A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium 1: Under Regret-Matching (2.2), the Empirical Distributions of Play Converge Almost Surely to the Set of Correlated EquilibriaResearch Paper
Motivation
A correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) is a probability distribution over strategy profiles of a game such that no player gains by deviating from a recommended strategy, given the recommendation. It is the solution concept of choice when players can condition on common signals, and its set is a convex polytope defined by linear inequalities, which makes it computationally tractable in a way that Nash equilibrium is not. A natural question in learning in games is whether simple adaptive behaviour by individual players, each using only their own payoffs and the observed history, leads to it.
Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) answer this with regret matching: each player switches away from their last action with probabilities proportional to the regret for not having played other actions in the past. They show that if every player uses this rule, the empirical distribution of play converges almost surely to the set of correlated equilibria. The procedure and its analysis became standard references for no-regret learning, internal (swap) regret, and the counterfactual-regret-minimization algorithms used in large imperfect-information games.
Timeline. Foster and Vohra (1997) obtained convergence to correlated equilibria by calibrated forecasting. Fudenberg and Levine (1999) gave conditionally consistent procedures with the same consequence. Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) gave the regret-matching procedure (2.2), in which a player's probabilities depend on regrets only, together with a Blackwell-approachability variant (their Theorem A, the subject of the companion mission 2 of this series).
Setting
A finite game has a finite set of players , a finite strategy set for each player, and payoffs on . A probability distribution on is a correlated -equilibrium if for every player and all
a correlated equilibrium is the case .
The game is played at , producing a history . For the regret of player is
the average gain player would have had by playing every time they played . Fix with for every , where and . Under regret matching (2.2), if player last played , then at they play each with probability and repeat with the remaining probability; the first-period mixed actions are arbitrary, and given the history the players randomize independently. The empirical distribution of play is .
Formalization targets
Goal: the Main Theorem
Almost surely, converges to the set of correlated equilibria:
This is convergence to a set, not to a point; the paper notes that need not converge.
Milestones
They follow the Appendix proof:
- the PROPOSITION (§3), a deterministic equivalence: for all and iff converges to the set of correlated -equilibria;
- positivity of the diagonal of the transition matrix of (2.2);
- Steps M1–M11, with the two LEMMAs used in the proofs of M4 and M7.
The squared distance satisfies a block recursion (M1). The cross term is rewritten through the transition probabilities (M2) and compared with a stationary auxiliary process (M3–M5). It then factors into a difference of consecutive matrix powers (M6), which is small (M7). This gives
Along this gives a.s. (M9–M10), and then a.s. (M11). A companion item states the strong law for dependent variables that M10 cites.
Significance
The result. The Main Theorem shows that correlated equilibrium is reached by uncoupled play: each player needs only their own payoff function and the history of play, and nothing about the others' payoffs. Steps M10–M11 give more than the goal, namely that every player's internal regrets vanish almost surely. The procedure underlies later work on swap regret, calibrated learning and regret-minimization algorithms for extensive-form games.
Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper. As far as a search of the platform and the local index shows, it has no machine-checked proof. The mission asks for one, following the paper's eleven steps. Several pieces are general and reusable: a bound on consecutive powers of a stochastic matrix with positive diagonal (LEMMA, proof of M7); a perturbation bound for multi-step transition probabilities (LEMMA, proof of M4); and a strong law of large numbers for martingale differences with general normalizing sequences, which Mathlib does not have in this form.
Difficulty
The natural approach is Blackwell approachability: show that the expected regret vector moves toward the nonpositive orthant in one step. It fails here. The one-step condition holds when a player uses an invariant distribution of , which is the procedure of Theorem A, but regret matching uses a row of instead. The cross term of the one-step recursion therefore does not vanish.
The proof has to work over blocks of periods. Within a block the players' choices are not independent given , because the transition probabilities change with time. The paper therefore compares the play with a process whose transitions are frozen at time . The matrix-power estimate cannot use convergence of , since only the diagonal of is known to be positive and may be reducible or periodic in its off-diagonal structure. The block length must also balance the errors and , which is why the subsequence appears.
Formalization scope
Players form a Fintype ι, strategies form Fintypes S i, each nonempty, and a profile is a function ∀ i, S i. is Mathlib's stdSimplex. Time is 0-based: play τ is , and a history is a tuple Fin t → ∀ i, S i. Regrets, , and are deterministic functions of a finite history. Every statement has , because the Lean value at is a default. A play of a behaviour profile on a probability space (IsPlay) is a sequence of profile-valued random variables with measurable level sets whose conditional law given any history of positive probability is the product of the players' mixed actions. Statements quantify over every probability space carrying a play, and conditional quantities given assume . The auxiliary -process is encoded by its explicit law, a power of the product transition matrix. The paper's (footnote 34) is a constant chosen after the game, and and before the initial play, the probability space and the play. Distances on are sup distances.
The hypotheses are exactly footnote 5's: and , with one for all players. The goal requires every player to follow (2.2). If other players may play arbitrarily the statement is false (§4(d)), so IsPlay constrains all of them. The goal is stated with an existential correlated equilibrium at distance less than , not with a distance to a possibly empty set, so no encoding makes it vacuous.
Disclosed choices:
- the LEMMA of M7 is stated with a constant that depends only on a lower bound on the diagonal, which is what the proof gives and what M7 uses;
- the PROPOSITION states as "for every , eventually ";
- the strong law assumes each is measurable and in .
Contributions are welcome at every milestone. The two LEMMAs and the strong law are self-contained and independent of the game.
Selected references
- S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium, Econometrica 68(5) (2000), 1127–1150. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00153
- R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
- D. P. Foster and R. V. Vohra, Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium, Games and Economic Behavior 21 (1997), 40–55. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0595
- D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine, Conditional Universal Consistency, Games and Economic Behavior 29 (1999), 104–130. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0705
- D. Blackwell, An Analog of the Minimax Theorem for Vector Payoffs, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 6 (1956), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1956.6.1
- M. Loève, Probability Theory II, 4th ed., Springer (1978), Theorem 32.1.E.