.8%.

Setting

A seller has one good and faces one buyer with value v≥0v \ge 0v≥0 drawn from a distribution FFF on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Write Fˉ(p)=1−F(p)=P(v>p)\bar F(p) = 1 - F(p) = \mathbb P(v > p)Fˉ(p)=1−F(p)=P(v>p) for the complementary cdf; posting price ppp sells with probability Fˉ(p)\bar F(p)Fˉ(p) and earns pFˉ(p)p\bar F(p)pFˉ(p) in expectation. The oracle revenue is

opt(F)=sup⁡p≥0 p Fˉ(p),\mathrm{opt}(F) = \sup_{p\ge 0}\, p\,\bar F(p),opt(F)=p≥0sup​pFˉ(p),

and an oracle price rFr_FrF​ is a maximizer. The class G\mathcal GG contains every FFF with 0<EF[v]<∞0 < \mathbb E_F[v] < \infty0<EF​[v]<∞; then opt(F)∈(0,∞)\mathrm{opt}(F) \in (0,\infty)opt(F)∈(0,∞).

For α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1], FFF is α\alphaα-strongly regular if it has a density fff and its virtual value φF(v)=v−Fˉ(v)/f(v)\varphi_F(v) = v - \bar F(v)/f(v)φF​(v)=v−Fˉ(v)/f(v) satisfies φF(v′)−φF(v)≥α(v′−v)\varphi_F(v') - \varphi_F(v) \ge \alpha(v' - v)φF​(v′)−φF​(v)≥α(v′−v) for v′≥vv' \ge vv′≥v in the support. With Fα\mathcal F_\alphaFα​ the α\alphaα-strongly regular members of G\mathcal GG, F0\mathcal F_0F0​ is the regular class and F1\mathcal F_1F1​ the mhr class. The generalized Pareto tails Γα(v)=(1+(1−α)v)−1/(1−α)\Gamma_\alpha(v) = (1+(1-\alpha)v)^{-1/(1-\alpha)}Γα​(v)=(1+(1−α)v)−1/(1−α) (α<1\alpha<1α<1) and Γ1(v)=e−v\Gamma_1(v) = e^{-v}Γ1​(v)=e−v are the extreme members of Fα\mathcal F_\alphaFα​.

With one sample s∼Fs \sim Fs∼F, independent of vvv, the mechanism δγ\delta_\gammaδγ​ posts the price γs\gamma sγs. Its expected revenue is

Rev(γ,F)=∫0∞γs Fˉ(γs) dF(s).\mathrm{Rev}(\gamma, F) = \int_0^\infty \gamma s\,\bar F(\gamma s)\,dF(s).Rev(γ,F)=∫0∞​γsFˉ(γs)dF(s).

Formalization targets

Goal: one sample against mhr distributions

For every F∈F1F \in \mathcal F_1F∈F1​,

∫0∞0.76 s Fˉ(0.76 s) dF(s)  ≥  0.644⋅opt(F).\int_0^\infty 0.76\, s\,\bar F(0.76\, s)\,dF(s) \;\ge\; 0.644\cdot \mathrm{opt}(F).∫0∞​0.76sFˉ(0.76s)dF(s)≥0.644⋅opt(F).

This is the mhr row of Table 3 (p. 27) and Table 4 (p. 29) of the paper; the abstract rounds it to "64%". It fixes the mechanism the paper reports and leaves the distribution arbitrary in F1\mathcal F_1F1​.

Milestones

The milestones are the lemmas of the paper's reduction that can be stated without its dynamic-programming objects:

  1. Lemma 2 (single crossing, p. 18): Fˉ\bar FFˉ lies above the generalized Pareto tail through (w,Fˉ(w))(w,\bar F(w))(w,Fˉ(w)) and (w′,Fˉ(w′))(w',\bar F(w'))(w′,Fˉ(w′)) on [w,w′][w,w'][w,w′] and below it beyond w′w'w′.
  2. Lemma G-1 (p. App-32): beyond rFr_FrF​ that tail has a non-increasing revenue curve.
  3. Lemma 1 i.) and ii.) (p. 18): local revenue integrals ∫ww′γsFˉ(γs)g(Fˉ(s)) dF(s)\int_w^{w'} \gamma s\bar F(\gamma s) g(\bar F(s))\,dF(s)∫ww′​γsFˉ(γs)g(Fˉ(s))dF(s) are bounded below by integrals in quantile space that use only envelopes of Fˉ\bar FFˉ.
  4. App. A.1 (p. App-2, citing Hartline, Mirrokni and Sundararajan 2008): Fˉ(rF)≥e−1\bar F(r_F) \ge e^{-1}Fˉ(rF​)≥e−1 for mhr FFF.

Significance

The result pins down the value of a single sample against mhr demand: together with the paper's upper bound it places the best one-sample guarantee in [64.4%,64.8%][64.4\%, 64.8\%][64.4%,64.8%]. A deterministic deflation of the sample is near optimal, so randomization is worth at most 0.4 points against this class. The lower bound improves the previous 58.9% guarantee, and the same method extends to any α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1] and to several samples.

No part of the chain is machine-checked at present. A formalization would add to the platform a reusable model of α-strong regularity and of generalized Pareto tails, which also appear in auction and prophet-inequality work. It would also give the first machine-checked guarantee for sample-based pricing. The milestones are general facts about α-strongly regular laws that hold independently of the numerical goal.

Difficulty

The direct approach is a worst case over all mhr distributions. That is an infinite-dimensional problem, and it is not convex: a mixture of mhr laws need not be mhr. The paper reduces it to finitely many quantiles of FFF (Lemmas 1–2, Propositions 2–4, Theorem 1). It then evaluates the remaining low-dimensional program numerically, with value iteration on a grid of step 1/7501/7501/750, iteration error below 10−910^{-9}10−9 and adaptive quadrature at relative tolerance 10−810^{-8}10−8 (Theorem D-11, App. D.6). The 64.4% figure is the output of that computation. A complete formal proof of the goal therefore needs either a certified evaluation of the finite program, for instance by interval arithmetic, or a different argument. Checking the inequality on a few families, such as exponentials or the paper's near-worst two-piece tails, does not prove it.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in PricingSamples.OneSampleMHR.

