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Markov ChainNumerical AnalysisOperations Research+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory X: Uniformization of Continuous-Time Markov ChainsTextbook

Motivation

Most Markovian queueing models have no closed-form transient solution. The M/M/1 queue already needs modified Bessel functions (Chapter 2 of the book), and a finite-capacity or multi-class model with state-dependent rates has no closed form at all. What an analyst can always write down is the system of forward equations p′(t)=p(t)Qp'(t)=p(t)Qp′(t)=p(t)Q for the state probabilities. Chapter 8 of Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., Wiley 2008, DOI 10.1002/9781118625651), presents two numerical techniques that turn such models into numbers: the randomization (or uniformization) method for the transient distribution of a finite continuous-time Markov chain, and the Fourier-series method for inverting a Laplace transform, as needed for the M/G/1 waiting-time transform (5.33) and the busy-period transform (5.37).

Uniformization goes back to Jensen (1953) and is the standard transient solver in performance-evaluation and reliability tools. Its appeal is that it replaces a matrix exponential, which is numerically delicate, by powers of a stochastic matrix weighted by Poisson probabilities, with an error bound that can be fixed before the computation starts (Grassmann 1977; Gross and Miller 1984). The Fourier-series method with Euler summation is due to Abate and Whitt (Abate and Whitt 1992; Abate, Choudhury and Whitt 1999).

Setting

A continuous-time Markov chain X(t)X(t)X(t) on the states {0,1,…,N}\{0,1,\dots,N\}{0,1,…,N} is described by its infinitesimal generator Q=(qij)Q=(q_{ij})Q=(qij​): for i≠ji\ne ji=j, qij≥0q_{ij}\ge0qij​≥0 is the rate of jumps from iii to jjj, and the diagonal entry is −qi-q_i−qi​ with

qi=∑j≠iqij,i=0,1,…,N.q_i=\sum_{j\ne i}q_{ij},\qquad i=0,1,\dots,N.qi​=j=i∑​qij​,i=0,1,…,N.

The transient state-probability vector p(t)=(p0(t),…,pN(t))p(t)=(p_0(t),\dots,p_N(t))p(t)=(p0​(t),…,pN​(t)), pn(t)=Pr⁡{X(t)=n}p_n(t)=\Pr\{X(t)=n\}pn​(t)=Pr{X(t)=n}, is the solution of the forward equations

p′(t)=p(t)Q(t≥0),p'(t)=p(t)Q\quad(t\ge0),p′(t)=p(t)Q(t≥0),

started from a given probability vector p(0)p(0)p(0). Fix a constant Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0 with Λ≥qi\Lambda\ge q_iΛ≥qi​ for every iii (the book takes Λ=max⁡iqi\Lambda=\max_i q_iΛ=maxi​qi​) and define the uniformized matrix

P~=QΛ+I,p~in={qin/Λ(i≠n),1−qi/Λ(i=n).\tilde P=\frac{Q}{\Lambda}+I,\qquad \tilde p_{in}=\begin{cases}q_{in}/\Lambda&(i\ne n),\\1-q_i/\Lambda&(i=n).\end{cases}P~=ΛQ​+I,p~​in​={qin​/Λ1−qi​/Λ​(i=n),(i=n).​

It is the transition matrix of a discrete-time chain YkY_kYk​: the state of XXX after the kkk-th event of a Poisson process of rate Λ\LambdaΛ that has been thinned. Write ϕ(k)=p(0)P~k\phi^{(k)}=p(0)\tilde P^{k}ϕ(k)=p(0)P~k for its distribution after kkk steps.

For the second half of the chapter, the Laplace transform of a real function fff on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) is fˉ(s)=∫0∞e−stf(t) dt\bar f(s)=\int_0^\infty e^{-st}f(t)\,dtfˉ​(s)=∫0∞​e−stf(t)dt, and the Fourier-series approximant with parameter AAA is

fA,n(t)=eA/22t[fˉ(A2t)+2∑k=1n(−1)k Re fˉ(A+2kπi2t)],f_{A,n}(t)=\frac{e^{A/2}}{2t}\Big[\bar f\Big(\frac{A}{2t}\Big)+2\sum_{k=1}^{n}(-1)^k\,\mathrm{Re}\,\bar f\Big(\frac{A+2k\pi i}{2t}\Big)\Big],fA,n​(t)=2teA/2​[fˉ​(2tA​)+2k=1∑n​(−1)kRefˉ​(2tA+2kπi​)],

with fA(t)=lim⁡n→∞fA,n(t)f_A(t)=\lim_{n\to\infty}f_{A,n}(t)fA​(t)=limn→∞​fA,n​(t).

Formalization targets

Goal: the randomization formula with its truncation bound (Eqs. (8.9)–(8.12))

The forward equations have a solution, and every solution satisfies, for all t≥0t\ge0t≥0,

p(t)=∑k=0∞p(0)P~(k) e−Λt(Λt)kk!,p(t)=\sum_{k=0}^{\infty}p(0)\tilde P^{(k)}\,\frac{e^{-\Lambda t}(\Lambda t)^k}{k!},p(t)=k=0∑∞​p(0)P~(k)k!e−Λt(Λt)k​,

and whenever ∑k=0Te−Λt(Λt)k/k!>1−ϵ\sum_{k=0}^{T}e^{-\Lambda t}(\Lambda t)^k/k!>1-\epsilon∑k=0T​e−Λt(Λt)k/k!>1−ϵ, every component of the sum truncated at k=Tk=Tk=T is within ϵ\epsilonϵ of pn(t)p_n(t)pn​(t).

Milestones

  1. Eq. (8.12): P~\tilde PP~ has the entries above and is a stochastic matrix.
  2. Eqs. (8.13)–(8.14): ϕ(k)=ϕ(k−1)P~\phi^{(k)}=\phi^{(k-1)}\tilde Pϕ(k)=ϕ(k−1)P~ and each ϕ(k)\phi^{(k)}ϕ(k) is a probability vector.
  3. p.385: ϕ=ϕP~  ⟺  0=ϕQ\phi=\phi\tilde P\iff0=\phi Qϕ=ϕP~⟺0=ϕQ.
  4. Eqs. (8.27)–(8.28): for bounded Lipschitz fff, A>0A>0A>0 and t>0t>0t>0,
fA(t)−f(t)=∑k=1∞e−kAf((2k+1)t),∣fA(t)−f(t)∣≤Ce−A1−e−A  if ∣f(x)∣≤C for x>3t.f_A(t)-f(t)=\sum_{k=1}^{\infty}e^{-kA}f\big((2k+1)t\big),\qquad |f_A(t)-f(t)|\le\frac{Ce^{-A}}{1-e^{-A}}\ \text{ if } |f(x)|\le C \text{ for } x>3t.fA​(t)−f(t)=k=1∑∞​e−kAf((2k+1)t),∣fA​(t)−f(t)∣≤1−e−ACe−A​  if ∣f(x)∣≤C for x>3t.

The mission also contains Eqs. (8.7)–(8.8) as a further theorem, outside the milestone list: the transition probabilities satisfy pin(t)=∑kp~in(k)e−Λt(Λt)k/k!p_{in}(t)=\sum_k\tilde p^{(k)}_{in}e^{-\Lambda t}(\Lambda t)^k/k!pin​(t)=∑k​p~​in(k)​e−Λt(Λt)k/k!, and pn(t)=∑ipi(0)pin(t)p_n(t)=\sum_i p_i(0)p_{in}(t)pn​(t)=∑i​pi​(0)pin​(t).

Significance

The randomization formula reduces the transient analysis of any finite Markovian queue (finite-buffer, multi-server, with balking, reneging or state-dependent rates) to repeated vector–matrix products with a sparse stochastic matrix. The truncation point is chosen from a Poisson tail alone, independently of QQQ. Milestone 3 shows that the same matrix gives the stationary equations, so one iteration serves both transient and steady-state computation. The discretization identity (8.27) is what justifies the parameter choice in Algorithm 8.1: the error decays like e−Ae^{-A}e−A.

All of these results are classical and proved in the literature. None of them is formalized in Lean or Mathlib as far as a search of the platform and Mathlib shows. Mathlib has the matrix exponential and Poisson summation under decay hypotheses, but no continuous-time Markov chain generators, no uniformization, and no Laplace transform. This mission would add the finite-state link between generators, stochastic matrices and matrix exponentials that later chapters of queueing and reliability theory use, and a verified error formula for a numerical inversion method in wide use.

Difficulty

The book's derivation is probabilistic: it conditions on the number of events of the Poisson(Λ\LambdaΛ) process and thins them. A formal statement cannot rest on that picture, because p(t)p(t)p(t) is defined analytically, by the forward equations. The goal therefore contains a uniqueness statement for a linear ODE on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with one-sided derivative at 000, which the book never mentions. The componentwise bound then needs P~\tilde PP~ to be stochastic, so that every ϕn(k)\phi^{(k)}_nϕn(k)​ lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. That is exactly where Λ≥max⁡iqi\Lambda\ge\max_i q_iΛ≥maxi​qi​ is used; with a smaller Λ\LambdaΛ the matrix P~\tilde PP~ has negative diagonal entries and the bound fails.

For (8.27), the book gives no proof. The identity is an aliasing (Poisson-summation) formula for a periodic function assembled from the values of fff at all odd multiples of ttt. The convergence of the conditionally summed series (8.24) is the delicate point: continuity of fff at ttt, the book's only hypothesis, does not guarantee convergence of a Fourier series. Mathlib's Poisson summation theorems require decay of the Fourier transform that the damped, reflected function built from fff does not have.

Formalization scope

  • States are Fin (N+1); a row vector is Fin (N+1) → ℝ; pQpQpQ is vecMul. A generator is a real matrix with nonnegative off-diagonal entries and diagonal −∑j≠iqij-\sum_{j\ne i}q_{ij}−∑j=i​qij​.
  • p(t)p(t)p(t) is not defined as the series. It is any function with p(0)=p0p(0)=p_0p(0)=p0​ and one-sided derivative p(t)Qp(t)Qp(t)Q within [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) at every t≥0t\ge0t≥0. The goal also asserts that such a function exists, so it cannot hold vacuously, and it asserts the series identity for every solution. Defining p(t)p(t)p(t) as the series (8.9) would make the goal a tautology and is ruled out.
  • Λ\LambdaΛ is any real with Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0 and Λ≥qi\Lambda\ge q_iΛ≥qi​ for all iii (the book takes equality with max⁡iqi\max_i q_imaxi​qi​).
  • The truncation bound is stated componentwise, as on p.384 ("an error bound on pn(t)p_n(t)pn​(t) of ϵ\epsilonϵ"), for an arbitrary real ϵ\epsilonϵ and truncation point TTT.
  • The series (8.8), (8.9) are stated with HasSum, so convergence is part of the claim.
  • The Laplace transform is the Lebesgue integral over (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) at a complex argument. fA(t)f_A(t)fA​(t) is the limit of the partial sums fA,n(t)f_{A,n}(t)fA,n​(t), and the convergence is part of milestone 4.
  • Strengthened hypotheses in milestone 4: fff bounded and Lipschitz on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) replaces "ttt is a continuity point of fff", which is not sufficient for convergence.
  • Corrected misprints: e−λte^{-\lambda t}e−λt in (8.9) is e−Λte^{-\Lambda t}e−Λt; qij/Λq_{ij}/\Lambdaqij​/Λ in (8.12) is qin/Λq_{in}/\Lambdaqin​/Λ; ϕ(Q/Λ−I)\phi(Q/\Lambda-I)ϕ(Q/Λ−I) on p.385 is ϕ(Q/Λ+I)\phi(Q/\Lambda+I)ϕ(Q/Λ+I).
  • Not formalized: Theorem 8.1 (Bromwich inversion) and the real form (8.21), which the book states without hypotheses on fff; the limit claim lim⁡kϕ(k)=lim⁡tp(t)\lim_k\phi^{(k)}=\lim_t p(t)limk​ϕ(k)=limt​p(t) on p.385, which fails when P~\tilde PP~ is periodic; the Euler-summation approximation (8.26) and the round-off discussion, which are stated with "≈".

Useful infrastructure: the matrix exponential and its derivative (Matrix, NormedSpace.exp), uniqueness for linear ODEs (Grönwall), Fourier series on the circle, and a reusable Laplace transform file. Contributions of general lemmas on generators and stochastic matrices are welcome, as they apply to every finite Markovian model in the series.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008, §§8.1.2–8.2. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • A. Jensen, "Markoff chains as an aid in the study of Markoff processes", Skandinavisk Aktuarietidskrift 36 (1953) 87–91.
  • W. K. Grassmann, "Transient solutions in Markovian queueing systems", Computers & Operations Research 4 (1977) 47–53.
  • D. Gross, D. R. Miller, "The randomization technique as a modeling tool and solution procedure for transient Markov processes", Operations Research 32 (1984) 343–361. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.2.343
  • J. Abate, W. Whitt, "The Fourier-series method for inverting transforms of probability distributions", Queueing Systems 10 (1992) 5–87. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01158520
  • J. Abate, G. L. Choudhury, W. Whitt, "An introduction to numerical transform inversion and its application to probability models", in W. Grassmann (ed.), Computational Probability, Kluwer, 1999, 257–323.
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Number Theory·Captain: xuanji

The irrationality measure of π is at most 19.8899945 (Chudnovsky 1982)Research Paper

Motivation

The irrationality measure μ(π)\mu(\pi)μ(π) is the supremum of the μ\muμ for which ∣π−p/q∣<q−μ|\pi - p/q| < q^{-\mu}∣π−p/q∣<q−μ has infinitely many rational solutions p/qp/qp/q. Every irrational number has μ≥2\mu \ge 2μ≥2 (Dirichlet), almost every real number has μ=2\mu = 2μ=2, and it is conjectured that μ(π)=2\mu(\pi) = 2μ(π)=2. Known upper bounds:

  • Mahler (1953): 424242, the first proof that π\piπ is not a Liouville number.
  • Mignotte (1974): 20.620.620.6.
  • Chudnovsky (1982): 19.8899944…19.8899944\ldots19.8899944…
  • Rhin–Viola (1993): 14.79707414.79707414.797074.
  • Hata (1993): 8.016045…8.016045\ldots8.016045…
  • Salikhov (2008): 7.606308…7.606308\ldots7.606308…
  • Zeilberger–Zudilin (2020): 7.103205334137…7.103205334137\ldots7.103205334137…, the current record.

The campaign's first proved value is Mahler's 424242. This entry records Chudnovsky's bound.

Formalization target

The campaign template with the value 19.889994519.889994519.8899945 filled in: PiIrrationality.UpperBound (19.8899945 : ℝ), i.e. μ(π)≤19.8899945\mu(\pi) \le 19.8899945μ(π)≤19.8899945.

Value. The bound is quoted in the literature as 19.8899944…19.8899944\ldots19.8899944… (e.g. Hata 1993), a truncation. This entry rounds the last digit up to 19.889994519.889994519.8899945 so that the goal follows from the published constant.

How the bound arises

Chudnovsky determined the exact asymptotic behaviour of the Hermite-type contour integrals 12πi∮(n!z(z−1)⋯(z−n))kewz dz\frac{1}{2\pi i}\oint \left(\frac{n!}{z(z-1)\cdots(z-n)}\right)^k e^{wz}\,dz2πi1​∮(z(z−1)⋯(z−n)n!​)kewzdz behind Mahler's approximations, which sharpens the resulting exponent.

Significance

Each step down the list replaces Mahler's approximations with a sharper family. Formalizing 19.889994519.889994519.8899945 would build reusable explicit machinery: integral constructions of rational approximations to π\piπ, bounds on their common denominators via prime-number estimates, and the standard lemma turning a sequence of good approximations into an irrationality-measure bound.

Selected references

  • G. V. Chudnovsky, Hermite–Padé approximations to exponential functions and elementary estimates of the measure of irrationality of π\piπ, Lecture Notes in Math. 925, Springer (1982), 299–322.
  • K. Mahler, On the approximation of π\piπ, Indag. Math. 15 (1953), 30–42.
  • F. Beukers, A rational approach to π\piπ, Nieuw Arch. Wiskd. (5) 1 (2000), 372–379.
  • Source table: https://teorth.github.io/optimizationproblems/constants/7a.html
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Number Theory·Captain: xuanji

The irrationality measure of π is at most 20.6 (Mignotte 1974)Research Paper

Motivation

The irrationality measure μ(π)\mu(\pi)μ(π) is the supremum of the μ\muμ for which ∣π−p/q∣<q−μ|\pi - p/q| < q^{-\mu}∣π−p/q∣<q−μ has infinitely many rational solutions p/qp/qp/q. Every irrational number has μ≥2\mu \ge 2μ≥2 (Dirichlet), almost every real number has μ=2\mu = 2μ=2, and it is conjectured that μ(π)=2\mu(\pi) = 2μ(π)=2. Known upper bounds:

  • Mahler (1953): 424242, the first proof that π\piπ is not a Liouville number.
  • Mignotte (1974): 20.620.620.6.
  • Chudnovsky (1982): 19.8899944…19.8899944\ldots19.8899944…
  • Rhin–Viola (1993): 14.79707414.79707414.797074.
  • Hata (1993): 8.016045…8.016045\ldots8.016045…
  • Salikhov (2008): 7.606308…7.606308\ldots7.606308…
  • Zeilberger–Zudilin (2020): 7.103205334137…7.103205334137\ldots7.103205334137…, the current record.

The campaign's first proved value is Mahler's 424242. This entry records Mignotte's bound.

Formalization target

The campaign template with the value 20.620.620.6 filled in: PiIrrationality.UpperBound (20.6 : ℝ), i.e. μ(π)≤20.6\mu(\pi) \le 20.6μ(π)≤20.6.

Value. The paper's abstract states ∣π−p/q∣>q−20.6|\pi - p/q| > q^{-20.6}∣π−p/q∣>q−20.6 for all q≥2q \ge 2q≥2, which gives μ(π)≤20.6\mu(\pi) \le 20.6μ(π)≤20.6 exactly as stated. The paper also proves ∣π−p/q∣>q−20|\pi - p/q| > q^{-20}∣π−p/q∣>q−20 for q≥q0q \ge q_0q≥q0​ (explicit), so μ(π)≤20\mu(\pi) \le 20μ(π)≤20 follows from the same source; this entry uses the table value 20.620.620.6.

How the bound arises

Mignotte refined Mahler's method of explicit rational approximations to π\piπ (Hermite's approximation formulae for the exponential and logarithm) and sharpened the estimates that turn their size and denominators into an irrationality measure.

Significance

Each step down the list replaces Mahler's approximations with a sharper family. Formalizing 20.620.620.6 would build reusable explicit machinery: integral constructions of rational approximations to π\piπ, bounds on their common denominators via prime-number estimates, and the standard lemma turning a sequence of good approximations into an irrationality-measure bound.

Selected references

  • M. Mignotte, Approximations rationnelles de π\piπ et quelques autres nombres, Mém. Soc. Math. France 37 (1974), 121–132. https://doi.org/10.24033/msmf.139
  • K. Mahler, On the approximation of π\piπ, Indag. Math. 15 (1953), 30–42.
  • F. Beukers, A rational approach to π\piπ, Nieuw Arch. Wiskd. (5) 1 (2000), 372–379.
  • Source table: https://teorth.github.io/optimizationproblems/constants/7a.html
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Group Theory·Captain: dbenbenn

Lodha–Moore: a nonamenable finitely presented group of piecewise projective homeomorphismsResearch Paper

This mission formalizes Y. Lodha and J. T. Moore, A nonamenable finitely presented group of piecewise projective homeomorphisms, Groups Geom. Dyn. 10 (2016) 177–200 (doi:10.4171/GGD/347; arXiv:1308.4250v3, whose page numbers are used): the group G0G_0G0​ generated by three explicit piecewise projective homeomorphisms of the line is nonamenable and finitely presented, the first torsion-free finitely presented counterexample to the von Neumann–Day problem.

Motivation

A discrete group is amenable when it has a finitely additive invariant probability measure on all its subsets. A group containing a nonabelian free subgroup is not amenable, and von Neumann and Day asked whether the converse holds. The counterexamples found before Monod's work are built from torsion groups by elaborate inductive constructions. Monod (2013) found nonamenable groups without free subgroups among piecewise projective homeomorphisms of the line. Lodha and Moore isolate in Monod's group HHH a subgroup with three explicit generators and nine explicit relations.

Timeline.

  • 1929: von Neumann introduces amenability for groups (Fund. Math. 13, no DOI).
  • 1950: Day poses the problem in print, attributing it to von Neumann (doi:10.1090/S0002-9947-1950-0044031-5).
  • 1980: Ol'shanskii's counterexample (doi:10.1070/RM1980v035n04ABEH001876); soon after, Adyan shows certain Burnside groups are counterexamples (doi:10.1070/IM1983v021n03ABEH001799).
  • 2003: Ol'shanskii and Sapir, the first finitely presented counterexample (doi:10.1007/s10240-002-0006-7); Ivanov gives another in 2005 (doi:10.1007/s10711-004-2826-8). Both are torsion-by-cyclic.
  • 2013: Monod's groups H(A)H(A)H(A) of piecewise projective homeomorphisms, nonamenable without free subgroups (doi:10.1073/pnas.1218426110); formalized on this platform in the Monod mission.
  • 2016: Lodha and Moore, a torsion-free finitely presented counterexample (doi:10.4171/GGD/347).
  • 2020: Lodha, a nonamenable group of type F∞F_\inftyF∞​ in the same family (doi:10.1112/topo.12172).

Setting

The generators act on the real line: a(t)=t+1a(t) = t + 1a(t)=t+1, and bbb, ccc are the piecewise projective maps of p. 2 (aFun, bFun, cFun). As homeomorphisms of the projective line R∪{∞}\mathbb R \cup \{\infty\}R∪{∞} (a, b, c) they generate G0G_0G0​ (G0), inside the group where the published Monod bundle defines HHH (Monod.Hpp).

Lodha and Moore move to infinite binary sequences through the continued-fraction map Φ\PhiΦ (Phi), under which aaa, bbb, ccc become functions xxx, x1x_1x1​, y10y_{10}y10​ of sequences (Proposition 3.1). There xsx_sxs​ and ysy_sys​ are xxx and yyy acting on the sequences that extend sss. GGG is the group generated by all xsx_sxs​ and ysy_sys​, G0G_0G0​ the group generated by the xsx_sxs​ and the ysy_sys​ with sss not constant, and RRR the five families of relations (1)–(5) among them. Products are taken left to right, as in the paper.

Section 5 rewrites words in the generators by explicit substitutions into standard forms and sufficiently expanded standard forms, and tracks them through strings in 000, 111, yyy, y−1y^{-1}y−1; these notions form the second definitions bundle.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.1

¬ IsAmenable(G0) ∧ G0 is finitely presented.\neg\,\text{IsAmenable}(G_0) \ \wedge\ G_0 \text{ is finitely presented}.¬IsAmenable(G0​) ∧ G0​ is finitely presented.

Milestones

  • Nonamenability (§2): Lodha and Moore's definition of a μ\muμ-amenable equivalence relation, with its equivalence to amenability (Connes, Feldman and Weiss, whose theorem is published as ConnesFeldmanWeiss.exists_nonsingular_generator_of_isAmenableRel) as two milestones; Theorems 2.1 (Zimmer) and 2.2 (Carrière and Ghys) as printed; the group K=⟨t+1,2t,−1/t⟩K = \langle t+1, 2t, -1/t\rangleK=⟨t+1,2t,−1/t⟩; and the identities and orbit comparison of p. 4.
  • Presentations (§3): Proposition 3.1, the identification of aaa, bbb, ccc with xxx, x1x_1x1​, y10y_{10}y10​, the relations (1)–(5), the presentation of FFF they contain, Propositions 3.4 and 3.5, the reduction to a finite presentation, the three-generator presentation of G0G_0G0​, and Theorem 3.3.
  • Section 5: Lemmas 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11.

Significance

The result. G0G_0G0​ settles the finitely presented von Neumann–Day problem with a group that is torsion-free, has explicit generators and relations, and acts by piecewise projective maps, so its elements can be described by labeled tree diagrams much as those of Thompson's group FFF. It shows that ⟨a,b,c⟩\langle a, b, c\rangle⟨a,b,c⟩ shares the combinatorics of FFF without its unresolved amenability question.

Formalizing it. Before this mission none of the paper was formalized. The Monod mission's milestones supply the setting, and the case of Carrière and Ghys that Monod uses is already proved there by an elementary argument (Monod.not_isAmenableRel_mob).

Difficulty

Nonamenability is a short reduction to Theorem 2.2, which in general is deep. Finite presentation is the bulk: one must show that every word that evaluates to the identity can be reduced to an XXX-word by the substitutions of §5, through a well-founded ordering on standard forms (Lemma 5.6) and an analysis of how yyy acts on binary expansions (Lemmas 5.9–5.11).

Formalization scope

Lean representation and conventions.

  • Sequences are List Bool (finite) and Stream' Bool (infinite). xxx is explicit; yyy and y−1y^{-1}y−1 are defined by the recursion of p. 5, digit by digit.
  • The groups on sequences are subgroups of the opposite of the permutation group of Stream' Bool, so that products are left to right as in the paper. Statements about aaa, bbb, ccc take products in the opposite of the homeomorphism group for the same reason.
  • a, b, c are the homeomorphisms that agree with the formulas on R\mathbb RR, and toSeqGroup turns a bijection of sequences into a group element. Both fall back to the identity for a function that is not a homeomorphism or a bijection. Every generator is in fact one, so the fallback is never reached, and a trivial group would make the goal false.
  • ϕ\phiϕ is a limit of finite continued fractions; its defining equations are a milestone.
  • KKK is a subgroup of PSL2(R)\mathrm{PSL}_2(\mathbb R)PSL2​(R) (Matrix.ProjectiveSpecialLinearGroup, with the quotient topology), as on p. 4; a class acts on the projective line by the Möbius map of either of its matrices, through the published Monod bundle.

What is left out, and deviations.

  • §4 (labeled tree diagrams) is not formalized: the paper calls it "not essential for understanding the proof", and its claims are left to the reader. Remark 3.2 (history) is left out, as are two remarks in the introduction: Thurston's unpublished result that ⟨a,b⟩\langle a, b\rangle⟨a,b⟩ is a copy of Thompson's group FFF (on this platform as Monod's published theorem that HQ(Z)≅FH_{\mathbb Q}(\mathbb Z) \cong FHQ​(Z)≅F) and the assertion that t↦t+1/2t \mapsto t + 1/2t↦t+1/2 and bbb generate a nonamenable group.
  • Lodha and Moore's definition of a μ\muμ-amenable relation is read with the action of Z\mathbb ZZ Borel; read literally, every equivalence relation with countable classes would be μ\muμ-amenable (the note on the definitions explains; CountableOrbit.exists_perm_rel_iff_exists_zpow_eq is the underlying fact).
  • In the three-generator presentation of p. 7, the fourth and ninth relations as printed in aaa, bbb, ccc do not hold in G0G_0G0​ (LodhaMoorePrinted.printed_relations_four_and_nine_ne); the milestone uses the translations of the relations in xsx_sxs​, ysy_sys​ that they come from.
  • The substitutions of p. 9 include the rule for ys−1y_s^{-1}ys−1​ that the proof of Lemma 5.2 uses and the paragraph before Lemma 5.6 writes out (without it Lemmas 5.2 and 5.4 fail: it is the only substitution that applies to ys−1y_s^{-1}ys−1​, LodhaMoorePrinted.eq_of_step_singleton_y_neg_one), and allow commuting yuiy_u^iyui​ and yvjy_v^jyvj​ for any exponents, as the proof of Lemma 5.6 does (with commuting only for positive exponents, Lemma 5.6 fails: LodhaMoorePosCommute.not_forall_exists_derives_sufficientlyExpanded).
  • Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 and the Connes–Feldman–Weiss equivalence are cited results, stated as Lodha and Moore apply them; the direction of the equivalence from their definition to the standard one is the easy one. Both directions assume the setting of Connes, Feldman and Weiss: a σ\sigmaσ-finite measure, quasi-invariant for the relation.

What a development needs. Monod's mission supplies HHH, its lack of free subgroups, the elementary non-amenability argument for SL2(A)\mathrm{SL}_2(A)SL2​(A) with AAA dense, and the passage from an amenable group to an amenable orbit relation. The theorem of Connes, Feldman and Weiss is published and proved (ConnesFeldmanWeiss.exists_nonsingular_generator_of_isAmenableRel); it gives the hard direction of the equivalence. The presentation of Thompson's group FFF is published by the Cannon–Floyd–Parry mission on the two presentations of Thompson's group FFF. Proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y. Lodha, J. T. Moore, A nonamenable finitely presented group of piecewise projective homeomorphisms, Groups Geom. Dyn. 10 (2016) 177–200. doi:10.4171/GGD/347
  • N. Monod, Groups of piecewise projective homeomorphisms, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 110 (2013) 4524–4527. doi:10.1073/pnas.1218426110
  • A. Connes, J. Feldman, B. Weiss, An amenable equivalence relation is generated by a single transformation, Ergodic Theory Dynam. Systems 1 (1981) 431–450. doi:10.1017/S014338570000136X
  • R. J. Zimmer, Amenable ergodic group actions and an application to Poisson boundaries of random walks, J. Funct. Anal. 27 (1978) 350–372. doi:10.1016/0022-1236(78)90013-7
  • Y. Carrière, É. Ghys, Relations d'équivalence moyennables sur les groupes de Lie, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris Sér. I Math. 300 (1985) 677–680 (no DOI).
  • J. Belk, Thompson's group F, PhD thesis, Cornell University, 2004 (no DOI). arXiv:0708.3609
  • J. W. Cannon, W. J. Floyd, W. R. Parry, Introductory notes on Richard Thompson's groups, L'Enseignement Math. (2) 42 (1996) 215–256. doi:10.5169/seals-87877
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Mathematical PhysicsTopology·Captain: Lucas

Assumptions of Physics II: Inference and Causal Relationships Between Experimental DomainsTextbook

Motivation

This is the second mission of the series on Assumptions of Physics by G. Carcassi and C. A. Aidala (book, v3.0, 2025), formalizing Part II, Chapter 2, "Domain combination and relationships". The chapter asks when the outcome of one experiment can be inferred from another (e.g. temperature from the height of a mercury column), and shows that such inference relationships between verifiable statements correspond to causal relationships between possibilities, which are continuous maps of the natural topologies. It builds on the definitions of the first mission (Assumptions of Physics I), which must be launched first because this mission imports its definition file.

Setting

Statements are truth sets s⊆Ωs\subseteq\Omegas⊆Ω over the possible assignments Ω\OmegaΩ of a fixed logical context; an experimental domain D\mathcal DD, its possibilities XXX, verifiable sets U(s)U(s)U(s) and natural topology are as in mission I. An inference relationship from DY\mathcal D_YDY​ to DX\mathcal D_XDX​ is a map r:DY→DXr:\mathcal D_Y\to\mathcal D_Xr:DY​→DX​ with r(s)≡sr(s)\equiv sr(s)≡s; DY\mathcal D_YDY​ depends on DX\mathcal D_XDX​ if one exists, and two domains are equivalent if each depends on the other. A causal relationship is a function f:X→Yf:X\to Yf:X→Y between possibilities with x≼f(x)x\preccurlyeq f(x)x≼f(x). The combined domain of a countable family of domains is generated by all their statements under finite conjunction and countable disjunction.

