Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem II: Every Equilibrium of Every Choice Mechanism Yields an Incentive-Feasible Allocation, F** = F*Research Paper
Motivation
An arbitrator who must choose among collective options for a group of players usually does not know the players' private characteristics. The arbitrator can only ask, and a player who expects to profit from a false answer may give one. Before designing any procedure, the arbitrator therefore needs to know which expected-payoff allocations can be reached at all once strategic misreporting is taken into account.
Myerson (1979) answers this for Bayesian collective choice problems with finitely many types. Restricting attention to mechanisms that simply ask each player for their type, and that make honest answers optimal, loses nothing: every expected-payoff allocation that any mechanism can produce in equilibrium is already produced honestly by such a direct mechanism, and conversely. This is the revelation principle in the form used throughout Bayesian mechanism design. It is what makes incentive-compatibility constraints the starting point for auction design, bilateral trade, and the bargaining solution in the second half of the same paper.
Timeline. Gibbard (1973) gave the dominant-strategy form of the principle. Rosenthal (Review of Economic Studies, 1978) studied arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty; Myerson notes that Theorem 2 could be derived as a corollary of Rosenthal's Theorem 3. Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) gave general Bayesian implementation results in the same year. Myerson's Theorem 2 states the principle as an equality of interim payoff sets over all finite response sets. Myerson (1982) later extended it to principal–agent problems with moral hazard.
Setting
A Bayesian collective choice problem has a nonempty finite set of players , a nonempty finite set of types for each player, a nonempty finite set of collective choices, utilities depending on the choice and on the true type profile , and a probability distribution on type profiles. With the marginal of type , a player of type assigns the conditional probability to profiles with , and to the others.
A choice mechanism on response sets (nonempty finite sets of possible answers) is a function with for every response profile . On the standard response sets , the payoff of type who reports while the others are honest is
The mechanism is Bayesian incentive-compatible if for all . Its honest allocation is the vector with coordinates , indexed by the disjoint union of the . The incentive-feasible set is
On general response sets, a response plan is a probability distribution over for each type . Plans give type the payoff
They form a response-plan equilibrium for if no type of any player gains by switching to any other response plan . The equilibrium-feasible set collects over all choice mechanisms , on all nonempty finite response sets, and all response-plan equilibria for .
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 2
Both inclusions are asserted for every Bayesian collective choice problem. says equilibrium behaviour under any mechanism can be replicated honestly by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. says honest reporting is itself an equilibrium of every incentive-compatible mechanism.
Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof)
- For any choice mechanism and response plans , the induced direct mechanism is a choice mechanism and .
- If is a response-plan equilibrium for , then is Bayesian incentive-compatible.
- If is a Bayesian incentive-compatible choice mechanism, the honest plans form a response-plan equilibrium for , and .
Significance
The result. Theorem 2 reduces a search over all communication protocols, an unbounded family of response sets and mixed reporting behaviours, to a finite system of linear inequalities in on a fixed finite domain. Combined with Theorem 1 of the paper, which shows is a nonempty compact convex set, it justifies applying a bargaining solution to rather than to some larger, ill-defined set of attainable outcomes. The same reduction underlies the use of incentive constraints in optimal auctions, bilateral trade and correlated-type mechanism design.
Formalizing it. The result is classical and its proof is short, but it is a statement about all finite response sets at once, and the equality of two sets of payoff vectors is sensitive to the conventions: which plans are allowed as deviations, where the conditioning happens, and whether the induced mechanism is a genuine probability distribution. A machine-checked version pins these down. To our knowledge no formal proof of this finite Bayesian revelation principle exists. The platform has related, unproved items in other models: MechanismDesign.Robust.revelation_principle (Börgers, Prop. 10.2, on a countable Harsanyi type space with PMF lotteries; one inclusion, outcome equivalence) and single-agent, quasi-linear and dominant-strategy revelation principles from the same book. None of them is the statement here.
Difficulty
The mathematics consists of finite sums, but the bookkeeping is the obstacle. Milestone 1 requires exchanging a sum over response profiles with a product over players and using that each plan sums to one. Milestone 2 requires recognizing a lie in as a particular whole response plan in : the plan that, at every type, behaves as type would. Because vanishes off , only its value at matters. For milestone 3, a mixed deviation from honesty has to be bounded by the best pure misreport, a convex-combination argument over . Identifying the side of the goal also needs instances on an existentially chosen family of types.
Formalization scope
All objects live in MyersonBargaining.Revelation. Players form a nonempty finite type ι; types A i, choices C and response sets S i are nonempty finite types in Type. Mechanisms and plans are real-valued functions with the probability constraints as predicates (IsChoiceMechanism, IsResponsePlan), event first and condition second: π c s, σ i s a. Allocation vectors are functions on Σ i, A i. The paper's loose phrases are read as follows:
- "probability distribution" means nonnegativity and sum one;
- (3) divides by , so the problem requires ; individual profiles may have probability zero;
- the consistent (common-prior) reading of (3)–(4) is formalized, not the subjective reading the paper permits on p. 63;
- "for every possible alternative response plan" in (14) ranges over all mixed response plans, compared type by type;
- " is a choice mechanism" in (15) ranges over all nonempty finite response sets, with an explicit existential over the family
S : ι → Typeand its instances; - "incentive-compatible mechanism" means a choice mechanism satisfying (6).
The product in (12) is printed with ; it is formalized with , as the paper's own induced mechanism on p. 66 uses. Milestone 1 is stated for arbitrary response plans, not only for equilibria. Section 6's numerical example is not formalized.
A trivializing formalization is ruled out explicitly: fixing in , restricting deviations to pure plans, or stating only would each change the theorem, and none is done.
A complete development needs finite sums over dependent product types (Fintype.piFinset, Finset.prod_univ_sum), Function.update on dependent families, and nothing beyond Mathlib. The two definition modules (the model and the response-plan objects) are reusable by any finite Bayesian mechanism-design formalization. Proofs of any milestone, alternative proofs via Rosenthal's argument, and cleaner restatements as lemmas about stochastic matrices are welcome.
Selected references
- Roger B. Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47(1), 61–73, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346
- Robert W. Rosenthal, Arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty, Review of Economic Studies 45(3), 1978 (cited in the source as reference [8], "forthcoming").
- Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica 41(4), 587–601, 1973. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
- Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond, Eric Maskin, The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility, Review of Economic Studies 46(2), 185–216, 1979. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297045
- Roger B. Myerson, Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1), 67–81, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4