  • Laws and the oracle. A value law is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR with μ((−∞,0))=0\mu((-\infty,0)) = 0μ((−∞,0))=0, v↦vv \mapsto vv↦v integrable and ∫v dμ>0\int v\,d\mu > 0∫vdμ>0 (class G\mathcal GG). The complementary cdf is the strict tail Fˉ(p)=μ((p,∞))\bar F(p) = \mu((p,\infty))Fˉ(p)=μ((p,∞)). opt\mathrm{opt}opt is the supremum of pFˉ(p)p\bar F(p)pFˉ(p) over p≥0p \ge 0p≥0, which is bounded above by E[v]\mathbb E[v]E[v] on G\mathcal GG, so the Lean supremum is the true one.
  • α-strong regularity. It is encoded in the convexity form the paper uses in its proof of Lemma 2 (p. App-10). The law admits a density (μ≪\mu \llμ≪ Lebesgue), and v↦Γα−1(Fˉ(v))v \mapsto \Gamma_\alpha^{-1}(\bar F(v))v↦Γα−1​(Fˉ(v)) is convex on {v≥0:Fˉ(v)>0}\{v \ge 0 : \bar F(v) > 0\}{v≥0:Fˉ(v)>0}; for α=1\alpha = 1α=1 this means −log⁡Fˉ-\log \bar F−logFˉ is convex. This form takes the support to be an interval, as the paper's proofs do.
  • Γ and its conventions. Γ1\Gamma_1Γ1​ is a separate branch. The generalized Pareto interpolant encodes the conventions Γα−1(0)=+∞\Gamma_\alpha^{-1}(0) = +\inftyΓα−1​(0)=+∞ and Γα(+∞)=0\Gamma_\alpha(+\infty) = 0Γα​(+∞)=0 explicitly.
  • Other conventions. Oracle prices are any maximizers of pFˉ(p)p\bar F(p)pFˉ(p) on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The inverses in Lemma 1 are generalized inverses inf⁡{x≥0:H(x)≤q}\inf\{x \ge 0 : H(x) \le q\}inf{x≥0:H(x)≤q}, with inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset = +\inftyinf∅=+∞ inside min⁡(w′,⋅)\min(w', \cdot)min(w′,⋅). The integrals of Lemma 1 are Lebesgue integrals of non-negative functions with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and ggg is taken measurable.
  • The goal's form. It is stated multiplicatively, 0.644⋅opt(F)≤Rev(0.76,F)0.644\cdot\mathrm{opt}(F) \le \mathrm{Rev}(0.76, F)0.644⋅opt(F)≤Rev(0.76,F). This is equivalent to the ratio form because opt(F)∈(0,∞)\mathrm{opt}(F) \in (0,\infty)opt(F)∈(0,∞). The class keeps the density and 0<E[v]<∞0 < \mathbb E[v] < \infty0<E[v]<∞, so the inequality cannot hold for a degenerate reason (opt=0\mathrm{opt} = 0opt=0, or a supremum that is not attained in R\mathbb RR). A sanity check shows that the exponential law with mean 1 belongs to F1\mathcal F_1F1​, so the class is nonempty.

The constant is the tables' 64.4%, reported as a provable bound for δ0.76\delta_{0.76}δ0.76​. A numerical search over two- and three-piece exponential-hazard laws finds a worst ratio of about 0.6472, consistent with the paper's bracket [64.4%,64.8%][64.4\%, 64.8\%][64.4%,64.8%].

Not posed. The following are left out because their printed statements cannot be formalized without choosing between conflicting readings:

  • Proposition 2 (the two-piece laws WαH\mathcal W^H_\alphaWαH​ have overlapping printed pieces);
  • the dynamic programs of Propositions 3–4 (the γ>1\gamma > 1γ>1 branch of TL\mathcal T^LTL, and TH\mathcal T^HTH through WH\mathcal W^HWH);
  • Theorem 1 (the one-argument Bα,γH(0)\mathcal B^H_{\alpha,\gamma}(0)Bα,γH​(0), and α1/(1−α)\alpha^{1/(1-\alpha)}α1/(1−α) at α=1\alpha = 1α=1);
  • Theorem D-11.

Contributions are welcome on any milestone. Lemma 2 and Lemma G-1 are general facts about log-concave and α-concave tails. Lemma 1 is a change of variables to quantile space. The App. A.1 bound is a classical mhr inequality. Each is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Allouah, A. Bahamou, O. Besbes, Pricing with Samples, Operations Research 70(2), 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2200 (read as SSRN 3334650, revised 06/02/2021: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3334650)
  • P. Dhangwatnotai, T. Roughgarden, Q. Yan, Revenue maximization with a single sample, Games and Economic Behavior 91, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.011
  • Z. Huang, Y. Mansour, T. Roughgarden, Making the most of your samples, SIAM Journal on Computing 47(3), 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.2479
  • R. Cole, T. Roughgarden, The sample complexity of revenue maximization, STOC 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.00963
  • J. Hartline, V. Mirrokni, M. Sundararajan, Optimal marketing strategies over social networks, WWW 2008. https://doi.org/10.1145/1367497.1367524
  • N. Schweizer, N. Szech, The quantitative view of Myerson regularity, SSRN 2736801, 2016. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2736801
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions: At Symmetric System Equilibria, Reserve Pricing Earns at Least the Profit of Thresholding, and Thresholding at Least That of Bid ShadingResearch Paper

Motivation

Online advertising platforms sell impressions through repeated auctions, and advertisers typically buy them under a budget: a cap on what they spend over a campaign. Because the advertisers cannot re-optimize their bids in every auction, the platform usually manages their budgets for them, adjusting how each advertiser participates so that spending tracks the budget. Platforms implement this in different ways, such as pacing bids down, raising personalized reserve prices, or entering a buyer only when his value clears a threshold, and the choice affects the platform's revenue, the advertisers' surplus and welfare.

Balseiro, Kim, Mahdian and Mirrokni (Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions, Operations Research 2021; SSRN working paper 2858261, version of July 8, 2020) put these practices in one model and compare them at equilibrium. The comparison of the seller's profit is the paper's main theoretical result (§1.1). Among the strategies it covers, three are compared in this mission:

  • bid shading, which scales bids down;
  • reserve pricing, which sets a personalized reserve price;
  • thresholding, which admits a buyer only above a personalized threshold but still charges him the second-price payment floored at the seller's cost.