Formalization targets

Goal (Theorem 2.10, Experimental Relationship Theorem, with continuity made explicit)

DY⊆DX  ⟺  ∃ f:X→Y continuous with x≼f(x) ∀x∈X.\mathcal D_Y\subseteq\mathcal D_X \iff \exists\, f:X\to Y \text{ continuous with } x\preccurlyeq f(x)\ \forall x\in X.DY​⊆DX​⟺∃f:X→Y continuous with x≼f(x) ∀x∈X.

Milestones

  • Corollary 2.3: a sub-domain depends on the domain.
  • Corollary 2.5: domain equivalence is an equivalence relation.
  • Corollary 2.9: a causal relationship is unique if it exists.
  • Corollary 2.11: DX≡DY\mathcal D_X\equiv\mathcal D_YDX​≡DY​ iff there is a homeomorphism f:X→Yf:X\to Yf:X→Y with x≡f(x)x\equiv f(x)x≡f(x).
  • Proposition 2.14: the possibilities of a combined domain are the non-impossible conjunctions ⋀ixi\bigwedge_i x_i⋀i​xi​ of possibilities xi∈Xix_i\in X_ixi​∈Xi​.

Significance

Theorem 2.10 is what justifies describing experimental relationships by functions between possibilities rather than by maps between all finite-precision statements, and Corollary 2.11 identifies equivalence of experimental domains with homeomorphisms that respect the statements. Later chapters use these to transport structure between equivalent domains. The results are proved informally in the book; no machine-checked formalization is known to the drafters.

Difficulty

The forward direction requires showing that each possibility of DX\mathcal D_XDX​ lies inside exactly one possibility of DY\mathcal D_YDY​ and that preimages of verifiable sets are verifiable. The converse is subtler: Definition 2.7 does not require continuity, and the book's Corollary 2.8 ("all causal relationships are continuous") does not hold in general. For example, with Ω={0,1}\Omega=\{0,1\}Ω={0,1}, DX={∅,{1},Ω}\mathcal D_X=\{\emptyset,\{1\},\Omega\}DX​={∅,{1},Ω} and DY={∅,{0},Ω}\mathcal D_Y=\{\emptyset,\{0\},\Omega\}DY​={∅,{0},Ω}, the identity on possibilities is a causal relationship but DY⊈DX\mathcal D_Y\not\subseteq\mathcal D_XDY​⊆DX​. The goal therefore includes continuity of fff explicitly. That is the hypothesis the book's proof of the converse actually uses.

Formalization scope

Domains are ExperimentalDomain Ω on a common type Ω; dependence is ExperimentalDomain.DependsOn (existence of an equivalence-preserving map, which here is the inclusion DY⊆DX\mathcal D_Y\subseteq\mathcal D_XDY​⊆DX​), causal relationships are predicates IsCausalRel on functions between the possibility types, and topological notions are Mathlib's (Continuous, ≃ₜ). The combined domain ExperimentalDomain.combined takes a family over an arbitrary countable index type. Theorem 2.12 (transport of structure) is informal in the source and is not formalized here. Propositions 2.15–2.28 are left out: the residual possibility depends on the choice of basis, and Proposition 2.18 appears to need a stronger independence hypothesis than Definition 2.17 provides. They are candidates for a later mission.

Selected references

  • G. Carcassi, C. A. Aidala, Assumptions of Physics, Ver. 3.0, December 31, 2025. https://assumptionsofphysics.org/book — Part II, Chapter 2 "Domain combination and relationships", pp. 149–168.
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Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: wurtle

WordRAM and Turing machines: two-way halting equivalenceResearch Paper

We formalize the equivalence between Turing machines and the WordRAM model of computation. Turing machines are the standard model for studying computability, but algorithms are rarely described in terms of tape operations. WordRAM is much closer to assembly, with memory accesses, arithmetic instructions, branches, and loops. The goal is to connect this familiar way of expressing algorithms to the foundations of computability. This will also bring us closer to one day formalizing Fine Grained Complexity.

The formal target is halting equivalence through simulations in both directions, with the stated memory bounds and a family of word widths, each fixed during a run.

References:

  • Stephen A. Cook and Robert A. Reckhow. Time Bounded Random Access Machines. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 7(4), 354–375, 1973.
  • Torben Hagerup. Sorting and Searching on the Word RAM. STACS 1998, 366–398.
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies IV: Sufficient Conditions for Logarithmic Regret with a Known Incumbent PriceResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who does not know how demand responds to price must learn the demand curve from its own sales while also earning revenue. This is the learn-and-earn problem of dynamic pricing. Every price it charges both earns and informs, and a policy that only earns can stop learning. Keskin and Zeevi (Operations Research 62(5), 2014) study the problem for a linear demand model with unknown parameters. They show that the certainty-equivalent ("greedy") policy can fail, and they give simple conditions on a policy's price path under which its regret is of optimal order.

This mission covers the paper's incumbent price problem (§3.4). Here the seller has charged one price p^\hat pp^​ for a long time and knows its expected demand D^\hat DD^. Only the slope of the demand curve is unknown, and p^\hat pp^​ is the single price that reveals nothing about it. A greedy seller whose estimates drift toward p^\hat pp^​ stops learning ("incomplete learning"), and its regret can grow linearly. Earlier single-parameter models (Broder and Rusmevichientong 2012) assumed that the intercept is known, which makes the uninformative price 000, a price no seller would choose. The incumbent price model makes the trade-off real. The paper proves a log⁡T\log TlogT lower bound on regret for this model (its Theorem 3), and its Theorem 4 gives sufficient conditions for matching that bound. Theorem 4 is the goal of this mission.

Setting

Prices lie in [l,u][l,u][l,u] with 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u. The incumbent price is p^∈[l,u]\hat p \in [l,u]p^​∈[l,u]. The seller decides the price deviation xt=pt−p^x_t = p_t - \hat pxt​=pt​−p^​ in each period t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… and observes demand

Dt=D^+βxt+εt.D_t = \hat D + \beta x_t + \varepsilon_t .Dt​=D^+βxt​+εt​.

The unknown slope β\betaβ lies in a known interval B=[bmin⁡,bmax⁡]\mathfrak B = [b_{\min}, b_{\max}]B=[bmin​,bmax​] with bmin⁡<bmax⁡<0b_{\min} < b_{\max} < 0bmin​<bmax​<0. The shocks εt\varepsilon_tεt​ are i.i.d., with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0, and they are light-tailed: E[ezεt]<∞\mathbb E[e^{z\varepsilon_t}] < \inftyE[ezεt​]<∞ for ∣z∣≤z0|z| \le z_0∣z∣≤z0​, for some z0>0z_0 > 0z0​>0. They need not be Gaussian. The expected revenue at deviation xxx is rβ(x)=(p^+x)(D^+βx)r_\beta(x) = (\hat p + x)(\hat D + \beta x)rβ​(x)=(p^​+x)(D^+βx). It is maximized at

ψ(β)=−p^2−D^2β,\psi(\beta) = -\frac{\hat p}{2} - \frac{\hat D}{2\beta},ψ(β)=−2p^​​−2βD^​,

and p^+ψ(β)\hat p + \psi(\beta)p^​+ψ(β) is assumed to lie in the open interval (l,u)(l,u)(l,u) for every β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B.

A pricing policy π\piπ chooses each price in [l,u][l,u][l,u] as a measurable function of past demands and prices only. Its regret over TTT periods is

Δβπ(T)=T rβ(ψ(β))−Eβπ∑t=1Trβ(xt).\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) = T\, r_\beta(\psi(\beta)) - \mathbb E^\pi_\beta \sum_{t=1}^T r_\beta(x_t).Δβπ​(T)=Trβ​(ψ(β))−Eβπ​t=1∑T​rβ​(xt​).

From the data the seller forms the information metric J^t=∑s=1txs2\hat J_t = \sum_{s=1}^t x_s^2J^t​=∑s=1t​xs2​, the least squares estimate β^t=∑s=1t(Ds−D^)xs/J^t\hat\beta_t = \sum_{s=1}^t (D_s - \hat D)x_s / \hat J_tβ^​t​=∑s=1t​(Ds​−D^)xs​/J^t​ and the truncated estimate bt=bmin⁡∨(β^t∧bmax⁡)b_t = b_{\min} \vee (\hat\beta_t \wedge b_{\max})bt​=bmin​∨(β^​t​∧bmax​). The greedy deviation at the end of period ttt is ψ(bt)\psi(b_t)ψ(bt​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 1150)

Let β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B with ψ(β)≠0\psi(\beta) \ne 0ψ(β)=0. There is κ0′>0\kappa_0' > 0κ0′​>0 such that for all κ0≥κ0′\kappa_0 \ge \kappa_0'κ0​≥κ0′​, κ1>0\kappa_1 > 0κ1​>0 and t0≥1t_0 \ge 1t0​≥1 there is a finite C>0C > 0C>0 with the following property. If a policy satisfies, almost surely for all t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​,

(i) J^t≥κ0log⁡t,(ii) ∑s=1t(ψ(bs)−xs+1)2≤κ1log⁡t,\text{(i)}\ \hat J_t \ge \kappa_0 \log t, \qquad \text{(ii)}\ \sum_{s=1}^t (\psi(b_s) - x_{s+1})^2 \le \kappa_1 \log t,(i) J^t​≥κ0​logt,(ii) s=1∑t​(ψ(bs​)−xs+1​)2≤κ1​logt,

then Δβπ(T)≤Clog⁡T\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) \le C \log TΔβπ​(T)≤ClogT for all T≥3T \ge 3T≥3.

Milestones

  1. (27), p. 1150: β^t−β=Mt/J^t\hat\beta_t - \beta = M_t / \hat J_tβ^​t​−β=Mt​/J^t​ with Mt=∑s=1tεsxsM_t = \sum_{s=1}^t \varepsilon_s x_sMt​=∑s=1t​εs​xs​, whenever J^t≠0\hat J_t \ne 0J^t​=0.
  2. Lemma 5, p. 1150: there is ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0 with Pβπ{∣β^t−β∣>δ,J^t≥m}≤2exp⁡(−ρ(δ∧δ2)m)\mathbb P^\pi_\beta\{|\hat\beta_t - \beta| > \delta, \hat J_t \ge m\} \le 2\exp(-\rho(\delta\wedge\delta^2)m)Pβπ​{∣β^​t​−β∣>δ,J^t​≥m}≤2exp(−ρ(δ∧δ2)m) for every policy, every β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B, all δ,m>0\delta, m > 0δ,m>0 and t≥2t \ge 2t≥2.
  3. (A14), p. 1159: E(ψ(β)−xt+1)2≤2E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt))2+2E(ψ(bt)−xt+1)2\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - x_{t+1})^2 \le 2\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - \psi(b_t))^2 + 2\mathbb E(\psi(b_t) - x_{t+1})^2E(ψ(β)−xt+1​)2≤2E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt​))2+2E(ψ(bt​)−xt+1​)2.
  4. Linear growth of J^t\hat J_tJ^t​ on AtA_tAt​, p. 1159. Here At=⋂s=⌊(t−1)/2⌋t−1{(ψ(β)−ψ(bs))2≤ψ(β)2/12}A_t = \bigcap_{s=\lfloor (t-1)/2\rfloor}^{t-1}\{(\psi(\beta)-\psi(b_s))^2 \le \psi(\beta)^2/12\}At​=⋂s=⌊(t−1)/2⌋t−1​{(ψ(β)−ψ(bs​))2≤ψ(β)2/12} is the event (A15). The claim: J^t≥(ψ(β)2/8−κ1log⁡(t−1)/(t−1))(t−1)\hat J_t \ge (\psi(\beta)^2/8 - \kappa_1\log(t-1)/(t-1))(t-1)J^t​≥(ψ(β)2/8−κ1​log(t−1)/(t−1))(t−1) on AtA_tAt​, given (ii) at time t−1t-1t−1.
  5. (A19), p. 1160: E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt))2≤K1t−1+K2 P(Atc)\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - \psi(b_t))^2 \le K_1 t^{-1} + K_2\,\mathbb P(A_t^c)E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt​))2≤K1​t−1+K2​P(Atc​) for all t≥Nt \ge Nt≥N. The constants are K1=512K0σ2(u−l)2ψ(β)−4K_1 = 512K_0\sigma^2(u-l)^2\psi(\beta)^{-4}K1​=512K0​σ2(u−l)2ψ(β)−4, K2=4(u−l)2K_2 = 4(u-l)^2K2​=4(u−l)2 and K0=D^2/(4bmax⁡4)K_0 = \hat D^2/(4b_{\max}^4)K0​=D^2/(4bmax4​).

The goal fixes no constants beyond the order log⁡T\log TlogT. The milestones keep the paper's explicit constants where the paper gives them.

Significance

Theorem 4 turns asymptotic optimality into two checkable properties of a price path: enough information (i) and closeness to the greedy price (ii). Any policy meeting them has regret of order log⁡T\log TlogT. Together with the paper's matching lower bound, this pins down the optimal regret of the incumbent price problem. The same conditions certify whole families of simple policies. One example is the "constrained iterated least squares" rule of p. 1150, which perturbs the greedy price by ±κt−1/2\pm\kappa t^{-1/2}±κt−1/2 when it comes too close to p^\hat pp^​. Heavy exploration schemes are not needed. The contrast with the paper's two-parameter Theorem 2, where the corresponding rate is Tlog⁡T\sqrt T \log TT​logT, shows that the known incumbent point is what makes linear information growth free.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of it is machine-checked: the platform has no dynamic pricing regret results and no least squares tail bound of this self-normalized, adaptively designed form. A formal proof would give a checked instance of a pattern that recurs throughout learning-and-earning analyses: an exponential tail bound for a self-normalized martingale with an adaptively chosen design, combined with a pathwise information-growth argument.

Difficulty

The deviations xsx_sxs​ are chosen adaptively from past data, so Mt=∑εsxsM_t = \sum \varepsilon_s x_sMt​=∑εs​xs​ is a martingale with a random, data-dependent quadratic variation σ2J^t\sigma^2\hat J_tσ2J^t​. Classical fixed-design least squares bounds do not apply, and a bound that holds on the event {J^t≥m}\{\hat J_t \ge m\}{J^t​≥m} uniformly over all policies is needed (Lemma 5). The regret bound then needs a bootstrap. The information grows linearly only if the recent greedy prices are near optimal (the event AtA_tAt​). Near-optimal greedy prices are likely only if enough information has already been collected. Closing this loop requires the tail bounds of Lemma 5 to be summable in ttt, and this is where the threshold on κ0\kappa_0κ0​ enters. A naive argument that bounds the estimation error by σ2/J^t\sigma^2/\hat J_tσ2/J^t​ using only condition (i) gives ∑t1/log⁡t\sum_t 1/\log t∑t​1/logt, which is far from logarithmic regret.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace KeskinZeevi.IncumbentSufficient. Model bundles l,u,p^,D^,bmin⁡,bmax⁡l, u, \hat p, \hat D, b_{\min}, b_{\max}l,u,p^​,D^,bmin​,bmax​ with the standing assumptions, and ψ\psiψ is the closed form above. LightTailedNoise P ε σ states the shock assumptions on a probability space. A Policy is a sequence of measurable history-to-price maps into [l,u][l,u][l,u]. The price, deviation and demand processes are defined by recursion from the noise, which realizes the paper's law of the sales process on the noise space. Periods are 1-based. Regret is for a fixed true slope β\betaβ, not the worst case over B\mathfrak BB. Expectations are Bochner integrals of bounded measurable functions, and probabilities are measures of sets.

The goal is a corrected form of the printed Theorem 4. The page says "there exist finite positive constants κ0,κ1\kappa_0, \kappa_1κ0​,κ1​, and CCC such that if π\piπ … satisfies (i)–(ii) almost surely for all ttt". Read literally, that statement is satisfied vacuously by choosing κ0\kappa_0κ0​ so large that no policy meets (i) (at t=2t = 2t=2, J^2≤2(u−l)2\hat J_2 \le 2(u-l)^2J^2​≤2(u−l)2). The Lean statement instead quantifies universally over every κ0\kappa_0κ0​ above a threshold, every κ1>0\kappa_1 > 0κ1​>0 and every start time t0t_0t0​, which is what the proof establishes, and it implies the printed statement. The sum in (ii) starts at s=1s = 1s=1 rather than s=0s = 0s=0, because b0b_0b0​ is defined only for the greedy policy. This only weakens the hypothesis. When J^t=0\hat J_t = 0J^t​=0, β^t\hat\beta_tβ^​t​ uses Lean's a/0=0a/0 = 0a/0=0, a case the hypotheses exclude for t≥max⁡(t0,2)t \ge \max(t_0, 2)t≥max(t0​,2). (27) is stated under J^t≠0\hat J_t \ne 0J^t​=0. The linear-growth milestone is pathwise and is stated for t≥3t \ge 3t≥3. (A19) has its threshold NNN existential and uniform over policies.

A complete development needs a conditional exponential-moment (supermartingale) argument for MtM_tMt​ under adaptive design, a mean value bound for ψ\psiψ on B\mathfrak BB, and elementary summation of s−3s^{-3}s−3 and log⁡\loglog terms. The self-normalized tail bound (Lemma 5) and the regret identity Δβπ(T)=−β∑tE(xt−ψ(β))2\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) = -\beta\sum_t \mathbb E(x_t - \psi(\beta))^2Δβπ​(T)=−β∑t​E(xt​−ψ(β))2 are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are sharper constants.

Selected references

  • N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • J. Broder and P. Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4):965–980, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • T. L. Lai and H. Robbins, Iterated Least Squares in Multiperiod Control, Advances in Applied Mathematics 3(1):50–73, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(82)90005-5
  • A. Goldenshluger and A. Zeevi, Woodroofe's One-Armed Bandit Problem Revisited, Annals of Applied Probability 19(4):1603–1633, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1214/08-AAP589
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CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryLinear Optimization+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Understanding and Using Linear Programming X: Pairwise Intersecting d-Intervals Have a Transversal of Size 2d²Textbook

Motivation

A basic question of combinatorial geometry asks when a family of sets can be pierced (or stabbed) by few points. For intervals on the real line the answer is classical: if every two of finitely many closed intervals intersect, one point meets all of them, namely the rightmost left endpoint. This is the one-dimensional case of Helly's theorem. The situation changes as soon as the sets are allowed to have holes. Unions of two intervals can intersect pairwise without any point being common to three of them, so no single point suffices, and it is not obvious that any bound depending only on the number of holes exists.

This mission formalizes the answer given in Section 8.6 of Matoušek and Gärtner's Understanding and Using Linear Programming (Springer, 2007): pairwise intersecting unions of ddd intervals can always be pierced by 2d22d^22d2 points. The section uses the result to illustrate a general method of combinatorics, in which a linear programming relaxation of a covering problem is bounded through LP duality and then rounded. The same scheme, a bound on the fractional transversal number followed by a rounding step, appears across discrete geometry and combinatorial optimization.

Timeline.

  • 1970: Gyárfás and Lehel prove that a bound depending only on ddd exists; their bound is exponential in ddd (A Helly-type problem in trees, in Combinatorial Theory and its Applications, North-Holland).
  • 1992: Alon and Kleitman solve the Hadwiger–Debrunner (p,q)(p,q)(p,q)-problem with a method combining fractional transversals and LP duality (Adv. Math. 96).
  • 1997: Kaiser proves the bound d2d^2d2 using algebraic topology (Discrete Comput. Geom. 18).
  • 1998: Alon gives the short LP-duality proof of the bound 2d22d^22d2 formalized here (Discrete Comput. Geom. 19).
  • 2001: Matoušek shows that the transversal number cannot in general be below a constant multiple of d2/log⁡dd^2/\log dd2/logd (Discrete Comput. Geom. 26).

Setting

Fix an integer d≥1d \ge 1d≥1. A ddd-interval is a union of ddd closed intervals on the real line,

J=[a1,b1]∪⋯∪[ad,bd],ak≤bk.J = [a_1,b_1] \cup \dots \cup [a_d,b_d], \qquad a_k \le b_k .J=[a1​,b1​]∪⋯∪[ad​,bd​],ak​≤bk​.

The numbers aka_kak​ and bkb_kbk​ are the endpoints of JJJ. A finite family J\mathcal JJ of ddd-intervals is pairwise intersecting if J1∩J2≠∅J_1 \cap J_2 \ne \emptysetJ1​∩J2​=∅ for all J1,J2∈JJ_1, J_2 \in \mathcal JJ1​,J2​∈J. A set XXX of real numbers is a transversal of J\mathcal JJ if every J∈JJ \in \mathcal JJ∈J contains a point of XXX.

More generally, for a finite set VVV and a system F\mathcal FF of subsets of VVV: a transversal is a set X⊆VX \subseteq VX⊆V meeting every member; the transversal number τ(F)\tau(\mathcal F)τ(F) is the smallest size of a transversal; a matching is a subsystem of pairwise disjoint members, and the matching number ν(F)\nu(\mathcal F)ν(F) is the largest size of a matching. The fractional transversal number τ∗(F)\tau^*(\mathcal F)τ∗(F) is the optimal value of the linear program

min⁡∑v∈Vxvs.t.∑v∈Fxv≥1 (F∈F), x≥0,\min \sum_{v\in V} x_v \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{v \in F} x_v \ge 1 \ (F \in \mathcal F),\ x \ge 0,minv∈V∑​xv​s.t.v∈F∑​xv​≥1 (F∈F), x≥0,

and the fractional matching number ν∗(F)\nu^*(\mathcal F)ν∗(F) is the optimal value of

max⁡∑F∈FyFs.t.∑F: v∈FyF≤1 (v∈V), y≥0.\max \sum_{F\in\mathcal F} y_F \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{F :\, v \in F} y_F \le 1 \ (v \in V),\ y \ge 0 .maxF∈F∑​yF​s.t.F:v∈F∑​yF​≤1 (v∈V), y≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.6.1

J finite, pairwise intersecting family of d-intervals  ⟹  ∃X⊂R, ∣X∣≤2d2, X∩J≠∅  ∀J∈J.\mathcal J \text{ finite, pairwise intersecting family of } d\text{-intervals} \;\Longrightarrow\; \exists X \subset \mathbb R,\ |X| \le 2d^2,\ X \cap J \ne \emptyset \ \ \forall J \in \mathcal J .J finite, pairwise intersecting family of d-intervals⟹∃X⊂R, ∣X∣≤2d2, X∩J=∅  ∀J∈J.

This is the book's theorem with its constant 2d22d^22d2.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 8.6.2. If J1,…,JnJ_1,\dots,J_nJ1​,…,Jn​ (n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, repetitions allowed) are ddd-intervals with Ji∩Jj≠∅J_i \cap J_j \ne \emptysetJi​∩Jj​=∅ for all i,ji,ji,j, then some endpoint of some JiJ_iJi​ lies in at least n/2dn/2dn/2d of the JjJ_jJj​.
  2. §8.6, p. 182. For every finite set system with nonempty members,
ν(F)≤ν∗(F)=τ∗(F)≤τ(F).\nu(\mathcal F) \le \nu^*(\mathcal F) = \tau^*(\mathcal F) \le \tau(\mathcal F).ν(F)≤ν∗(F)=τ∗(F)≤τ(F).
  1. Lemma 8.6.3. If J\mathcal JJ is a finite pairwise intersecting family of ddd-intervals and PPP its set of endpoints, there are weights xp≥0x_p \ge 0xp​≥0, p∈Pp \in Pp∈P, with ∑p∈J∩Pxp≥1\sum_{p \in J \cap P} x_p \ge 1∑p∈J∩P​xp​≥1 for every J∈JJ \in \mathcal JJ∈J and ∑p∈Pxp≤2d\sum_{p\in P} x_p \le 2d∑p∈P​xp​≤2d.

Significance

The result. Theorem 8.6.1 shows that the piercing number of pairwise intersecting ddd-intervals is bounded by a function of ddd alone, and that this function is polynomial. The section also states, without proof, the extension τ(J)≤2d2 ν(J)\tau(\mathcal J) \le 2d^2\,\nu(\mathcal J)τ(J)≤2d2ν(J) for arbitrary finite families of ddd-intervals. Upper bounds of this kind feed into piercing and hitting-set questions for families with bounded "complexity", and the chain ν≤ν∗=τ∗≤τ\nu \le \nu^* = \tau^* \le \tauν≤ν∗=τ∗≤τ is the standard frame in which such bounds are proved.

Formalizing it. The theorem, both lemmas and the duality chain are proved in the literature and in the book. None of them is on the platform. The work consists of formalizing the book's proof: a double-counting argument, LP duality for the pair of fractional programs together with the rationality of an optimal basic solution, and a rounding step. The general-set-system milestone is reusable for any transversal problem, independent of ddd-intervals.

Difficulty

The obvious generalization of the one-dimensional argument fails: for d≥2d \ge 2d≥2 no point need be common to all members, so there is no single extremal endpoint to choose, and a greedy piercing procedure has no control over how many points it uses. The difficulty is to obtain a bound that does not depend on the size of the family. In the book's route the counting statement of Lemma 8.6.2 holds only for equal weights, while the fractional programs produce arbitrary real weights, and the passage between the two, as well as the passage from a fractional transversal of small total weight to an actual finite set of points, are the steps that need care.

Formalization scope

A ddd-interval is stored as data: two functions left, right : Fin d → ℝ with left k ≤ right k, together with the set toSet =⋃k[ak,bk]= \bigcup_k [a_k,b_k]=⋃k​[ak​,bk​]. Components are indexed 0,…,d−10,\dots,d-10,…,d−1. Endpoints are those of the given components, so they depend on the representation, as in the book's proofs. Families are Finsets of such data; Lemma 8.6.2 uses a Fin n-indexed sequence, since the proof of Lemma 8.6.3 applies it to a sequence with repetitions. The hypotheses d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 (the book's definition) and, in Lemma 8.6.2, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 are explicit. The quantity n/2dn/2dn/2d is real division. Transversal sizes are cardinalities of a Finset ℝ bounded by 2d22d^22d2.

For set systems, VVV is a finite type and F\mathcal FF a Finset (Finset V) with nonempty members; without this assumption no transversal exists and both fractional programs degenerate. The numbers τ∗\tau^*τ∗ and ν∗\nu^*ν∗ are expressed through optimal feasible solutions, not as infima or suprema, so no junk value of an empty or unbounded set is involved. τ\tauτ is an sInf over N\mathbb NN that is attained under the nonemptiness assumption, and ν\nuν is a maximum over the finite family of matchings.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the pairwise-intersection hypothesis is satisfiable by nonempty families, the transversal is required to meet the actual sets JJJ, not a representation artifact, and the bound 2d22d^22d2 and 2d2d2d are the book's constants, not weakened ones.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over Finset ℝ, LP duality for a finite primal–dual pair in inequality form (or a direct proof of the chain), rationality of an optimal vertex, and a left-to-right sweep over a sorted finite set of reals. Contributions of a general LP duality statement for set-system relaxations are welcome and reusable.

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, §8.6. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • N. Alon, Piercing d-intervals, Discrete Comput. Geom. 19 (1998) 333–334.
  • N. Alon, D. Kleitman, Piercing convex sets and the Hadwiger–Debrunner (p, q)-problem, Adv. Math. 96 (1992) 103–112.
  • T. Kaiser, Transversals of d-intervals, Discrete Comput. Geom. 18 (1997) 195–203.
  • J. Matoušek, Lower bounds on the transversal numbers of d-intervals, Discrete Comput. Geom. 26 (2001) 283–287.
  • A. Gyárfás, J. Lehel, A Helly-type problem in trees, in Combinatorial Theory and its Applications (P. Erdős, A. Rényi, V. T. Sós, eds.), North-Holland, 1970, 571–584.
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Understanding and Using Linear Programming IX: Basis Pursuit Recovers Sparse Solutions Exactly iff the Kernel Misses the CrosspolytopeTextbook

Motivation

A deep-space probe sends a vector w∈Rkw\in\mathbb{R}^kw∈Rk encoded as z=Qw∈Rnz=Qw\in\mathbb{R}^nz=Qw∈Rn, and up to about 8% of the transmitted numbers may be corrupted arbitrarily. Section 8.5 of Matoušek and Gärtner's Understanding and Using Linear Programming (Springer 2007, DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4) shows that decoding reduces to finding a sparse solution of an underdetermined linear system Ax=bAx=bAx=b, and that under suitable conditions this sparse solution is found exactly by a single linear program. The same problem arises in signal processing (sparse representations in redundant wavelet dictionaries) and in computer tomography, and it is the core of what became known as compressed sensing.

Timeline, as recorded in the book's references:

  • 1999: Chen, Donoho and Saunders introduce basis pursuit, minimizing the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-norm subject to Ax=bAx=bAx=b (SIAM J. Sci. Comput. 20).
  • 2005: Candès, Rudelson, Tao and Vershynin prove that for every α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1) there is β(α)>0\beta(\alpha)>0β(α)>0 such that a random ⌊αn⌋×n\lfloor\alpha n\rfloor\times n⌊αn⌋×n matrix is exact for ⌊βn⌋\lfloor\beta n\rfloor⌊βn⌋-sparse vectors with probability exponentially close to 1 (FOCS 2005).
  • 2006: Donoho, via neighborliness of centrally symmetric polytopes, obtains the constants α=0.75\alpha=0.75α=0.75, β=0.08\beta=0.08β=0.08 used in the book, and shows that no ⌊0.75n⌋×n\lfloor 0.75n\rfloor\times n⌊0.75n⌋×n matrix is exact for r>0.25nr>0.25nr>0.25n when nnn is large (Discrete Comput. Geom. 35).
  • 2006: Linial and Novik prove further upper bounds showing that these existence results are asymptotically optimal (Discrete Comput. Geom. 36).

Setting

Let AAA be a real m×nm\times nm×n matrix with m<nm<nm<n and b∈Rmb\in\mathbb{R}^mb∈Rm. The support of x∈Rnx\in\mathbb{R}^nx∈Rn is supp⁡(x)={i:xi≠0}\operatorname{supp}(x)=\{i: x_i\ne 0\}supp(x)={i:xi​=0}. For an integer r≥0r\ge 0r≥0, a sparse solution of Ax=bAx=bAx=b is an xxx with Ax=bAx=bAx=b and ∣supp⁡(x)∣≤r|\operatorname{supp}(x)|\le r∣supp(x)∣≤r. The ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-norm is ∥x∥1=∣x1∣+⋯+∣xn∣\|x\|_1=|x_1|+\dots+|x_n|∥x∥1​=∣x1​∣+⋯+∣xn​∣.

Basis pursuit is the optimization problem

(BP)minimize ∥x∥1  subject to x∈Rn, Ax=b,\text{(BP)}\qquad\text{minimize } \|x\|_1\ \text{ subject to } x\in\mathbb{R}^n,\ Ax=b,(BP)minimize ∥x∥1​  subject to x∈Rn, Ax=b,

which is equivalent to the linear program

(BP′)minimize u1+⋯+un  subject to Ax=b, −u≤x≤u, u≥0.\text{(BP}'\text{)}\qquad\text{minimize } u_1+\dots+u_n\ \text{ subject to } Ax=b,\ -u\le x\le u,\ u\ge 0 .(BP′)minimize u1​+⋯+un​  subject to Ax=b, −u≤x≤u, u≥0.

