Motivation
Whether a customer joins a queue depends on how long she expects to wait. In the classical observable-queue model of Naor (1969), the service rate is known, and a longer queue only means a longer wait: customers avoid the crowd (ATC), so the more willing others are to join, the less willing the individual is. Many services do not publish their capacity. Staffing in banks, clinics and government offices varies by shift for internal reasons that a customer in the waiting area cannot see. A customer who knows the distribution of capacity, but not its realization, can learn something from the queue itself, and what she learns depends on how others behave.
Yang, Shang and Liu (SSRN 4159035, 2022; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, doi:10.1287/msom.2022.1139) show that this inference can reverse the classical conclusion: an individual may follow the crowd (FTC), joining more often when others join more. Their Proposition 2 characterizes, in closed form, the reward–cost ratios at which this happens. Follow-the-crowd behaviour is the source of multiple equilibria and of the value of disclosing capacity, which the later sections of the paper study.
Setting
The service rate μ of a single-server queue is μH with prior probability γ and μL with probability 1−γ, where μH>μL>0 and γ∈(0,1). Customers arrive as a Poisson process of rate λ, receive reward R from service, and pay C per unit of time spent in the system. An arriving customer sees the number n of customers present, not the rate. Assumption 2 requires R−C/μL>0, so that a customer facing an empty queue always joins. The queue never exceeds Nˉ=⌊RμH/C⌋, and ρX=λ/μX for X∈{H,L}.
The other customers follow a joining vector p−=(1,p1−,p2−,…): a customer who sees i others joins with probability pi−∈[0,1]. Given μ=μX, the queue length is a birth–death process with stationary law
πX(n,p−)=∑j=0NˉρXj∏i=0j−1pi−ρXn∏i=0n−1pi−,0≤n≤Nˉ.
A tagged customer who sees n updates her belief of high capacity by Bayes' rule, which takes the closed form
θn(p−)=γπH(0,p−)+(1−γ)πL(0,p−)(ρL/ρH)nγπH(0,p−),
and her expected utility of joining is
u(n,p−)=R−C(n+1)[μHθn(p−)+μL1−θn(p−)].
Her best response p~n(p−) is to join when u(n,p−)≥0 (Assumption 1) and at the empty queue, and to balk otherwise. Her ex-ante joining probability is
JPU(p−)=n=0∑Nˉp~n(p−)(γπH(n,p−)+(1−γ)πL(n,p−)).
Finally, the threshold profile p−(v), v≥0, joins at queue lengths up to ⌊v⌋, joins with probability v−⌊v⌋ at ⌊v⌋+1, and balks above. We write θn(v), u(n,v) and JPU(v) for the quantities under p−(v).
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 2 (corrected)
There exist v∈(0,Nˉ) and δ>0 with JPU(v+δ)>JPU(v) if and only if, for some n∈{1,…,Nˉ−1},
(n+1)[μHθn(Nˉ−1)+μL1−θn(Nˉ−1)]≤CR<(n+1)[μHθn((n−2)+)+μL1−θn((n−2)+)].
Milestones
In attack order:
- the closed form (A-1) of the belief agrees with Bayes' rule (1) at every reachable state;
- Lemma 1: θn(p−) and u(n,p−) strictly decrease in n;
- Proposition 1: the best response is a threshold strategy;
- Lemma 2: raising others' joining probabilities raises the belief at every queue length;
- θn(v) increases with v;
- πX(n,v) is continuous in v;
- u(n,v) crosses zero at most once, and exactly once under the interval condition;
- the congestion effect: more joining by others makes the queue stochastically longer.
Significance
The goal is an exact characterization: it says for which parameter values a rational, Bayesian customer's tendency to join increases with that of the crowd. With known capacity, the congestion effect alone acts and the behaviour is always ATC. FTC is therefore a pure consequence of inference from the queue. The characterization is what the paper's equilibrium analysis (multiple equilibria under FTC) and its comparison of capacity disclosure policies build on.
The formalization adds two things. First, it checks a closed-form characterization against its definitions at every parameter value. The "if" direction of Proposition 2 as printed fails: at λ=3, μH=3, μL=2, R=5/2, C=1, γ=3/4 (so Nˉ=7), the printed interval condition holds at n=5, but the tagged customer starts joining at state 5 while state 5 is still unreachable, and JPU never increases. The goal is the corrected statement. Second, none of the paper's results is machine-checked anywhere; the mission produces the first formal development of a Bayesian strategic queue.
Difficulty
The paper's proof of Proposition 2 runs as follows. The utility u(n,v) increases in v, so at a unique v∗ the customer's threshold moves from n to n+1, and continuity of the law in v makes JPU jump up. The step that fails is the jump: it adds γπH(n,v∗)+(1−γ)πL(n,v∗), which is zero when state n is unreachable under p−(v∗), that is, when v∗≤n−2. The correction moves the upper endpoint from the belief at v=0 to the belief at v=(n−2)+.
The converse direction, which the paper does not argue, needs the congestion effect in quantitative form. Between crossings, the best response is fixed and JPU is a fixed cumulative probability of a queue that grows stochastically with v, so it cannot increase. Every increase must come from a jump at a reachable state, and turning that into the interval condition requires the strict monotonicity of the belief in v on [0,Nˉ−1]. Neither monotonicity in the joining vector (Lemma 2) nor first-order stochastic dominance (the congestion effect) follows from a one-line computation. Each is a ratio comparison of truncated sums, πH(0,p)/πL(0,p) and ∑n≤mπX(n,p), in which every coordinate of p enters many terms.
Formalization scope
All objects live in one definition item, FollowCrowd.Inference.Model, built on Mathlib alone. States are natural numbers, and joining vectors are functions N→R, of which only the coordinates 0,…,Nˉ−1 enter the law. Nˉ is Nat.floor, and sums run over Finset.range (Nbar + 1).
The formalization commits to five conventions, each disclosed in the item statements:
- Added positivity. λ>0 and C>0 are added to the paper's stated assumptions; the paper uses both implicitly.
- Belief by (A-1). The belief is defined by the closed form (A-1), not by Bayes' rule (1), which is 0/0 at unreachable states. The paper itself evaluates θn(0) at such states. Milestone 1 recovers (1) where it is defined.
- Tie-break. At u(n,p−)=0 the paper allows any joining probability; Assumption 1 selects joining. This is why the left inequality of the goal is weak.
- Ex-ante joining probability. JPU is a sum over all states of the pure best response, which by Proposition 1 equals the paper's form.
- Proposition 1. It is stated with threshold m≥0, because the printed form with m≥1 cannot express the best response (1,0,…,0).
The trivializing formalization to rule out is one that takes the crossing point or the jump of JPU as a hypothesis. The goal quantifies over v and δ and compares values of JPU, which is defined from the primitives. The hypotheses are satisfiable (Figure 1's parameters satisfy them), and the counterexample to the printed statement is checked in Lean in exact arithmetic.
A complete development needs:
- finite birth–death laws;
- monotone likelihood-ratio arguments for truncated geometric sums;
- continuity of the threshold profile.
The likelihood-ratio and stochastic-dominance lemmas for truncated product-form laws are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, and in particular on the two monotonicity results (Lemma 2 and the congestion effect), which both directions of the goal use.
Selected references
- L. Yang, W. Shang and L. Liu, Follow the crowd with uncertain service capacity, SSRN working paper 4159035, version of June 24, 2022; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4159035, https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1139
- P. Naor, The regulation of queue size by levying tolls, Econometrica 37(1), 1969, 15–24. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909200
- R. Hassin and M. Haviv, To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems, Kluwer, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0359-0