Bid shading is the strategy behind the multiplicative pacing equilibria of Conitzer et al. (2018 working paper; Operations Research 2022). The learning strategies of Balseiro and Gur (2019), which converge to a system equilibrium, are similar to it in spirit.

Setting

A seller has TTT items to sell, one per round, to nnn buyers, at an opportunity cost c>0c>0c>0 per item. In each round the buyers' values x=(x1,…,xn)x=(x_1,\dots,x_n)x=(x1​,…,xn​) are drawn, independently across rounds, from a joint law FFF with a continuous density fff that is positive on the box [0,vˉ)n[0,\bar v)^n[0,vˉ)n and zero outside it (vˉ≤∞\bar v\le\inftyvˉ≤∞, c<vˉc<\bar vc<vˉ), with E[xi]<∞\mathbb E[x_i]<\inftyE[xi​]<∞. In the symmetric correlated setting FFF is exchangeable (invariant under permuting the buyers) and all buyers have the same budget B1>0B_1>0B1​>0.

A budget management mechanism has one parameter sis_isi​ per buyer. Its allocation rule Qi(x;s)Q_i(x;s)Qi​(x;s) and payment rule Mi(x;s)M_i(x;s)Mi​(x;s) are given in Table 1 of the paper, with competing bid did_idi​:

mechanismparameterbuyer iii wins ifand pays
bid shading (S)μi≥0\mu_i\ge0μi​≥0xi1+μi≥max⁡j≠ixj1+μj∨c\frac{x_i}{1+\mu_i}\ge\max_{j\ne i}\frac{x_j}{1+\mu_j}\vee c1+μi​xi​​≥maxj=i​1+μj​xj​​∨cmax⁡j≠ixj1+μj∨c\max_{j\ne i}\frac{x_j}{1+\mu_j}\vee cmaxj=i​1+μj​xj​​∨c
reserve pricing (R)ri≥cr_i\ge cri​≥cxi≥max⁡j≠i: xj≥rjxj∨rix_i\ge\max_{j\ne i:\,x_j\ge r_j}x_j\vee r_ixi​≥maxj=i:xj​≥rj​​xj​∨ri​max⁡j≠i: xj≥rjxj∨ri\max_{j\ne i:\,x_j\ge r_j}x_j\vee r_imaxj=i:xj​≥rj​​xj​∨ri​
thresholding (T)τi≥c\tau_i\ge cτi​≥cxi≥max⁡j≠i: xj≥τjxj∨τix_i\ge\max_{j\ne i:\,x_j\ge \tau_j}x_j\vee \tau_ixi​≥maxj=i:xj​≥τj​​xj​∨τi​max⁡j≠i: xj≥τjxj∨c\max_{j\ne i:\,x_j\ge \tau_j}x_j\vee cmaxj=i:xj​≥τj​​xj​∨c

Buyer iii's expected expenditure and utility over the horizon are Gi(s)=T E[Mi(x;s)]G_i(s)=T\,\mathbb E[M_i(x;s)]Gi​(s)=TE[Mi​(x;s)] and Ui(s)=T E[xiQi(x;s)]−Gi(s)U_i(s)=T\,\mathbb E[x_iQ_i(x;s)]-G_i(s)Ui​(s)=TE[xi​Qi​(x;s)]−Gi​(s). The expected number of items sold is I(s)=T∑iE[Qi(x;s)]I(s)=T\sum_i\mathbb E[Q_i(x;s)]I(s)=T∑i​E[Qi​(x;s)], and the seller's profit is

P(s)=∑i=1nGi(s)−c I(s).P(s)=\sum_{i=1}^nG_i(s)-c\,I(s).P(s)=i=1∑n​Gi​(s)−cI(s).

A profile s∗s^*s∗ is a system equilibrium (Definition 2.1) if every buyer's parameter maximizes his own utility over his parameter space, the others' parameters fixed, subject to his budget Gi≤B1G_i\le B_1Gi​≤B1​. For reserve pricing the parameter space is restricted by a lower bound ri≥r‾i(r−i)r_i\ge\underline r_i(r_{-i})ri​≥r​i​(r−i​), defined through the generalized failure rate ξi(zi,z−i)=zifi(zi∣x−i≤z−i)/Fˉi(zi∣x−i≤z−i)\xi_i(z_i,z_{-i})=z_if_i(z_i\mid x_{-i}\le z_{-i})/\bar F_i(z_i\mid x_{-i}\le z_{-i})ξi​(zi​,z−i​)=zi​fi​(zi​∣x−i​≤z−i​)/Fˉi​(zi​∣x−i​≤z−i​), and the notion is a restricted system equilibrium (Definition A.1). Assumption 1 asks that ξi\xi_iξi​ be jointly continuous and that ξi(zi,zi∨z−i)\xi_i(z_i,z_i\vee z_{-i})ξi​(zi​,zi​∨z−i​) be strictly increasing in ziz_izi​. A symmetric equilibrium is one of the form s11⃗s_1\vec1s1​1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2, part 1

For every symmetric correlated instance, and with τ1∗,μ1∗,r1∗\tau_1^*,\mu_1^*,r_1^*τ1∗​,μ1∗​,r1∗​ the symmetric (restricted) system equilibria of thresholding, bid shading and reserve pricing,

PS(μ1∗) ≤ PT(τ1∗),and, under Assumption 1,PT(τ1∗) ≤ PR(r1∗).P^S(\mu_1^*)\ \le\ P^T(\tau_1^*),\qquad\text{and, under Assumption 1,}\qquad P^T(\tau_1^*)\ \le\ P^R(r_1^*).PS(μ1∗​) ≤ PT(τ1∗​),and, under Assumption 1,PT(τ1∗​) ≤ PR(r1∗​).

This is the paper's "Reserve Pricing ≥SIF\ge_{SIF}≥SIF​ Thresholding ≥\ge≥ Bid Shading". Proposition 4.1 shows that each of these equilibria exists and is unique, so the comparison is well defined. The statement is quantified over every admissible choice of the parameter spaces' upper ends.