The matrix AAA is BP-exact for rrr if for every b∈Rmb\in\mathbb{R}^mb∈Rm: whenever Ax=bAx=bAx=b has a solution x~\tilde xx~ with at most rrr nonzero components, x~\tilde xx~ is the unique optimal solution of (BP). The crosspolytope is B1n={x:∥x∥1≤1}B^n_1=\{x:\|x\|_1\le 1\}B1n​={x:∥x∥1​≤1}, the kernel of AAA is L={x:Ax=0}L=\{x: Ax=0\}L={x:Ax=0}, and L+z={ℓ+z:ℓ∈L}L+z=\{\ell+z:\ell\in L\}L+z={ℓ+z:ℓ∈L}. For zzz with ∥z∥1=1\|z\|_1=1∥z∥1​=1, the cone at zzz is Cz={t(x−z):t≥0, x∈B1n}C_z=\{t(x-z): t\ge 0,\ x\in B^n_1\}Cz​={t(x−z):t≥0, x∈B1n​}, and LLL is good for zzz if (L+z)∩B1n={z}(L+z)\cap B^n_1=\{z\}(L+z)∩B1n​={z}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 8.5.4 (reformulation of BP-exactness)

For m<nm<nm<n and r≤mr\le mr≤m:

A is BP-exact for r  ⟺  ∀z∈Rn with ∥z∥1=1, ∣supp⁡(z)∣≤r:(L+z)∩B1n={z}.A \text{ is BP-exact for } r\iff \forall z\in\mathbb{R}^n\ \text{with}\ \|z\|_1=1,\ |\operatorname{supp}(z)|\le r:\quad (L+z)\cap B^n_1=\{z\}.A is BP-exact for r⟺∀z∈Rn with ∥z∥1​=1, ∣supp(z)∣≤r:(L+z)∩B1n​={z}.

This is the book's geometric characterization of exact recovery, and the statement on which the known probabilistic proofs are built.

Milestones

  1. Observation 8.5.1: Ax=bAx=bAx=b has at most one sparse solution for every bbb if and only if every 2r2r2r or fewer columns of AAA are linearly independent.
  2. The remark after it (p. 169): under m<nm<nm<n, that column condition forces m≥2rm\ge 2rm≥2r.
  3. Equivalence of (BP) and (BP′) (p. 170): in every optimal solution of (BP′), ui=∣xi∣u_i=|x_i|ui​=∣xi​∣; and xxx is optimal for (BP) iff (x,∣x∣)(x,|x|)(x,∣x∣) is optimal for (BP′).
  4. From the proof of Lemma 8.5.4 (p. 173): if Az=bAz=bAz=b, the solution set of Ax=bAx=bAx=b is exactly L+zL+zL+z.
  5. From "Intuition for BP-exactness" (p. 174): for ∥z∥1=1\|z\|_1=1∥z∥1​=1 and ∣supp⁡(z)∣≤r|\operatorname{supp}(z)|\le r∣supp(z)∣≤r, LLL is good for zzz iff L∩Cz={0}L\cap C_z=\{0\}L∩Cz​={0}.

Further draft item: Theorem 8.5.2

With m=⌊0.75n⌋m=\lfloor 0.75n\rfloorm=⌊0.75n⌋, r=⌊0.08n⌋r=\lfloor 0.08n\rfloorr=⌊0.08n⌋ and AAA an m×nm\times nm×n matrix of independent N(0,1)N(0,1)N(0,1) entries, there is a constant c>0c>0c>0 such that for every nnn

Pr⁡[A is BP-exact for r] ≥ 1−e−cm.\Pr[A \text{ is BP-exact for } r]\ \ge\ 1-e^{-cm}.Pr[A is BP-exact for r] ≥ 1−e−cm.

The book states this without proof. It is included as a separate theorem, not a milestone of the goal.

Significance

Lemma 8.5.4 converts an algorithmic property, that an ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ linear program returns a prescribed sparse vector for every right-hand side, into a purely geometric property of the kernel of AAA relative to the low-dimensional faces of the crosspolytope. With milestone 5 it becomes the statement that LLL avoids a finite family of cones, which is where union bounds over faces and estimates for random subspaces enter. Observation 8.5.1 separates what is information-theoretically possible (uniqueness of sparse solutions) from what is computationally achievable by linear programming; finding a sparse solution directly is NP-hard in general. Theorem 8.5.2 is the quantitative payoff: a fixed fraction of arbitrary gross errors can be corrected by solving one linear program.

All of these results are proved in the literature; Lemma 8.5.4, Observation 8.5.1 and the milestones are elementary, and Theorem 8.5.2 rests on Donoho's polytope-neighborliness analysis. The platform has a related formalization of Wainwright's restricted nullspace property (Theorem 7.8 of High-Dimensional Statistics, namespace HighDimStat.SparseLinear), which fixes a support set SSS rather than characterizing exactness for all rrr-sparse vectors through the crosspolytope. A machine-checked proof of Theorem 8.5.2 with the constants 0.750.750.75 and 0.080.080.08 is, to our knowledge, not available anywhere; it would require substantial Gaussian and high-dimensional geometry infrastructure.

Difficulty

For the goal and milestones the difficulty is bookkeeping, not ideas: the scaling between a sparse solution x~\tilde xx~ and the boundary point x~/∥x~∥1\tilde x/\|\tilde x\|_1x~/∥x~∥1​, the case x~=0\tilde x=0x~=0, and the fact that BP-exactness quantifies over all right-hand sides bbb while the geometric side quantifies over boundary points of the crosspolytope.

Theorem 8.5.2 is of a different order. A union bound over the (nr)2r\binom{n}{r}2^r(rn​)2r faces of dimension r−1r-1r−1 reduces it to bounding the probability that a random (n−m)(n-m)(n−m)-dimensional subspace meets one cone CFC_FCF​ nontrivially, and getting that probability small enough to beat the combinatorial factor with the stated numerical constants is the hard part. Rough asymptotic estimates do not give 0.080.080.08 at α=0.75\alpha=0.75α=0.75.

Formalization scope

Vectors are functions Fin n → ℝ (the book's indices 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n become 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1) and matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. The ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-norm is written out as ∑i∣xi∣\sum_i|x_i|∑i​∣xi​∣, since Mathlib's norm on Fin n → ℝ is the sup norm. The support is a Finset of indices. Optimality in (BP) and (BP′) is stated against every feasible point; no infimum is taken, so an empty or unbounded feasible set cannot create a spurious optimum. "Every 2r2r2r or fewer columns" ranges over finsets of distinct column indices, column jjj being Aᵀ j. The hypotheses m<nm<nm<n and r≤mr\le mr≤m of Lemma 8.5.4 are kept as on the page, although the equivalence does not use them; m<nm<nm<n is also the standing assumption of §8.5 needed for m≥2rm\ge 2rm≥2r.

In Theorem 8.5.2 the random matrix has the product law of independent gaussianReal 0 1 entries, the constant c>0c>0c>0 is quantified before nnn, and measurability of the BP-exact event is part of the conclusion, so the bound concerns a genuine probability rather than an outer measure.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: BP-exactness requires uniqueness among all minimizers for every right-hand side, not just optimality of x~\tilde xx~, and the crosspolytope condition is an equality of sets, not an inclusion that zzz alone would satisfy.

All definitions live in one module (MatousekLP.SparseRecovery.BasisPursuit); the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ and support vocabulary is reusable for later sparse-recovery missions. Contributions are welcome on every milestone, on the goal, and on the infrastructure towards Theorem 8.5.2 (Gaussian measures on matrix spaces, measurability of the BP-exact event, the face structure of the crosspolytope).

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek and B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, §8.5. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • S. S. Chen, D. L. Donoho and M. A. Saunders, Atomic decomposition by basis pursuit, SIAM J. Sci. Comput. 20(1), 1999, 33–61. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1064827596304010
  • E. J. Candès, M. Rudelson, T. Tao and R. Vershynin, Error correction via linear programming, Proc. 46th IEEE FOCS, 2005, 295–308. https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.2005.5464411
  • D. L. Donoho, High-dimensional centrally symmetric polytopes with neighborliness proportional to dimension, Discrete Comput. Geom. 35, 2006, 617–652. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00454-005-1220-0
  • N. Linial and I. Novik, How neighborly can a centrally symmetric polytope be?, Discrete Comput. Geom. 36, 2006, 273–281. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00454-006-1235-1
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Understanding and Using Linear Programming VIII: The Delsarte Linear Programming Bound for Binary CodesTextbook

Motivation

A binary error-correcting code is a set of nnn-bit words chosen so that the words stay distinguishable after a few bits have been corrupted in transmission. A code can correct any rrr errors exactly when every two of its words differ in at least 2r+12r+12r+1 positions. The more words the code has, the more information each transmitted block carries. So the central quantitative question of coding theory is how large a code of given length and minimum distance can be. Codes are used in every technology that transmits or stores data, from disks and phones to deep-space probes.

In 1973 Philippe Delsarte showed that an upper bound on this maximum size is the optimum value of an explicit linear program (Delsarte, An algebraic approach to the association schemes of coding theory, Philips Res. Repts. Suppl. 10, 1973). The bound was far stronger than the classical volume argument and remains a standard tool. This mission formalizes the self-contained proof of the bound in §8.4 of Matoušek and Gärtner's textbook (Springer 2007). That proof follows Best, Brouwer, MacWilliams, Odlyzko and Sloane (IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 24, 1978). The mission also covers the step of Delsarte's original argument that the book isolates as a lemma.

Timeline.

  • 1950: Hamming introduces single-error-correcting codes and the sphere-packing bound.
  • 1973: Delsarte proves the linear programming bound using association schemes.
  • 1978: Best et al. give the elementary parity proof and small improvements, among them A(17,3)≤6552A(17,3) \le 6552A(17,3)≤6552.
  • 2005: Schrijver replaces the linear program by a semidefinite program and improves many entries of the code tables (IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 51).

Setting

A word is w=(w1,…,wn)∈{0,1}n\mathbf w = (w_1,\dots,w_n) \in \{0,1\}^nw=(w1​,…,wn​)∈{0,1}n, and a code is any set C⊆{0,1}nC \subseteq \{0,1\}^nC⊆{0,1}n. The Hamming distance dH(w,w′)d_H(\mathbf w,\mathbf w')dH​(w,w′) is the number of positions jjj with wj≠wj′w_j \ne w'_jwj​=wj′​. The weight ∣w∣|\mathbf w|∣w∣ is the number of ones in w\mathbf ww. The word w⊕w′\mathbf w \oplus \mathbf w'w⊕w′ is the entrywise sum modulo 2. For I⊆{1,…,n}I \subseteq \{1,\dots,n\}I⊆{1,…,n}, the restricted distance dHI(w,w′)d^I_H(\mathbf w,\mathbf w')dHI​(w,w′) counts only the differing positions that lie in III.

A code has distance ddd if dH(w,w′)≥dd_H(\mathbf w,\mathbf w') \ge ddH​(w,w′)≥d for all distinct w,w′∈C\mathbf w,\mathbf w' \in Cw,w′∈C (Definition 8.4.1). The quantity A(n,d)A(n,d)A(n,d) is the maximum of ∣C∣|C|∣C∣ over all codes C⊆{0,1}nC \subseteq \{0,1\}^nC⊆{0,1}n with distance ddd.

For 0≤i,t≤n0 \le i,t \le n0≤i,t≤n the Krawtchouk numbers are

Kt(n,i)=∑j=0min⁡(i,t)(−1)j(ij)(n−it−j).K_t(n,i) = \sum_{j=0}^{\min(i,t)} (-1)^j \binom ij \binom{n-i}{t-j}.Kt​(n,i)=j=0∑min(i,t)​(−1)j(ji​)(t−jn−i​).

The distance distribution of a code CCC is

x~i(C)=1∣C∣ ∣{(w,w′)∈C2:dH(w,w′)=i}∣,i=0,…,n.\tilde x_i(C) = \frac{1}{|C|}\,\bigl|\{(\mathbf w,\mathbf w')\in C^2 : d_H(\mathbf w,\mathbf w') = i\}\bigr|, \qquad i=0,\dots,n.x~i​(C)=∣C∣1​​{(w,w′)∈C2:dH​(w,w′)=i}​,i=0,…,n.

The Delsarte linear program has variables x0,…,xnx_0,\dots,x_nx0​,…,xn​. It maximizes x0+⋯+xnx_0+\dots+x_nx0​+⋯+xn​ subject to:

  • x0=1x_0 = 1x0​=1;
  • xi=0x_i = 0xi​=0 for 1≤i≤d−11 \le i \le d-11≤i≤d−1;
  • ∑i=0nKt(n,i) xi≥0\sum_{i=0}^n K_t(n,i)\,x_i \ge 0∑i=0n​Kt​(n,i)xi​≥0 for 1≤t≤n1 \le t \le n1≤t≤n;
  • x≥0x \ge 0x≥0.

For Delsarte's original argument, MiM_iMi​ is the 2n×2n2^n\times 2^n2n×2n matrix whose (v,w)(\mathbf v,\mathbf w)(v,w) entry is 111 when dH(v,w)=id_H(\mathbf v,\mathbf w) = idH​(v,w)=i and 000 otherwise. The weights are y~i=∣{(w,w′)∈C2:dH=i}∣/(2n(ni))\tilde y_i = |\{(\mathbf w,\mathbf w')\in C^2 : d_H = i\}| / (2^n\binom ni)y~​i​=∣{(w,w′)∈C2:dH​=i}∣/(2n(in​)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.4.3 (the Delsarte bound)

A(n,d)  ≤  max⁡{∑i=0nxi  :  x feasible for the Delsarte program}for all n,d.A(n,d) \;\le\; \max\Bigl\{\textstyle\sum_{i=0}^n x_i \;:\; x \text{ feasible for the Delsarte program}\Bigr\}\quad\text{for all } n, d.A(n,d)≤max{∑i=0n​xi​:x feasible for the Delsarte program}for all n,d.

The goal is stated against every upper bound vvv of the objective on the feasible set. No particular optimum value is fixed, so the statement covers every nnn and ddd at once.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma 8.4.5. For every III and CCC, the pairs in C2C^2C2 with even dHId^I_HdHI​ are at least as many as the pairs with odd dHId^I_HdHI​.
  2. Corollary 8.4.6. ∑(w,w′)∈C2(−1)(w⊕w′)Tv≥0\sum_{(\mathbf w,\mathbf w')\in C^2}(-1)^{(\mathbf w\oplus\mathbf w')^T\mathbf v}\ge 0∑(w,w′)∈C2​(−1)(w⊕w′)Tv≥0 for every v\mathbf vv.
  3. Proposition 8.4.4. ∑i=0nKt(n,i) x~i(C)≥0\sum_{i=0}^n K_t(n,i)\,\tilde x_i(C) \ge 0∑i=0n​Kt​(n,i)x~i​(C)≥0 for every CCC and every t=1,…,nt = 1,\dots,nt=1,…,n.
  4. §8.4, p. 160. The values x~i(C)\tilde x_i(C)x~i​(C) sum to ∣C∣|C|∣C∣. For a nonempty code with distance ddd, the vector x~(C)\tilde x(C)x~(C) is feasible for the program.
  5. Lemma 8.4.2 (sphere-packing bound). A(n,2r+1)≤⌊2n/∑i=0r(ni)⌋A(n,2r+1) \le \lfloor 2^n / \sum_{i=0}^r\binom ni\rfloorA(n,2r+1)≤⌊2n/∑i=0r​(in​)⌋.
  6. Lemma 8.4.7. M~=∑i=0ny~iMi\tilde M = \sum_{i=0}^n \tilde y_i M_iM~=∑i=0n​y~​i​Mi​ is positive semidefinite.

Significance

The Delsarte bound turns an extremal problem over the 22n2^{2^n}22n subsets of the cube into a linear program with n+1n+1n+1 variables. For A(17,3)A(17,3)A(17,3) it gives 655365536553, while the sphere-packing bound gives 728172817281. Many entries of the standard code tables rest on this bound or its refinements. The positive semidefiniteness in Lemma 8.4.7 is the starting point of the semidefinite programming bounds of Schrijver and of later work. The same framework also underlies the linear programming bounds for spherical codes and sphere packings.

The theorem is classical and fully proved in the literature. Neither Mathlib nor this platform has a formal statement or proof of it. Mathlib has Hamming distance and binomial coefficients, but it has no A(n,d)A(n,d)A(n,d), no Krawtchouk numbers and no LP bound for codes. This mission would produce the first formal statement and proof. It would also produce reusable identities on Krawtchouk sums and character sums over {0,1}n\{0,1\}^n{0,1}n.

Difficulty

Two of the program's constraints are immediate once x~i\tilde x_ix~i​ is defined: x~0=1\tilde x_0 = 1x~0​=1, and x~i=0\tilde x_i = 0x~i​=0 for i<di < di<d. The difficulty lies in the Krawtchouk constraints. They do not follow from counting pairs at a single distance. They require a sign-weighted count over all words of weight ttt, and the sum must then be regrouped by the distance of each pair. That regrouping identifies a count of words, split by how many ones they share with a fixed word, with the Krawtchouk number. Formally this is an exchange of finite sums together with a binomial counting identity, and the index bookkeeping, including the range j≤min⁡(i,t)j \le \min(i,t)j≤min(i,t), has to be exact.

The obvious attempt proves the inequality one distance class at a time. It fails because the individual terms Kt(n,i) x~iK_t(n,i)\,\tilde x_iKt​(n,i)x~i​ have no sign. Only the whole sum is nonnegative.

Formalization scope

  • Words and codes. Words are Fin n → Bool, with bit 111 as true. The book's positions 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n become 0, …, n-1. Codes are Finsets of words, and dHd_HdH​ is Mathlib's hammingDist.
  • The maximum A(n,d)A(n,d)A(n,d). A(n,d)A(n,d)A(n,d) is a Finset.sup over the finite family of codes with distance ddd. This family contains the empty code, so the maximum is attained.
  • Krawtchouk numbers. Kt(n,i)K_t(n,i)Kt​(n,i) is an integer, and its natural-number subtractions are honest for i≤ni \le ni≤n and j≤tj \le tj≤t.
  • LP variables and the xi=0x_i = 0xi​=0 constraints. The LP variables are indexed by Fin (n+1) with no index shift. The constraints xi=0x_i = 0xi​=0 are imposed for 1≤i<d1 \le i < d1≤i<d, so they are vacuous for d≤1d \le 1d≤1.
  • The empty code. Lean's convention 1/0=01/0 = 01/0=0 gives x~(∅)=0\tilde x(\emptyset) = 0x~(∅)=0. Proposition 8.4.4 then holds trivially, and the feasibility milestone carries the hypothesis C≠∅C \ne \emptysetC=∅ that the book's division presupposes.
  • The sphere-packing floor. The floor in the sphere-packing bound is natural-number division by a denominator that is at least 111.
  • Positive semidefiniteness. This is Mathlib's Matrix.PosSemidef over R\mathbb RR.

No trivialization. The goal is not stated as "A(n,d)≤sup⁡A(n,d) \le \supA(n,d)≤sup" with a real supremum, which Lean would evaluate to 000 on an empty or unbounded set. Its hypothesis ranges over upper bounds of a feasible program: (1,0,…,0)(1,0,\dots,0)(1,0,…,0) is always feasible, so the hypothesis is never vacuous.

Contributions welcome. Useful lemmas include:

  • Krawtchouk identities, for example ∑tKt(n,i)=2n[i=0]\sum_{t}K_t(n,i) = 2^n[i=0]∑t​Kt​(n,i)=2n[i=0] and Ki(n,t)(ni)=Kt(n,i)(nt)K_i(n,t)\binom ni = K_t(n,i)\binom ntKi​(n,t)(in​)=Kt​(n,i)(tn​);
  • counting words of weight ttt that meet a fixed support in exactly jjj positions;
  • general facts on character sums ∑w∈C(−1)wTv\sum_{\mathbf w\in C}(-1)^{\mathbf w^T\mathbf v}∑w∈C​(−1)wTv.

These are reusable for other LP and SDP bounds in coding theory.

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, §8.4. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • P. Delsarte, An algebraic approach to the association schemes of coding theory, Philips Research Reports Supplements 10, 1973.
  • M. R. Best, A. E. Brouwer, F. J. MacWilliams, A. M. Odlyzko, N. J. A. Sloane, Bounds for binary codes of length less than 25, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 24 (1978), 81–93. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.1978.1055827
  • A. Schrijver, New code upper bounds from the Terwilliger algebra and semidefinite programming, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 51 (2005), 2859–2866. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2005.851748
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Understanding and Using Linear Programming VII: LP Rounding Schedules Unrelated Machines Within Twice the Optimal MakespanTextbook

Motivation

Scheduling indivisible jobs on parallel machines to finish all of them as early as possible is a basic problem in operations research and in the theory of algorithms. In the unrelated machines model each job may take a different time on each machine, with no relation between the rows of the time table, as when machines of different types (black-and-white, duplex, colour copiers in the book's example) handle jobs of different kinds. Minimizing the makespan in this model is NP-hard, so the question is how close to the optimum a polynomial-time algorithm can get.

  • 1990. Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos (Math. Programming 46, 259–271) give a polynomial-time algorithm that rounds a basic optimal solution of a linear programming relaxation and returns a schedule of makespan at most 2 topt2\,t_{\mathrm{opt}}2topt​. The same paper shows that approximating the optimum makespan within a factor less than 3/23/23/2 is NP-hard.
  • 2007. Matoušek and Gärtner present the algorithm in §8.3 of Understanding and Using Linear Programming in a simplified, somewhat less efficient form: minimize t∗(T)+Tt^*(T) + Tt∗(T)+T over the thresholds TTT rather than binary-searching for the smallest TTT with t∗(T)≤Tt^*(T) \le Tt∗(T)≤T. This mission follows the book's presentation.

The gap between 3/23/23/2 and 222 for the general unrelated-machines problem has remained open since 1990; it is the standard example of LP rounding driven by the sparsity of basic solutions.

Setting

There are mmm machines MMM and nnn jobs JJJ; dij>0d_{ij} > 0dij​>0 is the running time of job jjj on machine iii. A schedule is a map σ:J→M\sigma : J \to Mσ:J→M assigning each job to one machine. The load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=idij\sum_{j:\sigma(j)=i} d_{ij}∑j:σ(j)=i​dij​, the makespan of σ\sigmaσ is the largest load, and toptt_{\mathrm{opt}}topt​ is the makespan of an optimal schedule, one whose makespan is at most that of every schedule.

For a real threshold TTT, the linear program LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) in the variables ttt and xijx_{ij}xij​ is

minimize  tsubject to  ∑i∈Mxij=1  (j∈J),∑j∈Jdijxij≤t  (i∈M),xij≥0,xij=0  whenever dij>T.\begin{aligned} \text{minimize } \ & t \\ \text{subject to } \ & \textstyle\sum_{i \in M} x_{ij} = 1 \ \ (j \in J), \qquad \textstyle\sum_{j \in J} d_{ij} x_{ij} \le t \ \ (i \in M),\\ & x_{ij} \ge 0, \qquad x_{ij} = 0 \ \text{ whenever } d_{ij} > T . \end{aligned}minimize  subject to  ​t∑i∈M​xij​=1  (j∈J),∑j∈J​dij​xij​≤t  (i∈M),xij​≥0,xij​=0  whenever dij​>T.​

Its optimal value is t∗(T)t^*(T)t∗(T), with t∗(T)=∞t^*(T) = \inftyt∗(T)=∞ when LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) is infeasible. The constraint matrix AAA has one row per machine, one per job and one per pair with dij>Td_{ij} > Tdij​>T; the column of xijx_{ij}xij​ carries dijd_{ij}dij​ in the row of machine iii, 111 in the row of job jjj, and 111 in the row of the constraint xij=0x_{ij} = 0xij​=0 if present. Assumption 8.3.1 on a solution x∗x^*x∗ is that the columns of AAA belonging to its nonzero variables are linearly independent; basic feasible solutions satisfy it. The support graph of x∗x^*x∗ is the bipartite graph G=(M∪J,E)G = (M \cup J, E)G=(M∪J,E) with E={{i,j}:xij∗>0}E = \{\{i,j\} : x^*_{ij} > 0\}E={{i,j}:xij∗​>0}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.3.4

Let T∗T^*T∗ minimize t∗(T)+Tt^*(T) + Tt∗(T)+T over all real TTT and let (t∗,x∗)(t^*, x^*)(t∗,x∗) be an optimal solution of LPR(T∗)\mathrm{LPR}(T^*)LPR(T∗) satisfying Assumption 8.3.1. Then there is a schedule σ\sigmaσ with xσ(j)j∗>0x^*_{\sigma(j) j} > 0xσ(j)j∗​>0 for every job jjj and

max⁡i∈M∑j:σ(j)=idij  ≤  2 topt.\max_{i \in M} \sum_{j : \sigma(j) = i} d_{ij} \;\le\; 2\, t_{\mathrm{opt}} .i∈Mmax​j:σ(j)=i∑​dij​≤2topt​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 8.3.2. Every subgraph of the support graph GGG has at most as many edges as vertices: ∣E′∣≤∣M′∣+∣J′∣|E'| \le |M'| + |J'|∣E′∣≤∣M′∣+∣J′∣.
  2. Lemma 8.3.3. For T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 and an optimal solution (t∗,x∗)(t^*, x^*)(t∗,x∗) of LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) satisfying Assumption 8.3.1, some schedule along the edges of GGG has makespan at most t∗+Tt^* + Tt∗+T.
  3. Proof of Theorem 8.3.4, first step. LPR(topt)\mathrm{LPR}(t_{\mathrm{opt}})LPR(topt​) is feasible and t∗(topt)≤toptt^*(t_{\mathrm{opt}}) \le t_{\mathrm{opt}}t∗(topt​)≤topt​.
  4. Proof of Theorem 8.3.4, second step. t∗(T∗)+T∗≤2 toptt^*(T^*) + T^* \le 2\,t_{\mathrm{opt}}t∗(T∗)+T∗≤2topt​.

Significance

The theorem gives a polynomial-time 2-approximation for an NP-hard problem, and its proof isolates a reusable principle: a basic solution of an assignment-type LP has a support graph in which every subgraph has at most as many edges as vertices (a pseudoforest), so all but a matching's worth of the fractional assignment is already integral. The same sparsity argument underlies rounding results for the generalized assignment problem and for many later scheduling and allocation relaxations.

The result has been proved since 1990 and is textbook material. It is not formalized on Prove2Me or, to the maintainers' knowledge, in Mathlib. This mission produces a machine-checked version of the rounding theorem together with the counting lemma on basic solutions, the relaxation inequality t∗(topt)≤toptt^*(t_{\mathrm{opt}}) \le t_{\mathrm{opt}}t∗(topt​)≤topt​, and the bound on the chosen threshold, each stated on shared definitions of the scheduling LP.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, rounding every job to the machine carrying the largest fraction of it, can overload a machine by many jobs at once and gives no constant factor. The bound t∗+Tt^* + Tt∗+T needs two facts that are not visible from the LP value alone: that the support of a basic solution is sparse in the precise sense of Lemma 8.3.2, which has to be read off the linear independence of columns of the constraint matrix after deleting rows; and that the jobs left fractional can be matched injectively to machines, which requires a Hall-type condition derived from that sparsity. Relating linear independence of real column vectors to an edge count in a bipartite graph, and then producing a matching, is where the formal work lies.

A second subtlety is the threshold TTT: the bound t∗+T≤2toptt^* + T \le 2 t_{\mathrm{opt}}t∗+T≤2topt​ holds only because T∗T^*T∗ is chosen by minimizing over thresholds, and the relaxation at T=toptT = t_{\mathrm{opt}}T=topt​ must be compared with the one at T∗T^*T∗ through optimal solutions of different linear programs.

Formalization scope

Machines are Fin m, jobs are Fin n (0-based; the book's machines 1,…,m1,\dots,m1,…,m and jobs m+1,…,m+nm+1,\dots,m+nm+1,…,m+n are disjoint index sets), running times form d : Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, and the standing hypothesis dij>0d_{ij} > 0dij​>0 of §8.3 appears in every theorem. A schedule is a function Fin n → Fin m; the makespan is the supremum of the loads over the finite type Fin m, which is the maximum for m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. The optimum toptt_{\mathrm{opt}}topt​ is the makespan of a schedule assumed optimal, never an infimum.

Optimal values of LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) are never written as sInf: statements quantify over optimal solutions, i.e. feasible (t,x)(t, x)(t,x) with t≤t′t \le t't≤t′ for every feasible (t′,x′)(t', x')(t′,x′). The book's convention t∗(T)=∞t^*(T) = \inftyt∗(T)=∞ for infeasible LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) is encoded by letting thresholds without an optimal solution impose no condition in the minimality hypothesis on T∗T^*T∗, which reads t∗+T∗≤t+Tt^* + T^* \le t + Tt∗+T∗≤t+T for every real TTT and every optimal solution (t,x)(t, x)(t,x) of LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T). The constraint matrix used in Assumption 8.3.1 has rows indexed by Fin m ⊕ Fin n ⊕ {(i, j) // T < d i j} and excludes the column of ttt, as on p. 151.

"Efficiently construct" in Lemma 8.3.3 and "computes" in Theorem 8.3.4 are formalized by the property of the constructed schedule, not by its running time: every job goes to a machine iii with xij∗>0x^*_{ij} > 0xij∗​>0. This constraint is what rules out the trivializing formalization — "some schedule has makespan at most 2topt2 t_{\mathrm{opt}}2topt​" is true of the optimal schedule itself and says nothing about the rounding.

A complete development needs: finite linear algebra (a linearly independent family of vectors supported on kkk coordinates has at most kkk members), Hall's marriage theorem (available in Mathlib as Finset.all_card_le_biUnion_card_iff_exists_injective), and the existence of an optimal solution of a feasible, bounded linear program (used to apply the minimality of T∗T^*T∗ at T=toptT = t_{\mathrm{opt}}T=topt​). The counting lemma for basic solutions and the definitions of LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) are reusable for other assignment relaxations. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of Lemma 8.3.3 by the direct pseudoforest argument of p. 153–154, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, §8.3, pp. 148–156. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46 (1990), 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
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An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management II: Bid-Price Controls Are Not Optimal in GeneralResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and other capacity-constrained sellers decide, request by request, whether to sell a unit of a perishable resource now or hold it for a more valuable request later. In an airline network an itinerary uses seats on several flight legs at once, so the decision couples the legs. Bid-price controls are a widely used practical answer: each leg carries a threshold price, the bid price, and a request is accepted if and only if its fare covers the sum of the bid prices of the seats it uses. They are simple to store, to explain and to compute from linear programming duals (Simpson 1989 and Williamson 1992, as cited by Talluri and van Ryzin 1998, p. 1581).

Talluri and van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1998, asked whether this simplicity costs revenue. Their Proposition 1 shows that the optimal policy of the underlying dynamic program already compares each fare with an opportunity cost, which suggests that bid prices might be exactly optimal. Their §3.1 shows they are not: a two-leg, two-period instance in which the best bid-price control earns 10% less than the optimal policy. The same paper then proves (Theorem 1, a separate mission) that fixed bid prices are asymptotically optimal in large networks; the counterexample shows that this asymptotic statement cannot be sharpened to exact optimality.

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn itineraries; aij∈Na_{ij} \in \mathbb{N}aij​∈N seats of leg iii are used by itinerary jjj, A=[aij]A = [a_{ij}]A=[aij​], and AjA^jAj is the jjj-th column. The state is the vector y∈Nmy \in \mathbb{N}^my∈Nm of remaining capacities; selling itinerary jjj moves it to y−Ajy - A^jy−Aj. Time is counted backwards: period ttt has ttt periods to go.

In each period one request vector Rt∈RnR_t \in \mathbb{R}^nRt​∈Rn arrives: Rtj>0R_t^j > 0Rtj​>0 is a request for itinerary jjj with revenue RtjR_t^jRtj​, and Rt=0R_t = 0Rt​=0 means no request. Requests lie in S={αe:e∈En, α≥0}\mathcal{S} = \{\alpha e : e \in E_n,\ \alpha \ge 0\}S={αe:e∈En​, α≥0}, where En={e0=0,e1,…,en}E_n = \{e_0 = 0, e_1, \dots, e_n\}En​={e0​=0,e1​,…,en​}: at most one component is positive. The requests of different periods are independent, with laws FtF_tFt​ concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S and with finite first moments.

A control chooses in each period a decision ut(y,r)∈U(y)={e∈En:Ae≤y}u_t(y, r) \in \mathcal{U}(y) = \{e \in E_n : Ae \le y\}ut​(y,r)∈U(y)={e∈En​:Ae≤y} (reject, or sell one itinerary that fits), measurably in the request rrr. Its expected revenue is

V0u(y)=0,Vtu(y)=E[Rt ut(y,Rt)+Vt−1u(y−A ut(y,Rt))].V^u_0(y) = 0, \qquad V^u_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\big[R_t\,u_t(y, R_t) + V^u_{t-1}(y - A\,u_t(y, R_t))\big].V0u​(y)=0,Vtu​(y)=E[Rt​ut​(y,Rt​)+Vt−1u​(y−Aut​(y,Rt​))].

The optimal expected revenue Jt(y)J_t(y)Jt​(y) solves the Bellman equations

J0(y)=0,Jt(y)=E[max⁡e∈U(y)(Rte+Jt−1(y−Ae))].J_0(y) = 0, \qquad J_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\Big[\max_{e \in \mathcal{U}(y)} \big(R_t e + J_{t-1}(y - Ae)\big)\Big].J0​(y)=0,Jt​(y)=E[e∈U(y)max​(Rt​e+Jt−1​(y−Ae))].

A bid-price control (Definition 1) is given by real-valued bid prices μti(y)\mu_t^i(y)μti​(y) for every leg, period and capacity, and accepts an arriving request for itinerary jjj if and only if Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y and

rj≥∑i∈Aj∑h=0aij−1μti(y−hei).r^j \ge \sum_{i \in A^j} \sum_{h=0}^{a_{ij}-1} \mu_t^i(y - h e_i).rj≥i∈Aj∑​h=0∑aij​−1​μti​(y−hei​).

The instance of §3.1 has two legs with one seat each, the through itinerary (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) and the local itineraries (1,0)(1,0)(1,0), (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and two periods. In period 2 a $500 through request arrives with probability 0.4 and a $250 request for each local itinerary with probability 0.3; in period 1 a $500 through request arrives with probability 0.8, and nothing with probability 0.2.

Formalization targets

Goal: the §3.1 counterexample

In the §3.1 instance, from capacity (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) with two periods to go,

max⁡u admissibleV2u(1,1)=440,max⁡μV2uμ(1,1)=400,\max_{u \text{ admissible}} V^u_2(1,1) = 440, \qquad \max_{\mu} V^{u^\mu}_2(1,1) = 400,u admissiblemax​V2u​(1,1)=440,μmax​V2uμ​(1,1)=400,

where uμu^\muuμ is the bid-price control with bid prices μ\muμ; both maxima are attained. The goal fixes the paper's instance and its numbers exactly.

Milestones

  1. Equation (5): for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, Jk(x)=Jk−1(x)+∑j:Aj≤xE(Rkj+Jk−1(x−Aj)−Jk−1(x))+J_k(x) = J_{k-1}(x) + \sum_{j : A^j \le x} \mathbb{E}\big(R_k^j + J_{k-1}(x - A^j) - J_{k-1}(x)\big)^+Jk​(x)=Jk−1​(x)+∑j:Aj≤x​E(Rkj​+Jk−1​(x−Aj)−Jk−1​(x))+.
  2. Proposition 1: with finite first moments, Jk(x)J_k(x)Jk​(x) is finite, the threshold control u∗u^*u∗ that accepts jjj iff rj≥Jk−1(x)−Jk−1(x−Aj)r^j \ge J_{k-1}(x) - J_{k-1}(x - A^j)rj≥Jk−1​(x)−Jk−1​(x−Aj) and Aj≤xA^j \le xAj≤x attains JkJ_kJk​, and no admissible control does better.
  3. Values of the instance: J1(1,1)=400J_1(1,1) = 400J1​(1,1)=400, J1=0J_1 = 0J1​=0 at the other capacities, J2(1,1)=440J_2(1,1) = 440J2​(1,1)=440.
  4. No bid prices reproduce the optimal period-2 decisions: for every μ\muμ there is a period-2 request of positive probability at which the bid-price decision differs from that of every optimal control.

Significance

The result shows that the class of bid-price controls, the standard control class of network revenue management practice, does not contain an optimal policy in general, even though the optimal policy of Proposition 1 has a threshold form. The loss in the example is 10% of expected revenue, and it arises because the opportunity cost of a two-leg itinerary is not the sum of the opportunity costs of its legs. This is the negative half of the paper's analysis; the positive half is the asymptotic optimality of fixed bid prices (Theorem 1).

On the formal side, the mission builds a reusable finite-horizon model of network capacity control: request laws on S\mathcal{S}S, admissible Markov controls, their expected revenue, the Bellman value, and a proof that the Bellman value is the optimum over admissible controls (Proposition 1). The paper's argument for the counterexample is a few lines of inspection; formalizing it requires the upper bound over all admissible controls and the lower bound over all bid prices, including negative, time- and state-dependent ones. A search of the Prove2Me corpus (2026-09-25) found no network capacity-control model: the existing revenue-management items treat a single resource with discrete fare classes, and the existing finite-horizon dynamic-programming items assume a finite disturbance space, which excludes the request laws used here. As far as known, none of this has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The upper bound V2u(1,1)≤440V^u_2(1,1) \le 440V2u​(1,1)≤440 ranges over every measurable admissible control, not over a finite menu; it needs Proposition 1, i.e. the verification theorem for a finite-horizon dynamic program with continuous state of the request and integrability under only finite first moments. The bid-price bound ranges over arbitrary real-valued bid-price functions of the period and the capacity, so the argument must show that every realizable pattern of period-2 decisions earns at most 400, not only that one pattern is unrealizable. Equation (5) is an identity between Bochner integrals under only finite first moments, so every integrand involved must be shown integrable rather than assumed so.

Formalization scope

Legs are Fin m, itineraries Fin n, A : Fin m → Fin n → ℕ, capacities Fin m → ℕ, requests Fin n → ℝ, laws F : ℕ → Measure (Fin n → ℝ) indexed by time-to-go; expectations are Bochner integrals. A decision is Option (Fin n) (none is reject). Controls are Markov and may depend on the whole request vector; admissibility requires decisions in U(y)\mathcal{U}(y)U(y) and measurability in the request. The request laws are probability measures concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S with integrable coordinates; the continuity of fare distributions assumed in §1 of the paper is not assumed, because Proposition 1 does not need it and the §3.1 instance has deterministic fares, which the paper itself notes (p. 1581). The paper's remark that a continuous perturbation gives the same counterexample is not formalized. Read literally, (1) and (4) set uj=1u^j = 1uj=1 for every itinerary whose zero fare meets its threshold, which is not a unit vector; both are formalized as accepting only the arriving request (rj>0r^j > 0rj>0), at most one per period on S\mathcal{S}S. In (1), "x−hx - hx−h" is read as y−heiy - h e_iy−hei​, hhh fewer seats on leg iii. "Jk(x)J_k(x)Jk​(x) is finite" is stated as integrability of the Bellman integrands. Probabilities are exact rationals and fares exact reals. The goal cannot be discharged by restricting the bid prices (constant or nonnegative ones only) or the competing controls (a finite list): the Lean statement quantifies over all real-valued bid-price functions and all admissible controls, and it asserts attainment of both maxima, not only the strict inequality 400<440400 < 440400<440.

Reusable parts: the model definitions (bid-price controls, admissible controls, the Bellman value) and Proposition 1 as a verification theorem for finite-horizon capacity control. Contributions are welcome on any milestone; Proposition 1 and equation (5) are general and independent of the instance.

Selected references

  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1577–1593, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Athena Scientific, 1995 (the Bellman equation (2) cites p. 18). http://www.athenasc.com/dpbook.html
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Understanding and Using Linear Programming VI: The Minimax Theorem for Zero-Sum GamesTextbook

Why zero-sum games belong in a linear programming course

A two-player zero-sum game models any situation in which one party's gain is exactly the other party's loss: a military allocation in the spirit of Colonel Blotto, a sealed-bid contest, rock–paper–scissors. The central question is what each player should do when the opponent is also reasoning about them. John von Neumann answered it in 1928 with the minimax theorem (von Neumann 1928): each player has a strategy guaranteeing the same number, the value of the game, whatever the opponent does. The theorem underlies modern game theory, robust decision making, and the analysis of online learning algorithms, where regret bounds are routinely derived from it.

Section 8.1 of Matoušek and Gärtner's Understanding and Using Linear Programming (Springer 2007) presents the theorem as an application of linear programming duality. This mission is the sixth of a series formalizing the capstone results of the book.

Setting

Alice has m≥1m \ge 1m≥1 pure strategies and Bob has n≥1n \ge 1n≥1. A real m×nm \times nm×n payoff matrix M=(mij)M = (m_{ij})M=(mij​) records Alice's gain, and Bob's loss, when Alice plays her iiith and Bob his jjjth pure strategy. A mixed strategy of Alice is a probability vector x∈Rm\mathbf x \in \mathbb R^mx∈Rm, ∑ixi=1\sum_i x_i = 1∑i​xi​=1, x≥0\mathbf x \ge \mathbf 0x≥0; a mixed strategy of Bob is a probability vector y∈Rn\mathbf y \in \mathbb R^ny∈Rn. When the players randomize independently, Alice's expected payoff is

xTMy=∑i,jmijxiyj.\mathbf x^T M \mathbf y = \sum_{i,j} m_{ij} x_i y_j .xTMy=i,j∑​mij​xi​yj​.

The worst-case payoffs are

β(x)=min⁡yxTMy,α(y)=max⁡xxTMy,\beta(\mathbf x) = \min_{\mathbf y} \mathbf x^T M \mathbf y, \qquad \alpha(\mathbf y) = \max_{\mathbf x} \mathbf x^T M \mathbf y,β(x)=ymin​xTMy,α(y)=xmax​xTMy,

over mixed strategies. A mixed strategy of Bob is a best response against x\mathbf xx if it minimizes xTMy\mathbf x^T M\mathbf yxTMy; a mixed strategy of Alice is a best response against y\mathbf yy if it maximizes it. A pair (x~,y~)(\tilde{\mathbf x}, \tilde{\mathbf y})(x~,y~​) is a mixed Nash equilibrium (Definition 8.1.1) if each is a best response against the other. Alice's x~\tilde{\mathbf x}x~ is worst-case optimal if β(x~)=max⁡xβ(x)\beta(\tilde{\mathbf x}) = \max_{\mathbf x} \beta(\mathbf x)β(x~)=maxx​β(x); Bob's y~\tilde{\mathbf y}y~​ is worst-case optimal if α(y~)=min⁡yα(y)\alpha(\tilde{\mathbf y}) = \min_{\mathbf y}\alpha(\mathbf y)α(y~​)=miny​α(y).

The proof in the book passes through three linear programs: the dual of (8.1), which for a fixed x\mathbf xx maximizes x0x_0x0​ subject to MTx−1x0≥0M^T \mathbf x - \mathbf 1 x_0 \ge \mathbf 0MTx−1x0​≥0; program (8.2), the same with x\mathbf xx as variables subject to ∑ixi=1\sum_i x_i = 1∑i​xi​=1, x≥0\mathbf x \ge \mathbf 0x≥0; and program (8.4), which minimizes y0y_0y0​ subject to My−1y0≤0M \mathbf y - \mathbf 1 y_0 \le \mathbf 0My−1y0​≤0, ∑jyj=1\sum_j y_j = 1∑j​yj​=1, y≥0\mathbf y \ge \mathbf 0y≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.1.3 (minimax theorem for zero-sum games)

For every m×nm \times nm×n payoff matrix with m,n≥1m, n \ge 1m,n≥1: worst-case optimal mixed strategies exist for both players; for any worst-case optimal x~\tilde{\mathbf x}x~ of Alice and y~\tilde{\mathbf y}y~​ of Bob, the pair (x~,y~)(\tilde{\mathbf x}, \tilde{\mathbf y})(x~,y~​) is a mixed Nash equilibrium; and there is a single number vvv, the value of the game, with

β(x~)=x~TMy~=α(y~)=v\beta(\tilde{\mathbf x}) = \tilde{\mathbf x}^T M \tilde{\mathbf y} = \alpha(\tilde{\mathbf y}) = vβ(x~)=x~TMy~​=α(y~​)=v

for every such pair. The third clause is what distinguishes the theorem from the existence of some saddle point.

Milestones

  1. β\betaβ and α\alphaα are attained minima and maxima (p. 135).
  2. Lemma 8.1.2(i): β(x)≤xTMy≤α(y)\beta(\mathbf x) \le \mathbf x^T M \mathbf y \le \alpha(\mathbf y)β(x)≤xTMy≤α(y) for all mixed x,y\mathbf x, \mathbf yx,y, hence max⁡xβ≤min⁡yα\max_{\mathbf x}\beta \le \min_{\mathbf y}\alphamaxx​β≤miny​α.
  3. Lemma 8.1.2(ii): both strategies of a mixed Nash equilibrium are worst-case optimal.
  4. Lemma 8.1.2(iii): β(x~)=α(y~)\beta(\tilde{\mathbf x}) = \alpha(\tilde{\mathbf y})β(x~)=α(y~​) implies that (x~,y~)(\tilde{\mathbf x}, \tilde{\mathbf y})(x~,y~​) is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
  5. The dual of (8.1) has optimal value β(x)\beta(\mathbf x)β(x) (p. 137).
  6. Eq. (8.3): an optimal solution (x~0,x~)(\tilde x_0, \tilde{\mathbf x})(x~0​,x~) of (8.2) satisfies x~0=β(x~)=max⁡xβ(x)\tilde x_0 = \beta(\tilde{\mathbf x}) = \max_{\mathbf x}\beta(\mathbf x)x~0​=β(x~)=maxx​β(x).
  7. Eq. (8.5): an optimal solution (y~0,y~)(\tilde y_0, \tilde{\mathbf y})(y~​0​,y~​) of (8.4) satisfies y~0=α(y~)=min⁡yα(y)\tilde y_0 = \alpha(\tilde{\mathbf y}) = \min_{\mathbf y}\alpha(\mathbf y)y~​0​=α(y~​)=miny​α(y).
  8. Programs (8.2) and (8.4) both have optimal solutions, and their optimum values coincide (p. 138).
  9. The minimax equality (p. 137):
max⁡xmin⁡yxTMy=min⁡ymax⁡xxTMy.\max_{\mathbf x}\min_{\mathbf y}\mathbf x^T M \mathbf y = \min_{\mathbf y}\max_{\mathbf x}\mathbf x^T M \mathbf y .xmax​ymin​xTMy=ymin​xmax​xTMy.

Significance

The theorem gives a complete prescription for zero-sum play: a worst-case optimal strategy secures at least the value against any opponent, and a worst-case optimal opponent holds the player to at most the value, so both players can announce their strategies in advance without loss. With Lemma 8.1.2(ii) it yields a characterization: a pair of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium if and only if both are worst-case optimal. The minimax equality is used downstream in online learning (regret-to-value arguments), in robust optimization, and in Yao's principle for randomized algorithms.

The mathematics is classical and proved; what this mission adds is a machine-checked version in the book's own formulation. The platform already has AGT.zero_sum_minimax (Algorithmic Game Theory I), which proves the existence of a saddle point, and the general FamousTheorems.sion_minimax_theorem. Neither states that every pair of worst-case optimal strategies is an equilibrium with a common value, and neither exhibits the LP route: the dual of (8.1), the programs (8.2) and (8.4), and their duality. The mission records that route statement by statement, so that it can be reused as a worked instance of LP duality.

Difficulty

Lemma 8.1.2 is routine; the entire content is the reverse inequality max⁡xβ(x)≥min⁡yα(y)\max_{\mathbf x}\beta(\mathbf x) \ge \min_{\mathbf y}\alpha(\mathbf y)maxx​β(x)≥miny​α(y). The obvious attack, maximizing β\betaβ directly, fails because β\betaβ is a minimum of linear functions and hence not linear, so its maximization is not a linear program as written. The obstacle is removed only by an appeal to LP duality in the proof, together with the facts that the simplices are nonempty and compact, and that the relevant programs are feasible and bounded so that optima exist. None of this is supplied by the pure-strategy structure of the game: pure Nash equilibria need not exist (rock–paper–scissors has none).

Formalization scope

Pure strategies are indexed by Fin m and Fin n, with the book's standing assumption m,n≥1m, n \ge 1m,n≥1 carried as hypotheses 1 ≤ m, 1 ≤ n by every theorem; the book's indices 1,…,m1,\dots,m1,…,m become 0,…,m−10,\dots,m-10,…,m−1. Mixed strategies are Mathlib's stdSimplex ℝ (Fin m), the payoff is x ⬝ᵥ (M *ᵥ y). β(x)\beta(\mathbf x)β(x) is the real sInf and α(y)\alpha(\mathbf y)α(y) the real sSup of the payoffs over the opponent's simplex; milestone 1 states that these are attained. A mixed Nash equilibrium is defined in the verbal form of Definition 8.1.1 (mutual best responses). Worst-case optimality is defined against all mixed strategies, never as a saddle-point condition, so the goal is not circular with Lemma 8.1.2(iii). LP optimality is stated as "feasible and at least as good as every feasible point", so no supremum over a possibly empty or unbounded feasible set is used.

The book's clause that worst-case optimal strategies "can be efficiently computed by linear programming" is algorithmic and is not part of the formal statement; there is no complexity model. A goal asserting only the existence of worst-case optimal strategies, or only the existence of some equilibrium, would drop the theorem's third clause and is ruled out: the common value vvv is quantified before all pairs of worst-case optimal strategies.

A complete development needs compactness of the standard simplex, continuity of the bilinear payoff, and a strong duality theorem for linear programs in the form of the programs (8.2)/(8.4); the latter is reusable across the whole series. Proofs by other routes (Sion's theorem, a separating hyperplane argument, fixed points) are welcome for the goal; the LP milestones stand on their own as statements about the programs.

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, §8.1, pp. 131–142. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • J. von Neumann, "Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", Mathematische Annalen 100 (1928), 295–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01448847
  • M. Sion, "On general minimax theorems", Pacific Journal of Mathematics 8 (1958), 171–176. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171
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An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management I: The Fixed-Bid-Price Heuristic Is Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rental-car firms sell a fixed, perishable capacity to customers who arrive over time and pay different prices. In an airline network, one ticket for an origin–destination itinerary consumes seats on several flight legs at once, so accepting a cheap connecting passenger today can displace a more valuable request tomorrow on any of those legs. The exact optimal accept/reject rule is a dynamic program whose state is the whole vector of remaining leg capacities, which is intractable at airline scale.

Bid-price control is the standard practical answer. Each leg iii carries a price μi\mu^iμi, and a request for itinerary jjj is accepted only if its revenue exceeds the sum of the bid prices of the seats it uses. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science 44(11), 1998) gave the first rigorous analysis of this scheme. They showed that bid prices are not optimal in general, the subject of a separate mission in this series. They also showed that one fixed vector of bid prices, obtained from a convex upper-bound problem, is asymptotically optimal when capacity and demand are scaled up together. This mission targets that positive result, Theorem 1 of the paper. It is one of the results most often cited to justify the use of bid prices and of deterministic or fluid upper bounds in revenue management; see Talluri and van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (Springer, 2004), Ch. 3.

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn itineraries. Itinerary jjj uses aij∈Na_{ij} \in \mathbb{N}aij​∈N seats of leg iii; A=[aij]A = [a_{ij}]A=[aij​] and AjA^jAj is its jjj-th column. The state is the vector y∈Nmy \in \mathbb{N}^my∈Nm of remaining capacities, and time is counted backwards: period ttt has ttt periods to go, and the horizon is kkk.

In each period one request vector Rt=(Rt1,…,Rtn)R_t = (R_t^1, \dots, R_t^n)Rt​=(Rt1​,…,Rtn​) arrives. It lies in S={αe:e∈{0,e1,…,en}, α≥0}\mathcal{S} = \{\alpha e : e \in \{0, e_1, \dots, e_n\},\ \alpha \ge 0\}S={αe:e∈{0,e1​,…,en​}, α≥0}: at most one component is positive, Rtj>0R_t^j > 0Rtj​>0 is a request for itinerary jjj with revenue RtjR_t^jRtj​, and Rt=0R_t = 0Rt​=0 means no request. The RtR_tRt​ are independent with laws FtF_tFt​ concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S. Each marginal P(Rtj≤r)P(R_t^j \le r)P(Rtj​≤r) is continuous on (0,+∞)(0, +\infty)(0,+∞), and each RtjR_t^jRtj​ has a finite mean. These are the paper's standing assumptions. For the asymptotic result the revenues are also bounded: Rtj≤CR_t^j \le CRtj​≤C almost surely.

The optimal expected revenue Jt(y)J_t(y)Jt​(y) solves the Bellman equations

J0(y)=0,Jt(y)=E[max⁡(Jt−1(y), max⁡j: Aj≤y(Rtj+Jt−1(y−Aj)))].J_0(y) = 0, \qquad J_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\Big[\max\Big(J_{t-1}(y),\ \max_{j:\,A^j \le y}\big(R_t^j + J_{t-1}(y - A^j)\big)\Big)\Big].J0​(y)=0,Jt​(y)=E[max(Jt−1​(y), j:Aj≤ymax​(Rtj​+Jt−1​(y−Aj)))].

For bid prices μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0 write μAj=∑iμiaij\mu A^j = \sum_i \mu^i a_{ij}μAj=∑i​μiaij​ and define the relaxed value

Jˉk(x,μ)=∑t=1k∑j=1nE (Rtj−μAj)++μx.\bar J_k(x, \mu) = \sum_{t=1}^k \sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{E}\,(R_t^j - \mu A^j)^+ + \mu x .Jˉk​(x,μ)=t=1∑k​j=1∑n​E(Rtj​−μAj)++μx.

The convex program vk(x)=min⁡μ≥0Jˉk(x,μ)v_k(x) = \min_{\mu \ge 0} \bar J_k(x, \mu)vk​(x)=minμ≥0​Jˉk​(x,μ) has an optimal solution μ∗\mu^*μ∗.

The fixed-bid-price heuristic uses μ∗\mu^*μ∗ throughout the horizon. It accepts a request for itinerary jjj with revenue rrr if and only if the remaining capacity suffices (Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y) and r>μ∗Ajr > \mu^* A^jr>μ∗Aj. The θ\thetaθ-scaled problem, for an integer θ≥1\theta \ge 1θ≥1, has capacity θx\theta xθx, horizon θk\theta kθk and request laws Rt(θ)∼F⌈t/θ⌉R_t(\theta) \sim F_{\lceil t/\theta \rceil}Rt​(θ)∼F⌈t/θ⌉​. Each original period is thus split into θ\thetaθ independent copies. Write Jθk(θx)J_{\theta k}(\theta x)Jθk​(θx) for its optimal expected revenue and JθkH(θx)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x)JθkH​(θx) for the expected revenue of the heuristic with the bid prices μ∗\mu^*μ∗ of the original problem.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

There is a constant KKK, depending on the instance (A,F,C,k,x,μ∗)(A, F, C, k, x, \mu^*)(A,F,C,k,x,μ∗) but not on θ\thetaθ, such that for every integer θ≥1\theta \ge 1θ≥1

JθkH(θx) ≥ (1−Kθ) Jθk(θx).J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ \ge\ \Big(1 - \frac{K}{\sqrt{\theta}}\Big)\, J_{\theta k}(\theta x).JθkH​(θx) ≥ (1−θ​K​)Jθk​(θx).

This is the paper's JθkH(θx)/Jθk(θx)≥1−O(θ−1/2)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) / J_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ge 1 - O(\theta^{-1/2})JθkH​(θx)/Jθk​(θx)≥1−O(θ−1/2), multiplied out.

Milestones

In the order the paper's argument uses them:

  1. Gallego's bound E(Z−z)+≤(σ2+(z−m)2−(z−m))/2\mathbb{E}(Z - z)^+ \le \big(\sqrt{\sigma^2 + (z - m)^2} - (z - m)\big)/2E(Z−z)+≤(σ2+(z−m)2​−(z−m))/2 for a random variable with mean mmm and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2.
  2. The scaling identity: the relaxed value of the θ\thetaθ-scaled problem is θJˉk(x,μ)\theta \bar J_k(x, \mu)θJˉk​(x,μ), so μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is optimal for every θ\thetaθ.
  3. Lemma 1: Jk(x)≤Jˉk(x,μ)J_k(x) \le \bar J_k(x, \mu)Jk​(x)≤Jˉk​(x,μ) for every μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0.
  4. The Kuhn–Tucker conditions (10): for every leg iii, ∑t,jP(Rtj>μ∗Aj) aij≤xi\sum_{t,j} P(R_t^j > \mu^* A^j)\,a_{ij} \le x^i∑t,j​P(Rtj​>μ∗Aj)aij​≤xi, with equality where μ∗i>0\mu^{*i} > 0μ∗i>0.
  5. Eq. (13): Jθk(θx)≤θvk(x)J_{\theta k}(\theta x) \le \theta v_k(x)Jθk​(θx)≤θvk​(x).
  6. The coupling bound (14): JθkH(θx)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x)JθkH​(θx) is at least the revenue of an uncapacitated system accepting every request above its bid price, minus CCC times the expected seat overflow ∑iE(Ni−θxi)+\sum_i \mathbb{E}(N^i - \theta x^i)^+∑i​E(Ni−θxi)+.
  7. ENi=θ∑t,jEYijt\mathbb{E}N^i = \theta \sum_{t,j} \mathbb{E}Y_{ijt}ENi=θ∑t,j​EYijt​ and Var⁡(Ni)≤θ∑t,jVar⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(N^i) \le \theta \sum_{t,j} \operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Ni)≤θ∑t,j​Var(Yijt​), where Yijt=1{Rtj>μ∗Aj} aijY_{ijt} = \mathbf{1}\{R_t^j > \mu^* A^j\}\,a_{ij}Yijt​=1{Rtj​>μ∗Aj}aij​.
  8. Eq. (15): E(Ni−θxi)+≤Var⁡(Ni)/2\mathbb{E}(N^i - \theta x^i)^+ \le \sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(N^i)}/2E(Ni−θxi)+≤Var(Ni)​/2.
  9. Eq. (16): ∑t≤θk∑jP(Rtj(θ)>μ∗Aj) μ∗Aj=θμ∗x\sum_{t \le \theta k}\sum_j P(R_t^j(\theta) > \mu^* A^j)\,\mu^* A^j = \theta \mu^* x∑t≤θk​∑j​P(Rtj​(θ)>μ∗Aj)μ∗Aj=θμ∗x.
  10. The explicit bound
JθkH(θx)≥θvk(x)−C2θ∑i=1m∑t=1k∑j=1nVar⁡(Yijt).J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ge \theta v_k(x) - \frac{C}{2}\sqrt{\theta}\sum_{i=1}^m \sqrt{\sum_{t=1}^k\sum_{j=1}^n \operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})}.JθkH​(θx)≥θvk​(x)−2C​θ​i=1∑m​t=1∑k​j=1∑n​Var(Yijt​)​.

The goal leaves KKK unspecified. The explicit bound (milestone 10), together with (13), identifies one admissible value when vk(x)>0v_k(x) > 0vk​(x)>0.

Significance

Theorem 1 says that the whole value of dynamic, state-dependent control over a static price-per-leg rule vanishes relative to revenue as the system grows: the loss is O(θ)O(\sqrt{\theta})O(θ​) against revenues of order θ\thetaθ. It justifies computing bid prices once from a convex (or, in later work, linear) upper-bound problem instead of solving the network dynamic program. The same fluid-scaling argument underlies a large later literature on asymptotically optimal policies in network revenue management and online resource allocation. That literature includes re-solving heuristics and the choice-based deterministic linear program (Liu and van Ryzin, M&SOM 2008).

The result has a complete published proof. What this mission adds is a machine-checked version. It includes the network Bellman recursion, the relaxation bound, a coupling argument between a capacitated and an uncapacitated system on the product space of request paths, and a second-moment overflow estimate. Two statements on the printed page are wrong as written and appear here in corrected form (see Formalization scope). A formal proof settles that the theorem survives both corrections. No machine-checked proof of this theorem, or of the fluid upper bound for network revenue management, is known.

Difficulty

The optimal value JJJ is defined by a recursion over the full capacity vector and has no closed form; the only access to it is an upper bound. The heuristic's revenue JHJ^HJH depends on the random time at which each leg runs out, which couples all legs and all periods, so it cannot be computed period by period either. The obvious approach, comparing both values period by period through their recursions, fails for exactly this reason: neither side decomposes over time. The two sides must instead be connected through a third object, the relaxed value Jˉ\bar JJˉ, which is explicit but relies on the requests' distributional structure (at most one request per period, and continuous marginals, which make the optimality conditions of the convex program hold). The step from an upper bound on JJJ to a lower bound on JHJ^HJH has to hold path by path, including for group requests that take several seats of one leg. On the probabilistic side, the seat counts of one period are indicators of mutually exclusive events, so their variances do not simply add.

Formalization scope

Legs are Fin m, itineraries Fin n, the seat matrix is A : Fin m → Fin n → ℕ and capacities are Fin m → ℕ. A request law is a Measure (Fin n → ℝ), and IsRequestLaw bundles the standing assumptions:

  • it is a probability measure;
  • it is concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S;
  • no marginal has an atom at a positive value, which is continuity of the marginal distribution functions on (0,+∞)(0, +\infty)(0,+∞);
  • each coordinate is integrable.

The bound Rtj≤CR_t^j \le CRtj​≤C a.s. is a separate hypothesis wherever the paper uses it. Laws are indexed by time-to-go. JJJ is defined by the Bellman recursion, with the maximum over the finite control set taken for each realized request; capacity subtraction in ℕ occurs only when Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y. Jˉ\bar JJˉ is the closed form (8), which the paper derives from the relaxed control problem (7). An optimal μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is a hypothesis (μ∗≥0\mu^* \ge 0μ∗≥0 and Jˉk(x,μ∗)≤Jˉk(x,μ)\bar J_k(x, \mu^*) \le \bar J_k(x, \mu)Jˉk​(x,μ∗)≤Jˉk​(x,μ) for all μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0), not an sInf. The scaled laws use ⌈t/θ⌉=(t+θ−1)/θ\lceil t/\theta \rceil = (t + \theta - 1)/\theta⌈t/θ⌉=(t+θ−1)/θ in ℕ. JHJ^HJH is the integral of the heuristic's pathwise revenue, with strict threshold and capacity check, against Measure.pi over the θk\theta kθk periods, and NiN^iNi is a random variable on the same space. Var⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Yijt​) is the closed form aij2 p(1−p)a_{ij}^2\,p(1-p)aij2​p(1−p).