Milestones

  1. G1TG_1^TG1T​ and G1SG_1^SG1S​ strictly decrease on the parameter spaces (proof of Proposition 4.1, pp. ec 38–39).
  2. ∂G1R/∂r1=T P(x1≥r1,x−1≤r11⃗) (1−ξ1(r1,r11⃗))\partial G_1^R/\partial r_1=T\,\mathbb P(x_1\ge r_1,x_{-1}\le r_1\vec1)\,(1-\xi_1(r_1,r_1\vec1))∂G1R​/∂r1​=TP(x1​≥r1​,x−1​≤r1​1)(1−ξ1​(r1​,r1​1)), and under Assumption 1 G1RG_1^RG1R​ decreases on S^1\hat S_1S^1​ (p. ec 42).
  3. Proposition 4.1 for the three mechanisms: a unique symmetric equilibrium, the solution of G1(s1)≤B1⊥s1≥s‾1G_1(s_1)\le B_1\perp s_1\ge\underline s_1G1​(s1​)≤B1​⊥s1​≥s​1​.
  4. The items-sold formulas I(s1)=T(1−F(⋅ 1⃗))I(s_1)=T(1-F(\cdot\,\vec1))I(s1​)=T(1−F(⋅1)) and G1S(μ1)=G1R((1+μ1)c)/(1+μ1)G_1^S(\mu_1)=G_1^R((1+\mu_1)c)/(1+\mu_1)G1S​(μ1​)=G1R​((1+μ1​)c)/(1+μ1​) (pp. ec 45–46).
  5. Lemma B.2 (IT<IR⇒G1T<G1RI^T<I^R\Rightarrow G_1^T<G_1^RIT<IR⇒G1T​<G1R​) and Lemma B.3 (IS<IT⇒G1S<G1TI^S<I^T\Rightarrow G_1^S<G_1^TIS<IT⇒G1S​<G1T​).

Significance

The theorem ranks three budget-management strategies a platform can deploy by the profit they yield, uniformly over all exchangeable value distributions (with the failure-rate condition for the reserve-pricing comparison). Reserve pricing extracts the most from a binding budget while selling the fewest items, which matters when items are costly. Bid shading comes last. The comparison holds at equilibrium, where each buyer's parameter is a best response under his budget. A mechanism-by-mechanism simulation cannot establish such a uniform ranking.

The result is proved in the paper, with the proofs in its electronic companion. No part of it has been formalized. A Lean development would provide a reusable model of budget-constrained repeated auctions with correlated values and of system equilibria. It would also give machine-checked proofs of the equilibrium characterization (Proposition 4.1) and of the dominance chain, whose proofs in the paper differentiate under the integral and rest on several unstated regularity conventions.

Difficulty

The comparison is between equilibria, not between mechanisms at a fixed parameter. The obvious idea is to compare the profit functions pointwise, but that fails: at the same parameter, thresholding and reserve pricing sell the same items at different prices, while bid shading's parameter lives on a different scale. What can be compared is how expenditure trades off against items sold along each mechanism's one-parameter family. That requires the equilibria to be characterized by a one-variable complementarity condition, which in turn needs strict monotonicity of the expenditure function G1G_1G1​ in the common parameter, continuity, and the intermediate value theorem.

For reserve pricing the expenditure is not monotone on all of [c,∞)[c,\infty)[c,∞): it increases while the conditional generalized failure rate is below one. The parameter space is therefore a non-rectangular region cut out by ξi≥1\xi_i\ge1ξi​≥1. The case where reserve pricing's lower end exceeds ccc needs an extrapolation argument rather than the sufficient condition used for the other pairs. With correlated values, every monotonicity statement goes through conditional laws of one buyer given the others.

Formalization scope

Values live in Fin n → ℝ with the Lebesgue measure weighted by the density fff; expectations are Bochner integrals. The instance (SymInstance) bundles:

  • c>0c>0c>0, T>0T>0T>0 items and B1>0B_1>0B1​>0;
  • the support bound vˉ∈[0,∞]\bar v\in[0,\infty]vˉ∈[0,∞] with c<vˉc<\bar vc<vˉ;
  • fff, continuous on [0,vˉ)n[0,\bar v)^n[0,vˉ)n, positive on its interior, zero outside, of total mass 1, permutation invariant;
  • integrable coordinates.

Further conventions:

  • ties, a null event, are broken by lowest index;
  • the empty competing maximum is 000;
  • buyer 1 is index 0;
  • the factor TTT is kept, although the paper sets T=1T=1T=1.

The generalized failure rate is written as zi ∂tP(xi≤t,x−i≤z−i)/P(xi≥zi,x−i≤z−i)z_i\,\partial_t\mathbb P(x_i\le t,x_{-i}\le z_{-i})/\mathbb P(x_i\ge z_i,x_{-i}\le z_{-i})zi​∂t​P(xi​≤t,x−i​≤z−i​)/P(xi​≥zi​,x−i​≤z−i​), and reserve pricing's constraint ri≥r‾i(r−i)r_i\ge\underline r_i(r_{-i})ri​≥r​i​(r−i​) as ξi(ri,ri∨r−i)≥1\xi_i(r_i,r_i\vee r_{-i})\ge1ξi​(ri​,ri​∨r−i​)≥1, as on p. ec 9. The lower ends of the parameter spaces are Table 1's (ccc, ccc, 000). The upper ends are not fixed: every statement quantifies over all upper ends satisfying the conditions the paper's existence proof imposes (inside the support, budget met at the upper end). Bounded conditional expectations, which the paper uses only to construct such upper ends, are not assumed.

Two trivializations are ruled out:

  • System equilibria are defined by Definitions 2.1 and A.1 (each buyer best-responds under his own budget). They are never defined as solutions of the complementarity condition, which is Proposition 4.1.
  • The instance class is inhabited, for example by i.i.d. uniform values on [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n with c=1/2c=1/2c=1/2.

Needed infrastructure:

  • differentiation of parametric integrals of a continuous density;
  • continuity of G1G_1G1​ by dominated convergence;
  • the intermediate value theorem for the complementarity problem;
  • conditional CDFs on boxes.

The model and the monotonicity lemmas can be reused for the paper's utility and welfare comparisons (Theorems 4.3, 4.4). Contributions to any milestone are welcome; Proposition 4.1 and Lemmas B.2–B.3 can be attacked independently.