Corrections to the printed page:

  • (10) is printed with −λ-\lambda−λ; the stated conditions use the sign that the paper's own reading of (10) requires (expected demand at most capacity).
  • The page's Var⁡(Ni)=θ∑Var⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(N^i) = \theta\sum\operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Ni)=θ∑Var(Yijt​) holds only as ≤\le≤, which is all the proof needs.
  • NiN^iNi is the uncapacitated system's seat count, as the displayed formula says, not the heuristic's sales, as the sentence says.

The coupling bound and the mean/variance statement are stated at an optimal μ∗\mu^*μ∗ of (9), as on the page. The ratio of Theorem 1 is multiplied out because Jθk(θx)J_{\theta k}(\theta x)Jθk​(θx) may be 000, and KKK is quantified before θ\thetaθ. A formalization that replaced JJJ by an easier quantity, or JHJ^HJH by the uncapacitated system's revenue, would make the goal trivial or different; the definitions here are the Bellman optimum and the capacity-respecting heuristic.

A complete development needs Bochner integrals against product measures, independence of coordinates under Measure.pi, variance of sums, one-sided derivatives of z↦E(Z−z)+z \mapsto \mathbb{E}(Z - z)^+z↦E(Z−z)+, and first-order optimality for a convex function on the nonnegative orthant. The Bellman-recursion and coupling infrastructure is reusable for other network revenue management results. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1577–1593, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
  • G. Gallego, A minmax distribution free procedure for the (Q, R) inventory model, Operations Research Letters 11(1), 55–60, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(92)90063-C
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin, On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2), 288–310, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0171
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Understanding and Using Linear Programming II: Optimal Basic Feasible Solutions and Vertices in Equational FormTextbook

Motivation

Every finite algorithm for linear programming rests on one structural fact: if a linear program has an optimum at all, it has one at a point singled out by finitely many linear conditions. The simplex method walks between such points, and exact complexity analyses, sensitivity analysis and integrality arguments all start from them. Chapter 4 of J. Matoušek and B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming (Springer, 2007, DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4), establishes this fact for linear programs in equational form, in the definitions that the rest of the book (the simplex method of Chapter 5, duality in Chapter 6, the applications in Chapter 8) uses.

This mission is the second of a series formalizing that book. It fixes the book's notion of a basic feasible solution and of a vertex, and targets the theorem that optimal solutions exist whenever the program is feasible and bounded, and can then be chosen basic.

Setting

A linear program in equational form is

maximize cTxsubject toAx=b, x≥0,\text{maximize } c^{T}x \quad\text{subject to}\quad Ax=b,\ x\ge 0,maximize cTxsubject toAx=b, x≥0,

where AAA is a real m×nm\times nm×n matrix, b∈Rmb\in\mathbb{R}^mb∈Rm, c∈Rnc\in\mathbb{R}^nc∈Rn, and x≥0x\ge 0x≥0 means every coordinate of xxx is nonnegative. A feasible solution is an x∈Rnx\in\mathbb{R}^nx∈Rn satisfying both constraints; the set of them is PPP. An optimal solution is a feasible xxx with cTy≤cTxc^{T}y\le c^{T}xcTy≤cTx for every feasible yyy. The objective is bounded from above if some real MMM satisfies cTx≤Mc^{T}x\le McTx≤M for all feasible xxx.

Throughout Section 4.2 the book assumes that AAA has n≥mn\ge mn≥m columns and rank mmm (its rows are linearly independent). For S⊆{1,…,n}S\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}S⊆{1,…,n}, ASA_SAS​ denotes the matrix formed by the columns of AAA with indices in SSS. A basis is an mmm-element set BBB for which ABA_BAB​ is nonsingular, i.e. its columns are linearly independent. A basic feasible solution is a feasible xxx for which some basis BBB has xj=0x_j=0xj​=0 for every j∉Bj\notin Bj∈/B.

A point vvv is a vertex of PPP if v∈Pv\in Pv∈P and some nonzero c∈Rnc\in\mathbb{R}^nc∈Rn satisfies cTv>cTyc^{T}v>c^{T}ycTv>cTy for every y∈P∖{v}y\in P\setminus\{v\}y∈P∖{v}: vvv is the unique maximizer over PPP of a nonzero linear function.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2.3 (p. 46)

For AAA of rank mmm with n≥mn\ge mn≥m,

(P≠∅ ∧ ∃M ∀x∈P, cTx≤M) ⟹ ∃ x∗ optimal,\Bigl(P\neq\emptyset\ \wedge\ \exists M\ \forall x\in P,\ c^{T}x\le M\Bigr)\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,x^{*}\ \text{optimal},(P=∅ ∧ ∃M ∀x∈P, cTx≤M) ⟹ ∃x∗ optimal, ∃ x∗ optimal ⟹ ∃ x~ optimal and basic feasible.\exists\,x^{*}\ \text{optimal}\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,\tilde x\ \text{optimal and basic feasible}.∃x∗ optimal ⟹ ∃x~ optimal and basic feasible.

Both parts are one theorem, as in the book. Part (i) says optimal solutions fail to exist only for the two obvious reasons, infeasibility and unboundedness; part (ii) says an optimum can always be found among basic feasible solutions.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4.2.1 (p. 45): a feasible xxx is basic if and only if the columns of AKA_KAK​ are linearly independent, where K={j:xj>0}K=\{j : x_j>0\}K={j:xj​>0}.
  2. Proposition 4.2.2 (p. 45): for a basis BBB there is at most one feasible solution vanishing outside BBB.
  3. The statement proved inside the proof of Theorem 4.2.3 (p. 47): if the objective is bounded above, every feasible x0x_0x0​ is dominated by a basic feasible x~\tilde xx~, cTx~≥cTx0c^{T}\tilde x\ge c^{T}x_0cTx~≥cTx0​.
  4. Theorem 4.4.1 (p. 54): a point of PPP is a vertex of PPP if and only if it is a basic feasible solution.

Significance

Theorem 4.2.3 gives a finite, if impractical, algorithm for linear programming: enumerate the at most (nm)\binom{n}{m}(mn​) sets BBB, solve ABxB=bA_Bx_B=bAB​xB​=b, and keep the best nonnegative solution. It is the correctness backbone of the simplex method, which visits basic feasible solutions in a smarter order, and it is the source of the book's claim that a feasible and bounded linear program has an optimal solution. Theorem 4.4.1 identifies this algebraic notion with the geometric corners of the feasible polyhedron, which is what makes statements such as "the LP relaxation has an integral vertex" in later chapters meaningful.

All of these results are classical and fully proved in the book. The value of formalizing them here is the definition layer: later missions of this series (Bland's rule, the central path, the scheduling application) state their results about bases and basic feasible solutions in exactly these definitions, and a proved Theorem 4.2.3 in this form lets them import the existence of an optimal basic solution instead of re-deriving it. Related facts are already machine-checked on Prove2Me in the formulation of Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (Introduction to Linear Optimization I and II: minimization over polyhedra {x:aiTx≥bi}\{x : a_i^{T}x\ge b_i\}{x:aiT​x≥bi​}, extreme points, basic solutions as nnn active linearly independent constraints). Those statements concern a different presentation of the program and a different notion of basic solution; connecting them to the equational-form statements here is itself a welcome contribution.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for part (i), "a continuous function on a closed set bounded above attains its supremum", fails: the feasible set is usually unbounded, and a linear function bounded above on an unbounded closed convex set need not obviously attain its supremum without using the polyhedral structure. The existence of an optimum is exactly the nontrivial content of part (i); compactness is not available.

For milestone 1, the delicate direction is the converse: a set of linearly independent columns indexed by KKK must be completed to an mmm-element basis, which requires the rank-mmm assumption. For Theorem 4.4.1, the direction from vertex to basic feasible solution is not local: a vertex is defined by an optimization property, while basicness is a statement about the support of the point.

Formalization scope

All items live in the namespace MatousekLP.BFS and share one definition module, MatousekLP.BFS.EquationalForm. Conventions:

  • vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ; the book's indices 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n are 0, …, n-1;
  • Ax=bAx=bAx=b is A *ᵥ x = b, x≥0x\ge 0x≥0 is 0 ≤ x (pointwise), cTxc^{T}xcTx is c ⬝ᵥ x;
  • a subset BBB of indices is a Finset (Fin n); "ABA_BAB​ nonsingular" is linear independence over R\mathbb{R}R of the family of columns of AAA indexed by the elements of BBB, together with B.card = m;
  • the standing assumption of §4.2 is the pair of hypotheses m ≤ n and A.rank = m on every theorem;
  • "optimal" and "bounded from above" are stated against every feasible point. No real supremum over the feasible set appears anywhere, so an empty or unbounded feasible set cannot make a statement hold through a default value;
  • "vertex" is the book's unique-maximizer definition of p. 53, not Mathlib's Set.extremePoints; the book's remark on p. 55 that the two coincide is not used as a definition;
  • Theorem 4.4.1 carries the extra hypothesis n≥1n\ge 1n≥1: for n=0n=0n=0 there is no nonzero vector in R0\mathbb{R}^0R0, the single feasible point 000 is basic but not a vertex, and the book's equivalence fails.

A formalization in which "optimal" were defined through sSup of the objective over the feasible set would make part (ii) trivially true or false on unbounded programs; the definitions here rule that out. Dropping the rank hypothesis would make part (ii) false (no basis exists when the rows are dependent), so it is not optional.

Reusable infrastructure: the column-restriction and basis vocabulary, the support set KKK, and the extension of a linearly independent set of columns to a basis of the column space are needed again in the simplex chapter. Proofs of any milestone, and bridges to Mathlib's Set.extremePoints or to the Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis statements on the platform, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek and B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Universitext, Springer, 2007, Chapter 4, pp. 41–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • D. Bertsimas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, Chapter 2.
  • G. M. Ziegler, Lectures on Polytopes, Graduate Texts in Mathematics 152, Springer, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-8431-1
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning: The Separation-Based Policy Has Regret at Most κ₁⌈N/C⌉ log T + K̄₁Research Paper

Motivation

A retailer who can display only a limited number of products must decide which assortment to show each arriving customer, without knowing how attractive each product is. Offering a product reveals how often it is bought, but offering a poor product costs revenue. This exploration–exploitation trade-off arises in fast fashion, where the selling season is short, and in online display advertising, where the "shelf" is a page of slots. It is the assortment analogue of the multi-armed bandit problem, with one difference: an arm is a set of products, and the feedback from one set says something about every other set containing the same products.

Sauré and Zeevi, Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning (Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2013), give a lower bound for the regret of every consistent policy that is of order log⁡T\log TlogT in the number TTT of customers (their Theorem 1). They then show that simple policies attain this rate. This mission formalizes the first of those policies, the separation-based policy, and its regret bound (Theorem 2). Its proof is the only upper-bound proof printed in full in the article.

Setting

There are NNN products i∈N={1,…,N}i\in\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,N\}i∈N={1,…,N}, a display capacity 1≤C≤N1\le C\le N1≤C≤N and margins wi>0w_i>0wi​>0. Customer ttt assigns product iii the utility Uit=μi+ζitU_i^t=\mu_i+\zeta_i^tUit​=μi​+ζit​ and the no-purchase alternative 000 the utility U0t=ζ0tU_0^t=\zeta_0^tU0t​=ζ0t​ (mean utility μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0). The shocks are i.i.d. with distribution FFF, which has an everywhere-positive density fff. Offered an assortment SSS, the customer buys the product of highest utility if that utility beats the no-purchase alternative, so product i∈Si\in Si∈S is bought with probability

pi(S,μ)=∫−∞∞∏j∈S∪{0}∖{i}F(x−μj) dF(x−μi).p_i(S,\mu)=\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\prod_{j\in S\cup\{0\}\setminus\{i\}}F(x-\mu_j)\,dF(x-\mu_i).pi​(S,μ)=∫−∞∞​j∈S∪{0}∖{i}∏​F(x−μj​)dF(x−μi​).

The single-sale profit is r(S,μ)=∑i∈Swipi(S,μ)r(S,\mu)=\sum_{i\in S}w_ip_i(S,\mu)r(S,μ)=∑i∈S​wi​pi​(S,μ), the feasible assortments are S={S⊆N:∣S∣≤C}\mathcal S=\{S\subseteq\mathcal N:|S|\le C\}S={S⊆N:∣S∣≤C}, and S∗(μ)∈arg⁡max⁡S∈Sr(S,μ)S^*(\mu)\in\arg\max_{S\in\mathcal S}r(S,\mu)S∗(μ)∈argmaxS∈S​r(S,μ) is the optimal assortment, assumed unique at the true μ\muμ.

The retailer knows FFF but not μ\muμ. A policy chooses the assortment StS_tSt​ offered to customer ttt as a function of the purchases of customers 1,…,t−11,\dots,t-11,…,t−1. Its expected revenue over TTT customers is Jπ(T,μ)=Eπ∑t=1T∑iwiZitJ^\pi(T,\mu)=\mathbb E_\pi\sum_{t=1}^T\sum_iw_iZ_i^tJπ(T,μ)=Eπ​∑t=1T​∑i​wi​Zit​, where Zit=1Z_i^t=1Zit​=1 if customer ttt buys iii. Its regret is

Rπ(T,μ)=T−Jπ(T,μ)r(S∗(μ),μ),\mathcal R^\pi(T,\mu)=T-\frac{J^\pi(T,\mu)}{r(S^*(\mu),\mu)},Rπ(T,μ)=T−r(S∗(μ),μ)Jπ(T,μ)​,

the revenue lost against offering S∗(μ)S^*(\mu)S∗(μ) to everyone, in units of one optimal sale.

Assumption 1 (identifiability) says that purchase probabilities determine mean utilities. For a vector ρ\rhoρ of purchase probabilities with ∑iρi<1\sum_i\rho_i<1∑i​ρi​<1 there is a unique η(ρ)\eta(\rho)η(ρ) with pi(N,η(ρ))=ρip_i(\mathcal N,\eta(\rho))=\rho_ipi​(N,η(ρ))=ρi​. The map η\etaη is locally Lipschitz, and the choice probabilities are Lipschitz. The logit model (standard Gumbel FFF) satisfies it.

The separation-based policy π1=π(κ1,T,w)\pi_1=\pi(\kappa_1,T,w)π1​=π(κ1​,T,w) (Algorithm 1) partitions the products into ⌈N/C⌉\lceil N/C\rceil⌈N/C⌉ test assortments Aj={(j−1)C+1,…,min⁡{jC,N}}A_j=\{(j-1)C+1,\dots,\min\{jC,N\}\}Aj​={(j−1)C+1,…,min{jC,N}}.

  1. Exploration. Each test assortment is offered, in turn, to ⌈κ1log⁡T⌉\lceil\kappa_1\log T\rceil⌈κ1​logT⌉ customers.
  2. Exploitation. Every remaining customer ttt is offered S∗(μ^t)S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ^​t​). Here μ^t,i=η(p^t(Aj))i\hat\mu_{t,i}=\eta(\hat p_t(A_j))_iμ^​t,i​=η(p^​t​(Aj​))i​ for the test assortment Aj∋iA_j\ni iAj​∋i, and
p^i,t(Aj)=∑u=1t−1Ziu1{Su=Aj}∑u=1t−11{Su=Aj}(4)\hat p_{i,t}(A_j)=\frac{\sum_{u=1}^{t-1}Z_i^u\mathbf 1\{S_u=A_j\}}{\sum_{u=1}^{t-1}\mathbf 1\{S_u=A_j\}}\qquad(4)p^​i,t​(Aj​)=∑u=1t−1​1{Su​=Aj​}∑u=1t−1​Ziu​1{Su​=Aj​}​(4)

is the empirical purchase frequency of iii among the customers offered AjA_jAj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For every instance satisfying the standing assumptions and Assumption 1, there are finite constants Kˉ1\bar K_1Kˉ1​ and κˉ1\bar\kappa_1κˉ1​, depending on the instance but not on TTT or κ1\kappa_1κ1​, such that

Rπ1(T,μ)≤κ1⌈N/C⌉log⁡T+Kˉ1for all T, whenever κ1>κˉ1.\mathcal R^{\pi_1}(T,\mu)\le\kappa_1\lceil N/C\rceil\log T+\bar K_1\qquad\text{for all }T,\text{ whenever }\kappa_1>\bar\kappa_1.Rπ1​(T,μ)≤κ1​⌈N/C⌉logT+Kˉ1​for all T, whenever κ1​>κˉ1​.

The leading term is explicit; the constants are existential, as in the paper.

Milestones

In the order in which the proof of Theorem 2 (Appendix A) uses them:

  1. Lemma 1. On a test assortment, the empirical purchase frequencies concentrate exponentially: the deviation event has probability ≤2e−c(ϵ)n\le 2e^{-c(\epsilon)n}≤2e−c(ϵ)n once the assortment has been offered nnn times, with c(ϵ)c(\epsilon)c(ϵ) independent of TTT.
  2. Display (9). ∥μ−μ^t∥Aj≤κ(ϵ)∥p−p^t∥Aj\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_{A_j}\le\kappa(\epsilon)\|p-\hat p_t\|_{A_j}∥μ−μ^​t​∥Aj​​≤κ(ϵ)∥p−p^​t​∥Aj​​ whenever the right-hand norm is small.
  3. Display (10). P{∥μ−μ^t∥Aj>ϵ, Tj(t)≥n}≤2∣Aj∣e−cn\mathbb P\{\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_{A_j}>\epsilon,\ T^j(t)\ge n\}\le2|A_j|e^{-cn}P{∥μ−μ^​t​∥Aj​​>ϵ, Tj(t)≥n}≤2∣Aj​∣e−cn.
  4. Display (11). ∣r(S,μ)−r(S,μ^t)∣≤∥w∥∞KC∥μ−μ^t∥S|r(S,\mu)-r(S,\hat\mu_t)|\le\|w\|_\infty KC\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_S∣r(S,μ)−r(S,μ^​t​)∣≤∥w∥∞​KC∥μ−μ^​t​∥S​.
  5. Display (12). Estimates within (2∥w∥∞KC)−1δ(μ)r(S∗(μ),μ)(2\|w\|_\infty KC)^{-1}\delta(\mu)r(S^*(\mu),\mu)(2∥w∥∞​KC)−1δ(μ)r(S∗(μ),μ) of μ\muμ on S∗(μ)∪S∗(μ^t)S^*(\mu)\cup S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ)∪S∗(μ^​t​) recover the optimal assortment.
  6. Step 3. In the exploitation phase, P{St≠S∗(μ)}≤∑Aj2∣Aj∣T−κ1c\mathbb P\{S_t\ne S^*(\mu)\}\le\sum_{A_j}2|A_j|T^{-\kappa_1c}P{St​=S∗(μ)}≤∑Aj​​2∣Aj​∣T−κ1​c.
  7. Final display. Rπ(T,μ)≤∑t=1TP{St≠S∗(μ)}\mathcal R^\pi(T,\mu)\le\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb P\{S_t\ne S^*(\mu)\}Rπ(T,μ)≤∑t=1T​P{St​=S∗(μ)}.

Significance

Theorem 2 shows that, under identifiability, the regret of the dynamic assortment problem grows logarithmically in the horizon, matching the order in TTT of the lower bound. It also shows that separating exploration from exploitation is enough to reach that order, provided the exploration length is tuned by a large enough κ1\kappa_1κ1​. The refined policies of the paper (Theorems 3 and 4) sharpen the constant in front of log⁡T\log TlogT and are proved in the online companion. The argument of Theorem 2 is their template: concentration of frequencies, stability of η\etaη, stability of the argmax, and a sum over customers.

The theorem is proved in the article. It has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A formal development would contain a finite model of a sequential choice process, a Hoeffding-type bound along policy-dependent sampling times, and a perturbation theory for random-utility choice models, and each of these is reusable for other assortment and revenue-management results.

Difficulty

The concentration step does not follow from an off-the-shelf bound for i.i.d. samples. The times at which a test assortment is offered are chosen by the policy, and the number of offers Tj(t)T^j(t)Tj(t) is random. The estimate μ^t\hat\mu_tμ^​t​ is a nonlinear function, η\etaη, of the frequencies, and η\etaη is only locally Lipschitz, so the frequency error must first be driven into the neighbourhood where the Lipschitz bound applies. The exploitation-phase assortment S∗(μ^t)S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ^​t​) may itself coincide with a test assortment and feed further data into (4). Finally, every constant (ccc, κ\kappaκ, ξ\xiξ) must be shown independent of TTT and κ1\kappa_1κ1​; without that uniformity the bound T1−κ1cT^{1-\kappa_1c}T1−κ1​c is not summable into a constant.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Products are Fin N (0-based), with 1≤C≤N1\le C\le N1≤C≤N and wi>0w_i>0wi​>0. The noise is a density f that is integrable, positive everywhere and of integral one, and F(x)=∫−∞xfF(x)=\int_{-\infty}^xfF(x)=∫−∞x​f. The choice probabilities are the paper's integral, with μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0 built in.
  • History law. The purchase history of TTT customers lives in the finite type Fin T → Option (Fin N). Its law under a policy is the product of the per-customer choice probabilities given the offered assortments. Every probability and expectation is a finite sum.
  • Policies. A policy maps each customer and the earlier purchases to an assortment. Algorithm 1 is defined for each κ1\kappa_1κ1​ and TTT, and the regret at horizon TTT is that of the policy built for TTT. Exploration offers the test assortments in consecutive blocks. μ^t\hat\mu_tμ^​t​ is recomputed for every exploitation customer from all earlier offers.
  • Optimal assortments. S∗S^*S∗ is any selection of maximizers at every vector, and the goal holds for every such selection. Uniqueness is assumed at the true μ\muμ only.
  • Hypotheses added or restated. Several are standing assumptions of §3–4 that Theorem 2's sentence does not repeat: wi>0w_i>0wi​>0, C≤NC\le NC≤N, μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0, uniqueness of the optimum, and the positive density. 1≤C1\le C1≤C is implicit on the page. Assumption 1 is restated per test assortment: an inverse ηAj\eta_{A_j}ηAj​​ on {ρ:ρi>0 (i∈Aj), ∑Ajρi<1}\{\rho:\rho_i>0\ (i\in A_j),\ \sum_{A_j}\rho_i<1\}{ρ:ρi​>0 (i∈Aj​), ∑Aj​​ρi​<1} replaces the page's convention ηi=−∞\eta_i=-\inftyηi​=−∞ for products outside AjA_jAj​. Lipschitz continuity is required of every p(S,⋅)p(S,\cdot)p(S,⋅), S∈SS\in\mathcal SS∈S, as the proof uses it, not only of p(N,⋅)p(\mathcal N,\cdot)p(N,⋅). The minimum relative optimality gap δ(μ)\delta(\mu)δ(μ) is defined locally, since its definition is in the online companion.
  • Corrections of the page. ∥ν∥A\|\nu\|_A∥ν∥A​ carries absolute values. Display (9) is claimed only for small ϵ\epsilonϵ. Line (b) of (10) is read with the sum over earlier customers. Step 3 is stated for the exploitation phase. The final display's step ∣A∣⌈κ1log⁡T⌉≤∣A∣κ1log⁡T|\mathcal A|\lceil\kappa_1\log T\rceil\le|\mathcal A|\kappa_1\log T∣A∣⌈κ1​logT⌉≤∣A∣κ1​logT loses the rounding, so Kˉ1=2N\bar K_1=2NKˉ1​=2N should read 2N+⌈N/C⌉2N+\lceil N/C\rceil2N+⌈N/C⌉. Theorem 2 asserts only that some finite Kˉ1\bar K_1Kˉ1​ exists, so the goal is unaffected.
  • Ruled out. The estimator is the paper's, η\etaη applied to the frequencies (4), not an oracle or a free parameter with a concentration hypothesis. The constants Kˉ1,κˉ1\bar K_1,\bar\kappa_1Kˉ1​,κˉ1​ and those of Lemma 1, (10) and Step 3 are quantified before κ1\kappa_1κ1​ and TTT. Letting them depend on TTT would make the goal trivial, since R≤T\mathcal R\le TR≤T always.
  • Needed infrastructure. Marginalization and conditioning for finite product laws, Hoeffding's inequality along stopping times (optional skipping), and Lipschitz estimates for integrals depending on parameters. Contributions of these as general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Sauré, A. Zeevi, Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(3):387–404, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2013.0429
  • P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. M. Shen, D. B. Shmoys, Dynamic Assortment Optimization with a Multinomial Logit Choice Model and Capacity Constraint, Operations Research 58(6):1666–1680, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0866
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Allocation Rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6(1):4–22, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • C. F. Daganzo, Multinomial Probit: The Theory and Its Application to Demand Forecasting, Academic Press, 1979.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects II: A Myopic Firm Underprices and Its Prices Converge MonotonicallyResearch Paper

Motivation

Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal expectation formed from the prices they have seen before. A price below the reference feels like a gain and raises demand, a price above it feels like a loss and lowers demand. Because today's price moves tomorrow's reference price, a firm facing such consumers solves a dynamic problem even when nothing else changes over time. The marketing and revenue management literature has studied this problem since the late 1980s, mostly for linear demand (Kopalle, Rao and Assunção 1996; Fibich, Gavious and Lowengart 2003).

Popescu and Wu (2007) analyse the problem for a general reference-dependent demand model, using structural assumptions (monotonicity, concavity, supermodularity) instead of a parametric form. Their Proposition 1 answers a practical question: what does a firm lose, and how does its behaviour differ, if it ignores the effect of current prices on future expectations? The answer is that such a myopic firm systematically charges too little, and its prices drift monotonically to a single level.

Setting

Prices lie in P=[0,pˉ]P = [0, \bar p]P=[0,pˉ​] with pˉ>0\bar p > 0pˉ​>0. The data are a base demand d(p)d(p)d(p), the demand when the price equals the reference price, and a reference effect R(x,r)R(x, r)R(x,r), the change in demand caused by a perceived gain x=r−px = r - px=r−p at reference price rrr. Demand is

D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r),D(p, r) = d(p) + R(r - p, r),D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r),

so R(0,r)=0R(0, r) = 0R(0,r)=0. Short-term profit is Π(p,r)=p D(p,r)\Pi(p, r) = p\,D(p, r)Π(p,r)=pD(p,r) (unit cost zero), base profit is π(p)=p d(p)\pi(p) = p\,d(p)π(p)=pd(p), reference profit is ΠR(p,r)=p R(r−p,r)\Pi^R(p, r) = p\,R(r - p, r)ΠR(p,r)=pR(r−p,r), and λ(r)=Rx(0,r)\lambda(r) = R_x(0, r)λ(r)=Rx​(0,r) is the slope of the reference effect at zero gain.

Reference prices follow exponential smoothing, memory equation (1): with memory α∈[0,1)\alpha \in [0, 1)α∈[0,1) and prices ptp_tpt​,

rt+1=α rt+(1−α) pt.r_{t+1} = \alpha\, r_t + (1 - \alpha)\, p_t .rt+1​=αrt​+(1−α)pt​.

The strategic firm maximises discounted profit with discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta \in (0, 1)β∈(0,1). Its value function is

V(r0)=sup⁡(pt)⊂P∑t≥0βt Π(pt,rt),V(r_0) = \sup_{(p_t) \subset P} \sum_{t \ge 0} \beta^t\, \Pi(p_t, r_t),V(r0​)=(pt​)⊂Psup​t≥0∑​βtΠ(pt​,rt​),

its Bellman objective is W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p)W(p, r) = \Pi(p, r) + \beta V(\alpha r + (1-\alpha) p)W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p), and its optimal price p∗(r)p^*(r)p∗(r) is the largest maximizer of W(⋅,r)W(\cdot, r)W(⋅,r) over PPP. The myopic price p~(r)\tilde p(r)p~​(r) is the largest maximizer of Π(⋅,r)\Pi(\cdot, r)Π(⋅,r) over PPP. From a common initial reference price r0r_0r0​, the strategic firm follows rt+1∗=αrt∗+(1−α)p∗(rt∗)r^*_{t+1} = \alpha r^*_t + (1-\alpha) p^*(r^*_t)rt+1∗​=αrt∗​+(1−α)p∗(rt∗​) and charges pt∗=p∗(rt∗)p^*_t = p^*(r^*_t)pt∗​=p∗(rt∗​); the myopic firm follows rt+1M=αrtM+(1−α)p~(rtM)r^M_{t+1} = \alpha r^M_t + (1-\alpha)\tilde p(r^M_t)rt+1M​=αrtM​+(1−α)p~​(rtM​) and charges ptM=p~(rtM)p^M_t = \tilde p(r^M_t)ptM​=p~​(rtM​).

The standing hypotheses are the paper's Assumption 1 (on P×PP \times PP×P, demand is nonnegative, bounded and continuous, decreasing in ppp and increasing in rrr, and RRR is increasing in the gain), Assumption 2 (RRR is twice differentiable), and Assumption 3 (π\piπ is nonmonotonic and concave on PPP; π′(r)−rλ(r)\pi'(r) - r\lambda(r)π′(r)−rλ(r) is strictly decreasing; ΠR\Pi^RΠR is concave in ppp and supermodular in (p,r)(p, r)(p,r)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (Myopic vs. Strategic Firm)

Under the hypotheses above:

∀r∈P: p~(r)≤p∗(r),∀r0∈P, ∀t: ptM≤pt∗,\forall r \in P:\ \tilde p(r) \le p^*(r), \qquad \forall r_0 \in P,\ \forall t:\ p^M_t \le p^*_t,∀r∈P: p~​(r)≤p∗(r),∀r0​∈P, ∀t: ptM​≤pt∗​, ∃ pM∗∈P  ∀r0∈P: (ptM)t is monotone and lim⁡t→∞ptM=pM∗.\exists\, p^{M*} \in P\ \ \forall r_0 \in P:\ (p^M_t)_t \text{ is monotone and } \lim_{t\to\infty} p^M_t = p^{M*}.∃pM∗∈P  ∀r0​∈P: (ptM​)t​ is monotone and t→∞lim​ptM​=pM∗.

The limit pM∗p^{M*}pM∗ is one price, the same for every initial reference price.

Milestones

  1. Remark 2. VVV is increasing on PPP (Assumption 1 only).
  2. Lemma 1. p~\tilde pp~​ is increasing on PPP.
  3. Pointwise underpricing (§A.1): p~(r)≤p∗(r)\tilde p(r) \le p^*(r)p~​(r)≤p∗(r) for every r∈Pr \in Pr∈P.
  4. Underpricing along paths (§A.1): rtM≤rt∗r^M_t \le r^*_trtM​≤rt∗​ and ptM≤pt∗p^M_t \le p^*_tptM​≤pt∗​ for all ttt.
  5. Monotone myopic paths (§A.1): if p~(r0)≥r0\tilde p(r_0) \ge r_0p~​(r0​)≥r0​ the path ptMp^M_tptM​ is increasing, and if p~(r0)≤r0\tilde p(r_0) \le r_0p~​(r0​)≤r0​ it is decreasing.
  6. Unique myopic steady state (§A.1): at most one p∈Pp \in Pp∈P satisfies p~(p)=p\tilde p(p) = pp~​(p)=p.

Significance

Proposition 1 shows that the error a myopic firm makes has a definite sign: it underprices at every state and at every date along its own trajectory, not only on average. The monotone convergence clause means the myopic firm's long-run behaviour is a single price independent of initial expectations, which the paper later uses to bound the strategic firm's steady-state price from below (Theorem 1, pM∗≤p∗∗p^{M*} \le p^{**}pM∗≤p∗∗). The result holds for general reference-dependent demand, which is what distinguishes it from the linear models that preceded it.