Selected references

  • S. R. Balseiro, A. Kim, M. Mahdian, V. Mirrokni, Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions, Operations Research 69(3), 2021; SSRN working paper 2858261, version of July 8, 2020. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858261 (doi:10.1287/opre.2020.2073)
  • S. R. Balseiro, Y. Gur, Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium, Management Science 65(9), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3174
  • V. Conitzer, C. Kroer, E. Sodomka, N. E. Stier-Moses, Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets, Operations Research 70(2), 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2159
  • M. A. Lariviere, A Note on Probability Distributions with Increasing Generalized Failure Rates, Operations Research 54(3), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1060.0282
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Demand Shaping Through Bundling and Product Configuration: A Dynamic Multiproduct Inventory-Pricing Model: Under Bundle-to-Stock, the Optimal Policy Is Dictated by a No-Order SetResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that sell configurable products — computers, cable and phone packages, meal combos — decide not only how much to stock but also which bundles of components to offer and at what prices. Bundling decisions interact with inventory: offering a bundle draws on several items at once, and an overstocked item is a reason to push the bundles that use it. Song and Xue (SSRN 3168907, forthcoming in Operations Research, doi:10.1287/opre.2020.2062) build a multi-period model that optimizes procurement, assembly, bundle selection and pricing jointly. Its key modelling device is to use the market-share vector as the decision instead of prices: offering no bundle jjj means qj=0q_j = 0qj​=0, and prices are recovered from the shares. Under standard discrete-choice models the expected revenue is then concave in the shares, which makes the dynamic program tractable.

The single-item analogue, joint pricing and inventory control with an order-up-to (base-stock) list-price policy, goes back to Federgruen and Heching (1999) and Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004). With several items assembled into bundles the policy is no longer a plain base-stock policy, and the paper's main result describes what replaces it.

Setting

There are periods t=1,…,Tt = 1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T, items i∈Ii\in\mathcal Ii∈I, potential bundles j∈Jj\in\mathcal Jj∈J, a nonnegative bill of materials A=(αij)A=(\alpha_{ij})A=(αij​) and a discount rate β∈(0,1]\beta\in(0,1]β∈(0,1]. In period ttt the firm chooses a market-share vector q∈Ωq\in\Omegaq∈Ω, where Ω⊆R+J\Omega\subseteq\mathbb R^{\mathcal J}_+Ω⊆R+J​ is compact and convex. Bundle demand is

djt(q,εt)=qjλt+qjεjt,d_{jt}(q,\varepsilon_t) = q_j\lambda_t + q_j\varepsilon_{jt},djt​(q,εt​)=qj​λt​+qj​εjt​,

with λt>0\lambda_t>0λt​>0 the expected number of customers and εt\varepsilon_tεt​ a random vector with zero mean and finite variance, possibly correlated across bundles. The expected revenue is λtτt(q)\lambda_t\tau_t(q)λt​τt​(q), and the revenue rate τt\tau_tτt​ is concave on Ω\OmegaΩ (Property-CV, Assumption 1).

Costs are row vectors: procurement ctc_tct​, assembly ata_tat​, backorder btb_tbt​ and holding hth_tht​, with the postponement savings ctp=ct−βct+1c^p_t = c_t-\beta c_{t+1}ctp​=ct​−βct+1​, atp=at−βat+1a^p_t = a_t-\beta a_{t+1}atp​=at​−βat+1​ and btp=bt−atpb^p_t = b_t - a^p_tbtp​=bt​−atp​, and it is assumed that btp≥0b^p_t\ge 0btp​≥0 and ctp+ht≥0c^p_t+h_t\ge 0ctp​+ht​≥0.

Under bundle-to-stock (BTS) the firm, with net item inventory xxx, orders items up to y≥xy\ge xy≥x, schedules bundle production zzz with Az≤yAz\le yAz≤y, and sets qqq, all before demand is observed. After a change of variables the problem is the dynamic program (9): VT+1≡0V_{T+1}\equiv 0VT+1​≡0 and

Vt(x)=max⁡y−Az≥0, y≥x, q∈ΩGt(y,z,q),Gt=λtπt(q)−ctp(y−λtAq)−Ht(y,z,q)+βE Vt+1(y−Adt),V_t(x)=\max_{y-Az\ge0,\ y\ge x,\ q\in\Omega} G_t(y,z,q),\qquad G_t = \lambda_t\pi_t(q)-c^p_t(y-\lambda_tAq)-H_t(y,z,q)+\beta E\,V_{t+1}(y-Ad_t),Vt​(x)=y−Az≥0, y≥x, q∈Ωmax​Gt​(y,z,q),Gt​=λt​πt​(q)−ctp​(y−λt​Aq)−Ht​(y,z,q)+βEVt+1​(y−Adt​),

with profit rate πt(q)=τt(q)−atq−ctAq\pi_t(q)=\tau_t(q)-a_tq-c_tAqπt​(q)=τt​(q)−at​q−ct​Aq and expected inventory cost Ht(y,z,q)=btpE(z−dt)−+htAE(z−dt)++ht(y−Az)H_t(y,z,q)=b^p_tE(z-d_t)^-+h_tAE(z-d_t)^++h_t(y-Az)Ht​(y,z,q)=btp​E(z−dt​)−+ht​AE(z−dt​)++ht​(y−Az).

For a no-order set I+⊆I\mathcal I^+\subseteq\mathcal II+⊆I with complement I−\mathcal I^-I−, problem (14) maximizes GtG_tGt​ over yI+=xI+y_{\mathcal I^+}=x_{\mathcal I^+}yI+​=xI+​, yI−=[Az]I−y_{\mathcal I^-}=[Az]_{\mathcal I^-}yI−​=[Az]I−​, y≥Azy\ge Azy≥Az, q∈Ωq\in\Omegaq∈Ω.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For every period ttt and inventory xxx: (a) Vt+1V_{t+1}Vt+1​ is jointly concave and non-increasing; (b) GtG_tGt​ is jointly concave in (y,z,q)(y,z,q)(y,z,q) and (14) with I+=∅\mathcal I^+=\emptysetI+=∅ has a maximizer (Az∗,z∗,q∗)(Az^*,z^*,q^*)(Az∗,z∗,q∗); (c) if x≤Az∗x\le Az^*x≤Az∗, ordering up to Az∗Az^*Az∗ and producing z∗z^*z∗ is optimal, and otherwise there is a nonempty no-order set I+\mathcal I^+I+ such that the solution of (14) for I+\mathcal I^+I+ is optimal in (9):

yi∗=xi (i∈I+),(y∗,z∗,q∗)∈arg⁡max⁡ (14),Gt(y∗,z∗,q∗)=Vt(x).y^*_i = x_i\ (i\in\mathcal I^+),\qquad (y^*,z^*,q^*)\in\arg\max\,(14),\qquad G_t(y^*,z^*,q^*)=V_t(x).yi∗​=xi​ (i∈I+),(y∗,z∗,q∗)∈argmax(14),Gt​(y∗,z∗,q∗)=Vt​(x).