A formal development gives machine-checked versions of standard tools that recur throughout dynamic pricing and inventory theory: existence and monotonicity of the largest maximizer under supermodularity (Topkis' theorem on an interval), monotonicity of an infinite-horizon value function defined as a supremum over sequences, and monotone convergence of one-dimensional policy iterations. The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been formalized.

Difficulty

The value function is defined as a supremum over infinite price sequences, not as a given solution of a Bellman equation, so its monotonicity and the existence of a maximizer of W(⋅,r)W(\cdot, r)W(⋅,r) (which needs continuity of VVV) have to be established from the sequence problem. The comparison p~≤p∗\tilde p \le p^*p~​≤p∗ depends on the largest-maximizer convention: for arbitrary selections from the two argmax sets the inequality is false, because the sets can overlap without their chosen elements being ordered. The two firms move along different reference-price paths, so the path comparison is not a pointwise statement about one state. Uniqueness of the limit has to cover fixed points of p~\tilde pp~​ at the endpoints of PPP, where the first-order condition is only an inequality, and the limit of a myopic path is a priori only a maximizer of Π(⋅,pM∗)\Pi(\cdot, p^{M*})Π(⋅,pM∗), not necessarily the largest one.

Formalization scope

The data are functions d:R→Rd : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}d:R→R and R:R→R→RR : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}R:R→R→R; demand is defined from them, and R(0,r)=0R(0, r) = 0R(0,r)=0 is a hypothesis. The price set is Set.Icc 0 pbar. VVV is a real ⨆ over sequences N→[0,pˉ]\mathbb{N} \to [0, \bar p]N→[0,pˉ​] of a tsum; under the hypotheses the family is bounded and every series summable, so the default values of ⨆ and ∑' on unbounded or non-summable input are not reached. Both p∗p^*p∗ and p~\tilde pp~​ are defined as sSup of their sets of maximizers over PPP, which is the paper's largest-maximizer convention. That these sets are nonempty is a proof obligation, not a hypothesis. The myopic firm is defined directly from Π\PiΠ, not as problem (2) with β=0\beta = 0β=0.

"Increasing" and "decreasing" are non-strict. "Nonmonotonic" means neither monotone nor antitone on PPP. "Twice differentiable" means RRR and its Fréchet derivative are differentiable on R2\mathbb{R}^2R2. Supermodularity of ΠR\Pi^RΠR is the increasing-differences inequality on P×PP \times PP×P. One hypothesis is added to the paper's: ddd is differentiable, because Assumption 3(b) refers to π′\pi'π′ and Lean's deriv returns 000 where a function is not differentiable. Assumptions 2 and 3 hold throughout §§4.1–4.3, so they are hypotheses of every §4 item. They are not hypotheses of Remark 2, which is in §3.

A formalization in which VVV is an arbitrary increasing function, or p∗p^*p∗ an arbitrary maximizer satisfying p∗≥p~p^* \ge \tilde pp∗≥p~​ by hypothesis, would make the goal trivial. The definitions here rule it out, because VVV, p∗p^*p∗, p~\tilde pp~​ and both paths are all computed from (d,R,α,β,pˉ)(d, R, \alpha, \beta, \bar p)(d,R,α,β,pˉ​). The convergence clause quantifies the limit before the initial state, so a statement in which each path merely converges would not satisfy it. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: pˉ=3/4\bar p = 3/4pˉ​=3/4, d(p)=1−pd(p) = 1 - pd(p)=1−p, R(x,r)=x/4R(x, r) = x/4R(x,r)=x/4 satisfies all of them.

A complete development needs Topkis-type monotone comparative statics on intervals, continuity and monotonicity of the value function of a bounded discounted problem, and elementary facts on monotone bounded sequences. The first two are reusable across dynamic pricing, inventory and queueing-control missions, and contributions of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Popescu and Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3):413–429, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • N. L. Stokey, R. E. Lucas and E. C. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, 1989. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjnrt76
  • P. K. Kopalle, A. G. Rao and J. L. Assunção, Asymmetric Reference Price Effects and Dynamic Pricing Policies, Marketing Science 15(1):60–85, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.15.1.60
  • G. Fibich, A. Gavious and O. Lowengart, Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects, Operations Research 51(5):721–734, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.5.721.16758
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management III: Under MNL, Offering the Top-Ranked Products Solves the Offer-Set ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rail operators sell many products (itinerary–fare combinations) that share scarce capacity. When customers choose among whatever is on offer, the seller's lever is the offer set: the subset of products made available at each moment. Choice-based network revenue management, as set up by Liu and van Ryzin (2008), optimizes over offer sets through the choice-based deterministic linear program (CDLP), whose columns are indexed by all 2n2^n2n subsets of the nnn products. Solving it by column generation requires, at every iteration, a subproblem that picks the best offer set against the current dual prices; the paper's decomposition heuristic needs subproblems of the same form.

For a general choice model this subproblem is a hard combinatorial optimization. Under the multinomial logit (MNL) model with disjoint customer segments it separates by segment, and each segment's problem is solved by ranking the products. This observation is the reason the CDLP is computationally practical under MNL, and it is the content of Proposition 6 of the paper. The same structural fact, that under MNL the optimal assortment is revenue-ordered, was shown by Gallego, Iyengar, Phillips and Dubey (2004) and is related to the single-leg analysis of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). It underlies a large later literature on assortment optimization.

Setting

Fix one customer segment. Its consideration set is a finite set ι\iotaι of products, of size sss. Each product j∈ιj \in \iotaj∈ι has an MNL preference weight vj>0v_j > 0vj​>0, and not buying has a no-purchase weight v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0. When the set S⊆ιS \subseteq \iotaS⊆ι is offered, a customer of the segment buys j∈Sj \in Sj∈S with probability

Pj(S)=vj∑i∈Svi+v0.P_j(S) = \frac{v_j}{\sum_{i \in S} v_i + v_0}.Pj​(S)=∑i∈S​vi​+v0​vj​​.

Each product also carries a real score wjw_jwj​; in the paper's application wj=rj−π⊤Ajw_j = r_j - \pi^\top A_jwj​=rj​−π⊤Aj​ is the product's revenue minus the dual prices of the legs it uses, so wjw_jwj​ may be negative. The expected score per customer when SSS is offered is

f(S)=∑j∈Swjvj∑j∈Svj+v0,f(S) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S} w_j v_j}{\sum_{j \in S} v_j + v_0},f(S)=∑j∈S​vj​+v0​∑j∈S​wj​vj​​,

and the offer-set problem (the paper's (14)) is max⁡S⊆ιf(S)\max_{S \subseteq \iota} f(S)maxS⊆ι​f(S). The paper writes offer sets as binary vectors y∈{0,1}sy \in \{0,1\}^sy∈{0,1}s with yj=1y_j = 1yj​=1 iff jjj is offered; the formalization uses subsets.

The paper's proof passes through the relaxation (17): with zj=vjyjz_j = v_j y_jzj​=vj​yj​ allowed to range over the whole interval [0,vj][0, v_j][0,vj​], maximize

h(z)=∑jwjzj∑jzj+v0h(z) = \frac{\sum_j w_j z_j}{\sum_j z_j + v_0}h(z)=∑j​zj​+v0​∑j​wj​zj​​

over the box D=[0,v1]×⋯×[0,vs]\mathcal{D} = [0, v_1] \times \cdots \times [0, v_s]D=[0,v1​]×⋯×[0,vs​]. When v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 the paper sets h(0):=0h(0) := 0h(0):=0 (and likewise f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0).

In Lean, mnlObjective v w v₀ S is f(S)f(S)f(S) and relaxedObjective w v₀ z is h(z)h(z)h(z); the box is Set.Icc 0 v in the componentwise order.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6, the top-ranked products are an optimal offer set

Assume vj>0v_j > 0vj​>0 for all jjj, v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0, and that some score is nonnegative. Then there is a product k∈ιk \in \iotak∈ι such that

f(S)  ≤  f({j∈ι:wj≥wk})for every S⊆ι.f(S) \;\le\; f\bigl(\{ j \in \iota : w_j \ge w_k \}\bigr) \qquad \text{for every } S \subseteq \iota.f(S)≤f({j∈ι:wj​≥wk​})for every S⊆ι.

Here wkw_kwk​ is the paper's w[k∗]w_{[k^*]}w[k∗]​, the k∗k^*k∗-th largest score; the threshold set contains every product tied with it.

Milestones (all from the Appendix, proof of Proposition 6, p. 309)

  1. Claim (17). The relaxation has the same optimal value: max⁡z∈Dh(z)=max⁡S⊆ιf(S)\max_{z \in \mathcal{D}} h(z) = \max_{S \subseteq \iota} f(S)maxz∈D​h(z)=maxS⊆ι​f(S), both maxima attained.
  2. Quasiconvexity. hhh is quasiconvex on D\mathcal{D}D, including the case v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 with h(0):=0h(0) := 0h(0):=0.
  3. Nested relaxed optimum. If w1≥⋯≥wsw_1 \ge \cdots \ge w_sw1​≥⋯≥ws​ and some wi≥0w_i \ge 0wi​≥0, there is 1≤i∗≤s1 \le i^* \le s1≤i∗≤s such that z∗=(v1,…,vi∗,0,…,0)z^* = (v_1, \dots, v_{i^*}, 0, \dots, 0)z∗=(v1​,…,vi∗​,0,…,0) is an optimal solution of the relaxation.

Significance

The result. Proposition 6 reduces a search over 2s2^s2s offer sets to a search over at most sss nested sets, one per possible threshold. Under MNL with disjoint segments, it lets the CDLP column-generation subproblem, and the inner offer-set problems of the leg-level dynamic programs in the decomposition heuristic, be solved by checking at most sss candidate sets per segment, sss being the size of the segment's consideration set. Revenue-ordered assortments are the reference point against which later models (nested logit, mixtures of logits, constrained assortments) are measured.

Formalizing it. The proposition is proved on paper, twice (Gallego et al. 2004; Liu and van Ryzin 2008, Appendix), and no machine-checked version is known to the platform. The mission produces a checked statement of the ranking property with its hypotheses made exact, including the case the printed statement gets wrong (see below), and the supporting facts about the linear-fractional relaxation: that the box relaxation loses nothing, and that its objective is quasiconvex. These facts about ratios of affine functions over boxes are reusable beyond revenue management, for instance in fractional combinatorial optimization.

Difficulty

The objective is a ratio, so neither the numerator nor the denominator can be optimized alone, and adding a product with a positive score can lower fff by diluting the probability mass of better products. The optimal threshold is not a fixed number such as 000: it depends on the optimal value itself. A proof must therefore relate every one of the 2s2^s2s offer sets to a threshold set without enumerating them. Ties among scores, ties between a score and the optimal value, and the degenerate case v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 (where the denominator vanishes at the empty offer set) all have to be handled; in the relaxation, ties make interior points optimal, so an argument that every optimum is a vertex of the box is false.

Formalization scope

  • Offer sets are subsets S : Finset ι of a finite type ι (the consideration set); the binary vectors of the paper correspond one-to-one. The milestone on sorted scores uses Fin s with Antitone w, so indices are 0-based and i∗i^*i∗ is an element of Fin s.
  • Ranking. The goal does not formalize a sorting permutation: "wj≥w[k∗]w_j \ge w_{[k^*]}wj​≥w[k∗]​ for some 1≤k∗≤s1 \le k^* \le s1≤k∗≤s" is stated as "wj≥wkw_j \ge w_kwj​≥wk​ for some product kkk". With ties this is exactly the printed rule; it is not "the first k∗k^*k∗ products of a chosen sort order", which differs under ties.
  • Optimality means "is an optimal solution": the chosen set (or point) is compared with every S⊆ιS \subseteq \iotaS⊆ι (every z∈Dz \in \mathcal{D}z∈D). Uniqueness is not claimed, since ties produce several optima.
  • Division by zero. v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 is allowed, as in the paper's numerical study; the only zero denominator is at S=∅S = \emptysetS=∅ (or z=0z = 0z=0), where Lean's 0/0=00/0 = 00/0=0 implements the paper's convention h(0):=0h(0) := 0h(0):=0.
  • Repair. As printed, Proposition 6 (and the nested optimum in its proof) requires 1≤k∗1 \le k^*1≤k∗, i.e. a nonempty offer set, and is false when every score is negative: for s=1s = 1s=1, w1=−1w_1 = -1w1​=−1, v1=v0=1v_1 = v_0 = 1v1​=v0​=1, the empty set has value 000 and the only admissible set has value −1/2-1/2−1/2. Such scores occur in the paper's own application. The goal and milestone 3 therefore add the hypothesis that some score is nonnegative. The hypothesis is not strengthened to "all scores nonnegative", which would exclude the cases the column-generation subproblem actually meets.
  • Ruling out trivializations. The objective is the full MNL ratio with v0v_0v0​ in the denominator, the comparison ranges over every subset (not only threshold sets), and the consideration set is arbitrary, so the goal cannot be discharged by checking nested sets against each other or by a special case.
  • Infrastructure. Mathlib's QuasiconvexOn (and QuasilinearOn) and Finset sums suffice; there is no Mathlib lemma on quasiconvexity of linear-fractional functions, which milestone 2 would supply. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative routes to the goal that bypass the relaxation, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin. On the choice-based linear programming model for network revenue management. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2):288–310, 2008. doi:10.1287/msom.1070.0169
  • G. Gallego, G. Iyengar, R. Phillips, A. Dubey. Managing flexible products on a network. CORC Technical Report TR-2004-01, Columbia University, 2004. CORC technical reports
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin. Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior. Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • M. Avriel. Nonlinear Programming: Analysis and Methods. Prentice Hall, 1976.
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Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management II: Only Efficient Offer Sets Carry Time in an Optimal CDLP SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rail operators sell many products (an itinerary combined with a fare class) that share a network of finite resources (flight legs, room-nights). When customers choose among whatever products are on offer, the firm's control is no longer "accept or reject a request for product jjj" but which set of products to offer at each moment. The exact dynamic program for this problem is intractable for realistic networks, so practice and theory rely on a deterministic approximation, the choice-based deterministic linear program (CDLP) of Gallego, Iyengar, Phillips and Dubey (2004), which decides for how long each offer set should be offered.

The CDLP has one variable per offer set, so 2n2^n2n variables for nnn products, and it is solved by column generation. Knowing in advance which offer sets can never receive positive time in an optimal solution cuts this search space. Liu and van Ryzin (MSOM 2008) extended the single-leg notion of an efficient offer set from Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science 2004) to networks and showed that only efficient sets are used by an optimal CDLP solution. This mission formalizes that section of their paper (§5).

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn products N={1,…,n}N = \{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Product jjj earns revenue rjr_jrj​, and the 0–1 incidence matrix A=[aij]A = [a_{ij}]A=[aij​] records which legs product jjj uses. An offer set is a subset S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N. When SSS is offered, an arriving customer buys product jjj with probability Pj(S)≥0P_j(S) \ge 0Pj​(S)≥0, where Pj(S)=0P_j(S) = 0Pj​(S)=0 for j∉Sj \notin Sj∈/S, and buys nothing with probability P0(S)≥0P_0(S) \ge 0P0​(S)≥0, with ∑j∈SPj(S)+P0(S)=1\sum_{j\in S} P_j(S) + P_0(S) = 1∑j∈S​Pj​(S)+P0​(S)=1. The expected revenue per arriving customer and the vector of expected capacity consumption are

R(S)=∑j∈SrjPj(S),Q(S)=A P(S)∈Rm.R(S) = \sum_{j\in S} r_j P_j(S), \qquad Q(S) = A\,P(S) \in \mathbb{R}^m .R(S)=j∈S∑​rj​Pj​(S),Q(S)=AP(S)∈Rm.

An offer set TTT is inefficient if some convex weights α(S)≥0\alpha(S) \ge 0α(S)≥0, ∑Sα(S)=1\sum_S \alpha(S) = 1∑S​α(S)=1, over all offer sets satisfy

R(T)<∑Sα(S)R(S),Q(T)≥∑Sα(S)Q(S) (componentwise);R(T) < \sum_S \alpha(S) R(S), \qquad Q(T) \ge \sum_S \alpha(S) Q(S) \ \text{(componentwise)};R(T)<S∑​α(S)R(S),Q(T)≥S∑​α(S)Q(S) (componentwise);

otherwise TTT is efficient.

With arrival probability λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1] per period, capacities c∈R≥0mc \in \mathbb{R}^m_{\ge 0}c∈R≥0m​ and a horizon of length τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0, the CDLP is

max⁡∑S⊆NλR(S) t(S)s.t.∑SλQ(S) t(S)≤c,∑St(S)≤τ,t(S)≥0,\max \sum_{S\subseteq N} \lambda R(S)\,t(S) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_{S} \lambda Q(S)\,t(S) \le c,\quad \sum_S t(S) \le \tau,\quad t(S) \ge 0,maxS⊆N∑​λR(S)t(S)s.t.S∑​λQ(S)t(S)≤c,S∑​t(S)≤τ,t(S)≥0,

where t(S)t(S)t(S) is the total time during which SSS is offered. Its dual has prices π∈R≥0m\pi \in \mathbb{R}^m_{\ge 0}π∈R≥0m​ on the legs and σ≥0\sigma \ge 0σ≥0 on time. Finally, the frontier function is

Rˉ(q)=max⁡α{∑Sα(S)R(S):∑Sα(S)Q(S)≤q, ∑Sα(S)=1, α≥0},q∈[0,1]m.\bar R(q) = \max_\alpha\Big\{\sum_S \alpha(S)R(S) : \sum_S \alpha(S)Q(S) \le q,\ \sum_S\alpha(S) = 1,\ \alpha \ge 0\Big\}, \qquad q \in [0,1]^m .Rˉ(q)=αmax​{S∑​α(S)R(S):S∑​α(S)Q(S)≤q, S∑​α(S)=1, α≥0},q∈[0,1]m.

In the Lean development these objects are ChoiceNetwork m n (with revenue and consumption), IsEfficient, IsCDLPFeasible / cdlpObjective / IsCDLPOptimal, and frontier, all in the namespace ChoiceCDLP.Efficient.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4

If t∗t^*t∗ is an optimal solution of the CDLP and TTT is an offer set with t∗(T)>0t^*(T) > 0t∗(T)>0, then TTT is efficient:

t∗ optimal for the CDLP,  t∗(T)>0 ⟹ T efficient.t^* \text{ optimal for the CDLP},\ \ t^*(T) > 0 \ \Longrightarrow\ T \text{ efficient}.t∗ optimal for the CDLP,  t∗(T)>0 ⟹ T efficient.

The statement covers every optimal solution, not only basic ones.

Milestones

  1. Frontier function (Appendix, p. 307): Rˉ\bar RRˉ is increasing and concave on [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m.
  2. Proposition 3 (p. 296): TTT is efficient if and only if, for some π≥0\pi \ge 0π≥0, TTT maximizes R(S)−π⊤Q(S)R(S) - \pi^\top Q(S)R(S)−π⊤Q(S) over all offer sets SSS.
  3. Reduced cost at the optimal dual (proof of Proposition 4, p. 296): if t∗t^*t∗ is optimal and t∗(T)>0t^*(T) > 0t∗(T)>0, some optimal dual solution (π∗,σ∗)(\pi^*,\sigma^*)(π∗,σ∗) satisfies λR(S)−λπ∗⊤Q(S)−σ∗≤0\lambda R(S) - \lambda \pi^{*\top}Q(S) - \sigma^* \le 0λR(S)−λπ∗⊤Q(S)−σ∗≤0 for every SSS, with equality at S=TS = TS=T.
  4. Proposition 5 (p. 297): for efficient S1,S2S_1, S_2S1​,S2​, Q(S2)≥Q(S1)Q(S_2) \ge Q(S_1)Q(S2​)≥Q(S1​) implies R(S2)≥R(S1)R(S_2) \ge R(S_1)R(S2​)≥R(S1​).

Significance

Proposition 4 says that efficiency is a property of every offer set an optimal CDLP solution actually uses. Inefficient sets can therefore be removed from the column space of the CDLP, and Proposition 3 describes the remaining sets as the maximizers of revenue net of leg prices, which is the pricing subproblem of column generation. The paper also uses Proposition 4 to argue that its asymptotically optimal policy (Proposition 2 of the same paper) uses only efficient sets. Proposition 5 gives the partial order of efficient sets in the network, the analogue of the total order that drives nested policies in the single-leg model.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. A formalization provides a checked statement of the network notion of efficiency and its price characterization, which the single-leg results already on the platform do not cover (there Q(S)Q(S)Q(S) is a scalar), and a checked link between LP duality for the CDLP and the structure of its optimal solutions.

Difficulty

The paper's proof of Proposition 4 appeals to "the optimal basis" of the CDLP, while the statement is about every optimal solution, including non-basic ones, so the simplex-tableau argument as written does not cover the statement; the existence of optimal dual prices with the required reduced-cost properties has to be established for an arbitrary optimal solution. The "only if" half of Proposition 3 is argued in the paper by a supporting hyperplane to the concave function Rˉ\bar RRˉ at Q(T)Q(T)Q(T), followed by an informal argument that the hyperplane's slope is nonnegative; Q(T)Q(T)Q(T) may lie on the boundary of [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m, where a supporting hyperplane of a concave function need not exist in the naive sense, and the sign argument is stated in one line. Concavity of Rˉ\bar RRˉ is the concavity of an LP's optimal value in its right-hand side, which the paper cites from Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis without proof and which Mathlib does not provide.

Formalization scope

  • Products and legs are Fin n and Fin m; offer sets are Finset (Fin n), so sums over "all S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N" are sums over Finset.univ. All quantities are real. Vector inequalities (Q(T)≥∑Sα(S)Q(S)Q(T) \ge \sum_S\alpha(S)Q(S)Q(T)≥∑S​α(S)Q(S), c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, π≥0\pi \ge 0π≥0, Q(S2)≥Q(S1)Q(S_2) \ge Q(S_1)Q(S2​)≥Q(S1​)) are componentwise, and π⊤Q(S)\pi^\top Q(S)π⊤Q(S) is dotProduct.
  • The choice probabilities are generic, as in the paper: nonnegative, zero outside the offer set, and summing with P0(S)P_0(S)P0​(S) to one. Revenues are arbitrary reals.
  • The CDLP horizon is written τ\tauτ (the paper's TTT) to keep TTT for an offer set. "An optimal solution" is a feasible ttt whose objective is at least that of every feasible vector.
  • Repairs of the printed statements. (i) In Propositions 3 and 4, "TTT is the optimal solution" is read as "TTT is an optimal solution": with a unique-maximizer reading, Proposition 3's "only if" direction is false whenever two offer sets have the same RRR and QQQ (for instance, T′T'T′ is TTT plus a product that is never bought from T′T'T′); both are then efficient, and neither is a unique maximizer. (ii) Proposition 4 assumes λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, the paper's standing assumption that λ\lambdaλ is an arrival probability; at λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 every feasible ttt is optimal and inefficient sets can receive positive time. The milestone texts remain verbatim.
  • Rˉ\bar RRˉ is a real supremum (sSup) over attainable mixed revenues; on [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m the set is nonempty (the weight concentrated on the empty offer set is feasible because Q(∅)=0Q(\emptyset) = 0Q(∅)=0) and bounded above by max⁡SR(S)\max_S R(S)maxS​R(S), so it is the paper's maximum.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: efficiency quantifies over all convex weights on offer sets (not only single dominating sets), the price vector in Proposition 3 is required to be nonnegative, and the optimum in Proposition 4 is over the full feasible set of the CDLP.
  • A complete development needs finite-dimensional LP duality with complementary slackness (or Farkas' lemma) and concavity of the optimal value of a parametric LP. Both are reusable well beyond this mission; contributions of either as standalone results are welcome.

Selected references

  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin, On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2):288–310, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0169
  • G. Gallego, G. Iyengar, R. Phillips, A. Dubey, Managing Flexible Products on a Network, CORC Technical Report TR-2004-01, Columbia University, 2004 (no DOI; cited as Gallego et al. 2004 in the paper).
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997 (Theorem 5.1, p. 213).
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The d-Level Nested Logit Model: Assortment and Price Optimization Problems I: The Optimal Assortment Offers Each Product Whose Revenue Meets Its Parent's ThresholdResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among what is offered. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximizes expected revenue when customer choice follows a given probabilistic model. Under the multinomial logit model the answer has a simple shape: an optimal assortment is revenue ordered, i.e. it consists of all products whose revenue exceeds some threshold (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). The multinomial logit model treats all products as equally substitutable, and nested logit models relax this by grouping products into nests whose utilities are correlated.

The ddd-level nested logit model organizes the products as the leaves of a tree with ddd levels, each level refining the grouping of the previous one (for instance category, brand, size). Li, Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 63(2), 2015) characterized an optimal assortment under this model for every ddd. Timeline: the one-level case (multinomial logit) is due to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004); the two-level case with an arbitrary number of nests is due to Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (2014); Li, Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (2015) treat arbitrary depth ddd. This mission formalizes the 2015 characterization and the three statements of §4 of that paper that lead to it.

Setting

There are nnn products 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n and a no-purchase option 000. A product tree TTT is a finite rooted tree with ddd levels whose leaves are exactly the n+1n+1n+1 products: the leaves 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n lie at depth ddd, and leaf 000 is a child of the root. Each node jjj other than the root has a parent Parent(j)\mathrm{Parent}(j)Parent(j); Children(j)\mathrm{Children}(j)Children(j) is the set of its children, and Nj⊆{0,…,n}N_j\subseteq\{0,\dots,n\}Nj​⊆{0,…,n} is the set of leaves below jjj. Each nonleaf node carries a nest parameter ηj∈(0,1]\eta_j\in(0,1]ηj​∈(0,1], with ηroot=0\eta_{\mathrm{root}}=0ηroot​=0. Each product carries an attractiveness vl>0v_l>0vl​>0, and each product l≥1l\ge1l≥1 a revenue rl∈Rr_l\in\mathbb Rrl​∈R.

An assortment is a set S⊆{1,…,n}S\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}S⊆{1,…,n}; the no-purchase option is always available. The preference weight of a node is defined bottom-up: Vl=vlV_l=v_lVl​=vl​ at an offered product leaf, Vl=0V_l=0Vl​=0 at a product leaf that is not offered, V0=v0V_0=v_0V0​=v0​, and at a nonleaf node

Vj(Sj)=(∑k∈Children(j)Vk(Sk))ηj,V_j(S_j)=\Big(\sum_{k\in\mathrm{Children}(j)}V_k(S_k)\Big)^{\eta_j},Vj​(Sj​)=(k∈Children(j)∑​Vk​(Sk​))ηj​,

so Vroot=1V_{\mathrm{root}}=1Vroot​=1. A customer at a nonleaf node jjj moves to child kkk with probability Vk/∑lVlV_k/\sum_{l}V_lVk​/∑l​Vl​. The expected revenue from a customer at node jjj is Rl=rlR_l=r_lRl​=rl​ at an offered product leaf, 000 at an unoffered leaf and at leaf 000, and

Rj(Sj)=∑k∈Children(j)Vk(Sk)Rk(Sk)∑k∈Children(j)Vk(Sk)R_j(S_j)=\frac{\sum_{k\in\mathrm{Children}(j)}V_k(S_k)R_k(S_k)}{\sum_{k\in\mathrm{Children}(j)}V_k(S_k)}Rj​(Sj​)=∑k∈Children(j)​Vk​(Sk​)∑k∈Children(j)​Vk​(Sk​)Rk​(Sk​)​

at a nonleaf node. The assortment problem is

Z∗=max⁡S⊆{1,…,n}Rroot(Sroot).(3)Z^*=\max_{S\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}}R_{\mathrm{root}}(S_{\mathrm{root}}).\tag{3}Z∗=S⊆{1,…,n}max​Rroot​(Sroot​).(3)

Given an optimal assortment S∗S^*S∗, the thresholds tj∗t^*_jtj∗​ are computed top-down by

tj∗=max⁡{tParent(j)∗, ηjtParent(j)∗+(1−ηj)Rj(Sj∗)},tParent(root)∗=0,t^*_j=\max\{t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(j)},\ \eta_jt^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(j)}+(1-\eta_j)R_j(S^*_j)\},\qquad t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(\mathrm{root})}=0,tj∗​=max{tParent(j)∗​, ηj​tParent(j)∗​+(1−ηj​)Rj​(Sj∗​)},tParent(root)∗​=0,

and the local problem at node jjj is

max⁡Sj⊆Nj Vj(Sj)(Rj(Sj)−tParent(j)∗).(4)\max_{S_j\subseteq N_j}\ V_j(S_j)\big(R_j(S_j)-t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(j)}\big).\tag{4}Sj​⊆Nj​max​ Vj​(Sj​)(Rj​(Sj​)−tParent(j)∗​).(4)

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 4.3 (revenue comparison)

For every product tree and parameters in the ranges above, and for every optimal assortment S∗S^*S∗ with its thresholds t∗t^*t∗,

S^={ l∈{1,…,n}: rl≥tParent(l)∗ }satisfiesRroot(Sroot)≤Rroot(S^root)  for all S⊆{1,…,n}.\hat S=\{\,l\in\{1,\dots,n\}:\ r_l\ge t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(l)}\,\}\quad\text{satisfies}\quad R_{\mathrm{root}}(S_{\mathrm{root}})\le R_{\mathrm{root}}(\hat S_{\mathrm{root}})\ \text{ for all } S\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}.S^={l∈{1,…,n}: rl​≥tParent(l)∗​}satisfiesRroot​(Sroot​)≤Rroot​(S^root​)  for all S⊆{1,…,n}.

Milestones

  • Proposition 4.1. For an optimal S∗S^*S∗ and every node jjj, Sj∗=S∗∩NjS^*_j=S^*\cap N_jSj∗​=S∗∩Nj​ is an optimal solution of the local problem (4) at jjj.
  • The root observation (§4, p. 329). The objective of the local problem at the root equals RrootR_{\mathrm{root}}Rroot​, and a set solves the local problem at the root exactly when it solves (3).
  • Theorem 4.2. At a nonleaf node jjj, if S^k⊆Nk\hat S_k\subseteq N_kS^k​⊆Nk​ solves the local problem at each child kkk, then ⋃k∈Children(j)S^k\bigcup_{k\in\mathrm{Children}(j)}\hat S_k⋃k∈Children(j)​S^k​ solves the local problem at jjj.

Significance

The corollary says that an optimal assortment is determined by one comparison per product: a product is offered exactly when its revenue reaches a threshold attached to its parent node. Within each group of sibling products the optimal assortment is therefore revenue ordered, which reduces the search from 2n2^n2n subsets to a structured family, and it is the basis of the paper's polynomial-time algorithm (§5). For one level it recovers the revenue-ordered result for multinomial logit, and for two levels the characterization of Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (2014). Theorem 4.2, the synthesis of local solutions, is the property that makes a bottom-up dynamic program over the tree correct.

The result is proved in the paper; the proofs of Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 are in its online appendix. No machine-checked version of any nested logit assortment result is known to exist. A formalization would give a verified statement of the model itself (recursive preference weights with real exponents, conditional revenues, top-down thresholds), which is reusable for the paper's pricing results and for other tree-structured choice models.

Difficulty

The objective RrootR_{\mathrm{root}}Rroot​ is a nested ratio of sums raised to fractional powers, neither concave nor monotone in the offer set, so the usual exchange argument for revenue-ordered sets does not apply directly: adding a product to a nest changes that nest's weight, and through the exponents ηj\eta_jηj​ the weight of every ancestor. The thresholds tj∗t^*_jtj∗​ are defined from an optimal assortment that is not known in advance, so every statement is a property of an unknown optimum rather than a computation. The local problems couple across levels only through these thresholds, and relating the optimum of the problem at a node to the optima at its children is the step that requires work. A proof that tries to compare S^\hat SS^ with S∗S^*S∗ product by product meets the fact that S^\hat SS^ and S∗S^*S∗ may differ at ties.

Formalization scope

The tree is a structure ProductTree n with a finite node type, a root, a parent map, a depth function (root at depth 000, children one level deeper, all depths at most ddd, product leaves at depth exactly ddd, leaf 000 a child of the root) and an injective leaf map Fin (n + 1) → Node. Assortments are finsets of Fin (n + 1) not containing 000; the no-purchase leaf always contributes v0v_0v0​. Preference weights use Real.rpow, so x0=1x^0=1x0=1 gives Vroot=1V_{\mathrm{root}}=1Vroot​=1. Conventions fixed in Lean and silent on the page:

  • ηroot=0\eta_{\mathrm{root}}=0ηroot​=0 and ηj∈(0,1]\eta_j\in(0,1]ηj​∈(0,1] at the other nonleaf nodes (StandingEta);
  • v0,…,vn>0v_0,\dots,v_n>0v0​,…,vn​>0 is a hypothesis of every theorem: the page never states a sign, but the model presupposes it, and it makes every denominator in (2) positive; revenues carry no sign condition;
  • Rj(∅)=0R_j(\emptyset)=0Rj​(∅)=0 at a nonleaf node whose subtree offers nothing (Lean's x / 0 = 0 on the page's 0/00/00/0); in t∗t^*t∗ this value yields tj∗=tParent(j)∗t^*_j=t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(j)}tj∗​=tParent(j)∗​;
  • the thresholds are a function of the given optimal S∗S^*S∗, and the goal holds for every optimal S∗S^*S∗;
  • optimality means "no assortment has larger objective", with a finite quantifier, never a supremum.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the thresholds are not free parameters or computed from S^\hat SS^, and the conclusion is optimality of S^\hat SS^ against every assortment, not an existence statement.

A complete development needs facts about the recursive definitions (unfolding at leaves and nonleaf nodes, Nroot={0,…,n}N_{\mathrm{root}}=\{0,\dots,n\}Nroot​={0,…,n}, disjointness of the NkN_kNk​ of siblings), monotonicity and concavity properties of x↦xηx\mapsto x^{\eta}x↦xη on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) from Mathlib, and induction over the tree by depth. Tree-induction lemmas and the model layer are reusable by the companion pricing mission. Contributions of a proof of any milestone, of alternative proofs of Theorem 4.2, and of the special cases d=1d=1d=1 and d=2d=2d=2 are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Li, P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, The d-Level Nested Logit Model: Assortment and Price Optimization Problems, Operations Research 63(2):325–341, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1355
  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization Under Variants of the Nested Logit Model, Operations Research 62(2):250–273, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies II: Sufficient Conditions for Square-Root-Times-Log Regret of Least Squares PricingResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who does not know its demand curve has to learn it from the sales it makes. Each price it charges earns revenue now and also produces information for later. This learning-and-earning problem is basic to revenue management and online retail. The most common heuristic is certainty-equivalence pricing: fit the demand model by least squares, then charge the price that would be optimal if the fit were exact. The heuristic can fail. Its prices may settle at a wrong value, so that estimation stops improving, a phenomenon called incomplete learning (Lai and Robbins 1982; den Boer and Zwart 2013). The regret then grows linearly in the horizon.

Keskin and Zeevi (2014) first show that no policy can have regret below order T\sqrt TT​ (the subject of the first mission in this series). They then give two simple, checkable conditions on a policy's price path that guarantee regret of order Tlog⁡T\sqrt T \log TT​logT. The conditions cover a whole family of modified least squares policies, including the "MLE-cycle" policy of Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) and the "controlled variance" policy of den Boer and Zwart. This mission formalizes those sufficient conditions (Theorem 2 of the paper).

Setting

A seller charges prices pt∈[l,u]p_t \in [l,u]pt​∈[l,u], 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u, in periods t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… and observes the demand

Dt=α+βpt+εt.D_t = \alpha + \beta p_t + \varepsilon_t .Dt​=α+βpt​+εt​.

The unknown parameter θ=(α,β)\theta = (\alpha,\beta)θ=(α,β) lies in a rectangle Θ=[amin⁡,amax⁡]×[bmin⁡,bmax⁡]\Theta = [a_{\min},a_{\max}]\times[b_{\min},b_{\max}]Θ=[amin​,amax​]×[bmin​,bmax​] with bmax⁡<0b_{\max} < 0bmax​<0. The demand shocks εt\varepsilon_tεt​ are i.i.d. with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0, and they are light-tailed: E[ezεt]<∞\mathbb{E}[e^{z\varepsilon_t}] < \inftyE[ezεt​]<∞ for ∣z∣≤z0|z| \le z_0∣z∣≤z0​, for some z0>0z_0 > 0z0​>0. The expected revenue is rθ(p)=p(α+βp)r_\theta(p) = p(\alpha+\beta p)rθ​(p)=p(α+βp), maximized at the myopic price φ(θ)=−α/(2β)\varphi(\theta) = -\alpha/(2\beta)φ(θ)=−α/(2β). The model assumes φ(θ)∈(l,u)\varphi(\theta) \in (l,u)φ(θ)∈(l,u) for all θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ.

A pricing policy π\piπ charges a constant p1p_1p1​ and then pt+1=πt+1(Ht)p_{t+1} = \pi_{t+1}(H_t)pt+1​=πt+1​(Ht​), where πt+1\pi_{t+1}πt+1​ is a measurable function of the history Ht=(D1,p1,…,Dt,pt)H_t = (D_1,p_1,\dots,D_t,p_t)Ht​=(D1​,p1​,…,Dt​,pt​) with values in [l,u][l,u][l,u]. The regret of π\piπ under θ\thetaθ is

Δθπ(T)=T rθ(φ(θ))−Eθπ[∑t=1Trθ(pt)].\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = T\,r_\theta(\varphi(\theta)) - \mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T r_\theta(p_t)\Big].Δθπ​(T)=Trθ​(φ(θ))−Eθπ​[t=1∑T​rθ​(pt​)].

After ttt periods the empirical Fisher information is Jt=∑s=1t[1pspsps2]\mathcal{J}_t = \sum_{s=1}^t \begin{bmatrix}1 & p_s\\ p_s & p_s^2\end{bmatrix}Jt​=∑s=1t​[1ps​​ps​ps2​​]. The least squares estimate is θ^t=Jt−1(∑sDs,∑sDsps)T\hat\theta_t = \mathcal{J}_t^{-1}(\sum_s D_s, \sum_s D_s p_s)^{\mathsf T}θ^t​=Jt−1​(∑s​Ds​,∑s​Ds​ps​)T, and the truncated estimate ϑt\vartheta_tϑt​ is the Euclidean projection of θ^t\hat\theta_tθ^t​ onto Θ\ThetaΘ. The information metric is Jt=∑s=1t(ps−pˉt)2J_t = \sum_{s=1}^t (p_s - \bar p_t)^2Jt​=∑s=1t​(ps​−pˉ​t​)2 with pˉt=t−1∑s=1tps\bar p_t = t^{-1}\sum_{s=1}^t p_spˉ​t​=t−1∑s=1t​ps​. The greedy least squares price in period s+1s+1s+1 is φ(ϑs)\varphi(\vartheta_s)φ(ϑs​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (sufficient conditions for asymptotic optimality)

Let θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ, let κ0,κ1>0\kappa_0,\kappa_1 > 0κ0​,κ1​>0, and let π\piπ satisfy, almost surely for all t≥2t \ge 2t≥2,

(i)  Jt≥κ0t,(ii)  ∑s=2t(φ(ϑs)−ps+1)2≤κ1t.\text{(i)}\ \ J_t \ge \kappa_0\sqrt t, \qquad \text{(ii)}\ \ \sum_{s=2}^t \big(\varphi(\vartheta_s) - p_{s+1}\big)^2 \le \kappa_1 \sqrt t .(i)  Jt​≥κ0​t​,(ii)  s=2∑t​(φ(ϑs​)−ps+1​)2≤κ1​t​.

Then there is a finite C>0C > 0C>0 with

Δθπ(T)≤CTlog⁡Tfor all T≥3.\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) \le C\sqrt T \log T \quad\text{for all } T \ge 3 .Δθπ​(T)≤CT​logTfor all T≥3.

The goal fixes no constant. It asserts only the rate Tlog⁡T\sqrt T\log TT​logT.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (corrected constant). For any prices in [l,u][l,u][l,u], μmin⁡(Jt)≥Jt/(1+u2+(u−l)2)\mu_{\min}(\mathcal{J}_t) \ge J_t/(1+u^2+(u-l)^2)μmin​(Jt​)≥Jt​/(1+u2+(u−l)2).
  2. Lemma 3. There are ρ,k>0\rho, k > 0ρ,k>0 such that for every policy, every θ∈Θ\theta\in\Thetaθ∈Θ, all δ,m>0\delta,m>0δ,m>0 and t≥2t\ge 2t≥2,
Pθπ{∥θ^t−θ∥>δ, Jt≥m}≤k t e−ρ(δ∧δ2)m.\mathbb{P}^\pi_\theta\{\lVert\hat\theta_t-\theta\rVert>\delta,\ J_t\ge m\} \le k\,t\,e^{-\rho(\delta\wedge\delta^2)m}.Pθπ​{∥θ^t​−θ∥>δ, Jt​≥m}≤kte−ρ(δ∧δ2)m.
  1. (A10). E(φ(θ)−pt+1)2≤2E(φ(θ)−φ(ϑt))2+2E(φ(ϑt)−pt+1)2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\theta)-p_{t+1})^2 \le 2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\theta)-\varphi(\vartheta_t))^2 + 2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\vartheta_t)-p_{t+1})^2E(φ(θ)−pt+1​)2≤2E(φ(θ)−φ(ϑt​))2+2E(φ(ϑt​)−pt+1​)2.
  2. (A11). Under (i), there are K>0K>0K>0 and NNN with E(φ(θ)−pt+1)2≤Klog⁡t/t+2E(φ(ϑt)−pt+1)2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\theta)-p_{t+1})^2 \le K\log t/\sqrt t + 2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\vartheta_t)-p_{t+1})^2E(φ(θ)−pt+1​)2≤Klogt/t​+2E(φ(ϑt​)−pt+1​)2 for t≥max⁡{N,2}t \ge \max\{N,2\}t≥max{N,2}.
  3. Regret identity. Δθπ(T)=−β∑t=1TE(pt−φ(θ))2\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = -\beta\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2Δθπ​(T)=−β∑t=1T​E(pt​−φ(θ))2.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 turns the design of a near-optimal learning policy into two pathwise constraints on the price sequence. Condition (i) requires enough price dispersion to keep learning. Condition (ii) requires the policy to stay close to the greedy price so that it keeps earning. Any least squares variant that satisfies both constraints is optimal up to a logarithmic factor, and together with the T\sqrt TT​ lower bound this fixes the minimax rate of the problem. The constrained-ILS and decaying-perturbation policies of §3.3 are certified this way, and the same template reappears in the paper's incumbent-price and multiproduct results.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper. It has no machine-checked proof, and the platform has no dynamic-pricing results so far. A formalization would contribute a reusable model of adaptively chosen designs with a least squares estimator, an exponential concentration bound for least squares under adaptive prices (Lemma 3), and the regret decomposition. The formalization also checks the paper's constants: one of them, in Lemma 2, is misprinted (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The prices are chosen by the policy from past noise, so the regression design is random and adapted. The classical fixed-design analysis of least squares does not apply, and neither does a union bound over a fixed set of designs. Lemma 3 needs a tail bound for θ^t−θ\hat\theta_t - \thetaθ^t​−θ that is uniform over all directions in the plane and holds only on the event where JtJ_tJt​ is large, with noise that is only light-tailed rather than Gaussian or bounded. Converting the eigenvalue of Jt\mathcal{J}_tJt​ into the scalar JtJ_tJt​ (Lemma 2) is elementary but easy to get wrong, as the misprinted constant shows. Summing the per-period bounds into the Tlog⁡T\sqrt T\log TT​logT rate is where conditions (i) and (ii) interact.

Formalization scope

Periods are indexed from 111. The noise is a family ε : ℕ → Ω → ℝ on a probability space, with ε t used in period ttt. The price process of a policy is built by recursion from the noise, which realises the paper's law on demand sequences. A policy is a family of measurable maps from histories Fin t → ℝ × ℝ of (demand, price) pairs into [l,u][l,u][l,u], and it sees neither θ\thetaθ nor the noise. Expectations are Bochner integrals of bounded measurable functions. Probabilities are ENNReal values. Real.log is the natural logarithm. The least squares estimate uses Mathlib's matrix inverse, which is 000 on singular matrices. Every statement uses θ^t\hat\theta_tθ^t​ only where Jt>0J_t > 0Jt​>0, which is equivalent to det⁡Jt=tJt>0\det\mathcal{J}_t = tJ_t > 0detJt​=tJt​>0. The truncation onto Θ\ThetaΘ is coordinatewise clamping, the Euclidean projection onto a rectangle. The smallest eigenvalue is the infimum of the Rayleigh quotient over unit vectors. Constants sit in the paper's quantifier positions: CCC after θ\thetaθ and π\piπ in the goal; ρ,k\rho, kρ,k before the policy in Lemma 3.

Corrections of the printed statements.

  • Theorem 2, condition (i). The page requires (i) "almost surely for all ttt". At t=1t=1t=1, J1=0<κ0J_1 = 0 < \kappa_0J1​=0<κ0​, so read literally no policy satisfies the hypotheses and the theorem is vacuous. Conditions (i) and (ii) are required for t≥2t \ge 2t≥2, as the proof uses them.
  • Theorem 2, condition (ii). The page's sum starts at s=0s=0s=0, but ϑ0\vartheta_0ϑ0​ and ϑ1\vartheta_1ϑ1​ are undefined for a general policy because J0\mathcal{J}_0J0​ and J1\mathcal{J}_1J1​ are singular. The sum starts at s=2s = 2s=2. This only weakens the hypothesis.
  • Lemma 2. The printed constant γ=2/(1+2u−l)2\gamma = 2/(1+2u-l)^2γ=2/(1+2u−l)2 is false. For l=9.9l = 9.9l=9.9, u=10u=10u=10, p=(9.9,10)p = (9.9, 10)p=(9.9,10) one gets μmin⁡≈5.0⋅10−5<γJ2≈8.1⋅10−5\mu_{\min} \approx 5.0\cdot10^{-5} < \gamma J_2 \approx 8.1\cdot10^{-5}μmin​≈5.0⋅10−5<γJ2​≈8.1⋅10−5. The statement uses γ′=1/(1+u2+(u−l)2)\gamma' = 1/(1+u^2+(u-l)^2)γ′=1/(1+u2+(u−l)2), and downstream results use only γ′>0\gamma' > 0γ′>0.
  • (A11). The paper's explicit constants 4K~0/(ρκ0)4\tilde K_0/(\rho\kappa_0)4K~0​/(ρκ0​) and NNN depend on the existential constants of Lemma 3. They are therefore stated as existential KKK and NNN, uniform in θ\thetaθ and π\piπ.

Trivializing formalizations ruled out. Hypotheses that no policy can satisfy (conditions required at t=1t=1t=1) are excluded by the t≥2t \ge 2t≥2 form. A policy type that could read θ\thetaθ or the noise is excluded by construction. Junk values of the matrix inverse and of pˉ0\bar p_0pˉ​0​ never enter a hypothesis or conclusion.

A complete development needs the price-process recursion and its measurability, exponential supermartingales for adaptively weighted sums of light-tailed noise, a covering argument on the unit circle, and the layer-cake formula for E∥θ^t−θ∥2\mathbb{E}\lVert\hat\theta_t-\theta\rVert^2E∥θ^t​−θ∥2. The model, the least squares estimator and Lemmas 2–3 can be reused for the incumbent-price variant (mission IV of this series) and for other least-squares-based pricing and bandit policies. Contributions of any milestone are welcome, and Lemma 3 on its own is a useful statement.

Selected references

  • N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • J. Broder and P. Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4):965–980, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • A. V. den Boer and B. Zwart, Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing, Management Science 60(3):770–783, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1788
  • T. L. Lai and H. Robbins, Iterated Least Squares in Multiperiod Control, Advances in Applied Mathematics 3(1):50–73, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(82)90003-1
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VIII: Dominant-Strategy Implementation of Efficient Decision Rules Is VCGTextbook

Motivation

A group of agents must choose one alternative from a set AAA (whether to build a public project, who receives an object, which of several policies to adopt). Each agent privately knows how much each alternative is worth to them, and money can be transferred. A designer who wants the welfare-maximizing alternative must ask the agents for their valuations, and must set payments so that no agent gains by misreporting, whatever the others report. This requirement, dominant strategy incentive compatibility, does not depend on what agents believe about one another, which is why it is the standard robustness benchmark in public economics, auction design and algorithmic game theory.

The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanisms solve this problem for every efficient decision rule. The central question of Chapter 7 of Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015), is whether they are the only solution, and what can be implemented in dominant strategies at all.

Timeline:

  • 1961–1973: Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) introduce the payments that make efficient decisions dominant-strategy incentive-compatible.
  • 1977: Green and Laffont (Econometrica 45) show that, when valuations range over a sufficiently rich connected domain, every efficient dominant-strategy mechanism has the Groves form.
  • 1979: Holmström (Econometrica 47) extends the uniqueness result to smoothly connected domains. Roberts (1979) characterizes decision rules with positive association of differences on unrestricted domains as weighted welfare maximizers.
  • 1987: Rochet (J. Math. Econ. 16) characterizes implementable decision rules by cyclical monotonicity, with no structure on alternatives or types.
  • 2001: Krishna and Maenner (Econometrica 69) prove payoff equivalence for convex type sets and utilities convex in the type.
  • 2009: Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (Soc. Choice Welf. 32) give two short proofs of Roberts' theorem.

Setting

There is a finite set III of agents and a set AAA of alternatives. Agent iii has a type θi\theta_iθi​ from an abstract set Θi\Theta_iΘi​. If alternative aaa is chosen and agent iii pays tit_iti​, agent iii's utility is ui(a,θi)−tiu_i(a,\theta_i) - t_iui​(a,θi​)−ti​. A type vector is θ∈Θ=∏iΘi\theta \in \Theta = \prod_i \Theta_iθ∈Θ=∏i​Θi​; θ−i∈Θ−i=∏j≠iΘj\theta_{-i} \in \Theta_{-i} = \prod_{j \ne i}\Theta_jθ−i​∈Θ−i​=∏j=i​Θj​ omits agent iii, and (θi′,θ−i)(\theta_i', \theta_{-i})(θi′​,θ−i​) replaces agent iii's type by θi′\theta_i'θi′​.

A direct mechanism (q,t1,…,tN)(q, t_1, \dots, t_N)(q,t1​,…,tN​) consists of a decision rule q:Θ→Aq : \Theta \to Aq:Θ→A and transfer rules ti:Θ→Rt_i : \Theta \to \mathbb Rti​:Θ→R. It is dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) if for all θ\thetaθ, iii and θi′\theta_i'θi′​,

ui(q(θ),θi)−ti(θ) ≥ ui(q(θi′,θ−i),θi)−ti(θi′,θ−i).u_i(q(\theta),\theta_i) - t_i(\theta) \ \ge\ u_i(q(\theta_i',\theta_{-i}),\theta_i) - t_i(\theta_i',\theta_{-i}).ui​(q(θ),θi​)−ti​(θ) ≥ ui​(q(θi′​,θ−i​),θi​)−ti​(θi′​,θ−i​).

A decision rule is efficient if q(θ)q(\theta)q(θ) maximizes ∑iui(a,θi)\sum_i u_i(a,\theta_i)∑i​ui​(a,θi​) over a∈Aa \in Aa∈A at every θ\thetaθ. A mechanism is VCG if qqq is efficient and every agent's transfer has the form

ti(θ)=−∑j≠iuj(q(θ),θj)+τi(θ−i)t_i(\theta) = -\sum_{j \ne i} u_j(q(\theta),\theta_j) + \tau_i(\theta_{-i})ti​(θ)=−j=i∑​uj​(q(θ),θj​)+τi​(θ−i​)

for some function τi\tau_iτi​ of the other agents' types. The chapter also uses positive association of differences (PAD: if q(θ)=aq(\theta) = aq(θ)=a and every agent's utility advantage of aaa over every other alternative strictly increases from θ\thetaθ to θ′\theta'θ′, then q(θ′)=aq(\theta') = aq(θ′)=a), flexibility (the range q(Θ)q(\Theta)q(Θ) has at least three elements), ex post individual rationality and ex post budget balance (∑iti(θ)=0\sum_i t_i(\theta) = 0∑i​ti​(θ)=0).

Formalization targets

Goal: uniqueness of VCG (Corollary 7.1, Green–Laffont–Holmström)

If every Θi\Theta_iΘi​ is a convex subset of a Euclidean space Rdi\mathbb R^{d_i}Rdi​ and every ui(a,⋅)u_i(a,\cdot)ui​(a,⋅) is convex and continuous on Θi\Theta_iΘi​, then every DSIC mechanism (q,t)(q,t)(q,t) with an efficient qqq is a VCG mechanism: for each iii there is τi:Θ−i→R\tau_i : \Theta_{-i} \to \mathbb Rτi​:Θ−i​→R with

ti(θ)=−∑j≠iuj(q(θ),θj)+τi(θ−i)for all θ.t_i(\theta) = -\sum_{j \ne i} u_j(q(\theta),\theta_j) + \tau_i(\theta_{-i}) \qquad \text{for all } \theta.ti​(θ)=−j=i∑​uj​(q(θ),θj​)+τi​(θ−i​)for all θ.

The goal leaves AAA, the number of agents and the dimensions did_idi​ free; it asserts only the form of the transfers.

Milestones

Every numbered result of Chapter 7 except Proposition 7.6 (see Formalization scope):

  1. Proposition 7.1: implementability iff cyclical monotonicity in each agent's type (Rochet).
  2. Proposition 7.2: on bounded, one-dimensional type sets, implementability iff monotonicity.
  3. Proposition 7.3: under the goal's convexity hypotheses, the transfers implementing a given qqq are unique up to τi(θ−i)\tau_i(\theta_{-i})τi​(θ−i​).
  4. Proposition 7.4: VCG mechanisms are DSIC.
  5. Proposition 7.5: weak monotonicity in every θi\theta_iθi​ implies PAD.
  6. Proposition 7.7 (Roberts): on unrestricted domains with finite AAA, a flexible qqq with range q(Θ)=Aq(\Theta) = Aq(Θ)=A satisfies PAD iff there are ki≥0k_i \ge 0ki​≥0, not all zero, and F:A→RF : A \to \mathbb RF:A→R with ∑ikiui(q(θ),θi)+F(q(θ))≥∑ikiui(a,θi)+F(a)\sum_i k_i u_i(q(\theta),\theta_i) + F(q(\theta)) \ge \sum_i k_i u_i(a,\theta_i) + F(a)∑i​ki​ui​(q(θ),θi​)+F(q(θ))≥∑i​ki​ui​(a,θi​)+F(a) for all a∈Aa \in Aa∈A.
  7. Proposition 7.8: affine maximizers with all ki>0k_i > 0ki​>0 are implementable.
  8. Proposition 7.9: ex post individual rationality holds iff it holds at the lowest type θ‾i\underline\theta_iθ​i​ with outside option a‾i\underline a_ia​i​.
  9. Proposition 7.10: with N≥2N \ge 2N≥2, a budget-balanced VCG mechanism for efficient qqq exists iff ∑iui(q(θ),θi)=∑ifi(θ−i)\sum_i u_i(q(\theta),\theta_i) = \sum_i f_i(\theta_{-i})∑i​ui​(q(θ),θi​)=∑i​fi​(θ−i​) for some fi:Θ−i→Rf_i : \Theta_{-i} \to \mathbb Rfi​:Θ−i​→R.

Significance

Corollary 7.1 turns the VCG construction from one solution into the complete answer. Any question about efficient dominant-strategy mechanisms (revenue, budget balance, individual rationality) reduces to a question about the functions τi\tau_iτi​. With Proposition 7.10 it gives a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient, budget-balanced dominant-strategy implementation. That condition fails in bilateral trade, and the failure does not use individual rationality. Roberts' theorem plays the same role for inefficient rules: on unrestricted domains, weighted welfare maximization is essentially all that can be implemented.

All of these results are proved in the literature, and none is formalized. The platform has VCG incentive compatibility and weak monotonicity for valuation-based types (the Algorithmic Game Theory IV mission). It has no uniqueness theorem, no revenue equivalence for multidimensional convex types, no Rochet theorem and no Roberts theorem. The book proves Corollary 7.1 from Proposition 7.3, but proves 7.3 itself only by reference to Krishna and Maenner. It states Roberts' theorem without proof.

Difficulty

The uniqueness claim does not follow from incentive compatibility alone. With finitely many types it is false, because any transfers inside the gaps left by the incentive constraints work (Börgers §5.8). The work lies in showing that, along every segment in the convex type set, an agent's equilibrium utility is pinned down by the decision rule. The equilibrium utility is a pointwise supremum of convex functions, one for each report, and the chosen alternative can change at uncountably many points of the segment. A differentiable envelope argument is therefore not directly available. At the boundary of the type set, convexity alone does not prevent upward jumps, which is why continuity is part of the hypotheses. Roberts' theorem needs a separate, combinatorial analysis of the sets of utility differences at which each alternative is chosen, and flexibility is essential there.

Formalization scope

Agents form a finite type ι with decidable equality. Types are arbitrary types Θ i, and utilities are u : ∀ i, A → Θ i → ℝ. The profile (θi′,θ−i)(\theta_i',\theta_{-i})(θi′​,θ−i​) is Function.update θ i θ'. Θ−i\Theta_{-i}Θ−i​ is the product Others Θ i over j ≠ i, so each τi\tau_iτi​ and fif_ifi​ is a function of the others' types only; a constant or a function of the full profile would change the theorem. In the goal and Proposition 7.3, Θi\Theta_iΘi​ is a convex set S i in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin (d i)).

Deviations from the page, each forced by a counterexample recorded in the item's natural-language statement:

  • Corollary 7.1 and Proposition 7.3 add continuity of ui(a,⋅)u_i(a,\cdot)ui​(a,⋅) on Θi\Theta_iΘi​. With convexity alone, a utility with a jump at the endpoint of [0,1][0,1][0,1] admits a non-VCG DSIC mechanism.
  • Proposition 7.7 is stated with ki≥0k_i \ge 0ki​≥0, not all zero, instead of ki>0k_i > 0ki​>0, and with the added hypothesis that qqq is onto AAA (the conclusion still ranges over all a∈Aa \in Aa∈A, as on the page). Dictatorships and affine maximizers over a proper subset of AAA are counterexamples to the printed version.
  • Proposition 7.6 (flexible PAD rules on unrestricted domains are implementable) is false as printed. It is not a milestone; the reason is in the mission's hard list.
  • Proposition 7.10 adds N≥2N \ge 2N≥2, since its proof divides by N−1N-1N−1.

The trivializing formalization to avoid is proving Proposition 7.4 (VCG ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ DSIC) in place of the goal (DSIC +++ efficient ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ VCG). A development that proves the goal needs reusable infrastructure: convex functions restricted to segments, absolute continuity of continuous convex functions on compact intervals, and an envelope theorem for suprema of convex functions. Proofs of Rochet's and Roberts' theorems in this abstract setting are also welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers (with D. Krähmer and R. Strausz), An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Chapter 7. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance 16, 1961. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
  • E. H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice 11, 1971. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01726210
  • T. Groves, Incentives in Teams, Econometrica 41, 1973. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085
  • J. Green and J.-J. Laffont, Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods, Econometrica 45, 1977. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911219
  • B. Holmström, Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains, Econometrica 47, 1979. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1911954
  • K. Roberts, The Characterization of Implementable Choice Rules, in J.-J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North-Holland, 1979, pp. 321–348.
  • J.-C. Rochet, A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Rationalizability in a Quasi-Linear Context, Journal of Mathematical Economics 16, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90007-3
  • V. Krishna and E. Maenner, Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design, Econometrica 69, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00233
  • R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem and N. Nisan, Two Simplified Proofs for Roberts' Theorem, Social Choice and Welfare 32, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0333-3
  • P. Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies I: A Square-Root Lower Bound on Regret for Linear DemandResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm that sells a product repeatedly and does not know how demand responds to price must learn the demand curve and profit from it at the same time. This is the learn-and-earn or dynamic pricing with demand learning problem. It is a standard model in revenue management, and it is one of the simplest settings where exploration and exploitation have to be traded off in a continuous action space.

The paper behind this mission is N. Bora Keskin and Assaf Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014 (doi:10.1287/opre.2014.1294). For a linear demand model with two unknown parameters, it proves a lower bound on the regret of every pricing policy. It then gives simple conditions under which least-squares-based policies attain that bound up to a logarithmic factor. This mission is the first of a series on the paper, and its target is the lower bound (Theorem 1).

Timeline. Earlier work had already obtained T\sqrt{T}T​-type lower bounds for dynamic pricing under demand uncertainty:

  • Besbes and Zeevi (2009, doi:10.1287/opre.1080.0640) studied non-parametric pricing.
  • Besbes and Zeevi (2011) and Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012, doi:10.1287/opre.1120.1057) proved T\sqrt{T}T​ lower bounds with arguments based on the Kullback–Leibler divergence, for uncertainty in a single model parameter.

Keskin and Zeevi (2014) prove the T\sqrt{T}T​ bound when both the intercept and the slope of the demand curve are unknown. Their argument uses the Van Trees inequality instead (p. 1146).

Setting

Prices lie in an interval [l,u][l,u][l,u] with 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u. In period t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… the seller charges pt∈[l,u]p_t \in [l,u]pt​∈[l,u] and observes the demand

Dt=α+βpt+εt.D_t = \alpha + \beta p_t + \varepsilon_t .Dt​=α+βpt​+εt​.

The demand shocks ε1,ε2,…\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2, \dotsε1​,ε2​,… are i.i.d. N(0,σ2)\mathcal{N}(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) with σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0.

The parameter θ=(α,β)\theta = (\alpha,\beta)θ=(α,β) is unknown to the seller. It lies in a rectangle

Θ=[amin⁡,amax⁡]×[bmin⁡,bmax⁡],amin⁡<amax⁡,bmin⁡<bmax⁡<0.\Theta = [a_{\min},a_{\max}] \times [b_{\min},b_{\max}], \qquad a_{\min} < a_{\max},\quad b_{\min} < b_{\max} < 0 .Θ=[amin​,amax​]×[bmin​,bmax​],amin​<amax​,bmin​<bmax​<0.

The expected single-period revenue is rθ(p)=p(α+βp)r_\theta(p) = p(\alpha + \beta p)rθ​(p)=p(α+βp), and it is maximized at φ(θ)=−α/(2β)\varphi(\theta) = -\alpha/(2\beta)φ(θ)=−α/(2β). The model assumes that this optimal price lies in the open interval (l,u)(l,u)(l,u) for every θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ.