Milestones

  • §4.2: HtH_tHt​ is jointly convex in (y,z,q)(y,z,q)(y,z,q) when btp≥0b^p_t\ge0btp​≥0.
  • Lemma 2(a)–(c): VtV_tVt​ is non-increasing; GtG_tGt​ is non-increasing in yyy; in the modified problem the ordered items satisfy yi=[Az]iy_i=[Az]_iyi​=[Az]i​, which reduces it to (14).
  • Theorem 2(a) and the concavity part of Theorem 2(b), which form the backward induction.

Significance

Theorem 2 says that bundling, pricing and replenishment decisions are still governed by order-up-to levels, with one correction: items that are already overstocked form a no-order set, and once that set is known all remaining decisions, including which bundles to offer ({j:qj>0}\{j:q_j>0\}{j:qj​>0}), solve the single concave program (14). This is what makes the paper's branching algorithm for I+\mathcal I^+I+ (Algorithm 1), its myopic policy and its numerical study of bundling under inventory pressure possible.

The paper omits the proof ("similar to that of Theorem 2 in Song and Xue (2007)", an unpublished working paper). A machine-checked proof therefore supplies an argument that is not in the published record. No part of the model is formalized elsewhere: there is no multi-item joint pricing–inventory dynamic program on the platform and none in Mathlib.

Difficulty

The concavity part is the classical backward induction, but every step needs analytic bookkeeping that the paper does not do: the value function must be shown finite (the supremum of GtG_tGt​ over an unbounded feasible set), of linear growth, and therefore integrable against the demand distribution; the partial maximization of a jointly concave function over a jointly convex set must be shown concave. The no-order-set clause is the hard part. A first idea is to set I+={i:xi>[Az∗(∅)]i}\mathcal I^+=\{i: x_i>[Az^*(\emptyset)]_i\}I+={i:xi​>[Az∗(∅)]i​}; this is wrong, because once some items are frozen at xix_ixi​ the optimal assembly plan, market shares and hence the remaining order-up-to levels change, and items can enter or leave the set. The no-order set depends on the whole optimal decision, not on xxx and z∗(∅)z^*(\emptyset)z∗(∅) alone, and (14) drops the constraints yi≥xiy_i\ge x_iyi​≥xi​ on I−\mathcal I^-I−, so its maximizers are not obviously feasible in (9). The existence of maximizers requires coercivity of GtG_tGt​ in the production vector zzz, which in turn needs a bound on Vt+1V_{t+1}Vt+1​ from above.

Formalization scope

Items and bundles are finite types, vectors are real-valued functions with the coordinatewise order, and AzAzAz is the matrix–vector product. The randomness of period ttt is a probability measure μt\mu_tμt​ on RJ\mathbb R^{\mathcal J}RJ, the law of εt\varepsilon_tεt​, under which each coordinate is integrable with mean zero and square integrable. The value function is defined by backward recursion with Vt=0V_t = 0Vt​=0 for t>Tt>Tt>T, and Vt(x)V_t(x)Vt​(x) is the real supremum of GtG_tGt​ over the feasible set of (9); proving that this supremum is finite is part of the work. The program (9) is the paper's transformed program (P), stated directly; the change of variables from the original model is not formalized.

Hypotheses added relative to the page, all implicit in the model: ht≥0h_t\ge0ht​≥0, A≥0A\ge0A≥0, λt>0\lambda_t>0λt​>0, 0<β≤10<\beta\le10<β≤1, Ω⊆R+J\Omega\subseteq\mathbb R^{\mathcal J}_+Ω⊆R+J​ and Ω≠∅\Omega\ne\emptysetΩ=∅. For the existence of maximizers and the no-order-set clause only, the goal also assumes coercivity: τt\tau_tτt​ continuous on Ω\OmegaΩ, c~jtp<bjtp\tilde c^p_{jt}<b^p_{jt}c~jtp​<bjtp​ and c~jtp+h~jt>0\tilde c^p_{jt}+\tilde h_{jt}>0c~jtp​+h~jt​>0, where c~tp=ctpA\tilde c^p_t=c^p_tAc~tp​=ctp​A and h~t=htA\tilde h_t=h_tAh~t​=ht​A (the fill rate of §5.2 lies in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1)). Problem (14) keeps the constraint y≥Azy\ge Azy≥Az, which the printed (14) omits but the text after Lemma 2 requires. Maximizers need not be unique, so "otherwise" in Theorem 2(c) means that no maximizer of (14) with I+=∅\mathcal I^+=\emptysetI+=∅ covers xxx.

The value function is the supremum over (9), not the value of (14) or a closed form, and the no-order set must come with the maximality in (14), the optimality in (9) and the attainment of Vt(x)V_t(x)Vt​(x); a bare existence of some I+\mathcal I^+I+ would be trivial.

A complete development needs: concavity of partial maximization over a convex constraint set, concavity and continuity of expectations of concave functions of affine maps of a random vector, and coercivity arguments for existence of maximizers on unbounded domains. These lemmas are reusable for any convex stochastic dynamic program, and contributions of them as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • J.-S. Song and Z. Xue, Demand Shaping Through Bundling and Product Configuration: A Dynamic Multiproduct Inventory-Pricing Model, SSRN 3168907 (version of Aug. 19, 2020); Operations Research, 2021. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168907, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2062
  • A. Federgruen and A. Heching, Combined Pricing and Inventory Control Under Uncertainty, Operations Research 47(3), 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.47.3.454
  • X. Chen and D. Simchi-Levi, Coordinating Inventory Control and Pricing Strategies with Random Demand and Fixed Ordering Cost: The Finite Horizon Case, Operations Research 52(6), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1040.0134
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AnalysisFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

On Extensions of Bilinear Maps: Every Bounded Bilinear Map on M×N Extends to X×Y for Every Banach Target iff the Closures of M and N Are ComplementedResearch Paper

Motivation

The Hahn–Banach theorem extends every bounded linear functional on a linear manifold of a normed space to the whole space, with the same norm. For bounded linear operators into an arbitrary Banach space, and for bounded bilinear maps, nothing of the kind holds in general: there is no Hahn–Banach theorem for bilinear functionals. Extension problems for bilinear and multilinear forms have been studied under many restrictions on the spaces involved — forms on X×X\mathcal X\times\mathcal XX×X, the case X=L1\mathcal X = L^1X=L1, characterizations of c0c_0c0​ through extendible forms, and conditions linked to integral representations on injective tensor products (see the survey in §3 of the paper).

C. S. Kubrusly (arXiv:2110.03102, Mathematica Slovaca 72 (2022)) puts the condition on the domains only. For linear manifolds M⊆X\mathcal M\subseteq\mathcal XM⊆X and N⊆Y\mathcal N\subseteq\mathcal YN⊆Y of Banach spaces, every bounded bilinear map on M×N\mathcal M\times\mathcal NM×N with values in an arbitrary Banach space extends to X×Y\mathcal X\times\mathcal YX×Y exactly when the closures of M\mathcal MM and N\mathcal NN are complemented. This generalizes an earlier sufficient condition for bilinear forms (Hayden, 1967, restated as Theorem 5.1 of the paper) in three directions: it is an equivalence, it covers vector-valued maps, and the norm-one condition on the projections is needed only for norm preservation, not for the existence of an extension.

Setting

Let F\mathbb FF be R\mathbb RR or C\mathbb CC. A linear manifold of a normed space X\mathcal XX is a linear subspace, not necessarily closed; a subspace is a closed linear manifold; M−\mathcal M^-M− is the closure of M\mathcal MM.

A bounded bilinear map ϕ:X×Y→Z\phi:\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y\to\mathcal Zϕ:X×Y→Z is a map linear in each variable with

∥ϕ∥=sup⁡0≠x∈X, 0≠y∈Y∥ϕ(x,y)∥∥x∥ ∥y∥<∞.\|\phi\| = \sup_{0\ne x\in\mathcal X,\ 0\ne y\in\mathcal Y}\frac{\|\phi(x,y)\|}{\|x\|\,\|y\|}<\infty.∥ϕ∥=0=x∈X, 0=y∈Ysup​∥x∥∥y∥∥ϕ(x,y)∥​<∞.

The space of these is b[X×Y,Z]\boldsymbol b[\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y,\mathcal Z]b[X×Y,Z]; B[X,Y]\mathcal B[\mathcal X,\mathcal Y]B[X,Y] is the space of bounded linear operators with the operator norm. A map ϕ^∈b[X×Y,Z]\widehat\phi\in\boldsymbol b[\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y,\mathcal Z]ϕ​∈b[X×Y,Z] extends ϕ∈b[M×N,Z]\phi\in\boldsymbol b[\mathcal M\times\mathcal N,\mathcal Z]ϕ∈b[M×N,Z], written ϕ^∣M×N=ϕ\widehat\phi|_{\mathcal M\times\mathcal N}=\phiϕ​∣M×N​=ϕ, if the two agree on M×N\mathcal M\times\mathcal NM×N.

A subspace S\mathcal SS is complemented if it has a subspace (a closed linear manifold) T\mathcal TT as an algebraic complement: S∩T={0}\mathcal S\cap\mathcal T=\{0\}S∩T={0} and S+T=X\mathcal S+\mathcal T=\mathcal XS+T=X. A projection with range S\mathcal SS is an operator E∈B[X,X]E\in\mathcal B[\mathcal X,\mathcal X]E∈B[X,X] with E2=EE^2=EE2=E and R(E)=S\mathcal R(E)=\mathcal SR(E)=S.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.2

Let M,N\mathcal M,\mathcal NM,N be linear manifolds of Banach spaces X,Y\mathcal X,\mathcal YX,Y.

(a) For M,N≠{0}\mathcal M,\mathcal N\ne\{0\}M,N={0}:

(∀ Z Banach ∀ ϕ∈b[M×N,Z] ∃ ϕ^∈b[X×Y,Z]: ϕ^∣M×N=ϕ)  ⟺  M−, N− are complemented.\Bigl(\forall\,\mathcal Z\text{ Banach}\ \forall\,\phi\in\boldsymbol b[\mathcal M\times\mathcal N,\mathcal Z]\ \exists\,\widehat\phi\in\boldsymbol b[\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y,\mathcal Z]:\ \widehat\phi|_{\mathcal M\times\mathcal N}=\phi\Bigr)\iff\mathcal M^-,\ \mathcal N^-\text{ are complemented.}(∀Z Banach ∀ϕ∈b[M×N,Z] ∃ϕ​∈b[X×Y,Z]: ϕ​∣M×N​=ϕ)⟺M−, N− are complemented.