A pricing policy π\piπ is a constant first price π1∈[l,u]\pi_1 \in [l,u]π1​∈[l,u] together with measurable maps πt+1\pi_{t+1}πt+1​. Each πt+1\pi_{t+1}πt+1​ sends the observed history Ht=(D1,p1,…,Dt,pt)H_t = (D_1,p_1,\dots,D_t,p_t)Ht​=(D1​,p1​,…,Dt​,pt​) to [l,u][l,u][l,u], and the seller charges pt+1=πt+1(Ht)p_{t+1} = \pi_{t+1}(H_t)pt+1​=πt+1​(Ht​). The policy sees neither θ\thetaθ nor the shocks.

The regret of π\piπ over TTT periods under θ\thetaθ is

Δθπ(T)=T rθ(φ(θ))−Eθπ[∑t=1Trθ(pt)].\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = T\,r_\theta(\varphi(\theta)) - \mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T r_\theta(p_t)\Big].Δθπ​(T)=Trθ​(φ(θ))−Eθπ​[t=1∑T​rθ​(pt​)].

The worst-case regret is Δπ(T)=sup⁡θ∈ΘΔθπ(T)\Delta^\pi(T) = \sup_{\theta\in\Theta}\Delta^\pi_\theta(T)Δπ(T)=supθ∈Θ​Δθπ​(T).

The proof also uses the empirical Fisher information Jt=∑s=1t[1pspsps2]\mathcal{J}_t = \sum_{s=1}^t \begin{bmatrix}1 & p_s\\ p_s & p_s^2\end{bmatrix}Jt​=∑s=1t​[1ps​​ps​ps2​​] and the row vector C(θ)=[−φ(θ)  1]C(\theta) = [-\varphi(\theta)\ \ 1]C(θ)=[−φ(θ)  1].

In Lean, the model is the structure KeskinZeevi.LowerBound.Model. The noise hypothesis is the shared definition RobustBooking.Shared.GaussianNoise (measurable, mutually independent shocks, each with law N(0,σ2)\mathcal{N}(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2)). The other objects are Policy, pricePath, regret, worstRegret, sqErr (the expected squared pricing error Eθπ(pt−φ(θ))2\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2Eθπ​(pt​−φ(θ))2) and infoQuad (the scalar C(θ)Eθπ[Jt]C(θ)TC(\theta)\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta[\mathcal{J}_t]C(\theta)^{\mathsf T}C(θ)Eθπ​[Jt​]C(θ)T).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 1146)

There is a finite constant c>0c > 0c>0, depending only on the model, such that

Δπ(T)  ≥  cTfor every pricing policy π and every horizon T≥3.\Delta^\pi(T) \;\ge\; c\sqrt{T}\qquad\text{for every pricing policy } \pi \text{ and every horizon } T \ge 3 .Δπ(T)≥cT​for every pricing policy π and every horizon T≥3.

Milestones (Appendix A.1, pp. 1146 and 1156)

  • Lemma 1, inequality (14). For positive constants c0,c1c_0, c_1c0​,c1​,
sup⁡θ∈Θ∑t=2TEθπ(pt−φ(θ))2  ≥  ∑t=2Tc0c1+sup⁡θ∈ΘC(θ) Eθπ[Jt−1] C(θ)T.\sup_{\theta\in\Theta}\sum_{t=2}^T\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2 \;\ge\; \sum_{t=2}^T \frac{c_0}{c_1 + \sup_{\theta\in\Theta} C(\theta)\,\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta[\mathcal{J}_{t-1}]\,C(\theta)^{\mathsf T}}.θ∈Θsup​t=2∑T​Eθπ​(pt​−φ(θ))2≥t=2∑T​c1​+supθ∈Θ​C(θ)Eθπ​[Jt−1​]C(θ)Tc0​​.
  • The quadratic-form identity. C(θ)Eθπ[Jt−1]C(θ)T=∑s=1t−1Eθπ(ps−φ(θ))2C(\theta)\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta[\mathcal{J}_{t-1}]C(\theta)^{\mathsf T} = \sum_{s=1}^{t-1}\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_s-\varphi(\theta))^2C(θ)Eθπ​[Jt−1​]C(θ)T=∑s=1t−1​Eθπ​(ps​−φ(θ))2.
  • Inequality (A2). Lemma 1 with that identity substituted.
  • The regret identity. Δθπ(T)=−β∑t=1TEθπ(pt−φ(θ))2\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = -\beta\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2Δθπ​(T)=−β∑t=1T​Eθπ​(pt​−φ(θ))2 for θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ, and consequently Δπ(T)≥∣bmax⁡∣sup⁡θ∑t=2TEθπ(pt−φ(θ))2\Delta^\pi(T) \ge |b_{\max}|\sup_\theta \sum_{t=2}^T \mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2Δπ(T)≥∣bmax​∣supθ​∑t=2T​Eθπ​(pt​−φ(θ))2.
  • Inequality (A3). Δπ(T)≥bmax⁡2∑t=2Tc0/(∣bmax⁡∣c1+Δπ(t−1))\Delta^\pi(T) \ge b_{\max}^2\sum_{t=2}^T c_0/(|b_{\max}|c_1 + \Delta^\pi(t-1))Δπ(T)≥bmax2​∑t=2T​c0​/(∣bmax​∣c1​+Δπ(t−1)).

The goal states only the order T\sqrt{T}T​ with an unspecified constant. The paper's explicit constant is not part of the target.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 sets the benchmark for the whole paper. A policy is called asymptotically optimal when its regret grows no faster than T\sqrt{T}T​, up to logarithmic factors. Theorem 2 of the paper then gives sufficient conditions under which least-squares pricing policies meet this benchmark. Without Theorem 1, those upper bounds would have nothing to be optimal against.

The lower bound also explains a well-known failure. Greedy (myopic) least-squares pricing can stop learning and suffer linear regret, and this happens precisely when the information on the right side of (14) stops growing.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper but has not been formalized; no dynamic pricing or learn-and-earn regret result is on the platform yet. A formal proof needs a Van Trees (Bayesian Cramér–Rao) inequality for an adaptively generated sample, which Mathlib does not have, and a machine-checked version of the elementary recursion that turns (A3) into T\sqrt{T}T​. The model layer (policies driven by noise, regret, worst-case regret) is shared with the three later missions of the series.

Difficulty

The bound must hold for every measurable, history-dependent policy. So it is a statement about a sequential experiment whose design adapts to the data, not about one fixed estimator.

The usual two-point argument (Le Cam or Kullback–Leibler) perturbs one parameter at a time. It yields T\sqrt{T}T​ only when a single parameter is uncertain, and here both α\alphaα and β\betaβ are unknown. The information a policy gathers about the optimal price is itself tied to how far its prices stray from that price. That self-reference is what inequalities (A2) and (A3) express, and it has to be handled uniformly in π\piπ and in the horizon.

Formalization scope

  • Periods. Lean periods are indexed from 000, so Lean period ttt is the paper's period t+1t+1t+1. Sums ∑t=1T\sum_{t=1}^T∑t=1T​ are Finset.range T, and sums ∑t=2T\sum_{t=2}^T∑t=2T​ are Finset.Ico 1 T.
  • Histories. A history is a function Fin t → ℝ × ℝ of (demand, price) pairs. A policy is a structure with measurable rules valued in [l,u][l,u][l,u].
  • Law of the process. The price process is defined by feeding the noise εt(ω)\varepsilon_t(\omega)εt​(ω) into the policy recursion. This realizes the paper's measure Pθπ\mathbb{P}^\pi_\thetaPθπ​ of Eq. (5) on the noise space.
  • Noise. The theorems quantify over every probability space and every i.i.d. N(0,σ2)\mathcal{N}(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) sequence on it.
  • Constants. Every existential constant is placed before the probability space, the noise, the policy and the horizon, so it depends only on the model.
  • Worst-case regret. It is a real supremum over the subtype Θ\ThetaΘ, which is nonempty. The family is bounded above by ∣bmin⁡∣(u−l)2T|b_{\min}|(u-l)^2T∣bmin​∣(u−l)2T, so the supremum is genuine.
  • Optimal price. φ\varphiφ is defined by its closed form −α/(2β)-\alpha/(2\beta)−α/(2β), and interiority of the optimal price is a field of the model.
  • Correction of the printed statement. Nonempty interior of Θ\ThetaΘ (amin⁡<amax⁡a_{\min}<a_{\max}amin​<amax​, bmin⁡<bmax⁡b_{\min}<b_{\max}bmin​<bmax​) is made explicit. The printed statement leaves it implicit, while the proof uses a prior density positive on the interior of Θ\ThetaΘ (p. 1155). With α\alphaα or β\betaβ known, the statement is false.
  • Trivializing formalizations. The following are ruled out: a degenerate or empty Θ\ThetaΘ, a constant ccc that may depend on π\piπ or TTT, a policy type that can read θ\thetaθ or the noise, and replacing the supremum over Θ\ThetaΘ by an existential over Θ\ThetaΘ.

The Van Trees step (A1) of the proof of Lemma 1 is not a milestone. It needs Fisher information and a prior density on Θ\ThetaΘ, and neither is in Mathlib. Contributions of a Van Trees inequality for this Gaussian model are welcome, as is a formal proof that (A3) implies the T\sqrt{T}T​ bound. The first is reusable for other lower-bound missions of the series, and the second is elementary but careful real analysis. The multiproduct generalization (Theorem 5, §4) is outside this mission.

Selected references

  • N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • R. D. Gill and B. Y. Levit, Applications of the van Trees inequality: a Bayesian Cramér–Rao bound, Bernoulli 1(1–2):59–79, 1995. https://doi.org/10.2307/3318681
  • O. Besbes and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms, Operations Research 57(6):1407–1420, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0640
  • J. Broder and P. Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing Under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4):965–980, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • A. Goldenshluger and A. Zeevi, Woodroofe's One-Armed Bandit Problem Revisited, Annals of Applied Probability 19(4):1603–1633, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1214/08-AAP589
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationMechanism Design+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VI: Rochet's Theorem — Implementability Is Cyclical MonotonicityTextbook

Motivation

Almost every screening, auction and regulation model asks the same preliminary question: which allocation rules can be made incentive-compatible by some choice of payments? In the one-dimensional models of auction theory and nonlinear pricing the answer is monotonicity: higher types must receive higher allocations. Many applications are not one-dimensional, though. Examples are multi-object auctions, multi-product pricing, and lotteries over several outcomes. For those, a characterization that uses no structure at all is needed. Rochet (1987) gave one: an allocation rule is implementable exactly when it is cyclically monotone, a condition that originates in Rockafellar's characterization of subdifferentials of convex functions. Later work on dominant-strategy implementation, the "weak monotonicity" literature of algorithmic mechanism design, and revenue equivalence all build on it.

This mission formalizes Chapter 5 of Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015): all nine numbered results of the chapter.

Timeline. Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 24.8) characterized the cyclically monotone maps between vector spaces as the subgradient selections of convex functions. Rochet (1987) extended the idea to arbitrary alternatives and types with quasi-linear utility and proved that implementability is exactly cyclical monotonicity. Krishna and Maenner (2001) proved revenue equivalence on convex type spaces with utilities convex in the type. Bikhchandani, Chatterji, Lavi, Mu'alem, Nisan and Sen (2006) showed that for finitely many alternatives, weak monotonicity (the two-type case of cyclical monotonicity) already suffices on rich, order-based domains. Saks and Yu (2005) proved the same on convex domains.

Setting

A designer and one agent choose an alternative aaa from a set AAA. The agent has a type θ\thetaθ in a nonempty set Θ\ThetaΘ. With utility function u:A×Θ→Ru : A \times \Theta \to \mathbb Ru:A×Θ→R, her payoff from aaa when she pays ttt is u(a,θ)−tu(a,\theta) - tu(a,θ)−t. Neither AAA nor Θ\ThetaΘ carries any structure.

A direct mechanism is a decision rule q:Θ→Aq : \Theta \to Aq:Θ→A and a transfer rule t:Θ→Rt : \Theta \to \mathbb Rt:Θ→R. It is incentive-compatible if u(q(θ),θ)−t(θ)≥u(q(θ′),θ)−t(θ′)u(q(\theta),\theta) - t(\theta) \ge u(q(\theta'),\theta) - t(\theta')u(q(θ),θ)−t(θ)≥u(q(θ′),θ)−t(θ′) for all θ,θ′\theta,\theta'θ,θ′. A decision rule is implementable if some ttt makes it incentive-compatible. It is weakly monotone if u(q(θ1),θ1)−u(q(θ2),θ1)≥u(q(θ1),θ2)−u(q(θ2),θ2)u(q(\theta_1),\theta_1) - u(q(\theta_2),\theta_1) \ge u(q(\theta_1),\theta_2) - u(q(\theta_2),\theta_2)u(q(θ1​),θ1​)−u(q(θ2​),θ1​)≥u(q(θ1​),θ2​)−u(q(θ2​),θ2​) for all pairs of types. It is cyclically monotone if for every finite sequence of types θ1,…,θk\theta^1,\dots,\theta^kθ1,…,θk with θk=θ1\theta^k = \theta^1θk=θ1,

∑κ=1k−1(u(q(θκ),θκ+1)−u(q(θκ),θκ))≤0.\sum_{\kappa=1}^{k-1}\bigl(u(q(\theta^\kappa),\theta^{\kappa+1}) - u(q(\theta^\kappa),\theta^\kappa)\bigr) \le 0 .κ=1∑k−1​(u(q(θκ),θκ+1)−u(q(θκ),θκ))≤0.

A complete and transitive order RRR of AAA induces a partial order on types: θ≻Rθ′\theta \succ_R \theta'θ≻R​θ′ if θ\thetaθ values every RRR-higher alternative strictly more, relative to an RRR-lower one, than θ′\theta'θ′ does, and neither type distinguishes RRR-indifferent alternatives. The type set is one-dimensional if any two distinct types are ≻R\succ_R≻R​-comparable, and bounded if all utility differences lie in (−c,c)(-c,c)(−c,c) for some c>0c > 0c>0. It is rich if, for some reflexive and transitive relation RRR, every function v:A→Rv : A \to \mathbb Rv:A→R with aRb⇒v(a)≥v(b)aRb \Rightarrow v(a) \ge v(b)aRb⇒v(a)≥v(b) is some type's utility function. A mechanism is individually rational with outside option aaa if every type does at least as well as with aaa and no payment.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.2 (Rochet)

q implementable  ⟺  q cyclically monotone,q \text{ implementable} \iff q \text{ cyclically monotone},q implementable⟺q cyclically monotone,

for arbitrary AAA, nonempty Θ\ThetaΘ and uuu.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 5.1: implementable ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ weakly monotone.
  2. Proposition 5.3: for lotteries over finitely many outcomes, Θ⊆RΩ\Theta \subseteq \mathbb R^\OmegaΘ⊆RΩ convex and u(p,θ)=p⋅θu(p,\theta) = p\cdot\thetau(p,θ)=p⋅θ, qqq is implementable iff there is a convex UUU on Θ\ThetaΘ with U(θ′)≥U(θ)+q(θ)⋅(θ′−θ)U(\theta') \ge U(\theta) + q(\theta)\cdot(\theta'-\theta)U(θ′)≥U(θ)+q(θ)⋅(θ′−θ) for all θ,θ′\theta,\theta'θ,θ′.
  3. Proposition 5.4: weakly monotone ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ (θ≻Rθ′⇒q(θ) R q(θ′)\theta \succ_R \theta' \Rightarrow q(\theta)\,R\,q(\theta')θ≻R​θ′⇒q(θ)Rq(θ′)), for every complete transitive RRR.
  4. Proposition 5.5: on one-dimensional type sets, weak monotonicity   ⟺  \iff⟺ monotonicity with respect to RRR.
  5. Proposition 5.6: AAA finite, Θ\ThetaΘ bounded and one-dimensional: monotone with respect to RRR ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ implementable.
  6. Proposition 5.7 (Bikhchandani et al.): AAA finite, rich and consistent domain: weakly monotone ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ implementable.
  7. Proposition 5.8 (revenue equivalence): on convex Θ⊆Rn\Theta \subseteq \mathbb R^nΘ⊆Rn with u(a,⋅)u(a,\cdot)u(a,⋅) convex and continuous, if (q,t)(q,t)(q,t) is incentive-compatible then (q,t′)(q,t')(q,t′) is iff t′=t+τt' = t + \taut′=t+τ for a constant τ\tauτ.
  8. Proposition 5.9: on one-dimensional type sets with a lowest type θ‾\underline\thetaθ​ and a worst alternative a‾\underline aa​, an incentive-compatible mechanism is individually rational with outside option a‾\underline aa​ iff u(q(θ‾),θ‾)−t(θ‾)≥u(a‾,θ‾)u(q(\underline\theta),\underline\theta) - t(\underline\theta) \ge u(\underline a,\underline\theta)u(q(θ​),θ​)−t(θ​)≥u(a​,θ​).

Significance

Rochet's theorem turns the existence of payments, an infinite system of linear inequalities in unknowns t(θ)t(\theta)t(θ), into a condition on the decision rule alone. It underlies the characterization of implementable rules in multidimensional screening, the taxation principle, and the dominant-strategy characterizations of Chapter 7 (applied agent by agent). Propositions 5.4–5.6 recover the "monotone allocation" results of the one-dimensional chapters from it. Proposition 5.8 is the general form of the payoff-equivalence lemmas used for optimal auctions.

All results are classical and proved on paper, except Propositions 5.7 and 5.8, whose proofs the book omits and refers to the literature. None of them is formalized on Prove2Me. The platform's algorithmic-game-theory series has the weak-monotonicity half in a multi-agent valuation model (types are valuations A→RA \to \mathbb RA→R), not the abstract-type statement, and has no cyclical-monotonicity or Rochet result.

Difficulty

Necessity is a two-line telescoping argument. Sufficiency needs a transfer rule built from the decision rule, and the first idea fails: prices attached to alternatives chosen pair by pair (which weak monotonicity supplies) need not be globally consistent. Figure 5.1 of the book gives a three-type example that is weakly monotone but not implementable. The transfer must come from a supremum over all finite chains of types starting at a fixed type. The supremum is finite only because of cyclical monotonicity, and no finiteness, compactness or boundedness is available. Proposition 5.8 needs an envelope argument along segments in Θ\ThetaΘ without differentiability. Proposition 5.7 needs a combinatorial argument that uses richness of the domain.

Formalization scope

Alternatives and types are arbitrary Lean types A, Θ with Nonempty Θ, and the utility is u : A → Θ → ℝ. A cycle of length k=m+1k = m+1k=m+1 is a map Fin (m+1) → Θ with equal first and last entries, and its mmm summands are indexed by Fin m. Relations are predicates A → A → Prop. For Propositions 5.3 and 5.8, types form a subset S of Ω → ℝ (resp. Fin n → ℝ) used as a subtype. Lotteries are stdSimplex ℝ Ω, and the subgradient inequality is required only at points of S.

The explicit statements are fixed as follows:

  • Proposition 5.8's conclusion is the exact translation form t′(θ)=t(θ)+τt'(\theta) = t(\theta) + \taut′(θ)=t(θ)+τ for one τ\tauτ and all θ\thetaθ.
  • Proposition 5.9's condition is the single inequality at θ‾\underline\thetaθ​.
  • Boundedness in Proposition 5.6 is Definition 5.9's strict two-sided bound with some c>0c > 0c>0.

Two statements are corrected from the page, each with a counterexample to the literal version recorded in its item:

  • Proposition 5.7 adds Bikhchandani et al.'s requirement that every type's utility respects RRR.
  • Proposition 5.8 adds continuity of u(a,⋅)u(a,\cdot)u(a,⋅) on Θ\ThetaΘ (automatic in the relative interior).

Both directions of Rochet's theorem are required. The necessity half alone, or a version with finite Θ\ThetaΘ, finite AAA or bounded utilities, is a different and much weaker theorem and does not close the goal.

The development needs finite telescoping sums, suprema of sets of reals (sSup with an explicit bounded-above argument), convex functions on sets and one-dimensional convex analysis (Proposition 5.8). The definitions file is reusable for Chapters 6–8 of the series. Contributions of alternative proofs, for example Proposition 5.6 through Rochet's theorem, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • J.-C. Rochet, "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context," Journal of Mathematical Economics 16 (1987) 191–200. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90007-3
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970, Theorem 24.8.
  • V. Krishna and E. Maenner, "Convex potentials with an application to mechanism design," Econometrica 69 (2001) 1113–1119. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00233
  • S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan and A. Sen, "Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation," Econometrica 74 (2006) 1109–1132. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x
  • M. Saks and L. Yu, "Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains," Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (2005) 286–293. https://doi.org/10.1145/1064009.1064039
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design V: Dominant-Strategy Public Goods Mechanisms for Two Agents Are Fixed Cost SharesTextbook

Motivation

Bayesian mechanism design assumes that the designer knows a common prior from which every agent's beliefs about the others are derived. Chapter 4 of Börgers' An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001) drops that assumption. The designer is unwilling to rely on anything about what agents believe about each other, and therefore requires that truth telling be optimal for every type whatever the other agents report (dominant strategy incentive compatibility) and that participation be worthwhile after all reports are known (ex post individual rationality). The chapter revisits the three examples of Chapter 3 (single unit auctions, public goods, bilateral trade) and asks which mechanisms survive these requirements.

The answer differs sharply between examples. In auctions nothing is lost: an expected-revenue-maximizing auction can be implemented in dominant strategies. With a budget constraint, the class collapses. For a public good shared by two agents, the only dominant-strategy, ex post individually rational mechanisms that exactly balance the budget are fixed cost shares; in bilateral trade they are fixed-price mechanisms. These results go back to the dominant-strategy literature on public goods (Serizawa 1999, Econometrica) and on bilateral trade (Hagerty and Rogerson 1987, Journal of Economic Theory), as the book's §4.5 records (p.93), and they explain why simple posted-price and cost-sharing rules are common in practice.

Setting

Every agent iii has a type θi\theta_iθi​ in an interval. In the auction and the public good examples the interval is [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] with 0≤θ‾<θˉ0 \le \underline\theta < \bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ; Θ=[θ‾,θˉ]I\Theta = [\underline\theta,\bar\theta]^IΘ=[θ​,θˉ]I is the set of type vectors, and θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​ is θ\thetaθ without its iii-th entry. A direct mechanism asks every agent to report a type and maps the reports to an outcome.

  • Auction (§4.2). A seller has one good. The mechanism consists of allocation probabilities qi(θ)≥0q_i(\theta) \ge 0qi​(θ)≥0 with ∑iqi(θ)≤1\sum_i q_i(\theta) \le 1∑i​qi​(θ)≤1 and payments ti(θ)t_i(\theta)ti​(θ); buyer iii's utility is θiqi(θ)−ti(θ)\theta_i q_i(\theta) - t_i(\theta)θi​qi​(θ)−ti​(θ).
  • Public good (§4.3). A good costing c>0c > 0c>0 is produced (q(θ)=1q(\theta) = 1q(θ)=1) or not (q(θ)=0q(\theta) = 0q(θ)=0); agent iii pays ti(θ)t_i(\theta)ti​(θ) and has utility θiq(θ)−ti(θ)\theta_i q(\theta) - t_i(\theta)θi​q(θ)−ti​(θ). Ex post budget balance is the equality ∑iti(θ)=c q(θ)\sum_i t_i(\theta) = c\,q(\theta)∑i​ti​(θ)=cq(θ) for every θ\thetaθ.
  • Bilateral trade (§4.4). A seller with type θS∈[θ‾S,θˉS]\theta_S \in [\underline\theta_S,\bar\theta_S]θS​∈[θ​S​,θˉS​] and a buyer with type θB∈[θ‾B,θˉB]\theta_B \in [\underline\theta_B,\bar\theta_B]θB​∈[θ​B​,θˉB​]; trade takes place (q(θ)=1q(\theta) = 1q(θ)=1) or not; the seller receives tS(θ)t_S(\theta)tS​(θ) and has utility θS(1−q(θ))+tS(θ)\theta_S(1-q(\theta)) + t_S(\theta)θS​(1−q(θ))+tS​(θ); the buyer pays tB(θ)t_B(\theta)tB​(θ) and has utility θBq(θ)−tB(θ)\theta_B q(\theta) - t_B(\theta)θB​q(θ)−tB​(θ). Ex post exact budget balance is tB=tSt_B = t_StB​=tS​.

A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive-compatible if for every agent, every true type, every false report and every report profile of the others, truthful reporting yields at least as much utility. It is ex post individually rational if every type's utility at every type vector is at least its outside option: 000 for buyers and public good agents, θS\theta_SθS​ (keeping the good) for the seller. A canonical mechanism (Definitions 4.3–4.5) allocates according to strictly increasing continuous scores ψi(θi)\psi_i(\theta_i)ψi​(θi​) and charges each agent the smallest report with which the outcome would have been the same.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.8, fixed cost shares

For N=2N = 2N=2 and a decision rule whose production set {θ∈Θ∣q(θ)=1}\{\theta \in \Theta \mid q(\theta) = 1\}{θ∈Θ∣q(θ)=1} is closed, a direct public good mechanism is dominant strategy incentive-compatible, ex post individually rational and ex post budget balanced if and only if there are τ1,τ2∈R\tau_1, \tau_2 \in \mathbb Rτ1​,τ2​∈R with τ1+τ2=c\tau_1 + \tau_2 = cτ1​+τ2​=c and, for all θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ,

q(θ)=1, ti(θ)=τi  if θ1≥τ1 and θ2≥τ2;q(θ)=0, ti(θ)=0  otherwise.q(\theta) = 1,\ t_i(\theta) = \tau_i \ \text{ if } \theta_1 \ge \tau_1 \text{ and } \theta_2 \ge \tau_2; \qquad q(\theta) = 0,\ t_i(\theta) = 0 \ \text{ otherwise.}q(θ)=1, ti​(θ)=τi​  if θ1​≥τ1​ and θ2​≥τ2​;q(θ)=0, ti​(θ)=0  otherwise.

Both directions are part of the goal; the "only if" direction is the content.

Milestones

  • The revelation principle for dominant strategies (Proposition 4.1).
  • Characterizations of dominant strategy incentive compatibility: monotone allocation with the envelope payment formula in auctions (Proposition 4.2), threshold rules with payment jump τ^i−τi=θ^i\hat\tau_i - \tau_i = \hat\theta_iτ^i​−τi​=θ^i​ for public goods (Proposition 4.5) and bilateral trade (Proposition 4.9).
  • Ex post individual rationality reduces to the lowest type, or to the highest seller type (Propositions 4.3, 4.6, 4.10).
  • Canonical mechanisms are dominant strategy incentive-compatible and ex post individually rational, with zero rent for the lowest type (Propositions 4.4, 4.7, 4.11).
  • The bilateral trade analogue of the goal (Proposition 4.12): the only such mechanisms with tB=tSt_B = t_StB​=tS​ and closed trade set are no trade, or trade at a fixed price θ^\hat\thetaθ^ exactly when θS≤θ^≤θB\theta_S \le \hat\theta \le \theta_BθS​≤θ^≤θB​.

Significance

Proposition 4.4 shows that the optimal auctions of Chapter 3 remain available without any assumption on beliefs, while Propositions 4.8 and 4.12 show that under exact budget balance, dominant strategy implementation forces rules that ignore reported valuations except through a yes/no participation decision. Together they mark the boundary between settings where the Bayesian and the belief-free approaches coincide and settings where the belief-free requirement is severe. This contrast motivates the robust mechanism design of Chapter 10.

These results are proved in the book: Propositions 4.5 and 4.8 in full, the others with proofs omitted or "analogous". No machine-checked proof of them appears on the platform or in Mathlib. The platform has a single-parameter characterization in a different model (AGT.single_parameter_characterization: valuation profiles, win sets, normalized losers' payments) and the second-price dominance fact; neither covers public goods, bilateral trade, budget balance or randomized allocations. The mission would add a machine-checked belief-free counterpart of Chapter 3, including the two characterization theorems whose printed proofs leave cases to the reader.

Difficulty

The characterizations (Propositions 4.2, 4.5, 4.9) are standard single-agent arguments applied to every profile of the others. The goal is harder. Proposition 4.5 describes each agent's incentives separately, for each report of the other agent, with thresholds and payments that may vary with that report. Budget balance couples the two agents' payments at every type vector. The step that fails when attempted naively is going from "a threshold for each θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​" to "one fixed threshold for each agent": the thresholds may lie outside the type interval, several degenerate configurations occur (an agent whose report never matters, a good that is always or never produced), and the printed proof treats the degenerate cases by assuming θ‾=0\underline\theta = 0θ​=0 and leaves one of them "analogous". The closedness hypothesis is what makes the relevant minimal types exist; without it the boundary of the production set is not determined. Proposition 4.12 has the same structure with the seller's orientation reversed.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are a finite type with decidable equality (auctions, public goods), Fin 2 for the goal, and a pair (θS, θB) : ℝ × ℝ for bilateral trade. A deviation (θi′,θ−i)(\theta_i', \theta_{-i})(θi′​,θ−i​) is Function.update θ i x for θ ∈ Θ; quantifying over θ ∈ Θ quantifies over θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​.
  • Decision and trading rules are real-valued and take values in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} on Θ\ThetaΘ; auction allocations lie in Δ\DeltaΔ on Θ\ThetaΘ. Values outside Θ\ThetaΘ play no role.
  • Budget balance in §§4.3–4.4 is the equality ∑iti=c q\sum_i t_i = c\,q∑i​ti​=cq (resp. tB=tSt_B = t_StB​=tS​). The inequality of Definition 3.5 would make the goal false.
  • Explicit formulas stated as in the book: the payment identity of Proposition 4.2, the relation τ^i−τi=θ^i\hat\tau_i - \tau_i = \hat\theta_iτ^i​−τi​=θ^i​ (Propositions 4.5, 4.9), the canonical payments of Definitions 4.3–4.5 (with the 1/n1/n1/n tie-splitting of Definition 4.3), the cost shares with τ1+τ2=c\tau_1 + \tau_2 = cτ1​+τ2​=c (Proposition 4.8) and the fixed price θ^\hat\thetaθ^ with trade iff θS≤θ^≤θB\theta_S \le \hat\theta \le \theta_BθS​≤θ^≤θB​ (Proposition 4.12). Minima and maxima in the canonical payments are written as sInf/sSup of sets that are nonempty and closed whenever they are used.
  • Thresholds θ^i\hat\theta_iθ^i​ range over R\mathbb RR and depend on θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​; cost shares τi\tau_iτi​ may be negative; the goal does not assume θ‾=0\underline\theta = 0θ​=0.
  • The general mechanism of Proposition 4.1 has arbitrary message sets and an outcome function to allocation probabilities and expected payments. Stating the revelation principle for a mechanism that is already direct would trivialize it and is ruled out.
  • The goal must not be weakened to one direction, to the existence of some fixed-share mechanism, or to budget balance as an inequality.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the characterization milestones (4.2, 4.5, 4.9), which the goal and Proposition 4.12 use; a proof of the goal covering the degenerate cases the book leaves to the reader; and the three-agent counterexample of p.90 as a separate statement.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers (with D. Krähmer and R. Strausz), An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015, Chapter 4. DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • K. M. Hagerty and W. P. Rogerson, Robust trading mechanisms, Journal of Economic Theory 42 (1987) 94–107.
  • S. Serizawa, Strategy-proof and symmetric social choice functions for public good economies, Econometrica 67 (1999) 121–145.
  • D. Mookherjee and S. Reichelstein, Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules, Journal of Economic Theory 56 (1992) 378–399.
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