(b) If M−=R(E)\mathcal M^-=\mathcal R(E)M−=R(E) and N−=R(P)\mathcal N^-=\mathcal R(P)N−=R(P) for projections with ∥E∥=∥P∥=1\|E\|=\|P\|=1∥E∥=∥P∥=1, then every ϕ\phiϕ has an extension with ∥ϕ^∥=∥ϕ∥\|\widehat\phi\|=\|\phi\|∥ϕ​∥=∥ϕ∥.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4.1: a subspace is complemented iff it is the range of a continuous projection (the converse direction in Banach spaces).
  2. Proposition 4.2: b[X×Y,Z]≅B[X,B[Y,Z]]\boldsymbol b[\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y,\mathcal Z]\cong\mathcal B[\mathcal X,\mathcal B[\mathcal Y,\mathcal Z]]b[X×Y,Z]≅B[X,B[Y,Z]] isometrically.
  3. If every bounded bilinear map on M×N\mathcal M\times\mathcal NM×N extends, every bounded operator on M\mathcal MM (on N\mathcal NN) extends to X\mathcal XX (to Y\mathcal YY), provided the other factor is nonzero.
  4. If every nonzero T∈B[M,Z]T\in\mathcal B[\mathcal M,\mathcal Z]T∈B[M,Z] extends to X\mathcal XX for every Banach Z\mathcal ZZ, then M−\mathcal M^-M− is complemented.
  5. Every ϕ∈b[M×N,Z]\phi\in\boldsymbol b[\mathcal M\times\mathcal N,\mathcal Z]ϕ∈b[M×N,Z], Z\mathcal ZZ Banach, extends to ϕ~∈b[M−×N−,Z]\widetilde\phi\in\boldsymbol b[\mathcal M^-\times\mathcal N^-,\mathcal Z]ϕ​∈b[M−×N−,Z] with ∥ϕ~∥=∥ϕ∥\|\widetilde\phi\|=\|\phi\|∥ϕ​∥=∥ϕ∥.
  6. ϕ^(x,y)=ϕ~(Ex,Py)\widehat\phi(x,y)=\widetilde\phi(Ex,Py)ϕ​(x,y)=ϕ​(Ex,Py) extends ϕ\phiϕ and ∥ϕ∥≤∥ϕ^∥≤∥ϕ~∥ ∥E∥ ∥P∥\|\phi\|\le\|\widehat\phi\|\le\|\widetilde\phi\|\,\|E\|\,\|P\|∥ϕ∥≤∥ϕ​∥≤∥ϕ​∥∥E∥∥P∥.

Significance

The theorem turns a question about all bilinear maps and all Banach targets into a geometric property of two subspaces. Consequences in the paper include an unconditional extension theorem for bilinear maps on products of arbitrary linear manifolds of Hilbert spaces (Corollary 5.3, where every closed subspace is complemented by its orthogonal complement), and, through the identification b[X×Y,Z]≅B[X⊗^πY,Z]\boldsymbol b[\mathcal X\times\mathcal Y,\mathcal Z]\cong\mathcal B[\mathcal X\widehat\otimes_\pi\mathcal Y,\mathcal Z]b[X×Y,Z]≅B[X⊗​π​Y,Z], extension results for bounded operators on projective tensor products (§6). The norm statement (b) isolates exactly where norm-one projections enter; the paper shows by a two-dimensional example that its converse fails.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. Mathlib contains the linear theory used along the way (closed complemented submodules, extension of uniformly continuous linear maps from dense subspaces, the Hahn–Banach theorem), but not this bilinear extension theorem or its characterization of complemented closures. The mission produces a formal statement and proof of the equivalence, the norm-preservation clause, and the classical linear-extension characterization of complemented subspaces used in the necessity direction.

Difficulty

Two steps resist the obvious arguments. First, a bounded bilinear map is not uniformly continuous on M×N\mathcal M\times\mathcal NM×N, so extension by continuity to M−×N−\mathcal M^-\times\mathcal N^-M−×N− does not apply directly, and the norm identity ∥ϕ~∥=∥ϕ∥\|\widetilde\phi\|=\|\phi\|∥ϕ​∥=∥ϕ∥ on the closures has to be obtained some other way. Second, the necessity direction needs the classical fact that a closed subspace of a Banach space is complemented when every bounded operator from it into every Banach space extends; the paper cites this (Megginson, Theorem 3.2.17) without proof, so a formalization has to supply it. The naive reading "complemented means some algebraic complement exists" is not the notion: every subspace has an algebraic complement, and the content lies in the complement being closed.

Formalization scope

The field is any RCLike 𝕜 (R\mathbb RR or C\mathbb CC). Linear manifolds are Submodule 𝕜 X, not assumed closed; the closure is M.topologicalClosure. Bounded bilinear maps M×N→Z\mathcal M\times\mathcal N\to\mathcal ZM×N→Z are curried continuous linear maps M →L[𝕜] N →L[𝕜] Z, and ∥ϕ∥\|\phi\|∥ϕ∥ is Mathlib's operator norm; Proposition 4.2 (a milestone) is what makes this encoding agree with the paper's bilinear norm. Complemented means closed with a closed algebraic complement (IsClosed, IsCompl); a bare algebraic complement would make the notion trivial and is ruled out. A projection onto S\mathcal SS is a continuous linear operator mapping into S\mathcal SS and fixing S\mathcal SS pointwise. Extensions are stated pointwise on M×N\mathcal M\times\mathcal NM×N.

Conventions committed to, each disclosed in the item statements:

  • In (a) the linear manifolds are assumed nonzero, as in the first line of the paper's proof; without this the forward direction is false (N={0}\mathcal N=\{0\}N={0} makes every ϕ\phiϕ zero, while M−\mathcal M^-M− need not be complemented). Part (b) carries no such assumption.
  • "An arbitrary Banach space Z\mathcal ZZ" quantifies over Banach spaces in the universe of X\mathcal XX and Y\mathcal YY; the forward direction uses Z=M−\mathcal Z=\mathcal M^-Z=M−.
  • Part (b) asserts the existence of an extension of norm ∥ϕ∥\|\phi\|∥ϕ∥; extensions are not unique.
  • Two printed slips are read as intended: "R(E)=N−\mathcal R(E)=\mathcal N^-R(E)=N−" on p. 6 means R(P)=N−\mathcal R(P)=\mathcal N^-R(P)=N−, and the first supremum of the norm chain on p. 6 is over ϕ~\widetilde\phiϕ​.

Out of scope: Corollary 5.3 (Hilbert spaces), Remark 5.4 and §6 on projective tensor products. Reusable beyond this mission: the linear extension characterization of complemented subspaces (milestone 4) and the norm-preserving extension of bilinear maps to closures (milestone 5). Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • C. S. Kubrusly, On extensions of bilinear maps, Mathematica Slovaca 72 (2022) 959–968; arXiv:2110.03102v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.03102
  • R. E. Megginson, An Introduction to Banach Space Theory, Graduate Texts in Mathematics 183, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0603-3
  • T. L. Hayden, The extension of bilinear functionals, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 22 (1967) 99–108. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1967.22.99
  • R. A. Ryan, Introduction to Tensor Products of Banach Spaces, Springer, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3903-4
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